ITEMID: 001-22135
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2002
DOCNAME: DOUGLAS-WILLIAMS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Gaukur Jörundsson;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Lisa Douglas-Williams, is a United Kingdom national, born in 1972 and living in London. She is the sister of Wayne Douglas, who died in police custody on 5 December 1995. She is represented before the Court by Ms L. Christian, a lawyer practising in London.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant’s brother, Wayne Douglas, was 25 years old when he died. He was a large man who weighed approximately 90 kg, with no previous history of heart problems.
Shortly before 2.36 a.m. on 5 December 1995, the deceased was allegedly involved in a burglary in Strathleven Road, Brixton. An intruder broke into a house, awoke the young couple who were its occupants and threatened them at knifepoint before leaving with cash point cards, money and a kitchen knife. The couple rang the police at 2.36 a.m.
Police Constables Page and McKay responded. They saw the deceased leaving Strathleven Road and entering Acre Lane. Believing him to be the intruder, they apprehended him after a chase which ended in a children’s play area. The deceased threatened officers with a kitchen knife, which fell from his hand when his wrist was struck twice with a police baton by PC McKay. A second officer also struck him. In all, he was struck on the arms and back. Several police officers gave evidence that the deceased punched PC Page in the face. The time was 2.46 a.m. The deceased was tackled to the ground, arrested and placed in the prone position, i.e. on his front with his hands restrained behind his back, and handcuffed. The deceased was placed in a police van, prior to which he complained that he had difficulty breathing. He was again placed in the prone position while he was transported to the police station.
Some of the officers later testified that the deceased was “muttering” incoherently in the van and wriggling, unable to sit of his own will. There was further evidence that on leaving the van, he was still “shuffling” and “muttering” incoherently. Some officers said that he was carried into the police station. The van arrived at the police station at 2.58 a.m.
The arresting officer PC Page told the custody sergeant PS Sorensen of the circumstances surrounding the arrest, and stated that the deceased had assaulted him. Meanwhile, the deceased was placed face-down in the prone position on the floor of the custody suite. He was removed to a cell at 3.08 a.m. and had to be carried. He was then stripped and searched with his handcuffs removed, and was placed in the prone position for part of the search. The custody record notes, inter alia:
“Subject complains of difficulty in breathing and is turned over on his back for searching.”
PC Floodgate stated in oral evidence during the Inquest:
“He [the deceased] then complained that he was finding it difficult to breathe on his front so the handcuffs were removed first and he was straight away turned onto his back.”
PC Floodgate said that this appeared to relieve his breathing problem. On examination, PC Floodgate was asked if he saw any mucus on the deceased’s face, to which he replied, “No”. He did not mention that the prisoner had been placed in a “cell relocation position”.
The evidence of PC Turner was not the same:
“Present were PCs Mcintosh, Bennett and Cowland. They stripped him down to his underpants and left the cell one at a time, the last officer holding the prisoner’s legs crossed and then springing off him and then closing the door. (Cell relocation technique). I then slammed the cell door. The prisoner rolled over and groaned, and had what appeared to be nasal mucus over his face.”
After the search, the deceased was left on his own in the cell. PS Sorensen instructed PC Bennett to remain outside the cell and to keep a continuous watch on him. PC Bennett gave evidence that following this instruction he remained outside the cell door and kept watch through the wicket in the door.
PS Sorensen sent for the Forensic Medical Examiner to examine the deceased in case he had suffered any internal injury from a baton and also to examine the two police officers who complained of injury from the arrest.
After a short lapse of time, PS Sorensen came to the cell door. PC Bennett stated that he removed his gaze from the wicket to talk to him. When he looked back, the deceased was on his face and in difficulties.
Officers re-entered the cell at 3.31 a.m. when the deceased was said to be having a fit. His heart was beating but he had stopped breathing. Artificial respiration was commenced and an ambulance was called which conveyed the deceased to King’s College Hospital where he arrived at 3.42 a.m. He was pronounced dead at 3.56 a.m.
The inquest into the death of the deceased took place between 18 November and 6 December 1996. It was presided over by the Coroner Sir Montague Levine, and a jury. Over 40 witnesses gave evidence, including 3 pathologists as to the cause of death. The pathologists were unable to agree as to the cause of death. Dr F. Patel (instructed by the Coroner) considered that the deceased had died of natural causes, due to hypertensive heart disease. However, the applicant claims that the jury rejected this and preferred the evidence of Professor B. Knight and Dr N. Cary. The former considered that the most likely cause of death was “positional asphyxia”, and the latter considered that the cause of death was the deceased’s restraint in the prone position, coupled with the stress occasioned by the whole incident.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Coroner left four verdicts to the jury, namely accident, open verdict, death by natural causes and unlawful killing. The applicant claims that the Coroner misdirected the jury on the meaning of unlawful killing in English law. The jury’s verdict, by a majority of 8 to 1, was recorded in the following terms:
“Cause of death
1. (a) left ventricular failure
(b) stress and exhaustive and positional asphyxia
Verdict
Accidental death
Details of how Accident Happened
Between 3.10 a.m. and 3.15 a.m. in a police cell in Brixton Police Station following a chase and a series of restraints in the prone position face down as used in current police methods.”
After the verdict was delivered, the Coroner issued a number of recommendations in respect of police methods of restraint in relation to positional asphyxia. This included:
“Repeated periods of restraint in the face down position with the arms handcuffed behind the back can be dangerous and every officer should be given guidelines on essential observations to be made of the restrained person, with special emphasis on the possibility of positional asphyxia; that is taking the pulse rate, listening to the breathing and so forth...”
The Director of the Metropolitan Police Complaints Investigation Bureau assured the Authority that these recommendations would be put in progress as policy matters within the Service.
The applicant received legal aid to judicially review the decision of the Coroner on the basis of alleged misdirections.
On 31 July 1997 Laws J dismissed the application for judicial review. He found that there had been a misdirection in the Coroner’s summing up on the legal definition of “unlawful killing” in that he had had interwoven his explanation on the different aspects of manslaughter concerning unlawful acts and gross negligence in such a way that it may not have been clear to the jury that he was referring to two different types of unlawful killing. Nonetheless, he found that on the evidence before them, and in the light of their finding on the cause of death, even if the jury had been properly directed they would have reached the same verdict. He noted that no complaint had been made about the deceased’s arrest. As regarded alleged neglect by the police officers, he recalled the Coroner’s finding that there was no evidence that the police officers should have recognised that the deceased’s condition was due to anything other than stress and exhaustion. Each officer had been individually asked whether he thought that Wayne should have been taken to hospital and each had replied ‘no’. Further, there had been no evidence that had an attempt been made earlier to take him to hospital that this would have had any effect in avoiding his death. The judge agreed with the Coroner:
“I think it is clear that there was no evidence in the case to the effect that any officer could have foreseen the deceased’s sudden and catastrophic collapse owing to a left ventricular failure (or at all). The Registrar at King’s College Hospital, Dr Ellis gave evidence. The Coroner said this...
‘I asked her this question and this is vital: ‘In retrospect, if you were there at the time would you have done anything different than those officers at that point of time?’ and the answer was ‘no’ and I think it is to their credit that everything they did when they found the heart had stopped and the breathing had stopped was right, and they did it quickly and it was done efficiently. She, as a doctor, almost a specialist herself, had said that had she been there she could not have done anything differently. She agreed with everything that was done.’
In my judgment this was never a case in which the exceptional course of leaving neglect as a free-standing verdict should have been taken. One has to postulate circumstances in which a reasonable jury were not satisfied that unlawful killing (on any basis but in particular on the footing of gross negligence) was made out, yet could have been satisfied that there was a ‘gross failure’ to look after the deceased in the condition he was in. I cannot see that on the facts of the case there was any perceptible space for such a scenario...”
In the context of the allegations of gross negligence, the judge referred to the undisputed fact that arrangements had been made by the police for the Forensic Medical Examiner to see the deceased.
“There was also the very important evidence that PC Bennett was instructed to keep continuous watch over the deceased in the cell, looking through a wicket in the door. [Counsel for the family] seeks to raise a question whether this instruction was properly carried out. The custody record shows that when the officers re-entered the cell and found the deceased having a fit he was lying on his front. He had previously ... been turned or turned himself onto his back. The Coroner records PC Bennett (p. 63 1.3) as saying he had only momentarily turned his gaze away from the wicket when PS Sorensen arrived outside the cell; and (1.5) ‘when they looked back he was on his face’. [Counsel for the family] points to the expert evidence of Professor Knight and Dr Carey to the effect that if a prisoner is taken out of the prone position (as by being put on his back) he recovers the ability to breathe; and so [counsel] submits... ‘it is therefore difficult to understand why he further deteriorated and dies, if he was as Bennett alleged on his side or back while he was continuously watched’.
I am afraid I regard that this argument is entirely speculative. When the officers re-entered the cell, seconds after PS Sorensen arrived and spoke with Bennett, the deceased was as I have said having a fit; and most unhappily must have been in a critical and terminal condition as the events which immediately followed demonstrate. He was not in control of his movements. He may have turned voluntarily on his front. There is nothing here to call into question the clear evidence that PC Bennett fulfilled his instructions to watch over him.”
The applicant appealed this decision. It was dismissed on 30 July 1998 by the Court of Appeal composed of Lord Justices Woolf MR, Hobhouse and Thorpe. Lord Justice Woolf considered that there had been only borderline justification for leaving the verdict of unlawful killing to the jury. While there had been misdirections of law on “unlawful killing”, he refused to quash the verdict and order a fresh inquest as
– the verdict would not have been affected;
– any fresh inquest after this passage of time would inevitably be less satisfactory and most unlikely to result in any different verdict; and
– the inquest had performed in an exemplary manner the investigation of the facts and little more could be achieved by subjecting all concerned to the considerable expense and stress of a further inquest.
Lord Justice Woolf commented that it was important to note that it was not suggested that the way the deceased was treated at the time of his arrest was improper.
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused on 21 July 1999, of which the applicant was informed on 23 July 1999.
The matter was referred by the Metropolitan Police to the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), an independent body established by an Act of Parliament to oversee complaints by members of the public against police officers. It informed the family that it had investigated two disciplinary aspects of the case: whether any police officer had abused his authority by using unnecessary violence towards Wayne Douglas in effecting his arrest and detention, and whether any police officer had neglected his duty by failing to take proper care of the applicant’s brother whilst in custody.
The PCA found on 27 January 1997 that there were no grounds for criticism of the actions of any police officer on these issues.
Prior to the deceased’s death, there existed significant literature on the dangers of police methods of restraint and that the very scenario which was the context of the deceased’s death had been the subject of the following expert warning: a suspect, particularly one who is large, who has had his breathing compromised (due to running away from police officers and/or struggling in the course of his apprehension) who is then handcuffed to the rear, and placed on his front in the prone position, may be in danger.
The Metropolitan Police were aware of the dangers of positional asphyxia and officers had received training on this. The evidence from PC Page and PS Sorensen during the Inquest was that they had apparently had such training a few weeks before the incident. However, this training was limited and the Coroner expressed himself to be “appalled” that the topic had been dealt with in about 10 minutes.
Following the Coroner’s recommendations, an Operational Notice was issued on 22 January 1997 to all divisions in respect of positional asphyxia, dealing with risk factors, signs and symptoms, and ways of reducing risks. This was to be incorporated into a new two-day training course for Metropolitan Police Officers with effect from 1 April 1997.
Inquests are governed by the Coroners Act 1988 (“the Act”) and Coroners Rules 1984 (“the Rules”). Under s.8 of the Act, an inquest must be held if a person has died “a violent or an unnatural death”. It is the function of an inquest, as defined by the s. 11(5)(b) of the Act and r. 36 of the Rules, that a coroner and a jury shall look into and determine four essential matters: who the deceased was, and where, when and how the deceased came by his/her death.
There is no legal aid for representation at inquests. Prior to April 1999, there was no right to disclosure of documents, but there is now a scheme for limited disclosure, although not commensurate with that available for other types of proceedings.
It has been consistently emphasised in case-law that an inquest is an inquisitorial fact-finding exercise, and not a method of apportioning guilt. For example, Bingham LJ declared in ex parte Jamieson:
“It is not the function of a coroner or his jury to determine, or appear to determine, any question of criminal or civil liability, to apportion guilt or attribute blame. This principle is expressed in Rule 42 of the 1984 Rules.” [1995 1 QB 1]
There is no right of appeal in relation to an inquest and the High Court’s role is limited to review, which may be by way of judicial review, or statutory as contained in sections 13(1) and (2) of the Act. This section applies where, on an application by or under the authority of the Attorney-General, the High Court is satisfied as respects a coroner either –
“(a) that he refuses or neglects to hold an inquest which ought to be held; or
(b) where an inquest has been held by him, that (whether by reason of fraud, rejection of evidence, irregularity of proceedings, insufficiency of inquiry, the discovery of new facts of evidence or otherwise) it is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice that another inquest should be held.
The High Court may –
order an inquest or, as the case may be, another inquest to be held into the death...”
Under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 a claim may be brought by the dependants of the deceased for loss of support. Dependants include spouses and former spouses, children and parents, persons treated as children and/or parents, grandparents and grandchildren, and co-habitees of the opposite sex who had lived with the deceased for more than two years. The claim under the Fatal Accidents Act is for the following three heads:
– the value of the dependency;
– funeral expenses; and
– bereavement damages currently in the amount of £7500 for the surviving spouse, the parents of a legitimate child or the mother of an illegitimate child.
There is no claim under the Fatal Accidents Act for a deceased who leaves no dependants, or who does not fall into the limited category of persons mentioned above. English law does not recognise a tort for wrongful death.
Under section 1 of this Act, a cause of action subsists in the personal estate of the deceased for any right of action the deceased would have had for damage caused by an act or omission before he/she died.


ITEMID: 001-68263
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: MKD
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: BOZINOVSKI v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Ljubomir Bozinovski, is a national of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, who was born in 1934 and lives in Skopje.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On an unspecified date the applicant's niece Ms D. instituted civil proceedings with the Skopje Municipal Court disputing the applicant's title to a part of a house.
On 25 November 1991 the Skopje Municipal Court granted Ms D.'s claim. It found that her late father, who was the applicant's brother, with the knowledge of the previous owner of the house, had invested a considerable amount of money for its refurbishment and, thereby, he had acquired a title to part of the house in accordance with the relevant provision of the Law on Property. On 9 September 1992 the Skopje County Court upheld the above judgment.
On 15 April 1993 the Supreme Court quashed the lower courts' judgments. It referred the case back for re-examination to the Skopje Municipal Court and instructed it to order an expert valuation whereby the value of Ms D.'s father's investment would be determined in a precise manner.
On 11 April 1996 the experts submitted their report. They concluded that Ms D.'s late father's investment represented 71% of the value of the relevant part of the house after its refurbishment.
At the hearing of 7 May 1997 several witnesses appeared before the Skopje Municipal Court.
On 12 May 1997 the applicant made written submissions to the court. It objected to the expert report and requested that an additional expert report be prepared in respect of the value of the investment made by Ms D.'s late father.
A hearing was held on 13 June 1997 before the Skopje Municipal Court.
In November 1997 the applicant was served with the additional expert report.
On 16 February 1998 the applicant objected to the additional expert report and asked the court to appoint new experts. From the applicant's submissions it appears that the court did not grant his request.
Another hearing was held on 9 March 1998 before the Skopje Municipal Court.
On 5 July 1999 the Skopje Municipal Court granted Ms D.'s claim, as it found, on the basis of the witnesses' statements, expert report and additional expert report, that her late father had obtained the title to the disputed part of the house on the basis of the investment made.
On 27 March 2000 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Skopje Appellate Court. He complained, inter alia, that the lower court assessed the evidence wrongly and refused to appoint new experts.
On 29 June 2000 the Skopje Appellate Court rejected the applicant's appeal. It held, inter alia, that the expert report covered all the important issues, that on the applicant's request an additional expert report had been prepared and that the report was corroborated with other evidence.
The applicant received the judgment on 15 August 2000.


ITEMID: 001-87638
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GEO
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: CASE OF GALUASHVILI v. GEORGIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Art. 5-3
JUDGES: András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Nona Tsotsoria;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Tbilisi.
6. Following an anonymous telephone call at 3.35 p.m. on 26 June 2004 informing the Central Police Department of Tbilisi (“the CPD”) that armed men had been seen driving a car, the police urgently planned an arrest operation. The case file contains a transcript of that call.
7. At around 4 p.m. on 26 June 2004 the car, driven by the applicant, was stopped in one of the central avenues of Tbilisi (for more details, see Galuashvili v. Georgia (dec.), no. 40008/04, 24 October 2006). According to the record of the applicant’s body search undertaken on the spot, certified by two witnesses’ signatures, a gun was found tucked in the belt of his trousers. After the search, the applicant was immediately conveyed to the CPD.
8. According to the applicant’s version of events, however, he was never searched and nor were the reasons for his arrest explained to him at the time. The record of the search was allegedly drawn up ex post facto and presented to him only at the CPD, twenty minutes after his arrest in the street. He refused to sign the record of arrest, claiming that it had been fabricated.
9. At the same time the applicant contended that he had first learnt about the nature of the charges against him when glancing at the television in the room of the CPD used for questioning. The evening news of 26 June 2004 reported, quoting the investigator in charge of the case, that the applicant, “a.k.a. the ‘Elephant of Tskhneti’, a well-known criminal and ... recidivist ... had been arrested for the unlawful transport and storage of arms in large quantities.” Only later was the applicant presented with the investigator’s decision, dated 8.00 p.m. 26 June 2004, opening a criminal case and declaring him a suspect.
10. On the same day, without the applicant’s knowledge, the police conducted a search of his home in the presence of his family members. The record of that search, attested by the signatures of several witnesses, disclosed that guns and ammunition were discovered there. In addition, the police discovered and seized several Georgian passports of the applicant, issued on unspecified dates and containing different serial numbers, as well as his two old Soviet passports, in one of which he was apparently mentioned as a national of the former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The applicant’s wife refused to sign the record of the search, claiming that the police had planted firearms in their home.
11. On 27 June 2004 the Vake-Saburtalo District Court in Tbilisi validated the results of the two above-mentioned searches.
12. On 28 June 2004 the applicant was charged with the unlawful transportation and storage of firearms and ammunition. He pleaded “not guilty” but promised to cooperate with the investigation. On the same day the prosecutor requested that the applicant be remanded in custody, arguing as follows:
’s] guilt. He is not sincere in his dealings with the investigators. There exists a suspicion that he might interfere with the establishment of the truth. The possibility that he will abscond cannot be ruled out. A number of investigative actions have to be undertaken...”
No were relied on, or specific explanations put forward, in support of the above assertions.
13. At a hearing on 29 June 2004, the applicant denounced the unfounded nature of the charges and stated that his family, job and fixed place of residence were guarantees of his appearance for trial. He reaffirmed his readiness to cooperate with the investigation and stated that he was suffering from diabetes. The Vake-Saburtalo District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention for three months in the following terms:
“...Having examined [various pieces of evidence] ... [the court] has come to the conclusion that the collected evidence discloses a substantiated suspicion that the accused committed the offence in question. The evidence has been collected in conformity with the procedural norms.
“[In the court’s] opinion, the prosecutor’s request is substantiated, and granting it would be lawful since the accused has been charged with an offence carrying more than five years’ imprisonment. The seized gun has to be identified; it remains to be seen whether it has been the subject of suspicion in any other crimes. The suspicion that the accused, if released, might interfere with the establishment of the truth or, in view of the prospect of punishment, abscond is substantiated.”
14. The applicant appealed, requesting his release on the same grounds as had previously been put to the District Court. He submitted that the prosecution had not proved that there existed grounds for a reasonable suspicion that he might either abscond or negatively influence the investigation pending trial. The applicant also referred to his diabetes as an argument for release. The prosecutor replied that the appeal was unsubstantiated. A number of investigative measures had to be undertaken, and the applicant’s release might conflict with the interests of the investigation. The prosecution noted that no medical certificate proving the applicant’s disease had been submitted.
15. On 1 July 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court upheld the detention order of 29 June 2004. It noted that the applicant should remain in custody on the basis of the circumstances “well argued in the prosecutor’s submissions”. In particular, the court continued, “there existed sufficient grounds for the assumption that the applicant’s release pending trial would hinder the establishment of the truth and, in particular, the due assessment of the evidence submitted by the accused.”
16. Both the initial detention order of 29 June 2004 and the appeal decision of 1 July 2004 endorsed the fact that firearms and ammunition had been discovered on the applicant’s body and at his home on 26 June 2004.
17. On 5 July 2004, the applicant’s lawyer requested an official expert medical opinion on the applicant’s condition. The request was dismissed by the investigator on 8 July 2004 on the ground that the applicant had the right to have himself examined by an independent medical expert.
18. On 26 July 2004 the applicant’s lawyer requested the prosecution to include in the criminal case file the written statements of thirteen persons whom he had questioned himself. Some of those persons, having been eyewitnesses to the applicant’s arrest in the street on 26 June 2004, stated that the applicant had not been searched on the spot. Others, being witnesses to the search of the applicant’s home, testified that the police had planted the firearms there. The lawyer also requested that those witnesses be interviewed by the prosecution.
19. On 28 July 2004 the investigator in charge of the applicant’s case refused to include the above-mentioned statements as evidence in the file or to interview their authors. He reasoned that, since all of the witnesses who had allegedly been eyewitnesses to the applicant’s arrest were women, they would have been uninterested in what had been happening in the street and their testimonies, being moreover “superficial, incomprehensive and unsubstantiated”, were not trustworthy. The investigator suggested that those female witnesses might have been influenced and recalled that, in any case, the search on the spot had already been confirmed by other witnesses’ signatures. As to the witnesses to the search of the applicant’s home, the investigator considered that, as they were his neighbours, they were not impartial.
20. The applicant’s lawyer challenged that decision before the prosecutor, complaining, inter alia, that the investigator had discriminated against the female witnesses. The prosecutor dismissed the appeal on 2 August 2004 and instead ordered that the police officers who had been involved in the applicant’s arrest and in the search of his house be questioned.
21. An alternative expert medical opinion of 3 September 2004 confirmed that the applicant was suffering from a progressive type of diabetes and needed intensive insulin treatment. The opinion concluded that the risk of hypoglycaemia was high which, in the absence of urgent intervention, could lead to the applicant’s death. The following week, the applicant was transferred, upon his request, to the prison hospital where he stayed until his release (see paragraph 23 below).
22. On 25 September 2004 the investigation was terminated and the case sent to the Vake-Saburtalo District Court. During the trial, which opened on 18 November 2004, the applicant’s lawyer complained of the prosecution’s refusal to admit to the file the above-mentioned thirteen testimonies (see paragraph 18 above). He also referred to the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution, whose signatures certified the record of the applicant’s search, had changed their testimony in favour of the latter. In fact, when interviewed by the District Court, those persons said that they had not witnessed the actual process by which the gun on the applicant’s body had been revealed.
23. In its verdict of 22 November 2004, the Vake-Saburtalo District Court convicted the applicant of the unlawful transportation and storage of firearms and ammunition. In its opening part, the verdict referred to the applicant as an unemployed person. The court did not accept the prosecution witnesses’ altered testimonies, considering that they had been influenced by the applicant’s authority as a criminal ringleader. As disclosed by the record of the hearing, the prosecutor submitted – subsequently endorsed by the court – that the applicant’s “donation” of 100,000 Georgian laris (EUR 42,825) to the “Development Fund of the Law-Enforcement Agencies” should be considered as a mitigating factor. The facts that the applicant had had no prior convictions and was suffering from diabetes were also endorsed as mitigating circumstances. The applicant was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, suspended, and was immediately released from the courtroom.
24. On 3 December 2004 the applicant challenged the verdict before the Tbilisi Regional Court, seeking an acquittal. However, on 22 December 2004 he informed the Regional Court that he had lost interest in the proceedings and withdrew his appeal. According to the applicant, he had done so for security reasons, as the authorities had threatened to arrest him again.
“When the police officer, or other competent official, decides that the grounds prescribed by this Code for an arrest exist, he should inform the suspect thereof in understandable terms. Namely, the officer should explain to the suspect what are the charges leveled against him ... and convey him to a police station or other lawenforcement office.”
“A restraint measure shall be applied to ensure that the accused cannot avoid the preliminary investigation and trial, that his further criminal activity is prevented, that he cannot interfere with the establishment of the truth in the given criminal case, or that the court’s verdict is executed.
The application of a restraint measure is justified if the evidence in the criminal case file sufficiently substantiates the assumption that it is necessary to ensure the attainment of the aims mentioned in the first paragraph of this Article.
The ground for the imposition of pre-trial detention can be a substantiated suspicion that the accused may abscond or interfere with the establishment of the truth in the criminal case, or that a serious or grave crime has been committed.”
Apart from pre-trial detention, Article 152 § 1 envisaged the possibility of using such measures of pre-trial restraint as police supervision, home arrest, bail or a personal undertaking not to leave the place of residence.
“Pre-trial detention shall be imposed only with regard to persons charged with an indictable offence carrying [a punishment of] more than two years’ imprisonment ...”
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 5
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-3


ITEMID: 001-79472
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF GORBACHEV v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violations of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Loukis Loucaides
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in the town of Aleksin in the Tula Region.
6. On 18 May 1999 the applicant sued his former employer, a private company, for reinstatement, wage arrears and compensation for damage. The acknowledgment of receipt card indicated that the Aleksin Town Court had received the statement of claim on 21 May 1999. According to the Government, the applicant introduced the claim in August 1999.
7. On 5 January 2000 the Aleksin Town Court dismissed the claim. The judgment was quashed on 20 April 2000 by the Tula Regional Court and the case was remitted for a fresh examination.
8. In December 2000 the Aleksin Town Court told the defendant company that the first hearing had been fixed for 16 January 2001, and asked it to produce certain employment-related documents. The letter did not contain any indication whether the applicant had been summonsed. According to the applicant, he was not notified of the hearing of 16 January 2001. It appears from the list of events attached to the Government's memorandum that the case-file only contained a copy of summonses sent to the Aleksinskiy District Prosecutor who had been a third party in the proceedings.
9. The Aleksin Town Court fixed the following hearing for 9 February 2001. According to the Government, the parties were duly informed thereof. The applicant argued that the summonses had not been served on him.
10. On 9 February 2001 the Aleksin Town Court discontinued the proceedings. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:
“In the preparatory part of the hearing [the court] established that the plaintiff had not asked for an examination of his case in his absence and that he defaulted on the second summons, whereas the representative of the defendant... does not insist on the examination of the case on the merits.
Having studied the case-file and heard the prosecutor who considered that the proceedings should be discontinued, the court finds it necessary, under Articles 220, 221 § 6 of the RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure, to discontinue the proceedings.”
The decision was amenable to appeal within ten days.
11. According to the Government, on 19 February 2001 the Aleksin Town Court sent a copy of the decision to the applicant. The Government produced a copy of the covering letter accompanying the decision. The applicant claimed that he had not received the letter of 19 February 2001.
12. In May 2001 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation about the excessive length of the proceedings in his case. The Supreme Court readdressed the complaint to the Tula Regional Court.
13. On 12 September 2001 the President of the Tula Regional Court sent a letter to the Aleksin Town Court. The letter read as follows:
“I am sending you the complaint of Mr Gorbachev which was received from the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. [He complains] about your court's lengthy failure to examine his action... for reinstatement, payment of wage arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage after the Tula Regional Court quashed the judgment of 5 January 2000 of your court on 20 April 2000. [I ask you] to take immediate measures to determine the dispute.”
The applicant received a copy of the letter of 12 September 2001.
14. According to the Government, on 24 October 2001 officials of the Aleksin Town Court attempted to serve the applicant with a copy of the decision of 9 February 2001, however, he refused to countersign a record showing that the decision had been served on him. The Government indicated that this fact had been orally confirmed by the President of the Town Court. According to the applicant, he was not served with the decision either by mail or in person.
15. On 30 October 2001 the Aleksin Town Court sent a letter to the applicant and the President of the Tula Regional Court informing them that on 9 February 2001 the proceedings in the applicant's employment dispute had been discontinued. According to the applicant, he did not receive that letter.
16. On 29 November 2001 the applicant complained to the Tula Regional Court that the proceedings in his case were excessively long. On 11 December 2001 the Tula Regional Court readdressed the complaint to the Aleksin Town Court “in order to examine and respond”.
17. On 8 January 2002 the President of the Aleksin Town Court sent a letter to the applicant. A copy of that letter was also sent to a deputy President of the Tula Regional Court. The letter read as follows:
“Further to your complaint no. 22-5538 of 11 December 2001 lodged before the Tula Regional Court, the [Aleksin Town] Court informs you that by the decision of 9 February 2001 of the Aleksin Town Court the proceedings concerning reinstatement, payment of wage arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage were discontinued in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 221 of the RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure.
A copy of the decision advising you, in particular, of the right to appeal against it, was sent to you on 19 February 2001. However, you did not appeal against that decision by way of cassation or supervisory review after a copy of that decision had been delivered to you personally on 24 October 2001.
Your complaint is therefore unsubstantiated.”
The applicant submitted that he had not received that letter.
18. On 12 January 2002 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation that the Aleksin Town Court was delaying the examination of his action. The Supreme Court sent the complaint to the Tula Regional Court.
19. On 7 March 2002 the President of the Tula Regional Court sent letters to the President of the Aleksin Town Court and the applicant. The President noted that it had received the applicant's complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings related to his employment action. The President urged the Town Court to take measures to examine the applicant's action as soon as possible.
20. On 22 March and 5 April 2002 the President of the Aleksin Town Court sent letters to the applicant and the President of the Tula Regional Court. He insisted that on 9 February 2001 the proceedings had been discontinued, that a copy of that decision had been sent to the applicant on 19 February 2001 and that it had also been delivered to him personally on 24 October 2001. The applicant alleged that he had not received those letters.
21. On 29 March 2002 the applicant sent letters to the Constitutional and Supreme courts of the Russian Federation, the Tula Regional and Aleksin Town courts. The letters, in the relevant part, read as follows:
“On 4 December 2001 the Supreme Court of Russia received my complaint about the unjustified procrastination in the examination of civil cases in the Aleksin Town Court. The first-instance judgment of 5 January 2000 was quashed by the judgment of the appeal court on 20 April 2000. Almost two years have passed, but the civil case is not re-examined...
My complaints were readdressed to the Tula Regional Court and then to the Aleksin Town Court. I received letters of 12 September 2001, 7 March 2002 from the Regional Court. [The letters] state that 'immediate measures should be taken for examination of the case' and 'measures should be taken to examine the case as soon as possible'. No concrete response was received from the Aleksin Town Court...
The courts of the Russian Federation take every possible step to procrastinate for indefinite period the examination of my civil cases... to force me to withdraw my actions...
I would like to ask you to transfer the examination of my civil actions to another court in the town of Tula or to the Tula Regional Court”
22. In April 2002 the Supreme Court readdressed the applicant's complaint of 29 March 2002 to the Tula Regional Court. On 10 April and 14 May 2002 the President of the Tula Regional Court again sent letters to the Aleksin Town Court and the applicant. The Regional Court noted that the applicant had complained about the lengthy failure to examine his case. It urged the Aleksin Town Court to examine the applicant's claim as soon as possible. Copies of these letters were sent to the applicant.
23. On 15 May 2002 the President of the Aleksin Town Court sent letters to a deputy President of the Tula Regional Court and the applicant, informing them that the applicant had failed to appeal against the decision of 9 February 2001 and that his complaints were therefore unsubstantiated. The applicant claimed that he had not received that letter.
24. On 22 May 2002 the President of the Aleksin Town Court sent letters to the applicant and a deputy President of the Tula Regional Court. The letters read as follows:
“Further to your request of 29 March 2002 the Aleksin Town Court of the Tula Region informs you that on 9 February 2001 the proceedings... concerning reinstatement were discontinued under paragraph 6 of Article 221 of the RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure.
A copy of the court's decision was sent to the plaintiff on 19 February 2001; subsequently, on 24 October 2001 a copy of the decision of 9 February 2001 was made available to the plaintiff by personal delivery against his signature; an entry to that effect was made in the case-file.
However, at the material time, the plaintiff did not appeal against the decision by way of cassation or supervisory review. The complaint is therefore unsubstantiated.”
25. According to the applicant, he did not receive any letters from the Aleksin Town Court.
26. On 13 February 1999 the applicant lodged before the Aleksin Town Court a defamation action against the Aleksin Town Council. The statement of claim was sent to the Town Court by registered mail. The list of enclosures bearing a stamp of the Aleksin post office showed that the applicant's letter included three copies of the statement of claim and copies of responses from the prosecutor's office. The acknowledgment of receipt card shows that on 19 February 1999 the Aleksin Town Court received the statement of claims with enclosures.
27. The Government, relying on a certificate prepared by the Aleksin Town Court, claimed that no defamation action had been lodged by the applicant between 1999 and 2005.
28. In 1999 to 2002 the applicant complained to various domestic officials that the Aleksin Town Court had failed to decide on his claim.
29. On 7 March and 10 April 2002 the Tula Regional Court asked the Aleksin Town Court to take necessary steps to examine the merits of the applicant's defamation action as soon as possible. The applicant received copies of these letters.
30. The applicant did not receive any response from the Aleksin Town Court.
31. The RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure of 11 June 1964 (in force at the material time) provided that civil cases were to be prepared for a hearing no later than seven days after the action had been lodged with the court. Civil cases were to be examined no later than one month after the preparation for the hearing had been completed (Article 99)
32. Summonses were to be served on the parties and their representatives in such way so that they would have enough time to appear timely at the hearing and prepare their case. If necessary, the parties could be summoned by a phone call or a telegram (Article 106).
33. A party was to sign the second copy of a summons which was to be returned to a court. If a summons could not be served on a party, it was to be served on an adult family member who lived with the party. A family member who had received a summons was to indicate on its second copy his/her first name, patronymic and family name and his/her relation to a summonsed party. If a party was absent, a person who delivered a summons was to note on the second copy of the summons where the party had moved (Article 109).
34. Article 221 § 6 provided that a court could issue an interim decision on discontinuation of the proceedings (определение об оставлении заявления без рассмотрения), in particular, if the plaintiff had not waived his/her right to be present and had failed to appear for the second time, and the defendant had not insisted on continuation of the proceedings.
35. A copy of an interim decision on discontinuation of the proceedings was to be sent to the absent party no later than three days upon its delivery (Article 213).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-99626
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: UKR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2010
DOCNAME: CASE OF OLEKSIY MYKHAYLOVYCH ZAKHARKIN v. UKRAINE
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Art. 3 (substantial aspect);Violation of Art. 3 (procedural aspect);Violation of Art. 5-1-c;Violation of Art. 5-3;Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Karel Jungwiert;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Mykhaylo Buromenskiy;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1979. At the material time he lived in the town of Kalush, Ivano-Frankivsk Region.
6. At about 4 p.m. on 17 May 2003, when the applicant was driving from Ivano-Frankivsk to Kalush, he was stopped by police because they had received information that the applicant, who had previously been convicted of theft, might have been involved in recent burglaries committed in the neighbourhood.
7. When searching the applicant's car, the police officers seized an adjustable wrench, gloves, two pocket torches and some other things. They further allegedly found in the car and the applicant's pocket small amounts of cannabis. According to the applicant, he had no cannabis on him and there was none in his car.
8. Following the search, the police officers decided to formalise the applicant's arrest under Articles 44 and 263 of the Administrative Offences Code for possession of illegal drugs in small amounts (administrative offence). In the meantime they sent the seized adjustable wrench to an expert for an opinion as to whether it might have been used to break down the doors of the recently burgled apartments.
9. During the questioning, the applicant informed the police officers that the cannabis did not belong to him and stated that it had been planted on him and his car by the police officers. In response the applicant was allegedly beaten up.
10. According to the applicant, he was hung over a horizontal crowbar when handcuffed and with his head pointing downwards; when held in this position, he was threatened with being killed.
11. On 20 May 2003, after the expert confirmed that the adjustable wrench had been used for a number of burglaries, the police officers took the applicant to the investigator, who at 1 a.m. on 21 May 2003 formalised the applicant's further detention in the status of criminal suspect in respect of the burglaries.
12. When questioned, the applicant rejected the accusations of burglary. In response, he was allegedly beaten up by police officers. According to the applicant, he was hung over a horizontal crowbar when handcuffed and with his head pointing downwards; when he was in that position his head was beaten with a plastic bottle filled with water and his feet with a wooden bat; a gas mask filled with liquid was placed over his head, which made it impossible to breathe. During this treatment the applicant lost consciousness several times and when he came round he was told he had to confess to the crimes. Finally, he signed a confession to one burglary. Subsequently, he signed a number of other documents given to him by police officers.
13. During the night of 24 May 2003 the applicant, still being detained at the police station, asked to use the toilet. When allowed to use it, he cut his left-hand arterial vein. When the resultant bleeding was seen he was delivered to a local public hospital. The same day, having been provided with the requisite medical assistance, the applicant was released. The medical examinations and treatment provided to the applicant in connection with that injury were documented by medical officers.
14. On 26 May 2003 medical officers examined the applicant and issued a medical report. According to the letter of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor's Office (“the Regional Prosecutor's Office”) of 16 October 2003, the report attested that the applicant had suffered (in addition to the cut on the left arm) three abrasions to his right shoulder and arm, three bruises to his left shoulder, three abrasions and eight scratches to his left arm, and two abrasions to his right leg. According to the bill of indictment of 28 December 2007 (see also paragraph 32 below), the report, after describing the above injuries, ended with the conclusion that they had to be qualified as minor bodily injuries, which could have been inflicted by blunt objects (except for the cut on the left arm), about five days before the examination.
15. On 29 May 2003 the applicant was diagnosed with a severe and suicidal depressive disorder.
16. Following his release the applicant and his mother lodged numerous complaints with law enforcement authorities requesting that the police officers involved be held criminally responsible.
17. On 21 July 2003 the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Prosecutor's Office refused to institute criminal proceedings following the applicant's allegations, stating that there was no evidence of crime. The fact that the applicant sustained numerous injuries was noted but disregarded without explanation.
18. The applicant challenged that refusal before the Regional Prosecutor's Office which, in the course of reviewing the impugned decision, also requested the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Police Department, supervising the relevant local police offices, to carry out an additional internal inquiry concerning the facts complained of.
19. On 27 October 2003 the Regional Prosecutor's Office quashed the decision of 21 July 2003 on the basis that the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained the injuries had not been examined.
20. On 3 November 2003 the Regional Prosecutor's Office instituted an investigation of the allegedly unlawful detention and ill-treatment of the applicant.
21. On 15 December 2003 the applicant applied to the General Prosecutor's Office asserting that the Regional Prosecutor's Office could not carry out an impartial investigation in respect of police officers working in the same region. He requested therefore that the case be referred to a prosecutor's office of another region.
22. On 16 June 2004 the applicant repeated that request as there had been no reply to the first one. He stated that he could still remember the events in detail and identify the policemen involved but the relevant investigatory steps had not been taken.
23. On 24 June 2004 the Kalush Town Prosecutor's Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Yu. and B., two of the police officers who, it was alleged by the applicant, had been involved in the crimes.
24. On 26 July 2004 the Regional Prosecutor's Office itself considered the applicant's requests for referral of the investigation to another prosecutor's office and rejected them as unsubstantiated.
25. On 25 September 2004 the Regional Prosecutor's Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against police officers Zh., K., and H. for lack of evidence of their involvement in the alleged crimes. On several occasions the applicant requested a copy of that decision in order to challenge it before a court, but to no avail.
26. The Regional Prosecutor's Office then charged two police officers, A. (who was the operative officer of the local police office) and M. (who was the head of the division of the local police office dealing with crimes against individuals and crimes committed by group of persons), with abuse and exceeding their powers, forgery of documents, and unlawful arrest in respect of the applicant.
27. On 22 October 2004, having completed its investigation, the Regional Prosecutor's Office referred the case file to the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Court (“the Town Court”) for trial.
28. Between 3 November 2004 and 15 November 2006 the hearings in the case were adjourned by the Town Court five times because of the prosecutor's failure to appear, seven times at the request of the prosecutor, and once because the prosecutor was on holiday.
29. On 18 July 2007 the Town Court held a hearing in the case, in the course of which it established that the investigation had been carried out superficially and inadequately. The Town Court noted that the decisions to refuse to institute criminal proceedings against the other police officers had not been substantiated. It therefore remitted the case for further investigation and ordered that the other police officers be brought before the applicant for identification; that they be questioned; that a confrontation be held between them and the applicant; that the alibi of the accused M. be verified; that the staff of the hospital where the applicant was provided with medical assistance be questioned; and that a detailed reconstruction of the events be held with the participation of the applicant, given that the latter had made contradictory statements about how he had allegedly been hung over the crowbar.
30. On 24 September 2007 the Ivano-Frankivsk Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 18 July 2007 noting, inter alia, that the applicant's inconsistent statements should have been properly verified.
31. On 15 November 2007 the Regional Prosecutor's Office commenced additional investigations ordering that they should be terminated within one month.
32. On 28 December 2007 the Regional Prosecutor's Office, having completed the additional investigation, referred the case file to the Town Court. It charged A. with abuse of powers, excess of powers, forgery of documents, deliberately unlawful arrest. It further charged M. with excess of powers and deliberately unlawful arrest. All of the charges referred to the qualified corpi delicti of the relevant crimes. The bill of indictment stated, among other things, that M. requested the other police officers to handcuff the applicant and to hang him over the crowbar which was placed between two chairs; to place a gas mask over the applicant's head and block the air flow. It was specified that “the torture lasted from 1 a.m. on 21 May to 9.50 a.m. on 22 May 2003”.
33. According to the bill of indictment, the other police officers were not prosecuted as the applicant's mother submitted that, given the lapse of time, the applicant would not be in position to identify any other police officer except for A. and M.; moreover, all the other police officers denied their involvement in the crimes.
34. On 25 March 2009 the Town Court found that the Regional Prosecutor's Office had failed to comply with the investigatory instructions contained in the decision of 18 July 2007. The Town Court further decided to disjoin from the case the charges against M. and remitted this part of the case for additional investigation. As to the charges against A., the Town Court proceeded with their consideration.
35. On 26 March 2009 the Town Court found that in the course of the applicant's arrest A. planted drugs on the applicant, ill-treated him by punching and kicking him, falsified the administrative case in his respect, and illegally detained him. The Town Court found A. guilty of exceeding his powers, forgery of documents and unlawful arrest, and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment with a prohibition on occupying posts in law enforcement bodies for the same period. It also allowed the applicant's civil claim for damages in part.
36. On 15 September 2009 the Ivano-Frankivsk Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 25 March 2009. It further quashed the judgment of 26 March 2009 as unsubstantiated and remitted the whole case for additional investigation. It noted that A.'s guilt had not been properly established either, because of the serious shortcomings of the investigation. It also held thatthe Town Court had been wrong in its decision to examine the charges against A. separately from the charges against M.
37. The investigation against A. and M. is pending.
38. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her dignity.
No one shall be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that violates his or her dignity. ...”
“... In the event of an urgent necessity to prevent or stop a crime, bodies authorised by law may hold a person in custody as a temporary preventive measure, the reasonable grounds for which shall be verified by a court within seventy-two hours. The detained person shall be released immediately if he or she has not been provided, within seventy-two hours of the moment of detention, with a reasoned court decision in respect of the holding in custody. ...”
39. Chapter II of the Code deals with crimes against the life and health of an individual. Article 127 of the Code which is included in that chapter provides as follows:
“1. Torture, that is intentional causing of strong physical pain or physical or moral suffering by way of beating, tormenting or committing other violent acts with the purpose of compelling the victim or any other person to commit an act against his or her will
shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of from three to five years.
2. The same acts, if committed repeatedly or premeditatedly by a group of persons
shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of from five to ten years.”
40. Chapter XVII of the Code deals with crimes committed by public servants and other persons performing official functions. These offences include abuse of powers (Article 364); excess of powers (Article 365); forgery of documents (Article 366). The qualified corpi delicti are envisaged in the event of grave consequences and other circumstances. In particular, if the abuse of powers is committed by a law-enforcement officer, punishment for such a crime shall be imprisonment for a period of from five to twelve years with the prohibition to occupy certain posts (or to carry out certain activities) for a period of up to three years and with the confiscation of property (Article 364 § 3). Chapter XVIII of the Code deals with the crimes against the justice and provides, inter alia, the crime of deliberately unlawful arrest (Article 371).
41. Article 4 of the Code provides that the court, the prosecutor or the investigator must, to the extent that it is within their power to do so, institute criminal proceedings in every case where signs of a crime have been discovered, take all necessary measures provided by law to establish whether a crime has been committed and the identity of the perpetrators and punish them.
42. Article 99 of the Code provides that if there are no grounds to institute criminal proceedings, the prosecutor, the investigator, the body of inquiry, or the court shall take a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings and give relevant notices to the interested persons, companies, institutions and organisations.
43. The relevant parts of Article 106 of the Code read as follows:
“The body of inquiry shall be entitled to arrest a person suspected of a criminal offence for which a penalty in the form of deprivation of liberty may be imposed only on one of the following grounds:
1. if the person is discovered whilst or immediately after committing an offence;
2. if eyewitnesses, including victims, directly identify this person as the one who committed the offence;
3. if clear traces of the offence are found either on the body of the suspect, or on his clothing, or with him, or in his home.
If there is other information giving grounds to suspect a person of a criminal offence, a body of inquiry may arrest such a person if the latter attempts to flee, or does not have a permanent place of residence, or the identity of that person has not been established.
For each case of detention of a criminal suspect, the body of inquiry shall be required to draw up a minutes outlining the grounds, the motives, the day, time, year and month, the place of detention, the explanations of the person detained and the time when it was recorded that the suspect had been informed of his right to have a meeting with defence counsel as from the moment of his arrest, in accordance with the procedure provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 21 of the present Code. The minutes of detention shall be signed by the person who drew it up and by the detainee.
A copy of the minutes with a list of his rights and obligations shall immediately be handed to the detainee and sent to the prosecutor. At the request of the prosecutor, the material which served as a ground for detention shall be sent to him as well. ...
Within seventy-two hours of the arrest the body of inquiry shall:
(1) release the detainee if the suspicion that he committed the crime has not been confirmed, if the term of detention established by law has expired or if the arrest has been effected in violation of the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present Article;
(2) release the detainee and select a non-custodial preventive measure;
(3) bring the detainee before a judge with a request to impose a custodial preventive measure on him or her. ...
Detention of a criminal suspect shall not last for more than seventy-two hours.
If, within the terms established by law, the ruling of the judge on the application of a custodial preventive measure or on the release of the detainee has not arrived at the pre-trial detention facility, the head of the pre-trial detention facility shall release the person concerned, drawing up the minutes to that effect, and shall inform the official or body that carried out the arrest accordingly.”
44. Article 217 of the Code provides, inter alia, that after the completion of the investigation in the case, which has to be referred to the court for trial, the investigator gives relevant notices to the victim and his representative, civil plaintiff, civil defendant, or their representatives, and explains to them their right to familiarise themselves with the materials of the case file.
45. Article 44 of the Code prohibits the fabrication, purchase, storage, transport, or dispatch of drugs or psychotropic substances in small quantities without the purpose of their trafficking.
46. Article 263 of the Code provides, inter alia, that anyone who violates the rules on circulation of drugs may be arrested and detained for up to three hours in order for a report on the administrative offence to be drawn up. However, in order to identify the perpetrator of the offence, subject him to a medical examination, clarify the circumstances of purchase of the drugs or psychotropic substances and examine them, the detention may be extended by up to three days. In such cases the prosecutor shall be informed of the extension in writing within twenty-four hours. If the arrested person does not have identity documents the detention may be extended by up to ten days subject to the prosecutor's approval.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3
5
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-1
5-3
VIOLATED_BULLETPOINTS: 5-1-c