ITEMID: 001-102332
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: IRL
BRANCH: GRANDCHAMBER
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: CASE OF A, B AND C  v. IRELAND
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Art. 8;Violation of Art. 8;Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Alvina Gyulumyan;Christos Rozakis;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Françoise Tulkens;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Giovanni Bonello;Ineta Ziemele;Jean-Paul Costa;Josep Casadevall;Khanlar Hajiyev;Luis López Guerra;Mary Finlay Geoghegan;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Peer Lorenzen
TEXT: 11. The applicants reside in Ireland and are women over 18 years of age.
12. The facts, as submitted by the applicants, are summarised immediately below. The Government’s position was that these factual submissions were general, unsubstantiated and untested either by a domestic court, or through any other form of interaction with the Irish State, and they made further factual submissions as regards each applicant (summarised at paragraphs 115-18 and 122 below).
13. On 28 February 2005 the first applicant travelled to England for an abortion as she believed that she was not entitled to an abortion in Ireland. She was nine and a half weeks pregnant.
14. She had become pregnant unintentionally, believing her partner to be infertile. At the time she was unmarried, unemployed and living in poverty. She had four young children. The youngest was disabled and all four children were in foster care as a result of problems she had experienced as an alcoholic. She had a history of depression during her first four pregnancies, and was battling depression at the time of her fifth pregnancy. During the year preceding her fifth pregnancy, she had remained sober and had been in constant contact with social workers with a view to regaining custody of her children. She considered that a further child at that moment of her life (with its attendant risk of post-natal depression and to her sobriety) would jeopardise her health and the successful reunification of her family. She decided to travel to England to have an abortion.
15. Delaying the abortion for three weeks, the first applicant borrowed the minimum amount of money for treatment in a private clinic and travel from a money-lender (650 euros (EUR)) at a high interest rate. She felt she had to travel to England alone and in secrecy, without alerting the social workers and without missing a contact visit with her children.
16. She travelled back to Ireland by plane the day after the abortion for her contact visit with her youngest child. While she had initially submitted that she was afraid to seek medical advice on her return to Ireland, she subsequently clarified that on the train returning from Dublin she began to bleed profusely and an ambulance met the train. At a nearby hospital she underwent a dilation and curettage. She claims she experienced pain, nausea and bleeding for weeks thereafter but did not seek further medical advice.
17. Following the introduction of the present application, the first applicant became pregnant again and gave birth to her fifth child. She is struggling with depression and has custody of three of her children whilst two (including the disabled child) remain in care. She maintained that an abortion was the correct decision for her in 2005.
18. On 17 January 2005 the second applicant travelled to England for an abortion believing that she was not entitled to an abortion in Ireland. She was seven weeks pregnant.
19. The second applicant became pregnant unintentionally. She had taken the “morning-after pill” and was advised by two different doctors that there was a substantial risk of an ectopic pregnancy (a condition which cannot be diagnosed until six to ten weeks of pregnancy). She was certain of her decision to travel to England for an abortion since she could not care for a child on her own at that time of her life. She waited several weeks until the counselling centre in Dublin opened after Christmas. She had difficulty meeting the costs of the travel and, not having a credit card, used a friend’s credit card to book the flights. She accepted that, by the time she travelled to England, it had been confirmed that the pregnancy was not ectopic.
20. Once in England she did not list anyone as her next of kin or give an Irish address so as to be sure her family would not learn of the abortion. She travelled alone and stayed in London the night before the procedure to avoid missing her appointment as well as the night of the procedure, as she would have arrived back in Dublin too late for public transport and the medication rendered her unfit to drive home from Dublin airport. The clinic advised her to inform Irish doctors that she had had a miscarriage.
21. On her return to Ireland she started passing blood clots and two weeks later, being unsure of the legality of having travelled for an abortion, sought follow-up care in a clinic in Dublin affiliated to the English clinic.
22. On 3 March 2005 the third applicant had an abortion in England believing that she could not establish her right to an abortion in Ireland. She was in her first trimester of pregnancy at the time.
23. Prior to that, she had undergone three years of chemotherapy for a rare form of cancer. She had asked her doctor before the treatment about the implications of her illness as regards her desire to have children and was advised that it was not possible to predict the effect of pregnancy on her cancer and that, if she did become pregnant, it would be dangerous for the foetus if she were to have chemotherapy during the first trimester.
24. The cancer went into remission and the applicant unintentionally became pregnant. She was unaware of this fact when she underwent a series of tests for cancer, contraindicated during pregnancy. When she discovered she was pregnant, the applicant consulted her General Practitioner (GP) as well as several medical consultants. She alleged that, as a result of the chilling effect of the Irish legal framework, she received insufficient information as to the impact of the pregnancy on her health and life and of her prior tests for cancer on the foetus.
25. She therefore researched the risks on the Internet. Given the uncertainty about the risks involved, the third applicant travelled to England for an abortion. She maintained that she wanted a medical abortion (drug-induced miscarriage) as her pregnancy was at an early stage but that she could not find a clinic which would provide this treatment as she was a non-resident and because of the need for follow-up. She therefore alleged she had to wait a further eight weeks until a surgical abortion was possible.
26. On returning to Ireland after the abortion, the third applicant suffered complications as a result of an incomplete abortion, including prolonged bleeding and infection. She alleges that doctors provided inadequate medical care. She consulted her own GP several months after the abortion and her GP made no reference to the fact that she was visibly no longer pregnant.
27. The courts are the custodians of the rights set out in the Constitution and their powers are as ample as the defence of the Constitution requires (The State (Quinn) v. Ryan [1965] IR 70). In his judgment in The People v. Shaw ([1982] IR 1), Mr Justice Kenny observed:
“The obligation to implement [the guarantee of Article 40.3] is imposed not on the Oireachtas [Parliament] only, but on each branch of the State which exercises the powers of legislating, executing and giving judgment on those laws: Article 6. The word ‘laws’ in Article [40.3] is not confined to laws which have been enacted by the Oireachtas, but comprehends the laws made by judges and by ministers of State when they make statutory instruments or regulations.”
28. Prior to the adoption of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in 1983, Article 40.3 of the Constitution read as follows:
“1. The State guarantees in its laws to respect and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.
2. The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name and property rights of every citizen.”
29. Certain judgments relied upon Article 40.3 and other Articles of the Constitution to recognise the right to life of the unborn and to suggest that the Constitution implicitly prohibited abortion (McGee v. the Attorney General [1974] IR 284; G v. An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32; and Finn v. the Attorney General [1983] IR 154).
30. Abortion is also prohibited under the criminal law by section 58 (as amended) of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (“the 1861 Act”):
“Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of a felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life ...”
Section 59 of the 1861 Act states as follows:
“Whoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or other noxious thing, or any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used or employed with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour ...”
31. Section 58 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 (“the 1961 Act”) provides that “the law relating to wrongs shall apply to an unborn child for his protection in like manner as if the child were born, provided the child is subsequently born alive”.
32. Section 10 of the Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 re-affirms the statutory prohibition of abortion and states as follows:
“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorising—
(a) the procuring of abortion,
(b) the doing of any other thing the doing of which is prohibited by section 58 or 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (which sections prohibit the administering of drugs or the use of any instruments to procure abortion or the supplying of drugs or instruments to procure abortion), or
(c) the sale, importation into the State, manufacture, advertising or display of abortifacients.”
33. Article 50.1 of the Irish Constitution makes provision for the continuation of laws, such as the 1861 Act, which were in force on the adoption of the Constitution in 1937 as follows:
“Subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not inconsistent therewith, the laws in force in [Ireland] immediately prior to the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall continue to be of full force and effect until the same or any of them shall have been repealed or amended by enactment of [Parliament].”
34. The meaning of section 58 of the 1861 Act was considered in England and Wales in R. v. Bourne ([1939] 1 KB 687), where the defendant had carried out an abortion on a minor, pregnant as a result of multiple rape. Macnaghten J. accepted that abortion to preserve the life of a pregnant woman was not unlawful and, further, where a doctor was of the opinion that the woman’s physical or mental health would be seriously harmed by continuing with the pregnancy, he could properly be said to be operating for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother. This principle was not, however, applied by the Irish courts. In the case of Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd v. Grogan and Others ([1989] IR 753), Keane J. maintained that “the preponderance of judicial opinion in this country would suggest that the Bourne approach could not have been adopted ... consistently with the Constitution prior to the Eighth Amendment”.
35. In the early 1980s there was some concern about the adequacy of existing provisions concerning abortion and the possibility of abortion being deemed lawful by judicial interpretation. There was some debate as to whether the Supreme Court would follow the course adopted in England and Wales in Bourne (cited above) or in the United States of America in Roe v. Wade (410 US 113 (1973)).
36. A referendum was held in 1983, resulting in the adoption of a provision which became Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution, the Eighth Amendment (53.67% of the electorate voted with 841,233 votes in favour and 416,136 against). Article 40.3.3 reads as follows:
“The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right ...”
37. A number of cases then came before the courts concerning the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and the provision of information on or referral to abortion services available in other countries.
38. In 1986 the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) obtained an injunction restraining two organisations (Open Door Counselling and the Dublin Well Woman Centre) from furnishing women with information which encouraged or facilitated an abortion. The Supreme Court held (see The Attorney General (SPUC) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. [1988] IR 593]) that it was unlawful to disseminate information, including contact information, about foreign abortion services, which had the effect of facilitating the commission of an abortion (see also SPUC (Ireland) v. Grogan and Others, cited above). These two organisations then complained about restraints on their freedom to impart and receive information and a violation of Article 10 of the Convention was established by this Court (see Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 29 October 1992, Series A no. 246-A (“the Open Door case”)).
39. The interpretation of the Eighth Amendment was considered in the seminal judgment in the X case. X was 14 years of age when she became pregnant as a result of rape. Her parents arranged for her to have an abortion in the United Kingdom and asked the Irish police whether it would be possible to have scientific tests carried out on retrieved foetal tissue with a view to determining the identity of the rapist. The Director of Public Prosecutions was consulted who, in turn, informed the Attorney General. On 7 February 1992 an interim injunction was granted ex parte on the application of the Attorney General restraining X from leaving the jurisdiction or from arranging or carrying out a termination of the pregnancy. X and her parents returned from the United Kingdom to contest the injunction.
40. On 26 February 1992, on appeal, a majority (Finlay C.J., McCarthy J., Egan J. and O’Flaherty J., with Hederman J. dissenting) of the Supreme Court discharged the injunction.
41. The Chief Justice noted that no interpretation of the Constitution was intended to be final for all time (citing the domestic case of McGee, see paragraph 29 above), which statement was “peculiarly appropriate and illuminating in the interpretation of [the Eighth Amendment] which deals with the intimate human problem of the right of the unborn to life and its relationship to the right of the mother of an unborn child to her life”. He went on:
“36. Such a harmonious interpretation of the Constitution carried out in accordance with concepts of prudence, justice and charity, ... leads me to the conclusion that in vindicating and defending as far as practicable the right of the unborn to life but at the same time giving due regard to the right of the mother to life, the Court must, amongst the matters to be so regarded, concern itself with the position of the mother within a family group, with persons on whom she is dependent, with, in other instances, persons who are dependent upon her and her interaction with other citizens and members of society in the areas in which her activities occur. Having regard to that conclusion, I am satisfied that the test proposed on behalf of the Attorney General that the life of the unborn could only be terminated if it were established that an inevitable or immediate risk to the life of the mother existed, for the avoidance of which a termination of the pregnancy was necessary, insufficiently vindicates the mother’s right to life.
37. I, therefore, conclude that the proper test to be applied is that if it is established as a matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy, such termination is permissible, having regard to the true interpretation of Article [40.3.3] of the Constitution.”
42. Considering that a suicide risk had to be taken into account in reconciling the right to life of the mother and the unborn, the Chief Justice continued:
“44. I am, therefore, satisfied that on the evidence before the learned trial judge, which was in no way contested, and on the findings which he has made, that the defendants have satisfied the test which I have laid down as being appropriate and have established, as a matter of probability, that there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother by self-destruction which can only be avoided by termination of her pregnancy.”
43. Similar judgments on the substantive issue were delivered by three other judges. McCarthy J. noted that “the right of the girl here is a right to a life in being; the right of the unborn is to a life contingent; contingent on survival in the womb until successful delivery”. He went on:
“141. ... In my view, the true construction of the [Eighth] Amendment ... is that, paying due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, when there is a real and substantial risk attached to her survival not merely at the time of application but in contemplation at least throughout the pregnancy, then it may not be practicable to vindicate the right to life of the unborn. It is not a question of a risk of a different order of magnitude; it can never be otherwise than a risk of a different order of magnitude.
142. On the facts of the case, which are not in contest, I am wholly satisfied that a real and substantial risk that the girl might take her own life was established; it follows that she should not be prevented from having a medical termination of pregnancy.”
44. McCarthy J. commented in some detail on the lack of legislation implementing Article 40.3.3. He noted in the above-cited Grogan case, that he had already pointed out that no relevant legislation had been enacted since the Eighth Amendment came into force, the direct criminal-law ban on abortion still deriving from the 1861 Act. He also noted that the Chief Justice had pointed out in the above-cited Open Door case that it was “unfortunate that the [Parliament] has not enacted any legislation at all in respect of this constitutionally guaranteed right”.
Having noted that Article 40.3.3 envisaged a lawful abortion in the State and thereby qualified section 58 of the 1861 Act (which had made abortion for any purpose unlawful), he continued:
“... I agree with the Chief Justice that the want of legislation pursuant to the amendment does not in any way inhibit the courts from exercising a function to vindicate and defend the right to life of the unborn. I think it reasonable, however, to hold that the People when enacting the Amendment were entitled to believe that legislation would be introduced so as to regulate the manner in which the right to life of the unborn and the right to life of the mother could be reconciled.
147. In the context of the eight years that have passed since the Amendment was adopted and the two years since Grogan’s case the failure by the legislature to enact the appropriate legislation is no longer just unfortunate; it is inexcusable. What are pregnant women to do? What are the parents of a pregnant girl under age to do? What are the medical profession to do? They have no guidelines save what may be gleaned from the judgments in this case. What additional considerations are there? Is the victim of rape, statutory or otherwise, or the victim of incest, finding herself pregnant, to be assessed in a manner different from others? The Amendment, born of public disquiet, historically divisive of our people, guaranteeing in its laws to respect and by its laws to defend the right to life of the unborn, remains bare of legislative direction ...
148. ... The State may fulfil its role by providing necessary agencies to help, to counsel, to encourage, to comfort, to plan for the pregnant woman, the pregnant girl or her family. It is not for the courts to programme society; that is partly, at least, the role of the legislature. The courts are not equipped to regulate these procedures.”
45. The judgment of the Supreme Court gave rise to a number of questions. Certain obiter dicta of the majority in the Supreme Court implied that the constitutional right to travel could be limited so as to prevent an abortion taking place where there was no threat to the life of the mother.
46. A further referendum, in which three separate proposals were put forward, was held in November 1992. A total of 68.18% of the electorate voted.
47. The first was a proposal to amend the Constitution to provide for lawful abortion where there would otherwise be a real and substantial risk to the mother’s life, except a risk of suicide. Its acceptance would therefore have limited the impact of the X case: it was rejected (65.35% to 34.65%).
48. The second proposal was accepted and became the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution (added to Article 40.3.3). It was designed to ensure that a woman could not be prevented from leaving the jurisdiction for an abortion abroad and it reads as follows:
“This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another State.”
49. The third proposal was also accepted and became the Fourteenth Amendment (also added to Article 40.3.3). It allows for the provision in Ireland of information on abortion services abroad and provides as follows:
“This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another State.”
50. Further to certain public reflection processes (see paragraphs 62-76 below), a third referendum on abortion was held in March 2002 to resolve the legal uncertainty that had existed since the X case by putting draft legislation (Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act, 2002) to the electorate. The intention was threefold.
51. The referendum was designed to ensure that the draft 2002 Act, once adopted by referendum, could only be changed by another referendum.
52. The proposed 2002 Act defined the crime of abortion (to replace sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Act and to reduce the maximum penalty). It also removed the threat of suicide as a ground for a lawful abortion and thereby restricted the grounds recognised in the X case. The definition of abortion excluded “the carrying out of a medical procedure by a medical practitioner at an approved place in the course of which or as a result of which unborn human life is ended where that procedure is, in the reasonable opinion of the practitioner, necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of loss of the woman’s life other than by self-destruction”.
53. The proposed 2002 Act also provided safeguards to medical procedures to protect the life of the mother by setting out the conditions which such procedures were to meet in order to be lawful: the procedures had, inter alia, to be carried out by a medical practitioner at an approved place; the practitioner had to form a reasonable opinion that the procedure was necessary to save the life of the mother; the practitioner had also to make and sign a written record of the basis for the opinion; and there would be no obligation on anyone to carry out or assist in carrying out a procedure.
54. The referendum resulted in the lowest turnout in all three abortion referenda (42.89% of the electorate) and the proposal was defeated (50.42% against and 49.58% in favour). The Referendum Commission had earlier explained that a negative vote would mean that Article 40.3.3 would remain in place as it was. Any legislation introduced thereafter would have to accord with the present interpretation of the Constitution which would mean a threat of suicide would continue to be a ground for a legal abortion.
55. Following the above-described amendments, Article 40.3 of the Constitution reads as follows:
“1. The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.
2. The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen.
3. The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.
This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another State.
This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another State.”
56. The 1995 Act was the legislation envisaged by the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted a response to the above-cited judgment of this Court in the Open Door case. That Act defines the conditions under which information relating to abortion services lawfully available in another State might be made available in Ireland.
57. Section 2 defines “Act information” as information that (a) is likely to be required by a woman for the purpose of availing herself of services provided outside the State for the termination of pregnancies; and (b) relates to such services or to persons who provide them.
58. Section 1 confirms that a “person to whom section 5 applies” means a person who engages in, or holds himself, herself or itself out as engaging in, the activity of giving information, advice or counselling to individual members of the public in relation to pregnancy. Section 5 of the Act provides as follows:
“Where a person to whom section 5 applies is requested, by or on behalf of an individual woman who indicates or on whose behalf it is indicated that she is or may be pregnant, to give information, advice or counselling in relation to her particular circumstances having regard to the fact that it is indicated by her or on her behalf that she is or may be pregnant—
(a) it shall not be lawful for the person or the employer or principal of the person to advocate or promote the termination of pregnancy to the woman or to any person on her behalf,
(b) it shall not be lawful for the person or the employer or principal of the person to give Act information to the woman or to any person on her behalf unless—
(i) the information and the method and manner of its publication are in compliance with sub-paragraphs (I) and (II) of section 3(1)(a) and the information is given in a form and manner which do not advocate or promote the termination of pregnancy,
(ii) at the same time, information (other than Act information), counselling and advice are given directly to the woman in relation to all the courses of action that are open to her in relation to her particular circumstances aforesaid, and
(iii) the information, counselling and advice referred to in sub-paragraph (ii) are truthful and objective, fully inform the woman of all the courses of action that are open to her in relation to her particular circumstances aforesaid and do not advocate or promote, and are not accompanied by any advocacy or promotion of, the termination of pregnancy.”
59. Section 8 of the 1995 Act reads as follows:
“(1) It shall not be lawful for a person to whom section 5 applies or the employer or principal of the person to make an appointment or any other arrangement for or on behalf of a woman with a person who provides services outside the State for the termination of pregnancies.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be construed as prohibiting the giving to a woman by a person to whom section 5 applies ... of any medical, surgical, clinical, social or other like records or notes relating to the woman ...”
60. Before its enactment, the 1995 Act was referred by the President to the Supreme Court for a review of its constitutionality. The Supreme Court found it to be constitutional so that the 1995 Act thereby became immune from future constitutional challenge (Article 34.3.3 of the Constitution). In so concluding, the Supreme Court examined, inter alia, whether the provisions of Articles 5 and 8 were repugnant to the Constitution namely, whether, from an objective point of view, those provisions represented “a fair and reasonable balancing by [Parliament] of the various conflicting rights and was not so contrary to reason and fairness as to constitute an unjust attack on the constitutional rights of the unborn or on the constitutional rights of the mother or any other person or persons”. In this respect, the Supreme Court noted:
“The [1995 Act] merely deals with information relating to services lawfully available outside the State for the termination of pregnancies and the persons who provide such services.
The condition subject to which such information may be provided to a woman who indicates or on whose behalf it is indicated that she is or may be pregnant is that the person giving such information is
(i) not permitted to advocate or promote the termination of pregnancy to the woman or any person on her behalf;
(ii) not permitted to give the information unless it is given in a form and manner which do not advocate or promote the termination of pregnancy
and is only permitted to give information relating to services which are lawfully available in the other State and to persons, who in providing them are acting lawfully in that place if
(a) the information and the method and manner of its publication are in compliance with the law of that place, and
(b) the information is truthful and objective and does not advocate or promote, and is not accompanied by any advocacy or promotion of the termination of pregnancy.
At the same time information, counselling and advice must be given directly to the woman in relation to all the courses of action that are open to her in relation to her particular circumstances and such information, counselling and advice must not advocate or promote and must not be accompanied by any advocacy or promotion of, the termination of pregnancy.
Subject to such restrictions, all information relating to services lawfully available outside the State and the persons who provide them is available to her.”
61. The Supreme Court considered that the submission, namely that a woman’s life and/or health might be placed at serious risk in the event that a doctor was unable to send a letter referring her to another doctor for the purposes of having her pregnancy terminated, was based on a misinterpretation of the provisions of section 8 of the 1995 Act:
“This section prohibits a doctor or any person to whom section 5 of the [1995 Act] relates from making an appointment or any other arrangement for or on behalf of a woman with a person who provides services outside the State for the termination of pregnancies.
It does not preclude him, once such appointment is made, from communicating in the normal way with such other doctor with regard to the condition of his patient provided that such communication does not in any way advocate or promote and is not accompanied by any advocacy of the termination of pregnancy.
While a doctor is precluded by the terms of the [1995 Act] from advocating or promoting the termination of pregnancy, he is not in any way precluded from giving full information to a woman with regard to her state of health, the effect of the pregnancy thereon and the consequences to her health and life if the pregnancy continues and leaving to the mother the decision whether in all the circumstances the pregnancy should be terminated. The doctor is not in any way prohibited from giving to his pregnant patient all the information necessary to enable her to make an informed decision provided that he does not advocate or promote the termination of pregnancy.
In addition, section 8(2) does not prohibit or in any way prevent the giving to a woman of any medical, surgical, clinical, social or other like records relating to her.
...
Having regard to the obligation on [Parliament] to respect, and so far as practicable, to defend and vindicate the right to life of the unborn having regard to the equal right to life of the mother, the prohibition against the advocacy or promotion of the termination of pregnancy and the prohibition against any person to whom section 5 of the Bill applies making an appointment or any other arrangement for and on behalf of a woman with a person who provides services outside the State for the termination of pregnancies does not constitute an unjust attack on the rights of the pregnant woman. These conditions represent a fair and reasonable balancing of the rights involved and consequently sections 5 and 8 of the Bill are not repugnant to the Constitution on these grounds.”
62. Established in April 1995, the Review Group’s terms of reference were to review the Constitution and to establish those areas where constitutional change might be necessary with a view to assisting the governmental committees in their constitutional review work.
63. In its 1996 Report, the Review Group considered the substantive law on abortion in Ireland following the X case and the rejection of the Twelfth Amendment to be unclear (for example, the definition of the unborn, the scope of the admissibility of the suicidal disposition as a ground for abortion and the absence of any statutory time-limit on lawful abortion following the X case criteria). The Review Group considered the option of amending Article 40.3.3 to legalise abortion in constitutionally defined circumstances:
“Although thousands of women go abroad annually for abortions without breach of domestic law, there appears to be strong opposition to any extensive legalisation of abortion in the State. There might be some disposition to concede limited permissibility in extreme cases, such, perhaps, as those of rape, incest or other grave circumstances. On the other hand, particularly difficult problems would be posed for those committed in principle to the preservation of life from its earliest stage.”
64. The Review Group concluded that, while in principle the major issues should ideally be tackled by constitutional amendment, there was no consensus as to what that amendment should be and no certainty of success for any referendum proposal for substantive constitutional change in relation to Article 40.3.3. The Review Group therefore considered that the only practical possibility at that time was the introduction of legislation to regulate the application of Article 40.3.3. Such legislation could, inter alia, include definitions (for example of the “unborn”); afford express protection for appropriate medical intervention necessary to protect the life of the mother; require written certification by appropriate medical specialists of “real and substantial risk to the life of the mother” and impose a time-limit on lawful abortion namely, in circumstances permitted by the X case.
65. A cabinet committee was established to supervise the drafting of a Green Paper on abortion and the preparatory work was carried out by an Interdepartmental Working Group of officials. In drawing up the Green Paper, submissions were invited from the public, from professional and voluntary organisations and any other parties who wished to contribute. Over 10,000 such submissions were received, as well as petitions containing 36,500 signatures. The introduction to the Green Paper 1999 noted the following:
“The current situation ... is that, constitutionally, termination of pregnancy is not legal in this country unless it meets the conditions laid down by the Supreme Court in the X case; information on abortion services abroad can be provided within the terms of the [1995 Act]; and, in general, women can travel abroad for an abortion.
There are strong bodies of opinion which express dissatisfaction with the current situation, whether in relation to the permissibility of abortion in the State or to the numbers of women travelling abroad for abortion.
Various options have been proposed to resolve what is termed the ‘substantive issue’ of abortion but there is a wide diversity of views on how to proceed. The Taoiseach indicated shortly after the government took office in 1997 that it was intended to issue a Green Paper on the subject. The implications of the X case were again brought sharply into focus in November 1997 as a result of the C case, and a cabinet committee was established to oversee the drafting of this Green Paper, the preparatory work on which was carried out by an interdepartmental group of officials. [for a description of the C case, see paragraphs 95-96 below]
While the issues surrounding abortion are extremely complex, the objective of this Green Paper is to set out the issues, to provide a brief analysis of them and to consider possible options for the resolution of the problem. The Paper does not attempt to address every single issue in relation to abortion, nor to give an exhaustive analysis of each. Every effort has been made to concentrate on the main issues and to discuss them in a clear, concise and objective way.
Submissions were invited from interested members of the public, professional and voluntary organisations and any other parties who wished to contribute ...”
66. Paragraph 1.09 noted that there was no medical evidence to suggest that doctors in Ireland did not treat women with cancer or other illnesses on the grounds that the treatment would damage the unborn.
67. Chapter 7 of the Paper comprised a discussion of seven possible constitutional and legislative solutions:
– an absolute constitutional ban on abortion;
– an amendment of the Constitution so as to restrict the application of the X case;
– the retention of the status quo;
– the retention of the constitutional status quo with a legislative restatement of the prohibition of abortion;
– legislation to regulate abortion as defined in the X case;
– a reversion to the pre-1983 position; and
– permitting abortion beyond the grounds specified in the X case.
68. As to the fifth option (legislation to regulate abortion as defined in the X case), the Green Paper 1999 noted as follows:
“7.48 The objective of this approach would be to implement the X case decision by means of legislation ... This approach assumes that there would be no change in the existing wording of Article 40.3.3.
7.49 In formulating such legislation a possible approach may be not to restate the prohibition on abortion, which is already contained in section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, but instead to provide that a termination carried out in accordance with the legislation would not be an offence.
7.50 The detail of such legislation would require careful consideration but it could be along the lines of that discussed under the previous option (retention of the constitutional status quo with legislative restatement of the prohibition on abortion).
Discussion
7.51 Since this option does not provide for a regime more liberal than the X case formulation, no constitutional amendment would be required. This option would, however, provide for abortion in defined circumstances and as such, would be certain to encounter criticism from those who are opposed to abortion on any grounds and who disagreed with the decision in the X case. Central to the criticism would be the inclusion of the threat of suicide as a ground and the difficulties inherent in assessing same.
7.52 The main advantage of this approach is that it would provide a framework within which the need for an abortion could be assessed, rather than resolving the question on a case-by-case basis before the courts, with all the attendant publicity and debate. It would allow pregnant women who establish that there is a real and substantial risk to the their life to have an abortion in Ireland rather than travelling out of the jurisdiction and would provide legal protection for medical and other personnel, such as nurses, involved in the procedure to terminate the pregnancy. The current medical ethical guidelines would not be consistent with such legislation.
7.53 It must be pointed out however that the problems of definition in the text of Article 40.3.3 would remain. A decision would be necessary on whether the proposed legislation would provide the definitions necessary to remove the current ambiguity surrounding the text of that Article. There is however a limit to what legislation can achieve by way of definitions as ultimately the interpretation of Article 40.3.3 is a matter for the Courts.”
69. As to the Seventh option (permitting abortion beyond the grounds specified in the X case), the Green Paper 1999 noted as follows:
“7.65 In Chapter 4, other possible grounds for abortion are examined and set where possible in an international context. As indicated earlier, a number of submissions also sought the introduction of abortion on some or all of these grounds. Each of the possible types of provision identified has been considered separately. This does not rule out consideration of a combination of some or all of these options if this approach were to be pursued. Were this to be done, some of the difficulties identified when options are considered separately might not arise.
7.66 In all of the cases discussed in this section, abortion would be permissible only if Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution were amended. Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 may also need to be reviewed and new legislation to regulate any new arrangement would be necessary. The type of legislative model referred to in the discussion on the option of retention of the constitutional status quo with legislative restatement of the prohibition on abortion (see paragraphs 7.42-7.47) might, with appropriate adaptations, serve as a basis for regulation in other circumstances also. Issues such as criteria under which an abortion would be permissible, gestational limits, certification and counselling requirements, and possibly a waiting period after counselling, would be among the matters which legislation might address. The provisions in force in some other countries are also discussed in Chapter 4.
Discussion
(a) Risk to physical/mental health of mother
7.67 This option would provide for abortion on grounds of risk to a woman’s physical and/or mental health.
7.68 In 1992 the proposed Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution was the subject of some criticism on the grounds that it specifically excluded risk to health as grounds for termination of a pregnancy. The English Bourne case of 1938 involved interpretation of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 to permit termination of a pregnancy where a doctor thought that the probable consequence of continuing a pregnancy would be to make the woman a physical or mental wreck.
7.69 As stated earlier, this case has not been specifically followed in any decision of the Irish courts. Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution would rule out an interpretation of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 in the manner of the Bourne judgement. Therefore any proposal to permit abortion on the grounds of danger to a woman’s health would require amendment of this Article and possibly a review of the sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861. A legislative framework to regulate the operation of such arrangements would also be required.
7.70 As discussed in Chapter 4, ‘Other Grounds for Abortion, set in an International Context’, the concept of physical health used in other countries for the purposes of abortion law tends not to be very specific. If it were intended to permit abortion on grounds of risk to a woman’s health, but to confine the operation of such a provision to cases where there was a grave risk of serious and permanent damage, it would be necessary to circumscribe the provisions in an appropriate manner. The usual practice in other countries is for the issue to be treated as a medical matter. It could be anticipated that it might be difficult to arrive at provisions which would allow clinical independence and at the same time be guaranteed to operate in a very strict manner so as not to permit abortion other than on a very limited basis.”
70. The Green Paper 1999 was then referred to this Committee. The Committee consulted widely, initially seeking submissions on the options discussed in the Green Paper 1999. Over 100,000 submissions were received from individuals and organisations. Approximately 92% of these communications took the form of signatures to petitions (over 80,000 signatures were contained in one petition alone). The vast majority of communications were in favour of the first option in the Green Paper 1999 (an absolute constitutional ban on abortion).
71. Since very few medical organisations had made submissions during the preparation of the Green Paper 1999, the Committee was concerned to establish authoritatively the current medical practice in Irish hospitals as regards medical intervention during pregnancies. The Committee therefore heard the views and opinions of experts in the fields of obstetrics, gynaecology and psychiatry through public (and recorded) hearings.
72. The Chairman of the Institute of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, which represents 90-95% of the obstetricians and gynaecologists in Ireland, gave written evidence, inter alia:
“In current obstetrical practice rare complications can arise where therapeutic intervention is required at a stage in pregnancy when there will be little or no prospect for the survival of the baby, due to extreme immaturity. In these exceptional situations failure to intervene may result in the death of both the mother and baby. We consider that there is a fundamental difference between abortion carried out with the intention of taking the life of the baby, for example for social reasons, and the unavoidable death of the baby resulting from essential treatment to protect the life of the mother.
We recognise our responsibility to provide aftercare for women who decide to leave the State for a termination of pregnancy. We recommend that full support and follow-up services be made available for all women whose pregnancies have been terminated, whatever the circumstances.”
73. In oral evidence, the Chairman also noted the following:
“We have never regarded these interventions as abortion. It would never cross an obstetrician’s mind that intervening in a case of pre-eclampsia, cancer of the cervix or ectopic pregnancy is abortion. They are not abortion as far as the professional is concerned, these are medical treatments that are essential to protect the life of the mother. So when we interfere in the best interests of protecting a mother, and not allowing her to succumb, and we are faced with a foetus that dies, we don’t regard that as something that we have, as it were, achieved by an abortion. Abortion in the professional view to my mind is something entirely different. It is actually intervening, usually in a normal pregnancy, to get rid of the pregnancy, to get rid of the foetus. That is what we would consider the direct procurement of an abortion. In other words, it’s an unwanted baby and, therefore, you intervene to end its life. That has never been a part of the practice of Irish obstetrics and I hope it never will be.
...
In dealing with complex rare situations, where there is a direct physical threat to the life of the pregnant mother, we will intervene always.”
74. In 2000 the Committee issued its Fifth Progress Report on Abortion. The Report explained that this was not a comprehensive analysis of the matters discussed in the Green Paper 1999 but rather a political assessment of questions which arose from it in the context of the submissions received and the hearings conducted.
75. The Committee on the Constitution agreed that a specific agency should be put in place to implement a strategy to reduce the number of crisis pregnancies by the provision of preventative services, to reduce the number of women with crisis pregnancies who opt for abortion by offering services which make other options more attractive and to provide post-abortion services consisting of counselling and medical check-ups. There was agreement on other matters including the need for the government to prepare a public memorandum outlining the State’s precise responsibilities under all relevant international and European Union instruments.
76. The Committee agreed that clarity in legal provisions was essential for the guidance of the medical profession so that any legal framework should ensure that doctors could carry out best medical practice to save the life of the mother. However, the Committee found that none of the seven options canvassed in the Green Paper 1999 commanded unanimous support of the Committee. Three approaches commanded substantial but not majority support: the first was to concentrate on the plan to reduce the number of crisis pregnancies and the rate of abortion and to leave the legal position unchanged; the second approach would add legislation which would protect medical intervention to safeguard the life of the mother within the existing constitutional framework; and the third approach was in addition to accommodate such legislation with a Constitutional amendment. The Committee did not therefore reach agreement on a single course of reform action.
77. Further to the Fifth Progress Report on Abortion 2000, the CPA was established by the Crisis Pregnancy Agency (Establishment) Order 2001 (S.I. No. 446 of 2001). Section 4 of that Order described the functions of the Agency in its relevant part as follows (prior to its amendment in 2007):
“(i) ... to prepare a strategy to address the issue of crisis pregnancy, this strategy to provide, inter alia, for:
(a) a reduction in the number of crisis pregnancies by the provision of education, advice and contraceptive services;
(b) a reduction in the number of women with crisis pregnancies who opt for abortion by offering services and supports which make other options more attractive;
(c) the provision of counselling and medical services after crisis pregnancy.
...”
78. The CPA implemented its first Strategy (2004-06) and is in the process of implementing its second one (2007-11). It achieves its objectives mainly through its communications programme (including media campaigns and resource materials), its research programme (promoting evidence-based practice and policy development) and its funding programme which funds projects ranging from personal development to counselling, parent supports and medical and health services.
79. Further to the Health (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009, the CPA was integrated into the Health Service Executive (HSE) from 1 January 2010. Funding of the crisis pregnancy function was also transferred to the HSE.
80. The CPA Guidelines, developed in association with the Irish College of General Practitioners, outline the role of GPs in the management of crisis pregnancy. The Guidelines detail the role of GPs in the prevention of crisis pregnancies, in assisting the woman in making decisions about the outcome of her crisis pregnancy (by, inter alia, counselling on all options available to her including pregnancy, adoption and abortion) and assisting her in safely carrying out her decision (by, inter alia, advising on the importance of follow-up care, including medical care, after any abortion). GPs are advised on the importance of providing sensitive counselling to assist the decision-making process (“to minimise the risk of emotional disturbance, whatever decision is reached”) and of pre- and post-abortion counselling and medical care. GPs are reminded of their duty of care to the patient, that they should never refuse treatment on the basis of moral disapproval of the patient’s behaviour and that, where they have a conscientious objection to providing care, they should make the names of other GPs available to the patient.
The Guidelines went on to note that, “[i]rrespective of what decision a woman makes in the crisis pregnancy situation, follow-up care will be important. This may include antenatal care, counselling, future contraception or medical care after abortion. The GP’s response to the initial consultation will have a profound influence on her willingness to attend for further care.” If a woman decides to proceed with an abortion, it is the GP’s main concern to ensure that she does so safely, receives proper medical care, and returns for appropriate follow-up. GPs are advised to supplement verbal advice with a written handout.
81. A Patient Information Leaflet is attached to the Guidelines. It informs women that, should they choose an abortion, they should plan to visit their GP at least three weeks after the termination to allow the GP to carry out a full check-up and allow the woman to express any questions or concerns she may have.
82. The subject of this report was the perceptions of Irish women in the general age range of 20-30 about fertility, sex and motherhood. The Report captured the meanings young women attributed to their fertility and fertility-related decisions in relation to life objectives and women’s changing roles in education, careers, relationships, and motherhood. The report uses data drawn from qualitative interviews (20 individual case studies and 12 focus groups; the total sample was 66 women with an age range of 19-34). The research reflected the views of a diverse group of women by socio-economic status, geographic location, and relationship history. The data demonstrated a need for greater support for young Irish women in the range and variety of their decision-making about fertility, sex and motherhood.
83. The significant findings included the fact that the X case and the declining role of the Catholic Church were major events in the lives of young women and shaped their attitudes and experiences. Young women had moved into adulthood more firmly convinced that sexual and reproductive decisions should be part of a person’s private actions, with the freedom to decide as they thought best.
84. The aim of the study was to establish nationally representative data on current attitudes, knowledge and experience of contraception, crisis pregnancy and related services in Ireland. It carried out a cross-sectional national survey of the young adult population using a telephone interview (in 2003) of 3,000 members of the public to include equal numbers of women and men and people aged 18-45 in order to focus on those for whom contraceptive practices, service perceptions and service usage were considered most relevant. It was also considered that the age profile of the sample meant that the results would be particularly relevant to the contemporary evaluation of services and in planning for the future.
85. Public attitudes to aspects of crisis-pregnancy outcomes were assessed to evaluate the acceptability of alternative outcomes (lone parenting, adoption and abortion). The questions were adapted from a prior survey in 1986 and the replication of these questions in the CPA study provided an opportunity to measure any changes in attitudes to abortion. In the 1986 survey, over 38% of participants indicated that they believed abortion should not be permissible under any circumstances while 58% felt that it should be allowed in certain circumstances and 4% did not express a view.
86. In the CPA study, the question was extended to include the option that a woman “should always have a choice to have an abortion, regardless of the circumstances”: 8% of participants felt that abortion should not be permissible under any circumstances, 39% felt that it should be allowed under certain circumstances, 51% felt that women should always have a choice to have an abortion and 2% were unsure. The Report stated:
“Thus, a notable change in attitudes towards abortion was observed over the seventeen-year period (1986-2003), with a substantially higher proportion of the population supporting a choice of abortion in some or all circumstances in the more recent [CPA] survey ...”
87. Since many participants, who thought that a woman should have a choice in certain circumstances or who did not know, were considered to hold qualified views concerning the acceptability of abortion, those participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that a woman should have the choice to have an abortion in specific circumstances (based on the 1986 survey). The Report described the results as follows:
“The level of agreement reported across possible circumstances under which an abortion may be acceptable varied greatly across circumstance. The majority of these participants agreed that a woman should have a choice to have an abortion if the pregnancy seriously endangered her life (96%) or her health (87%). Additionally, most agreed that a woman should have a choice to have an abortion if the pregnancy was a result of rape (87%) or incest (85%). Less than half (46%) of participants felt that a woman should have a choice if there was evidence that the child would be seriously deformed. Furthermore, the majority of participants disagreed that a woman should have a choice if she was not married (79%) or if the couple cannot afford another child (80%). There were no significant variations in attitude across gender or educational level for any of the statements. There were small but significant age differences across two items. Firstly, younger participants were more likely to favour abortion as a choice for rape victims (92% of 18-25 year olds vs. 87% of 26-35 year olds and 83% of 36-45 year olds ...). The reverse pattern was evident in the case of pregnancy where there is evidence that the baby will be seriously deformed. Here older participants were more likely to favour having the choice to have an abortion (fewer (42%) of 18-25 year olds agreed vs. 49% of 26-35 year olds and 48% of 3645 year olds ...).”
88. The findings as to the circumstances in which abortion was acceptable were compared with those reported from the 1986 survey. The percentages of those who agreed that abortion was acceptable in various circumstances were reported as a proportion of all those interviewed for the relevant study. This showed that the acceptability of abortion in various circumstances “had increased substantially in the population over time”:
– if the pregnancy seriously endangered the woman’s life (57% agreement in 1986; 90% agreement in 2003);
– if the pregnancy seriously endangered the woman’s health (46% in 1986; 86% in 2003);
– if the pregnancy is the result of rape (51% in 1986; 86% in 2003) or incest (52% in 1986; 86% in 2003); and
– where there is evidence that the child will be deformed (31% in 1986 and 70% in 2003).
89. The Medical Practitioners Act 1978 gives the Medical Council of Ireland responsibility for providing guidance to the medical profession on all matters relating to ethical conduct and behaviour.
90. Its Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour (6th Edition 2004) provides (paragraph 2.5) that “treatment must never be refused on grounds of moral disapproval of the patient’s behaviour”. The Guide recognises that an abortion may be lawfully carried out in Ireland in accordance with the criteria in the X case, and provides as follows:
“The Council recognises that termination of pregnancy can occur where there is real and substantial risk to the life of the mother and subscribes to the view expressed in Part 2 of the written submission of the Institute of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists to the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution as contained in its Fifth Progress Report ...”
91. This latter written submission is Appendix C to the Guide and contains three paragraphs. In the first paragraph, the Institute of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists welcomes the Green Paper 1999 and notes that its comments were confined to the medical aspects of the question. The submission continued as cited at paragraph 72 above.
92. The 2003 Act came into force on 31 December 2003. Its long title described it as an Act to enable further effect to be given “subject to the constitution” to certain provisions of the Convention.
93. The relevant parts of section 5 of the 2003 Act reads as follows:
“(1) In any proceedings, the High Court, or the Supreme Court when exercising its appellate jurisdiction, may, having regard to the provisions of section 2, on application to it in that behalf by a party, or of its own motion, and where no other legal remedy is adequate and available, make a declaration (referred to in this Act as ‘a declaration of incompatibility’) that a statutory provision or rule of law is incompatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions.
(2) A declaration of incompatibility—
(a) shall not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the statutory provision or rule of law in respect of which it is made, and
(b) shall not prevent a party to the proceedings concerned from making submissions or representations in relation to matters to which the declaration relates in any proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights.
(3) The Taoiseach shall cause a copy of any order containing a declaration of incompatibility to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas within the next 21 days on which that House has sat after the making of the order.
(4) Where—
(a) a declaration of incompatibility is made,
(b) a party to the proceedings concerned makes an application in writing to the Attorney General for compensation in respect of an injury or loss or damage suffered by him or her as a result of the incompatibility concerned, and
(c) the Government, in their discretion, consider that it may be appropriate to make an ex gratia payment of compensation to that party (‘a payment’),
the Government may request an adviser appointed by them to advise them as to the amount of such compensation (if any) and may, in their discretion, make a payment of the amount aforesaid or of such other amount as they consider appropriate in the circumstances.
(5) In advising the Government on the amount of compensation for the purposes of subsection (4), an adviser shall take appropriate account of the principles and practice applied by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to affording just satisfaction to an injured party under Article 41 of the Convention.”
94. The Supreme Court (Carmody v. The Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform Ireland and the Attorney General [2009] IESC 71) made the following comments on an application for a declaration under section 5 of the 2003 Act:
“As can be seen from the foregoing the nature of the remedy, such as it is, provided by section 5 of the Act of 2003 is both limited and sui generis. It does not accord to a plaintiff any direct or enforceable judicial remedy. There are extra-judicial consequences whereby the [Prime Minister] is obliged to lay a copy of the order containing a declaration before each House of the Oireachtas within 21 days. That is the only step which is required to be taken under national law in relation to the provisions concerned. Otherwise it rests with the plaintiff who obtained the declaration to initiate an application for compensation in writing to the Attorney General for any alleged injury or loss or damage suffered by him or her as a result of the incompatibility and then it is a matter for the discretion of the government as to whether or not they should pay any such compensation on an ex gratia basis.
...
[T]he Court is satisfied that when a party makes a claim that an Act or any of its provisions is invalid for being repugnant to the Constitution and at the same time makes an application for a declaration of incompatibility of such Act or some of its provisions with the State’s obligations under the Convention, the issue of constitutionality must first be decided.”
95. This case concerned a 13-year-old girl (“C”) who became pregnant following a rape. The Health Board, which had taken the girl into its care, became aware that she was pregnant and, in accordance with her wishes, obtained a interim care order (under the Child Care Act 1991) from the District Court allowing the Health Board to facilitate a termination of her pregnancy. C’s parents sought to challenge that order by judicial review. On appeal C, her parents and the Health Board were each represented by a Senior and Junior Counsel, and the Attorney General was represented by two Senior and two Junior Counsel.
96. On 28 November 1997 the High Court accepted that, where evidence had been given to the effect that the pregnant young woman might commit suicide unless allowed to terminate her pregnancy, there was a real and substantial risk to her life and such termination was therefore a permissible medical treatment of her condition where abortion was the only means of avoiding such a risk. An abortion was therefore lawful in Ireland in C’s case and the travel issue became unnecessary to resolve. It rejected the appeal on this basis. In rejecting the parents’ argument that the District Court was not competent given, inter alia, the reconciliation of constitutional rights required, the High Court found:
“Furthermore, I think it highly undesirable for the courts to develop a jurisprudence under which questions of disputed rights to have a termination of pregnancy can only be determined by plenary action in the High Court. The High Court undoubtedly has a function in granting injunctions to prevent unlawful terminations taking place and it may in certain circumstances properly entertain an action brought for declarations and consequential orders if somebody is being physically prevented without just cause from having a termination. But it would be wrong to turn the High Court into some kind of licensing authority for abortions and indeed it was for this reason that I have rejected a suggestion made by counsel for C in this case that I should effectively convert the judicial review proceedings into an independent application invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and grant leave for such a termination to take place. I took the view that the case should continue in the form of a judicial review and nothing more. The Child Care Act [1991] is a perfectly appropriate umbrella under which these questions can be determined ...”
97. The parties disputed the ‘ownership’ of embryos fertilised in vitro. The High Court analysed at some length the decision of the Supreme Court in X which, it found, equated “unborn” with an embryo which was implanted in the womb or a foetus. The High Court concluded that there was no evidence that it was ever in the mind of the people voting on the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution that “unborn meant anything other than a foetus or child within the womb”. Accordingly, it could not be concluded that embryos outside the womb or in vitro fell within the scope of Article 40.3.3. As regards the Medical Council Guidelines 2004, the High Court noted as follows:
“These ethical Guidelines do not have the force of law and offer only such limited protection as derives from the fear on the part of a doctor that he might be found guilty of professional misconduct with all the professional consequences that might follow.”
98. The appeal to the Supreme Court ([2009] IESC 82) was unanimously dismissed, the five judges each finding that frozen embryos did not enjoy the protection of the unborn in Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution. Hardiman and Fennelly J.J. also expressed concern about the absence of any form of statutory regulation of in vitro fertilisation in Ireland.
99. D was a minor in care who had been prevented by the local authority from going abroad for an abortion. Her foetus had been diagnosed with anencephaly, which diagnosis was accepted as being incompatible with life outside the uterus. According to a transcript of its ex tempore oral judgment, the High Court clarified that the case was “not about abortion or termination of pregnancy. It is about the right to travel, admittedly for the purposes of a pregnancy termination, but that does not convert it into an abortion case.” Accordingly, the legal circumstances in which a termination of pregnancy was available in Ireland were not in issue, and this “judgment expressly disavows any intention to interfere, whether by enlargement or curtailment, with such circumstances”. The High Court held that the right to travel guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment took precedence over the right of the unborn guaranteed by Article 40.3.3. There was no statutory or constitutional impediment preventing D from travelling to the United Kingdom for an abortion.
100. Efforts to preserve, inter alia, the existing Irish prohibition on abortion gave rise to Protocol No. 17 to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union which was signed in February 1992. It reads as follows:
“Nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or in the treaties establishing the European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those treaties, shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.”
101. On 12 June 2008 the proposed constitutional amendment for the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was rejected by referendum. The government commissioned University College Dublin to conduct independent research into the behaviour and attitudes of the electorate and, notably, to analyse why the people voted for, against or abstained in the referendum. The Report (entitled “Attitudes and Behaviour in the Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon” prepared by professionals with expertise in political science, quantitative research methods, economics and social science data) is dated March 2009. Fieldwork was completed in July 2008 and the sample size was 2,101. The Executive Summary concluded:
“The defeat by referendum of the proposal to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon ... was the product of a complex combination of factors. These included attitudes to Ireland’s membership of the EU, to Irish-only versus Irish-and-European identity and to neutrality. The defeat was heavily influenced by low levels of knowledge and by specific misperceptions in the areas of abortion, corporate taxation and conscription. Concerns about policy issues (the scope of EU decision-making and a belief in the importance of the country having a permanent commissioner) also contributed significantly and substantially to the treaty’s downfall, as did the perception that the EU means low wage rates. Social class and more specific socio-economic interests also played a role ...”
102. The government sought and obtained a legally binding decision of the heads of State or governments of the 27 member States of the European Union reflecting the Irish people’s concerns that Article 40.3.3 would be unaffected by the Lisbon Treaty (The Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of 11/12 December 2008 and of 18/19 July 2009 (172171/1/08 and 11225/2/08)). The relevant part of the decision, which came into effect on the same date as the Lisbon Treaty, reads as follows:
“Nothing in the Treaty of Lisbon attributing legal status to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, or in the provisions of that Treaty and the area of freedom, security and justice, affects in any way the scope and applicability of the protection of the right to life in Article 40.3.1, 40.3.4 and 40.3.3 ... provided by the Constitution of Ireland.”
103. On 2 October 2009 a referendum approved a constitutional amendment allowing for the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon.
104. At this conference 179 countries adopted a twenty-year Programme of Action which focused on individuals’ needs and rights rather than on achieving demographic targets. The relevant parts of Article 8.25 of the Programme provided as follows:
“... All governments ... are urged to strengthen their commitment to women’s health, to deal with the health impact of unsafe abortion as a major public health concern and to reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and improved family-planning services. ... Any measures or changes related to abortion within the health system can only be determined at the national or local level according to the national legislative process ...”
105. The Platform for Action adopted at this Conference reiterated the above-noted paragraph 8.25 of the Programme of Action of the Cairo ICPD 1994 and the governments resolved to consider reviewing laws containing punitive measures against women who have undergone illegal abortions.
106. PACE noted that some progress has been made since the Cairo ICPD 1994. However, “achievements on education enrolment, gender equity and equality, infant child and maternal mortality and morbidity and the provision of universal access to sexual and reproductive health services, including family planning and safe abortion services, remain mixed”. PACE called on European governments to “review, update and compare Council of Europe member States’ national and international population and sexual and reproductive health and rights policies and strategies”, as well as to review and compare funding to ensure the full implementation of the Programme of Action of the Cairo ICPD 1994 by 2015.
107. This Resolution was adopted by 102 votes to 69. The 4 Irish representatives to PACE voted against it, 2 of the members urging PACE to apply the Programme of Action of the Cairo ICPD 1994.
108. The Resolution reads in its relevant part as follows.
“2. In most of the Council of Europe member States the law permits abortion in order to save the expectant mother’s life. Abortion is permitted in the majority of European countries for a number of reasons, mainly to preserve the mother’s physical and mental health, but also in cases of rape or incest, of foetal impairment or for economic and social reasons and, in some countries, on request. The Assembly is nonetheless concerned that, in many of these States, numerous conditions are imposed and restrict the effective access to safe, affordable, acceptable and appropriate abortion services. These restrictions have discriminatory effects, since women who are well informed and possess adequate financial means can often obtain legal and safe abortions more easily.
3. The Assembly also notes that, in member States where abortion is permitted for a number of reasons, conditions are not always such as to guarantee women effective access to this right: the lack of local health care facilities, the lack of doctors willing to carry out abortions, the repeated medical consultations required, the time allowed for changing one’s mind and the waiting time for the abortion all have the potential to make access to safe, affordable, acceptable and appropriate abortion services more difficult, or even impossible in practice.
4. The Assembly takes the view that abortion should not be banned within reasonable gestational limits. A ban on abortions does not result in fewer abortions but mainly leads to clandestine abortions, which are more traumatic and increase maternal mortality and/or lead to abortion ‘tourism’ which is costly, and delays the timing of an abortion and results in social inequities. The lawfulness of abortion does not have an effect on a woman’s need for an abortion, but only on her access to a safe abortion.
5. At the same time, evidence shows that appropriate sexual and reproductive health and rights strategies and policies, including compulsory age-appropriate, gender-sensitive sex and relationships education for young people, result in less recourse to abortion. This type of education should include teaching on self-esteem, healthy relationships, the freedom to delay sexual activity, avoiding peer pressure, contraceptive advice, and considering consequences and responsibilities.
6. The Assembly affirms the right of all human beings, in particular women, to respect for their physical integrity and to freedom to control their own bodies. In this context, the ultimate decision on whether or not to have an abortion should be a matter for the woman concerned, who should have the means of exercising this right in an effective way.
7. The Assembly invites the member States of the Council of Europe to:
7.1. decriminalise abortion within reasonable gestational limits, if they have not already done so;
7.2. guarantee women’s effective exercise of their right of access to a safe and legal abortion;
7.3. allow women freedom of choice and offer the conditions for a free and enlightened choice without specifically promoting abortion;
7.4. lift restrictions which hinder, de jure or de facto, access to safe abortion, and, in particular, take the necessary steps to create the appropriate conditions for health, medical and psychological care and offer suitable financial cover;
...”
109. The Commissioner noted that there was still no legislation in place implementing the X judgment and, consequently, no legal certainty as to when a doctor might legally perform a life-saving abortion. He opined that, in practice, abortion was largely unavailable in Ireland in almost all circumstances. He noted the Tysiąc v. Poland judgment (no. 5410/03, ECHR 2007I) and urged the Irish authorities to ensure that legislation was enacted to resolve this problem.
110. The Report of the CEDAW of July 2005 (A/60/38(SUPP)) recorded Ireland’s introduction of its periodic report to the Committee as follows:
“365. Steps had been taken to integrate a gender dimension into the health service and to make it responsive to the particular needs of women. Additional funding had been provided for family planning and pregnancy counselling services. The [CPA] had been set up in 2001. Extensive national dialogue had occurred on the issue of abortion, with five separate referendums held on three separate occasions. The representative noted that the government had no plans to put forward further proposals at the present time.”
In the CEDAW’s concluding comments, it responded as follows:
“396. While acknowledging positive developments ... the Committee reiterates its concern about the consequences of the very restrictive abortion laws, under which abortion is prohibited except where it is established as a matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother that can be averted only by the termination of her pregnancy.
397. The Committee urges the State Party to continue to facilitate a national dialogue on women’s right to reproductive health, including on the very restrictive abortion laws ...”
111. In the Committee’s Concluding Comments on the third periodic Report of Ireland on observance of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3 dated 30 July 2008), it noted:
“13. The Committee reiterates its concern regarding the highly restrictive circumstances under which women can lawfully have an abortion in the State Party. While noting the establishment of the [CPA], the Committee regrets that the progress in this regard is slow ...
The State Party should bring its abortion laws into line with the Covenant. It should take measures to help women avoid unwanted pregnancies so that they do not have to resort to illegal or unsafe abortions that could put their lives at risk ... or to abortions abroad (Articles 26 and 6).”
112. Abortion is available on request (according to certain criteria including gestational limits) in some 30 Contracting States. An abortion justified on health grounds is available in some 40 Contracting States and justified on well-being grounds in some 35 such States. Three Contracting States prohibit abortion in all circumstances (Andorra, Malta and San Marino). In recent years, certain States have extended the grounds on which abortion can be obtained (Monaco, Montenegro, Portugal and Spain).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 8
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 8


ITEMID: 001-89458
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: TSORIYEV v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Sverre Erik Jebens
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Viktor Magometovich Tsoriyev, is a Russian national who was born in 1961 and lives in Vladikavkaz, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alaniya (North Ossetia). The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Ms V. Milinchuk, the former Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is a former officer of the interior. He was discharged in 2002 and was entitled to special retirement conditions.
In 2005 he brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Interior of the North Ossetia claiming the pension arrears and non-pecuniary damages.
On 11 May 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz awarded the applicant 28,221.25 Russian Roubles in arrears and rejected the non-pecuniary claims. The judgment was not appealed against and entered into force on 23 May 2005.
On 9 June 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the local branch of the Ministry of Finance.
On 31 January 2006 the amount awarded by the judgment was transferred to the applicant's bank account.
Under section 9 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings of 21 July 1997, a bailiff must enforce a judgment within two months. Under section 242.2.6 of the Budget Code of 31 July 1998, the Ministry of Finance must enforce a judgment within three months.


ITEMID: 001-90383
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ESP
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: CASE OF MANGOURAS v. SPAIN
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: No violation of Art. 5-3
JUDGES: Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Ineta Ziemele;Josep Casadevall
TEXT: 7. The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Greece.
8. On 13 November 2002 the ship Prestige, flying the flag of the Bahamas, was sailing in the Spanish exclusive economic zone off the coast of Galicia, carrying 70,000 tonnes of fuel oil. The ship's hull sprang a leak and the contents of the tanks spilled into the Atlantic Ocean.
9. In view of the risk of shipwreck the maritime authorities launched a large-scale operation to rescue the crew. The applicant, who was the ship's captain, was taken by helicopter to the offices of the Corunna (A Coruña) harbourmaster, where he was arrested.
10. The spillage of the ship's cargo caused an ecological disaster whose effects on marine flora and fauna lasted for several months and spread as far as the French coast.
11. By a decision of 17 November 2002 the Corunna no. 4 investigating judge considered that the facts disclosed sufficient evidence to justify initiating a criminal investigation. The judge remanded the applicant in custody with the possibility of being released on payment of bail set at three million euros (EUR). The judge said that, although the oil-spill had been an accident, some of the elements in the file, which were provisional at that stage in the proceedings, pointed to irregularities in the applicant's conduct, such as a lack of cooperation with the port authorities when they tried to take the vessel in tow. The applicant's conduct could constitute an offence against natural resources and the environment and one of failing to comply with the instructions of the administrative authorities. In the judge's opinion, the seriousness of the presumed offences and the fact that the applicant was a foreign national who had no particular ties with Spain justified the high level of bail demanded.
12. The applicant requested his release or, in the alternative, the reduction of bail to EUR 60,000. In a decision of 27 November 2002 the Corcubión (Corunna) no. 1 investigating judge refused the request on the ground that the seriousness of the presumed offences justified keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention. Moreover, his continued detention conformed to the relevant principles established by the case-law of the Constitutional Court, according to which the measure had to be exceptional, subsidiary, temporary and proportionate in nature. As to the amount of bail, the judge stated that it was essential to secure the applicant's appearance for trial in order to elucidate the facts subsequent to the leak in the vessel's hull. He also reiterated the arguments of the first investigating judge to the effect that the seriousness of the offences, the public outcry caused by the marine pollution, the applicant's Greek nationality, the fact that his permanent address was abroad and the fact that he had no ties with Spain justified the high level of bail, which was designed to rule out any risk that the applicant might fail to appear.
13. On 7 December 2002 the same investigating judge confirmed the decision, rejecting an application from the applicant to have it varied.
14. The applicant appealed. In a decision of 3 January 2003 the Corunna Audiencia Provincial
15. On 6 February 2003 the Corcubión (Corunna) no. 1 investigating judge deposited a bank guarantee corresponding to the amount of bail demanded. Accordingly, he ordered the applicant's provisional release subject to the following conditions:
“(a) that [the applicant] supply an address in Spain;
(b) that he report every day before 1 p.m. to the police headquarters corresponding to the address supplied;
(c) that he be prohibited from leaving the country and surrender his passport to the court's registry.”
16. Relying on Article 17 of the Constitution (right to liberty and security), the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. While he did not appeal against his pre-trial detention, for which he also considered sufficient reasons to have been given, the applicant complained of the amount of bail, arguing that it was excessive and disproportionate in view of his financial circumstances, which made the prospects for his provisional release unrealistic. He stressed that the amount fixed did not take account of his personal circumstances as required by the case-law of the Strasbourg Court.
17. In a reasoned decision of 29 September 2003 the Constitutional Court declared the appeal inadmissible. It began by observing that, in accordance with its case-law, the fact that the applicant had been released did not render the amparo appeal devoid of purpose, given that:
“...in the event of a breach of the fundamental right relied on, the court should allow the appeal and grant the applicant amparo relief.”
18. However, on the merits, the Constitutional Court ruled as follows:
“... in accordance with Article 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the amount of bail set should take into account, among other factors, the nature of the offence, the accused's previous convictions and any other circumstances that might prompt him to evade justice. The European Court of Human Rights, for its part, has ruled that the object of bail is to secure the presence of the accused at the trial ... and that the amount should act as a deterrent, dispelling any wish on his part to abscond.
...
In the instant case the various decisions gave ample reasons for the amount demanded and the refusal of the request for a reduction, namely: the overriding objective of securing the accused's presence at the trial, the seriousness of the offences, the disastrous situation caused by the spillage of the ship's cargo both domestically and abroad, the fact that the applicant is a non-national and the fact that he has no ties whatsoever in Spain.
All the above circumstances led the courts to consider that the risk of the applicant's absconding could only be reduced by setting such a high sum for bail ... They also took into consideration the accused's personal and financial circumstances and the commercial environment in which he works ... The applicant's Greek nationality, the fact that his permanent address is abroad and the fact that he has no ties with Spain constitute personal circumstances which were taken into consideration in fixing bail, in order to deter the applicant from absconding.
Accordingly, bail was fixed on the basis of proportionality criteria ... The exceptional amount reflects the exceptional nature of the situation.”
19. The Spanish authorities later authorised the applicant's return to his country of origin, where he is now living, on condition that the Greek authorities ensured compliance with the periodic supervision to which the applicant was subject in Spain. Hence, the applicant has to report every two weeks to the police station on the island of Icaria, where he was born, or in Athens, where his children live.
20. The criminal proceedings on the merits are still pending before the Corcubión (Corunna) no. 1 investigating judge.
Article 17
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security. No one may be deprived of his liberty other than in accordance with the provisions of this Article and in the circumstances and form provided by law.”
Article 325
“Persons who ... cause or carry out, directly or indirectly, emissions, discharges ... into ... inland or maritime waters or groundwater ... capable of occasioning severe damage to the balance of natural systems, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of between six months and four years, a daily fine payable for between eight and twentyfour months and a prohibition on carrying out their occupation of between one and three years. Where there is a risk to persons' health the prison term shall be in the upper half of the range.”
Article 331
“The penalty imposed for an offence referred to in this Chapter shall be in the lower half of the range where it was the result of gross negligence.”
Article 325
“...
2. Persons who knowingly release, discharge or introduce ionising radiation or other substances into the air, soil or maritime waters ... in quantities such as to cause death or illness ... with irreversible effects, shall be liable to a further prison term of between two and four years in addition to that imposed [automatically] for damage to persons.”
Article 531
“In determining the nature and amount of the security, consideration must be given to the nature of the offence, the social situation and previous convictions of the accused and any other circumstance which may prompt the accused to seek to evade justice.”
This Convention has been amended on several occasions, most recently in July 2007 (entry into force December 2008). In particular, Annex I to the Convention relates to the prevention of pollution by oil and covers the prevention of pollution following collision or stranding. The Convention, which is a combination of two treaties adopted in 1973 and 1978, constitutes the main international instrument covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes.
Article 220
Enforcement by coastal States
“...
3. Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed a violation of applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels or laws and regulations of that State conforming and giving effect to such rules and standards, that State may require the vessel to give information regarding its identity and port of registry, its last and its next port of call and other relevant information required to establish whether a violation has occurred.
...
6. Where there is clear objective evidence that a vessel navigating in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed a violation referred to in paragraph 3 resulting in a discharge causing major damage or threat of major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State, or to any resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone, that State may, subject to section 7, provided that the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its laws.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 6, whenever appropriate procedures have been established, either through the competent international organization or as otherwise agreed, whereby compliance with requirements for bonding or other appropriate financial security has been assured, the coastal State if bound by such procedures shall allow the vessel to proceed.
...”
Article 221
Measures to avoid pollution arising from maritime casualties
“1. Nothing in this Part shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, both customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.
2. For the purposes of this article, 'maritime casualty' means a collision of vessels, stranding or other incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo.”
This Law regulates the responsibility of operators to prevent, avoid and remedy environmental damage in accordance with Article 45 of the Constitution and the prevention and “polluter pays” principles.
The aim of this Directive is to establish a framework of environmental liability based on the “polluter pays” principle, with a view to preventing and remedying environmental damage.
Article 3
Scope
“1. This Directive shall apply, in accordance with international law, to discharges of polluting substances in:
(a) the internal waters, including ports, of a Member State, in so far as the Marpol regime is applicable;
(b) the territorial sea of a Member State;
(c) straits used for international navigation subject to the regime of transit passage, as laid down in Part III, section 2, of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to the extent that a Member State exercises jurisdiction over such straits;
(d) the exclusive economic zone or equivalent zone of a Member State, established in accordance with international law; and
(e) the high seas.
2. This Directive shall apply to discharges of polluting substances from any ship, irrespective of its flag, with the exception of any warship, naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government noncommercial service.
...”
Article 8
Penalties
“1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that infringements ... are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which may include criminal or administrative penalties.
2. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the penalties referred to in paragraph 1 apply to any person who is found responsible for an infringement ...”
“...
In the sphere of penalties
167. Four lines of thought must be pursued:
a) The excessively absolute principle of freedom of navigation must be revised, as it is no longer appropriate in the context of present-day transport flows. Legally speaking, this would open the way for passive control and ultimately active control, at least in zones subject to risk. The issue of the responsibilities of control bodies could be considered at the same time.
b) A state which has suffered pollution damage caused by a ship must be able to demand reparation from the state whose flag that ship flies where it is established that the damage results completely or partly from the flag state's failure to exercise any effective monitoring of the vessel causing the damage.
c) Article 230 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea must be amended to make clearer the possibility of penalties of imprisonment for the most serious pollution offences.
d) An international maritime criminal court must be set up. In the same way that the notion of crimes against humanity finally yielded the creation of the international criminal court, it cannot be excluded in the future that states may eventually enshrine the notion of 'crime against the environment', drawing the consequences, in legal terms, of the idea put forward by some of establishing the sea as the common heritage of humanity.”
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 5
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-3