ITEMID: 001-4751
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 1999
DOCNAME: NAVIEDE v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1953. He is currently detained in H.M. Prison in Derbyshire. He is represented before the Court by Mr Andrew Kenyon, a solicitor practising in Manchester.
On an unspecified date the applicant was charged by the Serious Fraud Office with various offences of dishonesty. He applied and was granted legal aid.
At the end of 1992 the applicant's case was transferred to the Central Criminal Court. It was first listed before a judge in March 1993. At that stage the applicant was represented by solicitors and senior and junior counsel.
On 24 May 1994 the applicant was arraigned. The hearing was fixed for September 1994. However, that date was vacated because the applicant's representatives had sent to the Serious Fraud Office detailed submissions as to why the prosecution should have been discontinued. Following the rejection of these submissions, the applicant decided that he wished to represent himself.
On 13 October 1994 the applicant's counsel appeared before the judge and asked to be allowed, together with their solicitors, to withdraw from the case. The judge heard the applicant's senior counsel, his solicitor and the applicant himself. He also heard counsel for the Crown.
The applicant's position was that he wished to present himself the factual side of the case, examine and cross-examine witnesses and address the jury. At the same time he wanted to be allowed to have his solicitors and counsel to advise him upon and argue on his behalf such matters of law as might arise in the course of the case. The applicant's solicitor told the judge that he had advised the applicant that he should be represented by counsel if his case was to be conducted properly. However, according to the solicitor, there had been a serious breakdown of confidence between himself and the applicant and in those circumstances, unless directed to the contrary, he wished to withdraw.
The applicant's counsel said that he knew of cases where a defendant had retained solicitors and counsel to argue the law and the Crown's counsel accepted that, provided that proper ground rules were established, such a course of action could be followed.
The judge, having satisfied himself that the applicant had formed a firm and considered opinion and that his views had been properly presented to the court, decided that it would be improper to allow the applicant to proceed with the case in the manner he envisaged. The judge considered that, if counsel were to continue to participate in the proceedings, they should have control over the case. Counsel for the applicant and the Crown agreed. Then the applicant was asked whether, in the light of this development, he wished to reconsider his decision to represent himself. He refused.
The court reconvened on 21 October 1994. The matter of the applicant's representation was again discussed. The judge formally allowed the applicant's counsel and solicitors to withdraw. The applicant was allowed to represent himself. However, new solicitors were retained to advise the applicant who could seek advice from counsel on particular matters. These solicitors assisted the applicant throughout the proceedings and occasionally consulted counsel.
On 28 October 1994 the applicant requested that the court should sit only three days a week. However, the judge refused this request.
On a number of subsequent occasions, before the actual beginning of the trial, the applicant repeated his wish to have the kind of representation he had favoured from the beginning. However, the judge reaffirmed his earlier ruling. On at least one occasion, on 4 November 1994, the judge again sought and received confirmation that the applicant had decided to represent himself.
The judge's last pre-trial re-iteration of his ruling was on 3 January 1995 when he stated the following:
“It is an absolute right for someone to represent themselves; and Mr Naviede has decided to represent himself in this trial. I have considered the question of whether I should extend his legal aid for leading and junior counsel to represent him; and I have come plainly to the conclusion that it would be wholly inappropriate in this case for Mr Naviede to represent himself, have control of cross-examination and the calling of witnesses [on] issues of fact, then instruct counsel to represent him on points of law throughout the course of the case. It seems to me that that would be wrong. It would involve, were I to grant this application, an adjournment of this case for ... a considerable period ... and, in all the circumstances, I have no alternative but to reject the application that is made. The defendant has had ample time to prepare himself for this trial ... [A] great deal of work has been done on his behalf. The documents have all been got in order and, in my view, the representation that he has - which in the representation of experienced solicitors, who no doubt are knowledgeable in the law - is a proper basis on which we ought to proceed.”
The trial began on 9 January 1995. The applicant requested that the hearing be adjourned for a period of four to six weeks because he was suffering from mental exhaustion and stress. The judge, having heard expert evidence from two doctors for the defence and two for the prosecution, refused the applicant's request on the ground that the applicant was fit to continue with the hearing. Then the applicant cross-examined the most important prosecution witness.
On 11 February 1995 the applicant informed the judge that he was to undergo an operation as he was suffering from the disease of pneumothorax. He applied for an adjournment that would also give him sufficient time to recover from the post-operative effects. The court adjourned the case for five weeks. On returning, however, on 15 March 1995, the applicant was still suffering from post-operative discomfort and requested another week's adjournment. In support of his request the applicant invoked his doctor's opinion that he was at risk of a nervous breakdown. However, the judge relied on the evidence of another doctor that the applicant was in a fit state and refused his request.
On 14 May 1995 the judge, in the absence of the jury, threatened the applicant that he could be found in contempt of court because one of his witnesses was not present.
On Thursday 25 May 1995 the applicant, having completed eleven days in the witness box, asked for an adjournment until next Tuesday in order to prepare for the examination of the defence witnesses. The judge decided that the rest of the day would be sufficient for the applicant to prepare himself.
On 7 July 1995 the applicant was convicted of a number of dishonesty offences. He was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The applicant obtained leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against conviction and sentence. He relied on a number of grounds including the failure of the judge to grant his above-mentioned requests concerning the presentation of his case, the number of sittings per week and the adjournments. In the proceedings before the Court of Appeal the applicant was represented by legal aid counsel.
On 21 March 1997 the Court of Appeal, for technical reasons, quashed the applicant's convictions on some counts, substituted convictions for different offences and reduced his sentence to six years. However, the court did not allow any of the grounds of appeal concerning the above-mentioned requests. Furthermore, it refused to certify any question of law involved in the determination of the appeal as being of general public importance.


ITEMID: 001-81691
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF KUC v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 5-3
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Katowice. He is currently detained in Racibórz Prison.
5. On 2 June 1999 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having assisted an offender who was being sought pursuant to a “wanted” notice. He was subsequently brought before the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) and charged with having intentionally impeded the apprehension of an arrestable offender. The actual offender had been charged with homicide. The prosecutor applied to the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) for the applicant to be detained pending the investigation.
6. On 4 June 1999 the District Court, after hearing evidence from the applicant, remanded him in custody for 3 months in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged. The court also considered that, given that the applicant had not confessed and that the evidence given by him contradicted the material gathered by the prosecution, there was a fear that he would induce witnesses to give false testimony or would otherwise obstruct the proper course of the proceedings.
7. The applicant’s appeal against the detention order, as well as his further appeals against decisions prolonging his detention and all his subsequent repeated applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him, were unsuccessful. In his applications and appeals, he argued that the charge against him was based on unreliable and contradictory evidence. He referred to his personal circumstances, in particular his age (he was 63 at that time).
8. In the course of the investigation, on 30 September 1999, the applicant was charged with attempted homicide and 2 counts of armed robbery. The decision setting out the charges against the applicant was further amended on four occasions.
9. Between 17 August 1999 and 15 November 2000 the courts prolonged the applicant’s pre-trial detention on 6 occasions. The relevant decisions were given, respectively, by the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) on 17 August and 19 October 1999, the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 24 November 1999, 23 February and 15 November 2000 and the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) on 25 May 2000. The Supreme Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 2 December 2000.
10. In all those decisions the courts relied on a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged, which was supported by evidence from witnesses and experts. They attached importance to the serious nature of those offences and the likelihood of a heavy sentence being imposed on the applicant. They further considered that the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation, especially the need to verify evidence from the suspects and witnesses, justified holding him in custody.
11. In the course of the proceedings, the courts informed the prosecutor and the applicant’s lawyer about the dates of the sessions concerning the review of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. Nevertheless, the applicant’s lawyer failed to appear at the sessions.
12. The representatives of the prosecution participated in all court sessions relating to the prolongation of the applicant’s detention and were invited to state their position as to the necessity of keeping the applicant in custody.
13. In the meantime, the relevant penitentiary court had ordered that the applicant serve a sentence of imprisonment imposed in other criminal proceedings. He served that sentence from 2 June 1999 (the date of his arrest in the present case) to 27 July 2000.
14. At a session held on 15 November 2000, at which the applicant’s lawyer was present, the Katowice Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s detention until 2 March 2001, repeating the grounds that had been given in the previous decisions and – more particularly – relying on the need to secure and supplement evidence gathered in the investigation. That decision and the reasons therefor were upheld on appeal on 20 December 2000 at a session at which the applicant’s lawyer was present.
15. On 29 December 2000 the applicant was indicted before the Kielce Regional Court on charges of attempted homicide, armed robbery, burglary and having intentionally impeded the apprehension of an arrestable offender. The bill of indictment comprised 9 accused. In all, 49 charges were brought against them. The principal accused, a certain J.P., was charged with 4 counts of homicide, 6 counts of attempted homicide, several counts of incitement to homicide and several counts of armed robbery. The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from 162 witnesses.
16. On 24 January 2001 the Kielce Regional Court ordered that the applicant and his 6 co-defendants be kept in custody until 2 June 2001. The court referred to a strong likelihood that he had committed the serious offences with which he had been charged and stressed that a heavy penalty might be imposed on him. It considered that the severity of the anticipated penalty could by itself be a sufficient ground for continuing the detention in order to secure the proper course of the proceedings. In that context, the court added that both the gravity of the charges and the applicable sentence justified the conclusion that the defendants, if released, would obstruct the trial for fear of having that sentence executed.
17. Subsequently, the case was referred to the Katowice Regional Court, within whose territorial jurisdiction the offences in question had been committed.
18. On 23 May 2001 the Katowice Regional Court, under Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 2 December 2001. It reiterated the grounds previously given for his detention. On 4 July 2001 the Katowice Court of Appeal, ruling on the applicant’s appeal, upheld the decision and added that it should be based on Article 263 § 4 since the applicant’s detention had already exceeded the statutory time-limit of 2 years laid down in that provision, it being immaterial that during most of that period he had served the earlier sentence of imprisonment. The Court of Appeal fully shared the lower court’s view that there were valid grounds for the applicant’s detention.
19. The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged under Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on many occasions.
20. The relevant decisions were given on the following dates.
21. On 26 November 2001 the Katowice Regional Court ordered that the applicant be held in custody until 2 March 2002. On 28 February 2002 that court ordered his continued detention until 2 July 2002 but then amended its decision and set the deadline for 8 April 2002. This was due to the fact that after the latter date only the Court of Appeal could prolong his detention beyond the term laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
22. On 13 March 2002 the Katowice Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 November 2002. On 30 October 2002 it prolonged his detention until 30 April 2003. On 23 April 2003 it ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 30 September 2003. The next decision was given on 17 September 2003; it extended the applicant’s detention until 30 December 2003. It was followed by the decision of 23 December 2003, whereby the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 April 2004.
23. All the decisions reiterated the grounds previously given for the applicant’s detention, most notably the reasonable suspicion of his having committed the offences in question and the severity of the anticipated penalty which, in the courts’ opinion, justified keeping him in custody to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. The Court of Appeal also held that the proceedings had not been unduly protracted and that the frequent adjournments had been caused by events for which the Regional Court could not be held responsible.
24. All appeals and applications for release filed by the applicant – who repeatedly contested the factual basis for the charges against him and invoked the principle of the presumption of innocence – were to no avail.
25. In the meantime, the court held a number of hearings scheduled for various dates, some of which were cancelled or adjourned due to the absence of the applicant’s co-defendants, some of whom had been released, or the fact that the defendants still in detention had not been brought to trial from prison. As of October 2002, the trial court had heard evidence from over 160 witnesses.
26. On 20 April 2004 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. The applicant was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. He appealed. The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged on three occasions.
27. On 1 June 2005 the Katowice Court of Appeal upheld the impugned judgment. The applicant failed to inform the European Court whether he lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.
28. Neither during the proceedings nor after their termination did the applicant make use of domestic remedies for the excessive length of judical proceedings under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”).
29. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1997, which entered into force on 1 September 1998, defines detention on remand as one of the socalled “preventive measures” (środki zapobiegawcze).
Article 249 § 5 provides that the lawyer of a detained person should be informed of the date and time of court sessions at which a decision concerning the prolongation of detention on remand is to be taken.
30. A more detailed rendition of the relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of detention on remand (aresztowanie tymczasowe), the grounds for its prolongation, release from detention and rules governing other, so-called “preventive measures are stated in the Court’s judgments in the cases of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02, §§ 27-33, 25 April 2006 and Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006.
31. The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings are stated in the Court’s decisions in cases of Charzyński v. Poland no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§ 1223, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk v. Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005VIII.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 5
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 5-3


ITEMID: 001-86504
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: THOMAS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä
TEXT: The applicant, Mr William Thomas, is a British national who was born in 1941 and lives in Essex. He was represented before the Court by Royds Rdw, solicitors in London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Whomersley of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant’s wife died on 13 September 1999. In January 2001, the applicant made a claim for widows’ benefits. On 26 January 2001 the applicant was informed that his claim had been disallowed as he was not a woman. The applicant did not appeal further as he considered or was advised that such a remedy would be bound to fail since no such social security benefit was payable to widowers under United Kingdom law.
The applicant was not in receipt of child benefit at the time of his claim.
The domestic law relevant to this application is set out in Runkee and White v. the United Kingdom, no. 42949/98, §§ 40-41, 25 July 2007.


ITEMID: 001-107663
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2011
DOCNAME: DARKOWSKA AND DARKOWSKI v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
TEXT: The applicants, Ms Maria Darkowska (“the first applicant”) and Mr Marek Darkowski, are Polish nationals who were born in 1961 and 1957 respectively and live in Sokółka. They were represented before the Court by Ms A. Zemke-Górecka, a lawyer practising in Białystok. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. The applicants owned a flat in Krynki in which they lived until June 2005. The flat is located on the first floor of a block of flats. On 3 August 2000 the applicants and their neighbours participated in a residents’ meeting. It was decided that the communal boiler room be dismantled and that each of the residents would provide for their own heating.
2. In September 2000 the applicants’ neighbour from the second floor, Mr S (“S”), installed a central heating stove in his cellar and connected it to the chimney running through the applicants’ flat.
3. The applicants applied to the building and fire inspectors to report that their neighbours’ central heating stove had been installed without the necessary building permit and was causing carbon monoxide pollution in their flat. On 29 May 2001 the fire inspector carried out an inspection of the chimney in the applicants and their neighbours’ flats.
4. On 14 August 2001 the District Building Inspector ordered S to dismantle the central heating stove. The Inspector established that the heating system had been installed without the building permit and that the exhaust tube was not wide enough. In consequence, the smoke from the coal burned in the stove had been coming out through the leaking ventilation system into the applicants’ kitchen. The Inspector underlined that such smoke normally contained carbon monoxide, which constituted a danger to the applicants’ health. S appealed unsuccessfully.
5. The first applicant repeatedly complained to the Inspector that his decision had not been enforced by S. On 14 December 2001 the Building Inspector fined S for non-compliance with the decision to dismantle the stove.
6. On 30 April 2002 the Building Inspector carried out an inspection of the venue and informed the Mayor that the decision to dismantle the stove had been enforced. Another inspection was carried out on 23 May 2002. It confirmed that the heating installation had been dismantled.
7. On 4 December 2002 the first applicant complained to the District Sanitary Inspector about air pollution in her flat. On 2 January 2003 the Sanitary Inspector confirmed that the nuisance caused in the applicants’ flat by the smoke coming out of the chimney was due to the heating stove used by S. He further informed the applicants that it was the responsibility of the Mayor to ensure that the heating installation of their neighbours complied with the relevant building regulations.
8. On 14 February 2003 the Regional Sanitary Inspector informed the applicants that the use of the central heating stove did not pose any danger to their life or health. According to the tests carried out by the sanitary authorities on 6 February 2003 the concentration of carbon monoxide in their flat was below the permissible level.
9. On 1 March 2002 S applied to the Sokółka District Mayor (“the Mayor”; Starosta) for a building permit to install a heating system in his cellar. The proceedings were instituted on 12 March 2002. On 27 March 2002 the Mayor rejected the application on the grounds that S had not complied with the District Building Inspector’s earlier decision to dismantle the heating system.
10. On 7 May 2002 S made a new application for a building permit. On 24 June 2002 the Mayor granted it, having regard to the fact that the decision to dismantle the stove had been enforced. On 19 August 2002 the Podlaski Governor quashed the impugned decision. The subsequent Mayor’s decision granting a building permit was again quashed on appeal.
11. On 5 February 2003 the Mayor dismissed S’s application for a building permit for lack of all the required documents. S appealed against the decision and on 11 March 2003 the Podlaski Governor quashed it.
12. On 28 March 2003 the Mayor stayed the proceedings for a building permit because their outcome depended on the conclusion of a related set of proceedings instituted by the District Building Inspector (see point 5 below).
13. On 8 April 2004 the Mayor resumed the proceedings for a building permit at the applicants’ request. An inspection of the chimney in S’s apartment revealed no defects. On 21 April 2004 the Mayor discontinued the proceedings for a building permit as devoid of purpose, finding that S had complied with the conditions imposed by the Building Inspector and had been allowed to use the stove (see paragraph 20 below).
14. The applicants appealed. On 3 June 2004 the Podlaski Governor quashed the decision since the applicants had not been given an opportunity to defend their position in the proceedings.
15. On 14 July 2004 the Mayor again discontinued the proceedings. That decision was upheld by the Podlaski Governor on 24 September 2004 following an inspection. The Governor found that the proceedings for the building permit were devoid of purpose because the applicants’ neighbours had already installed the heating system. The applicants lodged a complaint with the Białystok Regional Administrative Court which appears to have been dismissed.
16. On 4 December 2002 the applicants informed the District Building Inspector that S had been unlawfully using his heating stove.
17. On 14 March 2003, the Building Inspector issued a decision aimed at regularising the heating installation and ordered S to prepare an expert opinion on its suitability. He observed that in accordance with the Building Act the installation at issue could not be subject to a demolition order. The Building Inspector established that there had been no causal link between the installation and the alleged air pollution and the fissures in the applicants’ flat. In the light of various opinions submitted by the parties he expressed a preliminary view that the heating installation had complied with the relevant regulations.
18. The decision became final on 5 April 2003 since the applicants did not appeal against it. Subsequently, they unsuccessfully requested the building authorities to declare it null and void.
19. On 30 September 2003 S submitted the opinion of an authorised expert on the suitability for use of their heating system.
20. On 6 April 2004 the District Building Inspector carried out an inspection of the heating system which confirmed that S had fulfilled the conditions indicated in the above expert opinion. The District Building Inspector informed the Mayor that his decision of 14 March 2003 had been complied with and that S had been allowed to use the central heating stove.
21. On 17 June 2004 the Building Inspector re-opened ex officio the proceedings, having regard to the Sokółka District Court’s judgment of 30 August 2002 which, in his opinion, concerned the same subject-matter (see paragraph 30 below). On 5 July 2004 the Building Inspector revoked his earlier decision of 14 March 2003 and discontinued the proceedings for installation of the heating system by S, having regard to the judgment of 30 August 2002.
22. On 14 December 2004 the Regional Inspector quashed the decision of 5 July 2004. He found that the proceedings should not have been discontinued because the neighbours’ heating stove had been still illegally connected to a chimney. The Regional Inspector had also regard to a decision on interpretation of the judgment of 30 August 2002 (see paragraph 33 below).
23. On 2 March 2006 S applied to the District Building Inspector for permission to use the stove. On 31 March 2006 the District Building Inspector issued a decision which formally confirmed that the neighbours had complied with the obligations imposed on them. The applicants appealed. Following a round of various decisions, the Regional Inspector eventually concluded that the District Inspector should have ordered an expert opinion.
24. The District Building Inspector complied and an opinion prepared by an independent expert, Z.M was submitted on 10 July 2007. The opinion was based on the inspection of the heating installation, chimney and ventilation duct and on the analysis of relevant building regulations and various previous opinions. It evaluated in a very comprehensive manner the conditions of the use of the heating installation. The expert concluded that the chimney was impermeable and that the installation was compatible with the relevant regulations. The only technical shortcoming concerned the diameter of the tube in the chimney which should be increased. In respect of the stains in the applicants’ flat, the expert found that they originated from the lack of correct ventilation of the flat due to a defective ventilation duct, and recommended the insulation of the duct with a view to resolving the issue. He excluded as entirely unproven the proposition put forward by the applicants and the opinion of expert P.K. submitted in the second set of civil proceedings that the tarry substances could have penetrated into the applicants’ flat (see paragraph 36 below). The applicants contested that opinion.
25. On 2 August 2007 the District Building Inspector ordered the neighbours to carry out some works in accordance with the expert opinion. That decision was subsequently quashed.
26. On 2 November 2007 the District Building Inspector revoked his decision of 14 March 2003 and ordered S to carry out the works recommended by the expert in his opinion of 10 July 2007. Following their unsuccessful appeal to the Regional Inspector, the applicants filed a complaint with the administrative court.
27. On 8 May 2008 the Regional Administrative Court dismissed their complaint as ill-founded. It thoroughly examined the opinion of expert Z.M. and held that the opinion had clearly indicated that it was possible to make the installation conform to the relevant regulations. It further noted that the proposed solution was also aimed at elimination of neighbourly conflicts. The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court.
28. On 17 July 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the cassation appeal. It concurred with the findings of the lower court and found no shortcomings in the expert opinion. The court emphasised that the solution concerning the regularisation of the installed heating system had not violated the law or the rights of third parties, including the applicants.
29. On 17 December 2001 the first applicant lodged a civil action against S in which she sought restitution of a legal situation and abstention from infringements of law. She further sought 5,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in respect of pecuniary damage.
30. On 30 August 2002 the Sokółka District Court partly allowed her action in that it ordered the defendant to stop the infringements of the first applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of the possession by the use of the central heating stove. It held that the first applicant’s claim for removal of the defendants’ heating system was too far-reaching and found it sufficient to have the applicants’ kitchen restored to its original state. The court dismissed her claim for pecuniary damage as unsubstantiated. It established that the defendants had connected the heating system to a chimney which was not technically adapted to such a function. In consequence soot and tarry substances had been penetrating the applicants’ flat. The first applicant’s appeal was rejected on formal grounds.
31. On 3 November 2003 the applicant’s lawyer instituted enforcement proceedings. At a court hearing held on 5 May 2004 the debtor stated that the creditor had not allowed him to enter the apartment in order to execute the judgment.
32. On 5 July 2004 the Sokółka District Court stayed the enforcement proceedings at the first applicant’s request.
33. On 19 November 2004 the District Court gave a decision on interpretation of its judgment of 30 August 2002. It held that the objective of its judgment was to prevent the defendants from causing nuisance to the applicants occasioned by the discharge of soot and tarry substances, however the fact that the stove had been connected to a chimney could not be seen per se in breach of the judgment.
34. On 8 September 2005 the court discontinued the enforcement proceedings in the absence of a request from the creditor to resume the proceedings.
35. On 18 April 2006 the applicants instituted a new set of civil proceedings against S, in which they sought an order to dismantle the heating system.
36. On 2 February 2007 the District Court gave a judgment in which it allowed the applicants’ action, referring to the opinion of expert P.K. The court established that in spite of works undertaken by S, the negative effect on the applicants’ flat, as found in its previous judgment of 30 August 2002, still existed. In particular, a wall in their kitchen had become stained as a result of the reaction of steam and soot which were penetrating through the leaky tube and chimney. The court thus ordered S to permanently disconnect the central heating stove and to brick up the entrance to the chimney.
37. On 30 July 2007 the applicants’ lawyer instituted enforcement proceedings. On 22 November 2007 the court stayed the enforcement proceedings following the applicants’ request of 24 October 2007. Their request was related to the pending administrative proceedings. On 24 November 2008 the court discontinued the enforcement proceedings as the applicants had not requested that they be resumed.
38. On 22 December 2002 the first applicant informed the police that an offence had been committed and requested them to initiate criminal proceedings against S. After initial discontinuation of the investigation, in June 2003 the Sokółka District Prosecutor indicted S before the Sokółka District Court.
39. On 14 October 2003 the trial court convicted S of a breach of building law and sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment. The court found him guilty of installing the central heating stove in November 2001 without the required permits, of using it afterwards, and of reconnecting it in December 2002 in spite of the decisions of the Building Inspector ordering him to stop use of the stove. By using his central heating stove S had caused smoke containing carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide as well as tarry substances to penetrate into the applicants’ flat which exposed the applicants to imminent danger to their life and health. The second applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that the penalty imposed on S was too lenient. On 26 February 2004 the Białystok Regional Court dismissed his appeal. Subsequently, S served his prison term.
40. Subsequently the prosecution service, apparently at the applicants’ request, instituted a second set of criminal proceedings against S. On 31 March 2004 the Sokółka District Court gave a summary judgment in which it found S guilty of reconnecting the stove and using it between January 2003 and January 2004. The court sentenced him to fifteen months of restriction of liberty together with the obligation to perform thirty hours of unpaid work per month. The judgment became final and enforceable on 13 April 2004.
41. In 2004 a third set of criminal proceedings was instituted against S. On 21 December 2004 the District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation, having regard, inter alia, to the results of the examination of the applicants’ apartment by the sanitary authorities on 11 February 2003. The applicants appealed unsuccessfully.
42. On 29 December 2004 the applicants bought another flat in Sokółka, for which they obtained a mortgage. It appears that in June 2005 they moved out of the flat in Krynki.


ITEMID: 001-4614
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 1999
DOCNAME: McDONNELL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant is a British national, born in 1972. He is currently serving a prison sentence in the United Kingdom.
The applicant is represented before the Court by John Carroll & Company, a firm of solicitors based in Glasgow, Scotland.
On 29 December 1997 police officers acting on information searched the applicant’s home pursuant to a warrant issued under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”). The applicant was cautioned by the police at the start of the search and did not exercise his right to silence. The search of the applicant’s home uncovered quantities of cannabis resin and amphetamines as well as cash and a “tick list”.
Towards the end of the search a visitor (“R.”) called at the house. The police admitted him and he was found to be in possession of a set of scales. When questioned about the scales, R. replied in the applicant’s presence: “They’re Pele’s”. Pele was the applicant’s nickname. The applicant did not react to R.’s statement. A brownish residue on R.’s scales was later found to contain the active principles of cannabis.
The applicant was charged under the 1971 Act with being concerned in the supply of controlled drugs.
At the trial both the applicant and R., who was called as a defence witness, denied that the incriminating words were uttered by R. In the applicant’s submission R. had said that the scales were broken. The applicant maintained that the drugs belonged to a third party (“J.”) who called at his house before the police arrived and had left his jacket with him. R. testified that the scales had been left in his car by another third party and that they had nothing to do with the applicant. He told the jury that it was a coincidence that he had turned up at the applicant’s house with the scales and that the only purpose of his visit was to collect the jacket left there by J. The prosecution accepted that the applicant and R. did not know each other.
At the close of the trial the judge directed the jury that it was for the prosecution to prove the applicant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt and summed up the evidence which they had heard during the trial. As to R.’s statement and the applicant’s failure to deny its implications, the trial judge stated:
“... You can also have regard to evidence about what was said by another person about the accused in his hearing and that is because he has an opportunity there and then to contradict what is being said about him if he wishes to dispute it, and that is obviously of relevance when you are looking at the evidence of what [R.] may have said about the scales and the police asked him a question about the scales... You might think from that that the scales had been associated with the weighing of cannabis and you might want to relate that to what was found in the house and also the Crown would ask you to take account of what, according to the police, [R.] said about the scales. ... You remember that evidence was that he said ‘They’re Pele’s’ – Pele being the nickname of the accused. That, of course, is denied and it is for you to decide whether you accept the police evidence or whether you disbelieve it or at least you think it is open to doubt, having regard to the evidence given by the [applicant] and [R.] ... Now, you will have to consider that issue, was that said and if so what can you take from it. Is this in some way indicative of some activities to do with weighing quantities of cannabis and does that have some bearing on the question of being concerned in the supplying of the cannabis so you can see it is a matter which might be regarded as being relevant to the central issue here.”
By a majority the jury found the applicant guilty of the charges and on 5 March 1997 he was sentenced to four and a half years’ imprisonment.
The applicant appealed to the High Court of Justiciary, which heard his appeal on 10 October 1997. Before the High Court the applicant contended that the trial judge should have directed the jury that while the silence of an accused in the face of an accusation of guilt could be taken into account in considering the case against him, in the applicant’s case no such accusation had been made by R. Accordingly the jury should have been directed to disregard the evidence as to his silence in the face of R.’s statement that the scales belonged to “Pele”.
In dismissing the appeal, the High Court concluded:
“... It seems to us that in considering the question of the case against the accused, there is no good reason to restrict the scope of the principle ... to a case where the accusation is one of the guilt of the accused. Accordingly it is available to cover situations in which a statement is made which if true would be criminative of the accused. There may be cases in which the statement which is made is of a comparatively trivial nature, in which case it will of course be a matter for comment in the trial as to whether any significance can be attached to silence in the face of such a statement. In the circumstances we consider that the appeal is not well founded and it will be refused.”


ITEMID: 001-86011
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: CZE
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: FOREJT (I) v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Renate Jaeger;Volodymyr Butkevych
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Miloslav Forejt, is a Czech national who was born in 1937 and lives in Plzen. The Czech Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr V.A. Schorm, from the Ministry of Justice.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 14 May 1996 the applicant brought an action before the Plzeň-město District Court (okresní soud) against the State claiming damages under the State Liability Act. He referred to two allegedly incorrect and unlawful expert medical opinions drawn up by experts in psychiatry without having sufficiently examined the applicant’s condition. The action was notified to the court on 16 May 1996.
It appears that the proceedings for damages are still pending.
The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings are stated in the Court’s decision in the case of Vokurka v. Czech Republic, no. 40552/02 (dec.), §§ 11-24, 16 October 2007).


ITEMID: 001-82951
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: RUS
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF ALMAYEVA v. RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6;Violation of P1-1
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Samara.
6. The applicant was engaged in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. She was issued with a certificate confirming her participation in the emergency operations. As a holder of the certificate she was entitled to certain monthly payments.
7. In February and March 2000 the Social Security Department of the Oktyabrskiy District of Orsk (Управление социальной защиты населения Октябрьского района г. Орска, hereinafter “the social security service”) paid to the applicant the arrears for the period from November 1999 to March 2000.
8. On 13 April 2000 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Orsk held that the social security service had unlawfully defaulted on the monthly payments from November 1999 to February 2000. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 24 April 2000.
9. In April 2000 the social security service discontinued the payments. The applicant sued the social security service.
10. On 20 August 2001 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Orsk held that the social security service had unlawfully refused to pay. The applicant held a certificate confirming her participation in the emergency operations in Chernobyl and was entitled to receive the payments. On 25 September 2001 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal and it became enforceable.
11. On 14 December 2001 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs.
12. On 17 December 2001 the bailiffs opened enforcement proceedings.
13. On 27 February 2002 the applicant received 11,762 Russian roubles (RUB).
14. On 11 July 2002 the bailiffs directed that the social security service pay the judgment debt by 20 August 2002. The social security service did not comply.
15. The judgment remains unenforced in part. According to the Government, the debt amounts to RUB 13,002.20.
16. On 22 June 2002 Judge R., the President of the Orenburg Regional Court, lodged an application for supervisory review of the judgments of 13 April 2000 and 20 August 2001, as upheld on 25 September 2001.
17. On 30 September 2002 the Presidium of the Orenburg Regional Court chaired by Judge R. quashed the judgments of 13 April 2000 and 20 August 2001, as upheld on 25 September 2001, and remitted the cases for a fresh examination before the District Court. It found that the District Court had erred in the assessment of the facts and application of domestic law. In particular, it had not verified whether the certificate confirming the applicant's participation in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster was valid.
18. On 29 November 2002 the Oktyabrskiy District Court held that the discontinuation of the monthly payments had been lawful and dismissed the applicant's claims. It found that the certificate confirming the applicant's participation in the emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster had been issued by an unauthorised person and was void. Consequently the applicant was not entitled to monthly payments.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6


ITEMID: 001-23659
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2004
DOCNAME: CRONIN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Matti Pellonpää;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Mark Cronin, is a United Kingdom national, who was born in 1956 and lives in Sheffield. He is represented before the Court by Mr P. Mahy, a lawyer practising in Sheffield.
On 21 November 2001 a warrant to search the applicant’s home was granted by justices sitting at Sheffield Magistrates’ Court under, inter alia, section 23 (3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The warrant authorised a search for cannabis and associated drug paraphernalia. It was granted on the basis of an Information dated 20 November, sworn by police constable Frost, which set out the following grounds for the application:
“In October/November 2001, the police were contacted by an anonymous male stating that they had witnessed various persons visiting the target address at all times of the day, both on foot and in vehicles. These persons were unknown to the source but only visited the target premises for a matter of minutes before leaving. It has been stated that the premises were involved in the supply of cannabis.
The source has since contacted the police and confirmed that the activity is constant.
This same unregistered source has contacted the police on several occasions and has supplied reliable information.
Enquiries with the council reveal that [the applicant] is the tenant of the semi-detached property and they have also received complaints in relation to vehicles visiting the address in the summer of 2001 by local residents.
The vehicles, which are visiting the address on a regular basis, are used by the local drug fraternity who have previous criminal convictions for possession of cannabis.”
The Information went on to outline why alternative methods of enquiry were considered unsuitable and why the search was necessary. It stated:
“A search warrant is considered to be a proportionate response”.
The warrant was executed on 29 November 2001. Eight police officers searched the applicant’s home for forty five minutes, during which time the applicant and his wife were present. No items were found and no further action was taken against the applicant.
The applicant issued judicial review proceedings in March 2002, alleging that the failure of the justices to give reasons for their decision or to make a record of the hearing at which the warrant was granted meant that there were no adequate or effective safeguards against abuse of the warrant procedure. He submitted that the information supplied to the justices was ambiguous and inconsistent; for example because the “anonymous” male was also a “source” known to the police, and because the statement that the premises were involved in the supply of cannabis was merely an unattributed assertion. Moreover, the source of the statement about the use of the vehicles by the local “drug fraternity” was unclear.
Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on 10 May 2002. Witness statements were served from the police officer, the two lay magistrates and the legal adviser who were at the hearing on 21 November 2001. The police officer made two statements, the second of which outlined police concerns that, as applications for warrants were often based on confidential information, recording of the evidence or the justices’ reasons at the hearing of an application for a warrant could have a severe impact on police effectiveness. As to the particular application, the officer recalled being asked various questions by the justices about the vehicles mentioned in the Information and the geographical layout of the area.
The legal adviser to the justices, although unable to remember the specific case, gave details in his statement of his “invariable practice” when dealing with applications for warrants. In particular, he stated that he would draw the justices’ attention to the relevant statutory requirements and if any matters arose during the application which did not appear within the body of the Information, he would direct the justices to endorse those matters on the Information. In general, he asserted that the Information itself became the written record of evidence, together with any additional comments noted as a result of the justices’ questions to the constable. Taking a full note of the evidence would therefore simply be to restate the facts already set out in the Information and serve no useful purpose.
In the Divisional Court’s judgment on 20 November 2002, the Lord Chief Justice, dismissing the application and endorsing the views of the legal adviser to the justices, said:
“23. The evidence that exists in this case, as it seems to me, shows that the safeguards which the statute rightly requires and which article 8 makes necessary, which would also be required in the appropriate circumstances by article 6, were fully complied with. In considering compliance with article 8 and article 6 the facts of the particular case will in the end always be decisive. When justices accept an information as containing all the material upon which they rely as satisfying them ... it is unreasonable to require them to make a note. If a particular matter is elicited in the course of questioning the deponent who is seeking the warrant, then ... it would be desirable to make a note of that matter, not only for the benefit of any subsequent citizen who wished to challenge the legality of the warrant, but also to protect the justices and police from unwarranted allegations.”
The Lord Chief Justice went on to say that, in the applicant’s case:
“The material upon which the warrant was issued is clearly contained in the information and the basis on which the warrant was issued is obvious without any need for the justice merely to repeat that he is satisfied as required by section 23 of the 1971 Act. To require the justice to set out that he was so satisfied would serve no purpose whatsoever.”
The Divisional Court referred with approval to the prescribed form in which the Information was contained, noting that it appeared to have been carefully drafted with Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention in mind. The court concluded that, whilst an exceptional case would have to be considered on its merits, in the ordinary case it would be unreasonable to require anything additional to the Information itself, which the person affected ought to be able to obtain. The court refused permission to appeal, as did the Court of Appeal itself on 23 December 2002.
Section 15 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”) provides:
“Search warrants-safeguards. (1) This section and section 16 below have effect in relation to the issue to constables under any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after this Act, of warrants to enter and search premises; and an entry or search of premises under a warrant is unlawful unless it complies with this section and section 16 below.
(2) Where a constable applies for any such warrant, it shall be his duty-(a) to state-(i) the ground on which he makes the application; and (ii) the enactment under which the warrant would be issued; (b) to specify the premises which it is desired to enter and search; and (c) to identify, so far as is practicable, the articles or persons to be sought.
(3) An application for such a warrant shall be made ex parte and supported by an information in writing.
(4) The constable shall answer on oath any question that the justice of the peace or judge hearing the application asks him.
(5) A warrant shall authorise an entry on one occasion only.
(6) A warrant-(a) shall specify-(i) the name of the person who applies for it; (ii) the date on which it is issued; (iii) the enactment under which it is issued; and (iv) the premises to be searched; and (b) shall identify, so far as is practicable, the articles or persons to be sought.
(7) Two copies shall be made of a warrant.
(8) The copies shall be clearly certified as copies.”
Section 16 of PACE deals with the procedure for the execution of a warrant.
Code B of PACE, set out under section 66, includes provision that an application for a warrant should not be made on the basis of uncorroborated anonymous information.
Section 23 (3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 provides, as relevant:
“ If a justice of the peace ... is satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting- (a) that any controlled drugs are, in contravention of this Act or of any regulations made thereunder, in the possession of a person on any premises; ... he may grant a warrant authorising any constable acting for the police area in which the premises are situated at any time or times within one month from the date of the warrant, to enter, if need be by force, the premises named in the warrant, and to search the premises and any persons found therein ...”


ITEMID: 001-95797
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ROU
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2009
DOCNAME: CASE OF BOLOVAN v. ROMANIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Art. 3 (substantive aspect);Violation of Art. 3 (procedural aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award
JUDGES: Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra
TEXT: 6. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Cioroiaşi. At the material time he was working as a professional driver.
7. On 21 June 1997, at around 7 p.m., the applicant parked his car at the side of the road, with the intention of spending the night in his outhouse. He was accompanied by his girlfriend, S.U. When they started walking away from the car, two lower ranking police officers (plutonieri) got out of a car and approached them, one in uniform (S.D.) and the other in plain clothes (P.D.). Other police officers were also present at the scene, as traffic controls were being carried out.
S.D. asked for the applicant’s identification papers, but the latter could not produce them as he had left them in his other car. S.D. grabbed the car keys from his hand with the intention of searching the car. The applicant told him that he would not find the papers in the car and that, in fact, he had just been fined for the same offence. He put his hand in his pocket to pull out the police report.
At that moment, the police officer punched the applicant in the mouth and tried to hit him again. The applicant stepped back and lifted his leg in defence. P.D. intervened and the two police officers threw the applicant face down on his car and searched him and the vehicle. As his lip was bleeding, the applicant shouted at the police, calling them “militia agents” (miliţieni). He told them he would go straight to a forensic doctor and would then press charges against them.
8. On 21 June 1997, at around 7 p.m., the applicant was driving his car while under the influence of alcohol. When he saw the police performing traffic controls, he decided to stop the car and continue on foot, in order to avoid being caught drunk driving. The police officers S.D. and P.D. noticed the applicant and assumed that he was trying to avoid being checked. They approached him in their car. S.D. introduced himself and asked to see the applicant’s identification papers.
The applicant turned his back on the police, shouted abuse and told them he did not have the papers on him. He was incoherent and smelled of alcohol. The police asked him to go with them to the hospital for a blood test. The applicant refused to follow them. When S.D. tried to take him by the arm, the applicant became violent and abusive. He kicked S.D. in the leg. He was then immobilised by S.D. and P.D. but managed to tear S.D.’s uniform.
9. After the incident, the applicant was taken straight to hospital to have his blood alcohol content tested. The physician concluded, after carrying out the standard tests, that the applicant was not under the influence of alcohol. She also noted in the clinical evaluation form that the applicant had a small bruise on the left upper lip. Two urine samples were taken and sent to the laboratory for further testing. The results (available on 23 June 1997) showed a blood alcohol content of 1.45g/oo.
10. Later that evening, the applicant was taken from the hospital to the police headquarters. His car was also brought to the police courtyard. His girlfriend was interviewed until 11 p.m., when she was released.
11. On 22 June 1997 the prosecutor ordered the applicant’s arrest. On 23 June 1997 he was remanded in custody for thirty days. He remained in custody until the end of the criminal proceedings against him.
12. A few days after the incident, the police allowed S.U. to take the applicant’s car from the police yard.
13. On 8 July 1997 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Dolj County Court indicted the applicant for driving under the influence of alcohol and for insult and violence. It described the incident as follows:
“As [the applicant] did not have his identity papers, [S.D.] insisted that they go to the hospital and when he tried to take his arm to lead him to the police car, [the applicant] became violent, tearing himself away and kicking him in the left femur, near the hip. ...
During the interview [the applicant] partially admitted the facts; he declared that he had only drunk one bottle of beer at around 11 a.m. and that he had only kicked the police officer after having been slapped by him.”
14. On 8 September 1997 the court heard statements from S.U. and a witness, D.P. They maintained the statements they had made to the prosecutor but the former added that she had seen the police officer hit the applicant and that he had started bleeding, and the latter added that he had seen the applicant bleeding.
15. On 20 October 1997 the Dolj County Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The court upheld the prosecutor’s version of the events. The applicant reiterated that he had been hit by S.D. The court discarded the statements given by S.U. and D.P as follows:
“It is true that before the court the witness [S.U.] declared that the applicant had been hit by [S.D.], and witness D.P. had noticed that the applicant had been bleeding, without having seen whether he had been hit. However, these statements will be set aside as insincere in so far as during the criminal prosecution the witnesses did not make such statements and could not justify why they did not do so.”
16. The applicant appealed against the decision. He reiterated that he had been hit first by the police officer and made reference to the clinical evaluation form to prove the violence suffered. The Craiova Court of Appeal based its examination on the statement the applicant made to the prosecutor and considered that his allegations were not supported by evidence. It therefore upheld the county court’s decision, on 12 February 1998.
17. On 19 June 1998 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant and upheld his sentence. It held that:
“None of the witnesses heard in the case confirmed the applicant’s defence that he had been hit straight after the request to produce his identity papers.”
18. On 7 August 1998 the applicant requested the Procurator General to appeal against the final decision of 19 June 1998. On 30 October 1998, the Procurator General informed him that there were no reasons to request the reopening of the proceedings (recurs în anulare). He received the same answer even after he complained that his intention had been to lodge a request for the annulment of the final decision (contestaţie in anulare).
19. On 26 July 1997 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against S.D. with the Craiova Military Prosecutor’s Office. He accused the police officer of having punched him in the mouth and in the back of his head.
20. He was interviewed on 14 August 1997 and 8 January 1998.
21. On 12 September 1997 S.D. made a statement.
22. On 23 September 1997 the applicant filed a complaint of theft from his car, apartment and outhouse, all keys being in the set that had been confiscated by the police and then returned to S.U.
23. The police officers who had been witnesses to the incident were interviewed by the prosecutor. They all declared that the applicant had been recalcitrant and had hit S.D.
24. On 30 January 1998 the Craiova Military Prosecutor’s Office decided not to start criminal proceedings against S.D. and the other police officers. It considered that the applicant had behaved aggressively on the evening of 21 June 1997. The decision made no reference to any act of violence having been perpetrated by the police officer. As for the accusations of theft, it noted that:
“The car was transported to the Traffic Police headquarters and, as the driver was arrested the same day by the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Dolj County Court for insult and violence, it was released to [S.U.], the driver’s mistress, and a report was drafted. ...
There is no evidence indicating that anything was stolen from the car; the report confirms that it was given [to S.U.] in good condition.”
25. Subsequent complaints lodged by the applicant did not result in the reopening of the case by the military prosecutor, the latest decision not to prosecute being dated 26 August 1999.
26. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and of the provisions governing the police and military prosecutor are set out in Dumitru Popescu v. Romania ((no. 1), no. 49234/99, §§ 43-46, 26 April 2007) and Barbu Anghelescu v. Romania (no. 46430/99, § 40, 5 October 2004).
27. In paragraphs 43-45 of the judgment in Dumitru Popescu (no. 1), cited above, there is a description of the development of the law concerning complaints about decisions by the prosecutor (Article 278 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 2781 introduced by Law no. 281/24 June 2003 applicable from 1 January 2004).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3