ITEMID: 001-76262
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: NLD
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF BAYBASIN v. THE NETHERLANDS
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 3;Not necessary to examine Art. 8;Just satisfaction reserved
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1956 and is serving a sentence of life imprisonment in the Netherlands.
6. On an unspecified date in 1996 the applicant was detained in the Netherlands in connection with a request for his extradition to Turkey, where he was suspected of murder. During his detention, there were serious indications that the applicant’s life was at risk from foreign State or non-State agents.
7. Shortly before his release in December 1996 – after a Netherlands court had ruled that the applicant’s extradition to Turkey was not permissible – the prison authorities received indications that the applicant and three co-detainees harboured escape plans. On 25 February 1998, the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the police, alleging that the Turkish authorities planned to kill him.
8. On 27 March 1998 the applicant was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention (voorlopige hechtenis) on suspicion of having committed serious crimes within a violent criminal organisation in which he played a leading role. Criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant, who was sentenced in first-instance proceedings to twenty years’ imprisonment. On 30 July 2002, following proceedings on appeal, the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of ‘s-Hertogenbosch quashed the first-instance judgment, convicted the applicant of several offences and sentenced him to life imprisonment. His subsequent appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) was dismissed on 21 October 2003.
9. The applicant was initially detained in an ordinary remand centre (huis van bewaring). Shortly after he was apprehended, and on the basis of information indicating a risk that he would seek ways to escape and also reports that he was in danger of being “liquidated”, he was transferred to the National Segregation Unit (Landelijke Afzonderingsafdeling) in a Rotterdam detention facility.
10. On 26 June 1998, on the advice of the special selection board of the maximum security institution (Extra Beveiligde Inrichting – “EBI”), the Minister of Justice decided to place the applicant in the pre-trial detention unit of the EBI, which is part of the Nieuw Vosseveld Penitentiary Complex in Vught. His detention in the EBI prison was reviewed and extended by the Minister every six months. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged each decision to extend before the Appeals Board (beroepscommissie) of the Central Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice (Centrale Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing). On 1 April 2001 the Central Council was replaced by the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles (Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing en Jeugdbescherming).
11. By letter of 16 July 2001 the applicant was informed that the Minister of Justice had decided to extend his detention in the EBI once again. According to information contained in the proposal of 25 June 2001 to extend the applicant’s stay in the EBI, he had not had any contact with social workers during the previous six months and apparently did not feel the need to have such contact. The proposal, which describes in detail the applicant’s attitude, behaviour and activities in the EBI, does not mention any psychological problems encountered by the applicant caused by his detention in the EBI.
12. The letter of 16 July 2001, in its relevant part, reads as follows:
“From the information available about you, it appears that you must be regarded as likely to try to escape (vluchtgevaarlijk). On this subject, I would inform you as follows.
Official reports (ambtsberichten) that have been received point out that – quite apart from your membership of a criminal organisation – you are suspected of having committed serious crimes. You are suspected of leadership of an international criminal organisation that must be regarded as very violent. You are suspected of having personally instigated very serious and very violent crimes that have seriously undermined law and order. You have since been sentenced at first instance to twenty years’ imprisonment, after a sentence of life imprisonment was sought [by the prosecution]. You have lodged an appeal.
When you were being transferred to the Breda Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) and the National Segregation Unit in Rotterdam on 8 April 1998 and 10 April 1998 respectively, “suspect” cars were observed [whose registered owners] may have been connected to persons with a criminal background. You have indicated that you(r family) are wealthy. It is therefore also reasonable to conclude that you are capable of providing financial backing for escape plans, in this instance for the organisation of an escape (attempt) via the hiring of third parties.
Also during a previous detention, in the ... detention facility, there were indications, on 29 November 1996, that you had plans to mount an escape together with others, in an operation involving a firearm. On 9 December 1996, in the same detention facility, information (was found) that could be connected to the indications referred to above. Your previous detention was a consequence of the fact that Turkey (unsuccessfully, as it later transpired) had requested your extradition in connection with serious crimes.
As during your previous detention, you have indicated that you are being threatened with “liquidation”, even whilst in detention. You also lodged a criminal complaint to that effect with the Rotterdam police on 25 February 1998. Accordingly, as during your previous detention, you were transferred – in view of the seriousness of the information, which became apparent after the investigation – [to the National Segregation Unit on 10 April 1998] in order to secure not only your safety but also the order, peace and security of the prison where you were detained. The fears which you expressed were confirmed once more in May 1998 by official reports.
On 13 September 1999 you and your sister, who was visiting you, acted in breach of the rules governing the regime in the EBI. Your sister allowed you to read uncensored reports which she then destroyed. Disciplinary action was taken against you as a result.
With reference to the contents of the third paragraph, I would inform you that in January 2001 the presence of another “suspicious” car was noted near the EBI around the time of your transfer to the Rotterdam Regional Court. Three persons who had been travelling in the car were present in the courtroom on 25 January 2001. They turned out to have criminal records.
On 30 October 2000 you and a co-detainee had a conversation about one of the latter’s escape attempts elsewhere in the Netherlands. In this context the co-detainee concerned told you that he had paid 25,000 Netherlands guilder for this. It was noted that your co-detainee added that ‘that would never succeed here because the staff and the Governor work closely together’.
In the meantime, after life imprisonment was sought [by the prosecution], you have been sentenced at first instance to twenty years’ imprisonment. You have lodged an appeal.
An escape on your part would be unacceptable to society and would seriously undermine law and order, having regard to the serious crimes of which you are suspected and, in this case, of which you have been convicted at first instance. If plans to “liquidate” you were to materialise, this would give rise to offences creating social unrest and seriously undermining law and order.
In view of the above, the [EBI] selection board, having heard evidence from the selection officer (with whom you refused to speak), has advised me to continue your detention in the EBI. I have taken a decision to that effect.
To give you as full a picture as possible, I would further inform you that the rules governing the EBI regime offer added guarantees for preventing the implementation of (possible) plans to “liquidate” you. In this connection it must be mentioned, with reference to what has been stated above, that (at the beginning of 2000) “liquidation plans” concerning you came to light within the EBI, in this case death threats by third persons. You indicated that you took these threats very seriously; you appeared frightened and it was clear that they had made an impression on you.”
13. On 25 July 2001 the applicant, as in the case of the previous decisions to extend, again challenged the extension of his stay in the EBI by lodging an appeal with the Appeals Board of the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles. In his appeal against the decision of 16 July 2001 the applicant challenged the necessity of his continued detention in the EBI. He also stated that he was suffering both physically and mentally as a result of the EBI detention regime without, however, substantiating that claim. Relying on the findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CPT”) in respect of its visit to the EBI in 1997 and on the Court’s decision on admissibility of 28 August 2001 in the case of Van der Ven v. the Netherlands (no. 50901/99), he argued that his (continued) detention in the EBI infringed his rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention on account of the EBI detention regime.
14. On 27 February 2002 the Appeals Board dismissed the appeal. It held, on the basis of the different elements set out in the impugned decision, that the applicant was extremely likely to try to escape and, in view of the offences of which he was suspected, that he posed an unacceptable risk in terms of the danger of his committing further serious violent crimes. Noting that the applicant was suspected of offences in respect of which a twenty-year prison sentence had been imposed at first instance and which were a source of grave concern to society and public opinion, the Appeals Board was of the opinion that the applicant, in the event of an escape, would pose an unacceptable risk to society. It also took into account the fact that specific threats to kill the applicant or to have him killed had repeatedly come to light. It therefore concluded that the applicant’s stay in the EBI corresponded to both situations provided for in Article 6 (a) and (b) of the Regulation on the selection, placement and transfer of detainees (Regeling selectie, plaatsing en overplaatsing van gedetineerden) of 15 August 2000. As regards the applicant’s reliance on the Convention, it held that the proceedings on the extension of the applicant’s stay in the EBI fell outside the scope of Article 6 of the Convention and that the interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention was permissible to the extent that such interference was in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of, inter alia, the prevention of disorder or crime. Lastly, it held that the decision to extend the applicant’s stay in the EBI was lawful and that, weighing up all the interests involved, it could not be considered as unreasonable or unjust. It did not deal with the applicant’s argument that the extension of his stay in the EBI was contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
15. In the meantime, on 21 December 2001, the applicant’s detention in the EBI had been extended again. His appeal to the Appeals Board was dismissed on 30 May 2002 on the same grounds as those given in the Appeal Board’s decision of 27 February 2002.
16. On 21 May 2002 the applicant’s detention in the EBI was extended once more. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Appeals Board against this decision on 30 May 2002. No further information has been submitted about these appeal proceedings.
17. On 24 December 2003 the applicant was transferred from the EBI to another prison with a different regime.
18. On 23 March 2004 Dr R.J.P. Rijnders – a psychiatrist attached to the Centre 1945 Foundation (Stichting Centrum ‘45), a national centre for the medical-psychological treatment of members of the Resistance in the Second World War, victims of war and organised violence, and asylum seekers suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder related to experiences in their country of origin – drew up a report on the applicant’s state of mental health. According to the report the applicant had developed various mental problems (chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and a strong tendency towards somatisation) during his detention in the EBI. The post-traumatic stress phenomena were mainly linked to his experiences in the EBI and only some of his complaints and symptoms were connected with his experiences in Turkey.
19. On 10 August 2004 the applicant brought a civil action in tort (onrechtmatige daad) against the Netherlands State before the Hague Regional Court. One of the grounds on which he claimed payment of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage for unlawful acts for which he considered the Netherlands State to be liable was that, from his arrest in March 1998 until the end of December 2003, he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment on account of the conditions of his detention, including “(continuous) sensory deprivation and insufficient social contact (extensive social isolation), humiliating and unnecessary strip-searches, frisking, [and] being prohibited (inter alia) from communicating in Kurdish with, for instance, his mother and children”. The applicant based this part of his claim on the Court’s findings in its judgments of 4 February 2003 in the cases of Van der Ven v. the Netherlands (no. 50901/99, ECHR 2003-II) and Lorsé and Others v. the Netherlands (no. 52750/99), the findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) as set out in two reports (see paragraphs 46-47 below), a report drawn up on 10 October 2003 by academic researchers on the psychological impact of the EBI regime on the mental well-being of (former) inmates (see paragraph 23 below), and the report drawn up on 23 March 2004 by the psychiatrist R.J.P. Rijnders (see paragraph 18 above). These civil proceedings are currently pending before the Regional Court.
20. An overview of the relevant domestic law and practice is given in the Court’s judgment of 4 February 2003 in the case of Van der Ven v. the Netherlands (no. 50901/99, §§ 26-35, ECHR 2003-II) and in Baybaşın v. the Netherlands ((dec.), no. 13600/02, 6 October 2005).
21. On 1 March 2003, in view of the Court’s findings in its judgments of 4 February 2003 in the cases of Van der Ven (cited above) and Lorsé and Others (cited above), the EBI house rules (huisregels) were amended, with the result that the practice of weekly routine strip-searches accompanying the weekly cell inspections was abandoned. Under the amended Article 6(4) of the EBI house rules, strip-searches could be carried out at random during or directly after a weekly cell inspection.
22. As from 10 July 2003, pursuant to a ruling given on 7 July 2003 by the judge responsible for provisional measures (voorzieningenrechter) of the Hague Regional Court in summary injunction proceedings brought against the Netherlands State in June 2003 by thirteen EBI detainees, the random strip-searches were no longer linked to cell inspections and the EBI authorities from then on determined in the case of each individual detainee to what extent random stripsearches were called for. The situation of each individual detainee is now discussed at the monthly EBI staff meeting on detainees.
23. On 10 October 2003 researchers from the Free University of Amsterdam presented a report on a study, commissioned in January 2001 by the Minister of Justice, about the psychological impact of the EBI regime on the mental well-being of (former) inmates (see paragraphs 47-48 below). It concluded that the EBI regime affected the cognitive functioning of detainees in a negative manner, with particular reference to the speed of processing information and response inhibition. This was probably a result of the lack of stimuli in the detention situation. The report further concluded that the EBI regime caused more depression than a restricted community regime and that strip-searches were perceived as humiliating, constituting an extra burden for persons detained in the EBI. On the other hand, the EBI regime provided a better balance between rest and activity than a restricted community regime, as a result of which EBI detainees maintained a healthier life rhythm. In addition it had not been demonstrated that EBI detainees displayed more physical symptoms of persistent mental stress.
24. Under Netherlands law the civil courts have traditionally had jurisdiction to grant relief against the authorities, if and in so far as no other relief is available. Where a person bases a claim against the authorities on an allegation that the latter have committed a tort within the meaning of Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) against him or her, the civil courts have jurisdiction in principle. Where the civil courts have jurisdiction, they can also act in summary injunction proceedings (kort geding) in which a plaintiff can, inter alia, request the civil court to issue an order against the authorities. An act by the authorities is unlawful and constitutes a tort when it violates a right of the plaintiff or is contrary to a rule of international or domestic law which seeks to protect the plaintiff’s interests, or to general principles of proper administration (algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur). An action in tort is subject to a limitation period of five years under Article 3:310 (1) of the Civil Code.
25. However, as to the jurisdiction of the civil courts in cases where an administrative appeal lies, it is an established principle under Netherlands law that – given the closed system of legal remedies (gesloten system van rechtsmiddelen) in the Netherlands legal system – the civil court should refrain from examining the lawfulness of an administrative decision, provided that the administrative appeal offers sufficient guarantees as to a fair procedure. On this topic, extensive case-law has been developed by the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) over the last decades, supported by several authorities, to the effect that where an administrative appeal does not offer sufficient guarantees of a fair procedure, the civil courts have full jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of the administrative decision. On the other hand, a civil action should be declared inadmissible when another specific remedy exists which offers sufficient guarantees of fair proceedings (see Supreme Court, 12 December 1986, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Netherlands Law Reports – “NJ”) 1987, no. 381; see also Oerlemans v. the Netherlands, judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 219, §§ 21-35 and §§ 53-56).
26. In a case in which it gave judgment on 3 December 1971, the Supreme Court examined the question whether a party which considers that it has been injured by a judicial ruling against it can bring a subsequent civil action in tort against the State arguing that the judge failed to act with due care in giving that ruling. The Supreme Court found that this was not possible, holding that it was solely for the legislature to decide in what cases a remedy was to be provided. It would be incompatible with this principle if an unsuccessful party were to have the possibility, via a civil action, of making the correctness of a [final] judicial ruling the subject matter of new proceedings, and thus to obtain a renewed examination in another manner than that provided for by statute. It added that only if the proceedings leading to a judicial decision had breached such fundamental legal principles (fundamentele rechtsbeginselen) that the case could no longer be said to have been determined in a fair and impartial manner, and if there was no possibility of appeal nor had there ever been such a possibility, could the State be held liable for the effects of such a ruling in a civil action in tort (NJ 1972, no. 137; see also Supreme Court, 29 April 1994, NJ 1995, no. 727; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 16 July 1998 and 12 November 1998, NJ 1999, nos. 256 and 127; and Court of Appeal of The Hague, 7 April 2000 and 18 May 2000, Administrative Law Reports (Jurisprudentie Bestuursrecht) 2000, nos. 147 and 142).
27. In a judgment given on 3 April 1987 concerning civil proceedings taken against the Netherlands State by an association of detainees who wished to challenge a special restricteddetention regime in a specific wing of the prison in The Hague, the Supreme Court held that, as individual detainees had available to them a specific remedy to challenge a transfer to the wing concerned (that is to say, the individual complaint procedure provided for in Article 51 et seq. of the Prison Act 1953 (Beginselenwet Gevangeniswezen) as in force at that time) and it was not in dispute that that remedy offered sufficient procedural safeguards, the plaintiff’s case had been correctly declared inadmissible, as the association had acted solely “in the context of promoting the interests of its members”, which were already safeguarded by the individual complaint procedure under Article 51 et seq. of the Prisons Act 1953 (NJ 1987, no. 744).
28. In a judgment given on 1 February 1991 (NJ 1991, no. 413) in a civil action against the Netherlands State brought by a coaccused of a successful applicant in Strasbourg (Kostovski v. the Netherlands, judgment of 20 November 1989, Series A no. 166), the Supreme Court held:
“It is embedded in the [Netherlands] legal system that a criminal court conviction against which an ordinary appeal can no longer be lodged not only should, but must, be executed. It is further incompatible with the closed system of legal remedies in criminal cases that a convicted person should have the opportunity, via a claim [for damage arising from tort] against the State, to bring a fresh set of legal proceedings challenging the decision of the criminal court or the acceptability of the [criminal] proceedings leading to the decision and to have [the subject matter of those proceedings] reviewed by the civil courts.
Considering the obligations flowing from Articles 1, 5 and 13 [of the Convention] to secure the rights set out in Article 6 [of the Convention] and to provide an effective remedy in the event of a violation of those rights, an exception must be made to the above-mentioned rules should a ruling of the European Court [of Human Rights], which the criminal court judge could not take into account in his decision, prompt the conclusion that the decision had come about in such a manner that it could no longer be said that there had been a fair hearing of the case within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 [of the Convention].
When such an exceptional case occurs, immediate execution of the decision can no longer be regarded as permitted under the legal system, and the person convicted can institute interim injunction proceedings [before the civil court judge] seeking – depending on the circumstances – to have execution prohibited, suspended or limited. The nature of interim injunction proceedings and the reticence to be observed by the judge in interim injunction proceedings when examining the manner in which an irrevocable decision of the criminal court judge has come about, mean that there is scope for granting such a claim only when it is beyond reasonable doubt that the ruling of the European Court [of Human Rights] indeed requires that the above-mentioned conclusion be reached.”
In this case, the Supreme Court accepted the Court of Appeal’s finding against the plaintiff in view of the fact that, when the impugned ruling was given on 22 December 1988, the Court had not yet delivered its judgment in the Kostovski case.
29. A number of persons detained in the EBI have in the past sought to bring interim injunction proceedings before the civil courts in order to have the regime, or certain aspects of it, relaxed (for further details, see Lorsé and Others, cited above, §§ 40-42).
30. On 1 January 2003 an amendment to Article 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering – “the CCP”) entered into force, governing possible means of obtaining revision (herziening) of final judgments. This amendment extended the existing grounds on which a revision of a final conviction could be sought by including as a ground for revision a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that the criminal proceedings leading to that conviction had been in violation of the Convention. The relevant part of the amended text of Article 457 of the CCP reads:
“1. An application for revision of a final ruling (eindbeslissing) entailing a conviction which has obtained the force of res iudicata can be lodged:
...
3o. on the ground of a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in which it has been established that [the Convention or one of its Protocols] has been violated in the proceedings leading to the conviction ... if revision is necessary in order to secure reparation within the meaning of Article 41 of [the Convention].”
A request for revision can be lodged with the Supreme Court by the Procurator-General, the convicted person or the latter’s lawyer within a period of three months after the convicted person has become aware of the Court’s ruling referred to in Article 457 (1), subparagraph 3 (Article 458 of the CCP).
31. If the Supreme Court accepts a request for revision based on Article 457 (1), subparagraph 3, it can either itself determine the criminal charges after reopening of the criminal proceedings, or order the suspension of execution of the original judgment and remit the case for a fresh determination to a Court of Appeal different from the one that gave the original judgment (Article 567 (2) of the CCP).
32. In its judgment of 23 April 1997 in the case of Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands (Reports 1997III), the Court found a violation of the Convention in that the criminal proceedings against the four applicants had not been conducted in compliance with the requirements of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention. In its judgment it awarded each of the applicants an amount for costs and expenses and adjourned its examination of the applicants’ claim for non-pecuniary damage, considering that that part of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction was not ready for decision.
33. On 23 April 1997 the applicants in that case lodged a request for their immediate release from detention, failing which they would bring summary injunction proceedings against the State. On 25 April 1997 the Minister of Justice decided to grant them temporary release (strafonderbreking) and they were released from prison on the same day.
34. The Court determined the applicants’ claims for non-pecuniary damage in its judgment of 30 October 1997 (Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands (Article 50), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997VII), in which it noted that under domestic law it was not possible for the applicants to obtain a retrial1. The applicants had claimed 250 Netherlands guilders (NLG) for each day spent in detention, resulting in total claims of between NLG 746,000 and NLG 752,500. After having examined the respondent Government’s comments on those claims, the Court awarded one applicant NLG 30,000 (13,613.41 euros (EUR)) and each of the three other applicants NLG 25,000 (EUR 11,344.51) for non-pecuniary damage, and rejected the remainder of the applicants’ claims for non-pecuniary damage.
35. On 19 February 1999 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, exercising its supervisory powers under the Convention as regards the execution of the Court’s judgments of 23 April 1997 and 30 October 1997, adopted a final resolution (Res DH(99)124) in the case. Having noted the measures taken by the Netherlands on the basis of the Court’s judgments, the Committee of Ministers concluded that the manner in which the Netherlands had executed both judgments was in compliance with their obligations under the Convention.
36. On 29 April 1999 three of the four applicants brought a civil action in tort against the Netherlands State before the Hague Regional Court. They sought a declaratory ruling that the Netherlands State was liable for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage arising out of unlawful administration of justice in violation of their rights under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d). They sought payment of compensation corresponding to NLG 250 for each day spent in detention, less the compensation amount awarded by the Court. They based their claims on the argument that, given the Court’s findings in its judgment of 23 April 1997, it had been established that in the domestic criminal proceedings against them the Netherlands judge had breached fundamental legal principles and that the resulting judgment and their detention had been unlawful.
37. In its judgment of 5 July 2003, following appeal proceedings taken by the Netherlands State, the Hague Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment given on 17 January 2001 by the Regional Court, and for the time spent in detention (pre-trial and following conviction) awarded compensation for non-pecuniary damage to the first plaintiff in the amount of EUR 190,240, less EUR 13,613.41 already awarded by the Court. It awarded the second plaintiff EUR 127,120, less EUR 11,344.51 awarded by the Court, and the third plaintiff EUR 127,140, less EUR 11,344.51 awarded by the Court. The Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that:
“The finding of the European Court [of Human Rights] that full redress (volledige genoegdoening) by means of a ‘retrial’ in the Netherlands is not possible, means that the European Court may award compensation on grounds of equity (vergoeding naar billijkheid), but not that in subsequent civil proceedings the domestic judge can no longer award full compensation for damage (volledige schadevergoeding). The State’s argument, that [the three plaintiffs] requested compensation for damage for the first time before the European Court and not previously before the domestic judge, and that the European Court would have taken into account in its judgment the same claims for damages (schadeposten) as those now in issue in the present procedure, fails because no rule exists prohibiting the bringing of a claim before the Netherlands judge seeking compensation for damage, a part of which – namely an award in equity – has already been awarded in separate proceedings before the European Court.”
38. In its judgment of 18 March 2005 on the appeal on points of law brought by the Netherlands State against the ruling of 5 July 2003, the Supreme Court held that the State had been correct in not challenging this part of the reasoning in the impugned judgment.
39. On 4 February 2003 the Court delivered its judgment in the case of Lorsé and Others (cited above), finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant Lorsé in that, during his stay in the EBI of more than six years, the applicant – who was already subjected to a great number of control measures – had been subjected to weekly routine strip-searches without convincing security reasons. It found no violation in respect of the other grievances raised by Mr Lorsé and the other applicants (his spouse and his children) under Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention. As regards damages, the applicants requested the Court to award them a symbolic amount of NLG 1,000 (EUR 453.78), stating that no amount of money would be capable of compensating for the harm suffered by them. Taking the view that Mr Lorsé had sustained some non-material damage on account of the treatment which had been found contrary to Article 3, the Court awarded him for nonpecuniary damage EUR 453.78, that is to say, the full amount claimed under that head.
40. On 6 February 2003 Mr Lorsé brought summary injunction proceedings against the Netherlands State before the judge responsible for provisional measures in the Civil Law Division of the Hague Regional Court, seeking an order against the State to cease with immediate effect the execution of the fifteen-year prison sentence that had been imposed on him, to release him immediately from prison and not to seek payment of the fine of NLG 1,000,000 (EUR 453,780.22) that had also been imposed.
41. On 12 February 2003 the judge responsible for provisional measures ruled on the applicant’s request. This decision, in its relevant part, reads:
“3.1. The plaintiff has an urgent interest in his claim. The civil court judge – in this case the judge responsible for provisional measures in summary injunction proceedings – is empowered to take cognisance [of the case], as the plaintiff claims that the State has acted unlawfully toward him by, inter alia, continuing his detention.
3.2. For the determination of the claim, it is a fact that the State has violated the applicant’s rights under Article 3....
3.3. Under Article 41 of [the Convention] the applicant is entitled to reparation (rechtsherstel) in respect of this irreparable violation of the Convention. If need be, he can assert that right before the courts. The State is deemed to be acting unlawfully towards him if no suitable form of redress is provided.
3.4. The parties provide different answers to the question as to whether the measures requested by the plaintiff ... constitute a form of redress compatible with our legal system and, if so, whether those measures are suitable and appropriate in this case.
3.5. [The judge responsible for provisional measures rejects] the argument of the State that the closed system of legal remedies in criminal proceedings and the corresponding obligation of the State to execute rulings of the criminal courts, militate against this form of redress. In this system, no provision has been made to date for (a suitable response to) a violation of the kind at issue in the instant case. There have been no prior similar cases, and the possible occurrence of such cases has apparently not been taken into consideration in legislation or in existing case-law. In principle, early release or non-execution of a fine imposed may constitute a suitable form of redress for a violation of Article 3 of the Convention of the kind in issue. This exception to the closed system of legal remedies in criminal cases is, to that extent, consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in its judgment of 1 February 1991 (NJ 1991, 413).
3.6. The State has referred to the financial compensation awarded by the [European Court of Human Rights] and to the just satisfaction which, in the case of the applicant, lies in the fact that his complaint was declared well-founded [by the European Court of Human Rights]. However, these two elements do not form a suitable, and certainly not a sufficient, form of redress for the plaintiff. Consequently, they do not stand in the way of the claims being allowed. The plaintiff can request the domestic judge to order that additional measures be taken.
3.7. In reply to a question, the State stated that it was possible, in this respect, to consider measures such as the plaintiff’s serving the remainder of his prison sentence under a less strict regime or the granting of a pardon in accordance with existing procedure. ... Again, these options do not form an obstacle to allowing the claims. The first option does not constitute sufficient redress in this case, while the option of a pardon corresponds to (a request for) a concession rather than the granting of a right, which is what is at issue here.
3.8. In these circumstances, the State should release the plaintiff earlier than June 2004 [when the plaintiff becomes eligible for early release] and waive the execution of the sentence in its entirety. Having regard to the nature of the violation of the Convention which is an established fact, a form of redress (genoegdoening) which relates to the applicant’s liberty is more suitable, and in any event warrants greater priority than waiving payment of the part of the fine still outstanding.
3.9. No fixed standard exists for ‘offsetting’ the remaining part of the plaintiff’s prison sentence. There are no pertinent reference points on the subject in the existing legislation. This means that the amount of the compensation must be determined on an equitable basis (naar billijkheid). The seriousness of the violation [of the Convention] justifies reduction of the sentence by a period equal to 10% of the number of days for which the applicant was subjected to the regime in the EBI... This amounts to a reduction of 230 days (round figure)...
3.10. On the basis of this solution, the plaintiff’s claim should be rejected. Indeed, the plaintiff has no urgent interest in a provisional measure which will only take effect after about nine months [when the applicant has served his mitigated sentence]... It is assumed that the State (the Minister of Justice) will execute this ruling and release the plaintiff at a time that can be determined precisely on the basis of the standard set out here. If need be, the plaintiff can apply again in due course to the judge responsible for provisional measures.
3.11. Each of the parties can in fact be deemed to have been ruled against.”
42. Both parties agreed to lodge a direct “leapfrog” appeal on points of law (sprongcassatie) with the Supreme Court, which dismissed both appeals on 31 October 2003. Although it agreed with the Netherlands State that the judge responsible for provisional measures had incorrectly assumed that Article 41 of the Convention gave Mr Lorsé an (independent) right to redress which, if need be, could be asserted before the domestic judge, it held that this could not lead to the setting-aside of the judgment as, pursuant to the Convention, the State was obliged to provide redress. However, relying on the Court’s reasoning in the cases of Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece ((Article 50), judgment of 31 October 1995, Series A no. 330B) and Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy ([GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, ECHR 2000VIII), the Supreme Court considered that, although the State was in principle free to determine the manner in which redress was to be provided, that freedom did not mean that the domestic judge was unable to take a decision on that point, but simply that a suitable form of redress was to be sought within the domestic legal order. As the Netherlands State had acted unlawfully towards Mr Lorsé in so far as his rights under Article 3 had been violated, as found by the Court, Mr Lorsé was entitled to claim compensation from the State, which would be acting unlawfully if it failed to provide a suitable form of redress. The Supreme Court accepted that such compensation could be granted in a manner other than the payment of a sum of money. In cases such as the present one, where the violation found concerned the manner of execution of a custodial sentence, it could take the form of cessation of the execution of the sentence. The Supreme Court found that the order of the judge responsible for provisional measures to cease execution of the prison sentence should be regarded as a suitable form of compensation in kind in the case of Mr Lorsé. As regards the argument raised by the State that the closed system of legal remedies and the corresponding obligation for the State to execute rulings of the criminal courts precluded the form of redress claimed by Mr Lorsé, the Supreme Court – while acknowledging that there was a difference between a situation in which the violation found concerned a domestic criminal conviction itself or the proceedings having led to that conviction [as in the case of Van Mechelen and Others] and a situation in which the violation found was unrelated to such a conviction or proceedings [as in the case of Mr LorséLorsé.
43. In its judgment of 8 April 2003 in the case of M.M. v. the Netherlands (no. 39339/98), in which the applicant complained that his telephone conversations with a Mrs S. had been recorded by the latter with equipment provided by the police with a view to their use as prosecution evidence against him, the Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on the ground that the conversations in question had not been recorded “in accordance with the law”. As the applicant had declined to submit any claims for compensation in respect of pecuniary or nonpecuniary damage, stating that he intended instead to pursue such claims before the domestic courts, the Court made no award for just satisfaction under those headings. In so far as the applicant claimed compensation for legal costs and expenses incurred by him in the domestic proceedings, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument that the criminal proceedings against him had resulted entirely from the violation it had found in his case, taking the view that those proceedings had in fact been occasioned by a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on the applicant’s part, and recalling that it had already at the admissibility stage rejected the applicant’s complaints touching on the use made of the evidence obtained as a result of the violation found.
44. On an unspecified date and on the basis of the Court’s findings in its judgment of 8 April 2003, the applicant M.M. filed a request with the Supreme Court for revision of the final domestic judgment of 16 June 1995, in which the Court of Appeal – without the recorded telephone conversations having been relied on in evidence – had convicted him of having sexually assaulted Mrs S. and another woman and had sentenced him to a suspended term of four months’ imprisonment and payment of a fine of NLG 10,000 (EUR 4,537.80), to be replaced by 100 days’ detention in the event of non-payment.
45. On 27 September 2005 the Supreme Court accepted the request for revision and, in accordance with Article 467 (2) of the CCP, determined the matter itself. It held:
“4.4. ... the State has the obligation to provide redress if the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation of a Convention provision. Such redress can be provided entirely or in part within the framework of the revision procedure, amended for this purpose.
4.5. Having regard to the violation of Article 8 found by the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that revision is necessary for the purposes of redress. To that extent, the request is well-founded. ... The request is aimed primarily at having the Supreme Court declare the prosecution inadmissible, while quashing the judgment in respect of which revision is sought.
4.6. The Supreme Court cannot accede to this request since it is only in exceptional cases that a prosecution may be declared inadmissible, and the instant case cannot be considered as such. In this respect the petitioner relies mistakenly on [the Supreme Court’s judgment of 19 December 1995; NL 1996, no. 249]. In that case the Supreme Court held that, in certain circumstances, a serious breach of the principles of proper proceedings may lead to the prosecution being declared inadmissible if, as a result of that breach, deliberately or owing to gross negligence of the defendant’s interests, the defendant’s right to a fair hearing has been violated. As the European Court of Human Rights, in its decision on admissibility [M.M.. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 39339/98] of 21 May 2002, preceding its judgment of 8 April 2003, declared inadmissible the [applicant’s] complaint under Article 6 of the Convention as being manifestly ill-founded, it cannot be said that there has been a serious breach of the principles of proper proceedings as a result of which, deliberately or owing to gross negligence of the [applicant’s] interests, his right to a fair hearing has been violated.
4.7. Taking into account that, in the proceedings leading to the judgment of which revision is sought, there was no breach of Article 6 and that the contents of the recorded telephone conversations were not used in evidence, there is no ground for referring the case to another Court of Appeal under Article 461 of the CCP for the purposes of obtaining redress, as requested by the petitioner in the alternative.
4.8. In the light of the importance of the provision violation and the nature and seriousness of the irreparable defects in the preliminary criminal investigation, as found by the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court will, after accepting the [revision] request, determine the matter itself, in accordance with Article 467 (2) of the CCP, and reduce the fine imposed by the Court of Appeal in the following manner.”
The Supreme Court quashed the original judgment of the Court of Appeal in part, that is, in respect only of the amount of the fine imposed and the duration of the alternative detention period, reducing the fine by 10% to EUR 4,000 and the duration of the alternative detention to 90 days.
46. The findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) as regards the EBI, as set out in its Report on the visit to the Netherlands from 17 to 27 November 1997, together with the Netherlands Government’s response to these findings, are set out in the Court’s judgment of 4 February 2003 in the case of Van der Ven (cited above, §§ 32-35).
47. The CPT visited the Netherlands again from 17 to 26 February 2002 and, in the course of this visit, carried out a follow-up visit to the EBI. Its findings were the following (Report to the Authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the visits carried out to the Kingdom in Europe and to the Netherlands Antilles by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) in February 2002, CPT/Inf (2002) 30, excerpts):
“33. At the time of the February 2002 visit, the Extra Security Institution (EBI) at the Nieuw Vosseveld Prison Complex was being renovated, and the inmates allocated to it were being held in the Temporary Extra Security Institution ((T)/EBI) building nearby (cf. paragraph 58 of CPT/Inf (98) 15).
In addition to paying a brief visit to the facilities undergoing renovation, the CPT’s delegation examined the regime currently being applied, and devoted attention to the procedures governing placement and extension of placement in EBI. In the course of the visit, interviews were held with all 14 inmates, the establishment’s management and staff, as well as representatives of the EBI Selection Board.
...
c. regime
37. Following its first visit to the EBI, the CPT expressed considerable concern about the regime applied within the institution. It recommended that the regime be revised, in particular as regards certain of its features: the group system (if not discarded, to at least be relaxed and inmates to be allowed more out-of-cell time and a broader range of activities); searching policies (to be reviewed in order to ensure that they are strictly necessary from a security standpoint); and visiting arrangements (to be reviewed, the objective being to have visits take place under more open conditions) (cf. paragraphs 61 to 70 of CPT/Inf (98) 15).
However, in their response (dated 1 March 1999) to the CPT’s visit report, the Dutch authorities defended point by point the different aspects of the regime being applied in the EBI (cf. paragraph 29 of CPT/Inf (99) 5).
38. In the course of the February 2002 visit, the Director of the Nieuw Vosseveld Prison Complex and the Acting Director of the EBI informed the CPT’s delegation that a limited number of modifications to the regime and its implementation had taken place. For instance, steps were being taken to increase staff/inmate communication through a training programme known as “Safety at the door”, as well as by the previously-mentioned adaptations of the exercise yards. Further, a slight expansion of the types of activities offered had made it possible for inmates to practice playing musical instruments in their cells. Another positive development was that the special “handcuffs regime” (cf. paragraph 8 of CPT/Inf (98) 15) had not been applied in respect of any inmate since 1999.
However, despite these welcome developments, the regime in the unit was essentially the same as in 1997, and the prison’s management acknowledged that there had been “no change in most of the rules”. Although the official allowance for activities was generous (50 or more hours per week), in practice, most inmates’ out-of-cell time did not appear to have increased (averaging 2 to 4 hours per day). The stringing of plastic curtain hooks on short rods, which was performed individually in the cells, continued to be the only work offered. It remained the case that body searches - including anal inspections - were performed on each prisoner at least once a week 13, a process which was invariably perceived as humiliating. Conditions under which visits and sessions with non-custodial staff took place also continued to be very restrictive. Inmates’ remarks to the delegation (e.g. “losing positivity”, lacking “future feelings”, “beginning to hate people from the heart”, and/or having to cope by being “mentally separate”) frequently echoed those made in November 1997.
To sum up, inmates held in the EBI remained subject to a very impoverished regime.
39. In an environment which is potentially hazardous to the mental health of prisoners, it is of critical importance to provide a varied programme of appropriate stimulating activities (including education, sport, work of vocational value, etc.). The CPT calls upon the Dutch authorities to make further efforts with a view to increasing out-of-cell time, allowing for more human contact, expanding the range of activities (work and education), and alleviating searching measures for prisoners held in the EBI. Less constrained contact should be encouraged with all staff.
Following a recommendation made by the CPT in its previous periodic visit report (cf. paragraph 70 of CPT/Inf (98) 15), the Dutch authorities commissioned the University of Nijmegen to carry out an independent study of the psychological state of current and former inmates of the EBI. A preliminary study completed on 17 April 2000 concluded that “an empirical examination of the possible effects of a maximum security regime on the mental conditions of prisoners is feasible.” The Dutch authorities have indicated that such an empirical examination has in fact commenced and would be completed by Summer 2003. The CPT trusts that it will receive the results of the study in due course.
One point raised by the preliminary study may be noted, i.e that the lack of influence of detainees on the severity of the regime being applied to them constitutes a “contradiction in the policy” of the EBI. The Committee would like to receive the views of the Dutch authorities on this statement.
13. Each prisoner was also subjected to such a search before and after being interviewed by members of the CPT’s delegation.”
48. The Netherlands Government responded to these findings in the following terms (CPT/Inf (2003) 39, excerpts):
“The “Extra Security Institution” at the Nieuw Vosseveld Prison Complex
recommendations ...
- the Dutch authorities to make further efforts with a view to increasing out-of-cell time, allowing for more human contact, expanding the range of activities (work and education), and alleviating searching measures for prisoners held in the EBI. Less constrained contact should be encouraged with all staff (paragraph 39)
Response: Prisoners in the EBI spend a total of about 52 hours a week on out-of-cell activities, and these activities are no less varied than in other prisons. They include exercise, visits, sport, work, education and recreation. Not all prisoners take part in all activities. What they do depends partly on interest and ability. The work in the EBI is simple. However, it is difficult to provide work that is more varied and yet meets security requirements. In principle, work in the EBI is done jointly. The Government refutes the claim that, on average, prisoners participate in activities for no more than between two and four hours a day. In fact they spend an average of four to five hours a day in out-of-cell activities.
The Government agrees that prisoners and staff should have more contact. Fenced-off walkways for staff have now been erected in the exercise yards. They provide more opportunities for informal contact and interaction between prisoners and staff.
The number of searches has been sharply reduced since the opening of the EBI. Besides a weekly search during cell checks, searches are carried out after visits to areas containing potentially dangerous objects, such as the hairdresser’s or the doctor’s or dentist’s surgery, and after contact with the outside world, such as visits. Searches are still necessary from the point of view of security. The Government would point out that searches are also conducted in ordinary prisons.
On 4 February 2003, in two separate cases against the Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that: “the combination of routine strip-searching with the other stringent security measures in the EBI amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of article 3 of the Convention. There has thus been a breach of this provision.” (Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, Application no. 50901/99, ECtHR 4 February 2002, § 63; see also Lorsé et al v. the Netherlands, Application no. 52750/99, ECtHR 4 February 2002, § 74). These judgments and other considerations have prompted the Government to stop routine weekly searches in the EBI over a long period of time. The EBI’s regulations will be amended.
...
requests for information
- the results of the “empirical examination of the possible effects of a maximum security regime on the mental conditions of prisoners”, being conducted by the University of Nijmegen (paragraph 39)
Response: The study is expected to be completed by autumn 2003 as indicated. As soon as the findings are available, the Government will forward them to the Committee.
- the views of the Dutch authorities on the statement, made in the preliminary study carried out by University of Nijmegen, to the effect that the lack of influence of detainees on the severity of the regime being applied to them constitutes a “contradiction in the policy” of the EBI (paragraph 39)
Response: The Government understands the point made in the preliminary study concerning the lack of influence that prisoners have on the regime. However, opportunities to exercise influence are necessarily more restricted in the EBI than in other prisons because of the nature of the system. The facility is exclusively for prisoners who are highly likely to abscond or who pose a serious threat to society. Placement in the EBI is mainly determined by considerations of safety and security. In this sense the EBI differs from other prisons. The emphasis on safety and security means that placement in the EBI does not depend on a prisoner’s behaviour but on the risk he represents.”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3


ITEMID: 001-80418
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF OZDEN v. TURKEY (No. 2)
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Istanbul.
6. In 1950, in accordance with Law no. 4753 regarding the distribution of lands to farmers in need, a plot of land measuring approximately 220,000 m2 on Maden Island, in the Ayvalık District of the Balıkesir Province, was sold to R.K. by the State authorities and registered in his name.
7. In 1968, pursuant to Law no. 6831, the Forest Cadastral Commission conducted a boundary-marking exercise (tahdit çalışması) on the Maden Island. The purpose of this exercise was to detect the forest areas which had not been included on the cadastral map. The outcome of the evaluation was publicly announced and as no opposition was made, this decision became definitive in 1970. It was concluded that the whole of Maden Island had the characteristics of a forest and it therefore could not be the subject of private ownership. This conclusion was annotated in the title deed registry in 1978.
8. In 1985 R.K. signed an agreement with the applicant, promising to sell the land in question.
9. Between 1985 and 1987, the Forest Cadastral Commission conducted an evaluation (aplikasyon çalışması) of the area to detect the lands which had lost their characteristics as a forest and to remove their forest status. Its decision was announced on 27 January 1988. It was concluded that the plot of land in question had not lost its characteristics as a forest within the meaning of Article 2 of the Law no.4785.
10. On 20 September 1989 the applicant purchased the land in question and registered it in his name.
11. On 10 June 1988 R.K. filed an action before the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction against the Forestry Directorate and the Forestry Ministry, objecting to the Cadastral Commission's decision of 27 January 1988.
12. On 15 June 1989 the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction held that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. The Forestry Directorate appealed against this decision. On 15 December 1989 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on procedural grounds. The case was remitted to the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction. On 30 May 1990 the court declared that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. The proceedings resumed before the Cadastral Court.
13. On 9 December 1992 the Ayvalık Cadastral Court decided to annul the Forest Cadastral Commission's decision of 27 January 1988 and to remove the land's forest status. Furthermore, it ordered that the land be registered in the name of the Treasury.
14. Both parties appealed against the decision. On 15 February 1994 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the first-instance court. It held that forests could not be the subject of private ownership and therefore could not be distributed to landless farmers for agricultural purposes. Any property claim over a forest was therefore considered legally invalid. The court found that R.K. was not entitled to request the removal of the land's forest status.
15. The case was resumed before the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. On 3 April 1995 the Cadastral Court maintained its initial decision of 9 December 1992.
16. The Forestry Directorate and the Forestry Ministry filed an appeal. On 3 April 1996 the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation supported the reasoning of the relevant chamber of the Court of Cassation and quashed the decision of the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. The case file was sent back to the Cadastral Court.
17. On 26 November 1998 the Ayvalık Cadastral Court decided to abide by the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation. It consequently dismissed R.K.'s case and held that there was no legal benefit for private persons to act as a plaintiff in cases concerning the revocation of forest status.
18. On 22 October 2001 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. This decision was served on the applicant on 14 December 2001.
19. On 12 August 1986 the Forestry Directorate initiated proceedings before the Ayvalık Magistrate's Court against R.K. to annul the registration of title and for an order preventing further use of the land by R.K. On 23 February 1987 the applicant intervened in the proceedings. On 25 June 1987 the Ayvalık Magistrate's Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction.
20. In 1988 the court decided to stay the proceedings as the determination of the case depended on the outcome of the case pending before the Ayvalık Cadastral Court (see paragraphs 11-18 above).
21. Following the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation, the proceedings before the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction resumed (see paragraph 16 above). On 5 June 1998, in view of the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation, the first instance court held that the plot of land in dispute was designated as part of a forest area and could not be the subject of private ownership. It therefore decided to annul the applicant's title and register the land in question in the name of the Treasury. The applicant appealed.
22. On 21 May 2002 the Court of Cassation found the applicant's grounds for appeal unfounded and upheld the decision of the first instance court.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6


ITEMID: 001-82425
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SWE
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF THE ESTATE OF NITSCHKE v. SWEDEN
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1 (length);Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings;Costs and expenses (domestic proceedings) - claim dismissed
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson
TEXT: 4. The application is brought by the estate of a Swedish national, Mr Alfred Nitschke, who was born in 1940 and died on 13 January 2003.
5. From 1988 until its bankruptcy in 1997, Mr Nitschke owned 49 % of the company Restaurang Takåsen AB (hereinafter referred to as “the company”). He was a member of the board of directors and authorised to sign for the company as well as being responsible for the daily functioning of the company. The other shares (51%) were owned by Stockholms företagskrogar AB.
6. On 3 November 1994 the Tax Authority (skattemyndigheten) of the County of Stockholm sent an audit report (granskningspromemoria) to Mr Nitschke, informing him that, following a tax audit of the company, it was considering altering the tax returns for the tax assessment years 1993 and 1994 for the company, as well as for Mr Nitschke, and imposing tax surcharges on them. On the basis of information from the audit, the Tax Authority concluded that Mr Nitschke had to be considered the executive of the company, due to his influence therein, and that his taxable income for both years should be increased because he had omitted to inform the Tax Authority about certain income from the company in the form of salary payments and benefits involving free lunches and the free use of a company car. Moreover, the Tax Authority had found that Mr Nitschke had let the company pay for a boat mooring at a marina, as well as for a computer and stereo which he had bought for private use and kept in his home.
7. Mr Nitschke replied to the Tax Authority, disputing its findings and demanding that he be taxed in accordance with his tax returns and that the tax surcharges be remitted. He stated that he was not the executive of the company, as he was a minority owner, but that it was the executive of Stockholms företagskrogar AB who controlled the company and that the book-keeping was carried out by that company's accountant. He further claimed that he had never eaten lunch at the restaurant since he was too busy serving lunches to the guests. Moreover, he only used the company car for carrying out work-related matters as he owned a car for private use. The mooring had been rented for the company to cater for islands in the archipelago, and he underlined that he did not own a boat himself. Also, as the company did not have proper office space, he kept the computer and stereo in a room of his house which he only used as an office. The stereo was used in the restaurant and when the company organised parties, and the computer was used to produce lunch menus, price lists, etc.
8. On 8 December 1994 the Tax Authority upheld its findings in the audit report for the tax assessment year 1993. It increased Mr Nitschke's income assessment to 240,363 Swedish kronor (SEK) and imposed tax surcharges amounting to 40 % of the tax liability on that sum (SEK 34,735, approximately EUR 3,800). Further, on 23 December 1994, it increased Mr Nitschke's income assessment for the tax year 1994 to SEK 70,260 and imposed tax surcharges on him amounting to SEK 12,992 (approximately EUR 1,400), again on the basis of the findings in the audit report.
9. On 20 February 1995 Mr Nitschke requested the Tax Authority to reassess its decision as he maintained that his tax returns were correct and that he should be taxed in accordance with them. He further developed his reasons for disputing the Tax Authority's findings on each of the points where his income had been altered.
10. On 21 April 1997 the Tax Authority maintained its decision concerning the tax year 1994 but lowered Mr Nitschke's income assessment by SEK 10,500 for the tax year 1993, as it had been confirmed that Mr Nitschke did not own a boat and that the mooring had been rented for company purposes. As a consequence, the tax surcharges were lowered to SEK 32,698.
11. On 9 May 1997 the company was declared bankrupt.
12. On 26 June 1997 Mr Nitschke appealed against the decisions and requested a stay of payment for the additional taxes for both tax years. This request was rejected on 18 August 1997 by the Tax Authority, and Mr Nitschke immediately appealed against it to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Stockholm. However, the court rejected the appeal on 23 October 1997, as it found that the prerequisites for granting a stay of payment were not fulfilled. Apparently, Mr Nitschke did not appeal against this judgment and, in the beginning of 1998, he paid the taxes and the tax surcharges to avoid seizure by the Enforcement Office (kronofogdemyndigheten).
13. In the meantime, the Tax Authority invited Mr Nitschke to an information meeting with the responsible officials, which took place on 24 October 1997. Mr Nitschke was given the opportunity to ask questions about the audit report and to discuss the changes to his tax returns.
14. On 5 March 1998 the Tax Authority made the obligatory re-assessment of its decisions of 21 April 1997 but decided not to change them. Following this, it forwarded the appeals to the County Administrative Court.
15. In August 1998 Mr Nitschke submitted a very detailed account (79 pages) of the company, its structure, business areas, its plans for the future, etc., which could be of relevance for the case, and to clarify his views on the contentious issues. He still maintained that he should be taxed in accordance with his tax returns and that the tax surcharges should be remitted, if on no other grounds, then at least because the proceedings before the Tax Authority had been of excessive length, which had caused the interest on the added taxes to increase his debt to the Swedish State.
16. In its reply, the Tax Authority, on 5 February 1999, maintained its stance, except as concerned the lunch benefits, which it agreed to remove for both tax assessment years. As a consequence, it also agreed that the tax surcharges should be lowered, but it objected to them being remitted completely as it did not consider that the proceedings had been unreasonably long or that there were any other reasons on which to remit them.
17. In April 1999 the applicant submitted his comments on the Tax Authority's submission and requested an extension to supplement his claims. The County Administrative Court granted an extension of the time-limit until 4 May 1999. This date was subsequently prolonged upon request by the applicant until 24 August 1999. However, no supplementary pleadings were received by the court.
18. On 9 February 2000 the County Administrative Court granted the appeal in so far as it related to the lunch benefits and the tax surcharges based on these costs, but rejected the remainder of the appeal. In its judgment, it examined, one by one, each point raised by Mr Nitschke, stating the grounds for its conclusions. As concerned the remaining part of the tax surcharges, the court found that no reasons for remission had been shown.
19. In April 2000 Mr Nitschke appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm and stated that he would submit supplementary information. However, no further material was received by the court, despite reminders. Thus, in September 2000, it formally ordered Mr Nitschke to submit all further material which he wanted to invoke before the court, within three weeks from the date on which he received the order. Apparently, Mr Nitschke asked for further extensions of the time-limit but did not submit any more material. Therefore, in September 2002, the court renewed its order and warned Mr Nitschke that the case could be decided even if he did not submit any material within the three weeks time-limit. Due to illness, Mr Nitschke hired a lawyer to represent him, who asked for a respite of four weeks to submit the supplementary information and material.
20. On 13 January 2003 Mr Nitschke died. However, his estate, through the same representative, pursued his appeal concerning both tax assessment years and requested another extension of the time-limit to supplement its claims. The Administrative Court of Appeal granted an extension until 23 May 2003 and informed the applicant's representative that no more extensions would be granted.
21. On 30 September 2003, without having received any submissions from the applicant, the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's judgment in full without giving any reasoning of its own. The court simply stated that:
“What has emerged in the case does not lead the Administrative Court of Appeal to make an evaluation other than that made by the County Administrative Court.”
22. On 9 December 2003 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) and at the same time asked for extra time to supplement its appeal, which was granted and subsequently prolonged twice. On 1 July 2004 the applicant submitted its supplementary pleadings, invoking Article 6 of the Convention. It claimed that the proceedings had been of excessive length and that the accumulated respite interest should therefore be remitted. Moreover, it alleged that the proceedings had been flawed in several ways, inter alia, by ignoring the evidence and by the Administrative Court of Appeal's failure to give any reasons for its judgment. Moreover, as Mr Nitschke had died before the appellate court's judgment, the tax surcharges should have been remitted in accordance with the Taxation Act, as they were a penalty falling within the criminal sphere.
23. On 17 August 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.
24. The rules governing the administration of justice before the administrative courts are laid down in the 1971 Administrative Court Procedure Act (förvaltningsprocesslagen, hereinafter “the 1971 Act”).
25. According to section 30 of the 1971 Act, the determination of a case by a court shall be based on that contained in the documents and what has otherwise been established in the case. The decision of the court shall state the reasons that determined the outcome.
26. Moreover, the 1971 Act does not contain any particular provisions stipulating how rapidly cases must be examined and determined by the administrative courts. However, it is in the nature of things that the courts shall conclude the examination of a case and issue a decision or a judgment as soon as this can be done, having regard, inter alia, to the character of the case.
27. At the time relevant for the present case, the 1953 Tax Collection Act (uppbördslagen, hereinafter “the 1953 Act”), section 102, stipulated that a request for reconsideration or an appeal against a decision concerning taxes and tax surcharges had no suspensive effect on the taxpayer's obligation to pay the amounts in question. However, the Tax Authority could grant a stay of execution in respect of the taxes and tax surcharges provided that certain conditions were met (section 49). Its decision in this respect could be appealed against to the administrative courts.
28. If a stay of execution was not granted, the taxes and tax surcharges should be paid immediately or they could be enforced by the Enforcement Agency. However, this also meant that if a tax decision was quashed or amended to the taxpayer's advantage by a court judgment after the relevant amounts had been paid, the amount overpaid was refunded with interest (Chapter 18, section 2, and Chapter 19, sections 1 and 12, of the Tax Payment Act, skattebetalningslagen). In addition, a taxpayer could claim compensation from the Chancellor of Justice or bring an action for damages against the State for the financial loss caused by enforcement measures taken, on the ground that the authorities or courts had acted wrongfully or negligently (Chapter 3, section 2, of the Tort Liability Act, skadeståndslagen).
29. According to Chapter 5, section 12, of the 1990 Taxation Act (taxeringslagen), no tax surcharges could be imposed if, at that time, the taxpayer had deceased. This was confirmed by a judgment from the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrättens Årsbok 2003 not 13). In this case, the County Administrative Court had granted the tax payer's appeal and remitted the tax surcharges imposed by the Tax Authority. The Tax Authority had appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal which overturned the lower court's judgment and upheld the Tax Authority's original decision, including imposing tax surcharges anew. However, during the proceedings before the appellate court, the taxpayer had died. Thus, the taxpayer's estate, and the National Tax Board (Riksskatteverket), appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court and requested that the tax surcharges be repealed as they could not be imposed on a deceased person. On 7 February 2003, the Supreme Administrative Court granted the appeal, noting that since the tax payer had died before the Administrative Court of Appeal's judgment, there had been no legal basis on which to impose the tax surcharges.
30. Under Swedish law, the estate of a deceased person is a separate legal person responsible for settling all matters relating to the deceased person, including his/her debts and liabilities (see, inter alia, the Inheritance Code [Ärvdabalken] and Chapter 12, section 9, and Chapter 22, section 1 (b) 3 of the Tax Payment Act).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-57495
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ITA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1984
DOCNAME: CASE OF GODDI v. ITALY
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-3-c;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award
JUDGES: C. Russo
TEXT: 10. Mr. Francesco Goddi, an Italian citizen born in 1951, is a shepherd. He resides at San Venanzo (Province of Terni).
11. On 6 June 1975, the applicant was tried, together with a certain Mr. F., by the Forlì Regional Court in connection with various offences. As regards some of the charges (threatening use of arms, unauthorised possession and carrying of arms and ammunition), he was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment (reclusione) and a serious-offence fine (multa) of 300,000 Lire; on the other charges (unauthorised possession and carrying of military weapons, causing damage to property, causing a dangerous explosion in an inhabited area), he was acquitted for want of sufficient evidence.
12. The offenders, the public prosecutor (procuratore della Repubblica) and the senior public prosecutor (procuratore generale) attached to the Bologna Court of Appeal all appealed. Mr. Goddi’s grounds of appeal were drafted by one of the two lawyers who had defended him at first instance, namely Mr. Monteleone.
The Bologna Court of Appeal set the hearing down for 30 November 1976, but Mr. Monteleone did not appear, although he had been notified of the date. The Court of Appeal assigned an officially-appointed lawyer, a Mr. Maio, to act for the applicant and then adjourned the proceedings indefinitely for other procedural reasons. The President subsequently decided that the hearing should be held on 9 July 1977. On that day, the Court of Appeal once more ordered an adjournment, since Mr. F. had not been notified of the date. The record of the sitting discloses that Mr. Goddi appeared before the Court assisted by a new lawyer of his own choosing, Mr. Bezicheri, but not whether the latter was the only lawyer representing the applicant at that time.
13. On 20 September 1977, the President of the Court of Appeal set the adjourned hearing down for 3 December. Three days later, the Bologna senior public prosecutor asked the Orvieto public prosecutor, in whose district the applicant was resident, to notify the latter accordingly and to make the necessary arrangements for transporting him to Bologna should he be under arrest.
The bailiff was unable to serve the summons either on Mr. Goddi himself or on a person duly authorised by law to accept it and therefore lodged it at the town hall; the bailiff informed the applicant both by notice left at his home and by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt. The letter, which had been posted on 5 October 1977, was collected by the applicant in person on 7 October.
On 29 October, pursuant to a warrant issued by the Forlì public prosecutor, Mr. Goddi was arrested and placed in custody in Orvieto in order to serve a sentence of six months’ imprisonment imposed on him by the Forlì Regional Court on 3 May 1976.
14. The hearing of 3 December 1977 was held in the absence not only of the applicant and his lawyer but also of the party seeking damages, the co-accused and his lawyer, and the three witnesses who had been summoned. The Court of Appeal was, in fact, unaware of Mr. Goddi’s recent arrest and declared him to be unlawfully absent (contumace).
The latter asserts, without adducing any proof that he had told the authorities of the criminal proceedings pending against him and of the date of the hearing - which assertion the authorities deny - but that they made no arrangements to enable him to attend.
Mr. Bezicheri failed to appear, since he had not received the notification: it had been sent to Mr. Monteleone and probably also to Mr. Ronconi, the other lawyer who had defended the applicant at first instance. According to his own evidence, Mr. Bezicheri learnt of the hearing only on 5 December, two days after the event, when relatives of his client sought information from him as to the progress of the proceedings.
15. At the hearing on 3 December, the Court of Appeal assigned another lawyer, Mr. Straziani, to act for Mr. Goddi. The public prosecutor’s office sought an adjournment so that the witnesses who should have been present on that day (see paragraph 14 above) could attend. After deliberating in private, the Court of Appeal refused this request and resumed the proceedings.
As regards Mr. Goddi, the public prosecutor’s office submitted that he should be convicted on the charges which the Forlì Regional Court had dismissed for want of sufficient evidence and that the remainder of the first-instance judgment should be confirmed. Mr. Straziani did no more than refer back to the grounds of appeal, which had been drafted by Mr. Monteleone.
The hearing was concluded on the same day. The Court of Appeal accepted the senior public prosecutor’s submissions and imposed on the applicant heavier sentences, namely four years’ imprisonment and a serious-offence fine of 500,000 Lire, together with three months’ "detention" (arresto) and a minor-offence fine (ammenda) of 30,000 Lire.
16. The applicant appealed on points of law; two of his grounds of appeal related to his own and his lawyer’s absence at the hearing on 3 December 1977.
The Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on 8 November 1979. It held that the notification sent to Mr. Monteleone satisfied the requirements of Article 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below). As to the finding that Mr. Goddi had been unlawfully absent, the Court of Cassation noted that the appeal court had been unaware of the impediment on which he relied.
17. Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
"An accused who is under arrest shall attend the hearing free from physical restraint, unless precautions are necessary to obviate the risk of escape or violence.
If at any time the accused refuses to attend and none of the circumstances contemplated in Article 497 obtains, the court shall direct that the proceedings are to continue as though he were present; in that event, he shall for all purposes be represented by the defence counsel.
..."
Under Article 22 of the regulations on the application of the same Code, it is for the public prosecutor’s office to request that an accused who is in custody be escorted to the hearing.
18. The accused may, by written declaration, decline to appear. If he does not decline, the rules concerning his participation and his assistance or representation by a defence counsel must always be complied with, failing which the proceedings will be null and void (Article 185). However, the Court of Cassation has held that this ground of nullity does not apply if the court was unaware that the person concerned was in custody (2nd Chamber, 30 October 1972, no. 1267, 1974 Reports, p. 2403).
Under Article 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where an accused, even if he is in custody, cannot attend the hearing on account of a legitimate impediment, the court has to adjourn the proceedings unless he agrees to their continuing without him. However, according to Article 498, if the impediment is not a legitimate one and if the notifications have been duly effected, the court has to order that judgment shall be rendered in absentia.
19. The Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that both the accused and his defence counsel shall be informed on the date of the hearing.
As regards notification to the lawyer, Article 410 provides:
"In cases before a regional court, an assize court, a court of appeal or an appel court of assize, the registrar shall ensure that the date fixed for the oral proceedings is notified in writing to the defence counsel at least eight days in advance ..."
The summons to appear is null and void if this Article has not been complied with (Article 412).
On the other hand, the Court of Cassation, taking its decision in plenary session, held on 7 February 1981 that where an accused is represented by several lawyers it suffices to address the notice to appear to one of them only (Murdocca and Others judgment).
20. Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, inter alia, that the proceedings shall be null and void if the accused did not have the assistance of defence counsel; there is an exception in the case of an offence punishable by a minor-offence fine not exceeding 3,000 Lire or "detention" for not more than one month, even if these penalties are imposed together. During the trial, the accused cannot have more than two defence counsel.
Under Article 133, third paragraph, of the same Code, if the accused has changed the defence counsel of his choice or simply withdrawn his instructions, the change or withdrawal is of no effect if the judge or the public prosecutor’s office investigating the case is not informed thereof; during the oral proceedings, such a change or withdrawal is effected by means of a declaration recorded in the minutes.
21. If the accused has not appointed a defence counsel or if the appointed counsel fails to fulfil his obligations, a lawyer will be officially assigned by the court (Article 128, first and last paragraphs, of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
22. The Court of Cassation, for its part, has held that a lawyer loses his status of defence counsel if he does not take part in the oral proceedings and does not arrange to be replaced (5th Criminal Chamber, 26 March 1975, Canistracci). The Court of Cassation stated:
"In that event, the accused will be defended by a lawyer officially assigned to him, unless he renews his instructions to his previous counsel: failing such renewal, (the latter) cannot lodge an appeal, this rights being reserved to the defence counsel who assisted or represented the accused during the proceedings. Accordingly, notice of a further hearing must be served on the officially-assigned defence counsel ..."
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-3
VIOLATED_BULLETPOINTS: 6-3-c


ITEMID: 001-103312
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2011
DOCNAME: CASE OF AYDEMIR v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 5-4 and 5-5
JUDGES: Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Vincent A. De Gaetano
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Sontheim an der Brenz (Germany).
6. On 25 November 2003 the applicant was charged in Slovakia with blackmail within the meaning of Article 235 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 140/1961 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time).
7. The charge was based on the suspicion that the applicant had sent a number of text messages from a German mobile telephone number to A. in Slovakia which contained serious threats that he would harm and kill her and their child.
8. On 10 March 2004 the applicant was handed over to the Slovakian authorities to be prosecuted in Slovakia. He was subsequently detained in Slovakia pending trial there (see below).
9. On 22 November 2004 the Levice District Court (Okresný súd) found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment, suspended for thirty months. The applicant waived his right of appeal and, on the same day, the judgment became final and binding and the applicant was released.
10. In so far as can be established from the applicant's submissions and the content of the documents in the case file, on 11 March 2004 a single judge of the District Court gave an order (uznesenie) for the applicant to be detained pending trial. The order was upheld following an interlocutory appeal (sťažnosť) by the applicant examined by the Nitra Regional Court (Krajský súd) on 20 May 2004. The decision on the appeal was served on the applicant's lawyer on 5 August 2004.
11. On 5 October 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) under Article 127 of the Constitution.
The applicant relied on Article 5 of the Convention and contended that his detention was unlawful and arbitrary since there was neither any “reasonable suspicion” with a basis in admissible evidence against him nor sufficient reasons to detain him. The applicant also argued that the impugned decisions lacked adequate reasoning and that the proceedings on his interlocutory appeal had not been speedy. He sought, inter alia, that the decision of 20 May 2004 be quashed, that he be released and that the Regional Court be ordered to determine his interlocutory appeal anew.
12. On 22 June 2005 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible.
13. In a written submission of 31 August 2005 the applicant, inter alia, requested for comment a copy of any observations that the District Court and the Regional Court, as the defendants in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, might have submitted in reply to his complaint.
14. On 15 February 2006 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment (nález) in which it found that the Regional Court had violated the applicant's rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in that it had failed to provide adequate reasoning for its decision of 20 May 2004 and in that the proceedings on the applicant's interlocutory appeal had not been speedy.
15. The Constitutional Court quashed the decision of 20 May 2004. It observed that the applicant had meanwhile been released. The part of his constitutional complaint, which was aimed at his release and at a fresh examination of his interlocutory appeal, had therefore become moot. Nevertheless, while accepting that the applicant had sustained non-pecuniary damage, the Constitutional Court did not award him any just satisfaction on the ground that the finding of a violation of the applicant's rights was sufficient redress for him. However, the Constitutional Court allowed a part of the applicant's claim for legal costs
16. The Constitutional Court took into account observations made in reply to the applicant's complaint by the District Court and the Regional Court but made no mention of the part of the applicant's complaint which concerned the substantive aspects of his detention.
17. The judgment of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant through the intermediary of his lawyer on 6 July 2006. No appeal lay against it.
18. In so far as can be established from the applicant's submissions and the content of the documents in the case file, on 17 May 2004 the applicant requested release, offered a pledge, under Article 73 § 1 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 141/1961 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time) (“the CCP”), that he would live in accordance with the law and, as an alternative, applied for bail under Article 73a of the CCP.
19. By law the request fell to be determined first by the regional prosecutor, who dismissed it and on 3 June 2004 forwarded it ex officio to the District Court for judicial determination.
20. The request for release was then dismissed in turn by a three-judge bench of the District Court on 26 July 2004 and, on an interlocutory appeal by the applicant, by the Regional Court on 28 October 2004. The decision on the appeal was served on the applicant on 20 December 2004.
21. The applicant challenged the decisions and various aspects of the procedure by way of two complaints under Article 127 of the Constitution.
22. On 10 January 2006 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible the complaint by which the applicant had mainly challenged the length of the proceedings in respect of his request for release, in so far as these proceedings had taken place before the public prosecution service and the District Court.
The Constitutional Court found that any possible delays on the part of the public prosecution service had been insignificant and that, in so far as the District Court was concerned, the complaint was manifestly ill-founded on the ground that, at the time of its introduction with the Constitutional Court, the request for release was no longer pending before the District Court, which was why the applicant was no longer in need of protection by the Constitutional Court.
The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 21 April 2006.
23. On 23 August 2006 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded a part of the applicant's outstanding constitutional complaint, which concerned the fact that the decision of 26 July 2004 had wrongfully been made by a bench whereas the body authorised to make it was a single judge. The Constitutional Court declared admissible the remainder of the complaint, as specified below. The decision was served on the applicant on 30 October 2006.
24. In a judgment of 21 June 2007 the Constitutional Court found that there had been a violation of the applicant's rights under Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention, in that the Regional Court had failed to provide the applicant with a copy of the observations made by the prosecution service in reply to the applicant's request for release, combined with the fact that it had also failed to hear the applicant in person, rule on all claims in the appeal and provide adequate reasoning for its decision. Moreover, the proceedings before both the District Court and the Regional Court had not been “speedy”. In reaching this last conclusion the Constitutional Court observed that, prior to the ordinary court's involvement in deciding on the applicant's request for release, his request had been examined by the public prosecution service. The Constitutional Court found no issue in the length of the proceedings before the public prosecution service.
25. The Constitutional Court held that there was no point in quashing the decision of the Regional Court in view of the fact that the applicant had meanwhile been released.
26. The applicant was awarded 100,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK) in just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage and the reimbursement of legal costs.
The judgment was served on the applicant's lawyer on 17 August 2007.
27. Until 30 June 2004 State liability for damage caused by decisions concerning pre-trial detention was governed by Chapter (hlava) 2 of Part (časť) 1 of the Act on State Liability for Damage Caused by a State Body's Decisions or Erroneous Official Action (Zákon o zodpovednosti za škodu spôsobenú rozhodnutím orgánu štátu alebo jeho nesprávnym úradným postupom – “the State Liability Act 1969”).
28. Persons deprived of their liberty had a claim against the State for damages when the criminal proceedings against them were dropped or they were acquitted (section 5(1)).
However, such compensation was excluded when the persons concerned were responsible for their own detention, in particular when they had tried to abscond or had otherwise given rise to the facts on which the decision concerning their detention was based.
29. Section 18(1) rendered the State liable for damage caused in the context of carrying out functions vested in public authorities resulting from wrongful official action of persons entrusted with the exercise of those functions. An award of compensation could be made when the plaintiff showed that he or she had suffered damage as a result of the wrongful official action of a public authority, quantified its amount, and showed that there was a causal link between the damage and the wrongful action in question.
30. The State Liability Act 1969 was traditionally interpreted and applied as not allowing for compensation to be awarded for non-pecuniary damage unless it was related to the deterioration of a person's health (see, for example, Pavletić v. Slovakia, no. 39359/98, § 55, 22 June 2004, and Havala v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 47804/99, 13 September 2001).
31. By its judgment of 31 May 2007 in an appeal on points of law (no. 4Cdo 177/2005) concerning an action for damages under the State Liability Act 1969, the Supreme Court upheld the view that neither that Act nor an action for protection of personal integrity provided a legal basis for awarding compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by unlawful detention.
The State Liability Act 1969 was, however, to be interpreted in line with Article 5 § 5 of the Convention which presupposed compensation for non-pecuniary damage and, pursuant to Article 154c § 1 of the Constitution, prevailed over the statutory text.
This line of reasoning was followed in judgments of the Banská Bystrica Regional Court of 26 March 2009 and the Nitra Regional Court of 26 February 2010 when deciding on appeals nos. 12Co 5/2009 and 6Co 237/2009.
32. In June 2002 the Minister of Justice submitted to the Government a draft bill providing for a new legislative framework for official liability.
The bill was accompanied by an introductory report (predkladacia správa) in which the Minister observed, inter alia, that the old State Liability Act had been on the statute book since 1969 and that, owing to subsequent changes to the social system and the adoption of the Convention, there was a new understanding of the concept of State liability for damage, which called for the introduction of new legislation.
33. The bill was later submitted to Parliament with an explanatory report, the relevant part of which stated that it was necessary to extend the current concept of the right to damages to incorporate just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage as well as pecuniary damage. The purpose of the proposed Act was, inter alia, to render the mechanism of compensation for damage caused by public authorities more effective and thereby reduce the number of cases in which claimants were obliged to seek redress before the European Court of Human Rights.
34. The bill was adopted with effect from 1 July 2004 (Zákon o zodpovednosti za škodu spôsobenú pri výkone verejnej moci) and replaced the State Liability Act 1969.
35. The right to compensation for damage caused by a decision concerning detention on remand (väzba) is vested in the person who was detained on remand provided that the criminal proceedings against him or her have been dropped (section 8(5)(a)) or he or she has been acquitted (section 8(5)(b)) or the matter has been referred to another authority (section 8(5)(c)).
36. However, no such right arises when the person concerned himself or herself gave cause to the detention on remand (section 8(6)(a)).
37. The State is also liable for damage caused by wrongful official action which comprises, inter alia, a public authority's failure to take action within the time-limit set, inactivity or any other unlawful interference with rights and legally recognised interests of individuals and legal entities (section 9(1)).
38. The right to compensation for damage caused by wrongful official action is vested in the person who suffered the damage (section 9(2)).
39. Under section 17 the compensation is to cover pecuniary damage, including loss of profit, and, where appropriate and necessary, nonpecuniary damage.
40. The Act applies only to damage caused by decisions and wrongful official action occurring after it entered into force (section 27(1)).
41. In a judgment of 16 March 2007 (in case no. 4C 258/2006) the Brezno District Court granted an action for damages by two individuals against the State under the State Liability Act 2003 and ordered the defendant to pay the costs of their defence in a criminal trial on charges of 2005 that had ended with their acquittal with final and binding effect in 2006.
On 22 November 2007 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court upheld the judgment following the defendant's appeal.
42. On 14 October 2009 the Bratislava Regional Court granted an appeal (case no. 2Co 238/2008) in an action brought by an individual against the State under the State Liability Act 2003 for damages and awarded him an amount of money in compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by detention on remand in 2005 in the context of a criminal trial on charges of the same year that had ended with his acquittal with final and binding effect in 2006.
43. In a judgment of 17 August 2009 (in case no. 19C 47/2006) the Bratislava District Court granted an action for damages by an individual against the State under the State Liability Act 2003 and awarded the claimant an amount of money in compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by wrongful official action in connection with his detention pending a criminal trial.
The impugned wrongful official action concerned the extension by a decision of 12 October 2004 until 28 April 2005 of the claimant's detention pending trial.
The action was preceded by a judgment of the Constitutional Court of 19 October 2005 (in case no. I. ÚS 65/05) in which the Constitutional Court had found a violation of the claimant's rights under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 in connection with the same facts.
However, the Constitutional Court had been unable to award the claimant damages as he had made no claim to that effect.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 5
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-4