ITEMID: 001-57715
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: FRA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1991
DOCNAME: CASE OF CARDOT v. FRANCE
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Lack of jurisdiction (complaint inadmissible)
JUDGES: C. Russo
TEXT: 10. Mr Jean-Claude Cardot is a French national and works as a road haulier.
On 2 August 1979 the public prosecutor at Valence (Drôme) applied to a local investigating judge for an investigation to be opened into, inter alia, the importing, exporting and transporting of drugs by a person or persons unknown. The police had just discovered an international organisation specialising in drug trafficking between the Middle East and Europe. The organisation had been active since 1978 and was made up of Iranian suppliers and French carriers, masterminded by Dutch nationals.
11. In August 1979 the investigating judge charged Mr Cardot and fourteen others with drug offences.
12. On 27 November 1979 the Italian police arrested Mr Cardot in Verona while he was carrying 455 kg of hashish in his lorry; the investigating judge at Valence was informed of the arrest on 30 November.
On 21 June 1980 the Verona District Court sentenced the applicant to five years and one month’s imprisonment, but on appeal the Venice Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to three years and seven months.
13. On 21 December 1981 Mr Cardot was pardoned. He was not released, however, as an international warrant for his arrest had been issued by the investigating judge at Valence on 26 June 1980, and on 3 July the French Government had applied to the Italian authorities for his extradition. On 14 August 1980 Mr Cardot had been served with a further warrant for his arrest, issued by the same judge, on suspicion of inciting an attempt to import 1,080 kg of hashish and attempting to import 650 kg; the commission of the first offence had been frustrated only by a circumstance beyond his control (the arrest of the principal offender in Tehran), while commission of the second had been prevented by the applicant’s arrest in Verona.
On 24 March 1981 the Venice Court of Appeal ruled in favour of extradition for the purposes of proceedings relating to participation in transporting drugs on three occasions in 1978. On 23 February 1982 the Ministry of Justice decided to extradite Mr Cardot, who was handed over to the French authorities on 23 March.
14. In an order of 5 February 1981 the investigating judge committed Mr Cardot, who was still in Italy, and his co-defendants for trial at the Valence Criminal Court.
The applicant was charged, firstly, with having, in concert with his co-defendants, organised an association or a conspiracy to import and export drugs and of having imported and transported drugs and, secondly, of having aided and abetted the offences with which the other defendants were charged and of having attempted to import, export and transport hashish on two specific occasions.
15. The court gave judgment on 7 May 1981.
It decided to sever the proceedings against Mr Cardot on account of his being in custody in Italy (see paragraphs 12-13 above).
One of the defendants (Mrs Cuvillier) was acquitted on the ground that there was insufficient evidence, and six others were given either immediate custodial sentences (Mr Millo sixteen years, Mr Jacques Montaner sixteen years, and Mr Humbert eight years) or suspended sentences (Mr Kabayan three years, Mr Jean Montaner five years, and Mrs Sabatier five years).
As to the seven co-defendants who had not appeared, the court sentenced them in absentia to periods of imprisonment ranging from five to twenty years.
The judgment contained the following passages concerning Mr Cardot:
"It appears from the preliminary investigation and the hearing that in late March or early April 1978, on Cardot’s instructions, a convoy of eight lorries driven by, among others, Cardot, Millo, Humbert and a driver from Jacques Montaner’s firm carried chemicals and pharmaceuticals to Afghanistan, returning via Iran.
Two days after the arrival of Cardot’s lorry at the Jacques Montaner depot at Charmes (Ardèche), Cardot and Millo dismantled the petrol tank and took out a number of metal boxes ... containing 300-400 kg of hashish ...
At all events, before the petrol tank was dismantled, Cardot had indicated to Millo that it contained hashish, whereas Montaner was confronted with a fait accompli.
...
Cardot subsequently asked Jacques Montaner and Millo, who agreed, to bring back a quantity of hashish when carrying car-wheel rims from Yugoslavia ...
When Cardot had arranged the rendez-vous, Millo and Jacques Montaner set off together during June 1978 ...
...
Cardot gave Jacques Montaner FRF 6,000, which did not even cover his expenses, while Millo received FRF 50,000 only after another journey to Iran.
...
For the petrol tanks fitted by the Dutchmen, Cardot went to two different boilermakers so as not to arouse suspicion ...
According to Millo and Montaner, the tanks measured 2.3m-2.5m x 0.8m x 0.8m and their components were charged to the Société Transpyrénées [Transpyrenean Company], in other words paid by Cardot (record of the hearing).
...
On returning from a trip to Afghanistan, Cardot suggested to Jean-Paul Humbert that he should engage in smuggling ...
At the end of July 1978 ... Humbert saw Cardot again, who told him that a petrol tank was ready.
...
Cardot, who went to Iran before Humbert, had arranged to meet him in the car park of Tehran Customs.
After his vehicle had been immobilised ..., Humbert, acting on Cardot’s instructions, got in touch again with an Iranian, who escorted him to a warehouse in the centre of the working-class district of Tehran, where, at night, he watched two other Iranians load forty rectangular metal boxes into the tank ...
...
On Cardot’s instructions and accompanied by him, he took an empty lorry to Holland, where Cardot made a telephone call from the Novotel car park on the outskirts of Amsterdam.
Guided by André Bronkhorst in the car which Cardot had got into ..., Humbert left his trailer at the Dutchman’s disposal outside a warehouse ...
...
On his return to Charmes, still accompanied by Cardot, he was given FRF 120,000 by Cardot for transporting 700 kg of hashish.
...
At about the same time, likewise on Cardot’s instructions, Jacques Montaner went to Iran in his lorry in order to bring back a quantity of hashish ...
According to Montaner’s disclosures at the hearing, Cardot, Millo and Humbert also went to Iran, each with specially adapted petrol tanks, whereas his own was not adapted until he reached Iran.
...
Montaner travelled via France to Amsterdam, where he rang a telephone number he had been given by Cardot in order to contact Antonius Vriens, known as ‘Tony’, who took delivery from him.
After the petrol tank had been cut out with a chain-saw in a warehouse, Montaner unloaded the tins containing the hashish, came back to France and subsequently received from Cardot payments of FRF 20,000, FRF 50,000 and FRF 10,000 on account, i.e. FRF 80,000 in all for the two journeys, this one and the one that had been made to Yugoslavia in June.
...
At Cardot’s instigation, Millo returned to Tehran by air on 30 September 1978 in order to collect his lorry, which he had left in Iran on 26 August and which Cardot had said was now ‘ready’ ...
...
From the statements of the various defendants and persons charged and inquiries made in Holland it appears that Van Dam Gybertus financed the operation and was the person for whom the consignments of drugs carried by the hauliers were ultimately intended.
...
André Bronkhorst, an important member of the organisation, took delivery in Amsterdam in August 1978 of the drugs brought from Iran by Humbert and Cardot.
...
Esser got Cardot involved in smuggling hashish ...
...
Gérardus Waterloo went to Valence several times in June 1978 to make specially adapted petrol tanks together with Van Vemde and Cardot.
...
In sum, as regards the transport of drugs, it has been established that:
1. In March 1978 Cardot and Millo took part in importing 400 kg of hashish from Afghanistan and exporting it.
2. In June 1978 Cardot, Jacques Montaner and Millo took part in importing 1,500 kg of hashish from Yugoslavia and exporting it to Holland.
3. In July 1978 Cardot and Humbert took part in importing 700 kg of hashish from Iran and exporting it to Holland.
4. In August 1978 Cardot and Jacques Montaner took part in importing 600 kg of hashish from Iran and exporting it to Holland.
5. In late September or early October 1978 Cardot incited an attempt to import 1,080 kg of hashish from Iran.
...
8. In November 1979 Cardot attempted to import and export 650 kg of hashish.
...
The offence of importing prohibited goods - in this instance 10 kg of morphine, 7 kg of heroin and more than 3,500 kg of hashish, with a total value of 47 million francs -, which is punishable under Articles 38, 215, 373, 414, 417, 419 and 435 of the Customs Code, has been made out.
The foregoing offence is imputable to Jacques Montaner, Millo, Humbert, Jean Montaner, Kabayan, Sabatier, Cardot, Sarrafinehad, Van Dam, Bronkhorst, Van Vemde, Vriens, Esser and Waterloo severally, the proceedings against Cardot having, however, been severed.
..."
16. Five of those convicted appealed and on 18 February 1982 the Grenoble Court of Appeal gave judgment. It acquitted two of them (Mr Jean Montaner and Mrs Sabatier) on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence, and reduced the prison sentences of the three others (Mr Humbert, Mr Millo and Mr Jacques Montaner) by a quarter.
In its judgment the court indicated that they had all claimed to have received their instructions from Mr Cardot, who was repeatedly named in the text. The judgment included the following references:
"...
It is apparent from the case file and the oral proceedings that in March 1978 Gérard Roucaries put Jean-Claude Cardot in touch with the Dutchman Esser Stanley, known as Carlos, who proposed to Jean-Claude Cardot - who was then in the business of road haulage to the Middle East - that he should carry hashish against payment of 100,000 French francs per tonne. Jean-Claude Cardot accepted this proposal, and in late March or early April 1978, on Cardot’s instructions, a convoy of eight lorries driven by, among others, Cardot, Millo, Humbert and a driver from Jacques Montaner’s firm carried chemicals and pharmaceuticals to Afghanistan, returning via Iran.
Two days after the arrival of Cardot’s lorry at the Jacques Montaner depot at Charmes (Ardèche), Cardot and Millo dismantled the petrol tank ...
...
Cardot subsequently asked Jacques Montaner and Millo, who agreed, to bring back a quantity of hashish when carrying car-wheel rims from Yugoslavia.
When Cardot had arranged the rendez-vous, Millo and Jacques Montaner set off together ...
...
On returning from a trip to Afghanistan, Cardot suggested to Jean-Paul Humbert that he should engage in smuggling.
...
After his vehicle had been immobilised ..., Humbert, acting on Cardot’s instructions, got in touch again with an Iranian ...
...
On Cardot’s instructions and accompanied by him, he took an empty lorry to Holland ...
...
At about the same time, likewise on Cardot’s instructions, Jacques Montaner went to Iran in his lorry in order to bring back a quantity of hashish.
...
Francis Millo admitted at the hearing that ... he had driven a consignment of hashish from Valence to Holland that had just been brought from Iran by Jean-Claude Cardot.
...
At Cardot’s instigation, he returned to Tehran by air on 30 September 1978 in order to collect his lorry, which Cardot had said was now ‘ready’.
..."
17. Mr Cardot was summoned to appear before the Valence Criminal Court on 2 April 1982.
On the same day, on an application by the prosecution, the court ordered that further inquiries should be made into the facts and that the defendant should remain in custody. On an appeal against the latter decision, the Grenoble Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision on 19 May 1982.
18. On 17 June the Valence Criminal Court appointed an investigating judge to carry out the further inquiries.
19. The judge questioned Mr Cardot on 28 June and 30 July 1982.
20. He also confronted Mr Cardot with the four main witnesses: Mr Humbert, Mr Millo, Mr Jean Montaner and Mr Jacques Montaner on 12, 13, 16 and 26 July respectively (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above).
On each occasion, in the presence of Mr Cardot and his lawyer, the investigating judge read out the statements that the witnesses had made to the police on 21 and 23 October 1979 and 19 February 1980. Mr Humbert, Mr Millo and Mr Jacques Montaner confirmed them.
The applicant disputed certain points in Mr Millo’s and Mr Jean Montaner’s statements; Mr Montaner had retracted certain things he had said to the police and to the courts. Mr Cardot also questioned the witnesses through his lawyer. He applied successfully for the record of his confrontation with Mr Jean Montaner to be amended and had further questions put to him.
21. The trial at the Valence Criminal Court opened on 1 September 1982. The prosecution did not deem it necessary to call as witnesses the four people with whom Mr Cardot had been confronted, and the accused himself did not make any written application for evidence to be heard from them.
The court adjourned the case to 17 September so that the national head office of the Customs investigations branch could be represented as a civil party.
22. During the hearing on 17 September Mr Cardot gave an account of himself in relation to the charges against him. He again challenged the statements that his former co-defendants had made to the police, pointing out that they had varied, but he did not apply for the persons concerned to be called.
23. On the same day the court sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. He was found guilty as charged; the court did not take into account the offences of which he had been convicted by the Venice Court of Appeal (see paragraph 12 above).
The judgment referred to the statements of the former co-defendants:
"...
... Millo stated that Cardot had used the time to have his trailer equipped with a specially adapted petrol tank made in Iran.
It appeared from Humbert’s statements that Cardot had had contacts concerning the transport of smuggled goods - Cardot did not deny this but claimed that the goods in question were carpets -, that when he (Humbert) drove his lorry with its specially adapted petrol tanks to Tehran, Cardot had told him that he could be paid FRF 120,000 per journey, that he had indeed heard conversations between Cardot and a Dutchman on the subject of drugs ...
For his part, Millo said that during his stay in Tehran, at that time, Cardot suggested to him that he should have his lorry loaded with hashish to take back to France, and Montaner stated that on returning from Afghanistan Cardot brought round 400-500 kilos of drugs, which had been collected by another lorry.
...
Millo said that the four petrol tanks had been made for Cardot by Van Vemde ...
...
While returning to France on or about 8 or 10 August 1978 Cardot met Millo in Turkey; the latter said during the further inquiries into the facts that Cardot had told him on that occasion that his lorry was carrying hashish; he even told Montaner that he had brought back hashish on this journey.
Millo stated categorically that on his return to France 400 kilos of hashish remained from Cardot’s consignment; ...
...
Montaner and Millo stated categorically that Cardot was behind the transporting of hashish from Yugoslavia; Montaner and Millo said that Cardot had organised the journey and given all the necessary instructions; ...
...
But in his original statements Humbert had said that ten or twelve days after this journey to Holland Cardot had paid him FRF 120,000 in cash in France ...
...
Cardot denied any involvement in the journey allegedly made to Lille by Montaner and himself together with Millo ...; Montaner and Millo, however, had said that all three of them had stopped at the Novotel in Lille before Millo continued his journey to Holland; the Dutchman Tony Vriens had joined them; Montaner had said that this Dutchman had given Cardot a bag containing money; Cardot had given him two bundles each containing FRF 50,000 in 500-franc notes and he had given one of these bundles of notes to Millo.
..."
24. Mr Cardot, the civil party and the prosecution appealed, and the Grenoble Court of Appeal gave judgment on 17 March 1983. It upheld the lower court’s judgment as regards Mr Cardot’s guilt and increased the sentence to seven years’ imprisonment.
The part of its judgment headed "The facts" contained the following:
"It appears from the police inquiries, from the judicial investigation and from the partly confirming judgment of this Court on 18 February 1982 [(see paragraph 16 above)] that the facts are established as follows:
...
... The judicial investigation established that [the traffickers] were divided into three groups: ... and, lastly, the carriers, consisting of Francis Millo, Jacques Montaner and Jean-Paul Humbert, who subsequently formally implicated Jean-Claude Cardot, whom they described as the intermediary between the Dutch and themselves.
...
For his part, Jean-Paul Humbert stated that on this occasion Cardot introduced him to two Dutchmen, ‘Tony’ and ‘Carlos’ ...
...
Jacques Montaner and Francis Millo ... stated that they made this journey at Cardot’s request in order to bring back a consignment of hashish. ... Millo stated that Cardot helped to load the lorry ...
...
According to [Cardot’s mistress], who confirmed Humbert’s and Jacques Montaner’s statements, Cardot helped Van Vemde and Waterloo to make specially adapted petrol tanks, but Cardot denied this. ...
...
Furthermore, during the trial in this Court on 18 February 1982 Millo stated ... that on that journey he had driven a consignment of hashish from Valence to Holland that had just been brought from Iran by Jean-Claude Cardot. He also stated that after meeting Cardot in Ankara he took his vehicle to Tehran and came back to France, subsequently returning to Tehran by air at Cardot’s instigation on 30 September 1978 in order to collect his lorry, which Cardot had told him was ‘ready’. ...
...
The various French lorry drivers involved in this trafficking, in particular Jacques Montaner, Francis Millo and Jean-Paul Humbert, who were convicted by this Court on 18 February 1982, all stated that they had received their instructions from Jean-Claude Cardot. ..."
25. At the hearing of the appeal the prosecution had considered "the facts ... completely established by the evidence in the file and in the concordant statements made by Jacques Montaner, Jean-Paul Humbert and Francis Millo during the judicial investigation and at the hearing in the Court of Appeal which led to their conviction".
Mr Cardot had challenged all the prosecution evidence. In particular, he had asserted that "Montaner’s and Millo’s statements [were] untrue and malicious and ha[d] no other purpose than to minimise their own responsibility" and that "the Grenoble Court of Appeal’s judgment of 18 February 1982 [could not] be used in evidence against him". He had not, however, made any application for witnesses to be called.
26. Mr Cardot appealed on points of law. One of his three grounds of appeal was based on failure to comply with Articles 485 and 593 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, lack of reasons, absence of any legal basis and a breach of the rights of the defence.
He criticised the Grenoble Court of Appeal for having
"found [him] guilty of the charges against him by reference to the terms of a judgment delivered on 18 February 1982 by the Grenoble Court of Appeal in a case brought by the public prosecutor’s office against other defendants, and to the hearing which [had] preceded that judgment.
He ended this ground of appeal as follows:
"It follows in reality that the appellant was tried on the basis not of the evidence uncovered by the investigation or by the hearing which preceded his conviction but of evidence from an earlier decision, to which he was not a party, and of a hearing during which he had not been able to put forward his defence.
The reference thus made in the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the contents of an earlier decision and, above all, to the hearing which preceded that decision to which the appellant was not a party manifestly amounts to a violation of the rights of the defence.
..."
27. The Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on 13 February 1984. As regards the ground of appeal in question, it said:
"It appears from the impugned judgment of the Court of Appeal and from the lower court’s judgment, whose reasoning the Court of Appeal adopted to the extent that it was not inconsistent, and from the case file that Cardot, a road haulier, took part in substantial smuggling of hashish between Iran and the Netherlands, in particular by organising, preparing and carrying out the transport of the drug as well as the manufacture and fitting in France of hidden compartments on lorries.
In order to found its belief as to the importance of Cardot’s role in organising the smuggling, the Grenoble Court of Appeal referred to the findings of another judgment it had given on 18 February 1982, in relation to proceedings against all the other members of the criminal organisation and from which Cardot’s case had been severed, on the direction of the court of first instance, because he was in custody in Italy for separate offences.
As copies of that judgment of the Court of Appeal and of the judgment it upheld have been added to the case file, the Court of Cassation is able to satisfy itself that, in holding as it did, the Court of Appeal in no way infringed the rights of the defence.
The courts have unfettered discretion to assess the weight of the various pieces of evidence, provided that, as in the instant case, this evidence was adduced in adversarial proceedings; it is accordingly wholly permissible to file documents from other proceedings.
It follows that this ground of appeal must be rejected."
28. Before the Convention institutions the Government and the applicant mentioned or relied on several provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The main ones were the following:
"Unless otherwise provided by statute, any type of evidence shall be admissible to substantiate a criminal charge, and the court shall reach its decision on the basis of being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt (intime conviction).
The court may only base its decision on evidence which has been adduced during the trial and discussed before it inter partes."
"Anyone called to be heard as a witness shall be required to appear, to take the oath and to give evidence."
"A witness who fails to appear or who refuses either to take the oath or to give evidence may, on an application by the public prosecutor, be punished by the court as provided for in Article 109."
"If a witness fails to appear and has not put forward any excuse recognised as being valid and legitimate, the court may, on an application by the public prosecutor or of its own motion, order the witness to be brought before it immediately by the police in order to be examined or adjourn the case."
"With the court’s leave, evidence may also be given by persons suggested by the parties and who are present at the beginning of the trial but have not been formally summoned."
"Witnesses shall be heard only if the court [of appeal] so orders."
"Pleadings shall contain the grounds of appeal to the Court of Cassation and shall refer to the statutory provisions which it is claimed have been disregarded."


ITEMID: 001-68056
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: GANENKO v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Vladimir Vladimirovich Ganenko, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1941 and lives in the city of Sebastopol, Ukraine. He was represented before the Court by Mr R.Y. Martynovskiy, a lawyer practising in Sebastopol. The respondent Government were represented by Mrs Z. Bortnovska, their Agent.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is physically disabled and cannot move about without the assistance of another person.
On 26 July 2001 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Gagarinskiy District Court of Sebastopol against the Labour and Social Policy Department on account of its failure to provide him with a new vehicle for disabled persons in place of the old one that he had been using since 1989. The applicant also requested the court to order the defendant to provide him with a new vehicle within six months.
On 27 December 2001 the court allowed the applicant's claim in part, ordering the Department to provide the applicant with a vehicle. At the same time the court refused to fix any time-limit for the defendant to comply with this judgment. This judgment was not appealed against by either party and became final on 28 January 2002.
On 9 April 2002 the enforcement proceedings were opened.
These proceedings were terminated several times. It appears that the judgment of 27 December 2001 could not be enforced because of the lack of funds in the State budget.
On 18 July 2003 the Bailiff Service took proceedings in the Gagarinskiy District Court of Sebastopol, requesting the suspension of the enforcement of the judgment of 27 December 2001 and a stay of the enforcement proceedings.
On 14 August 2003 the Gagarinskiy District Court of Sebastopol rejected the Bailiff Service's action.
On 17 March 2004 the applicant received the vehicle in question and the enforcement proceedings were terminated.
Paragraph 4 stipulates that a disabled person is provided with a vehicle free of charge or at thirty percent of its price for a period of ten years without having the right to sell it, donate it or transfer it to a third person. After the expiry of the said period, the disabled person can use the vehicle until he receives a new one.


ITEMID: 001-105845
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2011
DOCNAME: CASE OF M.B. v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 5-3
JUDGES: Lech Garlicki;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Sverre Erik Jebens;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Katowice.
5. On 18 October 2004 the Katowice Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Prokuratury Okręgowej) ordered the applicant’s detention in connection with a criminal investigation pending against her. The prosecutor also issued a search warrant for the applicant’s apartment with a view to locating any book-keeping records or other documents which could be used as evidence in the ongoing investigation.
6. On 19 October 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of abuse of her powers and office in her role as head of a certain division at the Katowice Office of Fiscal Control (Urząd Kontroli Skarbowej) and accepting a bribe (in the amount of 130,000 Polish zlotys (PLN)).
7. On 20 October 2004 the Katowice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody, relying on the reasonable suspicion that she had committed the offences in question. It also considered that keeping the applicant in detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given the risk that if released, the applicant might induce witnesses to give false testimony. The court also stressed that a severe sentence was likely to be imposed.
8. The applicant’s appeal against the detention order was dismissed by the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) on 1 December 2004.
9. In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s detention was extended on several occasions by the Katowice District Court, namely on 12 January, 14 April, and 12 July 2005.
10. On 14 January 2005 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office issued a decision whereby the possible penalty to be imposed on the applicant was to be secured by means of a charge on the applicant’s assets, amounting to PLN 25,000, as well as through the forfeiture of benefits deriving from her crime in the amount of PLN 130,000. On 25 February 2005 this decision was upheld together with the relevant enforcement order by the Katowice District Court.
The applicant appealed. The Prosecutor’s decision was eventually upheld by the Katowice Regional Court on 29 September 2005.
11. The applicant’s detention was subsequently extended by decisions of the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) delivered on 3 October and 28 December 2005, 29 March, 28 June, and 27 September 2006 and 4 January, 1 March and 4 April 2007.
12. In all their decisions the authorities repeatedly relied on the original grounds given for the applicant’s detention. They also considered that keeping her in detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given the risk that she might tamper with evidence or induce witnesses to give false testimony. Further, they attached great importance to the considerable number of witnesses and the extensive body of evidence to be considered.
In its decision of 4 January 2007 the court noted that the investigation has been lengthy and informed the prosecutor that any subsequent motion for having the applicant’s detention extended would be critically reviewed.
13. The applicant’s subsequent appeals against decisions extending her detention, as well as her other numerous applications for release were all unsuccessful. In her appeals she argued that the charges against her were based on unreliable and contradictory evidence. She subsequently invoked the principle of the presumption of innocence and also relied on her personal circumstances, in particular her age and health problems.
14. On 19 April 2007 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Katowice Regional Court. The bill of indictment comprised charges of abuse of powers and office, bribery and numerous tax offences. The applicant was accused of having gained through her criminal activities a permanent source of income. The charges were brought against twenty-one defendants.
15. On 26 April 2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 30 July 2007. It further held that she could be released if she put up bail of PLN 200,000 (approximately 52,000 euros (EUR) at the time) by 31 March 2007, to be deposited in cash into the Katowice District Court’s account. The court held that the amount of bail was appropriate in view of the applicant’s financial situation and the role she had played in the alleged criminal activities. In addition, the court placed the applicant under police supervision and prohibited her from leaving the country.
16. The applicant appealed, contesting the amount of bail to be paid and requesting its reduction to PLN 30,000. She stressed that since the date of her arrest she had no longer been gainfully employed and further relied on the difficult financial situation of her family. She also requested that bail be accepted in the form of a charge on her apartment.
17. On 18 May 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 26 April 2007, refusing to alter the conditions for the applicant’s release.
18. As it appears from the documents submitted, on 31 May 2007 the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s release as she had eventually paid the bail (in cash).
19. On 23 February 2009 the applicant filed a motion requesting that the amount of bail be reduced to PLN 20,000. On 7 April 2009 the Katowice Regional Court reduced the amount of bail to PLN 50,000.
20. It appears that subsequently the amount of bail was reduced to PLN 20,000.
21. On 20 July 2010 the Regional Court reduced the amount of bail to PLN 19,000. Subsequently, the measure prohibiting the applicant from leaving the country was quashed.
22. The proceedings are still pending before the Katowice Regional Court.
23. The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of detention during judicial proceedings (tymczasowe aresztowanie) the grounds for its extension and release from detention are set out in the Court’s judgments in the cases of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02, §§ 27-33, 25 April 2006, Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006 and Osuch v. Poland, no. 30028/06, §§ 22-24, 3 November 2009.
24. The relevant domestic provisions governing the imposition of other “preventive measures” (środki zapobiegawcze), inter alia, bail, are covered by Chapter 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1997, which entered into force on 1 September 1998.
25. Article 257 § 1 of the Code provides that detention shall not be imposed if another preventive measure (for example, bail) is considered to be adequate. Pursuant to Article 266 of the Code, bail in the form of cash, securities or by way of a charge on property can be deposited by the accused or by another person. Determination of the amount, form and the relevant methods for the payment of bail should be made by a decision, having regard to the financial situation of the accused and, as the case may be, that of another party depositing bail, as well as to the assessment of the damage which may have been caused by the offence concerned and to the character of the offence.
26. The relevant statistical data, recent amendments to the Code of Criminal procedure designed to streamline criminal proceedings and references to the relevant Council of Europe materials can be found in the Court’s judgment in the case of Kauczor (see Kauczor v. Poland, no. 45219/06, §§ 27-28 and 30-35, 3 February 2009).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 5
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-3


ITEMID: 001-60935
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: FRA
BRANCH: GRANDCHAMBER
DATE: 2003
DOCNAME: CASE OF ODIEVRE v. FRANCE
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion);No violation of Art. 8;No violation of Art. 14+8
JUDGES: Luzius Wildhaber;Nicolas Bratza;Paul Mahoney
TEXT: 9. The applicant is a French national who lives in Paris.
10. She was born in the fourteenth administrative district of Paris on 23 March 1965. Her mother requested that the birth be kept secret and completed a form at the Health and Social Security Department abandoning her after signing the following letter:
“I abandon my child Berthe Pascale. I certify that I have been informed that after one month the abandonment of my child will become irreversible and that the authorities reserve the right to have her adopted.
I decline the assistance that has been offered to me.
I request that this birth be kept secret.
I certify that I have received the form setting out information on abandonment.
Paris, 24.5.[deleted] Berthe”
11. The applicant was placed with the Child Welfare Service at the Health and Social Services Department (Direction de l'action sanitaire et sociale – “the DASS”) and registered on 1 July 1965 under no. 280326 as being in the care of the département of Seine. Subsequently, a full adoption order was made on 10 January 1969 in favour of Mr and Mrs Odièvre, under whose name she is now known. The operative provisions of the Paris tribunal de grande instance's judgment ordering her adoption read as follows:
“... The operative provisions of the judgment to be delivered shall be entered in the prescribed manner and time ... in the register of births, deaths and marriages held at the town hall of the fourteenth administrative district of Paris;
This entry shall serve as the child's birth certificate;
The original birth certificate and the birth certificate drawn up pursuant to Article 58 shall at the public prosecutor's behest be endorsed with the word 'adoption' and shall be deemed to be null and void.”
12. In December 1990 the applicant consulted her file as a person formerly in the care of the Children's Welfare Service of the département of Seine and managed to obtain non-identifying information about her natural family:
“Record of information on a child admitted to the Saint-Vincent-de-Paul Hospital and Nursing Home provided by: CONFIDENTIAL
Date of admission [date deleted]
Detailed explanation of the reasons for the child's admission (if the child has been or may be abandoned, provide full information on such matters as the mother's, and if possible the father's, physical appearance, mental outlook, health, social background and occupation in order to enable the authorities to find the best possible placement)
Abandonment: The parents have been cohabiting for seven years. Two children have been born of their relationship: an elder child, who is 21 months old, and Pascale, whom the mother has today abandoned and placed in our care. The couple have been put up by a woman for two years, but she now faces eviction. The father is a Spanish national and works as a painter and decorator. His monthly wage is approximately 1,200 [French] francs. He is married and has a legitimate daughter, who is being brought up by her mother. According to Pascale's mother, her partner refuses to have anything to do with Pascale and says that he cannot take on this new burden. She (Ms Berthe) appears to have no will of her own and is content to go along with her partner's wishes. She has not visited her daughter at the clinic, saying that she does not wish to become attached. She did not see her daughter until today and greeted their separation with total indifference. Ms Berthe does not work and looks after her son and her landlady's child.
A request has been made for the birth to remain secret.
Description of the mother: 1.63 m tall, slim, regular features, clear-skinned, heavily made-up brown eyes, long, thick brown hair, in good health, ambivalent attitude, very limited intellect.
Description of the father: average height, blond hair, brown eyes, in good health, sober.
Pascale was born 1 3/4 months premature and weighed 1,770 grams. She now weighs 3,100 grams. Her stay in the incubator room at ... was trouble-free. She has now reached term and presents no neurological or organic anomalies. Information noted on the medical certificate supplied to the nursery department.
25 May ... Birth certificate requested
14 June ... Certificate appended
18 June ... Proposal for category A registration.”
13. On 27 January 1998 the applicant applied to the Paris tribunal de grande instance for an order for the “release of information about her birth and permission to obtain copies of any documents, birth, death and marriage certificates, civil-status documents and full copies of long-form birth certificates”. She explained to the court that she had learned that her natural parents had had a son in 1963 and two other sons after 1965, that the DASS had refused to give her information concerning the civil status of her siblings on the ground that disclosure would be a breach of confidence, and that, now that she knew of her siblings' existence, she was entitled to seek an order for the release of information about her own birth.
14. On 2 February 1998 the court registrar returned the case file to the applicant's lawyer with the following letter of explanation:
“Following examination of your file by Mrs B., Vice-President of the First Division, it appears that the applicant should consider applying to the administrative court to obtain, if possible, an order requiring the authorities to disclose the information, although such an order would in any event contravene the law of 8 January 1993.”
15. The mater semper certa est rule has not found acceptance in French law. There is an ancient tradition in France that enables newborn babies to be abandoned in accordance with a set procedure. The practice can be traced back to the time of Saint Vincent de Paul, who introduced the use of the tour, a sort of revolving crib housed in the wall a charitable institution. The mother would place the child in the crib and ring a bell. On that signal someone on the other side of the wall would cause the tour to pivot and collect the infant. The aim of Saint Vincent de Paul in setting up the Foundlings Home (Œuvre des Enfants trouvés) in 1638 was to prevent infanticide, abortion and babies being exposed.
The Revolution introduced a reform making medical care available to expectant mothers who wished to abandon their children anonymously. In 1793 the Convention passed the following provision:
“The Nation shall bear all the costs of the mother's labour and provide for all her needs during her stay, which will continue until she has fully recovered from her confinement. All information about her shall be treated in the strictest confidence.”
The system of abandonment in the tour was abolished by a law of 27 June 1904 which introduced the “open office” (bureau ouvert) system (the office was open day and night so that the mother could leave her child there secretly, without disclosing her identity; at the same time she could be given information about the consequences of abandoning the child and offered assistance). The tradition of assisting anonymous births led the Vichy government to adopt the Legislative Decree of 2 September 1941 on the protection of births. The legislative decree allowed the mother to give birth anonymously and to receive free medical care during the month preceding and the month following the birth in any public hospital able to provide her with the care her condition required. That provision was repealed and subsequently reintroduced by decrees of 29 November 1953 and 7 January 1959, before being amended in 1986 and becoming first Article 47 of the Family and Welfare Code and then the current Article L. 222-6 of the Social Action and Families Code:
“The costs of accommodation and confinement of women who, on being admitted to a public institution or approved private institution, request that their identity remain secret shall be borne by the Child Welfare Service in the département in which the institution's head office is located.
At their request or with their agreement the women referred to in the first sub-paragraph shall receive psychological support and practical advice from the Child Welfare Service.
The first sub-paragraph shall apply without any means of identification being required or inquiry conducted.
If the name of the child's father or mother has been recorded in a birth certificate issued within the period prescribed by Articles 55 et seq. of the Civil Code, there shall be no legal entitlement to have the costs of accommodation and confinement paid for by the Service.”
The system of anonymous births was embodied in Law no. 93-22 of 8 January 1993 “amending the Civil Code as regards civil status, the family and the rights of the child and instituting the office of family judge”, which introduced new provisions concerning the secret abandonment of children. For the first time, choosing to give birth in secret had an effect on the determination of filiation, as Articles 341 and 341-1 of the Civil Code created an estoppel defence to proceedings to establish maternity: there was no mother in the legal sense of the word:
“An action to establish maternity may be brought subject to the application of Article 341-1. The child bringing the action shall be required to prove that he or she is the child to whom the alleged mother gave birth. The case may be proved only by strong presumptions or circumstantial evidence.
On giving birth, the mother may request that her admission to hospital and identity shall remain secret.”
In addition to Article L. 222-6 of the Social Action and Families Code setting out the procedure for anonymous and secret births – which are generally known as “births by an unidentified person” (accouchement sous X) and are related for filiation purposes to the aforementioned Articles 341 and 341-1 of the Civil Code – information about a child's origins may also be confidential under another provision. Provided the child is less than a year old, its parents may entrust it to the Child Welfare Service and request that their identity be kept secret (former Article 62-4 of the Family and Welfare Code, which later became Article L. 224-5 (4) of the Social Action and Families Code). The filiation stated in the civil-status documents is annulled and a fictitious birth certificate, known as a provisional civil-status certificate, issued in lieu.
16. Since the adoption of the law of 1993, several official reports have suggested that a reform of the system of anonymous births would be desirable.
As far back as 1990 a report by the Conseil d'Etat, entitled “Status and protection of the child”, proposed the setting up of a mediatory body, “the Council for Tracing Family Origins”, to allow information to be communicated and contact to be established between the persons concerned, provided the interested parties consented. The Conseil d'Etat thus emphasised the need for a prior consensual basis before secret information about a child's origins could be disclosed. In that connection, it noted the difficulties inherent in searching for a parent (“this task is rendered all the more difficult by the fact that the administrative authorities currently follow a wide variety of practices with regard to the secrecy of origins. No method for tracing relatives can be established in these conditions. Nonetheless, one consistently finds in practice that a certain amount of information is collected and preserved and, in theory, it could be used. However, it will only become usable if a uniform, clear and simple procedure for collecting and preserving the confidential information relied on is established beforehand”); it also observed that professional secrecy obligations constituted a serious impediment to tracing. For that reason it proposed a compromise that would enable professionals to disregard their confidentiality obligations if they considered it appropriate for the purposes of enabling family origins to be established. In short, the Conseil d'Etat proposed that children should be given a limited right of access to information regarding the identity of their progenitors through the intermediary of a specially created structure that would be responsible for ascertaining the wishes of the parents and facilitating a psychological rapprochement of the parties.
In 1995 a report by Mr Mattéi entitled “Children from here, children from elsewhere – Adoption without borders” proposed preserving the system of secret births, but suggested that it might be possible for non-identifying information to be gathered.
The report of the parliamentary inquiry committee presided over by Laurent Fabius entitled “Rights of the child, uncharted territory”, which was made public on 12 May 1998, proposed reforming the system of anonymous births in these terms:
“It is possible to envisage information on the child's biological filiation being kept with a public institution. Confidential information could be disclosed during the child's minority on a joint application by the mother and child. The right to make such an application could be made subject to conditions concerning the child's capacity or as to minimum age. The right would only be exercisable by the child in person, not its legal representative. Once the child has reached the age of 18, the information would automatically cease to be confidential at the child's request, subject to the mother being informed. In any event, disclosure of the confidential information would be incapable of having any effect on the parental ties the child already enjoyed. ...
A system of this type could initially be established for cases of anonymous births and secret abandonment and subsequently extended, once the legislature considered it appropriate, to births following medically assisted procreation.”
A report by Irène Théry entitled “Couples, filiation and parenthood today – The challenges posed to the law by changes in family and private life”, which was submitted to the Minister of Justice and the Minister for Employment and Solidarity on 14 May 1998, made the following proposal:
“In view of the extremely serious consequences of anonymous births, which deprive the child of both its paternal and maternal filiation, we propose repealing Article 341-1 of the Civil Code. Putting the child up for adoption voluntarily and responsibly appears to be a more balanced and less painful course for the child.”
A report by Professor Françoise Dekeuwer-Défossez entitled “Modernising family law: proposals for a law adapted to the realities and aspirations of our times”, which was submitted to the Minister of Justice on 14 September 1999, provides a résumé of the lively debate on the legitimacy of secrecy. It proposes retaining the system of anonymous births, repealing Article 62-4 of the Family and Welfare Code and encouraging a reversible implementation of a right for mothers to give birth “discreetly” by, for instance, the creation of a body or the appointment of referents who would be responsible for keeping confidential the mother's identity if she has so requested and would also act as mediators.
17. This statute is the final stage in the process of reform described above. It does not call into question the right to give birth anonymously but allows arrangements to be made for disclosure of identity subject to the mother's and the child's express consent being obtained. It does, however, abolish the parents' right to request confidentiality under Article L. 224-5 of the Social Action and Families Code. The main provisions of the statute provide as follows:
“A Chapter VII worded as follows shall be added to Part IV of Book I of the Social Action and Families Code:
'...
National Council for Access to Information about Personal Origins
Article L. 147-1 – A National Council, established under the auspices of the Minister for Social Affairs, shall be responsible for facilitating, in liaison with the départements and overseas authorities, access to information about personal origins in accordance with the conditions set out in this chapter.
It shall inform the départements, the overseas authorities and approved adoption agencies about the procedure for the collection, communication and preservation of the information referred to in Article L. 147-5, and about the arrangements for attending to and assisting persons who wish to trace their origins, the natural parents and adoptive families concerned by their search, and about arrangements for attending to and assisting women who wish to benefit from the provisions of Article L. 222-6. ...
It shall be composed of a judicial member of the national legal service, a member of the administrative courts, representatives of the ministers concerned, a representative of the authorities from the départements, three representatives of women's rights associations, a representative of adoptive families associations, a representative of associations of children in State care, a representative of associations that campaign for the right to know one's origins, and two public figures who are particularly qualified to hold office as a member of the Council as a result of their professional experience and skills obtained in the medical, paramedical or welfare spheres.
Article L. 147-2 – The National Council for Access to Information about Personal Origins shall receive:
(1) Requests for information about the child's origins from:
– the child itself if the child has attained its majority;
– the child's legal representatives or, with their agreement, the child itself, if the child is a minor;
– the child's guardian if the child has attained its majority but has a guardian;
– the child's direct adult descendants if the child is deceased;
(2) Declarations by the natural mother authorising disclosure of her identity, or, as the case may be, by the natural father authorising disclosure of his identity;
(3) Declarations of identity by their ascendants, descendants and siblings;
(4) Requests by the natural father or natural mother to be informed whether the child has sought to trace them.
Article L. 147-3 – Requests for access to information about one's origins shall be made in writing to the National Council for Access to Information about Personal Origins or the president of the council for the département; such requests may be withdrawn at any time in like manner.
A natural father or natural mother who makes an express declaration that he or she waives confidentiality and an ascendant, descendant or sibling of the natural father or natural mother who declares his or her identity shall be informed that the declaration will not be communicated to the person concerned unless that person makes a request for access to information about his or her origins.
Article L. 147-4 – The Council shall communicate to the president of the council for the département copies of all requests and declarations received pursuant to Article L. 147-2.
Article L. 147-5 – In order to be able to deal with requests made to it, the Council shall collect copies of evidence relating to the identity of:
(1) The woman who has requested that her identity and the fact of her admission to a health institution to give birth remain secret and, if applicable, the person named by her at that time as the father of the child;
(2) Any person or persons who have requested that their identity remain secret when their child was taken into State care or was put up for adoption with an approved adoption agency;
(3) The parents of any child whose name was not disclosed to the registrar of births, deaths and marriages when the birth certificate was issued.
Health institutions, the département services and approved adoption agencies shall furnish the National Council on request with copies of evidence relating to the identity of the persons referred to in the preceding sub-paragraphs and any information that does not breach confidence regarding such identity concerning the natural mother's or natural father's health, the child's origins and the reasons for which and circumstances in which the child was placed with the Child Welfare Service or an approved adoption agency.
In order to be able to process requests made to it, the Council shall also collect from the Central Adoption Authority, the International Adoption Mission or approved adoption agencies any information which they are able to obtain from the authorities of the child's country of origin in addition to the information initially received.
Article L. 147-6 – After ensuring that the request remains valid, the Council shall communicate to the persons referred to in Article L. 147-2 (1) the natural mother's identity:
– if it already has in its possession an express declaration waiving confidentiality in respect of the mother's identity;
– if the mother's wishes have been verified and she has not expressly stated that she wishes to keep her identity secret;
– if one of its members or a person appointed by it has been able to obtain the mother's express consent without interfering with her private life;
– if the mother has died, provided that she has not expressed a contrary intent following a request for access to information about the child's origins. In such cases, one of the members of the Council or a person appointed by it shall advise the mother's family and offer it assistance.
If the natural mother has expressly consented to disclosure of her identity or has died without refusing to allow her identity to be disclosed after her death, the Council shall disclose to the child who has made a request for access to information about its personal origins the identity of the persons referred to in Article L. 1472 (3).
... [a like provision follows with respect to the natural father]
The Council shall furnish the persons referred to in Article L. 147-2 (1) with any information, other than information revealing the identity of the natural father or natural mother, it shall have received from the health institution, the département services and the bodies referred to in the fifth sub-paragraph of Article L. 147-5 or obtained from the natural father or natural mother, without interfering with their private lives, by a member of the Council or a person appointed by it.
Article L. 147-7 – Access by a person to information about his or her origins shall have no effect on that person's civil status and filiation. It shall not create any right in favour of or impose any obligation on anyone whomsoever.
Article L. 147-8 – The public prosecutor shall furnish the National Council on request with the information contained in the original birth certificates when such certificates are deemed to be null and void pursuant to Article 354 of the Civil Code.
...' ”
“I. The following sub-paragraph shall be inserted at the beginning of Article L. 222-6 of the Social Action and Families Code:
'Any woman who, when giving birth, asks a health institution to keep the fact of her admission and her identity secret shall be informed of the legal consequences of her request and of the importance of knowing one's origins and history. She shall therefore be invited to leave, if she so agrees, information about her and the father's health, the child's origins and circumstances of the birth, and, in a sealed envelope, her identity. She shall be informed that she may at any time waive confidentiality regarding her identity and that otherwise her identity may only be disclosed in the circumstances set out in Article L. 147-6. She shall also be informed that she may at any time state her identity in a sealed envelope or add to the information given at the birth. The child's first names and, if applicable, a note that they were given by the mother, and the child's sex as also the date, place and time of birth shall be noted on the outside of the envelope. These formalities shall be attended to by the persons referred to in Article L. 223-7, whose names shall be furnished by the director of the health institution. In default, the director shall be responsible for attending to the formalities.' ”
“...
II. Article L. 223-7 of that Code shall be reintroduced as follows:
'Article L. 223-7 – For the purposes of the application of Article L. 222-6, in each département, the president of the council of the département shall appoint at least two members from his or her staff with responsibility for liaising with the National Council for Access to Information about Personal Origins, making arrangements without delay for the provision of the psychological counselling and practical advice to which women are entitled, receiving at the birth the sealed envelope referred to in the first sub-paragraph of Article L. 222-6, providing the mother with the information prescribed in Article L. 224-5 and collecting the information on the health of the natural father and natural mother, the origins of the child and the reasons for which and circumstances in which the child was placed with the Child Welfare Service or an approved adoption agency. They shall also ensure that arrangements are made for psychological counselling to be provided to the child.
These members of staff shall attend an initial training programme and refresher courses to enable them to perform their duties. The training shall be organised by the National Council for Access to Information about Personal Origins which, in accordance with arrangements to be set out by decree, will provide them with regular back up.' ”
18. Civil Code
“Within fifteen days of the date on which it becomes final, the full adoption order shall, at the request of the public prosecutor, be entered in the register of births, deaths and marriages held in the locality where the adopted child was born.
The entry shall state the date, time and place of birth, the child's sex and first names as set out in the adoption order, and the first names, surnames, date and place of birth, occupation and home address of the person or persons adopting the child. The entry shall contain no details of the child's real filiation.
The entry shall take the place of the adopted child's birth certificate.
The original birth certificate and, where applicable, the birth certificate delivered pursuant to Article 58 shall, at the behest of the public prosecutor, be endorsed with the word 'adoption' and deemed to be null and void.”
“Adoption shall confer on the child a filiation that shall replace its original filiation, since the adopted child ceases to be a member of its blood family ...”
19. It is relatively rare for mothers to be entitled to give birth anonymously under European domestic legislation, as Italy and Luxembourg stand alone in not imposing a statutory obligation on the natural parents to register a newborn child or to state their identity when registering it. Conversely, many countries make it obligatory to provide the names, not only of the mother, to whom the child is automatically linked, but also of the father. The countries concerned are Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Spain (where section 47 of the Law on civil status, which allowed mothers to have the words “mother unknown” entered in the register of births, deaths and marriages, was held to be unconstitutional in a decision of the Supreme Court in 1999), Denmark, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Slovenia and Switzerland.
The current trend in certain countries is towards the acceptance, if not of a right to give birth anonymously, then at least of a right to give birth “discreetly”. An example of this is provided by Belgium, where a debate has begun, largely as a result of the large number of women crossing the border to give birth anonymously in France. In an opinion delivered on 12 January 1998 the Consultative Committee on Bioethics set out the two lines of argument that were defensible from an ethical standpoint: the first considered it unacceptable for children to be brought into the world without parents; for that reason its proponents proposed that facilities for “giving birth discreetly” should be provided, without completely closing the door on all attempts to trace the parents. Proponents of the second line of argument considered that the ethical dilemma posed by the right to give birth anonymously did not result from the need to resolve the conflict arising out of the clash between the respective rights of “the child to filiation” and “the mother in distress”, but from the more fundamental confrontation of two values: the life of the child on the one hand and the right of everyone to know his or her natural mother on the other. They contended that in the face of that dilemma, the primary concern had to be the protection of the life and of the development of the child. For that reason, they considered that giving birth anonymously was perfectly legitimate and acceptable from an ethical standpoint. Likewise, in Germany, in view of the rising number of abandoned newborn infants, the first “baby box” (Babyklappe) – a system that allows the mother to leave her child, ring a bell and leave without giving her identity – was installed in Hamburg approximately two years ago. Since then, other “baby boxes” have been installed in other towns. In May 2002 a bill on anonymous births was rejected by the Bundestag. On 21 June 2002 the Land of Baden-Württemberg introduced a further bill in the Bundesrat which was submitted to the relevant committees for presentation to the Bundestag. Yet another example is provided by Hungary, where mothers may decide to remain anonymous by abandoning their newborn child in a special, unsupervised room in the hospital.
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 14
8


ITEMID: 001-61627
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2004
DOCNAME: CASE OF B.B. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 14+8 with regard to different treatment of homosexuals and heterosexuals;Not necessary to examine Art. 14+8 with regard to alleged discrimination on basis of age;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses (domestic proceedings) - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Matti Pellonpää;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 9. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in London.
10. The relevant facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. The events described below took place between January 1998 and February 1999.
11. The applicant contacted the police after he was attacked by a young man with whom he had had homosexual relations. He was arrested for allegedly engaging in buggery with a young man aged 16 years of age contrary to section 12(1) and schedule 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. The applicant underwent a medical examination with his consent during which samples were taken and his residence was searched by police. He was released on police bail the following day and was subsequently formally charged.
12. The applicant attended before the Magistrates' Court on four occasions and each time he was bailed to re-appear. During this period, the applicant wrote to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and other government officials stating that the criminal proceedings against him violated his human rights, citing the case of Sutherland v. the United Kingdom (no. 25186/94, Commission's report of 1 July 1997, unpublished).
13. The applicant subsequently requested leave to apply for judicial review of the CPS decision to prosecute him but this application was refused. His renewed application was later rejected by the High Court. Following a hearing at the Magistrates' Court, the applicant was committed for trial at the Central Criminal Court. He appeared before the Central Criminal Court for a plea and directions hearing and for a hearing on various matters including his request for the trial to be postponed in order to allow him more time to prepare.
14. The CPS later advised the applicant by letter that it had decided not to proceed with the case against him and that he should accordingly attend the Central Criminal Court on a particular date. On that date he was formally acquitted by that court. The trial judge asked the applicant if he would like to make a claim for costs but, following a brief discussion, the applicant decided not to make any claim on the grounds that, in his view, the CPS were “quibbling” over the amount to be awarded.
15. Section 12(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (“the 1956 Act”) made it an offence for a person to commit buggery with another person. Pursuant to Section 13 of the 1956 Act it was an offence for a man to commit an act of “gross indecency” with another man, whether in public or private.
16. Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act made it an offence for a person to commit indecent assault on a woman. Section 14(2) of the 1956 Act provided that a girl under the age of sixteen years of age could not give any consent which would prevent an act being an assault for the purposes of the section.
17. Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 (“the 1967 Act”) provided, inter alia, as follows:
“(1) Notwithstanding any statutory or common law provision ... a homosexual act in private shall not be an offence provided that the parties consent thereto and have attained the age of twenty-one years. ...
(7) For the purposes of this section a man shall be treated as doing a homosexual act if, and only if, he commits buggery with another man or commits an act of gross indecency with another man or is a party to the commission by a man of such an act ...”
18. The subsequent Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) replaced “twenty-one years” in the 1967 Act with “eighteen years”.
19. This Act entered into force on 8 January 2001. Section 1 reads:
“(1) In the Sexual Offences Act 1956-
(a) in subsections (1A) and (1C) of section 12 (buggery); and
(b) in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 16 (indecency between men etc.) of Schedule 2 (punishments etc.),
for the word 'eighteen' there shall be substituted the word 'sixteen'.”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 14
8


ITEMID: 001-78056
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF ZAYTSEV v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: No violation of Art. 6;Preliminary objection dismissed (abuse of process)
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: 6. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Novomoskovsk, Tula Region.
7. On 21 September 2001 the Novomoskovskiy Town Court of the Tula Region convicted the applicant, a school teacher, of cruel treatment of his pupils and sentenced him to one year and six months' imprisonment, suspended. The applicant and his counsel were present at the hearing. The court heard statements from a number of witnesses and victims and examined a transcript of a meeting of the school disciplinary committee.
8. The applicant appealed against the judgment on points of fact.
9. On 26 October 2001 the Tula Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant was not present at the hearing. The appeal court reviewed the applicant's conviction both on points of law and on points of fact. The prosecutor, who was present at the hearing, submitted that the conviction should stand. The appeal court did not hear any witnesses and there is no evidence that any were summoned.
10. On 28 February 2002 the applicant received a copy of the appeal judgment.
11. On 14 June 2005, following an application for supervisory review lodged by a deputy prosecutor of the Tula Region on 10 June 2005, a judge of the Tula Regional Court decided to institute supervisory review proceedings. The judge stated that in the absence of any evidence that the applicant had been duly notified of the appeal hearing on 26 October 2001, the examination of his appeal in his absence had violated his defence rights. The applicant was notified of the decision to institute supervisory review proceedings and sent his written pleadings to the court on 22 June 2005.
12. On 27 June 2005 the Presidium of the Tula Regional Court, having examined the case under the supervisory review procedure, quashed the appeal judgment of the Tula Regional Court of 26 October 2001 and remitted the case for a fresh examination on appeal. The Presidium noted that among the documents in the case file there was a notification of the appeal hearing dated 11 October 2001. The applicant had not appeared at the hearing and, later, in his numerous complaints repeatedly stated that he had never received the notification. The case file contained no conclusive evidence that the applicant had been duly notified of the hearing. The Presidium found that in these circumstances the examination of the applicant's appeal in his absence had violated his defence rights.
13. On 20 July 2005 the Tula Regional Court examined the case on appeal. The applicant was duly notified of the hearing, but did not appear. The appeal court upheld the findings of fact of the Novomoskovskiy Town Court. However, it set aside the judgment of 21 September 2001 and terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant on account of the expiry of the statutory time-limits.
14. Article 336 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960, in force at the material time, provided that appellants should be notified of the date of the hearing on appeal. The failure of appellants who had been duly notified of the relevant date to appear at the hearing did not preclude the court from examining the case. A notice indicating the time of the hearing on appeal should be displayed at the court not later than three days before the hearing.
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6


ITEMID: 001-61277
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: IRL
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2003
DOCNAME: CASE OF DORAN v. IRELAND
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Georg Ress
TEXT: 9. The applicants are Irish citizens, born in 1958 and 1957, respectively, and they both live in County Wicklow, Ireland.
10. On 12 September 1990 they agreed to buy a site with planning permission from “the vendors” on which they intended to build a house. The sale was completed in October 1990. It subsequently emerged that, because of discrepancies in the relevant site maps on which they relied during the sale, they did not have access to the site from the road. They were obliged to discontinue building and to sell the site.
11. On 31 May 1991 the Minister for Agriculture and Food established the Tribunal of Enquiry into the Beef Processing Industry (“Beef Tribunal”) and nominated the President of the High Court to be the sole member of the Tribunal. While conducting the Beef Tribunal, the President continued, when possible, to sit in cases in the High Court.
12. On 17 July 1991 the applicants instituted High Court proceedings for negligence, negligent misstatement, breach of contract, misrepresentation and breach of warranty against their own solicitors (“the applicants' solicitors”), the vendors and “the vendors' solicitors”. On 10 March 1992 the High Court ordered discovery on a consent basis. Pursuant to the applicants' motion and the defendants' consent, on 4 May 1992 the High Court ordered the defendants to file their defence within 4 weeks. Further motions of the applicants were struck out on 22 and 24 June and on 19 October 1992. On 18 May 1993 the case was certified ready for hearing by the applicants' senior counsel.
13. The case was originally listed for hearing on 8 July 1993 but it was adjourned (the applicants objected) due to the illness of one of the defendants to 15 July 1993 when another hearing date would be fixed. On 15 July 1993 a hearing date was fixed for 6 October 1993. On that date there was no judge available and the matter was heard on 7 October 1993 when the President of the High Court (“the trial judge”) made himself available.
The Government maintained that the trial judge was advised by counsel present that the hearing required two days, that the judge had notified the parties that his tribunal commitments meant that he had only two days for their case so that, if the case took longer, he would be obliged to adjourn until after the Beef Tribunal, that he would only deal with issues of liability and that the applicants agreed to this. The applicants denied that their counsel so advised the trial judge, that the trial judge had informed them that the trial would be so adjourned, that their counsel would have agreed to an indefinite adjournment (given the second applicant's psychological state) or that they agreed to the separation of issues of liability and damages.
14. The applicants' case was heard on 7 and 8 October 1993 and, since it was unfinished, the trial judge adjourned it. On 2 November 1993 and 8 February 1994 the applicants wrote to the Chief Registrar of the High Court asking for enquiries to be made as to when the action would be resumed. On 16 March 1994 they wrote to the Registrar asking him to intervene with the trial judge to fix a date and enclosing a medical report of the second applicant's doctor dated 12 March 1994 (see paragraph 32 below). The Registrar was also contacted by telephone on numerous occasions by the applicants regarding a hearing date. In March 1994 the Registrar informed the applicants by telephone that the trial judge had confirmed a hearing date in July 1994. A letter to the Registrar of 9 June 1994 requested that a hearing date be fixed.
15. During this period, the applicants wrote also wrote to, inter alia, numerous members of Dáil Eireann (the House of Representatives) including to the Minister for Justice. The Deputy Chair of Dáil Eireann indicated, in a letter dated 25 March 1994, that he had contacted the Acting President of the High Court asking the latter to intercede on the applicants' behalf. On 7 April 1994 the Acting President responded that the case would be taken in July 1994.
16. On 29 July 1994 the trial judge completed his report on the Beef Tribunal. On 19 September 1994 he was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The trial judge resumed the hearing of the applicants' case on 5 October 1994. He heard the last two witnesses and requested legal argument in writing. He reserved judgment, indicating that he would deliver it approximately one week after receipt of the written submissions. Those submissions were made by the end of October 1994
17. On 29 November 1994, 2 February, 12 April and 22 May 1995 the applicants wrote to certain Registrars of the High Court requesting information as to when the judgment would be delivered. A response, dated 26 May 1995, stated that the trial judge could not confirm when he could deliver his judgment given his heavy commitments. Further to the applicants' letter, the Minister for Justice indicated in a letter of 10 July 1995 that, while she could not intervene, she had brought the matter to the attention of a Registrar of the High Court. The applicants also wrote to a Registrar on 12 July 1995 again requesting an early delivery date. A Registrar's letter of 13 July 1995 indicated a delivery date before the end of the month. By letter dated 25 July 1995 the Minister for Justice responded to a further letter from the applicants indicating that she had forwarded a copy of the applicants' correspondence to the trial judge. Further to another letter from the applicants, a Registrar subsequently confirmed delivery of the judgment on 12 September 1995.
18. Judgment was orally delivered on that date. Both the vendors and the applicants' solicitors were found liable in damages and the claim against the vendors' solicitors was dismissed. On 21 September 1995 the Court made various orders concerning damages (adjournment of the assessment of damages) and costs to be paid by the unsuccessful parties. Pending finalisation by the trial judge of the written judgment, the form of order was not to be perfected in order to allow the applicants time to consider the text of that judgment prior to the expiration of the time-limit for appealing any orders of the High Court. The applicants wrote two letters to a Registrar of the High Court (dated 6 and 13 October 1995) and the text of the judgment became available in mid-October 1995. The order of the High Court was perfected on 17 October 1995 and on 3 November 1995 the applicants appealed the findings in favour of the vendors' solicitors to the Supreme Court. The vendors also appealed the High Court findings against them.
19. Since a stenographer had not been present during the High Court hearings, it was necessary to prepare and agree a record of the evidence given during those hearings for the purposes of the appeal. By 9 February 1996 the applicants had completed a substantial note of evidence and on 29 March 1996 they submitted it to the vendors and to the vendors' solicitors for their agreement. On 17 July 1996 the applicants issued two motions. The first sought the comments of the vendors' solicitors on the note of evidence and the second requested that the vendors' appeal be struck out for “want of prosecution” since the vendors had not filed documents in their appeal.
20. On 26 July 1996 the Supreme Court heard both motions with the trial judge (then Chief Justice) presiding. The court requested the vendors and the vendors' solicitors to submit their comments on the note of evidence within two weeks, in default of which the trial judge would finalise the note. On the second motion, the vendors were given until 7 October 1996 to file the relevant appeal documents, in default of which the Supreme Court envisaged striking out the vendors' appeal. Both motions were adjourned until 11 October 1996. The vendors' appeal and the related motion were later dropped.
21. Following further letters from the applicants in August 1996, on 17 September 1996 the vendors' solicitors indicated that they disagreed with 16 items in the note of evidence. On 11 October 1996 the applicants' motion concerning the note of evidence was adjourned to 18 October 1996. Three days later the vendors' solicitors confirmed that agreement would not be reached on the note. On 18 October 1996 three judges of the Supreme Court (not including the trial judge) directed the trial judge to settle the note of evidence. On 24 October 1996 the applicants submitted the note of evidence together with a note of the 16 disputed points to the trial judge.
22. In or around November 1996 the President of the High Court gave directions that all complaints about delays in proceedings should be forwarded to him. A memorandum of the President of the High Court published in the Bar Review of January/February 1997 noted the delays in delivering reserved judgments due to the shortage of judges and requested legal practitioners formally to notify the President of the High Court of their concerns about such delays.
23. Subsequently, the applicants wrote to a Registrar of the High Court on a number of occasions (including on 14 January, 12 March and 25 June 1997) requesting the early settlement of the note of evidence. On 8 July 1997 the applicants wrote to the President of the High Court requesting him to intervene given the delay in their proceedings. In July 1997 a Registrar of the High Court indicated orally that the trial judge would deal with the matter after 20 August 1997. The applicants sent a further reminder to that Registrar on 18 September 1997. On 10 October 1997 the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (“the Department of Justice”) requested the Chief Registrar's comments on the alleged undue delay in the case. On 16 October 1997 a Registrar indicated to the Department of Justice that the note of evidence matter would be resolved in one week.
24. By letter dated 22 October 1997 the trial judge forwarded a report (six pages) he had prepared on the evidence and on the points disputed by the relevant parties and he apologised to the applicants for the delay. By letter dated 24 October 1997 a Registrar assured the Department of Justice that the note of evidence matter had been resolved and that an early date for a hearing of the appeal would be made available.
25. Further to the applicants' complaints to their member of Dáil Eireann and to the Tánaiste (the deputy Prime Minister), the Attorney General expressed, by letter dated 30 October 1997 to the applicants, his concern at the delay in their case. While he was constitutionally obliged not to interfere in judicial matters, he had mentioned the matter informally to the trial judge and the latter assured him that all outstanding matters had been dealt with. In a letter dated 4 November 1997 the Attorney General confirmed to the Tánaiste that he was concerned about the delays which the applicants had experienced in their case and that he had raised these matters in a private and informal manner with the trial judge who had assured him that all outstanding matters had been dealt with. Following an invitation, the applicants met with a member of the Attorney General's Office in late November 1997, although the advice was that that office could not interfere in judicial processes.
26. By motion dated 9 December 1997 the applicants amended their appeal. By letter dated 21 January 1998 the Minister for Justice responded to queries of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) concerning the applicant's case pointing out that on 21 November 1997 the appeal hearing had been fixed for 2 February 1998.
27. The Supreme Court delivered its reserved judgment on the applicants' appeal on 9 March 1998 and found in the applicants' favour, considering that the vendors' solicitors were also liable in negligence to the applicants.
28. The case was remitted to the High Court for the assessment and apportionment of damages. By letter dated 7 May 1998 the Attorney General responded to queries raised by the applicants' member of Dáil Eireann: he indicated that their case was “concerning” and that it was hoped that the recently established system for monitoring judicial delays would ensure that their experience would not be repeated.
29. The vendors' solicitors filed an amended defence in May 1998 and the applicants filed further particulars of damage in June 1998. On 26 June 1998 the vendors' solicitors made a late lodgement into court in the sum of 85,000 Irish pounds (IR£). The applicants objected. A letter dated 13 July 1998 from the Attorney General's office to the applicants explained that his previous intervention related to an administrative act by the trial judge (the note of evidence) but that the outstanding matters were judicial in which he could not interfere. By letter dated 22 July 1998 the Attorney General's office confirmed that it had been informed that a hearing date had been fixed by the High Court for 13 October 1998. A letter dated 6 August 1998 from the Taoiseach's office to the applicants confirmed that increased resources to the courts meant that it was hoped that their experiences would not be repeated. On 9 October 1998 the applicants also met with the Tánaiste to discuss the length of their ongoing proceedings.
30. On 13-16 October 1998 an assessment hearing took place in the High Court. On 25 November 1998 the High Court awarded the applicants approximately IR£200,000 in respect of pecuniary loss and IR£10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage (the High Court finding that both applicants had been put through “a high degree of anxiety and upset” as a consequence of the defendants' negligence). The applicants were also awarded their costs when taxed and ascertained. On 11 December 1998 the High Court dealt with matters concerning the attribution of liability between the defendants. The order of the High Court was perfected in early February 1999. There was no appeal on these matters to the Supreme Court.
31. The Taxing Master abridged the time for service of the applicants' bill of costs (Order 99, Rule 28(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts) and fixed a hearing for 29 July 1999. The bill of costs contained 519 items and comprised 172 pages. This hearing was then adjourned on the application of the vendors' solicitors until 20 October 1999. The hearing took place on that date and, since it did not finish, it was adjourned to and continued on 20 November 1999. It was again adjourned and concluded on 22 November 1999, when the Taxing Master delivered his reserved ruling. The Certificate on Taxation (approximately IR£300,000) was signed by the Taxing Master on 15 December 1999.
32. The applicants submitted a number of medical certificates to the Court.
A certificate prepared by the second applicant's doctor on 26 May 1993 attested to her severe symptoms of anxiety since the legal problems had arisen. She had required repeated courses of medication and she was, at that stage, depressed and on medication. Her anxiety symptoms were likely to continue until the legal situation was resolved. The same doctor confirmed, in a certificate dated 12 March 1994, a deterioration of the second applicant's condition into “frank depression”. Medication had initially helped but the delay in the proceedings was worsening her condition. A psychiatric report on the second applicant dated July 1998 recorded her significant clinical depression since the start of the proceedings which warranted anti-depressants and tranquillisers on many occasions. It was considered that the proceedings continually threatened to bring about a relapse, in spite of certain periods of recovery following appropriate treatment. It was also considered that a full recovery was foreseeable only after the proceedings terminated. A psychiatric report on the first applicant dated August 1998 attested to the great strain the proceedings had caused him.
33. Article 40(3)(1) of the Constitution provide:
“The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. “
Certain of the personal rights of the citizen are explicitly guaranteed by provisions of the Constitution. In addition, in interpreting and applying Article 40(3)(1) of the Constitution, the Irish courts have identified other “unenumerated” rights protected by virtue of that Article. These include the principle of “constitutional justice” (inter alia, no one should be a judge in their own cause (nemo iudex in sua causa), anyone who may be adversely affected by a decision should be afforded the opportunity to put their side of the case (audi alteram partem) and the right to fair procedures). The other relevant unenumerated right derived from Article 40(3)(1) is the right to litigate or the right of access to court.
34. Order 60 of the Rules of the Superior Courts provides as follows:
“1. If any question as to the validity of any law, having regard to the provisions of the Constitution, shall arise in any action or matter the party having carriage of the proceedings shall forthwith serve notice upon the Attorney General, if he is not already a party.
2. If any question as to the interpretation of the Constitution, other than a question referred to in rule 1, shall arise in any action or matter, the party having carriage of the proceedings shall, if the Court so directs, serve notice upon the Attorney General.
3. Such notice shall state concisely the nature of the proceedings in which the question or dispute arises and the contention or respective contentions of the party or parties to the proceedings.
4. The Attorney General shall thereupon be entitled to appear in the act ion or matter and become a party thereto as regards the question which arises.”
35. Order 123 of the Rules of the Superior Courts provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. At the trial or hearing of any cause or matter with oral evidence, any party may apply to the Judge for an order that the proceedings be reported by a shorthand writer and thereupon the Judge shall appoint a shorthand writer. ...
3. The party applying for an order under rule 1 ... shall pay the remuneration of the shorthand writer and said payment shall be borne by said party unless the Judge or the Master (as the case may be) shall after the trial or hearing certify that in his opinion it was expedient that the proceedings or any part thereof should have been so reported. If such certificate is given the remuneration of the shorthand writer for reporting the proceedings or part thereof to which the certificate relates shall be part of the costs in the cause.
4. The Judge shall have power, during the course or at the conclusion of the trial or hearing, to direct that copies of the shorthand writer's transcript of the evidence or any part thereof be furnished to him at the public expense or be furnished to any party applying therefor at the expense of that party.”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-60870
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ITA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2003
DOCNAME: CASE OF E.P. v. ITALY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of P1-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: 8. The applicant was born in 1912 and lives in Mercato Sanseverino.
9. He is the owner of an apartment in Mercato Sanseverino, which he had let to M.S. in 1974. The lease was due to expire on 31 December 1983, but was extended until 31 December 1987 pursuant to Law No. 392/78.
10. In a writ served on the tenant on 4 September 1986, the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Mercato Sanseverino Magistrate.
11. By a decision of 30 September 1986, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Mercato Sanseverino Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1989.
12. On 1 August 1991, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.
13. On 15 October 1991, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 October 1991.
14. On 28 October 1991, the bailiff made an attempt to recover possession, which proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.
15. On 18 November 1991, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his daughter.
16. On 18 February 1992, the bailiff asked the local police to provide their assistance in enforcing the order for possession and at the same time suspended the enforcement proceedings until the assistance would be granted.
17. At the beginning of 1998, the tenant spontaneously vacated the premises.
18. The relevant domestic law is described in the Court's judgment in the case of Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 18-35, ECHR 1999-V.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1