ITEMID: 001-93874
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: CASE OF PITALEV v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objections dismissed (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, six-month period);Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Art. 3 (substantive aspect);Violation of Art. 3 (substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Anatoly Kovler;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
TEXT: 6. The applicant was born in 1970. He is currently serving his sentence in penitentiary institution УЩ349/2 in Yekaterinburg.
7. On 28 April 2001 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody on suspicion of inflicting grievous bodily harm resulting in the death of the victim. On 27 June 2002 the Podolskiy Town Court convicted the applicant of inflicting grievous bodily harm resulting in death and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. On 14 October 2002 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment. The applicant was held in a pre-trial detention facility till 3 December 2002.
8. Between 3 December 2002 and 9 June 2005, excluding three periods from 4 July to 12 September 2003, from 22 June to 9 July 2004 and from 19 November to 10 December 2004, the applicant served his sentence in correctional colony IK-3, Ryazan Region (ИК-3 Рязанской области, учреждение ЯМ 401/3).
9. The applicant was kept in units (отряды) nos. 3 and 5. The parties’ descriptions of conditions in IK-3 differ in a number of respects.
10. The applicant submitted that in unit no. 5 there were approximately another seventy detainees and in unit no. 3 around fourteen detainees. He had an individual sleeping place for the whole period of detention; however, the sanitary conditions in the colony were inadequate. The central heating in their dormitory was insufficient, and during the winter the convicts slept fully clothed. In summer it was very hot in the cell, and due to its overcrowding the air was stale and musty. The toilet was situated in a separate unheated area, and it was extremely cold there in winter. No hygiene facilities were provided. Food was of a very poor quality, the usual ration included white bread, barley porridge and semi-sweet tea in the morning, barley soup and porridge at lunch time, and mashed potatoes made from powder in the evening. While a supplementary diet was prescribed for him by the doctor, the applicant claimed that he had only received milk before November 2003 and after March 2004; butter and eggs were provided as of September 2004.
11. Furthermore, there was not enough light and heating in the sewing workshop where the applicant and other prisoners worked. There was not sufficient light in the bedroom either, because the windows were obstructed by bunk beds.
12. Unit no. 5 measured 240 sq. m., and its bedroom measured 150 sq. m. The unit housed approximately 70 inmates. After he was diagnosed with tuberculosis in June 2003, the applicant was transferred to unit no. 3 to a dormitory which measured 42 square meters and housed fifteen inmates. The applicant was at all times provided with an individual bed, bedding and clothes – a cotton suit, cap, cold-weather cap, sweater and boots. The relevant records were submitted to the Court.
13. The Government, relying on the certificates provided by the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences, further submitted that the cells were ventilated both naturally through the windows and by a ventilation shaft, which was mandatory. The windows in the cells were double glazed and allowed sufficient natural light through. The cells were also equipped with satisfactory artificial lighting.
14. The units were equipped with a central heating system; bedrooms had a seven-unit heating device which provided an average temperature of 18 degrees Celsius in winter, also in the toilets. The lighting in the sewing workshop was sufficiently provided by luminescent lamps in accordance with the relevant regulations. The applicant was provided with three special diet meals a day appropriate to his health condition.
15. From 4 July to 12 September 2003, from 22 June to 9 July 2004 and from 19 November to 10 December 2004 the applicant was held in a medico-prophylactic penitentiary institution (ЯМ-401/Б УИН МЮ РФ по Рязанской области, hereinafter – “the prison hospital”), where he was placed in the “enhanced regime” cell (палата усиленного контроля) of the tuberculosis department. The parties’ descriptions of the conditions in the prison hospital differ substantially.
16. The applicant submitted that one of his inmates in the prison hospital had had tuberculosis, and another one had had suspected tuberculosis. In the prison hospital the applicant was kept in two cells in similar conditions. In the corner of one of the cells there was a pail covered with a polyethylene lid which served as a toilet. The applicant asserted that the pail was not separated from the living area, was emptied once a day (around 11.30 a.m.) and that the stench from it was unbearable. The window was covered with a metal shutter.
17. The artificial light was never switched off, disturbing the applicant’s sleep. There was no water in the cell; the wash stand was situated in the hospital’s basement and inmates were taken there once a day. No laundry facilities were available. Detainees were allowed to take a shower once a week, but between July and September 2003 they had had to wash in cold water.
18. Only one hour’s exercise was available every day, and for the rest of the day inmates remained in their cells. Detainees repeatedly complained about the inadequate conditions to a commission from the local administration, the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences and the Prosecutor’s Office, which visited the hospital every Wednesday, but were told that there were no financial resources available to improve their situation.
19. From 4 July to 12 September 2003 the applicant was kept in the prison hospital in cell no. 4, which measured 7.7 sq. m. From 3 July to 22 July there were four inmates; from 22 July to 19 August, three inmates; from 19 to 26 August 2003 two inmates; and from 26 August to 12 September 2003 three inmates. From 22 June to 9 July 2004 and from 19 November to 10 December 2004 the applicant was held in cell no. 3, which also measured 7.7 sq. m., with three other inmates during the former period and two other inmates during the latter one.
20. The cells had been ventilated naturally through the windows; both cells were also equipped with the mandatory ventilation system. The cells had natural and artificial light. The partition around the toilet offered sufficient privacy and there was a dining table for four persons. Once a week the detainees had the opportunity to take a shower and to change their bedding. Laundry facilities were available, and the hot water had never been cut off. Access to water was unrestricted.
21. On 24 and 25 June 2003 the applicant underwent a medical examination and was diagnosed with suspected tuberculosis. On 4 July 2003 he was transferred to the prison hospital, where he underwent a further X-ray examination on 9 July 2003. In the course of a check-up, tuberculosis in the right lung was detected.
22. After initial treatment with further prescriptions, on 12 September 2003 the applicant was transferred back to the IK-3 of the Ryazan Region despite having alleged that he felt unwell. An X-ray examination conducted on 22 October 2003 showed that the applicant’s tuberculosis was advancing. In the hospital the applicant was treated with ethambutol, isoniazid and rifampicin. In the IK-3 he was given a stronger analogue of rifampicin – myrin-p. According to the applicant, no liver-protective medication, which should normally accompany such a strong anti-tuberculosis treatment, was offered. Additionally, an inguinal hernia was detected, but the required operation was never conducted. This lack of necessary treatment led to a skin disease and poor eyesight.
23. The Government submitted the applicant’s medical records from IK-3 and the prison hospital, which confirmed that since the applicant had been diagnosed with tuberculosis he had been regularly examined and all the necessary medication for his condition had been provided. The list of tests submitted by the Government included regular x-rays, advanced blood tests, further clinical tests and examinations by a number of specialists, including a tuberculosis specialist, an ophthalmologist, a surgeon, and a dermatologist, who prescribed necessary treatment. Two x-rays conducted in June and November 2004 showed a “positive dynamic of the tuberculosis process and dispersion of niduses of tuberculosis”. On 25 June 2004 the applicant was discharged from the hospital with a final diagnosis of infiltrative tuberculosis of the upper lobe of the right lung in the phase of dispersion. As concerns the inguinal hernia which the applicant had been suffering from since 1976, an operation was recommended after a full recovery from tuberculosis had been made.
24. Article 99 § 1 of the Penitentiary Code of 8 January 1997 provides for a minimum standard of two square metres of personal space per male convict in correctional colonies and five square meters in medico-prophylactic penitentiary institutions.
25. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) visited the Russian Federation from 2 to 17 December 2001. The section of its Report to the Russian Government (CPT/Inf (2003) 30) dealing with the conditions of detention in penitentiary institutions reads as follows:
45. It should be stressed at the outset that the CPT was pleased to note the progress being made on an issue of great concern for the Russian penitentiary system: overcrowding.
When the CPT first visited the Russian Federation in November 1998, overcrowding was identified as the most important and urgent challenge facing the prison system....
The CPT welcomes the measures taken in recent years by the Russian authorities to address the problem of overcrowding... Nevertheless, the information gathered by the Committee’s delegation shows that much remains to be done. In particular, overcrowding is still rampant and regime activities are underdeveloped. In this respect, the CPT reiterates the recommendations made in its previous reports (cf. paragraphs 25 and 30 of the report on the 1998 visit, CPT (99) 26; paragraphs 48 and 50 of the report on the 1999 visit, CPT (2000) 7; paragraph 52 of the report on the 2000 visit, CPT (2001) 2)...
46. In the course of the 2001 visit, the CPT’s delegation also noted that the regular supply of anti-tuberculosis drugs in sufficient quantities was ensured in the regions visited. This is another important achievement...
92. ...Hardly any complaints were heard about the quality and quantity of the food served. Prisoners with tuberculosis and HIV positive prisoners benefited from a special diet which entitled them to milk and margarine. However, a verification of the food stocks by a medical member of the delegation revealed that prisoners rarely consumed meat. Further, the level of proteins in the prisoners’ diet was rather low...
The CPT recommends that:
- efforts be made to decrease occupancy levels in the dormitories with the most cramped conditions ..., inter alia through a more even allocation of prisoners between the units; as already indicated (cf. paragraph 53 of the report on the 1999 periodic visit, document CPT (2000) 7), the aim should be to provide in due course a minimum living space of 4 m² per prisoner...
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3


ITEMID: 001-4570
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HUN
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 1999
DOCNAME: SABRI ALI AL-JAZAEERY v. HUNGARY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Marc Fischbach
TEXT: The applicant, born in 1968, is an Iraqi national. When introducing his application, he was held at the Communal Accommodation of the Budapest Border Guards Directorate, located on the premises of the Budapest Ferihegy Airport. Before the Court he is represented by Mr. J. Somogyi, a lawyer practising in Budapest and acting on behalf the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, and by Mr. F. Kőszeg, the executive director of the Helsinki Committee.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A.
On 14 December 1998 the applicant arrived at the Budapest Ferihegy II Airport from Cairo. His Iraqi passport contained a transit visa for Hungary issued by the Hungarian Embassy in Amman, Jordan. He possessed an Amman-Cairo-Budapest return flight ticket. At the immigration control a border guard expert found that it was likely that the applicant’s passport had been falsified. The applicant’s entry was therefore denied and his return to Egypt was ordered. Subsequently he lodged a request for recognition as a refugee.
On 15 December 1998 the applicant, who had meanwhile been committed to the Communal Accommodation of the Budapest Border Guards Directorate, was heard by an officer of the Border Guards Directorate in the presence of an interpreter.
On 16 December 1998 the applicant was heard by the Office for Refugees and Migration Affairs (“the Office”). In these proceedings the applicant, assisted by an interpreter, stated that in 1991 his late father, once belonging to the opposition in Iraq, had been arrested and executed in July 1992. Following the arrest of their father, the applicant’s two brothers had fled from Iraq. In connection with his father’s political activity, the applicant had been arrested in March 1991 and had been detained until late 1992, during which period he had regularly been subjected to interrogation by means of electric shocks. Following his release he had been under surveillance by the Iraqi security service. In 1995 he had obtained a passport with an exit visa and left Iraq for Jordan where he had spent one month being under constant surveillance by Iraqi agents. On his return to Iraq he had been detained again for about a month and interrogated by the Iraqi security service concerning his contacts with his late father’s political allies in Jordan.
On 22 December 1998 the Office dismissed the applicant’s request for recognition as a refugee as unsubstantiated. The decision specified that a subsequent action to challenge the lawfulness of the administrative proceedings before the civil courts would be of no suspensive effect concerning the applicant’s return to Egypt as ordered. On the same day, the Communal Accommodation was designated as the applicant’s compulsory place of residence.
On 30 December 1998 the applicant brought an action before the Budapest Regional Court to challenge the decision of 22 December 1998 concerning the dismissal of his request for asylum. These proceedings are still pending.
Meanwhile, apparently during the night 31 December 1998 to 1 January 1999 the Hungarian authorities attempted to return the applicant to Amman via Cairo. Having been denied entry to Egypt, he was, however, returned to Hungary on 2 January 1999. On the same day a meeting between the applicant and the Iraqi consul in Budapest took place on the premises of the Border Guards Directorate.
On 18 January 1999 the Border Guards Directorate requested the Office to form an opinion as to any reasons excluding the applicant’s deportation.
On 25 January 1999 the Office informed the Border Guards Directorate that it held that, in pursuance of S. 32 § 1 of the 1993 Aliens Act, the applicant could not be deported to Iraq or Egypt.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. The 1993 Aliens Act (Act no. 86 of 1993)
Section 4 § 1 provides that foreigners may cross the Hungarian state frontier and stay on the territory of the Republic of Hungary only in possession of valid passports verifying their citizenship and particulars of identification, and with valid visas issued by the Hungarian authorities. Section 5 § 1 provides that, at the request of the Hungarian authorities, foreigners shall certify - unless international agreements provide otherwise - that the financial means necessary for entry to, stay in and exit from Hungary, as well as the visas necessary for further travel or return, are at their disposal.
According to S. 25 §§ 1, 2 and 4, all conditions of entry and stay shall be inspected by the border guards at the time of entry to the country by the foreigner, prior to crossing the state frontier, while the availability of financial means shall be inspected by the customs authority. Foreigners who do not satisfy the conditions prescribed for entering the country, shall be - subject to the provisions of S. 32 § 1 - returned to the territory of the country they arrived from. Upon notification, an appeal may be lodged against the order of return.
Section 32 § 1 provides that foreigners shall not be returned or expelled to such countries, or to the frontier of such areas, where they would be exposed to the danger of persecution for reasons connected with their race, religion, national, social belonging or political views; furthermore, to the territory of such states, or to the frontier of such areas, where it is to be greatly feared that they would be exposed to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. These reasons shall be established by the refugee authority.
Section 43 provides the possibility of ordering an alien’s residence at a designated place. According to paragraphs 1 and 3, the police headquarters and the directorate or branch of Border-Guards may order the residence of the foreigner at a designated place, restricting his personal liberty, if: (a) he is not able to certify his identity, until the establishment thereof; or (b) he is not able to certify the lawfulness of his stay in Hungary, until the verification thereof or until an official permit to stay is issued; or (c) this is necessary for the purposes of guaranteeing the execution of an expulsion, until the establishment of the conditions of expulsion; or (d) his return was ordered (see S. 25 above); or (e) his return or expulsion should take place, but he may not be returned or expelled in accordance with the prohibition under S. 32 § 1.
The compulsory place of residence may also be designated at a communal accommodation, if the foreigner is not able to support himself, and no appropriate accommodation, financial means, income and inviting party or relatives obliged to support him are at his disposal.
Paragraph 5 provides that, although no administrative appeal may be lodged against the order to reside at a designated place, the foreigner may request the court review of the decision. The procedure of the court shall be governed by the provisions applicable to the court review of the lawfulness of ‘custody for the purposes of supervision of aliens’. These provisions are as follows:
Section 39 §§ 1 and 2 provide that foreigners may request - during the period of custody - a review of the lawfulness of the decision from the local court competent at the place of custody. The submission of such a request has no suspensive effect in respect of the enforcement of the custody order. If the foreigner requests the court review of the lawfulness of the ‘custody for purposes of supervision of aliens’, he shall be brought before the court in order to be heard. According to S. 41 § 1, if the court finds that the foreigner’s taking into, or holding in, custody violates the law, it shall take immediate measures for his release. Section 42 §§ 1, 3 and 4 provide that the authority ordering the taking into custody as well as the foreigner may appeal against the decision of the court. The appeal may be submitted orally in the course of the hearing or in writing to the local court within three days following the announcement of the decision. Appeals submitted against the decision of the local court shall be decided by the regional court within five days. Section 50 requires that the court shall act promptly in matters of judicial review of decisions of the immigration authorities.
2. The 1997 Asylum Act (Act no. 139 of 1997)
Section 33 §§ 3 and 4 provide that the applicant shall have the opportunity to use legal assistance of his choice, at his expenses, or to accept free legal aid offered by any registered organisation providing legal protection on a regular basis. The aliens control authorities and the refugee authorities shall provide the person applying for protection with information on his rights and the possibility to use legal assistance during the proceedings.
According to S. 42 § 1, the immigration authority shall, prior to allowing a foreigner to enter the territory of the Republic of Hungary at the border crossing point of the International Airport, immediately notify the refugee authority with a view to instituting asylum proceedings, if such a foreigner refers to a reason for seeking asylum defined in this Act, arrived from a safe country of origin or a safe third country, and is unable to prove his identity by means of a passport or other appropriate document.
3. Government Decree no. 64/1994 (of 30 April 1994) on the Implementation of the 1993 Aliens Act
According to S. 25 § 1, the competent aliens control authority shall issue ex officio a certificate permitting temporary residence to any foreigner who does not hold a permit to enter and stay in Hungary issued under the 1993 Aliens Act or other legislation and may not be returned or expelled from Hungary in compliance with S. 32 § 1 of the 1993 Aliens Act or may not leave the country for other reasons.
Paragraph 3 provides that the certificate’s period of validity shall be determined by the aliens control authority by means of appreciating the foreigner’s circumstances. The period of validity may be extended until the foreigner’s departure or until he is granted a residence permit.
4. Government Decree no. 24/1998 (of 2 February 1998) on the Detailed Rules of the Refugee Determination Procedure
Section 22 §§ 4 and 5 govern the “airport procedure”, according to which if an applicant does not prove his personal identity, moreover, the Office finds that he arrived from a safe third country and this presumption is not refuted, then the Office promptly delivers a decision on the rejection of the application and informs the aliens control authority thereof. If a decision on the merits cannot be delivered promptly or in accelerated procedure, the Office arranges for the applicant’s entry into the country and proceeds with the application under the general rules.
5. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act no. 3 of 1952)
a. General rules
Section 95 § 1 provides that if a submission is not in conformity with the provisions of the Act or must be supplemented or corrected for another reason, the presiding judge shall give it back to the party for completion, fixing a short time limit and indicating the deficiencies, and shall simultaneously warn the party that the court will dismiss the submission or handle it according to its incomplete contents, if it is submitted incompletely again.
Section 121 § 1 requires that an action must be brought by filing a submission indicating the trial court; the names, domiciles and legal positions of the parties and their representatives; the rights intended to be enforced, the relevant facts and evidence; data from which the competence and jurisdiction of the court can be established and an express claim.
According to S. 124 § 1, the presiding judge shall examine the action immediately after its receipt to see whether it has to be given back to the party for completion, forwarded to another court or rejected without issuing summonses and shall take the necessary measures without delay.
Section 130 § 1 (j) provides that an action shall be rejected by the court without issuing summonses, inter alia, if it can be established that the plaintiff did not re-file the submission given back to him for completion within the time limit fixed or re-filed it incompletely and, as a consequence, the action cannot be adjudged.
b. Judicial review of administrative decisions
Section 324 provides that the application of the general rules contained in Chapters 1 to 14 of the Code to litigations concerning the judicial review of administrative decisions is subject to the provisions in Chapter 20. Some of these special rules are outlined below.
Section 330 §§ 1 and 4 provide that the action shall be filed either with the authority which has passed the first instance administrative decision or with the competent court and within 30 days from the service of the decision requested to be reviewed. The first instance authority shall forward the action along with the case-file to the competent court within 8 days. If the plaintiff failed to observe the time-limit fixed for filing the action, he may apply for the reinstatement of the proceedings. The defendant authority shall not have the right to reject an action filed out of time, rather, it shall forward it to the court even if no request for the reinstatement of the proceedings has been filed by the plaintiff.
According to S. 331, the authority, which has passed the decision requested to be reviewed, shall submit its written observations in reply to the action either when forwarding the case-file to the court (in case the action has been filed with the authority), or otherwise within 8 days from the date when the authority has been notified of the action by the court.


ITEMID: 001-84718
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: CYP
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: TORNARITIS and C.T. TOBACCO LTD v. CYPRUS
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev;Loukis Loucaides;Sverre Erik Jebens
TEXT: The first applicant, Mr Christoforos Tornaritis, is a Cypriot national, and the second applicant, C. T. Tobacco Ltd, is a company incorporated under Cypriot law. They were represented before the Court by Mr E. Efstathiou, a lawyer practising in Nicosia. The Cypriot Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr P. Clerides, Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The first applicant lives in Nicosia. He is the director of the second applicant which is a limited liability company with its registered office in Nicosia.
On 21 May 2002 the customs department applied to the District Court of Nicosia for a search warrant on the basis of Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Protocol on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union (hereinafter “the Protocol”) and sections 27 and 28 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155, as amended). The application was made following a request made by the European Anti-Fraud Squad (“OLAF”) concerning an investigation they were carrying out into the smuggling of cigarettes into the European Union in violation of the Community Customs Code. The customs department maintained that they had reasonable grounds to suspect that there were documents, in electronic or other form, on the applicants’ premises which, on the basis of reasonable suspicion, concerned such smuggling.
The District Court of Nicosia issued two search warrants on the same date; one for the private residence of the first applicant and one for the applicant company’s office. The wording of the latter warrant was as follows:
“...
Towards the director of the customs department and the other customs officials of the customs department
Because it appears from the sworn statement of Christos Kotzapashi [customs official]
...
That there is reasonable cause to suspect
That on the premises of the company C.T. Tobacco Ltd (former Mananco Trading Ltd), ..., there are documents in electronic or other form, computers and other objects which on the basis of reasonable suspicion are used in smuggling cigarettes to countries of the European Union in violation of the Community Customs Code. With a written request by OLAF... towards the Cypriot Customs authorities which is based on Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Protocol on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union (Ratifying) Law of 2001 (32 (III)/01).
This warrant authorises you and calls you immediately with the appropriate help, to enter the mentioned premises of the mentioned person...and with diligence to search for the mentioned objects and if these or part of these, are found during the search, to bring the objects which will be so found ... before myself or another Judge of the District Court for them to be treated in accordance with the Law ... .”
The search of the company’s premises was carried out from 21 May 2002, 9.50 a.m., until 22 May 2002, 10.00 a.m. The search warrant was executed by the head of the investigation unit of the customs department in the presence of approximately ten customs officials, three officials from the tax department, four foreign officials authorised by OLAF, the first applicant and the second director of the applicant company, two shareholders and seven employees of the applicant company, the financial directors of another company and, finally, the applicants’ lawyers. It is not clear from the documents submitted before the Court how many of the above persons actually participated in the search.
The customs officials seized approximately 8000 documents and other material, including six computers, a computer screen, keyboards and several floppy discs. During the search the first applicant requested the officers not to separate certain documents and also contested the seizure of certain material. The customs officials gave him copies of all the documents seized.
All the material seized was taken to the customs department’s offices where the documents were copied. Some of these copies were communicated to OLAF.
The customs officials also carried out a search of the first applicant’s private residence but did not seize any material.
On 21 May 2002 an ex parte application (no. 188/02) was filed by the customs department before the District Court of Nicosia requesting the retention of the material seized until completion of the investigation and, in the case of filing of an action before the court, until the conclusion of the hearing of the action.
The court directed that the application be served on the applicants. The hearing of the application took place between 28 May and 12 June 2002.
The applicants objected to the retention of the material seized in so far as their relevance with the investigations had not been established. They further argued that the manner in which the search had been carried infringed their rights to private life, communication and correspondence under Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Constitution. In their application before the Court the applicants claimed that they had also complained before the District Court of a violation of their rights under Articles 3 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
During the hearing the customs authorities claimed that at the time of the search they had seized all the documents and material they had considered relevant to the investigation but that it had been impossible during the search, in view of the amount of documents, to assess their exact relevance. The customs officials had only carried out an evaluation at first sight and, as a consequence, certain of the seized documents subsequently proved to be irrelevant whilst others needed to be examined in conjunction with other documents that were abroad.
In the meantime, by a letter dated 23 May 2002 addressed to the director of the customs department, the applicants requested that the material seized during the search be returned to them. The Acting Attorney-General, who had received a copy of the above letter, replied by letter on the same day informing the applicants that all the material was kept at the offices of the customs department and would be presented before the court on the basis of section 32 of the Criminal Procedure Law and that copies of certain of the documents had been given to the representatives of OLAF.
Furthermore, in the intervening period, about 400 documents that were assessed as irrelevant were returned to the applicants.
On 21 June 2002 the District Court delivered its decision.
The judge firstly observed that both parties had accepted that search warrants were subject to the exclusive control of the Supreme Court and that they could be reviewed by way of appeal, where such a right was granted, or by way of the prerogative writ of certiorari. Consequently, in the present case, neither the issuing of the search warrant nor the basis for its issue nor its validity nor its legality was disputed. It was therefore binding.
The judge then found that he did not have jurisdiction to intervene at this stage and was therefore not competent to examine the lawfulness of the execution of the search warrant; this could only be examined in the context of criminal proceedings or of any procedure before the court in which an attempt would be made to use the exhibits seized as evidence. In particular, the judge noted as follows:
“I am of the opinion that the court at this pre-trial stage, of the completion essentially of the investigatory work which entailed the evaluation of the seized exhibits, cannot intervene as not being competent to examine the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the execution of the search warrant and of the consequences of this. It is obvious for this reason that an application of this kind is made by ex parte application by the authorities (police, customs etc) and the decision is within the discretionary power of the court which, as I mentioned above, is exercised judicially and with the interests of all the parties involved as the criterion. The main concern of the court is to ascertain if the detention of the seized exhibits is necessary or, moreover, if there is a danger of their destruction, with the interests of all the parties involved as the criterion. This serves both the urgency and the secrecy which should surround the conditions of the issuing of such an order for the detention of exhibits. The Legislator gave the right to the person from whom the exhibits have been seized or even to the person who claims ownership of them, to apply for their return after the filing of a criminal case or even for them to be disposed of for the payment of costs or damages (see Sect. 32 (3), Cap. 155 and also the case Concrete Mix Ltd ...).
The unlawful execution of a search warrant ... will be the subject of criminal proceedings or of any procedure before the court in which an attempt will be made to use exhibits seized and detained as evidential material. The competency, in my opinion, belongs to the court which will try the case to decide if the search was conducted lawfully or unlawfully (within the framework of a trial within a trial) and at the same time there is an obligation on the present court to safeguard evidence which might be lost, destroyed, altered or falsified.
In cases such as the present one, where there is seizure and the detention is sought of a large number of documents as exhibits and there is a great difference in the evidence before the court as to the way in which the search was carried out, the matter must be left to the court which will hear the case to decide within the framework of an investigation within the trial if the evidence collected and detained is admissible.
...
There are clearly many particularities in the present case. The first peculiarity is the issuing and execution of a search warrant by virtue of the Protocol and indeed by the customs department. The most important peculiarity, however, is the seizure of such a significant number of documents. And the time the search took is indicative. Some of the seized documents have already been returned (more than 400), having been assessed as irrelevant.
...
The relevance of documents which concern financial transactions and commercial activities in connection with the offences under investigation alleged to have been committed by the respondents, Christoforos Tornarites and C.T. Tobacco Ltd. is not an easy matter and no one can decide at first glance if a document is relevant or not. The work of evaluation is subtle, difficult and laborious, which requires time, knowledge and mainly comparison and evaluation with other documents abroad where customs officials are planning to send them in the near future, as was stated to the court.”
Despite the above findings, the judge noted that he would go into an examination of the unlawful or lawful execution of the search warrant, without pre-empting any future decision of the court within the framework of the trial, where the unlawfulness or the lawfulness of the execution of the search warrant and the consequences of this for the acceptance or rejection of evidential material detained for this purpose had to be examined in the light of the facts at the time. He therefore proceeded to consider the points raised by the applicants’ lawyer in this respect. The judge held that the customs authorities had complied with the Protocol when notifying OLAF of the results of the search and, further, that both the officers of OLAF and the tax department had been duly authorised by the director of the customs department to be present during the search. With regard to the applicants’ claim concerning their constitutional rights, the judge observed that questions concerning violations of rights such as the right to respect to one’s private and family life, home and correspondence, were taken into account at the stage of issuing and not of the execution of the search warrant. In this connection he held that “the issuing of a search warrant automatically resulted in the violation of the constitutional rights of the person against whom it was issued”. Deviation from these rights was only justified when required by the public interest for the investigation of serious offences.
Moreover, the judge held that the damage to the service of awarding justice would be much greater at the present stage if the documents were returned to those entitled to them than if they were detained by the customs department for evaluation and safe-keeping until a new order of the court. In this respect he further noted that their return before their essential evaluation was not advisable as the court was not competent and also lacked the knowledge to evaluate all the documents in order to decide if they were relevant or not. He therefore ordered that the majority of the documents and other exhibits be detained by the customs department until a new court order and/or until the conclusion of any criminal proceedings. In connection with this, the judge also observed that the applicants had not argued before the court that the retention of the material seized affected their trade activities in any way.
Although he disagreed with the applicants’ arguments that the search ought not to have included financial activity and commercial transactions of other legal and natural persons who had links with the applicants (associated persons), he found that it should have excluded the taking of documents which related to the applicants’ private life and any other activities, except financial activities and commercial transactions. He ordered that material that had been seized and concerned numbers of telephone communications of the applicants should be returned at once to the applicants and that the relevant copies taken by the customs officials should be destroyed, as the disclosure of such information was unlawful and violated the confidentiality of telephone communications. The judge referred to the Law on the Protection of the Confidentiality of Private Communication (Surveillance of Communications) in this respect (Law 92/(I)/96).
Finally, the judge did not exclude the possibility of the filing by the applicants of an application for the return of material seized at a future stage, in which the documents or exhibits would be specified and the reasons for which their return was claimed, either within the framework of section 32 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Law, that is, before the filing of any criminal proceedings or within the framework of section 32 (3) of that Law, that is, the commencement of the criminal proceedings.
Following the above decision, the authorities destroyed the copies made of the documents concerning the applicants’ telephone communications.
The applicants appealed against the decision of the court of first instance asking for it to be set aside and annulled (appeals nos. 7322 and 7323). They alleged that the decision was the outcome of a wrong exercise of the discretion granted to the court by section 32 of the Criminal Procedure Law to order the retention of objects seized during the execution of a search warrant. They further complained that the search of the company’s premises had been in violation of their constitutional rights.
During the course of the appeal proceedings all the remaining material seized was returned to the applicants.
On 21 April 2003 the Supreme Court rejected the appeals on the ground that the decision of the District Court was not appealable as the applicable law did not provide the right to appeal against decisions of this nature. The court, however, did go on to say the following:
“..in the case of section 32 (1) of the Law, the grant by law of the right to appeal against decisions giving rise to the detention of confiscated objects is advisable, in as much as it concerns the independent decision of a court of first instance which affects fundamental rights of the individual, that of property and of the use of movable property (Art. 23 of the Constitution), and possibly other rights too, such as the right to private life (Art. 15 of the Constitution) and of the secrecy of communication (Art. 17 of the Constitution).”
No criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicants.
The right to private life, communication and correspondence is safeguarded by Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Constitution. These provisions read as follows:
“1. Every person has the right to respect for his private and family life.
2. There shall be no interference with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary only in the interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person.”
“1. Every person’s dwelling house is inviolable.
2. There shall be no entry in any dwelling house or any search therein except when and as provided by law and on a judicial warrant duly reasoned or when the entry is made with the express consent of its occupant or for the purpose of rescuing the victims of any offence of violence or of any disaster.”
“1. Every person has the right to respect for, and to the secrecy of, his correspondence and other communication if such other communication is made through means not prohibited by law.”
2. There shall be no interference with the exercise of this right except in accordance with the law and only in cases of convicted and unconvicted prisoners and business correspondence and communication of bankrupts during the bankruptcy administration.”
Under Article 155 (4) of the Constitution the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to issue prerogative orders. This provision reads as follows:
“...
4. The High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue orders in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari.”
The sections of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155, as amended) concerning search and seizure provided as follows at the time of the incident:
“(1) Where a Judge is satisfied by a statement upon oath that there is reasonable ground for believing that there is in any place-
(a) anything upon or in respect of which any offence has been or is suspected to have been committed; or
(b) anything which there is reasonable ground for believing will afford evidence as to the commission of any offence; or
(c) anything which there is reasonable ground for believing is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any offence,
the Judge may at any time issue a warrant (in this Law referred to as a “search warrant”, authorising the person therein named-
(i) to search such place for any such thing and to seize and carry such thing before the Court out of which the search warrant is issued or some other Court to be dealt with according to law;
(ii) to apprehend and bring before a Judge the occupier of the house or place where the thing is found or any person in or about such house or place being in possession of such thing, if the Judge thinks fit so to direct in the warrant.”
“(1) Every search warrant shall bear the signature of the Judge issuing the same, the date and time of issue as well as confirmation of the judge that he has been reasonably satisfied for the existence of the need for the issue of the warrant.
(2) Every such warrant shall normally be directed generally to all police officers; but any Judge issuing such warrant may, if its immediate execution is necessary and no police officer is immediately available, direct it to any other person or persons and such person or persons shall execute the same and, when such warrant is directed to more officers or persons than one, it may be executed by all or by any one or more of them.
(3) Every such warrant shall remain in force until it is executed or until it is cancelled by a Judge.”
“(1) When, upon the execution of a search warrant, any object is seized and brought before any Judge, as provided in section 27 of this Law, such object, subject to subsection (2) of this section, may be detained by such person as the Judge may direct, reasonable care being always taken for its preservation until the conclusion of any criminal proceedings which may be initiated in respect thereof.
(2) Where any object seized under a search warrant and brought before a Judge is of a perishable or noxious nature, such object may be disposed of in such manner as the Judge may direct.
(3) If the Judge is of the opinion that anything seized under a search warrant is no longer required for the conduct of any criminal proceedings, he shall, unless he is authorised or required by this or any other Law to dispose it otherwise, direct -
(a) that the object or any part thereof be restored to the person who appears to the Judge to be entitled thereto and, if such person is the accused in the relevant criminal proceedings, that it be restored either to him or to such other person as the accused may direct ; or
(b) that, if such object belongs to the accused, such object or any part thereof be used to enable the payment of any costs or compensation directed to be paid by the accused.”
The relevant sections of the Criminal Code (Cap. 154, as amended) provide as follow:
“Any person employed in the public service who wilfully neglects to perform any duty which he is bound by law to perform, provided that the discharge of such duty is not attended with great danger than a man of ordinary firmness and activity may be expected to encounter, is guilty of a misdemeanour.”
“Every person who wilfully disobeys any Law by doing any act which it forbids, or by omitting to do any act which it requires to be done, and which concerns the public or any part of the public, is guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable, unless it appears from the Law that it was the intention of the Legislature to provide for some other penalty for such disobedience, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or to both.”
“Everyone who disobeys any order, warrant or command duly made, issued or given by any Court, officer or person acting in any public capacity and duly authorised in that behalf is guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable, unless any other penalty or mode of proceedings is expressly prescribed in respect of such disobedience, to imprisonment for two years.”
Law 92(I)/96 on the Protection of the Confidentiality of Private Communication (Surveillance of Communications) was enacted in line with Article 17 of the Convention. This Law prohibits and criminalises, with certain exceptions, the disclosure of the contents of every private communication, including telecommunication.
Law 32(III)/2001 ratified the Protocol on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union. The relevant provisions of the Protocol read as follows, in so far as relevant:
“At the request of the applicant authority, the requested authority shall, in accordance with legal or regulatory provisions applicable to the latter, take all necessary measures in order:
-to deliver any documents, or
-to notify any decisions,
emanating from the applicant authority and falling within the scope of this Protocol, to an addressee residing or established in the territory of the requested authority.
Requests for delivery of documents or notification of decisions shall be made in writing in an official language of the requested authority or in a language acceptable to that authority.”
“1. Requests pursuant to this Protocol shall be made in writing. They shall be accompanied by the documents necessary to enable compliance with the request ...
2. Requests pursuant to paragraph 1 shall include the following information:
(a) the applicant authority;
(b) the measure requested;
(c) the object of, and the reason for, the request;
(d) the legal or regulatory provisions and other legal elements involved;
(e) indications as exact and comprehensive as possible on the natural or legal persons who are the target of the investigations;
(f) a summary of the relevant facts and of the enquiries already carried out.
...”.
“1. In order to comply with a request for assistance, the requested authority shall proceed, within the limits of its competence and available resources, as though it were acting on its own account or at the request of other authorities of that same Contracting Party, by supplying information already possessed, by carrying out appropriate enquiries or by arranging for them to be carried out. This provision shall also apply to any other authority to which the request has been addressed by the requested authority when the latter cannot act on its own.
2. Requests for assistance shall be executed in accordance with the legal or regulatory provisions of the requested Contracting Party.
3. Duly authorised officials of a Contracting Party may, with the agreement of the other Contracting Party and subject to the conditions laid down by the latter, be present to obtain in the offices of the requested authority or any other concerned authority in accordance with paragraph 1, information relating to activities that are or may be operations in breach of customs legislation which the applicant authority needs for the purposes of this Protocol.
4. Duly authorised officials of a Contracting Party may, with the agreement of the other Contracting Party and subject to the conditions laid down by the latter, be present at enquiries carried out in the latter’s territory.!
“1. The requested authority shall communicated results of enquiries to the applicant authority in writing together with relevant documents, certified copies or other items.
...”.


ITEMID: 001-100387
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: CASE OF CHERNICHKIN v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Sverre Erik Jebens
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Moscow.
6. In 1995 the applicant deposited his money with the Savings Bank of Russia (Sberbank). Subsequently, the Savings Bank unilaterally reduced the interest rate on his deposit. The applicant sued the Savings Bank for the damages incurred through the unilateral modification of the interest rate.
7. On 10 March 1998 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant's claim as unsubstantiated. On 26 May 1998 the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment.
8. On 10 June 1999 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court quashed the judgments of 10 March and 26 May 1998 by way of supervisory review and remitted the claim for fresh consideration. The Presidium's decision was set aside by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 16 November 1999. However, on 9 December 1999 the City Court's Presidium re-examined the supervisory-review application, quashed the earlier judgments and ordered a new examination of the applicant's claim.
9. On 17 October 2000 the Tverskoy District Court granted a small portion of the applicant's claims to the amount of 386,63 Russian roubles and rejected the remainder. On 27 October 2000 the District Court adopted a supplementary judgment, by which it declared the deposit agreement, in relation to the right of the Savings Bank to change unilaterally the interest rate, invalid. On 16 February 2001 the Moscow City Court rejected an appeal by the applicant.
10. The applicant lodged a claim against the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages incurred through the inappropriate administration of justice, and notably the excessive length of proceedings in respect of his claim against the Savings Bank.
11. On 23 July 2001 the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant's claim. Referring to the Constitutional Court's Ruling of 25 January 2001 (see paragraph 16 below), the District Court noted that Parliament had not yet adopted a law determining jurisdiction over claims concerning State liability for the damage caused by a court's or judge's failure to adjudicate a case within a reasonable time, and dismissed the claim in the following terms:
“According to Article 1 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure, the rules of civil procedure in federal courts of general jurisdiction are determined by the Russian Constitution, the Judicial System Act, the Code of Civil Procedure and other federal laws.
The law has not determined the territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over civil claims for compensation of damages incurred in civil proceedings in cases where a dispute has not been heard on the merits as a consequence of unlawful acts (or failures to act) of a court (a judge), including the breach of a reasonable-time guarantee.
The court must dismiss the statement of claim if there are grounds listed in Article 129 (1) and (7) of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure, that is if the claim may not be examined in civil proceedings and if the court is not competent to examine the claim.”
12. On 20 December 2001 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision to dismiss the applicant's claim, finding as follows:
“In dismissing the claim, the judge correctly stated that the law had not determined the territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over civil claims for compensation of damages incurred in civil proceedings in cases where a dispute had not been heard on the merits as a consequence of unlawful acts (or failures to act) of a court (a judge), including the breach of a reasonable-time guarantee.
Under these circumstances, the [City Court] finds no grounds for quashing that decision. Since the judge reached the conclusion that the claim may not be examined in civil proceedings, the reference to Article 129 (7) of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure must be deleted [as being superfluous]”.
13. On 5 May 2003 and 4 February 2004 the Moscow City Court and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, respectively, refused the applicant's requests for the institution of supervisory-review proceedings.
14. Article 1064 of the Civil Code contains general provisions on liability for the infliction of damage. It establishes that damage inflicted on the person or property of an individual shall be reimbursed in full by the person who inflicted the damage (Article 1064 § 1).
15. Article 1070 of the Civil Code determines liability for the damage caused by unlawful actions of law-enforcement authorities or courts. In particular, it is established that the federal or regional treasury shall be liable for the damage sustained by an individual in the framework of the administration of justice provided that the judge's guilt has been established in a final criminal conviction (Article 1070 § 2).
16. By Ruling no. 1-P of 25 January 2001, the Constitutional Court found that Article 1070 § 2 of the Civil Code was compatible with the Constitution in so far as it provided for special conditions on State liability for the damage caused in the framework of administration of justice. It clarified, nevertheless, that the term “administration of justice” did not cover the judicial proceedings in their entirety, but only extended to judicial acts touching upon the merits of a case. Other judicial acts – mainly of a procedural nature – fell outside the scope of the notion “administration of justice”. State liability for the damage caused by such procedural acts or failures to act, such as a breach of the reasonable length of court proceedings, could arise even in the absence of a final criminal conviction of a judge if the fault of the judge has been established in civil proceedings. The Constitutional Court emphasised, moreover, that the constitutional right to compensation by the State for the damage should not be tied in with the personal fault of a judge. An individual should be able to obtain compensation for any damage incurred through a violation by a court of his or her right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The Constitutional Court held that Parliament should legislate on the grounds and procedure for compensation by the State for the damage caused by unlawful acts or failures to act of a court or a judge and determine territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims.
17. The RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure (in force at the material time) established that a civil claim should be dismissed, by a single judge, in particular, if it was not amenable to examination in civil proceedings (Article 129 (1)) or if the court was not competent to examine it (Article 129 (7)).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-78095
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SWE
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: AYEGH v. SWEDEN
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicant, Ms Mahin Ayegh, is an Iranian national, who was born in Iran in 1956, and is currently in Sweden. She is represented before the Court by Mr B. Johansson, a lawyer practising in Stockholm.
The respondent Government are represented by their Agent Mr C. H. Ehrenkrona of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 8 February 2003 the applicant and her son A. (born in March 1986) arrived in Sweden. On 20 February 2003 they applied to the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) for asylum and residence permits and, on the same day, an initial interview was held with them. The applicant stated that her husband and an adult daughter remained in Tehran where the family had always lived. She and A. had fled from Iran because A. would be called to do his military service when he reached 18 years of age. There was a risk that he could be stationed at the border with Iraq which would expose him to great danger. They further claimed that they had left Iran with the help of smugglers to whom the applicant had given her passport, in which A. was also registered. Thus, she could only show the Swedish migration authorities a copy of her Iranian identification certificate (shenasnameh). However, neither the applicant nor A., nor any other member of their family, had ever been arrested or otherwise persecuted by the Iranian authorities.
At a second interview, held on 3 April 2003, the applicant and A. added to their earlier statements that A. and a friend had once, in the school yard, glanced at The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie which another student had brought with him to school. The incident had been reported to the headmaster of the school who had beaten A. and then continued to harass him. Because of this, the applicant and her husband had tried in vain to get A. transferred to another school. Moreover, the applicant pointed out that, since A. was a minor, the fact that she had helped and accompanied him would cause her problems if she returned to Iran.
On 25 April 2003 the Migration Board rejected the application for asylum and residence permits. It first found that the applicant and A. had not been persecuted by the Iranian authorities and thus could not be considered as refugees or granted asylum. It then noted that the son was obliged to do his military service once he reached 18 years of age, but that this was not a reason for granting him a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, the claim that he had had a conflict with his headmaster did not alter this conclusion. Thus, the Migration Board found no reason for A. and the applicant to be allowed to stay in Sweden on humanitarian grounds.
The applicant and A. appealed against the decision to the Aliens Appeals Board (Utlänningsnämnden), maintaining their claims and adding that the applicant and her husband were in the process of divorcing. Moreover, they alleged that A. had, on several occasions, been raped and abused by his headmaster in Iran, who had also threatened him. A. had only told his mother about this in August 2003 after repeated attempts by the health care personnel to persuade him to tell her. Since homosexual acts were strictly forbidden in Iran, he strongly feared that he would be severely punished if he were forced to return to his home country. As a result of his traumas, A. suffered from a serious depression and there was a real risk that he would try to commit suicide if he was deported. Lastly, the applicant was also suffering from the uncertain situation.
On 29 September 2004 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected the appeal, sharing the Migration Board’s reasoning and conclusion. As concerned the new information provided by A. and the applicant, it noted that, if a minor were forced to perform sexual acts with a grown man, he would not be punished for it. However, the adult man could be sentenced to death. The Aliens Appeals Board therefore considered that A. could get help from the Iranian authorities if he were threatened by the headmaster, as there were no indications that the authorities would not assist the family in such a situation. It further considered that the mental health problems of the applicant and A. were not of such a serious nature that they could be granted residence permits on humanitarian grounds.
On 28 October 2004 the Migration Board decided that the applicant and A. should be kept under supervision due to the risk that they would go into hiding to avoid deportation. Thus, they were ordered to report to the Migration Board three times a week.
However, on 6 December 2004, the Migration Board decided that the applicant and A. should be taken into custody pending the enforcement of the deportation to Iran, and the decision was enforced in respect of the applicant the same day. The decision was due to the fact that A. had gone into hiding and could not be found, and there was a real risk that the applicant would do the same. Moreover, on 10 December 2004, the Migration Board handed over the responsibility for the enforcement of the deportation of the applicant to the police authority as she had declared that she would not leave Sweden voluntarily.
On 27 January 2005 the applicant and A. lodged a new application for asylum and residence permits with the Aliens Appeals Board. They invoked medical certificates stating that A. was in poor mental health, suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, and that the applicant was also depressed and very afraid. Moreover, the applicant stated that her husband in Iran had repeatedly called and threatened to kill her if she returned to Iran and that the Iranian authorities neither could nor would protect her. She claimed that her husband had divorced her and had threatened to kill her if she returned because he accused her of having committed adultery in Sweden, having abandoned her home in Iran and having unlawfully kept his son from him. Her brother-in-law, with whom she and A. had stayed after their arrival in Sweden, had also turned against her after her husband’s accusations, and she had been forced to find another place to stay. The applicant explained the late submission of the new circumstances and evidence by the fact that she had been in despair over her son’s situation and that she herself had suffered from serious mental problems. Furthermore, she had not realised the importance of telling the Swedish authorities about her husband’s threats until she had been detained.
The applicant and A. also requested that the Aliens Appeals Board stay the enforcement of their deportation, but this request was rejected on 28 January 2005.
On 3 February 2005 the applicant and A. renewed their request for a stay of the enforcement of the deportation. They submitted new evidence in the form of copies of documents in Persian which the applicant had received from her sister in Iran. Apparently, the applicant’s husband had given the copies to her father but, due to her father’s advanced age, she had not been able to find out when or how her husband had transmitted the copies. Moreover, since her husband had the originals, she would not be able to get hold of them. According to the applicant the documents were copies of:
A report to a first instant court by the applicant’s husband accusing her of adultery, abandoning her home and family, of unlawfully withholding her son from his father and of illegally leaving the country. This “summons application” is dated 10 May 2003.
A “formal notice” whereby the applicant’s husband warns her for the last time to come home and repent for what she has done or the court proceedings will go ahead (dated 7 April 2004).
Three summons to appear before the court to defend herself against the above charges (dated 8 September 2003, 6 April 2004 and 29 June 2004, respectively). The last of these three warnings states that if the applicant does not present herself before the court, it will take an appropriate decision and the case might be examined on the material before it.
A private letter from her husband (undated) stating that he has reported her for adultery and other offences to the authorities and that he will demand the harshest punishment possible for her.
Before the Aliens Appeals Board, the applicant claimed that, due to the above charges, she would face a real risk of being either sentenced to death or punished in an inhuman manner. Moreover, there was a real risk that she would be tortured during interrogation in order to force her to confess to the alleged crimes.
On the same day, 3 February 2005, the Aliens Appeals Board rejected the renewed request to stay the deportation.
On 4 February 2005 the applicant was taken by the police to Stockholm Airport, Arlanda, to be deported. However, once there, the police decided not to go through with the measure as they considered that the applicant was not in a state to be transported as she was acting in a very violent manner, refusing to get on the plane. The police also decided that the applicant should no longer be kept in custody, but that she should be placed under an obligation to report to the Migration Board three times a week.
Also on 4 February 2005, following the Court’s indication under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Migration Board decided to stay the deportation of the applicant until further notice. The Migration Board’s decision is still in force.
On 19 May 2005 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected the new application. It noted that the applicant had stated that her husband had started to threaten her about 7 to 8 months after her arrival in Sweden, but that she had not mentioned it previously. The Aliens Appeals Board found this strange. Moreover, as the applicant had failed to give any reasonable explanation for this delay, it considered the statements questionable. It further observed that the applicant had only handed in fax copies of the documents invoked, not the originals, and this the day before the planned enforcement of the deportation. Thus, the Aliens Appeals Board considered that the copies had little value as evidence. Already against this background, it found it highly doubtful that the applicant had demonstrated that she was in need of protection in Sweden.
In any event, it noted that the applicant had not claimed that her husband had any proof that she had been unfaithful but that, on the contrary, his suspicions were unfounded. Having regard to what was known about the evidence required in Iran to convict someone of adultery, the Aliens Appeals Board considered that the applicant had not shown that it was likely that her husband could prove his accusations of adultery, which were groundless, in a court hearing. Moreover, to the best of the Aliens Appeals Board’s knowledge, it was not a criminal offence for a married woman to leave Iran without her husband’s permission although, normally, it was not possible. However, it could constitute a ground for divorce. In view of the above, the Aliens Appeals Board found that even if the applicant had left the country illegally and without her husband’s permission, she had not shown that it was probable that she would risk being subjected to such serious difficulties from the Iranian authorities, if returned, that she was in need of protection in Sweden. The fax documents which had been invoked by the applicant did not change this assessment.
As concerned the applicant’s claim that she would face problems because of the accusations of the unlawful removal of a child, the Aliens Appeals Board noted that the son had been almost 17 years old when they entered Sweden and that he was now 19. It further observed that, to its knowledge, a married woman who takes her child with her out of the country without the permission of the husband/father could not be convicted of abduction or kidnapping. In the event that someone were considered guilty of having wrongfully removed a child, no disproportionate sentence was known to have been imposed. Therefore, the applicant was not in need of protection on this ground either.
Next, the Aliens Appeals Board considered that, in so far as the applicant alleged that her husband and his family would pose a threat to her upon return to Iran, it was for the Iranian authorities to deal with the matter. It noted that so-called honour killings were not accepted by Islam and that the authorities should be able to help her and offer protection. It followed that she was not in need of protection in Sweden on this ground either. The Aliens Appeals Board also rejected A.’s request for asylum and a residence permit and concluded that, making an overall assessment, the circumstances were not such that it would be contrary to humanitarian standards to deport them to their home country.
On 5 January 2006 the Court adjourned the case at the request of the Swedish Government following the enactment of an interim amendment to the Swedish Aliens Act, on the basis of which the applicant’s case would be reviewed.
On 10 April 2006 the Government informed the Court that, on 3 March 2006, the Migration Board had decided not to grant the applicant a residence permit in Sweden on the basis of the interim amendment to the Aliens Act. The Migration Board had concluded that the applicant could not be granted leave to stay on either medical or humanitarian grounds.
It appears that A., in a separate decision by the Migration Board, was granted a permanent residence permit in Sweden.
In a letter of 22 June 2006, the applicant informed the Court that she had requested the Migration Board to reconsider its decision of 3 March 2006 because of her continuously deteriorating mental health. However, the request had been rejected on 13 June 2006 as the Migration Board considered that it had already examined her health status and that the new information invoked did not alter its previous conclusions. The applicant then stated in her letter that, due to her very poor mental condition, deportation would cause her personal suffering beyond her ability to endure, for which reason it would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention to deport her.
The applicant has submitted two medical certificates to the Court dated 13 February 2006 and 2 June 2006, respectively.
The first certificate was written by Dr B. Hännestrand, specialist in psychiatry at the Medical Clinic for Refugees in Uppsala, and based on one consultation lasting two hours. She first noted that the applicant had previously had contact with psychologists and doctors because of depression and that, during the examination, she was distraught and anxious and expressed suicidal thoughts and an extreme fear of returning to Iran. She was taking sleeping pills and antidepressants. Dr Hännerstrand concluded that the applicant suffered from a serious depression with anxiety symptoms, and that there was a real risk that she would try to commit suicide if she were to be deported.
The second certificate was written by Dr A.-H. Hanson, chief physician at the psychiatric clinic at Nyköping Hospital, who had examined the applicant on one occasion in May 2006, but had known her for more than a year since she had treated A. at the clinic. According to this certificate, the applicant was very worried and afraid about her own situation but even more about how A. would recover and manage if she was deported from Sweden and he was left alone. It was noted that she was traumatised by her experiences and the threats and abuses of which she had been, and continued to be, the victim. She was diagnosed as suffering from a serious mental illness in the form of a depression and an enduring crisis reaction with suicide plans. Dr Hanson further stated that A. still had a great need for his mother and that, if she were deported, there was a real risk that A. might try to commit suicide. She concluded that the applicant was showing signs of pre-psychotic thinking and that she was very close to the limit of what she could bear.
The basic provisions, applied in the present case, concerning the right of aliens to enter and to remain in Sweden were laid down in the 1989 Aliens Act (utlänningslagen, 1989:529 – hereinafter referred to as “the 1989 Act”). However, the 1989 Act was replaced, on 31 March 2006, by a new Aliens Act (Utlänningslag, 2005:716 – hereinafter referred to as “the 2005 Act”). Both the 1989 and 2005 Acts define the conditions under which an alien can be expelled from the country, as well as the procedures relating to the enforcement of such decisions.
Chapter 1, Section 4 of the 1989 Act provided that an alien staying in Sweden for more than three months should have a residence permit. Such a permit could be issued, inter alia, to an alien who, for humanitarian reasons, should be allowed to settle in Sweden (Chapter 2, Section 4). For example, serious physical or mental illness could, in exceptional cases, constitute humanitarian reasons for the grant of a residence permit if it was a life-threatening illness for which no treatment could be provided in the alien’s home country.
Further, according to the 1989 Act, an alien who was considered to be a refugee or otherwise in need of protection was, with certain exceptions, entitled to residence in Sweden (Chapter 3, Section 4). The term “refugee” referred to an alien who was outside the country of his nationality owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or religious or political opinion, and who was unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. This applied irrespective of whether the persecution was at the hands of the authorities of the country or if those authorities could not be expected to offer protection against persecution by private individuals (Chapter 3, Section 2). By “an alien otherwise in need of protection” was meant, inter alia, a person who had left the country of his or her nationality because of a well-founded fear of being sentenced to death or receiving corporal punishment, or of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Chapter 3, Section 3).
An alien who was to be refused entry or expelled, in accordance with a decision that had gained legal force, could be granted a residence permit if he or she filed a new application based on circumstances which had not previously been examined, and if the alien was entitled to a residence permit under Chapter 3, Section 4, or it would be contrary to the requirements of humanity to enforce such a decision (Chapter 2, Section 5 b). Regard could also be had to serious illness under this provision. Such new applications were filed with and examined by the Aliens Appeals Board (Chapter 7, Section 7).
As regards the enforcement of a refusal of entry or expulsion, account had to be taken of the risk of capital punishment or torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. According to a special provision on impediments to enforcement, an alien could not be sent to a country where there were reasonable grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of suffering capital or corporal punishment or of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Chapter 8, Section 1).
In essence, the 2005 Act did not substantially amend the above provisions, except for the following:
By the 2005 Act, the Aliens Appeals Board has been replaced by the Migration Court and the Migration Court of Appeal (Chapter 14, Section 3). Moreover, it is no longer possible to renew applications but, instead, the Migration Board shall, on its own initiative, determine whether there is any impediment to the deportation or expulsion (Chapter 12, Section 18).
Furthermore, between 15 November 2005 and 30 March 2006, certain interim amendments to the 1989 Act were in force, according to which the Migration Board, upon application by an alien or on its own initiative, could re-determine final decisions already taken by the Aliens Appeals Board. The object of these temporary amendments was to grant residence permits to aliens who, inter alia, had been in Sweden for a very long time or where there existed “urgent humanitarian interests” (humanitärt angeläget). Special consideration was given to the situation of children.


ITEMID: 001-77675
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: BLEYOVA v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Mrs Oľga Bleyová, is a Slovakian national who was born in 1930 and lives in Bratislava. She is represented before the Court by Mr R. Bockanič, a lawyer practising in Bratislava. The respondent Government are represented by Mrs A. Poláčková, their Agent.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant was married to Mr B. who was a member of the Bratislava III Housing Cooperative (bytové družstvo) which assigned a flat to him. At that time the applicant was not a member of the cooperative. The couple lived in the flat under a lease and, by operation of law, they had the right of joint use (právo spoločného užívania).
In 1974 the marriage was dissolved and Mr B. moved out of the flat.
In 1975 the Bratislava Regional Court (then Mestský súd, at present Krajský súd) cancelled the applicant’s and her former husband’s right of joint use of the flat and ruled that the sole legal tenant was Mr B. The applicant was ordered to move out within 15 days of the date when a substitute dwelling was provided to her. Until then, the applicant would have an absolute right to stay in the flat (právo bývania).
As no substitute dwelling has ever been provided to her, the applicant continues to enjoy her right to stay in the flat.
In 1985 the applicant became a so called “non-resident member” of the cooperative. In 1992 she transferred the membership to a third person. In 1993 she again became a non-resident member.
In February 1993 the cooperative’s board passed a decision excluding Mr B. from its membership for breach of duties. It was noted that he had not been using the flat since 1974. Mr B. appealed against this decision, but his appeal has never been formally determined.
On 30 March 1993 the board annulled its decision of February 1993. The validity of the annulment is disputed. It was investigated following the applicant’s criminal complaint, but no charges were ever brought. The matter was considered to be of a private-law nature and, as such, fell to be determined by the ordinary courts. No criminal case to answer was detected.
In 1994 Mr B. petitioned for the applicant’s eviction on the basis of the 1975 judgment. On 2 August 1995 the Bratislava III District Court (then Obvodný súd, at present Okresný súd) dismissed the petition holding that Mr B.’s rights under that judgment were statute-barred.
In August 1995 the applicant invited the cooperative to sell her the flat under special legislation - Flats and Non-residential Premises Ownership Act (Law no. 182/1993 Coll., as amended - “the 1993 Act”) - which provided for the transfer of ownership of flats to tenants for a regulated price. She did not receive an answer.
In May 1996 the cooperative sold the flat to Mr B. under the 1993 Act.
The sale was registered in the Land Registry and Mr B. became the legal owner of the flat. The applicant subsequently challenged the validity of the sale in the ordinary courts. The course and outcome of her action is a separate subject-matter of the present application and is described in detail below.
On 11 September 1997, following numerous arguments and disturbances, Mr B. and his lawyer, Mrs N., arranged for a locksmith and a removal service to enter the flat forcibly and to start removing the applicant’s belongings from it. The police arrived after a call from the applicant and the operation was halted.
The applicant filed a criminal complaint about the incident and joined a claim for damages to it. On her complaint, Mr B. and Mrs N. were indicted to stand trial on a charge of having organised a breaking and entry within the meaning of Article 238 of the Criminal Code. They were first found guilty in summary proceedings, but the conviction was quashed on appeal. They were then acquitted in ordinary proceedings, but the acquittal was quashed on appeal. The proceedings are still pending.
On 20 January 1998 the applicant lodged a separate action for damages resulting from the incident of 11 September 1997. It is still pending.
Mr B. again sought the applicant’s eviction by way of a court action. It was stayed by the District Court on 16 August 2000 pending the outcome of the proceedings concerning the validity of the transfer of the flat to Mr. B. The action for eviction is still pending.
In 2001 Mr B. was registered in the Registry of Inhabitants as residing permanently in the flat. The registration was investigated following the applicant’s criminal complaint, but no charges were ever brought. The matter was found to be entirely of a private-law nature and, as such, fell within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. No criminal case to answer was detected.
On 8 August 2005 the applicant brought an action in the Bratislava III District Court seeking an injunction to restrain Mr B. from disturbing her peaceful enjoyment of the flat. At the same time she sought an interim injunction preventing him from entering the flat. On 16 January 2006 the matter was transmitted to the Bratislava I District Court, which had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain it. It is still pending there.
On 19 June 1997 the applicant brought an action against the cooperative in the Bratislava I District Court seeking a judicial ruling declaring the contract of sale of 1996 void on grounds of illegality in that Mr B. had previously been deprived of his membership of the cooperative and, as such, no longer qualified to have the flat transferred to him under the 1993 Act.
On 1 July 1997 the Bratislava I District Court transmitted the action to the Bratislava III District Court, which had territorial jurisdiction.
On 27 August 1997 the Bratislava III District Court invited the defendant to submit observations in reply and the applicant to pay the court fee, which she did on 4 September 1997.
On 16 February and 29 April 1998 the District Court held hearings.
On 15 June 1998 the District Court held another hearing following which, on the same day, it dismissed the action as unfounded.
On 10 August 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal. On the District Court’s request, on 7 October and 26 November 1998, respectively, the applicant corrected her appeal and paid the court fee. On 4 February 1999 the applicant supplemented her appeal.
On 7 April 1999 the Regional Court held a hearing. It had to be adjourned as the applicant had challenged the president of the Regional Court’s chamber on grounds of bias. On 14 April 1999 the applicant supplemented the reasons for the challenge.
On 19 August 1999 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) dismissed the challenge as unfounded.
On 30 September 1999 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 15 June 1998 for procedural shortcomings and remitted the matter to the District Court for reexamination. The court observed inter alia that the action should have been directed against both parties to the contract.
On 25 November 1999 the District Court invited the applicant’s lawyer to correct the action by identifying the defendants in line with the judgment of 30 September 1999. On 6 December 1999 the lawyer informed the District Court that on 30 November 1999 the applicant had withdrawn his power of attorney.
On 24 February 2000 the District Court forwarded the invitation to correct the action directly to the applicant, who responded on 6 March 2000.
On 1 June 2000, on the applicant’s motion, the District Court admitted Mr B. to the proceedings as the second defendant in the action.
In their submissions to the District Court filed in September and November 2000, respectively, the cooperative and its former in-house lawyer conceded that the re-admission of Mr B. as a member in 1993 had been contrary to law and to the statute of the cooperative. They also admitted that there had been shortcomings in the transfer of the flat to him and expressed doubts as to the accuracy of the internal records concerning his re-admission.
Between 18 September and 21 December 2000 the District Court held 3 hearings. The hearing called for 29 January 2001 was adjourned due to the absence of the applicant, her lawyer and a witness. It was also noted that, four days previously, the applicant had challenged the District Court judge dealing with the case for bias. The applicant completed the challenge by submitting new information and documents on 30 January and 19 February 2001.
On 30 April 2001 the Regional Court dismissed the challenge as unsubstantiated.
A hearing held before the District Court on 18 July 2001 was adjourned until 12 December 2001 and again until 25 February 2002.
On 8 April 2002 the District Court held a hearing following which, on the same day, it dismissed the action. It concluded that the applicant did not have a “pressing legal interest” in obtaining the ruling sought, which was a conditio sine qua non under Article 80 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure for the ruling to be made. Her legal status as regards the flat was defined by the judgment of 1975 under which she had an absolute right to stay in the flat until alternative accommodation had been provided to her. The contract of 1996 did not concern her directly and its validity had no effect on her own legal position. The applicant appealed against this judgment.
On 19 June 2003, following a hearing of the appeal on the same day, the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 8 April 2002, concurring fully with the District Court’s findings and conclusions. The judgment became final and binding on 3 September 2003.
In September 2003 the applicant requested that the Prosecutor General exercise his discretionary power and lodge an extraordinary appeal on points of law (mimoriadne dovolanie) on her behalf against the judgments of 2 April 2002 and 19 June 2003. She argued that those judgments were legally wrong and violated her right to respect for her private life and home.
On 13 May 2004 the Prosecutor General acceded to the applicant’s request and lodged the appeal. He maintained that the applicant did have a “pressing legal interest” in having the action determined as she had been living in the flat for 43 years, she was a member of the cooperative and had sought to obtain the flat under the 1993 Act, and that Mr B. had been taking various illegal and unacceptable measures to have her evicted from it. In contrast, Mr B. had vacated the flat decades ago, his rights under the judgment of 1975 were statuebarred, he had been excluded from the cooperative, his readmission to it was flawed and he was not eligible to have the flat transferred to him under the 1993 Act. The Prosecutor General maintained that the contract of sale of 1996 was illegal and should be declared void.
On 26 October 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal. The applicant had the right to stay in the flat until she had been provided with an alternative dwelling under the 1975 judgment. If she was being disturbed in exercising this right, she could seek judicial protection against the trespasser. Her right to stay could not be interpreted as entailing her standing to sue. The transfer of ownership of the flat from the cooperative to Mr B. had no effect on her legal position. The applicant must have known that Mr B. had a recognised legal title to the flat and thus could not claim to have acted bona fide in obtaining the title herself. The applicant therefore lacked a “pressing legal interest” in the action and, consequently, could not challenge the contract of 1996.
On 11 June 2003 the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution which she completed on 7 July 2003. She maintained that the length of the proceedings in her action of 1997, as conducted before the District Court and the Regional Court, had been excessive and that their respective decisions of 8 April 2002 and 19 June 2003 had been arbitrary and legally wrong and had violated her right to respect for her private life and home.
On 26 November 2003 the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) declared the complaint inadmissible. As to the length of the proceedings in their phase before the District Court, they had ended by the judgment of 8 April 2002. Their examination thus could not bring about their acceleration. In line with the Constitutional Court’s established practice, such an examination was not therefore required. The Constitutional Court did not address the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court.
The examination of the subjectmatter of the applicant’s action was primarily the task of the ordinary courts. They had proceeded in accordance with the applicable procedural rules and had given adequate reasons for their decisions. The Constitutional Court discerned no element of arbitrariness in the contested judgments and found that the remainder of the application was therefore manifestly ill-founded.
In February 2005 the applicant turned to the Constitutional Court again. She sought to challenge the judgments of the District Court, the Regional Court and the Supreme Court of, respectively, 8 April 2002, 19 June 2003 and 26 October 2004 on the ground that they had violated her right to respect for her private and family life and her home.
On 23 March 2005 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as out of time in that it had been lodged outside the statutory twomonth timelimit.


ITEMID: 001-75648
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: PROSSER and OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Josep Casadevall;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: In all the following cases, the Government are represented by their Agent, Mr C. Whomersley, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 10 September 1932 and who lives in Newport, Gwent. He is not represented before the Court.
The applicant was widowed on 17 July 1993. On 28 January 2001, aged 68, he made an application for survivors’ benefits, which was finally refused on 19 February 2001.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 8 May 1922 and lives in Swansea. He is not represented before the Court.
The applicant was widowed on 3 March 2001, when he was 78 years old. He subsequently claimed survivors’ benefits and was refused.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 19 November 1933 and who lives in Ormskirk. He is represented before the Court by Royds RDW, solicitors practising in London.
The applicant was widowed on 20 September 1992. There was one child of the marriage, born on 19 November 1977. The applicant made an enquiry about survivors’ benefits to the Benefits Agency in August 1997, and was informed by a letter dated 15 September 1997 that men were not eligible for such benefits. He wrote to the Benefits Agency again in November 2000, asking for his claim to be reconsidered, and was informed again, on 30 November 2000, that he was not entitled.
The applicant made a formal application for bereavement benefits on 27 May 2001, aged 67, and was refused on 31 May 2001. He appealed, and his appeal was finally rejected by the Appeals Tribunal on 3 August 2001.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 11 September 1934 and who lives in Tipton. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 16 September 1989. On 11 May 2000, aged 65, he applied for survivors’ benefits, and was finally refused on 9 November 2000.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 17 October 1931 and who lives in Birmingham. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 31 October 2000, when he was 69. He claimed survivors’ benefits on 17 April 2001 and was finally refused at some point after July 2001.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 12 August 1934 and who lives in Barnoldswick. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 22 October 1984. In December 2000, aged 66, he claimed survivors’ benefits, and was finally refused on 9 January 2001.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 21 December 1929 and who lives in Nelson. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 2 September 1989. On 12 December 2000, aged 70, he claimed survivors’ benefits, and was refused the following day.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 19 November 1923 and who lives in Brackley. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 9 July 1970. On 28 March 2001, aged 77, he claimed survivors’ benefits, and was finally refused on 6 June 2001.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 23 December 1933 and who lives in Skemersdale. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 30 January 1996. Shortly after his wife’s death he made enquiries about survivors’ benefits but was told these were not available for men. On 2 October 2000, aged 66, he claimed survivors’ benefits, and was refused the following day.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 22 October 1934 and who lives in Gosport. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 8 November 1993. In February 2001, aged 66, he enquired about survivors’ benefits and was informed on 2 April 2001 that such benefits were not available to men. He subsequently made a formal application, which was refused on 8 May 2001.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 19 August 1935 and who lives in Skemersdale. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 30 June 2000. In October 2000, aged 65, he applied for survivors’ benefits, and was refused on 13 October 2000.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 20 April 1922 and who lives in Prestwood. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 7 October 1989. Following his wife’s death the applicant enquired about survivors’ benefits but was informed by the Benefits’ Agency that men were not eligible. He made a formal application in November or December 2000, aged 78, to which he never received a response.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 5 July 1934 and who lives in Burnley. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 26 March 1996. He made a formal application for survivors’ benefits in February 2001, aged 66, which was finally refused on 12 April 2001.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 13 June 1935 and who lives in Skelmerdale. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 25 December 1989. On 13 September 2000, aged 65, he applied for survivors’ benefits, and was finally refused on 2 November 2000.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 24 September 1936 and who lives in Rossendale. He is also represented before the Court by Royds RDW.
The applicant was widowed on 25 April 1989. Following his wife’s death, he enquired about survivors’ benefits and was informed that they were not available for men. On 5 December 2001, aged 65, he applied for survivors’ benefits, and was finally refused on 10 December 2001.
The domestic law relevant to these applications is set out in Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, §§ 14-26, ECHR 2002-IV.