ITEMID: 001-76126
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF LAMPRET v. SLOVENIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;John Hedigan
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Velenje.
6. On 28 April 1998 the applicant was injured in a car accident. The perpetrator of the accident had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZS.
7. On 30 April 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZS in the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 3,144,108 tolars (approximately 13,000 euros) for the injuries sustained.
Between 14 July 1999 and 31 January 2006 the applicant lodged twelve preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.
Between 14 November 2000 and 9 September 2002 she made five requests that a date be set for a hearing.
Of the five hearings held between 10 October 2002 and 14 March 2006 none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
During the proceedings the court appointed a medical expert and a road traffic expert. The court also sought an additional opinion from the appointed medical expert.
At the last hearing the court decided to issue a written judgment. The judgment has not yet been served on the applicants.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-96372
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: FRIEND AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 1. These two applications challenge various bans on fox hunting and the hunting of other wild mammals with dogs in the United Kingdom.
The first application has been lodged by Captain Brian Leonard Friend, a British national who was born in 1939 and lives in Axminster, Devon. He is referred to below as the first applicant. His application relates to his challenge to the ban on hunting in Scotland and his challenge, in separate legal proceedings, to a similar ban in England and Wales.
The second application has been lodged by the Countryside Alliance and ten other applicants whose details are set out in the appendix. They are all represented by Clifford Chance LLP. The Countryside Alliance is a non-governmental organisation, which seeks to influence legislation and public policy that has an impact on the countryside, rural people and their activities. At the time of the domestic proceedings set out below, it had around 100,000 ordinary members and 250,000 associate members. The ten other applicants are British nationals who claim to have been affected by the ban in different ways. The Countryside Alliance and the ten other applicants in this application are referred to below as the second applicants. They sought to challenge the ban on hunting in England and Wales only.
2. On the basis of the facts as stated in the domestic proceedings and by the applicants before this Court, the cultural and social background to hunting can be summarised as follows.
Hunting with hounds has a long history in rural Britain. While it encompassed the hunting of deer, hare and mink, before the bans took effect, the principal quarry were foxes. These were traditionally hunted as vermin in order to protect farm stock. Over time, hunting of various quarries evolved such that the activity was organised in a particular area around a “Hunt”. The modern Hunt usually involves a pack of hounds, horseback riders and others who follow the hounds on foot. Any given Hunt now has its own particular customs and practices, including codes, dress, etiquette and hierarchy. The hunting season traditionally runs from early autumn until spring; most Hunts go out twice a week in that period, though larger Hunts may do so more frequently. Within each Hunt there is a Master of Hounds and other positions. Hunts are regulated by the Masters of Hounds Associations. Various charitable, community and social events have grown up around Hunts across the country. Members of the hunting community share the responsibilities for the organisation of the Hunt, for example caring for the hounds of a Hunt; those involved also have a common duty to repair any damage to the land on which the Hunt takes place.
3. In her witness statement before the High Court (see paragraph 6 below), which was characterised by that court as “largely unchallenged factually”, the President of the Countryside Alliance, Baroness Mallalieu, also stated that hunting was supported by the vast majority of farmers and land owners who allowed it to take place on privately owned land. She also averred that, in England and Wales, there were 174 registered fox hunting packs, one fox hunting club, 65 beagle packs, 12 harrier packs, 8 basset packs, 3 deerhound packs, 23 minkhound packs and 6 fell packs (with 2 affiliated fell packs). There were 27 registered Welsh gun packs and 56 registered Welsh hunting packs, although those registered with the Federation of Welsh Packs were only a proportion of the total number of packs in Wales.
4. In the case of Adams v. the Scottish Ministers (see paragraph 32 below), the Inner House of the Court of Session relied on a report prepared by the Rural Affairs Committee of the Scottish Parliament, which found that ten mounted hunts operated in Scotland and that two hunts based in Northumberland, England, regularly visited the Scottish Borders region.
5. In December 1999, the Home Secretary asked a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Burns to inquire into the various aspects of hunting and its impact. It was also asked to inquire into the consequences of any ban and how it might be implemented. After conducting hearings across England and Wales, the Burns Committee reported in June 2000. It did not address whether hunting should be banned but said that it believed its report would help inform the debate that followed its publication.
In December 2000, the Government introduced the Hunting Bill 2000 in the House of Commons, which offered three choices: regulation, supervision or prohibition of hunting. The Bill was not enacted as the House of Commons voted for prohibition and the House of Lords voted for supervision, which meant the Bill could not pass before the 2001 General Election.
A second Bill was introduced by the Government in 2002 which banned deer hunting and hare coursing but permitted fox, hare and mink hunting subject to registration. This was amended by the House of Commons to reject registration in favour of a ban on hunting, subject to exceptions. The registration system was reinstated by the House of Lords. In the following session of Parliament, the House of Commons passed a Bill which banned hunting, again subject to exceptions. This Bill became law (the Hunting Act 2004 – the 2004 Act) without the approval of the House of Lords pursuant to the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. For the provisions of the 2004 Act, see paragraph 30 below.
6. The first and second applicants challenged the legality of the 2004 Act by way of judicial review, arguing that it was incompatible with their rights under the Convention. A separate but related challenge was brought based on European Community law and the freedom to provide goods and services under Articles 28 and 49 of the EC Treaty.
7. Having reviewed the factual evidence before it, as well as the Burns Report, the High Court considered the impact the ban would have on the applicants. It stated:
“85. We are distinctly cautious in assessing, so far as we have to, the short, medium or long term effects of a ban on hunting which is regarded as permanent. The evidence of individual claimants of the actual or anticipated effect on them is unchallenged, other than by general contentions whose force we find unpersuasive. There is bound, we think, to be a decline in riding to hounds. We hesitate to say how sharp that decline might be. The Burns Report was similarly cautious. Fox hunts will not, we suppose, all disband overnight. Still less will related social activities collapse immediately. On the other hand, we cannot but suppose that there would be a substantial contraction of hunting related activities in the medium term. More importantly, for present purposes, we proceed on the scarcely contested basis that a significant number of individuals, of whom the individual claimants are representative, will suffer in a variety of tangible and economic ways and that some will lose all or part of their present livelihood. The extent to which they may be able to find alternatives is scarcely predictable. Some, no doubt, may not.
...
The Hunting Act will have a substantial general adverse effect on the lives of many in the rural community in England and Wales. It will have a direct effect on a significant number of individuals, of whom the individual claimants are representative. Some of these effects may not be immediate, but much of it is likely to happen in the short to medium term.”
8. The High Court found, however, that the ban did not interfere with the private lives of any of the claimants. Nor was there an interference with their right to respect for their homes with regard either to those applicants who had land over which hunts passed or those whose homes were tied to their employment or business insofar as their employment or business would be affected by the ban. There was similarly no interference with the applicants' rights under Article 11 § 1. It also found that Article 14 was not applicable since membership of the hunting community was not a personal characteristic amount to a status analogous with those contained in that Article. The High Court was, however, prepared to accept that there was an interference with their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, though that interference mainly, if not entirely, constituted control of use, not deprivation of property.
9. The precise nature of that interference was a matter of dispute between the parties. The applicants alleged that there were eleven interferences with property, grouped under three heads. First, in respect of land, there were interferences arising from: (i) the use of land to hunt by the owner; (ii) permitting others to hunt over one's own land; (iii) the value of land; (iv) expense associated with the removal of buildings and equipment which was of use only in the hunting industry; and (v) the reinstatement of land which had been modified specifically for hunting with dogs. Second, in respect of the livelihoods of certain of the applicants, there were interferences with: (vi) an individual's job and/or livelihood; (vii) the benefit of an existing contract of employment or contract for services related to hunting and (viii) goodwill in and/or the value of existing businesses which were reliant on the hunting industry for a large proportion of their income or the viability of their business. Third, in respect of other property, there were interferences as regards (ix) dogs; (x) horses and vehicles; and (xi) miscellaneous hunting equipment.
10. It was conceded by the Government that the 2004 Act interfered with the property covered in (i), (ii), (ix), (x) and (xi) above and that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 would be engaged to the extent that the Act had the indirect consequence of diminishing the values of land or other property or of damaging the goodwill of a business. The High Court agreed. In addition, “livelihood” was to be regarded as falling between the marketable goodwill of a business, which was a possession, and a loss of future income, which was not. To the extent that the Inner House of the Court of Session in Adams (see below) had regarded “livelihood” as a possession, the High Court declined to follow its ruling on that point.
11. Having reached these conclusions on Articles 8 § 1, 11 § 1, the High Court nevertheless examined whether the 2004 Act was justified under Articles 8 § 2 and 11 § 2 of the Convention and whether it was proportionate under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. That examination was joined to its examination of whether the Act was justified for the purposes of the restrictions it placed on the free movement of goods and services as guaranteed by European Community law. It found that, for Articles 8 § 2 and 11 § 2, the 2004 Act pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder, protection of health or morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and, for Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 14 (if the latter were applicable), that it pursued “legitimate objectives of public policy”. The Act was also in accordance with and prescribed by law for the purposes of Articles 8 § 2 and 11 § 2; no claim could be made that it lacked legal certainty or adequate procedural safeguards.
12. The first and second applicants' claimed that the Act was disproportionate because the House of Commons had adopted a more restrictive measure than that proposed by the Government and, further, that the Act itself promoted cruelty to foxes because it only allowed them to be shot, which, in certain cases, wounded but did not kill outright. The High Court rejected this argument, and instead found there was sufficient material for the House of Commons to conclude that hunting with dogs was cruel and that it was open to it to decide that legislative schemes other than a ban were unworkable. In the High Court's view, the balance to be struck between the legitimate aim pursued and the interference with rights and freedoms it engendered was: “intrinsically a political judgment and a matter of domestic social policy, incapable of measurement in any scientifically calibrated scale, upon which the domestic legislature had a wide margin of discretion.”
13. The High Court also found that, contrary to the first applicant's submissions, no issues arose in respect of Articles 9, 10, 17 and 53 of the Convention. Claims originally made under Articles 6 and 7 made by the applicants were not pursued before the court.
14. The High Court gave the second applicants permission to appeal in respect of their claims under Articles 8 and 11 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and refused the first applicant permission to appeal. The second applicants duly appealed to the Court of Appeal and the first applicant renewed his application for permission to appeal before that court.
15. Further evidence and witness statements were provided to the Court of Appeal. The Government submitted that since the passage of the 2004 Act, hunts had continued in alternative forms such as drag or trail hunting, where mounted riders and hounded pursued an artificial scent rather than live quarry; the applicants adduced evidence that this was an inferior and unrealistic alternative.
16. In respect of Article 8, the Court of Appeal found that it was not engaged and added:
“We have reached the foregoing, clear, conclusions on the assumption that some at least of the consequences of the Hunting Act feared by the [applicants] will in fact eventuate... But at the same time it is valuable to remind ourselves of circumstances in the real world. The new evidence adduced by the [Government] shows that things appear to have gone on very much as before, even if trail-hunting is regarded as a very inferior form of sport to the real thing.”
17. The court reached a similar conclusion in respect of Article 11:
“We entirely agree with both of our predecessor courts [the High Court and the Court of Session – see below] that it cannot be said that the Hunting Act interferes with the right of the [applicants] to assemble. All that it does is to prohibit a particular activity once the [applicants] have assembled. Moreover, the Hunting Act has now been in force for over a year, and the hunts have been assembling in greater numbers than ever. If they choose at some time in the future to lose interest in trail hunting or in other activities that are not directly prohibited by the Hunting Act, that will be a matter for them.”
18. On Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court of Appeal followed the approach of the High Court in accepting that that provision would only be engaged to the limited extent conceded by the Government. The Court of Appeal also upheld the reasoning of the High Court as to the legitimate aims pursued by the 2004 Act and its proportionality. That conclusion applied equally to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 8 and 11 if, contrary to its conclusions, those Articles were engaged.
19. The Court of Appeal found that the first applicant's renewed application for permission to appeal, brought in respect of his separate claims under Articles 9, 14, 17 and 53, should be refused as it had no reasonable prospect of success. It also refused the second applicants permission to appeal to the House of Lords. The second applicants then petitioned the House of Lords and, on 7 November 2006, an Appeal Committee of the House of Lords gave leave to appeal (see paragraph 24 below).
20. The Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act was passed by the Scottish Parliament on 13 February 2002 and entered into force on 1 August 2002. The 2002 Act prohibited the hunting of all wild mammals (except rabbits and rodents) with dogs (see relevant domestic law and practice at paragraph 31 below)
21. Together with one other petitioner, the first applicant, as a member of the Berwickshire Hunt, sought judicial review of the Act, contending that it was not within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, inter alia, because it was incompatible with Articles 8 – 11, 14, 17 and 53 of the Convention.
22. The petition was dismissed by the Outer House of the Court of Session on 20 June 2003. The Lord Ordinary found that Article 8 was not engaged: hunting was a complex social activity, carried on under public gaze, which clearly extended beyond the sphere of purely private life. He also dismissed the argument made by the first applicant and his copetitioner that Article 8 was engaged because hunting was so intrinsic to their way of life as to be their primary characteristic. Their case had to be distinguished from the gypsy lifestyle at issue in Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001I and the Saami way of life at issue in G. and E. v. Norway, nos. 9278/81 and 9415/81, Commission decision of 3 October 1983, Decisions and Reports (DR) 35, p. 30. A person's profession or recreation might assume great importance in his life but that was quite different from the situation where an activity was so closely associated with the way of life of a particular group that it fell to be regarded as integral to the individual personality of every member of that group. Furthermore, the hunting community could not be regarded as a distinct ethnic group.
The Lord Ordinary rejected the applicant's submissions that Articles 9, 10 and 11 were engaged but indicated that, had he found any of Articles 8 – 11 to be engaged, he would nevertheless have held that the Scottish Parliament was entitled to come to the view that the ban was necessary in a democratic society and pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of morals.
For the Lord Ordinary Article 14 could not apply because hunters could not be regarded as having a personal characteristic or status for the purposes of that Article; fox hunting was a common activity engaged in by a heterogeneous group of individuals. To the extent that the first applicant continued to rely on it before him, the Lord Ordinary did not regard Article 17 as relevant to the case. The same consideration applied to Article 53: it did not confer any rights on which the petitioners could rely.
23. The applicant appealed to the Inner House of the Court of Session. By this time, the Second Division of the Inner House had already given its judgment in Adams v. the Scottish Ministers, where, in a separate judicial review challenge brought by the Scottish hunting community, it had found the 2002 Act to be compatible with Articles 8, 11 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 32 below). On 27 September 2005, an Extra Division of the Inner House refused the first applicant's appeal. It found no reason to depart from the conclusions of the Second Division in Adams or the Lord Ordinary in the present case that Articles 8 – 11 and 14 were not engaged. It also upheld the Lord Ordinary's ruling in respect of Article 17 and the Article 53 submission was not pursued before the Inner House. The first applicant appealed to the House of Lords (see below).
24. On 28 November 2007 the House of Lords gave judgment on the first applicant's appeal from the Inner House of the Court of Session and the second applicants' appeal from the Court of Appeal. It unanimously dismissed both appeals.
25. In the second applicants' appeal, Lord Bingham of Cornhill found that Article 8 was not engaged, judging the applicants' complaints to be “far removed from the values which Article 8 existed to protect”. Fox-hunting was a very public activity and therefore no analogy could be drawn between it and any of this Court's cases where the notion of personal autonomy was found to underlie the right to respect for private life. Nor could any analogy be drawn with G and E, cited above, or Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 25 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996IV, where the applicants belonged to distinctive groups, each with a traditional culture and lifestyle at issue that was so fundamental as to form part of its identity. The hunting community could not be portrayed this way. That certain of the applicants were prohibited from hunting on their land was not an interference with the right to respect for their home since, in ordinary usage, such land could never be described as home. For those applicants who complained that they stood to risk losing their homes from the hunting ban, this was not the necessary or intended consequence of the 2004 Act and none of them had been evicted or might ever be. Finally, the applicants relied on the case Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, ECHR 2004VIII, as authority for the proposition that there would be an interference through loss of livelihood as a result of the ban but, for Lord Bingham, this was a very extreme case which could be distinguished on its facts.
Lord Bingham was not content to treat Article 11 as inapplicable: the right to assemble was of little value if the applicants, having assembled to act in a certain way, were prohibited from carrying out that activity. He then took the same approach as the High Court and Court of Appeal in considering whether the 2004 Act was justified under Articles 8 § 2 and 11 § 2 and, to the extent that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applied, whether the Act was a proportionate interference with the right to property. He concluded that it was: respect had to be paid to the recent and closely-considered judgment of Parliament. Finally, for Lord Bingham, no claim could be made under Article 14 as no personal characteristic of any of the applicants could be described as an “other status” under that Article.
26. Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hale of Richmond agreed with Lord Bingham, save that neither found Article 11 to be engaged. For them, it was insufficient simply to find that Article 11 did not apply on the grounds that the effect of the ban was not to prohibit the assembly of a hunt but to prohibit a particular activity which the hunt might engage upon once it had assembled. Instead, Lord Hope found Article 11 to be inapplicable because that Article did not guarantee a right to assemble for purely social purposes. The applicants' position was no different from that of any other persons who wished to assemble in a public place for sporting or recreational purposes. It fell well short of the kind of assembly whose protection was fundamental to the proper functioning of a modern democracy. Baroness Hale agreed: the kind of assembly protected by Article 11 had to be read alongside Article 10 and the democratic values those Articles sought to protect.
27. Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood agreed that Article 8 was not engaged but stated his strong wish that it were otherwise and that the scope of Article 8 should be developed by this Court. He also agreed that Article 11 was not engaged but that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was. As to proportionality, Lord Brown was prepared to accept that moral objection to hunting as expressed in the 2004 Act was sufficient justification for the “comparatively slight” interference with the applicant's property rights. However, under Article 8 § 2 he regarded the test to be much stricter and was unable to regard such an ethical objection to hunting as a sufficient basis for holding the ban to be necessary.
28. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry agreed in particular with the reasons given by Lord Brown and also found that Article 8 was not engaged. He accepted that certain activities could be regarded as integral to a person's identity and so form part of their private life for the purposes of Article 8. He also considered the activities which Princess Caroline had been photographed doing in public in Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004V (horse riding, riding her bicycle, playing tennis and going to the market) and suggested that if photographing her doing these things interfered with her rights under Article 8, then a law banning her from these activities would have constituted a greater interference. However, a distinction had to be drawn between, on the one hand, doing such activities simply for one's own enjoyment and the development of one's personality and, on the other, carrying out the same activity for a public purpose, where one could not be said to be acting for personal fulfilment alone. In the latter, a person might still be developing his or her personality through the activity but would have left the sphere in which they would be entitled to the protection of Article 8. He agreed with the Inner House of the Court of Session in Adams that a hunt took on the character of spectator sport and a public spectacle and thus that the applicants were not entitled to the protection of Article 8.
29. The first applicant's appeal was dismissed for the same reasons. Lord Hope delivered the lead speech with which the other four law lords concurred, subject to their opinions in the appeal brought by the second applicants. He upheld the finding of the Lord Ordinary and the Extra Division that Articles 17 and 53 had no relevance to the first applicant's basic argument that the Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act was outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament because it was incompatible with the Convention. He also upheld the lower courts' findings that Articles 8–11 and 14 were not engaged. To the extent that it was necessary to consider the justification for the 2002 Act, Lord Hope considered that there was adequate factual information to entitle the Scottish Parliament to conclude that foxhunting inflicted pain on the fox and that it constituted cruelty. The question of necessity was “pre-eminently one for the Parliament”.
30. Section 1 of the 2004 Act provides that a person commits an offence if he hunts a wild mammal with a dog unless his hunting is exempt. Classes of hunting which are exempt are specified in Schedule 1 of the Act. Under section 4, it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1 to show that he reasonably believed that the hunting was exempt.
Exempt hunting includes: (i) stalking a wild mammal, or flushing it out of cover, if the conditions in paragraph 1 of the Schedule are satisfied. The conditions include: (a) that the stalking or flushing out is undertaken to prevent or reduce serious damage which the wild mammal would otherwise cause; (b) that it does not involve the use of more than two dogs; nor (c) the use of one dog below ground otherwise than in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Schedule. The conditions in paragraph 2 include that the purpose of the stalking or flushing out is to prevent or reduce serious damage to game or wild birds kept for the purpose of their being shot; and that reasonable steps are taken to shoot the wild mammal dead as soon as possible after it has been flushed out from below ground. Further exemptions, subject to conditions, are made for the hunting of rats and rabbits, the retrieval of hares which have been shot, for falconry, for the recapture or rescue of a wild mammal, and for research and observation of a wild mammal.
Section 3 creates offences by a person who knowingly assists hunting which is banned under section 1. Section 11(2) provides that hunting a wild mammal with a dog includes any case where a person engages or participates in the pursuit of a wild mammal and one or more dogs are employed in that pursuit, whoever employs, controls or directs the dogs.
Section 5 bans hare coursing, which is defined as “a competition in which dogs are, by the use of live hares, assessed as to skill in hunting hares”.
A person guilty of an offence under the 2004 Act is liable on summary conviction to a fine of up to GBP 5,000. Conviction may lead to the forfeiture of any dog, vehicle or other article used for the purpose of prohibited hunting.
31. Section 1 of the 2002 Act makes it a criminal offence deliberately to hunt a wild mammal, for the owner or occupier of his land to permit it to be used for that purpose and for the owner of a dog to permit it to be used for the same. By section 10 rabbits and rodents are excluded from the definition of a wild mammal. Exemptions are made in sections 2 – 5 (subject again to conditions) for stalking and flushing from cover, falconry and shooting, retrieving and locating wild mammals. Section 6 gives the Scottish Ministers the power to specify further “excepted activities”, which will not constitute an offence under section 1. By section 8(1) a person guilty of an offence under the Act is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to 6 months or a fine of up GBP 5,000 or both.
32. The petitioners in this case sought to challenge the 2002 Act by way of judicial review, similarly relying on Articles 8, 11 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They were unsuccessful at first instance before the Lord Ordinary in the Outer House of the Court of Session. They appealed to the Second Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session, which dismissed the appeal on 28 May 2004. The Inner House took note of an expert report submitted by the petitioners, which found that the end to traditional foxhunting would bring the “collapse of an entire social and cultural world” and result in “profound and deeply felt social and cultural impoverishment” in the Scottish Borders. However, Articles 8, 11 and 14 were not engaged. For Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Inner House found that the Act did not amount to de facto expropriation of possessions related to hunting (in particular one of the petitioner's hounds) but rather control of the use of property and thus there was no requirement for the Act to provide a scheme of compensation. It was accepted that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was engaged to the extent that the Act restricted the use to which the petitioners put their land and hounds. The Inner House also sustained the finding of the Lord Ordinary that one of the petitioner's economic interest in making his livelihood as a self-employed manager of foxhounds was a possession within the meaning of that Article. In doing so, it relied on this Court's rulings in Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 7 July 1989, Series A no. 159; Van Marle and Others v. the Netherlands, 26 June 1986, Series A no. 101 and the Commission's decision in Karni v. Sweden, no. 11540/85, 8 March 1988, Decisions and Reports (DR) 55, p. 157. However, for that livelihood and the other possessions of the petitioners, the Scottish Parliament had struck an appropriate balance: it had conducted extensive inquiries before legislating and had acted within the scope of its discretion in judging that foxhunting should be prohibited.


ITEMID: 001-5366
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: NLD
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2000
DOCNAME: ECHEVERRI RODRIGUEZ v. THE NETHERLANDS
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Elisabeth Palm;Gaukur Jörundsson
TEXT: The applicant is a Colombian national, born in 1960 and currently serving a prison sentence in the Netherlands. He is represented before the Court by Ms E. Prakken, a lawyer practising in Amsterdam.
On 1 April 1992, upon request of the public prosecutor, the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) of the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague opened a preliminary judicial investigation (gerechtelijk vooronderzoek) against Mr X., a Colombian national residing in the Netherlands and who was suspected of being involved in importation of cocaine. At some later point in time, a preliminary judicial investigation was also opened against Ms Y., the spouse of Mr X. After Mr X. and Ms Y. had become aware of these investigations, they left the Netherlands for the United States of America (USA). Although, following their departure from the Netherlands, the criminal investigations against them were not actively pursued, they were not formally closed.
In April 1995, the USA Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) opened an investigation under the code name “Tropical Wizzard” against a number of persons suspected of cocaine trafficking and money laundering activities. One of these suspects was Mr X. As it appeared from tapped telephone conversations of Mr X., that he was involved in the transport of drugs to the Netherlands, the responsible Assistant Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Ms D., requested the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 20 April 1995 for an order allowing the disclosure of intercepted wire conversations to the Netherlands criminal investigation authorities. After having obtained this judicial disclosure order on 25 April 1995, the Netherlands criminal investigation authorities were provided with the intercepted communications.
On 24 May 1995, on the basis of the 1981 Treaty between the Netherlands and the USA with regard to mutual assistance in criminal matters, the public prosecutor Mr V. addressed a letter rogatory to the USA authorities to the effect of making available the results of the criminal investigation in the USA, including the tapped telephone conversations, in order to explore the possibilities of a joint investigation of the activities of Mr X. in particular.
From the information made available by the USA authorities, it appeared that around 9 July 1995, a ship carrying a large quantity of cocaine destined for the Netherlands had left a Colombian harbour and that Mr X. had contacts by telephone with persons in the Netherlands. One of the telephone numbers concerned was 06-528*****. This number was registered in the Netherlands under the name of a person called M. and used by a person referred to as “El Doctor”.
On 13 July 1995, the preliminary judicial investigation against Mr X. in the Netherlands was reactivated and permission was obtained from the investigating judge to tap a number of telephone lines including the number 06-528*****. In addition, a preliminary judicial investigation was opened against Mr Gomez Y., who would represent Mr X. in the Netherlands.
It appeared from telephone conversations tapped and a large number of observations that the ship from Colombia would arrive in the harbour of Zeebrugge (Belgium), where the drugs would be collected by a number of Colombians with the aid of divers and subsequently be brought by car to the Netherlands. Observations allowed the police to identify three cars in which the drugs would be transported. One of the cars, a Renault Clio, guided the other two cars to the final place of delivery. Mr X. was found to be in contact with the driver of the Renault Clio via the mobile telephone line 06-528*****. In the night of 2-3 August 1995, a large number of persons involved were arrested and taken into detention. A total of 145 kg. of cocaine was seized. Mr X. and the applicant were amongst the arrested persons. The applicant was arrested sitting in the Renault Clio, shortly after this car had arrived at the place where the cocaine was planned to be delivered.
Following the closure of the preliminary judicial investigation, the applicant was charged with narcotics offences and summoned to appear before the Regional Court of The Hague in order to stand trial.
In its judgment of 8 February 1996, following adversarial proceedings, the Regional Court convicted the applicant of being involved in narcotics offences and of membership of a criminal organisation. He was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. The applicant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of The Hague.
In the course of the hearing held on 2 October 1994 before the Court of Appeal, the defence requested the court, inter alia, to hear a number of witnesses, including Ms D., the USA Assistant Attorney having dealt with the investigation conducted in the USA, in relation to her request of 20 April 1995 and the role played by a certain Mr S. in the investigation in the USA. The defence did not find it necessary to take direct evidence from Mr S.
On 9 October 1994, after having deliberated, the Court of Appeal rejected the request to take evidence from Ms D. and a number of other witnesses. It considered on these points:
<Translation>
“As a general framework for the decisions to be taken, the court considers the following at the outset.

1. The case has its origins in a broad investigation of international cocaine trafficking conducted in the USA under the name Tropical Wizzard. The criminal investigation in the Netherlands has been set into motion after having obtained on 24 May 1995 disclosure of American tapping data, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America on mutual assistance in criminal matters…. The tapping data have thus formed the basis of the start of the investigation in the Netherlands. With the aid of further taps and observations in the Netherlands, the investigation has been pursued, which led on 3 August 1995 to the finding of 145 kg. cocaine and the apprehension of a large number of suspects, amongst whom the accused.
2. The accused now request the court, in brief, to assess inter alia the course of events in relation to the lawfulness of the use in the Netherlands of American investigation results. The question is whether it is incumbent on the Netherlands judge to do so. The court considers that in principle this is not the case. The existence of a treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters is based on the principle that it may be relied upon that the Government, to whom a request is addressed and in application of that treaty, will exercise its powers in conformity with the treaty norms, which may be considered as being in conformity with the essential norms of public order valid in the Netherlands. Only where there is a concrete reason to assume that in the application of such powers those norms would have been disrespected, a reason would arise to examine the lawfulness indicated. The court considers that those norms include those of the international human rights treaties.
3. For the question when acts are contrary to the Dutch public order it is possible, in connection with the instant case and noting the contents of the defence argument, to consider the case-law relating to the (in)admissibility of the public prosecution department in its prosecution. This appears, inter alia, from the so-called Zwolsman judgment …, namely that the far reaching sanction of inadmissibility of the prosecution can only follow in case of serious breaches of the principles of proper proceedings (behoorlijke procesorde) by which, deliberately or with gross negligence, the suspect’s interests in his right to a fair hearing have been disrespected.
4. In relation to the defence’s requests seeking an investigation into the lawfulness of the Netherlands criminal investigation, the court considers at the outset that a possible flaw of the lawfulness, insofar as it does not impel the inadmissibility of the prosecution, only then leads to the exclusion of the evidence if the suspect concerned is harmed in an interest that the violated norm seeks to protect. This implies that in such a case an investigation of a violation of such a norm is not necessary, if the suspect himself has not been directly harmed by this <violation>.
5. As to the compilation of the case-file, the court considers at the outset that the responsibility thereto rests primarily with the public prosecutor, who provides the case-file to the judge. In that file are to be included the data that in all reasonability may be of relevance to any decision to be taken by the judge, including possible exculpating evidence.
6. It applies to all objections and requests by the defence, that these are to be substantiated by sufficiently concrete facts and/or circumstances and which are of relevance to the point made. Suppositions and suggestions are insufficient to this end.
7. The court will now consider the requests of the accused.
8. It is contended that no full disclosure has been made as to the investigation in the USA. It is not excluded that more methods of investigation than taps has been used and that the Netherlands Prisma <criminal investigation> team was already itself actively involved in the investigation. The defence deduces this from the written remark on 20 April 1995 by Ms D. that the “the United States’ Attorney’s Office of the Southern District of Florida and the Drug Enforcement Administration currently are co-ordinating their law enforcement activities with the law enforcement agencies of the Netherlands” and furthermore from the fact that Mr E. <police commissioner in charge of the Prisma investigation team> states that on 23 May 1995 more documents had been shown than <those> subsequently requested and disclosed.
9. Mr E. has been extensively questioned twice about these matters by the investigating judge and the defence. It follows from his statements that the Netherlands police kept regular contacts with the American authorities about joint investigation targets - drug trafficking from South-America - and that in this framework it received a tip from the USA about possibly punishable acts by Mr X., which could have a follow-up in the Netherlands. Further consultations have occurred on a number of times. Subsequently, on 23 May 1993 and in the presence of the public prosecutor, a conversation with, amongst others, Ms D. has taken place in the Netherlands and, on 24 May <1995> by letter rogatory, the public prosecutor has requested the disclosure of the investigation results including the taps. Only the taps have been disclosed.
10. From the statements of Mr E. cannot be deduced more than that there has been a consultation prior to 23 May 1995, but not that the Netherlands police has been actively involved in the USA in investigation acts or that the Netherlands public prosecution department was conducting an investigation there. This can furthermore not be deduced from Ms D.’ remark on 20 April 1995. On 23 May <1995>, the American authorities have informed the Netherlands colleagues of the investigation results obtained at that point in time.
11. It is a fact that Mr E. declares that more documents have been shown and have been kept outside the case-file … and that he cannot make public <statements about> some matters. When questioned, he indicates … that those other documents and matters are, inter alia, connected to another cocaine line. Since the order of the judge in Florida dated 25 April 1995 on disclosure of documents only related to taps, the court considers at the outset that on 23 May <1995>, in relation to the Tropical Wizzard case, for that reason only the taps have been disclosed and that <the> other documents shown concerned other cases, as indicated by Mr E.
12. Given the previously formulated general framework, the court sees no terms in the defence’s submissions to have a further investigation of the lawfulness and of the possible presence of other methods of investigation in the USA. The submissions to this effect are insufficiently concretised and is for the greater part based on suppositions, whereas it has neither been substantiated that the methods used might be so unacceptable that the Netherlands public order comes into play.
13. A lack of clarity nevertheless remains. On 23 May <1995> documents have been selected in the presence of the public prosecutor. The following day, he has requested the disclosure of more documents than solely the taps. It is possible that with this he means the selected material. Insofar as known to the court, only the taps have been disclosed and the public prosecutor has acquiesced in this <situation>. The question therefore arises as to what documents the public prosecutor has possibly had in mind - possibly those of 23 May <1995> - and whether these documents could be of relevance for any decision of the court. The defence points at this lack of clarity. The court finds reason in this to request the public prosecutor to submit a clarification in writing on this <point> and/or to remain available as a witness, albeit with the explicit limitation that in this <evidence> only concerns these questions. It must, however, be pointed out at this stage that this matter is likely, for the time being at least, to be of limited importance. The further case-file, which has led to the suspect’s arrest, has in fact only been constituted following receipt of the taps.
14. The court therefore rejects the requests by the defence in relation to the investigation in the USA, i.e. the taking of evidence from Ms D., with the exception of the request in relation to the public prosecutor concerning the question as limited above.
15. The defence suspects that Mr S. might have been involved in the investigation as an infiltrator. An investigation is requested. He would currently live in Florida.
16. That Mr S. was an infiltrator is no more than a supposition. When questioned, Mr E. stated that no infiltrator was involved in the Netherlands investigation and has submitted good grounds why Mr S. was not arrested then as a suspect (he did not yet know Mr S. then and a suspicion of punishable acts had not yet arisen then).
17. Remains the possibility that Mr S. was working for the investigation authorities in the USA and infiltrated here <in the Netherlands>. Without further data, the court considers this possibility unlikely. The question is indeed to what purpose Mr S. would have infiltrated here, let alone in the case of this suspect. Nothing appears from the documents that could indicate provocation by Mr S. - X. even denies that actually - or any other influence of Mr S. on the actual importation of the cocaine.
18. Mr S. was possibly here in the Netherlands as an observer, leaving aside the desirability of such activities on the territory of another State. As the Netherlands police themselves have observed, the court considers that such a role, assuming that he has played it, is of insufficient weight to investigate this, given the frameworks indicated above. All requests in relation to this matter are therefore rejected.
19. It has been requested on behalf of the suspect to submit the full formal records of the observations. In the running formal records (“loop-p.v.”) summaries of the observations have been included. Whether in addition further formal records have been made is not known to the court. If so, then there is in principle reason to add those formal records to the case-file. The court will therefore request the Procurator General to do so or to indicate in writing why this cannot take place (in full).
…
22. The suspect has further requested to hear the witness Mr M. about the suspect’s role. The defence has not yet been able to question this witness. Nevertheless, the court rejects this request as insufficiently substantiated. It appears from the documents that Mr M. has hardly any knowledge of that role and it has not been indicated that he would know more.
…
24 The suspect has also requested to hear as a witness Ms Y., living in Florida. She would be able to testify about a possible role of the suspect in the past. The court rejects this request. In the extensive Dutch investigation numerous persons have been heard, amongst whom also a number in relation to the possible role of the suspect in the past. It is unclear why a further statement needs to be added, whereas furthermore it has not been indicated that the witness requested has own knowledge about that part. That is only supposed. “
By letter of 21 October 1996, the public prosecutor Mr V. submitted further explanations to the Court of Appeal in relation to his letter rogatory addressed to the USA authorities.
In the course of the hearing held on 30 October 1996 before the Court of Appeal, oral evidence was taken from the applicant, the public prosecutor Mr V. and a further witness. The hearing of the public prosecutor Mr V. was, however, restricted to the specific subject matter as explicitly defined by the Court of Appeal. On the same day, the Court of Appeal heard the parties’ final pleadings and fixed the date on which it would hand down its judgment.
In its judgment of 13 November 1996, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 8 February 1996, convicted the applicant of being involved in narcotics offences and of membership of a criminal organisation and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment.
It rejected the requests by the defence to adjourn the proceedings on appeal pending the inclusion of the records in relation to the observation of the garage at the final place of delivery of the cocaine or, alternatively, to take oral evidence from the police officers having observed that location; to take, in the light of the testimony given by the public prosecutor Mr V., oral evidence from Ms D. in relation to a possible informal co-operation between the Dutch and American criminal investigation authorities already in April 1995; and to take further unrestricted oral evidence from the public prosecutor Mr V.
The Court of Appeal held on the first point that, in conformity with the court’s request, the public prosecutor had added three formal records on the observation to the case-file. It considered itself sufficiently informed by these formal records and did not find a further investigation of this point necessary. Referring to its considerations stated on 9 October 1996 and finding that the hearing held on 30 October 1996 had not disclosed any further elements which should lead to a different finding, the Court of Appeal also further rejected the second and third requests by the defence.
It based the applicant’s conviction on the applicant’s statement before the Regional Court, statements taken from Mr X. before the police and the investigating judge, statements taken from other persons before the police and/or the investigating judge, formal records and the results of a forensic examination of substances seized by the police on 3 August 1995.
The applicant’s subsequent appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) was rejected on 16 December 1997. Insofar as the applicant complained that the Court of Appeal had unjustly rejected his requests to take further evidence, the Supreme Court accepted as correct the reasons stated by the Court of Appeal for not acceding to those requests. As regards the decision to restrict the scope of further evidence sought from the public prosecutor Mr V., the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal was at liberty to restrict the questioning of this witness to those points in respect of which the necessity to obtain further evidence had appeared. It further noted that it had not been argued and that it had not appeared that the defence had been restricted in the exercise of its rights in relation to the questioning of this witness about the subjects defined by the Court of Appeal.


ITEMID: 001-58074
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ITA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 1996
DOCNAME: CASE OF CETERONI v. ITALY
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Art. 6-1;Not necessary to examine Art. 8;Not necessary to examine P4-2;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: C. Russo
TEXT: 8. On 2 April 1982 the District Court of Fermo (Ascoli Piceno) made an insolvency order in respect of the company set up by Mr Umberto Ceteroni and his parents and also declared them personally bankrupt.
9. On 8 and 15 June 1983 respectively Mr A. and the L.M. company, claiming to be creditors of the bankrupts, instituted separate proceedings before the Fermo bankruptcy judge (giudice delegato) contesting the statement of liabilities drawn up with a view to settling the company's debts. The judge set down hearings to enter appearances on 26 October and 9 November 1983 respectively. On the latter date the liquidator applied to the judge for leave to join the second proceedings. His application was allowed on 3 February 1987.
10. The preparatory phases of the two cases continued until 15 and 29 October 1990. During the intervening period fifteen hearings were held in one case and sixteen in the other; they were almost all adjourned at the request of the parties or by the judge of his own motion.
11. On a date that has not been specified the two sets of proceedings were stayed sine die because the judge had been transferred to another post. Proceedings were reopened on 25 March and 7 February 1994.
12. On 30 May 1994 the Fermo District Court struck the first case out of its list because the parties had failed to appear. According to information supplied by the applicants' lawyer, the plaintiff had decided not to pursue his case. As regards the second case, on 21 February 1994 the parties communicated their final submissions and the judge set down the trial hearing for 11 March 1994, on which date the Fermo District Court allowed the L.M. company's application. The text of the judgment was deposited at the registry on 7 April 1994. II. Relevant domestic law
13. The relevant provisions of Royal Decree no. 267 of 16 March 1942 read as follows:
Section 26 "An appeal shall lie against the decisions of the bankruptcy judge ... to the district court within three days of their adoption, and may be lodged by the liquidator, by the bankrupt, by the creditors' committee or by any other person with an interest. The district court shall deliberate in private session and give a reasoned decision. The appeal shall not have suspensive effect in relation to the impugned decision."
Section 36 "An appeal shall lie against measures taken by the liquidator. Such appeals may be lodged by the bankrupt, or any other person with an interest, with the bankruptcy judge, who shall give a reasoned decision. An appeal against that decision must be lodged within three days with the district court. That court shall give a reasoned decision after hearing the liquidator and the appellant."
Section 48 "Correspondence addressed to the bankrupt must be passed to the liquidator, who shall be empowered to retain correspondence concerning property interests. The liquidator has a duty of confidentiality as regards the content of the correspondence that does not relate to such interests."
Section 49 "The bankrupt may not leave his place of residence without the authorisation of the bankruptcy judge and must report to that judge, to the liquidator and to the creditors' committee each time that he is duly summoned, except where he is unable to appear on legitimate grounds and the judge gives him leave to send a representative. If the bankrupt fails to comply with a summons, the judge may order that he be brought by the police."
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-60158
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: LTU
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2002
DOCNAME: CASE OF SIPAVICIUS v. LITHUANIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: No violation of Art. 6-3-a or 6-3-b
JUDGES: Georg Ress
TEXT: 8. The applicant is a Lithuanian national, born in 1950 and living in Kaunas.
9. The applicant, a police commissioner, was suspected of involvement in a conspiracy to smuggle non-ferrous metals in view of his alleged failure to investigate properly the activities of certain smugglers in 1994. He was arrested on 18 August 1995 in the context of criminal proceedings instituted in 1992. There were eight co-accused in the case, including the applicant.
10. On 22 August 1995 he was charged with obtaining property by deception (sukčiavimas) under Article 274 of the Criminal Code, abuse of office (piktnaudžiavimas tarnyba) under Article 285 of the Code, and official forgery (tarnybinis suklastojimas) under Article 289 of the Code. On 29 November 1995 the prosecution dropped the last charge.
11. From 1 December 1995 to 18 January 1996 the co-accused had access to the case-file. On 14 February 1996 a prosecutor confirmed the bill of indictment whereby the applicant was indicted for offences under Articles 274 and 285 of the Criminal Code. On 20 February 1996 the case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court.
12. On 17 May 1996 a judge of the Vilnius Regional Court ordered additional investigations and requested that the prosecution supplement the charges under Articles 274 and 285 of the Criminal Code. On 26 June 1996 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision, finding that the Regional Court was able to consider the question of committal for trial without further investigation measures. The Court of Appeal also ordered the applicant’s release on bail. He was released in open court. On 9 July 1996 the Court of Appeal remitted the case to the Vilnius Regional Court.
13. On 20 September 1996 the judge of the Vilnius Regional Court committed the applicant for trial on the charges under Articles 274 and 285 of the Criminal Code.
14. During the trial hearing on 24 April 1998 the judge stated:
“... the charge of cheating may be supplemented ... [and] the charge under Article 285 [of the Criminal Code] may be amended by adding the ‘selfish interest’ ... .”
During the trial hearing on 11 May 1998 the judge said:
“... the charge under Article 285 may be supplemented ... with alleged breaches of [the specific provisions] of the Police Act ... .”
During that hearing the trial judge informed the parties that she would pronounce the judgment on 22 May 1998.
15. On 22 May 1998 the Vilnius Regional Court acquitted the applicant on the count of obtaining property by deception under Article 274 of the Criminal Code. In connection with the charge under Article 285 the court held: “the charge of abuse of office cannot be sustained... . However, [the applicant], being a State official, improperly performed his functions because of negligence” in that he had failed to ensure proper investigation and control of the smuggling case. Since this failure amounted to a breach of certain provisions of the Police Act, the judge found the applicant guilty of official negligence (tarnybos pareigų neatlikimas dėl nerūpestingumo) under Article 288 of the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and deprived of the right to occupy an official position in the system of law enforcement. The judge reduced the custodial sentence by one third pursuant to an amnesty law, and found that the applicant had completed the sentence on account of the time spent in detention on remand.
16. The applicant appealed against the judgment of 22 May 1998, stating that the Vilnius Regional Court had convicted him of an offence not covered by the initial charges and in respect of which he had not been in a position to defend himself. He noted in particular that during the trial the judge had in no way indicated that the charge of abuse of office could be replaced by one of official negligence.
17. On 9 September 1998 the Court of Appeal held an appeal hearing on questions of fact and law in the presence of the applicant and his defence lawyer. The appeal court heard addresses by the applicant and a prosecutor. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the ground inter alia that:
“the allegation that the reclassification was not permitted is unfounded. Both Articles [285 and 288 of the Criminal Code] punish offences against State office. The [first instance court] court only established that [the applicant] improperly performed his functions as an officer because of negligence, but that he did not deliberately take advantage of his official position contrary to the interests of his office. The [original] charge did not refer to breaches [by the applicant] of specific provisions of the Police Act. In accordance with Articles 279 § 2 and 280 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court warned [the applicant] that the charge could be supplemented with breaches of [the specific provisions] of the Police Act. An adjournment was offered for the preparation of the defence, but the parties did not request such an adjournment ... . The allegation that [the applicant] could not defend himself against the charges is therefore dismissed.”
18. The applicant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, complaining inter alia that the reclassification of the charge had breached his right to defend himself. On 2 March 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. The cassation court held inter alia that the first instance court had reclassified the offence of abuse of office with that of official negligence in accordance with Articles 279 § 2 and 280 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the appeal court had replaced the initial charge with a lesser one, merely drawing the legal conclusions consistent with the facts laid before it.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
19. Article 285 creates liability for deliberate abuse of office which may be punished by up to 5 years’ imprisonment or a fine.
Article 288 punishes improper performance by State officials of their functions because of negligence with a custodial sentence of up to 4 years’ imprisonment or a fine.
Disqualification from holding certain public offices may also be imposed as a supplementary penalty for these offences.
20. At the material time, Article 279 § 2 allowed a court to replace a charge with another one during the trial. Pursuant to Article 280 § 1, a court was entitled to replace a charge with a less severe one, provided that the facts on which the new charge was based did not, in principle, differ from those of the initial one. Under Article 280 §§ 2 and 6, the court could also replace a charge with a more severe one. In the latter case, on the defendant’s request, the court could adjourn the trial to enable a revision of the defence.
On 5 February 1999 the Constitutional Court ruled that the provisions of Article 280 § 1 of the Code were compatible with the principles of a fair trial and defence rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Constitutional Court also ruled that Article 280 §§ 2 and 6 of the Code, to the extent that it permitted the court to replace a charge with a more severe one, was incompatible with the Constitution.
21. Pursuant to Article 398 § 2 of the Code, if an appeal is filed against a judgment of the first instance court, the judgment becomes effective upon the determination of the appeal. In accordance with Articles 374-377, the competence of the appeal court extends to all questions of fact and law established by the first instance court, and the appeal court has the power to take a decision quashing or amending the conviction, or to pronounce a new judgment. Under Article 376 an appeal hearing is obligatory, and it must be conducted in the presence of the parties. Articles 398 § 4 and 399 § 4 provide that the decision of the appeal court becomes effective when it is pronounced.
22. Under Articles 416-423 of the Code, a cassation appeal can be submitted to the Supreme Court against a judgment which has become effective. The competence of the cassation court extends to questions of fact and law, and it has the power to quash or amend lower decisions.
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
NON_VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-3
NON_VIOLATED_BULLETPOINTS: 6-3-a


ITEMID: 001-115478
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: DEU
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2012
DOCNAME: TIPP 24 AG v. GERMANY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Paul Lemmens
TEXT: 1. The applicant, Tipp 24 AG, (“the applicant company”), is a stock company based in Hamburg. It currently operates under the name Tipp 24 SE. The applicant company was represented before the Court by Mr T. Masing and Mr N. Wimmer, both lawyers practising in Berlin.
3. In Germany, jurisdiction over gambling is divided between the Federal State and the Länder. In most of the Länder, there is a regional monopoly on the organisation of sports betting and lottery games, while the organisation of betting on horseracing and the operation of gaming machines and casinos are entrusted to duly authorised private operators. By way of a State Treaty on lottery games (Staatsvertrag zum Lotteriewesen in Deutschland), which entered into force on 1 July 2004, the Länder created a uniform framework for the organisation, operation and commercial presence of games of chance. Under this treaty, the professional intermediation of lottery games was lawful without special licensing, so long as retailers complied with certain conditions.
4. In a judgment of 28 March 2006 (1 BvR 1054/01) the German Federal Constitutional Court held that the regional monopoly on sports betting in the Land of Bavaria infringed Article 12 § 1 of the Basic Law, which guaranteed freedom of occupation. The court held in particular that, by excluding private operators from the activity of organising betting, without at the same time providing a regulatory framework capable of ensuring the effective pursuit of the aims of reducing the passion for games of chance and combating gambling addiction, the monopoly had a disproportionately adverse effect on the right to freedom of occupation.
5. A majority of the German Länder later concluded the State Treaty on games of chance (Glücksspielstaatsvertrag ‒ “the State Treaty”, see paragraph 18 below), which established a new uniform framework for their organisation, operation and intermediation. The State Treaty was ratified in the Länder of Berlin and Lower Saxony on 15 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 January 2008, subject to certain transitional provisions. It subjected the organisation and intermediation of games of chance to a licensing system whereby licences could be issued by separate Länder and were limited to the territory of the respective Land. Furthermore, the State Treaty prohibited outright the online organisation, intermediation, and advertising of public games of chance.
6. From the year 2000, the applicant company operated an Internet platform which allowed the placing of bets with lottery operators run by the German Länder. This intermediation was operated on a contractual basis with the lottery operators, who paid a commission to the applicant company. The applicant company held about 60% of the overall market share in this area. By the end of 2008, it had around two and a half million registered customers.
7. Before the entry into force of the State Treaty, the applicant company requested the Länder authorities to grant it permission to continue its professional activity under Article 25 § 6 of the State Treaty for a transitional period of one year. Only the Länder of Hamburg and Hessen granted such permission. Accordingly, the applicant company continued its activity in these Länder until 31 December 2008. Following that date, the applicant company ceased all its activities relating to the intermediation of the State-run lottery. Instead, it continued to use its Internet platform for hosting so-called “ability games”, which, however, attracted significantly fewer customers.
8. On 29 February 2008 the applicant company lodged a constitutional complaint against a number of provisions of the State Treaty as implemented by the laws of the Länder of Berlin and Lower Saxony. The applicant company alleged, in particular, that the prohibition on online organisation and intermediation of public games of chance set out in Article 4 § 4 of the State Treaty violated its right to freedom of occupation under Article 12 of the Basic Law. It further complained of a violation of its property rights, and of its rights to freedom of expression and equal treatment.
9. On 14 October 2008 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a three-judge panel, refused to accept the applicant’s constitutional complaint for adjudication. The court observed that Article 4 § 4 of the State Treaty restricted and (as from 1 January 2009) prohibited outright the online intermediation of public games of chance, and thus the carrying out of a professional activity which had until then been exercised by the applicant company in a lawful way. Furthermore, Article 4 §§ 1 and 2, by subjecting the organisation of public games to State licensing, restricted the applicant company’s right to carry out a specific professional activity. These provisions were closely linked to Article 9 § 4 of the State Treaty, which provided that licences were issued by the Länder authorities and were limited to the territory of the respective Land. The Federal Constitutional Court concluded that these provisions interfered with the applicant company’s freedom to provide services. The same applied to the provisions relating to advertising and to its prohibition on television, the Internet and via other means of telecommunication. Conversely, the applicant company’s complaint did not come within the scope of the right to protection of property (Article 14 of the Basic Law), as that right only applied in case of interference with the use of acquired property, but not in cases concerning interference with specific professional activities.
10. The Federal Constitutional Court held that the provisions at issue were sufficiently precise and complied with the distribution of powers within the Federal State. Furthermore, they respected the principle of proportionality. In this connection, the court noted that the provisions primarily pursued the aim of protecting the population, and in particular minors, from the dangers of dependency on games and gambling-related crime. The court considered that these were important aims serving the public interest, which were capable of justifying objective restrictions on the freedom to carry out a specific professional activity.
11. The court further considered that gambling dependency could entail serious consequences not only for the person concerned, but also for his or her family and the wider community. It was true that certain types of games of chance were more likely to cause dependency than others, and that the lottery games intermediated by the applicant company were less likely to cause problematic or even pathological gambling behaviour than, for example, gaming machines and casino games. However, this did not call into question the legitimacy of the aims pursued.
12. The court considered that the legislature enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation when it came to making a prognosis on dangers to be averted from the public. This margin of appreciation was only exceeded if the legislature’s considerations were obviously erroneous to such a degree that they could not serve as a basis for the legislative measure in issue. Against this yardstick, the Federal Constitutional did not find reason to object to the legislature’s considerations. It noted that these considerations were supported by scientific research carried out by the University of Bremen, from which it could be concluded that lottery games could lead to the development of symptoms of addiction.
13. The court further held that the provisions were suitable for achieving the aim pursued. The prohibition on and special licensing of the organisation of games of chance created a channelling effect leading to a restriction on which games were offered and enhanced the transparency of the betting industry. In particular, the licensing system allowed the Länder authorities to directly influence the number of persons actively working in the betting industry. The restrictions on advertising also pursued the aim of preventing dependency and protecting minors.
14. Lastly, the court considered that the prohibition on the online organisation and intermediation of public games of chance was intended to curtail problematic forms of participation in such games. Online gambling was characterised by a high degree of convenience and unrestricted availability of the games in question. The high degree of abstraction from traditional ways of gambling could cause a player to lose perspective and, in particular, ignore the possibility of losing stakes. By cutting off the option of online gambling, participation became more difficult and the individual player was made more aware of the process of the game, which could prevent him or her from drifting off into problematic behaviour. Furthermore, there remained doubts as to whether the requirements of protecting minors could be effectively implemented on the Internet.
15. As regards the proportionality of the interference, the court further held that the Länder stayed within their margin of appreciation. It was, in particular, acceptable to ban any form of online advertising, as the State-run games of chance were exclusively devised to channel the natural play instinct, but they should not turn into a branch of the national economy. Lastly, the court held that there was no indication that any of the other basic rights relied upon by the applicant company had been violated.
16. The decision was served on the applicant company’s counsel on 22 October 2008.
17. On 1 June 2012, a new State Treaty amending the Treaty on Games of Chance entered into force. Under this new Treaty, the Länder may allow the organisation and intermediation of public games of chance on the Internet, provided specific prerequisites are met. The operator must, in particular, ensure the effective exclusion of minors or prohibited players. Furthermore, stakes must, as a rule, not exceed EUR 1,000 per player and month; particular incitements to dependency by rapid draws are prohibited; a programme of social measures adapted to the specific conditions of the internet have to be established and operated and bets and lotteries must not be offered via the same Internet domain. Advertising for public games of chance on television, on the Internet and via means of telecommunication remains, as a rule, prohibited, but the Länder may allow advertising for lotteries and horse- and sports bets on the Internet and on television in accordance with the principles laid down in the State Treaty.
18. The relevant provisions of the State Treaty on games of chance (Glücksspielstaatsvertrag – “the State Treaty”), which entered into force on 1 January 2008, read as follows:
Article 1
“The State Treaty’s objectives
The objectives of this State Treaty are as follows:
(1) to prevent dependency on games of chance and on bets, and to create the conditions for effectively combating dependency;
(2) to limit the supply of games of chance and to channel the gaming instinct of the population in an organised and supervised manner, preventing in particular a drift towards unauthorised games of chance;
(3) to ensure the protection of minors and players;
(4) to ensure the smooth operation of games of chance and the protection of players against fraudulent manoeuvres, and to prevent criminality connected with and arising from games of chance.”
Article 4
“General provisions
(1) The organisation or intermediation of public games of chance may take place only with the authorisation of the competent authority of the Land concerned. All organisation or intermediation of such games is prohibited without such authorisation (unlawful games of chance).
(2) Such authorisation shall be refused where the organisation or intermediation of the game of chance is contrary to the objectives of Article 1. Authorisation shall not be issued for the intermediation of games of chance unlawful according to the present State Treaty. There is no established right to the obtaining of an authorisation.
(3) The organisation and intermediation of public games of chance must not contravene the requirements of the protection of minors. Minors are not allowed to take part. The organiser or intermediary has to ensure that minors are excluded from taking part.
(4) The organisation and intermediation of public games of chance on the internet are prohibited.”
Article 5
“Advertising
(1) In order to avoid any enticement while maintaining the aim of offering lawful gaming opportunities, advertisements for public games of chance have to be limited to offering information and instructions on the offer of games of chance.
(2) Advertising for public games of chance must not contravene the aims laid down in Article 1. In particular, it must not be targeted at inviting, enticing or encouraging participation in public games. It must not be addressed to minors or similarly vulnerable target groups. Advertisements must not be misleading and must contain clear information that minors are not allowed to participate as well as on the risk of addiction and the possibilities of obtaining help.
(3) Any advertising for public games of chance on television, on the Internet and via other means of telecommunication is prohibited.
(4) Any advertising for unlawful games of chance is prohibited.”
Article 9
“Supervision of games of chance
...
(4) The authorisation is issued by the competent authority for the territory of the respective Land or for a part of this territory. It has to be revocable and subject to a time-limit...”
Article 25
“(6) The Länder may, for a maximum period of one year after the entry into force of the State Treaty, by way of derogation from Article 4 § 4, permit the organisation and intermediation of lottery games on the Internet where there is no reason to refuse them pursuant to Article 4 § 2 and where the following conditions are met:
1. exclusion of minors or prohibited players guaranteed by identification and authentication measures, in compliance with the directives of the Commission for the protection of minors as a closed group of media users;
2. limitation of stakes, as fixed in the authorisation, to EUR 1,000 per month, and guarantee that credit is prohibited;
3. prohibition of particular incitements to dependency by rapid draws and of the possibility of participating interactively with publication of results in real time; as regards lottery games, limitation to two winning draws per week;
4. localisation by use of the most modern methods, in order to ensure that only persons within the scope of the authorisation may participate;
5. establishment and operation of a programme of social measures adapted to the specific conditions of the Internet, the effectiveness of which is to be assessed scientifically.”
19. On 8 September 2010, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued several judgments relating to the compatibility of the rules on sports betting with European Union (EU) Law (case C-409/06, Winner Wetten GmbH v Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim; joined cases C316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07 C-409/07 and C-410/07, Markus Stoss and Others v. Wetterauskreis and Others; and C-46/08, Carmen Media Group Ltd v. Schleswig-Holstein and Others). The CJEU found that the German rules did not regulate games of chance in a consistent and systematic manner. In such circumstances, the objective of preventing incitement to squander money on gambling and combating addiction to the latter could no longer be effectively pursued by public monopoly, so that the latter could no longer be justified having regard to Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty (freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services; see Markus Stoss and Others, ibid., §§ 106-107).
20. In its judgment in the case of Carmen Media Group Ltd. (ibid., §§ 97-111), the CJEU, in addition, answered the question as to whether a prohibition such as that set out in Article 4 of the State Treaty (referred to below as “the GlüStV”) could be regarded as suitable for pursuing the objectives of combating the risk of dependency on games of chance and protecting minors from the betting industry as follows:
“97. Concerning, first, the prohibition on the organisation and intermediation of games of chance on the internet, it should be noted that the referring court has confined itself to casting doubt on the conformity of that prohibition with EU law in the very general terms which have just been referred to in paragraph 95 of this judgment.
98. Since the referring court has not been more specific about the nature of the doubts which it has in that regard, merely referring to positions which the Commission is said to have adopted in a reasoned opinion addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany following notification by the latter of the draft of the GlüStV [Glücksspielstaatsvertrag, see §§ 5 and 17, above], without however explaining them in any way, the Court will limit its examination to the question whether a measure prohibiting offers of games of chance on the internet such as that contained in [Article] 4(4) of the GlüStV may, in principle, be regarded as suitable for achieving the objectives of preventing incitement to squander money on gambling, combating gambling addiction, and protecting young people.
99. In that regard, it should be noted as a preliminary observation that the Court has previously acknowledged that a measure prohibiting, purely and simply, the practice of a form of gambling on the territory of a Member State, in that case lotteries, is capable of being justified by such overriding reasons in the public interest (see Schindler).
100. In the main proceedings, the prohibition in dispute concerns not the marketing of a particular type of gambling, but a channel through which games of chance may be offered, namely the internet.
101. The Court has already had occasion to emphasise the particularities concerned with the offering of games of chance on the internet (see Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International, paragraph 72).
102. has thus observed in particular that, because of the lack of direct contact between consumer and operator, games of chance accessible via the internet involve different and more substantial risks of fraud by operators against consumers compared with the traditional markets for such games (Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International, paragraph 70).
103. It should be noted that, in the same way, the characteristics specific to the offer of games of chance by the internet may prove to be a source of risks of a different kind and a greater order in the area of consumer protection, particularly in relation to young persons and those with a propensity for gambling or likely to develop such a propensity, in comparison with traditional markets for such games. Apart from the lack of direct contact between the consumer and the operator, previously referred to, the particular ease and the permanence of access to games offered over the internet and the potentially high volume and frequency of such an international offer, in an environment which is moreover characterised by isolation of the player, anonymity and an absence of social control, constitute so many factors likely to foster the development of gambling addiction and the related squandering of money, and thus likely to increase the negative social and moral consequences attaching thereto, as underlined by consistent case-law.
104. Moreover, it should be noted that, having regard to the discretion which Member States enjoy in determining the level of protection of consumers and the social order in the gaming sector, it is not necessary, with regard to the criterion of proportionality, that a restrictive measure decreed by the authorities of one Member State should correspond to a view shared by all the Member States concerning the means of protecting the legitimate interest at issue (see, by analogy, Case C518/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-3491, paragraphs 83 and 84).
105. Having regard to the whole of the above, it must be acknowledged that a prohibition measure covering any offer of games of chance via the internet may, in principle, be regarded as suitable for pursuing the legitimate objectives of preventing incitement to squander money on gambling, combating addiction to the latter and protecting young persons, even though the offer of such games remains authorised through more traditional channels.
106. Secondly, concerning the establishment of a transitional period such as that at issue in the main proceedings, it needs in particular to be verified whether the latter might not undermine the consistency of the legislation concerned by leading to a result contrary to the objective pursued.
107. In that respect, it should first be noted that the transitional measure at issue in the main proceedings applies only to lotteries, and not to other types of gambling.
108. Next, the explanations provided by the referring court show that that transitional measure is designed only to allow certain economic operators, who had hitherto legally offered lotteries via the internet in the Land concerned, to carry out a conversion of their business following the entry into force of the prohibition affecting their initial business, and that it is limited in duration to one year, which cannot be regarded as unreasonable in the said perspective.
109. Finally, it should also be emphasised, first, that, according to [Article] 25(6) of the GlüStV and [Article] 9 of the GlüStV AG, during the said transitional period, the operators concerned are obliged to comply with a series of conditions concerning the exclusion of minors and prohibited players, the limitation of stakes, the rules for and the frequency of the offer of games and the implementation of social measures, and, secondly, that the Land Schleswig-Holstein has stated before the Court that the benefit of that transitional measure was to be available, without discrimination, to all lottery operators who might be concerned.
110. It does not therefore appear that such a transitional period, in appearance justified by considerations of legal certainty (see, by analogy, Case C-347/06 ASM Brescia [2008] ECR I‑5641, paragraphs 68 to 71), is likely to affect the consistency of the measure prohibiting the offer of gambling on the internet and its suitability for achieving the objectives which it pursues (see, by analogy, in relation to a temporary exception from a prohibition on the operation of pharmacies by non-pharmacists, Joined Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others [2009] ECR I-4171, paragraphs 45 to 50).
111. Having regard to all the foregoing, the answer to the fourth question is that, on a proper interpretation of Article 49 EC, national legislation prohibiting the organisation and intermediation of games of chance on the internet for the purposes of preventing the squandering of money on gambling, combating addiction to the latter and protecting young persons may, in principle, be regarded as suitable for pursuing such legitimate objectives, even if the offer of such games remains authorised through more traditional channels. The fact that such a prohibition is accompanied by a transitional measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings is not capable of depriving the said prohibition of that suitability.”


ITEMID: 001-76599
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: TUR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: ALTINTOP AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
TEXT: The applicants, Mehmet Altıntop, Abdurrahman Altıntop and Hüseyin Altıntop, are Turkish nationals, who were born in 1939, 1943 and 1935 respectively and live in Diyarbakır. They were represented before the Court by Mr Mesut Beştaş and Ms Meral Beştaş, lawyers practising in Diyarbakır.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:
Until January 1994 the applicants lived in Gümeç village of Hani district in Diyarbakır. On 4 January 1994 the security forces came to the village and burned the villagers’ houses together with the belongings in them. The following day, the applicants left the village.
The applicants have not been supplied with alternative housing by the authorities. They currently live in Diyarbakır.
Upon the villagers’ complaint, the gendarmes drafted an incident report and the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court initiated an investigation into the incidents, which was pending at the time of the current application.
On 24 December 1998 the applicants filed a petition with the Ministry of Interior requesting compensation for their losses and permission to return to their village. The Ministry did not respond within the 60-day statutory period which meant that the petition was tacitly rejected.
On 30 April 1999 the applicants filed an action with the Diyarbakır Administrative Court against the Ministry of Interior, requesting compensation for the damage they had suffered and permission to return to their village. They also applied for legal aid and submitted to the court documents obtained from the village headman indicating their poverty (fakirlik belgesi).
On 22 June 1999 the applicants received a letter from the Hani District Governor on behalf of the Ministry of Interior. The Governor informed them that, due to security reasons, the villagers would not be allowed to return to their villages until security was restored in that region.
On 23 June 1999 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ request for legal aid. The court held that, since the applicants had sufficient means to be represented by a lawyer, they could not be considered to be in need of legal aid according to the case-law of the Court of Cassation and the rules of civil procedure.
On 28 October 1999 the court decided to discontinue the proceedings on the ground that the required legal fees had not been paid. This decision was served on the applicants on 24 November 1999.
The investigation carried out by the authorities indicated that the applicants had left their villages of their own will. The security forces had not destroyed the applicants’ village or forced them to leave their homes.
The official records indicated that there was no obstacle preventing villagers from returning to their homes and possessions in their villages. Persons who had left their villages as a result of terrorism had already started returning and regaining their activities in their villages.
On 14 July 2004 the Law on Compensation for Losses resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism was passed by the Grand National Assembly and entered into force on 27 July 2004 (“Compensation Law”). That Law provided for a sufficient remedy capable of redressing the Convention grievances of persons who were denied access to their possessions in their villages.
In that connection Damage Assessment and Compensation Commissions were set up in seventy-six provinces. Persons who had suffered damage as a result of terrorism or of measures taken by the authorities to combat terrorism could lodge an application with the relevant compensation commission claiming compensation.
The number of persons applying to these commissions had already attained approximately 170,000. A further 800 persons, whose applications were pending before the Court, had also applied to the compensation commissions. Many villagers had already been awarded compensation for the damage they had sustained.
A description of the relevant domestic law can be found in the Court’s decision of İçyer v. Turkey (no. 18888/02, §§ 44-54, 12 January 2006) and in its judgment of Doğan and Others v. Turkey (nos. 88038811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-8819/02, §§ 31-35, ECHR 2004-VI)


ITEMID: 001-73261
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF ZAKONJSEK v. SLOVENIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;John Hedigan
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Trbovlje.
6. On 22 August 1997 the applicant was injured in a car accident. The perpetrator of the accident had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT.
7. On 5 January 1999 the applicant instituted proceedings against ZT in the Ljubljana District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Ljubljani) seeking damages in the amount of 3,938,470 Slovenian tolars (approximately 16,410 euros) for the injuries sustained.
Between 11 November 1999 and 19 February 2002 the applicant lodged three preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.
On 18 February 2000 and 2 April 2001 he made requests that a date be set for a hearing.
Of the two hearings held on 18 June 2001 and 6 May 2002, none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
During the proceedings, the court appointed a medical expert.
At the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 1 July 2002.
8. On 12 July 2002 the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani).
On 16 April 2003, the court upheld his appeal as far as the statutory default interests were concerned and rejected the remainder.
The judgment was served on the applicant on 6 May 2003.
9. On 20 May 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče). He also requested a withdrawal of a Supreme Court’s judge.
On 14 July 2004 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.
The judgment was served on the applicant on 30 August 2004.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1