ITEMID: 001-112576
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: BGR;ITA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: CASE OF M. AND OTHERS v. ITALY AND BULGARIA
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objection partially dismissed (Article 34 - Victim);Preliminary objection partially allowed (Article 34 - Victim);Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect) (Italy);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect) (Italy)
JUDGES: András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Guido Raimondi;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
TEXT: 6. The applicants were born in 1985, 1959, 1958 and 1977 respectively and live in the village of Novo Selo in the Vidin region (Bulgaria). The applicants are of Roma ethnic origin. At the time of the events (May-June 2003), the first applicant was still a minor. The second and third applicants are her father and mother, and the fourth applicant is the first applicant’s sisterinlaw.
7.
8. The first, second and third applicants arrived in Milan on 12 May 2003 following a promise of work by X., a Roma man of Serbian nationality, residing in Italy, who accommodated them in a villa in the village of Ghislarengo, in the province of Vercelli, where he lived with his family. The third and the first applicants provided different versions on this point to the Italian authorities. In her declarations to the Italian police, on 24 May 2003, the third applicant maintained that she, her husband and her daughter, who lived in Bulgaria in a condition of extreme precariousness, moved to Italy in search of work; when they arrived in Milan they approached an individual who spoke their language, X., who proposed to them to work as domestic employees to take care of his big house. The first applicant, in her declarations to the public prosecutor on 11 June 2003, maintained that she had met X. in “Yugoslavia”, where she was with her mother in search of a job, and from there X. had driven them to Italy in his car after proposing a job. They remained in the villa for several days, during which time they undertook household chores. After a while, X. declared to the second applicant that Y., his nephew, wanted to marry his daughter (the first applicant). As the second and third applicants refused, X. threatened them with a loaded gun. Then the second and third applicants were beaten, threatened with death and forced to leave the first applicant in Italy and go back to Bulgaria. Although the applicants denied this, it seems from their initial submissions that the second and third applicants had been offered money to leave their daughter behind. On 18 May 2003, the second and third applicants went back to Bulgaria. On their return the second applicant was diagnosed with type 2 diabetes, which he alleged was a consequence of the stress endured.
9. The applicants submitted that during the month (following 18 May 2003) spent at the villa in Ghislarengo, the first applicant was kept under constant surveillance and was forced to steal against her will, was beaten, threatened with death and repeatedly raped by Y. while tied to a bed. During one of the robberies in which the first applicant was forced to participate, she had an accident and had to be treated in hospital. However, the Serbian family refused to leave her there to undergo treatment. The applicants submitted that they were not aware of the name and location of this hospital.
10. On 24 May 2003 the third applicant returned to Italy, accompanied by the first applicant’s sisterinlaw (the fourth applicant), and lodged a complaint with the Italian police in Turin, reporting that she and her husband had been beaten and threatened and that the first applicant had been kidnapped. She further feared that her daughter might be led into prostitution. They were settled in a monastery near Turin. Subsequently, the police accompanied them with an interpreter to identify the house in Ghislarengo.
11. Apparently frustrated with the police’s slowness in responding to the complaint, the second applicant lodged written complaints with many other institutions. A letter of 31 May 2003, addressed to the Italian Prime Minister, the Italian Ministers for Foreign and Internal Affairs, the Italian Ambassador in Bulgaria, the Prefect of Turin, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Bulgarian Ambassador to Italy, is included in the file.
12. It has been shown that, eighteen days after the lodging of the complaint, on 11 June 2003, the police raided the house in Ghislarengo, found the first applicant there and made a number of arrests. At about 2 p.m. that day, she was taken to a police station in Vercelli and questioned, in the presence of an interpreter, by two female and two male police officers. The applicants alleged that she was treated roughly and threatened that she would be accused of perjury and libel if she did not tell the truth. Allegedly she was then forced to declare that she did not wish her supposed kidnappers to be prosecuted, to answer “yes” to all other questions, and to sign certain documents in Italian, which she did not understand and which were neither translated into Bulgarian nor given to her. They also alleged that the interpreter did not do her job properly and remained silent in the face of the treatment being inflicted. The applicants further alleged that Y. was present during certain parts of the first applicant’s questioning.
13. Later that day, the third applicant was questioned by the police in Vercelli in the presence of an interpreter. The third applicant alleged that she was also threatened that she would be accused of perjury and libel if she did not tell the truth, and that the interpreter did not do her job properly. She claimed that, as she refused to sign the record, the police treated her badly.
14. At about 10 p.m. on the same day the first applicant was questioned again. The applicants alleged that no interpreter or lawyer was present and that the first applicant was unaware of what was recorded. The first applicant was then taken to a cell and left there for four or five hours. On 12 June 2003 at about 4 a.m., she was transferred to a shelter for homeless persons, where she remained until 12.30 p.m.
15. On the same day, upon their request, the first, third and fourth applicants were taken by the police to the railway station in Vercelli and travelled back to Bulgaria. They submitted to the Court that the facts were then investigated by the Italian authorities, but that no criminal proceedings were instituted in Italy against the first applicant’s kidnappers, or at least that they were not informed, nor were they able to obtain information about any ongoing criminal investigation. They also complained that the Italian authorities did not seek to question the second applicant in order to establish the facts, by means of cooperation with the Bulgarian authorities.
16. It appears from the file that, after June 2003, the applicants sent several letters and e-mails, most of which were in Bulgarian, to the Italian authorities (such as the Italian Prime Minister, the Italian Ministers for Justice and Internal Affairs, the General Prosecutor attached to the Court of Appeal of Turin, the mayor of Ghislarengo and the Italian diplomatic authorities in Bulgaria), with a request to provide them with information about the police raid of 11 June 2003 and to start criminal proceedings against the first applicant’s alleged kidnappers. They also complained that they had suffered threats, humiliation and ill-treatment at the hands of the police. They asked those authorities to forward their complaints to the Public Prosecutor in Vercelli and to the police department of the same town.
17. At the same time, the applicants also wrote to the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, the Head of the Consular Relations Division of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CRD) and the Bulgarian Consulate in Rome, requesting them to protect their rights and assist them in obtaining information from the Italian authorities. The Bulgarian Consulate in Rome provided the applicants with certain information.
18. The applicants did not provide the Court with any document regarding their questioning and the subsequent criminal proceedings against them (see below). Their representative claimed that, considering the circumstances, including the alleged refusal of the Italian Embassy in Bulgaria, it was impossible to submit any document. Apart from copies of the letters sent to the Italian institutions, they only submitted two medical reports, one dated 22 June 2003 establishing that the first applicant was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and one dated 24 June 2003 establishing that the first applicant had a bruise on the head, a small wound on the right elbow and a broken rib. It further stated that she had lost her virginity and was suffering from a vaginal infection. The medical report concluded that these injuries could have been inflicted in the way the first applicant had reported.
19. On 21 April 2009 and 30 July 2009, at the Court’s request, the Italian Government submitted a number of documents, among which the transcript of the first complaint lodged by the third applicant on 24 May 2003 with the Turin police, and the minutes of the interviews with the first applicant, the third applicant and some of the alleged kidnappers, which took place on 11 June 2003.
20. It appears from these documents that the transcript of the third applicant’s first complaint against the alleged kidnappers (lodged with the Italian police in Turin on 24 May 2003), as well as the applicants’ complaints sent by their representative to different Italian institutions, in the following days, were transmitted to the Italian police in Vercelli (on 26 May and 6 June 2003 respectively) and to the Public Prosecutor of the same town (on 4 and 13 June 2003 respectively).
21. More specifically, on 26 May 2003 the Turin Mobile Squad requested help from the Vercelli Mobile Squad to identify the location where the first applicant was allegedly being held. On 27 May 2003 the Vercelli Mobile Squad went to Ghislarengo to identify the location together with the third applicant. They inspected the location and the third applicant identified the villa she had mentioned in her complaint. On 4 June 2003 the Vercelli Police Headquarters transmitted the crime report (notizia di reato) to the Vercelli Public Prosecutor’s Office. From the communal registry it appeared that no person resided in the identified villa, but that it was owned by an individual who had a criminal record. In consequence, the police kept the place under surveillance. The police raided the villa on 11 June 2003, after having observed movement inside. During the search the police seized a number of cameras containing photographs of what appeared to be a wedding.
22. On 7, 11, 12 and 13 June 2003, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was informed by fax of developments in the case.
23. On 11 June 2003 at about 2.30 p.m., immediately after the raid, the first applicant was questioned by the Public Prosecutor of Vercelli, who was assisted by the police. As also transpires from the documents, the first applicant made allegations that showed a number of discrepancies with the complaint previously submitted by her mother, and which led the authorities to conclude that no kidnapping, but rather an agreement about a marriage, had in reality taken place between the two families. This conclusion was confirmed by photographs given to the police by X. after the raid, showing a wedding party at which the second applicant received a sum of money from X. When showed the photographs, the first applicant denied that her father had taken money as part of the agreement about the marriage.
24. At 8.30 p.m. the third applicant was questioned by the Public Prosecutor in Vercelli. She stated again that her daughter had not married Y. of her own free will, and claimed that the photographs were nothing but a fake, taken on purpose by the alleged kidnappers, who had threatened them with a gun, in order to undermine the credibility of their version of the facts. The Vercelli police also questioned X., Z. (a third party present at the wedding) and Y., who all stated that Y. had entered into a consensual marriage with the first applicant.
25. As a result of these interviews and on the basis of the photographs, the Public Prosecutor of Vercelli decided to turn the proceedings against unknown persons for kidnapping (1735/03 RGNR) into proceedings against the first and third applicants for perjury and libel. Later that evening, the first and third applicants were informed by the Vercelli and Turin police about the charges and invited to appoint a representative. They were then provided with a court-appointed lawyer. At about 11.30 p.m. the first applicant was transferred to a shelter for homeless people. On 12 June 2003 she was released into the custody of her mother. The applicants’ complaints sent to many Italian institutions during the following months were received by the Police Department in Vercelli, translated into Italian and forwarded to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
26. Following information requests, the first dated 6 November 2003 by the Embassy of Bulgaria in Rome, the Italian authorities updated the Consul about the status of the criminal proceedings (mentioned below) on 7 and 19 November 2003, and 2 December 2003.
27. On 11 July 2003, the Public Prosecutor attached to the Juvenile Court of Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta started criminal proceedings (1838/03 RGNR) against the first applicant for false accusations (calunnia) in so far as she claimed that X., Y. and Z. deprived her of her personal liberty by keeping her in the villa, thus accusing them of kidnapping while knowing they were innocent.
28. On 28 November 2003 the first applicant was invited for questioning by the Public Prosecutor, but she was in Bulgaria and did not appear.
29. On 26 January 2005 the Investigating Magistrate of the Juvenile Court decided not to proceed with the charges in so far as the offences committed were one-off and not serious, and therefore “socially irrelevant”.
30. On 26 June 2003 the Public Prosecutor of Turin started criminal proceedings (18501/03 RGNR) against the third applicant for perjury and false accusations (calunnia) in so far as she claimed that X., Y. and Z. deprived her daughter of her personal liberty by keeping her in the villa, thus accusing them of kidnapping while knowing they were innocent.
31. On 22 July 2003 the Public Prosecutor of Turin concluded the investigation against the third applicant and sent the case to the Turin Criminal Court.
32. On 8 February 2006 the Turin Criminal Court acquitted the third applicant, on the ground that the facts of which she was accused did not subsist. The actual evidence consisting of the notes verbal of the questioning of the accused and her daughter, the photographic evidence and the policemen’s statements, were indicative and could not establish without doubt the guilt of the accused. The accused and her daughter’s statements were contradictory and the photos did not certify the circumstances in which they were taken. According to the police statements it could only be deduced that the daughter had been found at the villa and the persons who could have clarified the facts had availed themselves of the right to remain silent. The understanding of the facts was further complicated by the Roma tradition of selling, or paying a sum of money previously established to the family of the bride for the purposes of concluding a marriage, a matter which in the case of a dispute could have created consequences which it had been impossible to establish.
33. On the basis of the documents produced by the Italian Government, particularly the declarations made by X., Y. and Z., the Bulgarian Government considered the facts to be as follows.
On 12 May 2003 the first three applicants arrived in Italy and were accommodated in the nomad camp in Arluno. It was there that X., Y. and Z. met them and that Y. chose the first applicant as his spouse. The first applicant agreed and therefore Z. and the second applicant bargained over the price of the bride. The second applicant initially demanded EUR 20,000, but eventually they agreed on the sum of EUR 11,000. Z. paid the second applicant EUR 500 in advance. After festivities the newlyweds retired to the trailer where they consummated the marriage and Y. confirmed that the first applicant had been a virgin. The two families then went to the nomad camp of Kudzhiono where they celebrated the marriage. At the end of the wedding X. paid the second applicant the remainder of the amount due, namely EUR 10,500, in the presence of both families and other witnesses, as proven by the photographs. After the festivities the bride’s parents were accompanied to the railway station and left for Bulgaria on 18 May 2003.
34. Once in Bulgaria it was only on 31 May 2003, thirteen days after their departure from Italy, that the second applicant complained to the CRD of Bulgaria. Following this first notification, the Bulgarian authorities took immediate action and on 2 June 2003 the claim was forwarded to the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome. Contact was made with the Italian authorities and a successful raid by the Italian police which freed the first applicant was carried out on 11 June 2003.
35. Subsequently, the first and third applicants were questioned by a prosecutor specialised in interaction with minors, in the presence of an interpreter. Following an investigation by the Italian authorities, criminal proceedings against the first and third applicants for perjury were initiated. The applicants did not inform the Bulgarian authorities of the latter proceedings.
36. According to Article 50 sub-articles 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Public Prosecutor undertakes criminal proceedings when the conditions for archiving a case are not fulfilled. When the complaint of the injured party or an authorisation to proceed is not required, criminal proceedings are undertaken ex proprio motu. According to Article 408 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, a request to archive a case is made if the notice of the crime (notizia di reato) is unfounded. Such a request is transmitted together with the relevant file and documents to the judge for preliminary inquiry. Notice of such a request is given to any victim who has previously declared his or her wish to be informed of any such action. The latter notice includes information about the possibility to consult the case-file and to submit an objection (opposizione), together with a reasoned request to continue the preliminary investigation.
37. Article 55 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the judicial police must, even on their own initiative, receive notice of crimes, prevent further crimes, find the perpetrators of crimes, take any measures necessary to ensure the sources of evidence and the collection of any other relevant material which might be needed for the application of the criminal law.
38. According to the Italian Criminal Code, at the time of the relevant facts, assault/battery (percosse), wounding and wounding with intent (lesione personale, lesioni personali colpose), kidnapping (sequestro di persona), sexual violence (including rape but not only) (violenza sessuale), private violence (violenza privata), violence or threat for the purposes of forcing the commission of an offence (violenza o minaccia per costringere a commettere un reato), and threats (minaccia) are crimes punishable by imprisonment for periods ranging from one day to six months for the more minor offence and to five years to ten years for the more serious offence.
Moreover, some of these crimes are subject to higher prison sentences when the crime is committed against, inter alia, a descendant or wife, as for example in the case of kidnapping, or are subject to the application of aggravating circumstances when, as in the case of sexual violence, the victim is younger than fourteen years of age, the victim is younger than sixteen years of age and has been assaulted by an ascendant parent or tutor, or the victim was subject to limited personal liberty.
39. Article 572 of the Criminal Code provides for a prison sentence of up to five years for anyone found guilty of ill-treating a member of his or her family, a child under fourteen years of age, or a person under his or her authority or who has been placed in his or her care for the purposes of education, instruction, care, supervision or custody.
40. The Italian Criminal Code, at the time of the present case, also included specific provisions relating to minors, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:
“Whoever takes away from the parent having parental authority or the curator, without the latter’s consent, a minor over fourteen years of age with his or her consent is punished by imprisonment of a period of a maximum of two years upon the complaint of the said parent or curator. The punishment is diminished if the purpose of the taking away is marriage and increased if it is lust.”
“A term of imprisonment of five to ten years is applicable for the offence of sexual acts not covered by the offence of sexual violence when the victim is:
1) Under twelve years of age,
2) Under sixteen years of age, if the aggressor is the ascendant, parent, or the latter’s cohabitee, tutor or any other person having the victim’s care for the purposes of education, instruction, care, supervision or custody and with whom the victim cohabits.
Save for the circumstances provided for under the offence of sexual violence, the ascendant, parent, or the latter’s cohabitee, and the tutor who has abused his or her powers connected to his or her position and is guilty of sexual acts with a minor older than sixteen years of age, is punished by imprisonment of from three to six years.”
41. Law no. 154 of 2001 introduced a number of measures against violence in family relations. These included precautionary and permanent measures regarding the ousting of the accused from the family home upon a decree to this effect by a judge.
42. Italy adopted Law no. 228, namely the Law on Measures to Prevent Trafficking in Human Beings, on 11 August 2003. The latter has added a number of offences to the Criminal Code, which in so far as relevant read as follows:
“Whoever exercises over a person powers corresponding to those of ownership, that is, whoever reduces or maintains a person in a state of continued subjection, forcing the person into labour or sexual services or begging, or in any event services involving exploitation, is punished by imprisonment of a period of eight to twenty years.
The holding of a person in a state of subjection occurs when such conduct is carried out by means of violence, threats, deception, abuse of authority or taking advantage of a situation of physical or mental inferiority or of a situation of need, or through the promise or the payment of a sum of money or other advantage to the individual who has authority over the person.
The punishment is increased by a third to a half if the facts mentioned in subparagraph one above are directed against a minor of less than eighteen years of age or if they are intended for the exploitation of prostitution or aimed at the removal of organs.”
“Whoever commits human trafficking for the purposes of holding a person in servitude or slavery as mentioned in article 600 above and induces such person, by means of violence, threats, deception, abuse of authority or taking advantage of a situation of physical of mental inferiority or of a situation of need, or through the promise or donation of a sum of money or other advantages to the individual who has authority over the said person, to enter or stay or leave the territory of the state or to displace him or herself internally, is punished by imprisonment of a period of eight to twenty years.
The punishment is increased by a third to a half if the facts mentioned in subparagraph one above are directed against a minor of less than eighteen years of age or if they are intended for the exploitation of prostitution or aimed at the removal of organs.”
Article 602 (purchase and alienation of slaves)
“Whoever, save for the cases indicated in article 601, purchases, alienates or sells a person in the situation laid down in article 600, is punished by imprisonment of a period of eight to twenty years.
The punishment is increased by a third to a half if the facts mentioned in subparagraph one above are directed against a minor of less than eighteen years of age or if they are intended for the exploitation of prostitution or aimed at the removal of organs.”
43. Law no. 228 also included other changes to the Criminal Code in relation to the above articles when taken in conjunction with pre-existing ones, such as Article 416, whereby it provided for specific punishments if association to commit a crime was directed towards committing any of the crimes in articles 600 to 602. It further provided for administrative sanctions in respect of juridical persons, societies and associations for crimes against individual personality and made the relevant changes to the Criminal Code of Procedure, including its provisions regarding interception of conversations or communications and undercover agents, which became applicable to the new offences. Law no. 228 also created a fund for anti-trafficking measures and the institution of a special assistance programme for victims of the crimes under articles 600 and 601 of the Criminal Code, together with provision for preventive measures. In so far as relevant, articles 13 and 14 of the said law read as follows:
“Save for the cases provided for under article 16-bis of legislative decree no. 8 of 15 January 1991, converted and modified by law no. 82 of 15 March 1991, and successive amendments, for the victims of the crimes under article 600 and 601 of the criminal code, as substituted by the present law, there shall be instituted ... a special assistance programme that guarantees temporary, adequate board and lodging conditions and health assistance. The programme is defined by regulation still to be adopted (...)”
“In order to reinforce the effectiveness of the action on prevention of the crimes of slavery and servitude and crimes related to human trafficking, the Minister for Foreign Affairs defines policies of cooperation in respect of any States interested in/affected by such crimes, bearing in mind their collaboration and the attention given by such States to the problems of respecting human right. The said Minister must ensure, together with the Minister of Equal Opportunities, the organisation of international meetings and information campaigns, particularly in States from which most victims of such crime come. With the same aim, the Ministers of Interior, of Equal Opportunities, of Justice and of Labour and Social Policy, must organise where necessary training courses for personnel and any other useful initiative.”
44. Law No. 189 of 30 July 2002 amended earlier laws regarding immigration. Its Article 18 relates to stays for reasons of social protection and in so far as relevant reads as follows:
1. When the existence of situations of violence or serious exploitation in respect of a foreigner are established during police operations, investigations or proceedings regarding the crimes under article 3 of Law no. 75 of 20 February 1958 [crimes related to prostitution] or during assistance intervention by the local social services, and there appears to be a concrete peril for his or her safety as a result of his or her attempts to escape from the influence of the association engaging in any of the above-mentioned crimes, or the declarations made during the preliminary investigation or the proceedings, the Police Commissioner upon request of the Public Prosecutor or with a favourable suggestion by the said authority, releases a special residence permit to allow the foreigner to escape the said violence and influence of the criminal organisation and to participate in a programme of assistance and social integration.
2. The elements showing the subsistence of such conditions, particularly the gravity and imminence of the peril together with the relevance of the help offered by the foreigner for the identification and capture of those responsible for the said crimes, must be communicated to the Police Commissioner with the above mentioned request or suggestion. The procedure for participating in such a programme is communicated to the mayor.”
The text states that the permit released for such purposes has a duration of six months and may be renewed for one year or for as long as necessary in the interest of justice. It also provides the conditions on the basis of which the permit may be revoked, what it entails, and who may issue it.
45. According to a Report of the Expert Group Meeting organized by the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DAW/DESA), in collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (ODC), of November 2002 entitled Trafficking in Women and Girls (EGM/TRAF/2002/Rep.1), in the first two years of implementation of this provision, 1,755 people – mostly women and girls – have been accepted in the programmes of assistance and social integration, and about 1,000 have received a residence permit. A hotline has been established, and more than 5,000 people have received concrete help in terms of information, counselling and health care.
46. The Bulgarian law on combating human trafficking entered into force on 20 May 2003. In so far as relevant the provisions read as follows:
“This Law shall provide for the activities aimed at preventing and counteracting the illegal trafficking in human beings for the purposes of:
a. Providing protection and assistance to victims of such trafficking, especially to women and children, and in full compliance with their human rights;
b. Promoting co-operation between the governmental and municipal authorities as well as between them and NGOs for fighting the illegal trafficking in human beings and developing the national policy in this area.”
“The diplomatic and consular posts of the Republic of Bulgaria abroad shall provide assistance and co-operation to Bulgarian nationals who have become victims of illegal trafficking for their return to the country in accordance with their powers and with the legislation of the relevant foreign country.”
“(1) In compliance with the Bulgarian legislation and the legislation of the accepting country, the diplomatic and consular posts of the Republic of Bulgaria abroad shall distribute amongst the relevant individuals and the risk groups information materials about the rights of the victims of human trafficking.
(2) The diplomatic and consular posts of the Republic of Bulgaria abroad shall provide information to the bodies of the accepting country regarding the Bulgarian legislation on human trafficking.”
47. Article 174 (2) of the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the time of the events read as follows:
“When aware of the commission of a criminal offence punishable by law, civil servants are duty bound to immediately inform the organ competent to undertake preliminary inquiries and to take the necessary measures to preserve the elements of the offence.”
48. Article 190 of the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure states:
“There shall be considered to exist sufficient evidence for the institution of criminal proceedings where a reasonable supposition can be made that a crime might have been committed.”
49. In so far as relevant the Bulgarian Criminal Code reads as follows:
“Whoever coerces a person to contract a marriage, which is thereafter annulled on this ground, will be punished by imprisonment of a maximum period of three years.
(2) Whoever kidnaps a woman with a view to coercing her to marry, will be punished by imprisonment of a maximum period of three years; if the victim is a minor, the punishment will be imprisonment for a period of up to five years.”
“(1) A parent or any other relative who receives a sum of money in order to authorise the marriage of his or her daughter or a relative, will be punished by imprisonment of a maximum period of one year or by a fine of between 100 to 300 levs (BGN) together with a public reprimand.
(2) the same punishment applies to whoever pays or negotiates the price.”
“Whoever abuses his or her parental authority to coerce a child, not having attained sixteen years of age, to live as a concubine with another person, will be punished by imprisonment of a period of three years, or by a control measure without deprivation of liberty (пробация) together with a public reprimand.”
“(1) All adults who without having contracted marriage are living as concubines with a female who has not attained sixteen years of age will be punished by imprisonment of a period of two years, or by a control measure without deprivation of liberty (пробация) together with a public reprimand. (...)”
“The persons who select, transport, hide or receive individuals or groups thereof with the aim of using such individuals for the purposes of prostitution, forced labour or the removal of organs, or to maintain them in a state of forced subordination, with or without their consent, are punished by imprisonment of a period of from one to eight years and by a fine of a maximum of 8,000 levs (BGN).
(2) When the offence in paragraph one above is committed 1) against an individual, who has not attained eighteen years of age, 2) with coercion or false pretences, 3) through kidnapping or illegal detention, 4) by taking advantage of a state of dependence, 5) by means of abuse of power, 6) through the promise, giving or receipt of benefits, the punishment is imprisonment for a period of two to ten years and a fine of a maximum of 10,000 levs (BGN).”
“Whoever selects, transports, hides or receives individuals or groups thereof and transfers them by crossing the border of the country with the aim mentioned in sub-paragraph 159 (a) above, will be punished by imprisonment for a period of three to eight years and by a fine of a maximum of 10,000 levs (BGN).
(2) if such an act takes place in the conditions mentioned in Article 159 (a) (2), the punishment will be imprisonment of a period of five to ten years and a fine of a maximum of 15,000 levs (BGN).”
“If the offences mentioned in Article 159 (a) and (b) above are committed by a recidivist or are ordered by a criminal organisation, the punishment is imprisonment for a period of five to fifteen years and a fine of a maximum of 20,000 levs (BGN); the tribunal may also order the seizure of part or the entirety of the possessions of the actor.”
50. The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power adopted by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985, in so far as relevant reads as follows:
“1. “Victims” means persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power.
2. A person may be considered a victim, under this Declaration, regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. The term “victim” also includes, where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation.”
51. An overview of the relevant international instruments pertaining to trafficking in human beings can be found in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, 7 January 2010.
52. The Palermo Protocol was ratified by Bulgaria on 5 December 2001 and by Italy on 2 August 2006, both States having previously signed the protocol in December 2000. The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (“the Anti-Trafficking Convention”) was signed by Bulgaria on 22 November 2006 and ratified on 17 April 2007. It entered into force in respect of Bulgaria on 1 February 2008. It was signed by Italy on 8 June 2005, ratified on 29 November 2010 and entered into force in respect of Italy on 1 March 2011.
53. For easiness of reference the relevant definitions for the purposes of the Anti-Trafficking Convention are reproduced hereunder:
a “Trafficking in human beings” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;
b The consent of a victim of “trafficking in human beings” to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;
c The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in human beings” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;
d “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age;
e “Victim” shall mean any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings as defined in this article.
54. The explanatory report to the Anti-Trafficking Convention 16.V.2005 reveals further detail regarding the definition of trafficking. In particular in respect of “exploitation”, in so far as relevant, it reads as follows:
85. The purpose must be exploitation of the individual. The Convention provides: “Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”. National legislation may therefore target other forms of exploitation but must at least cover the types of exploitation mentioned as constituents of trafficking in human beings.
86. The forms of exploitation specified in the definition cover sexual exploitation, labour exploitation and removal of organs, for criminal activity is increasingly diversifying in order to supply people for exploitation in any sector where demand emerges.
87. Under the definition, it is not necessary that someone have been exploited for there to be trafficking in human beings. It is enough that they have been subjected to one of the actions referred to in the definition and by one of the means specified “for the purpose of” exploitation. Trafficking in human beings is consequently present before the victim’s actual exploitation.
88. As regards “the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation”, it should be noted that the Convention deals with these only in the context of trafficking in human beings. The terms “exploitation of the prostitution of others” and “other forms of sexual exploitation” are not defined in the Convention, which is therefore without prejudice to how states Parties deal with prostitution in domestic law.
The explanatory report continues to list the other types of exploitation, namely forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs and gives their definition according to the relevant international instruments and the ECHR case-law where available.
55. Following the General Assembly of the United Nations resolution 843 (IX) of 17 December 1954, declaring that certain customs, ancient laws and practices relating to marriage and the family were inconsistent with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and calling on states to develop and implement national legislation and policies prohibiting such practices, the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages was opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 1763 A (XVII) of 7 November 1962. Italy signed the Convention on 20 December 1963, but has to date not ratified the Convention. The Bulgarian State has yet to sign the Convention.
56. The relevant provisions read as follows:
“1. No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person after due publicity and in the presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage and of witnesses, as prescribed by law.
2. Notwithstanding anything in paragraph 1 above, it shall not be necessary for one of the parties to be present when the competent authority is satisfied that the circumstances are exceptional and that the party has, before a competent authority and in such manner as may be prescribed by law, expressed and not withdrawn consent.”
“States Parties to the present Convention shall take legislative action to specify a minimum age for marriage. No marriage shall be legally entered into by any person under this age, except where a competent authority has granted a dispensation as to age, for serious reasons, in the interest of the intending spouses.”
“All marriages shall be registered in an appropriate official register by the competent authority.”
“1. The Parliamentary Assembly is deeply concerned about the serious and recurrent violations of human rights and the rights of the child which are constituted by forced marriages and child marriages.
2. The Assembly observes that the problem arises chiefly in migrant communities and primarily affects young women and girls.
3. It is outraged by the fact that, under the cloak of respect for the culture and traditions of migrant communities, there are authorities which tolerate forced marriages and child marriages although they violate the fundamental rights of each and every victim.
4. The Assembly defines forced marriage as the union of two persons at least one of whom has not given their full and free consent to the marriage.
5. Since it infringes the fundamental human rights of the individual, forced marriage can in no way be justified.
6. The Assembly stresses the relevance of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 843 (IX) of 17 December 1954 declaring certain customs, ancient laws and practices relating to marriage and the family to be inconsistent with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
7. The Assembly defines child marriage as the union of two persons at least one of whom is under 18 years of age.”
“24. The Assembly calls on the Roma community and its representatives to fight discrimination and violence against Roma women and girls in their own community. In particular, the problems of domestic violence and of forced and child marriages, which constitute a violation of human rights, need to be addressed also by the Roma community itself. Custom and tradition cannot be used as an excuse for human rights violations, but should instead be changed. The Assembly calls on member states to support Romani women activists who engage in debates within their community about the tensions between the preservation of a Romani identity and the violation of women’s rights including through early and forced marriages.”
57. More recently, at the Council of Europe High Level Meeting on Roma, Strasbourg, 20 October 2010, the member States of the Council of Europe agreed on a non-exhaustive list of priorities, which should serve as guidance for more focused and more consistent efforts at all levels, including through active participation of Roma. These included:
“Women’s rights and gender equality
(22) Put in place effective measures to respect, protect and promote gender equality of Roma girls and women within their communities and in the society as a whole.
(23) Put in place effective measures to abolish where still in use harmful practices against Roma women’s reproductive rights, primarily forced sterilisation.
Children’s rights
(24) Promote through effective measures the equal treatment and the rights of Roma children especially the right to education and protect them against violence, including sexual abuse and labour exploitation, in accordance with international treaties.
Combat trafficking
(29) Bearing in mind that Roma children and women are often victims of trafficking and exploitation, devote adequate attention and resources to combat these phenomena, within the general efforts aimed at curbing trafficking of human beings and organised crime, and, in appropriate cases, issue victims with residence permits.”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3


ITEMID: 001-75968
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF YILMAZ AND BARIM v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1 (composition of state security court);Not necessary to examine other complaints under Art. 6
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson
TEXT: 4. The applicants were born in 1972 and 1968 respectively. They were serving their prison sentences at Bergama prison at the time of the application.
5. The applicants were arrested and taken into police custody by police officers at the Anti-terror branch of the İzmir Security Directorate on 7 and 9 September 1996 respectively.
6. On 19 September 1996 the İzmir State Security Court ordered the applicants’ remand in custody.
7. On 22 October 1996 the public prosecutor at the İzmir State Security Court filed a bill of indictment with that court and accused the applicants and fifteen other suspects of membership in an illegal organisation, namely the TIKB (Turkish Revolutionary Communist Union - Türkiye İhtilalci Komünistler Birliği). He requested that the applicants be convicted and sentenced under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of Law no. 3713.
8. On 24 December 1997 the İzmir State Security Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment.
9. On 24 November 1998 the Court of Cassation held a hearing and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.
10. The relevant domestic law and practice in force at the material time are outlined in the following judgments: Özel v. Turkey (no. 42739/98, §§ 20-21, 7 November 2002), and Gençel v. Turkey (no. 53431/99, §§ 11-12, 23 October 2003).
11. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Journal on 30 June 2004, the State Security Courts have been abolished.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-106165
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2011
DOCNAME: CASE OF IZZETOV v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 3 (substantive aspect);Violation of Art. 5-1-c;Violation of Art. 5-3;Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Dean Spielmann;Elisabet Fura;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mykhaylo Buromenskiy
TEXT: 6. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Trudolyubove, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (“the ARC”).
7. On 28 November 1998 a criminal case (no. 91241) was initiated into the circumstances under which money was extorted from the I. family.
8. On 2 August 1999 the applicant, a police officer at the material time, was arrested on suspicion of taking part in this crime.
9. On 5 August 1999 the applicant was charged with robbery of the I. family, although no formal case concerning robbery had been initiated and the case on extortion had not been formally terminated. On the same date the Prosecutor of the ARC remanded the applicant in custody for two months.
10. On 7 October 1999 the Prosecutor of the ARC extended the applicant’s detention for three more months, referring to the need to carry out further investigative actions.
11. On 2 January 2000 the Prosecutor of the ARC extended the applicant’s detention for one further month.
12. On 27 January 2000 the Prosecutor General of Ukraine extended the applicant’s detention for six further months. The order concerned extension of detention of thirteen persons, including the applicant, with reference to a different case (no. 8229), which concerned robberies and organisation of a gang by Mr S. P., another policeman. At the material time the applicant had no formal procedural status in this latter case.
13. On 20 March 2000 case no. 91241 and case no. 8229 were joined.
14. On 19 May 2000 the Prosecutors’ Office of the ARC rejected the applicant’s request for release, referring to the need to take further investigative action.
15. During the pre-trial investigation, the authorities questioned some 120 witnesses concerning some thirty-four criminal episodes, carried out some twenty reconstructions of the crime scenes and ordered numerous expert assessments.
16. On 20 July 2000 the investigation was completed and the applicant, along with eighteen other individuals implicated in gang membership, was committed for trial to the Supreme Court of the ARC (subsequently renamed the Court of Appeal of the ARC (hereafter “the ARC Court”).
17. On 4 May 2001, following familiarisation of the defendants with the materials in the case file and completion of other procedural formalities, the ARC Court held a preliminary hearing in the case and scheduled the trial for 5 June 2001.
18. Having held some eighteen hearings between June and December 2001, the ARC Court adjourned the proceedings following a request by one of the defendants that the hearings be recorded, for which the technical means were not available at the time.
19. On 15 May 2002 the ARC Court resumed consideration of the case and held some 150 hearings up to 22 May 2004.
20. According to the applicant, the episode with which he had been charged (the I. family robbery) was examined by the court only in February 2003 in the course of five hearings.
21. On several occasions during the trial stage the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to institute criminal proceedings against investigator D., alleging that she had infringed his right to defend himself by concealing the fact that she had ordered ten expert assessments in the case, the results of which he had discovered only upon the completion of the pre-trial investigation.
22. On an unspecified date the applicant also attempted to institute criminal proceedings against the investigating authorities for unlawfully detaining him. In particular, they allegedly had no regard to his serious illness (pleuritis) at the time of his arrest, had charged him with robbery within the framework of an extortion case, and had obtained an extension of the detention order within the framework of a case in which he had no procedural status at the material time.
23. On 8 November 2002 the Prosecutors’ Office of the ARC refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding however that investigator Ch., who had been in charge of the case at the material time, had infringed Articles 26 and 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when processing the case file material. In particular, he was obliged to join the cases before seeking an extension of the detention order.
24. On several occasions during his trial the applicant requested to be released from custody on account of alleged illegality of the orders detaining him issued during the pre-trial investigation. The ARC Court rejected his requests, noting that at the material time the initial omissions in case-processing, if any, had been remedied and the seriousness of the charges against the applicant warranted holding him in custody.
25. On 17 November 2004 the ARC court pronounced its judgment (which was presented on some 200 pages), according to which the applicant was convicted of gang membership and of robbery of the I. family and sentenced to six and a half years’ imprisonment.
26. The applicant appealed in cassation, alleging that the trial court had erred in its assessment of the facts and application of the law, and had also not summoned a further witness suggested by him. The applicant also allegedly requested to be represented by Yustis, a public organisation of law students, in his appeal proceedings. This request was refused.
27. On 2 February 2006 the applicant was released from detention as the term of his imprisonment was up.
28. On 16 March 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal in cassation.
29. Following his arrest on 2 August 1999, the applicant was placed in the Saky Temporary Detention Centre (ITU). According to the applicant, he was held in the same cell as serial offenders, in spite of the fact that he was a policeman, and offered no medical assistance for his serious illness (pleuritis).
30. On 9 August 1999 the applicant was transferred to the Simferopol no. 15 Pre-trial Detention Centre (“the SIZO”) and stayed there until his release in February 2006.
31. According to the applicant, the cells in the SIZO were grossly overcrowded, as there was between 1.5 and 1.9 square metres per detainee in a cell. The detainees were confined to their cells for most of the day. Tuberculosis and other infectious diseases were rife among the inmates. Overall, the SIZO had some 230 cells and only twenty-four outdoor yards, which made it impossible to ensure that every detainee had outdoor exercise on a regular basis. The sanitary facilities were inadequate for detainees to keep themselves clean.
32. The Government submitted that throughout his stay in detention the applicant was held in seven different cells, designed for occupancy by up to ten inmates. The space per inmate was between 1.2 and 3.6 square metres. At some point the applicant was held in a single occupancy cell of 8.2 square metres. Each of the cells had a window enabling natural ventilation and penetration of daylight. All cells were equipped with ventilating equipment, water supply and sewerage, a table, chairs, a metal cupboard for food products and a radio. The cells had central heating. In the evenings the cells had electric light, enabling the detainees to read and write without damaging their eyes. Sanitary facilities available in each cell were separated from the living area and each morning the detainees were provided with a disinfectant solution to clean them. The detainees were likewise provided with linen at State expense and had weekly access to bathing facilities. On a daily basis the detainees were taken out for one hour’s exercise in the outdoor yards of the SIZO, where they could also have access to facilities where they could do physical exercises.
33. Relevant provisions of domestic law can be found in the judgment in the case of Yeloyev v. Ukraine (no. 17283/02, § 35, 6 November 2008).
34. Relevant provisions of the Report by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment can be found in the judgment in the case of Dvoynykh v. Ukraine (no. 72277/01, §§ 39-40, 12 October 2006).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3
5
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-1
5-3
6-1
VIOLATED_BULLETPOINTS: 5-1-c


ITEMID: 001-103367
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2011
DOCNAME: CASE OF BUBLAKOVA v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Košice.
5. On 30 January 2002 the applicant initiated divorce proceedings and asked the Košice II District Court to determine her and her husband's rights and duties in respect of their minor daughters.
6. On 7 April 2006 the District Court adopted a judgment in the case.
7. On 19 April 2006 the applicant lodged a length of proceedings complaint with the Constitutional Court.
8. The District Court's judgment was served on the applicant on 12 May 2006 and, in the absence of an appeal, it became final on 4 July 2006.
9. On 13 September 2006 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It held that the District Court, by adopting the judgment and delivering it to the parties, had taken all required steps in order to eliminate the state of the applicant's legal uncertainty. This role of the District Court had ended by adopting the decision on the merits, that is before the complaint was lodged with the Constitutional Court. This decision became final on 4 July 2006 and the District Court could not deal with the merits of the case after the initiation of the constitutional proceedings. It was the Constitutional Court's practice to protect one's right to a hearing without unjustified delay only if the length of proceedings complaint was lodged at a time when the alleged violation still persisted. The decision was served on the applicant's lawyer on 19 October 2006.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-67056
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2004
DOCNAME: DÜZGÖREN v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicant, Koray Düzgören, is a Turkish national, who was born in 1947 and lives in London. He is represented before the Court by Ms Anke Julia Stock of the Kurdish Human Rights Project in London, as well as by Mr Mark Muller, Mr Tim Otty and Ms Jane Gordon, lawyers practising in London.
On 1 April 1998 the applicant, who is a journalist, together with N. A., distributed a leaflet concerning the conscientious objector O. M. U., outside the Ankara State Security Court. The applicant also handed the leaflet to the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court along with a petition requesting that he be prosecuted for having committed a crime. The leaflet, entitled “Freedom to think - an initiative against the crime of thought” contained the press release issued by O. M. U on 1 September 1995. The latter had been previously convicted and sentenced on account of this press release. The relevant parts of the leaflet are as follows:
Preface and Epilogue:
“... For the purpose of defending the free expression of every kind of thought, we who have signed as publishers, convey this 'convicted' text to the people, regardless of its contents and the question whether or not we share its contents, even though some of us do not agree with some lines in it...'
The press release of O. M. U:
“Good morning, Today's press conference is not organised by the Izmir Association of the Opponents of War. The responsibility for this conference rests exclusively with me. As you know, the case, which was brought before the Ankara Military Court of the Office of the Chief of Staff where I was allegedly accused of committing the crime of 'causing unwillingness of the people to do military service', was concluded on 29 August.
...
The army, unable to deal with us through judicial methods, think that they can draw the opponents of war away from the public view. First of all, I am not a deserter; I am a 'conscientious objector'. I neither intend to do military service nor desert. There is no reason to desert, because I defend the principle that people should exercise their right not to do military service without having to go into hiding.
As to the papers given by the Recruitment Office...I am going to burn them right now before your eyes...
I am not a soldier and I will never be. Of course, I am aware that I will be summoned for military service, but until I am summoned, how many more days that will be, there will be no changes to my life style. They can find me here to take me by force. But I will resist to the end in the barracks, and I am underlining that I will refuse to do military service in any shape or fashion.”
On 1 April 1998 the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court took the statement of the applicant. In his statement the applicant reiterated his petition which he had previously submitted to the prosecutor. He stated that by publishing and distributing the above-mentioned leaflet he had committed the same offence of which O. M. U. had been convicted. He contended that he agreed with the contents of the leaflet. He further pointed out that there were judgments of the European Court of Human Rights which referred to conscientious objectors. He claimed that the leaflet was not intended to dissuade people from doing military service or to incite them to desert. He further stated that in the Netherlands conscientious objectors did not do their military service, but were given other jobs. He commented that maybe in the future the same will also be true for Turkey. He concluded that his aim was to obtain the abolition of compulsory military service in Turkey.
On 4 June 1998 the military public prosecutor at the General Staff Court in Ankara filed a bill of indictment, accusing the applicant of discouraging people from performing military service. He requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 155 of the Criminal Code and Article 58 of the Military Penal Code.
On an unspecified date, the criminal proceedings against the applicant commenced before the General Staff Military Court in Ankara. In the proceedings, the applicant reiterated his statement to the public prosecutor at the State Security Court. The applicant submitted that he was a defender of freedom of expression and challenged the independence and impartiality of the court.
On 9 March 1999 the court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to two months' imprisonment and to a fine of 1,520,000 Turkish Liras (3.5 Euros).
In its reasoning, the court contended that it had competence to deal with the case pursuant to the Constitution and domestic law provisions. It also pointed out that there was no ruling of the European Court of Human Rights which concluded that military courts were extraordinary courts.
As to the merits of the case, the court considered that by distributing the leaflet containing the press release which led to O. M. U's conviction and by presenting the leaflet to the public prosecutor's office at the Istanbul State Security Court and asking the latter to take legal action, the applicant's actions were deliberate and that he had committed the offence knowingly and willingly. The court, relying on Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, Article 10 § 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 29 § 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, affirmed that freedom of expression and dissemination of ideas was not absolute. Citing relevant articles of the Criminal Code, the court reasoned that the provisions under which the applicant was charged pursued the aim of eliminating threats to the unity of the country, national security and sovereignty. The court observed that Article 155 of the Criminal Code was in accordance with international law and that the applicant's case fell within the scope of Article 155 of the Criminal Code.
On 19 April 1999 the applicant appealed to the Military Court of Cassation. In his appeal, the applicant, relying on Articles 6 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, contended that he should not have been tried by a military court and that the act which he had committed could not be considered an offence.
On 25 May 1999 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the General Staff Military Court.
In respect of the applicant's submission that he should not have been tried by a military court, the Military Court of Cassation, referring to domestic law and to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, ruled that the military courts had jurisdiction and competence to try the applicant.
As to the merits, the court, after having assessed the contents of the leaflet, concluded that the judgment given by the General Staff Military Court was in accordance with the law.
On 17 July 1999 the applicant left Turkey in order to avoid imprisonment. He claims that he lost his job at a television station, Channel 8, because of pressure from the army. The applicant continues to write as a columnist for a Turkish newspaper. He submits that his earnings as a columnist are significantly less than what he had earned previously with Channel 8. The applicant received compensation from Channel 8 and did not bring any civil proceedings in respect of his loss of employment.
The applicant alleges that due to his conviction he cannot return to Turkey without risking imprisonment and that his family relations have suffered as a result.
“Whoever, in circumstances other than those indicated in the foregoing Articles, publishes editorials to incite people to violate the laws of Turkey or endangers the security of the country, or issues publications or makes suggestions in order to dissuade persons from performing military service or gives speeches to this effect at public meetings or in places where people have gathered, shall be liable to imprisonment for a period of two months up to two years and to a heavy fine of 4,500 to 36,000 liras.”
“Whoever commits the offences described in Articles 153 to 161 or the offence described in Article 155 of the Criminal Code dissuading persons from performing military service by issuing publications or making suggestions or giving speeches to that effect shall be liable to be punished in accordance with the aforementioned Articles for the crime of threatening national security.”


ITEMID: 001-60793
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2002
DOCNAME: CASE OF RADAJ v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 8;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: 8. The applicant is a Polish national, who was born in 1953 and lives in Warsaw.
9. Two letters from the Secretariat of the European Commission of Human Rights, posted on 20 March 1996 and on 14 May 1996, were intercepted, opened and read by the administration of the Warszawa-Służewiec prison, where the applicant was detained on remand. They were subsequently forwarded to the Warsaw District Court, before which criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending at that time, and were read by the court.
10. On 29 April 1996 the applicant requested the President of the Warsaw District Court to explain what was the legal basis on which his correspondence with the European Commission of Human Rights had been opened and read.
11. He reiterated his complaint on 31 July 1996 in a letter to the President of the Regional Court. In reply, on 15 October 1996 the President of the Regional Court informed him that Article 8 of the Convention did not prohibit censorship of correspondence of persons detained on remand. It was also permitted under Section 33 § 2 of the Rules of Detention on Remand. The correspondence sent to the European Commission of Human Rights fell within the scope of this provision. It was further stated that the text of the Convention did not contain provisions relating to the inviolability of the correspondence to and from the European Commission of Human Rights.
12. The situation of persons detained on remand was at the relevant time governed by the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences of 1969. Under Article 89, all correspondence of a detainee was to be opened, read and, if need be, subject to censorship, unless a prosecutor and a court decided otherwise. No provision of the Code provided for any remedy to contest the manner or scope of the censorship of a detainee’s correspondence.
13. The rights of persons detained on remand as regards their correspondence were further set out in Section 33 of the Rules on Detention on Remand. They provided that the correspondence of persons detained on remand was subject to screening by prison authorities and by authority conducting the criminal proceedings, i.e. either a public prosecutor or a court, depending on the stage reached in the proceedings.
14. On 6 July 1997 a new Code of Enforcement of Criminal Sentences was enacted by parliament. Article 102 of this Code, which entered into force on 1 January 1998, provides that the convicted persons are entitled to uncensored correspondence with the State authorities and with the Ombudsman. Article 103 of the Code further provides that convicted persons and their lawyers may lodge complaints with the international agencies established under international treaties on protection of human rights, ratified by Poland. Prisoners’ correspondence in such cases shall be dispatched with no delay and is not subject to censorship.
15. Pursuant to Article 512 of the new Code, the rights of persons detained on remand shall, in principle, be the same as those of persons convicted by a final judgment.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 8


ITEMID: 001-91786
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: AUT
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: CASE OF LANG v. AUSTRIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 14+9
JUDGES: Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Altmünster.
6. Upon his baptism on 30 July 1983 the applicant became a member of the recognised religious community of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Austria, within which he assumed the function of a preacher (Prediger) and, since 6 November 1997, an elder (Ältester) in the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ community in Gmunden. This function includes providing pastoral care to the community, leading church services and preaching.
7. In September 2000 the Upper Austrian Military Authority (Militärkommando) ordered the applicant to undergo examinations as to his ability to perform military service. The applicant appealed against the order, claiming that he should be dispensed from military service since he performed a function within the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was equivalent to that of members of a recognised religious society who were exempt from military service under section 24(3) of the Military Service Act (Wehrgesetz). To restrict such a privilege to members of recognised religious societies was not objectively justified and was therefore in breach of the Federal Constitution.
8. On 9 October 2000 the Upper Austria Military Authority dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 14 December 2000 the Federal Minister for Defence (Bundesminister für Landesverteidigung) confirmed that decision. Both authorities refused the applicant’s appeals on the ground that he did not belong to a recognised religious society.
9. Subsequently, on 25 January 2001, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), requesting it to repeal the wording “recognised religious societies” in section 24(3) of the Military Service Act.
10. On 25 September 2001 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the applicant’s complaint for lack of prospects of success. It found that the applicant’s obligations under the Military Service Act did not interfere with the internal rules and practices of the religious community at issue. It furthermore referred to earlier decisions dealing with the legal status of religious communities and their difference from recognised religious societies under the Recognition Act.
11. On 23 May 2003 the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that exemption from the obligation to perform military service merely applied to members of recognised religious societies and could not be extended to members of registered religious communities. This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 4 July 2003.
12. On 26 August 2003 the applicant asked the Federal Ministry for Defence to take no action until the European Court of Human Rights had decided on his application. The applicant was informed that an instruction had been issued to the Upper Austrian Military Authority not to call him up until further notice.
13. Article 9 a § 3 of the Federal Constitution reads as follows:
“Every male Austrian citizen is liable for military service. Conscientious objectors who refuse to perform compulsory military service and who are dispensed from this requirement must perform alternative service. The details shall be regulated by ordinary law.”
14. Section 24(3) of the Military Service Act, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows:
“An exemption from the obligation to perform military service shall apply to the following members of recognised religious societies:
1. ordained priests,
2. persons involved in spiritual welfare or in clerical teaching after graduating in theological studies,
3. members of a religious order who have made a solemn vow, and
4. students of theology who are preparing to assume a clerical function.”
15. For a detailed description of the legal situation in Austria in this field see Löffelmann v. Austria (no. 42967/98).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 14
9


ITEMID: 001-102825
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: GORSKI v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Vincent A. De Gaetano
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Andrzej Górski, is a Polish national who was born in 1977 and lives in Wrocław. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 6 December 2006 the applicant was committed to Międzyrzecz Remand Centre and then continuously detained in several penitentiary facilities. On 6 April 2009 he was released.
The applicant submitted that throughout his detention he had been held in overcrowded cells in conditions which did not comply with the basic standards of hygiene.
The Government submitted that they could not confirm whether during his stay in Międzyrzecz Remand Centre the applicant had been detained in cells with a surface area of at least 3 m² per person. However, they acknowledged that during the applicant’s detention, the remand centre had been overcrowded. The Government did not comment on the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the remaining penitentiary facilities.
The applicant lodged several complaints with the penitentiary authorities regarding the conditions of his detention. None of them was considered well-founded.
On 31 October 2007 the applicant brought a civil action in tort against the State Treasury to seek compensation for the infringement of his personal rights. However, he failed to submit any information as to its outcome.
A detailed description of the relevant domestic law and practice concerning general rules governing conditions of detention in Poland and domestic remedies available to detainees alleging that the conditions of their detention were inadequate are set out in the Court’s pilot judgments given in the cases of Orchowski v. Poland (no. 17885/04) and Norbert Sikorski v. Poland (no. 17599/05) on 22 October 2009 (see §§ 75-85 and §§ 45-88 respectively). More recent developments are described in the Court’s decision in the case of Łatak v. Poland (no. 52070/08) on 12 October 2010 (see §§ 25-54).


ITEMID: 001-5057
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ITA
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2000
DOCNAME: ANGELI v. ITALY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: A.
The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1966 and living in Florence.
The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Florence, which he had let to V.T.
In a writ served on the tenant on 29 April 1992 the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.
By a decision of 8 February 1993, which was made enforceable on 19 March 1993, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 8 February 1994.
On 21 May 1994, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself.
On 9 March 1995, and again on 25 October 1995, 13 March 1996 and 13 July 1996, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.
On 23 July 1996, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 6 September 1996.
On 6 September 1996, 15 January 1997 and 13 May 1997, the bailiff made attempts to recover possession of the apartment.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.
On 4 December 1997, the tenant vacated the premises.
B. Relevant domestic law
The relevant domestic law is described in the Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy judgment of 28 July 1999, to be published in the Court’s official reports, §§ 18-35.


ITEMID: 001-61478
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2003
DOCNAME: CASE OF WORWA v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: No violation of Art. 5-1;No violation of Art. 8 as regards the right to respect for family life;Violation of Art. 8 as regards the right to respect for private life;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award
JUDGES: Georg Ress;Mark Villiger
TEXT: 8. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Rdzawka.
9. In a dispute with her neighbours about a right of way, she was a party to various sets of legal proceedings, as detailed below.
10. The applicant's neighbours accused her of preventing them on 27 August 1993 from taking the track leading to the housing estate. On 29 December 1993 the Nowy Targ District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) made a summary order (nakaz karny) requiring the applicant and her husband to pay a fine. On 10 February 1994 the same court, taking into account the low level of the disturbance to public order caused by the offence, made a discontinuation order (postanowienie o umorzeniu postepowania), coupled with a probationary period of one year.
On 24 May 1996 it found the accused not guilty (wyrok uniewinniający). Having compared the evidence given by the victims and the witnesses they had asked to be called, it noted differences which undermined the credibility of their version of the facts. On 14 October 1996 the Nowy Sącz Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) dismissed an appeal by the prosecution.
11. In 1994 the applicant was prosecuted under Article 167 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see “Relevant domestic law” below) for an offence committed on 27 August 1993. On 6 July 1994 the Nowy Targ District Court asked for the applicant to be examined by two psychiatrists in order to determine whether, at the material time, she had been in full possession of her mental faculties. The court grounded this request on the fact that the applicant was under treatment as an outpatient of the neurology centre and the fact that she had also been required to undergo a psychiatric examination in connection with another case. The examination was arranged for 3 August 1994. The applicant was duly informed of the appointment but did not attend.
12. On 12 August 1994 the consultation was put back to 31 August 1994, but did not take place on that date because the applicant announced that she was seriously ill.
13. On 26 September 1994 the District Court informed the applicant in an ordinary letter that the consultation had been put back to 12 October 1994 and made it clear that her attendance was compulsory and that if she did not comply with the order it would be obliged to have her arrested.
14. On the same day the District Court issued a warrant for the applicant's arrest, if required, in order to enforce her attendance at the psychiatric examination on 12 October 1994.
15. The applicant was arrested at her home on 12 October 1994 at 8.50 a.m. At 9.10 she signed the arrest report and wrote on it that she had heart problems, that she intended to complain about the arrest and that she did not want anyone in her family to be informed.
16. Initially (in her observations of 6 October 2000), the applicant submitted that she had sent a medical certificate to explain why she could not attend the appointment with the psychiatrist.
17. The Government asserted that no certificate had been received by the court, which had ordered the applicant to be escorted to her medical examination, and that a certificate could not have been mislaid by the District Court's registry.
18. In reply the applicant submitted that, not having received a summons, she did not find out about the court's decision until the police arrived. It was then that she had informed them that she had been unable to attend the appointment and had given them a medical certificate dated 9 October 1994 showing that she had been admitted to hospital with a heart condition.
19. The Government then asserted that no medical certificate dated 9 October 1994 mentioning that the applicant had to be treated in hospital had been received by the District Court.
20. The applicant insisted that she had handed over such a certificate to the police, pointing out that she could not be held responsible if the police officers had omitted to send it on to the court.
21. According to the applicant, her daughter, then aged 10, had been present when she was arrested. One of the police officers had snatched the child out of her arms, as a result of which the girl had been traumatised. She alleged that the police made her get into the van, leaving the child at home unsupervised. She produced a certificate drawn up on 9 August 1995 by a psychologist, stating that her two daughters were receiving treatment for sleep disorders, namely nightmares and sudden panic attacks.
22. As regards the presence of the applicant's daughter when she was being arrested, the Government asserted that they were unable to say whether or not the child had been left alone. The arrest report contained no information of that kind and the applicant had not at any time asked to be allowed to contact a member of her family. The Government submitted a letter dated 11 June 2002 in which the commander of the local police stated that, when he interviewed the officer responsible for the arrest, the latter had informed him that he no longer remembered the exact circumstances but that if the child had been present he would have taken the normal steps to ensure that there was someone to look after her. The Government also pointed out that the medical examination had taken only a few hours and that the applicant had soon been able to go home.
23. The applicant, on the other hand, said that the police had forbidden her to contact a member of her family or her doctor. She also presented an affidavit signed by a third party who had been in the same police van, certifying that when the vehicle broke down they had been obliged to wait in it on the road without any concern being shown by the police as to whether they were correctly dressed to protect themselves from the cold.
24. On 12 October 1994 the applicant complained about being arrested. On 13 October 1994 the President of the District Court refused to entertain her application, since there was no provision for such a remedy. On 10 December 1994 that decision was upheld on appeal by the Nowy Sącz Regional Court.
25. According to the information noted by the Nowy Sącz Regional Court in its decision of 15 December 1995 concerning another case in which the applicant was involved (see Section C of this statement of the facts), the report on the examination on 12 October 1994 said that the applicant had not been in full possession of her mental faculties at the material time. The doctors also pointed out that since 1992 she had been receiving treatment for epilepsy.
26. On 23 September 1995 the family affairs judge (sędzia rodzinny) brought proceedings against the applicant's two minor daughters to establish whether or not on 13 June 1995, as alleged, they had thrown stones at their neighbour and insulted her, in the presence of and encouraged by their mother.
27. On 29 September 1995 the applicant protested against that measure.
28. On 26 April 1996 the Nowy Targ District Court issued a warning (upomnienie) to the girls and noted that one of them had partly lost her moral bearings. It found that the incident had formed part of the ongoing dispute between the victim and the children's parents. It further noted that the two girls were model pupils and had never been convicted of similar offences.
29. On 25 June 1996 the Nowy Sącz Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant. It found that a warning was not only the least severe correctional measure but also the most appropriate one in the circumstances. On 10 January 1997 the Minister of Justice refused leave to appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court.
30. On 30 September 1995 the Nowy Targ district prosecutor's office (Prokuratura Rejonowa) preferred an indictment against the applicant. She was prosecuted for inciting her daughters on 13 June 1995 to attack their neighbour physically and verbally, as a result of which the victim had sustained numerous lesions.
31. On 17 November 1995 the applicant was also charged under Article 167 § 1 of the Criminal Code for having, on 9 August 1995, threatened her neighbour with a shovel handle and prevented her using the track to the housing estate.
32. On 20 December 1995 the Nowy Targ District Court decided to require the applicant to undergo a psychiatric examination. On 10 January 1996 the Krakow-Kobierzyn neuropsychiatric hospital asked the applicant to go for an examination on 8 February 1996. On 4 March 1996 the same court decided to place the applicant in the Krakow-Kobierzyn psychiatric hospital for observation. It noted that the report produced after the medical examination of 8 February 1996 revealed a risk that the applicant might be suffering from delusions (psychoza urojeniowa). As it found the consultation inconclusive, the court accepted the doctors' opinion that a longer period of observation was necessary. It concluded that, if the applicant's state of health could be known with certainty, it would be possible to decide what provisional measures should be taken.
33. On 21 March 1996 the applicant appealed against the decision of 4 March 1996. She said that on 6 March 1996 she had already been required to undergo a psychiatric examination in Nowy Targ in connection with another case. She also complained that she had not been informed of the doctors' findings.
34. On 15 July 1996 the Nowy Targ District Court again ordered the applicant to undergo a psychiatric examination. It noted that psychiatric reports had been ordered twice in quick succession. As views on the applicant's state of health were divided, it considered that a fresh consultation was required. That took place on 28 August 1996.
35. On 28 November 1995 the District Court decided to send the file back to the prosecutor for further investigation. It pointed out that the applicant had been required to undergo a psychiatric examination in a similar case before the same court (see Section B above) and that the prosecutor was therefore under an obligation to provide all the useful information about her in his possession. The court also pointed out that on 1 January 1996 a criminal-law reform was due to come into force in Poland and that that might have a bearing on how the further proceedings would be organised.
36. On 11 December 1995 the applicant appealed against the decision to transfer the file. She argued that the doubts expressed by the judge about her mental health were unfounded, especially as the findings of the psychiatric examination referred to by the court had been favourable.
37. On a date which has not been specified the district prosecutor appealed against the same decision, arguing that the prosecution had not been aware either that another similar case was pending before the District Court or that the applicant had already been required to undergo a psychiatric examination.
38. On 15 December 1995 the Nowy Sącz Regional Court dismissed the appeals by the applicant and the district prosecutor. It noted that, since the psychiatric report of 12 October 1994 (see Section B above) had stated that the applicant was not in full possession of her mental faculties at the material time, a further expert report was necessary. The main aim of the new examination should be to establish whether the applicant was still in the same condition as she had been at the material time. The court also pointed out that the district prosecutor had taken part in the 1994 proceedings.
39. On 12 January 1996 the Nowy Targ district prosecutor decided to order the applicant to undergo a psychiatric examination at the Nowy Targ hospital with a view to establishing whether she was suffering from a mental illness, whether at the material time she had been in full possession of her mental faculties and whether the fact that she was still at liberty posed a threat to public order. On 17 January 1996 the applicant complained about the prosecutor's decision. She contended, among other arguments, that ordering a consultation on the ground that she had already been examined in a similar case was an abuse of the legal means placed at the judicial authorities' disposal.
40. On 17 January 1996 the Rabka police summoned the applicant to attend a consultation at the hospital in Nowy Targ on 12 February 1996. On 14 February 1996, for a reason not explained in the file, the Rabka police again summoned the applicant to attend a consultation arranged for 6 March 1996.
41. The report on the consultation of 6 March 1996 stated that the applicant's mental health was good.
42. On 14 March 1996 the Rabka police summoned the applicant for the third time, to a consultation on 4 April 1996. On the date specified the applicant went to the hospital. The doctor discovered that she had been examined on 6 March 1996 and explained that the local police must have made a mistake.
43. On 31 January 1997 the Nowy Targ District Court found the applicant guilty of inciting her children on 13 June 1995 to insult and throw stones at their neighbour and of threatening the neighbour on 9 August 1995 with a shovel handle, thereby preventing her from taking the track leading to the housing estate. It sentenced the applicant to a fine, together with a term of imprisonment in default of payment within the time allowed.
44. On 3 June 1997 the Nowy Sącz Regional Court dismissed an appeal against the District Court's judgment. It held that, as regards the assault on 9 August 1995, the applicant had not been in full possession of her powers of discernment so that she was unable to understand the significance of what she had done. It noted that two medical reports of 30 September 1996 and 22 April 1997 had established that the applicant was not in full possession of the mental faculties she needed to be able to understand the consequences of her conduct.
45. On 25 March 1998 the Nowy Targ district prosecutor preferred an indictment against the applicant and her husband, accusing them of carrying out unauthorised renovation work on a roof supported on wooden props previously built with planning permission.
46. On 12 February 1998 the district prosecutor had ordered the applicant to undergo a psychiatric examination. On 24 February 1998 the doctors reported that the applicant was not suffering from any mental disorder. At the interview she explained that the purpose of the roof was to protect her family from the smells given off by the neighbours' septic tank. She also said that she had not known such a structure required planning permission.
47. On 18 June 1998 the Nowy Targ District Court found the applicant and her husband guilty of the offence as charged and ordered them to pay a fine.
48. Article 167 § 1 of the Criminal Code formerly provided:
“It shall be an offence, punishable by up to two years' imprisonment, a restriction of liberty or a fine, to use violence or threats to compel another to behave in a particular way.”
Article 25 § 2 authorised a court, exceptionally, to reduce the sentence if the offender had not been in full possession of his or her mental faculties at the time of the offence.
49. Article 65 placed all defendants under the obligation to submit to any medical examination made necessary by the investigation of the case, surgery excepted.
50. Article 66 created an obligation to comply with a summons from a prosecutor or court. In the event of refusal without a valid reason, the person concerned could be brought by force.
51. Article 176 § 1 empowered a court to require a person to undergo an examination by a scientific or research institute, a specific centre, or any other institution or person. It made it clear that the consultation should not be ordered for any purpose other than obtaining specific information about the person concerned.
52. Article 208 § 1 provided that the court or prosecutor was empowered to order the arrest of a suspect or compel his or her appearance before them.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 8
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 5
8
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-1