ITEMID: 001-102642
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: HUN
BRANCH: COMMITTEE
DATE: 2011
DOCNAME: CASE OF JANOS LAKATOS v. HUNGARY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1
JUDGES: András Sajó;Kristina Pardalos
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Miske.
5. On 2 August 1992 two plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against the applicant before the Kalocsa District Court. After several hearings, a judgment was given on 8 September 1994. On 28 February 1995 the Bács-Kiskun County Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case.
6. In the resumed proceedings several hearings took place. On 18 December 1998 the District Court delivered a partial judgment. On appeal, on 24 August 1999 the Regional Court suspended the proceedings pending the adjudication of those claims which were unaffected by the partial judgment.
7. On 10 January 2000 the District Court held a hearing. On 2 May 2000 it suspended the proceedings pending the termination, on 7 February 2002, of a related land registry dispute.
8. Upon the resumption of the case on 11 December 2002 another hearing was held and an expert appointed. The expert opinion was submitted on 16 June 2003. Between 8 July 2003 and 14 March 2004 the proceedings were again suspended pending the termination of related administrative proceedings.
9. On 5 July 2004 the District Court adopted a partial judgment concerning damages. On appeal, on 6 January 2005 the Regional Court partly upheld the first instance decision while remitting some claims.
10. On 13 September 2005 the first instance proceedings continued. Another expert was appointed who filed his opinion on 12 October 2005. On 17 November 2005 and 7 February 2006 further hearings took place.
11. On 15 February 2006 the District Court gave judgment, finding partly for the plaintiffs. On appeal, on 22 November 2006 the Regional Court heard the parties and appointed an expert who filed his opinion on 5 January 2007.
12. On 20 November 2007 the Regional Court gave judgment. On 24 June 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's petition for review.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-89128
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2008
DOCNAME: CASE OF LIDIA NOWAK v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Libertów.
5. On 18 November 1993 the applicant divorced.
6. On 17 June 1994 she lodged with the Kraków District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a claim for division of matrimonial property consisting of a family house in Jankówka and a right to a flat in a housing-co-operative in Kraków.
7. Between 8 November 1994 and 2 August 2000, the Kraków District Court scheduled forty-five hearings, nine of which were adjourned and one expert report was obtained.
8. On 13 December 2000 the court issued an interim order (zarządzenie tymczasowe) securing the applicant’s claim. On 19 December 2000 the defendant appealed against the making of the order. On 19 July 2001 the court amended its order.
9. At a hearing held on 16 November 2001 the Kraków District Court gave a preliminary decision (postanowienie wstępne) on the parties’ respective shares in the matrimonial property.
10. The applicant and the defendant appealed on 4 February and 12 March 2002, respectively.
11. On 24 January 2003 the Kraków Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) amended the preliminary decision and dismissed the defendant’s appeal. His cassation appeal was rejected on 22 April 2003 on procedural grounds.
12. On 15 March 2004 the court ordered that an expert report be obtained. The report was submitted on 30 July 2004.
13. On 11 October 2005 the court held a hearing.
14. On 7 February 2006 the court ordered that the third expert report be obtained.
15. At a hearing held on 29 December 2006 the applicant’s lawyer made a friendly-settlement proposal. The court stayed the proceedings.
16. On 20 July 2007 the District Court resumed the proceedings and delivered a partial decision (postanowienie częściowe) in the case, concerning the composition of the matrimonial property. The defendant appealed against this decision. On 7 April 2008 the Kraków Regional Court rejected the defendant’s appeal.
17. The proceedings are still pending.
18. On 23 November 2004 the applicant lodged with the Kraków Regional Court a complaint under section 5 of the Law on 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”).
19. She sought a ruling declaring that the length of the proceedings before the Kraków District Court had been excessive and an award of just satisfaction in the amount of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approx. 2,500 euros (EUR)).
20. On 13 January 2005 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed her complaintin the part alleging., to the Supreme Court. The court observed that the proceedings had indeed been lengthy but it was the applicant’s husband who had been responsible for the delay in examination of the case. The court categorically stated that the Kraków District Court was not responsible for the protracted length of the proceedings.
21. The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the applicable provisions of the 2004 Act, are stated in the Court’s decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk v. Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005-VIII.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6


ITEMID: 001-82764
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: POL
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: DOMAGALA v. POLAND
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Piotr Domagała, is a Polish national who was born in 1942 and lives in Katowice, Poland. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In 1964 the applicant was a victim of an accident which occurred at his workplace in the “Wieczorek” mine. Subsequently, the applicant received a pension in connection with the work accident.
On 6 July 1992 the applicant lodged a civil action for compensation and a pension against his former employer.
On 26 October 1993 the Katowice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) partly granted his action and awarded the applicant a pension. The defendant appealed.
On 29 March 1994 the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case.
On 22 December 1995 the Katowice District Court again partly granted the applicant’s action and awarded him a pension. The defendant appealed.
On 4 June 1996 the Regional Court partly quashed the judgment and remitted the remainder of the case to the District Court.
On 23 October 2000 the Katowice District Court gave a judgment. The court dismissed the action. The applicant appealed against the judgment.
On 12 April 2001 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the appeal.
On 12 June 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed his cassation appeal. The applicant was notified about this decision on 3 October 2002.
On 2 November 2004 the applicant lodged a civil action for damages on account of the unreasonable length of the proceedings without specifying the legal grounds of his claim.
On 10 November 2004 he was invited by the Katowice Regional Court to specify the legal basis of his claim.
On 23 November 2004 the applicant submitted to the Regional Court a statement in which he clarified that his motion should be understood as a complaint about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time under the 2004 Act and a request for payment of PLN 10,000. The applicant further added that in the future he might seek compensation in tort from the State Treasury in a separate set of civil proceedings.
On 24 January 2005 the court rejected the applicant’s complaint. The court established that the 2004 Act had not been applicable as the proceedings complained of had ended before its entry into force. The transitional provision of section 18 of the 2004 Act could not be relied on either, as the applicant had lodged his complaint with the Court after the termination of the domestic proceedings.
The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings are stated in the Court’s decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§ 1223, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk v. Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005VIII and the judgment in the case of Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V.


ITEMID: 001-5699
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2001
DOCNAME: EATSON v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant is a British national, born in 1938 and living in Bedfordshire. She is represented before the Court by Mrs A. White, a solicitor practising in Berkhamsted.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant was born into a gypsy family and travelled in a caravan in a nomadic way of life throughout her childhood. This continued after her marriage at age 18 to her husband who is also a gypsy. They travelled mainly in Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire, working on farms. They often stopped at a site in Leighton Buzzard, where their three children were born.
From 1970 to 1981, the applicant and her family were continually harassed by the police or local authority officials, being required to move on. They were able to obtain a place on a local authority site where they stayed until 1984. They were given notice to quit apparently due to her husband’s use of a lorry on the site.
After some weeks of travelling, the applicant and her family moved on to a site in Tilsworth which they had bought. They intended to develop the land as a commercial nursery garden. In 1986, their caravan was stolen and they moved into the workshop building on the land.
The applicant’s application for planning permission for a mobile home was refused but on appeal, in 1992, they were given three years’ temporary permission while they established their nursery business. In his decision of 27 March 1992, the Planning Inspector said, inter alia:
“the appeal site is in the South Bedfordshire Green Belt and it is located in open countryside beyond the confines of any village. The site is not in a location where residential accommodation would normally be allowed…
At my site visit, I saw little to demonstrate a productive nursery… Without clear evidence of a firm intention and ability to develop the business I do not consider that a permanent dwelling can be justified by such an enterprise… on agricultural grounds….
I now turn to the question of gypsy status and the matters which flow from that. There is no doubt that the Eatsons have impeccable gypsy antecedents … I have no hesitation in concluding that the <applicant> and her husband are gypsies in statutory terms and entitled to the considerations which flow from that. …
South Bedfordshire District is a designated area under the 1968 Act which means that the Secretary of State was satisfied that adequate accommodation had been provided for gypsies residing in or resorting to the area. There is no evidence that a major problem of provision has developed in the area since designation. Within the district there are two council sites and one private site. There are 25 plots at Eaton Bray, 10 at Pepperstock and 4 mobile homes at Jockey farm. Between January 1989 and July 1990, the twice yearly counts showed no unauthorised sites in the district; this rose to 7 families in July 1990 and fell to one 6 months later. The Council consider that they can accommodate any genuine need within the existing sites, however there is a waiting list of 12 for Pepperstock and 8 at Eaton Bray. I appreciate that pitches do become available from time to time but there is no immediate prospect of one becoming available particularly in light of the waiting lists. I understand that there is a transit site at Wilstead about 20 miles away, which the Council use as a temporary expedient until a pitch on a permanent site becomes available. I understand that a move to the Wilstead site would mean that <the applicant> would not have the continuity of medical care which is advantageous to her. Moreover, it would put both of them at some considerable distance from what appears to be their source of income, the appeal site. I am therefore not satisfied that suitable alternative accommodation would be available to them were I to uphold <the enforcement notice> even within an extended compliance period.
While I recognise that it might sometimes be necessary to allow gypsy sites in the Green Belt and that private site provision can be advantageous, I do not find the need for further permanent provision in this case to be such as to outweigh the strong planning policy objection to additional residential development in the countryside. I appreciate that the buildings on the land are likely to remain and the visual impact of a caravan would therefore be limited but, by itself, that is not a compelling argument for allowing a permanent residential use in the Green Belt. However, in the light of the lack of suitable alternative provision for the Eatsons on an official gypsy site in the near future I consider I would be justified in granting them a personal permission limited to 3 years to enable them to make proper alternative arrangements…”
In 1993, a fire broke out destroying much of the applicant’s office workshop and her stock in trade.
Before the expiry of the temporary permission, the applicant applied in March 1995 for planning permission to live on her land as a gypsy invoking the relevant government circulars.
In September 1995, planning permission was refused by the local authority. On appeal, a Planning Inspector held a public inquiry on 3 and 4 March 1997. On 21 April 1997, he upheld the refusal of planning permission, stating inter alia:
“The site is within confirmed Green Belt, and at the inquiry it was accepted on behalf of <the applicant> that the development now under consideration is not “appropriate” in terms of Green Belt policy. Therefore having regard to the development plan and national planning guidance, I consider that the main issue in these appeals is whether there are very special circumstances which could justify making an exception to the normal, firm presumption against inappropriate development within the Green Belt. …
For the <applicant> heavy reliance was placed on Circular 1/94…It was pointed out that the current development plan… does not…’identify locations suitable for gypsy sites’ or set out ‘… clear, realistic criteria for suitable locations, as a basis for site provision policies.’
That is so. However, even if the development plan were fully in accord with the Circular, it is highly unlikely that the appeal site would be among the pieces of land identified for a gypsy caravan site, either on a site specific basis or ‘criteria’ basis…
In South Bedfordshire, there are two local authority sites, on which from time to time vacancies do arise. … it appears to me, on the basis of the regular six monthly official counts, that the level of need for additional authorised sites in the district is low. …
A linked issue is the extent of the difficulty the <applicant and her husband> would personally have in finding another private gypsy site, if they had to leave their present one. I accept I would be difficult to find a site in South Bedfordshire. .. The <applicants are local people, but it would not be unreasonable, in my view, to expect them at least to search for sites elsewhere in Bedfordshire, or in the districts bordering on South Bedfordshire.
It was claimed that since the temporary planning permission was granted in 1992 the <applicant and her husband> have made ‘strenuous efforts’ to find alternative accommodation. I do not agree that this is the case. From the evidence I was given, the main efforts appear to have been two telephone calls to the council and a number of letters to local estate agents since the appeals were lodged. … I do not regard these efforts as anything like sufficient to establish that there is no prospect of finding some alternative accommodation which it would be reasonable to expect the <applicant and her husband> to accept.”
The inspector noted that the applicant received injections twice a day for diabetes and that her husband suffered from chronic bronchitis and asthma. This indicated that they would benefit from a more settled lifestyle within a reasonable distance of medical services. He observed that these conditions could also be fulfilled in a mobile home park, of which there were several located within the district. Nor did he find that the agricultural use of their land was such as to require that they live on the site. He did however extend the period of compliance by eighteen months with reference to their organising what they would do with regard to accommodation, etc.
On 3 November 1997, the applicant’s appeal against that decision under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was dismissed by the High Court.
Counsel advised against appeal to the Court of Appeal on grounds of lack of prospects of success.
The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991) (“the 1990 Act”) consolidated pre-existing planning law. It provides that planning permission is required for the carrying out of any development of land (section 57 of the 1990 Act). A change in the use of land for the stationing of caravans can constitute a development (Restormel Borough Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Rabey [1982] Journal of Planning Law 785; John Davies v. Secretary of State for the Environment and South Hertfordshire District Council [1989] Journal of Planning Law 601).
An application for planning permission must be made to the local planning authority, which has to determine the application in accordance with the local development plan, unless material considerations indicate otherwise (section 54A of the 1990 Act).
The 1990 Act provides for an appeal to the Secretary of State in the event of a refusal of permission (section 78). With immaterial exceptions, the Secretary of State must, if either the appellant or the authority so desire, give each of them the opportunity of making representations to an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State. It is established practice that each inspector must exercise independent judgment and must not be subject to any improper influence (see the Bryan v. the United Kingdom judgment of 22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-A, p. 11, § 21). There is a further appeal to the High Court on the ground that the Secretary of State’s decision was not within the powers conferred by the 1990 Act, or that the relevant requirements of the 1990 Act were not complied with (section 288).
If a development is carried out without the grant of the required planning permission, the local authority may issue an “enforcement notice” if it considers it expedient to do so having regard to the provisions of the development plan and to any other material considerations (section 172 (1) of the 1990 Act).
There is a right of appeal against an enforcement notice to the Secretary of State on the grounds, inter alia, that planning permission ought to be granted for the development in question (section 174). As with the appeal against refusal of permission, the Secretary of State must give each of the parties the opportunity of making representations to an inspector.
Again there is a further right of appeal on a point of law to the High Court against a decision of the Secretary of State under section 174 (section 289). Such an appeal may be brought on grounds identical to an application for judicial review. It therefore includes a review as to whether a decision or inference based on a finding of fact is perverse or irrational (R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] Appeal Cases 696, 764 H-765 D). The High Court will also grant a remedy if the inspector’s decision was such that there was no evidence to support a particular finding of fact; or the decision was made by reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors; or made for an improper purpose, in a procedurally unfair manner or in a manner which breached any governing legislation or statutory instrument. However, the court of review cannot substitute its own decision on the merits of the case for that of the decision-making authority.
Where any steps required by an enforcement notice to be taken are not taken within the period for compliance with the notice, the local authority may enter the land and take the steps and recover from the person who is then the owner of the land any expenses reasonably incurred by them in doing so (section 178 of the 1990 Act).
The purpose of Green Belts and the operation of the policy to protect them is set out in the national policy document PPG 2 (January 1995).
“1.1. The Government attaches great importance to Green Belts, which have been an essential element of planning policy for some four decades. …
1.4. The fundamental aim of Green Belt policy is to prevent urban sprawl by keeping land permanently open; the most important attribute of Green Belts is their openness. Green Belts can shape patterns of urban development at sub-regional and regional scale, and help to ensure that development occurs in locations allocated in development plans. They help to protect the countryside, be it in agricultural, forestry or other use. They can assist in moving towards more sustainable patterns of urban development.
1.5. There are five purposes in Green Belts:
- to check the unrestricted sprawl of large built-up areas;
- to prevent neighbouring towns from merging into one another;
- to assist in safeguarding the countryside from encroachment;
- to preserve the setting and special character of historic towns; and
- to assist in urban regeneration by encouraging the recycling of derelict and other urban land. …
2.1. The essential characteristic of Green Belts is their permanence. Their protection must be maintained as far as can be seen ahead. …
3.1. The general policies controlling development in the countryside apply with equal force in Green Belts but there is, in addition, a general presumption against inappropriate development within them. Such development should not be approved, except in very special circumstances. …
3.2. Inappropriate development is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt. It is for the applicant to show why permission should be granted. Very special circumstances to justify inappropriate development will not exist unless the harm by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm, is clearly outweighed by other considerations. In view of the presumption against inappropriate development, the Secretary of State will attach substantial weight to the harm to the Green Belt when considering any planning application or appeal concerning such development.”


ITEMID: 001-68097
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: FRA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: CASE OF RAMIREZ SANCHEZ v. FRANCE
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: No violation of Art. 3;Violation of Art. 13;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: 8. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Paris.
9. The applicant, who claims to be a revolutionary by profession, was taken into custody on 15 August 1994. He was placed under judicial investigation in connection with a series of terrorist attacks in France and on 25 December 1997 was given a life sentence for the murder of three police officers on 27 June 1975. He is currently in Fresnes Prison.
10. From mid-August 1994 to 17 October 2002 he was held in solitary confinement in La Santé Prison (Paris) and Fleury-Mérogis Prison.
11. According to his lawyer, this entailed his being held in a 6.84 square metre cell that was run-down and poorly insulated, with an open toilet area. The applicant was prohibited all contact with other prisoners and even prison warders and was only allowed to leave his cell once his fellow inmates had returned to theirs. His sole activity outside his cell was a two-hour daily walk in a triangular area that was 15 metres long and 7.5 m wide at the base, receding to 1 m at the vertex. This area was walled in and covered with wire mesh. His only recreational activity was reading the newspapers or watching television on a rented set. His only visits were from his lawyers and, once a month, a priest. The prison authorities ignored his requests to be allowed visits from anyone else. Mail intended for the applicant had disappeared, although it was not officially confiscated, and he had not been given a winter jacket that had had been brought to the prison for him in October 1999 until 16 February 2000.
The Government did not dispute these facts.
12. The documents in the case file show that the applicant has received visits from 58 different lawyers during his time in prison.
His current representative, who is also his fiancée, visited him more than 640 times between 27 June 1997 and 29 April 2002.
13. The parties have produced a series of decisions requiring the applicant to be held in solitary confinement for successive three-month periods.
14. The first was taken when the applicant was first detained (15 August 1994). It consists of a form on which the following boxes have been ticked: “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners” and “breakdown of order and discipline in the prison”. There were no observations by the applicant. The same day, a doctor issued a medical certificate stating:
“[The applicant's] health is compatible with solitary confinement. However, he must, if possible, have complete rest for eight days.”
15. A decision dated 3 November 1995 to prolong the applicant's solitary confinement from 15 November 1994 to 15 February 1995 was approved by the Regional Director's Office of the Prison Service. The reasons stated were the same, but the applicant made the following observations:
“I consider that these solitary-confinement measures, especially the disturbances at night, indicate a desire to harass a political prisoner.”
In a medical certificate issued the same day, a doctor “certif[ied] that [the applicant's] health [was] compatible with his continued solitary confinement.”
16. A decision of 20 January 1995, which was applicable from 15 February to 15 May 1995, cited the same reasons and was approved by the Regional Director's Office. The applicant refused to sign the notice informing him of the decision. In a medical certificate issued the same day, a doctor:
“certif[ied] that [the applicant's] health [was] compatible with his continued solitary confinement for administrative reasons.”
17. A decision dated 25 April 1995, which was approved by the Regional Director's Office and was applicable from 15 May to 15 August 1995, spoke of the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners” and a “security measure”. The applicant was transferred that day to Fresnes Prison.
18. On 27 July 1995 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a certificate stating:
“... health currently compatible with continued solitary confinement.”
On 11 August 1995 the measure was prolonged for a period of three months starting on 15 August 1995.
19. On 10 November 1995 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a medical certificate stating that the applicant's health was satisfactory and compatible with solitary confinement.
On 20 November 1995 the measure was prolonged for a period of three months starting on 15 November 1995.
20. On 25 January 1996 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a certificate stating that the applicant's health was satisfactory.
On 4 March 1996 the measure was prolonged for a period of three months starting on 15 February 1996.
21. On 19 April 1996 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a certificate stating that the applicant's health was compatible with his detention in the segregation unit.
On 7 May 1996 the measure was prolonged for a period of three months starting on 15 May 1996.
22. It was not until 31 October 1996 that the applicant was notified of the measure applicable for the period from 15 May to 15 August 1996. He made the following observation:
“I do not think it right that I should be asked to sign more than five months late.”
23. On 22 October 1996 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a certificate stating that the applicant's health was compatible with his detention in solitary confinement.
24. On 15 July 1996 the applicant was notified of a measure which referred to the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners” and to “international terrorism”.
25. A decision dated 31 October 1996, which was applicable from 15 November 1996 to 15 February 1997, referred only to the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners”. The applicant made the following observations on the notification slip:
“I note that Mr ..., the director, has already replied to these observations even before I have made them; it is stated below: 07.11.1996 before the commission responsible for the execution of sentences in the prison. Consequently, the remarks I am required to make have become superfluous. Even so, my solitary confinement is a form of torture. This measure, like those that follow, was authorised by the Head of the Prison Service at the Ministry of Justice on 14 November 1996.”
26. On 17 January 1997 a doctor from the Paris Regional Health Authority certified that he had examined the applicant and found his health compatible with solitary confinement.
27. Proposals that were made on 20 January and 25 April 1997 referred to the “need to protect you from the rest of the prison population” and the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners”. The applicant made the following remarks on the first of these proposals:
“I note that I am increasingly subject to this base harassment and am being singled out as a political prisoner. I reject the reasons given for keeping me in solitary confinement.”
28. On 23 April 1997 a doctor from the Paris Regional Health Authority certified that solitary confinement was not contraindicated for the applicant.
With regard to the proposal of 25 April 1997, the applicant noted:
“I have not had a check-up, been weighed or had my blood pressure taken etc... I note that the lower section of the questionnaire has already been filled in, thus making a mockery of the observations which I have been asked to make. Please give me a further complete medical check-up.”
29. A decision of 21 July 1997 referred in addition to: “breakdown of order and discipline in the prison” and “potential dangerousness linked to acts of terrorism ”. The applicant made the following comments:
“I have not had a medical certificate following a medical examination and you are using forged documents which you do not even dare to show me. I request an immediate interview with those in charge.”
30. A decision of 13 August 1997 again cited the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners”.
31. On 14 October 1997 a Fresnes Prison doctor issued a certificate certifying that the applicant's health was satisfactory.
The proposals of 21 October 1997 and 23 January 1998 were in the same terms as those of 13 August 1997. On signing the proposal of 21 October, the applicant stated:
“I sign under protest against an unjust repressive measure (decision) against a political prisoner, hostage of the French State.”
32. On 23 January 1998 a Fresnes Prison doctor issued a certificate certifying that the applicant's health was satisfactory.
33. It was followed by a further certificate on 22 April 1998 stating that the applicant was well enough to remain in solitary confinement and a certificate of 23 July stating that solitary confinement was not contraindicated. A further certificate drawn up on 21 October 1998 stated that the applicant was in satisfactory health and well enough to remain in solitary confinement.
34. Proposals made on 22 April, 23 July and 19 October 1998 cited the need for “precautionary and security measures in view of the prisoner's character and record”. The applicant commented as follows on the proposal of 22 April 1998:
“I acknowledge receipt of notice but protest against the renewal of this unjustified measure of vile political repression that has been imposed on me. Please provide me with a copy.”
With regard to the measure of 19 October 1998, he noted:
“The signature on this notice by the disloyal deputy director Mr V. further attests to the unfairness of repressive measures imposed by a prison service that acts unlawfully against political inmates such as me.”
35. On 15 January 1999 a doctor from La Santé Prison issued a medical certificate in which he stated that the applicant's “health is currently compatible with his continued detention in solitary confinement subject to his receiving psychiatric treatment”.
Proposals made on 14 January and 8 April 1999 stated:
“The prisoner must remain in administrative solitary confinement on order and security grounds, in view of his character and record and the nature of his court cases.”
36. The Ministry of Justice stated in decisions of 20 January and 20 April 1999:
“The character of this prisoner, who is a high-security prisoner and objectively dangerous, in particular because of the nature and length of the sentence he faces, justifies his continued solitary confinement on order and security grounds.”
37. On 9 April 1999 the senior doctor at La Santé Prison issued a certificate which read:
“The circular of December 1998 on solitary confinement states that the opinion of a doctor will only be sought after a year's confinement. Last certificate issued on [illegible]. There is therefore no need to append a certificate regarding prolongation to this note.”
38. On 23 April 1999 another prison doctor certified that the applicant's health was compatible with his detention or continued detention in solitary confinement.
39. A further certificate dated 20 July 1999 confirmed that the applicant's health was compatible with his continued detention in solitary confinement.
A decision of 22 July 1999 cited the following reasons:
“You must remain in solitary confinement for a further period of three months on order and security grounds, in view of your character, your classification as a high-security prisoner, and the nature of your convictions and of the cases currently pending.”
40. A decision of 25 October 1999, which took effect on 15 November 1999, read as follows:
“It is necessary to prolong your solitary confinement for a further period of three months in order to preserve order and security in the prison in view of your dangerousness, your ability to influence fellow inmates and the risk of your escaping given the substantial aid potentially at your disposal.”
The applicant made the following observations:
“I note that the infamous masquerade by the Zionist militant Elisabeth Guigou, who runs the French Ministry of Justice on behalf of the imperialist forces that are seeking to reduce France to the level of a suzerain of the United States, continues. To heck with Human Rights and Law itself. ALLOUHA AKBAR.”
41. On 1 February 2000 the authorities relied on “order and security grounds, in view of your character, your classification as a high-security prisoner and the offences for which you have been imprisoned”.
42. The decisions of 27 April, 20 July and 20 October 2000 were couched in identical terms to the decision of 25 October 1999, save that the sentence read: “given your access to outside help”.
43. On 13 July 2000 the senior doctor at La Santé Prison issued a medical certificate which read:
“I, the undersigned, ... declare that [the applicant] is in quite astounding physical and mental condition after six years in solitary confinement.
However, it is not proper for a patient's doctor to be required to issue a certificate that ought to be a matter for expert opinion. It is very difficult for a doctor to sanction solitary confinement on administrative, not medical, grounds.”
44. On 3 October 2000 another doctor issued a certificate in the following terms:
“I the undersigned ... certify that I have today examined [the applicant].
No clinical examination was carried out. However, in view of his current mental state, I am unable to give a medical opinion on whether he is fit to remain in solitary confinement.”
45. On 5 January and 23 January 2001 the Ministry of Justice ratified decisions by the Governors of Fleury-Mérogis and La Santé Prisons dated 30 December 2000 and 22 January 2001 respectively to place the applicant in solitary confinement after previous orders had automatically lapsed following his transfer.
46. On 20 March 2001 a doctor from La Santé Prison certified that she had seen the applicant but had not been able to carry out a physical examination. She added:
“However, in view of his current mental state, I am unable to give a medical opinion on whether he is fit to remain in solitary confinement.”
On 28 March 2001 the applicant commented as follows:
“I have once again filled in this form, having already done so on 19 March... I denounce 'the white torture' of perpetual solitary confinement which, following the 'serious provocation of 28 December 2000', has been aggravated by the obstruction of the fanlight, which now only opens to an angle of 30o (7.5 cm), preventing fresh air getting in. This is on top of the ban on my receiving visits or French lessons, in breach of the undertakings. You are committing a crime of 'lese-humanity'.”
47. On 28 March 2001 a doctor from the Cochin Hospital practising in La Santé Prison issued the following certificate:
“I, the undersigned, ... state that the doctors from the medical service at Paris La Santé Prison are not qualified to judge whether the physical and mental condition of the prisoner Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, who is currently being held in La Santé, is compatible with his continued solitary confinement.”
48. On 24 April 2001 it was decided to prolong the solitary confinement “in order to preserve order and security in the prison in view of your dangerousness, your ability to influence fellow inmates and the risks of your escaping given your access to outside help.” The same reasons were cited in a further extension of 18 June 2001, while a decision of September 2001 was worded in almost identical terms.
49. On 23 May 2001 the doctor in charge of the Outpatient Consultation and Treatment Unit wrote to the Governor of La Santé Prison in these terms:
“I have met Mr Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, ..., as I was asked for an opinion on whether there is any contraindication to this patient's remaining in solitary confinement.
Even though Mr Ramirez Sanchez is in reasonable physical and mental condition, strict solitary confinement for more than six years and nine months is ultimately bound to cause psychological harm.
It is my duty as a doctor to alert you to these potential consequences so that you may take an informed decision.
...”
50. On 20 June 2001 the doctor who issued the certificate of 20 March 2001 issued a second certificate in like terms.
51. On 20 September 2001 the doctor in charge of the Outpatient Consultation and Treatment Unit issued a medical certificate after examining the applicant “for the purposes of the medical opinion required for continued solitary confinement”. He stated that the applicant presented:
“A physical and mental condition that was entirely reasonable after seven years in solitary confinement ... This opinion does not constitute an expert opinion, which I am not qualified to give.”
52. The following reasons were given for prolonging the solitary confinement in a decision of 4 October 2001: “It is necessary to prolong your solitary confinement in order to preserve order and security in the prison and to avoid your exerting an influence over your fellow inmates or attempting to escape”.
In his observations, the applicant noted in particular:
“More than seven years of strict solitary confinement, a ban on receiving visits or French lessons and a steady reduction in the amount of fresh air in the isolation cell from which even the old wooden school desk has been removed all serve to demonstrate the unfairness of the repressive measures that have been taken against a revolutionary political leader who will not be broken.”
53. Decisions of 10 January, 25 March and 8 July 2002 read as follows:
“It is necessary for you to remain in solitary confinement in order to preserve order and security in the prison and to avoid your exerting an influence over your fellow inmates or attempting to escape. The fact that you have received a life sentence, your classification as a high-risk prisoner and the nature of the offences for which you have been prosecuted militate in favour of your remaining in solitary confinement.”
54. On 13 June 2002 an assistant doctor from the Outpatient Consultation and Treatment Unit at La Santé Prison issued a medical certificate in the following terms:
“I, the undersigned, Doctor Haouili, an assistant doctor from the OCTU at La Santé Prison in Paris certify that I have examined Mr Ramirez Sanchez Ilich, who was born on 12/10/49, in connection with a request for his solitary confinement to continue.
From the medical standpoint, the problem posed by prolonged solitary confinement over a number of years is that it may affect the prisoner's physical and mental health.”
55. On 29 July 2002 the doctor in charge of the Outpatient Consultation and Treatment Unit at La Santé Prison provided the Ministry of Health with the following summary of the medical care the applicant was receiving:
“This patient, who, as you are aware, is in the segregation unit, receives two mandatory medical visits from a member of the OCTU medical team every week, as required by the French Criminal Code.
He is currently in excellent somatic health. I am not qualified to express an opinion on his mental health.
In addition, Mr Ramirez Sanchez may on request consult members of the OCTU team independently of the mandatory medical visits to the segregation unit.
He has thus been able to consult an ophthalmologist ... and has been prescribed corrective glasses.
He consulted a general practitioner independently of mandatory visits to the segregation unit on...
Biological tests are performed regularly. ...
The treatment Mr Ramirez-Sanchez has been receiving can be equated to comfort treatment: ...
It should be noted that Mr Ramirez Sanchez has refused any psychological help from the RMPS [Regional Medical and Psychological Service].
...”
56. In September 2002 a further decision to prolong the solitary confinement was taken “in order to preserve security and order, which are under serious threat owing to the applicant's implication in terrorist networks, his dangerousness and the risk of his escaping”.
57. On 17 October 2002 the applicant was transferred to Saint-Maur Prison (département of Indre), where his solitary confinement ended.
58. On 27 August 2003 the Indre Health Inspector wrote the following letter to the Ministry of Health:
“Mr Ramirez Sanchez received a somatic and psychiatric medical examination on his arrival at the prison on 17 October 2002.
He has at no stage been placed in solitary confinement in Saint-Maur Prison.
As regards his somatic health, Mr Ramirez Sanchez receives the statutory care and may consult the OCTU on request.
As to his mental health, he was seen by an RMPS psychiatrist as part of the standard induction procedure. No follow-up was prescribed at the time and the patient has not asked to see a psychiatrist since. He was offered an examination and this took place on 26 August 2003. The SMPR have not recommended any follow up to that appointment.”
59. In March 2004 the applicant was transferred to Fresnes Prison, where he returned to solitary confinement.
60. On 14 September 1996 the applicant lodged an application for judicial review with the Paris Administrative Court, arguing that the decision of 11 July 1996 to place him in solitary confinement should be set aside.
61. In a judgment of 25 November 1998, which was served on the applicant on 26 January 1999, the Paris Administrative Court dismissed the application, holding that the impugned decision was an internal administrative measure which the administrative courts had no power to set aside.
62. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are as follows:
“Save in the circumstances set out in Articles D. 136 to D. 147, prison staff must at all times be able to verify a prisoner's presence.
At night it must be possible to light cells when necessary. Cells should be entered only for good reason or in the event of imminent danger. In all cases, intervention must be by at least two staff members and an officer, if one is on night duty.”
“Rounds shall be made after lights out and during the night at set times to be changed daily by the senior custody officer, under the authority of the prison governor.”
“Any prisoner in a communal establishment or unit may be placed in solitary confinement at his or her request or as a precautionary or security measure.
Orders for prisoners to be placed in solitary confinement shall be made by the prison governor, who shall inform the regional director and the judge responsible for the execution of sentences without delay. The prison governor shall also report to the commission responsible for the execution of sentences at the first meeting following the prisoner's confinement or objection to a request for his or her confinement.
The prisoner may, either personally or through counsel, send any observations he or she has on the decision to the judge responsible for the execution of sentences.
The medical team shall be given a list of the prisoners in solitary confinement every day. Prisoners in solitary confinement will receive a medical examination in accordance with Article D. 381. If the doctor considers it appropriate in view of the prisoner's health, he or she shall give an opinion on whether solitary confinement should cease.
Solitary confinement may only exceed three months if a new report has been made to the commission responsible for the execution of sentences and the regional director so decides.
Solitary confinement may only exceed one year from the date of the initial decision if the Minister of Justice so decides on the basis of a reasoned report by the regional director after the regional director has obtained the opinions of the commission responsible for the execution of sentences and the prison doctor.
The prison governor shall keep a solitary-confinement register for consultation by the administrative and judicial authorities on supervisory visits and inspections.”
“Solitary confinement shall not constitute a disciplinary measure.
Prisoners in solitary confinement shall be subject to the ordinary prison regime.”
63. A circular was issued on 8 December 1998 to implement the decree amending the Code of Criminal Procedure. It contained, inter alia, the following provisions:
“4. Solitary confinement as a precautionary or security measure
Orders for solitary confinement as a precautionary or security measure are made by the prison governor at the prisoner's request or on the governor's own initiative. Since the governor has sole power to order solitary confinement, he or she will need to take particular care in setting out the reasons.
4.1. The need to state reasons
Since the Conseil d'État's Marie judgment of 17 February 1995 the administrative courts have assumed jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of disciplinary decisions 'giving cause for complaint'.
Judicial review has not yet been extended to decisions to place a prisoner in solitary confinement, which continue to be regarded in the most recent decisions as 'internal administrative measures' that are not amenable to review.
The courts consider on the basis of Article D. 283-2 that 'solitary confinement does not make conditions of detention worse and is not liable to affect the legal position of the person so held' (Conseil d'État, 28 February 1996, Fauqueux judgment; and Conseil d'État, 22 September 1997, Trébutien judgment).
4.2. Nature of the reasons
It is not sufficient simply to repeat the succinct 'as a precautionary or security measure' formula used in Article D. 283-1.
... Orders for solitary confinement as a precautionary or security measure must be based on genuine grounds and objective concordant evidence of a risk of the prisoner causing or being exposed to serious harm.
The reasons must state whether the measure has been taken to avoid the risk of an escape, violence or coercion, concerted action liable to disrupt the prison community, connivance or conspiracy, or to protect the life or physical integrity of individual prisoners or of the person in solitary confinement.
4.3. Invalid reasons
An order for solitary confinement cannot be made solely for the following reasons.
4.3.1. Nature of the offence
The seriousness of the offence for which the person concerned is being held and the nature of the offence of which he or she is accused cannot by themselves justify solitary confinement.
...
II. PROCEDURE IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT CASES
...
1.4. Content of the decision
The decision shall be in the form set out on the printed sheet annexed hereto and shall be notified after the hearing. It contains two sections, one for the reasons and the other for the prisoner's observations. Additional observations on an ordinary sheet of paper and any documents that may assist in explaining the reasons may be attached to the decision.
...
2.2. Copies of documents for the authorities
...
3. Lifting the measure
Solitary confinement is not intended to continue indefinitely, as it must be justified by factual and legal considerations, which may change or cease to apply.
In view of the harmful effects of prolonged solitary confinement the prison governor and regional director must closely monitor the length of the measure.
The measure will automatically lapse in the circumstances set out in Chapter 3. Consideration should also be given on the ordinary renewal dates to lifting the measure.
The prisoner must be notified of a decision to lift the measure. If the prisoner asked to be placed in solitary confinement, his or her observations (if any) must be obtained.
Article D. 283-1, subparagraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the prison governor to inform the regional director and the judge responsible for the execution of sentences of his decision without delay.
A copy of a decision to place a remand prisoner in solitary confinement must also be sent to the judge in charge of the investigation.
4. Prolongation of the measure
Unless a decision to prolong the measure is made at the end of three months, it will automatically lapse. ...
4.1. Proposals to prolong the measure
The prolongation procedure must be set in motion three weeks before the three-month period expires.
Prisoners in solitary confinement must be informed if it is intended to propose prolongation of the measure and, if they so wish, be given an hour in which to prepare their observations, which they may submit at a hearing held for that purpose. They are then notified of the proposal.
No prolongation may be proposed without a prior assessment of the prisoner's situation made with the aid, inter alia, of the record of observation of the prisoner in solitary confinement.
If the prison governor considers it necessary to prolong the measure, he or she must compile a file containing:
(i) The printed proposal form containing a statement of reasons, which must be up to date when the request is made. The form will contain confirmation that the prisoner has been notified of the proposal, the date of the verbal report to the commission responsible for the execution of sentences and the date of transmission to the regional director.
(ii) The liaison form.
(iii) The report on the prisoner's behaviour in solitary confinement based, in particular, on the record of observation.
Any report by the medical team or opinion by the doctor will be appended to the proposal file.
4.2. The regional director's investigation
The file should be sent to the regional director's office at least fifteen days before the three-month period expires. The regional director's office will examine the file and, if necessary, request additional documents or information. It should make sure it has a fully up-to-date statement of reasons for the proposal to prolong the measure.
The regional director must decide whether or not to prolong the solitary confinement and send the decision to the prison for notification to the prisoner before the expiry of the three-month period in all cases. The decision shall be reasoned.
If it is decided not to prolong the measure, it will immediately lapse and the prisoner will be returned to the ordinary cells.
The prisoner will be given a copy of the decision to prolong the measure on being notified of it.
The same rules apply to the preservation of evidence and the forwarding of copies to the authorities as for the initial decision.
The same procedure shall be followed if prolongation appears necessary at the end of a further three-month period. Regional directors shall consider the reasons for a further extension with particular care. In particular, they must examine whether other types of measure have been considered and satisfy themselves that no such measure would be feasible.
When a decision to prolong solitary confinement has already been taken by a regional director, then, unless it automatically lapses under Chapter 3, the measure may be lifted during the statutory periods only by a decision of the same authority. In such cases, the prison governor will forward to the regional director a reasoned proposal to lift the measure accompanied, if applicable, by a supporting report. The prison governor will also send the regional director without delay any medical certificates the doctor has decided to issue together with his opinion on whether any action is called for.
5. Prolongation after a year
Solitary confinement should be prolonged after a year only in exceptional cases. The Minister of Justice has sole decision-making power, in accordance with Article D. 283-1, subparagraph 6.
5.1. Proposals to prolong solitary confinement
The prison governor must send the proposal to prolong solitary confinement to the regional director before the end of the tenth month to allow the regional director's office and the central authority time to examine it thoroughly.
A doctor's opinion must be sought if it is proposed to prolong solitary confinement beyond a year. If the doctor gives an opinion, it must be set out in writing and forwarded with the proposal. If the doctor does not give an opinion, he or she should initial at least the form containing the proposal.
The prison governor will submit the proposal to the commission responsible for the execution of sentences for an opinion, which the latter will indicate on the proposal form.
The prison governor advises the prisoner of his or her intention to propose prolonging the solitary confinement beyond a year. If the prisoner so wishes, he or she may be given at least an hour in which to prepare observations to be made at a hearing at the end of the allotted time. The prisoner is then notified of the proposal.
The prison governor must append to the proposal a summary report on the prisoner's behaviour since the initial decision was made.
Lastly, the liaison record (III.3) is forwarded with the proposal to give the authority that will take the decision full details of the chronology of the measure.
5.2. The regional director's report
The regional director draws up a report on the basis of the prison governor's proposal and gives a reasoned opinion on whether the measure should be prolonged beyond a year.
Before doing so, the regional director may lift the measure if he or she considers that is it no longer warranted or substitute another measure within his or her powers.
He or she may also recommend other measures, such as a transfer.
The file containing the proposal to prolong solitary confinement must be sent to the head office of the prison service at least one month before the preceding measure expires. The central authority must be given time to examine the file and seek alternatives.
5.3. The decision of the Minister of Justice
The central authority sends the Ministry of Justice's decision (which will normally be taken by the director of the prison service under delegated authority) to the regional director's office at least one week before the preceding period of solitary confinement expires so that the prison can be informed in time.
The prisoner is provided with a copy of the decision. An original is placed in the file.
A verbal report on the final decision is made to the commission responsible for the execution of sentences.
The head office of the prison service retains power to decide on further quarterly extensions beyond a year. The matter is again referred to the central authority in accordance with the procedure described in this paragraph at least one month before the new period of solitary confinement is due to end.
Apart from the cases of automatic lapse set out in Chapter 3, power to lift the measure after a year is also vested in the central authority.
...
IV. THE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT REGIME
1. European and national recommendations
Following its visit to France of 6 to 18 October 1996 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment recommended that 'a balance [be struck] between the requirements of the case and the application of a solitary confinement type regime', in view of the harmful consequences that that regime could have on the prisoner. It proposed organising the segregation unit in a way that would give prisoners continued access to the better exercise areas and to activities, including outdoor activities.
These recommendations tie in with the findings of the working groups set up by or at the request of the prison service.
2. Implementation of the ordinary prison regime
In accordance with Article D. 283-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prisoners in solitary confinement are subject to the ordinary prison regime.
1o Prisoners must be permitted to make full use of their rights of defence, which are protected by instruments of constitutional or international rank, in accordance with the procedure set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the distinction it makes between convicted and remand prisoners. The prohibition on communications referred to in Article 145-4 cannot apply to communications with lawyers.
2o The right to relations with members of one's family and others are exercised through prison visits. Subject to the arrangements for individual access to the visiting room, there shall be no restrictions on prison visits unless a court has ordered solitary confinement.
There must be no restrictions on the right of prisoners in solitary confinement to send or receive correspondence. However, stricter monitoring of correspondence may be justified by court-imposed imperatives, the prisoner's classification as a high-security risk in accordance with Article D. 276-1 of Code of Criminal Procedure, or a recommendation for the prisoner to be placed on suicide watch.
Similarly, prisoners' rights to make telephone calls in penal establishments in accordance with Article D. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not suspended by solitary confinement.
3o There is no general restriction on the right of prisoners in solitary confinement to access to news, subject to the normal supervision prisoners receive throughout their term in prison. Prisoners in solitary confinement retain the right to buy newspapers of their choice, or to use a radio or television subject to the usual conditions.
If the library operates a direct-access system, it must arrange special opening hours for prisoners in solitary confinement or keep a separate stock for the segregation unit.
4o Religious observance.
Religious observance in the segregation unit shall take place in accordance with the rules set out in Articles D. 437 to D. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since prisoners in solitary confinement are unable to attend the services habitually open to all prisoners, they may be authorised to attend special services arranged in agreement with the chaplain.
5o Health.
The health of prisoners in solitary confinement is dependent on their being detained in conditions that allow them a healthy lifestyle:
(i) Cells must receive natural light through a window which also affords adequate ventilation, as required by Article D. 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(ii) The exercise yard must provide access to the open air. Consideration must be given to allocating specific times for prisoners in solitary confinement to exercise in an open yard. Exercise periods should be for the same length as for ordinary regime prisoners.
(iii) Sporting activities should be made available in the segregation unit, for example by the provision of an exercise bike, gym mat or table-tennis table.
2.6. Activities in the segregation unit
Although access to communal activities provided for ordinary-regime prisoners is suspended during solitary confinement, prisoners in solitary confinement remain under the ordinary regime and special arrangements should be made within the segregation unit for most activities to continue, allowing prisoners to assemble in small groups at times.
Thus, whenever possible, the prison governor must permit prisoners in solitary confinement to assemble in groups of two or three for exercise or activities. A room, which may be multipurpose (sport, reading) should be set aside for this purpose. It is for the prison governor to assess how and when such groups may be organised and to tailor the measure to individuals in the light of the reason for the prisoner's placement in solitary confinement, the aim pursued and the character and conduct of the prisoner or prisoners concerned.
Individual educational programmes or distance teaching offered by teachers or instructors should not be discouraged, as they ensure that activities are also directed towards training.
4. Monitoring of and dialogue with prisoners in solitary confinement
4.1. Monitoring
A record of observation must be compiled for all prisoners in solitary confinement; it will be supplemented by any relevant remarks by duty staff or the persons in charge of the unit on the prisoner's behaviour in solitary confinement.
The record of observation acts as an early warning system if it appears that solitary confinement is having harmful effects on the prisoner.
Staff should consult it regularly and in any event if it is intended to propose prolonging the measure.
A summary of the record of observation will be sent to the regional director and the central authority with the proposal to prolong the measure or in the event of an internal appeal by the prisoner against the original decision or a decision to prolong the measure.
All prisons shall be responsible for creating, or if one already exists improving, a record of observation meeting the stated objective.
4.2. Dialogue
In order to avoid excessive social isolation, it is essential to maintain contact and encourage exchanges between staff and prisoners in solitary confinement. Not only does this reduce the degree of isolation, especially for prisoners who do not receive visits, it also assists in monitoring the prisoner's character.
For the same reasons, senior prison officers and socio-educational staff should seek to meet prisoners in solitary confinement at least as regularly as they do ordinary prisoners.”
64. In a judgment of 30 July 2003 the Conseil d'État departed from its previous case-law when it held:
“The aforementioned provisions and the evidence before the tribunal of fact show that it is in the very nature of solitary confinement to deprive persons subjected to it of access to the sporting, cultural, teaching and training activities and paid work that are available to other prisoners collectively. Such a measure may be imposed for a period of up to three months and may be prolonged. In these circumstances, even though Article D. 283-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that solitary confinement is not a disciplinary measure, as the prisoners concerned are subject to the ordinary prison regime, a decision to place a prisoner in solitary confinement against his or her wishes will, in view of the effects it has on the conditions of detention, be amenable to judicial review. Accordingly, the Minister of Justice's submission that the Administrative Court of Appeal erred in law in declaring admissible an application by Mr X for judicial review of a decision by the Governor of Bois d'Arcy Prison to place him in solitary confinement is unfounded.
The Administrative Court of Appeal did not err in law when it held that a decision to place a prisoner in solitary confinement was one of the decisions for which the first section of the Act of 11 July 1979 requires reasons to be stated. In finding that insufficient reasons had been stated in the impugned decision, the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal reached a decision in its unfettered discretion which, in the absence of any distortion of the facts, cannot be challenged in this court.
It follows from the foregoing that the Minister of Justice is not entitled to an order setting aside the impugned judgment.
It is appropriate in the circumstance of this case to order the State to pay Mr X the sum of 2,300 euros he claimed under Article L. 761-1 of the Administrative Courts Code.”
65. The following extracts are taken from the reports of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the responses of the Government of the French Republic and the 'guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism' adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 11 July 2002.
“158. The CPT pays particular attention to prisoners held under conditions akin to solitary confinement. It reiterates that the principle of proportionality requires a balance be struck between the requirements of the case and the application of a solitary-confinement regime, which is a step that can have very harmful consequences for the person concerned. Solitary confinement can, in certain circumstances, amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. In any event, it should be as short as possible.
159. The delegation visited the segregation units in ... and in the remand prisons of Paris-La Santé .... It met a number of prisoners who had been held in solitary confinement for long, and, in some instances, very long, periods.
... Furthermore, the solitary-confinement cells in Paris-La Santé Prison could be described as reasonable (cf. paragraphs 100 and 101).
As regards the prison regime, which according to the Code of Criminal Procedure is an ordinary regime, the delegation found that the activities remained limited (reading, television, and in some instances in-cell educational or training activities). ... There continued to be little human contact and this took the form of any visits from close relatives or other authorised persons (such as religious representatives) and some daily contact with warders.
As regards outdoor exercise, the prison authorities said that a one to three hour walk was authorised every day, although conditions were less than satisfactory.
160. The CPT pointed out in its report on its first visit that particular attention had to be paid to the mental and physical condition of prisoners in solitary confinement. In paragraph 380 of their interim report, the French authorities indicated that prisoners in solitary confinement were examined twice a week by doctors and that a doctor was called out whenever the condition of a prisoner in solitary confinement demanded. Doctors were required to inform the prison governor in writing if they considered the prisoner's physical or mental health to be at risk.
In that connection, the French authorities informed the delegation that a draft decree (which is due to come into force on 1 December 1996) would establish new rules for gaining access to a doctor and assessing a prisoner's condition.
161. As to the other safeguards, it seemed to the delegation from an examination of the relevant files that the procedure for prolonging solitary confinement was rather summary. The manner of its implementation also appears to vary from one region to another. ... At Paris-La Santé Prison, the delegation heard allegations by prisoners in solitary confinement that this was no longer the case. These were credible allegations, since, unlike in Marseille, the delegation found no trace of annotations or headings indicating that prisoners had been informed of the proposal to prolong their solitary confinement. The delegation found virtually no evidence in the files it examined of reports being sent to the commission responsible for the execution of sentences or of the commission issuing opinions as required by the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the only medical certificates relating to the renewal procedure seen by the delegation were stereotyped and extremely brief.
162. In the light of the foregoing, the CPT recommends that the French authorities:
(i) review the arrangements for solitary confinement with a view to providing prisoners with a wider range of activities and ensuring appropriate human contact;
(ii) ensure that solitary confinement is as short as possible; in that connection, the quarterly review of the need for solitary confinement should entail a full assessment based, if appropriate, on a medical and social report;
(iii) ensure that all prisoners whose solitary confinement is prolonged are informed in writing of the reasons for the measure (it being understood that there is no obligation to communicate data which it would be reasonable to exclude on security grounds).
The CPT would also like to know whether the decree announced by the French authorities has entered into force and to receive a copy if it has.”
“(i) 'review the arrangements for solitary confinement with a view to providing prisoners with a wider range of activities and ensuring appropriate human contact' (paragraph 162)
The rules governing solitary confinement are being revised. Articles D. 283-1 and D. 283-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the circular of 12 July 1981, which are currently in force, need supplementing in order to improve the procedure and to limit the duration of the measure.
Draft Article D. 283-1 accordingly places particular emphasis on the need for the medical supervision of prisoners in the segregation unit. It also makes the director of the prison service responsible for deciding whether to prolong solitary confinement that has exceeded a year.
The entry into force of this Article, which will be included in a vast decree amending more than 300 articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been delayed, as the decree is part of a governmental programme of State reform.
It is intended that a draft circular will be issued when the decree enters into force. It will emphasise that prisoners in solitary confinement are subject to the ordinary prison regime and will give instructions for continued dialogue between staff and prisoners in solitary confinement, in particular through the organisation of individual teaching or training programmes.
(ii) 'ensure that solitary confinement is as short as possible; in that connection, the quarterly review of the need for solitary confinement should entail a full assessment based, if appropriate, on a medical and social report' (paragraph 162)
A draft circular is being prepared
(iii) 'ensure that all prisoners whose solitary confinement is renewed are informed in writing of the reasons for the measure (it being understood that there is no obligation to communicate data which it would be reasonable to exclude on security grounds)' (paragraph 162).
A draft circular is being prepared.”
“(i) 'review the arrangements for solitary confinement with a view to providing prisoners with a wider range of activities and ensuring appropriate human contact' (paragraph 162).
The draft decree referred to in the interim report, which brings the regulatory section of the Code of Criminal Procedure into line with a number of statutes that are already in force, is in the process of promulgation.
It will amend, inter alia, Article D. 283-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by making the director of the prison service responsible for deciding whether to prolong solitary confinement that has exceeded a year. It will redirect the focus of medical supervision to its exclusive role of providing prisoner health care.
Pursuant to this provision, a draft circular has been drawn up confirming that prisoners in solitary confinement are subject to the ordinary prison regime, which entails, inter alia:
(a) full compliance with prisoners' ordinary rights to relations with their family, representatives and others;
(b) continued dialogue between staff and the prisoner in solitary confinement through regular meetings;
(c) the organisation, to the extent possible, of special activities in the segregation unit and of individual teaching and training programmes.
This draft was prepared after wide consultation of decentralised services. An information and exchange procedure on the issue has thus already been set in motion and will continue with the distribution of the circular, which could be available immediately after publication of the aforementioned decree.
(ii) 'ensure that solitary confinement is as short as possible; in that connection, the quarterly review of the need for solitary confinement should entail a full assessment based, if appropriate, on a medical and social report' (paragraph 162)
The draft circular establishes a mechanism for controlling the length of solitary-confinement measures: before a decision to prolong the measure beyond three months can be taken, the regional director must examine an observation report from the prison governor based, in particular, on his knowledge of the prisoner concerned and the information provided by the various prison departments on the basis of the personal record of observation.
Any event with suspensive effect entailing release or for a period exceeding fifteen days will result in the lapse of the solitary-confinement measure and the prisoner's return to ordinary detention.
(iii) 'ensure that all prisoners whose solitary confinement is renewed are informed in writing of the reasons for the measure (it being understood that there is no obligation to communicate data which it would be reasonable to exclude on security grounds)' (paragraph 162)
The draft circular introduces an improved system for the provision of reasons and written notification of decisions to place a prisoner in solitary confinement. The prison governor will not, however, be required to disclose information to a prisoner that may put people or the prison at risk; this has been accepted by the CPT.”
“111. In its reports of both 1991 and 1996 the CPT stressed that the principle of proportionality required that a balance be struck between the requirements of the case and the application of a solitary confinement-type regime, which is a step that can have very harmful consequences for the person concerned. Solitary confinement can, in certain circumstances, amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. In any event, it should be as short as possible. Following its visits, the CPT advised of its concerns regarding various aspects of solitary confinement in France (cf. paragraphs 140 et seq., and 158 to 163 of the reports). Subsequently, in a circular dated 14 December 1998 the Minister of Justice issued instructions concerning, inter alia, the grounds on which prisoners could be placed in solitary confinement, the procedure to be followed and the regime for prisoners in solitary confinement. These instructions address some of the concerns expressed by the CPT in its reports on previous visits.
Nevertheless, during its visits the CPT delegation found serious shortcomings in the manner in which the earlier recommendations of the CPT and the ministerial instructions had been implemented in practice.
The CPT has serious reservations about the situation of a number of prisoners in solitary confinement for administrative reasons met by the delegation during its visit. Its reservations concern both the length of the confinement (which in some instances had been for years on end) and the highly restrictive regime to which such prisoners are subject (total lack of structured or communal activities).
112. The physical conditions of detention of prisoners placed in solitary confinement for administrative reasons were globally acceptable. However, the cells accommodating such prisoners at the Paris-La Santé Prison had only limited access to natural light. In addition, in the four institutions visited, the exercise yards – which were often also used by prisoners in solitary confinement for disciplinary reasons – were uninviting.
113. The ministerial instructions state: 'The essential features of the ordinary prison regime must, so far as possible and subject to practical constraints, be retained in the segregation unit' (point 4.1). They further state, inter alia: 'there shall be no restrictions on prison visits' (point 4.2.2) and '... prisoners in solitary confinement remain under the ordinary regime and special arrangements should be made within the segregation unit for most activities to continue, allowing prisoners to assemble in small groups at times', that '[i]t is for the prison governor to assess how and when such groups may be organised' and '[i]ndividual educational programmes or distance teaching offered by teachers or instructors should not be discouraged' (point 4.2.6). The instructions further require increased surveillance of prisoners and specify: 'In order to avoid excessive social isolation, it is essential to maintain contact and encourage exchanges between staff and prisoners in solitary confinement' (point 4.4.2).
From the information obtained by the delegation, it would seem that, with the odd exception (for instance as regards contact with the outside world), the vast majority of the aforementioned requirements have not been complied with. For example, the only establishment which allowed prisoners in solitary confinement for administrative reasons to associate was Lyon-Saint Paul Prison and even there association was restricted (to exercise outdoors and in the fitness room).
The CPT recommends that the authorities take measures without delay to give full effect to the Minister of Justice's instructions of 14 December 1998 concerning solitary confinement for administrative reasons – under paragraphs 4.2.6, 4.2.7 and 4.4.2 in particular.
114. The CPT also has reservations on the effectiveness of the procedural safeguards on solitary confinement for administrative reasons. The files that have been examined show that it is sometimes used as an alternative to solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure (for instance, in one case, the measure was imposed for: 'serious damage to property belonging to the prison that put prison security at risk') or to prolong such a measure and that the reasons stated for putting a prisoner in solitary confinement were often stereotyped ('to maintain order in the prison' or 'risk of escape'). In one case the prisoner had been held in solitary confinement since 1997 'because of the nature of the offences of which he had been convicted'.
In summary, it would appear that the ministerial instructions, namely 'Orders for solitary confinement as a precautionary or security measure must be based on genuine grounds and objective concordant evidence of a risk of the prisoner causing or being exposed to serious harm', are not always fully complied with (cf. point 1.4.2).
The CPT recommends that the French authorities carry out a case-by-case review of compliance with the instructions issued in 1998 with regard to solitary confinement for administrative reasons.
115. Lastly, the CPT understands that the issue of the nature and extent of available remedies has not yet been resolved (cf. paragraph 146 of the report on the 1991 visit). In practice this means that prisoners in solitary confinement currently have no real means of challenging decisions to place them in solitary confinement or to renew such a measure before an independent authority.
The CPT recommends that the reinforcement of the safeguards provided for prisoners in solitary confinement in order to ensure they have an effective remedy before an independent authority, preferably a judge. Indeed, that is the spirit of the various proposals that are currently pending before the French authorities (for instance, the Canivet report and the report of the Senate investigation).”
“(i) 'take measures without delay to give full effect to the Minister of Justice's instructions of 14 December 1998 concerning solitary confinement for administrative reasons – under paragraphs 4.2.6, 4.2.7 and 4.4.2 in particular' (paragraph 113)
(ii) 'carry out a case-by-case review of compliance with the instructions issued in 1998 with regard to solitary confinement for administrative reasons' (paragraph 114)
Power to take decisions on solitary confinement is vested in the Minister of Justice if the confinement has exceeded one year.
There are currently 77 prisoners who have been in solitary confinement for more than a year. Of these, 23 are in prisons for convicted prisoners and 54 in prisons for remand prisoners.
The majority of these prisoners were placed in solitary confinement at their own request, either on account of the offence for which they were imprisoned, or of their occupation before they were imprisoned.
Improvements are being made to the segregation units to make them compliant with the circular of 14 December 1998. The prisons to be built as part of the '4,000 programme' will be equipped with segregation units that allow prisoners to enjoy all the advantages set out in the aforementioned circular.
Furthermore, in accordance with the circular of 14 December 1998 on solitary confinement, it is the regional director of the prison service or the central authority who is responsible for reviewing the reasons given by the prison governor for placing a prisoner in solitary confinement. In addition, the prison inspectorate verifies compliance with these obligations when carrying out prison visits.
(iii) 'reinforce the safeguards provided for prisoners in solitary confinement to ensure they have an effective remedy before an independent authority, preferably a judge' (paragraph 115)
Solitary confinement is one of the issues being considered in connection with the proposed legislation on prisons.”
“III Lawfulness of anti-terrorist measures
1. All measures taken by States to combat terrorism must be lawful.
2. When a measure restricts human rights, restrictions must be defined as precisely as possible and be necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued.
IV Absolute prohibition of torture
The use of torture or of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, is absolutely prohibited, in all circumstances, and in particular during the arrest, questioning and detention of a person suspected of or convicted of terrorist activities, irrespective of the nature of the acts that the person is suspected of or for which he/she was convicted.
XI Detention
1. A person deprived of his/her liberty for terrorist activities must in all circumstances be treated with due respect for human dignity.
2. The imperatives of the fight against terrorism may nevertheless require that a person deprived of his/her liberty for terrorist activities be submitted to more severe restrictions than those applied to other prisoners, in particular with regard to:
(i) the regulations concerning communications and surveillance of correspondence, including that between counsel and his/her client;
(ii) placing persons deprived of their liberty for terrorist activities in specially secured quarters;
(iii) the separation of such persons within a prison or among different prisons,
on condition that the measure taken is proportionate to the aim to be achieved.”
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 3


ITEMID: 001-5733
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: NOR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2001
DOCNAME: LUNDE v. NORWAY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant is a Norwegian national, born in 1963. He is represented before the Court by Mr Christian B. Hjort, a lawyer practising in Oslo, Norway.
The applicant is a sociologist and was at the material time employed by the Centre Against Racism (Antirasistisk senter) as a researcher. His application before the Court relates to the publication of a book in respect of which he was found to have defamed Ms I.-M.L. The facts of the case, as described mainly in the national courts’ judgments, may be summarised as follows.
In the autumn of 1993 the Centre Against Racism published a book, of which the applicant was the author, entitled “At the extremity” (“Aller ytterst”) with the subtitle “Racist groupings in Norway” (“Rasistiske grupperinger i Norge”). It was presented as a product of scientific research conducted by a sociologist, listing and describing the most important racist groupings and persons in Norway and presenting in chart form the connections between the various groupings. This included the names of some 60 persons, one third of whom had been convicted of offences of assault, some of murder, and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.
The book comprised 9 Chapters entitled: 1. Neo-Nazism in Norway, 2. Neo-nazism in Norwegian, 3. The Race Warriors, 4. Norway is Ours, 5. To the Polls against Immigration, 6. Many Rivers Small, 7. Hitler’s Successors or just Silly People (this Chapter was divided into 5 sections: a. Many Differences but these are only Appearances, b. Contacts Abroad, c. Words and Contents, d. Methods, e. Consequences), 8. Society’s Response, and 9. But is that Something to be Concerned About?
On the cover of the book, the following is stated about the book’s contents:
“AT THE EXTREME is the first book to give an insight into current racist groupings in Norway.
Four years ago people in Germany laughed at Neo-Nazis distributing leaflets stating: ‘Germany for the Germans - foreigners get out’. Today the laughter has calmed down. Since the reunification 68 persons have been killed by Neo-Nazis.
Many people wonder whether the same could happen in Norway. Are the racist groupings in Norway Hitler’s successors or are they just a gang of silly fools?
No other political issue in Norway has roused people to the extent of the debate on immigration.
There are today more than twenty racist groupings which are against immigration.
Who are they? What do they do?
What consequences will this have for Norwegian society?
The answers may be found in this book.”
The book’s foreword includes the following statement:
“Many call them racists. They call themselves Nazis, Neo-Nazis, racists, nationalists or patriots. The labelling may be practical but the substance is more important. The groupings mentioned in this book are described as racists because, by words and deeds, they discriminate and harass individuals and groups on grounds of their ethnic origin, culture or religion.
People who form part of racist groups are not of any singular kind. They are not monsters, Hitler fans or mad. They are like ordinary people – almost.
Their solution to problems of anxiety and discontent, a channel for their hatred – is to have somebody to blame: If we get rid of immigrants, we may also be able to get rid of social problems such as narcotics, rape, stabbing and social security fraud?”
In Chapter 5, at page 60, a certain Ms I.-M.L. is mentioned as follows:
“ACROSS PARTY LINES ELECTORAL INITIATIVE (Tverrpolitisk Velgerinitiativ – hereinafter referred to as “the TVI”)
The above grouping is actually registered as a party. Its leader is Ms I.-M. L., and it operates from a mailbox at Bjølsen. It is a newsletter party which seldom appears publicly, except for Ms I.-M.L.’s participation in certain TV debates and her leaflets for The Norwegian Association (Den Norske Forening).”
The introduction to Chapter 5 stated that there were two registered parties hostile to immigrants in Norway and that
“today the parties emerge as an attempt to dress racism with a suit and a tie in order to lure people into believing that it is ‘an entirely ordinary party’ on the same line as other established parties.”
In Chapter 7 a., at page 78, it is stated:
“As usual in Norwegian society, it is men, in particular elderly men, who are the leaders, except for Ms H.S. (Najonaldemokratene) and Ms I.-M.L. (Tverrpolitisk Velgerforbund). The average age is lower within the militant groupings, but men lead these too. In the skin head milieus there is a stronger presence of young women than in other groups.”
Contrary to what is stated above, the TVI was not a registered political party but a grouping of 5 to 6 persons. Under Section 17 of the Parliamentary, County, and Municipal Elections Act 1985 (Act of 1 March 1985 No. 3, Valgloven), the signature of at least 5,000 persons entitled to vote in Parliamentary elections is a prerequisite for the registration of a party by the competent authority, namely the notarius publicus in Oslo. The lists of registered political parties are publicised. At present, there are some 20 registered political parties in Norway.
On 26 September 1994 Ms I.-M.L. instituted proceedings against the applicant before the Oslo City Court, claiming that the manner in which she had been mentioned in the applicant’s book constituted unlawful accusations of racism which were defamatory and warranted compensation. She felt particularly aggrieved and defenceless against such research, which was on a different level from ordinary public discussion. The risk of being described as a racist made it impossible to express one’s opinions in a public debate. Following the book’s publication, she feared reprisals from the far left and had had to bear derogatory remarks from neighbours. She was of the firm opinion that she was not a racist.
By judgment of 22 May 1995, the City Court acquitted the applicant. While finding that the book had indeed labelled Ms I.-M.L. as a racist it considered that it had been justified. In the City Court’s view the classical lexical definition of racism, which related to the belief that one race was superior to another according to physical and mental distinctions, ought to be supplemented by a more modern understanding of the concept. Ms I.M.L. had, by her own words and public connections, handled questions of immigration policy in a manner which, she should expect, would spark off reactions.
Ms I.-M.L. appealed to the Borgarting High Court (Lagmannsrett), which in a judgment of 18 October 1996 found unjustified defamation within the meaning of Article 247 of the Penal Code.
The High Court observed that, given the book’s title, in particular its subtitle, the comments on its cover page and the foreword, Ms I.-M.L.’s group, the TVI, was to be perceived as a racist group by the ordinary reader. The description of that group contained no reservation such as that made with respect to the Progress Party. The accusation of racism not only concerned the TVI but also extended to Ms I.-M.L. She was mentioned as the leader of the group and her name was cited twice. The book’s own definition of the concept of racism stated in the foreword should be decisive for the ordinary reader’s understanding of the book. Given the text on the cover page, taking as a starting point German Neo-Nazis and mentioning that 68 people had been killed by such Nazis, the reader would get the impression that the book dealt with clearly racist groups.
However, while Ms I.-M.L.’s remarks published by the Aftenposten on 24 August 1990 about the lack of common traditions between Norwegians and many immigrants or foreigners were deemed to border on racism, the High Court did not find that any of her published statements constituted proof of racism, even though they might be perceived as offensive by some immigrants. Her participation in a certain seminar (at which representatives of a number of racist groupings had been present) also fell within her freedom of expression and opinion. The same applied to the fact that, for a short time, she had held a post on the National Party’s interim governing board in Oslo. Since these matters did not justify describing her as a racist the applicant had failed to prove that the accusations made against her were true.
Moreover, while the accusations – which encompassed allegations of discrimination and harassment on ethnic grounds – had been expressed in a book written by a researcher for ordinary sale and were serious, the applicant’s investigations into Ms I.-M.L. had been clearly deficient. The information contained in the book about Ms I.-M.L. and her group was erroneous, namely, the allegations that the group TVI had been registered as a political party, that Ms I.-M.L had taken part in television debates and that she had been involved in the distribution of leaflets for the Norwegian Association. It was clear that the applicant had in part confused Ms I.-M.L. with someone else. In the view of the High Court, had the applicant met the requirement of diligence that ought to apply, he would have avoided such errors, with the result that the TVI would have appeared as a particularly marginal group of little public interest. Probably, if the applicant had carried out reasonable research, this group would not even have been mentioned in the book.
Considering the case as a whole, the High Court found that the accusation that Ms I.-M.L. was racist, according to the book’s own definition, must be deemed inappropriate, and constituted punishable defamation.
Under Section 3-6 of the Damage Compensation Act 1969 (Skadeserstatningsloven – Law no. 26 of 13 June 1969), the High Court ordered the applicant to pay 20,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK) to Ms I.-M.L. in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The amount awarded took into account that, to the extent that she felt defamed, she had brought this largely on herself by her affirmations and recommendations. She had expressed views which had been offensive to many immigrants and which, if they were to be accepted, would make their situation difficult in Norway. Regard was also had to the fact that the book had brought the applicant little profit. Finally the applicant was ordered to pay NOK 60,000 for her costs before the City Court and the High Court.
On 27 February 1997 the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court (Høyesteretts kjæremålsutvalg) refused the applicant leave to appeal.


ITEMID: 001-4821
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: ITA
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 1999
DOCNAME: CECERE, ZARRO, FRANZESE, DI GIOVANNI AND IANNAZZONE v. ITALY
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: The applicants are five Italian nationals, born respectively in 1947, 1948, 1943, 1952 and 1956. They all reside in Chianche. In 1988 and 1989, the first applicant was the mayor of Chianche; the other applicants were members of the Chianche Building Commission (“Commissione edilizia municipale”), a body responsible for expressing opinions on the granting of building permits. Before the Court, they are represented by Mr Pietro Palma, a lawyer practising in Moiano.
On an unspecified date, the Benevento Public Prosecutor’s Office commenced criminal proceedings against the applicants on charges of abuse of public authority (“interesse privato in atti d’ufficio”) in the course of their duties as mayor and members of the Building Commission. On 1 March 1995 the Benevento Public Prosecutor’s Office requested that the applicants and four other persons be committed for trial.
In an order of 1 March 1995, the Benevento investigating judge scheduled the date of the preliminary hearing for 24 October 1995. This order was subsequently served on the applicants, who were thus given official notification of the charges brought against them.
In an order of 9 April 1996, the investigating judge committed the applicants and their four co-accused for trial, commencing on 13 March 1997 before the Benevento District Court.
On 13 March 1997 Mr D., one of the judges composing the bench of the court, withdrew from the case. On 2 June 1997 the proceedings were adjourned by reason that the order fixing the date of the hearing had not been served on one of the accused. On 11 July 1997 Mr D. observed that notwithstanding his withdrawal, the case was still pending before the section in which he was sitting; the case-file was therefore forwarded to the President of the District Court.
A hearing scheduled for 12 January 1998 was adjourned by the District Court of its own motion. On 9 February 1998 two witnesses were examined and the parties presented their final pleadings. The applicants requested to be acquitted or, in the alternative, that the charges against them be declared time-barred.
In a judgment of the same day, filed with the registry on 17 February 1998, the District Court declared that the charges brought against the applicants and their co-accused had become time-barred at the latest on 8 February 1998. This decision became final on 27 March 1998.