ITEMID: 001-83278
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF KUKAYEV v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objection dismissed (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-1) Exhaustion of domestic remedies;Preliminary objection dismissed (Art. 34) Individual applications;(Art. 34) Victim;Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+2 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 2 - Right to life;Article 2-1 - Life);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Inhuman treatment);Violation of Article 38 - Examination of the case-{general} (Article 38 - Examination of the case);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)
JUDGES: Peer Lorenzen
TEXT: 7. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Grozny.
8. The facts of the case as submitted by the parties are summarised in section A below (paragraphs 9-61). A description of the documents submitted by the Government is contained in section B below (paragraphs 62-66).
9. The applicant is the father of Aslanbek Kukayev, born in 1976, who at the material time was an officer of the special police unit of the Chechen Department of the Interior (отряд милиции особого назначения при Управлении внутренних дел РФ по Чеченской Республике – “the Chechen OMON”) and lived in Grozny, together with his parents.
10. In early October 1999 the Russian Government launched a counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic.
11. The facts surrounding Aslanbek Kukayev's abduction are disputed by the parties.
12. The applicant did not witness his son's detention, and the following account is based on eyewitness statements submitted by him, including those of two police officers, Mr G. and Mr Dzh., and a civilian, Mr A.
13. On the morning of 26 November 2000 the applicant's son, along with another police officer, D., left home to report for duty at the headquarters of the Chechen OMON in the town of Gudermes. They were both wearing camouflage uniforms and had their OMON officers' identification cards.
14. At around 12 noon the applicant's son and D. were passing through Grozny central market in D.'s white VAZ 2106 Zhiguli car. At the same time federal servicemen were carrying out a special (“sweeping-up”) operation in the vicinity of the marketplace. According to Mr G.'s statement, the military personnel belonged to a “mobile detachment” (мобильный отряд) stationed in the central part of Grozny.
15. The servicemen blocked D.'s vehicle and then took Aslanbek Kukayev and D. away in the direction of the headquarters of the federal military detachment Don-100. Some time later the soldiers seized the Zhiguli car, which subsequently disappeared. The applicant submitted that the car had later been seen on several occasions at the Khankala federal military base.
16. At around 1 p.m. the applicant's son, D. and several other police officers of Chechen origin detained during the operation, including Mr Dzh., were put into a GAZ 66 truck with an emblem representing a rampant horse on its doors, which then drove off. According to Mr Dzh., the servicemen who apprehended them were hostile and offensive.
17. The truck having reached Ordzhonikidze Avenue in the centre of Grozny, the officer in charge ordered that Aslanbek Kukayev and D. be taken out of the truck. Mr Dzh. saw the applicant's son and D. being escorted by six federal servicemen towards the former Grozny Educational College building. The vehicle then drove on.
18. Several policemen of Chechen origin were detained during the “sweeping-up” operation at Grozny central market on 26 November 2000. Some of them were released later that day, including Mr Dzh. Aslanbek Kukayev and D. disappeared after being apprehended.
19. According to the applicant, on 27 November 2000 the central Russian television broadcaster announced that a number of members of illegal armed groups had been apprehended during a “sweeping-up” operation in the vicinity of Grozny central market. The applicant also enclosed information which he had obtained from the Internet site of Human Rights Watch to the effect that on 26 November 2000 the federal troops had carried out a “sweeping-up” operation at Grozny central market and that they had detained several people, some of them having subsequently disappeared.
20. The Government relied on a reply from the Prosecutor General's Office (Генеральная прокуратура РФ) to the effect that, on 26 November 2000, during daylight hours, “unidentified men wearing camouflage uniforms and armed with firearms” had abducted the applicant's son and several other persons near Grozny central market. The bodies of those abducted were subsequently found at various times in Grozny.
21. They also submitted, with reference to information provided by the Chechen Department of the Federal Security Service (Управление Федеральной службы безопасности по Чеченской Республике), that the federal forces had not conducted any special operations in the vicinity of Grozny central market on 26 or 27 November 2000.
22. According to the applicant, he learnt about his son's detention from his neighbour the next day. Immediately thereafter, he went to Gudermes, to the headquarters of the Chechen OMON, and enquired about his son. He was told that neither his son nor D. had reported for duty.
23. The applicant and his younger son also went to Grozny central market and enquired of those who had been there on 26 November 2000 about Aslanbek Kukayev. In particular, they questioned servicemen from the mobile detachment, showing Aslanbek Kukayev's photograph; however, the servicemen refused to talk to them.
24. The applicant further applied repeatedly to a number of State bodies, including prosecutors at various levels, the Grozny military commander's office (комендатура г. Грозного), the regional and federal departments of the Russian Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Security Service (Федеральная служба безопасности РФ – “the FSB”), the Special Envoy of the Russian President in Chechnya for Rights and Freedoms (Специальный представитель Президента Российской Федерации по соблюдению прав и свобод человека в Чеченской Республике) and the Russian President's Office (Администрация Президента РФ). In his letters to the authorities the applicant referred to the circumstances of his son's detention and asked for assistance and details of the investigation. In most cases he received formal responses informing him that his requests had been forwarded to various prosecutors.
25. On 13 December 2000 the Grozny prosecutor's office (прокуратура г. Грозного) commenced a criminal investigation into the disappearance of the applicant's son and D. under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (kidnapping of two or more persons by a group using firearms). The file was given the number 12332.
26. On 29 January 2001 the Grozny prosecutor's office joined the aforementioned criminal case with several other cases opened in connection with abductions near Grozny central market on 26 November 2000 and the subsequent disappearance of a number of persons, on the ground that all those offences had been committed by the same persons. The case file was assigned the number 12331.
27. On 30 January 2001 the Chechen Department of the FSB forwarded the applicant's letter to the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 (военная прокуратура – войсковая часть 20102).
28. On 13 February 2001 the Grozny prosecutor's office suspended the investigation in criminal case no. 12331 on account of the failure to identify those responsible.
29. On the same date the head of the special police unit at the Chechen Department of the Interior issued the applicant with a certificate confirming that Aslanbek Kukayev had been an officer of that unit since 24 August 2000 and that he had disappeared on 26 November 2000 in the vicinity of Grozny central market.
30. By a letter of 22 February 2001 the military prosecutor of military unit 20102 returned the applications by the mothers of Aslanbek Kukayev and D. to the Grozny prosecutor's office. The letter stated that the applications in question had been forwarded to the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 by mistake, since no involvement of military personnel in the alleged offence had been established.
31. On 18 April 2001 the Grozny prosecutor's office resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 12331.
32. It appears that at some point in 2001 a new mobile detachment replaced the one stationed in the central part of Grozny.
33. On 22 April 2001, during the inspection of the area for which they were responsible, the servicemen of the mobile detachment found two corpses bearing signs of having met a violent death in the basement of Grozny Educational College in Ordzhonikidze Avenue. The servicemen notified a district office of the Department of the Interior and the Grozny prosecutor's office. It appears that a forensic examination of the corpses was conducted later that day.
34. On 23 April 2001 the bodies were identified by relatives as those of Aslanbek Kukayev and D. On the same day the applicant buried his son.
35. According to the applicant, his son's body was found 50 metres away from the place where he had last been seen alive on 26 November 2000. The applicant further submitted that both on 26 November 2000 and during the period thereafter the area in question had been under the firm control of the federal mobile detachment. He also claimed that the area had been tightly secured by the federal forces, fenced with barbed wire and watchtowers, and inaccessible to civilians, and that even the police and officials of the prosecutor's office had been required to obtain special leave to have access to the area on 22 April 2001. The applicant submitted a hand-drawn map of the area. In the Government's submission, “it was not established during the investigation that the area where the dead bodies of the applicant's son and D. had been found had been secured and that there had been no free access there”.
36. On 3 May 2001 the Forensic Examinations Bureau of the Chechen Republic (Республиканское бюро судмедэкспертизы) issued a medical death certificate (врачебное свидетельство о смерти) in respect of Aslanbek Khamzatovich Kukayev, born in 1976. The document stated that the applicant's son had died on 26 November 2000 as a result of gunshot wounds.
37. On 1 June 2001 the civil registry office of the Leninskiy District of Grozny certified the death of the applicant's son. The date and the place of death were recorded as 26 November 2000, Grozny.
38. On 7 August 2001 a military expert medical commission of the Chechen Department of the Interior (военно-врачебная комиссия УВД МВД РФ по Чеченской Республике) issued a certificate stating that Aslanbek Kukayev, an officer of the special police unit of the Chechen Department of the Interior, had died on 26 November 2000 as a result of a “gunshot wound to the head and fracture of the cranial bones”.
39. On 10 August 2001 the commander of the Chechen OMON drew up a report on the result of the internal investigation into the death of their officer, Aslanbek Kukayev. The report stated that on 26 November 2000 Aslanbek Kukayev and D. had left for the Zavodskoy District of Grozny to perform an operational task and had gone missing during a special “sweeping-up” operation in the vicinity of Grozny central market. On 22 April 2001 their bodies, bearing signs of a violent death, had been found in the basement of one of the destroyed buildings in Ordzhonikidze Avenue.
40. According to the Government, at some point the applicant and his wife had received compensation in connection with the death of their son, a police officer on duty. Under domestic law such compensation was payable for the loss of a breadwinner and comprised for each of them insurance payments of 19,786.25 Russian roubles (RUB – approximately 580 euros (EUR)), a lump-sum payment of RUB 44,365.80 (approximately EUR 1,300) and a pension in the amount of RUB 1,078.22 (approximately EUR 30).
41. In a letter of 21 May 2001 the Grozny prosecutor's office informed the applicant, in reply to a query from him, that on 12 May 2001 the file in criminal case no. 12331 concerning Aslanbek Kukayev's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body had been sent to the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 for further investigation.
42. On 1 July 2001 the Grozny prosecutor's office informed the applicant that the criminal proceedings in case no. 12331 had been suspended on 28 May 2001 on the ground of failure to identify those responsible.
43. On 7 August 2001 the Russian President's Office forwarded the applicant's complaint to the Prosecutor General's Office.
44. In a letter of 21 August 2001 the Southern Federal Circuit Department of the Prosecutor General's Office (Управление Генеральной Прокуратуры РФ в Южном федеральном округе) informed the applicant that his complaints concerning the ineffective investigation into the abduction of his son had been forwarded to the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic (прокуратура Чеченской Республики).
45. On 24 August 2001 the Russian Presidential Commission on Rights and Freedoms (Комиссия по правам человека при Президенте РФ) forwarded the applicant's complaint concerning the ineffective investigation into the killing of his son to the Prosecutor General's Office for examination. The latter, in its turn, forwarded the complaint to the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic on 3 September 2001.
46. By a letter of 10 September 2001 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic requested the Grozny prosecutor's office to send it the file in criminal case no. 12331 so as to enable it to investigate the applicant's complaints relating to the ineffective investigation into his son's death.
47. On 10 October 2001 the Russian Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant that his complaint had been sent to the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic for examination.
48. On the same date the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic forwarded case file no. 12331, comprising 222 pages, to the Grozny prosecutor's office for further investigation. The latter reopened the proceedings instituted in the above-mentioned criminal case on 15 October 2001 and then adjourned them a month later on the ground that it was impossible to identify the perpetrators. At some point the case file was referred to the prosecutor's office of the Zavodskoy District of Grozny (прокуратура Заводского района г. Грозного – “the Zavodskoy District prosecutor's office”).
49. On 15 November 2001 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic referred the applicant's complaint to the Grozny prosecutor's office.
50. On 25 March 2002 the Grozny prosecutor's office informed the applicant that the criminal proceedings instituted in connection with the abduction and killing of his son had been suspended, as it was impossible to identify the alleged perpetrators, and that all possible steps to that effect had been taken.
51. It does not appear that any investigative activity took place between November 2001 and December 2005; the applicant's attempts to have the criminal proceedings resumed proved unsuccessful.
52. On 4 November 2005 the present application was communicated to the Russian Government.
53. On 16 December 2005 the Zavodskoy District Prosecutor's Office resumed the proceedings in criminal case no. 12331.
54. By a decision of 22 December 2005 the investigator in charge, referring to the fact that, during the examination of the materials in case no. 12331 concerning the abduction of the applicant's son and other persons, he had discovered that the bodies of the applicant's son and D., bearing signs of having met a violent death, had been found on 22 April 2001, ordered the institution of criminal proceedings in relation to the matter under Article 105 § 2 (a), (c) and (g) of the Russian Criminal Code (murder of two or more persons committed by a group and involving the act of kidnapping).
55. On 16 January 2006 the investigation in case no. 12331 was suspended, on the ground that it was impossible to identify those responsible.
56. On 1 March 2006 that decision was set aside and the criminal proceedings were reopened. The investigation was then stayed on 1 April and 21 August 2006 and resumed on 21 July 2006 and 16 January 2007 respectively.
57. According to the applicant, in March 2006 he was summoned to the Zavodskoy District Prosecutor's Office and informed that the investigation had been resumed. The applicant was not given access to the case file, let alone allowed to make copies of any documents.
58. Referring to the information provided by the Prosecutor General's Office, the Government submitted that, on 13 December 2000, the authorities had commenced an investigation into the abduction of the applicant's son and D. and subsequently, following the discovery of their bodies, into their murder and the theft of D.'s car. The investigation had been suspended and resumed on several occasions, but to date had failed to identify the alleged perpetrators. The investigation had been reopened most recently on 16 January 2007 and was being supervised by the Prosecutor General's Office. According to the Government, the applicant was duly informed about all decisions taken during the investigation.
59. The Government further submitted that the applicant had been questioned on 27 January and 30 April 2001 and on 20 December 2005 and that his wife, Aslanbek Kukayev's mother, had been questioned on 21 December 2005. According to the Government, the applicant had never made any statements concerning the fact that D.'s vehicle, which had disappeared on 26 November 2000, had later been seen at the Khankala federal military base. The applicant and his wife had been granted the status of victims on 20 and 21 December 2005 respectively and on 21 December 2005 had been recognised as civil parties seeking damages in the criminal proceedings. Relatives of other persons kidnapped on 26 November 2000 had also been questioned.
60. The investigating authorities had also questioned four persons, including Mr Dzh., all of whom, in the Government's words, “were apprehended by the federal forces on 26 November 2000 during a special operation and were later released”, as well as four police officers, including Mr G., and the servicemen who had found the bodies of the applicant's son and D. The Government did not specify on what date witness statements had been obtained and submitted that all the witnesses concerned had testified that they had no information regarding the perpetrators of the offences in question.
61. They stated next that on 23 April 2001 the corpses of Aslanbek Kukayev and D., found on 22 April 2001, had been examined by forensic medical experts, who had drawn up a report on 17 May 2001 stating that the death of the aforementioned two persons could have been caused by injuries sustained as a result of firearms shots. The Government stated that the investigating authorities had sent a number of queries to various State bodies on 19 December 2000, 3 January, 18 April, 8 May and 28 May 2001, and 18 December 2005. In their submission, on 3 March 2006 the investigators had sent a request to the Novosibirsk prosecutor's office to question the officers of the Novosibirsk special police unit who had served in Chechnya between 20 and 28 November 2001 (rather than 2000). It is unclear whether any reply was received to this query. On 20 March and 11 August 2006 the investigators had requested the town and district offices of the interior of the Chechen Republic to carry out a search so as to establish those responsible. None of the necessary information on the subject had been received, according to the Government, apart from the reply from the Chechen Department of the Federal Security Service to the effect that it had no information about the alleged perpetrators. According to the Government, the authorities had also undertaken other investigative measures; however, they did not specify what those measures had been.
62. In November 2005, when the application was communicated to them, the Government were invited to produce a copy of the investigation file in criminal case no. 12331 opened into the abduction and murder of Aslanbek Kukayev. Relying on the information obtained from the Prosecutor General's Office, the Government replied that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning the witnesses. They, however, agreed to produce several documents, “disclosure of which did not contravene the requirements of Article 161”. In February 2006 the Court reiterated its request and suggested that Rule 33 § 3 of the Rules of Court be applied. In reply, the Government submitted a few additional documents but refused to produce the entire investigation file for the aforementioned reasons.
63. On 23 October 2006 the application was declared admissible. At that stage the Court once again invited the Government to submit the investigation file and to provide information concerning the progress of the investigation. In February 2007 the Government informed the Court of the latest dates on which the investigation had been suspended and reopened and produced several documents pertaining to the period after April 2006. Overall, the Government produced 67 documents running to 74 pages from the case file, which, as could be ascertained from the page numbering, comprised at least 235 pages. The documents included:
(a) copies of the reports by the two servicemen who had found the bodies of the applicant's son and D. on 22 April 2001;
(b) numerous procedural decisions suspending and reopening the investigation in case no. 12331;
(c) a number of investigators' decisions taking up case no. 12331;
(d) decisions granting the status of victims in case no. 12331 to relatives of some of the persons missing since 26 November 2000, but not to the applicant;
(e) letters dated 17 December 2005 notifying the applicant and D.'s mother of the transfer of the case to the Zavodskoy District Prosecutor's Office;
(f) numerous letters informing the applicant and relatives of other victims of the suspension and reopening of the criminal proceedings in case no. 12331.
64. The Government did not furnish the Court with any other documents from the case file.
65. The Government enclosed a number of letters from various higher courts in Russia, stating that the applicant had never lodged any complaints about the allegedly unlawful detention of his son or challenged in court any actions or omissions of the investigating or other law-enforcement authorities.
66. The Government also produced copies of domestic court decisions taken in unrelated sets of civil or criminal proceedings. These included three firstinstance judgments by which federal servicemen, privates or junior officers had been convicted of criminal offences committed in the Republic of Ingushetia or the Chechen Republic; a first-instance judgment and appeal decision awarding compensation for damage to property inflicted by servicemen in Ingushetia; a first-instance judgment and appeal decision awarding damages to the first applicant in Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia (nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, judgment of 24 February 2005) in connection with the death of his relatives in Chechnya; and a first-instance judgment and appeal decision awarding compensation for omissions on the part of the investigating authorities during the investigation into a person's abduction in the Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia, the person in question having subsequently been released.
67. Until 1 July 2002 criminal-law matters were governed by the 1960 Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR. On 1 July 2002 the old Code was replaced by the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation.
68. Article 125 of the new Code provides that the decision of an investigator or prosecutor to dispense with criminal proceedings or to terminate criminal proceedings, and other decisions and acts or omissions which are liable to infringe the constitutional rights and freedoms of the parties to criminal proceedings or to impede citizens' access to justice may be appealed against to a district court, which is empowered to check the lawfulness and grounds of the impugned decisions.
69. Article 161 of the new Code enshrines the rule that data from the preliminary investigation may not be disclosed. Paragraph 3 of the same Article provides that information from the investigation file may be divulged with the permission of a prosecutor or investigator but only in so far as it does not infringe the rights and lawful interests of the participants in the criminal proceedings and does not prejudice the investigation. It is prohibited to divulge information about the private life of the participants in criminal proceedings without their permission.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
2
3
38
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 2-1


ITEMID: 001-59097
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: IRL
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2000
DOCNAME: CASE OF HEANEY AND McGUINNESS v. IRELAND
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 6-2;No separate issue under Art. 8;No separate issue under Art. 10;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Georg Ress
TEXT: 8. At approximately 4.10 a.m. on 23 October 1990 a large explosion occurred at a British Army/Royal Ulster Constabulary checkpoint in County Derry. Five British soldiers and one civilian were killed and a number of other British army personnel were seriously injured.
9. Approximately an hour and a half later, Irish police officers on surveillance duty noted a light in a house approximately four miles from the scene of the explosion. At approximately 6.05 a.m. on 24 October 1990 a warrant was obtained to search the house. At or around 7 a.m. that morning the police entered the house and found an assortment of gloves (rubber and knitted), balaclavas, caps and other clothing. The seven men in the house, including the owner and the applicants, were arrested and detained by the police under section 30 of the Offences against the State Act 1939 (“the 1939 Act”). As later noted by the High Court (see paragraph 15 below), it was suspected that the bombing had been carried out by the Irish Republican Army (an unlawful paramilitary organisation known as the IRA) and the applicants were, in turn, suspected by the police of membership of that organisation and of involvement in the bombing.
10. Both applicants were cautioned by police officers in the usual terms, namely that they were not required to say anything unless they wished to do so and they were also informed that anything they did say would be taken down in writing and might be given in evidence against them.
Mr Heaney was then questioned about the bombing and about his presence in the house where he was arrested. He refused to answer the questions put to him. Police officers then read section 52 of the 1939 Act to him and he was requested pursuant to that section to give a full account of his movements and actions between 6 p.m. on 23 October and 6.55 a.m. on 24 October 1990. He refused to answer any questions.
Mr McGuinness was also questioned about the explosion and about his presence in the house where he was arrested. He refused to answer those questions. He was then requested to account for his movements between 1 a.m. and 7.15 a.m. on 24 October 1990. He refused to answer. Police officers then read section 52 of the 1939 Act to him and he was handed a copy of the section and asked to read it. He continued not to answer questions put to him.
11. On 25 October 1990 both applicants were brought to the Special Criminal Court in Dublin and charged with the offence of membership of an unlawful organisation (contrary to section 21 of the 1939 Act) and of failing to account for their movements (contrary to section 52 of the 1939 Act).
12. On 19 April 1991 the applicants' trial in the Special Criminal Court took place. On 26 June 1991 the applicants were acquitted of the charge of membership of an unlawful organisation but each was convicted of failing to provide an account of their movements during a specified period contrary to section 52 of the 1939 Act. The court rejected their arguments that section 52 must be read as including a right to refuse to provide such information on reasonable grounds and about the confusion caused by police officers giving the usual caution about the right to remain silent and then making a request for information under section 52 of the 1939 Act. Both applicants were sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Their sentences commenced on 26 June 1991. They were released on 10 November 1991.
13. The applicants then appealed against their conviction and sentence under section 52 to the Court of Criminal Appeal. As regards their conviction, they submitted that the Special Criminal Court had erred in finding that the applicants were not confused as a result of the caution about their right to remain silent and the conflicting request for information under section 52 by the same officers. They argued that section 52 should have been read as including the possibility of a refusal to give information based on reasonable excuse. As to their sentence, they argued that the confusion caused by the caution and request for information should have been a mitigating factor; that there was no evidence that they warranted the maximum sentence; and that the court failed to take into account the time the applicants had spent in custody prior to their trial.
14. On 3 May 1992 the applicants took proceedings in the High Court challenging the constitutionality of section 52 of the 1939 Act. The proceedings pending before the Court of Criminal Appeal were consequently adjourned.
15. By a judgment dated 24 June 1994, the High Court rejected their application. It based the applicants' right not to answer questions as regards their movements on Article 38 of the Constitution rather than on Article 40, noting that their case related to suspects in custody and not to accused persons on trial. However, it was considered that section 52 constituted a proportionate interference with the applicants' right to silence, the objective being to assist police investigations into serious crimes of a subversive nature involving the security of the State. In addition, the restrictions were not considered arbitrary or irrational.
The High Court also considered that the restriction did not excessively impair the right to silence given the objective pursued by section 52 and the other legal protections applicable to persons in custody under section 30 of the 1939 Act, which protections were afforded to minimise the risk of an accused wrongfully confessing to a crime and to safeguard against the possible abuse of the powers provided by section 52 of the 1939 Act. Those protections were listed by the High Court: the requirement that a police officer must have a bona fide suspicion prior to arrest; the obligation to inform the suspect of the offences under the 1939 Act and/or of the scheduled offences of which he is suspected; the right to legal assistance when reasonably requested; the right to medical assistance; the right of access to a court; the right to remain silent and to be told of that right; the obligations to provide appropriate cautions to detainees and to abstain from cross-examining a person in detention under section 30 of the 1939 Act and from unfair and oppressive questioning of such detainees; and the conditions attaching to any extension of the length of detention under section 30 of the 1939 Act.
16. By a judgment dated 23 July 1996 the Supreme Court rejected the applicants' appeal, finding that section 52 of the 1939 Act was not inconsistent with the Constitution. It was noted that section 52 of the 1939 Act was silent on the use which could be made of statements provided pursuant to requests made under section 52. While the Court of Criminal Appeal had suggested in a previous case (The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. McGowan [1979] Irish Reports 45) that information lawfully obtained under section 52 might be later used in evidence, the Supreme Court expressly reserved its position as to whether that view was correct or not.
The Supreme Court considered that the right to silence was a corollary to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 40 of the Constitution and that the relevant assessment was to consider the proportionality of the restriction on the right to silence in view of the public order exception to Article 40 of the Constitution. It noted that the 1939 Act was aimed at actions and conduct calculated to undermine public order and the authority of the State and that the proclamation made pursuant to section 35 of the 1939 Act remained in force.
As to whether section 52 restricted the right to silence more than was necessary in light of the disorder against which the State was attempting to protect the public, the court noted that an innocent person had nothing to fear from giving an account of his or her movements even though such a person may wish, nevertheless, to take a stand on grounds of principle and to assert his or her constitutional rights. However, it considered that the entitlement of citizens to take such a stand must yield to the right of the State to protect itself. The entitlement of those with something relevant to disclose concerning the commission of a crime to remain silent must be regarded as of an even lesser order. The Supreme Court concluded that the restriction in section 52 was proportionate to the State's entitlement to protect itself.
17. The applicants' appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal in relation to their conviction under section 52 of the 1939 Act has been adjourned generally pending the outcome of the present application.
18. Article 38 § 1 of the Irish Constitution provides that no person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law. By Article 40, the State guarantees liberty for the exercise, subject to public order and morality, of the right of citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions.
19. The Offences against the State Act 1939 is described in its long (explanatory) title as an Act to make provision for actions and conduct calculated to undermine public order and the authority of the State and, for that purpose, to provide for the punishment of persons guilty of offences against the State, and to establish Special Criminal Courts.
20. Section 21 of the 1939 Act makes it an offence to be a member of an unlawful organisation as defined in the Act.
21. Section 30 deals with the arrest and detention of suspected persons and provides that a member of the police can arrest and detain a person whom he suspects of having committed an offence under the 1939 Act or an offence scheduled under Part V of the 1939 Act (the scheduled offences are mainly offences under the firearms and explosive substances' legislation). This power of arrest is a permanent power so that it is not dependent on a section 35 proclamation (see the following paragraph).
22. Section 35 of the 1939 Act provides that Part V of that Act (which establishes the Special Criminal Courts and contains section 52) is to come into force by means of a proclamation by the government made when the government is satisfied that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order, and when the government therefore makes and publishes a proclamation to that effect. The proclamation was made in 1972 and is still in force. Accordingly, section 52 of the 1939 Act has been in force since 1972 to date.
23. By section 36 of the 1939 Act the government may declare that a particular class or kind of offence is a scheduled offence for the purpose of the 1939 Act and such offences are to be tried by the Special Criminal Courts established under section 38 of the 1939 Act.
24. Section 52 of the 1939 Act reads as follows:
“1. Whenever a person is detained in custody under the provisions in that behalf contained in Part IV of this Act, any member of the [police] may demand of such person, at any time while he is so detained, a full account of such person's movements and actions during any specified period and all information in his possession in relation to the commission or intended commission by another person of any offence under any section or sub-section of this Act or any scheduled offence.
2. If any person, of whom any such account or information as is mentioned in the foregoing sub-section of this section is demanded under that sub-section by a member of the [police], fails or refuses to give to such member such account or any such information or gives to such member any account or information which is false or misleading, he shall be guilty of an offence under this section and shall be liable on summary conviction thereof to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.”
25. Under the terms of the Good Friday Peace Agreement of 10 April 1998, the government committed to initiating a wide ranging review of, inter alia, the 1939 Act with a view to reform and dispensing with those elements of the 1939 Act which would no longer be required. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform has, with government approval, established a committee to examine all aspects of the Offences against the State Acts and to report to the Minister with recommendations for reform. The committee has already commenced its work.
26. In the McGowan case cited above, the accused had been arrested under section 30 of the 1939 Act and had made certain statements to the police. The defence argued that because of the basis of his arrest (section 30), the existence of section 52 of the 1939 Act and even though no section 52 requests had actually been made, the accused was bound under penalty to give an account of his movements. Accordingly, the statements which had been made by him were involuntary and not therefore admissible. The court did not find this argument persuasive since no section 52 requests had in fact been made. It went on to point out that, even if section 52 had been relied on by the police, the defence submission was not well-founded because of previous Irish case-law which had held that statements obtained in accordance with Irish law, even a law which made it a criminal offence to refuse to answer, were not inadmissible in any legal proceedings.
27. The Garda Siochana (police) Handbook contains relevant legislation and commentaries and is published by the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland in association with the Garda Siochana. The commentary on section 52 of the 1939 Act in the sixth edition (1991) provides as follows:
“The fact that the accused is bound under threat of penalty to answer questions lawfully put under section 52 does not render the resultant answers or statements inadmissible in evidence.”
The judicial authority for that proposition was noted in the handbook as being found in the McGowan case cited above and the earlier Irish case-law approved in the McGowan case.
28. In the case of National Irish Bank Ltd (In the matter of National Irish Bank Ltd and the Companies Act 1990, [1999] 1 Irish Law Reports Monthly 343) the Supreme Court found that a confession of a bank official obtained by inspectors as a result of the exercise by them of their powers under section 10 of the Companies Act 1990 would not, in general, be admissible at a subsequent criminal trial of that official unless, in any particular case, the trial judge was satisfied that the confession was voluntary. The Supreme Court considered that compelling a person to confess and then convicting that person on the basis of the compelled confession would be contrary to Article 38 of the Constitution. That court also found that any other evidence obtained as a result of information provided under section 52 of the 1939 Act would be admitted in evidence in a subsequent trial if the trial judge considered, in all the circumstances, that it would be just and fair to admit it.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1
6-2


ITEMID: 001-98064
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: FIN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: CASE OF FLINKKILÄ AND OTHERS v. FINLAND
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 10;No violation of Art. 7;Pécuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä
TEXT: 5. The applicants were born in 1948, 1951, 1962 and 1951 respectively and live in Helsinki, except for Ms Isosaari who lives in Ikkala.
6. The first and second applicants are editors-in-chief of the nationwide magazine Seura and the third and fourth applicants are an editor-in-chief and a journalist of the nationwide magazine Nykyposti.
7. On 4 December 1996 A., the National Conciliator (valtakunnansovittelija, riksförlikningsmannen) at the time, and B., his female friend, entered late at night A.’s home where his wife was present. The situation escalated, the police were called and the incident, which subsequently involved also A.’s grown-up children, led to A.’s arrest. Due to the incident, criminal charges were brought against both A. and B. on 18 December 1996. On 16 January 1997 the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) sentenced A. to a four-month conditional prison sentence for resisting arrest and for criminal damage (vahingonteko, skadegörelse), and B. to a fine for assault. On 17 January 1997 the Council of State (valtioneuvosto, statsrådet) dismissed A. from his post as National Conciliator. On 25 June 1998 the Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten) upheld the judgment with respect to B. As regards A., the case had lapsed as he had died on 14 May 1998. On 15 December 1998 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused B. leave to appeal.
8. On 31 January and 1 March 1997, respectively, the magazines published an article about A. The article of 31 January 1997 in Seura magazine was based on A.’s interview, and B.’s name and age, together with her picture, were mentioned once in the article. The article was entitled “A.’s sincerity in the balance” and it concerned A.’s feelings about his dismissal and his possible divorce in the aftermath of the incident of 4 December 1996. The article of 1 March 1997 in Nykyposti magazine, which was entitled “Divorced wives’ club”, also dealt inter alia with A.’s possible divorce and his feelings about his dismissal. It was claimed that A.’s divorce proceedings had accelerated due to the incident of 4 December 1996, and B.’s name was mentioned once in that context. This article contained no pictures of B. Prior to these articles, B.’s identity had been revealed at least in a Swedish newspaper on 21 January 1997 and in a Finnish nationwide television broadcast on 23 January 1997.
9. In the spring of 1997 A. and B. requested that criminal investigations be conducted against journalists who had written about the incident on 4 December 1996 and the circumstances surrounding it. They made such a request with respect to the applicants, claiming that the articles published in Seura and Nykyposti had invaded B.’s privacy. It appears that in regard to all but one of these requests no charges were brought. On 17 September 1998 the public prosecutor decided not to bring charges against the applicants as, according to him, there was no indication of any crime.
10. On 25 October 1998 B. complained to the Prosecutor General (valtakunnansyyttäjä, högsta åklagaren) about the decisions not to prosecute and asked him to reconsider the cases. On 5 October 1999, after having considered the charges, the Deputy Prosecutor-General requested the public prosecutor to bring charges, inter alia, against the applicants. He reasoned his decision by stating, inter alia, that the facts revealed in the articles fell within the scope of private life and that no derogation could be made in this case as B. was not a public figure.
11. On 15 November 1999 the public prosecutor, by order of the Deputy Prosecutor-General, brought charges against the applicants under Chapter 27, section 3(a), paragraph 2 of the Penal Code. At the same time charges were also brought against another journalist and editor-in-chief of another magazine to be examined in the same proceedings. This journalist and editor-in-chief have lodged a separate appeal with the Court (see Tuomela and others v. Finland, no. 25711/04, 6 April 2010).
12. B. concurred with the charges brought by the public prosecutor. On 4 January and 10 November 2000 she pursued a compensation claim against all the applicants, which was joined to the criminal charges.
13. Following an oral hearing on 8 December 2000, the Espoo District Court rejected all the charges on 15 December 2000, finding that the information concerning B.’s private life in the article could not as such be conducive to causing her particular suffering, except for the information concerning her relationship with A. However, since the incident of 4 December 1996 B. must have understood that she could no longer seek protection on this ground. Thus, the applicants had not been under a duty to assess whether revealing B.’s identity could have caused her suffering. Furthermore, it had not been proved that the applicants had had the intention of invading B.’s privacy. Accordingly, all the compensation claims against the applicants were also rejected.
14. By letters dated 10 and 14 January 2001, respectively, the public prosecutor and B. appealed to the Helsinki Appeal Court, reiterating the charges and the compensation claims. Moreover, on 17 September 2002 B. requested that the case file be declared secret for at least ten years from the date of the judgment.
15. In its judgment of 15 May 2003, the Appeal Court first decided to declare all parts of the case file secret for ten years except for the applicable legal provisions and the conclusions. Additionally, B.’s identity was not to be revealed in the public parts of the judgment. The court found that the matter was very sensitive, that it fell within the scope of private life, and that the secrecy accorded did not violate Articles 6 or 10 of the Convention. As to the merits of the case, the court, without holding an oral hearing, quashed the District Court’s judgment and sentenced the applicants to pay twenty day-fines, amounting to 1,180 euros (EUR), EUR 1,100, EUR 1,020 and EUR 120 respectively, for invasion of private life. Moreover, the first and second applicants were ordered jointly to pay B. EUR 5,000 plus interest and the third and fourth applicants EUR 3,000 plus interest for non-pecuniary damage as well as her costs and expenses jointly with the publishing company. The applicants paid in total EUR 22,074.31 in fines and compensation.
16. The Appeal Court found that the facts mentioned in the articles were of a kind to which the protection of private life typically applied. The Supreme Court had already found in 2002 that the national television broadcast on 23 January 1997, in which B.’s name had been mentioned twice in the context of an interview with A., had invaded her private life. B. did not hold such a position in society that the exception in Chapter 27, section 3(a), paragraph 2, of the Penal Code was applicable. The fact that she was a friend of such a person and that she had been involved in the incident that subsequently led to the dismissal of A. from his post as National Conciliator did not justify revealing her identity. The fact that B.’s identity as A.’s friend had previously been revealed in the media did not justify the subsequent invasion of her private life. The Penal Code provision in question did not require that intent be shown; it was sufficient that the dissemination of information about the private life of a person was capable of causing him or her damage or suffering. The applicants, therefore, had had no right to reveal facts relating to B.’s private life or to publish her picture.
17. By letter dated 10 July 2003 the applicants applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming, inter alia, that the provision of the Penal Code in question did not define with sufficient clarity which acts fell within its scope and that, as a result, the Penal Code had been applied ex analogia. No intent had been shown, and nor was the Appeal Court judgment adequately reasoned in this respect. Moreover they claimed that, in declaring that the case file was to remain secret, the Appeal Court had not given reasons which would constitute sufficient grounds for the measure. Finally, the Appeal Court had not even tried to indicate on what grounds freedom of expression could be restricted in this case, and therefore the Appeal Court judgment was in contradiction with Article 10 of the Convention.
18. On 20 January 2004 the Supreme Court refused the applicants leave to appeal.
19. Section 10 of the Constitution Act (Suomen Hallitusmuoto, Regeringsform för Finland, Act no. 94/1919, as amended by Act no. 969/1995, which took effect on 1 August 1995 and remained in force until 1 March 2000), provided:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. The right to freedom of expression entails the right to impart, publish and receive information, opinions and other communications without prior hindrance from anyone. More precise provisions on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression shall be prescribed by an Act of Parliament. Restrictions on pictorial programmes necessary for the protection of children may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
Documents and recordings in the possession of the authorities are public, unless their publication has, for compelling reasons, been specifically restricted by an Act. Everyone has the right of access to public documents and recordings.”
The same provision appears in Article 12 of the current Constitution of 2000 (Suomen perustuslaki, Finlands grundlag, Act no. 731/1999).
20. Section 8 of the Constitution Act (as amended by Act no. 969/1995) corresponded to Article 10 of the current Constitution, which provides that everyone’s right to private life is guaranteed.
21. Section 39 of the Freedom of the Press Act (painovapauslaki, tryckfrihetslagen; Act no. 1/1919), as in force at the relevant time, provided that the provisions of the Tort Liability Act applied to the payment of compensation for damage caused by the contents of printed material.
22. Chapter 5, section 6, of the Tort Liability Act (vahingonkorvauslaki, skadeståndslagen, Act no. 412/1974, as amended by Act no. 509/2004) stipulates that damages may also be awarded for distress arising inter alia from an offence against liberty, honour, home or private life. Under Chapter 5, section 1, of the said Act, damages shall constitute compensation for personal injury and damage to property. Section 2 provides that a person who has suffered personal injury shall be entitled to damages to cover medical costs and other costs arising from the injury, as well as loss of income and maintenance and pain and suffering.
23. According to the government bill to amend the Tort Liability Act (HE 116/1998), the maximum amount of compensation for pain and suffering from, inter alia, bodily injuries had in the recent past been approximately FIM 100,000 (EUR 16,819). In the subsequent government bill to amend the Tort Liability Act (HE 167/2003, p. 60), it is stated that no changes to the prevailing level of compensation for suffering are proposed.
24. Chapter 27 (as amended by Act no. 908/1974), section 3(a), of the Penal Code (rikoslaki, strafflagen) read, at the relevant time, as follows:
“A person who unlawfully, through the use of the mass media or in another similar manner, publicly disseminates information, an insinuation or an image depicting the private life of another person, such as to cause him or her damage or suffering, shall be convicted of invasion of privacy and sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two years or to a fine. A publication that deals with a person’s behaviour in a public office or function, in professional life, in a political activity or in another comparable activity, shall not be considered an invasion of privacy if the reporting was necessary for the purpose of dealing with a matter of importance to society.”
25. In the travaux préparatoires of the above-mentioned provision (see government bill HE 84/1974) there was no precise definition of private life but matters such as, inter alia, family life, spare time activities, health and relationships and such conduct in socially significant position that had no significance to the relevant exercise of power, were considered as a part of private life. It was further required that the act might have caused damage or suffering. Such damage might have also been "immaterial damage, which might have manifested itself in problems with social interaction or respect". An ordinary person enjoyed the strongest protection of private life. His or her involvement in an incident with importance to society might have warranted an exception to the protection. In any case, if an offence was of such a kind that it could not be regarded as having social significance, it was a matter to be protected as belonging to the sphere of private life, otherwise the protection of private life did not restrict publishing. Moreover, the publishing could not be to a greater extent than was necessary. Thus, the necessity of mentioning a person’s name or other description of a person enabling identification was always subject to careful consideration.
26. In 2000, Chapter 27, section 3(a), of the Penal Code was replaced by Chapter 24, section 8 (Act no. 531/2000). Under the new provision on the injury of personal reputation (yksityiselämää loukkaavan tiedon levittäminen, spridande av information som kränker privatlivet), a person who unlawfully, through the use of the mass media or in another manner, publicly spreads information, an insinuation or an image of the private life of another person in such a way that the act is conducive to causing that person damage or suffering or subjecting that person to contempt, shall be convicted of injuring personal reputation. However, an act shall not constitute an injury to personal reputation if it concerns the evaluation of that person’s activities in a professional or public capacity and if it is necessary for the purpose of addressing a matter of importance to society.
27. According to the travaux préparatoires (see government bill HE 184/1999), the content of the new provision corresponds to the old Chapter 27, section 3(a), of the Penal Code. The amendments and clarifications made to the existing provision were mainly technical. The provision thus still restricts the protection of the private life of persons having important political or economic powers. This restriction, however, applies only to the persons referred to, not to their close friends and family. According to the Parliamentary Law Committee’s Report (lakivaliokunnan mietintö, lagutskottets betänkande LaVM 6/2000), the purpose of that provision is to permit the dissemination of information on the private life of such persons if the information may be relevant in assessing the performance of their functions.
28. The government bill HE 184/1999 further provides that in the assessment of interferences with private life, the lawfulness of the interference and the concept of private life are taken into account. A person’s consent to the provision of information has relevance in the assessment of the lawfulness of the interference. Without explicit consent, there is usually no reason to believe that the person in question would have consented to the publication of information relating to private life (see Parliamentary Law Committee’s Report LaVM 6/2000). With regard to the concept of private life, a reference is made to the explanatory works concerning the Constitution’s provisions on fundamental rights and to the government bill HE 84/1974). Moreover, private life is, in particular, protected against dissemination of information which may be correct as such. In order for the act to be punishable, it is necessary that the information concerns the private life of the person in question (see the government bill HE 184/1999).
29. Section 2 of the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings (laki oikeudenkäynnin julkisuudesta, lag om offentlighet vid rättegång; Act no. 945/1984), as in force at the relevant time, provided that the name, profession and domicile of the parties and the nature of the subject matter and the time and place of a hearing were public information from the beginning of the trial at the latest. Section 3 provided that the public had the right to be present during hearings unless otherwise provided in the relevant legislation. Section 9 stated that the provisions laid down in the Openness of Government Activities Act (laki viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta, lag om offentlighet i myndigheternas verksamhet: Act no. 621/1999) were applicable to trial documents. Information and documents relating to a trial are, as a rule, public once charges have been brought unless provided otherwise by an Act.
30. The Supreme Court decision (KKO 1980-II-99) concerned public showing of a series of photographs of half-naked children. The act was committed before the entry into force of Chapter 27, section 3(a), of the Penal Code and no criminal sanctions were requested.
31. In a Supreme Court decision (KKO 1980 II 123) the following was noted (summary from the Yearbook):
“The accused had picked up a photograph of the plaintiff from the archives of a newspaper and published it in the context of an electoral campaign without the plaintiff’s consent. He was convicted of a violation of private life and ordered, jointly with the political organisations which had acted as publishers, to pay damages for mental suffering.”
32. On 11 June 1997 the Supreme Court delivered two decisions relating to articles which had given information on cases of arson. The first decision (KKO 1997:80) concerned a newspaper article (summary from the Supreme Court’s Yearbook):
“A newspaper published an article concerning cases of arson, in which it was said that the suspect was the wife of the head of a local fire department. As it was not even alleged that the head of the fire department had any role in the events, there was no justifiable reason for publishing the information on the marriage between him and the suspect. The publisher, the editor-in-chief and the journalist who wrote the article were ordered to pay compensation for the suffering caused by the violation of the right to respect for private life.”
33. The second decision (KKO 1997:81) concerned an article published in a periodical, which was based on the afore-mentioned newspaper article (see the previous paragraph) and on the records of the pre-trial investigation and the court proceedings, but did not indicate that the newspaper article had been used as a source (summary from the Yearbook):
“Compensation was ordered to be paid for the reason that the article violated the right to respect for private life. Another issue at stake in the precedent was the relevance to liability for damages and the amount of compensation of the fact that the information had been reported in another publication at an earlier stage.”
34. The article published in the periodical had similarly mentioned the name and profession of the head of the fire department, although the offence was not related to the performance of his duties. Thus, it had not been necessary to refer to his position as head of the fire department or to his marriage to the suspect in order to give an account of the offence. The fact that the information had previously been published in print did not relieve the defendants of their responsibility to ensure, before publishing the information again, that the article did not contain information insulting the persons mentioned in it. The mere fact that the interview with the head of the fire department had been published in the newspaper did not justify the conclusion that he had also consented to its publication in the periodical. Repeating a violation did not necessarily cause the same amount of damage and suffering as the initial violation. The readers of the newspaper and the periodical were partly different, and the circulation of the newspaper apparently did not entirely coincide with that of the periodical. Therefore, and considering the differences in the content and tone of the articles, the Supreme Court found it established that the article published in the periodical was conducive to causing the head of the fire department additional mental suffering. The events reported in the article did not concern the plaintiff’s conduct in the performance of his duties as head of the fire department and it had not been necessary to mention the complainant’s name and profession for the purpose of discussing a matter involving significant public interest or reporting on the offences. By associating the complainant’s name and profession with the offences in question, the article had unlawfully spread information and insinuations concerning his private life likely to cause him damage and suffering. The disclosure of the complainant’s name and the emphasis on his occupation had amounted to an insult. By again reporting on the matter two months after the events had occurred, the periodical was found to have caused the complainant additional suffering for which separate compensation was to be paid.
35. The Supreme Court’s decision of 26 September 2001 (KKO 2001:96) concerned the publication in a magazine of an article which had described a pending criminal case in which the accused had been charged with, inter alia, aggravated fraud. The article had been illustrated, without the accused’s permission, with another article published previously in another magazine and with a picture of the accused published in that connection. The accused’s name had been given in the text of the article and she could be recognised from the picture. The Supreme Court found that the criminal case had no such social significance that would justify its publication without the accused’s permission and, consequently, her private life had been invaded.
36. The Supreme Court’s decision of 25 June 2002 (KKO 2002:55) concerned the same facts as the present case: when interviewing A., B.’s name was mentioned in the television broadcast in January 1997, that is, after they had been convicted. The court found that the facts discussed in the television programme with regard to B. were part of her private life and enjoyed the protection of privacy. The fines imposed on her as punishment for the assault did not constitute a criminal-law sanction justifying publication of her name. The interviewer and the television company were ordered to pay B. damages in the amount of EUR 8,000 for disclosing her identity in the television programme.
37. Another decision of 4 July 2005 (KKO 2005:82) concerned an article about a relationship between A., who worked as a press officer for a candidate in the presidential elections, and B., the ex-spouse of a TV journalist. A.’s photo was included in the article. The Supreme Court, having assessed the provision on the invasion of privacy in the Penal Code in the light of this Court’s case-law, found that A. did not hold a position that meant that such details of her private life were of public importance. The article had thus invaded A.’s privacy.
38. In a decision of 19 December 2005 (KKO 2005:136), the Supreme Court noted that an offence was not a private matter of the offender. In principle, however, a person convicted of and sentenced for having committed an offence also enjoyed the right inherent in private life to live in peace. According to the Personal Data Act, any information about the commission of an offence and the resulting sentence qualified as “sensitive” personal data. The publicity per se of criminal proceedings and of related documents did not mean that information made public during the proceedings could be freely published as such by the media. The Supreme Court concluded that publishing the name of a person convicted of, inter alia, assault and deprivation of liberty did not invade his privacy as the person concerned had been convicted of offences of violence which had also degraded the victim’s human dignity. Furthermore, the article in question did not include his photo.
39. The Supreme Court’s decision of 16 March 2006 (KKO 2006:20) concerned the scope of the private life of a leading public prosecutor whose name or identify had not been revealed in an article which mainly concerned his wife who had been suspected of having committed a crime. The Supreme Court concluded that the issue had had social significance as the person under suspicion was the public prosecutor’s wife. Even though the public prosecutor could have been identified from the article, this was justified by the fact that his own impartiality as a prosecutor was at stake.
40. In the Supreme Court’s latest decision of 22 January 2009 (KKO 2009:3) A. had been convicted of incest with his children and the case file was declared secret. Later A. revealed certain details of the case in a television programme. The court found that even though the children had remained anonymous in the programme, they could still be identified through the fact that A. had appeared in the programme undisguised and his first name had been given. The privacy of the children and their mother had thus been invaded.
41. The Union of Journalists in Finland (Suomen Journalistiliitto, Finlands Journalistförbund ry) publishes Guidelines for Journalists (Journalistin ohjeet, Journalistreglerna) for the purposes of self-regulation. The 1992 Guidelines were in force at the material time and provided, inter alia, that the publication of a name and other identifying information in the context of reporting on offences was justified only if a significant public interest was involved. The suspect’s identity was not usually to be published before a court hearing unless there were important reasons relating to the nature of the offence and the suspect’s position which justified publication (Article 26).
42. New Guidelines came into force in 2005, which noted that when publishing public material regard must be had to the protection of private life. The public nature of information does not necessarily mean that it may be published. Special care must be observed when discussing matters concerning a minor (Article 30). The name, photograph or other identifying facts of a convicted criminal may be published unless it is considered unjust in terms of his or her position or offence. As regards a minor or an unaccountable person information should be disclosed with restraint (Article 31). A journalist must be careful not to present information that may lead to the identification of a person in cases where he or she is only a suspect or has merely been charged (Article 32).
43. Also the Council for Mass Media (Julkisen sanan neuvosto, Opinionsnämnden för massmedier), which is a self-regulating body established in 1968 by publishers and journalists in the field of mass communication and whose task is to interpret good professional practice and defend the freedom of speech and publication, has issued a number of resolutions and statements, inter alia, in 1980 and 1981. The former concerned the content of private life and the latter disclosure of names in crime news coverage.
44. In its statement of 1981, the Council for Mass Media stated, inter alia, that according to the main principle of protection of identity, it is justifiable to publish a person’s name in crime news coverage only if there is a significant public interest in doing so. A journalist shall consider such publication separately in each individual case, weighing the harm that may be caused to the person concerned and to his or her family and close persons against the general importance of publishing the name. Furthermore, the Council stated that the aggravated, cruel or special nature of an act does not alone suffice to justify disclosing the perpetrator’s identity. An offence may, however, arouse so much public attention as to warrant publishing the name. Finally, the Council divided persons into three groups as to the protection of identity: (1) persons exercising political, economic or administrative power; (2) other public persons, for example in the sectors of entertainment, sports, arts or science; and (3) ordinary citizens. The Council noted that the protection of identity is narrowest for group 1 and most extensive for group 3.
45. On 10 July 2003 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation No. Rec(2003)13 on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings. In point 8 of the principles appended to the recommendation, it considers as follows:
“Protection of privacy in the context of on-going criminal proceedings
The provision of information about suspects, accused or convicted persons or other parties to criminal proceedings should respect their right to protection of privacy in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention. Particular protection should be given to parties who are minors or other vulnerable persons, as well as to victims, to witnesses and to the families of suspects, accused and convicted. In all cases, particular consideration should be given to the harmful effect which the disclosure of information enabling their identification may have on the persons referred to in this Principle.”
46. The commentary to the recommendation considers as follows (paragraphs 26 and 27):
“Everyone has the right to the protection of private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Principle 8 recalls this protection for suspects, the accused, convicted persons and other parties to criminal proceedings, who must not be denied this right due to their involvement in such proceedings. The mere indication of the name of the accused or convicted may constitute a sanction which is more severe than the penal sanction delivered by the criminal court. It furthermore may prejudice the reintegration into society of the person concerned. The same applies to the image of the accused or convicted. Therefore, particular consideration should be given to the harmful effect which the disclosure of information enabling their identification may have on the persons referred to in this Principle.
An even stronger protection is recommended to parties who are minors, to victims of criminal offences, to witnesses and to the families of suspects, the accused and convicted persons. In this respect, member states may also refer to Recommendation No. R (85) 11 on the position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure and Recommendation No. R (97) 13 concerning the intimidation of witnesses and the rights of the defence.”
47. On 4 October 2007 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1577 (2007), Towards decriminalisation of defamation, in which it urged those member States which still provide for prison sentences for defamation, even if they are not actually imposed, to abolish them without delay.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 10
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 7


ITEMID: 001-91615
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: DEU
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: NIEDZWIECKI v. GERMANY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Jaroslaw Niedzwiecki, is a Polish national who was born in 1961 and lives in Świdnica in Poland.
The applicant entered Germany in 1987. Until January 1997 he was in possession of a limited residence title for exceptional purposes (Aufenthaltsbefugnis). In April 1997 he obtained an unlimited residence permit (Aufenthaltsberechtigung).
The applicant’s daughter was born in July 1995. On 14 December 1995 he requested a child-raising allowance for the first year of the child’s life under the Child-raising Allowance Act (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz). For the applicant the benefits under that Act amounted to 600 German marks (DEM) (approximately 306.00 euros (EUR)) per month.
On 20 December 1995 the Würzburg Office for Care and Family Promotion rejected his request. The applicant filed an administrative objection on 17 January 1996, which the Bavarian Regional Office for Care and Family Promotion dismissed on 27 March 1996. It held that the applicant did not meet the requirements of the Child-raising Allowance Act as he was not a German national and he did not have the necessary unlimited residence permit. According to the relevant provisions of the Child-raising Allowance Act, the limited residence title for exceptional purposes did not suffice for the allowance.
On 21 April 1996 the applicant lodged an action with the Würzburg Social Court (Sozialgericht) arguing that the pertinent provisions of the Child-raising Allowance Act discriminated against foreign nationals.
In connection with a different set of proceeding (concerning family allowance), the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against, inter alia, the pertinent provisions of the Child-raising Allowance Act, arguing that those provisions discriminated against foreigners. On 2 June 1997, the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the constitutional complaint for failure to exhaust effective remedies.
On 18 July 1996 the applicant requested a child-raising allowance for the second year of his daughter’s life. On 26 February 1997 the Würzburg Office for Care and Family Promotion rejected the request. On 26 May 1997 it amended the decision and granted the applicant the requested allowance from 9 April 1997 onwards as on that day the applicant was in the possession of an unlimited residence permit. The applicant filed an administrative objection against the refusal of the authorities to grant the allowance also for the period prior to 9 April 1997. On 17 June 1997 the Regional Office for Care and Family Promotion rejected the objection.
On 9 July 1997 the applicant extended his action before the Social Court to include his claim for the second year of his daughter’s life concerning the period before 9 April 1997.
On 11 November 1997 the Würzburg Social Court rejected the applicant’s action in its entirety, holding that the applicant did not meet the requirements of the Child-raising Allowance Act. It also held that that Act’s requirement for foreign nationals to be in possession of a residence permit was not discriminatory. On 10 December 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment.
On 28 March 2001 the Bavarian Social Court of Appeal (Landessozialgericht) allowed an ancillary request concerning a cost decision but dismissed the appeal on the merits in its entirety. On 5 September 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against that judgment.
On 14 April 2003 the defendant acknowledged that the applicant’s claim on the merits was justified in so far as it concerned the two-day period of 7 and 8 April 1997.
On 24 April 2003 the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) dismissed the appeal on points of law.
On 30 June 2003 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
On 6 July 2004 the Federal Constitutional Court held, in proceedings by which the applicant was not directly concerned, that the pertinent provisions of the Child-raising Allowance Act violated the right to equal treatment enshrined in the German Basic Law (case no. 1 BvR 2515/95). It added that if the Child-raising Allowance Act was not amended until 1 January 2006, the law prior to the amendment of the Child-raising Allowance Act in 1993 should be applied to cases that were not subject to a final decision. On the same day, the Federal Constitutional Court also declared, for the same reasons, the provisions of the Federal Child Benefits Act (Bundeskindergeldgesetz) to be unconstitutional (case nos. 1 BvL 4/97, 5/97, and 6/97), also allowing for a transitional period until 1 January 2006.
In relation to the applicant’s constitutional complaint the Federal Constitutional Court, on 17 March 2005, rescinded the judgment of the Federal Social Court referring to its earlier decision of 6 July 2004.
It remitted the case to the Federal Social Court and decided that the Federal Social Court was to adjourn the case until the impugned provisions of the Child-raising Allowance Act had been amended. The Federal Constitutional Court added, in line with its earlier decision, that if the Act was not amended until 1 January 2006, the Federal Social Court should apply the law prior to the amendment of the Child-raising Allowance Act in 1993.
On 18 September 2006 the defendant acknowledged the applicant’s claim; on 1 December 2006 it also offered to pay interest on the outstanding amount.
On 13 December 2006 the German legislator amended the Child-raising Allowance Act to allow foreigners with limited residence titles for exceptional purposes, whose proceedings had not yet ended with a final decision, to benefit from the child-raising allowance. This amendment entered into force retroactively on 1 January 2006.
On 10 May 2007 the Federal Social Court allowed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The Federal Social Court noted that the applicant had not accepted the defendant’s acknowledgment. It ordered the defendant to pay the agreed child-raising allowance plus the accrued interest.


ITEMID: 001-93628
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: MDA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: CASE OF BAROUL PARTNER-A v. MOLDOVA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of P1-1;Just satisfaction reserved
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 5. The applicant, Baroul Partner-A, is a company incorporated in Moldova.
6. In 2000, in accordance with the Law on the Privatisation Programme for the years 1997-2000, the Government put up for sale their portion of the shares (199,875 shares, representing 65.86%) in the Soroca Gravel and Granite Quarry Co. (“the quarry”).
7. The applicant company participated in the auction and, having offered the highest price, purchased the stock in February 2000 at a price of 12.5 Moldovan lei (MDL) per share. The total price of the purchased stock was MDL 2,498,437.5.
8. In 2003 the Court of Accounts carried out a check on the privatisation activity of the Government and in a decision of 3 January 2004 found that in 1996 the quarry had received from a third State-owned company twenty-seven railway carriages without any title and that those carriages had remained in the quarry's possession throughout its subsequent existence without ever being included in the accounting documents.
9. On an unspecified date in 2004 the Department of Privatisation initiated proceedings for unjust enrichment against the quarry, claiming compensation for the railway carriages. The proceedings ended with a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 11 November 2004, by which the quarry was ordered to pay the State MDL 972,000, representing the cost of the carriages as established by an expert report. The judgment was enforced in 2005.
10. On 29 July 2006 the Centre for the Fight against Economic Crime and Corruption (“CFECC”) initiated criminal proceedings in respect of the privatisation of the quarry. The activity of the quarry was blocked as a result of the seizure of the accounting documents, the refusal to extend licences for extraction of granite and gravel, and other measures taken against the quarry by the State authorities. It appears that the criminal investigation is still pending before the CFECC and that the case has never been brought before the courts.
11. On 15 December 2006 the Prosecutor General's Office initiated, on behalf of the Government, court proceedings against the Department of Privatisation and the applicant company, seeking the annulment of the contract of sale of the State-owned stock. It argued that since at the date of the sale of the shares the quarry had not included the twenty-seven carriages in its accounting documents (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above), the price of each share had been fixed at only MDL 12.5, whereas it should have been MDL 13.88. The Prosecutor General's Office did not make reference to the proceedings which ended with the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 11 November 2004. In its pleadings before the court, the Prosecutor's Office argued that its action was not time-barred since the time-limit did not apply to its court actions.
12. In its observations and pleadings, the Department of Privatisation disagreed with the Prosecutor General's action and argued that the applicant company had participated in an auction organised by the Government and had won it by offering the highest price for the shares. The auction was organised in accordance with the relevant regulations. The question of the carriages which had not been included in the quarry's accounting documents in 1996 had been resolved by the Department of Privatisation by way of civil proceedings which ended with the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 11 November 2004 in favour of the Department of Privatisation. That judgment was enforced in 2005.
13. In its observations and pleadings, the applicant company argued that the Prosecutor General's action was time-barred. It was contrary to the principle of legal certainty and equality of arms to allow the Prosecutor General to challenge administrative acts in the courts without the latter being subject to any time limitations. In any event, the provision of the old Civil Code exempting the Prosecutor General from complying with the general three-year time-limit only referred to claims against kolkhozs (collective farms), non-governmental organisations, cooperatives and citizens. The applicant company did not fall within any of those categories. Finally, the dispute over the carriages had already been resolved by a final judgment of the Supreme Court of 11 November 2004.
14. On 12 April 2007 the Economic Court upheld the Prosecutor General's action and found the arguments adduced by him to be well-founded. Referring to the applicant company's objection concerning the Statute of Limitations, the court found that the three-year time-limit was applicable to the Prosecutor General's court action. At the same time, according to the court, the time-limit was to be calculated from the date when the Prosecutor General's Office found out or must have found out about the problem with the carriages. In the court's opinion, that date was 3 January 2004, the date of the Court of Accounts' decision (see paragraph 8 above). Accordingly, the action was lodged within the three-year limit. As to the applicant's objection concerning the existence of a final judgment concerning the same dispute, the court found that objection ill-founded because the first set of proceedings had concerned the issue of compensation while the second concerned the issue of the annulment of the privatisation. The Economic Court ordered the annulment of the contract of sale of shares, the return of 199,975 shares to the State and the return to the applicant company of the price paid for them, MDL 2,498,437.5.
15. The applicant company appealed against this judgment and argued, inter alia, that the Economic Court had on its own initiative come up with a solution for the Prosecutor General's problem with the time-limit. Furthermore, the applicant disagreed with this solution and argued that the time-limit should be calculated from the date when the shares were bought. It submitted that there were no impediments preventing the Prosecutor General from finding out about the problem of the carriages before the Court of Accounts had issued its decision in January 2004 and relied in this connection on the official commentary to the Civil Code. The applicant company also submitted that there had been no impediments to the Court of Accounts conducting its investigation earlier, and argued that accepting the Economic Court's line of thinking amounted to accepting that the Prosecutor's Office could challenge transactions concluded very many years ago by arguing that it had just found out about their illegality. The applicant company further submitted that the dispute was identical to that which ended with the judgment of the Supreme Court of 11 November 2004 and that the judge of the Economic Court who had examined the case had been influenced by the Government.
16. On 12 July 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant company's appeal and upheld the reasoning given by the lower-instance court. The judgment became final and an enforcement warrant was issued, under which the applicant company was obliged to transmit to the Government 199,875 shares in the quarry.
17. During the enforcement proceedings, the Government realised that in spite of the favourable outcome of the proceedings for them, they had not gained control over the quarry. Notably, they learned that in 2002 the quarry had issued 349,738 new shares as a result of the applicant company's adding new extraction equipment worth MDL 3,147,642 to its assets. The new shares were registered by the National Commission of Movable Assets on 20 May 2002. As a result, the ratio of the shares in the quarry's stock obtained by the Government after the proceedings had ended with the judgment of 12 July 2007 represented 30.59% and the applicant company maintained control over the quarry.
18. On 21 August 2007 the Prosecutor General's Office, on behalf of the Government, applied to the Economic Court for a supplementary judgment. It argued that the meaning of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 12 July 2007 had been to put the parties in the position they had been prior to February 2000, when the State held 65.86%. However, that was not possible because of the issue of new shares in 2002. Accordingly, the court was requested to annul the decision of the quarry's shareholder's meeting concerning the issue of 349,738 shares and the decision of the National Commission of Movable Values on 30 May 2002 concerning the registration of the new shares.
19. In its submissions to the Economic Court the applicant company argued that the Prosecutor General's Office, acting on behalf of the Government, had not requested the annulment of the issue of 349,738 shares in its initial court action. According to Article 250 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a supplementary judgment could be issued only if the court had omitted to rule in respect of a claim made by one of the parties to the proceedings. Since the Prosecutor's Office only sought the annulment of the sale of 199,875 shares, his new request could not be treated in a supplementary judgment. In any event, the issue of the new shares took place in 2002 and, therefore, the Prosecutor Office's action was time-barred. The approach taken by the court in respect of the time-limit in the main proceedings was inapplicable to the new request of the Prosecutor General's Office because the Court of Accounts did not refer to the problem of the issue of new shares in its judgment of 3 January 2004. Accordingly, the Prosecutor could not claim to have found out about that only in January 2004.
20. On 6 September 2007 the Economic Court upheld the Prosecutor General's action. Referring to the applicant company's objection that no claim about the annulment of the issue of new shares had been made during the proceedings which had ended on 12 July 2007 and that the new request could not be examined in a supplementary judgment, the court found that the claim was implicit in the Prosecutor General's Office's action, seeking that the State be reinstated in its right of ownership of 65.86% of the quarry's shares. According to the court, it was impossible to make such a reinstatement without annulling the shares issued in 2002. Since the court failed to rule on that problem, it was necessary to treat it in a supplementary judgment. The court ordered the annulment of the new shares arguing that otherwise the Government would own only 30.59% of the quarry's stock, a situation contrary to the judgment of 12 July 2007, where it was ordered that the Government be reinstated in its right of ownership of 65.86% of the shares. The court did not refer to the applicant company's objection based on the time-limit.
21. The applicant company appealed against the judgment and argued, inter alia, that in its initial action the Prosecutor General's Office had requested the annulment of the sale of the shares in 2000 but not the reinstatement of the State in its right of ownership of 65.86% of the quarry's shares. In support of this submission the applicant company cited parts of the Prosecutor General's application before the first-instance court. It argued that the Economic Court had misrepresented the prosecutor's claims. The applicant company also submitted that the first-instance court had failed to address its Statute of Limitations objection.
22. On 18 October 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant company's appeal. It found that since the sale of the shares of 2000 had been declared void, the parties had to be reinstated in their initial position, namely the position before the act of sale when the State owned 65.86% of the shares. Therefore, it was correct for the Economic Court to adopt a supplementary judgment clarifying the situation.
23. On 24 December 2007 the applicant company applied to the Economic Court and requested it to explain how the judgment of 6 September 2007 was to be enforced in terms of restitution of its contribution as a result of which the quarry had issued new shares in 2002 (see paragraph 17 above).
24. On 3 March 2008 the Economic Court issued a new judgment explaining that the applicant company was to be paid by the Government MDL 3,147,642, the value of the shares issued in 2002. The Government appealed against this judgment.
25. On 3 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the Government's appeal, quashed the judgment of 3 March 2008 and ordered a re-examination.
26. On 7 July 2008 the Economic Court re-examined the applicant company's request. It did not order that the value of the shares issued in 2002 be returned to the applicant but that the latter be returned the extracting equipment which had been added to the quarry's assets in 2002 (see paragraph 17 above). The applicant company appealed and argued that the solution given by the Economic Court was contrary to domestic legislation. However, the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Justice on 4 September 2008.
27. Since the mining equipment had been used and was useless to the applicant company, it has not been recovered by it from the quarry.
28. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code, in force at the relevant time, provide:
The general limitation period for protection through a court action of the rights of a [natural] person is three years; it is one year for lawsuits between State organisations, collective farms and any other social organisations.
The competent court ... shall apply the limitation period whether or not the parties request such application.
The limitation period starts running from the day on which the right of action arises. The right of action arises on the day when a person comes to know or should have come to know that his right has been breached...
Expiry of the limitation period prior to initiation of court proceedings constitutes a ground for rejecting the claim.
If the competent court ... finds that the action has not commenced within the limitation period for well-founded reasons, the right in question shall be protected.
The limitation period does not apply:
...
(2) to claims by State organisations regarding restitution of State property found in the unlawful possession of ... other organisations ... and of citizens;”.
29. The relevant provisions of the new Civil Code, in force after 12 June 2003, read as follows:
“(1) The civil law does not have a retroactive character. It cannot modify or suppress the conditions in which a prior legal situation was constituted or the conditions in which such a legal situation was extinguished. The new law cannot alter or abolish the already created effects of a legal situation which has been extinguished or is in the process of execution.”
30. In a judgment of 20 April 2005 (case nr. 2ra-563/05) the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the plaintiff's contentions based on the provisions of the new Civil Code on the ground that the facts of the case related to a period before the entry into force of the new Civil Code and that, therefore, the provisions of the old Civil Code were applicable.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1