ITEMID: 001-119149
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GEO
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2013
DOCNAME: AKHVLEDIANI AND OTHERS v. GEORGIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra;Nona Tsotsoria
TEXT: 1. The applicants are Georgian nationals. They were represented before the Court by Ms Lia Mukhashavria and Mr Nika Kvaratskhelia, lawyers at Human Rights Priority, a non-governmental organisation in Tbilisi. The Georgian Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Meskhoradze, of the Ministry of Justice.
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
3. The applicants were all employed as journalists by Imedi Media Holding, a private television and radio company formerly owned by the late Georgian media proprietor B.P. and by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation. The applicants were not shareholders in that company.
4. In the autumn of 2007, large-scale demonstrations led by a collection of opposition parties took place in Tbilisi, protesting against the President of Georgia and the Government. These demonstrations, to which B.P. was sympathetic, were initially peaceful but turned violent on 7 November 2007 when the police, using various harsh anti-riot tactics, dislodged the demonstrators from land adjoining the House of Parliament, preventing them from resuming their protests.
5. All major television stations in Georgia, including Imedi, broadcast live footage of the dispersal of the demonstrators on that day.
6. Later in the evening of 7 November 2007, without warning and without possession of a court order, hundreds of police officers armed with automatic weapons broke into the Imedi television station headquarters, causing the station to be taken off the air. According to the applicants’ version of events which is disputed by the Government, the police forced the Imedi staff members, including six of the applicants (see paragraph 12 below), to lie on the floor with their hands behind their heads. Some of the captive journalists were verbally insulted and threatened at gunpoint. After holding the staff members, including the applicants, in the above-mentioned conditions for 20-30 minutes, the police forced them out of the building, destroying much of the company’s television equipment and its video archive (“the police raid on Imedi”). Many other staff members of the television, including the remaining four applicants, were, in the meantime, gathered in a street adjacent to the building.
7. On the same day, 7 November 2007, a criminal case for attempted coup d’etat was initiated against B.P. by the General Prosecutor’s Office. Furthermore, the President of Georgia declared a nationwide state of emergency later that day which lasted until 16 November 2007.
8. On 8 November 2007 the Georgian National Communications Commission (“the GNCC”) suspended Imedi’s broadcasting licence, citing violations of broadcasting law by the company.
9. According to the Government, on 10 November 2007 the Tbilisi City Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal probe in the lawfulness of the police actions during the raid on Imedi. However, the case file does not contain any decision related to those proceedings.
10. On 15 November and 17 December 2007 B.P.’s two newly designated lawyers enquired with prosecution authority about progress in the criminal proceedings which had been initiated against their client on 7 November 2007, requesting to be acquainted with case materials. As disclosed by copies of those enquiries, the two lawyers, who did not possess authority to act from any of the ten applicants, did not voice any grievances and described any facts concerning the police raid on Imedi.
11. On 7 December 2007 the police allowed the Imedi staff members, including the applicants, to re-enter their offices in the television station for the first time. On 12 December 2007 the GNCC lifted the broadcast ban on Imedi.
12. Subsequently, and notably after B.P.’s death on 13 February 2008, a row concerning the question of ownership of Imedi broke out between the late media proprietor’s family and certain other persons. The company management’s subsequent decision to suspend the television broadcasts again, led most of its leading journalists, including the applicants, to leave their jobs at Imedi in the first half of 2008. In May 2008 Imedi television, already running under new management, started broadcasting again.
13. For more than two years after the police raid on Imedi on 7 November 2007, the applicants did not complain about the actions of the police before any of the domestic authorities. In early December 2009, Human Rights Priority, a human rights advocacy centre known in Georgia for specialising in bringing applications to the Court, publicly declared its readiness to assist victims of the police raid on Imedi. Subsequently, on 4 and 22 December 2009, all ten applicants simultaneously filed complaints with the Tbilisi City public prosecutor’s office requesting the initiation of a criminal investigation into the circumstances of that raid.
14. On 14 December 2009 the prosecution authority informed the applicants that their criminal complaints had been transmitted to the investigative unit of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office for further action.


ITEMID: 001-69391
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: LVA
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2005
DOCNAME: CASE OF SISOJEVA AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 8;No violation of Art. 34;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses - claim dismissed
JUDGES: Christos Rozakis
TEXT: 12. The applicants are a married couple, Svetlana Sisojeva (“the first applicant”) and Arkady Sisojev (“the second applicant”) and their daughter, Aksana Sisojeva (“the third applicant”). They were born in 1949, 1946 and 1978 respectively. The second and third applicants have Russian nationality, while the first applicant has no nationality. All three live in Alūksne (Latvia).
13. The first two applicants arrived in Latvia in 1969 and 1968 respectively. The second applicant, who was a member of the Soviet armed forces at the time, was stationed in Latvia and remained there until he finished serving his time in November 1989. The third applicant and her elder sister, Mrs Tatjana Vizule, were born in Latvian territory.
14. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the restoration of Latvian independence in 1991 the applicants, who had previously been Soviet nationals, became stateless.
In August 1993 Tatjana married a Latvian national. She is mother to two minor children who have Latvian nationality.
15. In 1993 the first and second applicants applied to the Latvian Interior Ministry's Nationality and Immigration Department (Iekšlietu ministrijas Pilsonības un imigrācijas departaments – “the Department”) to obtain permanent resident status and to be entered in the register of residents of the Republic of Latvia (Latvijas Republikas Iedzīvotāju reģistrs). However, on 19 June 1993 the Department issued them only with temporary residence permits.
16. The first and second applicants then lodged an application with the Alūksne District Court of First Instance, requesting it to direct the Department to enter them in the register of residents as permanent residents. In a judgment delivered on 28 October 2003 after adversarial proceedings, which was upheld on 8 December 1993 following an appeal on points of law, the court allowed their application. It considered that, under the legislation in force, the situation of the second applicant, who had left the army before 4 May 1990 – the date on which Latvia had declared its independence – could not be equated with that of a non-Latvian serviceman temporarily present on Latvian soil, who would be entitled only to a temporary residence permit. The Department subsequently entered all the applicants in the register of residents.
17. In 1995 the Department discovered that the first two applicants had each obtained two former Soviet passports in January 1992 and had therefore been able to have their place of residence registered in Izhevsk (Russia) despite already having a registered place of residence in Latvia (pieraksts or dzīvesvietas reģistrācija).
18. In two decisions dated 3 November and 1 December 1995 the Alūksne police decided not to institute criminal proceedings against the applicants for using false identity papers. However, the Department imposed an administrative penalty of 25 lati (LVL) (approximately 40 euros (EUR)) on them for breach of the passport regulations. The Department also applied to the Alūksne District Court of First Instance to have the proceedings reopened to consider new facts, alleging fraudulent behaviour on the part of the first two applicants. The Department also noted that the third applicant had followed the example of her parents and sister in 1995, obtaining two passports and having her place of residence registered in both Russia and Latvia.
19. In an order of 28 May 1996 the Alūksne District Court of First Instance, ruling on the application for the proceedings to be reopened, allowed the Department's application, quashed its own judgment of 28 October 1993 and ordered the removal of the applicants' names from the register of residents. The first two applicants appealed to the Vidzeme Regional Court which, in an order dated 3 June 1997, quashed the decision in question and referred the case back to the Alūksne Court of First Instance.
20. In 1996 the second and third applicants applied for and obtained Russian nationality. On 8 August 1996 the Russian Embassy in Latvia issued them with passports of the Russian Federation.
21. In March 1998 the third applicant, by now an adult, was joined as a party to the proceedings before the Alūksne Court of First Instance.
22. In a letter of 15 May 1998 the Joint Committee for the implementation of the agreement between the Government of Latvia and the Government of the Russian Federation on social-welfare arrangements for retired members of the Russian armed forces and their family members residing in Latvia (“the Russian-Latvian agreement” – see paragraph 45 below) requested the Interior Ministry's Nationality and Migration Directorate (Iekšlietu ministrijas Pilsonības un migrācijas lietu pārvalde – “the Directorate”), which had replaced the Department, to issue the applicants with permanent residence permits, on the ground that they had the right to remain in Latvia under the above agreement. In a second letter sent the same day the Joint Committee informed the Alūksne Court of First Instance that the first applicant had neither Russian nor any other nationality.
23. In July 1998 the applicants submitted a further request to the Court of First Instance. In a joint memorial they argued that, as the second and third applicants had Russian nationality, they had the right to obtain permanent residence permits under the Russian-Latvian agreement. The first applicant, who had no nationality, contended that she was entitled to the status of a “permanently resident noncitizen (nepilsonis)” under the Act on the Status of Former USSR Citizens without Latvian or other Citizenship (“the Non-Citizens Act” – see paragraph 41 below).
24. In court, the applicants made no attempt to deny the actions of which they had been accused by the Department and the Directorate, but maintained that those actions had been in breach only of Russian law and therefore had no effect on their rights in Latvia.
25. In a judgment of 28 July 1998 the Alūksne District Court of First Instance allowed the applicants' request. It noted that the applicants' place of residence had been legally registered in Alūksne since 1970 and that they had lived there from then onwards. In the court's view, since the procuring of second passports by the applicants and their registration in Russia were illegal and void acts, they had no impact on the applicants' legal status in Latvia. The court also noted that the second applicant was on the list of former members of the Russian armed forces in receipt of a Russian military pension and entitled to remain in Latvia. That list had been drawn up jointly by the two governments in accordance with the Russian-Latvian agreement. Consequently, the court held that the first applicant was entitled to apply for a passport as a “permanently resident non-citizen” and that the second and third applicants were entitled to obtain permanent residence permits.
26. The Directorate appealed against that judgment to the Vidzeme Regional Court. In a judgment of 15 June 1999 the Regional Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the findings and reasoning of the firstinstance court.
27. The Directorate then lodged an appeal on points of law with the Senate of the Supreme Court. In a judgment of 15 September 1999 the Senate quashed the Regional Court's judgment and declared it null and void. The Senate found that secretly obtaining two passports and registering places of residence in two different countries, failing to disclose the second passports and supplying false information to the authorities when applying for regularisation constituted serious breaches of Latvian immigration law. The Senate also referred to section 1 (3), subparagraph 5, of the Non-Citizens Act, which stated that the status of “permanently resident non-citizen” could not be granted to persons who, on 1 July 1992, had their permanent place of residence registered in a member State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (of which Russia is a member). The Senate considered that the provision in question was fully applicable to the applicants' case.
28. The Senate also noted that the judgment of the Alūksne Court of First Instance of 28 October 1993 had been subsequently set aside when the proceedings were reopened, thereby depriving the entry of the applicants on the register of residents of any legal basis. It concluded that the second and third applicants, since they did not satisfy the requirements of section 23 (1) of the Aliens and Stateless Persons (Entry and Residence) Act (“the Aliens Act” – see paragraph 43 below), were also not entitled to obtain permanent residence permits. Consequently, the Senate set aside the judgment of 15 June 1999 and referred the case back to the appellate court.
29. For procedural reasons, the case was transferred to the Latgale Regional Court which, in a judgment of 10 January 2000, rejected the applicants' application, reaffirming the reasons given by the Senate. Unlike the Russian-Latvian Joint Committee, the Regional Court considered that the first applicant had Russian nationality under the Russian Federation's Nationality Act. With regard to the second applicant, it considered that the fact that an individual was on the list of retired army personnel merely attested to the fact that the person concerned actually resided in Latvia and was in receipt of a Russian military pension; it did not in any sense confer entitlement to a residence permit.
30. In a judgment of 12 April 2000 the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants on points of law, endorsing in substance the arguments of the Regional Court.
31. In two letters dated 17 May and 26 June 2000 the Directorate reminded the applicants that they were required to leave Latvia.
32. On 11 November 2003 the head of the Directorate sent a letter to each of the applicants explaining the procedure to be followed in order to regularise their stay in Latvia. The relevant passages of the letter sent to the first applicant read as follows:
“... The [Directorate] ... would remind you that, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, no order has hitherto been made for your deportation, and that it is open to you to regularise your stay in the Republic of Latvia in accordance with the [country's] legislation.
Under sections 1 and 2 of the Status of Stateless Persons Act, persons who are not considered to be nationals of any one State under the laws of that State ... and who are legally resident in Latvia, may obtain stateless persons status.
You satisfy the above requirements...
In view of the above, the Directorate is prepared to regularise your stay in Latvia by entering your name in the register of residents as a stateless person [resident] in Latvia and by issuing you with an identity document on that basis.
In order to complete the necessary formalities, you will need to go in person to the Alūksne district office of the Directorate, bringing with you your identity papers, your birth certificate and two photographs...”
33. The letters sent to the other two applicants were similar in content. The letter to the second applicant stated in particular:
“... If your wife, Mrs Svetlana Sisojeva, avails herself of the opportunity to regularise her stay in the Republic of Latvia in accordance with the provisions in force, you will be entitled, under the Immigration Act, to obtain a residence permit. The Directorate is not aware of any reason which would prevent you from applying for and obtaining a residence permit in Latvia.
Under the terms of section 32 of the Immigration Act, only aliens residing in Latvia on the basis of a residence permit may apply to the Directorate for a residence permit... In other cases, and where such a move accords with international human rights provisions and the interests of the Latvian State, or on humanitarian grounds, the head of the Directorate may authorise the person concerned to submit the relevant papers to the Directorate in order to apply for a residence permit. As no order has hitherto been made for your deportation, you may submit the relevant papers ... to the Alūksne district office of the Directorate...
...
In view of the above, the Directorate is prepared to issue you with a residence permit at your wife's place of residence, in accordance with section 26 of the Immigration Act, on condition that S. Sisojeva completes the necessary formalities in order to regularise her stay in Latvia as a stateless person, and that she responds to the invitation from the Alūksne office of the Directorate...”
34. Lastly, the letter to the third applicant contained the following passages:
“ ... If your mother, Mrs Svetlana Sisojeva, avails herself of the opportunity offered to her and, after completing the necessary formalities, regularises her stay in the Republic of Latvia in accordance with the provisions in force, you will be entitled, under the Immigration Act, to obtain a residence permit. The Directorate is not aware of any reason which would prevent you from applying for and obtaining a residence permit in Latvia.
...
The Directorate would further inform you that, in accordance with section 23 (3) of the Immigration Act, in cases not provided for by the Act, a temporary residence permit may be issued by the Minister of the Interior, where such a move is in accordance with the provisions of international law. Consequently, you are also entitled to apply to the Minister of the Interior for a residence permit valid for a period longer than that specified in section 23 (1) subparagraph 1 of the Immigration Act. Furthermore, after a period of residence of ten years on the basis of a temporary residence permit, you may apply for a permanent residence permit in accordance with section 24 (1) subparagraph 7 of the Immigration Act...”
35. In addition, a letter containing the above information concerning the three applicants was sent to the Government's Agent. On the same date, 11 November 2003, the head of the Directorate signed three decisions formally regularising the applicants' status in Latvia. More specifically, he ordered that the first applicant be entered in the register of residents as a “stateless person”, that she be issued with an identity document valid for two years, and that the second and third applicants be issued with temporary residence permits valid for one year and six months respectively. However, regularisation of the status of the second and third applicants was contingent upon that of the first applicant. In other words, in order for Arkady Sisojev and Aksana Sisojeva to obtain residence permits, Svetlana Sisojeva first had to submit the relevant documents to the Directorate.
36. None of the applicants complied with the instructions outlined above in order to obtain residence permits. As matters stand, the applicants continue to reside in Latvia. According to the information available to the Court, the second applicant is legally employed as the operator of a municipal communal heating plant in Alūksne, while the third applicant is studying law at a private establishment in Riga.
37. The applicants contended that, on the morning of 6 March 2002, the first applicant, Svetlana Sisojeva, had been summoned to the regional headquarters of the security police (Drošības policija). An officer of the security police had asked her a number of questions, some of them relating to her application to the Court and to an interview she had given to journalists from a Russian television channel on the subject. In particular, the police had asked the first applicant how the Russian journalists had made contact with her, how she had heard about the possibility of lodging an individual application with the Court, how she had found lawyers to represent her before the Court and how she had known that certain persons had bribed Directorate officials in order to obtain Latvian residence permits. In addition, the police officer had asked her several questions about her professional career and about the members of her family.
38. The dialogue between the first applicant and the police officer, as reconstructed by the applicant and sent to her lawyers on 4 April 2002, ran as follows:
“Police officer: How did the television channel ORT find you?
Applicant: We had had telephone calls in November [and] December. At the time, we had refused to meet them, but journalists are bloodhounds, they always get what they want.
Police officer : And then?
Applicant: They telephoned from Riga and said they wanted to meet us and talk to us. I agreed. They wanted to talk to several [people] who had brought cases before the courts.
Police officer: When did they phone?
Applicant: It was a Saturday night, about 10 p.m. They came round on the Sunday, at about 3.30 p.m. If you want to come round [too], you're welcome. Our door is always open.
Police officer: You said that you'd taken the case all the way to the European Court, didn't you?
Applicant: Yes, I did. There were fourteen sets of proceedings; we fought and fought [again], and eventually we turned to the European Court, because of the people in charge in the [Directorate]. They saw it as a game to get us deported from the country, while we wanted to prove that we were in the right. [Their] attitude towards us was based on prejudice: we hadn't broken any laws in Latvia.
Police officer: How and where did you find out that you could apply to the European Court?
Applicant: The issue of our regularisation was discussed several times by the tripartite Joint Committee. We had approached the Human Rights Committee. We had lawyers. The representatives of the Interior Ministry and the [Directorate] had told us at the last meeting that they had no objections to raise or accusations to make as far as we were concerned, and that everything would be fine. Unfortunately, they haven't kept their promises so far. The Committee advised us to lodge an application with the European Court about the length of the proceedings if the case wasn't resolved.
Police officer: And how did you find those lawyers?
Applicant: With the help of the lawyers in the social welfare office we were registered with.
Police officer: Perhaps your lawyers threatened you, saying that if you didn't give information to ORT they would stop working with you?
Applicant: That's nonsense. They told us not to give information to anyone without their consent, not even to ORT...
Police officer: You said that over forty people had lodged applications?
Applicant: Yes, I did. Actually, there are even more people involved: I meant that there were forty families. We've all been through the courts: some of us once, some twice, and some even three times. A lot of people solved the problem by paying backhanders.
Police officer: How do you know that?
Applicant: We were all in the same boat and we helped one another. We used to say to one another that if someone had money, it was better for him to pay, to avoid a trial. [The first applicant then gave the example of two families whose status had been regularised after they had bribed Directorate officials; she named one of the officials concerned.]
Police officer: And why did you not come to us?
Applicant: We didn't know you could help us.
Police officer: How did you come by the information that forty people had lodged applications?
Applicant: Actually, the figure is higher. We've all had a lot of problems. [The applicant dwelt in detail on five specific cases concerning the regularisation of persons in a similar situation to her own.]
Police officer: What does your husband think about the case?
Applicant: He supports [me]: what would you do?
[The police officer then asked the applicant a series of questions about her education, her work, her husband's work and the family's financial situation.]
Police officer: Once more, how did you find out that you could take your case to the European Court?
Applicant: We read the papers, we watch television; the cases of Podkolzina, Kulakova, Slivenko and several other families were reported in the media. We approached the Human Rights Committee, who gave us advice and even offered to [help us] find a lawyer. Strange, isn't it? It was very hard for us, having to bring a case against Latvia before the European Court, but all the avenues open to us to try and resolve the problem in Latvia had been exhausted. It's the fault of the [Directorate and its officials], who flout the law and force people to leave Latvia. They're the ones who bring shame on Latvia. We haven't broken any law.
Police officer: When is the case going to be examined?
Applicant: We don't know.
Police officer: What documents have you sent them?
Applicant: The courts' decisions.”
39. The Government contested the accuracy of this record, particularly in view of the length of time that had elapsed between the interview itself and the drafting of the document. The first applicant conceded that the document was probably less than perfect, given that it had been drafted from memory almost a month after the fact; she acknowledged that several other questions (which she could not recall) might have been asked during the interview. However, she contended that her record reflected with sufficient accuracy the content and tone of the interview. Furthermore, she was “absolutely certain” that her conversation with the police officer had been recorded on tape.
40. Latvian legislation on nationality and immigration distinguishes several categories of persons, each with a specific status.
(a) Latvian citizens (Latvijas Republikas pilsoņi), whose legal status is governed by the Citizenship Act (Pilsonības likums);
(b) “permanently resident non-citizens” (nepilsoņi) – that is, citizens of the former USSR who lost their Soviet citizenship following the break-up of the USSR but have not subsequently obtained any other nationality – who are governed by the Act of 12 April 1995 on the Status of Former USSR Citizens without Latvian or other Citizenship (Likums “Par to bijušo PSRS pilsoņu statusu, kuriem nav Latvijas vai citas valsts pilsonības” – “the NonCitizens Act”; see paragraph 41 below);
(c) asylum-seekers and refugees, whose status is governed by the Asylum Act of 7 March 2002 (Patvēruma likums);
(d) “stateless persons” (bezvalstnieki) within the meaning of the Status of Stateless Persons Act of 18 February 1999 (Likums “Par bezvalstnieka statusu Latvijas Republikā” – see paragraph 42 below), read in conjunction with the Aliens and Stateless Persons (Entry and Residence) Act of 9 June 1992 (“the Aliens Act” – see paragraph 43 below) and, since 1 May 2003, with the Immigration Act of 31 October 2002 (Imigrācijas likums – see paragraph 44 below);
(e) “aliens” in the broad sense of the term (ārzemnieki), including foreign nationals (ārvalstnieki) and stateless persons (bezvalstnieki) falling solely within the ambit of the Aliens Act (before 1 May 2003), and the Immigration Act (after that date).
41. The relevant provisions of the Non-Citizens Act read as follows:
Section 1 (1) [Version in force before 25 September 1998]
“This Act shall apply to citizens of the former USSR who are resident in Latvia ..., were resident within Latvian territory before 1 July 1992 and are registered as being resident there, regardless of the status of their housing, provided that they are not citizens of Latvia or of any other State, and also to their children below the age of majority, if the latter are not citizens of Latvia or of any other State.”
[Version in force since 25 September 1998]
“The persons governed by this Act – 'non-citizens' – shall be those citizens of the former USSR, and their children, who are resident in Latvia ... and who satisfy all the following criteria:
(1) on 1 July 1992 they were registered as being resident within the territory of Latvia, regardless of the status of their housing; or their last registered place of residence by 1 July 1992 was in the Republic of Latvia; or a court has established that before the above-mentioned date they had been resident within the territory of Latvia for not less than ten years;
(2) they do not have Latvian citizenship; and
(3) they are not and have not been citizens of any other State.
...
Section 2 (2)
“... [N]on-citizens have the right
...
(2) not to be deported from Latvia, save where deportation takes place in accordance with the law and another State has agreed to receive the deportee. ...”
42. The relevant provisions of the Status of Stateless Persons Act read as follows:
Section 2
“1. The status of stateless person may be granted to persons whose status is not defined either by the Act on the Status of Former USSR Citizens without Latvian or other Citizenship or by the Asylum Act , provided they
...
(2) are legally resident in Latvia.
2. Stateless persons who have obtained outside Latvia documents attesting to the fact that they are stateless may obtain the status of stateless person in Latvia only if they have obtained a permanent residence permit in Latvia.
...”
Section 3 (1)
“Stateless persons shall be issued with an identity document for stateless persons, which shall also serve as [a] travel document.”
Section 4
“1. Stateless persons in Latvia shall enjoy all the human rights enshrined in the Latvian Constitution [Satversme].
2. In addition to the rights referred to in the first paragraph of this section, stateless persons shall be entitled
(1) to leave and return to Latvia freely;
(2) to be joined by their spouse from outside the country, and by their own minor children or those dependent on their spouse, in accordance with the rules laid down by the Aliens and Stateless Persons (Entry and Residence) Act;
(3) to preserve their native language, culture and traditions, provided these are not in breach of the law;
...
3. During their stay in Latvia, stateless persons shall be bound by [the provisions of] Latvian law.”
43. The relevant provisions of the Aliens Act, in force prior to 1 May 2003, read as follows:
Section 11
“Any foreigner or stateless person shall be entitled to stay in the Republic of Latvia for more than three months [version in force since 25 May 1999: 'more than ninety days in the course of one half of a calendar year'], provided that he or she has obtained a residence permit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. ...”
Section 12
(amended by the Act of 15 October 1998)
“Aliens or stateless persons may be issued with
(1) a temporary residence permit;
(2) a permanent residence permit. ...”
Section 23
“The following may obtain a permanent residence permit:
...
(2) the spouse of a Latvian citizen, of a 'permanently resident non-citizen' of Latvia or of an alien or stateless person who has [himself or herself] been granted a permanent residence permit, in accordance [with section] ... 26 of this Act, and the spouse's minor or dependent children ...”
Section 23 (1) (added by the Act of 18 December 1996, in force since 21 January 1997)
“Permanent residence permits may be obtained by aliens who, on 1 July 1992, were officially registered as being resident for an indefinite period within the Republic of Latvia if, at the time of applying for a permanent residence permit, they are officially registered as being resident within the Republic of Latvia and are entered in the register of residents.
Citizens of the former USSR who acquired the citizenship of another State before 1 September 1996 must apply for a permanent residence permit by 31 March 1997. Citizens of the former USSR who acquired the citizenship of another State after 1 September 1996 must apply within six months of the date on which they acquired the citizenship of that State. ...”
Section 26 (1) (amended by the Act of 18 December 1996, in force since 21 January 1997)
“The spouse of an alien or stateless person in possession of a permanent residence permit in Latvia, if [he or she] is not a Latvian citizen or non-citizen or an alien or stateless person in possession of a permanent residence permit, shall be issued with:
(1) following the initial application: a temporary residence permit valid for one year;
(2) following the second application: a temporary residence permit valid for four years;
(3) following the third application: a permanent residence permit.”
Section 35
“No residence permit shall be issued to a person who
...
(6) has knowingly supplied false information in order to obtain such a permit;
(7) is in possession of false or invalid identity or immigration documents;
...”
Section 38
“The head of the Directorate or of the regional office of the Directorate shall issue a deportation order...
...
(2) if the alien or stateless person is in the country without a valid visa or residence permit...”
Section 40
“A person shall leave the territory of Latvia within seven days after the deportation order has been served on him or her, provided that no appeal is lodged against the order in the manner prescribed in this section.
Persons in respect of whom a deportation order is issued may appeal against it within seven days to the head of the Directorate, who shall extend the residence permit pending consideration of the appeal.
An appeal against the decision of the head of the Directorate shall lie to the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Directorate's headquarters are situated, within seven days after the decision has been served.”
Section 49
“Where an international agreement on the entry, residence and deportation of aliens and stateless persons, concluded by the Republic of Latvia and approved by Parliament, contains provisions at variance with the provisions of the present Act, the provisions of the international agreement shall take precedence.”
44. Since 1 May 2003 the Aliens Act cited above is no longer in force; it was repealed and replaced by the Immigration Act. The relevant provisions of the new Act read as follows:
Section 1
“The present Act uses the following definitions:
1. an alien [ārzemnieks] – a person who is neither a Latvian citizen nor a “[permanently resident] non-citizen” of Latvia; ...”
Section 23
“1. In accordance with the arrangements laid down in the present Act, an alien may request a temporary residence permit
(1) once in the course of the calendar year, for a period not exceeding six months, if he or she is the relative of a Latvian citizen or a “[permanently resident] non-citizen” of Latvia or of an alien who has obtained a permanent residence permit. This shall apply up to the third degree in lineal descent, the second degree collaterally or the second degree by marriage;
...
(6) for the duration of his or her employment, up to a maximum of four years;
...
3. In cases not covered by the present Act, the temporary residence permit shall be granted by the Minister of the Interior, where the relevant decision accords with the provisions of international law or the interests of the Latvian State, or on humanitarian grounds.
4. In the cases referred to in subparagraphs 1 to 10 ... of paragraph 1 of this section, an application for a permanent residence permit may also be lodged by the spouse of the alien, his or her minor children (including those under his or her guardianship) or by persons placed under his or her supervision.”
Section 24
“1. In accordance with the arrangements laid down in the present Act, the following persons may apply for a permanent residence permit:
...
(2) the spouse of a Latvian citizen or a “[permanently resident] non-citizen” of Latvia or of an alien who has obtained a permanent residence permit, in accordance with section 25 or 26 of the present Act...;
...
2. In cases not covered by the present Act, the permanent residence permit shall be granted by the Minister of the Interior, where it accords with the interests of the State.
...
5. The aliens referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraph 2 ... of this section may obtain a permanent residence permit if they have a command of the official language. The level of knowledge of the official language and the means of verifying that knowledge shall be determined by the Council of Ministers.
6. Aliens who do not satisfy the requirements set forth in paragraph 5 of this section shall be entitled to continue to reside in Latvia if they hold a temporary residence permit.”
Section 26 (1)
“An alien married to an[other] alien who holds a permanent residence permit may obtain:
(1) following the initial application: a temporary residence permit valid for one year;
(2) following the second application: a temporary residence permit valid for four years;
(3) following the third application: a permanent residence permit.”
Section 32 (3)
“[By way of exception,] [t]he head of the Directorate may authorise [the person concerned] to submit an application for a residence permit to the Directorate, where such authorisation accords with the provisions of international law or the interests of the Latvian State, or on humanitarian grounds.”
Section 33 (2)
“... When the time-limit set down [for submitting an application for a residence permit] has passed, the head of the Directorate may authorise [the person concerned] to submit the [relevant] documents, where such authorisation accords with the interests of the Latvian State, or on grounds of force majeure or humanitarian grounds.”
Section 40
“1. Where a decision is taken to refuse an application by an alien for a residence permit or to withdraw his or her residence permit, the person who invited the alien may appeal against that decision to the head of the Directorate, within thirty days after the decision has been served.
2. Where the head of the Directorate refuses an application for a residence permit from an alien legally resident in the Republic of Latvia, the alien concerned, or the person who invited him or her, may appeal before the courts against that decision, in the manner prescribed by law.”
Section 42
“1. Aliens in respect of whom a deportation order is issued ... may lodge an appeal against that decision with the head of the Directorate within seven days. The head of the Directorate shall extend the person's stay pending consideration of the appeal.
“2. An appeal against the decision of the head of the Directorate shall lie to the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Directorate's headquarters are situated, within seven days after the decision has been served. ...”
45. An agreement between Russia and Latvia on socialwelfare arrangements for retired members of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and their family members resident in Latvia was signed in Moscow on 30 April 1994. It was ratified by Latvia on 24 November 1994 and entered into force on 27 February 1995. The relevant provisions of the agreement read as follows:
Article 1
“The present agreement shall apply to persons residing in the Republic of Latvia who are covered by the Russian Federation Act of 12 February 1993 on the granting of retirement benefit to persons who have served in the armed forces and in the organs of the Ministry of the Interior (“retired members of the armed forces”) and to their family members. The phrase “family members” shall be taken to mean the spouses, minor children and other dependants of retired members of the armed forces.”
Article 2
“The persons referred to in Article 1 of this agreement shall enjoy fundamental rights in the Republic of Latvia, in accordance with international law, the provisions of this agreement and Latvian legislation.
The persons to whom this agreement applies ... and who were permanently resident in Latvia before 28 January 1992, including those persons appearing in the lists confirmed by both Parties and annexed to the agreement in respect of whom the relevant formalities have not been completed, shall retain the right to reside without hindrance in Latvia if they so wish. By agreement between the Parties, persons who were permanently resident in Latvia before 28 January 1992 and whose names, for whatever reason, have not been entered on the abovementioned lists, may have their names added. ...”
46. At the time of the facts reported by the applicants, the relevant provisions of the Regulatory Offences Code (Administratīvo pārkāpumu kodekss) read as follows:
Article 187
“... Use of a passport which has been replaced by a new passport shall be punishable by a fine of up to 100 lati.”
Article 190 (3)
“Failure to provide the offices of the Latvian Nationality and Immigration Department with the information to be entered in the register of residents within the time allowed shall be punishable by a fine of between 10 and 25 lati.”
47. The main provisions governing interviews similar to that complained of by the first applicant are contained in the Act of 16 December 1993 on operational measures (Operatīvās darbības likums). The “operational measures” referred to in the Act cover all operations, covert or otherwise, aimed at protecting individuals, the independence and sovereignty of the State, the constitutional system, the country's economic and scientific potential and classified information against external or internal threats (section 1). Operational measures are aimed in particular at preventing and detecting criminal offences, tracing the perpetrators of criminal offences and gathering evidence (section 2).
48. The most straightforward measure is the “intelligence-related operational procedure” (operatīvā izzināšana), designed to “obtain information on events, persons or objects” (section 9 (1)). The procedure takes one of the following forms:
(i) an “operational request for intelligence” (operatīvā aptauja), during which “the persons concerned are asked questions about the facts of interest to the [relevant] authorities” (section 9 (2));
(ii) “operational intelligence gathering” (operatīvā uzziņa), which involves “gathering information relating to specific persons” (section 9 (3));
(iii) “operational clarification of intelligence” (operatīvā noskaidrošana), consisting in obtaining information by covert or indirect means where there is reason to suspect that the informer will be unwilling to supply the information directly (section 9 (4)).
49. All operational measures must be in strict compliance with the law and human rights. In particular, no harm – physical or otherwise – may be caused to the persons concerned, nor may they be subjected to violence or threats (section 4 (1) to (3)). Any person who considers that he or she has suffered harm as a result of the actions of a member of the security forces may lodge a complaint with the prosecuting authorities or the relevant court (section 5).
50. Under section 15 of the National Security Establishments Act of 5 May 1994 (Valsts drošības iestāžu likums), the security police come under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. They have powers to deploy operational measures in order to combat corruption.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 8
NON_VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 34


ITEMID: 001-58835
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2000
DOCNAME: CASE OF SANDER v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 1
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - claim dismissed
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 8. In March 1995 the applicant, an Asian, appeared together with J.B. and G.C. before the Birmingham Crown Court, composed of a judge and a jury, to be tried for conspiracy to defraud.
9. After the defence had stated its case, the judge started his summingup, which he had almost completed by Friday evening when he adjourned.
10. On Monday morning a juror arrived at the court and handed an envelope to the court usher containing the following complaint:
“I have decided I cannot remain silent any longer. For some time during the trial I have been concerned that fellow jurors are not taking their duties seriously. At least two have been making openly racist remarks and jokes and I fear are going to convict the defendants not on the evidence but because they are Asian. My concern is the defendants will not therefore receive a fair verdict. Please could you advise me what I can do in this situation.”
11. The juror who had written the complaint was asked not to join the other jurors. The judge discussed the complaint with counsel in chambers and then adjourned and listened to submissions in open court. The defence asked the judge to dismiss the jury on the ground that there was a real danger of bias. The judge, however, decided to call the jury back into court, at which stage the juror who had written the complaint joined the others. The judge read out the complaint to them and told them the following:
“Members of the jury, this morning I received a note from one of your number expressing extreme concern that some of your number are not taking your duties seriously, are making openly racist remarks and jokes about Asians and may not reach your verdicts upon the evidence but because of some racial prejudice.
I am not able to conduct an inquiry into the validity of those contentions and I do not propose to do so. This case has cost an enormous amount of money and I am not anxious to halt it at the moment, but I shall have no compunction in doing so if the situation demands.
When you took the oath or affirmed as jurors it was, you will remember, to bring in true verdicts according to the evidence. That is solemn and binding and means what it says.
I am going to adjourn now and I am going to ask you all to search your conscience overnight and if you feel that you are not able to try this case solely on the evidence and find that you cannot put aside any prejudices you may have will you please indicate that fact by writing a personal note to that effect and giving it to the jury bailiff on your arrival at court tomorrow morning. I will then review the position. Thank you very much.”
12. The next morning the judge received two letters from the jury. The first letter, which was signed by all the jurors including the juror who had sent the complaint, stated the following:
“We, the undersigned members of the jury, wish to put on record to the Court our response to yesterday's note from a juror implying possible racial bias.
1. We utterly refute the allegation.
2. We are deeply offended by the allegation.
3. We assure the Court that we intend to reach a verdict solely according to the evidence and without racial bias.”
13. The second letter, which the judge commended, was written by a juror who appeared to have thought himself to have been the one who had been making the jokes. The juror in question explained at length that he might have done so, that he was sorry if he had given any offence, that he was somebody who had many connections with people from ethnic minorities and that he was in no way racially biased.
14. The judge decided that he would not discharge the jury and told them the following:
“Ladies and gentlemen, the events of yesterday afternoon were clearly distressing for you, but I am sure you will see and realise that when a judge receives a note from one of your number raising those sort of issues it is the judge's duty to bring it to the attention of the whole jury.
Whether the suggestions were well or ill-founded is not something I or any judge can decide, nor is it something that can be investigated by the judge. It would be an improper activity. I took the course I did in the exercise of my discretion and I am sorry you were offended and upset.
However, all twelve of you have this morning utterly refuted the allegation, expressed your deep offence at it and assured the Court that you intend to reach a verdict or verdicts solely according to the evidence and without racial bias. One of your number has also written at length a most cogent and balanced letter, and it is quite clear to me that each and every one of you are conscious of the oath or affirmation that you have taken and are dutifully prepared to abide by.”
15. On 8 March 1995 the jury found the applicant guilty, but acquitted G.C., who was also Asian. On 20 April 1995 the judge imposed on the applicant a sentence of five years' imprisonment.
16. The applicant was given leave to appeal against conviction. In his appeal he raised, inter alia, the following ground: The judge should have reacted to the juror's complaint by dismissing the jury; in any event, the juror who had written the complaint should not have been segregated from the other members of the jury in the early stages and the judge should not have disclosed to the jurors the contents of the complaint.
17. On 1 March 1996 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. As regards the above-mentioned ground it considered the following: The court had regard to the letter signed by all the members of the jury, and the letter of the juror who was probably responsible for the remarks that had given offence, and found that the trial judge did not err in reaching the conclusion that there was no real risk of bias. Moreover, the judge was right to confront the jury with the problem and ask them to consider it. It was perhaps unfortunate that the juror who had written the complaint was for a time segregated from the other members of the jury, as this led to his identification. However, it would be unrealistic to suppose that the jury would not have wanted to know who the author of the complaint was and the judge dealt with the possibility of tensions among the jurors perfectly sensibly in the direction he gave to them.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-72477
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: CZE
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF KLEPETÁŘ v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Prague.
5. On 25 March 1992 the applicant’s brother brought restitution proceedings before the Brno Municipal Court (městský soud) against the Brno I Housing Association (podnik bytového hospodářství).
6. Between 2 November 1992 and 4 January 1995, the court and the parties to the proceedings took a number of procedural steps, including a query by the court on 7 December 1994 regarding a possible settlement, to which the defendant replied on 4 January 1995.
7. On 6 June 1995 the applicant requested the court to be added to the proceedings as a second claimant. His request was granted at a hearing held on 8 August 1995, which was then adjourned sine die, the claimants being requested to complete, within one month, their action.
8. On 10 May 1996 the claimants were urged to supplement their action.
9. On 16 December 1996 the court granted the claimants’ request that two other defendants be added to the proceedings. At the same time, it invited the claimants to present documentary evidence.
10. On 19 February 1997 the court dismissed one of the defendants’ appeals of 16 January 1997 against the previous decision. On 19 May 1997 it requested that evidence suggested by the applicant be adduced.
11. A hearing held on 4 September 1997 was adjourned until 14 October 1997. However, on 7 October 1997 it was again adjourned sine die, the plaintiffs’ submissions and claims still being unclear.
12. A hearing held on 3 March 1998 was adjourned in order to complete the evidence. On 1 April 1998 the applicant adduced further documents in evidence. On 4 May 1998 the court invited the parties to submit their final written pleadings.
13. In a judgment of 30 June 1998 the Municipal Court dismissed the claimants’ restitution action.
14. On 1 and 6 October and 18 November 1998 respectively, the court received the claimants’ appeals. According to the applicant, his appeal was dated 27 September 1998.
15. On 8 December 1998 the Municipal Court sent the case file to the Brno Regional Court (krajský soud) which, on 26 February 1999, invited the applicant to clarify, within seven days, his challenge to the Municipal Court’s presiding judge for bias. On 10 March 1999 the applicant complied, mentioning at the same time his new domicile. On 18 March 1999, the Regional Court remitted the case file to the Municipal Court, inviting the presiding judge to submit her comments. On 5 May 1999 the judge replied that she did not feel impartial.
16. On 3 January 2000 the Regional Court informed the Brno Municipal Prosecutor (městské státní zastupitelství) that the applicant’s wording in his appeal of 27 September 1999 had to be interpreted as a criminal claim against the Municipal Court’s presiding judge, with which the court could deal. On 4 February 2000 the Municipal Prosecutor informed the court that the motion in question could not be considered as a criminal claim.
17. On 5 September 2000 the Regional Court quashed the first instance judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court, stating that the judgment lacked sufficient reasoning, which consisted in mere references to the legal opinions of the parties and to facts presented by them. It also disqualified the Municipal Court’s presiding judge from considering the applicant’s case, as she had herself filed a request to be withdrawn, whilst rejecting the applicant’s allegation of anti-Semitism.
18. On 23 October 2000 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) declared the applicant’s constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) of 28 April 2000 inadmissible, stating inter alia that, although the restitution proceedings were long, the Regional Court had acted in the meantime by rendering its decision on 5 September 2000.
19. On 23 January 2001 the applicant, having received the Regional Court’s decision on 13 December 2000 because, according to the Government, he had changed his domicile in the meantime, suggested a modification of the restitution action and the defendants. On 7 February 2001 his brother informed the court that he agreed with these modifications. On 19 April 2001 one of the defendants submitted its comments.
20. On 26 April 2001 the Municipal Court took a partial decision on the applicant’s request that the original action be modified.
21. On 25 May 2001 the applicant appealed challenging, at the same time, the presiding judge for bias. Therefore, on 27 June 2001, the case file was sent to the Regional Court.
22. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, requesting the Constitutional Court to recognise the delays in the proceedings and to quash certain statutory provisions. On 20 June 2002 the Constitutional Court rejected this appeal as being manifestly ill-founded.
23. On 16 August 2002 the Regional Court partly upheld the Municipal Court’s decision of 26 April 2001. It also decided that the presiding judge was not excluded from the examination of the restitution case. The Regional Court’s decision became effective on 23 September 2002.
24. On 18 October 2002 the Municipal Court invited the claimants to specify the defendants in their restitution case. On 19 November 2002 the applicant replied, but not his brother.
25. According to the applicant, the Municipal Court held a hearing on 3 February 2004. On 29 February 2004 the applicant, following the Municipal Court’s request of 19 February 2004, expressed his opinion on the case.
26. On 11 March 2004 the Municipal Court refused the claimants’ request that the defendant party be modified.
27. On 8 June 2004 the Municipal Court partly granted the claimants’ restitution action.
28. On 9 July 2004 the claimants appealed. It appears that the proceedings are still pending.
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1


ITEMID: 001-83462
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2007
DOCNAME: CASE OF REAVEY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 2
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 2 (lack of independence of the investigating body during the initial stages of the investigation);Not necessary to examine Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Josep Casadevall;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 6. The applicant was born in 1923 and lives in Whitecross, County Armagh. She was the mother of John Reavey, Brian Reavey and Anthony Reavey.
7. On the evening of 4 January 1976, John Reavey, Brian Reavey and Anthony Reavey, sons of the applicant, were at home watching television. Between 6.05-6.10 p.m., three gunmen entered the house and shot all three brothers. Brian was shot three times in the back and once in the legs; John was hit by 14-16 9mm bullets in the neck and body: the autopsy report concluded that death would have been rapid in both cases. Anthony was hit six times in the legs. When the gunmen had gone, Anthony made his way to a neighbour's house to give the alarm. He later died of a brain haemorrhage in hospital on 30 January 1976, the autopsy report concluding that the wounds that he had received had played no part in his death.
8. On the same night, three other Catholics, Barry O'Dowd, Declan O'Dowd and Joseph O'Dowd were shot and killed in County Down, about twenty minutes after the attack on the Reaveys (see application no. 34622/04).
9. Shortly after the events, police arrived at the scene and secured it. An ambulance removed the bodies.
10. Detectives arrived at the scene at 7.25 pm.
11. At 7.40 pm officers went to a vehicle on fire and on its being extinguished took the remains to a garage for inspection. Scene of crime officers examined the scene, recovering a number of spent cartridge cases and bullet heads and one live round, which were sent for examination.
12. Forensic examination established that four weapons had been used in the attack, three of which had been used in previous incidents. Police believed the murders were carried out by the Ulster Volunteer Force (“UVF”), a proscribed loyalist paramilitary organisation.
13. House to house inquiries were carried out in the area and along the suspected escape route, and liaison made with officers involved in other killings of Catholics in the area. Nothing of evidential value was obtained. A number of known loyalist activists were arrested and interviewed about the murders but no admissions were made. The police sent a report to the DPP on 4 March 1976. As no person had been identified as a perpetrator no-one was charged.
14. Inquests were held on 28 January 1977. Open verdicts were returned.
15. The investigation did not close and became active again in 1978, when a Catholic priest Father Hugh Murphy was abducted by loyalist paramilitaries intending to use him as a hostage vis-à-vis the IRA. The police arrested a reserve police constable, William McCaughey, who, in the course of questioning, revealed his part in the abduction of the priest and in a variety of other loyalist paramilitary incidents. McCaughey made allegations that a police officer was involved in the Reavey murders. This officer was arrested and questioned. He was charged with serious offences, resigned from the police and was subsequently convicted.
16. McCaughey's revelations gave rise to investigations in eleven specific cases, some of which were linked in terms of the identities of those involved, the modus operandi or by virtue of the ballistic examinations of weapons used. Nine suspects were arrested in total, including five police officers and all were eventually charged with offences.
17. One of those implicated was a police officer John Weir who was named as having been involved in the murder of a shopkeeper called Strathearn in Ahoghill in April 1977: he was convicted for that murder in June 1980 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Government stated that both McCaughey and Weir refused to name the two loyalist paramilitaries also involved with them in the murder unless they received immunity from prosecution. The police and prosecuting authority took the decision prior to the trial not to enter into any process of bargaining with Weir and McCaughey. While both were approached by the police after their convictions to see if at that stage they would give evidence against the loyalist paramilitaries, each again refused to do so unless there was something in it for themselves. The Government stated that during the period in which Weir was detained he was interviewed on a large number of occasions. At no time did he implicate himself or others in any offence other than the Strathearn murder.
18. Apparently around this time, the applicant stated that Chief Superintendent Gerry McCann of the Royal Ulster Constabulary ("RUC") initiated a meeting with a member of the Reavey family and told him that he believed that two McClures (one of whom was Laurence McClure, a former Reserve Constable in the RUC) and James Mitchell, also a former Reserve Constable, were involved in the attacks on the Reaveys as well as the attacks on Donnelly's Bar (19 December 1975- see Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457/04 ) and the Rock Bar (5 June 1976: see McGrath v. the United Kingdom, no. 34651/04). He also named Robert McConnell (a former part time member of the Ulster Defence Regiment, the “UDR”) as the gunman who entered the house first. He said that one of the men was going to turn Queen's evidence if convicted of the Rock Bar attack, an apparent reference to Laurence McClure.
19. On 1 February 1993 John Weir was released from prison on licence. In January 1999, he made a statement to a journalist alleging RUC and UDR collusion with loyalist paramilitaries from the Portadown area in the mid-1970s. This statement was published in the Sunday Times newspaper in March 1999. It was obtained by the Patrick Finucane Centre, a human rights non-governmental organisation in Derry (“the Centre”).
20. John Weir's statement made detailed allegations about security force collusion with loyalist paramilitaries in a series of incidents. He alleged inter alia that RUC Reserve Constable Laurence McClure had told him that the murder of the Reavey family members was carried out by Robert McConnell, a member of the UDR, Laurence McClure, Johnny Mitchell, another Reserve Constable in the RUC and McClure's brother who was not a member of the security forces. The statement also made links between this incident and other attacks allegedly carried out by members of the security forces, both RUC and UDR, and loyalist paramilitaries. This group used the farmhouse in Glennane owned by James Mitchell, a RUC reservist, as a base from which to carry out attacks on Catholics and nationalists. Other attacks allegedly included the murder of Colm McCartney and Sean Farmer at a bogus vehicle checkpoint in August 1975 (see application no. 34575/04); the attack on Donnelly's Bar in which Trevor Brecknell, Michael Donnelly and Patrick Donnelly were killed (see application no. 32457/04); the murder of Joseph, Barry and Declan O'Dowd and wounding of Barney O'Dowd (see application no. 34622/04); and the attack on the Rock Bar in which Michael McGrath was seriously injured (see application no. 34651/04). Weir also linked these attacks to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in which 33 people were killed in the Republic of Ireland.
21. On or about 10 June 1999, RTE, an Irish television channel, broadcast a television programme that contained allegations of security force involvement in a number of deaths, including that of Trevor Brecknell. Weir made allegations on that programme that members of the RUC and UDR were directly involved in the attack on Donnelly's Bar. A BBC Spotlight programme produced a similar documentary dealing with these allegations.
22. These allegations attracted considerable attention on both sides of the Irish border and became the subject of police investigation in both jurisdictions. The Government stated that the police investigation in Northern Ireland was focussed on determining whether Weir's allegations should be assessed as sufficiently credible to require a full investigation. They obtained from the journalist an edited transcript of the interview with Weir. While his whereabouts were unknown to the RUC, Weir met with senior Irish police officers at the Irish Embassy on 15 April 1999. A copy of his statement was provided by the Garda to the RUC, along with a further statement made by Weir to another journalist dated 3 February 1999. The police analysed the available materials and sought to identify the personalities to be interviewed. It became apparent that some had died and that others, living abroad, could not be traced. A series of seven interviews were conducted, under cautions, between July and December 2001, of those individuals central to Weir's account who could be traced. No charges were preferred. The interviews followed the format of Weir's allegations being put to the interviewee for his or her response. The predominant response was denial of any involvement and claims that Weir had been untruthful. No admissions were made by any interviewee. Interviews were also conducted with less central personalities and with police officers involved in interviewing Weir in 1978. The latter stated that Weir had not mentioned the matters now being alleged. Amongst those interviewed by the police in the course of the preliminary investigation of Weir's allegations, one person was questioned about the Reavey murders. He denied any involvement and made no admissions.
23. Meetings were held regularly with RUC counterparts in the Republic of Ireland. The RUC co-operated also with the judicial inquiry established in the Republic of Ireland into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings (see the description of the inquiry in the Brecknell case referred to above). Amongst matters about which the RUC team provided information to the inquiry was ballistics information which linked some of the weapons used to more than one incident. In February 2000 a substantial report was compiled by the RUC for the Garda dealing with Weir's allegations. It profiled Weir and dealt inter alia with a description of the 1978 investigation into McCaughey, Weir and others. It concluded that the investigation would continue but that his credibility was in doubt. According to the Government, despite inquiries being conducted, Weir's whereabouts could not be traced. This report was not disclosed as the investigation was continuing. An internal RUC report dated 27 February 2001 concluded that it would be necessary to interview Weir before any view could be finalised in respect of the credibility of his allegations: such interview was not possible as his whereabouts were not known. The report noted the absence of any previous mention of the allegations before 1999 and that much of what he said was hearsay and speculation. Enquiries made of the British Embassy in Nigeria (where he had a known address) and the criminal intelligence service and others failed to locate Weir. Contact was made with the Garda and the secretariat of the Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings without positive result.
24. The Serious Crime Review Team ("SCRT") was established in March 2004, with responsibilities including the review of all historical murders by way of case assessment for evidential and investigative opportunities. A preliminary case assessment was carried out by a detective chief inspector, who audited all known information and documentation.
25. In light of the preliminary assessment, the case was referred to the Historical Enquiry Team (“HET”). On 28 April 2006, a Senior Investigating Officer reported on the further review; a number of potential lines of inquiry were identified and recommendations made, including that the HET should extensively interview Weir. This recommendation was approved. The HET director of Investigations, Detective Chief Superintendent James of the London Metropolitan Police Force, took over personal supervision of the investigation which has progressed through the first three of five stages of the HET process (collection of all relevant material; assessment of the investigations to date; review of evidence, with intelligence and open and non-police sources, together with a meeting with the families of the victims of the attack). As a number of investigative opportunities were identified and to be followed up, the case was to continue to be processed by HET, which had been put in touch with Weir by the Centre. The Government submitted that if any evidence of police involvement in the murders was found, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland would then become involved. The Government have provided recent information that Weir finally agreed to meet with the HET in Dublin; he refused, however, to make a written statement or to give evidence in court.
26. There has been contact between the police and family members, their solicitors or the Centre. In particular, there were meetings on 21 January 2000 with Chief Superintendent McCann; on 19 December 2001 with Detective Inspector Aiken and in November 2002 with Detective Inspector Williamson; and in June and August 2004 with the Chief Constable; members of HET met with families or their representatives on 5 April and 3 May 2006; and there has also been extensive correspondence with the families or their representatives.
See Brecknell, cited above (§§ 39-41).
See Brecknell, cited above (§§ 42-49).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 2


ITEMID: 001-23182
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: GBR
BRANCH: ADMISSIBILITY
DATE: 2003
DOCNAME: CONSTANTINOU v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTANCE: 4
CONCLUSION: Inadmissible
JUDGES: Matti Pellonpää;Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: The applicant, Mr Charalambous Constantinou, is a United Kingdom national, who was born in 1972 and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in HM Prison Frankland. He is represented before the Court by Hadgkiss, Hughes and Beale, solicitors practising in Birmingham.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 13 February 1997, Michael Menson died as a result of severe burns sustained during an incident in a street on the night of 27-28 January 1997, when he was sprayed with a form of accelerant and the back of his clothing set alight.
As a result of their investigation, the police arrested and charged in the United Kingdom three men, the applicant, Maria Pereira and Husseyin Abdullah. A fourth man implicated in the incident, Ozzie Cevat, had gone to Cyprus. He was arrested and tried in Cyprus and convicted of manslaughter.
The trial in the United Kingdom took place in November-December 1999. The prosecution case was that Pereira and Cevat had set Menson on fire while the applicant assisted by acting, inter alia, as lookout and that Abdullah had committed subsequent acts intended to pervert the course of justice (namely, by covering up the evidence of the incident). In the case of Pereira, the prosecution relied on the evidence of witnesses who said that he confessed his involvement to them; on covert tape recordings of conversations between him and his co-accused; and on the lies which he had told the police. As regarded the applicant, the prosecution relied on his own account that he had watched Pereira and Cevat carry out the attack, making no attempt to leave and doing nothing to prevent what happened. Afterwards he had taken Menson’s personal stereo. In his case too, the prosecution relied on the covert recordings and the lies he told.
The applicant had a history of mental illness and delusions. The doctor in charge of his treatment for the previous years stated that the applicant suffered from a longstanding personality disorder which at times of stress could be prone to paranoid states of mind. Expert opinion was obtained by the defence at the beginning of the trial as to whether he was fit to stand trial. In a report dated 21 September 1999, Dr Wilkins stated:
“... [the applicant] is fit to plead and stand trial. He gave a clear and consistent account of his version of events. It coincides with the known facts and I consider him well enough at the present time to instruct his solicitors and to enter an appropriate plea. He is also able to engage in court procedure. The only issue that is less certain is his ability to give evidence on his own behalf.”
During the trial, on 30 November 1999, Dr Wilkins saw the applicant again. He took the view that the applicant had improved and was capable of giving evidence.
However, the applicant did not give evidence during the trial and counsel made no submission to the judge that he should exercise his powers under section 35(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 not to draw inferences from his silence. Dr Wilkins gave evidence for the defence to the effect that the applicant’s personality disorder would have inhibited his ability to walk away from the incident and made it unlikely that he would have taken any part in it.
In his summing-up, the judge directed the jury as to the circumstances in which they might draw an inference from the applicant’s failure to give evidence if they thought appropriate, warning inter alia:
“Each [defendant] is entitled to remain silent and to require the prosecution to prove its case, and you must not assume that he is guilty just because he has not given evidence, because failure to give evidence cannot on its own prove guilt.
If, for instance, you are not sure that the prosecution has made out any case against the defendant, his failure to give evidence will add nothing to the prosecution case ...”
On 21 December 1999, the applicant was acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter and a count of perverting the course of justice. He was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for manslaughter and an additional two years on the second count. Pereira was convicted of murder.
The applicant was refused permission to appeal by a single judge of the Court of Appeal. He renewed his application. At a hearing held on 9 April 2001 concerning the applications of himself and Pereira, the applicant’s counsel informed the court that in light of instructions received from the applicant he no longer felt able to continue to represent him. The court adjourned consideration of the applicant’s applications and directed that the prison authority should obtain a medical report on his current psychiatric condition and whether he was able to instruct lawyers.
An examination took place in November 2001 and indications were given that the applicant was capable of giving instructions. The court adjourned the matter further in February 2002 to give the applicant’s new counsel time to prepare. The applicant changed his solicitors and counsel on a number of occasions. The case finally came for hearing on 24 June 2002.
As regarded the applicant’s argument that new evidence should be admitted concerning his mental state at the time of trial showing that the trial judge should not have allowed inferences to be drawn from his failure to give evidence, Lord Justice Buxton said:
“Put shortly, the contention before us is that it was sufficiently clear that it was undesirable for [the applicant] to give evidence for the judge to have been asked to give a ruling under section 35(1)(b), in the hope that the otherwise damaging direction to the jury as to [the applicant’s] failure to give evidence would be withheld.
...
Throughout the trial there are various notes [by the solicitors] about [the applicant] complaining of various events and engaging in inappropriate discussion and making inappropriate statements, including fears about aliens and unidentified flying objects. Also he expressed concern to his solicitor’s representative about sitting in court.
On 30 November ... the applicant was seen again by Dr Wilkins ... the upshot of that encounter appears to have been that the doctor thought that the applicant had improved, and was capable of giving evidence.
There were a number of disturbing observations by [the applicant] after that but on 6th December there was a conference between Dr Wilkins and the lawyers ... when Dr Wilkins appears to have said that, in light of his most recent examination ... he effectively withdrew what he had said in the report of 21st September 1999.
... [Dr Wilkins] says this:
‘On 30th November I am much less convinced that he was unable to give evidence at all and in fact, on balance, I have concluded that he probably could, although his ability to do so credibly and persuasively was almost impossible to predict. Bearing in mind fluctuations one would have expected in the context underlying mental health problems. It is possible that he could have done so at certain times and other times he would have been less able to do so. ...’
He added that his agreement that [the applicant] was able to give evidence was ‘couched with a certain degree of equivocation’ and he emphasised the need for [the applicant] to have regular breaks during the course of the trial.
We do not know, as we have said, what decision was then taken or the basis upon which it was taken. But the position seems to us quite clear that advice had been given to those representing [the applicant] that he could, in certain circumstances, and subject to certain conditions, give evidence. It would therefore have been extremely difficult for those representing [the applicant] properly to make any submission to the judge that he should exercise his powers under section 35(1)(b).
However broadly one interprets that section, it is clear and accepted that a decision of the judge must be based upon evidential material. The evidence that would have been given to the judge, so far as one can work it out, would have been the evidence of Dr Wilkins that he has sketched out in his helpful recent report. If that evidence had been given to [the trial judge] it seems extremely difficult to see how he could have said that it met the requirements of section 35(1)(b).
It is argued before us that this should be regarded as a fresh evidence case ... and therefore the fresh evidence should be, first of all, the observations of the solicitors... and secondly the recent report of Dr Wilkins. The difficulty about that one would have expected the observations made by the solicitors to have been drawn to Dr Wilkin’s attention, and certainly drawn to the attention of leading counsel. Although one cannot speculate, it may well be precisely because of that that Dr Wilkins was asked to intervene again on 30th November. But be that as it may, it cannot be material that can be used to offset the professional view of the doctor. The professional view of the doctor was that [the applicant] could, with some caution, give evidence. In our judgment therefore this matter does not fall within section 23(2) at all. It is a case where a decision was taken by leading counsel at trial, who had effectively all the information now before the court.
Of course, as [counsel for the applicant] has argued and argued powerfully, this Court will not always exclude cogent and relevant new evidence just because it was available at the original trial and not made use of. But there are limits to that latitude. One of them is where it is apparent on all material that the advisors were perfectly seized of the factual position and made a decision, rightly or wrongly, that they could not follow a particular course. Everything that we have seen about how this case was conducted suggests that both the solicitors and counsel representing [the applicant] were giving the matter the most anxious and urgent consideration, down to, as we have said, bringing in Dr Wilkins for a further report. It is really impossible, at this stage, to suggest that the matter should be re-opened. Indeed, as we have said, even if it were to be re-opened it seems to us that it would founder on the evidence that we now have from Dr Wilkins, which is consistent with the advice that he is reported to have given on 30th November and thereafter ...
We have gone into this matter in some considerable detail because it has been carefully and strongly pressed by [counsel for the applicant]. We are well aware of the concerns that are felt about the impact of [the applicant’s] mental state upon this trial. But there is really nothing in the matter that has been put before us to suggest that it would be justified to re-open that issue, which we are satisfied was carefully considered on the basis of full information at the time of the trial, and which it should be noted played no part in the grounds of appeal that were originally put before this Court ...”
The Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s other grounds of appeal but on his appeal against sentence reduced the sentence on manslaughter from ten to seven years.
Section 35(2)-(3) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (the 1994 Act) provide as relevant:
“(1) At the trial of any person who has attained the age of fourteen years for an offence, subsections (2) and (3) below apply unless-
(a) the accused’s guilt is not in issue; or
(b) it appears to the court that the physical or mental condition of the accused makes it undesirable for him to give evidence;
but subsection (2) below does not apply if, at the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, his legal representative informs the court that the accused will give evidence or, where he is unrepresented, the court ascertains from him that he will give evidence.
(2) Where this subsection applies, the court shall, at the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, satisfy itself (in the case of proceedings on indictment, in the presence of the jury) that the accused is aware that the stage has been reached at which evidence can be given for the defence and that he can, if he wishes, give evidence and that, if he chooses not to give evidence, or having been sworn, without good cause refuses to answer any question, it will be permissible for the court or jury to draw such inferences as appear proper from his failure to give evidence or his refusal, without good cause, to answer any question.
(3) Where this subsection applies, the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences as appear proper from the failure of the accused to give evidence or his refusal, without good cause, to answer any question.”


ITEMID: 001-76064
LANGUAGEISOCODE: ENG
RESPONDENT: SVK
BRANCH: CHAMBER
DATE: 2006
DOCNAME: CASE OF BIRO v. SLOVAKIA (No. 2)
IMPORTANCE: 3
CONCLUSION: Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
JUDGES: Nicolas Bratza
TEXT: 4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Bratislava.
5. The applicant was employed with a private commercial company. The company was associated with Mr A. and his son, Mr B., who both held shares in it and were also involved in its management. The company took credits from a bank.
6. The applicant provided security for the repayment of the bank credits by pledging in favour of the bank his savings which he had in an account at the bank. In order to secure his potential claims against the company and to provide for his compensation, the applicant and the company concluded two contracts in January and February 1998, respectively.
7. Mr A. then sold his share in the company to a third individual. The company subsequently failed to meet its payment obligations towards the bank and became insolvent. The bank consequently seized the corresponding amounts from the applicant's account. The applicant has received no indemnification from the company.
8. On 22 February 1999 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the public prosecution service accusing A. and B. of having committed criminal offences of fraud, fraudulent insolvency and usury in connection with the above transaction. At the same time, he requested that his claim for damages be secured under Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
9. In a letter of 11 March 1999 the Trnava District Prosecutor informed the applicant inter alia that the possibility of securing an aggrieved party's claim for damages only existed at the stage of proceedings after a criminal charge had been raised. As by that time no charges had been raised in the present case, the applicant's claim could not be secured.
10. The applicant's criminal complaint was examined by the Trnava District Office of Investigation which dismissed it, on 25 June 1999, finding that there was no case to answer. The decision indicated in its reasoning that the applicant had been interviewed and that, in the course of the interview, he had specified the amount of the damage which he had sustained when standing as surety for the above bank credits. The applicant challenged this decision by a complaint (sťažnosť) which was determined by the District Prosecutor on 17 August 1999. The prosecutor's decision contained information about the specific amount of the damage which the applicant had allegedly sustained. The prosecutor quashed the challenged decision as being premature.
11. The applicant's criminal complaint was dismissed again on 19 September 1999 and, on his further complaints, on 9 March 2000 and 25 March 2002. All these decisions refer inter alia to the applicant's criminal complaint of 22 February 1999.
12. The applicant challenged the decision of 25 March 2002 by numerous further complaints addressed to all levels of the public prosecution service. He alleged in particular that if no charges were brought promptly, there was the risk that the prosecution would become statutebarred.
13. On 6 February 2003 the Prosecutor General transmitted the complaints that had been submitted to him to the Trnava Regional Prosecutor who, in turn, transmitted the respective complaints to the District Prosecutor. The latter was instructed to ensure the commencement of criminal proceedings in the matter because the previous examination of the factual and legal side of the case had not been adequate.
14. On 3 March 2003 the District Prosecutor issued an instruction to the investigator under Article 174 § 2 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing him to commence a criminal prosecution on the basis of a suspicion that a criminal offence of infringing creditors' rights within the meaning of Article 256 § 1 (a) and § 3 of the Criminal Code had been committed. The instruction referred to the applicant's criminal complaints and also indicated that criminal proceedings should be commenced in connection with certain other creditors.
15. On 20 March 2003 the District Office of Investigation formally commenced a criminal prosecution under Article 160 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against one or more unknown persons alleging that they had infringed the applicant's rights as a creditor.
16. On 28 April 2003 the investigator interviewed the applicant. In response to his enquiry the applicant stated expressly that he wished his claim for damages to be joined to the criminal proceedings pursuant to Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
17. Between April and November 2003 the investigator interviewed 8 witnesses. Between September 2003 and January 2004 the investigator summoned A. and B. several times for an interview. As they ignored the summons, the investigator had B. brought to the interview by the police (predvedenie) and asked that a nationwide search (pátranie) be carried out for A. who eventually came of his own accord.
18. On 3 June 2004 A. and B. were charged with the offences of infringing the right of the applicant as a creditor pursuant to the above decision of 20 March 2003. They both appealed against this decision and their appeals were dismissed by the Regional Prosecutor on 20 August 2004.
19. In September 2004 the investigator invited the Land Registry and all banks in Slovakia to disclose information concerning the real property and bank accounts of A. and B. A search in the registry of motor vehicles was subsequently carried out.
20. During the proceedings, the applicant submitted, on numerous occasions, new evidence and made other written submissions and suggestions as regards the course of the investigation. He further complained several times about the way in which the proceedings were being conducted and filed unsuccessful complaints and criminal complaints against the investigators, prosecutor and other persons involved in the case.
21. The criminal proceedings are still pending.
22. In February 2005 the applicant who was represented by a lawyer lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). He asserted a violation of his right to a hearing “without unjustified delay” under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution and his right to a hearing “within a reasonable time” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the proceedings before the District Office of Investigation in respect of his criminal complaint of 22 February 1999. He claimed 1,500,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK) by way of compensation in respect of nonpecuniary damage.
23. On 31 March 2005 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It observed that the primary aim of criminal proceedings is to detect criminal offences and to punish the perpetrators and not to determine the aggrieved parties' claims for damages. Aggrieved parties' claims for damages were of a private law nature and were predominantly claims to be asserted in civil courts. The possibility of claiming damages in criminal proceedings was a privilege which did not make the determination of such claims the central issue of the proceedings and was limited by the above main aim of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court concluded that aggrieved parties in criminal proceedings did not enjoy the right to have their claims for damages determined without unjustified delay (Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution). In making this conclusion, the Constitutional Court relied on its previous decisions in cases file nos. IV. ÚS 4/02, IV. ÚS 166/03 and IV. ÚS 92/04. It later upheld this line of reasoning in the decision in the case file no. IV. ÚS 52/04.
24. In October 2005 the applicant turned to the Constitutional Court again. He argued that the Constitutional Court's decision of 31 March 2005 was erroneous and reiterated his complaint concerning the length of the proceedings in respect of his criminal complaint of 22 February 1999.
25. On 23 November 2005 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It held that its decision of 31 March 2005 was final and subject to no appeal. The matter at hand thus had to be considered res iudicata and could not be reviewed again.
26. Article 48 § 2 provides, inter alia, that every person has the right to have his or her case tried without unjustified delay.
27. Standing as an aggrieved party (poškodený) in criminal proceedings is governed by the seventh Section (Oddiel) of the second Chapter (Hlava).
28. Article 43 §§ 1 and 2 provides, inter alia, that a person who has suffered pecuniary or nonpecuniary damage as a result of a criminal offence, may claim compensation from the accused and request the court, when convicting the accused, to order him or her to pay compensation for the damage. The aggrieved party further has the right to adduce evidence and to comment on it, to inspect the court file, to take part in the hearing and to make submissions.
29. Article 47 et seq. provide for the possibility of securing the claim of an aggrieved party for damages by impounding the charged person's property in situations when there is a well-founded suspicion that the payment of the claim would be hindered or frustrated.
30. Standing as an aggrieved party is governed by the eighth Section of the second Chapter.
31. Persons who have suffered health, property, moral, or other damage; or whose legally protected rights or freedoms have been violated or jeopardized as a result of a criminal offence are considered aggrieved parties. They have inter alia the right to claim compensation in respect of their damage; to adduce evidence and to comment on it; to inspect the court file; to take part in the hearing; to make submissions etc. (Article 46 § 1).
32. An aggrieved party, who has a lawful claim against the accused person (obvinený) for compensation in respect of a damage resulting from a criminal offence, has the right to propose that a guilty verdict should include an order for compensation. The proposal must be made at latest by the closure of the investigation and must indicate the ground and scope of the claim (Article 46 § 3).
33. Article 50 et seq. provide for the possibility of securing the claim of an aggrieved party for damages in situations when there is a well-founded suspicion that the payment of the claim would be hindered or frustrated.
34. Under Article 83 if proceedings commence in relation to a specific matter, the same matter cannot be made the subject of other judicial proceedings. If a claim for damages is duly lodged in criminal proceedings, it is considered a lis pendens from the point of view of Article 83 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Collection of Judicial Decisions and Standpoints (Zbierka súdnych rozhodnutí a stanovísk), No. 22/1979).
35. Under Article 112 if creditors make and duly pursue a claim in respect of their rights before a court or another authority, the statute of limitations is stayed from the day the claim is made. This includes the making of a civil-party claim for damages in criminal proceedings including in their pretrial stage (see, for example, Collection of Judicial Decisions and Standpoints Nos. III/1967, 131/1974 and 29/1985 and Selection of Decisions and Standpoints (Výber rozhodnutí a stanovísk) No. 27/1984).
VIOLATED_ARTICLES: 13
6
VIOLATED_PARAGRAPHS: 6-1