ITEMID: 001-73141
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF FERLIC v. SLOVENIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: John Hedigan
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Braslovče.
6. On 2 February 1997 the applicant was bitten by a dog owned by S.H..
7. On 24 April 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against S.H. in the Žalec Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Žalcu) seeking damages in the amount of 705,000 Slovenian tolars (approximately 2,940 euros) for the injuries sustained.
On 21 July 1997 the applicant lodged a preliminary written submission.
Of the four hearings held between 10 May 1999 and 27 September 1999, none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
At the last hearing, the court decided to deliver a written interim judgment. It appears that the judgment, rejecting the applicant’s claim, was served on the applicant on 1 December 1999.
8. On 16 December 1999 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). S.H. cross-appealed.
On 20 September 2000 the court allowed both appeals and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination.
9. Between 10 January and 26 June 2001 the applicant lodged ten preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence with the Žalec Local Court.
Of the seven hearings held between 6 December 2000 and 12 July 2001, none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
At the last hearing, the court decided to deliver a written interim judgment. The judgment, rejecting the applicant’s claim, was served on the applicant on 24 October 2001.
10. On 5 November 2001 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). On 26 November 2001 he also appealed against the first-instance decision of 15 November 2001 concerning costs of proceedings.
On 10 October 2002 the court allowed the applicant’s appeals and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination by a new judge.
The decision was served on the applicant on 7 November 2002.
11. The applicant in the re-examination proceedings lodged five written submissions and/or adduced evidence between 27 June 2003 and 29 January 2004.
Of the two hearings held on 30 June 2003 and 13 February 2004, neither was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
On 4 September 2003 the court appointed a medical expert M.V. Since the applicant objected to this appointment, the court, on 14 October 2003, appointed another medical expert.
At the last hearing the Žalec Local Court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 16 March 2004.
12. On 19 March 2004 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). S.H. cross-appealed.
On 9 March 2005 the court dismissed both appeals, but changed the part of the first –instance judgment concerning legal costs.
The judgment was served on the applicant on 23 March 2005.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-103663
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2011
DOCNAME: CASE OF ZHUKOVSKIY v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 6-3-d
JUDGES: Dean Spielmann;Ganna Yudkivska;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Mark Villiger
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1979 and serves his sentence.
6. In 1996 the applicant moved from Ukraine to the Sakha Republic in the Russian Federation.
7. On 21 June 1998 a Mr G. was murdered in the city of Yakutsk, Russia. According to the applicant, the murder was committed by Mr Gl. and the applicant only helped to transport and hide the body.
8. On 14 September 1998 the police instituted criminal proceedings into the murder of Mr G. The same day the applicant was arrested and questioned as a suspect. He showed the police the place where the decapitated corpse of Mr G. was hidden.
9. On 10 October 1998 the applicant’s girlfriend Ms R. indicated to the police the place where the head of the murdered Mr G. was hidden.
10. The investigation conducted a number of forensic examinations and questioning, including cross-examination by the applicant of some of the witnesses.
11. On 12 February 1999 the applicant was released under an obligation not to abscond.
12. On 11 March 1999 Mr Gl., who had been on the run, was arrested. The next day the applicant breached his undertaking not to abscond and left for Ukraine.
13. On 19 November 1999 the Supreme Court of the Sakha Republic (the Russian Federation) sentenced Mr Gl. to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the murder of Mr G. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and became final on 19 April 2000.
14. On 2 December 1999 the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation requested the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine under the CIS Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters 1993 (“the Minsk Convention”) to prosecute the applicant for the crime committed on the territory of the Russian Federation, given that the applicant, a Ukrainian national, could not be extradited to Russia.
15. On 4 April 2001 the applicant was arrested within another set of criminal proceedings and on 31 July 2001 the Chornobayivsky Local Court sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment for another, unrelated offence. On 25 September 2001 the Cherkassy Regional Court of Appeal (the Cherkassy Court) upheld that judgment.
16. On 4 October 2001, under the request of 2 December 1999, the applicant was charged with murder committed on the territory of the Russian Federation in June 1998.
17. On 18 December 2001 the Cherkassy Court, sitting as a court of first instance, held its first hearing in the criminal case against the applicant. The applicant’s lawyer requested the court to summon and examine the witnesses who had participated in the judicial proceedings on the territory of the Russian Federation, and also Mr Gl.
18. The Cherkassy Court summoned the witnesses to appear before it on 15 January and then on 19 February 2002
19. On 22 February 2002 the Cherkassy Court granted the request of the applicant’s defence counsel to cross-examine the witnesses in the criminal proceedings who lived in the Russian Federation. The court noted that some witnesses had confirmed their statements by cable and stated that they could not travel to Cherkassy for financial reasons. The court ruled that it was necessary to examine the witnesses either in Ukraine or at their place of residence by a local judicial authority with jurisdiction under the Minsk Convention. Taking into account lack of sufficient funds for travel and accommodation for the witnesses from the city of Yakutsk in the city of Cherkassy, the court opted for the international legal assistance mechanism and ordered that the appropriate Russian authorities be requested to conduct a judicial examination of the witnesses in the Russian Federation. The records of that examination would be used by the Cherkassy Court as evidence in the criminal case against the applicant. The court also noted that as an alternative the witnesses could be brought to Cherkassy if the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation could cover their costs.
20. On 6 March 2002 and 19 April 2002, under the procedure envisaged by the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the court lodged with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine a request for letters rogatory to be sent to the Russian authorities in order to have nine citizens residing in the Russian Federation questioned or to ensure their appearance before the court.
21. The questioning took place in February and March 2003.
22. On 5 May 2003, having received the materials that had been requested by letters rogatory from the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine forwarded them to the court.
23. On 29 July 2003 the Cherkassy Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment. The court based its findings on the materials in the criminal case file received from the relevant Russian authorities and the materials obtained during the judicial examination of witnesses by the court in Russia in February and March 2003. The court also made a separate ruling noting the unlawfulness and irregularities of certain periods of the applicant’s detention and lack of cooperation of the Ukrainian authorities responsible for international legal assistance.
24. The applicant appealed in cassation complaining, among other things, that the evidence obtained in the Russian Federation was not admissible, since the applicant and his lawyers had not participated in the questioning.
25. On 18 November 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Cherkassy Court. In its decision, it stated that the applicant and his representatives had been aware of the difficulty of obtaining the attendance of witnesses from Russia and had agreed to and supported the proposal to send a request to a Russian court to have the witnesses questioned in that country, but that they had not showed any interest in attending the questioning, which they had had the right to do. In the absence of any actions on the part of the applicant and his lawyer in this matter, the court did not establish any violation of the applicant’s right to defence.
26. Article 9 of the Constitution provides:
“International treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, are part of the national legislation of Ukraine.”
27. Relevant provisions of the Code provide:
“The procedure for communications between the courts, prosecutors, investigators, or inquiry authorities and the respective authorities of foreign States as well as the procedure for execution of mutual letters rogatory shall be established by legislation of Ukraine and international treaties to which Ukraine is a signatory.”
“Defence counsel shall use remedies available under this Code and other legislative acts in order to ascertain the circumstances dispelling the suspicion or rebutting the charges, extenuating or excluding criminal liability on the part of the suspect, accused, defendant or convicted person, and shall provide them with the necessary legal assistance.
After having been permitted to provide legal representation in the proceedings, defence counsel shall have the right:
...
(7) to put questions in court to the defendants, victims, witnesses, and also to the expert, specialist, claimant or respondent, and to participate in the examination of other evidence;
(8) to adduce evidence, lodge requests or challenges, express in court his or her opinion on requests made by other participants in the judicial proceedings, appeal against acts or decisions of a person conducting an inquiry, or against those of the investigator, prosecutor, or court; ...
(13) to collect information on matters which can be used as evidence in the case; ...”
“Criminal evidence is any factual information on the basis of which the inquiry authority, the investigator and the court ascertain whether or not an act which is a danger to society has been committed, establish the guilt of the person who has committed the act, and any other circumstances relevant to the proper determination of the case.
Such information shall be established: from statements from witnesses, the victim, a suspect, an accused, and also from expert reports, material evidence, reports on investigative and judicial actions, reports – with relevant materials attached thereto – drawn up by the appropriate authorities on the results of detective and search activities, and other documents.”
No evidence shall have a prejudicial effect on the court, prosecutor, investigator, or the person who conducts the inquiry.”
“Anyone known to be aware of the circumstances relating to the case may be summoned as a witness.
A witness may be questioned about the circumstances to be established in a particular case and, inter alia, about matters relating to the personality of the accused or the suspect and about the witness’s relationships with the accused or the suspect.”
28. Relevant provisions of the Convention provide:
“1. In executing letters rogatory for assistance in legal proceedings, the requested authority shall apply legislation of its State. If so requested by the requesting authority, it may also apply procedural rules of the requesting Party...
...
3. If so requested by the requesting authority, the requested authority shall inform in timely manner the requesting authority and interested parties of the time and place of execution of the letters rogatory in order to enable them to be present at the execution of the letters rogatory in accordance with legislation of the requested Party.”
“1. The documents made or certified in the territory of one of the Contracting Parties by the authority or duly authorised person within their competence and in due form, sealed with an official stamp, shall be accepted in the territories of the other Contracting Parties without any certification for such purposes.
2. The documents regarded as official in the territory of one of the Contracting Parties shall have evidential force of official documents in the territories of the other Contracting Parties.”
“1. Letters rogatory for assistance in criminal proceedings shall be drawn up in accordance with Article 7 of this Convention.
2. The letters rogatory shall also contain:
...
в) the list of questions to be clarified at the interrogation;
29. Relevant provisions of the Convention provide:
“The Contracting Parties undertake to afford each other, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, the widest measure of mutual assistance in proceedings in respect of offences the punishment of which, at the time of the request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities of the requesting Party.”
“1. The requested Party shall execute in the manner provided for by its law any letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by the judicial authorities of the requesting Party for the purpose of procuring evidence or transmitting articles to be produced in evidence, records or documents.
2. If the requesting Party desires witnesses or experts to give evidence on oath, it shall expressly so request, and the requested Party shall comply with the request if the law of its country does not prohibit it.“
“On the express request of the requesting Party the requested Party shall state the date and place of execution of the letters rogatory. Officials and interested persons may be present if the requested Party consents.“
“1. Requests for mutual assistance shall indicate as follows:
a. the authority making the request,
b. the object of and the reason for the request,
c. where possible, the identity and the nationality of the person concerned, and
d. where necessary, the name and address of the person to be served.
2. Letters rogatory referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5 shall, in addition, state the offence and contain a summary of the facts.”
“Evidence or documents transmitted pursuant to this Convention shall not require any form of authentication.“
Any Contracting Party may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification or accession, make a reservation in respect of any provision or provisions of the Convention. (...)
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1
6-3
VIOLATED_BULLETPOINTS: 6-3-d


ITEMID: 001-5103
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: DEU
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2000
DOCNAME: HOGEFELD v. GERMANY
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Matti Pellonpää
TEXT: The applicant is a German national, born in 1956 and presently detained in a prison in Frankfurt. She is represented before the Court by Mr Thomas Kieseritzky, a lawyer practising in Frankfurt.
A.
The applicant is a former member of the Red Army Fraction (RAF), a left-wing extremist terrorist movement that was responsible for numerous attacks on high rank personalities in Germany since the early seventies. In April 1992 the RAF announced in a written declaration that they would suspend the attacks on representatives of the State and the economy. In a further declaration of August 1992, the RAF made several critical statements on its strategy in the past.
On 27 June 1993 the applicant was arrested and taken in detention on remand. On 21 January 1994 a warrant of arrest (Haftbefehl) was issued against her. The warrant of arrest was based, among other grounds, on the fear that the applicant might continue terrorist activities.
On 1 December 1995 the Frankfurt Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the request of a radio journalist to allow an interview with the applicant because such an interview would conflict with the purpose of the detention on remand as provided for in Section 119 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeordnung – see relevant domestic law below). The Court considered that in respect of a declaration made by the applicant during the trial, it had to be expected that the applicant would explain and advocate ideological positions of the RAF, which would amount to a new act of participation in a terrorist organisation pursuant to Section 129a of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch - see relevant domestic law below). According to the warrant of arrest, the purpose of the detention on remand was inter alia to prevent the applicant from committing further terrorist acts as defined in Section 129a of the Criminal Code.
On 21 December 1995 the Frankfurt Court of Appeal dismissed the request of a filmmaker to permit the filming of a visit of the applicant's mother to her daughter in prison. The Court, relying again on Section 119 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, considered that the film could enable the applicant to influence supporters of the RAF in order to strengthen their support for the latter. This would be the case if the applicant commented on the conditions of detention of terrorists. Such behaviour would constitute a renewed act of participation in a terrorist organisation within the meaning of Section 129a of the Criminal Code.
On 4 January 1996 the Frankfurt Court of Appeal dismissed the request of the applicant and a journalist to permit an interview with the applicant. It did, however, grant the journalist a permit for a single visit to the applicant on the condition that there would be no talk about the RAF and the trial. The decision was based on the same grounds as that of 1 December 1995.
On 11 January 1996 the Court dismissed yet another request of a journalist for a radio interview with the applicant. On 17 April 1996 it dismissed the applicant's objections (Gegenvorstellungen) against that decision.
On 31 August 1996 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) refused to entertain the applicant's constitutional complaint. The Court held that neither the freedom of expression under Article 5 § 1 of the Fundamental Law (Grundgesetz) nor any other of the applicant's fundamental rights had been violated. It found that the assessment of the facts by the Court of Appeal as well as its findings in law did not disclose any violation of the Constitution.
During the trial against the applicant at the Frankfurt Court of Appeal from 15 November 1994 until 5 November 1996 the applicant made several declarations in which she commented on the history of the RAF, her role in the organisation and the crimes she was accused of.
With her first declaration of 15 November 1994 the applicant commented on the events in connection with her arrest during which her companion, RAF member Wolfgang Grams, had been shot dead. She then explained the developments within the RAF which had lead to its declaration of April 1992 in which the group abandoned its strategy of attacks against representatives of the State and the economy. She explained this break with the former strategy of the RAF with the “experiences and the realisation that we [the RAF] ourselves do not have answers to many questions and that we, alone, cannot and do not want to answer them, as the draft of a global political vision cannot be the matter of one group [...] like the RAF”.
She concluded the declaration with the following statement:
“The fight for a humane future, for a world without government, in which people can live in liberty and self-determination, is still on the agenda. The reversal of the social developments is still a matter for which one must fight. Those who think that they have driven us into a dead-end street, should not rejoice too soon. They should know that we will fight for ourselves. There will be no return to the old strategy as a political concept, but we have our right to self-defence. I do not think that we will watch our destruction without resistance and I wish that everyone would think about our future.”
In a further declaration of 2 March 1995 she commented on the murder of the U.S. soldier Pimental by the RAF:
“The shooting of the GI Edward Pimental was one of the worst mistakes of the RAF.”
On 21 July 1995 the applicant read out a statement on the history of the RAF in which she critically commented on the strategy of violent attacks which the RAF had followed in the past. In this context she clearly admitted her commitment to the RAF and to its original aims as she stated:
“Although I believe today that we made many mistakes – our beginnings and our fight for a different world were at any time well-founded and justified, and that fight has to be conducted as a confrontation. Now the time has come for drawing conclusions from these experiences, because they are important for the determination of future fights and because others should not repeat our mistakes simply because we do not talk about them.
[...]
Where the RAF is concerned, I have written my whole text in the first person of the plural – my personal history has been closely linked to this group for 20 years now and thus I believe that I carry the responsibility for its whole history.”
She subsequently condemned again the shooting of the U.S. soldier and asked the question of “how people who had stood up to fight for a more just and more humane world, could have moved away so far from their original ideals ...”.
In this connection she tried to explain the reasons which had finally driven her to join the RAF. At the end of her statement, she had this to say about the development of the RAF:
“Our limitation of vision and our dogmatism continuously prevented critical questions and a self-critical reflection. As far as we were concerned, it lasted through the early nineties until we finally broke with it.”
She concluded her declaration with the following words:
“There will be no relevant anti-power here, as long as we – and I do not refer to the RAF only – continue to refuse to understand our own history. To determine future fights, we need an accurate analysis of the current situation and development. We also need the experiences and realisations of the last 25 years.”
On 5 November 1996 the Frankfurt Court of Appeal sentenced the applicant to life-time imprisonment for murder in several cases, robbery, causing an explosion and illegal possession of firearms. It found that the applicant had joined the underground operating group of the RAF in 1984 and had participated in several attacks by the RAF, namely (1) the deadly shooting of the U.S.-soldier Edward Pimental on 7 August 1985, (2) the bomb outrage on the U.S. Airbase in Frankfurt on 8 August 1985, (3) the attack on former Under-Secretary of State Dr. Heinz Tietmeyer on 21 September 1988 and (4) the bombing at Weiterstadt prison on 27 March 1993.
On the applicant's appeal, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) by decision of 13 February 1998 quashed the applicant's conviction for the bombing of the Weiterstadt prison but confirmed the Court of Appeal's judgment with respect to the other crimes.
B. Relevant domestic law
The admissibility of any contacts of the detainee on remand is regulated by Section 119 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), which reads as follows:
“The person arrested may only be subjected to those limitations which are required by the purpose of the detention on remand or by the maintenance of order in the prison.”
The applicant was, among other crimes, accused of membership in a terrorist organisation pursuant to Section 129a of the Criminal Code. The relevant paragraphs of Section 129a read as follows:
“Foundation of terrorist associations
(1) Everyone who founds an association, the purpose or activities of which are directed to commit
1. murder, homicide or genocide (Sections 211, 212, 220a), 2. crimes against the freedom of the person in the cases of Sections 239a or 239b or 3. crimes pursuant to Section 305a [destruction of important working materials] or crimes against public safety according to Sections 306 to 306c [arson] or Section 307 §§ 1 to 3 [causing explosions through nuclear energy], Section 308 §§ 1 to 4 [causing an explosion], Section 309 § 1 to 5 [abuse of ionising radiation], Sections 313 [causing floodings], 314 [poisoning dangerous to public safety] or 315 §§ 1, 3 or 4 [dangerous disturbances of rail, sea or air traffic], Section 316b §§ 1 or 3 [disturbance of public service plants] or Sections 316c §§ 1 to 3 [attacks on air and sea traffic]
or who participates as a member in such an organisation, is liable to imprisonment of one to ten years.
(2) If the perpetrator is one of the ringleaders or instigators, imprisonment may not be below three years.
(3) Whoever supports or promotes an organisation as described in § 1 is liable to imprisonment of six months to five years.”


ITEMID: 001-82504
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: NLD
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: MERIE v. THE NETHERLANDS
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson
TEXT: The applicant, Mr John Merie, claims to be a Burundian national who was born in 1985. At the time of the events complained of he was staying in the holding centre for asylum seekers and illegal immigrants (grenshospitum) at Amsterdam (Schiphol) Airport. He is represented before the Court by Mr P.A. Blaas, a lawyer practising in 's-Hertogenbosch. The respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mr R.A.A. Böcker, of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant arrived at Amsterdam (Schiphol) Airport on 8 October 2004. An officer of the Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee) initially refused him admission to the country on the ground that he did not hold a valid passport, and that he had insufficient means either to provide for his own subsistence in the Netherlands or to cover the cost of his journey to a destination outside the Netherlands. When the applicant then asked for asylum, the same officer ordered that he be detained in the asylum application centre (aanmeldcentrum) at Schiphol for the purposes of prevention of unauthorised entry into the Netherlands, in accordance with Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet).
In an asylum application centre, and following an initial intake interview with the asylum seeker, the Netherlands immigration authorities make the first selection between prima facie unfounded and possibly founded asylum requests. Petitioners falling within the latter category are transferred to a reception and investigation centre for asylum seekers (opvang- en onderzoekscentrum), whereas petitioners falling within the former category remain in detention in the asylum application centre pending the determination of their asylum request, which may be dealt with in an accelerated procedure if they do not require a time-consuming investigation; the accelereated procedure means that the asylum request can be processed with all due care within 48 working hours.
On 9 and 10 October 2004 the applicant was interviewed by an immigration official in relation to his asylum request. On 11 October 2004, on the basis of these interviews, the Minister for Immigration and Integration (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie) rejected the applicant's asylum application. Apart from the fact that he had not submitted any documents capable of demonstrating his identity, nationality or travel itinerary, the applicant was deemed to have insufficiently cooperated in the establishment of his travel itinerary, since he had provided virtually no tangible or verifiable statements about his journey (departure and arrival times of the airplane(s), the name and/or logo of the airline company, and whether or not the airplane had made a stop-over). Given the applicant's inability to answer a large number of elementary and basic questions about Burundi and his alleged area of origin, the Minister also had doubts as to whether the applicant was a Burundian national or of Burundian origin. The Minister further maintained the aliens' detention order. On the same day the applicant appealed to the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague against his placement in aliens' detention.
The Regional Court held a hearing on 25 October 2004. The applicant's counsel – referring to the European Court's judgment in the case of Shamsa v. Poland (nos. 45355/99 and 45357/99, 27 November 2003) – argued that a measure whereby a non-judicial authority issues a detention order can only justify detention for a few days and that, consequently, his detention after 13 October 2004 had to be regarded as unlawful. The Minister submitted, inter alia, that an application for a laissez-passer had already been filed but that no date had yet been fixed to present the applicant to the Burundian authorities.
The Regional Court gave its decision on 29 October 2004. Referring to a precedent set by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State) in a ruling of 13 May 2004 (see below under “Relevant domestic law”), it dismissed the appeal.
On 1 November 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 29 October 2004 with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division. He raised only one complaint, namely that the Regional Court had unjustly failed to acknowledge that, where a detention order has been issued by an administrative authority, the alien concerned must – pursuant to the Court's considerations in its Shamsa judgment – be brought before a judge within a few days.
On 24 November 2004 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division dismissed the further appeal, confining its reasoning to a reference to its earlier ruling of 13 May 2004. No further appeal lay against this ruling.
Until 1 April 2001 the admission, residence and expulsion of aliens were regulated by the Aliens Act 1965 (Vreemdelingenwet; “the Aliens Act 1965”). Further rules were set out in the Aliens Decree 1966 (Vreemdelingenbesluit), the Regulation on Aliens (Voorschrift Vreemdelingen) and the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 1994 (Vreemdelingencirculaire). The General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht) applied to proceedings under the Aliens Act 1965, unless indicated otherwise in this Act.
On 1 April 2001 the Aliens Act 1965 and the associated regulations were replaced by the Aliens Act 2000, the 2000 Aliens Decree, the 2000 Regulation on Aliens and the Aliens Act 2000 Implementation Guidelines. Unless indicated otherwise in the Aliens Act 2000, the General Administrative Law Act continued to apply to proceedings on requests by aliens for admission and residence.
The Aliens Act 2000, in so far as relevant to the case, provides:
“1. An alien who has been refused permission to enter the Netherlands may be obliged to remain in a space or area indicated by an official charged with border control.
2. A space or area as referred to in the first paragraph may be secured against unauthorised departure. ...”
“In derogation from Article 37 § 1 of the Act on the Council of State (Wet op de Raad van State), no appeal lies against a decision of the Regional Court ...:
a. about a decision or act based on Article 6 § 1[of the Aliens Act 2000] ...”
“1. Our [competent] Minister shall notify the Regional Court of a decision to impose deprivation of liberty as referred to in Article 6 ... [of the Aliens Act 2000] no later than the twenty-eighth day after communication of the decision, unless the alien himself has lodged an appeal first. As soon as the Regional Court has received the notification, the alien shall be deemed to have lodged an appeal against the said decision imposing deprivation of liberty. The appeal shall also constitute a request for the award of damages.
2. The Regional Court shall immediately fix the date of a hearing. The hearing shall take place no later than the fourteenth day after the receipt of the written statement of appeal or the notification. ... In derogation from Article 8:42 § 2 of the General Administrative Law Act, the delay referred to in that Article cannot be prolonged.
3. The Regional Court shall give judgment orally or in writing. A written judgment shall be given within seven days of the conclusion of the hearing. In derogation from Article 8:66 § 2 of the General Administrative Law Act, the delay referred to in that Article cannot be prolonged.
4. If the Regional Court finds on appeal that the application or implementation of the decision [to impose deprivation of liberty] is contrary to this Act or is – on consideration of all the interests involved – not reasonably justified, it shall accept the appeal. In such a case the Regional Court shall order that the deprivation of liberty be terminated or the manner of its implementation altered.”
Article 95
“1. In derogation from Article 84 under a., an appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State lies against a ruling given by the Regional Court as referred to in Article 94 § 3...”
Article 96
“1. Should the Regional Court reject as unfounded an appeal within the meaning of Article 94 and [should] the deprivation of liberty continue, Our Minister shall notify the Regional Court of the continuation of the deprivation of liberty no later than four weeks after the ruling within the meaning of Article 94 has been given, unless the alien himself has lodged an appeal first. As soon as the Regional Court has received the notification, the alien shall be deemed to have lodged an appeal against the decision to prolong the decision imposing deprivation of liberty. ”
Pursuant to Article 94 §§ 1 and 2, as in force until 1 September 2004, the delay within which the Minister was to notify the Regional Court of the placement of an individual in aliens' detention was three days and the Regional Court was to hold a hearing no later than seven days after receipt of the appeal. On 1 September 2004 an amendment to Article 94 entered into force, prolonging these time-limits to twenty-eight and fourteen days respectively. In practice, this meant a revival of the legal situation that existed until 1 April 2001 in respect of these two time-limits under the former Aliens Act 1965 and associated regulations (for further details, see Tekdemir v. the Netherlands (dec.), nos. 46860/99 and 49823/99, 1 October 2002, under “Relevant domestic law and practice”).
Article 69 § 3 of the Aliens Act 2000 stipulates that there is no time-limit for filing an appeal within the meaning of Articles 94 and 96 of the 2000 Aliens Act and that an appeal referred to in Article 95 must be filed within one week. Accordingly, an individual placed in aliens' detention may in principle file as many appeals against this placement as he or she sees fit. When the lawfulness of a decision to place an individual in aliens' detention has been determined for a first time, the examination of any subsequent appeal in this respect will be limited to the lawfulness of the continuation of the placement in aliens' detention. Pursuant to Article 84 of the Aliens Act 2000, no appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division lies against a decision by the Regional Court on such a subsequent appeal (Administrative Jurisdiction Division, 1 November 2006, case no. 200607626/1). The hearing and determination of any such subsequent appeal are subject to the same mandatory time-limits as those for a first appeal (Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Groningen, 19 June 2006, case no. AWB 06/22632).
According to a ruling given by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division on 11 February 2005 (Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht (Immigration Law Reports – “JV”) 2005/172), the time-limit set out in Article 94 § 2 of the 2000 Act is of a strict mandatory nature. If this time-limit has not been respected, the placement in aliens' detention becomes unlawful on the day following the day on which this time-limit expired.
In a ruling handed down on 13 May 2004 (JV 2004/290), the Administrative Jurisdiction Division held, in so far as relevant for the present case:
“The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights [in the case of Shamsa v. Poland] of 27 November 2003, relied on by the [appellant], concerns the continued detention of aliens against whom an expulsion or extradition procedure was no longer pending, for which continued detention there was no legal basis. Consequently, the detention had lost its lawful character and thus did not fall within the scope of one of the permissible grounds of deprivation of liberty as listed in an exhaustive manner in Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In this light, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division understands the judgment and in particular the reasoning set out in paragraph 59 to mean that the Court – in assessing such detention – incorporates the rationale of Article 5 taken as a whole and, in that context, also considers relevant the guarantees for legal protection and legal certainty as incorporated in the third paragraph of [Article 5 of the Convention]. Noting this as well as the [decisions on admissibility taken by] the Court in the case Leaf v. Italy [no. 72794/01, 27 November 2003] and Vikulov and Others v. Latvia [16870/03, 25 March 2004], the Administrative Jurisdiction Division is of the opinion that the Court did not have the intention to consider Article 5 § 3 applicable by analogy to the detention of aliens in accordance with [Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention], which would also be at variance with the wording of [Article 5 § 3 of the Convention]. In this connection the Administrative Jurisdiction Division also finds of relevance that the Court, in its [decision on admissibility] in the case of Tekdemir v. the Netherlands (no. 46860/99, 1 October 2002) found that there was no reason for holding that there was a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, as the alien concerned who had been placed in aliens' detention under the Aliens Act [as in force until 1 April 2001] could at any point challenge the lawfulness of [that] detention before [a] judge, who should determine [this issue] speedily. The Court did not conduct an additional examination of the matter under [Article 5 § 3 of the Convention]. In accordance with Article 94 § 1 (and Article 96 §§ 1 and 5) of the Aliens Act 2000 an alien may also at present file an appeal at any point against a decision imposing deprivation of liberty.”
As there is no statutory fixed maximum duration of a placement in aliens' detention for the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry into the country or expulsion, an alien refused admission or whose expulsion has been ordered may, in principle, remain in aliens' detention for an unlimited period of time, provided there are reasonable prospects for departure or expulsion within the foreseeable future. However, it has been established in domestic case-law that the interest of an alien to be released from aliens' detention increases with the passage of time. Where a placement in aliens' detention exceeds a period of six months, the alien's interest in being released may – but not necessarily – be accepted as having become greater than the interest in keeping him in detention for the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry. Depending on the specific circumstances of each case, this turning point may be attained later than six months when, for instance, the alien concerned insufficiently cooperates in the determination of his/her identity and nationality and in making documents available. However, once an alien has spent six months in aliens' detention for the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry, the judge is to verify more thoroughly whether the authorities have complied with their obligation to do whatever they can do to facilitate the alien's departure to a destination outside of the Netherlands (see, Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam, 10 January 2006, Landelijk Jurisprudentienummer (National Case-law (database) number ) – “LJN”) AU9605 with further references).


ITEMID: 001-87356
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HRV
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: CASE OF VIDAS v. CROATIA
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objection dismissed (victim);Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Rab.
5. While working with a circular saw on 16 May 1994 the applicant sustained an injury in the workplace resulting in the loss of two fingers. The injuries were of such a degree that on 29 March 1995 the applicant had to retire and was awarded a disability pension.
6. On 22 September 1995 the applicant brought a civil action against the company, S., in the Rab Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Rabu) seeking damages in connection with the above accident. The applicant subsequently designated company J. as the respondent because he considered it to be the legal successor of company S., which had gone bankrupt and had been erased from the companies’ register in 1996.
7. In a judgment of 15 May 2000 the Rab Municipal Court declared the applicant’s action inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction and referred the case to the Rijeka Commercial Court (Trgovački sud u Rijeci). The applicant appealed and on 4 October 2000 the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci) quashed the first-instance decision and referred the case to the Crikvenica Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Crikvenici) as the competent court.
8. On 25 October 2002 the Crikvenica Municipal Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. The judgment was quashed upon an appeal lodged by the applicant on 29 January 2003 by the Rijeka County Court and the case was remitted to the court of first instance.
9. Meanwhile, on 28 March 2002 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining about the length of the above proceedings. On 13 April 2005 the Constitutional Court found a violation of his constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time, awarded him 5,200 Croatian kunas (HRK) in compensation, and ordered the Crikvenica Municipal Court to give a decision in the case in the shortest time possible but no later than twelve months following the publication of the decision in the Official Gazette. The Constitutional Court’s decision was published on 2 May 2005.
10. In the resumed proceedings, on 10 February 2006 the Crikvenica Municipal Court again gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. The applicant again appealed and on 5 July 2006 the Rijeka County Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment.
11. On 5 September 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court which was dismissed on 21 February 2007.
12. The relevant part of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court (Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 49/2002 of 3 May 2002 – “the Constitutional Court Act”) reads as follows:
Section 63
“(1) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint whether or not all legal remedies have been exhausted if the competent court fails to decide a claim concerning the applicant’s rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him or her within a reasonable time ...
(2) If a constitutional complaint ... under paragraph 1 of this section is upheld, the Constitutional Court shall set a time-limit within which the competent court must decide the case on the merits...
(3) In a decision issued under paragraph 2 of this section, the Constitutional Court shall assess appropriate compensation for the applicant for the violation of his or her constitutional rights ... The compensation shall be paid out of the State budget within three months from the date a request for payment is lodged.”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-96547
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: CYP
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: CASE OF ONOUFRIOU v. CYPRUS
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 3;Violation of Art. 8;Violation of Art. 13
JUDGES: Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Michael Fotiou;Sverre Erik Jebens
TEXT: 6. The applicant was born in 1951 and is currently detained in Nicosia Central Prison. He is serving concurrent eighteen-year sentences pursuant to his conviction for two counts of attempted murder.
7. On 5 September 2003 the applicant was permitted to leave detention on twenty-four hour leave granted by the prison director. He did not return to the prison when his leave expired. Following a search to trace his whereabouts, he was arrested on 21 September 2003. At the time of his arrest he was in possession of a gun and cartridges and was wearing a bullet-proof vest and a woman’s wig. He was transferred to the maximum security wing of the prison and placed in solitary confinement. He was thus confined until 7 November 2003, that is, for a total of 47 days.
8. The parties’ submissions concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention during the period of his solitary confinement differed.
9. The Government agreed that the applicant had been detained in the prison’s maximum security wing but maintained that he was detained in a normal cell. The dimensions of the cell were 2.8 metres by 2.1 metres, that is, 5.88 square metres. It was furnished with a bed, a cupboard and a table. The cell had two windows: an exterior one (0.8m by 0.6m) and a smaller one above the cell door (0.4m by 0.4m). The cell was opened about three times a day for a total of about an hour. This time was used for personal hygiene purposes and taking meals. It was the applicant’s responsibility to clean his cell and he was provided with all the necessary equipment. He had regular direct contact with prison personnel. Moreover, newspapers had been provided in the wing and he had access to books from the prison library. There was a television set in the wing corridor to which the applicant could listen and he would have been provided with a radio if he had requested one.
10. During the applicant’s confinement he had spent considerable time outside prison when attending court hearings on 2, 10, 13, 16, 22 and 29 October and 4 and 6 November 2003. He was seen on four occasions by the prison doctor (7, 18, 20 and 31 October 2003). He was also visited by a welfare officer on 14 October 2003 and was seen by the prison psychologist on 3 and 30 October 2003.
11. Although the applicant was allowed to send letters to his family and friends twice a week, he did not attempt to send any such letters. He did not ask to make or receive telephone calls. Visits from family members while the applicant was in solitary confinement were not permitted but during the applicant’s visits to the court, he could meet with his family and friends, and was in fact supplied with food, soft drinks and clothes by his family which he was allowed to take back to prison. On one occasion, a mobile telephone given to the applicant by a family member was confiscated upon his return to prison after a hearing.
12. The applicant disputed the Government’s description of the conditions of his confinement. He alleged that following his return to prison on 21 September 2003 he was confined in a cold, damp cell of a maximum of five square meters without food, water or suitable clothing. The cell had no external window and the window of the cell door was considerably smaller than the Government had indicated. The applicant was excessively restricted in his ability to use the toilet or have a shower: for the first four days of his solitary confinement he was forced to use an empty water bottle to urinate and nylon bags for other needs. These were provided to him by a prison officer through the small window in the cell door. Due to the cold, his arm and shoulder had frozen and he suffered from pain but the doctor was not allowed by the prison authorities to provide him with painkillers. He was nevertheless given an anti-inflammatory gel by the doctor using her own funds. Relying on the prison logbook submitted to the Court by the Government, the applicant stated that he had not been allowed to go to the toilet prior to 24 September 2003 or to have food or the opportunity to shower before 25 September 2003, although he was given bottled water and an apple from time to time through his small cell window by a prison officer. He had no access to newspapers, books or television. Further, he was not regularly seen by a doctor and he was not allowed regularly to exit his cell for half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the afternoon, as required by the relevant regulations.
13. While in solitary confinement, the applicant was not permitted to have visits from his family or to make telephone calls. As for the Government’s allegations that he had not asked to make telephone calls, the applicant replied it was not the practice of the prison authorities to give formal decisions refusing requests to make telephone calls in writing, there were no telephone booths in the maximum security block and, in general, prisoners were not allowed to receive calls from outside the prison. He had no contact with his family in the prison during the period of his solitary confinement and no contact was possible during his court visits. In particular, when he attended hearings at the district court in Limassol, he was kept at the Limassol central police station’s cells. It was only after the period of his solitary confinement that he could see his family and friends at the court’s hearings.
14. The applicant also alleged that the maximum security wing was used to threaten or punish prisoners given the conditions of detention there and, in particular, the fact that another prisoner would beat up prisoners without any attempt by the authorities to protect them. The applicant alleged that he had been ill-treated in this manner on two occasions but did not provide further details.
15. According to the entries in the prison logbook which was submitted to the Court by the Government, the applicant was returned to prison on 21 September 2003. On 24 September 2003, the logbook records that the applicant left his cell to use the toilet after special notification had been given to the security direction (“φρουραρχείο”). The following day, the entry in the logbook records that he met with the prison director and was given food.
16. Although the logbook records that on some days the applicant used the toilet on several occasions, on others it indicates that he only used the toilet once. On 4 October 2003, there is no record of the applicant leaving his cell to use the toilet. Access to shower facilities appears to have been sporadic: at times he showered every couple of days but on other occasions, according to the logbook, he did not leave his cell to shower for two weeks. Similarly, the prison logbook records that on some days the applicant was given two or three meals whereas on others, it would appear that he received only one. On 4 October 2003, there is no entry recording any meal given to the applicant.
17. The logbook indicates that the applicant saw a prison psychologist four times: on 23 and 26 September and on 3 and 31 October 2003. He saw the prison doctor on 7 and 20 October 2003. He met with the welfare officer on 14 October 2003. On 31 October 2003, he refused to attend a scheduled visit to see a surgeon at the General Hospital
18. The logbook records that the applicant attended court on seven occasions: on 10 October 2003 for about six hours; on 13 October 2003 for about five hours; On 16 October 2003 for about six hours; on 22 October 2003 for about eight hours; on 27 October 2003, for about one and a half hours; on 29 October 2003 for about seven and a half hours; and on 4 November 2003, for about two hours.
19. According to the logbook, on 1 November 2003, the applicant met a member of the Prisons Board. On 5 November 2003, he was taken to meet with the Prisons Board and was away from his cell for 20 minutes.
20. There are two entries in the logbook recording other relevant events. On 17 October 2003, he was taken to a conference room, where he remained for one hour and twenty minutes. On 4 November 2003, he was accompanied by a prison officer to visit a Mr A.T. and was away for about half an hour.
21. Although the applicant was in solitary confinement until 7 November 2003, only entries from the logbook up to 5 November 2003 have been submitted by the Government.
22. On the date of the applicant’s arrest following his failure to return to prison, a police investigation began into alleged offences committed while the applicant was at liberty. According to the Government, this was concluded on 11 November 2003 with the filing of charges against the applicant for the commission of various offences. The applicant maintained that he was charged on 10 October 2003.
23. In parallel, on 5 November 2003, the applicant was charged with several disciplinary offences concerning the breach of the terms of his leave. However, the disciplinary proceedings were not pursued.
24. On 19 July 2005 the Limassol Assize Court convicted the applicant of escaping from custody and of other offences associated with his escape. The prison director stated in his evidence before the court that the applicant was placed in solitary confinement in order to protect him from other prisoners who were hostile towards him because of restrictions imposed in the prison affecting everyone as a result of the applicant’s escape. The court noted in its judgment that the applicant had entered a plea of not guilty in respect of the disciplinary offences but that the proceedings were not pursued, no witnesses were heard and no sentence was imposed. Given that there had been no trial, no verdict and no imposition of a sentence in the disciplinary proceedings, the court concluded that the applicant’s confinement could not be treated as a disciplinary sentence.
25. The applicant lodged an appeal against his conviction before the Supreme Court.
26. On 11 December 2007 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal against his conviction of the offence of escaping from custody given that, at the relevant time, he had been on temporary release and had merely failed to return to prison at the expiry of his release period.
27. The applicant, in a letter to the office of the Commissioner of Administration (“the Ombudsman”) dated 6 October 2003, complained about his detention for an excessive period of time in the maximum security wing, alleging in particular that during this period he was not able to have visits or contact with his family by telephone or correspondence and that he was only allowed to leave his cell in order to go to the toilet, have a bath or pick up his food tray. He subsequently complained that his letter addressed to the Ombudsman dated 6 October 2003 was delivered late, after having been sent by the prison director to the Director General of the Ministry of Justice.
28. According to the Ombudsman’s report of 21 November 2003 the applicant had been confined to a cell in the security wing for 47 days. Having been contacted by the Ombudsman, the prison authorities stated that the applicant had been put in solitary confinement for his own protection given the possibility of retaliation by other prisoners due to the restrictive measures imposed on them as a result of the applicant’s failure to return from home leave. The prison authorities confirmed that the applicant was not permitted any visits, telephone conversations or letters and that moreover, he was not allowed to exit his cell except in order to wash himself, to go to the toilet and to get his food. It was further noted that although the Senior Prison Inspector had given instructions on 31 October 2003 that the applicant be returned to normal detention, the applicant was kept confined to his cell until 7 November 2003 as the instructions had not been registered in the records of the wing but had merely been noted on a piece of paper which had been misplaced.
29. As regards the applicant’s letter to the Ombudsman dated 6 October 2003, the report noted that a copy of that letter, as well as copies of three other letters addressed to recipients other than the prison authorities, had been sent by the prison director to the Director General of the Ministry of Justice in order to seek instructions as to whether the particular letters should be sent to the intended recipients. The Ombudsman received the letter addressed to her on 5 November 2003.
30. The Ombudsman in her report observed that it did not appear from the file that the confinement of the applicant had been of a disciplinary nature. She also noted that had the applicant’s confinement been a preventive measure or a measure for the protection of the applicant, as claimed by the prison authorities, then under regulation 151(5) of the Prison (General) Regulations 1997 (“Prison Regulations” – see further “Relevant domestic law and practice”, below) the written approval of the prison director would have been required. No such approval had been given. The Ombudsman therefore considered that the applicant’s confinement was a punitive measure.
31. Moreover, the Ombudsman was not convinced that the denial of the applicant’s right to receive visits, correspondence and telephone contact, for example with his eight year old son, had aimed to protect the applicant from his fellow inmates. She further observed the following:
“It is noted that although in theory the total seclusion of a person in combination with his total social isolation is not acceptable, in practice the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission have tolerated this type of total confinement in exceptional circumstances. However, this was done in cases concerning particularly dangerous terrorists who had been detained pending their trial and who had been allowed to go into the prison yard at some specific time in the day.”
32. The Ombudsman concluded that the applicant’s confinement for a total period of 47 days with no right to exit his cell for one hour a day as provided for in the Prison Regulations, in combination with the denial of the applicant’s right to have contact with family and friends, was in breach of the Prison Regulations and constituted a violation of the applicant’s rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.
33. As regards the applicant’s complaint concerning the monitoring of the letter he sent to her, the Ombudsman emphasised the importance of allowing prisoners direct and uninhibited access to her office. In this connection she referred, inter alia, to the European Prison Rules and a report by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the prevention of torture (see further “International materials”, below), as well as the case of Silver and others v. the United Kingdom, (no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75, Commission’s report of 11 October 1980, Decisions and Reports (DR) 9, p. 56).
34. On 1 January 2004 the applicant submitted an additional complaint to the Ombudsman against the prison authorities. He complained that the prison authorities had, on 20 December 2003, refused to allow him to give his father, who had visited him in prison, a letter addressed to the Ombudsman requesting her to send him copies of past correspondence between them. The applicant claimed that he did not want the contents of his letters to the Ombudsman to be monitored by the prison personnel and that for this reason he had decided to send the letter through his father. He had complained on 30 December 2003 to the prison director.
35. The Ombudsman, in a report dated 15 March 2004, repeated that prisoners should be allowed unrestricted access to her office. She found that there had been unjustified difficulties and unnecessary obstacles in the direct and unhampered communication of the applicant with her office that had negatively affected the exercise of his rights. She noted that on 3 February 2004, at a meeting held in the Ministry of Justice, it was decided that a designated letter box would be placed in the central prisons to allow prisoners, freely and without procedural or substantive restrictions, to submit complaints to the Ombudsman concerning their conditions of detention.
36. By letter of 22 May 2004 the applicant informed the Court that in May 2004, on the basis of a recommendation by the Attorney-General of Cyprus, fifty-four prisoners were granted an official pardon by the President and were consequently released. The applicant was not among the fifty-four.
37. The Cypriot Constitution provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.”
“1. Every person has the right to respect for his private and family life.
2. There shall be no interference with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary only in the interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person.”
“1. Every person has the right to respect for, and to the secrecy of, his correspondence and other communication if such other communication is made through means not prohibited by law.
2. There shall be no interference with the exercise of this right except in accordance with the law and only in cases of convicted and unconvicted prisoners and business correspondence and communication of bankrupts during the bankruptcy administration.”
Article 146
“1. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on a recourse made to it on a complaint that a decision, an act or omission of any organ, authority or person, exercising any executive or administrative authority is contrary to any of the provisions of this Constitution or of any law or is made in excess or in abuse of powers vested in such organ or authority or person.
2. Such a recourse may be made by a person whose any existing legitimate interest, which he has either as a person or by virtue of being a member of a Community, is adversely and directly affected by such decision or act or omission.
3. Such a recourse shall be made within seventy-five days of the date when the decision or act was published or, if not published and in the case of an omission, when it came to the knowledge of the person making the recourse.
4. Upon such a recourse the Court may, by its decision-
(a) confirm, either in whole or in part, such decision or act or omission; or
(b) declare, either in whole or in part, such decision or act to be null and void and of no effect whatsoever, or
(c) declare that such omission, either in whole or in part, ought not to have been made and that whatever has been omitted should have been performed.
...
6. Any person aggrieved by any decision or act declared to be void under paragraph 4 of this Article or by any omission declared there under that it ought not to have been made shall be entitled, if his claim is not met to his satisfaction by the organ, authority or person concerned, to institute legal proceedings in a court for the recovery of damages or for being granted other remedy and to recover just and equitable damages to be assessed by the court or to be granted such other just and equitable remedy as such court is empowered to grant.”
38. Regulations 114 and 116 of the Prison Regulations deal with the contact rights of prisoners (correspondence, telephone calls and visits). In so far as relevant, they provide as follows:
“1. A prisoner who has been sentenced to imprisonment can send letters to his family members, associates and friends twice a week, provided he submits these letters beforehand for examination by the competent officer in accordance with the provisions of the present regulations.
It is provided that the director can allow a prisoner to send more letters, if in his judgment this will help him to maintain beneficial contacts with the outside world.
2. There is no restriction on the number of letters a prisoner can receive in prison.
3. The prisoner can, if a direct need is shown, request permission from the director to contact by telephone, or to ask the competent prison officer to contact on his behalf, his lawyer or members of his family as well as professional or other associates for the settlement of personal, family and other matters in abeyance or differences ...”
“1. Every prisoner is allowed to have visits by members of his family, relatives or friends up to six times a month ...”
39. Regulation 115 of the Prison Regulations deals with the monitoring of the correspondence of prisoners. The relevant provisions provide as follows:
“The content of telephone calls or letters is monitored in cases where in the director’s view such control is necessary for security reasons or for preventing the commission of a new offence or for any other justifiable reason.”
“The privilege of correspondence or telephone contact can be suspended following an order by the director in the case of a disciplinary offence by the prisoner.”
“Letters addressed by prisoners to any official authority of the Republic or to politicians or to the mass media are always sent through the director.”
“In the event that the director ascertains that their content does not come within the competence of the authority or person it is addressed to, or that in the letters improper or abusive language is used, or malicious allegations or unsubstantiated accusations are included against anyone or an attempt is made to distort facts or information concerning the security and in general the functioning of the prisons is revealed, the director can, in the interests of public security or public order or public morals or the protection of the reputation or rights of others or to prevent the revelation of confidential information or to preserve the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, prohibit the sending of these letters. The director informs the prisoner of his decision.
It is provided that prisoners can contact the Prisons Board by means of letters without any monitoring of their content by the prison authorities.”
40. The Prison Regulations concerning solitary confinement provide, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“The prison director can, when he deems it appropriate, order the confinement or isolation of a prisoner for such period as he considers necessary for the purposes of
(a) preservation of discipline and order;
(b) protection of the interests of the prisoner himself or of other prisoners;
(c) confinement or isolation of violent prisoners, who by their behaviour cause problems and intimidate other prisoners;
(d) discipline ...”.
“The extension of the confinement of the prisoner in a special cell or isolated space (apart from the wing in which he resides for preventive and not disciplinary reasons) for over twenty-four hours requires the written approval of the director ... Prisoners under confinement or isolation have a right to exit the place of confinement or isolation for half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the afternoon.”
“A prisoner who is to be accused of a disciplinary offence may be confined to his individual cell or a special cell, according to the situation and the seriousness of the offence, until the examination of the facts of the case is completed. The period of confinement of the prisoner must not exceed four days, unless the director approves the extension of the period of confinement of the prisoner for another two days.”
“In the event that a prisoner is to be accused of a disciplinary offence, the accusation should be set out as soon as possible and the trial of the case should begin at the latest two months from the date of the commission of the offence and should be concluded as quickly as possible.”
“A prisoner shall not be punished before having acquired knowledge of the offence of which he is accused and without having been given the possibility to defend himself.”
41. The CPT produced a report to the Government of Cyprus following its visit to Cyprus from 8 to 17 December 2004. As regards allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of other prisoners, the report noted as follows:
“59. The CPT is also concerned by several allegations received by the delegation that prison staff threatened inmates with transfer to Block 4 (the maximum security unit) and used one or more prisoners accommodated in Block 4 as a means of maintaining control over other inmates.
In this connection, one prisoner interviewed by the delegation claimed that, on 17 October 2004, he had been severely beaten by fellow inmates and subsequently placed in Block 4. A criminal investigation had apparently only been initiated after the prisoner concerned succeeded in bringing the matter to the attention of the Minister of Justice and Public Order, who transmitted the case to the competent authority.
A similar case was brought to the delegation’s attention by an official report of the Office of the Commissioner for Administration. It would appear that, on 18 July 2003, one of the alleged perpetrators (I.C.) of the above-mentioned assault had severely beaten another inmate; the latter had required hospital treatment as a result. The Commissioner for Administration found that the case had not been investigated thoroughly by the establishment’s management and added that ‘the inexcusable delay in investigating such a serious incident gives good reason to suspect preferential treatment vis-à-vis I.C.’.
60. It would be entirely unacceptable for prison staff to threaten prisoners in the above-mentioned manner as a means of control, let alone place prisoners at risk of assault from fellow inmates. The CPT wishes to emphasise that the duty of care which is owed by the prison authorities to prisoners in their charge includes the responsibility to protect them from other prisoners who might wish to cause them harm. In particular, prison staff must be alert to signs of trouble and be both resolved and properly trained to intervene when necessary.
The CPT recommends that the Cypriot authorities take the necessary steps with a view to preventing inter-prisoner violence, in the light of the above remarks.
61. The diligent examination by prison management of all information which may come to its attention regarding possible ill-treatment of prisoners by staff or inter-prisoner violence (whether or not that information takes the form of a formal complaint) and, if necessary, the instigation of proceedings, is also essential. Indeed, the lack of an appropriate response by prison management can foster a climate in which those minded to ill-treat prisoners can quickly come to believe – and with very good reason – that they can do so with impunity. The delegation gained the impression that the management of Nicosia Central Prisons was reluctant to adopt a proactive approach in this respect ...”
42. The report also commented on measures of confinement in use in Cypriot prisons. It observed the following:
“62. The CPT must also express concern about the potential duration of measures involving the segregation of prisoners for disciplinary reasons (confinement to a special isolation cell for a period of up to sixty days and confinement to their own cell for up to ninety days), and the fact that inmates undergoing segregation for disciplinary reasons were deprived of outdoor exercise throughout their sanction (cf. paragraph 91).
...
86. ... The disciplinary penalties include confinement to a special isolation cell for up to 60 days, with simultaneous loss of contact with the outside world (correspondence, visits and telephone calls), or confinement to a personal cell for up to 90 days.
The CPT has serious reservations as to the maximum possible periods of disciplinary confinement; it considers that they should be substantially reduced ...
The CPT also wishes to stress that a disciplinary punishment should never involve a total prohibition on contact with the outside world. Further, under no circumstances should visits between a prisoner and his/her family be withdrawn for a prolonged period ...
...
88. The CPT also pays particular attention to any prisoner held, for whatever reason, under conditions akin to solitary confinement.
Under the terms of Section 151 of the Prisons Regulations, the director can order the confinement or isolation of a prisoner for such a period as he deems necessary for the purpose of: maintenance of order; protection of the interests of the prisoner himself or of other prisoners; violent behaviour; discipline. In this respect, the observations made by the delegation identified important lacunae as regards the guarantees which should surround such a measure. Indeed, no provision is made for those guarantees within the Prisons Regulations themselves.
89. The CPT wishes to stress that the principle of proportionality requires that a balance be struck between the requirements of the case and the application of a solitary confinement-type regime, which is a step that can have very harmful consequences for the person concerned. In particular, all forms of solitary confinement should be as short as possible. Further, they should be surrounded by certain guarantees. A prisoner in isolation or confinement or in respect of whom such a measure is extended, should be informed in writing of the reasons therefor (it being understood that there might be reasonable justification for withholding specific details related to security from the prisoner) and should be given an opportunity to express his views on the matter and have the right to appeal to an authority outside the prison establishment concerned against the imposition or extension of the measure. Further, the application of the measure should be fully re-examined at regular intervals (at least every three months). In addition, all such measures should be properly entered in a specific register.
...
The CPT recommends that the Cypriot authorities review the provisions of the Prisons Regulations relating to isolation and confinement, in the light of the above principles. It also recommends that a special register be kept of all isolation/confinement measures, recording the identity of the prisoner, the reasons for the measure, the date and time of the commencement and end of the measure, the deciding authority and the precise place(s) where the prisoner concerned has been accommodated.
90. Further, although the application of isolation/confinement for a prolonged period can be necessary in exceptional cases for reasons related to good order and safety, the CPT considers that the application of such a measure for disciplinary purposes is unacceptable; the use of isolation/confinement for such purposes should be governed exclusively by Sections 153 to 162 of the Prisons Regulations.
The CPT recommends that the Cypriot authorities amend the Prisons Regulations accordingly.”
43. As regards the conditions of the cells and the possibility of outdoor exercise for prisoners confined to their cells, the report found as follows:
“91. Material conditions in the cells used for administrative separation or disciplinary purposes (16 cells in Block 8) were adequate.
However, from the information received by the delegation during the visit, it emerged that prisoners in isolation or confined to their cells do not benefit from outdoor exercise, sometimes for extended periods. In particular, from an official investigation by the Office of the Commissioner for Administration, it emerged that one prisoner had been placed in confinement in Block 4 for 47 days without benefiting from outdoor exercise. Such a situation is unacceptable.
The CPT recommends that the Cypriot authorities immediately take the necessary steps to ensure that all prisoners placed in an isolation cell or confined to their cells, for whatever reason, benefit from at least one hour of outdoor exercise each day.”
44. In respect of contact with family and friends, the report noted:
“92. The CPT wishes once again to underline the importance for prisoners of being able to maintain good contact with the outside world. Above all, they must be given the opportunity to safeguard their relationships with their family and friends, and especially with their spouse or partner and their children. The continuation of such relations can be of critical importance for all concerned, particularly in the context of prisoners’ social rehabilitation. The guiding principle should be to promote contact with the outside world; any restrictions on such contacts should be based exclusively on security concerns of an appreciable nature or considerations linked to available resources.
93. Under the terms of the Prisons Regulations, in principle all prisoners (both remand and sentenced) have the right to receive up to six one-hour visits every month. In addition, a certain degree of flexibility is possible, for example, when the visitors concerned are family members living abroad. The CPT welcomes these arrangements. ...
95. Telephones have been installed within the prisons, one in each block for use by prisoners from 08.00 a.m. to 2.30 p.m. This is in principle a very positive development. However, apart from in Block 4, which was only accommodating approximately ten prisoners, access to the telephone was rarely straightforward given the number of prisoners involved.”
45. Finally, as regards communication of complaints to the Ombudsman, the report stated:
“98. During the visit carried out in December 2004, the delegation observed that, in response to the recommendation made by the CPT in its report on the 2000 visit, locked boxes had been installed, in which prisoners could put complaints for the attention of the Commissioner for Administration.”
“53.1 Special high security or safety measures shall only be applied in exceptional circumstances.
53.2 There shall be clear procedures to be followed when such measures are to be applied to any prisoner.
53.3 The nature of any such measures, their duration and the grounds on which they may be applied shall be determined by national law.
53.4 The application of the measures in each case shall be approved by the competent authority for a specified period of time.
53.5 Any decision to extend the approved period of time shall be subject to a new approval by the competent authority.
53.6 Such measures shall be applied to individuals and not to groups of prisoners.
53.7 Any prisoner subjected to such measures shall have a right of complaint in the terms set out in Rule 70.
...
70.1 Prisoners, individually or as a group, shall have ample opportunity to make requests or complaints to the director of the prison or to any other competent authority.
...
70.3 If a request is denied or a complaint is rejected, reasons shall be provided to the prisoner and the prisoner shall have the right to appeal to an independent authority ...”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
3
8


ITEMID: 001-81914
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: BGR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF PEEV v. BULGARIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 8;Violation of Art. 10;Violation of Art. 13+8 et 10;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award
JUDGES: Peer Lorenzen
TEXT: 5. The applicant, who is a sociologist by training, was employed as an expert by the Criminological Studies Council at the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office (see paragraph 27 below). He was a close friend of Mr N.D., a prosecutor at the Supreme Administrative Prosecutor's Office, who had become widely known for his public accusations against the Chief Prosecutor, Mr N.F., and for his assertions that the Chief Prosecutor and his entourage were harassing him and exerting improper pressure on him, and who committed suicide on 24 April 2000, leaving a note which said that the Chief Prosecutor should resign.
6. Following this event, the applicant was considering resigning from his position. For this purpose, he had prepared two draft resignation letters, which he kept in a drawer of his office desk. However, he eventually decided that he would not resign.
7. On 11 May 2000 the applicant sent a letter to the daily newspaper Trud, the weekly newspaper Capital, and the Supreme Judicial Council. In that letter he made a number of allegations against the Chief Prosecutor, Mr N.F. He averred that the latter had groundlessly discontinued criminal proceedings against high-ranking persons from the executive branch, and had exploited the Prosecutor's Office for the purpose of reprisals against political opponents of the ruling party and his own opponents. The applicant also claimed that the Chief Prosecutor had created a fearful and morbid working atmosphere in the Prosecutor's Office by acting rudely and insultingly towards his subordinates, even, as rumour had it, occasionally physically assaulting them. He further claimed that, according to certain rumours, the Chief Prosecutor had heavily beaten his former wife and a female judge. According to the same rumours, the Chief Prosecutor was mentally ill and suffered from paranoia, for which he had undergone treatment in a psychiatric hospital. According to the applicant, all these rumours had to be verified by the Supreme Judicial Council. The applicant also alleged that the Chief Prosecutor had deliberately tried to wreck the Criminological Studies Council by harassing members of its staff. The applicant further averred that the Chief Prosecutor and his entourage, who had repeatedly uttered threats against the late Mr N.D., were responsible for the latter's death. According to the applicant, that event had to be investigated with a view to determining whether the Chief Prosecutor had incited Mr N.D.'s suicide, which was a criminal offence. Finally, the applicant submitted that he had intended to resign because of the bad atmosphere in the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office, but had eventually decided that the more proper thing to do was to continue performing his work and opposing the nuisance generated by the Chief Prosecutor from within.
8. The letter was published in the 13 May 2000 issue of Trud under the heading “[N.F.] finished [N.D.] off” and the subheading “Fear and evil reign in the Prosecutor's Office”. The 13 May issue in fact came out during the evening of 12 May, in accordance with the practice of Trud's publishers.
9. At approximately 9 p.m. on Friday 12 May 2000 S.D., a prosecutor from the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office, ordered the police officer who was on duty at the entrance of the Courts of Justice building in Sofia to let him enter in order to seal off the applicant's office. A few minutes later he came back and handed the police officer a written order to not allow the applicant into the building on 13 and 14 May 2000, stating that the latter had been dismissed.
10. At approximately 10 a.m. on Saturday 13 May 2000 the applicant tried to enter the Courts of Justice building in order to go to his office, but was stopped by the police officer at the entrance.
11. At 8 a.m. on Monday 15 May 2000 the applicant went to the Courts of Justice building, accompanied by an editor from Trud and other journalists. He tried to enter his office, but could not, as the door was locked and his key did not fit in, the lock having apparently been changed. He then went to the office of a prosecutor from the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office, where he was informed that his resignation letter (see paragraph 6 above) had been brought to the attention of the Chief Prosecutor and that the latter had accepted it.
12. At 3.10 p.m. on 15 May 2000 the applicant was handed an order for the termination of his employment on the basis of Article 325 § 1 (1) of the Labour Code (see paragraph 28 below), signed by the Chief Prosecutor and effective immediately. The applicant objected that he had never in fact tendered his resignation and that the termination was therefore contrary to that provision.
13. The same day the applicant requested the Sofia City Prosecutor to inquire into the events (in particular, an alleged search of his office) and, if justified, to open criminal proceedings for abuse of office against the officials who had committed the alleged acts.
14. On 23 May 2000 a commission consisting of the head of the administrative department of the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office, the head of the Chief Prosecutor's administration and the Chief Prosecutor's secretary inspected the applicant's office. It drew up a very detailed inventory of the items that it found in his desk drawers and filing cabinets, which included medicines, compact discs with personal material, notes, notebooks, diplomas, personal photographs, books and personal documents, including medical ones. On 25 May 2000 the same commission inspected the contents of the hard disk of the applicant's computer and drew up an inventory of its findings.
15. On 25 May 2000 the applicant and his brother went to the applicant's office to collect his personal belongings. They found that all the cabinets and the applicant's desk had been sealed, that the cabinets and the desk drawers had been rummaged in, and that the draft resignation letters which the applicant had prepared (see paragraph 6 above) were missing, as were his letter of 11 May 2000 (see paragraph 7 above) and his office computer.
16. In an order of 15 June 2000 the Sofia Regional Military Prosecutor's Office, to which the applicant's complaint of 15 May 2000 (see paragraph 13 above) had been referred, refused to open criminal proceedings. It reasoned that in refusing to allow the applicant to enter the Courts of Justice building on 13 May 2000 the police officers at the entrance had acted lawfully.
17. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the order was incomplete, because his complaint had included allegations of official misconduct by prosecutors of the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office, who, according to the relevant rules of criminal procedure, could be investigated only by a specially appointed prosecutor from the same office. His complaint should therefore also have been brought to the attention of the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office. In an order of 3 July 2000 the Military Appellate Prosecutor's Office upheld the refusal of the Sofia Regional Military Prosecutor's Office to open criminal proceedings against the police officers. However, it agreed that the remainder of the applicant's complaint fell within the competence of the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office and referred it to it.
18. In a decision of 10 July 2000 a prosecutor from the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office refused to open criminal proceedings. He briefly reasoned that in his complaint the applicant had not named particular persons and had not identified the specific provisions of the Criminal Code that had allegedly been breached by them. Having studied the file, the prosecutor had not found any evidence of a publicly prosecutable offence relating to the refusal to allow the applicant access to his workplace or relating to his resignation letter.
19. In the meantime, on 5 June 2000, the applicant had brought a civil action against the Prosecutor's Office. He alleged that the termination of his contract had been unlawful and sought reinstatement and compensation for loss of salary. He averred, inter alia, that the climate in the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office had deteriorated as a result of the actions of the Chief Prosecutor. After the death of Mr N.D. he had decided to resign and had prepared a draft resignation letter, but had eventually decided not to and instead to make public his observations about the atmosphere in the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office. In consequence, he had written a letter to Trud, Capital and the Supreme Judicial Council. Later, access to his office had been impeded and his employment had been terminated on the basis of a resignation which he had never in fact tendered.
20. In a judgment of 5 March 2002 the Sofia District Court declared the termination of the applicant's employment unlawful, ordered that he be reinstated in his position, and awarded him 2,419.20 Bulgarian levs, plus interest, for loss of salary for the six months following the termination of his employment, in line with Article 225 § 1 of the Labour Code (see paragraph 29 below). In the facts part of its judgment it described in detail the events set out in paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 above. After analysing in detail the evidence, the court found that there was no indication that at any point in time the applicant had in fact tendered his resignation. On the contrary, it was evident from the facts that his draft resignation letter had been taken from his office by a person having access to it during the period from 12 to 15 May 2000 and had been submitted by that person to the Chief Prosecutor. This made the termination of the applicant's employment by ostensible mutual agreement unlawful, as Article 325 § 1 (1) of the Labour Code (see paragraph 28 below) required proof of both parties' actual intention to terminate the employment.
21. The Prosecutor's Office appealed to the Sofia City Court, arguing that the applicant had in fact tendered his resignation.
22. In a judgment of 7 July 2004 the Sofia City Court upheld the lower court's judgment. It likewise described in detail the events set out in paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 above, and held, like the court below, that the available evidence did not indicate that the applicant had in fact tendered his resignation. Therefore, in the court's view, the termination of the applicant's employment had been unlawful.
23. The Prosecutor's Office appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Cassation. It argued that the lower court had erroneously assessed the evidence and established the facts.
24. In a final judgment of 25 September 2006 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the lower court's judgment. It fully agreed with its finding that, on the basis of the available evidence, there was no indication that the applicant had in fact tendered his resignation. Therefore, one of the key requirements of Article 325 § 1 (1) of the Labour Code (see paragraph 28 below) had not been complied with, which made the termination of the applicant's employment unlawful.
25. The applicant was not reinstated in his former position, as in 2003 the Criminological Studies Council at the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office had been abolished. However, during the pendency of the proceedings, again in 2003, a similar body was established at the Ministry of Justice and on 1 April 2003 the applicant was appointed there, apparently independently of the court order for his reinstatement. He has been working there to this day.
26. Section 112 of the Judicial Power Act of 1994 („Закон за съдебната власт“) provides that the Prosecutor's Office is unified and centralised, that each prosecutor is subordinate to the relevant senior prosecutor, and that all prosecutors are subordinate to the Chief Prosecutor (the last-mentioned aspect is also provided by Article 126 § 2 of the Constitution of 1991). The Chief Prosecutor may issue directives and give instructions relating to the Prosecutor's Office's activities (sections 111(3) and 114 of the Judicial Power Act of 1994). The Chief Prosecutor oversees the work of all prosecutors, and the prosecutors of the appellate and regional prosecutor's offices oversee the work of their subordinate prosecutors (section 115(1) and (2) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994). Higher prosecutors may perform any acts which are within the competence of their subordinate prosecutors. They may also stay or revoke their decisions in the cases provided for by law (section 116(2) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994). The higher prosecutors' written orders are binding on their subordinate prosecutors (section 116(3) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994).
27. Until 2003 the Criminological Studies Council was an agency attached to the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office (section 111(3) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994, as in force at the relevant time).
28. Article 325 § 1 (1) of the Labour Code of 1986 provides that an employment contract may be terminated by the parties without notice by mutual agreement expressed in writing.
29. By Article 225 § 1 of that Code, an unlawfully dismissed employee is entitled to compensation amounting to his gross salary for the time during which he has remained unemployed, but not for a period exceeding six months.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 10
13
8