ITEMID: 001-57912
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: FIN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1994
DOCNAME: CASE OF STJERNA v. FINLAND
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: No violation of Art. 8;No violation of Art. 14+8
JUDGES: C. Russo;N. Valticos;R. Pekkanen
TEXT: 8. Mr Stjerna is a Finnish national and lives in Helsinki.
9. On 28 March 1989 he applied to the County Administrative Board (lääninhallitus, länsstyrelsen) of Uusimaa for permission to change his surname Stjerna (pronounced "Shaerna") to "Tawaststjerna". He maintained that his ancestors had used the proposed name and that he and other members of the Stjerna family had always felt it an injustice only to bear half of the original name. Moreover, the use of his surname gave rise to practical difficulties as it was an old Swedish form, was not well known and was difficult to pronounce. This meant that it was frequently misspelt (as "Stjärna", "Säärna", "Saarna", "Seerna", "Sierna", "Tierna" and "Stjerba").
10. In an opinion of 19 April 1989 submitted to the County Administrative Board, the Advisory Committee on Names (nimilautakunta, nämnden för namnärenden) opposed the change. It had not been shown that the proposed name had been used by his ancestors because the ancestor in question, Mr Fredrik Stjerna, had been born out of wedlock. The ancestors cited were too far back to satisfy the requirements of section 10 (2) of the 1985 Surnames Act (sukunimilaki 694/85, släktnamnslagen 694/85, see paragraph 17 below).
11. In the course of an exchange of views with the Advisory Committee on Names, on 14 June 1989 the applicant stated that his name had given rise to a pejorative nickname "kirnu" in Finnish derived from the Swedish word "kärna" ("churn"). Moreover, in his view, the remoteness of the ancestors in question could not be a ground for refusing to authorise the name change. Referring to a genealogical report, he disputed the allegation that Mr Magnus Fredrik Tawaststjerna was not the father of Mr Fredrik Stjerna.
12. On 25 October 1989 the Advisory Committee on Names recommended that the applicant’s request be rejected; it considered the proposed name inappropriate. Although Mr Stjerna had cited a telling argument in support of his request - the obscure nature of his name - and was a descendant of a person named Tavaststjerna, his ancestor, who had died in 1773, was very far back and the suggested name would result in sources of inconvenience similar to his present name.
13. On 21 November 1989 the applicant told the Advisory Committee on Names that his mail was delayed as a result of his name being misspelt. In line with the spelling recommended by one of its members, he asked for his name to be changed to "Tavaststjerna" (as opposed to Tawaststjerna).
14. On 12 February 1990, on the basis of section 10 (2) of the Surnames Act, the County Administrative Board rejected the applicant’s request for permission to change his name. It was not satisfied that the proposed name had been used by his ancestors in such a way as to become "established", since the first one to bear his current name had been born out of wedlock. Since the proposed name had been used by ancestors who were very far back, it would not be appropriate to change his name to theirs.
15. The applicant appealed from the County Administrative Board’s decision to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen), which, in a judgment of 14 November 1990, upheld the Board’s decision by four votes to one. It observed that it emerged from the written evidence that the applicant’s ancestor, Mr Fredrik Stjerna was born in 1764 and had been the illegitimate son of Mr Magnus Fredrik Tavaststjerna. For this reason alone the proposed name could not be considered to have been the "established" name of the applicant’s ancestors as required by section 10 (2) of the Surnames Act. In the light of this and the reasoning given by the Board there was no ground for altering the latter’s decision.
In the opinion of the minority the name Tavaststjerna had been the "established" name of the applicant’s ancestors. The fact that Fredrik Stjerna, the first of his ancestors to be called Stjerna, was born out of wedlock was irrelevant. In view of the inconvenience which the present surname was causing the applicant, the County Administrative Board’s decision should be quashed and the case referred back to it.
16. According to the Government a Finnish surname guide of 1984 listed approximately 7,000 which had fallen out of use and, in addition, some 2,000 names based on common Finnish nouns and place names.
17. Section 10 of the Surnames Act provided that a surname may be changed on the condition that the person concerned could show:
"(1) that the use of his current surname causes inconvenience because of its foreign origin, its meaning in common usage or its common occurrence or for any other reason;
(2) that the proposed surname has previously been used by himself or in an established way (vakiintuneesti, hävdvunnen) by his ancestors and the name change may be considered appropriate; or
(3) that a change of surname may be considered justified by changed circumstances or by any other special reasons."
18. Section 11 of the 1985 Act contained provisions on obstacles of a general character to authorising changes of surname. A new surname was not to be improper or otherwise one the use of which would be manifestly inconvenient. Save in particular circumstances, the new surname should not by virtue of its form or spelling be incompatible with domestic name practice (paragraph 1); or be a name very commonly used as a surname (paragraph 2); or be commonly used as a christian name (paragraph 3).
A surname which was well known as the name of a particular Finnish or foreign family could not, unless there were particular reasons for doing so, be approved as a new surname (section 12 (1)).
19. Pursuant to section 13 (2) (1) (which contained provisions on "particular reasons for permitting a new surname"), a new surname falling foul of the restrictions in sections 11 (2) or 12 could nevertheless be permitted if the person requesting the name change showed that the surname in question had previously and lawfully been used by him or his ancestors.
20. If the County Administrative Board, after the Advisory Committee on Names had given its opinion, found no grounds under sections 10 to 13 for refusing to authorise an application for a change of surname, the application was published in the Official Gazette (section 18).
21. A person who claimed that the granting of an application for a change of surname would be incompatible with section 12 and would infringe his or her rights could, under section 19, file an objection with the County Administrative Board within thirty days from the date of the above-mentioned publication. An objection submitted after expiry of this time-limit could be taken into account in the examination of the application unless the matter had already been decided.
22. If the County Administrative Board rejected the application, its reasons were to be stated in the decision (section 20 (2)).
A decision on an application for a change of surname was to be notified to the applicant and also to any person who has filed objections under section 19 (section 21) and could be the subject of an appeal by them (section 22) to the Supreme Administrative Court.
23. In 1991 the provisions concerning first names were included by Act 253/91 in the 1985 Surnames Act, which was then retitled the Names Act (nimilaki, namnlagen).
24. Population registration was effected at national and local level.
Population registration was administered, at national level, by the Population Register Centre (chapter 3, section 8 of the 1970 Act on Population Registers - västökirjalaki 141/69, lag 141/69 om befolkningsböcker) and, at local level, by the evangelical-lutheran and orthodox parishes or, for persons who were not members of such parishes, by the local registration office (chapter 2, sections 3, 6 and 26).
25. The national register, which was updated five times a week, contained the names and personal identity numbers of the persons registered and also other information, making it possible to trace by electronic data processing a person’s name and address, even if the name or identity number did not appear on the register. Only public authorities had direct access to the register (see Le système d’information de l’état civil finlandais, Journée internationale de l’état civil, published in 1992 by the Commission internationale de l’état civil - "International Commission on Civil Status").
26. The Centre established a personal identity number for every person registered, consisting of the person’s date of birth, an individual number, and a control number (sections 4 and 5 of the 1970 Decree on Population Registers - väestökirja- asetus 198/70, förordning 198/70 om befolkningsböcker).
27. If the County Administrative Board or, on an appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court, authorised a change of name, it had to inform the Centre of the new name (section 8 (1) of the 1991 Names Decree (nimiasetus 254/91, namnförordning 254/91)). The authority which gave permission for the name change had to be specified in the register (section 7 (4) of the 1970 Decree).
28. As from 1 November 1993, the 1970 Act and the 1970 Decree were replaced by the 1993 Act on Population Data (väestötietolaki 507/1993, befolkningsdatalag 507/1993) and the 1993 Decree on Population Data (väestötietoasetus 886/1993, befolkningsdataförordning 886/1993).
29. Under the legislation on names in the twelve member States of the International Commission on Civil Status, all members of the Council of Europe, the possibility of a person to change his or her name is subject to certain conditions. In Belgium, Portugal and Turkey, any reason may be invoked in support of a request for a change of name. In France, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland the reasons must be convincing ones. In some countries specific reasons are required: for instance that the current name gives rise to pronunciation and spelling difficulties (Austria) or causes legal or social difficulties (Austria and Greece) or is contrary to decency (the Netherlands and Spain), or is ridiculous (Austria, Italy and the Netherlands) or is otherwise contrary to the dignity of the person concerned (Spain) (see the International Commission’s Guide pratique international de l’état civil, Paris).
Name changes are noted in population records, at the request of the interested person (Belgium and France) or of a public authority (France), or are done so automatically (the other ten members of the International Commission).
30. Under English law a person is entitled to adopt a surname of his own choosing and to use this name without any restrictions or formalities, except in connection with the practice of some professions (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed., vol. 35, paras. 1173-76). The new name is valid for purposes of legal identification, may be used in public documents and is entered on the electoral roll (Cossey v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 184, p. 9, para. 16). The United Kingdom has no civil status certificates or equivalent current identity documents (ibid., para. 17). The near absence in English law of formalities governing changes of name has not resulted in a large number of changes (Margaret Killerby, ‘Précisions sur le droit anglais du nom’, pp. 183-84, in La nouvelle loi sur le nom, Paris, 1988).
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 14
8


ITEMID: 001-75160
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: MDA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF MACOVEI AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible under Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 6-1 (legal certainty and right to a court);Not necessary to examine complaint under Art. 13;Violation of P1-1;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses awards - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 6. The applicants, all of whom are Moldovan citizens, live in the Republic of Moldova. They were born in 1961, 1946, 1939, 1946, 1946 and 1951 respectively.
7. In 1994 each applicant concluded a contract with ASITO (an insurance company incorporated in Moldova), according to the terms of which he or she paid an insurance premium in exchange for an annuity pension. The size of the monthly pensions varied between 200 Moldovan lei (MDL) and MDL 600 (between the equivalent of 45 United States dollars (USD) and USD 135 at the time).
8. On different dates between 1999 and 2001 ASITO stopped paying the pensions, in some cases, or refused to start paying them, in other cases, invoking a change in the interest rate of the National Bank of Moldova and calling for the termination of the contracts.
9. On unspecified dates in 2001, the applicants brought civil actions against ASITO, seeking the payment of the pension arrears to date and requiring the company to abide by the contracts of 1994.
10. All the applicants obtained final and enforceable judgments between 2001 and 2002, by which the domestic courts ordered ASITO to pay the pension arrears and to resume the execution of the contracts. The courts found the contracts to be valid and dismissed ASITO’s requests to terminate them or to exempt it from abiding by them on the ground of force majeure, which in ASITO’s view was constituted by the economic crisis, inflation and the change in the interest rate of the National Bank of Moldova. The Court was not presented with information on whether those judgments were complied with by ASITO.
11. On 14 December 2001 the Prosecutor General lodged an “appeal in the interest of the law” with the Supreme Court of Justice. According to the Prosecutor General, the appeal had the purpose of clarifying the controversy surrounding the contracts and of setting a uniform practice for all courts.
12. On 11 March 2002, the Plenary Supreme Court of Justice issued a judgment deciding the dispute between ASITO and the pension beneficiaries in favour of the former. In particular, it ruled that the economic crisis, inflation and the change in the interest rate of the National Bank of Moldova could be relied upon by ASITO in order unilaterally to avoid the annuity contracts. It also ruled that its judgment was binding on all the courts, although it could not, however, affect already existing judgments and it could not be used against the parties to proceedings which had already been decided.
13. Subsequently, on different dates, ASITO brought civil actions against the applicants asking for the termination of the contracts concluded in 1994. It relied on the same arguments as in the first sets of proceedings and also the judgment of the Plenary Supreme Court of 11 March 2002.
14. Between December 2002 and June 2003 ASITO obtained final favourable judgments against all the applicants. The courts dismissed the applicants’ submissions to the effect that the matter of the unilateral denunciation of the contracts by ASITO on grounds of hardship had already been resolved by final judgments and found instead that the subject matter of the proceedings which had ended in final judgments favourable to the applicants had been different, because those proceedings had been concerned with the enforcement of the annuity contracts up to the moment of their termination, while the subject matter of the new proceedings was the termination of the contracts.
15. On 25 October 2004, after the Court communicated the present cases to the Government, the Plenary Supreme Court of Justice upheld a revision request lodged against its judgment of 11 March 2002 by a group of ASITO pensioners who are not applicants in the present cases. The Supreme Court quashed its previous judgment while finding inter alia that ASITO could not rely on the economic crisis, inflation and the change in the interest rate of the National Bank of Moldova for avoiding its annuity contracts.
16. The old Code of Civil Procedure in force between 26 December 1964 and 12 June 2003 read as follows:
...
3) the proceedings shall be discontinued if previously a final judgment has been adopted in a dispute between the same parties, regarding the same object and having the same scope ...
In order to ensure a uniform application of the law in the entire territory of the country, the Prosecutor General can address ex officio to the Supreme Court of Justice an appeal, asking the court to give an opinion on questions of law which have been solved differently by the courts.
The Prosecutor General’s appeal shall be examined in a hearing by the Plenary Supreme Court.
The judgments adopted by the Plenary cannot affect already existing judgments and they cannot be used against the parties to proceedings where judgments have been delivered. The judgments adopted in respect of the appeals in the interest of the law shall be brought to the attention of the courts and shall be binding on them.
17. On 12 June 2003 a new Code of Civil Procedure entered into force. Section 449, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
“Grounds for revision
Revision may be requested:
When new and essential facts or circumstances have been discovered, that were unknown and could not have been known earlier;
When, after the adoption of a judgment, new documents have been discovered, that were hidden by one of the parties to the proceedings or that could not have been presented to the court for reasons not imputable to the party who seeks revision;...
When a court decision or a decision of another body on which a judgment is based, has been annulled... ”
18. Section 450, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
“A revision request may be lodged:
...
Within three months of the date on which the concerned person has come to know the essential circumstances or facts of the case which were unknown to him/her earlier and which could not have been known to him/her earlier, in cases provided by Section 449 (c);
Within three months of the date on which the documents have been discovered, in cases provided by Section 449 (d);
Within three months of the date on which the court decision or the decision of another body on which the judgment is based have been annulled, in cases provided by Section 449 (f)...”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-23700
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: NLD
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2004
DOCNAME: MEHO and OTHERS v. THE NETHERLANDS
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicants, Mr Gazmen Meho and Ms Stasa Limani, are apparently nationals of Serbia and Montenegro (formerly the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), who were born in 1962 and 1960 respectively, and live in the Netherlands. They are represented before the Court by Mr M.P.H. van Wezel, a lawyer practising in Utrecht (Netherlands).
The facts of the case, as apparent from public information and the documents submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. The applicants are Kosovar Albanians. They have been living in the Netherlands apparently since October 1993. They applied for asylum in November 1994; ultimately, the dismissal in February 1998 of their appeal made the rejection of their asylum requests final.
The first applicant has been suffering increasingly from psychotic decompensation ever since 1996.
On 21 January 1997 the first applicant was found guilty by the Breda Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of rape and abduction and sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment, six months of which were suspended. The Regional Court’s reasoning included the following:
“On 23 June 1996 the accused, together with D., deprived a woman called M. of her freedom and raped her. The victim was blindfolded, tied up, kicked, beaten and a burning cigarette was held to her back. In addition to this violence, she was threatened by being told that she would be murdered and by saying, close to the victim: ‘What do you think Mohammed, should we let her live for the children or shall we murder her’. Eventually the two accused left the victim tied and blindfolded on a lavatory. The Regional Court is of the opinion that a rape such as this may be counted as one of the most serious crimes known to us. After all, not only did this rape constitute a serious interference with the victim’s integrity, but in addition she was threatened in such a way that it is readily imaginable that she must have feared for her life during and after the rape.
In setting the sentence the Regional Court takes into account the fact that it appears from, in particular, the statement of the victim M. that the accused has had a minor part in the crime, compared to that of the co-accused D. It was in fact D. who committed the major part of the violence against the victim and who threatened the victim with death in various ways.
In setting the sentence, the Regional Court also takes into account the psychiatric report of Dr A.D. Haverkamp dated 6 January 1997, in which Dr Haverkamp reaches the conclusion that the accused, at the moment when the facts charged were committed, was suffering from retarded mental development in the form of illiteracy and mental disturbances in the form of character-neurotic disturbances, depression and periodic alcohol abuse, with its inhibition-reducing effect on the accused’s behaviour in the criminal situation, and that the accused’s accountability for the crimes is thereby diminished. The Regional Court accepts this conclusion as established fact.”
It seems that this judgment was never appealed against and that the first applicant served a term of imprisonment.
In March 1998 the first and second applicants lodged requests for residence permits for themselves and their underage children, citing “humanitarian reasons or, in the alternative, medical treatment”.
On 9 March 2000 the competent domestic authority, the Deputy Minister of Justice, rejected the first applicant’s request. A residence permit on humanitarian grounds was refused in view of the above conviction. A residence permit for the purpose of medical treatment was refused for the following reasons:
“Aliens wishing to undergo medical treatment in the Netherlands may be granted admission for that purpose subject to certain conditions. Pursuant to the policy conducted in this respect, temporary residence for the purpose of medical treatment is normally granted only if the Netherlands are the most appropriate country (het meest aangewezen land) in which to undergo that medical treatment.
The fact of the Netherlands being the most appropriate country may follow from the nature of the condition, a particular specialist treatment [available] in this country, or other factors by reason of which treatment elsewhere of the person concerned is less appropriate.
For this reason the medical advisor of the Medical Advisory Office (Bureau Medische Advisering) of the Ministry of Justice has been asked for advice.
It appears from the report of the medical advisor, given in this case on 7 February 2000 by the medical advisor of the Medical Advisory Office, the content of which is to be deemed repeated and included here, that the person concerned [i.e. the applicant] is suffering from a psychotic disturbance. The person concerned has been undergoing treatment since December 1997 by a social-psychiatric nurse under the supervision of a psychiatrist. Treatment consists of talk therapy and periodic medication administered by injection and is lasting in nature. It is apparent, however, that such treatment is possible also in Kosovo. Various hospitals have psychiatrists who can treat the complaints both on an inpatient basis and on an outpatient basis. These possibilities are being extended further with international aid. Although the medicine Cisordinol is not available in Kosovo, alternative antipsychotic medication is.
If the current course of treatment is stopped, this will cause an acute medical emergency but, in view of the possibilities of treatment in the country of origin, this treatment need not be discontinued upon return. That being so the Netherlands are not considered to be the most appropriate country for undergoing this medical treatment.”
In a simultaneous but separate decision, the Deputy Minister declared the first applicant an undesirable alien in view of his conviction, and decided that any objections that might be lodged against his decisions would not suspend the applicants’ deportation.
The applicants objected. At the same time, they lodged an application to the President of the Regional Court of The Hague for a stay of their deportation pending a decision on their objection. They relied on the length of time they had already been living in the Netherlands. They also alleged that they were integrated into Netherlands society: in particular, two of their children had been born in that country and spoke no other language than Dutch. Finally, they also drew attention to the first applicant’s mental health. The first applicant was at that time being treated as an inpatient for psychiatric problems; the treatment he required was unavailable in Kosovo. He submitted a written statement by the psychiatrist who was treating him, to the effect that stress and radical change in his situation such as would result from his removal to Kosovo would jeopardise the progress thus far made. Reliance was also placed on a report published by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), dated October 2000, according to which “severe and chronic mental illness and psycho-social disorders” could not be satisfactorily treated in Kosovo.
Following a hearing on 6 April 2001, the President of the Regional Court gave his decision in the case on 20 April (transmitted to the applicants on 14 August 2001). Refusing to order a stay of deportation, he decided at the same time to dismiss the objections. As to the length of time already spent in the Netherlands, it was found that this had been caused by the legal remedies pursued by the applicants, so that they could not derive any rights from this period. In addition, there were contra-indications in respect of the first and second applicants.
His reasoning concerning the first applicant’s request for residence rights on medical grounds included the following:
“As regards the residence permit for medical treatment of the [first applicant], the President is of the opinion that the defendant [i.e. the Deputy Minister] has undertaken sufficient investigations before arriving at a decision. In so doing the defendant’s medical advisor has obtained information from the sector administering treatment (behandelend sector). The conclusion of the medical advisor on the basis of this investigation is that treatment of the [first applicant’s] psychiatric complaints consists of talk therapy and medication administered by periodic injection. In addition, it has appeared that this treatment is permanent in nature. Finally, the medical advisor expresses the view that treatment for the [first applicant] is available in Kosovo, as is alternative medication.
The President is of the opinion that, although medical treatment of the [first applicant] will be difficult in the country of origin, it is not impossible. The permanently psychiatric condition of the [first applicant] might well deteriorate even in the Netherlands. It cannot be decisive, in considering the [first applicant’s] request, that the [first applicant] would be worse off in his country of origin than in the Netherlands.”
For the remainder, it was found that the first applicant had been declared an undesirable alien; the objection lodged against this declaration had been out of time, and the declaration had therefore become unappealable. That being so, the first applicant was not entitled to rely on compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature.
On 6 August 2003 the applicants’ representative informed the Court that the first applicant was being treated as an inpatient in a psychiatric hospital in Wolfheze, Netherlands.
In late 1999 or early 2000 a multidisciplinary task force was set up, with the support of the World Health Organisation, to prepare a strategic plan for improving the mental health care situation in Kosovo which was reported to be dire. In December 2000 this task force published a report containing proposals for significant improvements. Among these were the downsizing of an existing psychiatric institution in Shtimle/Štimlje, replacing much of its capacity with community-based care and improving the remaining part of the institution, and increasing the number of psychiatrists and support staff. These goals were to be achieved by 2004. The plan was submitted to UNMIK for approval by January 2001.
A report published in August 2002 by the non-governmental organisation Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI) entitled Not on the Agenda: Human Rights of People with Mental Disabilities in Kosovo, mentioned that the Shtimle/Štimlje institution was to be refurbished. It was, however, highly critical of conditions there and in other closed institutions, including the mental ward of Prishtinë/Priština University Hospital, and denounced insufficient staffing and violence among the patients.
In December 2002 UNMIK reported that the detention centre in Lipjan/Lipljan had started to provide proper care for mentally handicapped prisoners.
In 2003 MDRI reported in several press releases critical of current developments that the refurbishment and extension of the Shtimle/Štimlje institution, undertaken at the expense of decentralised community-based services, had been nearly completed, and that a group of mental patients would be transferred to an institution in Serbia itself.


ITEMID: 001-100440
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: CASE OF TAYLAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1
JUDGES: Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria
TEXT: 4. The applicant worked for a Turkish company in Libya between 1992 and 1994. Following the termination of his contract by the company the applicant brought civil proceedings before the Libyan courts and requested compensation. On 3 October 1995 the Libyan courts partially awarded the applicant's claims. Upon his return to Turkey the applicant brought the following proceedings before the Turkish courts.
5. Without specifying before which court, the applicant stated that he instituted domestic proceedings on 29 April 1998 for the recognition of the Libyan court order. According to the applicant, these proceedings had later been abrogated. The applicant did not present any document regarding these proceedings.
6. On 20 October 1998 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Üsküdar 3rd Civil Court requesting the recognition of the Libyan court order. On 24 March 1999 the Üsküdar 3rd Civil Court rejected the applicant's request. The applicant appealed and on 4 October 1999 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision on the ground that the first instance court did not have jurisdiction. On 29 February 2000 the Court of Cassation further rejected the rectification request. On 29 March 2001 the Üsküdar 3rd Civil Court issued a decision of non-jurisdiction.
7. On 9 April 2001 the applicant requested the proceedings to be referred to the competent labour court. On 10 October 2002 the Istanbul 5th Labour Court held that the case before it concerned the recognition of the Libyan court order, the contents of which were the subject matter of the proceedings pending before the Istanbul 4th Labour Court that the applicant had introduced separately on 20 December 2000. Therefore there was no need to continue the proceedings. The applicant appealed. On 18 September 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment.
8. On 20 December 2000 the applicant initiated proceedings before the Istanbul 4th Labour Court and requested compensation for the same period that had been examined and concluded by the Libyan court as well as a number of other damages. After holding 24 hearings the Istanbul 4th Labour Court partially awarded the applicant on 31 May 2007. The applicant appealed. The Court of Cassation upheld the judgment on 17 February 2009.
9. The applicant also instituted proceedings before the İstanbul 6th Labour Court against the Libyan company and requested the payment of five months' salary. These proceedings which started on 22 April 1999 ended on 5 April 2001 when the court partially upheld the applicant's request. The applicant appealed and the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment on 16 October 2001. The sum awarded was paid to the applicant.
10. In 1986 the applicants brought proceedings before the Çatalca Civil Court and requested additional compensation for their property that had been expropriated. Claiming that the additional compensation amount to be awarded by the court would not have met their actual loss, the applicants later stopped pursuing their case and on 11 August 1994 the court decided not to continue the proceedings. On 9 December 1997 the applicants initiated proceedings before the Büyükçekmece Civil Court and requested determination of the value of the expropriated property and their damages due to the expropriation. The court issued a decision of non-jurisdiction on the ground that the proceedings should have been instituted before the competent administrative court. The applicants' appeal was further dismissed by the Court of Cassation on 12 April 1999.
11. Consequently, the applicants instituted damage proceedings on 21 July 1999 before the Istanbul Administrative Court. On 14 February 2002 the Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' claims. Referring to the previous proceedings before the Çatalca Civil Court which the applicants had stopped pursuing, the court declared that the State could not be held liable for the applicants' omission in not following the judicial procedure in due time. The applicants' appeal and rectification requests were rejected by the Council of State on 17 February 2004 and 28 March 2005 respectively.
12. On 11 December 2002 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant and six others who were allegedly involved in a bribery and forgery incident. On 22 October 2003, 12 May 2006 and 24 June 2008 the Çankırı Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. The Court of Cassation quashed these judgments on 22 February 2005, 16 May 2007 and 16 July 2009. According to the information submitted by the applicant, the proceedings are still pending before domestic courts.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-70362
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: CASE OF BITKIVSKA v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Violation of P1-1;Remainder inadmissible;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in the village of Krichka, the Ivano-Frankivs'k region of Ukraine.
5. In 1987 the applicant's family was placed on the waiting list to receive an apartment from the State. By 1990 the applicant was first on the housing list. Nevertheless, the Executive Committee of the Dzvinyach Village Council, by a decision of 12 October 1990, gave an available apartment to another person. The applicant instituted proceedings in the Ivano-Frankivs'k Regional Court against the executive committee of the Village Council, challenging its decision.
6. On 30 August 1991, the Ivano-Frankivs'k Regional Court found for the applicant and ordered the Village Council to assign the disputed apartment to the applicant. On 30 October 1991, the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the Regional Court.
7. In 1996, as the judgment in her favour remained unenforced, the applicant requested the Bogorodchansky District Court to change the manner of enforcement and to order the Village Council to build her a house. On 7 October 1996, the court satisfied the applicant's request and changed the manner of execution accordingly.
8. In 1997, as the judgment was still unenforced, the applicant requested the same district court to change the manner of execution again and to award her the pecuniary equivalent of the disputed apartment. On 16 June 1997, the Bogorodchansky District Court satisfied the applicant's request and awarded her UAH 29,600 in compensation.
9. On 28 December 2000, the Head of the Bogorodchansky District Department of the State Bailiffs' Service issued an order to freeze all the current bank accounts of the Village Council in order to secure the payment of the judgment debt in the applicant's favour.
10. On 26 January 2001, the Dzvinyach Village Council challenged the order of 28 December 2000 in the Bogorodchansky District Court. The enforcement proceedings were accordingly suspended.
11. On 12 February 2001, the Bogorodchansky District Court found in part for the Village Council and quashed the order of the Bailiffs' Service with respect to two principal accounts containing the budget funds for social payments, salaries, etc. By the same decision the court allowed the other accounts of the debtor to be frozen.
12. The applicant lodged a protest with the Deputy Chairman of the Ivano-Frankivs'k Regional Court to challenge this decision. The Deputy Chairman rejected her protest by his letter of 20 April 2001. On 8 October 2001, the panel of three judges of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant's request for leave to appeal under the new cassation procedure.
13. On 21 November 2002 the court decision of 16 June 1997 was enforced in full and the Bailiffs ended the enforcement proceedings.
14. The relevant domestic law is summarised in the judgment of Romashov v. Ukraine (no. 67534/01, §§ 16-18, 27 July 2004).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1