United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
B.T., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, Napa, CA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 08-1970
Issued: May 13, 2009

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On July 8, 2008 appellant filed a timely appeal from a June 24, 2008 decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, denying his claim for an injury on May 8, 2004.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this
case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant sustained an injury on May 8, 2004 while in the
performance of duty.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 10, 2004 appellant, then a 66-year-old laborer, filed a traumatic injury claim
alleging that he aggravated a preexisting right shoulder and back injury on May 8, 2004 while
working at Lake Berryessa. He stated that he had experienced chronic pain in his right shoulder
and back since he sustained injuries at work on August 11 and November 21, 2002. In a
September 8, 2004 written statement, appellant indicated that on May 8, 2004 he was working

alone. After he had emptied trash containers for three hours, his right knee began to swell.
Appellant returned to the maintenance yard, advised his supervisor of his condition and went
home.1
By decision dated September 15, 2004, the Office denied appellant’s claim on the
grounds that the evidence did not establish that he sustained an employment-related injury on
May 8, 2004. Appellant requested a hearing that was held on July 14, 2005.
On May 13, 2004 Dr. Zamani diagnosed a medial meniscal tear and noted that, even after
surgery, appellant would not be able to perform his regular duties. On May 14, 2004 a physician
noted that appellant was seen for right knee pain, status post surgery. Appellant’s condition was
described as “not better.” In a May 17, 2004 disability certificate, a physician noted that
appellant was off work from May 17 to 20, 2004 but could perform modified work from May 21
to June 17, 2004. Work restrictions included no lifting or reaching above the right shoulder with
the right arm. In a May 17, 2004 medical note, a physician noted that appellant had right
shoulder pain “for some time from reaching and lifting, although he [i]s only [illegible] modified
work. Here because three days ago notes a lump on top of [right] shoulder.” The diagnosis was
right shoulder tendinitis. On June 22, 2004 Dr. Zamani stated that appellant had chronic pain
and was unable to drive or perform his duties due to the effects of his medications. He
recommended disability retirement.
In a September 20, 2004 report, Dr. John R. Chu, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon
and an Office referral physician, reviewed the medical history and provided findings on physical
examination. He diagnosed right knee osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar
spine and right shoulder pain consistent with a rotator cuff tear or tendinitis. Dr. Chu stated that
on August 11, 2002 appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident while performing his
duties and sustained a right knee strain and medial meniscal tear. He underwent arthroscopic
treatment for this condition which revealed preexisting osteoarthritis. In November 2002, while
appellant was walking down a trail carrying heavy equipment, he slipped and fell onto his back.
He underwent arthroscopic surgery of his right knee in May 2003. Appellant was released to
return to work in January 2004 with a lifting limit of 50 pounds. On May 24, 2004 he had
performed heavy lifting of 70 pounds or more at work. Due to appellant’s continued knee pain,
he was unable to properly perform the lifting and injured his back and right shoulder. Dr. Chu
noted that x-rays were consistent with degenerative disc disease of his lumbar spine as well as
rotator cuff pathology. He stated that appellant likely had some degenerative disc disease as well
as rotator cuff pathology prior to the accident of August 2002 and his traumatic fall in
November 2002. However, Dr. Chu had no significant symptoms in his back, shoulder and knee
prior to these injuries. He opined that appellant’s disability began on May 8, 2004 when he had
significant worsening of his knee, back and shoulder condition.
On December 7, 2004 Dr. Jacob E. Tauber, an attending Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, reviewed the history of appellant’s condition and provided findings on physical
examination. He noted that appellant had pain in his right shoulder pain, right knee and back.
Dr. Tauber stated that on August 11, 2002 appellant was a passenger in a truck driven by a
1

This case was previously before the Board. See Docket No. 07-1855. By order dated April 16, 2008, the Board
remanded the case for reconstruction and proper assemblage.

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coworker when a tire blew out. The truck went down a hill and landed on trees and shrubs.
Appellant sustained injuries to his right shoulder, right knee and back. On November 21, 2002
he was walking down a trail and twisted his right knee when he slipped and fell. Appellant
reinjured his right shoulder, right knee and back. Dr. Tauber stated that on May 8, 2004
appellant was working alone, and lifting trash cans and bags weighing more than 40 pounds and
throwing them into a truck. When appellant’s right knee gave way, he reported the injury. After
a few hours, he began to experience right shoulder and back pain. On December 14, 2004
Dr. Tauber diagnosed degenerative arthritis of the right knee, right rotator cuff tears and
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and spinal stenosis.
By decision dated January 19, 2006, the Office denied appellant’s claim on the grounds
that the evidence did not establish that he sustained an employment-related injury on
May 8, 2004.
On April 18, 2006 Dr. Tauber provided a history of appellant’s condition dating back to
the August 11 and November 21, 2002 accidents at work. He noted that on May 8, 2004 he was
working without assistance, lifting trash cans and bags weighing more than 40 pounds and
throwing them into a truck. Dr. Tauber stated that appellant had right shoulder, right knee and
low back pain. On physical examination, he noted right shoulder positive impingement and
Hawkins signs, low back and right knee tenderness and positive straight leg raising. No recent
radiological evaluations were provided. Dr. Tauber diagnosed degenerative osteoarthritis of the
right knee, lumbar spine degenerative disc disease with sciatica and spinal stenosis and right
rotator cuff derangement, impingement and tear. He stated that it was evident that appellant’s
work activities on May 8, 2004 caused a permanent aggravation of his underlying pathology.
Dr. Tauber opined that the work activities on that day were inappropriate for someone with
appellant’s preexisting pathology.
In a May 8, 2006 letter, appellant requested that his claim be expanded to include
permanent aggravation of right knee osteoarthritis, permanent aggravation of his right rotator
cuff tear, impingement and derangement, and permanent aggravation of his degenerative disc
disease of the lumbar spine with sciatica and spinal stenosis.
By decision dated August 11, 2006, the Office denied modification of the January 19,
2006 decision.
Appellant requested reconsideration. By decision dated June 24, 2008, the Office denied
modification of the January 19, 2006 merit decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 has the
burden of establishing the essential elements of his claim by the weight of the reliable, probative

2

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

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and substantial evidence,3 including that he is an “employee” within the meaning of the Act,4 and
that he filed his claim within the applicable time limitation.5 The employee must also establish
that he sustained an injury in the performance of duty as alleged and that his disability for work,
if any, was causally related to the employment injury.6
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty, it first must be determined whether the fact of injury has been established.
There are two components involved in establishing the fact of injury. First, the employee must
submit sufficient evidence to establish that he actually experienced the employment incident at
the time, place and in the manner alleged.7 Second, the employee must submit medical evidence
to establish that the employment incident caused a personal injury.8 An employee may establish
that the employment incident occurred as alleged but fail to show that his disability or condition
relates to the employment incident.
Causal relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence generally required to
establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence. Rationalized medical
opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s rationalized opinion on
whether there is a causal relationship between the employee’s diagnosed condition and the
compensable employment factors. The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete
factual and medical background of the employee, must be one of reasonable medical certainty,
and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the
diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by the employee.9
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that the evidence is insufficient to establish that appellant sustained an
injury on May 8, 2004 while in the performance of duty.
The May 2004 reports and disability certificates from Dr. Zamani and other physicians
did not provide a rationalized explanation as to how appellant’s work on May 8, 2004 caused or
aggravated a medical condition. Therefore, they are not sufficient to establish that appellant
sustained a work-related injury on May 8, 2004.
3

J.P., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-1159, issued November 15, 2007); Joseph Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 57 (1968).

4

See M.H., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 08-120, issued April 17, 2008); Emiliana de Guzman (Mother of Elpedio
Mercado), 4 ECAB 357, 359 (1951). See 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1).
5

R.C., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-1731, issued April 7, 2008); Kathryn A. O’Donnell, 7 ECAB 227, 231
(1954); see 5 U.S.C. § 8122.
6

G.T., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-1345, issued April 11, 2008); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143,
1145 (1989).
7

Bonnie A. Contreras, 57 ECAB 364, 367 (2006); Edward C. Lawrence, 19 ECAB 442, 445 (1968).

8

T.H., 59 ___ (Docket No. 07-2300, issued March 7, 2008); John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354, 356-57 (1989).

9

I.J., 59 ___ (Docket No. 07-2362, issued March 11, 2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).

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Dr. Chu diagnosed right knee osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine
and right shoulder pain consistent with a rotator cuff tear or tendinitis. He stated that on
August 11, 2002 appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident while performing his duties
and sustained a right knee strain and medial meniscal tear. Dr. Chu also diagnosed preexisting
osteoarthritis. In November 2002, appellant slipped and fell at work and underwent arthroscopic
surgery of his right knee in May 2003. He was released to return to work in January 2004 with a
lifting limit of 50 pounds. On May 8, 2004 appellant had to perform heavy lifting of 70 pounds
or more. Due to his continued knee pain, he was unable to properly perform the lifting and
injured his back and right shoulder. Dr. Chu noted that x-rays were consistent with degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar spine and rotator cuff pathology that preexisted the August and
November 2002 accidents. However, he had no significant symptoms in his back, shoulder and
knee prior to these injuries. Dr. Chu opined that appellant became disabled on May 8, 2004
when he had significant worsening of his knee, back and shoulder condition. However, he
provided insufficient medical rationale explaining how the May 8, 2004 incident at work
aggravated his preexisting conditions. Such medical rationale is particularly necessary in light of
the fact that appellant’s conditions were long-standing and even predated the 2002 accidents.
Lacking adequate medical rationale, Dr. Chu’s opinion on causal relationship is of diminished
probative value and is insufficient to establish that the May 8, 2004 incident at work aggravated
appellant’s preexisting conditions or caused a new medical condition.
In two December 2004 reports, Dr. Tauber reviewed the history of appellant’s condition
and provided findings on physical examination. He provided a history of the August and
November 2002 accidents and the May 8, 2004 incident at work. Dr. Tauber noted that on
May 8, 2004 appellant was working alone and lifting trash cans and bags weighing more than 40
pounds. When his right knee gave way, he reported the injury. A few hours later, appellant
began to experience right shoulder and back pain. Dr. Tauber diagnosed degenerative arthritis of
the right knee, right rotator cuff tears and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and
spinal stenosis. On April 18, 2006 he provided a history of appellant’s condition dating back to
the August 11 and November 21, 2002 accidents at work. Dr. Tauber noted that on May 8, 2004
appellant was lifting heavy trash cans and bags and throwing them into a truck. He stated that
appellant had right shoulder, right knee and low back pain. On physical examination, Dr. Tauber
noted right shoulder positive impingement and Hawkins signs, low back and right knee
tenderness and positive straight leg raising. No recent radiological evaluations were provided.
Dr. Tauber diagnosed degenerative osteoarthritis of the right knee, lumbar spine degenerative
disc disease with sciatica and spinal stenosis and right rotator cuff derangement, impingement
and tear. He stated that it was evident that appellant’s work activities on May 8, 2004 caused a
permanent aggravation of his underlying pathology. Dr. Tauber opined that the work activities
on that day were inappropriate for someone with appellant’s preexisting pathology. However,
he provided insufficient objective physical findings to establish that the May 8, 2004 work
activities caused a material change and aggravation of his preexisting conditions. Dr. Tauber
also provided insufficient medical rationale explaining how the May 8, 2004 work activities
caused the aggravation. Such medical rationale is necessary in light of the fact that appellant’s
back, shoulder and knee conditions were long-standing and even predated the 2002 accidents.
Lacking sufficient objective findings and adequate medical rationale, Dr. Tauber’s opinion on
causal relationship is of diminished probative value and is insufficient to establish that the
May 8, 2004 incident at work aggravated appellant’s preexisting conditions or caused a new
medical condition. The Board finds that appellant failed to provide rationalized medical
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evidence establishing that his work activities on May 8, 2004 caused a new injury or an
aggravation of preexisting conditions. Therefore, he failed to meet his burden of proof. The
Office properly denied his claim.
On appeal, appellant indicated that the Board should review his June 25, 2007 brief
submitted to the Office following the Board’s April 16, 2008 decision. Included in the brief are
his reasons for disagreeing with the Office’s interpretation of the medical evidence. Having
reviewed the June 25, 2007 brief, the Board finds appellant’s arguments to be without merit. His
arguments do not establish that he sustained a work-related injury on May 8, 2004.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant failed to establish that he sustained an injury on May 8,
2004 while in the performance of duty.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated June 24, 2008 is affirmed.
Issued: May 13, 2009
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
B.D., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, AVIATION &
MISSILE COMMAND, Corpus Christi, TX,
Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 18-0689
Issued: August 3, 2018

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On February 12, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a January 30, 2018 nonmerit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). As more than 180 days
elapsed from OWCP’s last merit decision, dated July 13, 2017, to the filing of this appeal, pursuant
to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board lacks jurisdiction over the merits of the claim.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly determined that appellant abandoned his request for
a hearing.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On December 15, 2016 OWCP accepted that appellant, then a 64-year-old electrical
avionics inspector, sustained a sprain of the medial collateral ligament of his left knee on
October 20, 2016 when he climbed into the cockpit of a Blackhawk helicopter and hit his left knee
on a metal step while in the performance of duty. Appellant did not stop work.
In a November 23, 2016 report, Dr. Mark Yelderman, an attending Board-certified
anesthesiologist, with whom appellant sought treatment, indicated that he was not prescribing any
medication for appellant and that he was releasing appellant from his care.
On April 24, 2017 appellant filed a notice of recurrence (Form CA-2a) claiming a
recurrence of his need for medical treatment on December 12, 2016 due to his October 20, 2016
employment injury. He submitted medical evidence in support of his claim, including a
December 12, 2016 report of Dr. Yelderman.
By decision dated July 13, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for a recurrence of
disability on December 12, 2016 due to his October 20, 2016 employment injury because he failed
to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish that he required additional medical treatment
due to a worsening of his accepted work-related condition, without intervening cause.
On July 24, 2017 appellant requested a hearing with a representative of OWCP’s Branch
of Hearings and Review.
In a November 17, 2017 letter, a representative of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and
Review notified appellant that a telephone hearing was scheduled for January 19, 2018 at 1:30
p.m., Eastern Standard Time, and provided a telephone number for appellant to call at that date
and time.
By decision dated January 30, 2018, the same OWCP hearing representative determined
that appellant abandoned his request for a hearing. She indicated that he had failed to appear for
the hearing scheduled for January 19, 2018 despite receiving proper notice at least 30 days in
advance, and did not contact OWCP either prior or subsequent to the scheduled hearing to explain
his failure to appear.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
A claimant who has received a final adverse decision by OWCP may obtain a hearing by
writing to the address specified in the decision within 30 days of the date of the decision for which
a hearing is sought.2 Unless otherwise directed in writing by the claimant, the hearing
representative will mail a notice of the time and place of the hearing to the claimant and any

2

20 C.F.R. § 10.616(a).

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representative at least 30 days before the scheduled date.3 OWCP has the burden of proving that
it properly mailed to the claimant and any representative a notice of a scheduled hearing.4
A claimant who fails to appear at a scheduled hearing may request in writing within 10
days after the date set for the hearing that another hearing be scheduled. Where good cause for
failure to appear is shown, another hearing will be scheduled and conducted by teleconference.
The failure of the claimant to request another hearing within 10 days, or the failure of the claimant
to appear at the second scheduled hearing without good cause shown, shall constitute abandonment
of the request for a hearing.5
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant abandoned his request for
a hearing.
Following OWCP’s July 13, 2017 decision denying his claim for a recurrence of a need for
medical treatment, appellant filed a timely request for a telephone hearing with a representative of
OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review. In a November 17, 2017 letter, OWCP’s hearing
representative notified appellant of the scheduled telephone hearing for January 19, 2018 at 1:30
p.m., Eastern Standard Time, and provided a telephone number for appellant to call at that date
and time. OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review properly sent the notice to appellant’s address
of record.6 Appellant failed to call in for the scheduled hearing.7 He did not request a
postponement or provide any explanation to OWCP for his failure to attend the hearing within 10
days of the scheduled hearing. As appellant did not request a postponement, did not call in to the
scheduled hearing, and did not provide any notification to OWCP within 10 days of the scheduled
hearing explaining his failure to appear, the Board finds that he abandoned his request for an oral
hearing.8
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant abandoned his request for
a hearing.

3

Id. at § 10.617(b).

4

T.P., Docket No. 15-0806 (issued September 11, 2015).

5

20 C.F.R. § 10.622(f); Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Hearings and Reviews of the Written
Record, Chapter 2.1601.6(g) (October 2011).
6

Absent evidence to the contrary, a letter properly addressed and mailed in the ordinary course of business is
presumed to have been received. This is called the mailbox rule. See James A. Gray, 54 ECAB 277 (2002).
7

On appeal appellant contends that he called OWCP’s hearing representative at the appropriate time, but was not
able to get through on the telephone line to speak to anyone. However, appellant did not explain how the evidence of
record supports this contention.
8

See supra note 5; see also R.S., Docket No. 15-1358 (issued December 4, 2015).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the January 30, 2018 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: August 3, 2018
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.D., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Boston, MA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Jacqueline Shanahan, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 18-0001
Issued: March 27, 2018

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 25, 2017 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a July 5,
2017 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to
the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has established a low back injury causally related to the
accepted July 1, 2014 employment incident.
1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for
legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An
attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject
to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
This case has previously been before the Board.3 The facts and circumstances of the case
as set forth in the Board’s prior decision are incorporated herein by reference. The relevant facts
are as follows.
On August 14, 2014 appellant, a 55-year-old truck driver, filed a traumatic injury claim
(Form CA-1) alleging that, on July 1, 2014, he experienced severe low back pain putting a chock
block under the rear tire of his vehicle. He stopped work on the date of injury.
On July 29, 2014 Dr. William P. Docken, Board-certified in internal medicine, opined
that appellant remained disabled due to lower back pain.
Dr. Bahige Asaker, an attending osteopath, evaluated appellant on September 9, 2014 for
low back pain. He obtained a history of appellant experiencing severe pain in his back on July 1,
2014 putting a chock block under the wheel of his truck at work and noted that he had not
worked since that date. Dr. Asaker indicated that he had a “history of low back pain dating back
to 2012.” He advised that an August 6, 2014 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan revealed a
disc protrusion at L5-S1, spondylosis at T-11 and T-12 with some neural impingement, mild disc
bulging with congenital spinal narrowing at L2-3, and mild stenosis at L3-4. He further found
that the MRI scan showed moderate-to-marked central spinal stenosis and moderate right L3
neural stenosis, right L3 neural impingement, a moderate asymmetric disc bulge at L4-5,
bilateral L4 neural impingement, a nerve root sheath arising from the thecal sac at L5-S1,
bilateral mild L5 neural foraminal stenosis, and L11 and L12 spondylosis with a mild disc bulge.
Dr. Asaker indicated that x-rays obtained July 3, 2014 showed degenerative joint disease and old
trauma. He opined that appellant was disabled from work as he was unable to perform the
lifting, continuous sitting, and standing required by his work duties.
By decision dated September 26, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding that the
medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish a diagnosed condition causally related to
the accepted employment incident. On October 24, 2014 appellant, through counsel, requested
an oral hearing before an OWCP hearing representative. On February 17, 2015 counsel
requested a review of the written record in lieu of an oral hearing.
In a report dated July 10, 2014, received by OWCP on February 17, 2015, Dr. Asaker
noted that appellant initially sustained a back injury at work in May 2012, but had experienced
another injury to his back a week earlier. He diagnosed back strain, L3-4 disc spurring, and
degenerative disc disease. Dr. Asaker found that appellant should remain off work pending
evaluation by a specialist, noting that appellant’s 2012 injury periodically flared up and that he
was worried that if he returned to work and no light duty was available he might permanently
injure his back.
Dr. Docken, in a report dated November 4, 2014, advised that appellant continued to
experience low back pain which increased with bending, stooping, and lifting. He noted that his
symptoms began early in July 2014 when he experienced acute pain in his low back after he put
3

Docket No. 16-0887 (issued November 4, 2016).

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a block under the wheel of his truck. Dr. Docken diagnosed low back pain with underlying
lumbar degenerative disease and possible myofascial pain. He also diagnosed lumbar spinal
stenosis, which he found was “of degenerative origin, and probably not related to [the] 2012
injury.”
In a November 24, 2014 report, Dr. Christopher M. Bono, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, advised that appellant initially felt low back pain in 2012. He reinjured his back in
2014 when he experienced the onset of severe low back pain on the left side placing a stop
behind a tire. Dr. Bono advised that appellant’s pain increased when he transitioned from sitting
to standing and with extensive sitting and standing.
On January 29, 2015 Dr. Docken found that, as set forth in his July 23, 2014 office note,
appellant “incurred acute low back pain on July 1, 2014, specifically related to placing a chock
block under his truck while at work. Since then, there has been persisting back pain, as has also
been documented….”
By decision dated April 28, 2015, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed the
September 26, 2014 decision, as modified. It found that the reports of Drs. Docken, Asaker, and
Bono were sufficient to establish that appellant sustained diagnosed medical conditions, but the
claim remained denied as the medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish causal
relationship between the diagnosed conditions and the July 1, 2014 employment incident.
On July 7, 2015 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration and submitted
additional medical evidence. In a July 2, 2015 report, Dr. Joseph S. Barr, an orthopedic surgeon,
related that he evaluated appellant on May 14, 2015. He discussed his history of the onset of
acute low back pain on July 1, 2014 when he placed a block wedge under the wheel of his truck.
Appellant had a history of a 2012 back injury. He had not worked since July 1, 2014. Dr. Barr
reviewed an August 1, 2014 MRI scan which he found revealed degenerative changes throughout
the lumbar spine, with moderate-to-marked spinal stenosis at L3-4 and L4-5. He diagnosed
“postlumbar sprain related to employment.” Dr. Barr noted that appellant had preexisting
lumbar spine problems, with one episode of lumbar problems in 2012 causing him to be out of
work. He opined that the July 2014 work incident resulted in a permanent aggravation in the
underlying process, as evidenced by the findings on MRI scan of lumbar stenosis.
By decision dated August 12, 2015, OWCP denied modification of the April 28, 2015
decision. On October 21, 2015 appellant, through counsel, again requested reconsideration.
In a September 9, 2015 report, Dr. Barr reviewed OWCP’s decision. He indicated that he
did not find appellant’s spinal stenosis arose due to trauma, but instead found that the stenosis
and lumbar degeneration were permanently aggravated by the July 1, 2014 work incident.
Dr. Barr noted that appellant had a prior low back problem in 2012 which resulted in the
appellant being out of work for two and a half months and later recovered. He further noted that
appellant was able to perform his work duties until the July 1, 2014 work incident. Dr. Barr
opined that the July 1, 2014 work incident of bending and twisting could slightly increase disc
swelling and swelling in the lumbar facet joints. He found that appellant sustained a “permanent
aggravation of a preexisting condition which renders [him] incapable to doing his former work
pushing heavy containers of mail.”

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By decision dated February 10, 2016, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision.
Appellant, through counsel, then appealed to the Board. By decision dated November 4,
2016, the Board affirmed a February 10, 2016 OWCP decision finding that appellant had not met
his burden of proof to establish an injury to his low back due to an accepted July 1, 2014 work
incident. The Board found that appellant had not submitted a sufficiently reasoned medical
opinion explaining the mechanism by which the July 1, 2014 work incident resulted in a
diagnosed medical condition. The Board noted that Dr. Barr did not explain how slight swelling
of the disc and lumbar facet joints permanently aggravated a preexisting condition.
On April 28, 2017 appellant, through counsel, again requested reconsideration. Counsel
contended that an April 13, 2017 report from Dr. Barr was sufficient to demonstrate causal
relationship. She further noted that, if work duties contributed in any way to a claimant’s
condition, it was compensable under FECA.
In his April 13, 2017 report, Dr. Barr reviewed the Board’s decision. He discussed his
September 9, 2015 findings and noted that an August 2014 MRI scan showed that appellant had
a developmental or acquired condition of spinal stenosis. Dr. Barr found that such a condition
did not mean that appellant had back pain. He related:
“However, the fact that the lumbar spinal canal was decreased in size would
cause, contribute to, accelerate, or precipitate compression/injury to the lumbar
nerve roots from an injury such as [appellant] sustained on July 1, 2014.
Mechanical pressure on the nerves creates an inflammatory response that adds to
the nerve pain. Thus, pressure and inflammation are additive to nerve roots in an
already stenotic environment. These opinions are stated to a reasonable degree of
certainty.”
Dr. Barr found that appellant had age-related degenerative spinal changes, including facet joint
thickening and ligamentum flavum bulging with some disc collapse. He advised:
“The injury of July 1, 2014 suffered by [appellant] came about as he had to bend
over and twist to put the block wedge under the wheel of his truck. This type of
twisting stress on the lumbar spine was enough to compromise the area available
for the lumbar nerves. The lumbar spine and the discs and nerve roots were
aggravated by the injury. The term ‘aggravation’ is used to denote a permanent
increase of symptoms in a previously abnormal, but asymptomatic area such as
the lumbar spine.”
Dr. Barr reviewed the definition of “probative” and opined that he had provided probative
evidence that the July 1, 2014 work incident caused “lasting damage and symptoms in
[appellant’s] lumbar spine.”

4

By decision dated July 5, 2017, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision.4. It
found that Dr. Barr did not sufficiently describe the objective findings he relied upon in finding
that the July 1, 2014 work incident worsened his preexisting back condition.
On appeal counsel asserts that OWCP is requesting medical evidence beyond the scope
of reasonableness. She maintains that FECA should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
claimant.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA5 has the burden of establishing the essential
elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the United
States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time
limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any
disability or specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the
employment injury.6 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim
regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.7
To determine whether an employee sustained a traumatic injury in the performance of
duty, OWCP must determine whether fact of injury has been established. First, an employee has
the burden of demonstrating the occurrence of an injury at the time, place, and in the manner
alleged, by a preponderance of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.8 Second, the
employee must submit sufficient evidence, generally only in the form of medical evidence, to
establish causal relationship between the employment incident and the alleged disability and/or
condition for which compensation is claimed.9 An employee may establish that the employment
incident occurred as alleged, but fail to show that his or her disability and/or condition relates to
the employment incident.10
Proceedings under FECA are not adversarial in nature and OWCP is not a disinterested
arbiter. While the claimant has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to compensation,

4
OWCP is not authorized to review Board decisions. Although the November 4, 2016 decision was the last merit
decision of record, the February 10, 2016 OWCP decision is the appropriate subject of possible modification by
OWCP. See 20 C.F.R. § 501.6(d).
5

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

6

Alvin V. Gadd, 57 ECAB 172 (2005); Anthony P. Silva, 55 ECAB 179 (2003).

7

See Elizabeth H. Kramm (Leonard O. Kramm), 57 ECAB 117 (2005); Ellen L. Noble, 55 ECAB 530 (2004).

8

David Apgar, 57 ECAB 137 (2005); Delphyne L. Glover, 51 ECAB 146 (1999).

9

Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001); Shirley A. Temple, 48 ECAB 404, 407 (1997).

10

Id.

5

OWCP shares responsibility to see that justice is done.11 The nonadversarial policy of
proceedings under FECA is reflected in OWCP’s regulations at section 10.121.12
ANALYSIS
Appellant alleged that he sustained a back injury at work on July 1, 2014 putting a chock
block under the rear tire of his vehicle. OWCP initially accepted the occurrence of the July 1,
2014 work incident, but denied his claim as the medical evidence was insufficient to establish
causal relationship between a diagnosed condition and his placing of a block under a rear tire of
his vehicle. The Board, on November 4, 2016, affirmed OWCP’s determination, finding that the
medical evidence did not contain sufficient rationale to demonstrate that appellant’s action on
July 1, 2014 aggravated a preexisting low back condition. The Board noted that Dr. Barr did not
explain how increased swelling in the disc and lumbar facet joints caused a permanent
aggravation of a preexisting condition.
Subsequent to the Board’s November 4, 2016 decision, appellant requested
reconsideration and submitted an April 13, 2017 report from Dr. Barr. Dr. Barr advised that he
had reviewed the Board’s decision and noted that an MRI scan showed developmental or
acquired spinal stenosis. He asserted that the decrease in the size of appellant’s spinal canal
contributed or precipitated his compression injury to the lumbar nerve roots on July 1, 2014 as
mechanical pressure on the nerve caused an inflammatory response resulting in nerve pain in a
stenotic spinal canal. Dr. Barr related that his twisting motion on July 1, 2014 when he bent over
to put the block beneath his tire wheel caused a compromise of the lumbar spine area and an
aggravation of his condition. By decision dated July 5, 2017, OWCP denied modification of its
prior decisions.
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision. Dr. Barr, in his April 13,
2017 report, provided some rationale for his finding that the July 1, 2014 work incident
aggravated a preexisting low back condition. He evidenced knowledge of the history of injury,
referenced the results of diagnostic studies, and explained the mechanical process by which the
accepted employment incident caused or aggravated the previously diagnosed condition of postlumbar sprain and a permanent aggravation of a preexisting condition. The Board finds that
Dr. Barr’s opinion, while insufficiently rationalized to represent the weight of the evidence, is
sufficient, given the absence of any opposing medical evidence, to require further development
of the record.13
Proceedings under FECA are not adversarial in nature, nor is OWCP a disinterested
arbiter. While the claimant has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to compensation,
OWCP shares responsibility in the development of the evidence to see that justice is done.14 On
remand, OWCP should refer appellant to an appropriate specialist for a rationalized opinion
11

See S.M., Docket No. 16-0990 (issued February 8, 2017); Jimmy A. Hammons, 51 ECAB 219 (1999).

12

20 C.F.R. § 10.121.

13

See R.B., Docket No. 16-0205 (issued October 11, 2016).

14

See W.W., Docket No. 15-1130 (issued August 7, 2015); Phillip L. Barnes, 55 ECAB 426 (2004).

6

regarding whether he sustained a diagnosed condition causally related to the accepted July 1,
2014 employment incident.15 After such further development as OWCP deems necessary, it
shall issue a de novo decision.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 5, 2017 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this decision of the Board.
Issued: March 27, 2018
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

15

See M.K., Docket No. 17-1140 (issued October 18, 2017).

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
H.E., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Detroit, MI, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

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Docket No. 21-1070
Issued: March 18, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER REMANDING CASE
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On July 8, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from an April 28, 2021 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards
docketed the appeal as No. 21-1070.
On December 9, 2020 appellant, then a 53-year-old rural carrier, filed an occupational
disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he developed left cubital and carpal tunnel syndrome due
to factors of his federal employment, including sorting, casing, and delivering mail; lifting and
delivering packages; and unloading tubs, bags, and parcels. He indicated that he first became
aware of his condition on September 3, 2020, and that it was related to his federal employment on
November 30, 2020. OWCP assigned this claim File No. xxxxxx436.
Appellant had previously filed a Form CA-2 on November 5, 2020 alleging that he had
sustained carpal tunnel syndrome due to factors of his federal employment including sorting,
casing and delivering mail, as well as lifting packages. He related that he first became aware of
his condition and its relationship to his federal employment on September 3, 2020. OWCP
assigned this claim File No. xxxxxx310.
In a development letter dated December 15, 2020 in the instant claim, OWCP File No.
xxxxxx436, OWCP informed appellant of the deficiencies of his claim. It advised him regarding

the type of medical evidence necessary to establish his claim and provided 30 days for him to
submit the requested evidence.
In response, appellant submitted a medical report dated September 10, 2020 from Dr. Ryan
Beekman, a Board-certified orthopedic and hand surgeon. Dr. Beekman diagnosed tendinosis and
tenosynovitis involving the extensor carpi ulnaris without tendon tear, minimal tenosynovitis of
the extensor carpi radialis longus and brevis tendons. In reports dated September 24 and
November 5, 2020, he diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and also cubital tunnel
syndrome.
In a report dated November 30, 2020, Amy Herrick, a nurse practitioner, related that
appellant was seen for a follow-up appointment for his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and that
he was scheduled for a right carpal tunnel release.
In a letter dated January 8, 2021, Dr. Beekman related that appellant underwent bilateral
right and left carpal tunnel release on January 5, 2021. He noted that appellant had indicated that
his hand symptoms of numbness and tingling were significantly exacerbated by his work activities
including lifting heavy objects and repetitive heavy gripping. Dr. Beekman concluded that it was
reasonable to believe that appellant’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and left cubital tunnel
syndrome were causally related to his employment.
By decision dated February 4, 2021, OWCP denied appellant’s claim as causal relationship
was not established between the diagnosed medical conditions and the accepted employment
factors. It concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been met to establish an injury or
medical condition causally related to the accepted employment factors.
In a letter dated March 2, 2021, Dr. Beekman related that appellant had reported that his
symptoms were significantly exacerbated by his work activities of lifting heavy objects and
gripping. He also stated that medical literature supported that repetitive heavy gripping was a
known cause of carpal tunnel and that he believed that appellant’s work duties caused his bilateral
carpal and left cubital tunnel syndrome.
On March 11, 2021 appellant requested reconsideration of OWCP’s February 4, 2021
decision.
By decision dated April 28, 2021, OWCP denied modification of its February 4, 2021
decision.
The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that this case is not in posture for
decision. OWCP’s procedures provide that cases should be administratively combined when
correct adjudication of the issues depend on frequent cross-referencing between the files. 1 For
example, if a new injury case is reported for an employee who previously filed an injury claim for

1

See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, File Maintenance and Management, Chapter 2.400.8(c)
(February 2000).

2

a similar condition or the same part of the body, doubling is required.2 Herein, appellant filed a
claim for carpal tunnel syndrome, assigned OWCP File No. xxxxxx310 on November 5, 2020, and
subsequently filed an occupational disease claim on December 9, 2020 for cubital and carpal
tunnel syndrome, assigned OWCP File No. xxxxxx436. The evidence pertaining to OWCP File
No. xxxxxx310, however, is not part of the case record presently before the Board.
For a full and fair adjudication, the case must be returned to OWCP to administratively
combine the current case record with OWCP File No. xxxxxx310. Following this and such further
development as OWCP deems necessary, it shall issue a de novo decision. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 28, 2021 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this order of the Board.
Issued: March 18, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

2

Id.; D.C., Docket No. 19-0100 (issued June 3, 2019); N.M., Docket No. 18-0833 (issued April 18, 2019); K.T.,
Docket No. 17-0432 (issued August 17, 2018).

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.D., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Atlanta, GA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 11-1779
Issued: March 6, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On July 18, 2011 appellant filed a timely appeal from the March 22 and June 28, 2011
merit decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) denying her claim
for disability compensation. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained a
recurrence of disability from February 12 to March 13, 2010 as a result of her accepted back
condition.
FACTUAL HISTORY
OWCP accepted that on July 26, 2006 appellant, then a 32-year-old rural carrier,
sustained a ruptured disc in her lower back when she lifted a tray of mail back onto a shelf. Her
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

claim was accepted for herniated disc and lumbar sprain. Appellant stopped work that day. She
returned to light duty on September 11, 2006 but stopped again on September 15, 2006.
Appellant was placed on the periodic rolls for disability compensation. She returned to work on
January 30, 2010 without restrictions.2
On January 7, 2011 OWCP received appellant’s claim for disability compensation for the
period February 12 to April 13, 2010. In an accompanying time analysis, Form CA-7a, appellant
noted that on February 12, 13 and 16 and March 12 and 23, 2010 she used a total of 12 hours of
leave without pay (LWOP) for therapy. From March 27 to April 3, 2010 she did not work and
used eight hours of LWOP each day due to back pain. On April 5, 8, 9, 12 and 13, 2010
appellant used a total of 10 hours of LWOP to undergo therapy.
Treatment notes signed by physical therapists Jessica Babcock and Michelle Cokely
advised that appellant underwent manual therapy treatments on March 30, April 1, 2, 5, 8, 9
and 16, 2010.
In a February 17, 2010 report, Dr. Woodley Mardy-Davis, a pain medicine specialist,
noted appellant’s complaints of chronic lower back pain for the past three years as a result of a
work injury. He reported that her treatment modalities included chiropractic, steroid injections,
joint injections, massage therapy, medication, physical therapy and spinal cord stimulation.
Examination of appellant’s spine revealed paraspinous tenderness to palpation and pain with
extension or flexion. Her Spurling’s test was positive, but her straight leg raise test was negative
for elicitation of pain. Dr. Mardy-Davis diagnosed intervertebral disc disorder with myelopathy
in the lumbar region, lumbar facet joint arthropathy, displacement of lumbar intervertebral disc
and degeneration of lumbar or lumbosacral intervertebral disc. He recommended that appellant
continue following neuromuscular therapy and her home exercise program.
In a February 25, 2010 note, Dr. Mardy-Davis prescribed neuromuscular therapy two to
three times a week.
In a March 26, 2010 low back disability questionnaire, appellant stated that her pain
decreased with massage therapy. She reported that massage therapy and medication kept her
available to work, but she had not worked until Tuesday.
In an April 13, 2010 report, Dr. Mardy-Davis noted appellant’s complaints of back pain
and provided an accurate history of injury. He related that she experienced more pain over the
past month and had to miss two full weeks of work. Appellant stated that massage therapy
helped, but she needed to attend more often. Dr. Mardy-Davis conducted a physical examination
and recommended that she continue her home exercise program, physical therapy and
neuromuscular stimulation.

2

On February 22, 2010 OWCP issued a preliminary decision that appellant received an overpayment in the
amount of $1,336.11 because she continued to receive compensation for temporary total disability through
February 13, 2010 after she returned to work full duty on January 30, 2010. The decision was finalized on
March 22, 2010. By letter dated June 10, 2011, OWCP informed appellant that her overpayment had been satisfied.

2

In an April 14, 2010 attending physician’s report, Dr. Mardy-Davis noted that appellant
sustained a back injury when she lifted a heavy tub of mail at work. He indicated that she was
unable to return to regular duty but was capable of light duty. Dr. Mardy-Davis restricted
appellant to moderate work and lifting up to 20 pounds.
In a December 3, 2010 injured workers’ status report, an OWCP counselor, noted that
appellant returned to full-time employment on January 20, 2010 as a modified rural carrier.
Appellant began taking time off from work and did not work consistently for 60 days by
March 21, 2010. She was ultimately terminated from her employment for cause in June 2010.
In letters dated February 18, 2011, OWCP requested additional information regarding
appellant’s compensation claim for the period February 12 to April 3, 2010. It requested she
provide a statement identifying the activities she had performed since the date of injury that
caused an increase in her lumbar pain or affected her low back. OWCP also asked for medical
evidence showing that she was examined on or immediately prior to her stopping work. It also
informed her that it was unable to authorize physical therapy and requested a physician’s report
explaining why she needed physical therapy for her July 26, 2006 employment injury.
In a March 3, 2011 statement, appellant noted that she returned to light duty in
January 2010. She explained that she underwent physical therapy and massage after returning to
work because she still experienced pain. Appellant reported that returning to work aggravated
her injury and caused her pain to the point that she had to stay home from work on March 23,
2010 and from April 3 to 5, 2010. She explained that everything she does aggravated her injury
and it did not matter what it is or what she did, but she would always be in pain. Appellant
related that she was out of work from March 23 to April 3, 2010, left early or came in late from
April 9 to 12, 2010 and underwent physical therapy treatments from April 5 to 12, 2010. She
was placed on administrative leave on April 15, 2010, but she continued to go to physical and
massage therapy until June 2010. Appellant noted that she had not worked since April 15, 2010.
In a decision dated March 22, 2011, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding insufficient
medical evidence establishing that she was disabled during this period as a result of her July 26,
2006 employment injury.
On April 11, 2011 appellant requested a review of the written record and submitted
additional medical evidence, most of which was previously submitted.
In a May 7, 2011 statement, appellant explained that she returned to modified duty in
January 2010. Her duties included cleaning machines and bathrooms, delivering express mail,
answering telephones and laminating parcel markers which required her to stretch, squat, stoop,
bend, sit, stand and drive a vehicle. Appellant explained that these activities caused her back
pain. She stated that the physical and massage therapy was necessary to help her endure the pain
of returning to work for eight hours a day. Appellant noted that after she worked for a few
weeks, she missed work for over a week because of her back pain. She concluded that returning
to work aggravated her condition and that physical and massage therapy was necessary to help
ease her pain.

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By decision dated June 28, 2011, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed the March 22,
2011 decision denying appellant’s claim for disability compensation on the grounds of
insufficient medical evidence.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
A recurrence of disability means an inability to work after an employee has returned to
work, caused by a spontaneous change in a medical condition, which resulted from a previous
injury or illness without an intervening injury or new exposure to the work environment that
caused the illness.3 This term also means an inability to work when a light-duty assignment
made specifically to accommodate an employee’s physical limitations due to his work-related
injury or illness is withdrawn (except when such withdrawal occurs for reasons of misconduct,
nonperformance of job duties or a reduction-in-force) or when the physical requirements of such
an assignment are altered so that they exceed her established physical limitations.4 Moreover,
when the claimed recurrence of disability follows a return to light-duty work, the employee may
satisfy her burden of proof by showing a change in the nature and extent of the injury-related
condition such that she is no longer able to perform the light-duty assignment.5
Where an employee claims a recurrence of disability due to an accepted employmentrelated injury, she has the burden of establishing that the recurrence of disability is causally
related to the original injury.6 This burden includes the necessity of furnishing evidence from a
qualified physician who concludes, on the basis of a complete and accurate factual and medical
history, that the condition is causally related to the employment injury.7 The medical evidence
must demonstrate that the claimed recurrence was caused, precipitated, accelerated or aggravated
by the accepted injury.8
Section 8103 of FECA provides for the payment of expenses incidental to the securing of
medical services, which encompasses compensation for any time missed from work due to
medical treatment for an employment-related condition.9 However, OWCP’s obligation to pay
for medical expenses and expenses incidental to obtaining medical care, such as loss of wages,
extends only to expenses incurred for treatment of the effects of any employment-related
condition.10 Appellant has the burden of proof to submit rationalized medical evidence
3

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(x).

4

Id.

5

Theresa L. Andrews, 55 ECAB 719, 722 (2004).

6

20 C.F.R. § 10.104(b); Carmen Gould, 50 ECAB 504 (1999); Robert H. St. Onge, 43 ECAB 1169 (1992).

7

Helen K. Holt, 50 ECAB 279 (1999).

8

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.2 (March 2011).

9

5 U.S.C. § 8103; Vincent E. Washington, 40 ECAB 1242 (1989).

10

Daniel Hollars, 51 ECAB 355 (2000); Antonio Mestres, 48 ECAB 139 (1996); supra note 8 at Computing
Compensation, Chapter 2.901.16(a) (December 1995).

4

establishing that the medical services were for a condition causally related to the employment
injury and that the services were medically warranted.11
ANALYSIS
OWCP accepted that appellant sustained a back condition as a result of a July 26, 2006
employment injury and placed her on the periodic rolls. She returned to work on
January 30, 2010. On January 7, 2011 OWCP received appellant’s claim for intermittent
disability compensation for the period February 12 to April 13, 2010. It denied her claim finding
insufficient medical evidence to establish that she was disabled during the claimed period as a
result of her accepted injury.
Appellant submitted CA-7a forms for 22 hours of wage-loss compenastion from
February 12 to April 13, 2010 to undergo therapy. In subsequent statements, she explained that
physical and massage therapy were necessary to help her endure her back pain after she returned
to work. The Board finds, however, that the medical evidence is insufficient to establish that
physical and massage therapy were medically necessary to treat her accepted back condition and
therefore appellant has not established that she is entitled to wage-loss compensation incidental
to this therapy.
Appellant submitted medical reports from Dr. Mardy-Davis who noted complaints of
chronic back pain for the past three years and conducted a physical examination. Dr. MardyDavis listed her diagnoses of intervertebral disc disorder with myelopathy in the lumbar region,
lumbar facet joint arthropathy, displacement of lumbar intervertebral disc and degeneration of
lumbosacral intervertebral disc. He did not explain how appellant’s current physical
examination findings supported the need for physical or massage therapy. In February 17
and 25, 2010 reports, Dr. Mardy-Davis recommended that she continue with neuromuscular
therapy. In an April 13, 2010 medical report, he generally commented that massage therapy
helped appellant with her pain and recommended she continue her physical and neuromuscular
therapy. Dr. Mardy-Davis did not, however, provide adequate medical rationale explaining how
the treatments were necessary to treat her accepted back condition or would aid in lessening the
period of disability. Without such rationalized medical opinion, the Board finds that appellant is
not entitled to wage-loss compensation during the claimed period.12
Appellant claimed disability compensation for the period March 23 to April 3, 2010 as
she was unable to work due to back pain. In an April 13, 2010 medical report, Dr. Mardy-Davis
stated that she experienced more pain after she returned to work and had to miss two full weeks
of work. He did not, however, provide sufficient opinion explaining how and why appellant was
unable to work. The Board has held that medical reports that do not provide any opinion
regarding the cause of appellant’s current condition and inability to work are of little probative
value on the issue of causal relationship.13 Furthermore, Dr. Mardy-Davis did not state the dates
11

David P. Sawchuk, 57 ECAB 316 (2005); R.L., Docket No. 08-855 (issued October 6, 2008).

12

See G.W., Docket No. 11-1159 (issued January 12, 2012).

13

S.S., 59 ECAB 315 (2008); Elizabeth H. Kramm, 57 ECAB 117 (2008); C.S., Docket No. 11-81 (issued
August 22, 2011).

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when appellant did not work but only stated generally that she was unable to work for two
weeks. Because OWCP has no obligation to pay disability compensation in the absence of any
medical evidence addressing the specific dates of disability for which compensation would
claim, the Board finds that it properly denied appellant’s claim for disability compensation.14
On appeal, appellant contends that she suffers from chronic back pain and that sometimes
the pain prevents her from working, such as on the dates she listed. She further alleged that she
has provided medical documents and written statements regarding why she missed work during
those dates. The issue of causal relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence
required to establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence.15 In this case,
the Board finds that the record does not contain a well-rationalized opinion from a physician that
establishes that appellant was unable to work from March 27 to April 3, 2010 as a result of her
July 26, 2006 employment injury. Appellant, therefore, did not meet her burden of proof to
establish that her claimed disability was causally related to her original injury.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish a recurrence
of disability for the period February 12 to April 13, 2010.

14

Amelia S. Jefferson, 57 ECAB 183 (2005); see William A. Archer, 55 ECAB 674 (2004).

15

G.T., 59 ECAB 447 (2008); Jacqueline M. Nixon-Steward, 52 ECAB 140 (2000).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 28 and March 22, 2011 decisions of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed.
Issued: March 6, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
T.G., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, COBB POST OFFICE,
Cobb, CA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Daniel M. Goodkin, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 20-1549
Issued: August 3, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 19, 2020 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a May 22, 2020
merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that a traumatic
incident occurred in the performance of duty on May 15, 2018, as alleged.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On June 4, 2018 appellant, then a 47-year-old part-time flexible letter carrier, filed a
traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on May 14, 2018 she injured her lower back,
legs, and right arm when picking up a mail cage while in the performance of duty. On the reverse
side of the claim form appellant’s supervisor indicated that the injury was caused by appellant’s
willful misconduct as she had performed an unsafe act. She further indicated that the facts
concerning the injury did not agree with statements from appellant or witnesses. Appellant stopped
work on June 1, 2018.
In support of her claim, appellant submitted an x-ray report of her lumbar spine, dated
May 31, 2018, which revealed mild degenerative changes without acute fracture or dislocation.
Appellant also submitted hospital discharge notes dated May 31 and June 11, 2018.
In a narrative statement dated May 31, 2018, appellant noted that on May 14, 2018 she
helped a mail truck driver lift a mail cage. She indicated that she felt her back pop in her lower
spine, causing a shooting pain down her legs. Appellant further noted that she informed her
coworkers, supervisor, and postmaster of the employment incident and her resultant lower back
pain. She reported that no one had contacted her regarding the incident since May 14, 2018.
Appellant asserted that her back pain had worsened and that the pain made her nauseous and
prevented her from sleeping, standing, or sitting at times. She indicated that her back pain had not
improved with medication and ice packs.
In a May 31, 2018 witness statement, J.R., appellant’s coworker, noted that on May 26,
2018 appellant informed him of the employment incident and her continuing back pain.
In a May 31, 2018 witness statement, S.N., appellant’s supervisor, noted that on May 25,
2018 appellant reported injuring her back while helping a truck driver pick up a cage. He indicated
that he did not take action because appellant did not “seem to want” it. S.N. further reported that
appellant told him that she felt a burning feeling in her back on May 29, 2018.
OWCP also received copies of e-mails, dated June 4, 2018, from S.C. and J.T., appellant’s
coworkers. S.C. and J.T. noted that appellant complained of back pain on May 14, 2018 after
helping a truck driver lift a cage. They indicated that appellant continued to work after the
employment incident.
In a June 7, 2018 witness statement, R.L., a contractor for the employing establishment,
noted that on May 14, 2018 he was unloading mail cages onto a lift gate. He indicated that
appellant helped him lift a cage despite him telling her that he could handle it. R.L. reported that
appellant responded affirmatively when he asked her if she was all right.
In a letter dated June 8, 2018, M.L., appellant’s supervisor, noted that appellant reported
the alleged employment incident on May 31, 2018. She indicated that she heard of the incident in
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passing, but did not begin the accident reporting process until May 31, 2018 when appellant
reported the incident directly.
In a separate letter of even date, M.L. controverted appellant’s claim asserting that
appellant delayed reporting the employment incident and continued to work without restrictions.
She further asserted that appellant had complained of headaches in the past and had attendance
issues. M.L. contended that appellant’s statement of the employment incident did not concur with
other witness statements.
In a June 11, 2018 report, Katherine Pisesky, a nurse practitioner, noted that appellant
experienced back pain after helping a coworker lift a cage at work. She examined appellant and
diagnosed lumbosacral strain.
By development letter dated June 22, 2018, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence
of record was insufficient to establish her claim. It advised her of the type of factual and medical
evidence needed and provided a questionnaire for her completion. OWCP afforded appellant 30
days to submit the necessary evidence.
OWCP subsequently received lumbar spine magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan
reports dated June 18, 2015 through June 21, 2018.
Appellant submitted reports and work excuse notes, dated May 31 through July 16, 2018,
from nurse practitioners, who listed appellant’s work restrictions and provided updates of her
treatment related to her back pain.
In a June 11, 2018 emergency department report, Dr. Jared Greenholz, a Board-certified
emergency medicine specialist, noted that appellant complained of a back injury sustained on
May 14, 2018. He indicated that appellant “assisted [a] man who was yelling at her to help him
after he fell by attempting to lift a cage.” Dr. Greenholz reported that appellant felt a pop in her
lumbar spine when lifting the cage and experienced immediate pain that had progressively
worsened. He provided physical examination findings and diagnosed lumbosacral strain.
Appellant submitted emergency department discharge notes and a work excuse note from
Dr. Gary Young, a Board-certified emergency medicine specialist, dated June 27, 2018.
In a June 29, 2018 statement, appellant clarified that the employment incident occurred on
Tuesday, May 15, 2018. She asserted that she informed her supervisor, M.L., of the incident that
day and indicated that M.L. gave her ibuprofen and work restrictions. Appellant noted that M.L.
did not offer to send her to the hospital or give her any forms. She reported that she informed her
coworkers, J.R., S.N., S.C., and J.T., of the employment incident and her back pain. Appellant
alleged that R.L., a contractor for the employing establishment, was not present on the date of the
employment incident.
In progress reports, dated July 2 and 16, 2018, Dr. Daniel Weinberg, a Board-certified
specialist in family medicine, diagnosed lumbar spine sprain and held appellant off work.
On July 16, 2018 appellant responded to OWCP’s development questionnaire. She
reiterated her account of the employment incident and noted that the date of the incident was
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May 15, 2018. Appellant indicated that she informed her coworkers, supervisor, and postmaster
of the incident.
By decision dated July 25, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that the factual
evidence of record was insufficient to establish that the alleged event occurred on May 15, 2018
as described. It concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been met to establish an injury
as defined by FECA.
OWCP subsequently received a June 27, 2018 report from Dr. Young who noted that
appellant injured her back at work on May 14, 2018. Dr. Young examined appellant and
diagnosed acute left-sided low back pain with left-sided sciatica. In an accompanying emergency
department note, he advised that appellant was unable to perform her usual work.
On August 21, 2018 appellant requested a review of the written record before a
representative of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review.
In support of her request, appellant submitted a lumbar spine MRI scan report dated
August 6, 2018, which revealed no significant interval change.
Dr. Young, in an August 6, 2018 report, noted that appellant felt a pop in her low back
when helping a truck driver lift a cage on May 15, 2018. He examined appellant and diagnosed
acute exacerbation of chronic low back pain.
In a letter dated October 25, 2018, Dr. Kimberly Fordham, a Board-certified family
practitioner, described the employment incident and opined that appellant’s conditions were
related to the bending, lifting, and twisting motion of the lower back that occurred on
May 15, 2018.
By decision dated November 5, 2018, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed the
July 25, 2018 decision.
OWCP subsequently received notes, dated August 8 through 21, 2018, from Ms. Jordan
who described appellant’s treatment and provided physical examination findings.
In an October 22, 2018 response, counsel argued that appellant’s account of the
employment incident was detailed and consistent. She asserted that the truck drivers’ statement
was self-serving and dishonest and should not be considered. Counsel contended that appellant
helped lift a cage of mail to assist in keeping the mail moving despite not being specifically
authorized to do so. She noted that appellant’s coworkers were not qualified to assess her pain or
medical conditions. Counsel argued that there was no strong or persuasive evidence to refute
appellant’s claim that she injured her back while helping a truck driver lift a cage of mail. She
explained that while appellant originally listed the date of the incident as May 14, 2018 and not
May 15, 2018, this was a simple error that had promptly been corrected in the record. Counsel
noted that the postmaster’s statement conflicted with appellant’s supervisor’s statement regarding
the date that appellant reported the incident. She contended that appellant’s case should be
remanded for further development and adjudication based on the medical evidence and appellant’s
statements.

4

On November 30, 2018 appellant requested reconsideration.
In support of her request, appellant submitted a July 25, 2018 statement from M.C., a
postmaster, who noted that appellant informed him of the employment incident on May 31, 2018.
M.C. advised appellant to write a statement and report the incident to the employing establishment.
Appellant also submitted statements from her friends and former employer, dated October 3
through November 26, 2018, who attested to her honesty.
In September 5 and December 10, 2018 duty status reports (Form CA-17), a November 12,
2018 restriction assessment, and a December 10, 2018 work excuse note, appellant’s work
restrictions were noted.
A lumbar spine MRI scan report addendum dated October 25, 2018 revealed a small left
paracentral disc protrusion at L4-5 that was likely not clinically significant.
In an October 31, 2018 report, Dr. Marcia Luisi, a Board-certified specialist in physical
medicine and rehabilitation, noted that appellant experienced pain and numbness in her lower back
and left leg after feeling a pop in her back on May 15, 2018. She examined appellant and reviewed
an electromyography and nerve conduction studies. Dr. Luisi found no electrodiagnostic evidence
of left lumbosacral radiculopathy or plexopathy. She recommended x-rays of appellant’s lower
back and physical therapy treatment.
In a November 6, 2018 report, Dr. Parinaz Azari, a Board-certified physical medicine and
rehabilitation specialist, noted that appellant had chronic low back pain after a work incident on
May 15, 2019. She provided physical examination findings.
In a December 1, 2018 statement, appellant reiterated her account of the employment
incident and disputed her coworkers’ statements, noting that they were not qualified to assess her
medical conditions.
By decision dated January 23, 2019, OWCP denied modification of the November 5, 2018
decision.
On February 19, 2019 appellant requested reconsideration.
By decision dated March 28, 2019, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration
of the merits of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
On January 22, 2020 appellant, through counsel, again requested reconsideration. Counsel
argued that the witness statements of record showed that appellant promptly reported the
employment incident. She asserted that there were no serious inconsistencies with regard to the
material allegations made by appellant and that the date of the employment incident was clarified.
Counsel attached a statement from appellant who explained that R.L., a contractor for the
employing establishment, was not present on May 15, 2018. Appellant asserted that a sub driver
was present on the date of the employment incident and provided a description and sketch of the
driver. She indicated that she contacted R.L. who confirmed that he was not present on
May 15, 2018.

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By decision dated May 22, 2020, OWCP denied modification of the January 23, 2019
decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA3 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable
time limitation period of FECA,4 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty, as
alleged, and that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally
related to the employment injury.5 These are the essential elements of each and every
compensation claim, regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an
occupational disease.6
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty it must first be determined whether fact of injury has been established.7
Generally, fact of injury consists of two components that must be considered in conjunction with
one another. First, the employee must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he or she actually
experienced the employment incident at the time, place, and in the manner alleged.8 Second, the
employee must submit sufficient evidence to establish that the employment incident caused a
personal injury.9
An employee’s statement that an injury occurred at a given time and in a given manner is
of great probative value and will stand unless refuted by strong or persuasive evidence.10
Moreover, an injury does not have to be confirmed by eyewitnesses. The employee’s statement,
however, must be consistent with the surrounding facts and circumstances and his or her
subsequent course of action. An employee has not met his or her burden of proof to establish the
occurrence of an injury when there are such inconsistencies in the evidence as to cast serious doubt
upon the validity of the claim. Circumstances such as late notification of injury, lack of
3

Id.

4

J.P., Docket No. 19-0129 (issued April 26, 2019); S.B., Docket No. 17-1779 (issued February 7, 2018); Joe D.
Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).
5

J.M., Docket No. 17-0284 (issued February 7, 2018); R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40
ECAB 312 (1988).
6

R.R., Docket No. 19-0048 (issued April 25, 2019); L.M., Docket No. 13-1402 (issued February 7, 2014);
Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).
7

T.A., Docket No. 20-1284 (issued January 27, 2021); T.H., 59 ECAB 388, 393-94 (2008).

8

M.F., Docket No. 19-0578 (issued January 26, 2021); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

9

G.E., Docket No. 20-1081 (issued January 26, 2021); B.M., Docket No. 17-0796 (issued July 5, 2018); John J.
Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989).
10
C.R., Docket No. 20-1147 (issued January 5, 2021); M.S., Docket No. 18-0059 (issued June 12, 2019); D.B., 58
ECAB 464, 466-67 (2007).

6

confirmation of injury, continuing to work without apparent difficulty following the alleged injury,
and failure to obtain medical treatment may, if otherwise unexplained, cast doubt on an employee’s
statement in determining whether a prima facie case has been established.11
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that a traumatic
incident occurred in the performance of duty on May 15, 2018, as alleged.
In a May 31, 2018 narrative statement, appellant alleged that on May 14, 2018 she assisted
a truck driver with lifting a mail cage. She indicated that she felt her back pop in her lower spine
causing a shooting pain down her legs. Appellant noted that she informed her coworkers,
supervisor, and postmaster of the employment incident and her lower back pain. In a June 29,
2018 statement, appellant clarified that the employment incident occurred on May 15, 2018. She
asserted that she informed her supervisor, M.L., of the incident on that date and indicated that M.L.
gave her ibuprofen and work restrictions. Appellant alleged that R.L., a contractor for the
employing establishment, was not present on the date of the employment incident.
In witness statements and e-mails, dated May 31 through June 8, 2018, appellant’s
coworkers and supervisors corroborated appellant’s account of the employment incident and the
fact that she informed them of the incident and her back pain. The employing establishment
controverted appellant’s claim, arguing that she delayed reporting the employment incident.
However, in a May 31, 2018 witness statement, S.N., appellant’s supervisor, noted that appellant
reported the employment incident, but he did not take action because appellant did not “seem to
want” it and that she continued to work. Additionally, in a letter dated June 8, 2018, M.L.,
appellant’s supervisor, noted that she heard of the incident in passing, but did not begin the accident
reporting process until May 31, 2018 when appellant reported the incident directly. The
employing establishment also contended that appellant’s statement was not consistent with R.L.’s
June 7, 2018 witness statement who indicated that appellant helped him lift a cage despite him
telling her that he could handle it. However, in a January 22, 2020 statement, appellant clarified
that R.L. was not present on May 15, 2018. She asserted that a different driver was present on the
date of the employment incident and provided a description and sketch of the driver.
The Board finds that appellant clarified the date of the incident and contemporaneously
sought medical treatment. She submitted extensive medical evidence, including an August 6, 2018
report from Dr. Young, an October 25, 2018 letter by Dr. Fordham, and an October 31, 2018 report
from Dr. Luisi, which provided a single account of the mechanism of injury that has not been
refuted by any evidence in the record.12 As noted above, a claimant’s statement that an injury
occurred at a given time and place, and in a given manner is of great probative value and will stand
unless refuted by strong or persuasive evidence.13 Appellant’s account of the incident is consistent
with the surrounding facts and circumstances and her subsequent course of action does not cast
11

K.F., Docket No. 18-0485 (issued February 18, 2020); D.R., Docket No. 19-0072 (issued June 24, 2019).

12

G.E., supra note 9.

13

Supra note 10.

7

doubt on the validity of her claim.14 The Board therefore finds that appellant has established that
the employment incident occurred, as alleged, on May 15, 2018. Appellant has, thus, established
the first component of fact of injury.15
As appellant has established that the May 15, 2018 employment incident factually occurred
as alleged, the question becomes whether the incident caused an injury.16 As OWCP found that
appellant had not established fact of injury, it did not evaluate the medical evidence. The Board
will therefore set aside OWCP’s May 22, 2020 decision and remand the case for consideration of
the medical evidence of record.17 After such further development as deemed necessary, OWCP
shall issue a de novo decision addressing whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish
a medical condition causally related to the accepted May 15, 2018 employment incident.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that a traumatic
incident occurred in the performance of duty on May 15, 2018, as alleged. The Board further finds
that the case is not in posture for decision regarding whether she has established a medical
condition causally related to the May 15, 2018 employment incident.

14

L.F., Docket No. 19-1275 (issued October 29, 2020).

15

Supra note 8.

16

Supra note 9.

17

T.A., supra note 77.

8

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 22, 2020 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this decision of the Board.
Issued: August 3, 2021
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

9