ITEMID: 001-22421
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2002
DOCNAME: VIDRA v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Vladimír Vidra, is a Slovakian national who was born in 1957 and lives in Žilina. The respondent Government were represented by Mr P. Vršanský, their Agent.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 30 June 1997 the District Investigation Office in Žilina accused the applicant of fraud and brought criminal proceedings against him. On 24 July 1997 the District Prosecutor’s Office in Žilina dismissed the applicant’s complaint against this decision.
The applicant was examined by the police investigator on 14 July 1997 and on 11 August 1997.
On 15 August 1997 the applicant refused to be examined as his lawyer was ill.
Another examination was held on 18 September 1997. It had to be adjourned as the applicant had health problems.
Examinations were scheduled for 25 September 1997, 7 October 1997 and 15 October 1997. On the last two dates the applicant refused to answer further questions as his complaint about the investigator had not been decided upon.
At the examination held on 3 November 1997 the applicant availed himself of his right not to answer the investigator’s questions.
On 19 January 1998 the applicant was allowed to consult the case file and he was examined by the investigator.
In a report of 26 January 1998 a public prosecutor noted that the length of the preliminary proceedings was due to the fact that documentary evidence had to be obtained from the Czech Republic. The report stated that it had been difficult to contact the witnesses during the summer period and that the applicant and his lawyer had also contributed to the length of the proceedings. The police was instructed to conclude the investigation before 30 March 1998.
On 19 February 1998 the applicant requested the public prosecutor to order further evidence to be taken.
On 17 March 1998 the applicant was questioned for half an hour. Subsequently he decided to remain silent and refused to have his handwriting examined by an expert as an expert opinion to the same effect had already been ordered.
On 23 March 1998 the applicant challenged an expert. The public prosecutor dismissed the request on 30 March 1998.
On 6 May 1998 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Žilina District Court (Okresný súd).
On 23 June 1998 the Žilina District Court returned the case to the public prosecutor. The District Court shared the applicant’s view that the case had not been properly investigated into and ordered further comprehensive evidence to be taken. On 22 September 1998 the Žilina Regional Court (Krajský súd) dismissed the public prosecutor’s complaint against the District Court’s decision. On 5 October 1998 the case file was returned to the District Court and it reached the police investigator on 6 November 1998.
On 26 November and on 1 December 1998 respectively the applicant challenged the officials dealing with his case and complained about shortcomings in the examination of a witness. On 7 December 1998 the Regional Office of Investigation in Žilina found that the investigators were not excluded.
A reconstitution of the alleged offence was scheduled for 4 December 1998. It did not take place as the applicant objected that several witnesses were absent. The reconstitution was held on 21 December 1998. The applicant challenged the way in which it was carried out and proposed further evidence to be taken.
On 5 January 1999 the applicant complained to the public prosecutor that the police investigator lacked impartiality. On 5 February 1999 the public prosecutor instructed the investigator to remedy shortcomings in the proceedings.
On 22 February 1999 another reconstitution of the alleged offence was carried out.
On 8 April 1999 a witness was heard and confronted with the applicant in the Czech Republic. The applicant challenged the examination.
On 24 June 1999 an expert was appointed at the applicant’s request.
Another confrontation of the applicant with a witness in the Czech Republic was scheduled for 25 June 1999. In the morning of the same day the lawyer informed the police that the applicant was ill and that he could not attend.
On 24 September 1999 the applicant challenged all Žilina police investigators. On 11 October 1999 the Ministry of the Interior refused to exclude the Žilina police investigators from dealing with the case.
On 12 October 1999 the applicant challenged the public prosecutor involved in his case. On 21 October 1999 the Žilina District Prosecutor dismissed the request.
On 27 October 1999 the applicant challenged the police investigators and the public prosecutor dealing with his case. The case file was submitted to the General Prosecutor’s Office.
On 13 December 1999 the Žilina District Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings on the ground that the applicant had committed no offence. The person who had filed the criminal complaint against the applicant lodged a complaint which was dismissed by the Žilina Regional Prosecutor. The decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the applicant thus became final on 4 April 2000.


ITEMID: 001-86881
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: CASE OF LUGOVOY v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy
JUDGES: Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Renate Jaeger;Volodymyr Butkevych
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Chernivtsi.
5. On 24 August 1998 the applicant had a quarrel with Mr B. and three other persons, which led to a fight in the course of which the applicant wounded Mr B. in the face with a gas pistol.
6. On 11 September 1998 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for inflicting grievous bodily harm.
7. On 19 March 1999 the investigative authorities decided that the applicant had acted within the permissible limits of self-defence and terminated the proceedings.
8. On 15 May 1999 the Prosecutor of Razdolnensky District of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (“the ARC”), quashed the decision of 19 March 1999 and reopened the proceedings.
9. On 8 August 1999 the applicant was charged with having exceeded the limits of self-defence. On the same day he was placed on the wanted list. According to the applicant, he never left his place of residence in Chernivtsi (about 1,000 km from the ARC), and the authorities had been well aware of his permanent address. However, they failed to contact him concerning the criminal investigation.
10. On 13 March 2000 the charges against the applicant were amended: he was accused of intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm.
11. On 20 October 2000, when the applicant was visiting the ARC, he was placed under an undertaking not to abscond.
12. On 1 November 2000 the investigation was completed and the case was referred to the Razdolnensky District Court of the ARC (Раздольненський районний суд Автономної республіки Крим).
13. On 8 February 2001 the court questioned the accused, the victim and witnesses, ordered an additional forensic medical examination and adjourned the hearing.
14. The next hearing was scheduled for 10 April 2002. This hearing was adjourned at the request of the applicant’s advocate. The following hearings were scheduled for 25 April and 17 June 2002 respectively. After the adjournment of the hearing of 17 June 2002 at the applicant’s request, the next hearing was scheduled for 4 November 2002.
15. On 4 November 2002 the court transferred the case file to the investigative authorities and ordered them to carry out a reconstruction of the crime.
16. On 4 April 2003 the reconstruction of the crime was carried out and the case was transferred back to the court for consideration.
17. Between September and December 2002 the court scheduled four hearings, none of which took place. Two hearings were adjourned on account of the absence of the applicant’s advocate, one on account of the absence of the prosecutor and one on account of the absence of two witnesses. The next hearing was scheduled for 4 February 2004.
18. On 4 February 2004 the court ordered an additional medical forensic examination.
19. On 24 March 2005 the results of the examination were produced to the court. The next hearing was scheduled for 26 September 2005. This hearing was adjourned at the prosecutor’s request.
20. On 27 September 2005 the court ordered an additional medical and ballistic assessment. On 11 November 2005 the designated expert institution refused to make the assessment, referring to the unavailability of qualified experts.
21. On 7 December 2005 the court ordered the assessment at a different facility. On 10 March 2006 the case file was sent to the expert facility. The next hearing took place in May 2006.
22. On 13 June 2006 the court terminated the criminal proceedings as the charges against the applicant had become time-barred. On 20 June 2006 the applicant appealed, seeking acquittal.
23. On 26 August 2006 the Court of Appeal of the ARC (Апеляційний суд Автономної республіки Крим) quashed the ruling of 13 June 2006 and remitted the case for fresh consideration.
24. Between December 2006 and March 2007 the trial court scheduled three hearings, one of which was adjourned on account of a witness’s failure to appear.
25. On 21 March 2007 the trial court found the applicant guilty, sentenced him to one year’s restriction of freedom and released him from punishment as the charges had become time-barred. The court also lifted the applicant’s undertaking not to abscond. On 4 April 2007 the applicant appealed, seeking to be acquitted.
26. On 29 May 2007 the Court of Appeal of the ARC excluded the mention of a punishment from the judgment and otherwise upheld it.
27. On 26 November 2007 the applicant appealed in cassation before the Supreme Court of Ukraine.
28. On 7 February 2008 the Supreme Court took a final decision in the applicant’s case.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6


ITEMID: 001-88466
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: CASE OF ANTONOVA v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property
JUDGES: Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Sverre Erik Jebens
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Yakutsk, a town in Yakutia.
5. The applicant’s father and his family of three (including the applicant) lived in a council flat under the threat of collapse. On 16 November 1998 the Yakutsk Town Court ordered the local council to provide the applicant’s father with “decent living premises for a family of three”. This judgment became binding on 26 November 1998, but was not enforced.
6. In January 2001 the applicant’s father died, and on 19 September 2005 the Town Court transferred the right of claim to the applicant.
7. Under section 9 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings of 21 July 1997, a bailiff must enforce a judgment within two months.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
P1
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: P1-1


ITEMID: 001-68632
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HRV
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: CASE OF LULIC AND BECKER v. CROATIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses - claim dismissed
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: 7. The applicants were born in 1954 and 1979, respectively, and live in Suhopolje, Croatia.
8. On 18 January 1992 the applicants' house in Suhopolje was blown up by unknown perpetrators.
9. On 17 March 1995 the applicants instituted civil proceedings against the State in the Virovitica Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Virovitici) seeking damages. They based their claim on section 180 of the Civil Obligations Act.
10. On 14 December 1995 the Municipal Court gave judgment dismissing the applicants' claim on its merits.
11. On 18 December 1995 the applicants appealed to the Bjelovar County Court (Županijski sud u Bjelovaru).
12. On 17 January 1996 Parliament introduced an amendment to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1996 Amendment”) which provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from terrorist acts were to be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation on the subject.
13. On 29 February 1996 the County Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the 1996 Amendment.
14. On 14 July 2003 Parliament introduced the Act on Liability for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (“the 2003 Liability Act”).
15. It appears that the proceedings resumed on 3 October 2003, pursuant to the 2003 Liability Act.
16. On 4 December 2003 the case was transferred to the Virovitica County Court (Županijski sud u Virovitici) as the appellate court, due to changes in jurisdiction.
It appears that the proceedings are still pending.
17. The relevant part of the Civil Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette nos. 53/1991, 73/1991, 3/1994, 7/1996 and 112/1999) provided as follows:
“Liability for loss caused by death or bodily injury or by damage or destruction of another's property, when it results from acts of violence or terror or from public demonstrations or manifestations, lies with the ... authority whose officers were under a duty, according to the laws in force, to prevent such loss.”
18. The relevant part of the Act Amending the Civil Obligations Act (Zakon o izmjeni Zakona o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette no. 7/1996) (“the 1996 Amendment”) reads as follows:
“Section 180 of the Civil Obligations Act (the Official Gazette nos. 53/91, 73/91 and 3/94) shall be repealed.”
“Proceedings for damages instituted under section 180 of the Civil Obligations Act shall be stayed.
The proceedings referred to in sub-section 1 of this section shall be resumed after the enactment of special legislation governing liability for damage resulting from terrorist acts.”
This Act entered into force on 3 February 1996.
19. The relevant part of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 53/91, 91/92, 58/93, 112/99, 88/01) provides:
“Proceedings shall be stayed:
...
(6) where another statute so prescribes.”
20. The Act on Liability for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (Zakon o odgovornosti za štetu nastalu uslijed terorističkih akata i javnih demonstracija, Official Gazette no. 117/2003) (“the 2003 Liability Act”) provides, inter alia, that the State is to compensate only damage resulting from bodily injuries, impairment of health or death. All compensation for damage to property is to be sought under the Reconstruction Act. Section 10 provides that all proceedings stayed pursuant to the 1996 Amendment are to be resumed. This Act entered into force on 31 July 2003.
21. The relevant part of the Reconstruction Act (Zakon o obnovi, Official Gazette nos. 24/1996, 54/1996, 87/1996 and 57/2000) provides, inter alia, that the State shall grant, under certain conditions, reconstruction assistance to owners of property (flats and family houses only) which has been damaged during the war. The request is to be submitted to the competent ministry.
22. The relevant part of section 63 of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court (Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 49/02) (“the Constitutional Court Act”) reads as follows:
“(1) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint whether or not all legal remedies have been exhausted if the court with jurisdiction fails to decide a claim concerning the applicant's rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him or her within a reasonable time ...
(2) If a constitutional complaint ... under paragraph 1 of this section is upheld, the Constitutional Court shall set a time-limit within which the court with jurisdiction must decide the case on the merits...
(3) In a decision issued under paragraph 2 of this section, the Constitutional Court shall assess appropriate compensation for the applicant for the violation of his or her constitutional rights ... The compensation shall be paid out of the State budget within three months from the date a request for payment is lodged.”
23. Article 29 § 1 of the Constitution (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 41/01) reads as follows:
“ In the determination of his rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.”
24. On 24 March 2004 the Constitutional Court gave decision no. U-III-829/2004 in the case of Mr N., who had filed a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act alleging a breach of Article 29 § 1 of the Constitution. He complained about the length of the proceedings and of lack of access to a court because his action in the domestic courts had been stayed by statute for a long period. In its decision, the Constitutional Court held that there had been a violation of the constitutional rights to a trial within a reasonable time and to access to a court. It ordered the court concerned to give a decision in Mr N.'s case within one year, and awarded him compensation.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-90955
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: TOSCANO v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Ms Elwira Toscano, is a German national who was born in 1935 and lives in Berlin. She is represented before the Court by Mr T. Gertner, a lawyer practising in Bad Ems.
A summary account of historical events in which the present application originated can be found in the Court’s decision on admissibility in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (see Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (dec.), no. 47550/06, 7 October 2008, §§ 3-5, ECHR 2008-...).
The applicant’s family owned 49 hectares of agricultural land in Nowy Tomyśl and 1.5 hectares of land in Szklarka Trzcielska. This region before and during the Second World War belonged to the German Reich. After the defeat of Germany at the end of the war, when the border between Germany and Poland was drawn along the Oder-Neisse line, it was included in the territory of Poland (see Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A., cited above, § 3).
According to the applicant, on 29 June 1945 Polish militiamen came to their house and told them that they were to be deported at once. They were given only half an hour to pack the barest personal essentials. They marched for about four weeks towards the Oder. They eventually arrived in BerlinAdlershof.
The applicant and other members of her family have still not been allowed to return to their home and have been refused restitution of their property.
A detailed description of the relevant international and domestic law is set out in the above-mentioned case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (ibid. §§ 31-41).


ITEMID: 001-82591
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HUN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF IMMOBILIA BAU KFT. v. HUNGARY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1
TEXT: 4. The applicant is a limited liability company with its seat in Miskolc.
5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
6. On 27 November 1990 the liquidation of the Diósgyőr Machine Factory Ltd. (“the Factory”) was ordered by the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court. However, during the liquidation procedure, the Factory remained partly active, in order to minimise losses.
7. Between April 1991 and January 1994, the predecessor of the applicant was a supplier of the Factory. As the Factory was unable to pay for the services already rendered – the outstanding fees amounted to 8,528,183 Hungarian Forints (approximately 32,421 euros) – the applicant became a creditor in the liquidation proceedings.
8. On 31 August 1994 the Factory's liquidator prepared the closing balance sheet. The liquidator was of the view that the satisfaction of all the creditors in cash was impossible. Instead of payment in cash, it therefore offered shares in the Factory, but the applicant declined the proposal.
9. On 21 February 1995 the applicant objected (kifogás) to the closing balance sheet and insisted on payment in cash.
10. On 4 July 1995 the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court accepted the closing balance sheet. On appeal on 29 May 1997, the Supreme Court, acting as a second-instance court, quashed this decision due to procedural shortcomings. It found, inter alia, that the Regional Court had not dealt with the applicant's objection. The Supreme Court held that the liquidator was under an obligation to attempt to sell the shares of the Factory first and then satisfy the creditors from the sums received. The Supreme Court's decision arrived at the Regional Court on 15 July 1997.
11. On 10 December 1997 the Regional Court ordered the liquidator to prepare a new closing balance sheet.
12. On 19 January 1998 the liquidator informed the Regional Court that the sale of the shares was only possible well below their nominal value. The liquidator also informed the Regional Court about the ongoing negotiations with possible investors and requested an extension of the time-limit for the preparation of the closing balance sheet. The Regional Court registered the liquidator's request.
13. On 17 September 1998 the liquidator announced that its attempt to sell the shares had been unsuccessful and requested the Regional Court to accept an amended closing balance sheet.
14. On 18 February 2000 the liquidator informed the Regional Court about an update to the closing balance sheet.
15. On 22 January 2001 the applicant initiated negotiations with the liquidator. At a meeting held on 20 February 2001, the liquidator acknowledged that it had satisfied some of the creditors more favourably than the applicant, but had only done so to keep the Factory at least partly active.
16. On 23 January 2001 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Regional Court about the lack of a final decision in the case.
17. On 29 March 2001 the applicant raised an objection before the Regional Court, asking the court to terminate the liquidation proceedings.
18. On 1 July 2004 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint without examining its merits.
19. Subsequently, on 2 April 2001 the applicant lodged another complaint with the Regional Court and requested the appointment of an expert auditor in order to establish whether the liquidator had breached its duties.
20. On 12 October 2004 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's second complaint. The applicant appealed. On 15 September 2005 the Debrecen Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance decision.
21. Meanwhile, on 30 January 2002 the Regional Court ordered the liquidator, under pain of a fine and deletion from the register of liquidators, to produce the closing balance sheet within 30 days or inform the court about any obstacles.
22. On 4 March 2002 the liquidator informed the Regional Court that the liquidation procedure was at an advanced stage, but requested the court to forbear from demanding the closing balance sheet “because of difficulties in obtaining, handling and classifying certain documents”. The liquidator added that the unsuccessful attempt to reach a settlement with the applicant had also delayed the proceedings.
23. On 8 June 2004 the Regional Court again requested information from the liquidator about the obstacles to finishing the procedure.
24. On 1 July 2004 the liquidator informed the Regional Court that it was still facing the same difficulties and, therefore, was not able to produce the closing balance sheet.
25. On 4 February 2005 the liquidator prepared an additional closing balance sheet. The Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Tax Authority audited that document, which was then lodged with the Regional Court on 19 October 2006.
26. The liquidation procedure is apparently still pending.
27. On 20 April 2001 the applicant brought an action for compensation against the liquidator before the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court.
28. On 8 May 2001 the Regional Court stayed the proceedings. On appeal, on 6 September 2001 the Supreme Court, acting as a second-instance court, reversed the first-instance decision and ordered the continuation of the proceedings.
29. In the resumed proceedings, on 30 October 2001 the Regional Court found that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the case and transferred it to the competent Miskolc District Court. The Supreme Court, acting as a second-instance court, upheld this decision on 19 December 2002.
30. On 2 April 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant's case, finding that the procedure followed by the liquidator had complied with the relevant domestic law. Moreover, it pointed out that the applicant had failed, despite warnings, to request the appointment of an auditor, whose opinion would have been the only acceptable proof for the establishment of the defendant's liability.
31. On appeal, on 21 November 2003 the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision. The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
32. On 14 July 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed its petition, without an examination on the merits, as inadmissible, since it was incompatible ratione materiae with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
33. In 2004 the applicant brought an official liability action against the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court before the Miskolc District Court.
34. As the District Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case, on 1 September 2004 the Budapest Court of Appeal had appointed the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Regional Court to proceed.
35. On 24 January 2005 the County Regional Court dismissed the applicant's case. It pointed out that the domestic courts dealing with the matter had kept regular contact with the liquidator and repeatedly ordered it to produce the closing balance sheet. It also noted that the relevant domestic law did not contain a specific deadline to finish a liquidation procedure. The Regional Court acknowledged that there had been some delays imputable to the courts dealing with the case, but was of the view that these delays had not caused any damage to the applicant, given that the possibility of recovering the money owed by the debtor had in any event been very low.
36. On appeal, on 29 September 2005 the Debrecen Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance decision.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-78798
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HRV
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF RADANOVIC v. CROATIA
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Violation of P1-1;Violation of Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - domestic proceedings
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: 6. The applicant was born in 1939 in Croatia. She currently lives in Burlington, Canada.
7. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Karlovac where she lived until October 1991, when she left for Germany to join her son. Later on both of them went to Canada.
8. On 27 September 1995 the Temporary Takeover and Managing of Certain Property Act (“the Takeover Act”) entered into force. It provided that property belonging to persons who had left Croatia after 17 October 1990 was to be taken into the care of, and controlled, by the State. It also authorised local authorities (takeover commissions) to temporarily accommodate other persons in such property.
9. After realising that her flat had been occupied by third persons, on 24 September 1996 the applicant brought a civil action against a certain family U. in the Karlovac Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Karlovcu) seeking their eviction.
10. On 27 September 1996 the Commission for Temporary Takeover and Use of Property of the Municipality of Karlovac (Komisija za privremeno preuzimanje i korištenje imovine Općine Karlovac – “the Takeover Commission”) issued a decision authorising a certain M.V. to use the applicant's flat temporarily.
11. On 16 November 1996 the Municipal Court invited the applicant to designate the proper respondent. On 31 November 1996 the applicant did so by designating M.V. as the respondent.
12. On 13 June 1997 the respondent submitted to the Municipal Court the decision of the Takeover Commission.
13. In June 1998 Parliament adopted the Programme for the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons (“the Programme for Return”), regulating the principles for their return and repossession of their property.
14. In August 1998 the Act on Termination of the Takeover Act (“the Termination Act”) entered into force. It incorporated and gave legal force to the provisions of the Programme for Return providing that those persons, whose property had during their absence from Croatia been given for accommodation of others, had to apply for repossession of their property with the competent local authorities – the housing commissions.
15. At the hearing held on 15 September 1999 the court enquired with the Housing Commission of the Municipality of Karlovac (Stambena Komisija Karlovac – “the Housing Commission”) whether it had set aside the Takeover Commission's decision of 27 September 1996. On 22 February 2000 the Housing Commission replied to the court in the negative.
16. On 10 March 2000 the Municipal Court declared the applicant's action inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the Termination Act was lex specialis in relation to the Act on Ownership and Other Rights In Rem (“the Property Act”). Accordingly, instead of bringing a civil action the applicant should have applied for repossession of her property to the competent housing commission, as provided by the Termination Act.
17. As neither party appealed against the decision, it became final on 31 March 2000. On the same day the applicant applied for repossession of her property to the Housing Commission.
18. On 16 October 2000 the Housing Commission decided to set aside the Takeover Commission's decision by which M.V. had obtained the right to use the applicant's property. It also ordered M.V. to vacate the flat within 15 days. M.V. unsuccessfully appealed against that decision to the Karlovac Municipal Court.
19. On 4 June 2001 the Housing Commission issued a warrant ordering M.V. to vacate the flat within 15 days following the receipt of the warrant and indicated that otherwise it would bring a civil action against him in the competent municipal court.
20. M.V. failed to comply with that warrant. However, the Housing Commission brought no action against him.
21. On 1 October 2002 the Amendments to the Act on Areas of Special State Concern (“the 2002 Amendments”) entered into force. They transferred the jurisdiction in the matter from the housing commissions (which were abolished) to the Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and Construction (Ministarstvo za javne radove, obnovu i graditeljstvo – “the Ministry”).
22. On 21 February 2003 the Ministry invited the applicant to contact its competent regional office in order to repossess her flat and/or receive compensation for the prolonged inability to use it, in accordance with the 2002 Amendments.
23. One day later the Ministry issued a decision by which it established that M.V. had a right to housing which was to be satisfied by providing him with construction material, in line with the 2002 Amendments. Pursuant to that decision M.V. was obliged to vacate the flat within 90 days of the final shipment of the construction material. The date on which M.V. received the final shipment is unknown.
24. On 2 April 2003 the applicant contacted the Ministry and requested compensation. She also reiterated her request for repossession.
25. On 23 June 2003 the Ministry made an offer for a settlement according to which the State was to pay compensation to the applicant. However, the applicant declined the offer as unsatisfactory. She submitted that the amount of compensation offered had covered only the period from 1 November 2002 onwards. Moreover, the compensation had amounted to only 314 Croatian kunas (HRK) per month while the amount of the rent for the flat of that size (45 m²) should have been assessed at HRK 2,500.
26. In December 2003 M.V. delivered the flat to the Ministry and the applicant repossessed it on 13 January 2004. She submitted that the flat had been looted and rendered uninhabitable.
27. The Takeover Act (Zakon o privremenom preuzimanju i upravljanju određenom imovinom, Official Gazette nos. 73/1995 and 7/1996) in its relevant part provided as follows:
Section 2(2) provided that property belonging to persons who had left Croatia after 17 October 1990, was to be taken into the care of, and controlled, by the State.
Section 5, inter alia, authorised the takeover commissions to entrust the property under Section 2 for temporary use by refugees, displaced persons or persons whose property had been destroyed in the war.
Section 7 obliged temporary occupants to use the property with the care of a prudent administrator (bonus paterfamilias) and prohibited them from selling it or from creating any charges on such property.
28. The Property Act (Zakon o vlasništvu i drugim stvarnim pravima, Official Gazette nos. 91/1996, 73/2000 and 114/2001) in its relevant part provides as follows:
Section 161(1) entitles the owner of property to recover it from anyone who possesses it.
Section 163(1) provides that the possessor may refuse to deliver the property to its owner if he is entitled to retain possession of it (i.e. if he has a right of possession).
Section 164(1) provides that a bona fide possessor, who is not actually entitled to possess the property, must deliver it to its owner but is not obliged to compensate the owner for its use, the benefit derived from it, or the damage resulting from its loss or deterioration.
29. Section 9 of the Programme for Return (Program povratka i zbrinjavanja prognanika, izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba, Official Gazette no. 92/1998) provided as follows:
“Persons with Croatian [citizenship] documents who are owners of property in Croatia in which other persons are temporarily accommodated may apply to the municipal housing commission and seek repossession of their property. The commission shall inform the owner within five days about the status of his property. Relying on proof of ownership, the commission shall set aside any previous decision allowing the temporary accommodation of other persons and order the temporary occupant to vacate the premises. The commission shall serve a written decision on the owner and on the temporary occupant within seven days. The decision shall contain a time-limit for eviction and an offer of alternative accommodation for the temporary occupant in a house or flat under state ownership.
...
If a temporary occupant fails to vacate the premises within the fixed time-limit, the commission shall institute eviction proceedings in the competent municipal court within seven days. The court shall apply the provisions concerning summary procedure in civil matters. The court's decision shall be immediately enforceable. An appeal shall not interfere with the enforcement proceedings or the repossession of the property by the owner.”
Section 2(3) and 2(4) of the Termination Act (Zakon o prestanku važenja Zakona o privremenom preuzimanju i upravljanu određenom imovinom, Official Gazette no. 101/1998) provided that the Programme for Return applied to proceedings concerning the temporary use, management and control of the property of persons who had left Croatia and that such proceedings were to be conducted by housing commissions in the first instance and by municipal courts in the second instance. They were required to apply the Administrative Procedure Act.
30. Sections 8, 9 and 17 of the Act on Areas of Special State Concern (Zakon o područjima od posebne državne skrbi, Official Gazette nos. 44/1996, 57/1996 (errata), 124/1997, 73/2000, 87/2000 (errata), 69/2001, 94/2001, 88/2002, 26/2003 (consolidated text), 42/2005), as amended by the 2002 Amendments, provide that a temporary occupant has a right to housing.
Section 18(1) provides that a temporary occupant whose right to housing is to be satisfied by providing him with construction material, must vacate the house or flat entrusted for his temporary use within 90 days of the final shipment of such material.
Section 18(2) provides that if a temporary occupant fails to observe the above time-limit, the State Attorney will, within the 15 days following the expiry of the time-limit, institute civil proceedings for his eviction.
Section 18(5) provides that, regardless of whether the State Attorney has brought a civil action for eviction, the owner has an independent right to bring such an action for the protection of his ownership.
Section 27 provides that the Ministry shall pay compensation for the damage sustained by an owner who applied for repossession of his or her property prior to 30 October 2002 but to whom the property was not returned by that date.
31. The Decision on the Level of Compensation Due to Owners for Damage Sustained (Odluka o visini naknade vlasnicima za pretrpljenu štetu, Official Gazette no. 68/2003) establishes the amount of that compensation at seven Croatian kunas (HRK) per square metre.
32. In a series of decisions (for example, in cases nos. Rev-291/1999-2 of 11 September 2002, Rev-1157/02-2 of 21 November 2002 and Rev1289/00-02 of 6 November 2003), starting with decision no. Rev574/02-2 of 23 April 2002 the Supreme Court interpreted the relationship between the Property Act and the Termination Act as follows:
“The jurisdiction to decide on an owner's application for repossession conferred on the administrative authorities under the Termination Act does not exclude ordinary court jurisdiction in such matters under the Property Act. Therefore, a civil action for repossession, based on section 161(1) of the Property Act and brought in a court against a temporary occupant by an owner whose property had been taken over under the Takeover Act, should be decided on its merits rather than declared inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction.”
33. In its decisions nos. Rev-967/00-2 of 30 September 2004 and Rev1444/02-2 of 29 June 2004 the Supreme Court gave further interpretation of the relationship between the Property Act and the Termination Act as well as of the Programme for Return:
“The temporary occupant's right to use the owner's property does not cease merely for the reason that a housing commission has set aside the decision allowing him or her to do so. This is because the duty to return the property to its owner is conditional upon the duty of the State to provide alternative accommodation for the temporary occupant.
It follows that the temporary occupant is not obliged to compensate the owner for the use of his or her property since, before being provided with alternative accommodation, he or she remains a bona fide possessor.”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13


ITEMID: 001-114099
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: MDA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: CASE OF GHIMP AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra;Mihai Poalelungi
TEXT: 6. The applicants were born in 1977, 1969, 1961 and 1959 respectively and live in Budesti and Chişinău.
7. The present case concerns the circumstances surrounding the death of Leonid Ghimp, who was the first applicant’s husband, the second and the third applicants’ sibling and the fourth applicant’s brother-in-law.
8. Leonid Ghimp, who was thirty-five years old at the time of the events in question and the father of two children aged six and ten years old, worked as a truck driver. On Saturday 10 December 2005 at approximately eight o’clock in the morning he went to work in order to load his truck and prepare it for the following Monday. According to witnesses, he finished work at approximately 2 p.m. After that and before going home, he spent time enjoying drinks with his co-workers, first at their workplace and later in two bars. At approximately 10.00 p.m. he left the bar and took a taxi. He subsequently had a dispute with the taxi driver because the driver had allegedly not taken him to the agreed destination. Because he refused to pay the fare, the taxi driver drove him to Ciocana police station. According to witnesses from the police station, the taxi driver left after a short time and after being paid by Leonid Ghimp. The report of the latter’s arrest, however, stated that he had been found drunk and sleeping at a bus station. There was no mention of the incident with the taxi driver in the report.
9. According to the applicants, at the police station, Leonid Ghimp was beaten up by three police officers: A.P., S.C. and I.B, and was left lying in the corridor on a dirty concrete floor. He was released the next morning at approximately 11 a.m.
10. According to the accused police officers, Leonid Ghimp was not beaten up at the police station and was told that he was free to go shortly after being brought in. However, being severely intoxicated he refused to leave and preferred to sleep on the floor until the next morning.
11. After being released at approximately 11 a.m. the next day, Leonid Ghimp went home. According to his wife and a person who had seen him walking home, he was pale and walking very slowly. He told his wife that he had stomach ache and spent all day in bed. Only later during the evening, after the pain had intensified, did he tell his wife about the beating at the police station. He told her that the pain had started after a blow to his stomach which had caused him to feel a sharp pain and lose his breath. Later during the night Leonid Ghimp started vomiting and his wife called an ambulance, which took him to a hospital. On 12 December 2005 at 6.35 a.m. Leonid Ghimp died in hospital.
12. On an unspecified date the first applicant informed the Prosecutor’s Office of Leonid Ghimp’s account of his beating at Ciocana police station. On 5 January 2006 criminal proceedings were initiated by the Ciocana Prosecutor’s Office.
13. An autopsy report dated 23 January 2006 stated that his death had resulted from diffuse purulent peritonitis after a perforated ulcer of the small intestine. The perforated ulcer had developed after a blow with a blunt object with a small impact area, possibly on the night of 10 December 2005.
14. In another forensic report dated 31 May 2006, a panel of forensic doctors composed of doctors G.M., N.S. and I.C., after examining the victim’s medical documents and his exhumed corpse, came to a similar conclusion, namely that he had died as a result of a rupture of the small intestine resulting in intestinal contents flowing into the abdominal cavity and causing bacterial contamination of the abdominal cavity – in other words, purulent inflammation of the peritoneum. According to the doctors, the injury causing his death had resulted from a blow from a blunt object with a small surface area to Leonid Ghimp’s stomach, possibly on the evening of 10 December 2005. The doctors did not find any traces of alcohol in his blood and concluded that he had been sober at the time of his death. They also concluded that there was a chance that his life could have been saved had he gone to a hospital within the first few hours after being injured.
15. During the criminal investigation, the prosecutor in charge of the case questioned numerous witnesses, including police officers from Ciocana police station. The three police officers suspected of ill-treating Leonid Ghimp denied that he had been treated violently and unanimously maintained that he had been found drunk and sleeping at a bus stop and brought to the police station. They also stated that after questioning him, Leonid Ghimp had refused to go home because it was late and he had no money and preferred to sleep on the floor of the police station. All the police officers submitted that Leonid Ghimp had been intoxicated but that he had not presented any signs of violence or injuries.
16. Two other police officers from Ciocana police station, who were not suspects, submitted that the victim had come to the police station together with a taxi driver, whom he had been refusing to pay for a fare. After several minutes the taxi driver had been paid by Leonid Ghimp and had left the premises of the police station. The police officers also denied having witnessed acts of violence against Leonid Ghimp and also stated that he had preferred to sleep on the floor in the corridor of the police station rather than go home.
17. A witness, O.O., who had been brought to the police station on the same evening (10 December 2005), stated that she had had an argument with her family and had been taken to Ciocana police station from her home. At the police station she had been in the same room as a man who had had an argument with a taxi driver. She had understood that from the discussion which that man had had with three police officers. Because he had continued to refuse to pay the taxi driver, the police officers had beaten him up in front of her. She had seen the police officers punching the man until he had collapsed to the floor. Then one of the police officers had grabbed the man by his coat, dragged him into the corridor and left him lying on the concrete floor. She had later been released after being forced to sign a document stating that she was being fined for appearing drunk in public. As in Leonid Ghimp’s case, the report of her arrest stated that she had been arrested on the street.
18. The prosecutor also questioned the people with whom Leonid Ghimp had spent the day on 10 December 2005. All of them stated that he had appeared to be in good health and had not shown any signs of illness throughout the entire day. The prosecutor’s attempt to find the taxi driver who had brought Leonid Ghimp to the police station was not successful.
19. On 6 July 2006 one of the accused police officers, A.P., changed his initial statement. He admitted to having lied in his previous statement and admitted that Leonid Ghimp had been brought to the police station by a taxi driver. He submitted that another co-accused, police officer I.B., had punched the victim several times in the stomach area. Then I.B. had taken money from the pocket of Leonid Ghimp’s trousers and had paid the taxi driver. After that, he had punched Leonid Ghimp several more times. A.P. also stated that the beating had taken place in his presence and that of two other people, a police officer and a person who had been brought to the police station that evening and had been in the same room. A.P. stated that he had decided to change his initial statement because he had felt remorseful and sorry for Leonid Ghimp’s children and wife. His statement was given in the presence of a lawyer between 10.17 p.m. and 11 p.m. and was videotaped. At the time of his questioning he was not detained in custody.
20. During further questioning of the other two police officers suspected of ill-treating Leonid Ghimp, they also admitted that he had been brought by a taxi driver to the police station – not found sleeping at a bus stop as had been mentioned in the report of his arrest and as initially stated by them. They continued, however, to deny having ill-treated him.
21. The prosecutor also examined the room where questioning usually took place in the Ciocana police station and in which the victim had allegedly been beaten up, and discovered numerous blood stains on the walls and furniture.
22. During the subsequent court proceedings, suspect A.P. changed his statement again and submitted that nobody had ill-treated Leonid Ghimp on the evening of 10 December 2005. When asked why he had admitted on 6 July 2006 to one of the co-accused having ill-treated Leonid Ghimp in his presence, he replied that he could not remember having made such a statement because he had been very tired and hungry on that day, as he had been on duty the previous night and had worked around the clock. He remembered, however, that the prosecutor had threatened him and had used a swear word in doing so and that he had not been assisted by a lawyer of his choice. He also argued that at the time of questioning he had not realised the questioning was being filmed.
23. On 9 July 2007 the Ciocana District Court found police officers A.P., S.C. and I.B. guilty of acts of violence against Leonid Ghimp causing his death. They were also found guilty of making false statements in the report of Leonid Ghimp’s arrest and in the report of witness O.O.’s arrest and were each sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. The court also ordered them to pay compensation to the first applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 300,000 lei (MDL) and ruled that the rest of the claims made by her be examined in separate civil proceedings.
24. The police officers appealed against conviction. During the appeal proceedings, one of the officers, I.B., presented a new version of events, namely that Leonid Ghimp had fallen down in the police station and that a table had fallen on top of him. On 7 November 2007 the Chişinău Court of Appeal partially allowed the officers’ appeals and reduced I.B.’s sentence to six years’ imprisonment and that of A.P. and S.C. to five years each.
25. On 11 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice allowed an appeal on points of law brought by the officers and, after concluding that the case had not been thoroughly examined, quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and ordered a re-examination of the proceedings by the same court.
26. On 6 June 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal acquitted the police officers of all charges. A.P.’s statement of 6 July 2006 was excluded on the grounds that it had been obtained in breach of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely that it had been obtained late in the evening when A.P. had been very tired and in the absence of a lawyer of his choice. In excluding A.P.’s statement the court relied on the statement of a psychologist, who submitted that in cases of extreme tiredness a person may be prone to making false self-incriminating statements. As to the statement of O.O., the court considered it unreliable because she had reason to resent the police officers who had arrested her on 10 December 2005. Moreover, some of the assertions she had made in her statement were considered to be contradictory. As to the findings of the panel of forensic doctors, the court held that they were refuted by the statements of one of the experts who had signed the report dated 31 May 2006, I.C. That expert had been invited to testify by one of the accused police officers. He had changed his opinion and had stated that Leonid Ghimp’s injuries could have been caused between 6.35 a.m. on 9 December and 6.35 a.m. on 10 December 2005 that is prior to his detention. In accepting I.C.’s new opinion, the court did not explain why it preferred it over the conclusion of the panel of forensic doctors or what had made I.C. change his opinion after two years had passed. In so far as the charges of making false statements in the arrest reports were concerned, the court found that the accused had indeed made false statements; however, as there was no personal gain involved, they were acquitted.
27. On 27 January 2009 a panel of the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the Prosecutor’s Office and by the first applicant. The Prosecutor’s Office challenged this judgment with an extraordinary appeal.
28. On 1 March 2010 the Plenary Supreme Court of Justice accepted the extraordinary appeal and quashed both the judgment of the Court of Appeal and that of the Supreme Court of 27 January 2009. The Supreme Court found, inter alia, that the findings of the first panel of forensic doctors could not be rebutted by the opinion of a single doctor and that only the opinion of another panel of doctors could be acceptable. A fresh re-examination of the appeal against the judgment of 9 July 2007 was ordered.
29. During the proceedings, the Court of Appeal ordered a repeated forensic examination in respect of the circumstances of Leonid Ghimp’s death by a panel of doctors from the National Institute of Forensic Medicine. In the meantime, I.C., the expert who had testified during the previous proceedings before the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 26 above), had become the chief doctor of the National Institute of Forensic Medicine.
30. In an expert report dated 1 November 2010, a panel of doctors reached, on the basis of medical documents, a conclusion identical to that expressed by I.C. during the previous proceedings before the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 26 above), namely that the victim’s injury had been caused between 6.35 a.m. on 9 December and 6.35 a.m. on 10 December 2005. According to the report, the rupture of his intestine had initially been incomplete and only on 12 December 2005 had it become complete, causing Leonid Ghimp’s death.
31. On 28 February 2011 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the appeals lodged by the officers, reversed the judgment of the Ciocana Disctrict Court of 9 July 2007 and acquitted the officers of all the charges against them. In so doing, the Court of Appeal attributed substantial weight to the new forensic report of 1 November 2010.
32. On 29 May 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the Prosecutor’s Office.
33. The Police Act of 18 December 1990 states:
“Police officers are only entitled to use force and special fighting techniques for the purpose of ending criminal activities and for neutralising resistance to lawful demands in cases in which non-violent methods are not sufficient to discharge their obligations.”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 2
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 2-1


ITEMID: 001-90406
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: BOYARCHENKO v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Volodymyr Butkevych
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Sergiy Vasylyovych Boyarchenko, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1957 and lives in Chernigiv. He was represented before the Court by Mr I. Uvarov, a lawyer practising in Chernigiv. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mrs V. Lutkovska and Mr Y. Zaytsev.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 18 February 2001 the applicant brought a car registered in Lithuania (a 1986 Volvo 740) into the customs territory of Ukraine. When crossing the border he undertook an obligation to re-export the car before 27 February 2001. According to the State authorities he failed to do so.
On 23 June 2003, the Chernigiv Customs Office (“the Customs Office”) drew up a report on an infringement of customs regulations due to the applicant’s failure to remove the car from the customs territory of Ukraine (Article 113 of the Customs Code 1991). This case of a violation of customs regulations was referred to the Novozavodsky District Court of Chernigiv (“the Novozavodsky Court”) for consideration.
On 26 December 2003, having heard the applicant, who stated that he had taken the car to Russia, although he had no confirmation for this, and the Customs Office, which explained that a check of the records did not confirm that the car had crossed the border into Russia, the Novozavodsky Court returned the case to the customs authorities for corrections and additional verification. In particular, the court noted that the information submitted by the Customs authority contained an inaccuracy as to the chassis number of the vehicle (00761 instead of 007612) and therefore the court ordered that the customs records be checked once again with the correct chassis number.
On 23 January 2004 the applicant left Ukraine to take up permanent residence in Russia without informing the court about his new address.
The Novozavodsky Court summoned the applicant for a further hearing in February 2004.
By a letter of 16 February 2004, the applicant’s lawyer informed the court that the applicant had registered as having left his apartment in Ukraine and had left for Russia at the end of January. He also stated that the applicant had not been notified about the court hearing as the applicant’s actual location was unknown to him.
The court summoned the applicant again for a hearing in March 2004.
On 16 March 2004 the court considered the case in the applicant’s absence. The applicant’s mother, who appeared before the court, confirmed that his actual place of residence was unknown. The court considered the applicant’s failure to appear before it as an intentional evasion from justice and decided that the case could be considered in the applicant’s absence. The court then found the applicant guilty of having failed to re-export the car in violation of Section 113 of the Customs Code 1991 and reclassified the offence under Section 348 of the Customs Code 2002. The court ordered the confiscation of the vehicle, but given that the car’s location was unknown, it replaced confiscation with payment of 16,779.31 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (about 2,237 euros (EUR)), which corresponded to the value of the car, in accordance with Section 450 of the Customs Code 2002.
On an unknown date the applicant lodged a request for review of the decision of 16 March 2004 with the President of the Chernigiv Court of Appeal.
By a letter of 7 July 2004 the President of the Chernigiv Court of Appeal informed the applicant that he had examined his case file and his request and found no reason for the review. He noted, in particular, that the decision of 16 March 2004 was in accordance with law and that the applicant had been duly summoned twice at the address indicated by him and had provided no justification for his absence.
Relevant provisions of the Codes are summarised in the case of Nadtochiy v. Ukraine (no. 7460/03, §§ 13-14, 22 April 2008.)
The new Customs Code contains provisions relevant to the case which are similar to those in the old Customs Code.
Section 348 of the Code provides for a fine or confiscation of goods in case of infringement of the obligation on taking the items in or out the customs territory of Ukraine (Section 113 of the Customs Code 1991).
Section 390 of the Code foresees that, as a general rule, court hearings shall be conducted in the presence of the person against whom proceedings on violation of custom regulations have been brought. However, the hearings can be conducted in the absence of such a person when there is information about the timely notification of this person about the place and time of consideration of the case, but he or she has not submitted any request for adjournment of the case.
Section 405 of the Code stipulates that if the confiscation ordered by the court is impossible the pecuniary equivalent of the value of the items to be confiscated shall be collected from the persons who have infringed the customs regulations (Section 149 of the Customs Code 1991).


ITEMID: 001-77197
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: YILMAZ AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicants, MM. Bayram Yılmaz and Seyfettin Yıldız, are Turkish nationals who were born in 1963 and 1955 respectively and live in Adana. They were represented before the Court by MM. M. Çinkiliç and K. Derin, lawyers practising in Adana.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 17 October 1994 the first applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of aiding and abetting an illegal organisation, namely the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (“the PKK”) and was subsequently placed in detention on remand.
The Public Prosecutor at the Konya State Security Court initiated criminal proceedings against him and twelve others. He requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of Law no. 3713.
On 19 January 1995 the trial commenced before the Konya State Security Court against twenty-seven persons, including the first applicant.
On 30 September 1995 police officers from the Adana Security Directorate apprehended the second applicant. On 23 October 1995 the Public Prosecutor at the Konya State Security Court filed an indictment charging him with membership of an illegal organisation.
On 30 October 1995 the proceedings against the second applicant, together with ten others, commenced before the Konya State Security Court.
On 5 March 1996 the court joined the second applicant’s case to the first applicant’s case pending before a different chamber of the court.
On 4 June 1996 two other cases were joined to the applicants’ proceedings.
On 13 November 1996 the court acquitted the first applicant on account of lack of evidence. Moreover, it convicted the second applicant and sentenced him to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment.
While the case was pending at the appeal stage, on 19 May 1997, after the promulgation of Law no. 4210, which abolished the Konya State Security Court, the case-file was transferred to the Adana State Security Court.
On 26 October 1998 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the State Security Court for procedural reasons.
The first hearing before the Adana State Security Court took place on 14 January 1999. The court took the statements of some of the accused concerning the Court of Cassation’s decision to quash the judgment of 13 November 1996.
At the hearing of 25 February 1999 and during the following two hearings the other accused submitted their comments on the decision of the Court of Cassation. According to the minutes, when some of the accused wanted to read out loud their written defence statements the court informed them that the examination of the merits would be carried out once the procedural stage was completed.
On 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judges sitting on the bench of State Security Courts were replaced by civilian judges.
At the hearing of 15 July 1999 the civilian judge who had been appointed to replace the military judge sat as a member of the trial court for the first time. Between 15 July 1999 and 5 October 2000 the Adana State Security Court, which was composed of three civilian judges, held ten hearings.
On 7 October 1999 two other cases were joined to the applicants’ proceedings.
At the sixteenth hearing held on 16 November 2000, the number of accused before the court was seventy. The court, composed of three civilian judges, found the applicants guilty as charged. It sentenced the first applicant to three years and nine months’ imprisonment and the second applicant to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment. The applicants appealed.
On 26 January 2001 the court gave an additional decision in which it suspended the proceedings in respect of the first applicant and thirty-two others, in accordance with Law no. 4616 on conditional release, the suspension of proceedings or the execution of sentences in respect of crimes committed before 23 April 1999.
On 25 March 2002 the Court of Cassation decided that the criminal proceedings against the first applicant be terminated on the ground that the statutory time-limit under Article 102 of the Criminal Code had expired. It further decided to uphold the decision of the Adana State Security Court in respect of the second applicant, endorsing the first instance court’s assessment of the evidence and its reasons for rejecting his defence.
The relevant domestic law and practice in force at the material time are outlined in the following judgments: Özel v. Turkey (no. 42739/98, §§ 2021, 7 November 2002) and Öcalan v. Turkey ([GC], no. 46221/99, § 54, ECHR 2005...).


ITEMID: 001-95254
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: WATKINS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Jeffrey Shane Watkins, is a British national who was born in 1962 and is currently serving a lifesentence in a prison in Rugby. He was represented before the Court by Mr E. Abrahamson, a lawyer practising in Liverpool. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr D. Walton of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
Between 1 May 1998 and 5 December 2000 the applicant was engaged in a variety of legal proceedings, actual or contemplated, which necessitated correspondence with various legal advisers, courts and other bodies. For the first part of this period he was detained at prison W. and in September 1999 he was moved to prison F.
On 16 September 1998, whilst the applicant was being detained in Prison W., he asked the officer on duty for his mail and was told that unless he opened the letters in that officer’s presence he would not be allowed to have them. The applicant pointed out that he was entitled to take his legal correspondence unopened unless the governor had reasonable cause to suspect an illicit enclosure, but the officer refused to give it to him. The officer proceeded to inform the applicant that he would be referring the letters to the principal officer in his wing.
On 17 September 1998 another prison officer summoned the applicant to his office and told him that there were two legal letters for him. Each envelope was marked with a reference to Rule 37A of the Prison Rules 1964 (“the Rule,” later replaced by Rule 39 of the Prison Rules 1999, see Relevant Domestic Law below) and each bore a franked strip containing details of the solicitor from whom the correspondence originated. The officer pulled out legal paperwork from a larger envelope which had already been opened. When the applicant complained, the officer told him that the envelope was already open when he had entered the office. The officer then inspected the contents of the envelope before he handed the envelope and the legal papers over to the applicant. The officer then picked up a smaller envelope, opened it, and inspected its contents before handing it over. When the applicant protested about the breach of the applicable Rule, the officer laughed and said “So report me to John Major” (the British Prime Minister between 1990 and 1997). The following day the applicant made a formal complaint about the matter which led to the promulgation of a notice to staff drawing attention to the effect of the Rule in question.
On 5 October 1998 the applicant noticed that his name was on a board indicating that he had received mail. When the applicant asked for his mail he was told that there was a letter for him marked with reference to the Rule, but the officer on duty refused to hand it over to him unless he was willing to open it in his presence. Later that day another officer called the applicant and informed him that there was a letter for him. The officer then proceeded to rip the letter open. When the applicant asked him why he was doing this, the officer told him that the new notice mentioned above only applied to outgoing mail. The applicant made a complaint ten days later.
On 5 December 2000, whilst the applicant was pursuing County Court proceedings against one of the prison officers, that particular officer opened two letters marked “Durham County Court” addressed to the applicant without the latter’s knowledge or consent. The officer then handed them to the applicant already opened.
The applicant made several complaints to the effect that his correspondence, both outgoing and incoming, was being treated by prison officers in a manner that conflicted with the requirements of the Rule.
The applicant found his attempts to pursue the matter both through the formal prison complaints systems and the Prisons Ombudsman unsatisfactory, and he was eventually granted legal aid to bring an action for damages in the courts.
On 15 July 2003 the County Court gave judgment refusing the applicant’s claims for damages for misfeasance in public office against the Home Office and 14 named prison officers. The judge found that most of the prison officers had committed a breach of the Rule but that they had not acted in bad faith. He found further that some misunderstandings had arisen in prison W. from the fact that although the prison governor had notified both prisoners and prison staff on 21 September 1998 about the effect of the Rule, he had overlooked the fact that the letters which a court sent to a prisoner bore the name of the court on the envelope but contained no reference to Standing Order 5 (see Relevant Domestic Law below). Moreover, the judge was satisfied that some of the officers had opened the relevant letters accidentally and in other cases he ascribed the breach of the Rule to inadequate training. Therefore, the applicant’s claims against those officers failed as bad faith was an essential ingredient of the tort of misfeasance in public office.
Though the County Court judge found that three prison officers had, on the balance of probabilities, acted in bad faith when dealing with the applicant’s legally privileged correspondence in breach of the Rule, he was not satisfied that the applicant had suffered any loss or damage as a result. In particular, the judge stated that at its highest, the applicant’s case was that he had suffered embarrassment and injury to his sense of pride and dignity. Without minimising in any way the effect of the breaches of confidentiality in issue, the judge found that the reactions suffered by the applicant came nowhere near to mental, still less physical injury. Neither had there been any allegation of financial loss or actual prejudice to his position in any of the litigation in which he was engaged. Furthermore, having listened to the evidence and seen the applicant in the witness box, it was considered that he had not been particularly embarrassed or humiliated. In sum, the applicant seemed to the County Court judge to be “ a man of some intelligence who had acquired some knowledge of the legal process and, without in any way trivialising his complaints or minimising the effect upon him, ... it could be said that in many ways he appeared to thrive on these conflicts.”
An application for permission to appeal was made but refused by the County Court judge. The application for leave to appeal was then renewed before the Court of Appeal and permission to appeal was granted on the papers on 17 October 2003. The applicant appealed against the dismissal of his claims against the three officers who had acted in bad faith, contending that the tort of misfeasance in public office was a tort actionable per se, and so capable of being established without proof of damage, or alternatively capable of being established by proof of anxiety and distress falling short of physical or mental injury.
On 20 July 2004 the Court of Appeal gave judgment on the applicant’s appeal against the County Court’s decision of 15 July 2003. The applicant’s appeal was allowed on the ground that, acting in bad faith, the three officers had infringed a constitutional right of such importance, namely, that of unimpeded access to court and access to confidential legal advice, that the applicant’s cause of action in misfeasance in public office was complete even without proof of damage. The Court of Appeal held that the County Court judge’s conclusion on the issue was therefore wrong and that the applicant was entitled at least to nominal damages against the officers who had acted in bad faith. The Court of Appeal further stated that it was for the trial judge and not itself to determine whether exemplary damages should be awarded.
The applicant’s appeal was allowed, a nominal award of GBP 5 (British pounds sterling) was entered against the three defendants who had been found to have acted in bad faith and the case was remitted back to the County Court judge to determine whether to make an exemplary award against any of the defendants and if so, for assessment of the sums to be awarded. The Court of Appeal also granted the Home Office leave to appeal to the House of Lords on condition that it paid the applicant’s costs irrespective of the outcome.
On 29 March 2006 the House of Lords allowed the Home Office’s appeal and restored the judgment of the County Court judge. The House of Lords found that, though in the present context the unlawfulness of what was done to interfere with the applicant’s enjoyment of his right to confidential legal correspondence was clear, the House should not take the novel step of introducing into the tort of misfeasance in public office a right to damages (based on the importance of the constitutional right infringed) in the absence of material damage to the victim. It was noted in this regard that the great weight of authority treated damage as an element of the tort. Furthermore, it was considered that the applicant had legal remedies available to him, namely, judicial review against prison officers who acted in breach of the applicable rules (even in the absence of bad faith) and the prison governors. Moreover, it was suggested that errant officers would be susceptible to disciplinary sanctions and that failure to initiate such proceedings could also on appropriate evidence be challenged by judicial review, or alternatively that the officers in question might well be indictable for the common law offence of misconduct in public office.
The House of Lords also considered that any breach of a fundamental human or constitutional right would be covered by section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. It could reasonably be inferred that Parliament had intended that infringements of the core human and constitutional rights protected by the Act should be remedied under it and not by the development of parallel remedies. As it was held that there was no existing right to damages where misfeasance in public office had caused no material damage to the victim, the European Court of Human Rights could be expected to award compensation for non-pecuniary loss in cases where the evidence showed an egregious and deliberate abuse of power by a public officer.
Though ultimately agreeing with the majority that the appeal should be allowed, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe commented that if the Home Office were successful in their appeal, the applicant would have no private law remedy at his disposal and that judicial review would not offer him a prospect of damages. He considered that judicial review, with the preliminary filter of the need for leave and little prospect of obtaining an order for cross-examination of witnesses, was hardly a satisfactory substitute for an action in the county court.
The House of Lords ultimately ruled that the tort of misfeasance in public office was never actionable without proof of material damage as its function was to compensate the claimant and not punish the public officer. Consequently, it was held that the Home Office’s appeal should be allowed, that the Court of Appeal’s order should be set aside save as to costs and that the order of the County Court judge should be restored.
Rule 39 of the Prison Rules 1999 (SI 1999/728) which replaced rule 37A of the Prison Rules 1964 (SI 1964/388) in identical terms provides as follows:
“(1) A prisoner may correspond with his legal adviser and any court and such correspondence may only be opened, read or stopped by the governor in accordance with the provisions of this rule.
(2) Correspondence to which this rule applies may be opened if the governor has reasonable cause to believe that it contains an illicit enclosure and any such enclosures shall be dealt with in accordance with the other provision of these Rules. (3) Correspondence to which this rule applies may be opened, read and stopped if the governor has reasonable cause to believe its contents endanger prison security or the safety of others or are otherwise of a criminal nature.
(4) A prisoner shall be given the opportunity to be present when any correspondence to which this rule applies is opened and shall be informed if it or any enclosure is to be read or stopped.
(5) A prisoner shall on request be provided with any writing materials necessary for the purposes of paragraph (1).
(6) In this rule, "court" includes the European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice; and ‘illicit enclosure’ includes any article possession of which has not been authorised in accordance with the other provisions of these Rules and any correspondence to or from a person other than the prisoner concerned, his legal adviser or a court.”
Standing Order 5 includes a direction that an envelope carrying correspondence between an inmate and his/her legal adviser should be marked with a reference to the above Rule. It further explains the effect of the new Rule as follows:
“Prison Rule 37A [now Rule 39] ... applies to all correspondence between an inmate and his or her legal adviser or a court (including the European bodies referred to in the Rules). Such correspondence carries special privileges under the Rules and may not be read or opened for examination unless in accordance with instructions laid down by Prison Service Headquarters...”
Home Office instruction (113/1995, 21 December 1995) to prison governors requires them to protect such correspondence against inadvertent or deliberate opening by, in particular, the training of staff handling prisoners’ mail.
Part 54.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules and section 31 (4) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 contain the relevant rules governing the bringing of a claim for damages in tort in the same proceedings as a judicial review claim. Claims for public law remedies (such as a mandatory order, prohibitory order or quashing order), injunctions or declarations may be made by way of judicial review proceedings. Damages may also be claimed alongside such remedies provided that a cause of action for such damages exists under the law of tort.
Since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA 1998”) on 2 October 2000, a court may grant such relief or remedy within its powers as it considers just and appropriate for breaches of Convention rights (section 8 of HRA). In deciding whether to award damages, or the amount of any award, the court must take into account the principles applied by this Court in relation to the award of compensation under Article 41 of the Convention.


ITEMID: 001-100520
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ROU
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: TRUTA v. ROMANIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra
TEXT: 1. The applicant, Mr Victor Truţă, is a Romanian national who was born in 1943 and lives in Galaţi.
2.
3. From 1990 to 1997 the applicant was the leader of the drivers' trade union of a bread-making company in Galaţi. He was also a member of the National Christian-Democrat Agrarian Party (“PNTcd”, Partidul Naţional Ţărănesc creştin şi democrat). On 3 February 1997 his work contract was terminated on disciplinary grounds.
4. In the February-March 1998 issue of the monthly local journal Opinia P.C. published an article under the heading: “The snake within the PNTcd – because of him, Galaţi was almost left without bread” (Sarpele din sânul PNTcd – din cauza lui Galaţiul era să rămână fără pâine) in which he accused the applicant mainly of maintaining an ungrounded conflict with the company's management, of harassing and defaming its director, of having repeatedly neglected his work duties alleging trade union needs and of having jeopardised bread distribution in Galaţi in pursuit of his personal goals.
The relevant parts of the article read as follows:
“... Through his actions – lying, defaming and falsifying – he does nothing but undermine the PNTcd's credibility... That is why Victor Truţă may be called, without hesitation:
The snake within the PNTcd
Paradoxically, sometimes bad faith comes from within the trade unions. I say this because the conflict between an uninspired trade union leader and the management of [the bread-making company in Galaţi] jeopardised the bread supply of the inhabitants of Galaţi on several occasions.”
The article was accompanied by the applicant's photograph and several documents issued by the employer or the trade union concerning the applicant's activity.
5. On 30 April 1998 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Galaţi District Court against A.Z., the director of Opinia, and P.C., its chief editor. He accused them of having damaged his reputation by publishing that article. He sought 400,000,000 Romanian Lei (ROL) in respect of nonpecuniary damage.
6. Between 19 October 1998 and 28 October 1999, the Galaţi District Court held several hearings in the case. However, it could not examine the case, as P.C. had not been properly identified and summoned (according to the applicant, another person with the same name had been summoned to appear in court instead). In addition, the applicant claimed that on 20 April 1999 the court had informed him that the next hearing would take place on 11 May, whereas in reality the court had met on 6 May, and thus he was not able to participate in the court hearing. He was present at the other hearings.
7. On 28 October 1999 the court sent the case to the Prosecutor's Office and asked it to identify the accused P.C.
8. On 17 March 2000 the prosecutor sent the case back with the information requested and it was registered in the District Court's list of cases again.
9. The applicant complained six times against the judges or prosecutors, asking them to step down. His requests were all dismissed.
10. The parties were heard and documents were adduced. The applicant claimed that the court had refused to hear his witness and had not asked for additional evidence.
11. The court gave judgment on 3 June 2002. It acquitted the journalists and dismissed the applicant's claim for damages. It also ordered the applicant to pay ROL 2,500,000 to the State in respect of costs incurred in the proceedings.
12. It noted that P.C. had written the article in good faith, had based it on documents provided by A.Z. and information available in other press articles previously published on the subject, and had checked the facts by means of a journalistic investigation. Furthermore, the applicant had failed to prove that the journalists had acted with the intent to defame him.
13. The applicant appealed, arguing notably that the court's decision contradicted the evidence in the file, that the court had not examined the offensive language used in the article, had not given reasons for rejecting the civil claims and had unlawfully ordered him to pay the costs incurred by the State. He also requested that the court declare null and void an interlocutory judgment by means of which the District Court upheld a request by one of the judges to be allowed to step down from the case.
14. In addition, on 26 June 2003 he also lodged a constitutional complaint against the order to pay costs. On 8 July 2003 the complaint was dismissed as unfounded by the Constitutional Court, on the ground that justice was not free of charge and that court fees did not as such restrict or deny access to court, as in any case the authorities were bound to investigate and decide on the case even when the parties refused to cover the expenses.
15. In a final decision of 17 September 2003 the Galaţi County Court upheld the judgment.
16. The County Court had examined the applicant's arguments one by one. In essence, it found that the first-instance court had correctly interpreted the facts and the evidence in the file and considered that the reasons given for acquitting the journalists constituted relevant justification for dismissing the civil claim. It also considered that the complaints against the interlocutory judgment and against the obligation to reimburse the costs were unfounded.


ITEMID: 001-98466
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HRV
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: LAZIĆ v. CROATIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Vojin Lazić, is a Croatian national who was born in 1951 and lives in Beli Manastir. He was represented before the Court by Mrs B. Paprić, a lawyer practising in Osijek. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs Š.Stažnik.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 30 September 1998 the applicant brought a civil action against company B. in the Osijek Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Osijeku) seeking reinstatement and salary arrears.
On 1 January 1999 the case was transferred to the Beli Manastir Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Belom Manastiru) which held hearings on 14 April 2000 and 27 February, 15 May and 16 October 2003 and 19 February 2004. The hearings scheduled for 7 April 2000 and for 8 November 2002 were adjourned since either the applicant or his lawyer, or both, failed to appear. The applicant also exceeded the time-limit for submitting his reply in respect of the defendant's submission by almost three years.
On 27 February 2004 the Municipal Court declared the applicant's action inadmissible for lack of locus standi on the part of the defendant.
On 4 August 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act complaining about the length of the above proceedings.
Following an appeal by the applicant, on 26 August 2004 the Osijek County Court (Županijski sud u Osijeku) quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case.
In the resumed proceedings, on 7 January 2005 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant's action. The applicant's subsequent appeal was dismissed by the County Court on 3 March 2005.
Following an appeal on points of law (revizija) by the applicant, on 15 March 2007 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) quashed the lower courts' judgments and remitted the case to the first-instance court.
On 5 June 2007 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time and attributed some of the delays in the proceedings to the applicant and some to the inefficiency of the Beli Manastir Municipal Court. It awarded the applicant 7,000 Croatian kuna (HRK) in compensation and ordered the Supreme Court to give a decision in the applicant's case as quickly as possible but in any case within six months following the publication of its decision in the Official Gazette. The Constitutional Court's decision was published on 9 July 2007.
In the resumed proceedings, the Municipal Court held three hearings and obtained an expert opinion. In a judgment of 1 December 2008 it found for the applicant.
Following an appeal by the defendant, on 2 April 2009 the County Court upheld the first-instance judgment in part and in the remaining part quashed it and remitted to the Municipal Court.
The defendant appealed on points of law (revizija) to the Supreme Court. It appears that the case is still pending before the Municipal Court and the Supreme Court.
The relevant part of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court (Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 49/2002 of 3 May 2002 – “the Constitutional Court Act”) reads as follows:
Section 63
“(1) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint whether or not all legal remedies have been exhausted if the competent court fails to decide a claim concerning the applicant's rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him or her within a reasonable time ...
(2) If a constitutional complaint ... under paragraph 1 of this section is upheld, the Constitutional Court shall set a time-limit within which the competent court must decide the case on the merits...
(3) In a decision issued under paragraph 2 of this section, the Constitutional Court shall assess appropriate compensation for the applicant for the violation of his or her constitutional rights ... The compensation shall be paid out of the State budget within three months from the date a request for payment is lodged.”
The relevant part of the Courts Act (Zakon o sudovima, Official Gazette nos. 150/05, 16/07 and 113/08), which entered into force on 29 December 2005, reads as follows:
III. PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO A HEARING WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
“(1) A party to court proceedings who considers that the competent court failed to decide within a reasonable time on his or her rights or obligations or a criminal charge against him or her, may lodge a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time with the immediately higher court.
(2) If the request concerns proceedings pending before the High Commercial Court of the Republic of Croatia, the High Court for Administrative Offences of the Republic of Croatia or the Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia, the request shall be decided by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia.
(3) The proceedings for deciding the request referred to in sub-section 1 of this section shall be urgent. The rules of non-contentious procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis in those proceedings and, in principle, no hearing shall be held.
(1) If the court referred to in section 27 of this Act finds the request well founded, it shall set a time-limit within which the court before which the proceedings are pending must decide on a right or obligation of, or a criminal charge against, the person who lodged the request, and shall award him or her appropriate compensation for the violation of his or her right to a hearing within a reasonable time.
(2) The compensation shall be paid out of the State budget within three months of the date on which the party's request for payment is lodged.
(3) An appeal, to be lodged with the Supreme Court within fifteen days, lies against a decision on the request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. No appeal lies against a Supreme Court decision, but a constitutional complaint may be lodged.”