ITEMID: 001-60748
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2002
DOCNAME: CASE OF BAKOVA v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 7. The applicant claimed restitution of real property which had been expropriated from her in 1967.
8. On 15 September 1992 the Košice-mesto Land Office (Pozemkový úrad) granted the applicant’s claim. The Land Office established, after an inspection of the land in question, that it had never served the purpose for which it had been expropriated which was a relevant reason for its restitution within the meaning of Section 6 (1) (m) of the Land Ownership Act of 1991. The educational institution which possessed the land challenged the decision.
9. On 19 April 1993 the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd) quashed the administrative decision as it considered the reasons for it to be insufficient. The Regional Court instructed the administrative authority to establish all relevant facts of the case and to hear the parties.
10. On 29 December 1997 both the applicant and a representative of the institution using the land in question met with officials of the Košice 2 District Office (Okresný úrad) to which the case fell to be examined. In the course of the meeting the relevant facts of the case were examined.
11. On 6 February 1998 the Košice 2 District Office delivered a new decision by which it dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held that the plot served the original purpose of its expropriation within the meaning of Section 6 (1) (m) of the Land Ownership Act of 1991 and that the applicant had received compensation for it. The decision was signed by the head of the land, agriculture and forest department of the District Office.
12. On 10 March 1998 the applicant requested judicial review of this decision. She complained that the Land Office had failed to establish the relevant facts correctly, that it had decided arbitrarily and that there had been no hearing in the case.
13. On 12 June 1998 the Košice Regional Court upheld the District Office’s decision. The court found, with reference to the documents included in the file of the District Office, that the plot in question served the purpose of its expropriation since a social institution used it as a playground for handicapped children. With reference to Article 250f of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Regional Court decided in camera.
14. Pursuant to Section 6 (1) (m) of Act No. 229/91 on Adjustment of Ownership Rights to Land And Other Agricultural Property (Zákon o úprave vlastníckych vzťahov k pôde a inému poľnohospodárskemu majetku – “the Land Ownership Act”), real property which was expropriated with payment of compensation shall be restored if it still exists and provided that it has never served the purpose for which it was expropriated.
15. The lawfulness of decisions delivered by administrative authorities can be examined by courts in accordance with Part V of the Code of Civil Procedure which governs the administrative judiciary.
16. Article 250f, as in force at the relevant time, entitled the courts to deliver a judgment without prior oral hearing in simple cases, in particular when there is no doubt as to whether the administrative authority established the facts correctly, and the point at issue was a question of law.
17. In accordance with Article 250m (3), the parties to the proceedings before the court are the parties in the proceedings before the administrative authority and the administrative authority whose decision is to be reviewed.
18. Pursuant to Article 250q (1), when the court reviewing an administrative authority’s decision does not decide without an oral hearing pursuant to Article 250f, it may take such evidence as is necessary for reviewing the decision at issue.
19. Under Article 250r, if the court quashes the decision of the administrative authority, the latter, when taking a new decision, is bound by the legal opinion expressed by the court.
20. Act No. 222/1996 on the Organisation of the Local State Administration (Zákon o organizácii miestnej štátnej správy a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov) governs, inter alia, the status and competence of district offices.
21. Sections 1 (1) and 4 (1) provide that district offices are State authorities in charge of local administration of the State which are financed from the State budget.
22. Section 5 (2) entitles the district offices to decide at first instance on the rights and obligations of natural or legal persons in the context of administrative proceedings.
23. Pursuant to Section 8 (2), the head of a district office is appointed and revoked by the Government.
24. Section 8 (7) provides that the heads of departments of district offices are appointed by the head of the district office.
25. Pursuant to Section 9, the departments of district offices shall act and decide in the context of administrative proceedings autonomously unless the law otherwise provides.
26. Section 11 (1) provides that district offices are directed and controlled by the Government when carrying out State administration.
27. In its finding No. PL.ÚS 14/98 of 22 June 1999 the Constitutional Court found that Article 250f of the Code of Civil Procedure was contrary to the Constitution and also to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As a result, this provision ceased to be effective from the moment of its publication in the Collection of Laws on 14 July 1999.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-68378
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: MKD
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: CASE OF VESELINSKI v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of P1-1;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses (Convention proceedings) - claim dismissed
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson
TEXT: 10. The applicant was born in 1924 and lives in Skopje. He used to be an army serviceman of the Yugoslav Army until he retired in 1985.
11. In former Yugoslavia, the citizens used to pay a tax for housing. On the basis of the accumulated funds the State constructed “socially owned” apartments which were then rented to individuals at legally fixed rates.
12. The Yugoslav Army was the single army on the territory of former Yugoslavia governed by laws which were applicable throughout former Yugoslavia. The applicant, as an officer of the Yugoslav Army, paid monthly contributions from his salary to the Yugoslav Army for the construction of army apartments. All army servicemen were entitled to live in army apartments as tenants.
13. The applicant, as an army serviceman, used to live until 1982 as a tenant in an apartment owned by the former Yugoslav Army in Skopje. Once he started working for the Macedonian Secretary of Defence, he sought to obtain a bigger apartment. On 3 June 1982 the Governing Council (Извршен совет) of the Socialistic Republic of Macedonia issued a decision by which it rented to the applicant a bigger apartment in its possession. The applicant gave up his previously rented apartment which remained the property of the former Yugoslav Army. In 1985 the applicant retired and continued living in the new apartment.
14. On 29 December 1990 the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia enacted a Law on Housing of the Army Servicemen (Закон за станбено обезбедување во ЈНА) (“Z.S.О.J.N.A.”), according to which army servicemen, current and retired, could purchase apartments in which they lived with a price adjustment for the amount of the paid contributions for the construction of army apartments and for development of the construction land. Section 26 of that law provides that the same purchase conditions apply to apartments which do not belong to the army, as it was in the case of the applicant. According to regulations issued by the Yugoslav Federal Ministry, the price difference was to be paid by the federal army (see paragraphs 39-42 below).
15. Following the fall of Yugoslavia and a referendum held on 8 September 1991, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared independence. On 17 November 1991 it adopted a Constitution (Устав на РМ) and the Law on the Implementation of the Constitution (Уставен Закон за спроведување на Уставот). According to the Constitution the laws from former Yugoslavia remain in force, except for the laws regulating the organisation and competence of the former Yugoslav federal organs. On 21 February 1992 the Macedonian President and the General of the Yugoslav Army concluded an agreement for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Macedonian territory.
16. On 28 February 1992 the Macedonian Government concluded an Agreement for Settlement of Claims and Obligations in Respect of Real Property (Спогодба за правата и обврските во врска со примопредажбата на недвижностите на територија на Република Македонија) (“the S.P.O.V.P.N.T.R.M.”) with the Federal Yugoslav Ministry of Defence. According to this agreement the Macedonian Ministry of Defence took over all the obligations of the Yugoslav Army in respect of army apartments, including the obligation to sell these apartments with a price reduction. The Macedonian Government in 1992 and 1994 enacted regulations implementing this agreement. In 1992 the Macedonian Government enacted Regulations on the Terms of Purchase of the Apartments Obtained by Succession from the Yugoslav Army (Уредба за продажба на државниот стамбен фонд наследен од ЈНА) (“U.P.D.S.F.N.J.A.”), according to which present and former army servicemen living in apartments owned by the Macedonian Ministry of Defence, could purchase them under the Z.S.О.J.N.A.
17. From the Ministry of Defence’s decision of 12 June 1992 it appears that the Ministry exchanged the title of its apartments which were inhabited by civilians with the title of the apartments owned by the Housing Fund (“ПУИГ”) which were inhabited by servicemen. Thereby, the servicemen were able to exercise the right under the Z.S.O.J.N.A. to purchase the apartments at a reduced price. However, this exchange was limited and concerned only six apartments owned by the Housing Fund and twenty owned by the Ministry. No details were provided as to the criteria concerning the exchange.
18. In 1993 an amended version of the 1990 Law on the Sale of Socially Owned Apartments (Закон за продажба на станови во општествена сопственост) (“the Z.P.S.O.S.”) was promulgated in the Official Gazette. Under the law their tenants were entitled to purchase them on credit and at a beneficial price. Unlike the Z.S.О.J.N.A., the law did not provide for a price adjustment for the amount of the paid contributions for the construction of “socially owned” apartments and for development of the construction land, despite the fact that the tenants had also paid them.
19. On 26 June 1996 the Constitutional Court abrogated the Z.S.O.J.N.A. without retroactive effect and the respective Government’s regulations on the ground that they had been contrary to the 1991 Constitution. In particular, the court stated that: a) the Yugoslav Army, its “housing fund” and the “social ownership” no longer existed; b) the 1991 Constitution had abolished all the privileges enjoyed by army servicemen; and c) the Z.S.O.J.N.A. had created an unequal treatment in comparison to the citizens who were entitled to purchase their apartments under the Z.P.S.O.S. The S.P.O.V.P.N.T.R.M. was not mentioned in the Constitutional Court’s decision.
20. In 1992 the applicant requested the Macedonian Ministry of Defence to allow him to purchase the apartment owned by the Government at a reduced price or to give him another apartment which used to be owned by the former Yugoslav Army. On an unspecified date the applicant asked the Ministry of Defence to speed up the proceedings. On 4 December 1993 the Ministry informed him that it had been waiting for the Government to settle the issue.
21. On 20 October 1993 the applicant and fifteen other persons asked the Constitutional Court to examine the compatibility of the Z.P.S.O.S. and the relevant regulations issued by the Ministry of Defence with the Z.S.O.J.N.A. On 29 December 1993 this was refused by the Constitutional Court.
22. On 4 December 1993 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Skopje I Municipal Court (Општински Суд Скопје I) against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, requesting that the apartment be sold to him at a reduced price in accordance with section 21(2) of the Z.S.O.J.N.A. On 15 March 1994 the court granted the applicant’s request. The court held, inter alia, that the applicant, as a retired army serviceman, was entitled under sections 21(2) and 26 of the Z.S.O.J.N.A. to purchase the apartment at a reduced price. The court stated in particular that the purchase price should be reduced by the re-evaluated amount of the monthly contributions which the applicant had paid to the Federal Ministry of Defence for the construction of apartments and for the improvement of construction land. Whether the apartment had belonged to the Ministry of Defence or to the Government was irrelevant as both apartments now belonged to the single State-owned housing fund.
23. The Solicitor-General (Јавен правобранител) acting for the Ministry of Defence appealed against the above decision on the ground that there was no formal agreement between the Federal Army and, at that time, the Macedonian Governing Council for an exchange of the apartments and that the applicant had given up the apartment owned by the army for a bigger apartment owned by the Governing Council. Therefore, he had accepted that the apartment in question would be subject to different statutory rules. It further stated that the Z.S.O.J.N.A. had been applicable only to the apartments owned by the former Yugoslav Army which had later become the property of the Macedonian Government, but not to other apartments.
24. On 31 March 1995 the Skopje Appellate Court (Апелационен Суд Скопје) dismissed the appeal on the grounds (i) that an exchange of the right to use the apartments between the former Federal Army and the Macedonian Governing Council had taken place; (ii) that the applicant, as a former officer of the Yugoslav Army had paid contributions for the construction of army apartments and was therefore entitled to purchase an apartment at a reduced price under sections 21(2) and 26 of the Z.S.О.J.N.A.; and (iii) that its section 26 had explicitly regulated the cases of purchase of an apartment by an army serviceman that had not been owned by the army.
25. On 4 May 1995 the Solicitor-General lodged an appeal on points of law (ревизија) with the Supreme Court (Врховен Суд) alleging, inter alia, that since the day of independence it had been for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to regulate the use and purchase of the apartments owned by the former Yugoslav Army and that the agreement which had been concluded with the army could not have been applicable to the apartments not owned by the said army. In 1992 the Council of Ministers enacted a regulation which had made clear that the Z.S.O.J.N.A. applied only to sale-purchase agreements for the apartments previously owned by the former Yugoslav Army.
26. In the meantime, on 4 September 1995 the applicant and the Government concluded a purchase contract for the apartment on the basis of the Municipal and Appellate Courts’ judgments. The applicant thus purchased the apartment at a price reduced by the amount of contributions he had paid to the former Yugoslav Army. On 29 September 1995 the Skopje I Municipal Court authorised the contract.
27. From the copy of one document issued by the Public Enterprise for Administering State Property (Јавно претпријатие за стопанисување со стамбен и деловен простор на Република Македонија), it may be deduced that the applicant paid for the apartment in 1995 at the latest. It is not clear whether later the Ministry of Defence reimbursed the Housing Fund with the price difference for the apartment.
28. On 16 October 1997 the Supreme Court granted the appeal on points of law submitted by the Solicitor-General and dismissed the applicant’s request to purchase the apartment at a reduced price. It found that the Z.S.O.J.N.A. had provided for more beneficial conditions for the sale of apartments to army servicemen, and that it had governed the relations and status of the former Yugoslav Army and its housing fund, both of which had ceased to exist. The court held, inter alia, that as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was not a legal successor of the former Yugoslav Army, it was under no obligation whatsoever to cover the price difference. In addition, the new Macedonian Constitution had abolished special privileges of the army servicemen.
29. The court did not mention at all the decision of the Constitutional Court and the S.P.O.V.P.N.T.R.M. Nor did it observe that the applicant had already purchased the apartment by contract or that the Ministry of Defence had exchanged a number of apartments owned by the Housing Fund and inhabited by other servicemen.
30. The applicant was served with the decision on 16 March 1998.
31. The parties have not indicated whether the applicant was formally registered as the owner of the apartment in the Land Registry (Државен завод за геодетски работи) after the purchase agreement was authorised by the Municipal Court in 1995. From their submissions it appears that the applicant had already recorded his title over the apartment. In addition, the parties have not indicated whether the Government have taken any legal action to enforce the Supreme Court’s judgment of 16 October 1997. There is no information that such proceedings have ever been instituted.
32. The applicant still lives in the apartment in question.
33. Section 110 provides, as far as relevant, that the Constitutional Court decides on the conformity of laws with the Constitution.
34. Section 112 § 1 provides, inter alia, that the Constitutional Court shall repeal or invalidate a law if it determines that it does not conform to the Constitution.
35. Section 112 § 2 provides that the decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be final and executive.
36. Section 4 provides that all issues of succession arising out of the break-up of Yugoslavia shall be regulated by way of treaties with the other former republics.
37. Section 5 §§ 1 and 4 provide that the existing federal laws of former Yugoslavia shall be in force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the exception of the laws regulating the organisation and competence of the Yugoslav federal organs.
38. Section 6 provides that all federal laws which are inconsistent with the Macedonian Constitution shall be amended accordingly within one year from the day when the Constitution was promulgated.
39. Section 1 provides that the law in question regulates the housing of present and former Yugoslav Army servicemen and their families.
40. Section 21 § 1 provides that the purchase price for an apartment owned by the Yugoslav Army shall be determined on the basis of the apartment’s re-assessed construction value, its quality, equipment, location and other similar factors. The price thus determined shall be reduced by the amortisation of the apartment, but not more than 50% of the total amount of amortisation.
41. Section 21 § 2 provides that when an apartment is purchased by an active or retired army serviceman, the purchase price shall be reduced by the adjusted (re-assessed) amount of the monthly contributions paid by the servicemen for construction of army apartments and improvement of construction land.
42. Section 26 provides that when an army serviceman mentioned in Section 21 § 2 wishes to purchase an apartment which is not owned by the army, the army shall pay to the owner of the apartment the price difference between the adjusted and the normal purchase price.
43. According to Section 2 § 2 of that agreement, concluded between the Macedonian Ministry of Defence and the former Yugoslav Army, army apartments should be sold to army servicemen under the conditions set forth in the 1990 former Yugoslav Law on the Housing of the Army Servicemen (Z.S.O.J.N.A.).
44. Section 9 of the said agreement provides that the former Yugoslav Army shall not have any right to impose further obligations on the Macedonian Ministry of Defence after the signing of the agreement.
45. Section 10 provides that all other rights and obligations which the former Yugoslav Army had on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia until 28 February 1992 in connection with real property, housing fund and business premises owned by it shall be transferred to the Macedonian Ministry of Defence.
46. Section 134 of the Law on Defence (Закон за одбрана) provides that real property which was owned by the former Yugoslav Ministry of Defence on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shall become the property of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
47. Section 1 provides that this law regulates the conditions, manner and procedure for the sale of socially owned apartments. The law does not provide for a price adjustment for the amount of the paid contributions for the construction of “socially owned” apartments and for development of the construction land.
48. Section 2 provides that a decision to sell the (socially) owned apartment will be issued by its owner (the State) within 30 days from the day when this law enters into force.
49. Section 3 § 1 provides that the socially owned apartment may be sold to the tenant of that apartment or to members of his family.
50. Section 3 § 2 provides that if the owner of the apartment (the State) does not issue a decision to sell that apartment within the time limit specified in Section 2, then the holder of tenancy right may within 30 days request the appropriate court to issue a decision in non-contentious civil proceedings to replace the sale contract.
51. The law does not provide for a price adjustment for the amount of the paid contributions for the construction of “socially owned” apartments and for development of the construction land.
52. Section 384 provided that the filed appeal on points (ревизија) of law does not adjourn the execution of judgment against which it has been filed.
53. Section 387 provided that parties may present new facts and introduce new evidence in the proceedings only if these concern essential violations of the provisions for civil procedure for which an appeal on points of law is permitted.
54. Section 393 provided that the Supreme Court may dismiss an appeal on points of law as unfounded if it determines that the grounds it must examine ex officio, or which were included in the appeal, are ill-founded.
55. Section 395 § 1 provided that when the Supreme Court finds that the substantive provisions of an act are wrongly applied by the lower courts, it shall grant the appeal on points of law (ревизија) and deliver a judgment on the merits.
56. Section 144 § 3 provides that the lawful acquiring of ownership over a property does not have any bearing on the rights of other persons over that property.
57. Section 148 § 1 provides that the ownership title over real estate obtained by a legal act is acquired by recording that right (act) in the public records for registering real estate rights unless otherwise provided by the law.
58. Section 151 § 1 provides, inter alia, that the ownership title over a real estate is acquired by virtue of the recording.
59. Section 151 § 2 provides that the removal of ownership title from the public records, on the ground that the recording was incorrect, may be initiated by an action within three years from the day when the real estate was recorded.
60. Section 5 provides, inter alia, that the Land Registry (Државен завод за геодетски работи) is responsible for recording property rights over real estates.
61. Section 50 provides, inter alia, that the Land Registry shall record ownership rights over real estates.


ITEMID: 001-73164
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HUN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF CSIK v. HUNGARY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Remainder inadmissible;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budapest.
5. The applicant was employed by a construction co-operative; his duty was to disinfect pieces of wood with chemicals. On account of various illnesses which the applicant alleged were caused by this activity, he suffered a 40% disability. In September 1989 he instituted proceedings in the Budapest Labour Court. He claimed that his diseases had been caused by the chemicals and that his former employer should pay him compensation. On 20 October 1990 the Labour Court dismissed the action. This judgment was quashed by the Budapest Regional Court on 8 January 1992. The case was remitted to the first instance court.
6. In the resumed proceedings, the respondent employer was replaced by its successor. Between 13 October 1992 and 22 February 1994, the Labour Court held five hearings and obtained an opinion from the Institute of Forensic Medicine. On that date it delivered a judgment and dismissed the applicant’s action. On 9 September 1994 the applicant appealed.
7. After a hearing on 6 September 1995, on 28 February 1996 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.
8. Following the applicant’s successful request of 13 August 1996 to have his case re-opened, the Labour Court held hearings on 5 December 1996, and 24 April and 5 June 1997. By 28 September 1998 the opinions of further two experts were obtained. Another hearing was held on 31 March 1999.
9. On 8 September 1999 the Labour Court dismissed the applicant’s action, holding that the respondent was not liable for the applicant’s sickness.
10. On 30 March 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 13 October 2000 the applicant filed a petition for review. On 16 January 2001 the Supreme Court appointed a legal-aid lawyer for him. On 3 April it scheduled a hearing for 14 November 2001.
11. On 6 April 2001 the liquidator of the successor to the applicant’s former employer informed the Supreme Court that the respondent had been liquidated on 1 June and deleted from the company register on 7 October 2000. On 10 May 2001 the Supreme Court interrupted the proceedings until the respondent’s successor joined the proceedings.
12. On 18 September 2001 the applicant requested that the liquidator be allowed to join the proceedings as the defendant’s successor.
13. On 7 November 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request, observing that the liquidator was not the successor.
14. In separate proceedings, on 7 January 2002 the applicant requested that the proceedings resulting in the defendant’s liquidation be re-opened, since he had never been informed of them. On 1 February 2002 the Regional Court’s Economic Collegium dismissed this request. On 28 April 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal since the request was incompatible ratione materiae with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and Act no. XLIX of 1991 (“the Insolvency Act”). In its reasoning, the Supreme Court made reference to the fact that, under sections 20 and 82(g) of Act no. CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives, the respondent had ceased to exist ipso iure without a successor (section 1(3) of the Insolvency Act).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-58234
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1998
DOCNAME: CASE OF LAUKO v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Not necessary to examine Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: R. Pekkanen
TEXT: 8. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Považská Bystrica, Slovakia.
9. In June 1992 he requested, pursuant to newly adopted legislation, that a flat in which he lived and which was located in a block of flats in Dubnica nad Váhom, Slovakia should be sold to him.
10. The applicant alleged that his neighbours and other individuals subsequently disturbed him by their noisy behaviour, mockery and threats. On several occasions the door and windows of his flat and his letter box were damaged. The applicant considers that the purpose of those interferences was to dissuade him from buying the flat.
11. On several occasions the applicant asked the police department in Dubnica nad Váhom to investigate the disturbances and to prosecute the persons responsible. He cited, inter alia, family B. The police informed him that the facts he had complained of could not be established and that accordingly the investigation of his complaints had been closed. On 15 April 1994 the police department, acting pursuant to section 63 of the 1990 Minor Offences Act, notified the Dubnica nad Váhom local office (Obvodný úrad) about the complaints brought by the applicant (see paragraph 31 below).
12. On 11 May 1994 the local office found that the applicant had committed a minor offence (priestupok) under section 49(1)(d) of the Minor Offences Act in that without justification he had accused family B. of causing a nuisance. The decision was based on the evidence submitted by the police department in Dubnica nad Váhom and on the facts which were established in the course of the proceedings before the local office.
13. The applicant was fined 300 Slovakian korunas (SKK) and ordered to pay SKK 150 in respect of the costs of the proceedings. The decision of the local office was signed by the head of its legal department. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Považská Bystrica district office (Okresný úrad).
14. On 28 July 1994 the district office dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the local office. The applicant's case was examined by the legal department of the district office which rejected his appeal in a decision signed by the head of that department.
15. On 16 August 1994 the applicant brought a complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). In his submissions to that court he alleged, inter alia, a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in that there had been no fair and public hearing in his case and that the administrative authorities dealing with it had not been impartial.
16. On 24 November 1994 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint as being manifestly ill-founded. It held, inter alia:
“A minor offence is characterised, in general, by a wrongful breach of law or legal obligations in different spheres of public administration which represents a minor danger to the society. Because of its character, a minor offence is not subject to examination by a court... In accordance with the Minor Offences Act, the examination of minor offences falls within the competence of administrative authorities. Pursuant to section 83 of the Minor Offences Act, in conjunction with Articles 244 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure, the lawfulness of administrative organs' decisions on minor offences can be reviewed by courts only in cases where a fine exceeding SKK 2,000 has been imposed, the exercise of a certain activity has been prohibited for a period exceeding six months or an object of a value exceeding SKK 2,000 has been confiscated. The aforesaid provision of the special Act governing minor offences is fully binding also on the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic.”
17. On 2 July 1997 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's request for the review of its decision of 24 November 1994.
18. Article 46 § 2 of the Constitution guarantees to everyone who claims to have been denied his rights as a result of a decision made by a public administrative authority the right to appeal to a court of law and have the legality of the decision reviewed, unless otherwise provided by law. The review of decisions on matters of fundamental rights and freedoms may not be excluded from the jurisdiction of courts of law.
19. Article 121 entitles the government to grant pardons in matters concerning minor offences.
20. Pursuant to Article 127 the Constitutional Court decides on complaints concerning final decisions made by, inter alia, local government authorities and local self-governing bodies in cases concerning violations of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, unless the protection of such rights falls under the jurisdiction of another court.
21. At the time of the offence the legislation read as follows.
22. Section 1 of the Minor Offences Act defines its purpose in the following terms:
“Administrative authorities of the Slovak Republic and municipal organs shall encourage citizens to respect legal rules and the rights of other citizens. They shall ensure, in particular, that citizens do not impede the conduct of the administration ... and contravene public order and civic propriety.”
23. Section 2(1) provides the following definition of a minor offence:
“A minor offence is a wrongful act which interferes with or causes danger to the public interest and is expressly classified as a minor offence in this Act or another law, unless such an act represents a separate administrative offence punishable under special legal rules or a criminal offence.”
24. Section 11 entitles the competent authorities to impose sanctions (sankcie) on the perpetrators of minor offences. It reads as follows:
“(1) The following sanctions may be imposed for a minor offence:
(a) reprimand,
(b) fine,
(c) prohibition to exercise a certain activity,
(d) confiscation of an object.
(2) A sanction can be imposed either separately or in combination with another sanction; a reprimand cannot be combined with a fine.
(3) It is permissible to decide not to impose a sanction if the mere fact that the minor offence was examined is sufficient to reform its perpetrator.”
25. Section 12(1), as relevant, provides:
“When determining the type and amount of the sanction, the seriousness of the minor offence and, in particular, the way and the circumstances in which it was committed, its consequences, the degree of guilt, the motive and the character of the perpetrator including whether or not he or she has already been punished for the same act in ... disciplinary proceedings should be taken into account.”
26. Section 49 of the Act governs minor offences against civic propriety. Pursuant to section 49(1)(d) a minor offence is committed by a person who deliberately offends against civic propriety by threat of bodily harm, by causing minor bodily injury, by unjustifiably accusing another person of a minor offence, by annoyances or other rude behaviour. Under section 49(2) such a minor offence is punishable with a maximum fine of SKK 3,000.
27. According to section 51 the proceedings concerning minor offences are governed, unless otherwise provided, by the Administrative Proceedings Act.
28. Section 52 provides that the following administrative authorities are entitled to examine minor offences: (i) local offices, (ii) police authorities if a minor offence was committed in breach of the generally binding legal rules relating to the security of road traffic and (iii) other organs of State administration if a special law so provides.
29. Pursuant to section 58(4)(b) cases involving minor offences against civic propriety, which are directed against the security of persons, are investigated by the police authorities subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior.
30. Section 59(1) provides that minor offences are to be investigated either on the basis of an investigation carried out by the competent police authority or upon a notification submitted by an individual, an organisation or an authority.
31. Under section 63(1) the police authority should submit to the competent administrative organ a report on the outcome of its investigation of a case. Such a report ought to comprise, inter alia, a description of the relevant facts and specify which minor offence they are alleged to constitute.
32. Section 73 reads as follows:
“(1) A citizen is accused of a minor offence as soon as the administrative authority has taken the first procedural step against him or her. Such a person shall be considered innocent until his or her guilt has been established by a final decision.
(2) A person accused of a minor offence has the right to comment on all facts that are imputed to him or her as well as on the evidence related to these facts, to present facts and evidence in his or her defence, make submissions and have recourse to remedies. He or she cannot be forced to make statements or to plead guilty.”
33. Section 77, as relevant, provides:
“The operative part of a decision by which an accused of a minor offence is found guilty shall comprise also the description of the act including the place and time when the minor offence was committed, the finding of guilt, the type and amount of the sanction or, as the case may be, the decision not to impose a sanction...”
34. According to section 83(1) decisions on minor offences imposing a fine exceeding SKK 2,000, prohibiting the exercise of a certain activity for a period exceeding six months or confiscating an object having a value exceeding SKK 2,000 can be reviewed by the courts. In such cases the provisions of Articles 244 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure on administrative jurisdiction are applied.
35. Section 1(1) of Law no. 472/1990 on the Organisation of Local State Administration, as amended, empowers district offices and local offices to carry out local administration falling within the competence of the State. The exercise of local administration by the aforesaid authorities is managed and controlled by the government.
36. Under section 6(1) the head of a local office is appointed and dismissed by the head of a district office.
37. According to section 8(1) the head of a district office is appointed by the government on the proposal of the Ministry of the Interior.
38. The officers of local and district offices are subordinated to the heads of those offices and their contracts of employment are governed, as in the case of other salaried employees, by the provisions of the Labour Code.
39. In 1996 this Law was repealed and replaced by Law no. 222/1996 on the Organisation of Local State Administration.
40. Under the terms of Article 135 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure civil courts are bound, inter alia, by the decisions of the competent authorities that a criminal offence, a minor offence or another administrative offence punishable under special rules has been committed.
41. Article 3 § 1 of the Criminal Code defines a criminal offence as an act which is dangerous to society and whose characteristics are laid down in the Criminal Code. However, according to Article 3 § 2, an act whose dangerousness is negligible is not a criminal offence even if it has its attributes.
42. According to Article 3 § 4 the degree of dangerousness of an act is determined, in particular, by the importance of the protected interest affected by that act, by the circumstances and the way in which the act was committed and its consequences as well as by the character of its perpetrator, the degree of his guilt and his motives.
43. The Criminal Code refers to repressive measures imposed for committing a criminal offence as penalties (tresty).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-67577
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2004
DOCNAME: BARANOVA v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: The applicant, Tatyana Nikolayevna Baranova, is a Russian national, who was born in 1964 and lives in Moscow.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant worked as an officer of the Moscow Division of the Courts Administration Office attached to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. On 21 April 2000 she was dismissed for being absent from work for four days without permission.
She brought proceedings before the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow for reinstatement and damages, alleging, in particular, that she was a single mother and could not be dismissed on the administration's initiative.
On 7 June 2000 the court examined the case and found the applicant's allegation concerning her status as a single mother false and her dismissal lawful. On 22 September 2000 the Moscow City Court disallowed the applicant's appeal and upheld the judgment.
The applicant's subsequent applications to the Moscow City Court, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the prosecutor's office pursuing the supervisory review of the judgment were rejected as well as her application for re-examination of the case due to newly discovered circumstances (decision of the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow of 5 June 2002).
The functioning of the Courts Administration Office attached to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation is mainly regulated by the 1996 Law on the Judicial System of the Russian Federation (sections 30, 31, 33), the 1998 Law on the Courts Administration Office at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the 1992 Law on the Status of Judges (section 9).
The Head of the Courts Administration Office is appointed to this post by the President of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation with the consent of the Judges' Council. The Courts Administration Office assumed, in particular, the following functions, previously performed by the federal Ministry of Justice, aimed at ensuring the activity of courts and arrangement of conditions necessary for the proper administration of justice without an interference with the latter:
- in the field of the financing of courts (judges' remuneration, benefits, training and pensions; construction and maintenance of court buildings; office equipment; postal expenses, transport and other charges are financed by the federal budget): budget drafting and budget presentation to the Government and to the federal legislature; distribution of funds between courts; supervision and audit of courts' expenditure of funds.
- in the field of human resources: determination of the need of particular courts for human resources and redistribution between courts, with the consent of the President of the Supreme Court, of the newly formed vacancies of posts of judges; assistance to the Qualification Board of Judges in the selection of candidates for the posts of judges; judges' training; provision of judges (including retired judges) with free housing, social security and other benefits provided for by law; undertaking measures on the security of judges and members of their families. According to the applicant, Section 2.2.13 of the Regulations on the Moscow Division of the Courts Administration Office approved by the Head of the Courts Administration Office provided that the Moscow Division of the Courts Administration Office also makes proposals to the Qualification Board of Judges on termination of judge's functions.
- other administrative support: construction and maintenance of court buildings; supply with office equipment, transport and other resources; organization of clerical work and informational support.


ITEMID: 001-87689
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: PASHKOVSKIY v. UKRAINE AND POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Lech Garlicki;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Volodymyr Butkevych;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Mikhail Petrovich Pashkovskiy, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1925 and lives in the village of Maryanivka, Donetsk region.
On 9 September 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine concluded an agreement on the mutual resettlement of Ukrainians from Poland and Poles from Ukraine.
In March 1945 the applicant’s family was moved from Poland to Ukraine. In Poland they left property, namely a house and other buildings and a three hectare plot of land. According to archive documents the value of that property was 8,564 Soviet roubles.
Thereafter the applicant and his family became members of a collective farm (kolhoz) in the village of Maryanivka, where the applicant still lives.
In 2004 the applicant started seeking information about the possibility of obtaining compensation for the property that had been abandoned by his family in Poland in 1945.
On 15 July 2004, after receiving the applicant’s request, the General Consulate of Poland in Kharkiv informed him that it was dealing with the issues concerning Polish nationals living in Ukraine and recommended that he raised the question with the Ukrainian Ministry of Labour and Social Protection.
On 15 December 2004 the State Archives Department in the Donetsk region informed the applicant that it could not find among the existing documents anything to indicate that his family had received compensation in 1945 for the property left in Poland. It further noted, however, that it did not have the Maryanivka village council records for 1945.
On 28 March 2005 the applicant wrote to the Head of the Department of Labour and Social Protection for advice on how to claim compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the forced resettlement in 1945 and for the abandoned property. In reply, the Department informed the applicant that he qualified for war-participant status which would entitle him to apply for various social benefits. As to compensation for the abandoned property and forced resettlement, it stated that it had no authority to deal with such issues.
The applicant sent similar requests to a number of institutions, but to no avail. He has informed the Court that he sent a letter to the Supreme Court, but he has not given any details of the contents of the letter, nor has he stated whether he received a reply.
The Agreement between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on the evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and of the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland (Układ pomiędzy Polskim Komitetem Wyzwolenia Narodowego a Rządem Ukraińskiej Socjalistycznej Republiki Rad dotyczący ewakuacji obywateli polskich z terytorium U.S.R.R. i ludności ukraińskiej z terytorium Polski / Угода між Урядом Української Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки і Польським Комітетом Національного визволення про евакуацію українського населення з території Польщі і польських громадян з території УРСР – “the Agreement”) was signed on 9 September 1944 and entered into force the same day. It was officially published in the Official Gazette of Ukraine more than sixty years later, on 24 May 2006.
The Agreement provided, in so far as relevant, as follows:
Article 1
“...The Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declares that [persons] evacuated to the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic shall be settled according to their wishes either on a collective farm or on a plot of land to be used as an individual farm such plot to be no smaller than that used prior to the evacuation up to a maximum of 15 hectares per farm...”
Article 3
1. The following benefits shall be established for persons evacuated from the Ukrainian RSR to Poland and from Poland to the territory of the Ukrainian RSR:
(a) the writing off of all arrears accumulated by such persons in respect of deliveries in kind, pecuniary taxes and insurance premiums;...
...
(c) exemption from all State pecuniary taxes and insurance premiums due in 1944 and 1945 in respect of all the evacuated households, both on the territory of Poland and on the territory of Ukraine;
(d) the grant of a five-year pecuniary loan of 5,000 roubles or zlotys per household to evacuees at the place of their resettlement for their financial and other needs;...
2. Evacuees shall be allowed to take with them clothing, footwear, linen, bedding, foodstuffs, household goods, farming inventory stock, harnesses and other articles for household and agricultural use, up to a total weight of 2 metric tons per family, as well as any cattle and poultry belonging to the evacuated farm.
3. Persons with specialised professions, such as workmen, craftsmen, doctors, artists and scholars, shall be accorded the right to take with them objects needed in the exercise of their professions.
4. The following may not be taken upon evacuation:
(a) cash, banknotes and gold and silver coins of any type, with the exception of Polish banknotes up to a maximum of 1,000 zlotys per person, or Soviet currency up to a maximum of 1,000 roubles per person;
(b) gold and platinum in alloy, powder or scrap form;
(c) precious stones in unworked form;
(d) works of art and antiques whenever they constitute a collection, or even as individual items, unless they are the evacuated person’s family property;
(e) firearms (with the exception of hunting rifles) and military equipment;
(f) photographs (other than personal photographs), charts and maps;
(g) automobiles and motorcycles;
(h) furniture, whether by rail or by motor vehicle, because of the transport problems caused by the war.
...
6. The value of movable belongings left behind upon evacuation, and also of immovable property, shall be returned to the evacuated person on the basis of insurance valuations, in accordance with the applicable laws in the State of Poland and in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as the case may be. In the absence of an insurance valuation, the value of movable and immovable property shall be assessed by the Plenipotentiaries and Representatives of the Parties. The Contracting Parties shall undertake to ensure that town and village houses vacated as a result of resettlement are made available to resettled persons on a priority basis.”
On 21 July 1952 the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Belarus Soviet Socialist Republic and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic concluded an agreement on the mutual settlement of accounts in connection with the evacuation of population groups and the delimitation of the Polish-Soviet State border (Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, z jednej strony i Rządem Związku Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich, Rządem Ukraińskiej Socjalistycznej Republiki Radzieckiej, Rządem Białoruskiej Socjalistycznej Republiki Radzieckiej i Rządem Litewskiej Socjalistycznej Republiki Radzieckiej, z drugiej strony, o wzajemnych rozliczeniach, wynikłych w związku z ewakuacją ludności i delimitacją polsko-radzieckiej granicy państwowej – “the 1952 Pact”). Article 2 of the Pact provided:
“With a view to the complete and definitive mutual settlement of accounts for movable and immovable property, agricultural products and seed left on the territories of the Republic of Poland and of the USSR by persons evacuated and resettled in connection with the delimitation of the Polish-Soviet State border, the Government of the Republic of Poland undertake to pay the Government of the USSR the sum of 76 (seventy-six) million roubles.”
From 1946 to the present day, Polish law has provided that persons repatriated from the territories beyond the Bug River are entitled to have the value of the property abandoned as a result of the Second World War offset either against the fee for the right of perpetual use or replacement land or against the price of immovable property purchased from the State Treasury.
That provision has been repeated in several statutes, starting with the Decree of 6 December 1946 on the transfer from the State of non-agricultural property in the Regained Territories and the former Free City of Gdańsk (Dekret o przekazywaniu przez Państwo mienia nierolniczego na obszarze Ziem Odzyskanych i b. Wolnego Miasta Gdańska).
The so-called “Regained Territories” (“Ziemie Odzyskane”) were former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line, with which – upon Stalin’s proposal – the victorious Allies compensated the Poles for the “territories beyond the Bug River” that had been taken away from them by the former USSR.
Under the policy pursued at that time by the authorities, the “Regained Territories” and Gdańsk, after the expulsion of Germans residing there, were intended for the accommodation of Polish citizens “repatriated” from “beyond the Bug River”, that is, from the territories beyond the Curzon line. The repatriated persons had priority in purchasing land.
Further decrees and statutes were enforced between 1952 and 1991.
In the 1990s, however, the authorities started to consider the possibility of enacting a single statute dealing with all forms of restitution of property, including claims for compensation for property abandoned by repatriated persons (Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, §§ 62-65, ECHR 2004V).
Ultimately, a statute exclusively relating to the Bug River claims (the December 2003 Act) came into force on 30 January 2004 (Broniowski v. Poland, cited above, §§ 114-19).
In Ukraine no specific legislation has been adopted or commitment made to compensate former Polish residents who were resettled in Ukraine under the Agreement of 9 September 1944. However, in recent years other legislative measures have been introduced.
In July 1995 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine submitted to the Parliament a War Veterans (Amendment) Bill. The bill mentioned for the first time people resettled in Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) passed the bill with some amendments. In particular, they introduced a requirement of proof of work during the war, depending on the age of the person concerned. In its final version of 22 December 1995, as enacted by the Parliament, the relevant parts of section 9 of the War Veterans (Amendment) Act read as follows:
Section 9. Persons to be considered war participants
“The following persons shall be considered war participants:
...
2) ... Persons who worked during the Great Patriotic War in territories which after 1944 were integrated into the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and persons who were resettled after 1945 on the territory of Ukraine from the territory of other States, as well as citizens who were assigned by State bodies of the former USSR to work in countries allied to the USSR, shall also be considered war participants.
For persons who were born on or prior to 31 December 1932 and have valid reasons for failing to submit documentary evidence of their work during the war, the status of war participant may be established by a motion by a special committee under the procedure established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
For persons born after 31 December 1932, the status of war participant may be established only by the production of documents and other evidence that unequivocally prove that they worked during the war...”
By the Amendment Act of 2 October 2003, section 9 was changed and the categories of resettled persons, including persons resettled prior to and in 1945, were listed separately in a new paragraph of the Article with no other conditions attached. This provision reads as follows:
“...11) persons resettled after 9 September 1944 on the territory of Ukraine from the territory of other States.”
The decree provides for a number of events to commemorate the forced resettlement but is silent on the question of compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage for those who were resettled.
This bill was submitted to the Parliament in November 2003 but has not been adopted. Article 3 of the bill proposed compensating the resettled persons for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage by granting them war-participant status and facilitating their travel to Poland to visit the lands where they had previously resided. The bill further stated that provision could be made in the domestic legislation for other benefits and forms of compensation to be furnished to resettled persons.
“International treaties that are in force and have been agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are part of the national legislation of Ukraine.”
“... international treaties concluded and duly ratified by Ukraine shall constitute an inalienable part of the national legislation of Ukraine and shall be applied according to the rank prescribed for norms of national legislation.”
Article 19 Validity of International Treaties of Ukraine on the Territory of Ukraine
“1. International treaties that are in force and agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, are part of the national legislation of Ukraine and are applied in the order foreseen for the norms of the national legislation...”


ITEMID: 001-75819
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: BGR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF ZLINSAT, SPOL. S R.O. v. BULGARIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Not necessary to examine Art. 13;Violation of P1-1;Pecuniary damage - reserved;Costs and expenses (Convention proceedings) - partially awarded and partially reserved
JUDGES: Peer Lorenzen
TEXT: 6. In September 1995 the Sofia Municipal Council decided to privatise a hotel owned by the Sofia Municipality, and situated in Gorna Banya, Sofia. In July 1996 the Sofia Municipal Privatisation Agency opened a procedure for the privatisation of the hotel through negotiations with potential buyers. At the close of the procedure only one company had submitted a privatisation bid. On 8 May 1997 that company assigned its rights under the privatisation procedure to the applicant company.
7. On 10 May 1997 the applicant company entered into a privatisation contract with the Sofia Municipal Council, whereby it bought the hotel. It agreed to pay 425,000 United States dollars (USD) and also agreed to make, during the following five years, investments in the amount of USD 1,500,000. The applicant company also undertook to create fortyfive new jobs. Clause 8(7) of the contract stipulated that the applicant company was barred from disposing of the hotel for five years without the express consent of the Sofia Municipal Council. Clause 10 of the contract, however, stipulated that the applicant company could convey the hotel as noncash consideration for shares in a limited liability company, if it held at least 67% of such a company’s shares.
8. In a decision of 7 July 1997 the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office, acting pursuant to an article in the weekly newspaper Capital published in its issue of 25 May 1997, and to complaints by employees and leaseholders of hotel premises, ordered the suspension of the performance of the privatisation contract. It relied on Article 185 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1974 (“the CCrP”) and on section 119(1)(6) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994 (see paragraphs 37 and 38 below), and reasoned that the privatisation procedure had been tainted by a breach of paragraph 8 of the transitional and concluding provisions of the Transformation and Privatisation of State and MunicipallyOwned Enterprises Act of 1992 (see paragraph 44 below). There were also indications that certain interested parties had not been properly notified of the privatisation terms. The latest valuation of the hotel prior to the privatisation had been conducted under circumstances which called into question the objectivity of the officials involved. These facts could only be elucidated through a criminal investigation. The prosecution authorities were also bound to exercise their powers under Article 27 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1952 (“the CCP”) (see paragraph 40 below). In these circumstances, the performance of the obligations in the privatisation contract would disturb public order, lead to the commission of offences by officials and economic offences, and cause considerable damage.
9. The decision was served on the chairperson of the Sofia Municipal Council and on the Sofia Municipal Privatisation Agency, but not on the applicant company.
10. The mayor of Sofia appealed against the decision to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office, arguing that the privatisation contract could only be set aside by a court. In a decision of 25 July 1997 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the lower prosecutor’s office had correctly found that measures – consisting of the suspension of the performance of the contract – had to be taken to prevent the future commission of offences and that it was bound to seek the annulment of the contract by a court.
11. The mayor of Sofia further appealed to the Chief Prosecutor. In a decision of 28 August 1997 the Chief Prosecutor rejected the appeal, fully endorsing the reasoning of the lower prosecutor’s offices and noting that a criminal investigation had been opened into the matter.
12. The applicant company was not served copies of the above decisions and was apparently not aware of these developments.
13. In the meantime, on 12 August 1997, the Sofia Municipality handed possession of the hotel over to the applicant company. On 18 August 1997 the mayor of Sofia ordered that all prior leaseholders be removed from the hotel premises.
14. On an unspecified date the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office apparently opened a criminal investigation against an official of the Sofia Municipality or the municipal company which previously owned the hotel. The charges apparently included abuse of office.
15. In a decision of 2 October 1997 the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office, relying on Article 185 § 1 of the CCrP and on section 119(1)(6) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994, ordered the police to remove the applicant company’s officers, subcontractors and agents from the hotel, which was to be placed in the custody of a Stateowned company. It also ordered the police to seize all accounting and other documents relating to the returns obtained by the company since it had taken possession of the hotel, and to notify its officers that any attempt to regain possession of the hotel would constitute an offence under Article 323 § 2 of the Criminal Code of 1968 (see paragraph 45 below). It reasoned that by undertaking these measures despite the fact that it had ordered the suspension of the performance of the privatisation contract and had commenced an action under paragraph 8 of the transitional and concluding provisions of Transformation and Privatisation of State and Municipally-Owned Enterprises Act of 1992 and a criminal investigation, the Sofia Municipality had seriously breached section 119(2) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994 (see paragraphs 35 and 44 below) and had infringed important public interests and public order.
16. This decision was served on the Sofia Municipality, but not on the applicant company. The company learned about it on 6 October 1997, when the police arrived at the hotel, removed its officers and agents from the premises, and warned its manager that any attempt to regain possession of the hotel would constitute an offence under Article 323 § 2 of the Criminal Code of 1968 (see paragraph 45 below).
17. The Sofia Municipality appealed against the decision to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office, arguing that it had been unlawful, as the applicant company was the rightful owner of the hotel and there were no legal grounds for its eviction. In a decision of 27 November 1997 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the appeal. It found that the performance of the privatisation contract had been suspended and that an action had been commenced by the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office aiming to annul the contract. The legal basis of the decision appealed against were Article 185 § 1 of the CCrP and section 119(1)(6) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994. The fact that a civil action had been commenced and that a criminal investigation had been opened indicated that there was a risk that an offence would be committed. The legality of the decision was not affected by the fact that it had not been served on the applicant company.
18. Meanwhile, on 17 September 1997, the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office, exercising its powers under Article 27 § 1 of the CCP (see paragraph 40 below), brought a civil action against the Sofia Municipality and the applicant company, seeking the annulment of the privatisation contract. It argued that it had been entered into under manifestly disadvantageous conditions, within the meaning of paragraph 8 of the transitional and concluding provisions of Transformation and Privatisation of State and MunicipallyOwned Enterprises Act of 1992. The price paid for the hotel had been below its real market value. The penalties stipulated in the contract in the event of a failure of the applicant company to perform its investment obligations were negligible. The applicant company was allowed to convey the hotel as noncash consideration for shares in a limited liability company despite the prohibition to dispose of the hotel for five years. The contract made no provision for its rescission in the event of nonperformance. Finally, the performance of the contract was questionable in view of the fact that the negotiations had initially been conducted with another company, while the applicant company had intervened in the process later.
19. On 9 December 1997 the Sofia Municipality made a request for a declaratory judgment to the effect that the decisions of the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office had been made without a legal basis, were ultra vires and thus null and void, and did not entail any legal consequences. In a final decision of 11 February 1998 the Sofia City Court rejected the request as inadmissible, holding that it was not connected with the subjectmatter of the original action, as it concerned acts which postdated the execution of the contract, and that it was not sufficiently precise, as it did not specifically identify all impugned decisions of the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office. The court went on to say that it had no jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of prosecutors’ decisions and actions in civil proceedings.
20. In a judgment of 3 April 1998 the Sofia City Court dismissed the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office’s action. It held, inter alia, that the price at which the hotel had been sold was not unreasonable. It took into account not only the cash amount paid to the Sofia Municipal Council, but also the investment and job creation commitments. The court went on to say that there was no legal prohibition on the use of privatised property as noncash consideration for shares. There was nothing to prevent the parties to the contract to agree that the applicant company was free to do so under certain conditions. The Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office’s arguments concerning the possibility of such a transaction were immaterial, as the court’s task was not to hypothesise about future events, but to decide on the basis of concrete facts. The court further found that the lack of any clauses in the contract for its rescission did not render it manifestly disadvantageous, since in the event of nonperformance it could be rescinded by virtue of the law. The penalties provided by the contract for nonperformance were immaterial since the Sofia Municipal Council could in any event claim compensation for its actual damages by law. The court thus did not find it established that the contract had been entered into under manifestly disadvantageous conditions.
21. The Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office appealed to the Sofia Court of Appeals. Its appeal was not endorsed by the Sofia Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, which argued in an additional memorial that the Sofia City Court had correctly disposed of the case.
22. In a judgment of 4 March 1999 the Sofia Court of Appeals upheld the Sofia City Court’s judgment, with similar reasoning.
23. Despite its previous stance, the Sofia Appellate Prosecutor’s Office lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Cassation, apparently on the express instructions of the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office (the successor entity of the Chief Prosecutor’s Office).
24. A hearing was held on 28 June 1999, at which a prosecutor of the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office maintained the appeal.
25. In a final judgment of 30 July 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s judgment, fully confirming its reasoning.
26. In the meantime, while the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Cassation were pending, on 17 May 1999 the applicant company appealed to the Sofia Appellate Prosecutor’s Office against the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office decisions of 7 July and 2 October 1997. It argued that they were unlawful and that the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office reliance on Article 185 § 1 of the CCrP had been misplaced. It filed the appeal through the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office.
27. In a letter of 22 June 1999 the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant company that the decisions had already been unsuccessfully appealed before the Chief Prosecutor’s Office and the Chief Prosecutor and sent the applicant company copies of the latter’s decisions. It noted that there were no new facts warranting the rescission or variation of the impugned decisions.
28. On 6 July 1999 the applicant company filed its appeal directly with the Sofia Appellate Prosecutor’s Office.
29. In a decision of 9 July 1999 the Sofia Appellate Prosecutor’s Office rejected the appeal. It reasoned that the decisions of 7 July and 2 October 1997 had already been appealed against before the Chief Prosecutor’s Office and the Chief Prosecutor, which had rejected the appeals. It had therefore no competence to examine them.
30. On 24 August 1999 the applicant company applied to the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office, asking it to rescind its decisions of 7 July and 2 October 1997. It argued that the dismissal of the action against it by means of a final judgment was a fresh fact indicating that the privatisation contract had not been entered into under manifestly disadvantageous conditions and that no State or public interests had been prejudiced thereby. Moreover, the prohibition to use the hotel had already lasted two years, without any justification, in breach of its right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to peacefully enjoy its possessions.
31. In a letter of 14 September 1999 the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant company that there was no need to rescind the decision of 2 October 1997, but that the final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation was binding upon the parties to the case and they should comply with it.
32. In a letter of 5 October 1999, a copy of which was sent to the applicant company, the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office notified the police that following the Supreme Court of Cassation’s judgment the decisions of 7 July and 2 October 1997 were no longer enforceable.
33. The Prosecutor’s Office („прокуратурата“) is part of the judicial branch (Article 117 § 2 of the Constitution of 1991). Its structure mirrors that of the courts (Article 126 § 1 of the Constitution of 1991). Prosecutors are appointed, promoted, demoted and dismissed the way judges are, and enjoy the same tenure and immunities (Articles 129, 131, and 132 § 1 of the Constitution of 1991). The task of the Prosecutor’s Office is to ensure the enforcement of the law by (i) prosecuting persons who have allegedly committed criminal offences, (ii) overseeing the execution of penalties and coercive measures, (iii) seeking the annulment of unlawful decisions and instruments, and (iv) participating, where provided by law, in civil and administrative proceedings (Article 127 of the Constitution of 1991).
34. Section 112 of the Judicial Power Act of 1994 („Закон за съдебната власт“) provides that the Prosecutor’s Office is unified and centralised, that each prosecutor is subordinate to the respective senior prosecutor, and that all prosecutors are subordinate to the Chief Prosecutor (the latter is also provided by Article 126 § 2 of the Constitution of 1991). The Chief Prosecutor may issue directives and give instructions relating to the Prosecutor’s Office’s activity (sections 111(3) and 114 of the Judicial Power Act of 1994). The Chief Prosecutor oversees the work of all prosecutors, and the prosecutors of the appellate and the regional prosecutor’s offices oversee the work of their subordinate prosecutors (section 115(1) and (2) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994). Higher prosecutors may perform all acts which are in the competence of their subordinate prosecutors. They may also stay or revoke their decisions in the cases provided for by law (section 116(2) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994). The higher prosecutors’ written orders are binding on their subordinate prosecutors (section 116(3) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994).
35. Prosecutors’ decisions issued within their competence and in accordance with the law are binding on all state officials and private persons (section 119(2) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994). Prosecutors may give orders to the police (section 119(4) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994).
36. Prosecutors are immune from civil liability for the damage they have inflicted while discharging their duties, unless in so doing they have committed a publicly prosecutable criminal offence (Article 132 § 1 of the Constitution of 1991 and section 134(1) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994).
37. Article 185 § 1 of the CCrP (repealed in 2003) provided that “the [criminal investigation authorities] shall be bound to take the necessary measures to prevent a criminal offence, for which there is reason to believe that it will be committed. [These measures may include] the temporary impounding of the means which could be used for committing the offence”. The new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2005, which entered into force on 29 April 2006 and superseded the CCrP, does not contain a provision similar to that of the former Article 185 § 1 of the CCrP.
38. Section 119(1)(6) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994 provides that in carrying out their duties prosecutors “may take all measures provided for by law, if they have information that a publicly prosecutable criminal offence or other illegal act may be committed”. The text of section 119(1)(6) of the Judicial Power Act of 1994 closely matches that of section 7(1) of the repealed Prosecutor’s Office Act of 1980 („Закон за прокуратурата“), which provided that in case he or she “had information that a criminal offence or another illegal act might be committed, the prosecutor shall issue a warning and take all legally permissible measures to prevent those”.
39. There is no reported caselaw on the exact import of these texts. During their 2002 visit to Bulgaria the Committee for the Prevention of Torture were told, while visiting a psychiatric hospital, that prosecutors had relied on Article 185 § 1 of the CCrP to order the confinement of individuals there (CPT/Inf (2004) 21, p. 53, § 150 in limine and footnote 12).
40. Article 27 § 1 of the CCP, as worded at the material time, provided that prosecutors could, inter alia, commence a civil action on behalf of another person or entity if they considered that this was necessary to protect the State or the public interest.
41. By section 117 of the Judicial Power Act of 1994, prosecutors are independent of the courts in the performance of their duties. Section 116(1) of the same Act provides that “all decisions and actions of a prosecutor may be appealed before the higher prosecutor’s office, unless they are subject to judicial review”, which is the case in respect of some of their decisions made in the course of criminal investigations (for instance under Articles 153a § 3, 237 § 3 and 239 § 7 of the CCrP).
42. Article 181 § 1 of the CCrP provides that prosecutors’ decisions are appealable before the higher prosecutor. The appeal may be filed either through the prosecutor whose decision is appealed against, or directly with the higher prosecutor. In the former case, the appeal must be forwarded immediately to the competent prosecutor together with a written opinion by the lower prosecutor (Article 182 of the CCrP). The filing of the appeal has no suspensive effect unless the competent prosecutor decides otherwise. The higher prosecutor must rule on the appeal within three days of its receipt (Article 183 of the CCrP).
43. The Supreme Administrative Court has held that prosecutors’ decisions are generally not subject to judicial review, because they are not administrative decisions as the Prosecutor’s Office is part of the judicial branch, its task is the defence of legality, it is a centralised structure, and all prosecutorial decisions and actions may be appealed before the higher prosecutors. Unlike the decisions of the administrative authorities, which are subject to judicial review unless otherwise provided by statute, prosecutors’ decisions may be scrutinised by the courts only in the cases expressly provided for by law, which is not the case in respect of decisions made under section 119 of the Judicial Power Act of 1994 (опр. № 10697 от 25 ноември 2003 г. по адм. д. 4844/2003 г., ВАС, пето отделение; опр. № 3815 от 27 април 2005 г. по адм. д. № 3033/2005 г., ВАС, петчленен състав; опр. № 5065 от 2 юни 2005 г. по адм. д. № 11114/ 2004 г., ВАС, петчленен състав).
44. Paragraph 8 of the transitional and concluding provisions of that Act („Закон за преобразуване и приватизация на държавни и общински предприятия“), now superseded by new legislation, provided that all contracts disposing of State or municipal property which had been entered into under manifestly disadvantageous conditions could be annulled.
45. By Article 323 § 2 of the Criminal Code of 1968, it is an offence for any person to take possession of an immovable property from which they have been lawfully removed.
46. The principal enactment in this field is the State Responsibility for Damage Act of 1988 („Закон за отговорността на държавата за вреди, причинени на граждани“). Its section 1, as worded until 31 December 2005, provided as follows:
“1. The State shall be liable for the damage suffered by private persons as a result of unlawful decisions, actions or omissions by its organs and officers, committed in the course of or in connection with the performance of administrative action.
2. Compensation for damage flowing from unlawful decisions under [subsection 1] may be claimed after the decisions concerned have been annulled [in prior proceedings]. If the damage flows from an administrative decision which is null and void or from a act or omission which is unlawful, the nullity of the decision or the unlawfulness of the act or the omission shall be established by the court having cognisance of the claim for compensation.”
47. Section 1 was amended with effect from 1 January 2006 and now expressly provides that juristic persons may also claim compensation under the Act. Previously the courts construed this provision as allowing only natural persons to claim compensation (реш. № 1307 от 21 октомври 2003 г. по гр.д. № 2136/2002 г., ВКС, пето г.о.; тълк. реш. № 3 от 22 април 2005 г. по гр.д. № 3/2004 г., ОСГК на ВКС).
48. The general rules of the law of torts are set out in sections 45 to 54 of the Obligations and Contracts Act of 1951 („Закон за задълженията и договорите“). Its section 45(1) provides that everyone is obliged to make good the damage which they have, through their fault, caused to another. Section 49 provides that a person who has entrusted another with performing a job is liable for the damage caused by that other person in the course of or in connection with the performance of the job.
49. Juristic persons are not liable under section 45(1) of the Act, as they cannot act with mens rea. They may, however, be vicariously liable under section 49 thereof for the tortuous conduct of individuals employed by them (пост. № 7 от 30 декември 1959 г., Пленум на ВС).
50. One of the prerequisites of the liability in tort under sections 45 to 50 of the Act is the wrongfulness of the impugned conduct (реш. № 567 от 24 ноември 1997 г. по гр.д. № 775/1996 г., ВС, петчленен състав).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-96098
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: CASE OF PANCHENKO v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property
JUDGES: Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Mykhaylo Buromenskiy;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Brovary, Ukraine.
5. The applicant is a disabled war veteran. From 1994 he was on a special list of persons to be allocated an apartment by the State on priority basis (see paragraph 38 below).
6. In May 1997 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Brovary Town Court (“the Town Court”) against Brovary Town Council, requesting the court to order the defendant to provide him with an apartment on a priority basis.
7. On 17 July 1997 the court dismissed the applicant's claim.
8. The applicant appealed and on 19 August 1997 the Kyiv Regional Court (since June 2001 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal) upheld the lower court's judgment.
9. In August 2001 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Town Court against the Brovary Town Executive Committee, the Kyiv Regional State Administration and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, requesting the court to order the defendants to provide him with a apartment on a priority basis and seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
10. On 10 December 2001 the court dismissed the applicant's claims.
11. On 14 March 2002 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the lower court's judgment and remitted the case to it for fresh consideration.
12. In the course of subsequent hearings before the Town Court the applicant withdrew some of his claims, eventually requesting the court only to order the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to provide him with an apartment on a priority basis.
13. On 27 November 2002 the Town Court dismissed the applicant's claim. On 27 December 2002 the same court rectified certain clerical errors in its judgment.
14. On 6 June 2003 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 27 November 2002 and rendered a new one, ordering the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to provide the applicant with an apartment within three months of the judgment becoming final. Apparently, this judgment was not appealed against.
15. On 20 October 2003 the State Bailiff's Service instituted proceedings to enforce this judgment.
16. In May 2004 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to change the means of enforcement of the judgment of 6 June 2003. In particular he sought replacement of the in-kind award with monetary compensation to him in the amount of 225,332.40 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH).
17. On 27 May 2004 the court rejected that request, indicating that the matter should be examined by the Town Court.
18. On 13 October 2004 the Town Court allowed the applicant's request in part, ordering the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to pay Brovary Town Council the above-mentioned sum in order to purchase an apartment for the applicant.
19. On 12 May 2005 this sum was transferred to the bank account of Brovary Town Council.
20. On 16 May 2005 the State Bailiff's Service terminated the enforcement proceedings against the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine as the judgment of 6 June 2003 as amended by the decision of 13 October 2004 had been enforced.
21. On 26 May 2005 Brovary Town Council authorised the Brovary Town Executive Committee to arrange the purchase of an apartment for the applicant in compliance with the judgment of 6 June 2003 as amended by the decision of 13 October 2004.
22. According to the Government, the sum awarded on 13 October 2004 was insufficient to purchase an apartment for the applicant on the secondhand market due to the dramatic increase in real estate prices. For that reason, having invited tenders, on 30 August 2005 the Brovary Town Council concluded a contract with an appropriate company for the construction of an apartment for the applicant.
23. By 2007 the apartment at issue had been constructed, and on 14 August 2007 the Brovary Town Executive Committee issued the applicant with a housing warrant (ордер на заселення житлової площі). On several occasions the applicant was invited to take that warrant but to no avail.
24. On 3 July 2008 the Town Court found the applicant to be abusing his rights (namely, by evading concluding the tenancy contract and, accordingly, paying the tenancy fee) and ordered him to take the housing warrant and move into the apartment within ten days. In that regard enforcement proceedings were instituted against the applicant but the judgment of 3 July 2008 has not yet been enforced.
25. In November 2007 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Town Court against the Brovary Town Executive Committee, seeking to annul the defendant's decision of 14 August 2007 to issue him with the housing warrant. In particular, he pleaded that the floor space of the apartment allocated to him was less than that guaranteed by the domestic law and that the apartment had been purchased as a result of an unlawful tender. On 8 September 2008 the court dismissed his claims as unsubstantiated. It is not clear whether the applicant appealed against that decision.
26. According to the applicant, though, the judgment has still not been enforced. He did not inform the Court about the events set out in the preceding paragraphs (23-25).
27. In October 2005 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings in the Town Court against Brovary Town Council, seeking enforcement of the judgment of 6 June 2003 as amended by the decision of 13 October 2004. In view of the increase in real estate prices, the applicant also sought an additional sum of money to be paid by the defendant as compensation for pecuniary damage as a result of the alleged inactivity.
28. On 28 October 2005 the court dismissed the applicant's claim on account of procedural shortcomings (in particular, for failure to pay the court fee).
29. On 17 February 2006 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the matter of the admissibility of the applicant's claim to the Town Court for fresh consideration.
30. On 24 November 2006 the Town Court dismissed the applicant's claim as unsubstantiated.
31. On 26 February 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld that judgment.
32. On 25 September 2008 the Higher Administrative Court quashed the lower courts' decisions and discontinued the proceedings, having found that the claim should be examined under the civil procedure.
33. On 31 October 2006 the applicant requested the General Prosecutor's Office to institute criminal proceedings against Brovary Town Council, alleging embezzlement and misuse of budgetary funds.
34. On 15 December 2006 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings as requested. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Town Court.
35. On 3 August 2007 the Town Court quashed the decision in question and referred the matter back for additional investigation. Subsequently the prosecutor refused to institute the proceedings in question on several occasions and the applicant successfully challenged those refusals before the Town Court.
36. Apparently the investigation is still pending.
37. Under section 61 of the 1983 Housing Code publicly owned dwellings shall be used on the basis of a tenancy contract concluded between the tenant and the relevant authority.
38. The Military Servicemen Legal and Social Protection Act (no. 2011-XII of 20 December 1991, as amended at the material time) sets forth that the State provides the military servicemen with, among other benefits, appropriate dwelling (section 12). Those servicemen who have retired due to their service-related injuries and diseases are entitled to housing on a priority basis (section 12 § 4).
39. Under section 6 § 1 of the State Housing Fund Privatisation Act (no. 2482-XII of 19 June 1992, as amended at the material time) the dwelling occupied by the military servicemen who enjoy benefits under the above Military Servicemen Legal and Social Protection Act shall be granted free of charge into private property of these military servicemen.
40. The Veterans of War and Their Social Protection Guarantees Act (no. 3551-XII of 22 October 1993, as amended at the material time) guarantees that disabled war veterans shall be housed within two years, at maximum, of submitting an appropriate application, provided that their existing accommodation does not comply with the relevant housing standards (section 13 § 18).
41. The State Social Housing Fund Act (no. 3334-IV, valid since 1 January 2007) provides the same guarantees to the veterans of war (sections 11 and 12). Under section 3 § 5, however, social dwellings are not subject to privatisation.
42. The relevant domestic law is summarised in the judgment of Romashov v. Ukraine (no. 67534/01, §§ 16-19, 27 July 2004).
43. Under section 33 of the Enforcement Proceedings Act the bailiff and the parties to the enforcement proceedings (debtor and creditor) are entitled to request proprio motu the relevant court to change the means of enforcement of a court decision if there are circumstances which preclude its enforcement by the means specified in that decision.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
P1
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: P1-1