ITEMID: 001-72772
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SWE
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: GOMES v. SWEDEN
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Francis Gomes, is a Bangladeshi national born in 1966 and currently living in Sweden. He was represented before the Court by Mr Gazi Ziauddin, Bromma. The respondent Government were represented by Ms Anita Linder, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant left Bangladesh on 6 May 1993 and came to Sweden where he applied for political asylum. He claimed that he used to be a member of the Bangladesh Sharbahara party (hereinafter “the party”), an opposition left-wing party. He further claimed that, due to his political involvement, he had been arrested and jailed in 1986 and subjected to repeated torture. He had been released after 15 days. On 18 November 1992 the Dhaka Judge Court had sentenced him to life imprisonment with hard labour for illegal possession of arms. However, the verdict had allegedly been an attempt to put an end to his political activity.
His application was rejected by the then Immigration Board (Invandrarverket) on 17 June 1994 and by the Aliens Appeals Board (Utlänningsnämnden) on 7 February 1996, which concluded that the applicant would have the opportunity to receive a fair trial upon return to Bangladesh, and that political activity did not, as such, entail persecution by the authorities in Bangladesh. The applicant was sent back to Dhaka in April 1996.
The applicant returned to Sweden on 24 November 1999, again applying for asylum. He claimed that, upon arrival in Bangladesh in April 1996, he had been arrested by the military and brought to a police station where he had been questioned. Before the questioning, a member of the military had made the secret sign of the Sharbahara party. During the questioning, the soldiers had said that they had been looking for him and that they wanted to know whether he was Francis Gomes, member of the Sharbahara party. He was then tortured badly and transferred to a prison from which he had escaped in December 1996, with the help of a party friend. In spite of the torture he had not revealed his identity, which was, the applicant claimed, probably why the sentence of life imprisonment had not been executed. After having escaped, he had lived in hiding for a few months but had continued to work for the party.
The applicant further stated that he had been arrested at a party conference in Jehore in April 1997, after which he had been jailed and repeatedly tortured. After eight months’ imprisonment a party friend had helped him escape. Following his escape he had found out that he had been charged with the murder of another prisoner.
He had again lived in hiding, but had continued to work for the party. He had distributed leaflets and had been able to work quite freely. However, during a demonstration in May 1998, he had been arrested and tortured anew. Three party members had been killed during the demonstration and he had been accused of the killings. Proceedings had been instituted against him in Jeshore. He believed that he had escaped sometime in November or December 1998. This time too, he had received help from a party member. He had subsequently found out that a court in Dhaka had sentenced him to death in absentia on 3 March 1998 for the murder of his cell-mate of which he had been accused in 1997.
In a letter to the Aliens Appeals Board in February 2000 the applicant submitted that after his escape in December 1996 his political party had helped him to contact ‘Refti’, a nursing home in Dhaka where he had been treated daily for his torture injuries. After his escape in November 1997, he had returned to Refti and had been treated there daily between 26 November 1997 and 18 January 1998. Following his escape in December 1998, he had received treatment in a nursing home in Bashabo.
The party had helped him leave Bangladesh. He submitted before the Immigration Board that he risked being killed by his own party, because members who had been jailed were regarded as a security risk since they could reveal secret information concerning the party. His life was also threatened by Muslim fundamentalists since he was a Christian. He had once been taken captive by such people and was to be killed. He had, however, managed to scare off his captors. Besides the death sentences against him, the Government had ordered the police to shoot members of the Sharbahara party.
On 22 December 1999 the Immigration Board rejected the applicant’s request for asylum. It made the following observations: The applicant had travelled to Sweden with a false passport and had not applied for asylum until this had been discovered. He had also submitted unclear information regarding the details of his journey and had thus tried to hide information relevant to the investigation. Considering his submissions that he had on numerous occasions been arrested and tortured, that a life sentence had not been executed because the authorities had not been able to identify him, that he had in the meantime continued to work for the party, that he was persecuted by Muslim fundamentalists, and that he risked being executed by his party despite having been continuously helped by the party to escape and in the end to leave the country, the Immigration Board concluded that the applicant was not credible. It also remarked that he had not been able to submit any documentation regarding his allegations.
Upon appeal, the Aliens Appeals Board, by a decision of 20 June 2000, granted the applicant a permanent residence permit. It reiterated that the applicant had been committed under the Act on Compulsory Psychiatric Care between 16 February and 20 March 2000, having been suicidal and diagnosed with potential post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which had however not been confirmed. The applicant had also submitted a medical certificate concluding that it was probable that he had been subjected to torture as alleged. The Appeals Board deferred to the conclusions of the Immigration Board with regard to his credibility. However, due to his medical condition, the applicant was entitled to stay in Sweden.
The applicant’s wife joined him in Sweden in May 2003 together with their daughter Sara, born in 1997. Sara is physically handicapped and dumb. The applicant also has a 12-year-old son in Bangladesh with whom he has no contact. On 23 October 2003 the applicant was charged with aggravated assault against a woman (grov kvinnofridskränkning), it being alleged, inter alia, that on several occasions he had beaten his wife when she had refused to have sex with other men who had promised the applicant money, and had otherwise systematically abused her. The applicant had replied that, due to the torture he had become impotent and for this reason his wife had met another man. It was the applicant’s understanding that they had conspired to put him in jail.
On 17 November 2003 the District Court (tingsrätten) of Stockholm convicted the applicant as charged. He was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and subsequent expulsion from Sweden, being forbidden to return before 17 November 2010, in accordance with Chapter 1, section 8 of the Penal Code, in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Aliens Act.
Subsequent to the applicant’s conviction, divorce proceedings between the applicant and his wife had been initiated at the Stockholm District Court. The same court had also awarded the applicant’s former wife custody of their daughter. The applicant had appealed this latter decision.
Concerning the issue of the applicant’s expulsion, the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) submitted to the District Court that there was no obstacle to expelling the applicant to Bangladesh. The court did not make any separate assessment in this respect, but deferred to the conclusion of the Migration Board. It further noted that, ever since the applicant had been granted a permanent residence permit in Sweden, he had received a social security allowance and had been on sick-leave due to psychiatric problems until May 2003. It therefore questioned to what extent he had acquired a real connection to Swedish society. Moreover, the violence of which he had been convicted had been aimed at one of his two family members, his only relatives in Sweden. The court held that, considering the nature of the violence and the applicant’s ruthlessness, it could not be excluded that he would again commit a crime in Sweden. Having regard to his weak links with Sweden, as well as to the fact that he had had a residence permit for less than four years, the Court held that he could be expelled.
Both the prosecutor and the applicant appealed against the sentence, and the applicant also appealed against the expulsion order. On 5 March 2004 the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) raised the sentence to one year and six months’ imprisonment, but otherwise confirmed the verdict and agreed with the assessment of the District Court. On 11 May 2004 the Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal.
The applicant’s expulsion was to be enforced on 5 October 2004. On 28 September 2004 the police authority decided that he should be taken into custody upon his release from prison on 30 September 2004, to await the execution of his expulsion order.
On 29 September 2004 the applicant submitted a petition to the Swedish Government, asking that the Government stay or quash the planned expulsion. No information has been submitted as to the outcome. In support of the petition, the application claimed that proceedings had been initiated against him in Bangladesh for the alleged killing of a Mr Anisur Rahman which had supposedly taken place in 1999. A group of investigators had found the applicant guilty of the killing. On 13 and 22 September 2004 a court had issued an arrest warrant for the applicant, referring to a provision in the Bangladeshi penal code under which the penalty, according to the applicant, was death or life imprisonment.
The applicant has submitted copies of Bangladeshi documents and translations thereof. One of the documents is a “charge sheet”, dated 20 September 2003, according to which the injured party is the widow of the above-mentioned Mr Rahman. The applicant is mentioned as the “hidden guilty person”, apparently registered in an area called Christian Para within the district of Pirjopur. It follows from the document, without further clarification, that a “preliminary report” had been issued on 31 May 1999. The charge sheet refers to the applicant as one of the two perpetrators of the alleged crime, the effect of which appears to have been the death of Mr Rahman. It states that a body was found covered in blood and that all the evidence was sent to the court. The second document is a Magistrate’s “court order”, dated 13 and 22 September 2004. It refers to a provision in the Bangladeshi Penal Code under which, according to the applicant, the penalty is death or life imprisonment. The document states that, on 21 December 2003, the investigation group found the applicant, who was in hiding, to be guilty as charged. Upon the request of the prosecutor, a warrant for his arrest was issued. The document states at the end “Accused has been accepted”. The copies of the Bangladeshi documents are accompanied by a statement from a Mr Narayan Chandra Saha, senior advocate in the Dhaka and Gazipur Judge Court. The letter in English is dated 23 September 2004, addressed to the applicant and reads, inter alia, as follows:
“The punishment of the case might be either death sentence or life imprisonment and the facts of your absconding from the prosecution will contribute and confirm such depth of punishment. I understand quite well that a great unavoidable circumstances like torture and persecution which has been used for you in jail and the possibility of killing by the members of your [Sharbahara party] compelled you to leave the country but the nature of the case is ignoring such facts of circumstances. By the fact in issue, you are the master mind and the authority of the event and the possibility of escaping is less as the procedural materials developed in the case.”
The applicant has also submitted transcripts from his medical journal and some medical certificates. In a transcript dated 17 August 1993 from the Centre for Torture Survivors (Centrum för tortyrskadade) at Karolinska Hospital (“the Centre”), the doctor concluded that the applicant had many scars and other marks on his body which could very well be the result of certain of the alleged acts of torture. A new transcript from his medical journal at the Centre is dated 11 January 2000 and states that, after his visit in 1993, the applicant submitted that he had been beaten, subjected to electric shocks, burned with cigarettes, drenched with hot water, suffocated, had needles put under his fingernails and his fingernails pulled out, and subjected to strong light and high volume noise. In a certificate dated 19 January 2000, also from the Centre, Dr Erik Edston, specialist in forensic medicine, noted that the applicant had acquired new injuries, many of which were consistent with scarring from cigarette burns. It could not be excluded that some of the marks had been contracted due to disease, but it was less probable that the scars would have arisen due to accidents or that they had been self-inflicted. He concluded that it was probable that the applicant had been tortured or beaten as alleged, and that many of the torture methods mentioned would only occasionally leave any lasting marks. The torture described was furthermore to a great extent compatible with the Centre’s previous experience of torture in Bangladesh.
In a certificate from the Centre dated 26 January 2000, Dr Hans Peter Søndergaard, chief physician and specialist in general psychiatry, noted that the applicant had urgent thoughts of suicide and was completely absorbed by the memories of traumatic experiences. He had severe sleeping problems and difficulties to eat. His speech was partly incoherent but he described electric torture in a manner indicating that he had experienced it.


ITEMID: 001-92526
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: CASE OF GASANOVA v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial
JUDGES: Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Mendeleyevo, a town in the Moscow Region.
5. In 1995 the applicant brought a court action against a housing maintenance service. Throughout the proceedings she represented herself. She claimed compensation for damages sustained as a result of poor quality repairs carried out by the respondent in her flat and requested that the works be done again. She also claimed penalties for the delays in the reparation of her flat. In course of the proceedings the applicant amended her claims.
6. On 27 November 1995 the Solnechnogorskiy Town Court of the Moscow Region (“the Town Court”) dismissed her claim. On 6 February 1996 the Moscow Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld that judgment.
7. On 28 May 1996 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 27 November 1995 and remitted the case for a fresh examination to the first-instance court.
8. In the meantime the administration of the Solnechnogorskiy District transferred the municipal housing into the authority of a municipal enterprise, Mendeleyevo Service.
9. On 10 October 1997 the Town Court granted the applicant’s claim in part. On 18 February 1998 the Regional Court upheld that judgment.
10. On 13 January 1999 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 10 October 1997 and remitted the case for a new examination to the Town Court. It held in particular that the lower courts had failed to establish the proper defendant in the case. It also indicated that in order to decide on the penalties the first-instance court had to establish whether the parties had previously set any deadlines for the repairs.
11. On 5 March 1999 the Town Court set the examination of the case for 9 April 1999. Between April and October 1999 six hearings were scheduled, however they were adjourned mainly because the respondent and the third party failed to appear.
12. On 26 October 1999 the Town Court established that the municipal enterprise Mendeleyevo Service was the proper respondent in the case and ordered it to repair the applicant’s flat. It awarded the applicant penalties for the delays in the repair of her flat and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Furthermore, it held that the respondent had been in bad faith in opposing a correct and quick examination of the case and ordered it to pay the applicant compensation for the lost time.
13. On 2 February 2000 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 26 October 1999 and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh examination. It found that the Town Court had not indicated in its decision which repairs had to be done in the applicant’s flat, it had not followed the Presidium’s decision of 13 January 1999 and it had not given reasons for its conclusions as regards the respondent’s bad faith in delaying the proceedings.
14. On 3 May 2000 the Town Court set the examination of the case for 29 June 2000. Between June and December 2000 nine hearings were scheduled. Three of them did not take place because the respondent failed to appear, one hearing was postponed because the applicant did not appear and three hearings were adjourned either because the applicant asked for additional time to amend her claims or because the respondent asked for additional time to submit evidence. One hearing was postponed in order to call an expert to trial.
15. On 19 December 2000 the Town Court held that since the maintenance service no longer existed it was impossible for it to repair the applicant’s flat. Therefore, it awarded the applicant the money necessary for such repairs and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It also ordered the respondent to replace some equipment in the applicant’s flat. It further established that the parties had not concluded any written contract in respect of the repairs in the flat and had not set any time-limits; therefore there was no call to award the applicant any penalties in that respect. On the same date the Town Court decided to examine the applicant’s claim for payment of penalties for the delayed replacement of sanitary equipment and for compensation for loss of time in separate proceedings.
16. On 18 April 2001 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 19 December 2000 and referred the case to the first-instance court for a new examination on the ground that the first-instance court had failed to follow its decision of 2 February 2000.
17. On 6 August 2001 the case was adjourned until 26 September 2001 because the parties failed to appear.
18. According to the Government, on 26 September 2001 the proceedings were discontinued at the applicant’s request, however on 16 January 2002 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed that decision in supervisory review on the prosecutor’s application. The Government did not provide the Court with copies of those decisions.
19. On 15 February 2002 the Town Court set the examination of the case for 13 March 2002. On that date the case was adjourned until 11 April 2002 because the parties failed to appear.
20. On 11 April 2002 the Town Court left the applicant’s claim unexamined on the ground that she had failed to appear at two hearings.
21. On 16 January 2003 the applicant requested the Town Court to reinstate the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of 11 April 2002. In her appeal she claimed that she had failed to appear at two hearings because she had not been duly notified of them and that she had not received a copy of the decision of 11 April 2002. On 21 January 2003 the Town Court granted her appeal, quashed the decision of 11 April 2002 and scheduled the examination of the case for 12 March 2003. On that date the case was again adjourned because the parties failed to appear.
22. On 29 May 2003 the case was adjourned until 23 July 2003 because the judge was on sick leave. On that date the applicant amended her claims. She submitted that since the examination of the case was very lengthy, she had repaired her flat at her own expense and she requested the court to reimburse her those expenses. On the same date the case was adjourned until 25 August 2003. The next three hearings were adjourned either because the respondent company did not appear or because it asked for additional time to submit evidence and comments on the applicant’s claims.
23. On 24 November 2003 the Town Court ordered the municipal enterprise Mendeleyevo Service to reimburse the applicant for the repair expenses and pay her non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of poor-quality repair works. Furthermore, it ordered the defendant to replace the sanitary installations in the applicant’s flat. It dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s claims.
24. On 16 March 2004 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 24 November 2003.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6


ITEMID: 001-59422
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2001
DOCNAME: CASE OF B. AND P. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: No violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to lack of a public hearing;No violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to lack of public judgment;Not necessary to examine Art. 10
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 10. On 5 February 1993 the applicant and his cohabitant, X, had a son. X and the child ceased living with the applicant in March 1993.
11. In September 1993 the applicant made an application to the county court for a residence order under section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989. In January 1994 the court made a residence order in favour of X with a specific contact order in favour of the applicant.
12. In 1994 X married Y and commenced divorce proceedings against him early in 1996. The applicant claims that in April or May 1996 his parents received an anonymous letter to which was attached a lengthy affidavit sworn by X setting out in detail her complaints against Y, including drunkenness and violence.
13. On 3 June 1996 the applicant made a further application to the county court seeking a variation of the residence order of January 1994. The judge to whom the case was assigned had already made eleven orders in respect of the applicant’s son.
14. On 10 June 1996 the applicant, referring, inter alia, to Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention, applied to have the residence application heard in open court with a public pronouncement of the judgment. His application for public proceedings was dismissed at the directions hearing before a judge in chambers on 14 June 1996. According to the transcript of the hearing, the judge dealt with the publicity application as follows:
“Judge: Now your application today is for a direction that the [residence] application be heard in open court, public pronouncement of the judgment thereon. Well I can deal with that straightaway. Children’s cases are not held in open court. It is not anything to do with the parents, it is for the protection of the child.
Applicant: Yes, I understand that, I would wish for this case to be heard in open court, with public pronouncement of the judgment.
Judge: I have got no power, I don’t think, to order it to be held in open court in any event. This Parliament has dictated that it must be held in private, do you see?”
The judge then proceeded to make various directions in respect of the residence application. At the end of the hearing he remarked:
“For the avoidance of doubt I shall direct today that today’s hearing is in chambers and, as you know, nobody – including the party to the action – is entitled to disclose outside court anything that has happened in chambers ... . [If] there is any disclosure that will be contempt of court, for which you can be sent to prison, do you understand? ... I shall also order for the avoidance of doubt that the next hearing will also be in chambers. I do not think it is in [the child’s] interest for it to be any other way. ...”
15. The applicant appealed against this decision to the Court of Appeal, which refused leave to appeal on 22 July 1996. In giving judgment, Mrs Justice Bracewell observed:
“Rule 4.16(7) [of the Family Proceedings Rules 1991] states as follows:
‘Unless the Court otherwise directs a hearing of, or directions appointment in, proceedings to which this Part applies shall be in chambers.’
... [T]his particular rule governs proceedings under the Children Act 1989 and provides that hearings are to be held in chambers unless otherwise directed. The Court therefore has a discretion to sit in open court.
The basis of the applicant’s application for a hearing in open court was not that there was a point of law and/or that there was any public interest, but in his statement he relies on the following:
(1) The Social Services and the Court Welfare Officer had withheld information.
(2) The Court Welfare Officer and the Social Services were biased.
(3) The mother was unstable and the child was at risk with his mother.
... The Court of Appeal, in a different constitution, has given judgment on precisely this point [in the second applicant’s case: see paragraph 23 below]. That decision is binding on this court. ... Rule 4.16(7) provides that child cases shall be heard in private unless there is a special direction to the contrary which would have to be justified by unusual features. The rules plainly indicate a policy of cases being heard in chambers.
In the current case there is nothing to distinguish the proceedings as out of the usual or raising any issues which would justify a public hearing. The judge exercised his discretion properly and judicially ... ”
16. The county court heard the applicant’s residence application in chambers on 23 July 1996. The judge observed that he did not consider that it would be in the child’s interests that the matter should be public. He dismissed the application to vary the residence order and ordered, under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989, that no further application for a residence or contact order could be made by the applicant without leave of the court. The judgment was pronounced in chambers. The parties were provided with a copy in writing.
17. The applicant applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal. Leave was refused to appeal against the residence order but was granted to appeal against the order under section 91(14). On 17 November 1997 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and made an order prohibiting the identification of the child. The judgment was pronounced publicly.
18. On 1 December 1998 the Court of Appeal dismissed an application by the applicant to have the anonymity order set aside. This judgment was also pronounced publicly.
19. On 31 October 1995, in the course of proceedings for separation from his wife, the applicant made an application to the county court for a residence order under section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989 in respect of his son (“the residence application”). The applicant represented himself in the proceedings and his wife was represented by counsel.
20. On 15 January 1996 the applicant, referring, inter alia, to Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention, made a further application asking for the residence application to be heard in open court with a public pronouncement of the judgment.
21. This application (“the publicity application”) was heard on 29 February 1996 in public. The county court’s judgment in the publicity application was pronounced on 14 March 1996, in public, although the judge underlined that no reference to the child’s identity should be made in any publication concerning the case. It was accepted that there was nothing out of the ordinary about the residence application; the gist of the applicant’s argument was that all cases concerning children should be heard in public. He contended, inter alia, that the public had the right to see how decisions were made about children’s lives, and that publicity would serve the interests of justice by encouraging judges, barristers and other professionals involved in such cases to take greater care in their work. In rejecting the applicant’s submissions the judge observed:
“It is all very well for the father ... to say that the hearing of cases in chambers brings about sloppy or lax practice. I personally have no evidence of that. ... It seems to me that, if such practices ... occur ... then they can be placed before the Court of Appeal and if the Court of Appeal so finds that that particular judge can be criticised and if guidance thereafter can be given to the judiciary in general, so much the better.
... Even assuming that ... it would be possible ... to draw my attention to any number of cases which ... have been wrongly decided by the tribunal at first instance and which for one reason or another have not found their way to the Court of Appeal, I am very dubious whether or not the solution to that particular problem is to have those cases heard in public. When one is arguing for principle, one should stick to principle, and I think it a draconian measure to bring about the hearing of these cases in public ... in order to chastise judges or expose lax and inadequate preparation by barristers. I would not wish children to be subjected to any form of embarrassment in order, as I say, to chastise the legal profession.
... But finally I dispose of this case, I am afraid, in a very simplistic manner. The rules of court – the Family Proceedings Rules – ... came into force on 14 October 1991, which coincided with the coming into force of virtually the whole of the substantial provisions of the Children Act. I think I must approach this case in this manner. The Children Act itself – the preamble – says that it is an Act to reform the law relating to children. ... It was a consolidating Act, trying to bring together the various legislative Acts which had gone before, but it was a reforming Act in many senses. It took a great deal of time going through Parliament. I have no doubt at all that various interested parties and pressure groups gave evidence to various committees. I have no doubt at all that judges of family experience at the very highest level were consulted. During the course of its going through Parliament it would have been debated not only in the Lower House but in the Upper House, where all their Lordships of the House of Lords would doubtless have voiced an opinion on it. ... Not only was the Act a long time coming to the statute book, it was nearly two years before the bulk of it came into effect. During the course of that gestation period, rules of court were argued about endlessly, and the rules of court appeared virtually at the eleventh hour. They were not made until 1 May 1991. There is a long history to that, which is not relevant to this judgment. I can only assume, sitting here, that the question of whether or not children’s cases should be heard in open court or in camera was and must have been anxiously considered at all levels during the course of the progress of this Act and the rules under the Act through Parliament. I can only read, and I do so read and interpret 4.16(7), which is the rule to which reference has been made, as being a direction – a rule of court – that hearings of family cases shall be heard and shall continue to be heard in chambers. ... I would want chapter and verse as to what should be put before the judge before he otherwise directs a hearing of a case in open court. I am not prepared in the course of this judgment to give myself any guidelines as to the sort of case that that might be.
It therefore follows that, irrespective of the arguments that have been placed before me ..., I have come to the clear conclusion that all of this must have been contemplated by the legislature, and ... if any change is to be made it should be made by the legislature. I assume that the legislature knew what it was doing and wished, despite all arguments to the contrary, to continue to have Children Act cases heard in chambers. I do not feel that I have any power, even if I wished to do, – which I do not – to hear this particular case in open court. I think I would be breaking the law, in the sense that I would be interpreting in a perverse manner the rules of court laid down under the Children Act. Therefore ... I feel I have no alternative but to direct that the hearing of this case shall be in camera ...”
22. The applicant appealed on 29 March 1996 on the ground, first, that the county court judge had fettered his discretion by indicating that he had no option but to hear the case in private and, secondly, that the exercise by the judge of his discretion was flawed since, if he had exercised it correctly, the only conclusion to which he could have come would have been to hear the entire case in open court.
23. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 20 June 1996 (reported as Re P-B (a minor) [1997] 1 All England Law Reports 58). In giving judgment, Lord Justice Butler-Sloss said:
“When the Children Act 1989 came into force in October 1991 there were new rules of procedure for the High Court and the County Court contained in the Family Proceedings Rules 1991. Rule 4.16 governs hearings and Rule 4.16(7) states:
‘Unless the court otherwise directs, a hearing of, or directions appointment in, proceedings to which this Part applies shall be in chambers.’
... Despite the arguments advanced by [the applicant], it is abundantly clear that the courts are bound by sub-rule (7) to hear child cases generally in private. That was obviously the intention of the Rules Committee and it follows the long-established practice in the hearing of child cases. Sub-rule (7) allows for all or part of the case to be heard in public. In the light of the long established practice it is unlikely that judges will, other than rarely, hear the evidence relating to the welfare of a child in public. The judgment is in a somewhat different position and it may be that the practice of giving judgment in private is partly due to the parties not asking for it to be heard in public and partly because in the county court, where the vast majority of children’s cases are heard, it is less likely that there will be issues of public interest. Where issues of public interest do arise it would seem entirely appropriate to give judgment in open court providing, where desirable in the interests of the child, appropriate directions are given to avoid identification. If the case raises issues of principle or of law, the judgments are increasingly provided to the law reporters and are published in a large number of law reports which report family cases. But the majority of cases are of no interest to anyone beyond the parties and their families.
In answer, therefore, to the appellant’s first criticism of the judge that he fettered his discretion, the judge undoubtedly used language which might by reading the judgment in a narrow way be said to restrict him to hearing the case in camera. The judge was, however, recognising that the existing practice of hearing the case in private was restated in sub-rule (7) unless there were unusual features to the case. This was a run of the mill case and the general practice would seem appropriate to this case. In my judgment, the judge ought not to be criticised for a cautious view of the exercise of his discretion.
In answer to the appellant’s second point that the exercise of discretion should always be in favour of hearings in open court, it would seem to me that he is directing his arguments to the wrong forum. The wording of sub-rule (7) is clear. The exercise of discretion remains in the hands of the trial judge and it is a matter for the judge in each case to exercise that discretion if called upon to do so. In the absence of an application to hear the case in open court and unusual circumstances, the normal position would remain, as recognised by the wording of the sub-rule, that the evidence would be heard in private.”
24. On the same date, 20 June 1996, the Court of Appeal ordered that no one should publish or reveal any information likely to lead to the identification of the applicant’s child. Breach of this order would be a contempt of court punishable with up to two years’ imprisonment.
25. The county court heard the applicant’s residence application in chambers in June 1996. According to the applicant, before the end of the hearing the judge again considered whether he should give judgment publicly. Given the Court of Appeal’s decision of 20 June 1996, the judge concluded that he was bound not to, there being no special feature or interest to justify open judgment.
26. On 8 August 1996 the county court ordered that the mother should have custody of the child and granted the applicant access rights. The judgment was pronounced in chambers. The parties were provided with a copy in writing.
27. The applicant did not appeal against the residence order.
28. On 19 December 1996 the House of Lords refused the applicant leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal of 20 June 1996 concerning his application of 15 January 1996.
29. The Family Proceedings Rules 1991 provide in Rule 4.23(1) that:
“Notwithstanding any rule of court to the contrary, no document, other than a record of an order, held by the court and relating to proceedings to which this Part applies shall be disclosed, other than to a party, the legal representative of a party, the guardian ad litem, the Legal Aid Board, or a welfare officer, without leave of the judge or district judge.”
Persons with a legitimate interest in a child case may apply to the court for leave to inspect and obtain copies of documents or evidence in any particular child-care case and a party may apply for leave to disclose any document to a third party (see Re EC (Disclosure of Material) [1996] 2 Family Law Reports 725 and A County Council v. W and Others (Disclosure) [1997] Family Law Reports 574).
30. Section 12(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 provides as follows:
“The publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except in the following cases, that is to say:
(a) where the proceedings
(i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors;
(ii) are brought under the Children Act 1989; or
(iii) otherwise relate wholly or mainly to the maintenance or upbringing of a minor.”
According to section 12(2) of the Act, the above does not apply to the publication of the text or summary of the whole or part of the relevant court order.
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-138511
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2013
DOCNAME: LOZHKIN v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Ksenija Turković
TEXT: 1. The applicant, Mr Andrey Aleksandrovich Lozhkin, is a Russian national, who was born in 1988 and lives in the town of Anzhero-Suzhensk (Kemerovo Region).
2. The respondent Government are represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. The applicant stood trial for murder. He was a minor at the time of the events which gave rise to the accusation. During the trial the applicant was represented by a lawyer of his own choosing and his father as his statutory representative. On 5 June 2007 the Yashkinskiy District Court of the Kemerovo Region convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to three years and six months’ imprisonment.
5. On 14 June 2007 the applicant’s lawyer as well as his father lodged appeals before the Kemerovo Regional Court. On 15 June 2007 the applicant lodged his own brief of appeal against his conviction. He made a special request to ensure his participation in the appeal hearing.
6. On 19 July the Kemerovo Regional Court granted the applicant’s request for his participation in the appeal hearing which was set for 14 August 2007.
7. On 31 July and 1 August 2007 the applicant lodged written requests with the Kemerovo Regional Court to hold the appeal hearing in his absence.
8. On 14 August 2007 the Kemerovo Regional Court held the appeal hearing. The applicant’s lawyer did not appear. The public prosecutor was present and made his oral submissions. The Regional Court examined the appeals lodged by the applicant and his lawyer, held that the applicant should serve a prison sentence in a colony with less stringent conditions of detention than that indicated in the judgment, and upheld the remainder of the judgment. The father’s appeal was declared inadmissible because his authority to represent the applicant had expired due to the fact that the latter had reached the age of majority during the trial. It appears that the father was present at the hearing but was not allowed to make submissions on the applicant’s behalf.
9. On 9 February 2010 the Leninskiy District Court of Kemerovo granted an application for the applicant’s release on probation. On 12 February 2010 the applicant was released.
10. On 6 October 2012, on request by the acting Prosecutor of the Kemerovo Region, the Presidium of the Kemerovo Regional Court, by way of supervisory review proceedings, quashed the appeal judgment of 14 August 2007 and remitted the case for a fresh examination before the appellate court. The Presidium found that, in breach of procedural law, the applicant’s right to legal assistance had been infringed, and that the appeal lodged by his statutory representative (father) had not been examined.
11. On 6 November 2012 the Kemerovo Regional Court held a fresh appeal hearing. The statutory representative and a legal-aid defense lawyer participated in the hearing. The applicant did not appear. It follows from the minutes of the hearing that he was summonsed but asked the appellate court to examine the case in his absence. The court studied the case file and heard oral submissions made by the defence lawyer, statutory representative and the public prosecutor. The defence, in particular, pointed to numerous procedural violations, and asked to quash the judgment of 5 June 2007 and to remit the applicant’s case to the trial court for a fresh examination. By judgment of the same date, the appellate court upheld the applicant’s conviction and the sentence. According to the minutes of the hearing, the defence raised no objections as regards the conduct of the proceedings.


ITEMID: 001-59588
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2001
DOCNAME: CASE OF FELDEK v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 10;No separate issue under Art. 9;No violation of Art. 14;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: 8. In 1991 Mr Dušan Slobodník, a research worker in the field of literature, published an autobiography entitled Paragraph: Polar Circle. He described in it, inter alia, his conviction by a Soviet military tribunal in 1945 on the ground that he had been ordered to spy on the Soviet army after having been enrolled, in 1944 when he was 17 years old, in a military training course organised by Germans. In the book, Mr Slobodník also wrote about his detention in Soviet gulags and his rehabilitation by the Supreme Court of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in 1960. In June 1992 Mr Slobodník became Minister for Culture and Education of the Slovak Republic.
9. On 20 July 1992 the newspaper Telegraf published a poem by the applicant. It was dated 17 July 1992 (the day when the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic was solemnly proclaimed) and entitled “Good night, my beloved” (“Dobrú noc, má milá”). One of its verses read as follows:
“In Prague prisoner Havel is giving up his presidential office. In Bratislava the prosecutor rules again. And rule by one party is above the law. A member of the SS and a member of the ŠTB [The ŠTB (Štátna bezpečnosť) was the secret police during the communist regime in Czechoslovakia] embraced each other.”
10. The poem was later published in another newspaper. In separate articles, two journalists alleged that the expression “member of the SS” stood for Mr Dušan Slobodník.
11. On 30 July 1992 several newspapers published a statement which the applicant had distributed to the Public Information Service (Verejná informačná služba) the day before. It was entitled “For a better picture of Slovakia – without a minister with a fascist past” (“Za lepší obraz Slovenska – bez ministra s fašistickou minulosťou”). It read as follows:
“There has been a problem about how to keep a democratic character in [the Slovakian] national emancipation process, which we have tried to resolve many times. Until now, Slovakia has lost most when matters related to the Slovakian nation were in the hands of the wrong people who led us away from democratic evolution. The cost was high: for example, the combatants’ lives lost in the Slovakian National Uprising [in 1944 and 1945] .
Now, we are scared that this mistake could be made again. To say that our way to Europe is by working together and cooperating in its democratic evolution is not enough. This is a direct condition arising from international law without the fulfilment of which no one in Europe will take notice of us.
I expressed this concern in my polemics with Mr Dušan Slobodník last year; life has finished the writing of our polemics, and my views were proved correct.
This year Mr Slobodník became the Slovak Republic’s Minister for Culture and Education and the next thing was that his fascist past came out in public. Mr Slobodník managed this situation in a way that allowed the writer Ladislav Mňačko to prove he was a liar. But he still has not given up his ministerial post, although in any other democratic country he would have had to do so a long time ago.
Does Mr Slobodník think that Slovakia is some special exception and that it is the only country having the right to revise the philosophy of the Nuremberg trials, which is binding on the post-war development of all other European countries? Or is the message of the Slovakian National Uprising not correct? ... Does Mr Mečiar think that having this minister in the government will help him to persuade people in Europe that his talk about the democratic intentions of his government is serious? Is it good to have Mr Slobodník in the government when this fact will lead to the political, economic and cultural isolation of Slovakia?
Mr Slobodník likes to use every chance to talk about improving the image of Slovakia around the world. I fully agree with him on this. He has a personal opportunity to do something in order to improve the image of Slovakia: to resign.”
12. On 5 August 1992 Mr Slobodník publicly declared that he would sue the applicant for the above statement.
13. In an interview published in the Czech daily Lidové noviny on 12 August 1992 the applicant stated, inter alia:
“... when I speak of the fascist past [of Mr Slobodník], I do not characterise him, I only think that the fact that he attended a terrorist training course organised by the SS falls within the term ‘fascist past’. I consider that such a person has nothing to do in the government of a democratic State ...”
14. In the context of the nomination of Mr Slobodník to a post in the government, issues relating to his past were taken up by several Slovakian and Czech newspapers both before and after the publication of the applicant’s statement. Articles concerning this subject were also published in The New York Times, on 22 July 1992, the Tribune de Genève, on 18 September 1992, Izvestia on 31 August 1992, as well as by the Austrian Press Agency. The New York Times, the Tribune de Genève and Izvestia later published the reaction of Mr Slobodník to their respective articles.
15. On 9 September 1992 Mr Slobodník sued the applicant for defamation under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code before the Bratislava City Court (Mestský súd). He later extended the action and alleged that the verses “In Bratislava the prosecutor rules again. And rule by one party is above the law. A member of the SS and a member of the ŠTB embraced each other” from the applicant’s poem referred to him. He also alleged that the above-mentioned statement published in the newspapers wrongly referred to his fascist past. The plaintiff claimed that the applicant should bear the costs of publication of an apology in five newspapers and also pay him 250,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK) as compensation.
16. On 18 October 1993 the Bratislava City Court dismissed the action. It established that the plaintiff had been a member of the Hlinka Youth (Hlinkova mládež) and that in February and March 1945 he had participated in a terrorist training course in Sekule. It observed that the Hlinka Youth had been a military corps of the Hlinka Slovakian People’s Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana) and that under the law then in force the Slovak nation had participated in the exercise of State power through the intermediary of that party. The court pointed out that, under Article 5 of Presidential Decree no. 5/1945 of 19 May 1945, legal persons which had deliberately promoted the war waged by Germany and Hungary or had served fascist and Nazi aims were to be considered unworthy of the State’s trust.
17. The City Court further established that in May 1945 a military tribunal of the Soviet army had sentenced Mr Slobodník to fifteen years’ imprisonment on the ground that he had attended the training course in Sekule and had been ordered, on 22 March 1945, to cross the front line and to spy on Soviet troops. The military tribunal’s judgment further stated that Mr Slobodník had not crossed the front line but had gone home in April 1945, when he had been arrested. The City Court also noted that the plaintiff had served the sentence in Soviet camps until his release in 1953. In 1960 the Supreme Court of the USSR had quashed the sentence and discontinued the proceedings for the lack of factual elements of an offence.
18. Before the City Court, Mr Slobodník claimed that he had been a member of the Hlinka Youth only for a short time and that he had joined the organisation only because it had been a prerequisite for his participation in a table-tennis tournament. He further explained that he had been summoned to the training course in Sekule and that he had complied with the summons out of fear for himself and his family. Mr Slobodník alleged that he had been excluded from the course as being unreliable after he had expressed his negative opinion about it. He had then been taken to the Hlinka Youth headquarters in Bratislava, from where he had been allowed to return home to Banská Bystrica under the condition that he would report on the Soviet army. However, the City Court did not find these facts established. In particular, it did not consider as relevant evidence the description of the events contained in the plaintiff’s book Paragraph: Polar Circle, which had been published earlier. In its view, the fact that the 1945 sentence had been quashed did not prove that the plaintiff had not been a member of the Hlinka Youth and that he had not attended the training course in Sekule.
19. The City Court also noted that the relevant period of Mr Slobodník’s life had been covered by the press both in Slovakia and abroad prior to the applicant’s statement, and that on several occasions Mr Slobodník himself had commented and given interviews on those issues, both in Slovakia and abroad. The court concluded that, in the statement, the applicant had expressed his opinion on the basis of information which had already been published in the press. The statement concerned a public figure who was inevitably exposed to close scrutiny and sometimes also to criticism by other members of society. By making the statement, the applicant had exercised his right to freedom of expression and he had not unjustifiably interfered with the plaintiff’s personality rights.
20. Mr Slobodník appealed to the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd), alleging that the applicant had not proved that he had a “fascist past”, and that the City Court had not established the meaning of that term. Mr Slobodník argued that he had been summoned to the training course in Sekule by an order and that he had left it at the first opportunity after he had learned about its real purpose. He also explained that martial law had been in force at the material time and that people had been unlawfully executed or detained. Members of the Hlinka Youth had been incorporated in the armed forces by a presidential order and had fallen under military judicial and disciplinary rules. The plaintiff maintained that he had done nothing against his homeland or the anti-fascist allies and concluded that the applicant’s statement and poem were defamatory.
21. The applicant contended, in particular, that the courts should abandon their established practice according to which the defendant has to prove the truthfulness of his statements in defamation proceedings. He maintained that the burden of proof should be shifted onto the plaintiff or shared between the parties. The applicant further argued that his statement was a value judgment based on the undisputed facts that the plaintiff had been a member of the Hlinka Youth and that he had attended a terrorist training course in Sekule. It was irrelevant to what extent the plaintiff had been involved in the activities of the Hlinka Youth or for how long he had been a member of it. What mattered was that the plaintiff had voluntarily joined the organisation and that, after his alleged exclusion from the training course in Sekule, he had undertaken, as shown by the Soviet military tribunal’s judgment of 19 May 1945, to provide information on the movements of Soviet troops to the headquarters of the Hlinka Youth. The applicant therefore proposed that the appeal be dismissed.
22. On 23 March 1994 the Supreme Court reversed the first-instance judgment, ruling as follows:
“... [the applicant] has to accept that ... Dušan Slobodník will distribute, if he thinks fit, to the Press Agency of the Slovak Republic as well as to five newspapers of his choice, both in Slovakia and abroad, the following declaration to be published at [the applicant’s] expense:
‘(1) [The applicant’s] statement addressed to [the Public Information Service] and published in daily newspapers on 30 July 1992 which reads: “...This year Mr Slobodník became the Slovak Republic’s Minister for Culture and Education and the next thing was that his fascist past came out in public ... Does Mr Slobodník think that Slovakia is some special exception and that it is the only country having the right to revise the philosophy of the Nuremberg trials, which is binding on the post-war development of all other European countries? ...”
(2) The occasional poem ... entitled “Good night, my beloved” in its part “... In Bratislava the prosecutor rules again. And rule by one party is above the law. A member of the SS and a member of the ŠTB embraced each other ...”
... represent a gross slander and disparagement of the civil honour and life, and an unjustified interference with the personality of the plaintiff Dušan Slobodník.’
...
(4) [The applicant] is liable to pay SKK 200,000 to the plaintiff in respect of non-pecuniary damage. ...’ ”
23. The applicant was also ordered to pay costs and the other party’s expenses.
24. The Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff had described the relevant events in his book Paragraph: Polar Circle before the dispute concerning his past had arisen, and that no other relevant facts had been established in the course of the proceedings.
25. In the appellate court’s view, the term “fascist past” was equivalent to the statement that a person was a fascist in the past. The court considered that the applicant himself had given a restrictive interpretation of that term in connection with the plaintiff, namely the interpretation according to the philosophy of the Nuremberg trials. This philosophy was derived from the multilateral agreement of 8 August 1945, which included also the statute of the International Military Tribunal, and which had become part of the Czechoslovakian legal order on 2 October 1947. The Supreme Court held that it was bound by the principle of individual responsibility set out in that agreement.
26. The Supreme Court further studied all available documents and evidence used during the Nuremberg trials relating to Slovakia. It found no reference in those documents to the Hlinka Youth in connection with fascist organisations. It established that the propagation or implementation of fascist theories had not been inherent in the statutory rules and regulations governing the Hlinka Youth. If some persons had abused the Christian principles on which the organisation had been built, this had contravened the rules then in force. Such persons and, as the case might be, those who had let themselves be abused for criminal purposes, were individually responsible. However, such was not the case of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court accepted the latter’s argument that he had learned about the character of the training course in Sekule only after he had started attending it.
27. The appellate court found irrelevant the reference, in the first-instance court’s judgment, to Presidential Decree no. 5/1945 of 19 May 1945 as that decree had only concerned property, in that it had placed under national administration the property of persons whom the State had considered unreliable.
28. The Supreme Court recalled that, at the relevant time, criminal and moral liability had been governed by Order no. 33 on the punishment of fascist criminals, occupants, traitors and collaborators and on the establishment of the people’s judiciary adopted by the Slovakian National Council on 15 May 1945 and also by Presidential Decree no. 16/1945 of 19 June 1945 on the punishment of Nazi criminals, traitors and their assistants and on extra-ordinary people’s courts. These rules were partly based on the principle of collective liability, but they did not mention the Hlinka Youth.
29. As regards the poem by the applicant, the Supreme Court noted that it was dated 17 July 1992, that is, the day on which the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic had been proclaimed from the balcony of the Slovakian National Council, where Mr Slobodník had also been present. Shortly afterwards, the applicant had written his statement concerning Mr Slobodník’s past and two journalists had interpreted the poem as a description of the scene during the proclamation. They had alleged that by “member of the SS” the applicant had meant to designate Mr Slobodník. The court therefore concluded that the applicant had infringed the plaintiff’s personality rights by his poem as well as by his statement of 29 July 1992.
30. The applicant’s request that the burden of proof in the case should be shifted onto the plaintiff or at least shared between the parties was not accepted as it had no basis in domestic law and practice. The Supreme Court concluded that the applicant had not proved that Mr Slobodník had been a fascist in the past, holding that the latter had joined the Hlinka Youth because he had wanted to participate in sports activities and had not been motivated by fascist sympathies. As to the training course in Sekule, it found that Mr Slobodník had not completed it, and it was irrelevant whether he had been excluded or had left it on his own initiative. The only relevant fact was that the plaintiff’s past could not be considered fascist from that point of view.
31. The applicant filed an appeal on points of law alleging, inter alia, a violation of his rights under Article 10 of the Convention. He claimed that the Supreme Court should have concluded from the relevant provisions of Presidential Decree no. 5/1945 that the Hlinka Youth was a fascist organisation and that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Slovakian National Council’s Orders nos. 1/1944 and 4/1944, participation in any activity within the Hlinka Youth was to be considered as participation in an unlawful fascist organisation. He further complained that the Supreme Court had not established with sufficient certainty whether the plaintiff had actually been excluded from the training course in Sekule, and whether he had undertaken to carry out terrorist activities or not.
32. On 25 May 1995 a different Chamber of the Supreme Court sitting as a court of cassation upheld the part of the appeal judgment of 23 March 1994 according to which the plaintiff was entitled to arrange for publication of the text set out in it and concerning the applicant’s statement of 29 July 1992. As for the remainder, the court of cassation quashed both the first and second-instance judgments and sent the case back to the Bratislava City Court.
33. The court of cassation did not share the applicant’s view that the plaintiff should be required to prove that the applicant’s allegations were untrue. It further held that a person could be considered as having a fascist past only if he or she had propagated or practised fascism in an active manner. Mere membership of an organisation and participation in a terrorist training course which had not been followed by any practical actions could not be characterised as a fascist past.
34. As the applicant had failed to prove that the plaintiff had a fascist past within the above meaning, the court found that his statement had infringed without justification the plaintiff’s personality rights. In the judgment, the court admitted that Slovakian law characterised the Hlinka Youth as a fascist organisation. It recalled, however, that the relevant legal rules, including those relied on by the applicant, applied to natural persons only where justified by their specific actions. Applying those rules to all members of such organisations without considering their actual deeds would entail the recognition of their collective guilt. It recalled that children over the age of 6 had been admitted to the Hlinka Youth.
35. The court considered that the applicant’s argument according to which his statement was a value judgment could only have been accepted if the applicant had expressly referred, in that statement, to the particular facts on which such a value judgment was based. The court stated, inter alia:
“Indicating that the plaintiff has had a fascist past is not a value judgment based on an analysis of facts, but an allegation (statement) made without any concurrent justification of factual circumstances from which a conclusion can be inferred by the person making the judgment. It could have been a value judgment if the statement [of the applicant] had been accompanied by reference to the [plaintiff’s] membership of the Hlinka Youth and his participation in the training course, namely, to the activities which the person making the judgment considers to constitute a fascist past. Only such a statement, based on circumstantial facts used by the person making the judgment, would be a value judgment the truthfulness of which would not require any proof. Only such an interpretation will guarantee a balance between the freedom of expression and the right to the protection of [a person’s] reputation within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention.”
36. The court then found the restriction on the applicant’s freedom of expression compatible with the requirements of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention as it was necessary for the protection of the plaintiff’s reputation in accordance with Articles 11 et seq. of the Civil Code.
37. As to the poem, the court of cassation quashed both the first and second-instance judgments for lack of evidence and held that in further proceedings the plaintiff would have to prove that the applicant had referred to him in the poem. It also quashed the part of the appeal concerning compensation for non-pecuniary damage and costs since their award depended on an assessment of both the interferences complained of by the plaintiff.
38. On 15 April 1996 the Bratislava City Court reached a new decision on the remainder of the case. It stayed the proceedings as far as the poem was concerned on the ground that the plaintiff had withdrawn that part of the action.
39. The City Court further dismissed the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage as it did not find it established that the applicant’s statement had considerably diminished the plaintiff’s dignity and position in society within the meaning of Article 13 § 2 of the Civil Code. In its view, the plaintiff had failed to show that the considerable publicity concerning his person had arisen as a result of the applicant’s statement and not, as the case might be, as a consequence of newspaper articles and the plaintiff’s book published prior to the applicant’s statement.
40. Having considered to what extent the parties had been successful in the proceedings, the City Court ordered the plaintiff to pay SKK 56,780 to the applicant in reimbursement of the relevant part of the latter’s costs. The applicant and the plaintiff were further ordered to pay respectively SKK 875 and 2,625 in reimbursement of the costs paid in advance by the court.
41. On 25 November 1998 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Bratislava City Court to discontinue the proceedings in respect of the poem and to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for non-pecuniary damage. The Supreme Court held that neither party was entitled to have the costs reimbursed. It further ordered each party to pay half of the costs paid in advance by the State, namely SKK 1,750. Mr Slobodník filed an appeal on points of law. The proceedings are pending.
42. The above decree was issued by President Beneš on 19 May 1945 and concerned, inter alia, the placing under national administration of the property of “Germans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators and of certain organisations and institutions”.
43. Article 4 (b) qualifies as unworthy of the State’s trust
“persons who carried out activities directed against State sovereignty, the independence, integrity, democratic and republican form of the State, or the security and defence of the Czechoslovak Republic, who incited other persons to take part in such activities and deliberately supported the German and Hungarian occupants in any way whatsoever. Persons falling under this category shall include, for example, ... leading representatives of ... the Hlinka Youth ... and other fascist organisations of a similar nature.”
44. Article 5 qualifies as being unworthy of the State’s trust those legal persons whose administrations had deliberately promoted the conduct of war by Germany and Hungary or served fascist and Nazi aims.
45. The right to protection of a person’s dignity, honour, reputation and good name is guaranteed by Articles 11 et seq. of the Civil Code.
46. According to Article 11, any natural person has the right to protection of his or her personality, in particular of his or her life and health, civil and human dignity, privacy, name and personal characteristics.
47. According to Article 13 § 1, any natural person has the right to request that unjustified infringement of his or her personality rights should be stopped and the consequences of such infringement eliminated, and to obtain appropriate satisfaction.
48. Article 13 § 2 provides that, in cases where the satisfaction obtained under Article 13 § 1 is insufficient, in particular because a person’s dignity and position in society has been considerably diminished, the injured person is entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
49. In accordance with the established practice, a plaintiff in defamation proceedings has to prove that the defendant’s allegations were objectively capable of affecting his or her rights under Article 11 of the Civil Code. If this requirement is met, the defendant is obliged to produce evidence capable of proving the truth of his or her allegations if the defence is to succeed.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 10
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 14


ITEMID: 001-80848
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ITA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF DELLE CAVE AND CORRADO v. ITALY
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation de l'art. 6-1;Non-violation de l'art. 13;Préjudice moral - réparation pécuniaire;Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure de la Convention;Frais et dépens (procédure nationale) - demande rejetée
JUDGES: András Baka;Antonella Mularoni;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky
TEXT: 4 The applicants were born in 1954 and 1956 respectively and live in Cicciano (Naples).
5. On 21 April 1993, the applicants, acting both in their own names and as representatives of their son S.D.C., then a minor, sued the insurance company R. and Mr V.B. in Naples District Court, seeking to obtain compensation for damage sustained by their son in a road traffic accident.
6. Preparation of the case for hearing began on 23 September 1993. Two hearings were initially scheduled for 15 and 17 March 1994 but were adjourned: one of the court's own motion and the other for examination of evidence.
7. At a hearing of 8 November 1994, upon the applicants' request, the judge in charge of preparations for trial ordered the transmission of the case file to the District Court of Nola (Naples), which assumed jurisdiction ratione loci.
8. The case was set down for a first hearing before that court as late as 29 May 1997. Five hearings scheduled to take place between 4 December 1997 and 26 October 1999 were adjourned: two for examination of evidence, one of the court's own motion, one because S.D.C., who had in the meantime reached his majority, had joined the proceedings in his own name before Nola District Court, and one in order to allow the parties to make their submissions. The hearing of submissions was then scheduled for 11 July 2000. However, finding that the defendant had not been informed of a change in the judge in charge of preparations for trial, the new judge adjourned the case until 18 January 2001. The hearing of submissions finally took place on 31 May 2001 and judgment was reserved.
9. In a judgment of 8 October 2001, the text of which was deposited in the court's registry on 10 October 2001, Nola District Court allowed the claims of the applicants and their son.
10. On 27 September 2001 the applicants lodged an application with the Rome Court of Appeal under Law no. 89 of 24 March 2001, known as the “Pinto Act”, complaining of the excessive length of the above-described proceedings. The applicants requested the court to conclude that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to order the Italian Government to pay compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage that they claimed to have sustained. Each applicant sought, inter alia, at least 2,582.28 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage and EUR 8,392.42 for non-pecuniary damage.
11. In a decision of 28 January 2002, the text of which was deposited in the court's registry on 20 March 2002, the Court of Appeal found that the length of the proceedings had been unreasonable. Dismissing their claim in respect of pecuniary damage on the ground that the applicants had not adduced any evidence in that connection, it awarded each applicant the sum of EUR 1,032.92, determined on an equitable basis, in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 620 for costs and expenses. This decision was served on the authorities on 12 July 2002 and became final on 26 September 2002.
12. The applicants did not appeal to the Court of Cassation, taking the view that such a remedy was available only in respect of points of law. On 11 April 2003 they brought their case before the Court.
13. In the meantime, the applicants had addressed a letter on 16 July 2002 to the Ministry of Justice, seeking payment of the sum awarded by the Rome Court of Appeal.
14. On 25 February 2003 the applicants served formal notice on the Ministry of Justice to pay the sum in question, then applied for a garnishee order (pignoramento presso terzi).
15. The sum awarded by the Court of Appeal was paid on 17 November 2005.
16. The relevant domestic law and practice are to be found in the Cocchiarella v. Italy judgment ([GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 23-31, ECHR 2006V).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13


ITEMID: 001-75633
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: CZE
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: HAMBÁLEK v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Peer Lorenzen
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Zdeněk Hambálek, is a Czech national who was born in 1957 and lives in Opava. He is represented before the Court by Mr J. Vyroubal, a lawyer practising in Moravská Ostrava. The Czech Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Mr V.A. Schorm, Ministry of Justice.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 12 December 1996 the applicant’s daughter brought proceedings for damages against the two medical institutions before the Ostrava District Court (okresní soud). She was represented before the court by the applicant.
Between October 1997 and July 1998 the District Court took a number of procedural steps. On 28 August and 30 September 1998 respectively, it held two hearings. Between December 1998 and August 2000 further procedural steps were carried out.
On 21 August 2000 the District Court held a hearing.
During the period from September 2000 to December 2003 the case of the applicant’s daughter continued to be dealt with by the courts.
On 23 April 2001 the applicant’s daughter reached majority.
On 13 January 2003 the District Court held a hearing.
On 28 February 2003 the applicant, acting in his daughter’s name, withdrew the action as a consequence of delays in the proceedings. On 25 April 2003 the District Court discontinued the proceedings. Its decision became effective on 27 May 2003.


ITEMID: 001-108689
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: AUT
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: CASE OF KURIER ZEITUNGSVERLAG UND DRUCKEREI GMBH v. AUSTRIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)
JUDGES: Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska
TEXT: 5. The applicant company, a limited liability company with its registered office in Vienna, is the owner and publisher of the daily newspaper Kurier.
6. In November 2003 criminal investigations were launched in respect of A and B who were suspected of the repeated and serious ill-treatment and sexual abuse of 10-year-old C, which had caused severe injuries. A is C’s father and B is her stepmother. C was taken to hospital and several media reported the case.
7. After C left the hospital in May 2004 she stayed with D, her biological mother. On 9 December 2004 custody of C was transferred to the X Regional Youth Welfare Agency (Jugendwohlfahrtsträger des Landes X) for the period of 1 December 2003 to 29 November 2004 and from 30 November 2004 onwards it was transferred to D.
8. The trial of B and A was held in February 2005 and media interest in the case grew again. At the same time C had a relapse and began suffering from severe psychological problems again, making it necessary for her to be re-admitted to hospital.
9. On 21 February 2005 A and B were convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of minors (schwerer sexueller Missbrauch von Unmündigen), deliberate aggravated bodily harm (absichtliche schwere Körperverletzung) and ill-treatment of minors (Quälen von Unmündigen). They were sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
10. The applicant company published two articles in Kurier on 16 and 22 February 2005, using the first name of C and the full names of A and B, and illustrating them with photographs of A and B
11. On 16 February 2005 an article was published in the applicant company’s newspaper, which read as follows:
“Judge: ‘C could easily have been dead’
When 10-year-old C was taken into hospital, nine percent of her body was burnt. She had burn wounds on her upper body and around her genitals, multiple broken ribs, a fractured skull, bruises everywhere and a deep cut in her arm ‘almost as though an attempt had been made to amputate it’ (one of the trial participants). ‘The child could just as easily have been dead’ Judge J.J. told the girl’s father, one of the accused, in no uncertain terms in the X Regional Court on Tuesday. A [age], and his second wife, B [age], are accused of reducing C to this state.
AT HOME In her parents’ flat in the AB district of X, C was beaten, tortured, ill-treated and severely sexually abused between August 2003, when A fetched C from her grandparents’ home in Y ‘to give her a better life’ (the accused’s words) and early December 2003, when he took his daughter to hospital with life-threatening injuries. That is beyond doubt. The couple both try to place (the bulk of) the blame on each other. C stated that it was her stepmother who had deprived her of her virginity using a cooking spoon and who had pressed down on her private parts with a soup spoon heated over a candle. She accused her stepmother and her father of kicking her, binding and gagging her, tying her to the bedpost and leaving her kneeling beside the bed like that for hours. This was described as ‘corporal punishment’ by defence lawyer R.S., meted out because, according to A, ‘my wife told me that C was constantly masturbating’. He claimed that he had felt ‘out of his depth’ as a father.
COOKING SPOON He claims not to have known that his wife sexually assaulted C with a cooking spoon, or that she had pressed a red-hot iron on the girl’s breast. He had only noticed the wounds later. ‘Why didn’t you take your daughter to the doctor?’ asked the judge. ‘Because my wife said I shouldn’t’ came the reply. B puts most of the blame on her husband. She claims to have hit C only once, when the girl was being really bad. She regards herself ‘as a victim too’ (defence lawyer M.B.). The victim of a husband who was ‘incredibly’ violent, who beat her and the children; a husband who would not allow her to take her children to the doctor when he had beaten them. Because she was afraid of him she had looked away, or looked on, while C was tormented. The trial resumes on 21 February.”
12. On 22 February 2005 a further article was published in the applicant company’s newspaper, which read as follows:
“Maximum sentence for C’s parents
Father and stepmother of ‘torture victim’ sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment each at first instance
On the opening day of the trial C’s stepmother was not (yet) afraid to look into the cameras: By the end of the trial on Monday B [age] was doing the same as her husband A [age], sitting in the dock with her head bowed. On day two it was the turn of the court experts and C to give evidence. However, the girl was spared the ordeal of appearing before the X Regional Court. Now aged twelve, she gave her evidence on film during the preliminary proceedings. ‘How far away are they, those bad people?’ C had asked at the time, before describing her ordeal. The video footage shown to the jury lasted one hour. The public was prohibited from watching. C’s lawyer, E.P., had requested that they be excluded. ‘The girl was so frightened of giving evidence. She made her statements on the understanding that they would be treated with discretion. Her sense of modesty, integrity and trust would be damaged again if her statements were to reach the media.’ The request was granted. According to forensic medical expert C.R., a plugged-in iron had been placed on the girl’s upper body ‘at least six times’, ‘not just gliding over it, but held in one place’. The 10-year-old had third-degree burns, including burn wounds around her genitals, when she was taken to hospital by her father in December 2003. In addition she had a fractured skull, multiple broken ribs and a cut which went down almost to the bone. The abuse perpetrated against ‘torture victim C’ (the words of forensic child psychologist A.G.) will have lasting psychosexual effects. A.G. believes that the girl’s experiences will resurface as soon as she begins to have contact with the opposite sex. But ‘even now the child undoubtedly receives daily reminders of what happened, for instance in the form of nightmares. C’s lawyer requested the court to award the girl 100,000 euros in compensation and 25,000 euros for the cost of a transplant. ‘No civil proceedings will be conducted in this case, in order to spare C further examination’. The jury’s verdict was swift: fifteen years’ imprisonment for each of the accused – the maximum sentence. C was awarded the 125,000 euros. ‘You destroyed this child. You deserve the maximum sentence’ said Judge J.J. C’s father lodged an appeal immediately, while his wife asked for time to consider.”
13. In subsequent proceedings under section 7a of the Media Act, C, represented by the Regional Youth Welfare Agency, sought compensation from the applicant company for the damage caused by the publication of her name, the names and pictures of her parents and further details given in the two articles of 16 and 22 February 2005, which together made her identifiable to the wider public.
14. On 24 November 2005 the X Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen) rejected C’s request for compensation. It observed that already at an early stage of the criminal proceedings the case had attracted considerable media attention. The case and the identity of the offenders had therefore been known to the public.
15. As regards the articles at issue, the Regional Court found that by mentioning the first name of the victim, her age, the first names and family names of the offenders, indicating their family relationship to the victim and publishing pictures of the father and the stepmother, the victim had become recognisable to a wide number of persons beyond the circle of those directly informed. Therefore, these articles constituted an intrusion into the victim’s strictly private life and injured her legitimate interest in remaining anonymous and she was in principle entitled to compensation.
16. However, the interest protected by Article 8 of the Convention had to be weighed against the interest protected by Article 10 of the Convention. If there existed an overriding public interest in the information about the particular circumstances which allowed for the identification of offender and victim, such interest outweighed the interest of the victim to remain anonymous.
17. Even though the publication of the identity of the persons involved in a criminal offence was normally unnecessary for understanding how the offence was committed, how the investigations progressed or whether the perpetrator had been convicted, there was a public interest in being informed of the identity of persons who had committed a criminal offence against a child, as such information might serve to prevent similar acts in the future. Despite the interest of the victim in not having her identity disclosed, the disclosure was justified because of the public interest in knowing the identity of the perpetrators and the subsequent wider public discussion on violence against children.
18. On 28 June 2006 the X Court of Appeal, on an appeal by C, quashed the decision of the Regional Court and granted C compensation in the amount of 5,000 euros (EUR) for each of the two articles published.
19. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Regional Court that the articles at issue, which described in detail the severe ill-treatment and sexual abuses of which C was the victim constituted an intrusion into her strictly private life and injured her legitimate interest to remain anonymous. It also agreed with the Regional Court that the identity of the offenders, A and B, was not protected under the Media Act and it was therefore, in principle, allowed to report on them while citing their names and also publishing pictures.
20. However, the permissibility of disclosing the victim’s identity had to be examined separately and with due diligence. The mere fact that she had become the victim of a crime which attracted considerable public attention was not sufficient to consider her a person connected with public life. Under section 7a of the Media Act the predominant public interest which outweighs the victim’s personal interest in not disclosing his or her identity must relate to the identity of the person, and that particular information should have a genuine news value. A mere general interest in appropriate press reporting on criminal cases was not sufficient to establish such a predominant public interest. In the present case such a genuine interest in the identity of the victim could not be established. There was no predominant public interest in revealing the identity of the offenders as the public could have been informed on the psychological dynamics of violent crimes and sexual abuse committed within the family without revealing the identity of the victim. The reporting also did not serve the purpose of warning and protecting the public (Warn- und Schutzfunktion) because the accused had already been taken into detention and there was no indication that they had assaulted other minors.
21. Therefore, the publication of articles disclosing the identity of the offenders and indicating the family relationship between the offenders and the victim in such a way that the identity of the victim is revealed in cases which touch upon a victim’s strictly private life was in breach of section 7a of the Media Act.
22. Section 7a of the Media Act which has the title “protection against divulging a person’s identity in special cases” (“Schutz vor Bekanntgabe der Identität in besonderen Fällen”), reads as follows:
“(1) Where publication is made, through any medium, of a name, image or other particulars which are likely to lead to the disclosure to a larger not directly informed circle of people of the identity of a person who
1. has been the victim of an offence punishable by the courts, or
2. is suspected of having committed, or has been convicted of, a punishable offence,
and where legitimate interests of that person are thereby injured and there is no predominant public interest in the publication of such details on account of the person’s position in society, of some other connection with public life, or of other reasons, the victim shall have a claim against the owner of the medium (publisher) for damages for the injury suffered. The award of damages shall not exceed 20,000 euros; additionally, section 6(1), second sentence, shall apply.
(2) Legitimate interests of the victim shall in any event be injured if the publication
1. in the case of subsection (1)1, is such as to give rise to an interference with the victim’s strictly private life or to his or her exposure,
2. in the case of subsection (1)2, relates to a juvenile or merely to a lesser indictable offence (Vergehen) or may disproportionately prejudice the advancement of the person concerned.
(3) No compensation claim under paragraph 1 exists if
1. the publication at issue is based on a truthful report on a public session of the National Council or the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly, a regional diet or a committee of one of these general representative bodies;
2. the publication of the information on the person has been decided officially, in particular for the purposes of criminal justice or public security;
3. the person concerned has agreed to the publication or if the publication is based on information given by that person to the media;
4. it is a direct broadcast on radio or television (live programme) and the employees or contractors of the radio or television station have not neglected the principles of journalistic diligence;
5. the information has been published on a retrievable website and the owner of the media or its employees or contractors have not neglected the principles of journalistic diligence.”
23. Section 6(1) second sentence of the Media Act, to which reference has been made above, reads as follows:
“The amount of compensation shall be fixed according to the extent of the publication, its impact and, in particular, the type of media and how broadly it is disseminated; the compensation must not endanger the economic existence of the media owner.”
24. Article 31 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of 25 October 2007, CETS No. 201, in so far as relevant reads as follows:
“Article 31 – General measures of protection
(1) Each party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims, including their special needs as witnesses, at all stages of investigations and criminal proceedings, in particular by:
...
(e) protecting their privacy, their identity and their image and by taking measures in accordance with international law to prevent the public dissemination of any information that could lead to their identification;”
25. In the Explanatory Report to the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, paragraph 222 gives the following comment on Article 31 of that Convention:
“The article goes on to list a number of procedural rules designed to implement the general principles set out in Article 31: the possibility for victims of being heard, of supplying evidence, of having their privacy, particularly their identity and image protected, and of being protected against any risk of retaliation and repeat victimisation. The negotiators wished to stress that the protection of the victim’s identity, image and privacy extends to the risk of “public” disclosure, and that these requirements should not prevent this information being revealed in the context of the actual proceedings, in order to respect the principles that both parties must be heard and the inherent rights of the defence during a criminal prosecution.”
26. On 28 June 1985 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation Rec(85)11 on the position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure. In section F (Protection of privacy) point 15 reads as follows:
“Information and public relations policy in connection with the investigation and trial of offences should give due consideration to the need to protect the victim from any publicity which will unduly affect his private life and dignity. If the type of offence or the particular status or personal situation and safety of the victim make such a special protection necessary, either the trial before the judgment should be held in camera or disclosure or publication of personal information should be restricted to whatever extent is appropriate;”
27. On 31 October 2001 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation Rec(2001)16 on the protection of children against sexual exploitation. In Article III (Criminal law, procedure and coercive measures in general) point 32 reads as follows:
“Ensure throughout judicial, mediation or administrative proceedings the confidentiality of records and respect for the privacy of children who have been victims of sexual exploitation.”
28. On 10 July 2003 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation Rec(2003)13 on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings. The Appendix to that Recommendation contains the following principles:
“Principle 1 - Information of the public via the media
The public must be able to receive information about the activities of judicial authorities and police services through the media. Therefore, journalists must be able to freely report and comment on the functioning of the criminal justice system, subject only to the limitations provided for under the following principles.
...
Principle 8 - Protection of privacy in the context of ongoing criminal proceedings
The provision of information about suspects, accused or convicted persons or other parties to criminal proceedings should respect their right to protection of privacy in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention. Particular protection should be given to parties who are minors or other vulnerable persons, as well as to victims, to witnesses and to the families of suspects, accused and convicted. In all cases, particular consideration should be given to the harmful effect which the disclosure of information enabling their identification may have on the persons referred to in this Principle.
An even stronger protection is recommended to parties who are minors, to victims of criminal offences, to witnesses and to the families of suspects, the accused and convicted persons ...”
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 10
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 10-1


ITEMID: 001-75263
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF MANDIR v. SLOVENIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;John Hedigan
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Celje.
6. On 24 June 1995 the applicant was injured in a car accident. The perpetrator of the accident had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZM
7. On 6 April 1998 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZM in the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 2,031,322 Slovenian tolars (approximately 8,470 euros) for the injuries sustained.
Between 28 October 1998 and 17 May 2004 the applicant lodged several written submissions and/or adduced evidence.
Between 19 March 1999 and 23 January 2003 he made three requests that a date be set for a hearing.
Of the six hearings held between 15 March 2001 and 8 June 2004, none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
During the proceedings, the court appointed two medical experts and a traffic expert. The court also sought an additional opinion from the appointed expert.
At the last hearing, the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 4 October 2004.
8. On 18 October 2004 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju).
The case is still pending before the Celje Higher Court.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1