ITEMID: 001-57487
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: CHE
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1988
DOCNAME: CASE OF MÜLLER AND OTHERS v. SWITZERLAND
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: No violation of Art. 10
TEXT: 8. The first applicant, Josef Felix Müller, a painter born in 1955, lives in St. Gall. The other nine applicants are:
(a) Charles Descloux, art critic, born in 1939 and living in Fribourg;
(b) Michel Gremaud, art teacher, born in 1944 and living at Guin, Garmiswil;
(c) Christophe von Imhoff, picture restorer, born in 1939 and living at Belfaux;
(d) Paul Jacquat, bank clerk, born in 1940 and living at Belfaux;
(e) Jean Pythoud, architect, born in 1925 and living in Fribourg;
(f) Geneviève Renevey, community worker, born in 1946 and living at Villars-sur-Glâne;
(g) Michel Ritter, artist, born in 1949 and living at Montagny-la-Ville;
(h) Jacques Sidler, photographer, born in 1946 and living at Vuisternens-en-Ogoz;
(i) Walter Tschopp, assistant lecturer, born in 1950 and living in Fribourg.
9. Josef Felix Müller has exhibited on his own and with other artists on many occasions, particularly since 1981, both in private galleries and in museums, in Switzerland and elsewhere.
With the assistance of the Federal Office of Culture, he took part in the Sydney Biennial in Australia in 1984, as Switzerland’s representative. He has been awarded several prizes and has sold works to museums such as the Kunsthalle in Zürich.
10. In 1981, the nine last-mentioned applicants mounted an exhibition of contemporary art in Fribourg at the former Grand Seminary, a building due to be demolished. The exhibition, entitled "Fri-Art 81", was held as part of the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of the Canton of Fribourg’s entry into the Swiss Confederation. The organisers invited several artists to take part, each of whom was allowed to invite another artist of his own choosing. The artists were meant to make free use of the space allocated to them. Their works, which they created on the spot from early August 1981 onwards, were to have been removed when the exhibition ended on 18 October 1981.
11. In the space of three nights Josef Felix Müller, who had been invited by one of the other artists, produced three large paintings (measuring 3.11m x 2.24m, 2.97m x 1.98m and 3.74m x 2.20m) entitled "Drei Nächte, drei Bilder" ("Three Nights, Three Pictures"). They were on show when the exhibition began on 21 August 1981. The exhibition had been advertised in the press and on posters and was open to all, without any charge being made for admission. The catalogue, specially printed for the preview, contained a photographic reproduction of the paintings.
12. On 4 September 1981, the day of the official opening, the principal public prosecutor of the Canton of Fribourg reported to the investigating judge that the paintings in question appeared to come within the provisions of Article 204 of the Criminal Code, which prohibited obscene publications and required that they be destroyed (see paragraph 20 below). The prosecutor thought that one of the three pictures also infringed freedom of religious belief and worship within the meaning of Article 261 of the Criminal Code.
According to the Government, the prosecutor had acted on an information laid by a man whose daughter, a minor, had reacted violently to the paintings on show; some days earlier another visitor to the exhibition had apparently thrown down one of the paintings, trampled on it and crumpled it.
13. Accompanied by his clerk and some police officers, the investigating judge went to the exhibition on 4 September and had the disputed pictures removed and seized; ten days later, he issued an attachment order. On 30 September 1981, the Indictment Chamber dismissed an appeal against that decision.
After questioning the ten applicants on 10, 15 and 17 September and 6 November 1981, the investigating judge committed them for trial to the Sarine District Criminal Court.
14. On 24 February 1982, the court sentenced each of them to a fine of 300 Swiss francs (SF) for publishing obscene material (Article 204 § 1 of the Criminal Code) - the convictions to be deleted from the criminal records after one year - but acquitted them on the charge of infringing freedom of religious belief and worship (Article 261). It also ordered that the confiscated paintings should be deposited in the Art and History Museum of the Canton of Fribourg for safekeeping. At the hearing on 24 February, it had heard evidence from Mr. Jean-Christophe Ammann, the curator of the Kunsthalle in Basle, as to Josef Felix Müller’s artistic qualities.
In its judgment, the court pointed out first of all that "the law [did] not define obscenity for the purposes of Article 204 CC [Criminal Code] and the concept [had] to be clarified by means of interpretation, having regard to the intent and purpose of the enactment as well as to its place in the legislation and in the overall legal system". After referring to the Federal Court’s case-law on the subject, it said among other things:
"In the instant case, although Mr. Müller’s three works are not sexually arousing to a person of ordinary sensitivity, they are undoubtedly repugnant at the very least. The overall impression is of persons giving free rein to licentiousness and even perversion. The subjects - sodomy, fellatio, bestiality, the erect penis - are obviously morally offensive to the vast majority of the population. Although allowance has to be made for changes in the moral climate, even for the worse, what we have here would revolutionise it. Comment on the confiscated works is superfluous; their vulgarity is plain to see and needs no elaborating upon.
...
Nor can a person of ordinary sensitivity be expected to go behind what is actually depicted and make a second assessment of the picture independently of what he can actually see. To do that he would have to be accompanied to exhibitions by a procession of sexologists, psychologists, art theorists or ethnologists in order to have explained to him that what he saw was in reality what he wrongly thought he saw.
Lastly, the comparisons with the works of Michelangelo and J. Bosch are specious. Apart from the fact that they contain no depictions of the kind in Müller’s paintings, no valid comparison can be made with history-of-art or cultural collections in which sexuality has a place ..., but without lapsing into crudity. Even with an artistic aim, crude sexuality is not worthy of protection ... . Nor are comparisons with civilisations foreign to western civilisation valid."
On the question whether to order the destruction of the pictures under paragraph 3 of Article 204 (see paragraph 20 below), the court said:
"Not without misgivings, the court will not order the destruction of the three works.
The artistic merit of the three works exhibited in Fribourg is admittedly less obvious than is supposed by the witness Ammann, who nevertheless said that the paintings Müller exhibited in Basle were more ‘demanding’. The court would not disagree. Müller is undoubtedly an artist of some accomplishment, particularly in the matter of composition and in the use of colour, even though the works seized in Fribourg appear rather scamped.
Nonetheless, the court, deferring to the art critic’s opinion while not sharing it, and concurring with the relevant findings of the Federal Court in the Rey judgment (ATF 89 IV 136 et seq.), takes the view that in order to withhold the three paintings from the general public - to ‘destroy’ them - it is sufficient to place them in a museum, whose curator will be required to make them available only to a few serious specialists capable of taking an exclusively artistic or cultural interest in them as opposed to a prurient interest. The Art and History Museum of the Canton of Fribourg meets the requirements for preventing any further breach of Article 204 of the Criminal Code. The three confiscated paintings will be deposited there."
15. All the applicants appealed on points of law on 24 February 1982; in particular, they challenged the trial court’s interpretation as regards the obscenity of the relevant paintings. For example, it was argued by Josef Felix Müller (in pleadings of 16 March 1982) that something which was obscene sought directly to arouse sexual passion, and that this had to be its purpose, with the essential aim of pandering to man’s lowest instincts or else for pecuniary gain. This, it was alleged, was never the case "where artistic or scientific endeavour [was] the primary consideration".
16. The Fribourg Cantonal Court, sitting as a court of cassation, dismissed the appeals on 26 April 1982.
Referring to the Federal Court’s case-law, it acknowledged that "in the recent past, and still today, the public’s general views on morality and social mores, which vary at different times and in different places, have changed in a way which enables things to be seen more objectively and naturally". The trial court had to take account of this change, but that did not mean that it had to show complete permissiveness, which would leave no scope for the application of Article 204 of the Criminal Code.
As for works of art, they did not in themselves have any privileged status. At most they might escape destruction despite their obscenity. Their creators nonetheless fell within the thrust of Article 204, "since that statutory provision as a whole [was] designed to protect public morals, even in the sphere of the fine arts". That being so, the court could dispense with deciding the question whether the pictures complained of were the outcome of "artistic ideas, though even then, intention [was] one thing and realisation of it another".
Like the trial court, the appellate court found that Josef Felix Müller’s paintings aroused "repugnance and disgust":
"These are not works which, in treating a particular subject or scene, allude to sexual activity more or less discreetly. They place it in the foreground, depicting it not in the embrace of man and woman but in vulgar images of sodomy, fellatio between males, bestiality, erect penises and masturbation. Sexual activity is the main, not to say sole, ingredient of all three paintings, and neither the appellants’ explanations nor the witness Mr. Ammann’s learned-seeming but wholly unpersuasive remarks can alter that fact. To go into detail, however distasteful it may be, one of the paintings contains no fewer than eight erect members. All the persons depicted are entirely naked and one of them is engaging simultaneously in various sexual practices with two other males and an animal. He is kneeling down and not only sodomising the animal but holding its erect penis in another animal’s mouth. At the same time he is having the lower part of his back - his buttocks, even - fondled by another male, whose erect penis a third male is holding towards the first male’s mouth. The animal being sodomised has its tongue extended towards the buttocks of a fourth male, whose penis is likewise erect. Even the animals’ tongues (especially in the smallest painting) are more suggestive, in shape and aspect, of erect male organs than of tongues. Sexual activity is crudely and vulgarly portrayed for its own sake and not as a consequence of any idea informing the work. Lastly, it should be pointed out that the paintings are large ..., with the result that their crudeness and vulgarity are all the more offensive.
The court is likewise unconvinced by the appellants’ contention that the paintings are symbolical. What counts is their face value, their effect on the observer, not some abstraction utterly unconnected with the visible image or which glosses over it. Furthermore, the important thing is not the artist’s meaning or purported meaning but the objective effect of the image on the observer ... .
Not much of the argument in the appeal was directed to the issues of intention or of awareness of obscenity, nor indeed could it have been. In particular, an author is aware of a publication’s obscenity when he knows it deals with sexual matters and that any written or pictorial allusion to such matters is likely, in the light of generally accepted views, grossly to offend the average reader’s or observer’s natural sense of decency and propriety. That was plainly so here, as the evidence at the trial confirmed. ... Indeed, several of the defendants admitted that the paintings had shocked them. It should be noted that even someone insensible to obscenity is capable of realising that it may disturb others. As the trial court pointed out, the defendants at the very least acted recklessly.
Lastly, it is immaterial that similar works have allegedly been exhibited elsewhere; the three paintings in issue do not on that account cease to be obscene, as the trial court rightly held them to be ..."
17. On 18 June 1982, the applicants lodged an application for a declaration of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) with the Federal Court. They sought to have the judgment of 26 April set aside and the case remitted with a view to their acquittal and the return of the confiscated paintings or, in the alternative, merely the return of the paintings.
In their submission, the Fribourg Cantonal Court had wrongly interpreted Article 204 of the Criminal Code; in particular, it had taken no account of the scope of the freedom of artistic expression, guaranteed inter alia in Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention. Mr. Ammann, one of the most distinguished experts on modern art, had confirmed that these were works of note. Similar pictures by Josef Felix Müller, moreover, had been exhibited in Basle in February 1982 and it had not occurred to anyone to regard them as being obscene.
As to the "publication" of obscene items, which was prohibited under Article 204 of the Criminal Code, this was a relative concept. It should be possible to show in an exhibition pictures which, if they were displayed in the market-place, would fall foul of Article 204; people interested in the arts ought to have an opportunity to acquaint themselves with all the trends in contemporary art. Visitors to an exhibition of contemporary art like "Fri-Art 81" should expect to be faced with modern works that might be incomprehensible. If they did not like the paintings in issue, they were free to look away from them and pass them by; there was no need for the protection of the criminal law. It was not for the court to undertake indirect censorship of the arts. On a strict construction of Article 204 - that is, one which, having regard to the fundamental right to freedom of artistic expression, left it to art-lovers to decide for themselves what they wanted to see -, the applicants should be acquitted.
Confiscation of the disputed paintings, they submitted, could only be ordered if they represented a danger to public order such that returning them could not be justified - and that was a matter the court of cassation had not considered. Since the pictures had been openly on display for ten days without giving rise to any protests, it was difficult to see how such a danger was made out. Josef Felix Müller would certainly not show his paintings in Fribourg in the near future. On the other hand, they could be shown without any difficulty elsewhere, as was proved by his exhibition in Basle in February 1982. It was consequently out of all proportion to deprive him of them.
18. The Criminal Cassation Division of the Federal Court dismissed the appeal on 26 January 1983 for the following reasons:
"The decided cases show that for the purposes of Article 204 of the Criminal Code, any item is obscene which offends, in a manner that is difficult to accept, the sense of sexual propriety; the effect of the obscenity may be to arouse a normal person sexually or to disgust or repel him. ... The test of obscenity to be applied by the court is whether the overall impression of the item or work causes moral offence to a person of ordinary sensitivity ...
The paintings in issue show an orgy of unnatural sexual practices (sodomy, bestiality, petting), which is crudely depicted in large format; they are liable grossly to offend the sense of sexual propriety of persons of ordinary sensitivity. The artistic licence relied on by the appellant cannot in any way alter that conclusion in the instant case.
The content and scope of constitutional freedoms are determined on the basis of the federal law currently in force. This applies inter alia to freedom of the press, freedom of opinion and artistic freedom; under Article 113 [of the Federal Constitution], the Federal Court is bound by federal enactments ... In the field of artistic creation [it] has held that works of art per se do not enjoy any special status ... A work of art is not obscene, however, if the artist contrives to present subjects of a sexual nature in an artistic form such that their offensiveness is toned down and ceases to predominate ... In reaching its decision, the criminal court does not have to view the work through an art critic’s spectacles (which would often ill become it) but must decide whether the work is liable to offend the unsuspecting visitor.
Expert opinion as to the artistic merit of the work in issue is therefore irrelevant at this stage, though it might be relevant to the decision as to what action to take in order to prevent fresh offences (destruction or seizure of the item; Art. 204 § 3 CC ...).
The Cantonal Court duly scrutinised the paintings for a predominantly aesthetic element. Having regard in particular to the number of sexual features in each of the three (one of them, for instance, contains eight erect members), it decided that the emphasis was on sexuality in its offensive forms and that this was the predominant, not to say sole, ingredient of the items in dispute. The Cassation Division of the Federal Court agrees. The overall impression created by Müller’s paintings is such as to be morally offensive to a person of normal sensitivity. The Cantonal Court’s finding that they were obscene was accordingly not in breach of federal law.
The appellants maintained that the publication element of the offences was lacking. They are wrong.
The obscene paintings were on display in an exhibition open to the public which had been advertised on posters and in the press. There was no condition of admission to ‘Fri-Art 81’, such as an age-limit. The paintings in dispute were thus made accessible to an indeterminate number of people, which is the criterion of publicity for the purposes of Article 204 CC ..."
Finally, the Criminal Cassation Division of the Federal Court declared the alternative application for return of the paintings to be inadmissible as it had not first been made before the cantonal courts.
19. On 20 January 1988, the Sarine District Criminal Court granted an application made by Josef Felix Müller on 29 June 1987 and ordered the return of the paintings.
On the basis that it had been requested in effect to reconsider the confiscation order it had made in 1982, the court held that it had to decide whether the order could stand "almost eight years later". Hence, the reasons for its decision were as follows:
"In Swiss law, confiscation is a preventive measure in rem. This is already clear from the legislative text, which classifies Article 58 under the heading ‘other measures’ - the heading in the margin for Articles 57-62 CC - and not under the subsidiary penalties prescribed in Articles 51-56 CC ...
The confiscation of items or assets may admittedly constitute a serious interference with property rights. It must be proportionate and a more lenient order may thus be justified where it achieves the desired aim. Confiscation remains however the rule. It should be departed from only where a more lenient order achieves the desired aim ... In this case, when the confiscation order was made in 1982, the statutory provision (Article 204 § 3 CC) would normally have required the destruction of the paintings. Giving a reasoned decision, the court preferred a more lenient measure which achieved the aim of security, whilst complying with the principle of proportionality ... . The measure itself should remain in force only as long as the statutory requirements are satisfied ... .
It is true that the Code makes no provision for an order under Article 58 to be subsequently discharged or varied. The legislature probably did not address itself to this question at the time, whereas provision was made whereby other measures, which were admittedly much more serious because they restricted personal liberty, could be re-examined by a court of its own motion (Articles 42-44 CC). It does not follow that discharge or variation is completely illegal. The Federal Court has, moreover, held that a measure should not remain in force where the circumstances justifying it cease to obtain ... .
Accordingly, the view must be taken that an order confiscating a work of art may subsequently be discharged or varied, either because the confiscated item is no longer dangerous and a measure is no longer required, or because the necessary degree of security may be achieved by another more lenient measure (judgment of the Basle-Urban Court of Appeal of 19 August 1980, in the Fahrner case).
Judgments concerning freedom of expression and its scope often refer to Article 10 §§ 1 and 2 (art. 10-1, art. 10-2) [of the Convention].
In this area, the decisions of the Convention authorities have a direct influence on the Swiss legal system, by way of strengthening individual liberties and judicial safeguards ...
In this case, where the applicant has availed himself of the possibility of applying for the return of his paintings, the court must consider whether the grounds on which it made the confiscation order in the first place, which restricted J.F. Müller’s freedom of expression, are still valid.
While the restriction was necessary in a democratic society in 1982 and was justified by the need to safeguard and protect morality and the rights of others, the court considers, admittedly with some hesitation, that the order may now be discharged. It should be noted that the confiscation measure was not absolute but merely of indeterminate duration, which left room to apply for a reconsideration.
It appears to the court that the preventive measure has now fulfilled its function, namely to ensure that such paintings are not exhibited in public again without any precautions. Those convicted have themselves admitted that the paintings could shock people. Once the order has achieved its aim, there is no reason why it should continue in force.
Accordingly, the artist is entitled to have his works returned to him.
It is not necessary to attach any obligations to this decision. If J.F. Müller decided to exhibit the three paintings again elsewhere, he knows that he would be running the risk of further action by the courts under Article 204 of the Criminal Code.
Finally, it appears that by exhibiting three provocative paintings in a former seminary in 1982, J.F. Müller deliberately intended to draw attention to himself and the organisers. Since then he has become known for more ‘demanding’ works, to use the terms of the art critic who gave evidence in 1982. Having achieved a certain repute, he may find it unnecessary to shock by resorting to vulgarity. In any event, there is no reason to believe that he will use the three paintings in future to offend other people’s moral sensibilities.
..."
Josef Felix Müller recovered his paintings in March 1988.
20. Article 204 of the Swiss Criminal Code provides:
"1. Anyone who makes or has in his possession any writings, pictures, films or other items which are obscene with a view to trading in them, distributing them or displaying them in public, or who, for the above purposes, imports, transports or exports such items or puts them into circulation in any way, or who openly or secretly deals in them or publicly distributes or displays them or by way of trade supplies them for hire, or who announces or makes known in any way, with a view to facilitating such prohibited circulation or trade, that anyone is engaged in any of the aforesaid punishable activities, or who announces or makes known how or through whom such items may be directly or indirectly procured, shall be imprisoned or fined.
2. Anyone supplying or displaying such items to a person under the age of 18 shall be imprisoned or fined.
3. The court shall order the destruction of the items."
The Federal Court has consistently held that any works or items which offend, in a manner that is difficult to accept, the sense of sexual propriety, are obscene; the effect may be to arouse a normal person sexually or to disgust or repel him (Judgments of the Swiss Federal Court (ATF), vol. 83 (1957), part VI, pp. 19-25; vol. 86 (1960), part IV, pp. 19-25; vol. 87 (1961), part IV, pp. 73-85); making such items available to an indeterminate number of people amounts to "publication" of them.
21. The Federal Court held in 1963 that, for the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 204, if an obscene object was of undoubted cultural interest, it was sufficient to withhold it from the general public in order to "destroy" it.
In its judgment of 10 May 1963 in the case of Rey v. Attorney-General of Valais (ATF vol. 89 (1963), part IV, pp. 133-140), it held inter alia "that, in making destruction mandatory, the legislature had in contemplation only the commonest case, publication of entirely pornographic items". As "destruction is a measure as opposed to a punishment", "it must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the desired aim", that is to say "the protection of public morality". The court went on to state:
"In other words, ‘destruction’, as prescribed by Article 204 § 3 of the Criminal Code, must protect public morality but go no further than that requirement warrants.
In the commonest case, that of pornographic publications devoid of artistic, literary or scientific merit, the destruction will be physical and irreversible, not just because of the lack of any cultural value, but also because, in general, this is the only adequate way of ultimately protecting the public from the danger of the confiscated items ... .
It is quite a different matter when one is dealing, as in the present case, with an irreplaceable or virtually irreplaceable work of art. There is then a clash of two opposing interests, both of them important in terms of the civilisation to which Switzerland belongs: the moral and the cultural interest. In such a case, the legislature and the courts must find a way of reconciling the two. This court has thus held, in applying Article 204, that it must always be borne in mind that artistic creativity is itself subject to certain constraints of public morality, but that there must nonetheless be artistic freedom ... .
It is, accordingly, a matter for the courts to consider in each case in view of all the circumstances, whether physical destruction is essential or whether a more lenient measure suffices. The mandatory requirement of Article 204 § 3 will, therefore, be complied with where the courts order that an obscene item devoid of any cultural value is to be physically destroyed, and, in respect of an item of undoubted cultural interest, where effective steps are taken to withhold it from the general public and to make it available only to a limited number of serious specialists ... .
If such precautions are taken, Article 204 of the Criminal Code will not be applicable to items which are inherently obscene but of genuine cultural interest. A distinction must also be drawn between such items and pure pornography. The cultural interest of an item admittedly does not prevent it from being obscene. But it does require the courts to determine with particular care what steps must be taken to prevent general access to the item, while making it available to a well-defined number of serious connoisseurs; this will comply with the requirements of Article 204 § 3 of the Criminal Code, which, as has been shown, makes destruction mandatory but only as a measure whose effects must be in proportion to the intended aim ... ."
This particular case concerned seven ivory reliefs and thirty prints of antique Japanese art; the court held that the requirement to "destroy" them was met by placing them in a museum.
22. Previous to the Sarine District Criminal Court’s decision of 20 January 1988 (see paragraph 19 above), the Basle-Urban Court of Appeal had already discharged a confiscation order made pursuant to the Criminal Code. In a judgment of 29 August 1980, to which the District Court referred, the Court of Appeal granted an application to restore to the heirs of the painter Kurt Fahrner a painting confiscated in 1960, after he had been convicted of an infringement of freedom of religious belief and worship (Article 261 of the Criminal Code).
The Court of Appeal held inter alia that as confiscation "always interferes with the property rights of the person concerned, a degree of restraint is called for and, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, such a measure must go no further than is essential to maintain security". The court added (translation from the German):
"This principle applies, in particular, where (on account of its distinctiveness) the item subject to confiscation is hard or impossible to replace. Therefore the principle applies more strictly to a work of art (e.g. a painting) than to a weapon used to commit an offence ... . Finally, having regard to its preventive character, the measure should remain in force only for as long as the legal requirements are satisfied ... ."
Accordingly, the view had to be taken that "an order confiscating a work of art may subsequently be discharged or varied, either because the confiscated item is no longer dangerous and the measure no longer required, or because the necessary degree of security may be achieved by another more lenient measure".
In that particular case, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal was as follows:
"To apply present-day criteria, both parties agree with the court that the public’s ideas of obscenity, immorality, indecency, blasphemy, etc. have changed considerably in the last twenty years and have become distinctly more liberal. Although the confiscated painting is undoubtedly liable to offend a great many people’s religious sensibilities even today, there is no reason to fear that, by exhibiting it in a private or suitable public place, one would be endangering religious harmony, public safety, morals or public order within the meaning of Article 58 of the Criminal Code ...
Whether there is a danger thus depends primarily on where the item to be confiscated is liable to end up ... . In this case, the exhibition of the painting in a museum would at present clearly be unobjectionable in the context of Article 58 of the Criminal Code. However, even if the picture were to be returned unconditionally, the likelihood of misuse must be regarded as minimal because Fahrner, who deliberately set out, by means of a provocative exhibition, to draw attention to himself as a painter and to his ideas and works, has since died. There is no reason to believe that the applicants have any intention of using the picture to offend other people’s religious sensibilities. At any rate, the picture would not lend itself to such a purpose (Article 261 of the Criminal Code) sufficiently to permit the 1960 confiscation order to stand ... . Any danger of that kind arising from the picture is no longer serious enough to justify action under Article 58 of the Criminal Code. Nor is there any reason to hand this picture over to a scientific collection, i.e. a museum, in order to protect the public and morality. The confiscation order should be discharged and the picture unconditionally returned to the applicants, whose main application is thus granted."
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 10


ITEMID: 001-59860
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2001
DOCNAME: CASE OF AKCAM v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Elisabeth Palm;Feyyaz Gölcüklü;Gaukur Jörundsson
TEXT: 9. On 17 November 1980 police officers from the Ankara Security Directorate arrested the applicant on suspicion of membership of an illegal armed organisation, the Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way).
10. On 20 February 1981 the Ankara Martial Law Court (sıkıyönetim mahkemesi) ordered the applicant’s detention on remand.
11. On 26 February 1982 the Military Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Martial Law Court against the applicant and 722 other defendants. The Public Prosecutor accused the applicant, inter alia, of membership of the Dev-Yol, whose object was to undermine the constitutional order and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist regime. The prosecution sought the death penalty under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code.
12. On 14 December 1988 the Ankara Martial Law Court ordered the applicant’s release pending trial.
13. In a judgment of 19 July 1989 the Martial Law Court convicted the applicant of membership of the Dev-Yol. It sentenced the applicant to 16 years’ imprisonment under Article 168 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code, permanently debarred him from employment in the civil service and placed him under judicial guardianship.
14. As the applicant’s sentence exceeded 15 years’ imprisonment, his case was automatically referred to the Military Court of Cassation (askeri yargıtay).
15. Following promulgation of the Law of 27 December 1993, which abolished the jurisdiction of the Martial Law Courts, the Court of Cassation (yargıtay) acquired jurisdiction over the case and on 26 December 1994 the case file was transmitted to it.
16. On 27 December 1995 the Court of Cassation quashed the applicant’s conviction on the ground that he should have been convicted of the offence under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code. It referred the case to the Ankara Assize Court (ağır ceza mahkemesi). The criminal proceedings are still pending before the latter court.
17. Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code provides:
“Whosoever shall attempt to alter or amend in whole or in part the Constitution of the Turkish Republic or to effect a coup d’état against the Grand National Assembly formed under the Constitution or to prevent it by force from carrying out its functions shall be liable to the death penalty.”
18. Article 168 of the Criminal Code reads:
“Any person who, with the intention of committing the offences defined in Articles ..., forms an armed gang or organisation or takes leadership ... or command of such a gang or organisation or assumes some special responsibility within it shall be sentenced to not less than fifteen years’ imprisonment.
The other members of the gang or organisation shall be sentenced to not less than five and not more than fifteen years’ imprisonment.”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-22587
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: CHE
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2001
DOCNAME: VERLIERE v. SWITZERLAND
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: The applicant has dual Swiss/French nationality. She was born in 1953 and lives at Nyon (Switzerland). She is represented before the court by Mr Bitton, a lawyer practising in Geneva.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In 1979 the applicant was injured in a road accident when travelling as a passenger in a vehicle insured for third-party risks by the S. insurance company.
She sustained serious bodily injuries. S. paid her medical expenses until 1985 but refused to make any further payments.
After negotiations had broken down, the applicant brought an action for damages against the insurance company on 20 October 1989 in the Zürich Commercial Court.
In the course of those proceedings she learnt that had been under surveillance by private detectives on several occasions. It appears from the file that was produced to the Court that in 1982 the insurance company began to have doubts about the true extent of the applicant’s injuries and instructed two private detectives to verify her physical condition. The detectives monitored the applicant’s movements and followed her by car. They also kept a record of any visits she received. They filmed the applicant on various occasions, notably when she attended an appointment at the insurance company’s offices and at a picnic that had been organised in the car park of the company for which her partner worked. In the course of their surveillance operations the detectives produced reports, photographs and a video recording.
On 13 November 1990 the applicant made an “application for protection of her personality rights” to the Geneva Court of First Instance on the basis of Articles 28 et seq. of the Civil Code. She sought an injunction restraining the insurers from keeping her under surveillance, an order for the destruction of the photographs and video and a declaration that the reports, photographs and video constituted an unlawful interference with her personality rights.
On 25 January 1993 she lodged a criminal complaint against the private detectives and representatives of the insurance company, notably for interference with her privacy. The criminal proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of the civil proceedings before the Zürich Commercial Court, which on 22 March 2001 made an order for damages against the insurance company. According to the applicant, that judgment has become final and irreversible as neither party has appealed against it.
On 31 May 1996 the Geneva Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s application for protection of her personality rights. On 23 May 1997 the Civil Division of the Court of Justice of the Canton of Geneva upheld that decision.
In a judgment of 18 December 1997 the Swiss Federal Court dismissed the applicant’s application to have that judgment set aside. It began by observing that by virtue of Article 28 subparagraph 2 of the Civil Code an interference was unlawful unless justified by the victim’s consent, an overriding private or public interest, or statute. When, as in the case before it, the insurance company had pleaded an overriding interest, the trial court had to decide whether, in the light of all the circumstances, sufficient grounds existed to make the interference legitimate. It further pointed out that it was for the trial court, in its discretion, to weigh up the competing interests. It proceeded to dismiss the applicant’s application on the following grounds:
“(b) Before making an insurance payment, an insurer providing third-party cover has a duty to verify whether the insured has incurred civil liability for the damage caused to the third party and whether the victim’s claim for reparation is justified. It must also defend the insured against unjustified claims by third parties. Further, the insurer acts in the interests of all its insured collectively (see, on this subject, Roland Brehm, The Contract of Third-Party Insurance, Lausanne 1983, nos. 381 et seq.). When discharging its duties, the insurer is therefore entitled to conduct private investigations and assemble evidence. For their part, victims claiming compensation must cooperate in establishing the facts and accept that the insurer may conduct investigations, even without their knowledge, when that is necessary to achieve the aim pursued. Thus, assembling evidence with a view to establishing the existence and extent of the insurer’s obligations towards the victim may constitute a valid reason for interfering with personality rights (see Michael Nonn, ‘Die Beweiswürdigung im Zivilprozess’, thesis, Basle/Frankfurt 1996, p. 155).
(c) In the present case, the cantonal court accepted, and its finding is binding on the Federal Court (Article 63 subparagraph 2 of the Federal Judicature Act), that the investigations, which were conducted from a public place and were confined to ascertaining the appellant’s mobility, that being ‘an essential element in the Zürich proceedings for which the information thereby obtained was intended’, were aimed solely at protecting the insurer’s pecuniary rights and preserving the evidence necessary for its defence in the proceedings. On the basis of those facts, the Court of Justice must be regarded as having acted within the limits of its discretionary powers when it found that the respondent had an overriding interest that made the interference lawful.
The impugned judgment shows that the insurer had doubts about the true extent of the injuries sustained by the appellant in the accident. In the light of the above principles and of the amount claimed (2,600,000 Swiss francs), the insurer was entitled to conduct an investigation. Furthermore, the means employed (surveillance, photographs and video recording) were appropriate for the aim pursued. Admittedly, any impairment of a person’s physical condition can be established by medical evidence and indeed the appellant underwent a medical examination. However, a medical examination constitutes first and foremost a theoretical medical assessment, while the effects of damage to physical integrity may also be assessed by reference to the sufferer’s actual daily and working life. In the circumstances, the surveillance carried out by the respondent – which amounted to four investigations each lasting a few days and staggered over a period of ten years – and the pictures taken of the appellant as part of those investigations do not appear to be disproportionate either. In any event, the cantonal court clearly was acting within the bounds of its discretion when it found that the interference was justified.
(3) In conclusion, to the extent that it is admissible, the application must be dismissed and the impugned judgment upheld.”
Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code lays down the principle of protection of personality rights. It reads as follows:
“Anyone who suffers an unlawful interference with their personality rights may apply to the courts for protection against any person who has participated therein.
An interference will be unlawful unless it is justified by the consent of the victim, an overriding private or public interest or statute.”
Article 28(a) sets out the remedies available to anyone who claims to have sustained damage as a result of a violation of their personality rights:
“The applicant may request the court to:
(1) prohibit an unlawful interference, if imminent;
(2) order that any continuing unlawful interference shall cease;
(3) make a declaration that an interference is unlawful if the harm which it has caused continues to subsist.”
The applicant lodged a criminal complaint for, inter alia, “an interference with [her] private life” against the private detectives and the representatives of the insurance company. Article 179 quater of the Swiss Criminal Code makes it an offence to use a camera to encroach upon a person’s personal or private life:
“It shall be an offence punishable by imprisonment or a fine following a complaint to use a camera to observe, or image-recording equipment to record, any matter pertaining to a person’s personal life or, if it would not be in public view but for the camera or equipment, to his or her private life, without the consent of the person concerned.”


ITEMID: 001-128050
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2013
DOCNAME: CASE OF SHMUSHKOVYCH v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Public hearing)
JUDGES: Aleš Pejchal;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Stanislav Shevchuk
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Odessa.
6. The applicant is a vice-president of Zelyonka (Зелёнка), a non-governmental youth organisation, and a member of the Odessa City Council.
7. On 17 March 2009 the applicant, acting on behalf of Zelyonka, notified the Odessa City Mayor and the Head of the Prymorsky District Police Department of Odessa of the organisation’s intention to hold a peaceful assembly (picket) in front of the Odessa City Council building on 19 March 2009 from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. The purpose of the assembly was declared as the demand for completion of the construction of the residential buildings contracted by the Council’s Department of Construction.
8. In reply, by a letter of the same date, the Odessa City Council informed the applicant that holding a picket within such short notice was liable to be considered unlawful. The letter indicated that, pursuant to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 28 July 1988 on the procedure for organisation and holding of meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations in the USSR (the 1988 Decree – see paragraph 18 below), notification had to be given no later than ten days prior to the meeting in question. It further indicated that the Constitutional Court, in its decision of 19 April 2001 (see paragraph 20 below), had held that the organisers of peaceful assemblies must inform the authorities in advance of their intention to hold a meeting. It also mentioned that no implementing law in respect of the right to peaceful assembly had yet been enacted in Ukraine and that the 1988 Decree was still in force. The applicant was further informed that untimely notification about the picket could be considered as a violation of the procedure for holding meetings under paragraph 2 of the 1988 Decree and the person responsible held administratively liable under Article 185-1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (the CAO).
9. The picket took place as planned between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. on 19 March 2009. According to the applicant, it was peaceful and only a few people took part in it. The police report of the same day noted that about 250 persons had taken part in the picket and that there had been no violation of public order.
10. On 4 April 2009 a police officer of the Prymorsky District Police Department of Odessa drew up an administrative offence report, in the applicant’s presence, indicating that on 19 March 2009 the applicant had organised and held a picket in violation of Article 185-1 of the CAO and the decision of the Constitutional Court of 19 April 2001. The applicant signed the report, adding a note to the effect that he considered his actions lawful. The report was referred to a court.
11. On 15 May 2009 the Prymorsky District Court of Odessa (“the District Court”) examined the applicant’s case. According to the record of the hearing, provided by the Government, the questioning took place between 1.24 and 1.34 p.m. After that the judge retired to the deliberations chamber. At 2.27 p.m. the judge publicly pronounced judgment and the hearing closed at 2.32 p.m. According to the Government, the full text of the judgment was pronounced publicly and three hours later the court clerk handed a hard copy of the judgment to the applicant’s representative. According to the applicant, the judgment was not pronounced in public but given to his representative in writing three hours after the end of the hearing.
12. In that judgment the District Court found that the applicant had violated public order by failing to give the Odessa City Council sufficient advance notification of the picket he had organised. The court found the applicant guilty of having violated the procedure for organising and holding meetings and demonstrations and fined him 170 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (17 euros (EUR)). The court held, in particular, that the applicant was in breach of Article 185-1 of the CAO because he had not complied with the ten-day notification requirement. The court based its findings on the 1988 Decree, which provided that an application to hold an assembly had to be lodged with the relevant authority at least ten days in advance. The court further referred to the decision of the Constitutional Court and noted that the exact time-limits for notification were to be regulated by law. It further indicated that the 1988 Decree was valid in Ukraine under the Resolution of the Ukrainian Parliament on temporary application of certain legislative acts of the Soviet Union (see paragraph 19 below). The court also pointed to the fact that the applicant had been informed by the Council that the notification he had given was liable to be regarded as contrary to the requirements of the legislation and had been warned that he could incur administrative liability.
13. On 25 May 2009 the applicant appealed. He argued that the 1988 Decree, on which the first-instance court had based in its decision, was invalid and contrary to the Constitution. In particular, he noted that the 1988 Decree provided that persons wishing to hold a peaceful assembly had to seek permission, whereas the Constitution provided only that the authorities had to be notified of an intention to hold such an assembly. Furthermore, Article 92 of the Constitution provided that human rights guarantees had to be regulated exclusively by laws and Article 39 of the Constitution provided that restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly could be established only by law, whereas the 1988 Decree was not a law of Ukraine. He further noted that at the time of the picket there had been no judicial decision restricting the above-mentioned picket as required by Article 39 of the Constitution. The applicant also contended that his punishment violated Article 11 of the Convention and was not necessary as the picket had been peaceful and had not violated public order. Lastly, he complained that the decision in question had not been pronounced publicly which was contrary to Article 285 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 17 below) and to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
14. On 16 July 2009 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal, ruling in the presence of the applicant and his representative, upheld the decision of the first-instance court. Its ruling contained a summary of the facts of the case, outlined the applicant’s arguments and included an analysis of the pertinent legislation in line with that of the first-instance court. As to the applicant’s argument that it was unnecessary to punish him, the court pointed out that the applicant had been punished not for breaching the procedure for holding an assembly but for violating the established procedure for organising it. The court did not however address the applicant’s complaint that the first-instance court’s judgment had not been pronounced publicly.
15. The applicant has not paid the fine.
16. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“Human and citizens’ rights and freedoms affirmed by this Constitution are not exhaustive.
Constitutional rights and freedoms are guaranteed and shall not be abolished.
The content and scope of existing rights and freedoms shall not be diminished by the enactment of new laws or the amendment of laws that are in force.”
“Citizens have the right to assemble peacefully without arms and to hold meetings, rallies, marches and demonstrations, after notifying the executive authorities and bodies of local self-government beforehand.
Restrictions on the exercise of this right may be established by a court in accordance with the law − in the interests of national security and public order only − for the purpose of preventing disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the population, or protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons.
“The following are determined exclusively by the laws of Ukraine:
(1) human and citizens’ rights and freedoms; the guarantees of these rights and freedoms; the main duties of the citizen ...”
“1. Laws and other normative acts enacted prior to the entry into force of this Constitution shall apply in so far as they do not conflict with the Constitution of Ukraine...”
17. The relevant provisions of the Code read, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“A breach of the procedure for organising and holding meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations shall be punishable by a reprimand or by a fine of between ten and twenty-five times the minimum monthly wage.
The same actions committed within a year of the application of administrative penalties or by the organiser of the meeting, rally, street procession or demonstration shall be punishable by a fine of between twenty and one hundred times the minimum monthly wage, or by correctional labour of one to two months, with a deduction of 20% of earnings; or by administrative detention of up to fifteen days.”
Article 285
Pronouncement and service of decision regarding an administrative offence
“A decision shall be pronounced immediately after the examination of the case. Within three days a copy of the decision shall be given or sent to the person concerned ...”
18. The Decree lays down the procedure for seeking and granting permission to organise and hold meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations. The Decree provides inter alia:
“The Constitution of the USSR, according to the interests of the people and for strengthening and development of the socialist system, guarantees to the citizens of the USSR the freedom of meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations. The exercise of these political freedoms shall be ensured to the working people and their organizations by providing them with public buildings, streets, squares and other places...
1. An application to hold a meeting, rally, street procession or demonstration shall be submitted to the executive committee of the appropriate local Soviet of people’s deputies...
2. An application to hold a meeting, rally, street procession or demonstration shall be submitted in writing no later than ten days before the planned date of the event in question...
3. The executive committee of the Soviet of people’s deputies shall examine the application and notify the representatives (organisers) of its decision no later than five days prior to the date of the event mentioned in the application...
6. The executive committee of the Soviet of people’s deputies shall ban a meeting, rally, street procession or demonstration if the goal of the event in question is contrary to the Constitution of the USSR, the Constitutions of the Republics of the Union or of the autonomous republics or poses a threat to the public order and safety of citizens.”
19. The resolution provides in particular:
“ ... before the relevant legislation of Ukraine is enacted, the legislation of the USSR is applicable within the territory of the republic in respect of issues that have not been regulated by the legislation of Ukraine and in so far as they do not contravene the Constitution and legislation of Ukraine.”
20. In its decision the Constitutional Court held inter alia:
“1. ... the Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine applied to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine for an official interpretation of the provisions of Article 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine regarding timely notification to executive authorities or bodies of local self-government of planned meetings, rallies, marches or demonstrations.
In this constitutional application it is noted that, under Article 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine, citizens have the right to assemble peacefully without arms and to hold meetings, rallies, marches or demonstrations following prior notification to the executive authorities or bodies of local self-government. However, it is stressed that the current legislation of Ukraine does not provide for a specific time-limit within which the executive authorities or bodies of local self-government are to be notified about such actions...
... the Constitutional Court holds as follows:
1. The provisions of the first part of Article 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine on the timely notification to the executive authorities or bodies of local self-government about planned meetings, rallies, marches or demonstrations relevant to this constitutional application shall be understood to mean that where the organisers of such peaceful gatherings are planning to hold such an event they must inform the above-mentioned authorities in advance, that is, within a reasonable time prior to the date of the planned event. These time-limits should not restrict the right of citizens under Article 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine, but should serve as a guarantee of this right and at the same time should provide the relevant executive authorities or bodies of local self-government with an opportunity to take measures to ensure that citizens may freely hold meetings, rallies, marches and demonstrations and to protect public order and the rights and freedoms of others.
Specifying the exact deadlines for timely notification with regard to the particularities of [different] forms of peaceful assembly, the number of participants, the venue, at what time the event is to be held, and so on, is a matter for legislative regulation ...”
21. On 21 May 2012 the Plenary of the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine by its Decree No. 6 decided to send this note for information to the judges of lower administrative courts. The note mentioned, inter alia, as follows:
“...The judicial practice contains instances of cases restricting the right to peaceful assembly being decided on the basis of the procedure for organising and holding meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations laid down by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 28 July 1988 No. 9306-XI on the procedure for organisation and holding of meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations in the USSR. This approach is incorrect.
Since the norms of this Decree establish the procedure for authorising (registering) peaceful assembly and empower the authorities and bodies of local self-governments to ban such events, whereas the norms of the Constitution of Ukraine provide for a procedure whereby the authorities are notified that a gathering is to be held and provides that only the courts have power to ban a peaceful gathering, the above-mentioned legal act should not be applied by courts when deciding such cases ...”
22. In a judgment of the Babushkinsky District Court of Dnipropetrovs’k of 30 March 2007 in the case of S. v. the Executive Committee of the Dnipropetrovs’k City Council concerning the adoption of regulations on holding mass events in the city of Dnipropetrovs’k, the court held, inter alia, that the procedures for exercising the right to freedom of assembly and the procedures and grounds for restricting the right were not regulated by Ukrainian legislation and therefore the Council had no grounds for adopting the impugned regulation, which would interfere with the rights of citizens.
23. In another case the Kyiv Administrative Court, in a judgment of 29 November 2011, restricted the right of several NGOs and private persons to hold a demonstration on account, in particular, of their failure to notify the Kyiv City State Administration of their intention ten days in advance. The court referred to the 1988 Decree. The participants appealed against that judgment. On 16 May 2012 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the first-instance court. In its decision the Court of Appeal noted that the 1988 Decree conflicted with the Constitution as it required the organisers to seek permission to hold a demonstration and authorised the executive authorities to ban such an event, whereas Article 39 of the Constitution provided that the authorities should be notified that a demonstration was being planned, and empowered only the judicial authorities to place restrictions on the organisation thereof. It also noted that in its decision of 19 April 2001 (see paragraph 20 above) the Constitutional Court had not referred to the 1988 Decree as a normative act which should apply in Ukraine to the legal relations under consideration. The court also noted that the file contained no documents proving that notification about the demonstration less than 10 days in advance had not allowed the police to ensure public order during the demonstration and that the holding of such an event could create a real risk of riots or crimes or endanger the health of the population and imperil the rights and freedoms of others. It concluded that the judgment of the first-instance court was incompatible with Article 39 of the Constitution and Article 11 of the Convention.
24. In another case the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal, in a decision of 11 October 2012, quashed a judgment of the Kyiv Administrative Court, which had restricted the freedom of peaceful assembly in respect of a number of political and non-governmental organisations upon an application by the Kyiv City State Administration. In its decision the Administrative Court of Appeal noted that, in deciding the case, the first-instance court had had regard to the provisions of the 1988 Decree, whereas since 1996 the question of holding peaceful gatherings had been regulated by the Constitution. The court further stated that the 1988 Decree conflicted with the Constitution as it provided for a procedure for seeking permission to hold a demonstration and that the Decree concerned the holding of such events in a non-existent country (“the USSR”), regulated relations between the citizens of the USSR and the executive committees of the Soviets of People’s Deputies, and considered demonstrations on the basis of their compatibility with the Constitution of the USSR, the constitutions of the union and the autonomous republics, that is, non-existent constitutions of non-existent subjects. The court also noted that under the Ukrainian Constitution human rights and freedoms, and the relevant safeguards, could be defined only by the laws of Ukraine.
25. Other relevant domestic law and practice and the relevant international documents can be found in the case of Vyerentsov v. Ukraine (no. 20372/11, §§ 26, 32, 33 and 38 to 43, 11 April 2013).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 11
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 11-1
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1