ITEMID: 001-60642
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2002
DOCNAME: CASE OF M.G. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 8;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 9. The applicant was born in 1960 and he lives in Leicester. He is the eldest of three children. He was in voluntary care with the social services' department of the local authority for five periods during his childhood: 8 September – 6 November 1961, 15 February – 20 July 1962, 26 October – 23 December 1962, 4 April 1963 – 4 April 1966 and 16 January – 8 April 1967.
10. During these periods his mother was receiving periodic psychiatric treatment and his father had some difficulty coping with the children on his own. The applicant had contact with both parents while in care: there was contact each week and weekend during the second period of care, there were visits over every weekend and then fortnightly weekend visits by the end of the fourth (and longest) period, and those fortnightly weekend visits continued during the fifth period of care. It is not known how much parental contact there was during the first and third periods of care.
11. By letter dated 10 April 1995, the applicant requested access to his social service records. By letters dated 5 and 9 June 1995, he requested specific information including whether he had ever been on the “risk register”, whether his father had been investigated or convicted of crimes against children and about the responsibility of the local authority for abuse he had suffered as a child.
12. On 13 June 1995 a social worker discussed with the applicant the access procedures and the information sought. On 27 June 1995 that social worker went through background information gleaned from the file with the applicant (concerning the dates and places of care) and provided him with hand-written notes of that information.
13. On 22 August 1995 the same social worker provided the applicant with further information gleaned from the file in the form of typed notes (covering September 1961 to March 1966). She also discussed certain areas of particular concern to the applicant including the impact of childhood neglect and ill-treatment which he remembered at the hands of his father, his feelings about having had a violent father and his vague suspicions of having been abused while in local authority institutional care. They also discussed the allegations of ill-treatment of the applicant by his father which had been made by neighbours via the school to the local authority in November 1966, and the consequent investigation and decisions made by the local authority. The social worker also provided the applicant with various documents, including letters from his father to the social services between August 1962 and February 1967, social service progress reports dated November 1961 and April 1963, medical treatment permission forms signed by his father between September 1961 and February 1962, child care agreements with his father from September 1961 to April 1963, a medical report card dated January 1967 and a copy of his birth certificate. He was also given a report of a Child Care Officer dated 16 March 1967 (which was prepared for a case conference to be held on 17 March 1967) together with notes of that case conference. The latter report provided further detail of the allegations of ill-treatment in November 1966, of the consequent investigation and of the recommendations of the Child Care Officer.
14. By letter dated 18 September 1995, the social worker wrote to the applicant with more typed information taken from his file. That note dealt with the period April 1966 – September 1976. It included brief references to the applicant returning home in April 1967, to the family's move in October 1975 and to a supervision order made in respect of the applicant by a juvenile court in August 1976. She also gave the applicant a typed note recording the information which had been given orally to him during their last meeting, which note included further details of the period 1961-1963.
15. By letter dated 12 June 1996 to the local authority the applicant's legal representatives noted that the applicant had been provided with summary information and certain documents. They requested that he be allowed full access to his file. The local authority responded by letter dated 25 June 1996, pointing out that his social service records had been created prior to the entry into force of the Access to Personal Files Act 1987.
16. Further to the applicant's queries, the local authority confirmed by letter dated 12 July 1996 that there were no detailed records relating to him after 1967 except an indication of juvenile offending. It also noted that there was little mention of ill-treatment, but it enclosed the above-mentioned report of the Child Care Officer dated 16 March 1967. That letter accepted that the attitude expressed in that report would not have been acceptable in 1996 given the more developed understanding of child abuse matters.
17. In his letter of 21 January 1997, the applicant stated that memories of abuse suffered by him began to return shortly after March 1995 and that he was now in full possession of his memories, was being counselled and had consulted solicitors about a negligence action against the local authority. He requested specific information about the allegations of ill-treatment made in November 1966 and about his being abused by his father for eight years thereafter. The local authority responded by letter dated 17 February 1997, referring the applicant to the information already provided to him in 1995 and to the differences between social work standards and procedures in 1997 and in the 1960s.
18. The Court of Appeal in Gaskin v. Liverpool Corporation (1980 1 WLR 1459) held that the High Court, in refusing access to the relevant records, had correctly balanced the public interest in maintaining an efficient child-care system with the individual's interest in obtaining access to records, and that it was not necessary for the court to review the records in question in order to so decide.
19. In 1983 a binding circular, LAC(83)14, was issued setting out the principles to be applied by local authorities in permitting access to their care records. Access to records was, in principle, to be permitted subject to necessary exceptions (such as the preservation of third party confidences and the protection of sources).
20. The Access to Personal Files Act 1987 and the Access to Personal Files (Social Services) Regulations 1989 both entered into force on 1 April 1989. The Act and the Regulations gave subjects the statutory right to know what was recorded about them in manually maintained records held by the local authority for the performance of social service functions. A number of exceptions were retained for the preservation of third party confidences and the protection of sources, but there was a right of review (and, subsequently, of judicial review) of a refusal of access. The Act and Regulations did not, however, apply to records created before 1 April 1989.
21. Circular LAC(89)2 was issued to provide guidance to the local authorities on the implementation of the 1987 Act and the 1989 Regulations. The previous circular (LAC(83)14) was cancelled and Paragraph 7 of Appendix 1 to the new circular pointed out that, while there was no obligation to furnish pre-April 1989 information, “there is likely to be significant advantage in authorities making available as much information as possible. This could lead to greater clarity and understanding of an individual's background.”
22. On 1 March 2000 the Data Protection Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”) came into force and repealed the 1987 Act, the 1989 Regulations and circular LAC(89)2. It provided a statutory right of access for a “data subject” to information held about him in care records and other personal files (both manual and electronic) regardless of the date when the information was recorded, together with a right of appeal to the domestic courts or to the Data Protection Commissioner if access were refused, or where a contributor or a relevant third party had not consented.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 8


ITEMID: 001-57531
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: DEU
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1987
DOCNAME: CASE OF LUTZ v. GERMANY
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objection rejected (incompatibility);No violation of Art. 6-2
JUDGES: C. Russo;N. Valticos
TEXT: 11. Mr. Uli Lutz, a German national born in 1959, lives in Heilbronn-Horkheim.
12. On 10 October 1980, he was riding a motor cycle and was involved in a road accident. According to the police report (Verkehrs-Ordnungswidrigkeiten-Anzeige), he had attempted to overtake a car, although the traffic situation was unclear (unklare Verkehrslage). The result had been a collision which caused damage to both vehicles.
When he was questioned, the applicant made the following statement:
"At about 4.30 p.m. today, I was driving southwards along Hohenloher Strasse, Heilbronn-Horkheim.
Near the junction with Amsterdamer Strasse, I noticed a red car - which had its left indicator flashing - about to pull away from the kerb.
I was about to overtake on the left of this vehicle when it not only moved forward onto the road but turned further to the left in order to make a U-turn.
[It] was making its U-turn and was on the point of moving into the opposite carriageway (Gegenfahrspur) when I was still about ten yards behind it. As I was not expecting it to make a U-turn, I was intending to overtake it on the left.
By the time I realised that this was no longer possible, I had already moved over quite far to the left and I tried to brake but could not avoid colliding with the car, which by now was at right angles to the flow of traffic.
I was wearing a crash helmet when the accident occurred; I was not injured."
13. On 9 December 1980, on the basis of the police report, the Heilbronn Police Authority (Amt für öffentliche Ordnung) imposed on Mr. Lutz a fine (Geldbusse) of DM 125, to which were added costs of DM 14, for "joint responsibility for a road accident due to overtaking in an unclear traffic situation such that a collision was caused with another road-user".
The decision was based on section 24 of the Road Traffic Act (Strassenverkehrsgesetz - see paragraph 38 below) and Regulations 1(2), 5 and 49 of the Road Traffic Regulations (Strassenverkehrs- Ordnung). Regulation 1(2) reads:
"All road-users have a duty to conduct themselves in such a manner as not to harm or jeopardise others or inconvenience or annoy them more than may be inevitable in the circumstances."
Regulation 5 provides that motorists must overtake on the left (paragraph 1), that they may overtake only if they can see that they will not thereby interfere with oncoming traffic (paragraph 2) and that no overtaking is allowed in an unclear traffic situation (paragraph 3(1)).
By Regulation 49(1)(1) and 49(5), it is a "regulatory offence" (Ordnungswidrigkeit) to contravene Regulations 1(2) and 5(1) to (3); under section 24(2) of the Road Traffic Act, such an offence is punishable by a fine.
14. The driver of the car was likewise fined for a "regulatory offence".
15. Two days later, Mr. Lutz, who was represented by Mr. Wingerter, lodged an objection (Einspruch) against the decision of 9 December 1980. The appropriate authority in Heilbronn forwarded the objection to the public prosecutor’s office on 23 January 1981, and the latter transmitted it to the Heilbronn District Court (Amtsgericht) on 5 February.
On 24 July 1981, the court informed the applicant that it intended to discontinue the proceedings as they were time-barred and order costs against the Treasury (Staatskasse), while the applicant would have to bear his own necessary costs and expenses (notwendige Auslagen).
On 12 August, Mr. Wingerter replied that his client naturally agreed to the stay of proceedings, but not to an order requiring him to bear his own necessary costs and expenses; and he referred among other things to "the presumption of innocence, secured in the Convention on Human Rights".
16. On 24 August 1981, the District Court stayed the proceedings on the ground that they were time-barred. Its decision read as follows:
"In the ‘regulatory offence’ matter (Bussgeldsache)
against ... Uli Lutz
concerning a breach of the Road Traffic Regulations,
...
the proceedings shall be stayed.
The costs of the proceedings shall be borne by the Treasury. The defendant shall bear his own necessary costs and expenses.
Reasons:
On 9 December 1980, the Heilbronn Police Authority took a decision to impose a fine (Bussgeldbescheid) on the defendant for a breach of the Road Traffic Regulations. The defendant appealed against this decision. By an order made on 27 January 1981, the public prosecutor’s office in Heilbronn forwarded the case to the Heilbronn District Court for a decision. After the case had been submitted, prosecution of the ‘regulatory offence’ became time-barred under section 26(4) of the Road Traffic Act. The proceedings must therefore be stayed by reason of there being a technical bar to prosecution (Verfolgungshindernis), in accordance with Article 206a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, taken together with section 46 of the Act on ‘regulatory offences’ (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten) [see paragraph 19 below].
The decision on costs is based on Article 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, taken together with section 46 of the Act on ‘regulatory offences’.
In accordance with Article 467 § 2 [sic], second sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, taken together with section 46 of the Act on ‘regulatory offences’, the court declines to order the Treasury to bear the defendant’s necessary costs and expenses. As the file stands, the defendant would most probably have been convicted of an offence against the Road Traffic Regulations (Nach Lage der Akten wäre der Betroffene mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit wegen eines Verstosses gegen die StVO verurteilt worden). That being so, it would be unjust (unbillig to award his necessary costs and expenses against the Treasury."
17. On 10 September 1981, the applicant challenged this decision in so far as he had been ordered to bear his own costs and expenses.
On 25 September, the Heilbronn Regional Court (Landgericht) dismissed the appeal (sofortige Beschwerde) as being unfounded.
The court held that Article 6 § 2 (art. 6-2) of the Convention did not apply to the case. As it had already explained at length in an earlier decision, Article 6 (art. 6) protected the individual only from possible hazards in civil or criminal trials. This was clear beyond a peradventure from the wording of the provision itself. There was no reason to give Article 6 § 2 (art. 6-2) a broad interpretation such as would extend its application to other proceedings. The Article (art. 6-2) consequently could not apply to proceedings in connection with "regulatory offences", as these had been excluded from the category of criminal offences, and procedure relating to them was quite distinct from criminal procedure. On the basis that Article 6 § 2 (art. 6-2) was not applicable, the District Court had therefore been right to order the defendant to bear his own necessary costs and expenses (under Article 467 § 3, second sentence, sub-paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure) because had the prosecution not been statute-barred, "the defendant would almost certainly (mit annähernder Sicherheit) have been found guilty of an offence". He had himself admitted to the police that he was not expecting the car which was moving out to the left onto the road in front of him to make a U-turn; and that he had consequently attempted to overtake it but had been unable to avoid a collision despite his efforts to brake. Mr. Lutz had thus broken the basic rule in Regulation 1(2) of the Road Traffic Regulations and, in particular, had disregarded his duty under Regulation 5(3)(1) not to overtake where the traffic situation was unclear. The court held that in such circumstances it would have been unjust to award the defendant’s necessary costs and expenses against the Treasury, especially as the prosecution had become time-barred only during the course of the court proceedings, so that until that moment the defendant was rightly being proceeded against.
18. Mr. Lutz then applied to the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), but on 2 February 1982 a bench of three of that court’s judges refused to entertain the application, holding that it had insufficient prospects of success.
In the Constitutional Court’s view, the decisions of the District Court and the Regional Court did not offend the presumption of innocence, which was founded on the principle of the rule of law and was embodied in Article 6 § 2 (art. 6-2) of the Convention. However strong the suspicions, the presumption of innocence precluded taking measures against a defendant (Beschuldigter) that amounted in effect to a penalty (Strafe) in anticipation of a penalty (im Vorgriff auf die Strafe). This rule was not infringed where the necessary costs and expenses of a party who had been proceeded against in respect of a "regulatory offence" were not awarded against the Treasury in the event of the proceedings being discontinued. The judgment continued:
"The decision not to order the Treasury to pay the costs and expenses of the party concerned obviously cannot be regarded as a punishment (Bestrafung) or even be equated with such. Furthermore, the decision as to costs and expenses pursuant to Article 467 § 3, sub-paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 46(1) of the Act on ‘regulatory offences’ does not make any finding that the person concerned is guilty: it derives merely from the suspicion falling on him, which had given rise to his being prosecuted for a ‘regulatory offence’. The reasons for the order as to costs in the impugned decisions are therefore rightly confined to the finding that the defendant would most probably have been found guilty."
19. The subject of "regulatory offences" is governed by the Act of 24 May 1968 on "regulatory offences" (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten), in its version of 1 January 1975 ("the 1968/1975 Act"). The purpose of this legislation was to remove petty offences from the sphere of the criminal law. Included in this category were contraventions of the Road Traffic Act. Under section 21 of the Road Traffic Act (in its old version), commission of such contraventions had given rise to liability to a fine (Geldstrafe) or imprisonment (Haft). Section 3(6) of the Act of 24 May 1968 (Einführungsgesetz zum Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten) classified them as "Ordnungswidrigkeiten" and henceforth made them punishable only by fines (Geldbussen) not deemed to be criminal by the legislature.
The 1968/1975 Act had been preceded in the Federal Republic by the Act of 25 March 1952 on "regulatory offences" and, to a certain extent, the Economic Crime Act of 26 July 1949 (Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz). It was most recently amended by a statute of 7 July 1986, which entered into force on 1 April 1987.
20. Section 1(1) of the 1968/1975 Act defines a "regulatory offence" as an unlawful (rechtswidrig) and reprehensible (vorwerfbar) act, contravening a legal provision which makes offenders liable to a fine. The fine cannot be less than DM 5 or, as a general rule, more than DM 1,000 (section 17(1)). The amount of the fine is fixed in each case by reference to the seriousness of the offence, the degree of misconduct attributable to the offender and, save for minor (geringfügig) offences, the offender’s financial circumstances (section 17(3)).
If the act constitutes both a "regulatory" and a criminal offence, only the criminal law is applicable; however, if no criminal penalty (Strafe) is imposed, the act may be punished as a "regulatory offence" (section 21).
21. "Regulatory offences" are to be dealt with by the administrative authorities (Verwaltungsbehörde) designated by law, save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act confers the power of prosecution of such offences on the public prosecutor and the trial and punishment of them on the courts (sections 35 and 36). Where an act has come before him as a criminal matter, the public prosecutor may also treat the act as a "regulatory offence" (section 40).
22. The administrative authorities will remit the matter to the public prosecutor if there is reason to suppose that a criminal offence has been committed; he will refer the matter back to them if he does not take proceedings (section 41). In the case of a "regulatory offence" having a close connection with a criminal offence in respect of which the public prosecutor has instituted proceedings, the prosecutor may extend the criminal proceedings to cover the "regulatory offence" as long as the administrative authorities have not fixed any fine (section 42).
The public prosecutor’s decision to treat or not to treat an act as a criminal offence is binding on the administrative authorities (section 44).
23. Subject to the exceptions laid down in the 1968/1975 Act, the provisions of the ordinary law governing criminal procedure - in particular the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judicature Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) and the Juvenile Courts Act (Jugendgerichtsgesetz) - are applicable by analogy (sinngemäss) to the procedure in respect of "regulatory offences" (section 46(1)). The prosecuting authorities (see paragraph 21 above) have the same rights and duties as the public prosecutor in a criminal matter unless the 1968/1975 Act itself states otherwise (section 46(2)). Nevertheless, a number of measures permissible in criminal matters cannot be ordered in respect of "regulatory offences", notably arrest, interim police custody (vorläufige Festnahme) and seizure of mail or telegrams (section 46(3)). The taking of blood samples and other minor measures within the meaning of Article 81(a) § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remain possible.
24. The prosecution of "regulatory offences" lies within the discretion (pflichtgemässes Ermessen) of the competent authority, which may terminate the prosecution at any time while the case is pending before it (section 47(1)).
Once the case has been brought before a court (see paragraphs 29-30 below), power to direct a stay of proceedings rests with the court; any such decision requires the agreement of the public prosecutor and is final (section 47(2)).
25. As regards the judicial stage (if any) of the proceedings (see paragraphs 30-32 below), section 46(7) of the 1968/1975 Act vests jurisdiction in divisions (Abteilungen) of the district courts and in chambers (Kammern/Senate) of the regional courts, of the courts of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte) and of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof).
26. Investigations (Erforschung) into "regulatory offences" are a matter for the police authorities. In this connection, the police authorities enjoy a discretion (pflichtgemässes Ermessen); save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act provides otherwise, they have the same rights and duties as in the investigation of criminal offences (section 53(1)).
27. Prior to any decision being taken, the person concerned (Betroffener) has to be given the opportunity of commenting, to the competent authorities, on the allegation made against him (section 55).
In the case of a minor offence, the administrative authorities may give the person concerned a warning (Verwarnung) and impose on him an admonitory fine (Verwarnungsgeld); save for any exception laid down under the applicable law, the amount of an admonitory fine ranged from DM 5 to 40 at the relevant time, and since 1 April 1987 has ranged from DM 5 to 75 (section 56(1)). However, sanctions of this kind are possible only if the person concerned consents and pays the fine on the spot or within one week (section 56(2)).
28. If necessary, the administrative authorities will officially designate a lawyer to act for the person concerned in the proceedings before them (section 60).
Measures taken by the administrative authorities during the preliminary procedure can in principle be challenged before the courts (section 62).
29. Save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act provides otherwise - as in the case of the matter being settled by payment of an admonitory fine -, a "regulatory offence" is punishable by an administrative decision imposing a fine (Bussgeldbescheid; section 65).
The person concerned may lodge an objection (Einspruch) within a period which on 1 April 1987 was increased from one week to two weeks (section 67). Unless they withdraw their decision, the administrative authorities will then forward the file to the public prosecutor, who will submit it to the competent District Court and thereupon assume the function of prosecuting authority (sections 68 and 69).
30. Under section 71, if the District Court finds the objection admissible (section 70) it will, unless the 1968/1975 Act states otherwise, examine the objection in accordance with the provisions applicable to an objection against an order of summary punishment (Strafbefehl): in principle, it will hold a hearing and deliver a judgment (Urteil) which may impose a heavier sentence (Article 411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
However, the District Court’s ruling may take the form of an order (Beschluss) if the court considers that a hearing is not necessary and provided the public prosecutor or the person concerned does not object (section 72(1)). In that event, it may, inter alia, acquit the person concerned, settle the amount of a fine or terminate the prosecution, but it cannot increase the penalty (section 72(2), now renumbered (3)).
31. The person concerned has the option of attending the hearing but is not bound to do so unless the District Court so directs (section 73(1) and (2)); he may be represented by a lawyer (section 73(4)).
The public prosecutor’s office may be represented at the hearing; if the District Court considers the presence of an official from that office to be appropriate, it will inform the latter accordingly (section 75(1)).
The District Court will give the administrative authorities the opportunity to set out the matters which, in their view, are of importance for the decision to be given; they may address the Court at the hearing, if they so wish (section 76(1)).
32. Subject to certain conditions, section 79 allows an appeal on points of law (Rechtsbeschwerde) to be brought against a judgment or an order issued pursuant to section 72; save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act states otherwise, in determining the appeal the court concerned will follow, by analogy, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to review proceedings (Revision).
33. The administrative authorities’ classification of an act as a "regulatory offence" is not binding on the court ruling on the objection; however, it can apply the criminal law only if the person concerned has been informed of the change of classification and been enabled to prepare his defence (section 81(1)). Once this condition has been satisfied, either by the court of its own motion or at the public prosecutor’s request, the person concerned acquires the formal status of an accused (Angeklagter; section 81(2)) and the subsequent proceedings fall outside the scope of the 1968/1975 Act (section 81(3)).
34. A decision imposing a fine is enforceable once it has become final (sections 89 and 84). Unless the 1968/1975 Act states otherwise, enforcement of a decision taken by the administrative authorities is governed by the Federal Act or the Land Act, as the case may be, on enforcement in administrative matters (Verwaltungs-Vollstreckungsgesetze) (section 90(1)). When the decision is one taken by a court, certain relevant provisions of, inter alia, the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable (section 91).
35. If, without having established (dargetan) his inability to pay, the person concerned has not paid the fine in due time, the court may, at the request of the administrative authorities or, where the fine was imposed by a court decision, of its own motion, order coercive imprisonment (Erzwingungshaft - section 96(1)). The resultant detention does not replace payment of the fine in the manner of an Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe under the criminal law, but is intended to compel payment. The period of detention may not exceed six weeks for one fine and three months for several fines (section 96(3)). Implementation of the detention order is governed, inter alia, by the Code of Criminal Procedure (section 97).
36. As far as the costs of the administrative procedure are concerned, the competent authorities apply by analogy certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (section 105).
37. Under section 109 - likewise amended with effect from 1 April 1987 -, the person concerned has to bear the costs of the court proceedings if he withdraws his objection or if the competent court rejects it.
For the rest, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding payment of the costs of proceedings and of parties’ necessary costs and expenses apply by analogy (Article 464 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 46 of the 1968/1975 Act).
By the terms of Article 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any judgment, order of summary punishment or decision terminating a set of proceedings must determine who is to pay the costs of the proceedings (paragraph 1); the judgment or decision in which the proceedings culminate shall state who is to bear the necessary costs and expenses (paragraph 2).
Paragraph 1 and paragraph 3, second sentence, sub-paragraph 2, of Article 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which were applied in the instant case pursuant to section 46 of the 1968/1975 Act, provide:
"1. If the defendant (Angeschuldigter) is acquitted or if committal for trial (Hauptverfahren) is refused or if the proceedings against him are discontinued, the costs of the proceedings and the defendant’s necessary costs and expenses shall be borne by the Treasury.
...
3. ... The court may decline to award the defendant’s necessary costs and expenses against the Treasury where the defendant
...
(2) has avoided conviction merely because of a technical bar to the proceedings (Verfahrenshindernis)."
Inasmuch as the law does not make the reimbursement of necessary costs and expenses mandatory, the courts decide the issue on an equitable basis and have a degree of discretion in the matter.
38. The Road Traffic Act, the Road Traffic Regulations and the Road Traffic Licence and Vehicle Conformity Regulations (Strassenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung) contain lists of "regulatory offences" punishable by a fine (section 24 of the Road Traffic Act).
Section 24 of the Road Traffic Act provides:
"1. It shall be a ‘regulatory offence’ wilfully or negligently (vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig) to contravene a provision in a statutory instrument (Rechtsverordnung) made pursuant to section 6(1) or in an order (Anordnung) made pursuant to such a statutory instrument if the statutory instrument concerned refers to the present provision ... in respect of a given offence. Such reference shall not be required where the provision of the statutory instrument was made before 1 January 1969.
2. A ‘regulatory offence’ is punishable by a fine."
The Road Traffic Regulations, which were applied in the instant case, were contained in one of the statutory instruments issued under section 6(1) of the Road Traffic Act.
39. In the case of a "regulatory offence" committed in gross (grob) and persistent (beharrlich) violation of the duties incumbent on a driver, the administrative authorities or, where an objection has been lodged, the court may at the same time disqualify the person concerned from holding a driving licence (Fahrverbot) for a period of one to three months (section 25 of the Road Traffic Act).
40. The Länder have co-operated to adopt rules (Verwaltungs-vorschriften) establishing a uniform scale of fines (Bussgeldkatalog) for the various road traffic "regulatory offences"; legally, these rules are binding on the administrative authorities empowered to impose fines but not on the courts.
Section 26(a) of the Road Traffic Act, which was inserted into the Act on 28 December 1982 but has not yet been implemented, provides that the Minister of Transport shall issue such rules with the agreement of the Bundesrat and in the form of a statutory instrument (Rechtsverordnung).
41. Under section 28 of the Road Traffic Act, a fine imposed for contravention of road traffic regulations may in some specified cases be entered in a central traffic register (Verkehrszentralregister) if it exceeds a certain amount (DM 39 at the time of the events in issue, DM 79 as from 1 July 1982); on the other hand, no mention of it is included in the criminal records (Bundeszentralregister). The entry must be expunged after a maximum of two years, unless further entries have been made in the meantime (section 29).
Only certain authorities have access to the register, notably for the purposes of a criminal prosecution or a prosecution for a road traffic "regulatory offence" (section 30).
42. At the time of the events in issue, by virtue of section 26(3) of the Road Traffic Act, the limitation period for the "regulatory offences" specified in section 24 of the Act was three months; since 1 April 1987, it has been three months in respect of the proceedings before an administrative authority and six months as from the date of the decision taken by that authority.
43. According to the unchallenged statements of the Government, the 1968/1975 Act in practice plays a particularly important role in road traffic cases, and approximately 90 per cent of fines imposed relate to road traffic offences.
In Bavaria, which the Government said could be taken as representative of the Federal Republic, there were 1,141,221 decisions imposing a fine in 1985. The percentage of fines of over DM 200 and DM 500 was only 1.3 and 0.1 respectively, as compared with 8.8 for fines of DM 120 to 200, 15 for fines of DM 80 to 119, 22.3 for fines of DM 41 to 79 and 52.5 for fines of DM 5 to 40.
Of the 1,199,802 road traffic offences recorded in 1986, infringements of waiting and parking prohibitions accounted for 49.7 per cent.
44. The scope of the principle of the presumption of innocence in the context of discontinuance of criminal proceedings has recently been clarified by the Federal Constitutional Court. By a judgment delivered on 26 March 1987, the Federal Constitutional Court quashed, as contravening the principle, two decisions by district courts and one decision by a regional court whereby the courts, having held the guilt of the defendants to be insignificant (gering), had stayed the private prosecutions brought against them but had awarded the costs of the proceedings against the defendants, including the costs and expenses of the complainants (cases 2 Bvr 589/79, 2 Bvr 740/81 and 2 Bvr 284/85, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1987, pp. 203-209).
The Constitutional Court held it to be inconsistent with the presumption of innocence to speak in the reasons given for a discontinuance decision of a defendant’s guilt or to base an order as to costs and expenses on the supposition (Annahme) that a defendant has been guilty of an offence if the trial has not reached the stage at which the verdict can be given (Schuldspruchreife). It pointed out that the principle of the presumption of innocence derived from the principle of the rule of law, and it also referred to Article 6 § 2 (art. 6-2) of the Convention. The Convention did not have the status of constitutional law in the Federal Republic, but regard should be had to it and to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting the principles and fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
Reaffirming its case-law, the Constitutional Court reiterated that, by virtue of the principle of the presumption of innocence, no measures amounting in effect to a penalty may be taken against a defendant without his guilt having been established beforehand at a proper trial and no defendant may be treated as guilty. The Court added that this principle requires that guilt be proved according to law before it can be held against the person concerned. A finding of guilt will accordingly not be legitimate for this purpose unless it is pronounced at the close of a trial which has reached the stage at which a verdict can be given.
Citing the Minelli judgment of 25 March 1983 (Series A no. 62), the Constitutional Court ruled that a decision discontinuing criminal proceedings may offend the presumption of innocence if it contains in its reasoning a finding of the defendant’s guilt without that guilt having been proved according to law. On the other hand, nothing precluded a court from making findings in such a decision as to the defendant’s guilt and ordering him to pay the necessary costs and expenses of the complainants as well as the costs of the proceedings if it had held a hearing enabling it to reach a verdict (Entscheidungsreife).
On the basis of these considerations, the Constitutional Court quashed three of the five decisions challenged but dismissed the application in the first of the three cases concerned, as the defence had made the closing address after a trial.
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-2


ITEMID: 001-109341
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: FIN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: CASE OF HUHTAMAKI v. FINLAND
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 7 - No punishment without law (Article 7-1 - Nullum crimen sine lege)
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;George Nicolaou;Lech Garlicki;Nebojša Vučinić;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Helsinki.
6. On 6 August 1993 a company controlled by Mr A. purchased real estate. In summer 1997 Mr A. transferred the control over the company to another person who, on 24 September 1997, met the applicant for the first time. On 13 October 1997 the applicant sold the real estate, in accordance with this other person’s instructions, on behalf of the company to another company. On 14 October 1997 Mr A. was declared personally bankrupt while he was at the same time charged with dishonesty by a debtor (velallisen epärehellisyys, oredlighet som gäldenär). On 7 November 1997, when the first swearing of the inventory of the bankruptcy estate was held, Mr A. refused to swear the inventory. The inventory did not include the real estate. On 17 December 1997, when the second swearing of the inventory of the bankruptcy estate was held, Mr A. swore the inventory.
7. On 23 June 2005 the public prosecutor brought charges against the applicant for having concealed and obliterated, between 18 December 1997 and 12 February 1998 by, inter alia, drafting contracts and transferring moneys, the true nature and origin of the real estate, in reality owned by Mr A., knowing that this property was obtained by a criminal act.
8. On 16 June 2006 the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) convicted the applicant in the context of money laundering, inter alia, of an aggravated receiving offence (törkeä kätkemisrikos, grovt häleri) and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of one year and ten months and to removal from office as a professor of commercial law. The conviction was based on a principal offence committed by Mr A. He was convicted on the same date by the District Court of aggravated debtor’s fraud (törkeä velallisen petos, grovt gäldenärsbedrägeri) and sentenced to imprisonment. The court found that Mr A. had not declared all his assets when swearing the inventory of his personal bankruptcy estate in 1997.
9. By letter dated 29 September 2006 the applicant appealed to the Helsinki Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten) requesting, inter alia, that he be acquitted.
10. On 14 December 2007 the Helsinki Appeal Court upheld the judgment of the District Court, except for the fact that the applicant’s prison sentence was converted into a conditional one.
11. By letter dated 8 February 2008 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen).
12. On 17 April 2009 the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to Mr A. The applicant was granted leave to appeal only in respect of the removal from office and the obligation to pay costs and expenses to Mr A.’s bankruptcy estate. As to the merits, the court upheld the District Court’s judgment. The court found that the information Mr A. had declined to give in 1997 was not such that it would in all probability have provided a basis for his conviction. Mr A. had thus not had any right to decline to give this information and he was thus guilty of aggravated debtor’s fraud. As concerns the applicant, the court acquitted him of the obligation to pay costs and expenses to Mr A.’s bankruptcy estate. As to his removal from office, the court did not change the earlier judgments. The judgment included several dissenting opinions.
13. Four days later, on 21 April 2009, the Court delivered its judgment in the case Marttinen v. Finland (no. 19235/03, 21 April 2009) in which it found that there had been a violation of the applicant’s right to silence and his right not to incriminate himself guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In that case the applicant was charged with for having previously given false accounts of his assets at the time when coercion was used to obtain information from him. The circumstances of that case were identical to that of Mr A. with the only exception that Mr Marttinen had been subject to enforcement while Mr A. was subject to personal bankruptcy proceedings. They were both under threat of a similar default fine and even imprisonment if they did not agree to declare all their assets. This information could have been used against them in other pending criminal proceedings.
14. On an unspecified date Mr A. filed an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court requesting re-opening of his case on the basis of the Court’s judgment in the Marttinen case.
15. On 12 May 2009 the applicant also filed a re-opening request with the Supreme Court as his conviction was ancillary to that of Mr A. He also requested that the execution of his sentence be stayed as far as the removal from office was concerned.
16. On 22 May 2009 the Supreme Court refused the request to stay the execution due to the fact that the removal from office had taken effect on the date of the judgment, namely, on 17 April 2009, and that there was thus no execution measure to be stayed.
17. On 20 October 2009 the Supreme Court, sitting in plenum, re-opened Mr A.’s case, dismissed all the charges against him and freed him from the sentence imposed. The court found that Mr A. had had a right to remain silent as he could not rule out that the information given could be used against him in criminal proceedings. Mr A had thus been entitled to decline to declare, inter alia, the real estate.
18. On 22 June 2010 the Supreme Court, sitting in plenum, rejected the applicant’s request for re-opening. The court found that even though Mr A. had had a right to remain silent, this did not mean that the applicant’s acts to conceal assets, namely the real estate, from A.’s creditors were justified. The effects of the right not to incriminate oneself were limited only to the person who was asked to submit information. A person could be convicted of a receiving offence even if the perpetrator of the principal offence was freed from criminal liability. The applicant’s right to a fair trial had not been violated as no information received in violation of the right not to incriminate oneself had been used as evidence vis-à-vis the applicant.
19. The referendary and three justices gave a joint dissenting opinion. According to them, there was no domestic law or jurisprudence on whether the right not to incriminate oneself could have effects on other persons connected to the crime in question. The Supreme Court had already found that Mr A. had not committed the debtor’s fraud of which he was accused. Therefore the applicant could not have been guilty of receiving the assets that Mr A. had acquired through debtor’s fraud, as indicated in the charges. There were no other charges against him. Consequently, the applicant’s case should be re-opened, all charges against him dismissed and he should be freed from all sanctions imposed on him.
20. Chapter 39, sections 2 and 3, of the Criminal Code (rikoslaki; strafflagen, Act no. 769/1990, as in force at the relevant time) provide the following:
“Fraud by a debtor
A debtor who, in order to obtain unlawful financial benefit for himself or herself or another in bankruptcy, enforcement, debt adjustment or restructuring proceedings
(1) conceals his or her property,
(2) reports a liability that is false in full or in part, or based on a sham transaction,
(3) gives other false or misleading information on a circumstance that is significant from the point of view of the creditors, or
(4) fails to report a liability,
shall be sentenced for fraud by a debtor to a fine or to imprisonment for at most two years.
If the debtor rectifies the misleading information or otherwise prevents the effect of his or her act on the proceedings before he or she attests to the correctness of the estate inventory or before the misleading information otherwise affects the proceedings, the act is not deemed fraud by a debtor.
Aggravated fraud by a debtor
If in the fraud by a debtor
(1) considerable benefit is sought or
(2) the debtor attests in court to the correctness of the false or misleading information
and the fraud by the debtor is aggravated also when assessed as a whole, the offender shall be sentenced for aggravated fraud by a debtor to imprisonment for at least four months and at most four years.”
21. Chapter 32, section 1, of the Criminal Code (Act no. 769/1990, as in force at the relevant time) provides the following:
“Receiving offence
A person who hides, procures, takes into his or her possession or conveys property obtained from another through theft, embezzlement, robbery, extortion, fraud, usury or means of payment fraud or through fraud by a debtor, aggravated fraud by a debtor or intentional deceitfulness by a debtor, or otherwise handles such property although he or she knows that the property was thus obtained shall be sentenced for a receiving offence to a fine or to imprisonment for at most one year and six months.
A person shall also be sentenced for a receiving offence if he or she
1) receives, converts, conveys or transfers funds or other property although he or she knows that they were acquired through an offence or replace funds or property acquired through an offence, in order to conceal or obliterate their illegal origin or to assist the offender in evading the legal consequences of the offence, or
2) conceals or obliterates the true nature, origin, location or disposition of or rights to property referred to in paragraph 1, or conceals information about such a circumstance which he or she is obliged to disclose under law.”
22. According to Chapter 32, section 2, of the same Code:
“Aggravated receiving offence
If the object of the receiving offence is very valuable property and the receiving offence is aggravated also when assessed as a whole, the offender shall be sentenced for an aggravated receiving offence to imprisonment for at least four months and at most four years.”
23. According to Chapter 5, section 7, of the Criminal Code (Act no. 15/2003, as in force at the relevant time),
“[w]here a special circumstance vindicates, mitigates or aggravates an act, it applies only to the perpetrator, inciter or abettor to whom the circumstance pertains.
An inciter or abettor is not exempted from penal liability by the fact that he or she is not affected by a special circumstance related to the person and said circumstance is a basis for the punishability of the act by the perpetrator.”
24. Chapter 31, section 14, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Proceedings (oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångs balk, Act no. 109/1960) provides the following:
“If the request for the reversal of a final judgment is upheld and it is deemed necessary to retry the case, the Supreme Court shall order the deadline, the court and the manner in which the case is to be brought for a retrial. However, the Supreme Court shall have the right to immediately rectify the judgment, if the case is found to be clear and the request does not concern the reversal of a judgment in a criminal case to the detriment of the defendant.”
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 7
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 7-1


ITEMID: 001-69033
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: CASE OF HEGER v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Modra. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
5. On 24 August 1993 the Modra municipality sued the applicant before the Bratislava-vidiek District Court. The plaintiff sought to have a contract of lease terminated in respect of a flat which had been earlier allocated to the applicant.
6. Between 7 September 1993 and 7 December 1993 the District Court scheduled five hearings. The applicant did not appear. On two occasions he informed the court that he was ill and on another two occasions he stated that his duties prevented him from attending the court hearings.
7. On 30 September 1994 a different judge was assigned to deal with the case. A hearing was held on 24 November 1994 at which the applicant failed to appear. The District Court therefore imposed a fine on the applicant as well as on a witness who had also failed to appear.
8. At a hearing held on 19 December 1994 the applicant appealed against the decision on a fine and he also challenged the District Court judge dealing with the case. The file was transmitted to the Bratislava Regional Court. On 25 April 1994 the latter quashed the decision on the fine and refused to exclude the District Court judge from dealing with the case.
9. The file was returned to the District Court on 1 June 1995. A hearing was scheduled for 4 March 1996. The court had difficulties in serving the summons on the applicant. On 1 March 1996 the applicant requested that the hearing be adjourned as he was ill.
10. On 4 April 1996 the case was again adjourned due to the absence of the applicant. The court requested a doctor to submit information on the applicant’s health. Both the applicant and the plaintiff’s lawyer informed the District Court that they could not attend a hearing scheduled for 5 August 1996.
11. On 17 September 1996 the District Court decided to jointly deal with the above case and an action of 31 July 1996 seeking termination of the applicant’s contract of lease on a different ground.
12. On 27 September 1996 the applicant requested that a hearing scheduled for 30 September 1996 be adjourned as he was ill.
13. On 14 November 1996 the District Court heard the parties.
14. In the context of a reform of the judiciary the case was transferred to the Bratislava III District Court. The new judge received the file in May 1997. In February 1998 she scheduled a hearing for 6 April 1998. On 16 March 1998 the applicant informed the court that he was ill. The case was adjourned as both the applicant and the plaintiff had failed to appear.
15. On 17 June 1998 the applicant made a counter-claim.
16. On 31 March 1999 the District Court heard the applicant. On 20 April 1999 the applicant requested that a witness should be heard. Subsequently the case was transferred to a different judge.
17. A hearing was held on 12 December 2000.
18. On 22 February 2001 and on 3 April 2001 the case was adjourned due to the applicant’s absence.
19. On 26 April 2001 the Bratislava III District Court dismissed the action. The decision became final on 10 July 2001.
20. By a judicial decision which became final in 1990 the applicant’s former wife was ordered to pay a sum of money to the applicant.
21. On 28 January 1991, on the applicant’s request of 3 December 1990, the Bratislava-vidiek District Court started enforcement proceedings in which the sum due was to be obtained by means of selling the defendant’s car.
22. On 8 March 1991 the defendant appealed. She alleged that she no longer owned the car in question. On 30 August 1991 the appellate court upheld the District Court’s decision on enforcement of the judgment in question. On 22 November 1991 the new owner of the car requested that it should be excluded from the enforcement. In March 1992 the police withheld the documents relating to the car at the court’s request.
23. On 21 October 1992 the court heard the persons concerned. The defendant submitted a sales contract concerning the car in question and informed the court that she had started paying the debt to the applicant. Subsequently the case was transferred to a different judge. On 2 July 1993 the judge requested that the parties should submit further information and documents. The applicant was asked to specify, inter alia, the outstanding sum which the defendant owed him.
24. On 16 July 1993 the applicant informed the court that he did not agree to the instalments which the defendant had proposed to pay to him. On 8 October 1993 the District Court asked the applicant to submit further information including the sum which the defendant had already paid to him.
25. On 22 December 1993 a different judge was assigned to deal with the case. On 5 October 1994 the case was transferred to another judge.
26. Between 12 June 1995 and 29 October 1996 the file was submitted for examination to a judge dealing in a different set of proceedings with the applicant’s claim for compensation against his former wife. On 25 October 1996 the applicant requested that additional evidence should be taken.
27. On 22 November 1996 the case was taken over by the Bratislava III District Court as the Bratislava-vidiek District Court had ceased to exist.
28. On 26 February 1997 the President of the Bratislava III District Court admitted, in reply to the applicant’s complaint, that there had been undue delays in the proceedings. The letter stated that the judge dealing with the case had left the judiciary and that the vacant post had not yet been filled.
29. On 27 March 1998 the applicant informed the District Court that the defendant had paid a part of the debt and specified the relevant sum. The court therefore discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of that sum.
30. On 22 February 2000 the Bratislava III District Court found that the claim for enforcement was inadmissible as the defendant had sold the car in question on 4 January 1991. The sum due could not, therefore, be enforced as claimed by the applicant.
31. On 5 June 2000 the Bratislava III District Court formally discontinued the enforcement proceedings which had been brought on 28 January 1991.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-4797
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SWE
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 1999
DOCNAME: JAMA v. SWEDEN
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Gaukur Jörundsson;Josep Casadevall
TEXT: The applicant is a national of Ethiopia, born in 1958. At present he is imprisoned. Previously he resided in Gothenburg, Sweden.
The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.
The applicant came to Sweden in 1989 and applied for asylum. He stated that he had not been involved in any direct political activities in Ethiopia but that he had encountered problems due to his Somalian origin. He maintained furthermore that he had assisted the resistance movement by transporting necessities of life to people in the Ogaden province. The applicant was considered a de facto refugee by the Swedish authorities, and was granted a permanent residence permit. His request for a travel document and a declaration of refugee status was, however, rejected.
The applicant was convicted of theft in 1993 and of petty larceny and aggravated assault in 1995. For the last two crimes he was, on 1 December 1995, sentenced to one year and ten months’ imprisonment by the District Court (tingsrätten) of Gothenburg.
On 30 September 1996 the District Court of Gothenburg convicted the applicant of attempted manslaughter (försök till dråp). He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. As regards the question of expulsion the court found, with its chairman and one of the lay assessors dissenting that, being of Somalian origin from the Ogaden province, the applicant would risk persecution if he returned to Ethiopia. The court, therefore, did not issue an expulsion order also bearing in mind that the applicant had resided in Sweden since 1989.
The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal (hovrätten). During the proceedings before the Court of Appeal the court obtained an opinion from the National Immigration Board (Statens invandrarverk) as to the applicant’s need for protection. In its opinion of 23 August 1996 the Board submitted that it had formed its opinion on the basis of an overall assessment of the political situation in Ethiopia. The assessment was founded on several reports from the Swedish foreign administration covering the political situation after the fall of the Mengistu regime in May 1991. According to those reports the human rights situation had improved considerably. A new Constitution had been adopted in 1994 which established, both generally and in detail, that human rights should be respected. The Ethiopian Government had also signed all essential conventions on human rights. The Board therefore considered that the applicant was no longer in need of protection in Sweden.
On 6 December 1996 the Court of Appeal of Western Sweden, at the same time reviewing the judgment of 1 December 1995, sentenced the applicant to five years’ imprisonment to be followed by expulsion. The Court took into consideration, inter alia, that the applicant during one year had committed two serious crimes of violence, that it could be assumed that he would pursue his criminal activities in Sweden if he was allowed to stay there, that he, whilst residing in Sweden, had been working for only a limited time, that he did not have any relatives in Sweden and that he had not learned Swedish although he had been living in the country for seven years. Furthermore the court took into consideration the the National Immigration Board’s opinion that the applicant, due to the new conditions in Ethiopia, was no longer in need of protection in Sweden as a de facto refugee.
The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen). On 30 January 1997 he was refused leave to appeal.
On 2 October 1997 the Government rejected the applicant’s petition to have the expulsion order revoked.
The applicant may be released on probation on 16 October 1999 at the earliest. An expulsion may take place as from that date. The enforcement will be carried out by the local police authority.


ITEMID: 001-22962
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2002
DOCNAME: KOZAK v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicant, Mrs Anastasiya Borisovna Kozak, is a Ukrainian national who was born in Odessa on 28 November 1948 and lives in Ukraine.
In February 1986 the Illichevsk Municipal Council instituted proceedings against the applicant for the withdrawal of her title to a plot of land and the house built on that land by R.L.P. without authorisation. According to the applicant, this property belonged to her.
On 18 March 1986 the Illichevck District Court of Odessa allowed the Illichevsk Municipal Council’s claims.
In 1998 the applicant requested the President of the Odessa Regional Court to initiate supervisory review proceedings and to seek annulment of the decision, since she had not participated in the proceedings as the owner of the property in question.
The Odessa Regional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint on 8 April 1998, 23 September 1998 and 28 January 1999, as being unsubstantiated.
In February 1999 the applicant lodged a request with the President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine for a supervisory review of her case.
On 16 March 1999, the Supreme Court of Ukraine instructed the Odessa Regional Court to review the complaints of the applicant and to inform her of the results of the review.
On 12 May 1999, the Odessa Regional Court informed the applicant that it was not possible to review the case because the case-file had been destroyed.
In February 2001 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Illichevsk District Court of Odessa for the reconstruction of the case-file which had formed the basis of the 1986 decision.
On 5 February 2001 the Illichevsk District Court of Odessa decided to reconstruct the case-file.
In May 2001 the applicant lodged an application with the President of the Odessa Regional Court to annul the decision of the Illichevsk District Court of Odessa of 18 March 1986. On 30 May 2001 the Odessa Regional Court refused to initiate supervisory review proceedings on the basis of the applicant’s complaints.
In September 2001 the applicant lodged an application with the Supreme Court of Ukraine in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the transitional provisions of the Law of 21 June 2001 on the Introduction of Changes and Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, for annulment (касаційна скарга) of the decision of the Illichevsk District Court of Odessa of 18 March 1986.
On 7 December 2001 a panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to transfer the case to a chamber for consideration.
“The Court of Cassation is the Supreme Court of Ukraine.”
“Parties and other persons who participate in court proceedings, and the prosecutor and other persons who have not participated in the proceedings in which the court has decided on their rights and obligations, may lodge a cassation appeal against judgments and rulings adopted by the court of first instance, only in relation to a violation of the substantive or procedural law and rulings and judgments of an appeal court.
The basis for such an appeal is the incorrect application of the norms of substantive law or infringement of the norms of procedural law.”
“The deadline for lodging an application by the prosecutor is three months from the date of delivery of the ruling or judgment of the Court of Appeal, or one year from the date of delivery of the ruling or judgment of the court of first instance, if these rulings or decisions have not been appealed against.”
“The issue of the transfer of the case for consideration by a judicial chamber is to be considered by a panel of three judges, in camera, without the participation of the parties to the proceedings.
The case shall be transferred for a hearing by a judicial chamber if one of the judges of the court reaches that conclusion. ...
If the grounds for transfer of the case for consideration by the chamber are not satisfied, the court shall adopt a ruling refusing to allow the applicant’s claims.”
“The Court of Cassation has the power to:
1) adopt a ruling rejecting the application for annulment;
2) adopt a ruling fully or partly annulling a judicial decision at issue and remitting the case for a re-hearing to the court of first instance or appellate court;
3) adopt a ruling annulling the decision at issue and leaving in force a judgment that was quashed by an appeal court in error;
4) adopt a ruling annulling a decisions at issue, terminating the proceedings in a civil case and refusing to allow an applicant’s claims;
5) change the decision on the merits of the case and not remit it for further consideration.”
“1. This Law shall enter into force as from 29 June 2001.
2. Laws and other normative acts adopted before this Law entered into force are effective in so far as their provisions do not conflict with the Constitution of Ukraine and this Law.
3. Appeals in civil cases lodged before 29 June 2001 shall be considered in accordance with the procedure adopted for the examination of appeals against local courts’ decisions.
4. Protests against judicial decisions lodged before 29 June 2001 shall be sent to the Supreme Court of Ukraine for consideration in accordance with the procedure for consideration of cassation appeals (касаційних скарг).
5. Decisions that have been adopted and have entered into force before 29 June 2001 can be appealed against within three months in accordance with the procedure for consideration of cassation appeals (to the Supreme Court of Ukraine).”


ITEMID: 001-57862
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SWE
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1993
DOCNAME: CASE OF ZANDER v. SWEDEN
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings
TEXT: 6. Mr Lennhart and Mrs Gunny Zander, who are husband and wife, are Swedish citizens and live in Gryta in the municipality of Västerås.
7. Since 1966 the applicants have owned a property in Gryta, adjacent to land on which a company - Västmanlands Avfallsaktiebolag (VAFAB) - takes delivery of and treats household and industrial waste, amongst other things. VAFAB has been authorised to engage in this activity on the land in question since 1 July 1983, when the National Licensing Board for Protection of the Environment (koncessionsnämnden för miljöskydd - "the Licensing Board") first issued it with a permit to this effect under the provisions of the 1969 Environment Protection Act (miljöskyddslagen 1969:387 -"the 1969 Act").
8. Prior to this, it had been discovered in 1979 that refuse containing cyanide had been left on the dump and analyses of drinking-water emanating from a nearby well had shown excessive levels of cyanide in the water. The Health Care Board (hälsovårdsnämnden, later named miljö - och hälsoskyddsnämnden) of Västerås had prohibited the use of the water and had provisionally supplied the property owner dependent on the well with municipal drinking-water.
Further analyses effected in October 1983 showed excessive levels of cyanide in six other wells near the dump, one of which was on the applicants’ property. As a result, the use of the water from these wells too was prohibited and the landowners concerned, including the applicants, were temporarily provided with municipal drinking-water.
However, in June 1984 the National Food Agency (livsmedelsverket) recommended that the maximum permitted level of cyanide be raised from 0.01 mg to 0.1 mg per litre. As a result, as of February 1985, the municipality stopped supplying the above-mentioned landowners with water.
9. In July 1986 VAFAB asked the Licensing Board to renew its permit and to allow it to expand its activities on the dump. The applicants together with other landowners demanded that the request should not be granted without an obligation being imposed on VAFAB, by way of precautionary measure under section 5 of the 1969 Act (see paragraph 12 below), to supply drinking-water free of charge to the owners concerned, as the proposed activity entailed and would continue to entail a risk of polluting their water.
10. By decision of 13 March 1987, the Licensing Board granted VAFAB’s request and dismissed the applicants’ and the other owners’ claim, on the ground that there was no likely water connection between the dump and the wells. It further stated that, notwithstanding a possible risk of pollution, it would be unreasonable to make the authorisation in question conditional upon such a general measure as that suggested by the claimants.
On the other hand, the Board attached a number of conditions to the granting of the permit, including the requirement that the water in the wells be carefully analysed at regular intervals and that the owners be informed of the results. Should the analyses give reason to suspect that the dump was causing pollution of the water, VAFAB would be under an obligation to take immediately any such action to supply the owners with water as deemed appropriate by the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen).
11. The applicants appealed to the Government, challenging the conditions set for the permit. The Government, as the final instance of appeal (see paragraph 13 below), upheld these and dismissed the appeal on 17 March 1988.
12. According to section 1 of the 1969 Act, any use of land that may cause, inter alia, water pollution is considered an environmentally hazardous activity for the purposes of the Act.
Section 5 provides:
"A person who engages in or intends to engage in an environmentally hazardous activity shall take such protective action, comply with such restrictions on the activity and take such other precautionary measures as may reasonably be required in order to prevent or remedy its detrimental effects. The duty to remedy detrimental effects continues to apply after the activity has ceased.
In assessing the extent of obligations imposed under the first paragraph, regard should be had to what is technically feasible for the activity in question as well as to the public and private interests involved.
In striking a balance between the various interests, particular weight should be attached, on the one hand, to the nature of the area that may be subjected to disturbance and to the impact of the disturbance and, on the other hand, to the usefulness of the activity, the costs of protective action and other financial implications of the precautionary measures in issue."
13. A decision by the Licensing Board authorising an environmentally hazardous activity must specify what activity is being permitted and on what conditions (section 18). It may be appealed against to the Government by any person concerned (section 48). At the time of the Government’s dismissal of the applicants’ appeal (see paragraph 11 above), its decisions were not subject to judicial review (for further details on this point, see, in particular, the Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 19-20, para. 50). Since the entry into force, on 1 June 1988, of the Act on Judicial Review of certain Administrative Decisions, the lawfulness of a number of decisions by the Government may be challenged before the Supreme Administrative Court. However, it was not possible for the applicants to avail themselves of this remedy in respect of the Government’s decision as the Act did not have retroactive effect.
14. The Licensing Board is composed of a chairman and three other members, all of whom are appointed by the Government. The chairman is required to be well-versed in legal matters and experienced in performing judicial tasks; in addition, one of the three members must have expertise and experience in technological matters, the second must have experience in activities falling within the competence of the National Environment Protection Board (naturvårdverket) and the third in industrial operations (section 11 of the 1969 Act).
15. Pursuant to section 34, a claim relating to an environmentally hazardous activity may be filed with the Real Estate Court (fastighetsdomstolen), a specially composed chamber of the District Court (tingsrätten). Such a claim may, for instance, seek to have the activity made conditional upon protective or precautionary measures being taken.
On the other hand, section 22 provides that the holder of a permit granted under the 1969 Act may not be ordered to discontinue the activity in question or to take precautionary measures other than those, if any, specified in the permit. The exceptions to this rule, contained in sections 23-25, 29 and 40, are not relevant to the present case.
16. Under section 3 of the 1986 Environmental Damage Act (miljöskadelagen 1986:225 - "the 1986 Act"), a person who has suffered damage or injury as a result of pollution of groundwater or watercourses may lodge a claim for compensation with the Real Estate Court. The claim may be brought against the person or persons who have caused the deleterious activity to be carried on (section 6).
A condition for compensation is that there be a substantial probability of a causal link between the impugned activity and the damage or injury (section 3). The fact that the activity has been authorised under the 1969 Act is not a bar to liability under the 1986 Act.
A decision by the Real Estate Court on a compensation claim as mentioned above may be appealed against to the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) and, with leave, to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-97783
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: CASE OF SPK DIMSKIY v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of P1-1;No violation of Art. 6
JUDGES: Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev
TEXT: 6. The applicant is the agricultural production co-operative “Dimskiy” (сельскохозяйственный производственный кооператив «Димский»), a legal entity under the Russian law, established in 1992 in the village of Novoaleksandrovka in the Tambov District of the Amur Region. The applicant was subsequently re-organised into a joint-stock company “Dimskoye” (ОАО «Димское»).
7. In 1987 the General Secretary of the USSR Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev presented his “basic theses”, which laid the political foundation for economic reform heralding the transition to a market economy. Several laws were enacted which opened up the State-dominated planned economy to private enterprise. However, the Government preferred to keep control over consumer prices rather than leaving them to be determined by the free market.
8. By 1990 Government spending increased sharply as a growing number of unprofitable enterprises required State support, whereas more resources were diverted to subsidise consumer prices. At the same time, the elimination of central control over production decisions, especially in the consumer-goods sector, led to a breakdown in traditional supply-demand relationships. This resulted in pervasive shortages of food and basic consumer goods. The Government reacted by introducing ration stamps for food and certain hygiene articles.
9. In addition to ration stamps, the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) put into circulation several types of so-called “commodity bonds” (товарные чеки) which gave their bearers the right to purchase consumer goods, such as refrigerators, washing machines, tape recorders and passenger cars. The Urozhay-90 (“Harvest-90”) bonds were one of many types of bonds; they were distributed among agricultural workers and companies which had sold grain and other agricultural produce to the State in 1990 and 1991. Those bonds were designed to encourage agricultural workers to sell produce to the State in exchange for the right to priority purchasing of goods in high demand (see paragraph 26 below). The State paid workers for the produce at fixed prices and also gave them bonds in amounts proportionate to the value of the produce sold.
10. The Urozhay-90 bonds were not legal tender, but they had a certain nominal value indicated on their face. That value determined the maximum purchase price of consumer goods which could be sold on production of the bonds. The bonds were not intended for payment but merely for certification of the right to purchase specific goods; the sale of goods was conditional on payment of the full purchase price by the bond-holder and production of the bonds for the same amount. The bonds were not registered in the person’s name or otherwise personalised and the Government Resolution did not prevent them from being transferred among individuals and legal entities.
11. On 2 January 1992 the Russian Government decided to put an end to the regulation of retail prices. Shops began to fill up with merchandise but prices increased at a staggering speed (the inflation rate in 1992 was 2,600%). In March 1992, the Government established that goods available under the bonds would be sold at the prices fixed before 2 January 1992 (see paragraph 27 below).
12. In August 1992 the Government introduced the possibility of buying out the bonds with a coefficient of 10. In 1994, the coefficient was raised to 70 (see paragraphs 28 and 29 below). It appears that a significant number of bonds were bought out by the State before the buyout operations were stopped in 1996 (see paragraph 31 below).
13. In 1995 the status of the commodity bonds was codified in the Commodity Bonds Act passed by Parliament (see paragraph 30 below). Its text was very laconic, shorter than one page, but it purported to cover every type of commodities bonds issued in previous years. Section 1 recognised the commodity bonds as part of the internal debt of the Russian Federation; section 2 fixed at ten years the limitation period for the obligations arising out of commodity bonds (the starting date was not specified); section 3 required the Government to adopt a programme for settlement of the internal debt.
14. In 2000 the Government presented the programme for settlement of the internal debt (see paragraph 33 below). It covered every type of commodity bond, save for the Urozhay-90 bonds. A few months before the Commodity Bonds Act was amended so as to provide that the settlement of the debt under the Urozhay-90 bonds would be regulated by a special federal law (see paragraph 32 below).
15. Between 2003 and 2009 the application of section 1 of the Commodity Bonds Act was suspended in the part concerning the Urozhay-90 bonds, in accordance with the laws on the federal budget for each successive year (see paragraph 34 below).
16. In 2009 Parliament passed a law on the buyout of the Urozhay-90 bonds and the Government issued implementing regulations which set out a detailed procedure for buyout of the bonds (see paragraphs 35 and 36 below).
17. The applicant holds Urozhay-90 bonds with a total nominal value of 343,375 non-denominated Russian roubles (RUR).
18. On 1 March 2001 the applicant brought an action against the Russian Government, seeking to recover 8,236,498 Russian roubles (RUB) as compensation for the bonds. The amount was calculated as the nominal value of the bonds multiplied by the official inflation co-efficient.
19. On 7 May 2001 the Commercial Court of the Amur Region issued a decision to dismiss the applicant’s claim. It noted that the federal law establishing the procedure for redemption of Urozhay-90 bonds had not yet been adopted and their maturity date had not been determined. The Commercial Court held that the plaintiff had not yet obtained the right to lodge this claim.
20. On 20 June 2001 the Appeals Division of the Commercial Court of the Amur Region quashed the decision of 7 May 2001 on procedural grounds and remitted the claim for a new examination.
21. On 27 August 2001 the Commercial Court of the Amur Region gave judgment. It established that the Ministry of Finance, rather than the Russian Government, should have been the proper defendant in the applicant’s claim for damages because the Russian Government had not committed any unlawful actions. As the applicant refused to substitute the original defendant or to join the Ministry of Finance as a co-defendant and as the court was not competent to do so of its own motion, it determined to disallow the applicant’s claim.
22. On 22 October 2001 the Appeals Division of the Commercial Court of the Amur Region upheld the judgment of 27 August 2001.
23. Counsel for the applicant, Mr Okunev, submitted a cassation appeal. On 23 November 2001 the Federal Commercial Court of the Far-Eastern Circuit fixed the hearing date for 11 December 2001. Mr Okunev had been notified of that decision on 3 December 2001 by registered mail.
24. On 11 December 2001 the Federal Commercial Court heard oral submissions by Mr Okunev and adjourned the hearing until 17 December 2001.
25. On 17 December 2001 Mr Okunev did not appear at court. In the absence of any valid reason for his absence, the Federal Commercial Court proceeded with the hearing and upheld, in the final instance, the judgments of 27 August and 22 October 2001. It confirmed that the actions of the Russian Government had been lawful and that the Ministry of Finance was responsible for the debts chargeable to the treasury.
26. On 26 July 1990 the RSFSR Council of Ministers adopted Resolution no. 259 on urgent measures for increasing the purchase of agricultural products harvested in 1990 and for ensuring their safe keeping. Its relevant parts resolved as follows:
“1. To authorise all manufacturers of agricultural produce to sell the surplus of such produce that remains after delivery under existing agreements ... to procurers or other consumers at negotiated prices...
2. To declare inadmissible any restrictions on the sale or shipment of agricultural produce to consumers in autonomous districts or regions of the RSFSR under paragraph 1 of the present resolution... Should local councils introduce such restrictions in their territories, the RSFSR Council of Ministers may stop issuing Urozhay-90 bonds or delivering goods on the basis of them in those territories...”
“7. To begin issuing, in 1990, Urozhay-90 bonds to employees of collective and Soviet farms, other agro-industrial enterprises and organisations, peasants’ farms and owners of personal subsidiary land plots in respect of agricultural produce sold to the State.
To determine that the bonds certify the right to purchase goods in high demand at retail prices in trade outlets. The said bonds are not legal tender.
8. The RSFSR Ministry of Finance and the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture and Food will, until 1 September 1990, print and put into circulation through the branches of the RSFSR State Bank Urozhay-90 bonds for a total amount of 10 billion roubles. The bonds are to be used before 1 October 1991.
9. To establish that Urozhay-90 bonds are issued by the branches of the RSFSR State Bank:
- to all producers who sold standard products to the State between 1 July 1990 and 30 June 1991 ... in an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the products sold...
...
13. The Russian Consumers’ Association is to submit to the RSFSR Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations requests for those goods in high demand which are to be sold on production of the Urozhay-90 bonds, and organise their sale, on advance orders by citizens and organisations, at regional fairs and exhibitions and in specialised trade outlets. The Consumers’ Associations is to deliver goods to the consumers on the basis of the Urozhay-90 bonds no later than 1 January 1990 [sic]. In 1991 orders under the said bonds will be executed within two months.”
27. On 15 March 1992 the Russian Government issued Resolution no. 161, intended to compensate the owners of Urozhay-90 bonds for an increase in retail prices. It resolved, in particular:
“1. To establish that passenger cars and other consumer goods which are made available to citizens as a reward for the grain and other agricultural produce that was sold to the State in 1990 and 1991 are to be sold at the retail prices that prevailed before 2 January 1992...
2. To extend the period of validity of the Urozhay-90 bonds until the end of 1992...”
28. On 10 August 1992 the Government adopted Resolution no. 1442-r. It required the Russian ministries to allocate substantial amounts for the purchase of goods that were to be sold on production of the Urozhay-90 bonds. It further provided:
“4. The Ministry for Trade and Material Resources, in cooperation with the Central Consumers’ Union, shall define, within two weeks, the list of goods intended for the implementation of the Urozhay-90 bonds...
5. The Prices Committee of the Ministry of the Economy shall determine the increase in prices of domestic and imported goods since 1990... The price difference shall be reimbursed from the republican budget.
6. The Ministry of Agriculture shall carry out an inventory of bonds held by agricultural enterprises and organisations and private individuals as on 1 September.
7. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture shall, within two weeks, lay down the procedure for the buyout of the Urozhay-90 bonds through the branches of the Savings Bank. It is to be taken into account that these bonds may be either used for purchasing goods or bought out by the State with a coefficient of 10.”
29. On 16 April 1994 the Government approved Regulation no. 344 on State commodity bonds, which provided as follows:
“With a view to redeeming the State commodity bonds and preventing accrual of the State’s liability to compensate for price differences, the Government of the Russian Federation resolves:
1. The Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation –
– will buy out ... the Urozhay-90 bonds at a price equivalent to their nominal value multiplied by 70 and credit that amount into a bank account...”
30. On 1 June 1995 the Commodity Bonds Act (no. 86-FZ, ФЗ «О государственных долговых товарных обязательствах») was enacted. It provided that State commodity bonds, including Urozhay-90 bonds, would be recognised as part of the internal State debt of the Russian Federation (section 1). The obligations arising out of the commodity bonds would be settled in accordance with the general principles of the Russian Civil Code, the limitation period being set at ten years (section 2). The original wording of section 3 provided:
“The Government of the Russian Federation shall draft, in 1995-1997, the State Programme for settlement of the internal debt of the Russian Federation described in section 1, based on the principle of full compensation. The Programme shall provide for redemption terms ... convenient for citizens, including, according to their choice: provision of goods designated in ... the State bonds issued to agricultural suppliers ...; redemption of State commodity bonds at consumer prices prevailing at the time of the redemption ...; conversion of the debt into State securities...”
31. On 16 January 1996 the Government adopted Resolution no. 33, by which it annulled Regulation no. 344 and instructed the Ministry of Finance to redeem the State commodity bonds within the amounts allocated for that purpose in the federal budget.
32. On 2 June 2000, section 3 of the Commodity Bonds Act was amended to provide that the procedure for implementation of the State’s obligations to holders of the Urozhay-90 bonds would be determined in a special federal law.
33. On 27 December 2000 the Government adopted the State Programme for settlement of the internal debt of the Russian Federation. Paragraph 14 of the Programme provided that the procedure for payments in respect of the Urozhay-90 bonds would be determined in a special federal law.
34. In 2003 the application of section 1 of the Commodity Bonds Act was for the first time suspended in the part concerning the Urozhay-90 bonds. The suspension clause was maintained in the following years (Federal Law no. 176-FZ of 24 December 2002; no. 186-FZ of 23 December 2003; no. 173-FZ of 23 December 2004; no. 189-FZ of 26 December 2005; no. 238-FZ of 19 December 2006; and no. 198-FZ of 24 July 2007).
35. On 19 July 2009 a federal law governing the procedure for the buyout of the Urozhay-90 bonds was adopted (no. 200-FZ – “the Buyout Act”). It established that holders of the bonds would be paid, in the period between 15 December 2009 and 31 December 2010, an amount equivalent to the nominal value of the bonds divided by 1,000 (section 2). The law also amended the Commodity Bonds Act by removing the reference to the Urozhay-90 bonds from section 1 of that Act.
36. On 15 September 2009 the Government issued Resolution no. 749, setting out the detailed procedure for payments in exchange for the production of Urozhay-90 bonds.
37. On 15 December 2000 the Constitutional Court gave a decision on an application lodged by the Parliament of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic, which had claimed that the amendments of 2 June 2000 (see above) had indefinitely delayed the implementation of the State’s obligations towards the bearers of the Urozhay-90 bonds. The Constitutional Court declared the application inadmissible for the following reasons:
“In its [previous decisions] the Constitutional Court has already determined that a unilateral change in the scope of the State’s obligations towards individuals, including the obligation to sell goods in exchange for commodity bonds, is impermissible. This does not exclude, however, the possibility of imposing restrictions on the property rights of individuals – in an established form and within the constitutional limits – in the matter of State obligations, which is compatible with Article 55 § 3 of the Constitution.
In particular, it follows from the case-law of the Constitutional Court ... that implementation of the rights and lawful interests of individual citizens or groups of citizens should not excessively and adversely affect the budgetary resources allocated for satisfying the rights and interests of society as a whole. This principle becomes particularly relevant in a situation where budgetary resources are insufficient to resolve many social problems relating to the exercise of the rights to life and personal dignity. It follows that the balance between the rights and lawful interests of the individuals who act as creditors for the State in property relationships, on the one hand, and everyone else, on the other hand, may, in principle, be struck only in the form of an act of Parliament.
Hence, given that the legislature may restrict individual rights and freedoms (including property rights) for the purpose of the protection of the rights and lawful interests of others, a review of the federal law amending section 3 of the Commodity Bonds Act by the Constitutional Court would imply an assessment of the financial and economic justification for the legislative decision on the procedure for settlement of State commodity bonds, which ... falls outside the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.
When examining claims relating to settlement of the State commodity bonds, courts of general jurisdiction have the right and duty to interpret the legislative provisions in the light of the interests of the individual (Articles 2 and 18 of the Constitution) and be guided, in particular, by section 2 of the Commodity Bonds Act, which establishes that State commodity bonds are to be settled in an appropriate form and in accordance with the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.”
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6