United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.B., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, MALVERNE POST
OFFICE, Malverne, NY, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Paul Kalker, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 20-0629
Issued: May 26, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 27, 2020 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a December 30,
2019 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish intermittent
disability for the period December 30, 2017 through April 20, 2018 due to her accepted
1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

November 4, 2005 employment injury; (2) whether OWCP has met its burden of proof to terminate
appellant’s entitlement to wage-loss compensation and medical benefits, effective May 18, 2019,
as she no longer had residuals or disability causally related to her November 4, 2005 employment
injury; and (3) whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish continuing residuals or
employment-related disability on or after May 18, 2019.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On November 4, 2005 appellant, then a 41-year-old letter carrier, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on that date she sprained the upper right side of her neck when
she removed a relay bag while in the performance of duty. She continued to work in a modifiedduty capacity and stopped work again on December 7, 2005. On April 17, 2006 OWCP accepted
appellant’s claim for neck strain. It paid her wage-loss compensation on the supplemental rolls,
effective January 10, 2006. On June 21, 2006 appellant returned to part-time, modified-duty
working four hours per day as a carrier technician and filed claims for intermittent disability.
OWCP continued to pay her intermittent wage-loss compensation on the supplemental rolls for
the remaining four hours per day. It placed appellant on the periodic rolls, effective April 12, 2009.
By decision dated September 17, 2010, OWCP terminated her entitlement to wage-loss
compensation and schedule award benefits, effective September 26, 2010, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 8106(c)(2) because she refused an offer of suitable work. In a May 21, 2014 decision, an OWCP
hearing representative reversed the September 17, 2010 termination decision and reinstated
appellant’s entitlement to wage-loss compensation benefits. Appellant subsequently filed claims
for wage-loss compensation (Form CA-7) for intermittent periods of disability.
Appellant continued to receive medical treatment. In a July 13, 2017 attending physician’s
report (Form CA-20), Dr. Conrad Cean, a Board-certified anesthesiologist, noted the November 4,
2005 employment injury and indicated that appellant suffered from cervicalgia and cervical
radiculopathy from “heavy lifting.” He checked a box marked “Yes” indicating that her condition
was caused or aggravated by the described employment activity. Dr. Cean also indicated that
appellant was partially disabled since June 2006.
In a July 13, 2017 work capacity evaluation form (Form OWCP-5c), Dr. Cean reported
that appellant could work four hours per day with restrictions of pushing, pulling, and lifting up to
25 pounds for two hours, walking for up to two hours, and reaching above the shoulder for up to
three hours.
On August 16, 2018 appellant filed a Form CA-7 claim for wage-loss compensation for
intermittent disability during the period December 30, 2017 through April 20, 2018. On the
reverse side of the claim form, a human resource management specialist for the employing
establishment confirmed that appellant was claiming 243.39 hours of wage-loss compensation for
leave without pay (LWOP). The accompanying Time Analysis Form (Form CA-7a) indicated that
she was claiming compensation for: eight hours of LWOP on March 5, 2018; six to seven hours
of LWOP on March 17, 2018; five to six hours of LWOP on March 10, 2018; four to five hours
of LWOP on December 30, 2017, January 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 20, 22, 24, 29, and 31, 2018, February 5,
7, 9, 10, 15, 16, and 17, 2018, March 5, 7, 12, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 28, and 31, 2018, and April 2 and
16, 2018; three to four hours of LWOP on January 3, 11, 17, 18, 25, 26, and 27, 2018, February 1,

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2, 3, 8, 12, 14, and 28, 2018, March 8, 9, 14, 15, 24, 26, 29, and 30, 2018, and April 4, 5, 6, 7, and
18, 2018; and two to four hours of LWOP on January 6, 2018.3
In an August 31, 2018 development letter, OWCP informed appellant that no medical
evidence was received to establish her claim for wage-loss compensation for the period
December 30, 2017 through April 20, 2018. It advised her of the type of medical evidence
necessary to establish her wage-loss compensation claim and afforded her 30 days to submit the
necessary evidence.
By decision dated November 2, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for wage-loss
compensation due to disability for the period December 30, 2017 through April 20, 2018. It found
that the medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish that she was unable to work
modified duty causally related to her November 4, 2005 employment injury.
On December 19, 2018 OWCP referred appellant, along with a statement of accepted facts
(SOAF), a copy of the case record, and a series of questions to Dr. Edward Mills, a Board-certified
orthopedic surgeon, for a second opinion evaluation regarding the status of her November 4, 2005
employment injury. The SOAF noted that on November 5, 2005 she returned to full-time, limitedduty work as a city letter carrier.
In a January 15, 2019 report, Dr. Mills reviewed the SOAF and the medical evidence of
record. He accurately described the November 4, 2005 employment injury and recounted
appellant’s complaints of neck pain. Dr. Mills indicated that she reportedly returned to work on
November 5, 2005 and stopped work on January 20, 2017 for unrelated reasons. He noted that
appellant “reportedly returned to work part time.” Upon examination of her cervical spine,
Dr. Mills observed tenderness to palpation over the right paraspinal muscles and no palpable
muscle spasms. Neurological examination revealed good strength and intact sensation. Dr. Mills
diagnosed cervical spine sprain. In response to OWCP’s questions, he reported that the accepted
condition of neck sprain had resolved and indicated that appellant could return to full duty as a
letter carrier. Dr. Mills indicated that it was “unclear” if she was currently suffering from any
other medical condition or concurrent nonwork-related disability.
On April 8, 2019 OWCP proposed to terminate appellant’s wage-loss compensation
benefits and medical benefits because she was no longer disabled or required medical treatment
due to her accepted November 4, 2005 employment injury. It found that the weight of the medical
evidence rested with the January 15, 2019 report of Dr. Mills, who found that she was no longer
totally disabled from work or had residuals due to her accepted cervical injury. OWCP afforded
appellant 30 days to submit additional evidence or argument, in writing, if she disagreed with the
proposed termination. No evidence was received within the allotted time.
By decision dated May 17, 2019, OWCP finalized the termination of appellant’s wage-loss
compensation and medical benefits, effective May 18, 2019. It found that the weight of medical
evidence rested with Dr. Mills, OWCP’s second opinion examiner, who concluded in his

3
On the Form CA-7a, the human resource management specialist indicated that appellant used four hours of LWOP
on December 30, 2017 for surgery unrelated to her employment injury.

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January 15, 2019 report that appellant had no disability or residuals causally related to her accepted
November 4, 2005 work-related injury.
On October 1, 2019 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration of the
November 2, 2018 decision. Counsel argued that appellant’s cervical condition was more serious
than a simple neck sprain and may include cervical bulging or herniated discs and loss of cervical
lordosis. He also asserted that 14 years of medical evidence fully supported her continuing workrelated disability.
On October 8, 2019 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration of the May 17,
2019 termination decision. He argued that the weight of medical evidence supported ongoing
work-related disability. In the alternative, counsel argued that OWCP erred in terminating
appellant’s wage-loss compensation benefits without referral to a referee medical examination.
Appellant submitted a June 19, 2019 narrative report by Dr. Stephen J. Roth, a Boardcertified neurologist, who indicated that he first treated her on July 11, 2018 for complaints of
lower back pain and right lower extremity sensory symptoms since January 2017. Dr. Roth noted
that initial examination of her lower extremities demonstrated significant pain limitations in the
right lower extremity. He discussed his continued medical treatment. Dr. Roth reported that in
his last June 18, 2019 evaluation appellant continued to complain of significant lower back pain
radiating into her right hip and knee. He indicated that she was unable to work as a letter carrier
because she was unable to sit or stand for prolonged periods of time or lift heavy objects. Upon
physical examination, Dr. Roth observed discomfort with palpation of the paravertebral region of
appellant’s cervical spine and significant tenderness to palpation of the bilateral lumbar
paravertebral region. He discussed her diagnostic studies and indicated that nerve conduction
studies suggested lumbosacral radiculopathy. Dr. Roth opined that appellant would require
continued treatment for her lower extremities.
By decision dated December 30, 2019, OWCP denied modification of the November 2,
2018 and May 17, 2019 decisions.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
An employee seeking benefits under FECA4 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that any disability or specific condition
for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment injury.5 The term
disability is defined as the incapacity, because of an employment injury, to earn the wages the
employee was receiving at the time of the injury.6 For each period of disability claimed, the
employee has the burden of proof to establish that he or she was disabled from work as a result of

4

Supra note 2.

5

S.W., Docket No. 18-1529 (issued April 19, 2019); B.K., Docket No. 18-0386 (issued September 14, 2018);
Amelia S. Jefferson, 57 ECAB 183 (2005); see also Nathaniel Milton, 37 ECAB 712 (1986).
6
20 C.F.R. § 10.5(f); S.T., Docket No. 18-412 (issued October 22, 2018); Cheryl L. Decavitch, 50 ECAB
397 (1999).

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the accepted employment injury.7 Whether a particular injury causes an employee to become
disabled from work, and the duration of that disability, are medical issues that must be proven by
a preponderance of the reliable, probative, and substantial medical evidence.8
The medical evidence required to establish causal relationship between a claimed period
of disability and an employment injury is rationalized medical opinion evidence. The opinion of
the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must
be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the
nature of the relationship between the claimed disability and the specific employment factors
identified by the claimant.9
The Board will not require OWCP to pay compensation for disability in the absence of
medical evidence directly addressing the specific dates of disability for which compensation is
claimed. To do so would essentially allow an employee to self-certify his or her disability and
entitlement to compensation.10
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish intermittent
disability from work for the period December 30, 2017 through April 20, 2018 due to her accepted
November 4, 2005 employment injury.
In support of her claim, appellant submitted a Form CA-20 and Form OWCP-5c by
Dr. Cean who noted the November 4, 2005 date of injury and indicated that she suffered from
cervicalgia and cervical radiculopathy from “heavy lifting.” Dr. Cean checked a box marked
“Yes” indicating that her condition was caused or aggravated by the described employment
activity. He also indicated that appellant was partially disabled since June 2006.
Although Dr. Cean noted that appellant remained partially disabled from work, he did not
provide any medical reasoning to support his opinion on disability nor did he refer to any physical
examination findings or other objective evidence to support his opinion that she remained partially
disabled during the claimed period due to the accepted November 4, 2005 employment injury. The
Board has found that findings on examination are generally needed to support a physician’s
opinion that an employee is disabled from work.11 These reports, therefore, are insufficient to
establish appellant’s disability claim.
Moreover, the employing establishment indicated on the time analysis form that appellant
had surgery on December 30, 2017 for an unrelated employment injury. The Board has held that,
7

K.C., Docket No. 17-1612 (issued October 16, 2018); William A. Archer, 55 ECAB 674 (2004).

8

S.G., Docket No. 18-1076 (issued April 11, 2019); Fereidoon Kharabi, 52 ECAB 291-92 (2001).

9

K.H., Docket No. 19-1635 (issued March 5, 2020); V.A., Docket No. 19-1123 (issued October 29, 2019).

10

K.A., Docket No. 19-1564 (issued June 3, 2020); J.B., Docket No. 19-0715 (issued September 12, 2019);
William A. Archer, supra note 7.
11

R.C., Docket No. 17-0748 (issued July 20, 2018); Dean E. Pierce, 40 ECAB 1249 (1989).

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when a claimant stops work for reasons unrelated to his or her accepted employment injury, he or
she has no disability within the meaning of FECA.12
As the evidence of record is insufficient to establish that appellant’s claimed period of
intermittent disability from December 30, 2017 through April 20, 2018 was due to her
November 4, 2005 employment injury, the Board finds that she has not met her burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
According to FECA,13 once OWCP accepts a claim and pays compensation, it bears the
burden of proof to justify termination or modification of benefits.14 It may not terminate
compensation without establishing either that the disability has ceased or that it is no longer related
to the employment.15 OWCP’s burden of proof includes the necessity of furnishing rationalized
medical opinion evidence based on a proper factual and medical background.16
The right to medical benefits for an accepted condition is not limited to the period of
entitlement for disability compensation.17 To terminate authorization for medical treatment,
OWCP must establish that the employee no longer has residuals of an employment-related
condition, which require further medical treatment.18
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
The Board finds that OWCP did not meet its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s
entitlement to wage-loss compensation and medical benefits, effective May 18, 2019, as she no
longer had residuals or disability causally related to her November 4, 2005 employment injury.
OWCP accepted that appellant sustained a neck sprain as a result of her November 4, 2005
employment injury. By decision dated May 17, 2019, it terminated her wage-loss compensation
and medical benefits based on the opinion of Dr. Mills, the second opinion examiner, who

12

V.M., Docket No. 16-0062 (issued May 18, 2016); V.B., Docket No. 12-0114 (issued June 13, 2012).

13

Supra note 2.

14

A.D., Docket No. 18-0497 (issued July 25, 2018); S.F., 59 ECAB 642 (2008); Kelly Y. Simpson, 57 ECAB 197
(2005); Paul L. Stewart, 54 ECAB 824 (2003).
15
A.G., Docket No. 18-0749 (issued November 7, 2018); see also I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Elsie L. Price, 54
ECAB 734 (2003).
16

R.R., Docket No. 19-0173 (issued May 2, 2019); T.P., 58 ECAB 524 (2007); Del K. Rykert, 40 ECAB 284 (1988).

17

L.W., Docket No. 18-1372 (issued February 27, 2019); Kathryn E. Demarsh, 56 ECAB 677 (2005).

18

R.P., Docket No. 17-1133 (issued January 18, 2018); A.P., Docket No. 08-1822 (issued August 5, 2009).

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concluded in a January 15, 2019 report that she no longer suffered residuals or disability due to
her November 4, 2005 employment injury.
In a January 15, 2019 report, Dr. Mills reviewed the SOAF and accurately described the
November 4, 2005 employment injury. He noted that appellant “reportedly returned to work part
time.” Upon examination of her cervical spine, Dr. Mills observed tenderness to palpation over
the right paraspinal muscles and no palpable muscle spasms. He diagnosed cervical spine sprain.
In response to OWCP’s questions, Dr. Mills reported that the accepted condition of neck sprain
had resolved and that appellant could return to full duty as a letter carrier.
The Board finds, however, that Dr. Mills’ opinion was conclusory in nature and did not
contain sufficient medical reasoning to establish that appellant no longer had residuals or disability
due to her November 4, 2005 employment injury.19 In assessing medical evidence, the number of
physicians supporting one position or another is not controlling, the weight of such evidence is
determined by its reliability, its probative value, and its convincing quality.20 The factors that
determine the probative medical evidence include the opportunity for and thoroughness of
examination performed by the physician, the accuracy or completeness of the physician’s
knowledge of the facts and medical history, the care of analysis manifested, and the medical
rationale expressed by the physician on the issue addressed to him by OWCP.21
The Board finds that Dr. Mills’ report lacks sufficient medical reasoning to establish that
appellant’s accepted neck sprain condition had resolved. Dr. Mills opined that her accepted neck
sprain condition had resolved and that she could return to full duty as a letter carrier. He did not
give any medical explanation as to how appellant’s physical examination findings established that
her accepted condition had resolved. Rationalized medical evidence must include rationale
explaining how the physician reached the conclusion he or she is supporting.22 Accordingly, the
Board finds that Dr. Mills did not provide an opinion with sufficient medical reasoning to establish
that appellant no longer had residuals or disability due to her accepted November 4, 2005
employment injury.23
The Board further finds that OWCP provided Dr. Mills a deficient SOAF, which
inaccurately reported that on November 5, 2005 appellant returned to full-time, limited duty as a
city letter carrier.24 The evidence of record reveals that on November 5, 2005 appellant returned
to part-time, modified-duty work for four hours per day as a carrier technician.

19

See J.W., Docket No. 19-1014 (issued October 24, 2019); S.J., Docket No. 17-0543 (issued August 1, 2017).

20

D.W., Docket No. 18-0123 (issued October 4, 2018); Nicolette R. Kelstrom, 54 ECAB 570 (2003).

21

A.G., Docket No. 19-0220 (issued August 1, 2019); James T. Johnson, 39 ECAB 1252 (1988).

22

B.B., Docket No. 19-1102 (issued November 7, 2019); Beverly A. Spencer, 55 ECAB 501 (2004).

23

A.G., Docket No. 20-1087 (issued December 31, 2020).

24
See L.G., Docket No. 20-0611 (issued February 16, 2021); see also N.W., Docket No. 16-1890 (issued
June 5, 2017).

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OWCP’s procedures dictate that, when an OWCP medical adviser, second opinion
specialist, or impartial medical examiner renders a medical opinion based on a SOAF, which is
incomplete or inaccurate, or does not use the SOAF as the framework in forming his or her opinion,
the probative value of the opinion is seriously diminished or negated altogether.25 The Board finds,
as Dr. Mills based his report on an inaccurate SOAF, the probative value of his opinion is
diminished.26
Once OWCP undertook development of the record it was required to complete
development of the record by procuring medical evidence that would resolve the relevant issue in
the case.27 As it did not request that Dr. Mills provide a supplemental opinion clarifying his
opinion and based on an accurate SOAF, the Board finds that OWCP has not met its burden of
proof in terminating appellant’s wage-loss compensation and medical benefits based on his
January 15, 2019 report.28
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish intermittent
disability from work for the period December 30, 2017 through April 20, 2018 due to her accepted
November 4, 2005 employment injury. The Board also finds that OWCP has not met its burden
of proof to terminate her entitlement to wage-loss compensation and medical benefits, effective
May 18, 2019, as she no longer had residuals or disability causally related to her November 4,
2005 employment injury.

25
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 3 -- Medical, Requirements for Medical Reports, Chapter 3.600.3
(October 1990); see S.C., Docket No. 18-1011 (issued March 23, 2020).
26

See P.C., Docket No. 20-0935 (issued February 19, 2021).

27

See J.F., Docket No. 17-1716 (issued March 1, 2018).

28

In light of the Board’s disposition in issue 1, issue 2 is rendered moot.

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the December 30, 2019 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Issued: May 26, 2021
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.K., claiming as widow of J.K., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NAVAL
SHIPYARD, Philadelphia, PA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 09-2014
Issued: May 21, 2010

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 5, 2009 appellant filed a timely appeal from a July 20, 2009 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs regarding an overpayment of compensation.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this
case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether the Office properly found an overpayment of $992.82 was
created from January 1 to May 9, 2009; (2) whether the Office properly denied waiver of the
overpayment; and (3) whether the Office properly determined that the overpayment should be
recovered by deducting $50.00 from continuing compensation payments.
FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant received compensation following the death of the employee while in the
performance of duty in 1984. As of May 10, 2008 she received net compensation of $1,690.15
every 28 days, with no deductions for health benefit insurance. In a memorandum of telephone

call dated April 29, 2009, the Office noted that appellant reported her health benefits had been
involuntarily terminated. A memorandum dated May 7, 2009 indicated that she had selected
Keystone Heath Plan East in 2000 and remained covered although no deductions were made.
Appellant asserted that her coverage had been cancelled as of January 2009. A certificate of
group health plan coverage showed coverage had begun October 1, 2001 and ended
December 31, 2008.
By letter dated May 21, 2009, the Office advised appellant’s congressional representative
that health benefit coverage had been reinstated effective January 1, 2009. The record indicates
that, as of May 10, 2009, the Office began deducting premiums for health benefits. A May 20,
2009 Office memorandum reported appellant was covered under code plan ED1.
In a letter dated June 5, 2009, the Office advised appellant of a preliminary determination
that an overpayment of $992.92 was created.1 Its worksheet (Form CA-25) showed $93.88 in
health benefit premiums should have been deducted from January 1 to 17, 2009 and $829.04 in
premiums from January 18 to May 9, 2009. The Office advised appellant that she was found not
at fault in creating the overpayment and an overpayment recovery questionnaire was enclosed.
Appellant was advised to complete the form and submit supporting financial documentation
within 30 days for the Office to consider the waiver issue. She did not respond.
By decision dated July 20, 2009, the Office found an overpayment of $992.82 was
created from January 1 to May 9, 2009. It denied waiver of the overpayment. With respect to
repayment, the Office indicated $50.00 would be deducted from appellant’s continuing
compensation payments. A memorandum dated July 20, 2009 noted that $50.00 was less than
five percent of appellant’s continuing compensation payments.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
The regulations of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which administers the
Federal Employee Health Benefits (FEHB) Program, provides guidelines for the registration,
enrollment and continuation of enrollment for federal employees. In this connection, 5 C.F.R.
§ 890.502(b)(1) provides: “An employee or annuitant is responsible for payment of the
employee’s share of the cost of enrollment for every pay period during which the enrollment
continues. In each pay period for which health benefits withholdings or direct premium
payments are not made but during which the enrollment of an employee or annuitant continues,
he or she incurs an indebtedness due to the United States in the amount of the proper employee
withholding required for that pay period.”
In addition, 5 C.F.R. § 890.502(d) provides: “An agency that withholds less than or none
of the proper health benefits contributions from an individual’s pay, annuity or compensation
must submit an amount equal to the sum of the uncollected deductions and any applicable
agency contributions required under section 8906 of the title, 5 United States Code, to OPM for

1

The final overpayment decision determined the overpayment was $992.82, without further explanation.

2

deposit in the Employees Health Benefits Fund.” When the Office deducts less than the proper
health benefit premium for the coverage selected, an overpayment of compensation is created.2
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The period of the overpayment in this case was from January 1 to May 9, 2009.
Appellant was eligible for coverage under the FEHB as survivor of her federal employee spouse.
The record establishes that she selected health benefits from Keystone Health Plan East, under
FEHB plan code ED1 for single individuals. Appellant had coverage under this plan since at
In 2009, her coverage temporarily ceased but was reinstated effective
least 2001.3
January 1, 2009.
As noted, it is appellant’s responsibility for payment of premiums for health benefits.
The Office did not make deductions for the health benefit insurance from January 1 to
May 9, 2009. Accordingly, an overpayment of compensation was created. As to the amount, the
Office calculations indicated that $992.92 should have been deduced for plan code ED1 during
this period. The Board notes that the final decision stated that amount was $992.82, which may
have been an inadvertent error. Since this was a minor adjustment in appellant’s favor, the
Board will accept the stated amount of $992.82.
On appeal, appellant states that she had no coverage for months in 2009 and was being
asked to pay “for something I never had.” However, her coverage was reinstated retroactive to
January 1, 2009. Since appellant was covered under the health plan from January 1 to May 9,
2009 the Office must properly deduct the appropriate premiums for any period of enrollment.4
The evidence clearly establishes an overpayment based on the failure to deduct premiums for
health benefit insurance.5
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
The waiver or refusal to waive an overpayment of compensation by the Office is a matter
that rests within the Office’s discretion pursuant to statutory guidelines.6 These statutory
guidelines are found in section 8129(b) of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act which
states: “Adjustment or recovery [of an overpayment] by the United States may not be made
when incorrect payment has been made to an individual who is without fault and when
adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of [the Act] or would be against equity and
2

See John Skarbek, 53 ECAB 630 (2002).

3

The certificate of coverage reported an initial date of October 1, 2001, but a memorandum of telephone call
dated May 20, 2009 indicated the 2001 date represented only the implementation of a new system and appellant had
been covered prior to this date.
4

See John Skarbek, supra note 2; Leticia C. Taylor, 47 ECAB 198 (1995); Marie D. Sinnett, 40 ECAB
1009 (1989).
5

The Board also notes that the declared overpayment represents only a limited period in 2009, even though the
record indicated premiums had not been deducted for prior periods.
6

Robert Atchison, 41 ECAB 83 (1989).

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good conscience.”7 Since the Office found appellant to be without fault in the creation of the
overpayment, then, in accordance with section 8129(b), the Office may only recover the
overpayment if it determined that recovery of the overpayment would neither defeat the purpose
of the Act nor be against equity and good conscience.
Section 10.436 of the implementing regulations8 provide that recovery of an overpayment
will defeat the purpose of the Act if recovery would cause hardship to a currently or formerly
entitled beneficiary because: (a) the beneficiary from whom the Office seeks recovery needs
substantially all of his or her current income (including compensation benefits) to meet current
ordinary and necessary living expenses; and (b) the beneficiary’s assets do not exceed a specified
amount as determined by the Office from data furnished by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.9 An
individual is deemed to need substantially all of his or her income to meet current ordinary and
necessary living expenses if monthly income does not exceed monthly expenses by more than
$50.00.10
Section 10.437 provides that recovery of an overpayment is considered to be against
equity and good conscience when an individual who received an overpayment would experience
severe financial hardship in attempting to repay the debt; and when an individual, in reliance on
such payments or on notice that such payments would be made, gives up a valuable right or
changes his or her position for the worse.11
With respect to the submission of evidence regarding waiver, Office regulations provide:
“(a) The individual who received the overpayment is responsible for providing
information about income, expenses and assets as specified by [the Office]. This
information is needed to determine whether or not recovery of the overpayment
would defeat the purpose of the [Act] or be against equity and good conscience.
This information will also be used to determine the repayment schedule, if
necessary.
“(b) Failure to submit the requested information within 30 days of the request
shall result in denial of waiver and no further request for waiver shall be
considered until the requested information is furnished.”12

7

See 5 U.S.C. § 8129(b); Carroll R. Davis, 46 ECAB 361 (1994).

8

20 C.F.R. § 10.436 (1999).

9

An individual’s assets must exceed a resource base of $4,800.00 for an individual or $8,000.00 for an individual
with a spouse or one dependent plus $960.00 for each additional dependent. This base includes all of the
individual’s assets not exempt from recoupment; see Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 6 -- Debt
Management, Initial Overpayment Actions, Chapter 6.200.6 (October 2004).
10

Sherry A. Hunt, 49 ECAB 467 (1998).

11

20 C.F.R. § 10.437 (1999).

12

Id. at § 10.438.

4

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
On the issue of waiver of the overpayment, the Office’s June 5, 2009 preliminary
determination provided appellant with an overpayment recovery questionnaire and requested that
she submit relevant financial information within 30 days. The financial information is necessary
for the Office to make a proper determination as to whether recovery of the overpayment would
defeat the purpose of the Act or be against equity and good conscience. Appellant did not submit
the OWCP-20 or any relevant financial information.
Under the regulations noted above, failure to submit the requested information “shall
result in denial of waiver” and no further request shall be considered until the information is
provided. The Board accordingly finds that the Office properly denied waiver in this case.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 3
Section 10.441 of the Office’s regulations provide:
“When an overpayment has been made to an individual who is entitled to further
payments, the individual shall refund to [the Office] the amount of the
overpayment as soon as the error is discovered or his or her attention is called to
same. If no refund is made, [the Office] shall decrease later payments of
compensation, taking into account the probable extent of future payments, the rate
of compensation, the financial circumstances of the individual and any other
relevant factors, so as to minimize any hardship.”13
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 3
In this case, the Office determined that the overpayment could be recovered by deducting
$50.00 every 28 days from appellant’s continuing compensation payments. As noted it must
consider such factors as the extent of future payments, compensation rate and the financial
circumstances of the individual to “minimize any hardship.” Appellant did not submit any
evidence regarding her financial circumstances and the Office can only consider the evidence of
record. The Office noted in its July 20, 2009 memorandum that its procedures provide that when
a claimant is being paid compensation and does not respond to the preliminary overpayment
determination, a final decision must be issued and the overpayment recovered in a timely
manner.14 In addition, the memorandum noted that $50.00 represented a small percentage of
appellant’s continuing compensation payments.
Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that the Office properly considered the
relevant factors in attempting to minimize hardship to appellant. The Office’s determination that
the overpayment should be recovered by deducting $50.00 from continuing compensation is in
accord with the Office regulations regarding recovery of an overpayment.

13

Id. at § 10.441(a).

14

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual supra note 9 at Chapter 6.200.4(c)(2) (May 2004).

5

On appeal, appellant asks that her age, limited income and rising expenses be taken into
consideration. As noted it is her responsibility to submit relevant financial information so that
the Office can make an appropriate decision. The Office properly denied waiver because
appellant did not submit any evidence regarding her income and expenses on which to properly
assess the waiver issue. The repayment by deducting $50.00 from continuing compensation
properly minimizes any hardship based on the evidence available.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds an overpayment of $992.82 was created due to a lack of health benefit
insurance deductions. The Office properly denied waiver of the overpayment and properly
determined it would be recovered by deducting $50.00 from continuing compensation payments.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated July 20, 2009 is affirmed.
Issued: May 21, 2010
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
V.C., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Tampa, FL, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Lenin V. Perez, for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 14-1912
Issued: September 22, 2015

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 3, 2014 appellant, through his representative, filed a timely appeal from an
August 11, 2014 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly terminated appellant’s compensation benefits
effective December 7, 2012 on the grounds that his accepted cervical condition had ceased
without residuals.
On appeal, appellant’s representative contends that the second opinion evaluation lacked
probative value.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
In December 2011, OWCP accepted that appellant, then a 46-year-old mail processing
clerk, sustained a subluxation at C6-7 due to factors of his federal employment, including
repetitive loading and sweeping on an automation machine. Appellant received appropriate
medical and wage-loss compensation benefits.
OWCP referred appellant to Dr. William Dinenberg, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, for a second opinion evaluation on July 27, 2012 to determine the nature and extent of
his employment-related condition. In an August 6, 2012 report, Dr. Dinenberg reviewed a
statement of accepted facts, history of the injury, and the medical evidence of record and
conducted a physical examination. He noted that appellant had a history of cervical strain,
cervical disc syndrome, cervical spondylosis, radiculopathy of the right upper and lower
extremity, lumbar strain, lumbar disc syndrome, and lumbar herniated disc at L4-5 and L5-S1.
Upon examination of the cervical spine, Dr. Dinenberg found decreased range of motion. There
was 20 degrees of flexion, 30 degrees of rotation to the left and right, and 10 degrees of
extension. Dr. Dinenberg found no radiation of pain with extension or rotation either to left or
right on the side cervical spine. Appellant had decreased sensation to light touch involving the
dorsal and plantar surfaces of the right upper extremity in a glove distribution bilaterally.
Dr. Dinenberg indicated that magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan studies dated November 1,
2011 revealed a two-millimeter posterior subluxation of C6-7. He opined that the subluxation at
C6-7 was not appellant’s employment-related condition. Dr. Dinenberg opined that appellant
“sustained a cervical and lumbar sprain/strain as a result of the work injury in October 2011.”
He indicated that the cervical subluxation at C6-7 was degenerative and anticipated that it would
be a chronic, long-lasting condition that would most likely progress over time. Dr. Dinenberg
opined that appellant’s subluxation at C6-7 was “not work related” and indicated that he was
“unable to cite specific residuals based on the cervical subluxation, as [he did] not feel that this
[was appellant’s] work-related diagnosis.”
An electromyography and nerve conduction studies (EMG/NCS) of the upper and lower
extremities dated August 15, 2012 were abnormal with findings mostly consistent with bilateral
S1 radiculopathies.
In a September 13, 2012 addendum report, Dr. Dinenberg reviewed the August 15, 2012
EMG/NCS and found that they revealed abnormalities with bilateral S1 radiculopathies on the
lower extremity. No upper extremity abnormalities were noted. Dr. Dinenberg reiterated his
opinion that appellant’s cervical and lumbar strains were causally related to his federal
employment. He indicated that these conditions were typically resolved within a 6- to 12-week
period and, therefore, appellant’s medical restrictions were secondary to his preexisting
conditions and not to his employment-related cervical or lumbar strains. Dr. Dinenberg opined
that appellant had reached maximum medical improvement from his employment injury.
By letter dated October 17, 2012, OWCP notified appellant that it proposed to terminate
his compensation benefits based on the weight of the medical evidence, as represented by
Dr. Dinenberg. It afforded him 30 days to submit additional evidence or argument in
disagreement with the proposed action.

2

By decision dated December 7, 2012, OWCP terminated appellant’s compensation
benefits effective that day. It found the weight of the evidence was represented by
Dr. Dinenberg.
On December 27, 2012 appellant, through his representative, requested a telephonic oral
hearing before an OWCP hearing representative, which was held on April 17, 2013.
By decision dated July 2, 2013, OWCP hearing representative affirmed the December 7,
2012 termination decision, finding that Dr. Dinenberg represented the weight of the medical
evidence.
In a letter received by OWCP on August 13, 2013 appellant, through his representative,
requested reconsideration. He submitted a position description, a description of the automation
machine, and illustrations of his duties. Appellant also submitted an April 11, 2014 physical
capacity evaluation and reports dated August 8, 2013 through February 27, 2014 from
Dr. Orlando Ruano, a Board-certified psychiatrist, diagnosing major depressive disorder.
In reports dated August 26 through October 22, 2013, Dr. Claude Barosy, a family
practitioner, diagnosed chronic cervical strain, cervical disc syndrome, cervical spondylosis most
pronounced at C5-6 and C6-7, right and left upper extremity radiculopathy, chronic lumbosacral
strain, lumbar disc syndrome, herniated lumbar disc at L4-5 and L5-S1, bilateral lower extremity
radiculopathy, “subluxation of C6 on C7 of two millimeters and subluxation of C5 on C6 with
one millimeter of anterior subluxation, [and] posterior subluxation of L5 on S1 of three
millimeters.”
Appellant submitted reports dated March 12, 2013 through April 10, 2014 from his
attending physician Dr. Samy Bishai, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed chronic cervical
strain, cervical disc syndrome, cervical spondylosis most pronounced at C5-6 and C6-7, right and
left upper extremity radiculopathy, chronic lumbosacral strain, lumbar disc syndrome, herniated
lumbar disc at L4-5 and L5-S1, bilateral lower extremity radiculopathy, “subluxation of C6 on
C7 of two millimeters and subluxation of C5 on C6 with one millimeter of anterior subluxation,
[and] posterior subluxation of L5 on S1 of three millimeters.” Dr. Bishai indicated that appellant
continued to complain of pain in his neck with radiation down the arms, pain in his lower back
with radiation down the legs, and pain in the upper back between the shoulder blades.
By decision dated August 11, 2014, OWCP denied modification of its July 2, 2013
decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Once OWCP accepts a claim and pays compensation, it has the burden of justifying
After it has determined that an
modification or termination of an employee’s benefits.2
employee has disability causally related to his or her federal employment, OWCP may not
terminate compensation without establishing that the disability has ceased or that it is no longer

2

See S.F., 59 ECAB 642 (2008); Kelly Y. Simpson, 57 ECAB 197 (2005); Paul L. Stewart, 54 ECAB 824 (2003).

3

related to the employment.3 OWCP’s burden of proof includes the necessity of furnishing
rationalized medical opinion evidence based on a proper factual and medical background.4 The
right to medical benefits for an accepted condition is not limited to the period of entitlement for
disability.5 To terminate authorization for medical treatment, OWCP must establish that
appellant no longer has residuals of an employment-related condition, which would require
further medical treatment.6
Section 8123(a) of FECA provides in pertinent part: if there is disagreement between the
physician making the examination for the United States and the physician of the employee, the
Secretary shall appoint a third physician who shall make an examination.7 Where a case is
referred to an impartial medical specialist for the purpose of resolving a conflict, the opinion of
such specialist, if sufficiently well rationalized and based on a proper factual and medical
background must be given special weight.8
ANALYSIS
In December 2011, OWCP accepted appellant’s claim for subluxation at C6-7. It
subsequently terminated his compensation benefits effective December 7, 2012 based on reports
from Dr. Dinenberg, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon serving as a second opinion examiner.
On appeal, appellant’s representative contends that the second opinion evaluation lacked
probative value.
On July 10, 2012 OWCP referred a statement of accepted facts, comprised of a history of
appellant’s claim and a series of questions to Dr. Dinenberg for second opinion evaluation. The
statement indicated that appellant sustained an injury to the back, neck, and shoulders as a result
of his postal duties. It further stated that OWCP accepted the claim for subluxation at C6-7 and
that appellant had stopped work on October 1, 2011. With regard to the inquiries, it specifically
asked whether the work-related condition of subluxation at C6-7 had resolved, what are the
current objective findings, what conditions are related to appellant’s postal duties, whether he
has any continuing restrictions, and if so are they temporary or permanent.
In his August 6, 2012 report, Dr. Dinenberg indicated that MRI scan studies dated
November 1, 2011 revealed a two-millimeter posterior subluxation of C6-7. He determined that
the subluxation at C6-7 was not appellant’s employment-related condition and opined that
appellant “sustained a cervical and lumbar sprain/strain as a result of the work injury in
October 2011.” Dr. Dinenberg concluded that appellant’s subluxation at C6-7 was “not work
3

See I.J., 59 ECAB 524 (2008); Elsie L. Price, 54 ECAB 734 (2003).

4

See J.M., 58 ECAB 478 (2007); Del K. Rykert, 40 ECAB 284 (1988).

5

See T.P., 58 ECAB 524 (2007); Kathryn E. Demarsh, 56 ECAB 677 (2005).

6

See James F. Weikel, 54 ECAB 660 (2003).

7

5 U.S.C. § 8123(a). See R.C., 58 ECAB 238 (2006); Darlene R. Kennedy, 57 ECAB 414 (2006).

8

See V.G., 59 ECAB 635 (2008); Sharyn D. Bannick, 54 ECAB 537 (2003); Gary R. Sieber, 46 ECAB
215 (1994).

4

related,” indicating that he was “unable to cite specific residuals based on the cervical
subluxation, as [he did] not feel that this [was appellant’s] work-related diagnosis.” In a
September 13, 2012 addendum report, Dr. Dinenberg reiterated his opinion that appellant’s
cervical and lumbar strains were causally related to his federal employment that should have
resolved with a 6- to 12-week period.
In his initial report of August 6, 2012, Dr. Dinenberg did not rely on the statement of
accepted facts in formulating his opinion. He specifically concluded that appellant’s accepted
employment injury of October 10, 2011 was not the cause of his subluxation at C6-7 and
attributed the subluxation at that level to a preexisting degenerative condition.
The Board finds the reports of Dr. Dinenberg to be of diminished probative value. It is
well established that a physician’s opinion must be based on a complete and accurate factual and
medical background. When OWCP has accepted an employment condition as occurring in the
performance of duty, the physician must base his opinion on the accepted facts.
In Paul King9 the Board found that the report of an impartial medical examiner who
disregarded a critical element of the statement of accepted facts was of diminished probative
value. In King, the impartial medical examiner also disagreed with the medical basis for
acceptance of a condition. The Board found that this defective report was not sufficient to
resolve the existing conflict of medical opinion evidence.
Dr. Dinenberg likewise disregarded the statement of accepted facts and, as in King, did
not rely on the statement of accepted facts for the determination of the initial injury of a
subluxation at C6-7. The Board finds that his report is of diminished probative value as his
opinion disregarded critical elements of the statement of accepted facts and is therefore flawed.
The Board notes that it is the function of a medical expert to give an opinion only on medical
questions, not to find facts.10 Dr. Dinenberg disregarded the statement of accepted facts and as
such his report is not based on an accurate history of injury and is therefore not sufficient to
resolve the issue relative to OWCP’s burden of proof to terminate appellant’s wage-loss
compensation and medical benefits.11
For these reasons, the Board finds that Dr. Dinenberg’s reports are of limited probative
value on the relevant issue of this case and OWCP improperly relied upon his opinion to
terminate appellant’s compensation benefits.

9

54 ECAB 356 (2003).

10

Id.

11

Id., see also C.C., Docket No. 13-446 (issued May 15, 2013) (finding that the impartial medical examiner
disagreed with an accepted condition and that his report was therefore of diminished probative value resulting in an
unresolved conflict of medical opinion evidence and failure of OWCP to meet its burden of proof to terminate
compensation benefits).

5

CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP improperly terminated appellant’s compensation benefits
effective December 7, 2012 on the grounds that his accepted cervical condition had ceased
without residuals.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 11, 2014 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is reversed.
Issued: September 22, 2015
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.R., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Decatur, IL, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 18-1408
Issued: March 1, 2019

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On July 12, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a June 6, 2018 merit decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to
consider the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish a right hand and
wrist injury and right-sided rib contusion causally related to the accepted April 26, 2018
employment incident.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On April 27, 2018 appellant, then a 60-year-old rural carrier associate, filed a traumatic
injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that, when stepping from his delivery vehicle on April 26, 2018
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

while in the performance of duty, he lost his footing and fell onto concrete, causing a right wrist
fracture and right-sided rib contusion. He stopped work on April 27, 2018.
In support of his claim, appellant submitted two form reports dated April 27, 2018 from
Antoniannette Pate, a nurse practitioner, who diagnosed a possible right wrist fracture and rightsided rib contusion. Ms. Pate noted work restrictions.
In a referral form dated April 27, 2018, Ms. Pate and Dr. Keith Fabrique, an attending
family practitioner, referred appellant to an orthopedic surgeon to evaluate right hand and wrist
pain for a possible fracture.
By development letter dated May 2, 2018, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence
submitted was insufficient to establish the claim. It advised him of the type of medical and factual
evidence needed, including a detailed description of the April 26, 2018 employment incident, and
a narrative report from his physician explaining how and why that event would cause the claimed
right hand and wrist condition. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to submit the necessary
evidence.
In response, appellant submitted a chart note dated April 27, 2018 from Ms. Pate. He also
submitted a duty status report (Form CA-17) dated May 2, 2018 that does not bear a legible
signature.
By decision dated June 6, 2018, OWCP accepted that the April 26, 2018 incident occurred
as alleged. It denied the claim, however, finding that causal relationship had not been established.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time
limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any
disability or specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the
employment injury.3 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim
regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.4
In order to determine whether an employee sustained a traumatic injury in the performance
of duty, OWCP begins with an analysis of whether fact of injury has been established. Generally,
fact of injury consists of two components, which must be considered in conjunction with one
another. The first component to be established is that the employee actually experienced the

2

Supra note 1.

3

Alvin V. Gadd, 57 ECAB 172 (2005); Anthony P. Silva, 55 ECAB 179 (2003).

4

See Elizabeth H. Kramm (Leonard O. Kramm), 57 ECAB 117 (2005); Ellen L. Noble, 55 ECAB 530 (2004).

2

employment incident which is alleged to have occurred.5 The second component is whether the
employment incident caused a personal injury and generally can be established only by medical
evidence.6
Causal relationship is a medical issue, and the medical evidence required to establish causal
relationship is rationalized medical evidence.7 The opinion of the physician must be based on a
complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must be one of reasonable medical
certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship
between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by the employee.8
Neither the mere fact that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period of employment,
nor the belief that the disease or condition was caused or aggravated by employment factors or
incidents is sufficient to establish causal relationship.9
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a right hand and
wrist injury and right-sided rib contusion causally related to the accepted April 26, 2018
employment incident.
Dr. Fabrique diagnosed right hand and wrist pain in a report dated April 27, 2018.
However, pain is a description of a symptom rather than a clear diagnosis of a medical condition.10
Dr. Fabrique also diagnosed a possible wrist fracture. However, medical opinions that are
speculative or equivocal are of diminished probative value.11 Therefore, the April 27, 2018 report
of Dr. Fabrique is of limited probative value and insufficient to establish a firm medical
diagnosis.12
Appellant also submitted reports from Ms. Pate, a nurse practitioner. The Board has held
that medical reports signed solely by a nurse practitioner are of no probative value as nurse

5

R.E., Docket No. 17-0547 (issued November 13, 2018); David Apgar, 57 ECAB 137 (2005); Delphyne L. Glover,
51 ECAB 146 (1999).
6

R.E., id.

7

G.N., Docket No. 18-0403 (issued September 13, 2018); Jacqueline M. Nixon-Steward, 52 ECAB 140 (2000).

8

K.V., Docket No. 18-0723 (issued November 9, 2018); Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000); Gary L. Fowler,
45 ECAB 365 (1994).
9

Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215 (1997).

10

D.A., Docket No. 18-0783 (issued November 8, 2018); C.B., Docket No. 09-2027 (issued May 12, 2010); Robert
Broome, 55 ECAB 339 (2004) (the Board has consistently held that pain is a symptom, not a compensable medical
diagnosis).
11

T.O., Docket No. 18-0139 (issued May 24, 2018); Lourdes Harris, 45 ECAB 545, 547 (1994).

12

Id.

3

practitioners are not considered physicians as defined under FECA and therefore are not competent
to provide a medical opinion.13
Appellant also provided a duty status report (Form CA-17) dated May 2, 2018 that does
not bear a legible signature. Reports bearing no signature or an illegible signature cannot be
identified as having been prepared by a physician and therefore, they do not constitute competent
medical opinion evidence.14
As appellant has not submitted rationalized medical evidence to establish an injury causally
related to the accepted employment incident, he has not met his burden of proof.
On appeal, appellant contends that OWCP should reimburse his medical expenses as the
employing establishment sent him to a “company doctor” who referred him to a specialist. As
explained above, he is not entitled to wage-loss compensation or medical benefits as the medical
evidence of record is insufficient to establish his claim. Also, the record does not contain an
authorization for medical treatment (Form CA-16), which would create a contractual obligation to
pay for the cost of examination or treatment.15
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a right hand and
wrist injury and right-sided rib contusion causally related to the accepted April 26, 2018
employment incident.

13

See David P. Sawchuk, 57 ECAB 316, 320 n.11 (2006) (lay individuals such as physician assistants, nurses and
physical therapists are not competent to render a medical opinion under FECA); 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2) (this subsection
defines a physician as surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, and
osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by state law). S.J., Docket No. 17-0783, n.2
(issued April 9, 2018) (nurse practitioners are not considered physicians under FECA).
14

A medical report may not be considered as probative medical evidence if there is no indication that the person
completing the report qualifies as a physician as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); L.F., Docket No. 18-0327 (issued
August 17, 2018); Merton J. Sills, 39 ECAB 572 (1988).
15

A properly completed CA-16 form authorization may constitute a contract for payment of medical expenses to a
medical facility or physician, when properly executed. The form creates a contractual obligation, which does not
involve the employee directly, to pay for the cost of the examination or treatment regardless of the action taken on the
claim. The period for which treatment is authorized by a Form CA-16 is limited to 60 days from the date of issuance,
unless terminated earlier by OWCP. See 20 C.F.R. § 10.300(c); P.R., Docket No. 18-0737 (issued November 2, 2018);
N.M., Docket No. 17-1655 (issued January 24, 2018), Tracy P. Spillane, 54 ECAB 608 (2003).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 6, 2018 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: March 1, 2019
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.B., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
Nashville, TN, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 13-552
Issued: November 21, 2013

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 9, 2013 appellantfiled a timely appeal from an October 31, 2012 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) denying her emotional
condition claim. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.2
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant sustained an emotional condition in the performance of
duty.

1
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

Appellant filed a timely request for oral argument which the Board, in exercising its discretion, denied by order
on August 16, 2013. Order Denying Request for Oral Argument, Docket No. 13-552 (issued August 16, 2013).

FACTUAL HISTORY
On December 29, 2011 appellant, then a 52-year-old supply distribution clerk, filed an
occupational disease claim alleging that she sustained anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress
disorder, insomnia and flashbacks due to factors of her federal employment. She attributed her
condition to racial discrimination by the employing establishment and retaliation after she filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On the reverse of the
claim form, the employing establishment indicated that appellant had been removed from
employment.
By letters dated January 9, 2012, OWCP requested additional factual information from
appellant and the employing establishment. It also requested supporting medical information
from her.
In a decision dated March 19, 2012, OWCP denied appellant’s claim after determining
that she had not established the factual basis for her claim. It found that she had not submitted a
factual statement identifying the allegations that she believed caused her emotional condition.
In an undated statement received on March 23, 2012, appellant related that starting in
September 2001 she and her coworkers were part of an unspecified experiment. She asserted
that the employees could not physically keep up with the workload, which included ordering,
picking up, delivering and scanning supplies. Appellantmaintained that around 2005,after
another facility transferred surgical instruments to her location,the workload became “completely
out of control.”She believed that she was entitled to a promotion based on her level of expertise
as a surgical technician. Appellantinformed the employing establishment that it should create an
oversight position to ensure that instruments were properly sterilized. The employing
establishment hired a Caucasian nurse in the position that appellant described as needed. It
removed appellant when she was off sick after indicating that it had not received paperwork from
her physician. Appellant filed an EEOC complaint in 2005. She alleged that she was called
racial slurs, including being referred to as black before her first name. Appellant submitted
records regarding her EEOC discrimination complaint.
On April 14, 2012 appellant requested a telephone hearing before an OWCP hearing
representative. At the telephonic hearing, held on July 16, 2012, she made a series of claims that
in 2001 the employing establishment selected her location to conduct an experiment that had
some workers doing inventory and purchasing and others sterilization. Appellant had extra
training in sterilization and others came to her because of her knowledge. She had a much
heavier workload than the white employees in another location and it became “humanly
impossible to do.” Appellant formally complained in 2005 that the patients were not being
adequately cared for and believed that a person should oversee the sterilization of instruments.
In March 2006, she requested a promotion because of her experience and training. A desk audit
indicated that appellant was in the proper position. The employing establishment created a
position to oversee sterilizations but hired a Caucasian nurse instead of appellant. It removed
appellant from her position in sterilization as retaliation. In the new position appellant had a
heavy workload that caused physical complaints. A supervisor asked a black coworker how her
“mammie” was doing. A supervisor calledher “black Lisa” whenever he saw her. After the war
began it was not possible to get all the work done because the state abolished its program and

2

sent veterans to the employing establishment. Appellant described her work duties. She worried
that there were contaminated eye drops on the shelf. After appellant began working in the clinics
the employing establishment locked the door to her office.
On July 25, 2012 the hearing representative provided a copy of the transcript to the
employing establishment and allowed it 20 days to provide comments.
By decision dated October 31, 2012, an OWCP hearing representative affirmed the
March 19, 2012 decision as modified to show that appellant failed to establish an injury in the
performance of duty. He found that she had not established any compensable employment
factors.
On appeal, appellant asserted that the employing establishment retaliated against her until
she was unable to continue in the employment.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is
somehow related to an employee’s employment. There are situations where an injury or an
illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the
concept or coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s
emotional reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed
by the employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.3 On the other hand, the
disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reductionin-force or his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or
to hold a particular position.4
OWCP’s procedures provide:
“An employee who claims to have had an emotional reaction to conditions of
employment must identify those conditions. The [claims examiner] must
carefully develop and analyze the identified employment incidents to determine
whether or not they in fact occurred and if they occurred whether they constitute
factors of the employment. When an incident or incidents are the alleged cause of
disability, the [claims examiner] must obtain from the claimant, agency personnel
and others, such as witnesses to the incident, a statement relating in detail exactly
what was [stated] and done. If any of the statements are vague or lacking detail,
the responsible person should be requested to submit a supplemental statement
clarifying the meaning or correcting the omission.”5

3

Supra note 1;Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

4

Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).

5

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Performance of Duty, Chapter 2.804.17(j) (July 1997); see
also A.K., Docket No. 13-79 (issued April 15, 2013).

3

OWCP’s regulations provide that an employer who has reason to disagree with an aspect
of the claimant’s allegation should submit a statement that specifically describes the factual
argument with which it disagrees and provide evidence or argument to support that position.6
ANALYSIS
Appellant attributed her emotional condition to discrimination and administrative actions
and retaliation by the employing establishment. She submitted a detailed statement received on
March 23, 2013 describing the events to which she attributed her condition. Appellant
maintained that she could not keep up with the workload, that she should have received a
promotion, that she was subject to racial slurs and that she was removed while off on sick leave.
Even though many of the incidents she described relate to administrative actions by the
employer, she contended that the actions resulted from discrimination and were, therefore,
compensable. OWCP did not obtain a statement from the employing establishment addressing
appellant’s allegations. Its procedures require that, in development of an emotional condition
claim, it must obtain statements from witnesses, coworkers and supervisors, among others,
before it makes a determination of whether the incidents alleged by a claimant occurred and
whether such incidents or factors constitute compensable factors of employment.7 OWCP’s
procedures further provide, in certain types of claims, such as a stress claim, a statement from the
employer is imperative to properly develop and adjudicate the claim.8
Although it is a claimant’s burden to establish his or her claim, OWCP is not a
disinterested arbiter but, rather, shares responsibility in the development of the evidence,
particularly when such evidence is of the character normally obtained from the employing
establishment or other government source. It shares responsibility to see that justice is done.9
OWCP’s regulations provide that an employer who has reason to disagree with an aspect of the
claimant’s allegation should submit a statement that specifically describes the factual argument
with which it disagrees and provide evidence or argument to support that position.10 If the
employer does not submit a written explanation to support its disagreement, OWCP may accept
the claimant’s report of injury as established.11
The case will, consequently, be remanded to OWCP to further develop the factual
evidence and, thereafter, to make appropriate findings regarding appellant’s allegations. OWCP
shall request that the employer address the assertions set forth in appellant’s statements.

6

20 C.F.R. § 10.117(a); seeFederal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Initial Development of Claims,
Chapter 2.800.7(a)(2) (June 2011) (in certain types of claims, such as a stress claim, a statement from the employer
is imperative to properly develop and adjudicate the claim).
7

See supra note 4.

8

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, supra note 6, Chapter 2.800.5(d)(1) (June 2011).

9

See S.P., Docket No. 11-1271 (issued April 19, 2012).

10
11

20 C.F.R. § 10.117(a).
Id.; see Alice F. Harrell, 53 ECAB 713 (2002).

4

Following this and such further development as deemed necessary, OWCP should issue a
de novo decision.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THATthe October 31, 2012 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion of the Board.
Issued: November 21, 2013
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.M., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
MINNEAPOLIS VA MEDICAL CENTER,
Minneapolis, MN, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 21-1159
Issued: March 7, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On June 7, 2021 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a May 26, 2021
merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

1

ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish a right elbow
condition causally related to the accepted March 2, 2020 employment incident.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On March 4, 2020 appellant, then a 48-year-old supply technician, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on March 2, 2020 he was maneuvering a cart, which was difficult
to push and steer, when he experienced a shooting pain from his elbow to his fingers, while in the
performance of duty. He stopped work on March 2, 2020 and returned to work on March 4, 2020.
On the reverse side of the claim form appellant’s supervisor acknowledged that appellant was
injured while in the performance of duty.
Appellant submitted a form dated March 6, 2020 from Dr. Fardows Omar Salim, a family
medicine specialist, who noted a March 2, 2020 date of injury and provided work restrictions.
OWCP also received an imaging report dated March 10, 2020 from Dr. Kyle Shipley, a
Board-certified diagnostic radiologist, which related an impression of mild distal biceps and
common extensor tendinopathy.
Appellant submitted a work capacity form dated March 11, 2020 from Dr. Elizabeth
Moorhead, a Board-certified internist. Dr. Moorhead related that appellant was injured on
March 2, 2020 and diagnosed right ulnar neuropathy and right lateral epicondylitis. He noted
appellant’s work restrictions and limited him to four hours of work a day.
In a development letter dated March 23, 2020, OWCP informed appellant of the
deficiencies of his claim. It informed him of the type of factual and medical evidence needed and
provided him with a questionnaire. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to submit the necessary
evidence.
In response, appellant submitted a medical report dated March 4, 2020 from Dr. Salim.
Dr. Salim related that appellant was pushing and steering a crash cart with bad wheels at work and
reinjured his right elbow. She related that appellant had previously injured the same elbow at work
in April 2019 when he struck his elbow on metal shelving.3 Dr. Salim provided an assessment of
right elbow pain and noted that there concern regarding a fracture versus a nerve injury; therefore,
appellant would undergo an x-ray and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan.
By decision dated May 6, 2020, OWCP accepted that the March 2, 2020 employment
incident occurred, as alleged. However, it denied appellant’s claim, finding that he had not
submitted medical evidence containing a medical diagnosis in connection with his accepted

3

Appellant has a prior claim under OWCP File No. xxxxxx929 alleging that on April 11, 2019 he was stocking a
storeroom, lifting heavy boxes and putting them on shelves, when he struck his elbow against the metal shelves.
OWCP denied that claim by decisions dated August 29 and December 17, 2019. Appellant’s claims have not been
administratively combined by OWCP.

2

employment incident. It concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been met to establish
an injury as defined by FECA.
On April 13, 2021 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration of OWCP’s
May 6, 2020.
In a letter dated March 30, 2021, Dr. Moorhead related that, on April 11, 2019, appellant
was carrying boxes when he struck the posterior side of his elbow on a shelf. She noted that an
electromyogram (EMG) performed on September 3, 2019 showed a mild right ulnar sensory
mononeuropathy, and an MRI scan performed on December 9, 2019 showed mild lateral
epicondylitis. Dr. Moorhead diagnosed lateral epicondylitis, ulnar neuropathy, and right elbow
pain.
By decision dated May 26, 2021, OWCP modified its May 6, 2020 decision and found that
appellant had established a diagnosed medical condition, but denied appellant’s claim as causal
relationship had not been established between the diagnosed right elbow condition and the
accepted employment incident.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA 4 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including that the individual is an employee of the United
States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time
limitation of FECA, 5 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and that
any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the
employment injury. 6 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim,
regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.7
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty, it first must be determined whether fact of injury has been established. There
are two components involved in establishing fact of injury. The first component is that the
employee must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he or she actually experienced the
employment incident at the time and place, and in the manner alleged. The second component is
whether the employment incident caused a personal injury. 8

4

Supra note 2.

5

F.H., Docket No.18-0869 (issued January 29, 2020); J.P., Docket No. 19-0129 (issued April 26, 2019); Joe D.
Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).
6

L.C., Docket No. 19-1301 (issued January 29, 2020); J.H., Docket No. 18-1637 (issued January 29, 2020);
James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB 312 (1988).
7

P.A., Docket No. 18-0559 (issued January 29, 2020); K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016);
Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).
8

T.H., Docket No. 19-0599 (issued January 28, 2020); K.L., Docket No. 18-1029 (issued January 9, 2019); John J.
Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989).

3

The medical evidence required to establish a causal relationship between a claimed specific
condition and an employment incident is rationalized medical opinion evidence. 9 The opinion of
the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the employee, must
be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the
nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and specific employment factors
identified by the employee. 10
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a right elbow
condition causally related to the accepted March 2, 2020 employment incident.
Appellant was initially seen by Dr. Salim on March 4, 2020 who related appellant’s history
of the alleged March 2, 2020 injury, and noted that appellant had previously injured his right elbow
at work in April 2019 when he struck his elbow on metal shelving. Dr. Salim assessed right elbow
pain. The Board has held that pain is a description of a symptom, not a firm diagnosis of a medical
condition.11 Moreover, Dr. Salim did not provide an opinion with regard to causal relationship.
In a form report dated March 6, 2021, she noted appellant’s work restrictions, but again did not
provide a firm diagnosis or an opinion regarding causal relationship. The Board has held that a
medical report lacking a firm diagnosis or an opinion on causal relationship is of no probative
value.12 As such, these reports are insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.
In a report dated March 11, 2020, Dr. Moorhead related that appellant was injured on
March 2, 2020. She diagnosed right ulnar neuropathy and right lateral epicondylitis. However,
Dr. Moorhead merely repeated the history of injury as reported by appellant without providing her
own opinion regarding whether appellant’s condition was work related. OWCP also received a
March 30, 2021 report wherein Dr. Moorhead related that on April 11, 2019 appellant was
carrying boxes when he struck the posterior side of his elbow on a shelf. Dr. Moorhead related
diagnoses of lateral epicondylitis, ulnar neuropathy, but did not provide an opinion on causal
relationship. As noted, the Board has held that a medical report lacking an opinion on causal
relationship is of no probative value. 13 As such, this evidence is also insufficient to establish the
claim.

9

S.S., Docket No. 19-0688 (issued January 24, 2020); A.M., Docket No. 18-1748 (issued April 24, 2019); Robert G.
Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996).
10

T.L., Docket No. 18-0778 (issued January 22, 2020); Y.S., Docket No. 18-0366 (issued January 22, 2020);
Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).
11

D.R., Docket No. 18-1408 (issued March 1, 2019); D.A., Docket No. 18-0783 (issued November 8, 2018).

12

See J.P., Docket No. 20-0381 (issued July 28, 2020); R.L., Docket No. 20-0284 (issued June 30, 2020); L.B.,
Docket No. 18-0533 (issued August 27, 2018); D.K., Docket No. 17-1549 (issued July 6, 2018).
13

Id.

4

Appellant also submitted diagnostic studies. The Board has long held that diagnostic
studies, standing alone, lack probative value on the issue of causal relationship as they do not
address whether the employment incident caused a diagnosed condition. 14
As the medical evidence of record is insufficient to establish causal relationship between a
diagnosed right elbow condition and the accepted employment incident, the Board finds that
appellant has not met his burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607. 15
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a right elbow
condition causally related to the March 2, 2020 employment incident.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 26, 2021 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: March 7, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

14

J.P., Docket No. 19-0216 (issued December 13, 2019); A.B., Docket No. 17-0301 (issued May 19, 2017).

15

Upon return of the case record, OWCP should consider administratively combining this case record with the prior
record for OWCP File No. xxxxxx929.

5