ITEMID: 001-22597
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HRV
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2002
DOCNAME: SLAVICEK v. CROATIA
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Antun Slaviček, is a Croatian citizen, who was born in 1935 and lives in Čakovec.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 17 October 1992 the applicant lent to S.H. 6,820,000 Croatian Dinars (HRD) for a period of three months at a rate of interest of 3%. He also lent to N.Š.F., a company in Zagreb HRD 3,100,000 for periods of three to twelve months at a rate of interest of 40%.
On 17 November 1992 he lent to T.T.B., a company in Zagreb, 5,370 German Marks (DEM) for periods of three to twelve months at a rate of interest of 30%.
As the said companies failed to repay the loans, the applicant instituted three sets of proceedings in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu).
On 15 October 1993 the applicant filed two separate civil actions for re-payment of his loans, one against T.B., the owner of the company T.T.B. and the other against N.Š., the owner of the company N.Š.F.
On 18 April 1994 the applicant filed yet another action for re-payment of his loan, against S.H.
All three sets of proceedings are pending before the court of first instance.
Section 59 (4) of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court (entered into force on 24 September 1999 - hereinafter “the 1999 Constitutional Court Act” - Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu) reads as follows:
“The Constitutional Court may, exceptionally, examine a constitutional complaint prior to exhaustion of other available remedies, if it is satisfied that a contested act, or failure to act within a reasonable time, grossly violates a party’s constitutional rights and freedoms and that, if it does not act a party will risk serious and irreparable consequences.”
Section 26 of the Constitutional Act on the Changes of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court (entered into force on 15 March 2002, published in the Official Gazette no. 29 of 22 March 2002 - hereinafter “The Act of 15 March 2002” - Ustavni zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Ustavnog zakona o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske) introduced a new Section 59 (a), which subsequently became Section 63 of the 2002 Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court. The relevant parts of that Section read as follows:
(1) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint even before all legal remedies have been exhausted in cases when a competent court has not decided within a reasonable time a claim concerning the applicant’s rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him ...
(2) If the constitutional complaint ... under paragraph 1 of this Section is accepted, the Constitutional Court shall determine a time-limit within which a competent court shall decide the case on the merits...
(3) In a decision under paragraph 2 of this Article, the Constitutional Court shall fix appropriate compensation for the applicant in respect of the violation found concerning his constitutional rights ... The compensation shall be paid from the State budget within a term of three months from the date when the party lodged a request for its payment.


ITEMID: 001-57497
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: PRT
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1984
DOCNAME: CASE OF GUINCHO v. PORTUGAL
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - financial award
TEXT: 8. The applicant is a Portuguese citizen, born in 1949. He works as an electrician and resides in Lisbon.
On 18 August 1976, he was travelling in a car with Mr. Domingos Lopes, who was the owner and driver of the car, and with the latter’s brother, Mr. José Carlos Lopes. At Alverca, the car entered into collision with a vehicle belonging to the Canalux Company of Lisbon and driven by Mr. Antonio Rodrigues Baptista Dinis. Mr. Guincho was injured and lost the use of his left eye; on 18 May 1977, he was certified as having a permanent partial disability.
9. After being notified of the accident by the local police, the public prosecutor’s department at the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court instituted criminal proceedings against the drivers of both vehicles for causing unintentional bodily harm.
On 20 January 1977, the applicant learnt that the file on the case had been closed as a result of an amnesty granted under a Legislative Decree.
10. On 7 December 1978, Mr. Guincho and Mr. D. Lopes ("the plaintiffs") commenced a civil action in the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court against Mr. Dinis, the Canalux Company and the "Tranquilidade" Insurance Company ("the defendants"). The applicant claimed damages of 350,000 Escudos.
Under Article 68 of the Road Traffic Code, civil liability actions in road traffic matters must be conducted in accordance with summary procedure. Under the Code of Civil Procedure (Articles 783 to 800), this procedure is characterised, inter alia, by the reduction of certain time-limits.
11. On 9 December 1978, the judge of the second chamber (2o juizo) of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court granted the plaintiffs legal aid and ordered service of the writ on the defendants. In this connection, the judge issued a request for service (oficio precatorio) in Lisbon, the defendants’ place of residence.
In principle, when such a request is received at a court the registry has two days in which to submit it to the judge. The latter must then order the writ to be dispatched for service within five days, following which the relevant registry official is bound to execute the request for service within a similar five-day interval unless he has a justifiable excuse (Articles 159 and 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
On 30 January, 28 February, 2 April, 4 May and 11 June 1979, the judge of the first chamber of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court, replacing the judge of the second chamber (whose post was vacant), insisted that the request for service of the writ be given effect. However, this was not done until 18 June.
12. The "Tranquilidade" Insurance Company filed its defence (contestaçao) on 27 June contesting the plaintiffs’ claims. It applied to have a third party, Mr. José Lopes (see paragraph 8 above), joined in the proceedings (intervençao principal).
On 2 July 1979, Mr. Dinis and the Canalux Company filed their defence. They indicated that at the appropriate moment they would be seeking to have a medical examination of the plaintiffs.
13. The registry of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court transmitted the file to the judge on 4 July.
On 28 January 1981, the judge directed that the defence pleadings be communicated to the plaintiffs and that they are allowed five days to reply to the interlocutory application by the "Tranquilidade" Insurance Company.
In their reply filed on 9 February 1981, the plaintiffs took issue with the other side’s submissions and claimed that the interlocutory application was a delaying tactic as Mr. José Lopes, who was the brother of Mr. Domingos Lopes, had suffered no prejudice and had expressly waived his right to claim damages. In addition, they complained that they had not been notified until January 1981 of defence pleadings dating back to June and July 1979, and informed the Regional Court that Mr. Guincho had lodged a petition with the European Commission of Human Rights in connection with the length of the proceedings. The registry of the Regional Court did not transmit this reply to the judge until 26 March 1981.
14. In the meantime on 10 February 1981, the judge had declared the interlocutory application admissible on the ground that no objection had been raised against it, and he directed that a summons be served on Mr. José Lopes, who resided in Loures. A request for service in that jurisdiction was issued on the same day and service was effected on 26 February.
On 27 March 1981, the above-mentioned judge, having received late notice of the objection to the application, decided nonetheless to maintain his decision of 10 February 1981. In a preliminary decision (despacho saneador) taken on the same day, he declared the main action admissible and drew up a list of uncontested facts (especificaçao) and a list of facts that had to be clarified at the hearing (questionario).
15. The parties did not enter an appeal (agravo) against this decision. On 29 April, 30 April and 5 May 1981, they filed in the registry the list of witnesses they proposed to call.
Mr. Guincho and Mr. D. Lopes asked that one of their witnesses, Maria do Sacramento Peixoto Silva, be heard at Almada, the seat of the Regional Court within whose jurisdiction she was said by them to reside. The judge consented on 18 May 1981 and a request for evidence on commission (carta precatoria) was issued on 1 June.
On 8 June, the Almada Regional Court set the hearing down for 9 July 1981. However, the Court discovered soon afterwards that Mrs. Silva did not reside within its jurisdiction; on 12 June, it forwarded the request to the Seixal Regional Court, the competent court in this respect.
16. On 26 June, the judge of the Seixal Regional Court issed a direction to the effect that he would hear the witness on 12 October. On 9 October, the lawyer representing the first two defendants sent the judge a telegram saying that he could not be present because of illness.
Mrs. Silva failed to appear on 12 October. The same day, the judge fined her and directed that she be heard on 17 November 1981. However, the lawyer once more notified the judge by telegram that he was still unwell, and the witness did not attend.
The judge thereupon adjourned the hearing of the witness until 10 February 1982; Mrs. Silva was finally examined on that date.
17. The evidence taken on commission was sent to the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court. The judge dealing with the case received it on 16 February 1982. The following day, he submitted the file to the two other judges of the full Court who certified it on 18 February. On 19 February, he directed that the hearings be held on 12 March 1982.
The hearings could not be held on that day because of the absence of the lawyer representing the first two defendants and of two other persons, namely Fernanda do Carmo Oliveira, in respect of whom the summons as requested by the "Tranquilidade" Insurance Company indicated an address where she was not known, and a witness called by the plaintiffs, the police officer Adriano da Cruz Surreira. The latter witness had drawn up the report on the accident (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above) but had subsequently been transferred to Oporto.
The judge therefore adjourned the hearings until 16 June and then until 15 December 1982. He also issued a request for the evidence of the latter witness to be taken on commission in Oporto, as he had been asked to do by counsel for Mr. Guincho and Mr. Lopes.
18. The Oporto Regional Court summoned Mr. Surreira to appear on 14 May 1982, but on that day neither he nor the lawyers representing the plaintiffs and the first two defendants attended and the hearing was deferred until 3 June. However on 18 May, the judge was informed that the witness had again changed his residence and was serving in Montalegre; the request for evidence on commission was therefore forwarded to the Regional Court of that town.
The Montalegre Regional Court set the hearings down for 1 June 1982. On that day, Mr. Surreira’s superiors gave notice that the demands of public service (razoes inadiaveis de servico publico) prevented his attendance. Counsel on both sides also failed to appear.
Examination of the witness took place finally on 17 June 1982 and the evidence on commission was remitted to the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court.
19. On 29 July 1982, because of the impending court vacation, the competent judge decided to bring the hearings forward to 20 October 1982. The hearings were duly held on that day.
Judgment was given on 25 October 1982. The Regional Court found for the plaintiffs; it held that they were entitled to damages from the defendants within the limits of the statement of claim but subject to the proviso that the liability of the "Tranquilidade" Insurance Company could not exceed 200,000 Escudos. The Regional Court awarded Mr. D. Lopes, compensation for repairs to the car and for pecuniary and non-pecuniary prejudice. In the case of Mr. Guincho, on the other hand, it considered that the amount of the award could not yet be assessed, and it reserved the decision on quantum for the procedure for "execution" of the judgment (liquidacao en execucao de sentenca) in accordance with Article 661 para. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment was notified in writing to the applicant on 3 November.
The Regional Court subsequently liquidated the costs and expenses, having varied its decision with regard to this point in December 1982. The applicant was given notification thereof on 9 December 1982 and then on 17 January 1983.
None of the parties appealed.
20. On 22 September 1983, Mr. Guincho sought "execution" of the judgment in the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court. Prior to that, he had received from the "Tranquiladade" Insurance Company part of the sum claimed.
According to the evidence adduced before the Court, the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court has not yet fixed the quantum of compensation to be awarded to the applicant.
The socio-political situation
21. The Government stressed that at the relevant time the Portuguese legal system had to operate under exceptional circumstances on account of the restoration of democracy in April 1974, the need to consolidate the newly set up institutions and the repatriation of almost a million people from the former colonies. The domestic courts had to be reorganised in a period of serious economic recession. From 1974 to 1979, the volume of litigation almost doubled.
On 25 April 1974, there were only 336 judges in office, that is approximately four times fewer judges per inhabitant than the European average; by the end of 1983, the number had risen to 952. In 1976, court administration posts totalled 2,844, including 20 per cent vacant; currently, on the other hand, 5,566 of the 5,714 existing posts are filled.
After the Constitution was published in 1976, several measures relating to the administration of justice were taken. Notably, access to legal aid was improved, Acts governing the judiciary, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary and the office of the Procurador-Geral were passed, a judicial re-organisation of the territory was carried out and a Centre of Judicial Studies (Centro de Estudos Judiciarios) was set up to train judges and judicial officers.
Situation at the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court
22. Against this general background, the population of Vila Franca de Xira increased by nearly one quarter between 1978 and 1984, partly because of the privileged position of the town on an important main road and partly because of the influx of people repatriated from the former colonies.
According to the statistics supplied by the Government, the number of cases, both civil and criminal, before the chambers of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court increased sharply: 2,377 in 1976, 2,705 in 1977, 4,079 in 1978, 4,175 in 1979 and 5,485 in 1980. As far as civil actions were concerned, the following figures were cited:
1978 - first chamber: 206 second chamber: 199
1979 - first chamber: 457 second chamber: 337
1980 - first chamber: 579 second chamber: 508
23. The established posts of judge in the second and first chambers of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court remained vacant for more than five months (from 7 January 1979 to 26 June 1979) and nine months (21 June 1979 - 8 April 1980), respectively. On each occasion, the judge sitting in the other chamber was obliged to deputise during the period of vacancy; in particular, the judge of the first chamber acted in this way in the applicant’s case (see paragraph 11 above).
24. According to uncontested information furnished by Mr. Guincho’s representative, the lawyers in Vila Franca de Xira met on 14 December 1979 and drew the attention of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary and the Minister of Justice to the "chaotic" situation of the Regional Court and asked for urgent measures to be taken, in particular the appointment of another permanent judge, three seconded assistant judges, an investigating judge, a registrar and six court officials whose posts were then vacant.
On 18 February 1980, they raised the matter again with the Minister of Justice. On 29 May, they sent a telegram to the Supreme Council of the Judiciary once more urging the appointment of judges and emphasising that it was "humanly impossible" for the two judges in office to cope with the backlog of cases. On 27 February 1981, they made further representations to the Minister and the Supreme Council.
On 19 March 1981, the judge of the second chamber himself requested the relevant department of the Ministry of Justice to recruit a number of court officials as a matter of urgency.
Steps taken by the Government
25. The Government pointed out that from 1 October 1980 to 19 February 1981; the four judges sitting on the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court were aided by a seconded assistant judge. Furthermore, as from March 1981, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary decided that three judges from Lisbon should work on a part-time basis in in the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court.
The number of court officials varied as follows:
1977: 14 out of 17 posts filled; 1978: 15 out of 23 posts filled; 1979: 27 out of 33 posts filled; 1980: 24 out of 27 posts filled; 1981: 23 out of 26 posts filled; 1984: 33 posts, all filled.
According to the Government, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary recommended especial speediness in the conduct of the applicant’s case.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-112501
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ARM;MDA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: CASE OF SHOLOKHOV v. ARMENIA AND MOLDOVA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Armenia);Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Alvina Gyulumyan;Ineta Ziemele;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra;Mihai Poalelungi;Nona Tsotsoria
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Chisinau.
6. In May 1971 the applicant, who was living in Yerevan at that time, suffered an injury at work, namely a spinal fracture, while working at the Yerevan Meat Factory, a State-owned enterprise. He was recognised as a disabled person of the first degree, in need of constant nursing, and was granted a monthly disability allowance.
7. On 25 February 1972 the administration of the Meat Factory acknowledged its liability for the accident and awarded the applicant monthly payments for life, equivalent to the difference between the disability allowance and the average wage.
8. On an unspecified date the applicant, who by that time had apparently moved to the Moldovan SSR, instituted proceedings in the local courts against the Meat Factory, seeking damages.
9. On 20 November 1973 the Leninskiy District Court of Chisinau ordered the Meat Factory to pay the costs of nursing: a lump sum of 1,375 roubles and monthly payments of 62.50 roubles for the period between 29 October 1973 and 20 August 1975, the latter being the date when the applicant was supposed to undergo his regular disability examination. On 16 January 1974 the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Moldovan SSR modified this judgment by decreasing the awarded sums to 882 roubles and 40 roubles respectively.
10. It appears that on an unspecified date the applicant was granted disability status for life, with 100% loss of capacity for work. It further appears that the Factory continued to make the monthly payments on a voluntary basis after August 1975.
11. On an unspecified date in the late 1980s the applicant instituted proceedings against the Meat Factory seeking further damages for the cost of supplementary medical care and extra nutrition.
12. On 15 January 1988 the Ordzhonikidzenskiy District Court of Yerevan granted the applicant’s claims and ordered the Meat Factory to pay a lump sum of 5,430 roubles for the cost of supplementary medical care between 1971 and 1986, a lump sum of 400 roubles for the period between November 1986 and June 1987 and a lump sum of 4,655 roubles for the cost of extra nutrition for the period between October 1971 and June 1987 (hereafter “the 1988 judgment”). The District Court further ordered the Meat Factory to pay the applicant, with effect from the date of the judgment, 119.63 roubles monthly for supplementary medical care and extra dietary needs.
13. No appeal was lodged, so this judgment became final.
14. It appears that the factory stopped making monthly payments to the applicant starting from 1 January 1992.
15. On 14 June 1995 the Yerevan Meat Factory, which by that time had already been renamed the “Urartu Production Unit”, was restructured into the Urartu Production Unit Meat Factory of Yerevan Open Joint-Stock Company (hereafter the Urartu OJSC) and was subsequently privatised. According to the statute of the company, the Urartu OJSC was considered as a legal successor of the Urartu Production Unit.
16. By a letter of 26 July 1995, the general director of the Urartu OJSC, R.D., informed the Society of Disabled Persons of Moldova that the factory had been experiencing financial problems and was not able to make the payments. The general director pledged to restart the payments notwithstanding these problems.
17. On 14 January 1997 the Erebuni District People’s Court of Yerevan, pursuant to the provisions of the Enterprises and Private Entrepreneurs Bankruptcy Act, declared the Urartu OJSC bankrupt. On 28 April 1997 the company was put up for auction and sold to a private person. On 12 May and 2 June 1997 respectively the District People’s Court declared the private person the new owner of Urartu OJSC and concluded the bankruptcy proceedings by releasing the debtor company from repayment of any debts. The Urartu OJSC, in turn, adopted a new statute according to which it was not considered as a legal successor of any other company and was not liable for any other company’s debts.
18. By a letter of 13 April 2001 the Ministry of Justice of Moldova (the MJM) informed the Ministry of Justice of Armenia (the MJA) about the applicant’s allegations of non-enforcement of the 1988 judgment. Commenting on the fact that the Urartu OJSC was experiencing financial difficulties, the MJM drew attention to Article 7 of the Convention on Mutual Recognition of the Right to Compensation for Damage Caused to Employees by an Injury, an Occupational Disease or Other Damage to Health Related to the Performance of their Professional Duties, signed in Moscow on 9 September 1994 (Соглашение о взаимном признании прав на возмещение вреда, причиненного работникам увечьем, профессиональным заболеванием либо иным повреждением здоровья, связанные с исполнением ими трудовых обязанностей – “the Moscow Convention”) and asked the MJA to inform it about the outcome of its inquiry.
19. By a letter of 25 June 2001 the MJA informed the MJM that, provided that the applicant submitted all the duly completed documents, it was prepared to forward these documents to the relevant court to have the judgment in question enforced as required under the agreements of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
20. On 19 November 2001 the applicant submitted a letter to the MJM complaining, inter alia, about the non-enforcement of the 1988 judgment and asking to have the arrears paid and the monthly payments resumed.
21. By a letter of 7 December 2001 the MJM forwarded the applicant’s letter to the MJA.
22. On an unspecified date the applicant wrote to the MJA, informing it that its request for duly completed documents must have been a misunderstanding since his complaints concerned the non-enforcement of a judgment adopted by the Armenian courts as opposed to a foreign judgment.
23. The MJM addressed a letter to the MJA on 2 August 2002 with a similar content, attaching a copy of the 1988 judgment and stating that all the requisite enforcement documents were in the possession of the Armenian authorities.
24. By a letter of 20 September 2002 the MJA informed the MJM that it had applied to the Erebuni and Nubarashen District Court of Yerevan with an inquiry about the reasons for non-enforcement of the 1988 judgment.
25. By a letter of 21 November 2002 the MJA informed the MJM that, on 14 January 1997, Urartu OJSC had been declared bankrupt, sold to a third party by auction and that it was not considered as a legal successor of any other company and was not liable for any other company’s debts.
26. On an unspecified date the applicant wrote to the General Prosecutor of Armenia and the MJA stating that the above reply contradicted Article 7 of the Moscow Convention which was to be applied in his case if Urartu OJSC had been liquidated.
27. On an unspecified date the applicant wrote to the MJA, arguing that Urartu OJSC could not be considered as liquidated and that, in any case, Article 7 of the Moscow Convention was to be applied. In the same period he wrote to the MJM, complaining about its failure to react under Articles 10 and 11 of the Moscow Convention to the non-compliance of the Armenian authorities with Article 7 of that Convention.
28. It appears that the applicant continued to complain to various authorities about the non-enforcement of the 1988 judgment. By a letter of 3 April 2006 the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Armenia, in reply to the applicant’s complaint addressed to the Russian parliament, informed him that, according to Paragraph 16 of the Government decree no. 576 of 15 November 1992 which was no longer in force since 26 August 2004, in the event of liquidation of a company damage was to be compensated by the social security authorities with funds allocated from the State budget. The applicant could have applied to the competent authorities to obtain such compensation, which he had failed to do. Therefore the questions raised by the applicant in his complaint fell outside the competence of the administrative authorities. The applicant was advised to apply to the courts.
29. On an unspecified date the applicant instituted proceedings in the Moldovan courts against Urartu OJSC, alleging that the latter had stopped making any payments on 1 January 1992 and seeking further damages for (a) the costs of medicine, (b) the costs of prosthetics and a wheelchair once every five years, (c) the costs of domestic services, (d) the costs of sanitary and health resort treatment, including the voucher and the travel costs for himself and an accompanying person, (e) the costs of bed linen, (f) the costs connected with the purchase of a vehicle, its major repairs and fuel, (g) the costs of physiotherapy, massage, rental of equipment, and the fees of an instructor and masseur, and (h) the costs connected with the purchase of accommodation and its maintenance. The costs under items (a)-(g) were claimed for the period between January 1992 and December 2001. The applicant submitted that he had applied to the management of Urartu OJSC with the above claims but had been refused.
30. On 27 March 2003 the Ciocana District Court of Chisinau found Urartu OJSC to be the legal successor of the Yerevan Meat Factory and granted the applicant’s claims under items (a)-(g), awarding him a total of 17,884 United States dollars, while rejecting his claim under item (h) (hereafter “the 2003 judgment”). This judgment was subject to appeal within 15 days after its delivery.
31. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal, seeking to have his claims granted in full.
32. On 21 July 2003 Mr R.D. also lodged an appeal, apparently in his capacity as the general director of the company.
33. On 22 October 2003 the Civil Panel of the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the 2003 judgment in the final instance.
34. It appears that the applicant, in the meantime, requested the MJM to assist him in the recognition and execution of the 2003 judgment on the territory of Armenia in accordance with the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters signed in Minsk on 22 January 1993 (Конвенция о правовой помощи и правовых отношениях по гражданским, семейным и уголовным делам – “the Minsk Convention”). It further appears that on 1 September 2003 the MJM forwarded the applicant’s request, including all the necessary documents, to the MJA.
35. By a letter of 20 January 2004 the MJA informed the applicant that his request for the recognition and execution of the 2003 judgment had been forwarded to the competent Armenian court.
36. On 4 March 2004 the Erebuni and Nubarashen District Court of Yerevan granted the applicant’s request by recognising the 2003 judgment and ordering its enforcement.
37. On an unspecified date Mr R.D. lodged an appeal against this decision.
38. On 23 April 2004 the Civil Court of Appeal of Armenia decided to dismiss the applicant’s request. In this respect, the Court of Appeal mentioned that, by the 1988 judgment, the applicant was awarded monthly payments for medical care and extra nutrition, and quoted Article 55 (c) of the Minsk Convention.
39. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, in which he argued that the subject matter of the 1988 and 2003 proceedings was different and that, in any event, the defendant had stopped making any payments on 1 January 1992.
40. On 17 September 2004 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unsubstantiated by upholding the findings of the Civil Court of Appeal. A copy of this decision was received by the applicant on an unspecified date after 19 April 2005.
41. On 22 November 2007 the MJM addressed a letter to the MJA seeking to find out the official position of the Armenian authorities on the interpretation and application of the Moscow Convention to the applicant’s case and the possibility of an unbiased examination by an Armenian court of the issue of the execution of the 2003 judgment. It is not clear if there was any reply to this letter by the MJA.
42. According to Article 6, international agreements are an integral part of the legal system of Armenia.
43. The relevant provisions of the Moscow Convention provide:
“This Convention covers enterprises, agencies and organisations of Contracting Parties (including those of the former USSR) irrespective of their form of ownership (hereafter, the enterprises).
Compensation payments for damage caused to employees by an injury, an occupational disease or other damage to health related to the performance of their professional duties (hereafter, compensation for damage) are made to the employees who have previously worked at the enterprises, or in case of their death to persons entitled to compensation for damage, and who are nationals of and permanent residents in any of the Contracting Parties. ...”
“Compensation for damage caused to an employee as a result of an occupational injury, other damage to health (including cases where the loss of capacity to work as a result of an accident at work connected with the performance of professional duties by employees occurs after the injured person has moved to another Contracting Party) or death is paid by the employer of the Contracting Party whose laws were applicable to the employee at the time of the injury, other damage to health or death.
The employer responsible for causing damage pays compensation pursuant to the domestic law.”
“In case of liquidation of the enterprise responsible for damage caused to an employee and in the absence of a legal successor, the Contracting Party on whose territory the enterprise was liquidated guarantees compensation for damage to such employees pursuant to the domestic law.”
“A court of the Contracting Party on whose territory the action incurring a liability for damages has taken place, or a court of the Contracting Party on whose territory persons entitled to compensation for damage reside enjoy jurisdiction over the cases as provided for in the present Convention.”
“Disputes concerning interpretation or application of this Convention are resolved through negotiations between the Contracting Parties concerned and other generally accepted means, including conciliation commissions set up upon the request of one of the Contracting Parties.”
“Issues not regulated by this Convention, including those related to its application, are examined by the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties.”
44. The relevant provisions of Section III of the Minsk Convention, entitled “Recognition and Execution of Decisions”, provide:
“Each Contracting Party, in compliance with the requirements of this Convention, shall recognise and execute the following decisions adopted in the territories of other Contracting Parties: (a) the decisions adopted by institutions of justice on civil and family cases...”
“1. The request for authorisation of execution of a decision shall be filed with the competent court of the Contracting Party where the decision is subject to be executed. It can also be filed with the court which has decided on the case at first instance. That court shall forward the request to the court competent to decide on the request...”
“1. The request for recognition and execution of decisions envisaged by Article 51 shall be examined by the courts of the Contracting Party in the territory of which the decision must be executed.
2. The court, examining the request for recognition and authorisation of execution of a decision, shall limit itself to determining that the requirements of this Convention have been observed. If the requirements have been observed, the court decides to have the decision executed...”
“The recognition of decisions ... and the authorisation of their execution may be refused if: ... (c) there has been previously a final decision adopted on the case in the territory of the Contracting Party, where the decision must be recognised and executed, involving the same parties, having the same subject-matter and on the same grounds...”
45. Section 17 empowered the court to declare a debtor bankrupt.
46. Section 30 § 1 provided that the court shall decide to put a bankrupt debtor legal entity on sale through auction. According to sub-paragraph 4 of the same Section, the purchaser of the bankrupt legal entity should not be liable for its debts.
47. Section 34 provided that a court, upon conclusion of the court examination of a bankruptcy case, should declare the debtor released from paying all outstanding debts and it should be forbidden thereafter to institute court proceedings against the debtor seeking to recover such debts.
48. According to Paragraph 16 of the Decree, which lost its effect on 26 August 2004, in the event of termination of the activities of a company in consequence of its liquidation or restructuring the damage caused to an employee as a result of a professional injury was to be compensated by the company’s legal successor and, in the event of the absence of the latter, the social security authorities with funds allocated from the State budget.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-76630
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: MACHUNKA v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Rastislav Machunka, is a Slovakian national who was born in 1971 and lives in Trenčín. He was represented before the Court by Mrs E. Ľalíková, a lawyer practising in Bratislava. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs A. Poláčková.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 21 October 1998 the applicant filed an action for protection of his personal rights with the Trenčín District Court. He sued the editor of a daily newspaper which had allegedly made defamatory statements about him.
On 14 January 1999 the District Court invited the applicant to pay the court fee. On 3 February 1999 the applicant informed the District Court in writing that he had transferred the sum due on 29 January 1999. As the District Court did not receive the sum, the applicant was heard on 19 October 1999. It was established that the sum had been returned to the applicant’s account. On 21 October 1999 the District Court received the fee.
On 16 November 1999 the District Court asked the defendant to submit comments on the action within ten days.
According to a note in the case file, the judge dealing with the case had been attached temporarily to a different court starting on 1 January 2000.
On 17 July 2000 the Trenčín District Court delivered a judgment against which both parties appealed on 25 August and on 19 September 2000 respectively.
After having taken several procedural steps the District Court submitted the case file to the Trenčín Regional Court on 30 January 2001. On 13 March 2001 the Regional Court returned the file to the District Court as there had been shortcomings in serving the first-instance judgment. On 14 March 2001 the District Court sent the judgment to the party concerned. That party filed an appeal on 17 April 2001. On 19 June 2001 the file was re-submitted to the appellate court.
On 19 November 2002 the Regional Court quashed the District Court’s judgment of 17 July 2000. The appellate court found that the District Court had committed a serious procedural mistake in that its decision exceeded the scope of the case. The question whether the defendant had standing in the case was also to be clarified and further evidence was to be taken. The file was returned to the District Court on 20 December 2002. The Regional Court’s decision was served on the parties on 20 January and on 7 February 2003 respectively.
On 7 February 2003 the applicant withdrew a part of his claim which concerned an apology for the statements in question. He explained that almost five years had lapsed since their publication. The applicant maintained his claim for compensation amounting to the equivalent of approximately 5,000 euros (EUR).
On 19 February 2003 the District Court admitted another person as a defendant in the proceedings.
The District Court made several inquiries, in accordance with the Regional Court’s instructions, between February and June 2003.
On 1 July 2003 the case was assigned to a different judge as the judge dealing with it had been transferred to a different court.
On 10 September 2003 the District Court made further written inquiries to which it received replies on 22 and 26 September 2003.
On 28 January 2004 the District Court scheduled a hearing for 18 March 2004. It also made inquiries with a view to obtaining further evidence.
On 3 March 2004 the applicant asked for the hearing scheduled for 18 March 2004 to be adjourned due to the absence of his lawyer.
A hearing was scheduled for 22 April 2004. The defendant asked for its adjournment as his lawyer could not attend. He further requested that no hearing be scheduled for June 2004.
On 10 May 2004 the District Court asked the police for assistance in serving a summons on a witness. On 17 June 2004 the police replied that they had been unable to serve the summons.
At the hearing held on 13 July 2004 the applicant withdrew his claim against the second defendant. After the decision to discontinue the relevant part of the proceedings had become final on 10 August 2004, the court scheduled a hearing for 30 September 2004. On the last mentioned date the case was adjourned as a witness failed to appear.
A hearing scheduled for 11 November 2004 was adjourned as the judge was ill.
On 7 December 2004 both the defendant and a witness failed to appear. The court imposed a procedural fine of 5,000 Slovak korunas on the witness. It asked the Bratislava I District Court to hear the witness. On 21 June 2005 the Bratislava I District Court informed the Trenčín District Court that the witness had not appeared before it and that neither the post office nor the police had been able to serve the summons on her.
Subsequently the case was assigned to a different judge as the judge originally appointed to deal with it was on maternity leave.
The hearing scheduled for 2 November 2005 was adjourned to 30 November 2005 at the request of the applicant’s lawyer.
On 30 November 2005 the District Court delivered a judgment in which it granted the applicant’s claim in part. The judgment became final on 18 January 2006.
On 10 February 2003 the applicant complained about the length of the proceedings before the District Court to the Constitutional Court. He claimed, inter alia, the equivalent of EUR 1,750 as financial compensation. On 12 March 2003 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible.
On 3 December 2003 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant’s right to a hearing without unjustified delay. It instructed the Trenčín District Court to proceed with the case without any further delay and awarded the equivalent of EUR 730 by way of just satisfaction to the applicant, payable within two months. It also ordered the District Court to reimburse the costs of the applicant’s legal representation within fifteen days.
The decision stated that the case was of a certain procedural complexity and that what was at stake for the applicant called for the particular attention of the court dealing with it. In the Constitutional Court’s view, the applicant was responsible for the delayed payment of the court fee, as a result of which one year had lapsed before the District Court could start proceeding with the case. On the other hand, several delays occurred subsequently for which the District Court was responsible. In particular, more than seven months had lapsed between 21 October 1999 (when the court fee was paid) and 2 June 2000 (when the District Court effectively started dealing with the case). Undue delay occurred between 30 January 2001 and 19 June 2001 because of the erroneous service of the first-instance judgment. The Constitutional Court found further delays in the proceedings after 20 December 2002 when the Regional Court had returned the case file to the District Court.


ITEMID: 001-104601
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2011
DOCNAME: KOCHERGA v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Elisabet Fura;Ganna Yudkivska;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Mykola Mykolayovych Kocherga, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1954 and lives in the town of Shakhtarsk, Donetsk region, Ukraine.
The applicant worked in the mining industry for more than thirty years and developed an occupational lung disease and disability confirmed by the medical commission. Under the Compulsory State Social Insurance Against Work-Related Accidents and Occupational Diseases Causing Disability Act (“the Social Insurance Act”) he was entitled to receive different types of payments from the State Insurance Fund for Work-Related Accidents and Occupational Diseases (“the Fund”). According to the applicant, the Fund provided him with the majority of payments and other social benefits due to him. However, the Fund refused to pay him compensation for non-pecuniary damage, which was equally guaranteed by the Social Insurance Act, on the ground that the State budget for 2006 had suspended the relevant provision of the Social Insurance Act and did not foresee funds for this type of payment.
The applicant challenged the above refusal in the Shakhtarsk Town Court in October 2006.
By its decision of 4 December 2006, the court found in part for the applicant and awarded him 14,000 Ukrainian hryvnias, approximately 2,100 euros at the material time.
The Fund appealed against the judgment, claiming that compensation for non-pecuniary damage was not automatic and that the applicant had to prove he had suffered such damage, which he had failed to do. It further contended that the applicant’s claim was belated and that the State Budget Act had suspended the relevant provisions of the Social Insurance Act and did not foresee expenses for this type of payment.
On 15 February 2007 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the first-instance court and found against the applicant on the basis that the applicant had acquired a right to compensation after the State Budget Act for 2006 had already come into force and suspended the relevant provision.
The applicant appealed on points of law. He maintained that the insurance scheme under which he had claimed compensation was formed of extra-budget funds and could not depend on the State budget. He further contested the conclusions of the court of appeal about the relevant provisions of the Social Insurance Act being suspended.
On 3 April 2007 the Supreme Court refused the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law.


ITEMID: 001-110212
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ROU
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: CASE OF POPA AND TANASESCU v. ROMANIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Article 6-3-c - Defence in person) (Article 6-3-c - Defence in person;Article 6 - Right to a fair trial);Violation of Article 6+6-3-d - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Article 6-3-d - Examination of witnesses) (Article 6-3-d - Examination of witnesses;Article 6 - Right to a fair trial);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage);Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Ineta Ziemele;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Mihai Poalelungi;Nona Tsotsoria
TEXT: 6. The applicants were born in 1971 and 1974 respectively.
7. The first applicant started serving a seven-year prison sentence in October 2007. On 8 January 2012 his sentence was suspended on probation. According to the latest information submitted by the second applicant he is serving a prison sentence and is detained in Ploieşti Prison.
8. In January 2000, the applicants were involved in an affair which had largescale media coverage called “The Car Boot Affair” (Afacerea Portbagajul). R.V., the applicants’ friend, was kidnapped and subjected to illtreatment for almost five weeks by people paid by a businessman, B.M., to get back money he had allegedly stolen from the boot of a car belonging to the businessman.
9. In the evening of 11 January 2000, a little before midnight, R.V. received a phone call from one of his friends, D.C., who informed him that he was invited at the headquarters of B.M.’s company to clarify the situation of the stolen money. R.V. accepted the invitation and went to the place indicated. Immediately after his arrival, R.V. admitted under threat that he had stolen the money, with another person. From that moment he was kept prisoner, permanently guarded by the people being paid by B.M., in different buildings in Bucharest.
10. On 7 February 2000 he was taken to a villa belonging to B.M. in Breaza. On 14 February 2000, taking advantage of a lapse of attention on the part of the people guarding him, R.V. climbed out of a window of the toilets and escaped.
11. Immediately after R.V.’s escape, B.M. left the country in order to avoid arrest.
12. The role played by the applicants in this affair was highly controversial.
13. The prosecutors presented them as individuals paid by B.M. to kidnap R.V. and keep him under guard.
14. According to the statements given by R.V., the victim, and other witnesses, the applicants were friends of the victim and they were present at the meeting between B.M. and R.V. as protection for the latter.
15. According to a statement given by a witness, P.C., before the Bucharest County Court on 28 May 2001, the applicants were sent to the headquarters of B.M.’s company to protect R.V. and to keep their mutual friends informed of what was happening.
16. In his statement given on 2 February 2001, D.C. recognised that he had contacted the applicants and asked them to be present at the meeting. He also added that they had informed him that their friend R.V. needed help, which they could not provide as they were outnumbered and surrounded by armed persons.
17. Furthermore, at the last hearing before the Bucharest County Court held on 8 February 2002, R.V.’s lawyer called for the two applicants to be acquitted, stressing that they were the victim’s friends, who had tried to make their friend’s situation easier under the circumstances.
18. According to the applicants, they were present at the meeting which took place on 11 January 2000 between their friend and B.M. They informed D.C. and M.C. (another friend of R.V.) that R.V. would not be released until he returned the stolen money. When they saw that the people paid by B.M. had left the headquarters of B.M.’s company with their friend, they tried to find out where he had been taken. On being informed that their friend was being kept in a deserted house outside Bucharest, they went there and tried to release him.
19. When threatened by B.M. and the people paid by him they were forced to give up and leave. They maintained that they did not inform the police, because they were frightened by B.M.’s threats.
20. Also, when they found out that D.C.’s house had been set on fire and that M.C.’s car had been found full of spent bullets, the applicants decided to run and hide in Moldova until the situation was clarified even though they knew that warrants had been issued on them as witnesses.
21. By a bill of indictment delivered on 25 May 2000 by the prosecutor’s office attached to the Prahova County Court, the applicants and ten other defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit a crime under Article 323 of the Criminal Code and with deprivation of liberty under Article 189 of the Criminal Code. Their arrest was also ordered. It was not possible to arrest the applicants as they were hiding in Moldova.
22. On 26 May 2001 the applicants informed the mass media that they intended to surrender to the Romanian authorities the next day. They alleged that in this way they had tried to obtain some protection against the individuals in the pay of B.M., who were continuing to threaten them. The next day they surrendered to police at Otopeni Airport.
23. At a hearing on 18 July 2001 the Bucharest County Court replaced the arrest warrant on the applicants with an obligation not to leave the city, citing as a reason that the justification for keeping them under arrest had changed in the light of the evidence adduced before the court.
24. By a judgment delivered on 15 February 2002 the Bucharest County Court acquitted the applicants. It found the rest of the defendants guilty as charged and sentenced them to imprisonment (most of them to seven years). It noted that the victim had stated before the court that the applicants “did not threaten or hit him or keep him prisoner, but on the contrary they protected him as much they could, and maybe if they had not been there he would be dead”. Furthermore, it referred to the victim’s statement of 12 May 2000, which reads as follows: ”Stef and Auras untied me and they could not simply just leave as they were afraid...and on the other hand they tried to calm things down, helping me as much they could so as not to be killed (omorât în bătaie)”. The Court also noted that this statement was in agreement with the statements of the witnesses B.F., D.C. and M.C.
25. The prosecutor’s office attached to the Bucharest County Court lodged an appeal, seeking, inter alia, a guilty verdict on the applicants. It maintained that the applicants were part of the group controlled by B.M. and that they had contributed to R.V.’s being held captive, as they had invited him to the place where he was kidnapped.
26. On 5 July 2002 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part but maintained the not-guilty verdict on the applicants. It held that the mere fact of their presence at the headquarters of B.M’s company could not lead to the conclusion that they were guilty, in the absence of any incriminatory evidence.
27. The prosecutor’s office attached to the Bucharest Court of Appeal lodged an appeal on points of law, again seeking the conviction of the applicants. In its grounds for appeal it maintained that even if the applicants could not be convicted as perpetrators they should be convicted as accomplices.
28. At the last hearing before the High Court of Cassation and Justice held on 18 September 2003, all the lawyers representing the defendants submitted oral conclusions on the admissibility of the appeals. No other evidence was adduced before the court. The applicants were invited to speak only before the end of the hearing (ultimul cuvânt al inculpatului). They said that they agreed with the statements submitted by their lawyers.
29. Public pronouncement of the decision was adjourned until 13 October 2003, as the court needed more time for deliberation.
30. On 13 October 2003 the High Court of Cassation and Justice allowed in part the appeal on points of law lodged by the prosecutor, set aside the decisions of the first two courts with respect to the acquittal of the applicants, and retained the file for fresh consideration without setting a date for a new hearing. It found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to seven years’ imprisonment.
31. The High Court of Cassation and Justice considered that the findings of fact by the first-instance courts were not ill-founded and were thus suitable for appellate review without taking further evidence. Giving a new interpretation to the facts it found that the applicants’ roles consisted in luring (ademenirea) the victim to the headquarters of B.M.’s company. It also found that the applicants were members of B.M.’s group.
32. Although it held that the applicants’ role consisted only of luring the victim and that they were present only on the evening of 11 January 2000 and the night which followed, they were sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, the same punishment received by the other co-defendants, who had kept R.V. in captivity for the whole fiveweek period and had subjected him to constant ill-treatment.
33. The relevant provisions concerning the appeal on points of law of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure as in force at the material time are described in Constantinescu v. Romania, no. 28871/95, § 37, ECHR 2000-VIII), and Dănilă v. Romania, (no. 3897/00, § 26, 8 March 2007).
34. Law no. 356/2006 which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure made it mandatory for an appeal court to hear an accused when the firstinstance court had acquitted him or her. Currently, where an appeal court quashes a judgment given by a first-instance court, it must decide on the evidence to be adduced and set a date on which it will take statements from the accused if the latter has not been heard or if he or she was acquitted by the first-instance court (Articles 38514 § 11 and 38516, as amended).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1
6-3
VIOLATED_BULLETPOINTS: 6-3-c
6-3-d


ITEMID: 001-57643
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: AUT
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1990
DOCNAME: CASE OF WINDISCH v. AUSTRIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1 + 6-3-d;Just satisfaction partially reserved;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings
TEXT: 8. The applicant, a pensioner of Austrian nationality, is at present residing in Innsbruck.
9. On the night of 20 to 21 May 1985 a burglary was committed in a café at Stams, in the Tyrol. From footprints found at the scene of the crime, the police inferred that at least two persons had taken part in the burglary.
10. On the following day two women, a mother and a daughter, came to the police station. After having received the assurance that their anonymity would be respected, they reported to the officers in charge that, on the previous evening, they had seen two men in a minibus in the vicinity of the place where the crime had been committed. One of the men had passed them in the street, under a street lamp, at approximately 10.00 p.m., his face partly covered by a handkerchief. The suspicious appearance of the men led the two witnesses to take down the licence number of the minibus.
The police arrested the owner of the minibus, who denied having had anything whatsoever to do with the burglary. As to the second man referred to by the anonymous witnesses, suspicion first fell on a former waiter at the café, but he had an alibi for the evening in question. The investigations then concentrated on his acquaintances, including the applicant.
Subsequently, the police informants were shown various photographs of the applicant and they recognised him as being the man who had passed them in the street.
11. Mr Windisch was arrested on 24 June 1985. On the following day the police arranged for a "covert confrontation" of the applicant with the two witnesses. It took place in Stams at noon: they were sitting in a car some seven to ten metres from the suspect and could not be seen by him; he was holding a handkerchief in front of his face. They had no hesitation in identifying him as one of the men they had seen. The applicant denied having been at Stams, claiming that he had been in Innsbruck throughout the night in question.
On 24 July 1985 he and the owner of the minibus were charged with burglary (schwerer Diebstahl durch Einbruch).
12. The Innsbruck Regional Court (Landesgericht) held a hearing on 6 November 1985 during which two police officers gave evidence concerning the statements made by the two witnesses mentioned above. Their identity was not, however, disclosed in the court proceedings.
The applicant’s requests to have those witnesses summoned to appear and to be confronted with them were rejected by the Regional Court. It noted that the police officers concerned had promised not to reveal the names of the witnesses, who feared retaliation, and that the Tyrol Police Department (Landesgendarmeriekommando) had not released the officers from their duty of secrecy in this respect. The court also considered that the police officers’ testimony established sufficiently what the two women had seen and that they were reliable. The decision not to disclose their identity was therefore justified.
13. On 20 November 1985 the Regional Court, after hearing evidence from several witnesses, including another police officer, convicted the applicant and his co-accused of burglary and indicated orally the principal grounds for its decision. Mr Windisch was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, from which the periods of detention on remand were to be deducted. He stated immediately that he intended to lodge an application for a declaration of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) and an appeal against sentence (Berufung).
14. The written judgment of the Innsbruck Regional Court was served on the applicant on 10 December 1985. Extensive reference was made therein to the statements of the two unidentified witnesses to the police. In relation to the question of their anonymity, the court stated:
"The names of these two women are not known to the court. The Tyrol Police Department had not released the investigating officers from their duty of secrecy, and they could not therefore disclose the identity of the two women. The court is bound by this decision ... . In this connection it should be stated that the police are under instructions to co-operate with the public in investigating crime. The two women asked the investigating officers not to disclose their names, because they are afraid of reprisals. The two women are simple but trustworthy persons. The investigating officers of the criminal investigation department can be relied upon for this kind of assessment. It is therefore entirely acceptable that the two persons should remain anonymous."
The Regional Court also took into consideration that another witness had provided the applicant, at his request, with certain details concerning the victim and his financial situation, and that the two defendants had been seen in Innsbruck, leaving a bar together, shortly before the events in question. Furthermore, the court found that the evidence given by the sixteen witnesses called on Mr Windisch’s behalf had failed to establish an alibi. It concluded that Mr Windisch, together with his co-accused, had committed the crime.
15. On 20 March 1986 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) rejected Mr Windisch’s application for a declaration of nullity. In its view, his request to have the anonymous witnesses summoned and examined could serve no purpose since it had not been specified how their identity would be established and because the police had refused to answer enquiries in this respect. It would have been possible to identify the two witnesses by taking evidence from X, whom, according to their statement, they had met on the evening in question. However, the applicant had not submitted any request to this effect.
The applicant’s appeal against sentence was dismissed on 24 April 1986.
16. By a letter of 25 July 1990 the Government informed the Registrar that the Attorney-General had recently brought before the Supreme Court a plea of nullity for the preservation of the law (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde zur Wahrung des Gesetzes - Article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) against the judgment of 20 November 1985.
17. The taking of evidence at a trial is governed by Articles 246 to 254 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung).
Article 247 para. 1 provides that "witnesses and experts shall be called separately and heard in the presence of the accused". The presiding judge and the other members of the court, the public prosecutor, the accused, the party seeking damages and their representatives may question them (Article 249). However, in certain exceptional circumstances, their previous statements may be read out at the hearing (Article 252).
No provision deals expressly with statements made by anonymous witnesses and hearsay evidence.
18. The assessment of evidence by the trial court is provided for in Article 258, which reads as follows:
"(1) In passing judgment the court shall only have regard to what has occurred at the trial
(2) The court has to examine the evidence carefully and conscientiously with regard to its trustworthiness and conclusiveness separately and in its entirety. The judges do not decide upon the question whether or not a particular fact has been proven according to formal rules of evidence, but only according to their own conclusions drawn on the basis of their careful examination of all evidence before them."
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-109033
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: MDA
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: BADEA v. MOLDOVA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra;Mihai Poalelungi;Nona Tsotsoria
TEXT: 1. The applicant, Mr Viorel Badea, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1978 and lives in Chişinău. The Moldovan Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr V. Grosu.
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
3. On 20 October 2005 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having stolen property.
4. He was allegedly subjected to psychological pressure in order to confess to the crime with which he had been charged, following which he made self-incriminating statements. He subsequently confirmed his statements and asked the courts to reduce his sentence in view of his family’s poor financial situation. He had allegedly had to steal in order to feed his family. He also claimed that he had never seen the State-appointed lawyer handling his case, who had signed all the documents relating to the matter after the fact in order to lend an appearance of legitimacy to the investigation.
5. On 21 November 2005 the applicant was convicted by the Ciocana District Court. That judgment was upheld by the Chişinău Court of Appeal on 19 January 2006. The applicant did not inform the Court of any subsequent judgments concerning his case.
6. After his arrest, the applicant was detained in Ciocana police station for three days in a cell measuring just over 1 sq. m together with four or five other detainees. It was impossible to sleep or sit there – one could only stand. There was no window or other means of ventilation.
7. The applicant was subsequently transferred to the premises of the General Police Directorate (“the GPD”). However, he was brought back to Ciocana police station several times for further questioning and each time he was detained in the same 1 sq. m cell as previously. In the GPD’s premises he was placed in cell no. 11, which measures 2.5 x 3 m and in which twelve detainees were held. The cell was unventilated, dirty and damp. No daily walk was allowed. A window of 50 cm x 50 cm was covered with thick metal netting preventing almost all sunshine and air from reaching the cell. The cell had a toilet, next to the dining table. Water was available from a tap installed above the toilet. Detainees had to take turns to sleep. The cell was infested with parasitic insects. No bed linen was available. No doctor visited the cell. The prosecutor responsible for checking conditions of detention fully supported the police and did not take action in response to any complaints.
8. Three weeks later the applicant was transferred to prison no. 13 in Chişinău and placed in cell no. 126. The cell was in the basement, had no windows and was not heated; it was very cold and damp. There were more detainees than sleeping places in the cell.
9. On 15 March 2006 he was transferred to prison no. 15 in Cricova.


ITEMID: 001-71321
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: CASE OF CHERGINETS v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Violation of P1-1;Remainder inadmissible;Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - financial award
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in the village of Yelizavetovka, the Dnepropetrovsk Region.
5. On 20 November 2001 and 5 February 2003 the Dneprovsky District Court of Dneprodzerzhynks (hereafter “the District Court”) awarded the applicant a total of UAH 14,987 against the Dneprodzerzhynksy Zavod Elektroispolnitelnyh Mekhanizmov Company (hereafter “the Company”) in salary arrears. Both judgments became final and were sent to the Dneprovsky District Bailiffs’ Service of Dneprodzerzhynks (hereafter “the Bailiffs”) for compulsory enforcement.
6. On 14 May 2003 the District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint about the Bailiffs’ alleged inactivity. The court pointed out that the judgments given in the applicant’s favour could not be executed in due time and in full on account of the debtor’s lack of funds, the moratorium on the forced sale of the property of State-owned enterprises and a lien placed on the company’s assets to secure the payment of taxes. On 22 July 2003 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed this decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. On 11 December 2003 the proceedings were discontinued on the applicant’s request.
7. On 11 November 2003 the judgment of 20 November 2001 was enforced in full. On 20 October 2004 the sum awarded to the applicant by the judgment of 5 February 2003 was transferred to his account. However, the amount of UAH 136.18 was deducted by the bank as a processing fee.
8. The relevant domestic law may be found in the judgment of 26 April 2005 in the case of Sokur v. Ukraine (no. 29439/02, §§ 17-22).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-95835
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: CASE OF ŞENTÜRK v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial
JUDGES: András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Karacabey.
5. On 17 October 1996 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of armed robbery and murder. On 27 October 1996 he was placed in detention on remand. On 4 November 1996 the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant in the Bursa Assize Court. On 27 November 1997 the applicant was released pending trial. Subsequently, on 29 June 2001 the Bursa Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the charges against him and this judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 19 March 2002.
6. On 5 August 2002 the applicant applied to the Bursa Assize Court, seeking compensation for both non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage pursuant to Law no. 466 pertaining to the payment of compensation to persons unlawfully arrested or detained.
7. On 23 January 2003 the Bursa Assize Court awarded the applicant 358,071,000 Turkish liras (TRL) for pecuniary damage and TRL 3,000,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It also decided that no default interest should be applied.
8. On 31 March 2004 the Court of Cassation upheld this judgment.
9. On 26 April 2004 the applicant applied to the Bursa Enforcement Office and requested the payment of TRL 6,022,015,000, including interest running from the date of the judgment. On 10 August 2004 the Treasury objected to the interest rate, but paid the amount of TRL 5,727,000,000 which was not in dispute. Following the objection of the Treasury, proceedings commenced before the Bursa Enforcement Court to determine the exact amount and interest rate to be paid by the Treasury. On 26 October 2004 the Bursa Enforcement Court dismissed the objection of the Treasury. Subsequently, on 25 February 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment, holding that the interest rate should be calculated on the basis of that laid down in the Budget Law. The case was then remitted to the Enforcement Court. Following a re-examination of the case, and based on an expert report, on 10 June 2005 the Enforcement Court ordered an additional payment of TRL 479,450,000 to the applicant. This amount was paid in August 2005. Consequently, the domestic authorities had applied an interest rate of 50% per annum between 23 January 2003 and 1 January 2004, and 15% per annum as from 1 January 2004.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6


ITEMID: 001-82309
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF MUHAMET AKYOL v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 5-3;Violation of Art. 6-1
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently detained in the Tekirdağ F-Type Prison.
6. On 6 February 1993 the applicant was taken into custody within the context of a police operation carried out against an illegal organisation, namely the TKP/ML – TIKKO (the Turkish Communist Party-Marxist Leninist - Turkish Workers and Peasants' Liberation Army).
7. On 15 February 1993 the applicant was brought before a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court who ordered his detention on remand.
8. On 8 April 1993 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against nine persons, including the applicant who was charged with membership of an illegal organisation under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code.
9. On 19 April 1994 the case brought against the applicant and his co-accused before the 2nd Chamber of the Istanbul State Security Court was joined with another case which had been pending before the 3rd Chamber of the Istanbul State Security Court.
10. During the subsequent forty-eight hearings between 17 May 1993 and 12 June 2000, the Istanbul Security Court, relying on the state of the evidence, the nature of the offence, and the duration of his detention, refused to release the applicant.
11. In the meantime, on 8 July 1997 the applicant escaped from prison. On 17 September 1997 he was arrested and sent back to prison.
12. On 12 June 2000 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment.
13. On 15 May 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 12 June 2000 and remitted the case file to the first-instance court.
14. On 28 December 2001 the Istanbul State Security Court ordered the applicant's release pending trial.
15. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. Subsequently, the 11th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court acquired jurisdiction over the case.
16. While these proceedings were pending under file no. 2001/225, on 2 July 2004 the applicant was taken into police custody in connection with a new crime. On 6 July 2004 he was detained on remand.
17. On 9 July 2004 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a new bill of indictment with the 11th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order. The proceedings commenced before the 11th chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court under file no. 2004/225.
18. On 31 January 2005 the 11th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court rendered its judgment in case no. 2001/225 in respect of some of the accused. It disjoined the case against the applicant and decided to join it to the new proceedings brought against the applicant pending before the same court under file no. 2004/225.
19. On 2 February 2005 the 11th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court decided to join the case (file no. 2004/225) to another pending before it (file no. 2004/191).
20. During the subsequent hearings, the Istanbul Assize Court rejected the applicant's release requests having regard to the state of the evidence, the nature of the offence and the risk of the applicant absconding.
21. According to the information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the 11th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court under file no. 2004/191. The applicant is currently in detention on remand.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 5
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-3
6-1


ITEMID: 001-100212
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: LTU
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: LIETUVOS NACIONALINIS RADIJAS IR TELEVIZIJA AND TAPINAS AND CO LTD. v. LITHUANIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria
TEXT: The applicants, Lietuvos Nacionalinis Radijas ir Televizija (the Lithuanian National Radio and Television Broadcasting Company; “the first applicant”) and Tapinas ir Partneriai (a company of journalists; “the second applicant”) are Lithuanian legal entities. They were represented before the Court by Mr P. Docka, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Elvyra Baltutytė.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 9 June 2003 the first applicant placed on its Internet site notice of a forthcoming television (“TV”) broadcast entitled 'Money generation'. This programme had been produced by the second applicant. The notice stated that the broadcast would reveal that “an influential official and a well-known person openly asks for a bribe in return for his help in settling the gambling organisers' problems. Who is he? The answer will be given on 10 June, Tuesday, 9 p.m. in the TV broadcast 'Money generation'”.
Having read this announcement, S.J., a member of the State Gaming Control Commission, on 10 June 2003 wrote to the first applicant, asking that the broadcast be deferred until certain information had been thoroughly analysed. He stated that the programme would damage his honour and dignity because it was defamatory. Nevertheless, the first applicant went ahead with the following broadcast:
A. Tapinas (the announcer and one of the journalists at the company Tapinas ir Partneriai): It's 'Money generation' on the air. If you follow public life in Lithuania at least a little, you might already know what we are showing you today.
(Vignette of the broadcast 'Money Generation' is being shown)
A. Tapinas (the announcer): (Announcement of the broadcast – views of a casino are being shown) A dazzling casino and thousands of naive people expecting to get rich in a moment. Big money, very big money – it lures.
(Recording taken by a secret camera is being shown)
Voice no 1: If you want... I don't like these things, you know...
Voice no 2: I understand.
Voice no. 1: ...I have been working for half a year so far and I ...
Voice no. 2: I understand.
Voice no. 1: I know how it's done.
Voice no. 2: Ok. Everybody, we live, still it will be needed in the future. In case I legalise paths will still cross, and this is... Well... My situation in Klaipėda is normal, why, well, this...
A. Tapinas (the announcer): (Announcement of the broadcast is continued – views of a casino are being shown) “An influential official and a well-known person openly asks for a bribe in return for his help in settling the gambling organisers' problems. However, he does not know that he is being filmed”.
(Vignette of the broadcast 'Money Generation' is being shown)
A. Tapinas (the announcer): This will, however, be shown later in the broadcast. (The recording is aborted)
The programme included a report, which was filmed with a hidden camera, of a conversation between S.J. and a businessman, showing the surname of S.J. in subtitles.
After the transmission, the second applicant gave the video material to the Special Investigation Service (Specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba), which is the responsible authority in the fight against corruption in Lithuania. Having analysed the submitted material the latter reported that the video included a conversation between S.J., who was a member of the Gaming Control Commission, and the director of a private company, about the gambling business. During that conversation, the businessman had asked S.J. for help several times, without specifying the nature of such help, or any remuneration for it. During the same conversation, S.J. commented on the methods by which the businessman pursued his business. He also commented on certain decisions and actions of the State authorities. The Special Investigation Service concluded that no objective and unquestionable data about any corruption-related criminal activity was disclosed by the video. Therefore, there was no factual basis on which to start a pre-trial investigation into S.J.'s activities.
The recording was also examined by the Chief Official Ethics Commission (Vyriausioji tarnybinės etikos komisija), which found that S.J. had not violated the applicable legislation. However, the Commission noted that, having unofficially consulted a person who was engaged in illegal gambling without informing the State Gaming Control Commission, S.J. had behaved improperly.
On 5 August 2003 S.J. asked the first applicant to correct the statement in a future broadcast and to compensate him for non-pecuniary damage, but the first applicant did not comply with this request.
On an unknown date S.J. suspended his duties and took unpaid leave. Subsequently, he brought a civil action for defamation before the Vilnius Regional Court against the first applicant. The second applicant joined the proceedings as a third party.
In its response to the lawsuit, the first applicant argued that the information, which according to S.J. was untrue, was made public for the first time on 9 June 2003 at 6.45 p.m. in another television channel's news broadcast. In addition, the information had previously been published by the daily newspapers Lietuvos Rytas and Respublika. The first applicant stated that the authors of the television programme were honest, and that their main concern had been to inform society about potentially illegal actions by a public figure. The information in its Internet announcement represented the journalist's opinion on the facts and a subjective evaluation of the events. The facts were ambiguous; therefore the first applicant had the right to interpret them. S.J. was a public figure; this allowed a critical opinion to be expressed about him. Consequently S.J. should have been more tolerant when reacting to criticism.
On 7 May 2004 the Vilnius Regional Court ruled in favour of S.J. The court noted at the outset that the information which formed the basis of the lawsuit had been published by the aforementioned newspapers after the first applicant had already placed its announcement on the Internet. Moreover, the first applicant failed to submit a recording of the above-mentioned other television channel's news broadcast. Therefore, the Vilnius Regional Court found that the first applicant was precluded from relying on Article 55 § 1.3 of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public (see Relevant domestic law part below).
Having considered the merits of the case, the Vilnius Regional Court noted that, pursuant to Article 2.24 § 1 of the Civil Code, the data which had been made public was to be presumed to be erroneous unless the publisher proved the opposite. Given that the first applicant had failed to prove that the broadcast statement was true, as well as the fact that, in its report, the Special Investigation Service had found no objective and unquestionable data to prove the suspected corruption, the Vilnius Regional Court concluded that the information it had in its possession did not substantiate the accusation of alleged bribery. Nonetheless, the court partly agreed with the first applicant, in so far as the broadcast concerned issues of general public interest involving the criticable activities of a public official. The court took note of the conclusion of the Chief Official Ethics Commission that S.J. had acted improperly and that his actions had damaged society's trust in the public service. Yet the court emphasised that disseminating untrue information about alleged bribery did not constitute justified criticism of S.J.'s activities.
The Vilnius Regional Court did not agree with the first applicant's argument that the announcement of the future broadcast, and the broadcast itself, expressed an opinion to which the criterion of truth did not apply. According to the national court, the main point, that the State official had met a representative of an illegal business, was clear. The official's behaviour was indeed unethical, but at no point during the conversation did S.J. ask for a bribe. Consequently, the first applicant could have interpreted the content of this meeting and the conversation negatively, but without any allegation of bribery. The court, whilst acknowledging that some of the applicants' statements expressed an opinion, nevertheless noted that the categorical interpretation of the main point as a clear request for a bribe amounted to new information which did not correspond to reality. According to the court, this publicly disseminated statement about a proposed bribe could only be understood by the public as an allegation that a crime had been committed by S.J.
The Vilnius Regional Court also took into account the fact that, after the announcement of the broadcast, S.J. had requested the first applicant not to show the programme until the journalists' information had been scrutinised. Despite this request, the first applicant had gone ahead with the transmission. In the opinion of the court, the first applicant had not acted honestly, as it had not taken all reasonable measures to evaluate S.J.'s actions based on correct and verified information.
The Vilnius Regional Court found that, by making the statement that “an influential official and a well-known person openly asks for a bribe in return for his help in settling the gambling organisers' problems” both in the notice of the forthcoming 'Money generation' broadcast and at the beginning of that broadcast, the first applicant had damaged S.J.'s reputation, and ordered it to correct that statement publicly. The court also ordered the first applicant to pay S.J. 1,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 290 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and LTL 1,150 (approximately EUR 333) in litigation costs. The court rejected as unsubstantiated S.J.'s claim for pecuniary damage, which S.J. had allegedly sustained due to the need to take unpaid leave.
S.J. appealed, claiming that the award for non-pecuniary damage was too low. The second applicant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the information contained in the broadcast was an opinion and not news and, therefore, the criterion of truth did not apply to it. Unlike the defence's response to the lawsuit, the second applicant no longer argued that the statement about S.J.'s corrupt behaviour had been made public by other mass media before the 'Money generation' programme was aired. Lastly, the second applicant maintained that the first-instance court had made too high an award for the litigation costs to be paid by the first applicant.
The first applicant did not appeal.
By a decision of 22 November 2004, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the second applicant, upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court and, in addition, awarded S.J. LTL 4,091 (approximately EUR 1,185) in compensation for pecuniary damage to S.J.
On 17 February 2005 the first and second applicants lodged a joint appeal on points of law, relying on Article 2.24 (6) of the Civil Code and the Court's judgment in the case of Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 1) (23 May 1991, Series A no. 204) and arguing, inter alia, that they had acted honestly in the interests of society and that, in their broadcast, they had merely expressed their opinion about S.J., who was a public person and for that reason enjoyed less privacy. Again, the applicants no longer maintained that information about S.J.'s alleged corruption had been made public before the 'Money generation' broadcast.
By a ruling of 21 February 2005, the Supreme Court refused to examine the cassation appeal, on the ground that it did not meet the requirements of Articles 346 and 347 § 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The next day the applicants lodged a new joint cassation appeal. Again, they argued that they had acted in good faith and had been punished for merely expressing opinions about a public figure. In support of their pleas, this time the applicants explicitly invoked Article 10 of the Convention.
On 25 February 2005 the Supreme Court, relying on Articles 346 and 347 § 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, refused to accept the cassation appeal, finding that the applicants had failed to demonstrate convincingly that the alleged breaches of procedural and substantive law had an essential significance for the uniform interpretation and application of the law and could have caused the adoption of an unlawful decision.
Article 2.24 of the Civil Code regarding the protection of honour and dignity reads as follows:
“1. A person shall have the right to demand the refutation, in judicial proceedings, of publicised data which abase his honour and dignity and which are erroneous, as well as the redress of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage incurred by the public announcement of the said data. Data which has been made public shall be presumed to be erroneous unless the publisher proves the opposite to be true.
2. Where erroneous data have been publicised in the mass media (press, television, radio, etc.) the person about whom those data were published shall have the right to file a correction and demand that the media publish the said correction free of charge, or make it public in some other way...
...
4. Where the mass media refuse to publish the correction or to make it public in some other way ... the [aggrieved] person has the right to apply to a court in accordance with the procedure established in paragraph 1 of the given Article. The court shall establish the procedure and the terms of the refutation of the erroneous data which prejudiced that person's reputation.
5. The mass media which have publicised erroneous data prejudicing a person's reputation shall provide redress for any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage incurred by that person only in cases when they knew, or should have known, that the data were erroneous, including those cases where the data were made public by their employees or ... anonymously, and the media refuse to name their source.
...
6. The person who publicly disseminates erroneous data shall be exempted from civil liability in cases when the publicised data relate to a public person and his State or public activities and the person who made them public can demonstrate that his actions were in good faith and intended to introduce the person and his activities to the public.”
The relevant sections of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public read as follows:
“1. The producers and/or disseminators of public information must correct published, false information which prejudices the honour and dignity of a physical person or damages the legitimate interests of a legal person, in particular their reputation.
2. A request to correct information shall be submitted to the producer or disseminator of the publicised information in writing not later than two months after the publication ... The request shall specify the false information which requires correction, when and where it was published, and which statements ... are degrading to the honour and dignity of the person concerned ...
3. After receiving a reasoned request to correct published false information prejudicing the honour and dignity of a person, the producer or disseminator of that information must publish the correction free of charge and without comment, in an equivalent place, of an equivalent size and in the same form, in the nearest possible publication, television or radio broadcast, or in any other media where such information was published. A subsequent refutation shall not release the producer of that information from liability.”
“1. A producer of public information shall not be liable for the publication of false information if he indicates his source ... and that the information has been: ...
3) published previously in other mass media, if the information has not been corrected by the mass media in which it was published. ”
The Code of Civil Procedure, as relevant in this case, provides:
“1. Cassation is possible only if the grounds enumerated in this Article exist.
2. The grounds for reviewing a case in cassation are:
1) a violation of the rules of substantive or procedural law, such violation having an essential significance for the uniform interpretation and application of the law if this violation could have caused an unlawful ruling or decision to be adopted;
2) if in its decision or ruling which has been appealed against the court has deviated from the practice in the application and interpretation of the law, as formulated by the Supreme Court of Lithuania;
3) if the Supreme Court's practice in respect of the disputed issue is not uniform.”
“1. The cassation appeal ... shall contain: ...
3. Extensive legal arguments, which confirm the existence of grounds of cassation, as enumerated in Article 346 of the Code ...”
Article 350 § 2 (3, 4) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Supreme Court shall refuse to accept a cassation appeal if it does not meet the requirements of Articles 346 and 347 thereof. If the cassation appeal has been rejected for the above reason, a party to the proceedings can rectify the shortcomings and submit a new cassation appeal (Article 350 § 5).
Article 225 of the Criminal Code, which creates criminal liability for bribery, stipulates that a civil servant who, in favour of others, directly or indirectly demanded or provoked the giving of a bribe for a specific legal act or omission, is to be punished by the deprivation of the right to hold a specific position or engage in certain activity, or by imprisonment of up to three years.


ITEMID: 001-75362
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: BARRY and OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant is a British national who was born on 20 August 1941 and who lives in Epsom. He is not represented before the Court. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Mr C. Whomersley, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The applicant was widowed on 12 October 1975. There were two children of the marriage, born on 23 January 1972 and 22 June 1973. In October 1975 the applicant asked the Department of Health and Social Security for financial assistance in raising the children, but was refused.
The applicant remarried in 1988. On 1 July 2000, he applied for backdated widows’ benefits. On 20 November 2000 he was informed that his claim had been rejected by the Appeal Tribunal.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 6 December 1935 and who lives in Standish, Lancashire. He is not represented before the Court. The Government are again represented by Mr C. Whomersley.
The applicant was widowed on 26 April 1994.
On 13 December 2000 he made an application for survivors’ benefits, and was informed in January 2001 that the Appeal Tribunal had rejected his claim. He made a further appeal on 20 March 2001 but was again rejected.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 30 July 1965 and who lives in Skelmersdale, Lancashire. He is represented before the Court by Messrs Royds Treadwell, solicitors practising in London. The Government are again represented by Mr C. Whomersley.
The applicant was widowed on 27 January 1993. On 14 November 2000 he made an application for survivors’ benefits, to which he received no response.
The applicant is a British national who was born on 11 December 1935 and who lives in Barnsley. He is not represented before the Court. The Government are again represented by Mr C. Whomersley.
The applicant was widowed on 18 August 1999. Shortly after his wife’s death he asked the Benefits Agency if he was entitled to benefits equivalent to those received by widows, but he was informed that he was not eligible because he was a man.
In March 2002 the applicant made a formal application for widows’ benefits, to be backdated to the time of his wife’s death. The claim was finally refused by the Social Security Appeal Tribunal on 17 July 2002.
The domestic law relevant to these applications is set out in Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, §§ 14-26, ECHR 2002-IV.