ITEMID: 001-22632
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: DEU
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2001
DOCNAME: GLÄSSNER v. GERMANY
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicant, Ludwig Glässner, is a German national, who was born in 1928 and lives in Berlin. From 1964 to 1994 he was a public prosecutor (Staatsanwalt), working under the authority of the Principal State Prosecutor (Generalstaatsanwalt) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). He was represented before the Court by Mr Buchholz, a lawyer practising in Berlin.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In 1977 the East German dissident Rudolf Bahro published a book inspired by the events of the Prague Spring of 1968 entitled “The Alternative – A Critique of Socialism as it Actually Exists” (Die Alternative – Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus), in which he advocated a number of reforms with a view to setting up an ideal communist system and criticised the GDR’s party apparatus. In September 1977 the book was published in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
In 1975 he had written a thesis on “Employment conditions of scientifically trained management staff in the industry of the GDR” (Einsatzbedingungen wissenschaftlich ausgebildeter Kader in der Industrie der DDR), for which he had collected comments from some fifty graduates on their conditions of employment in industry. In January 1977 the technical university he was attending rejected Mr Bahro’s thesis and so he attempted to publish it in the FRG.
On 23 August 1977 Mr Bahro was arrested and the next day he was remanded in custody.
On 14 June 1978 the trial opened before the Berlin City Court (Stadtgericht), which had jurisdiction over political offences. In his submissions as prosecutor the applicant recommended, on behalf of the Principal State Prosecutor, that Mr Bahro be sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment for “repeated offences or attempted offences of intelligence gathering” (mehrfacher, teils versuchter Verbrechen der Nachrichtensammlung), pursuant to Article 98 §§ 1 and 2 of the former GDR’s Criminal Code, and betrayal of secrets (Geheimnisverrat), pursuant to Article 245 § 1 of the GDR’s Criminal Code.
In a judgment of 30 June 1978 the Berlin City Court convicted Mr Bahro of “gathering, imparting and attempting to impart intelligence” (Sammlung, Übermittlung und versuchter Übermittlung von Nachrichten) and “betrayal of secrets” (Geheimnisverrat) and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment in accordance with Articles 98 §§ 1 and 2 and 245 § 1 of the GDR’s Criminal Code (see Relevant domestic law and practice below).
On 7 July 1978 Mr Bahro’s lawyer, Mr Gysi, appealed against that judgment.
In his submissions, the applicant asked the Supreme Court (Oberstes Gericht) to dismiss Mr Bahro’s appeal.
In a decision of 1 August 1978 the Supreme Court declared Mr Bahro’s appeal manifestly ill-founded (offensichtlich unbegründet) and upheld the judgment at first instance.
Mr Bahro was granted an amnesty on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR and released on 11 October 1979. The applicant had recommended that he should be released.
On 15 June 1990, in anticipation of the approaching reunification of the two German States, the Presiding Committee (Präsidium) of the Supreme Court set aside the Berlin City Court’s judgment of 30 June 1978 and the Supreme Court’s judgment of 1 August 1978 and acquitted Mr Bahro because his conviction for “intelligence gathering” and “betrayal of secrets” had been unjustified.
On 5 April 1996 the Berlin Regional Court (Landgericht) sentenced the applicant to one year and three months’ imprisonment, suspended, for aiding and abetting a deliberate perversion of the course of justice (Beihilfe zur Rechtsbeugung), pursuant to Article 244 of the GDR’s Criminal Code, taken together with Article 336 of the FRG’s Criminal Code, and aiding and abetting a deprivation of liberty (Beihilfe zur Freiheitsberaubung), pursuant to Article 131 § 1 of the GDR’s Criminal Code, taken together with Article 239 § 1 of the FRG’s Criminal Code. It also convicted one of the judges of the GDR’s Supreme Court who had taken part in drawing up the decision of 1 August 1978.
The Regional Court began by reiterating the general principles that are applicable to prosecutions of former members of the GDR’s national legal service. Both judges and prosecutors are liable to prosecution since the offences of deliberate perversion of the course of justice (Rechtsbeugung) and deprivation of liberty (Freiheitsberaubung) are expressly defined both by Articles 336 and 239 § 1 of the FRG’s Criminal Code and by Articles 244 and 131 § 1 of the GDR’s Criminal Code (see Relevant domestic law and practice below). In accordance with the principles on the application of criminal law in Germany after the reunification for offences committed in the GDR before the reunification (see Relevant domestic law and practice below), the Regional Court applied the relevant provisions of the GDR’s Criminal Code at the material time.
In respect of the first offence of which the applicant was accused, namely aiding and abetting a deliberate perversion of the course of justice, the Regional Court, having regard to the principle that the criminal law is not to be applied retrospectively, pointed out that the only acts which were reprehensible were those which, while taking account of the relevant legal provisions applicable in the GDR and the values on which that State was based, were found to be manifestly arbitrary (offensichtliche Willkürakten) and in breach of human rights. According to the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), three types of case might arise – those in which the elements constituting the offence (Straftatbestände) were exaggerated (überdehnt), those in which the sentence was intolerably disproportionate (in einem unerträglichen Missverhältnis) to the offence committed and finally those in which the proceedings had flagrantly infringed human rights.
In the instant case, the Regional Court considered that, in the light of the methods of interpretation (Auslegungsmethoden) that had existed in the GDR, the offences of which Mr Bahro had been accused could just conceivably be regarded as “intelligence gathering” and “betrayal of secrets” as defined in Articles 98 and 245 of the GDR’s Criminal Code. On the other hand, it found that the sentence imposed on Mr Bahro by the Supreme Court of the GDR had been totally at variance with the principle of proportionality which had also formed part of the GDR’s law. Even though the sentence had still been formally within the limits set by statute (innerhalb des gesetzlichen Strafrahmens), the judgment of 30 June 1978 flagrantly infringed the sentencing rules (Strafzumessungsgrundsätze) laid down in Article 61 § 2 of the GDR’s Criminal Code (see Relevant domestic law and practice below).
In its judgment the City Court had found Mr Bahro guilty of supporting those who had sought to overthrow the socialist system for over ten years through his offences, whereas it had previously found that Mr Bahro’s conduct prior to 1976 had not been criminal and it could not therefore legitimately argue that his conduct before that date had increased his guilt. The City Court had also held that Mr Bahro had taken advantage of his position and industrial workers’ trust in him to extort information from them. However, when taking evidence, the City Court had failed to establish what kind of information Mr Bahro had extorted in this way.
The Regional Court also pointed out, with reference to a commentary on the GDR’s Criminal Code published by its Ministry of Justice in 1969, that the consequences and adverse effects of the offence should be decisive for the fixing of the sentence. But the City Court had declared that the book published by Mr Bahro contained information that could be used with the assistance of enemy intelligence services to promote measures that would damage the economy (Nachrichten, die geeignet seien, wirtschaftschädigende Massnahmen mit Hilfe der gegnerischen Nachtrichtendienste zu unterstützen) and that the information contained in his thesis could have been used for “ideological diversion” (ideologische Diversion), whereas it was not at all clear how Mr Bahro’s book could have led to such consequences or that it had done so, and the same was true where so-called “ideological diversion” was concerned.
The Regional Court also criticised the City Court for having failed to take any account of the many extenuating circumstances which weighed in Mr Bahro’s favour. It had taken absolutely no account of the fact that Mr Bahro had acknowledged the objective facts, that he had been acting in a noble cause, namely to propose reforms to the socialist system, not to support its enemies, that until that date his conduct in the GDR had been irreproachable and above all that he had never been prosecuted before.
The Regional Court accordingly held that the sentence imposed on Mr Bahro had been patently disproportionate and an intolerable arbitrary act (unerträglicher Willkürakt). Its aim had not been to achieve justice (Article 86 of the Constitution of the GDR) but to silence a brave critic of the regime maintained by the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – “the SED”) under the guise of a criminal trial. Consequently, Mr Bahro’s imprisonment had also been a breach of the law because it had been based on a judgment obtained by a deliberate perversion of the course of justice.
As to the applicant’s role, the Regional Court pointed out in the first place that it was not the indictment (Anklage) itself that was at issue, since the legal classification of the offences of which Mr Bahro had been accused had still been just within the bounds of acceptability; it was in fact the sentence recommended by the applicant (Strafantrag) in his submissions of 28 June 1978 against Mr Bahro during the hearing before the City Court, which had amounted to the offences of aiding and abetting a deliberate perversion of the course of justice and deprivation of liberty. While acknowledging that it was not the applicant, via his submissions, who had given the judges the idea (auf die Idee gebracht) of convicting Mr Bahro, the Regional Court held that he had considerably assisted them in that task because the judges were bound to reply to his submissions under the relevant provisions of the GDR’s Code of Criminal Procedure and their findings in the instant case had been largely based on those submissions.
Consequently, the Regional Court considered that in sentencing Mr Bahro to eight years’ imprisonment – a sentence that was flagrantly disproportionate to his guilt, as the City Court judges knew – the judges had been guilty of a deliberate perversion of the course of justice and deprivation of liberty. Because of the harshness of the sentence he had asked the court to impose on Mr Bahro, the applicant, who knew the law of the GDR very well by virtue of his function, had deliberately and knowingly assisted the judges in making the decision that had perverted the course of justice and resulted in the deprivation of Mr Bahro’s liberty. By recommending before the Supreme Court that Mr Bahro’s appeal be dismissed, the applicant had also assisted the judges of the Supreme Court in their task.
Lastly, the Regional Court found that the defendant’s conviction was ruled out neither by the amnesties granted by the GDR at the material time nor because it was time-barred.
The Regional Court applied Article 82 of the GDR’s Criminal Code, which set a limitation period of eight years for a deliberate perversion of the course of justice since that offence carried a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment (under Article 22 of the GDR’s Criminal Code, the extent of a person’s criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting (Beihilfe) depends on the offence committed). It also applied Article 83 (2) of the GDR’s Criminal Code, under which there is a suspension (Ruhen) of the running of time where, “for another legal reason” (aus einem anderen gesetzlichen Grund), criminal proceedings cannot be brought; in so doing, it referred to the Federal Court of Justice’s established case-law on the subject (see Relevant domestic law and practice below).
To determine the length of the sentence to be imposed on the applicant, the Regional Court also applied the criminal law of the GDR that had been applicable at the material time (because it was more lenient than that of the FRG) and took account of a number of extenuating circumstances in the applicant’s favour.
In a decision of 26 November 1997 the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) dismissed an appeal by the applicant.
On 28 July 1998, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesvefassungsgericht), sitting as a three-member panel, refused to examine an appeal by the applicant.
Under Article 315 of the Introductory Act to the FRG’s Criminal Code (Einführungsgesetz ins Strafgesetzbuch), taken together with Article 2 of the Code itself, offences committed inside the territory of the GDR prior to the entry into force of the Unification Treaty (on 3 October 1990) are in principle judged under the more lenient criminal law applicable at the material time if there were equivalent criminal provisions in the FRG and the GDR.
The relevant provisions of the GDR’s Criminal Code at the material time provided as follows.
Article 89 of the GDR’s Criminal Code provided, inter alia, that anyone who allowed himself to be recruited by a foreign power, secret services or a foreign organisation for the purposes of gathering, disclosing or imparting secret information prejudicial to the GDR’s interests should also be convicted of espionage under Article 97, which stated that the penalty for espionage was at least five years’ imprisonment.
Article 245 § 1 of the GDR’s Criminal Code provided, inter alia, that anyone divulging secret documents or intelligence to unauthorised third parties was liable to a term of imprisonment of up to two years.
Article 244 of the GDR’s Criminal Code defined the offence of deliberate perversion of the course of justice (Rechtsbeugung). It stated, inter alia, that judges or prosecutors who deliberately showed bias for or against a defendant during a trial or investigation were liable to a maximum of five years’ imprisonment.
Article 131 § 1 of the GDR’s Criminal Code defined the offence of deprivation of liberty (Freiheitsberaubung).
In its judgment of 5 April 1996 the Berlin Regional Court also referred to Article 61 of the GDR’s Criminal Code, which laid down the rules on sentencing (Strafzumessungsgrundsätze). Article 61 provided among other things, in paragraph 2, that when deciding on the severity of the sentence, regard should be had both to the objective and subjective circumstances of the offence and to its consequences. Account also had to be taken of the offender’s character, his social conduct before and after the offence and the causes and circumstances of the offence. It was particularly important to ascertain whether the offender had learnt the lessons of any previous conviction. Lastly, courts were also under an obligation to have regard to any extenuating or aggravating circumstances for the offender.
The relevant provisions of the 1974 Constitution provided:
“The generally recognised rules of international law intended to promote peace and peaceful cooperation between peoples are binding (sind verbindlich) on the State and every citizen.”
“Respect for and protection of the dignity and liberty of the person (Persönlichkeit) are required of all State bodies, all forces in society and every citizen.”
The first chapter of the Special Part (Besonderer Teil) of the 1974 Criminal Code, entitled “Crimes against the national sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, peace, humanity and human rights”, included the following introduction:
“The merciless punishment of crimes against the national sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, peace, humanity and human rights, and of war crimes, is an indispensable prerequisite for stable peace in the world, for the restoration of faith in fundamental human rights (Wiederherstellung des Glaubens an grundlegende Menschenrechte) and the dignity and worth of human beings, and for the preservation of the rights of all.”
Article 95 of the Criminal Code was worded as follows:
“Any person whose conduct violates human or fundamental rights, international obligations or the national sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic may not plead (kann sich nicht berufen auf) statute law, an order or written instructions in justification; he shall be held criminally responsible.”
Article 84 of the Criminal Code provided:
“Crimes against peace, humanity or human rights, and war crimes shall not be subject to the rules on limitation set out in this law [laying down the limitation periods for the various categories of offences].”
Article 83 of the GDR’s Criminal Code made provision for the suspension (Ruhen) of the running of time for the purposes of the limitation of prosecution in the following cases:
“1. as long as the offender remains outside the territory of the GDR;
2. as long as criminal proceedings cannot be brought or continued because the offender is seriously ill or for another legal reason (aus einem anderen gesetzlichen Grund);
3. as long as criminal proceedings cannot be brought or continued pending the outcome of another set of proceedings;
4. once the court has decided to commence the trial.”
In accordance with its settled case-law, the Federal Court of Justice has held that the deliberate refusal of the GDR’s authorities and its single party to prosecute where there had been deliberate perversions of the course of justice, even where those offences were punishable under the GDR’s written law, constituted “another legal reason” entailing a suspension of the limitation period (see Federal Court of Justice, criminal cases, Reports of decisions no. 40, pp. 48 et seq. and pp. 113 et seq., Reports of decisions no. 41, pp. 317 et seq., and the decision of 26 April 1995 published in the Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift, pp. 2861 et seq.).
This case-law had existed since the 1950s in Germany, when it had been applied to the crimes committed under National Socialist rule (see the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of 18 September 1952, Reports of decisions no. 1, pp. 418 et seq., and the Federal Court of Justice’s decisions in criminal cases of 28 May 1963 and 29 October 1969, Reports of decisions no. 18, pp. 367 et seq. and no. 23, pp. 137 et seq., respectively).
Section 1 of the Law of 26 March 1993 on the suspension (Ruhen) of limitation in respect of injustices committed under the SED regime of the Socialist Unity Party, known as the Limitation Act, (Gesetz über das Ruhen der Verjährung bei SED-Unrechtstaten - Verjährungsgesetz), which complements this case-law, provides as follows:
“When calculating the limitation period for the prosecution of acts committed under the unjust regime of the Socialist Unity Party (SED-Unrechtsregime) which, in accordance with the express or implicit wishes of the State authorities or the single party of the former GDR, were not prosecuted for political reasons or reasons contrary to the fundamental principles of a liberal constitutional system (freiheitliche rechtsstaatliche Ordnung), the period between 11 October 1949 and 2 October 1990 shall not be taken into account. During this period limitation was suspended.”
The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was ratified by the GDR on 8 November 1974.
Article 14 § 1 of the Covenant provides:
“All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, ... everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...”


ITEMID: 001-109142
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: MNE
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: CASE OF BOUCKE v. MONTENEGRO
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Reasonable time)
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
TEXT: 5. The applicants, Ms Snežana Boucke (“the first applicant”) and Ms Kristina Boucke (“the second applicant”), were born in 1951 and 1988 respectively and live in Kruševac, Serbia.
6. On 21 May 1988 the first applicant gave birth to the second applicant, born out of wedlock.
7. On 18 August 1992 the District Court in Düsseldorf ruled that M.J., from Montenegro, was the father of the second applicant and ordered him to pay child maintenance.
8. On 29 October 1999 the District Court (Okružni sud) in Kruševac (Serbia) confirmed (priznao) the decision of the Düsseldorf District Court. It would appear that enforcement of this judgment has never been sought.
9. On an unspecified date the second applicant instituted proceedings against M.J. seeking child maintenance. As she was a minor at the time she was represented by the first applicant as her legal guardian.
10. On 23 December 1997 the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in Kruševac issued a judgment ordering M.J. (hereinafter “the debtor”) to pay 62,500 Yugoslav dinars (YUD) for the maintenance accrued between 1 July 1988 and 30 June 1997, with statutory interest, plus YUD 960 for the costs of proceedings. This judgment became final on 10 February 1998.
11. On 13 April 1998 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Herceg Novi (Montenegro) issued an enforcement order (rješenje o izvršenju) providing that the amount due would be paid by the sale of the debtor’s movable assets. On 22 October 1998 the debtor’s objection (prigovor) in this regard was rejected.
12. On 29 October 1998 the court bailiff established that the debtor had no movable assets of his own, as he lived at his father-in-law’s house. The debtor, for his part, submitted in addition that he was paying 70% of his salary for the maintenance of two other children.
13. On 12 November 1998 the Court of First Instance informed the second applicant that the debtor was insolvent, as he had no movable assets which could be sold to allow the judgment in question to be enforced.
14. On an unspecified date in 1998 the debtor paid YUD 600 towards his debt.
15. On 14 January 1999 the second applicant sought enforcement of the remainder of the decision by attachment of the debtor’s salary, which request was repeated on 7 August 2000, 19 February 2001, and 7 May, 1 July and 3 September 2004.
16. It would appear that on 1 July 2004 the second applicant complained to the Montenegrin Ministry of Justice about the work of the relevant Court of First Instance. On 12 July 2004 the judge who was in charge of the enforcement as of May 2004, in reply to this complaint, informed the president of the Court of First Instance that he “considered the complaint justified (osnovana).”
17. On 12 July 2004 the said judge informed the second applicant that the enforcement proceedings in her case had been resumed.
18. On 24 September 2004 an expert witness submitted to the Herceg Novi court a recalculation of the amount owed in euros, the amount due being 6,352.42 euros (EUR).
19. On 8 November 2004 the Court of First Instance in Herceg Novi requested the second applicant’s lawyer to provide the necessary bank details so that a corresponding enforcement order could be issued.
20. Between 13 December 2004 and 28 December 2004 the said court attempted to contact the second applicant and also sought assistance from the relevant Internal Affairs Secretariat as well as a Social Care Centre in Serbia.
21. On 27 January 2005 the first applicant provided the court with the requested bank details.
22. On 4 March 2005 the Herceg-Novi court issued another enforcement order, providing that one third of the debtor’s monthly income was to be transferred to the first applicant as the second applicant’s legal guardian.
23. On 17 March 2005 the debtor lodged an objection, stating, inter alia, that he was supporting a family of four, two of whom were minor children, as well as paying 50% of his salary for the maintenance of another child. He proposed to pay one-sixth of his income for the enforcement in question.
24. On 16 May 2007 the Court of First Instance rejected the debtor’s objection and upheld its enforcement order of 4 March 2005, without considering the debtor’s arguments in respect of his financial commitments.
25. On 20 October 2010 the same court forwarded the enforcement order of 4 March 2004 to the Power Supply Company (Elektroprivreda – Filijala Herceg Novi), the debtor’s employer, a State-owned company.
26. On an unspecified date thereafter the second applicant would appear to have informed the Court of First Instance that the said enforcement order had not been complied with, apparently because the debtor was paying off several loans.
27. On 19 November 2010 the Court of First Instance approached the debtor’s employer, reminding them that the child maintenance, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Family Act and the Enforcement Act, had priority over all the other pecuniary obligations of the debtor and that the employer was therefore obliged to comply with the enforcement order.
28. On 14 December 2010 the Court of First Instance ordered the debtor’s employer to transfer to the second applicant the amount that was otherwise retained by the employer on a monthly basis on account of a loan owed by the debtor to the employer (see paragraph 37 below).
29. This decision would appear not to have been enforced to date.
30. On an unspecified date the second applicant instituted another set of civil proceedings against M.J. seeking child maintenance. She was represented by the first applicant as her legal guardian.
31. On 30 June 2004, after two remittals, the Municipal Court in Kruševac gave a judgment ordering M.J. to pay 8% of his monthly income from 18 February 1998, plus YUD 48,600 for the costs of proceedings. This judgment became enforceable on 23 May 2005.
32. The applicants maintain that they sought enforcement of this judgment, but have submitted no evidence in that regard, even though they have been requested by the Court to do so on at least three occasions.
33. This judgment would appear not to have been enforced to date.
34. On an unspecified date the second applicant instituted another set of civil proceedings against the debtor, seeking an increase of the child maintenance established by the decision of 30 June 2004 (see paragraph 31 above). On 17 September 2009 the Municipal Court in Kruševac gave a decision stating that the second applicant’s claim had been withdrawn. On 2 October 2009 the second applicant appealed against this decision. These proceedings appear to be still pending.
35. On 3 February 1997 the debtor and his spouse at the time lodged with the Court of First Instance in Herceg Novi a plea for dissolution of their marriage, proposing to the court, inter alia, that the debtor’s spouse be given custody of their two minor children, born in 1990 and 1995 respectively, and that the debtor pay in respect of child maintenance 50% of his monthly income. There is no decision of a domestic court in this regard in the case file.
36. On 17 July 2009, in criminal proceedings, the debtor was found guilty of not paying child maintenance to the second applicant between 23 May 2005 and 30 January 2006, and was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of one year. It would appear that the decision is still pending on appeal.
37. The debtor’s payslip of October 2010 specified that he earned EUR 559.89 per month, 62% of which he was paying towards two loans. The payslip indicates that the debtor had taken one of those loans from his employer in a total amount of EUR 5,500 ten months earlier, to be repaid over ten years, and that the other loan had been taken from a bank that very month in a total amount of EUR 54,295.75, to be repaid over fifteen years. It also transpires that over an unspecified ten-year period before October 2010 the debtor had been paying off a third loan, the monthly payment of which amounted to approximately 20% of his monthly income.
38. Article 149 of the Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court shall rule on a constitutional appeal lodged in respect of an alleged violation of a human right or freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, after all other effective legal remedies have been exhausted.
39. This Constitution entered into force on 22 October 2007.
40. Section 48 provides that a constitutional appeal may be lodged against an individual decision of a state body, an administrative body, a local self-government body or a legal person exercising public authority, for violations of human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, after all other effective domestic remedies have been exhausted.
41. Sections 49-59 provide additional details as regards the processing of constitutional appeals. In particular, section 56 provides that when the Constitutional Court finds a violation of a human right or freedom, it shall quash the impugned decision, entirely or partially, and order that the case be re-examined by the same body which rendered the quashed decision.
42. This Act entered into force in November 2008.
43. This Act provides, under certain circumstances, the possibility to have lengthy proceedings expedited by means of a request for review (kontrolni zahtjev), as well as an opportunity for claimants to be awarded compensation by means of an action for fair redress (tužba za pravično zadovoljenje).
44. Section 44, in particular, provides that this Act shall be applied retroactively to all proceedings from 3 March 2004, but that the duration of proceedings before that date shall also be taken into account.
45. This Act entered into force on 21 December 2007, but contained no reference to applications involving procedural delay already lodged with the Court.
46. Between 1 January 2008 and 30 September 2009 the courts in Montenegro considered 102 requests for review pursuant to the Right to a Trial within a Reasonable Time Act. A further two requests were withdrawn, and eight were still being examined. Of the 102 requests that had been considered, in eighty-four cases the applicants were notified that certain procedural measures would be taken within a specified period. There is no information in the documents provided as to whether these time-limits were complied with or not. Eighteen requests were rejected as ill-founded.
47. Between 1 January 2010 and 30 April 2011 an additional ninety-six requests for review were considered. A further two requests were still being examined and one request had been withdrawn. Of the ninety-six requests that had been considered two were rejected on procedural grounds (odbačeni), and twenty-six were rejected as ill-founded (odbijeni). Ten requests were considered justified (usvojeni): in five cases the proceedings were indeed expedited, in three they were not, and in two cases it is unclear if the proceedings advanced. In thirty-eight requests the applicants were notified that certain procedural measures would be taken within a specified period: in twenty-six cases the indicated measure would appear to have been taken, in eight cases “compliance with notifications was controlled” without any further details having been provided, in two cases the proceedings were not expedited, in one case it is unclear what the outcome of the notification was and in one case the impugned proceedings ended at about the same time as the applicant lodged the request. As regards the remaining twenty requests for review, decisions and/or notifications were issued without details as to their specific content.
48. Between 1 January 2008 and 30 September 2009 twenty-two actions for fair redress were submitted, of which sixteen were dealt with and six were still being examined. In one case the courts awarded the plaintiff compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the length of civil proceedings. Between 1 January 2010 and 30 April 2011 an additional fifteen actions for fair redress were examined, in three of which the courts awarded damages.
49. Section 2 provides that enforcement proceedings are to be instituted at the request of the creditor, except when this Act specifically provides that the proceedings are to be instituted ex officio.
50. Section 4 § 1 provides that the enforcing court is obliged to proceed as a matter of urgency.
51. Sections 63-84 contain, inter alia, provisions relating to enforcement in respect of the debtor’s movable assets.
52. Section 87 provides that enforcement in respect of the debtor’s salary can reach a maximum of half his/her salary.
53. Sections 112-120 contain, inter alia, provisions relating to enforcement in respect of the debtor’s income. Section 115 § 1, in particular, provides that when there are several people entitled to legal maintenance (zakonsko izdržavanje) from the same debtor and the total amount sought by them exceeds the proportion of the debtor’s income in respect of which their claims can be enforced, the enforcement shall be carried out in favour of each creditor in proportion to their claim (izvršenje se određuje i sprovodi u korist svakog od takvih poverilaca srazmerno visini njihovih potraživanja).
54. This Act entered into force on 8 July 2000. In accordance with section 262 of the Act, however, all enforcement proceedings instituted prior to 8 July 2000 are to be concluded pursuant to this Act.
55. The Enforcement Procedure Act 2004 entered into force on 13 July 2004, thereby repealing the Enforcement Procedure Act 2000. In accordance with section 286 of this Act, however, all enforcement proceedings instituted prior to 13 July 2004 are to be concluded pursuant to the Enforcement Procedure Act 2000.
56. Section 273 provided, inter alia, that following a debtor’s request to that effect, a court could increase, reduce, terminate (ukine) or alter the maintenance established by a previous court decision if the circumstances on which the said decision was based have changed.
57. Section 277 further provided that in a case where a parent who has been ordered by a court decision to pay child maintenance does not comply with that obligation on a regular basis, the Social Care Centre (organ starateljstva) shall, either at the request of the other parent or of its own motion, take measures to ensure that the child is provided with temporary maintenance in accordance with the regulations on social and child protection, until the said parent starts fulfilling his obligation.
58. The Family Act 2007 entered into force on 1 September 2007, thereby repealing the Family Act 1989. By virtue of section 380 however, if the first-instance decision was given before this Act entered into force, the procedure shall be continued under the Family Act 1989.
59. Pursuant to section 44, the court competent to deal with disputes arising from enforcement proceedings is the court in the region of jurisdiction of the court in charge of the enforcement proceedings.
60. This Act entered into force on 10 July 2004.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-85417
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: DEU
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: SCHUMACHER v. GERMANY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Renate Jaeger;Volodymyr Butkevych
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Friedrich Schumacher, is a German national who was born in 1953 and lives in Vestenbergsgreuth in Germany.
The applicant is the father of three children born in wedlock: a son F., born on 15 September 1986, and two daughters born in 1980 and 1983.
In June 1994 the applicant’s wife left the joint household together with the three children and denied the applicant contact with them.
On 20 June 1994 the applicant requested the Cologne District Court (Amtsgericht) to grant him rights of contact with his three children.
On 11 March 1997 the Cologne District Court, having heard expert opinion, suspended the applicant’s rights of contact.
On 22 May 1997 the Cologne Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) limited the suspension of rights of contact until 30 June 1998.
On 4 April 2000, during a court hearing, the parents agreed on two contact visits, to take place on 25 April and 23 May 2000 within the premises of the Cologne Youth Office. Following these visits, the mother refused to consent to further contact visits.
On 19 September 2000, in the proceedings relating to the parents’ divorce, the parents agreed that the applicant should enjoy supervised contact visits with his son F. on a monthly basis.
Following one contact between the applicant and F., which took place on 10 November 2000, the child’s mother refused to grant the applicant further rights of contact.
The applicant’s marriage was dissolved on 21 March 2001 without a decision on the applicant’s rights of contact having been taken.
On 14 February 2001 the applicant, who was represented by counsel, having regard to the fact that the mother did not comply with the access agreement concluded on 19 September 2000, requested the Cologne District Court to grant him rights of contact with his son F. by interim order.
On 15 May 2001 the District Court held a hearing.
On 31 May 2001 the District Court refused the applicant’s request for an interim contact order on the ground that it deemed it necessary to examine further whether a regulation of rights of contact was in F.’s best interests. It noted that F., when heard by the court, had objected to contact with his father and that the tensions and conflicts between the parents were known to the court through a multitude of judicial proceedings pending between them.
The District Court further ordered both parents to contact a municipal family counselling centre and to make use of the counselling offered to them. It further appointed a curator ad litem to represent the child’s interests.
On 25 October 2001 the District Court held a hearing in the main proceedings.
On 15 November 2001 the District Court refused the applicant’s request in the main proceedings, on the ground that fixed monthly contact visits would jeopardise the child’s welfare. It noted that F., who was fifteen years of age, had repeatedly declared that he refused contact with his father. According to the Youth Office’s opinion, F. should not be forced into contact with the applicant. According to the curator’s submissions, F. did not refuse contact with his father capriciously. Apparently, the hurt he had sustained in recent years had been so serious that he now did not wish to agree to personal contact with his father. There was no indication that F. had been influenced by his mother in this respect. The judicial conflicts concerning custody and rights of contact and the confrontations had led to the adolescent’s seeking psychotherapeutic treatment. Having regard to these circumstances, the District Court considered that it was in the child’s best interests to refuse the applicant’s request for rights of contact. The applicant remained, however, free to stay in touch with his son by mail.
On 11 December 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Cologne Court of Appeal.
On 30 January 2002 the applicant’s counsel submitted reasons for his appeal. He alleged, in particular, that F. had been influenced by his mother against him and that a prohibition on contact visits would jeopardise the child’s welfare. The mother contested these submissions.
On 6 December 2002 the Court of Appeal held a hearing in the presence of the applicant, F.’s mother, F., his curator ad litem and a Youth Office representative. The applicant alleged that F. suffered from parental alienation syndrome (PAS) and requested the court to hear expert opinion in this respect.
On 13 December 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered the preparation of an expert opinion by psychological expert O. as to whether the exercise of rights of contact was contrary to F.’s welfare.
On 9 January 2003 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to rectify the record of its hearing and to include the applicant’s request to hear an expert opinion on PAS. The applicant further objected to the commission of expert O., on the ground that the latter was not licensed as a psychologist for children and adolescents, but only for adults. Furthermore, the question put to the expert did not sufficiently take into account the problems relating to PAS.
On 25 February 2003 the Court of Appeal refused the applicant’s request for rectification of its record. It further appointed psychological expert Z. to replace O., who had been prevented by illness from accepting the commission.
On 19 March 2003 the applicant named three witnesses to demonstrate that F. had been manipulated by his mother and submitted a written witness statement. He further requested the Court of Appeal to allow him contact with his son by interim order.
On 21 March 2003 the Court of Appeal asked the applicant whether the request for an interim order could be suspended, having regard to the Youth Office’s efforts. In reply, the applicant declared on 28 March 2003 that the matter did not allow for any further delay, taking into account the fact that F. would soon reach the age of majority.
On 10 April 2003 the applicant alleged that the Youth Office had delayed the proceedings and complained about the length of the proceedings on access rights. He further expressed doubts as to the competency of the court-appointed expert. Additionally, he named a further witness.
On 5 May 2003 the applicant rejected expert Z., alleging that she lacked the necessary qualifications.
On 6 May 2003 the Court of Appeal refused the applicant’s request for an interim contact order. Having regard to F.’s own statements when heard by the court and to the Youth Office’s submissions, that court considered that there were serious indications that court-ordered visits would lead to a deterioration of the relationship between father and son.
On 20 June 2003 the Court of Appeal released expert Z. from her duties at her own request and decided to commission an expert, to be named by the psychological institute of Cologne University.
On 28 July 2003 the applicant accepted the nomination of Professor P. as an expert.
On 31 July 2003 the Court of Appeal commissioned the expert Professor P., who submitted his expert opinion on 16 December 2003. The expert considered that there was no indication that the applicant presented a danger to the child’s welfare. However, the severe conflicts between their parents prevented all three children from maintaining an emotional relationship with them. In this respect, both parents were seriously harming their children.
The expert further considered that F. could be rather easily influenced by third persons. He did not, however, meet all the criteria defining parental alienation syndrome. Having regard to F.’s age and his strong resistance to contact visits, the expert urgently advised the court not to order forced contact visits. Such an order would not only jeopardise F.’s welfare, but would also complicate the instigation of voluntary contact after F. had reached adult age.
In January 2004 the Court of Appeal scheduled a hearing for 20 February 2004, which was postponed at defence counsel’s request to 19 March 2004.
On 19 February 2004 the applicant submitted two comments in reply to the expert opinion prepared by two psychological experts. He further repeated his request to summon the nominated witnesses to the hearing.
On 19 March 2004 the Court of Appeal held a hearing in the presence of both parents, F., the curator ad litem, the expert Professor P. and another psychological expert summoned by the applicant. Following deliberations, F. declared that he was ready to meet the applicant on a monthly basis as from May 2004. The applicant declared that he would not pursue the proceedings further as long as the meetings took place.
On 1 May 2004 a meeting took place between the applicant and F.
On 13 May 2004 F. informed the Court of Appeal that he did not wish to continue the meetings because his father had failed to show personal interest and, in particular, because his father had taken enforcement measures against him.
On 24 May 2004 the applicant, through his counsel, contested these submissions and urgently requested the Court of Appeal to render a decision without a further hearing.
On 25 May 2004 the Court of Appeal served the applicant’s submissions on the defendant, the curator and the Youth Office for comments within two weeks. The Court of Appeal further considered that the applicant had not pursued his original request to hear the expert Professor P. in person.
On 27 May 2004 the applicant stated that rights of contact should be granted in accordance with the agreement made during the hearing on 19 March 2004. Alternatively, he requested to be granted an interim contact order for June 2004. As a further alternative, he requested the Court of Appeal to hold a hearing without further delay and to hear the expert Professor P.
On 8 June 2004 the applicant’s counsel submitted a personal letter dated 31 May 2004 from the applicant to his son and requested the court to render a decision without further delay.
On 21 June 2004 the applicant’s counsel submitted further comments.
On 22 June 2004 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. That court accepted that the applicant wished to exercise rights of contact in accordance with his son’s best interests. It considered, however, that the exercise of rights of contact would jeopardise F.’s welfare. The Court of Appeal, having heard F. personally, was firmly convinced that F. had formed his own strong opinion on the question of contact with his father which could be only marginally influenced by his mother’s wishes. Under these circumstances, the court did not consider it necessary to examine whether F. had been negatively influenced by his mother or to hear further expert opinion.
The Court of Appeal further noted that F., during the hearing held on 19 March 2004, and under the influence of the expert’s and the court’s submissions that the exercise of rights of contact would not be harmful to him, had agreed to see his father once a month if the applicant refrained from instituting judicial proceedings. Accordingly, one meeting took place, on 1 May 2004. Having learned that the applicant had taken enforcement measures against him by attempting to execute costs orders obtained against him in separate proceedings, F. refused to agree to further contact. Even taking into account the explanations given by the applicant for taking these enforcement measures, according to which the enforcement measures were aimed at the mother and were addressed to the son for purely formal reasons, the Court of Appeal considered that F.’s reaction was understandable, at least on an emotional level. Having regard to the fact that F. had almost reached the age of majority, his firmly established will had to be respected. The Court of Appeal further considered that forced contact visits were not likely to contribute to establishing a stable relationship with his father.
This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 29 June 2004.
On 9 July 2004 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal (Gegenvorstellung) against the Court of Appeal’s decision. He complained, in particular, that the Court of Appeal had given its decision without having heard the witnesses named by the applicant and without a further oral hearing. He further complained about the length of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal.
On 11 July 2004 the applicant extended the scope of his extraordinary appeal and requested the Court of Appeal to reopen the proceedings because of an infringement of his right to a fair hearing.
On 21 July 2004 the curator ad litem requested the court to grant an extension of the time-limit for comments on the applicant’s submissions until 27 August 2004.
On 23 July 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
On 27 July 2004 the Court of Appeal informed the curator that the time-limit could only be extended until 19 August 2004, having regard to the urgency of the matter.
On 7 September 2004 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s extraordinary appeal. The Court of Appeal pointed out that it had referred to the written expert opinion submitted by Professor P. only in support of the assumption that contact with the applicant would not in principle jeopardise the child’s welfare. This assumption was in the applicant’s favour and induced the court to propose contact visits. Under these circumstances, it had not been necessary personally to hear the expert. Based on its own impression during the hearing held on 13 March 2004, the Court of Appeal confirmed that it had no doubt that F.’s refusal further to see the applicant was based on an autonomous decision. Under these circumstances, it was out of the question to impose contact visits on the adolescent, who was at the time seventeen and a half years of age.
This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 8 September 2004.
On 13 October 2004 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, refused to accept the applicant’s constitutional complaint for adjudication pursuant to the relevant provisions of its Rules of Procedure without giving any further reasons. This decision (file no. 1 BvR 2094/04) was served on the applicant on 19 October 2004.
According to Article 1684 subsection 1 of the Civil Code, a child is entitled to have contact with its parents; each parent is obliged to have contact with, and is entitled to such contact with, the child.
Pursuant to subsection 2, each parent is obliged to refrain from any actions which could disturb the relationship of the other parent with the child.
The family courts can restrict or suspend a parent’s rights of contact if such a measure is necessary for the child’s welfare. A decision restricting or suspending that right for a lengthy period or permanently may only be taken if otherwise the child’s welfare would be jeopardised (Article 1684 § 4).


ITEMID: 001-110699
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: AZE
BRANCH: COMMITTEE
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: CASE OF GASIMOVA AND OTHERS v. AZERBAIJAN
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)
JUDGES: Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Peer Lorenzen
TEXT: 5. All of the applicants have either tenancy rights to their flats on the basis of occupancy vouchers (yaşayış sahəsi orderi) issued by the relevant executive authorities or ownership rights to them on the basis of an ownership certificate issued by the competent domestic authority (see Appendix - Table I).
6. In all five cases, the applicants’ flats were unlawfully occupied by internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) from different regions of Azerbaijan under occupation by Armenian military forces following the ArmenianAzerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
7. The applicants lodged separate civil actions before the domestic courts seeking the eviction of the IDPs from their flats.
8. On the dates indicated in the Appendix (Table I), the applicants’ claims were granted by different domestic courts, which ordered the eviction of the IDPs from their flats.
9. The respective judgments became final and enforceable. However, the IDP families refused to comply with those judgments and despite the applicants’ complaints to various authorities, the judgments were not enforced.
10. After the communication of application no. 7867/09 to the respondent Government, on 16 October 2010 the judgment in favour of Ms Lala Gasimova was enforced.
11. The relevant domestic law is summarised in the Court’s judgment in the case of Gulmammadova v. Azerbaijan (no. 38798/07, §§ 18-24, 22 April 2010).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
P1
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1
P1-1
VIOLATED_BULLETPOINTS: P1-1-1


ITEMID: 001-71250
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: WIKTOROWICZ v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Mrs Genowefa Wiktorowicz, is a Polish national who was born in 1949 and lives in Łask-Kolumna.
On 24 November 1994 the applicant lodged a civil action with the Łask District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) asking for discontinuation of the construction works carried out on an adjacent plot of land.
On 12 August 1998 the Łask District Court gave judgment.
On 30 September 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment with the Sieradz Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). On 11 August 1999 the Sieradz Regional Court gave judgment and upheld the first-instance judgment.
On 25 October 2000 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy).
On 6 July 2001 the Supreme Court refused to examine the cassation appeal, considering that it had been manifestly ill-founded. That decision was served on the applicant on 23 July 2001.
On 18 November 1999, the date on which the application was lodged with the Court, the proceedings were pending before the Supreme Court.
On 17 September 2004 the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”) entered into force. It lays down various legal means designed to counteract and/or redress the undue length of judicial proceedings.
Section 2 of the 2004 Act reads, in so far as relevant:
Section 5 reads, in so far as relevant:
“1. A complaint about the unreasonable length of proceedings shall be lodged while the proceedings are pending. ...”
Section 12 provides for measures that may be applied by the court dealing with the complaint. It reads, in so far as relevant:
“1. The court shall dismiss a complaint which is unjustified.
2. If the court considers that the complaint is justified, it shall find that there was an unreasonable delay in the impugned proceedings.
3. At the request of the complainant, the court may instruct the court examining the merits of the case to take certain measures within a fixed time-limit. Such instructions shall not concern the factual and legal assessment of the case.
4. If the complaint is justified the court may, at the request of the complainant, grant ... just satisfaction in an amount not exceeding PLN 10,000 to be paid by the State Treasury. If such just satisfaction is granted it shall be paid out of the budget of the court which conducted the delayed proceedings.”
Section 18 lays down transitional rules in relation to the applications already pending before the Court. It reads, in so far as relevant:
“1. Within six months after the date of entry into force of this law persons who, before that date, had lodged a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights ... complaining of a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time guaranteed by Article 6 (1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ..., may lodge a complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings on the basis of the provisions of this law if their complaint to the Court had been lodged in the course of the impugned proceedings and if the Court has not adopted a decision concerning the admissibility of their case.
...”
On 18 January 2005 Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) adopted a resolution (no. III SPP 113/04) in which it ruled that while the 2004 Act produced legal effects as from the date of its date of entry into force (17 September 2004), its provisions applied retroactively to all proceedings in which delays had occurred before that date and had not yet been remedied.


ITEMID: 001-76595
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: DÖKER AND ÖZTEKİN v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicants, Ali Döker and Yusuf Öztekin, are Turkish nationals who were born in 1933 and 1929 respectively and live in Diyarbakır. They are represented before the Court by Mr M. Vefa and Mr B. Deyar, lawyers practising in Diyarbakır.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
Until May 1994, the applicants lived in Erkenciler hamlet of Dolapdere village in Silvan, Diyarbakır, where they own property. Following an armed clash with the PKK militants in a nearby area, the security forces came to Erkenciler and required the inhabitants to establish a village guards system. Upon their refusal, the security forces evacuated the hamlet.
After the evacuation, the applicants moved to the city centre of Diyarbakır, where they currently live.
On an unspecified date, the security forces set fire to the houses and the cultivated fields in the hamlet.
Following the incidents, the applicants filed applications with the administrative and military authorities, asking for an authorization to return to their hamlet, or in the alternative, to continue to cultivate their fields. The applicants maintained that they were unable to provide copies of all of the complaints and requests they had filed, except for one letter dated 17 January 1996, which had been sent to the Governorship of Diyarbakır. In the letter, which was later transmitted to the gendarmerie command, Mr Döker stated that the hamlet had been burnt down by the security forces and requested to be remedied.
The authorities have not responded to these requests or taken any action.
The investigation carried out by the authorities indicated that the applicants had left their villages of their own will. The security forces had not destroyed the applicants’ village or forced them to leave their homes.
The official records indicated that there was no obstacle preventing villagers from returning to their homes and possessions in their villages. Persons who had left their villages as a result of terrorism had already started returning and regaining their activities in their villages.
On 14 July 2004 the Law on Compensation for Losses resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism was passed by the Grand National Assembly and entered into force on 27 July 2004 (“Compensation Law”). That Law provided for a sufficient remedy capable of redressing the Convention grievances of persons who were denied access to their possessions in their villages.
In that connection Damage Assessment and Compensation Commissions were set up in seventy-six provinces. Persons who had suffered damage as a result of terrorism or of measures taken by the authorities to combat terrorism could lodge an application with the relevant compensation commission claiming compensation.
The number of persons applying to these commissions had already attained approximately 170,000. A further 800 persons, whose applications were pending before the Court, had also applied to the compensation commissions. Many villagers had already been awarded compensation for the damage they had sustained.
A description of the relevant domestic law can be found in the Court’s decision of İçyer v. Turkey (no. 18888/02, §§ 44-54, 12 January 2006) and in its judgment of Doğan and Others v. Turkey (nos. 88038811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-8819/02, §§ 31-35, ECHR 2004-VI)