ITEMID: 001-102109
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: CASE OF BULANOV v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1
JUDGES: Ganna Yudkivska;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
TEXT: 4. The first applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Sebastopol. The second applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Lysychansk.
5. On 21 December 2004 the first applicant instituted proceedings in the Zaliznodorozhnyi District Court of Sympheropil against the enlistment office, seeking recalculation of his pension.
6. On 4 July 2005 the court rejected the first applicant's claim as unsubstantiated. On 13 December 2005 the Crimea Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. In the operative part of its decision the Court of Appeal stated that the first applicant could challenge the decision before the Supreme Court within two months.
7. On 20 January 2006 the first applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.
8. On 6 February 2006 a judge of the Supreme Court ruled that the first applicant's cassation appeal should be referred to the Higher Administrative Court, stating that the latter court was the court of cassation in administrative cases pursuant to Article 210 of the Code of Administrative Justice of 2005.
9. In a ruling of 7 August 2006 a judge of the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant's cassation appeal as having been lodged out of time. The judge, relying on Article 212 paragraph 2 of the Code of Administrative Justice, held that the first applicant's cassation appeal ought to have been lodged within one month of the date of the decision of the Court of Appeal.
10. In a letter of 29 August 2006 the First Vice-President of the Higher Administrative Court informed the first applicant that he could resubmit his cassation appeal with a request for an extension of the expired time-limit.
11. On 23 September 2006 the first applicant resubmitted his cassation appeal to the Higher Administrative Court.
12. In June 2007 the first applicant received a letter from the Higher Administrative Court, enclosing a copy of a ruling dated 15 March 2007. By that ruling, the Higher Administrative Court declined jurisdiction to consider the first applicant's cassation appeal on the grounds that the case had been determined by the Court of Appeal under the rules of civil procedure subsequent to the entry into force of the Code of Administrative Justice on 1 September 2005, and thus that the Supreme Court was the court of cassation for the first applicant's case.
13. The rulings of 6 February and 7 August 2006 and 15 March 2007 each stated that they were final and not subject to appeal.
14. On 8 November 2005 the second applicant instituted proceedings in the Lysychansk Town Court against his former employer, the Lysychansk Town Police Department, seeking recovery of salary arrears.
15. On 16 March 2006 the court rejected the second applicant's claim, doing so partly on the basis that it found the claim to be unsubstantiated and partly as having been lodged out of time. On 22 May 2006 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. In the operative part of its decision the Court of Appeal stated that its decision could be appealed against to the Supreme Court by way of a cassation appeal within two months.
16. On 18 July 2006 the second applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.
17. On 11 September 2006 a judge of the Supreme Court dismissed the second applicant's cassation appeal, holding that it was to be considered by the Higher Administrative Court.
18. On 18 December 2006 the second applicant submitted his cassation appeal to the Higher Administrative Court.
19. On 16 November 2007 a judge of the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal fell to be dealt with by the Supreme Court, as the case had been considered by the lower courts under the rules of civil procedure after the entry into force of the Code of Administrative Justice on 1 September 2005. The judge ruled that the cassation appeal was to be returned to the second applicant, together with an explanation of the right to lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. The ruling was final and not subject to appeal.
20. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows:
“In Ukraine the system of courts of general jurisdiction is formed in accordance with the principles of territoriality and specialisation.
The Supreme Court of Ukraine is the highest judicial body in the [hierarchy] of courts of general jurisdiction.
The respective higher courts are the higher judicial bodies of specialised courts.
Courts of appeal and local courts shall operate in accordance with the law.
The creation of extraordinary and special courts shall not be permitted.”
21. The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1963, as worded at the material time, read as follows:
“... Legislation on civil court procedure shall establish procedures for the consideration of cases concerning disputes arising from legal relations in the civil, family, labour and collective farming spheres, cases concerning administrative legal relations...”
“The court of cassation instance is the Supreme Court of Ukraine.”
“The parties and other persons taking part in the case ... have the right to challenge in cassation judgments and rulings adopted by a first-instance court which have been considered by a court of appeal, as well as rulings and judgments of the court of appeal.
The grounds for [an appeal] in cassation are the wrongful application by the court of norms of substantive law or a violation of norms of procedural law.”
“The question of referral ... shall be decided by a court composed of three judges ...
In the absence of grounds for referral ... the court shall adopt a ruling dismissing the appeal.
This ruling ... shall not be subject to appeal.
If the court has dismissed the cassation appeal, the case shall be returned to the court of first instance ...”
22. The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of 2004, as worded at the material time, read as follows:
“1. The courts shall consider, within the framework of civil court procedure, cases ... concerning legal relations in the civil, housing, land, family and labour spheres, as well as other legal relations, provided they do not fall to be considered under the rules of a different type of court procedure...”
“1. The court of cassation instance in civil cases is the court which is envisaged by the Judiciary Act as the court of cassation in such cases.”
“1. The parties and other persons taking part in the case ... have the right to challenge in cassation:
(1) judgments of the court of first instance after they have been reviewed on appeal, judgments and rulings of the appeal court adopted [in the course of] the consideration [of the case] on appeal...
2. The grounds for [an appeal] in cassation are the wrongful application by the court of norms of substantive law or a violation of norms of procedural law.”
“...
2. The reporting judge shall refuse to open cassation proceedings if:
(1) the case does not fall to be examined in cassation within the framework of civil procedure ...
5. A copy of the ruling ... refusing to open cassation proceedings, together with the materials annexed to the appeal, shall be forwarded to the appellant, and the cassation appeal shall remain with the court of cassation.”
“...
9. Claims and complaints in cases concerning administrative [matters] ... lodged before the entry into force of this Code ... shall be considered pursuant to [the rules of] the Code of Administrative Justice ...”
23. The relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Justice of 2005, as worded at the material time, read as follows:
“1. The administrative courts shall enjoy jurisdiction over:
(1) disputes between physical persons or legal entities and subjects vested with public powers concerning the latter's decisions ... actions or lack of action;
(2) disputes relating to the recruitment, careers and termination of public service of citizens...”
“...
3. The Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine shall review in cassation the judicial decisions of local administrative courts and administrative courts of appeal...”
“1. The court of cassation instance in administrative cases is the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine.”
“1. The parties and other persons taking part in the case ... have the right to challenge in cassation judicial decisions of the court of first instance after they have been reviewed on appeal, as well as judicial decisions of the court of appeal in full or in part...
3. A violation by a court of norms of substantive or procedural law shall constitute a ground for [an appeal] in cassation.”
“...
3. The reporting judge shall refuse to open cassation proceedings in the case if:
(1) the case does not fall to be examined in cassation within the framework of administrative procedure...
5. A copy of the ruling ... refusing to open cassation proceedings, together with the materials annexed to the appeal, shall be forwarded to the appellant, while the cassation appeal shall remain with the court of cassation.”
“1. Parties ... may challenge, in the light of exceptional circumstances, court decisions in administrative cases after their review in cassation and decisions of the court of cassation before the Supreme Court of Ukraine.
2. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Ukraine in administrative cases may also be challenged in the light of exceptional circumstances [on the basis] set out in subparagraph 2 of Article 237 of this Code.
...”
“1. Court decisions in administrative cases may be reviewed in the light of exceptional circumstances by the Supreme Court of Ukraine, if they are challenged on the [following] grounds:
(1) dissimilar application of the same provision of law by courts of cassation instance;
(2) a finding by an international judicial body that the courts' decisions [in a case] are infringing Ukraine's international obligations.”
“1. An appeal shall be lodged within a month of the discovery of the circumstances capable of serving as grounds for [appeal] in the light of exceptional circumstances.
2. An appeal lodged after the expiry of [that] term ... shall be left without consideration, if, upon a request by the appellant, the Supreme Court of Ukraine finds no grounds to renew [the term]...”
“1. A panel of at least five judges of the judicial chamber of the Supreme Court dealing with administrative cases ... shall decide on the admissibility of an appeal made in the light of exceptional circumstances within fifteen days of its receipt and without summoning the persons taking part in the case. At the same time, [the panel] may decide on [the question of] the extension of the term for lodging an appeal made in the light of exceptional circumstances.
2. An appeal shall be considered admissible ... if at least three judges have reached [such a conclusion].
...”
“1. ...[A] panel of judges ... shall adopt, by a majority vote, one of the following decisions...
(1) allowing the appeal in full or in part;
(2) dismissing the appeal.
...
3. The decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine [concerning an appeal made in the light of exceptional circumstances] is final and may not be appealed against, save for in the circumstances envisaged by Article 237 paragraph 2 of this Code.”
“1. The Supreme Court of Ukraine shall allow an appeal if it discovers a dissimilar application of the same provision of law by courts of cassation instance.
2. If the Supreme Court of Ukraine establishes that the contested court decision is unlawful, it shall quash it in full or in part and remit the case for fresh consideration to the court of first, appeal or cassation instance, as appropriate, depending on which court was the first to infringe a provision of substantive or procedural law resulting in the incorrect determination of the case. The Supreme Court of Ukraine may also quash decisions of courts of appeal or cassation and leave wrongfully quashed decisions of courts of first or appeal instance in force.
...
4. The decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine allowing an appeal shall be reasoned.”
“1. This Code shall enter into force as from 1 September 2005...
5. Before the district administrative courts and administrative courts of appeal start to operate, cases falling within their jurisdiction shall be decided by the respective local and appeal courts of general jurisdiction ... pursuant to the rules of the Code of Administrative Justice of Ukraine...
7. After the entry into force of this Code, claims and complaints in cases concerning administrative [matters] ... as well as appeals and appeals in cassation ... in such cases, which were lodged, but not determined, before the entry into force of the Code of Administrative Justice of Ukraine, shall be considered pursuant to [the rules of] this Code.
Such claims or complaints ... may not be left without further action or returned pursuant to this Code, if they were lodged in compliance with the relevant requirements and jurisdictional rules established by the Code of Civil Procedure of Ukraine of 1963 ...
10. Appeals in cassation against judgments of the courts of first instance in the situations envisaged in paragraph 7 of this Chapter which were lodged before the entry into force of this Code and which have not been considered by the Supreme Court of Ukraine shall be referred to the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine ...”
24. The relevant provisions of the Judiciary Act of 21 June 2001, as worded at the material time, read as follows:
“1. The Supreme Court of Ukraine is the highest judicial body within the [hierarchy] of courts of general jurisdiction ...
2. The Supreme Court of Ukraine:
(1) ... shall consider cases in cassation in the situations envisaged by law ...”
“...
(9) ... The chamber of the Supreme Court of Ukraine which hears civil cases shall consider civil cases in cassation until such time as another court [vested with functions] of a court of cassation in civil cases is determined by legislation.”
25. Relevant extracts from the Joint Opinion on the Law on the Judicial System and the Status of Judges of Ukraine by the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Co-operation within the Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 84th Plenary Session (Venice, 15-16 October 2010), read, in so far as relevant, as follows (emphasis added in the original text):
“4.1.4. The Supreme Court
...
28. ...[T]hree different orders of jurisdiction, topped by three courts of cassation that are independent of each other, may well lead to numerous and often complex conflicts of jurisdiction. The least that one would expect in such a situation, is that there would be an efficient system for the solution of such conflicts, e.g. through a special “conflicts” court. ... The Supreme Court should fit that purpose ...
31. ... [T]he idea of a supreme court generally interpreting the law in an authoritative way and thus paving the way for a uniform interpretation of the law by all courts, even before contradictions have arisen.
...
14. Conclusion
125. ... The Supreme Court's jurisdiction should ... reflect[s] its constitutional status as the highest judicial body in the system of courts of general jurisdiction ...
129. Recommendations for improvement of the Law include inter alia:
...
2. The Supreme Court should be allowed to exercise its jurisdiction to resolve conflicts between the high specialised courts also in matters of procedural law and the Court should be able to decide itself on the admissibility of cases involving a conflict in the interpretation of the law. It should also be made competent to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between the three sorts of jurisdiction (civil and criminal, commercial and administrative).
...”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-59081
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2000
DOCNAME: CASE OF GÜL v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion);Violation of Art. 2 in respect of death of applicant's son;Violation of Art. 2 in respect of failure to carry out effective investigation;Violation of Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Georg Ress
TEXT: 10. The facts of the case, particularly concerning events on 8 March 1993 when Mehmet Gül, the applicant’s son, was shot dead by police officers firing through the door of his apartment during a search operation in Bozova, were disputed by the parties. The Commission, pursuant to former Article 28 § 1 (a) of the Convention, conducted an investigation with the assistance of the parties.
The Commission heard witnesses in Ankara from 15 to 19 February 1999. These included the applicant; Filiz Gül, his daughter-in-law and widow of his deceased son; Mustafa Gül, his son; Mustafa Gül, the applicant’s nephew; two neighbours, Mustafa Hakkı Ocakoğlu and Ömer Kaya; Erhan Güder, the Bozova district gendarme commander, who set up the operation on 8 March 1993; Fahrettin İlgun, leader of the special operations team which opened fire; Murat Sönmezyurt, Enis Ünlü, Lüfti Demirtürkoğlu, Recep Doğan and Şener Karamurat, members of the team; Mehmet Meral, Bozova police superintendant, and police officers Mehmet Toprak, Şahin Yakut, Mehmet Telçi and Ömer Avcı, who attended the scene of the incident; Kamil Çetinkaya and Fikret Yılmaz, Bozova public prosecutors involved in the investigation; Ali Rıza Uytun, Şanlıurfa public prosecutor, who attended the autopsy; Ömer Koçaslan, Şanliurfa public prosecutor involved in the criminal trial of the three police officers who opened fire; Güven Sağban, gendarme lieutenant who gave an expert opinion to the court in the criminal trial; Güner Kalkendelen, a police operations expert who gave an opinion in the trial; and Teyfik Ziayeddin Akbulut, the provincial governor of Şanlıurfa, who authorised the operation.
11. The Commission’s findings of fact are set out in its report of 27 October 1999 and summarised below (Section A). The applicant accepts the Commission’s findings of fact. The Government’s submissions concerning the facts are summarised below (Section B).
12. Bozova was a small town, of about 15-16,000 people, located about 36 km from Şanlıurfa in the south-east region of Turkey. It was close to the Atatürk dam which was perceived as a possible target for the PKK (the Kurdish Workers’ Party). A company of commandos was stationed there. There was no evidence that PKK activity was particularly prevalent in Bozova itself or that there were any significant security problems.
13. The applicant, a business-man and an official in the local branch of the True Path Party, was well-known in Bozova and a respected citizen, unsuspected of any illicit activities. His son Mehmet Gül was less well-known, running a petrol station for him. There was no evidence prior to the events of 7-8 March 1993 that he was suspected of involvement with the PKK.
14. On 7 March 1993, Major Güder, the provincial gendarme commander, received a telephone call from an informant, naming three to four terrorists and indicating the addresses in Bozova where they could be found. Major Güder informed the provincial governor Ziyaeddin Akbulut at about 19.00 to 19.30 hours. The governor authorised the search operation proposed by Major Güder to locate the terrorists and the allocation of personnel from Şanlıurfa to assist, who were to be chosen by the Şanlıurfa police chief Mustafa Cebe.
15. A meeting was held on the night of 7 March 1993, at about 20.30 hours, at the district gendarme headquarters to plan the search operation, attended by the district governor, Major Güder the district gendarme commander, the deputy police chief of Bozova (Fatih Güner) and possibly a number of other local police officers. The information given at the meeting did not clearly emerge in the evidence before the Commission - the names and code names of the terrorists who had been seen were mentioned and a number of addresses. As a large number of addresses were searched during the night, the search was wider than the addresses originally mentioned by the informant. The basis on which those addresses were chosen was not established. Mehmet Gül had not been named as one of the terrorists by the informant and the reason why his apartment was to be searched was not provided in any of the written or oral evidence.
16. Between 22.00 and 23.00 hours, a special operations team of twelve officers, assigned by the Şanlıurfa police chief, arrived in Bozova. The acting team leader was Fahrettin İlgun. The team members were briefed by their leader. Their recollection of what they were told varied considerably. It appeared however that they had been given a strong indication that PKK terrorists would be likely to be present at the address. No instructions were given to them about the use of their weapons or the tactics to be used to gain entry to the apartment if there was resistance. No details were given concerning the other people who lived in the Gül apartment block. The Commission found insufficient evidence to support the allegation of the applicant that the special operations team was assigned and instructed for the purpose of carrying out a “point operation”, namely, an operation in which it was planned to use lethal force against an identified target in an extra-judicial execution-type raid. The Commission commented that the lack of contemporaneous documentary evidence concerning the planning of the operation hampered its assessment of this aspect of the case.
17. The house searches had begun before the arrival of the special operations team. A search report indicated that by 23.20 hours eight searches had been carried out. The house of Mustafa Gül, the applicant’s nephew, who lived 150 metres from the applicant’s apartment block was searched between 22.00 hours and 23.00 hours by local police officers, and proceeded in a polite, unaggressive manner. Nothing was found which supported the information given by the informant earlier in the day.
18. Shortly before 01.00 hours, the special operations team arrived at the applicant’s apartment block with the intention of carrying out a search of Mehmet Gül’s flat.
19. The Gül apartment block had streets on three sides and a garden on the fourth. On the ground floor, there were commercial premises; on the first floor, Mustafa Gül and his family lived in a flat on the left-hand side while Mehmet Gül and his family lived in a flat on the right-hand side. There were stairs leading up to the first floor from both the left and right corners of the side of the house facing the garden. The applicant occupied the flat on the second floor which was reached by a flight of stairs, which descended onto the balcony outside Mehmet Gül’s apartment. There was a partition separating the balcony into two areas in front of the two flats respectively. The stairs on each level were open, with railings. The area outside the flat was described as a balcony but there were differing descriptions of its dimensions and, particularly, whether it was a closed or open space. Videotapes provided by the parties did not elucidate the matter as there had been extensive alterations to the building since the events in issue. The videotapes did show that the stairwell to the second floor was located in the area in front of Mehmet Gül’s front door.
20. The entrance to Mehmet Gül’s flat was an iron door, which was secured by a lock, which was turned by a key, and also by a bolt. The door opened inwards. Outside, on the left of the door, was the kitchen window. Inside, on entering the flat, a hall ran straight ahead 5 metres to the sitting room. Leading from left of the hallway was the kitchen, then a WC and bathroom. On the right of the corridor, there was a bedroom where the children slept, then a spare bedroom and furthest from the entrance the bedroom where Mehmet Gül and his wife slept.
21. As the search operation at the flat commenced, two police officers, Meral and Avcı, were in position outside the house, in the street where they could see who entered and left the building. Six of the special operation team ensured the security of the house - Cahıt İnal, Sadık Ergüler, Hasan Söylemez, Bülent Torent, Murat Avan and Nurettin Yıldız. None of these men were in a position in which they had a view of the first floor of the house. Six of the special operations officers (Fahrettin İlgün, the team leader, Murat Sönmezyurt, Recep Doğan, Enis Ünlü, Lüfti Demirtürkoğlu, Şener Karamurat) went up the stairs to the first floor. The positions of these officers were obscure. Their oral and written evidence was in many instances inconsistent. It appeared that Fahrettin İlgun, in position near the door of Mustafa Gül’s flat was not able to see clearly what occurred in front of Mehmet Gül’s flat. Murat Sönmezyurt was either on the stairs leading to the second floor or the ground floor and also unable to see what occurred. Şener Karamurat claimed that he was watching up the staircase towards a window and did not see anything, as he was behind an iron partition to the right of the door. There was however general agreement that Enis Ünlü was on the left side of the door to Mehmet Gül’s flat, while Recep Doğan and Lüfti Demirtürkoğlu were nearby, providing him with cover.
22. Many of the details surrounding what occurred next were in dispute. The Commission found considerable difficulties attaching to the evidence of the three special team officers at the door, who alleged that, after Enis Ünlü had knocked on the door giving loud warnings to open up, the door had swung abruptly open, Mehmet Gül had fired a shot through the door with a pistol and closed the door again. They had then opened fire on the door with a view to forcing it open, accidentally inflicting multiple wounds on Mehmet Gül who was behind the door. The Commission found their testimony lacking in reliability and credibility and that it was in some respects incredible. Their account gave an impression of being embroidered to present as exculpatory a picture as possible. On the other hand, it found the evidence of Filiz Gül and Mustafa Gül, who were immediate witnesses of events, to be on the whole consistent, credible and convincing. Their accounts were in many respects supported by the testimony of the applicant and the other non-official witnesses.
23. On the basis of its assessment of the evidence, the Commission found that there was no prolonged knocking on the door or any verbal warning given to those inside the flat. Mehmet Gül came to the door in answer to a light knocking. It was highly probable that the officers outside started firing through the door, as Mehmet Gül was in the process of opening the lock. It was possible that the click of the key turning sounded like a gun being cocked and that this triggered their reaction. The intensity of the firing destroyed fingers on Mehmet Gül’s right hand and inflicted numerous wounds. As he turned away from the door, a bullet struck him in the back inflicting a fatal injury. He staggered back up the corridor, leaving blood stains against the wall. His wife, Filiz Gül, collided with him in the doorway of the bedroom and he collapsed on a sofa bed in that room. Meanwhile, in the flat next door, Mustafa Gül had heard the shooting and after opening his door briefly, he realised that it was the police and came out. He was forced onto the ground with a gun to his head. When the applicant came downstairs, he saw Mustafa on the ground held at gunpoint by a security officer. He also saw that the lights were out and switched the mains switch back on. The applicant and Mustafa participated in the efforts to open the door by physical force as the lock had jammed under the force of the bullets and Filiz Gül had been unable to open it from the inside. When the door was kicked open, the applicant and Mustafa entered the flat to find his injured son at the same time as, or shortly after, police officers entered.
24. The applicant and other members of the family carried the severely injured Mehmet Gül downstairs and carried him to the local health centre in the applicant’s car. There, he was transferred to an ambulance which took him to Şanlıurfa hospital. He died however prior to his arrival. His body was taken to the morgue.
25. Meanwhile, a search was carried out at Mehmet Gül’s flat. An incident report, and numerous statements of police officers, recorded that two guns were found in the flat - a Browning cocked with a bullet in the barrel and a French 10 rounder - and that a 9 mm empty cartridge was found in the corridor near the front door. These documents did not identify which of the signatories in fact witnessed the finding of these objects. The oral testimonies of the officers were confused and contradictory. No one was able to say who had found the French 10 rounder as alleged in a wardrobe. While Telçi claimed to have found the Browning, he was unable to recall whether it was bloodstained or not. There was no evidence that any precautions were taken in handling the guns with a view to preserving any forensic evidence. The finding of the guns was not properly recorded. They were not delivered to the public prosecutor until 12 March, three days later. The photograph taken of the guns shows them sitting on a desk, either at the police station or the prosecutor’s office. The Commission did not find it established that the guns were found in the flat as alleged by the officers.
26. The special operations team returned to Şanlıurfa after the search. They were not required to hand in their guns for examination or to account for the bullets expended during the operation.
27. The body of Mehmet Gül was examined by a doctor at Şanlıurfa hospital at about 02.00 hours in the presence of the Şanlıurfa public prosecutor Ali Rıza Uytun. The report which was drawn up was brief. It did not number the injuries on the body, giving only a general reference to grazes, cuts and erosions. No sketch was made of the location of injuries nor were any photographs taken. His family - Mustafa Gül the son and Mustafa Gül the nephew - described the body as showing numerous bullet injuries, from the waist downwards. There was no full autopsy carried out, nor any X-rays taken. The public prosecutor Uytun considered that this was unnecessary as the cause of death - the bullet injury to the right kidney - was clear. He considered it was evident from the body that there were no bullets or fragments of bullets inside and that it was not necessary to give details of the grazes as these did not contribute to the death. The Commission found the report to be seriously deficient - it failed to describe the extent of Mehmet Gül’s injuries and to provide any useful medical or forensic detail for the purpose of assessing the proportionality of the force used by the security forces, the necessity for which evidence should have been apparent to the public prosecutor in the case of the killing of an individual by police officers.
28. In addition to the lack of proper recording of the finding of the guns and cartridge at the scene of the incident (i.e. no photographs, sketch map or record of the officers who found them), the procedures at the scene were deficient in a number of other respects. Although the public prosecutor noted 50-55 bullet holes in the door, only 30 cartridges were found. Though the Browning was tested to see if it had been recently fired, no testing was carried out to establish that it had been fired by Mehmet Gül, i.e. by way of fingerprinting or analysis of blood traces. If the gun had been used by Mehmet Gül as alleged, there was a high probability that blood traces would have been present (he was right handed, his right hand was shattered by bullets and blood smears were evident throughout the apartment where he had come into contact with walls and furniture). The photograph of the guns showed no visible stains however. Nor were Mehmet Gül’s hands tested for traces of firing. Though it was alleged by prosecutor Uytun that this test was pointless, this assertion did not accord with the practices adopted in other Turkish cases examined by the Commission and utilised by police forces in other member States. The explanations given variously for not employing these tests (shortness of time, the desire to avoid upsetting the family) were not convincing. While the body was buried rapidly, there was nothing to stop the prosecutor delaying the release of the body to the relatives until the necessary tests had been carried out.
29. Though it was alleged that Mehmet Gül had fired a shot at the officers, no steps appeared to have been taken to check for a strike mark outside the flat or to find the bullet. The evidence before the Commission including the videotapes indicated that the staircase to the second floor was at the front of the balcony and potentially in the line of fire depending on the angle. The Commission was not convinced by the explanation that, assuming the bullet was fired into an open space over the balcony or stairway, it was not worth searching the garden for it. The fact that the gathering of forensic evidence was frequently a time-consuming and painstaking task did not relieve the authorities of the responsibility to make efforts to locate and preserve such evidence.
30. As regarded the gathering of evidence from witnesses, the public prosecutor in Bozova took statements from the applicant, family members and neighbours shortly after the events. They maintained that there had been no warnings given and that Mehmet Gül had not fired any gun at the officers. However, no statements were taken from any of the police officers involved until 8 May 1993, two months later. No statements were taken from any gendarme officers involved, nor the other persons who might have been involved in the planning of the operation. No enquiries were made of the special operations team department as to the weapons used or number of bullets expended on the operation.
31. On 17 March 1993, the Bozova public prosecutor issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction, which indicated the applicant as complainant, the members of the special operations team as the defendants and the offence as unintentional homicide. It stated that based on intelligence that members of the PKK could be located in certain residences in Bozova, a number of searches were carried out at about 20.30 hours. At 00.01 hours special team officers intended to carry out a search at Mehmet Gül’s house. After giving warning, “Police. Open the door”, they fired at the metal door to gain entry. At that moment, Mehmet Gül was behind the door. He died from the wounds received. During the search of his house, there was found an illegal 7.65 mm French pistol, a Belgian Browning pistol with its hammer drawn back and a bullet in the barrel, 13 bullets and a cartridge. The applicant, father of the deceased, had lodged a criminal complaint. However, as it appeared that the defendants were special team officers and the offence carried out while they were performing their duties, the public prosecutor decided that he lacked jurisdiction and sent the file to the Provincial Governor for the necessary action.
32. On 29 March 1993, the Şanlıurfa provincial governor requested the appointment of an inspector to carry out an investigation into the incident on behalf of the provincial administrative council. A police inspector, Salih Dost, was appointed. He took statements from the applicant and other family members, the neighbours Omer Kaya and Mustafa Ocakoğlu, the local police officers involved in the search operations that night and all the members of the special operations team. All the statements, save that of Mehmet Telci taken on 11 August 1993, were taken from 8 to 10 May 1993.
33. On 3 September 1993, the inspector issued his report. It concluded that the officers had not fired to kill but had shown lack of care, which could justify charges being brought against them for causing death from lack of care and precautions, and recommended a disciplinary sanction of 16 months’ suspension. However, a decision not to prosecute was endorsed by the provincial administrative council on 21 October 1993 on the basis that the officers had not intended to kill anyone, that they had only fired after a shot had been fired at them and that they had given a warning. This decision was not communicated to the applicant.
34. On 18 April 1995, some sixteen months later, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision on 18 April 1995 and ordered the trial of the three officers who had fired at the door – Enis Ünlü, Recep Doğan, Lüfti Demirtürkoğlu.
35. The three officers were tried for causing death by lack of attention and due precaution (Art. 455 of the TPC). They were not represented by a lawyer during the proceedings, which lasted from 5 July 1995 to 9 September 1996 before Şanlıurfa Criminal Court No. 2. During the trial, the three officers appeared. They maintained their written statements, and only Recep Doğan made any additional comments. No other witnesses were heard.
36. On 26 February 1996, the court appointed a gendarme lieutenant Güven Sağban as expert. He submitted a report dated 28 February 1996. This stated that from the file it was understood that the officers had called out warnings at the house, that the deceased had come out, fired one shot and shut the door again and that the officers fired at the lock to open it. The deceased, in the line of fire, was wounded and died. A subsequent search revealed the gun which had been fired and another, both unlicensed. It was noted that the complainants and other witnesses essentially disputed the statements of the security officers. It concluded that the defendants were members of a special operations team and had received serious and strict security training. During the incident and operation, conducted on the basis of intelligence information, the deceased fired a shot and the defendants were therefore “preconditioned”. They were primarily concerned to open the door and also to protect themselves and their colleagues. For those reasons, they fired at the lock. The photographs indicated that the defendants’ firing was concentrated round the lock to break it. Also the deceased’s firing was intended to attack more than to defend. This indicated that although the defendants showed the care and attention expected from them, the incident occurred. No fault or ill-intention could be attributed to them.
37. On 3 April 1996, the court decided to send the file to the Ankara Criminal Court for expert lecturers from the Ankara Police Academy to be selected to prepare a detailed report on the use of weapons and the intention behind the use of weapons.
38. On 16 July 1996, three experts (Chief Inspectors Güner Kalkendelen and Yılmaz Yaşar and Dr Vahit Bicak, a research fellow at the police academy) issued a report. This stated that they had been requested to give their opinion on the fault, if any, of each accused individually based on the court file. It listed as fact that the security forces acting on intelligence about the presence of PKK members surrounded Mehmet Gül’s house at about 24.00 hours on 7 March 1993. The officers knocked on the door, warning, “Police. Open the door”. The door was slightly opened from the inside, a gun was fired and the door closed. The officers fired aiming at the lock to enter. The deceased who was behind the door was injured. The opinion of gendarme officer Adnan Kulaksiz stated that the 9 mm hand gun found was set to fire and recently used.
The report analysis stated that it was believed that the security forces opened fire after the deceased fired due to the stress caused by the situation in the south-east and the psychological tension of the operation. It was significant that they did not shoot wildly but concentrated on the lock of the door. The fatal bullets were in the kidney and intestinal area, the same level as the lock, showing further that there was no intention to injure or kill. It concluded that the deceased was injured by chance and that the accused could not be charged with negligent conduct.
39. None of the experts visited the scene or requested any further information or evidence but based themselves on the statements in the file.
40. On 9 December 1996, the court referring to the expert report of 16 July 1996 concluded that the defendants were not at fault and acquitted the three officers. The Commission noted that there was no indication that in any of the proceedings consideration had been given as to whether the accounts of the family were in any respect accurate or on what basis the version of events given by the security forces was to be preferred. It is not apparent that the applicant was informed of the criminal proceedings or afforded the opportunity to join as a party.
41. The applicant’s son Mehmet Gül was killed during an armed operation intended to effect the arrest of PKK terrorists. That night, having been informed that some PKK terrorists were being sheltered in some houses, including the applicant’s house, security forces arrived at the house at about 01.00 hours to arrest the terrorists believed to be inside. They knocked on the door and asked the occupants to open the door. The door suddenly opened, a gunshot was heard and the door immediately closed again. Upon this, the officers fired three or four shots towards the lock of the door. After these shots, a woman’s voice was heard asking for help. When she tried to open the door, she told those outside that the lock had been jammed. Since it was understood that the matter was urgent, the officers told her to move aside and fired directly on the lock. Then they opened the door, carried out a rough search and let in the applicant. The security forces assisted the applicant and his son Mustafa in carrying the injured Mehmet Gül to a police car, which took him to the local health centre.
42. Two guns were later found in Mehmet Gül’s apartment, as well as a 9 mm cartridge near the door.
43. The death of Mehmet Gül was caused accidentally. The three officers who shot at the door were acquitted by the criminal court on the basis that they had not acted negligently.
44. The principles and procedures relating to liability for acts contrary to the law may be summarised as follows.
45. Under the Criminal Code all forms of homicide (Articles 448 to 455) and attempted homicide (Articles 61 and 62) constitute criminal offences. It is also an offence for a government employee to subject some-one to torture or ill-treatment (Article 243 in respect of torture and Article 245 in respect of ill-treatment). The authorities’ obligations in respect of conducting a preliminary investigation into acts or omissions capable of constituting such offences that have been brought to their attention are governed by Articles 151 to 153 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Offences may be reported to the authorities or the security forces as well as to public prosecutor’s offices. The complaint may be made in writing or orally. If it is made orally, the authority must make a record of it (Article 151).
If there is evidence to suggest that a death is not due to natural causes, members of the security forces who have been informed of that fact are required to advise the public prosecutor or a criminal court judge (Article 152). By Article 235 of the Criminal Code, any public official who fails to report to the police or a public prosecutor’s office an offence of which he has become aware in the exercise of his duty is liable to imprisonment.
A public prosecutor who is informed by any means whatsoever of a situation that gives rise to the suspicion that an offence has been committed is obliged to investigate the facts in order to decide whether or not there should be a prosecution (Article 153 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
46. In the case of alleged terrorist offences, the public prosecutor is deprived of jurisdiction in favour of a separate system of State Security prosecutors and courts established throughout Turkey.
47. If the suspected offender is a civil servant and if the offence was committed during the performance of his duties, the preliminary investigation of the case is governed by the Law of 1914 on the prosecution of civil servants, which restricts the public prosecutor’s jurisdiction ratione personae at that stage of the proceedings. In such cases it is for the relevant local administrative council (for the district or province, depending on the suspect’s status) to conduct the preliminary investigation and, consequently, to decide whether to prosecute. Once a decision to prosecute has been taken, it is for the public prosecutor to investigate the case.
An appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court lies against a decision of the Council. If a decision not to prosecute is taken, the case is automatically referred to that court.
48. If the suspect is a member of the armed forces, the applicable law is determined by the nature of the offence. Thus, if it is a “military offence” under the Military Criminal Code (Law no. 1632), the criminal proceedings are in principle conducted in accordance with Law no. 353 on the establishment of courts martial and their rules of procedure. Where a member of the armed forces has been accused of an ordinary offence, it is normally the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which apply (see Article 145 § 1 of the Constitution and sections 9 to 14 of Law no. 353).
The Military Criminal Code makes it a military offence for a member of the armed forces to endanger a person’s life by disobeying an order (Article 89). In such cases civilian complainants may lodge their complaints with the authorities referred to in the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 45 above) or with the offender’s superior.
49. Under section 13 of Law no. 2577 on administrative procedure, anyone who sustains damage as a result of an act by the authorities may, within one year after the alleged act was committed, claim compensation from them. If the claim is rejected in whole or in part or if no reply is received within sixty days, the victim may bring administrative proceedings.
50. Article 125 §§ 1 and 7 of the Constitution provides:
“All acts or decisions of the authorities are subject to judicial review ...
The authorities shall be liable to make reparation for all damage caused by their acts or measures.”
That provision establishes the State’s strict liability, which comes into play if it is shown that in the circumstances of a particular case the State has failed in its obligation to maintain public order, ensure public safety or protect people’s lives or property, without it being necessary to show a tortious act attributable to the authorities. Under these rules, the authorities may therefore be held liable to compensate anyone who has sustained loss as a result of acts committed by unidentified persons.
51. Article 8 of Legislative Decree no. 430 of 16 December 1990, the last sentence of which was inspired by the provision mentioned above (see paragraph 50 above), provides:
“No criminal, financial or legal liability may be asserted against … the governor of a state of emergency region or by provincial governors in that region in respect of decisions taken, or acts performed, by them in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by this legislative decree, and no application shall be made to any judicial authority to that end. This is without prejudice to the rights of individuals to claim reparation from the State for damage which they have been caused without justification.”
52. Under the Code of Obligations, anyone who suffers damage as a result of an illegal or tortious act may bring an action for damages (Articles 41 to 46) and non-pecuniary loss (Article 47). The civil courts are not bound by either the findings or the verdict of the criminal court on the issue of the defendant’s guilt (Article 53).
However, under section 13 of Law no. 657 on State employees, anyone who has sustained loss as a result of an act done in the performance of duties governed by public law may, in principle, only bring an action against the authority by whom the civil servant concerned is employed and not directly against the civil servant (see Article 129 § 5 of the Constitution and Articles 55 and 100 of the Code of Obligations). That is not, however, an absolute rule. When an act is found to be illegal or tortious and, consequently, is no longer an “administrative act” or deed, the civil courts may allow a claim for damages to be made against the official concerned, without prejudice to the victim’s right to bring an action against the authority on the basis of its joint liability as the official’s employer (Article 50 of the Code of Obligations).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
2


ITEMID: 001-105336
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: CHE
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2011
DOCNAME: CASE OF ADAMOV v. SWITZERLAND
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: No violation of Art. 5-1;Remainder inadmissible
JUDGES: András Sajó;David Thór Björgvinsson;Françoise Tulkens;Giorgio Malinverni;Guido Raimondi;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque
TEXT: 7. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Moscow.
8. In 2004 criminal proceedings were brought against him in the United States of America. They concerned his alleged misappropriation of funds provided to Russia by the USA during his term as Russian Minister for Energy.
9. On 11 February 2005 he obtained a four-month Swiss visa issued by the Swiss Embassy in Moscow, valid until 10 June 2005. On the visa application form he had indicated, without being more specific, that the main purpose of his journey to Switzerland was to visit his daughter, who was living in Bern.
10. On 21 February 2002 criminal proceedings were opened against the applicant’s daughter, by the competent investigating judge for the Canton of Bern, on a charge of money laundering. The suspicions notably concerned sums of money she had allegedly received from her father.
11. On 5 April 2005, when consulting the case file concerning the criminal proceedings against the applicant’s daughter, her former lawyer informed the investigating judge that the applicant visited Switzerland from time to time and that he agreed to be questioned in connection with the case in question. The applicant then indicated to his daughter’s lawyer that he was prepared to come to Switzerland to be questioned by the investigating judge. He explained that it would suit him if the questioning took place between 20 April and 6 May 2005.
12. On 15 April 2005 the investigating judge thus suggested two possible dates to the new lawyer representing the applicant’s daughter, namely 1 and 2 May 2005.
13. After arriving in Switzerland on 20 April 2005 the applicant expressed, through his daughter’s lawyer, his preference for 2 May 2005 at 2 p.m. He asked the investigating judge to confirm that date.
14. On the same day the judge duly issued a summons using the appropriate form in accordance with practice in the Canton of Bern. The hearing was scheduled for 2 May 2005 and the summons indicated that any delay in appearance or unjustified absence from the hearing would entail a penalty, with the possibility of using force in the event of non-appearance. The summons, which was addressed to the applicant, was served at his daughter’s private address in Bern. A copy was also sent to her lawyer for information purposes.
15. On 28 April 2005 the investigating judge contacted a public prosecutor in Pennsylvania, USA, to find out any information that might be useful in the proceedings against the applicant’s daughter. During the conversation, the judge mentioned that he would be questioning the applicant on 2 May 2005 at 2 p.m.
16. On 29 April 2005 the US Department of Justice sent the Swiss Federal Office of Justice a request for the applicant’s provisional arrest in accordance with the extradition treaty of 14 November 1990 between Switzerland and the USA.
17. On the same day the Federal Office of Justice (mutual legal assistance division) issued an “urgent” order for the applicant’s arrest that was sent to the investigating judge for the Canton of Bern.
18. On 2 May 2005 at 2 p.m. the applicant appeared before the investigating judge for the Canton of Bern to give evidence in the proceedings against his daughter. When asked why he was in Switzerland he replied that he was visiting for private reasons but also for business.
19. After the interview, which lasted about four hours, the investigating judge notified the applicant that he was under arrest. Two police officers of the Canton of Bern, who had been waiting in a neighbouring room for the interview to finish, immediately took him to the regional prison of Bern.
20. On 3 May 2005 the Federal Office of Justice issued an order for the applicant’s provisional detention pending extradition and it was served on the applicant the next day.
21. On 17 May 2005 Russia also applied for his extradition.
22. On the same day, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Appellate Division of the Federal Criminal Court.
23. During his detention the applicant wrote an article, which was published on 6 June 2005 in the Moscow daily newspaper Izwestija. He explained that his trip was connected to two projects on which he was working at the time, concerning the export of energy by Russia and technological cooperation, in particular with an energy supplier based in Switzerland.
24. On 9 June 2005 the Federal Criminal Court upheld the applicant’s appeal and set aside the extradition arrest order against him. The court took the view that the applicant had been in Switzerland for questioning in the context of criminal proceedings against his daughter, that the summons for the interview of 2 May 2005 should have been served on him through mutual assistance channels and that the protection afforded by the safe-conduct clause, deriving from the requirement of good faith, was also valid for a person examined as a witness who had not been summoned through mutual assistance channels but who had appeared “spontaneously” in Switzerland to give evidence.
25. On 17 June 2005 the Federal Office of Justice appealed before the Federal Court against the Federal Criminal Court’s decision.
26. On 24 and 27 June 2005 the US authorities filed a formal request, dated 2 June 2005, for the applicant’s extradition to the USA.
27. On 14 July 2005 the First Public Law Division of the Federal Court upheld the appeal of the Federal Office of Justice.
28. The Federal Court basically took the view that the applicant had been visiting Switzerland for private purposes – to see his daughter – and for business. In its view, the Federal Criminal Court had clearly made an erroneous and incomplete assessment of the facts in finding that the applicant had come to Switzerland in order to give evidence as a witness in criminal proceedings. It was not therefore appropriate to apply Article 12 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal matters of 20 April 1959 or Article 73 of the Federal Law on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (see paragraphs 31-32 below). The case was referred back to the Federal Criminal Court for examination of the applicant’s other arguments (breach of the Russian Government’s immunity under international law, and the allegedly political nature of the criminal proceedings against him in the USA).
29. The applicant was held in custody until 30 December 2005 and then extradited to the Russian Federation pursuant to an administrative decision of the Federal Court of 22 December 2005. That court, unlike the administrative authority, the Federal Office of Justice, found that priority had to be given to the Russian extradition request, as the applicant was a Russian national and stood accused of committing criminal acts mainly in that country.
30. In a decision of 6 December 2007 the Federal Criminal Court dismissed, at last instance, a request by the applicant for compensation in respect of his detention pending extradition. The court found that his detention had not been unlawful.
31. Article 12 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal matters of 20 April 1959, to which both Switzerland and the Russian Federation are parties, contains a safe-conduct clause. That Article reads as follows:
“1. A witness or expert, whatever his nationality, appearing on a summons before the judicial authorities of the requesting Party shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected to any other restriction of his personal liberty in the territory of that Party in respect of acts or convictions anterior to his departure from the territory of the requested Party.
2. A person, whatever his nationality, summoned before the judicial authorities of the requesting Party to answer for acts forming the subject of proceedings against him, shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected to any other restriction of his personal liberty for acts or convictions anterior to his departure from the territory of the requested Party and not specified in the summons.
3. The immunity provided for in this article shall cease when the witness or expert or prosecuted person, having had for a period of fifteen consecutive days from the date when his presence is no longer required by the judicial authorities an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained in the territory, or having left it, has returned.”
32. Section 73 of the Federal Law on international mutual assistance in criminal matters of 20 March 1981 contains a provision on safe conduct in Switzerland:
“1. A person habitually resident abroad and who appears in Switzerland in a criminal case pursuant to a summons may neither be prosecuted nor restricted in his personal freedom on the basis of reasons that pre-date his entry into Switzerland.
2. A person being prosecuted shall enjoy no safe conduct in respect of the offences specified in the summons.
3. The safe conduct provided for in paragraph 1 shall cease when the person leaves Switzerland and at the latest three days after he is permitted to leave by the summoning authorities.”
33. The object and purpose of the safe-conduct clause were explained as follows by a Federal Court judgment of 26 April 1978 (ATF 104 Ia 448):
...”
34. In an unpublished judgment of 17 May 1995 (1P.289/1995), the Federal Court had occasion to develop its case-law on safe-conduct clauses as follows:
...”
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 5
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-1


ITEMID: 001-61007
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HUN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2003
DOCNAME: CASE OF SIMKO v. HUNGARY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award
TEXT: 8. The applicants were born in 1955 and 1953 respectively and live in Sopron, Hungary. Their previous application (no. 27587/95) was declared inadmissible by a Committee of the Commission on 16 May 1996.
9. Seeking judicial review and compensation for damages on account of administrative decisions taken in a protracted dispute over their licence to sell folk-art items on public premises, the applicants brought an action on 9 October 1992 against the Sopron Mayor's Office (“the 1992 action”). The action was first registered at the Sopron District Court, which on 4 November 1992 issued an order for the completion of the file. The applicants complied with this order on 12 November 1992.
10. On 1 March 1993 the District Court rejected the action, holding that it had no competence to hear the case. On 23 March 1993 the applicants appealed.
11. On 5 August 1993 the Győr-Moson-Sopron County Regional Court quashed the District Court's decision. It transferred the case-file to its own competent bench.
12. In the proceedings before the Regional Court, on 16 September and 28 October 1993 orders were issued for the completion of the file. The applicants complied with these orders on 28 September and 5 November 1993, respectively. On 19 November 1993 the defendant authority was eventually notified of the action.
13. Meanwhile, on 1 March 1993, the applicants brought an official liability action in the context of the above-mentioned proceedings before the District Court (“the 1993 action”). The defendant authority was notified of this action on 22 October 1993. On 20 November 1993 the District Court held a hearing and, on 29 November 1993, it transferred the case-file to the Regional Court for reasons of competence.
14. Following a hearing held on 14 December 1993, the Regional Court on 9 February 1994 discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicants' 1992 action. The Regional Court observed that the defendant authority had been notified earlier of the 1993 action and, for that reason, the applicants' claims were to be pursued in the proceedings relating to the latter action. On 21 February 1994 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court, which, on 13 October 1994, upheld the decision to discontinue the proceedings on the 1992 action.
15. Meanwhile, following repeated exchanges of observations between the parties in the proceedings concerning the 1993 action, the Regional Court held hearings on 25 August and 18 October 1994. Another hearing was scheduled for 25 October 1994. In the context of procedural disputes concerning the applicants' motion to hear certain witnesses, their obligation to pay outstanding stamp duties, as well as questions of legal aid, on 2 November 1995 the Supreme Court decided the applicants' procedural appeals.
16. On 9 July 1996 the Regional Court awarded the applicants compensation in a total amount of 300,000 Hungarian forints (“HUF”), plus accrued interest. The Regional Court dismissed the remainder of their claims. Having reviewed numerous related administrative files and decisions, the Regional Court ruled that the defendant authority's conduct had hindered the applicants in the exercise of their rights derived from their licence to trade on public premises. In reasoning its ten-page decision, the Regional Court relied on documentary evidence.
17. On 6 August 1996 the applicants appealed. On 2 September 1996 they supplemented their appeal.
18. On 5 February 1998 the Supreme Court, acting as a second instance jurisdiction, held a hearing. On 13 February 1998 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court's decision. The decision was served on the applicants on 8 April 1998.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1