ITEMID: 001-72586
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF JAKUB v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1 (length);Remainder inadmissible;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Humenné.
5. Under a contract of employment of 1991, the applicant was employed with the municipality of Humenné and occupied the position of the head of one of its departments.
6. In December 1994 the new mayor of the municipality cancelled the applicant’s appointment as the head of department and informed him that, due to the lack of other appropriate posts for him, his employment with the municipality would be terminated. The notice of termination was served on the applicant at some point in February 1995.
7. On 11 July 1995 the applicant challenged the cancellation of his appointment and the termination of his employment before the Humenné District Court (Okresný súd). He also claimed compensation in respect of lost wages.
8. On 18 August 1995 the District Court discontinued the proceedings observing that the applicant had not paid the court fee and finding that he was not eligible for an exemption from the obligation to do so.
9. On 28 November 1995, on the applicant’s appeal (odvolanie), the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd) quashed the decision of 18 August 1995, finding that the applicant’s action fell within the ambit of the exemption under section 4 (2) (d) of the Court Fees’ Act (Law no. 71/1992 Coll., as amended).
10. On 15 March 1996 the District Court ruled that both the cancellation of the applicant’s appointment and the termination of his employment were void. The District Court found that the applicant’s employment had not been established by a deed of appointment (vymenovaním) under Article 27 §§ 4 and 5 of the Labour Code but by an ordinary employment contract (pracovná zmluva) under Article 27 § 2 of that Code. The applicant’s “appointment” thus could not be “cancelled” and the statutory condition for the valid termination of his employment contract had not been met.
The District Court further ruled that the applicant’s claim for compensation for lost wages would be dealt with in separate proceedings.
11. On 25 June 1997, on the defendant’s appeal, the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 15 March 1996 and remitted the case to the District Court for reexamination. The Regional Court noted that, at the time of the applicant’s dismissal, the post of his superior - the head of the municipal office - had been vacant. The applicant had thus been directly answerable to the mayor of the municipality. This being so, the applicant’s employment fell within the category of employment by appointment. In the light of these findings, the case had to be reconsidered at first instance.
12. On 29 June 1998 the District Court dismissed the action. It observed that the applicant had been directly answerable to the mayor and that, consequently, the rules for the cancellation of an appointment had applied to him and were complied with. As the municipality had had no possibility of continuing to employ the applicant and all other conditions for the termination of his employment contract had been met, the applicant’s dismissal was lawful.
13. On 17 December 1998, on the applicant’s appeal, the Regional Court upheld the part of the judgment of 29 June 1998 dismissing the applicant’s motion to declare the cancellation of his appointment void. The Regional Court further overturned the part of the District Court’s judgment concerning the termination of the applicant’s contract of employment and ruled that it was void.
It was observed that the applicant undoubtedly became the employee of the defendant. There was however no deed of appointment. Declaring the cancellation of the applicant’s appointment void would therefore not reestablish his appointment. The applicant thus could not be considered as having a “pressing legal interest”, within the meaning of Article 80 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in obtaining the declaratory ruling sought in respect of the cancellation of his appointment.
The termination of the applicant’s employment with the defendant, as such, could not be justified by the restructuring of the defendant’s office, on which the defendant had relied, as this restructuring had only taken place after the applicant’s dismissal.
14. On 29 November 2000, on the applicant’s appeal on points of law (dovolanie), the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) quashed the judgment of 17 December 1998 and remitted the case to the Regional Court for a new determination of the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of 29 June 1998. In particular, the Supreme Court found a flaw in the procedure before the Regional Court requiring the quashing of its judgment. It further found that the Regional Court had failed to examine adequately the factual and legal grounds on which the applicant’s contract of employment had been terminated.
15. On 16 May 2001 the Regional Court held a hearing of the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s judgment of 29 June 1998, following which it upheld the latter’s judgment. It endorsed the reasoning given by the District Court and, in addition, it observed that, in view of the scope of his duties and his working relationship with the mayor, the applicant had clearly been in a “leading position” to which the rules on employment by appointment had applied.
16. On 28 November 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the judgment of 16 May 2001 as unfounded.
It was held that, as for its substance and irrespective of the formal designation of the applicant’s contract, his relation with his former employer was one falling within the category of appointment within the meaning of Article 27 § 5 of the Labour Code. The applicant’s appointment thus could be, and in fact had been, cancelled. As the defendant had no other appropriate posts for the applicant, the termination of his employment was justified and lawful under Article 46 § 1 (d) of the Labour Code. On 10 February 2003 the Supreme Court corrected clerical errors in the decision. No appeal lay against it.
17. Following its decision of 15 March 1996 to deal separately with the applicant’s claim for compensation in respect of lost wages, at some unspecified time in 2001, the District Court opened a new set of proceedings under a different file number for this purpose.
18. On 6 November 2001 the District Court dismissed the claim. Referring to the judgments of 29 June 1998 and 16 May 2001, the District Court took it as established that the applicant’s dismissal was lawful. It thus could not have resulted in the loss of any wages.
19. On 21 May 2003, on the applicant’s appeal, the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 6 November 2001 observing that the District Court had deprived the applicant of an opportunity to assert his rights adequately in that it had determined the claim without having heard him. The matter was remitted to the District Court for re-examination.
20. On 29 September 2003 the District Court again dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation for lost wages in substance for the same reason as on 6 November 2001.
21. On 13 September 2004, on the applicant’s appeal, the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 29 September 2003 finding that the District Court had failed to decide on the part of the applicant’s claim concerning severance pay. The matter was again remitted to the District Court where it is still pending.
22. On 21 June 2000, on the applicant’s petition (podnet) under Article 130 § 3 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) found that the District Court had violated the applicant’s right under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution to a hearing without unjustified delay. It considered that the subject matter of the proceedings was not of particular complexity, that the applicant’s conduct had been cooperative and that what was at stake for him called for special diligence. As to the conduct of the District Court, the Constitutional Court observed in particular that it had failed to open a new set of proceedings or take any procedural steps in respect of the applicant’s claim for compensation for lost wages, as it had announced it would do in its judgment of 15 March 1996.
23. In February 2002 the applicant seized the Constitutional Court anew by a complaint (sťažnosť) under Article 127 of the Constitution, as in force since 1 January 2002, of continuing undue delays in his proceedings. The complaint was formally directed against the District Court.
24. On 19 February 2003 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It observed that, at the time when the constitutional complaint had been lodged, the District Court had no longer been dealing with the case. By then the case had already been transmitted to the Supreme Court for a determination of the applicant’s appeal on points of law. In these circumstances, an examination of the part of the proceedings before the District Court could no longer serve to expedite them. Thus, in line with its established practice, the Constitutional Court found that it was not called upon to examine the complaint.
25. Article 48 § 2 provides, inter alia, that every person has the right to have his or her case tried without unjustified delay.
26. Pursuant to Article 130 § 3 of the Constitution, as in force until 30 June 2001, the Constitutional Court could commence proceedings upon the petition presented by any individual or a corporation claiming that their rights had been violated.
27. According to its case-law under the former Article 130 § 3 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to draw legal consequences from a violation of petitioners’ rights under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution. It could neither grant damages to the person concerned nor impose a sanction on the public authority liable for the violation found. In the Constitutional Court’s view, it was therefore for the authority concerned to provide redress to the person whose rights had been violated (for further details see, e.g., Bánošová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 38798/97, 27 April 2000).
28. As from 1 January 2002 the Constitution has been amended in that, inter alia, natural and legal persons can complain about a violation of their fundamental rights and freedoms pursuant to Article 127. Under this provision, the Constitutional Court has the power, in the event that it finds a violation of Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution, to order the authority concerned to proceed with the case without delay. It may also grant adequate financial satisfaction to the person whose constitutional rights have been violated as a result of excessive length of proceedings (for further details see, e.g., Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 57984/00, 60237/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00, 68563/01, 60226/00, ECHR 2002-IX).
29. The implementation of the amended Article 127 of the Constitution is set out in more detail in sections 49 to 56 of the Constitutional Court Act (Law no. 38/1993 Coll., as amended). The relevant amendment (Law no. 124/2002 Coll.) was published in the Collection of Laws and entered into force on 20 March 2002.
30. Pursuant to section 24 (a), which applies to all motions for any type of constitutional proceedings to be opened, a motion is inadmissible if it concerns a matter which the Constitutional Court has already determined.
31. Section 53 (3) provides that a constitutional complaint can be filed within a period of two months from the date on which the decision in question has become final and binding or on which a measure has been notified or on which a notice of other interference has been given. As regards the measures and other interferences, the above period commences when the complainant could have become aware of them.
32. Under section 79a (2), which was introduced by the abovementioned amendment no. 124/2002 Coll., and which specifically concerns constitutional complaints by natural and legal persons, the Constitutional Court is to declare inadmissible a complaint if it has already decided on substantially the same matter in proceedings on a complaint or in proceedings on a petition under the applicable legal rules.
33. In proceedings file nos. IV. ÚS 68/02, I. ÚS 64/00 and IV. ÚS 140/03 the Constitutional Court examined the length of civil proceedings before first instance courts on individual complaints under Article 127 of the Constitution, as in force from 1 January 2002. In all 3 cases the Constitutional Court had already examined the length of those proceedings at their first instance stage on petitions under Article 130 § 3 of the Constitution, as in force until 30 June 2001, and had found unjustified delays therein.
In judgments (nález) of 6 March, 3 April and 29 October 2003, respectively, the Constitutional Court found continued unjustified delays in the proceedings under review, in their phase after the previous examinations. The Constitutional Court awarded the complainants just satisfaction. In determining the merits of the case and amounts of the just satisfaction, it took into consideration that delays in those proceedings had already been found before.
34. It has been the Constitutional Court’s longstanding practice to entertain constitutional petitions or, as the case may be, complaints about excessive length of proceedings only where the proceedings complained of are pending before the authority liable for the alleged violation at the moment when such petitions or complaints are lodged (see, for example, decisions file nos. I. ÚS 34/99, II. ÚS 55/02, III. ÚS 20/00, I. ÚS 29/02, II. ÚS 55/02, IV. ÚS 96/02, II. ÚS 138/02, ÚS 139/02, I. ÚS 161/02, IV. ÚS 176/03 and many others).
35. In proceedings file number I. ÚS 56/02 the Constitutional Court examined an individual complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution of delays in enforcement proceedings concerning a minor’s claim for maintenance. The enforcement commenced in 1998 in Bratislava IV District Court and, from 2001, continued in Bratislava I District Court where it was still pending.
In a judgment (nález) of 14 May 2003 the Constitutional Court found that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings before both District Courts and awarded the minor complainant just satisfaction in respect of nonpecuniary damage to be paid by both courts.
36. In proceedings file number I. ÚS 145/02 the Constitutional Court examined a complaint by an individual under Article 127 of the Constitution of delays in proceedings in his civil action of 1995. The action was partially granted at first instance in 1999. That judgment was however quashed on appeal in March 2002 and the matter was remitted to the first instance court where it was still pending.
In a judgment of 6 June 2003 the Constitutional Court found that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings before the first instance court and awarded the complainant nonpecuniary damages. The Constitutional Court also examined the phase of the proceedings before the court of appeal but found no unjustified delays. A similar approach was adopted in proceedings nos. I. ÚS 100/02 and III. ÚS 10/03.
37. In proceedings file number III. ÚS 123/02 the Constitutional Court examined a complaint by an individual under Article 127 of the Constitution of delays in proceedings in a civil action against him. The action was lodged in 1993 with a District Court which, shortly after, transferred it to a Regional Court for reasons of jurisdiction. The action was then pending at the Regional Court until 1998 when the Supreme Court ruled that it should be determined at first instance by the District Court. The action was eventually withdrawn and the proceedings were consequently discontinued by a final decision of January 2003.
In a judgment of 6 June 2003 the Constitutional Court found that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings both before the District Court and the Regional Court. The complainant was awarded nonpecuniary damages to be paid by both courts. A similar approach was adopted in proceedings no I. ÚS 52/02.
38. In proceedings file no. IV. ÚS 176/03 the Constitutional Court examined a complaint by an individual under Article 127 of the Constitution of, inter alia, delays in court proceedings concerning her maintenance. The action was originally filed with the Košice II District Court in 1998. The question arose whether the first instance and the second instance court judges were impartial. On 24 May 1999 the Supreme Court decided that the question of impartiality of the judges at the first instance would be determined by the Žilina Regional Court. The latter decided on 28 January 2000 that the action would be examined at first instance by the Michalovce District Court which determined it on 11 December 2002. On 10 September 2003 the Žilina Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment. In her complaint to the Constitutional Court of 28 February 2003 the plaintiff alleged that the ordinary courts had violated her right to a hearing without undue delay.
On 9 October 2003 the Constitutional Court declared this complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. The decision stated that, in so far as the complaint related to the part of the proceedings leading to the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 May 1999, it had been filed out of time since, at the moment of the introduction of the constitutional complaint, the relevant part of the proceedings had no longer been pending. For similar reason the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint in respect of the subsequent proceedings before the Michalovce District Court which had ended on 11 December 2002. As to the appellate proceedings before the Žilina Regional Court, the Constitutional Court noted that they had lasted less than five months and found that this period was not excessive. Similar approach was adopted for example in proceedings nos. II. ÚS 39/03, IV. ÚS 219/03 and I. ÚS 84/05.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-75243
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVN
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF GASHI v. SLOVENIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: David Thór Björgvinsson;John Hedigan
TEXT: 5. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Celje.
6. On 9 May 1996 the applicant was injured in a car accident. The perpetrator of the accident had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT.
7. On 6 May 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZT in the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 5,150,000 tolars (approximately 21,400 euros) for the injuries sustained.
Between 29 May 1997 and 11 May 2005 the applicant lodged thirteen preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.
Between 20 November 1997 and 6 March 2002 he made five requests that a date be set for a hearing.
Of the eight hearings held between 15 October 1999 and 5 December 2003 none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
During the proceedings the court appointed three medical experts. The court also sought an additional opinion from two of the appointed experts.
The proceedings are still pending.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-23423
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2003
DOCNAME: VACLAVIK v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Dušan Václavík, is a Slovakian national, who was born in 1944. He was represented before the Court by Mr L. Hincker, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Mr P. Vršanský, succeeded by Mr P. Kresák in that function.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In 1968 the applicant emigrated to the South African Republic. He returned to Slovakia in 1989. Subsequently the following relevant facts occurred.
Upon his arrival in Slovakia, the applicant registered with the authorities as permanently living at the address of his mother and sister in Lučenec. The house in question was owned by the applicant’s sister. The applicant submitted a written consent of his mother when registering his permanent address. He was issued with an identity card on the basis of this registration.
According to the applicant, his identity card was stolen, together with other objects, from a flat which also served as the premises of a political party of which he was a member in November 1994.
On 9 December 1994 the applicant’s sister requested the Lučenec municipal authorities to cancel the registration of the applicant as permanently residing in her house on the ground that she had never consented to such a registration. On 23 March 1995 the Lučenec municipal authorities therefore cancelled the applicant’s registration as having a permanent address at his sister’s house.
The applicant filed a criminal complaint against the Mayor of Lučence in this context. It was dismissed by the Lučenec District Police Department on 12 November 1997. The decision stated, inter alia, that following her request for the applicant’s permanent address in her house to be cancelled the applicant’s sister had found a flat for the applicant and that she had paid the rent for one year in advance. According to the decision, the applicant subsequently refused to pay the rent and again left for South Africa.
In his application to the Court the applicant stated that the authorities refused to issue him with a new identity card as he had no permanent address.
The Government submitted a copy of the records of the competent authority indicating that the applicant had reported a loss of his personal identity card on 4 April 1995. Another remark in the same document, dated 21 November 1995, indicates that the applicant’s personal identity card was subsequently found and that it was left with the applicant.
According to the applicant, he was twice refused free dental treatment, in summer 1995 and in January 1996 respectively, on the ground that he did not have his permanent residence registered in the district where he applied for the treatment. On 23 January 1997 the Social Security Administration in Spišská Nová Ves refused to entertain the applicant’s request for free medical treatment in a spa resort. The letter stated that the costs of stays in spa resorts were covered by a person’s health insurance according to the place of permanent residence of the person concerned.
On 3 October 1996 the Lučenec District Police Department refused to deliver a firearms licence to the applicant on the ground that he was not registered as permanently residing in the Lučenec district. Finally, the applicant submits that he was not allowed to trade securities on the public market, on 10 June 1998, on the ground that he was not able to prove his identity by means of a personal identity card.
On 18 January 1999 the applicant applied for a new personal identity card. He stated that his original personal identity card had been lost during the forcible removal of his belongings from an apartment. A personal identity card was issued to the applicant on the same day.
The applicant also possessed a valid passport issued by the Slovakian authorities.
In a letter addressed to the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic of 14 January 2001 the applicant stated, inter alia, that following the parliamentary election held in October 1994 he had left Slovakia for South Africa from where he had returned in March 1995. In the letter the applicant further stated that he had no place to live and that he had been repeatedly treated in psychiatric hospitals, for an overall period of approximately eighteen months, whereby he had been saved from starvation.
The documents before the Court indicate that the applicant was registered with the competent authorities as an employment seeker from 12 October 1993 to 3 October 1994, between 27 March 1995 and 9 December 1997 and also in January 1999. He was considered as a person in need and received a social allowance provided for by law. By a decision of 10 February 2000 he was granted an invalidity pension with effect from 10 November 1999.
On 30 August 1996 the applicant requested the Lučenec District Court that “proceedings concerning an estate” be re-opened. On 13 September 1996 and on 8 November 1996 a judge replied to the applicant that his submissions were illegible and unclear. The applicant was invited to specify the subject-matter of his claim and also to indicate the name of the person whose estate was to be determined, the date of his or her death, and to submit the relevant documents. The applicant was informed that the court would not be in a position to proceed with the case in the event that he failed to remedy the formal shortcomings in his action.
On 8 August 1997 the Lučenec District Court informed the applicant that the real property in question had formed part of the estate of his late parents. That estate had been distributed in two separate sets of proceedings which ended in 1986 and on 6 February 1996 respectively. In the first set of proceedings the authorities noted that the applicant lived in South Africa and that he had waived his rights in respect of his father’s estate. In the second set of proceedings, which concerned the estate of the applicant’s mother, the District Court appointed a guardian to represent the applicant as his whereabouts were unknown. At the same time a leaflet was issued inviting the applicant to inform the court within thirty days whether or not he accepted the estate. In the absence of any such reply, the applicant would not be taken into consideration when distributing the estate. The letter of 8 August 1997 concluded that the estate in question could not be redetermined as the above decisions had become final.
On 20 October 1997 the applicant claimed damages from his sister before the Lučenec District Court. On 27 October 1997 the latter informed the applicant that his action was incomplete. The applicant was invited to submit, within ten days, a new action in accordance with the formal requirements. The letter explicitly stated what information the action should contain. As the applicant did not comply with the court’s request, the District Court declined to proceed further with the case.
On 7 March 1997 the applicant sued the Lučenec municipality before the Lučenec District Court. He claimed 50,000,000 Slovakian korunas on the ground that his personality rights had been affected as a result of the decision to terminate the registration of his permanent address at his sister’s place.
On 12 March 1997 the District Court informed the applicant that his action was incomplete. The applicant was invited to submit, within ten days, a new action in accordance with the formal requirements which were indicated in the letter.
On 17 March 1997 the applicant made further written submissions to the District Court which the latter considered to be unclear. As the applicant also requested that a lawyer be appointed to represent him, the court sent him a form with a view to establishing whether his situation justified granting the request. After the postman had failed to reach the applicant at the address indicated by him on 1 and 4 August 1997 respectively, he left a message for the applicant informing him that the envelope would be deposited at the post office. The applicant did not withdraw the mail.
As the applicant neither eliminated the formal shortcomings in his submissions nor submitted a claim for a lawyer to be appointed, no further action was taken on his claim.
The applicant filed a criminal complaint alleging that the Slovak Post had lost parcels which he had addressed to himself from South Africa and which contained a large quantity of silver coins. On 1 April 1997 a public prosecutor dismissed the complaint as being unsubstantiated.
On 16 October 1997 the applicant sued the Slovak Post for the loss of the coins before the Zvolen District Court. On 27 October and on 12 November 1997 the judge invited the applicant to eliminate formal shortcomings in his submissions.
On 18 March 1998 the District Court granted the applicant’s request for waiver of court fees. A lawyer appointed by the court to file an action on the applicant’s behalf did so on 4 June 1998. The action stated that two parcels containing silver coins and addressed to the applicant arrived at the Zvolen 2 post office on 3 May 1995. The applicant was invited to pay the tax and customs fees. He refused to do so as he considered that he was entitled to import the coins free of charge as a part of his personal belongings following his return after emigrating to South Africa. Subsequently the applicant was informed that the parcels had been sent back to South Africa. As far as it could be established by the applicant, the parcels were never returned to South Africa.
On 22 September 1998 the Zvolen District Court transferred the case to the Banská Bystrica District Court. On 14 October 1998 the latter requested the Banská Bystrica Regional Court to decide which court had jurisdiction to deal with the case. On 14 November 1998 the Regional Court found that the case fell to be examined by the Zvolen District Court.
In its submission of 16 April 1999 the defendant argued that the applicant had failed to identify the parcels which had been allegedly lost and that in accordance with the relevant regulations the applicant should have first sought to obtain compensation from the Slovak Post.
On 21 July 1999 the Zvolen District Court tried to establish the applicant’s whereabouts. On 28 July 1999 a mental hospital in Prešov informed the court that the applicant had been treated as an in-patient between 20 October 1998 and 15 December 1998 as well as between 4 and 30 June 1999.
On 23 September 1999 the Zvolen District Court heard the parties.
Subsequently the District Court experienced difficulties in contacting the applicant as he frequently changed his address. The court therefore appointed a lawyer to represent the applicant on 6 April 2000.
On 10 July 2000 the Zvolen District Court dismissed the action. The judgment stated that the applicant had not raised his complaint before the postal authorities within the one year statutory time-limit and that his right to claim damages had therefore lapsed. On 21 September 2000 the applicant appealed.
On 14 December 2000 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court quashed the first instance judgment and discontinued the proceedings. The Regional Court found that the courts lacked jurisdiction to deal with the claim as, in accordance with the relevant regulations, the applicant should have first filed it with the postal authorities.
Under Section 3(3) of the Citizens’ Stay Registration Act of 1982 (Zákon o hlásení a evidencii pobytu občanov, No. 135/1982 Coll.) an individual may permanently reside for the purposes of that Act only in premises which have a registration number issued in accordance with special regulations.
Section 4(1)(2) provides that all citizens shall have the place of their permanent residence registered. For that purpose they shall submit their identity card and a certificate to the effect that they are authorised to use a flat or other dwelling premises.
Pursuant to Section 15(1)(b), an entry concerning the registration of a person’s permanent residence is to be quashed where it has been shown that such an entry was made erroneously on the basis of an invalid document.
Act No. 135/1982 has been repealed, with effect from 1 July 2004, by Act No. 253/1998 on Reporting of the Citizens’ Stay and on the Register of Citizens of the Slovak Republic (Zákon o hlásení pobytu občanov Slovenskej republiky a registri obyvateľov Slovenskej republiky). Section 5(1) of Act No. 253/1998 provides that persons who are not in a position to show that they are authorised to live in a flat or other dwelling premises shall have their permanent residence registered in the place of their birth or, when they were not born within Slovakia, in the place where they stay. In such cases the name of the municipality concerned shall be indicated as the place of their permanent residence.
Under Section 2 of the Personal Identity Cards Act (Zákon o občianskych preukazoch, No. 162/1993 Coll.), a personal identity card is issued by the police authority in the district where a citizen registered his or her permanent residence.
Under Section 7(4), an individual applying for a new personal identity card, e.g. when the identity card delivered earlier was stolen or lost, is obliged to substantiate by relevant documents any change in the data to be set out in the card.
In accordance with Section 6(3)(b), applied by analogy, an individual whose permanent residence changed shall, when applying for a new personal identity card to be issued, submit a certificate of registration of his or her new permanent residence delivered by the competent municipal authorities.
Section 10(d) provides that a personal identity card becomes invalid when any of the relevant information set out in it ceases to correspond to reality.
Pursuant to Section 14(1), (4) and (5), in case of loss or theft of a personal identity card and when the request of the person concerned for a new personal identity card cannot be satisfied immediately, the authorities are to issue such a person with a certificate replacing the personal identity card pending the delivery of a new one. The validity of such a certificate shall not exceed six months.


ITEMID: 001-76896
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SRB
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF MATIJASEVIC v. SERBIA
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-2;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: András Baka;Antonella Mularoni;Elisabet Fura;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Jean-Paul Costa
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently serving a prison sentence.
5. On 7 May 2003 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody by an investigating judge of the Novi Sad District Court on suspicion of fraud and murder.
6. On 4 November 2003 the district public prosecutor’s office in Novi Sad issued an indictment against the applicant on charges of fraud and incitement to commit murder.
7. On 2 April 2004 the three-judge panel of the Novi Sad District Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for another two months. In its reasoning, justifying this decision, the panel relied on the applicant’s prior convictions as well as his persistent anti-social behaviour. In addition, the panel expressly stated that the applicant had “committed the criminal offences which are the subject of this prosecution” (“počinio kriv. dela koja su predmet ove optužbe”) and concluded that the applicant, if released, would be likely to commit further offences.
8. On 16 April 2004 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Serbia, requesting that his detention be terminated or, alternatively, that the remand decision be quashed and the case remitted to the Novi Sad District Court for reconsideration. He argued, inter alia, that, since the impugned decision had prejudged the outcome of the pending criminal case, it had blatantly breached his fundamental right to be presumed innocent as “guaranteed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and, indeed, Article 6 § 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.
9. On 22 April 2004 the Supreme Court of Serbia dismissed the appeal, focusing exclusively on the applicant’s prior criminal convictions and the alleged danger that he would commit further offences if released. It did not refer to the applicant’s submission concerning the presumption of innocence.
10. On 27 May 2004 the Novi Sad District Court found the applicant guilty of incitement to murder and sentenced him to eight years in prison.
11. On 23 September 2004 the Supreme Court of Serbia upheld the judgment of the Novi Sad District Court. As stated by the applicant in a separate case currently pending before this Court (no. 31617/05), his lawyer received that decision on 7 March 2005.
12. Articles 19 and 9 § 2 of the Charter provided as follows:
“Everyone shall be deemed innocent until proved guilty of a criminal offence in a final decision of a court of law.”
“Everyone who believes that any of his human or minority rights as guaranteed by this Charter have been violated or denied by an individual act or action of a State Union institution, or a member-State body or organisation exercising public powers, shall have the right to submit a complaint to the Court of Serbia and Montenegro, if no other legal redress is provided in a member State, in accordance with the Constitutional Charter.”
13. The relevant part of Article 46 of the Constitutional Charter provided as follows:
“The Court of Serbia and Montenegro:
...
– shall examine complaints lodged by citizens in cases where an institution of Serbia and Montenegro has infringed their rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the Constitutional Charter, if no other legal redress has been provided;
...”
14. Article 23 § 3 of this Constitution provides as follows:
“No one shall be considered guilty of a criminal offence until so proved in a final decision of a court of law.”
15. Articles 199 and 200 of the Obligations Act provided, inter alia, that anyone who had suffered fear, physical pain or, indeed, mental anguish as a consequence of a breach of personal rights (prava ličnosti) was entitled, depending on their duration and intensity, to sue for financial compensation in the civil courts and, in addition, to request other forms of redress “which might be capable” of affording adequate non-pecuniary satisfaction.
16. The relevant provisions of this legislation were as follows:
“A citizen’s complaint may be filed by anyone who considers that an individual act or action of an institution of Serbia and Montenegro, or a member-State body or organisation exercising public powers, has violated his human or minority rights, if no other avenue of legal redress is available or if redress has not been secured within a member State.”
“A citizen’s complaint may be lodged within three months from the date of receipt of the individual decision or the commission or cessation of an action in violation of a human or minority right guaranteed by the Constitutional Charter.”
“If the Court finds that an individual decision or action is in violation of a human or minority right guaranteed by the Constitutional Charter, it may annul the individual decision in question, prohibit the continuation of such actions or order the implementation of other specific measures and, in view of the circumstances of each case, order the removal of all consequences stemming from such decisions and/or actions.
The decision of the Court accepting a citizen’s complaint shall constitute a legal basis for requesting compensation, or the removal of other adverse consequences, from a competent body, in accordance with the law.”
17. In a Council of Europe report on the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro of 30 April 2004, it was stated that the Court of Serbia and Montenegro had still not been established and that the setting-up of such a court had not been considered a priority by the State Union authorities since accession to the Convention (Serbia and Montenegro: Compliance with obligations and commitments and implementation of the post-accession cooperation programme, document presented by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, fourth report, February-April 2004, § 27).
18. In a subsequent report of 13 July 2005, the Council of Europe found that the Court of Serbia and Montenegro had finally started operating in January 2005. The court’s financing, however, had not been fully secured. Lastly, 200 individual human rights complaints had been registered as cases, but no decisions had yet been rendered (Serbia and Montenegro: Compliance with obligations and commitments and implementation of the post-accession cooperation programme, document presented by the Secretary General, eighth report, March-June 2005, §§ 14 and 44).
19. In a reservation contained in their instrument of ratification of the Convention and its Protocols, deposited with the Council of Europe on 3 March 2004, the Government of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro stated that “the provisions of Article 13 shall not apply in relation to the legal remedies within the jurisdiction of the Court of Serbia and Montenegro, until the said Court becomes operational in accordance with Articles 46 to 50 of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Službeni list Srbije i Crne Gore, no. 1/03)”.
20. This reservation was withdrawn by a letter dated 11 July 2005 from the Permanent Representation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which was registered at the Secretariat General on 15 July 2005.
21. In a letter of 16 January 2006, the Court of Serbia and Montenegro clarified that it was yet to rule in respect of a single “citizen’s appeal”. It further pointed out that the reason for this was the proposed amendment to the relevant legislation regulating the court’s work which, at the time, was still pending (Statement no. 20/60, provided in the context of a separate application pending before this Court (no. 2361/05)).
22. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro ratified the Convention on 3 March 2004.
23. Following a referendum, on 3 June 2006, Montenegro declared its independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, whereupon that entity ceased to exist, together with all of its public bodies including the Court of Serbia and Montenegro.
24. On 5 June 2006 the President of Serbia informed the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that Serbia was the sole successor to the former State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
25. In its decision of 14 June 2006, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe noted, inter alia: (i) that “Serbia ... [had continued] ... membership of [the State Union of] Serbia and Montenegro in the Council of Europe with effect from 3 June 2006”, and (ii) that it had remained a party to a number of Council of Europe conventions signed and ratified by the former State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, including the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-2


ITEMID: 001-78471
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: BALAZ AND OTHERS v. SLOVAKIA
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicants are relatives. They are all Slovakian nationals and live in Leopoldov. Their particulars appear in the appendix. The respondent Government are represented by Mrs A. Poláčková, their Agent.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
Mr Vincent Baláž is the father of Mr Vincent Baláž Jr, Ms Jana Konečníková and Ms Helena Balážová. He is the husband of Ms Antónia Balážová. He operates a small entertainment park. It consists of merrygorounds and other attractions which are attached to movable trailers. The trailers have no number plates.
On 8 September 2001 around noon, Mr Vincent Baláž Jr, accompanied by Ms Jana Konečníková, drove a tractor from the village of Ratkovce towing one trailer. They stopped in front of a school in Leopoldov. Ms Konečníková got off the tractor and went to connect a second trailer to the convoy. A police car stopped nearby and an officer of the Leopoldov County Police Department (Obvodné oddelenie Policajného zboru), Mr P., checked Mr Baláž Jr’s identity card and driving licence. He inquired as to why the trailers had no number plates and then left. According to the applicants Officer P. shouted that he would impose a fine on Mr Baláž Jr because “he had an impudent [sister]” and instructed them using harsh words to move on. The Government disagree on that point.
On 10 September 2001 at around 8 p.m., Mr Baláž Jr, accompanied by Ms Konečníková, again drove the tractor from Ratkovce towing a trailer. As they were entering the street where they lived, they noticed that a police car was behind them. They drove into the yard and stopped. The trailer protruded into the street. While Mr Baláž Jr was parking the tractor, a police officer from the Leopoldov County Police Department, Mr S., entered the property without being invited, inquired of Mr Baláž Jr as to why the trailer had no number plates and asked him to produce his identity and driving documentation. Mr Baláž Jr refused, arguing that he was on his private property. According to the applicants Officer S. shouted at Mr Baláž Jr, shone an electric torch in his face and slapped him on his hand. The Government contest that suggestion. Mr Baláž Jr then shouted to Mr Baláž for help. Officer S. subsequently left. During the entire incident the police car had been parked away from the scene. Officer P., who was also present, remained close to the car.
On 10 September 2001, after 8 p.m., Mr Baláž called the police emergency service to report that his children had been attacked by Officers S. and P. Later that evening the aforementioned officers also called the police emergency service to report the incident. They subsequently filed a report regarding the incident, which resulted in proceedings for roadtraffic offences being brought against Mr Baláž Jr (see below).
Mr Baláž lodged numerous complaints with various public institutions about the incidents of 8 and 10 September 2001. He complained in particular that the police interventions had been unwarranted and arbitrary, that they constituted a discriminatory persecution of his family and that the subsequent investigation in respect of them was biased and ineffective. The investigation case file had been tampered with, the bodies which had examined his complaints had not been independent and impartial and the complaints were dismissed solely on the basis of the onesided information and reports submitted by the officers against whom the complaints had been directed. The applicants had not been given an opportunity to comment on the information and reports and in general had been treated in a discriminatory manner on account of their Roma origin. Lastly, Mr Baláž argued that his trailers were exempt from the obligation to have number plates.
The above complaints were interpreted as administrative complaints (sťažnosť) under the Complaints’ Act (Law no. 152/1998 Coll.). They were examined and dismissed by the Trnava Regional Police Directorate (Krajské riaditeľstvo policajného zboru) and, on repeated appeals, by the Directorate General of the Police (Prezídium Policajného zboru) and the Inspection Service of the Ministry of the Interior (Sekcia kontroly a inšpekčnej služby ministerstva vnútra). Mr Baláž was informed of the dismissals by letters of 16 October and 20 November 2001 and 30 January 2002, respectively.
The authorities examined documentary evidence and statements from Mr Baláž Jr, Ms Konečníková, Mr Baláž, Officers S. and P. and several other police officers. The applicant’s allegations were found not to be established. Their complaints were thus unfounded.
The procedure and its outcome were then examined and upheld as correct by the Trnava District Office of Public Prosecution, the Trnava Regional Office of Public Prosecution and the Office of the Prosecutor General on 12 December 2001, 28 January and 27 May 2002 respectively.
In the meantime, on 31 January 2002, the Inspection Service of the Ministry of the Interior acknowledged that the trailers of Mr Baláž were exempt from the duty to have number plates. It was further found that no records were missing from the case file of the investigation.
Further complaints of Mr Baláž were dismissed by the Inspection Service of the Ministry of the Interior on 11 March, 7 May and 11 December 2002 and by the Directorate General of the Police on 12 June 2002 respectively. The applicants’ allegations were found not to be substantiated.
On 23 May 2002 the Inspection Service of the Ministry of the Interior decided under the Code of Criminal Procedure not to bring charges of abuse of official power against the officers involved in the incidents of 8 and 10 September 2001 and the alleged disappearance of documents from the case file. The examination of the files and evidence from the applicants and the officers revealed that there was no case to answer. The decision could have been, but was not, appealed.
On 8 April 2002 the Trnava District Traffic Police (Dopravný inšpektorát) found that Mr Baláž Jr had committed a traffic offence on 10 September 2001, having driven his tractor recklessly such that he could not be overtaken by a police car. The rear lights on his trailer were not functioning either. A fine of approximately 25 euros was imposed on him.
On 23 May 2002 the Trnava Region Traffic Police upheld the decision on appeal by Mr Baláž Jr. The decision could have been, but was not, challenged by an administrative-law action under Article 83 of the Minor Offences Code (Law no. 372/1990 Coll., as amended) in conjunction with Articles 244 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended).
On 5 February 2002 Mr Baláž Jr was charged with insulting a public official, Officer S., on 10 September 2001, by using grossly abusive language towards him.
On 14 January 2003 the Trnava District Court (Okresný súd) found Mr Baláž Jr guilty as charged and sentenced him to 4 months’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of one year. The District Court examined documentary evidence and heard the accused, Ms Konečníková and Officers S. and P. It “found no reasons not to believe” the testimonies of the latter, notwithstanding that officer P. had not been directly involved in the incident, his recollection of the incident was vague and his testimony at the trial had differed from his pretrial deposition.
On 27 March 2003 the Trnava Regional Court (Krajský súd) dismissed the appeal by Mr Baláž Jr. No further appeal was available.
On 3 February and 4 March 2002 Ms Konečníková Jr reported to the police that, on those days, she had received from an unknown person threatening, racially motivated phone calls and text messages.
The matter was investigated by the Leopoldov and Hlohovec County Police Departments which interviewed Ms Konečníková, Ms Konečníková Jr, Mr Baláž and 13 other persons as witnesses. The police also obtained and examined 3 reports from the telephone network operators. They established that the perpetrator of the threats was a classmate of Ms Konečníková Jr. The matter was considered to be a minor offence and the case was transmitted to the Piešťany District Office for the initiation of proceedings under the Minor Offences Code.
On 27 November 2002 the District Office found the classmate guilty of a minor offence and sentenced him to a reprimand (pokarhanie). It was observed that the wrongdoer was a minor and that he had not meant his threats to be taken seriously.


ITEMID: 001-4897
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: NLD
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 1999
DOCNAME: HIBBERT v. THE NETHERLANDS
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Elisabeth Palm
TEXT: The applicant, a Dutch national, was born in 1969. He is represented by Mr S.J. van der Woude, a lawyer practising in Amsterdam.
By letter of 23 December 1998, the applicant's representative informed the Court that the applicant had died on 9 August 1998 and that his mother, the applicant's sole heir, wished to pursue her son's application.
On 24 September 1991, the applicant was arrested and detained on remand on suspicion of having committed robbery. By summons of 6 December 1991, the applicant was charged with various counts of robbery and extortion and ordered to appear on 20 December 1991 before the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Amsterdam.
In its judgment of 20 December 1991, following adversarial proceedings, the Regional Court of Amsterdam acquitted the applicant of the charges against him for lack of sufficient evidence and ordered his immediate release. The applicant was released on the same day. The public prosecutor filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of Amsterdam.
In its judgment of 8 March 1993, following proceedings in absentia as the applicant had failed to appear, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam quashed the judgment of 21 December 1991, convicted the applicant of one count of robbery and two counts of extortion and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment with deduction of the time spent in pre-trial detention. The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).
On 27 February 1996, the Supreme Court, holding that the Court of Appeal had unjustly not allowed the applicant's lawyer to conduct the applicant's defence in the latter's absence before the Court of Appeal, quashed the judgment of 8 March 1993 and referred the case back to the Court of Appeal of The Hague.
By judgment of 11 September 1996, following proceedings in absentia, the Court of Appeal of The Hague acquitted the applicant for lack of sufficient evidence.
On 7 October 1996, the applicant filed a request with the Court of Appeal of The Hague, under Article 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering), for compensation in an amount of NLG. 9,100 for the time he had spent in pre-trial detention as well as a request, under for Article 591a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for reimbursement by the State of his legal costs in an amount of NLG. 789.60 in connection with the proceedings on his request under Article 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In its decision of 12 March 1997, the Court of Appeal of The Hague rejected the applicant's request for compensation for the time he had spent in pre-trial detention, holding:
<Translation>
“Article 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens the possibility for compensation of damages suffered as a consequence of having been detained in pre-trial custody where a case ends without the imposition of a punishment ... Compensation shall be awarded if and to the extent the court, taking all circumstances into account, is of the opinion that there are reasons in equity to do so.
The court considers on this point that, in the applicant's case, there were witnesses having made incriminating statements as to the applicant's involvement in the punishable facts as charged, which fully justified the applicant's detention during that phase <of the proceedings>.
Moreover, sufficient lawful evidence was available, yet doubts as regards the applicant's role have led to the acquittal. It has therefore not been established that the applicant has not committed the fact, so that, all circumstances having been taken into account, there are no reasons in equity for any compensation.”
On 12 March 1997, in a separate decision, the Court of Appeal also rejected the applicant's request under Article 591a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It held that, given its decision on the applicant's request under Article 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there were no reasons in equity for the costs claimed.
No appeal lies against the decisions of 12 March 1997.