United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
New York, NY, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 09-1258
Issued: March 16, 2010

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 16, 2009 appellant filed a timely appeal from a March 30, 2009 decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has established that she sustained injuries to her left hand,
left wrist, left arm and left shoulder in the performance of duty.
FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant, a 56-year-old mail handler, filed a Form CA-1 claim for benefits on
August 15, 2007, alleging that she strained her left hand and left arm while pulling a mail cart on
July 25, 2007. She indicated on the form that she was experiencing carpal tunnel syndrome
(CTS) in her left hand, which radiated into her left shoulder; she also stated that she had tingling
in the left finger with sharp pain up the left arm.

Appellant submitted an August 6, 2007 disability slip, received by the Office on
August 15, 2007, from Dr. Leo Parnes, an osteopath, who stated that she had been disabled since
July 31, 2007 due to left shoulder bursitis and CTS. Dr. Parnes advised that she was scheduled
to return to work on August 13, 2007.
By letter dated August 20, 2007, the Office advised appellant that she needed to submit
additional factual and medical evidence in support of her claim. It stated that she had 30 days to
submit the requested information.
In an August 28, 2007 form report, Dr. Parnes stated that on July 25, 2007 appellant was
pulling a heavy post cart from the elevator to the mail sorter when she experienced pain and
numbness in the left hand, with tingling and numbness in the fingers of the left hand. He also
indicated that she had pain radiating up the left hand into the left wrist, left forearm and left
shoulder, in addition to severe pain in the left shoulder with limited abduction of the left arm at
the shoulder. Dr. Parnes opined that appellant was totally disabled.
In an August 15, 2007 letter from appellant’s supervisor, Harvey Outlaw, received by the
Office on August 28, 2007, the employing establishment contraverted the claim. Mr. Outlaw
stated that, on August 13, 2007, appellant had just returned from being absent from work since
July 25, 2007.1 He stated that when she initially reported the alleged accident on August 13, 2007,
she stated that she had told him and supervisor, Marcella Robinson, about the injury on the day it
happened but alleged that they both failed to complete the proper paperwork. Mr. Outlaw stated,
however, that when appellant was questioned on August 15, 2007 by supervisor Susan Curate,
appellant acknowledged that she had told Mr. Robinson and Mr. Outlaw only that she was not
feeling well and that her arm hurt. Mr. Outlaw asserted that she admitted to Ms. Curate and
Mr. Outlaw that she did not tell either supervisor that she had hurt herself while performing her
work duties.
Mr. Outlaw stated that at no time during the course of the 18 calendar days appellant was
away from work did she give notice to any of her supervisors that she had sustained a work-related
injury and was absent due to this injury. He noted that she made seven telephone calls to the
worksite during her absence to report that she was not coming in to work; however, she never
mentioned during any of these calls that her absence was caused by the alleged accident.
Mr. Outlaw also stated that appellant did not seek medical attention until 13 days after the alleged
injury occurred. He asserted that the illnesses diagnosed on appellant’s medical report are not
those typically caused by a single incident.
In a Form CA-16 report dated September 10, 2007, Dr. Parnes indicated that appellant
sustained an injury to her left hand, left wrist, left arm and left shoulder on July 25, 2007 while
pushing a heavy cart. He stated that she had left shoulder bursitis; left CTS; left shoulder spasm
and pain; left arm and wrist spasm and pain; numbness in fingers of the left hand; left wrist
sprain; left shoulder sprain; and an unspecified injury to the left wrist and left hand. On the
form, Dr Parnes responded yes to the question of whether the condition found was caused or
aggravated by the employment activities.
1

Mr. Outlaw stated that appellant was on scheduled leave on July 26, 2007.

2

In a Form CA-17 report dated August 20, 2007, received by the Office on September 10,
2007, Dr. Parnes advised that appellant sustained injuries to her left hand, left wrist, left arm and
left shoulder on July 25, 2007 while pushing a heavy cart. He indicated, however, that the history
of injury she provided was not consistent with the injuries she sustained. Appellant noted left
shoulder bursitis; left CTS; left shoulder spasm and pain; left arm and wrist spasm and pain;
numbness in fingers of the left hand; left wrist sprain; left shoulder sprain; and an unspecified
injury to the left wrist and left hand. On the form, Dr. Parnes responded yes to the question of
whether the condition found was caused or aggravated by the employment activities.
In an August 24, 2007 disability slip, received by the Office on September 20, 2007,
Dr. Parnes reiterated his previously stated diagnoses and indicated that appellant’s date of injury
was July 25, 2007. He also stated that she had been disabled since July 26, 2007. Dr. Parnes
advised that appellant would be totally disabled for an indefinite period of time.
By decision dated September 25, 2007, the Office denied appellant’s claim, finding that she
failed to establish fact of injury. It stated that she failed to submit a clear statement regarding the
basis of her claim; it, therefore, found that the factual basis of her claim was unclear and
insufficient to establish that the incident occurred on the date, at the time and in the manner she
alleged. The Office further found that the medical evidence appellant submitted lacked sufficient
medical rationale to establish that the claimed diagnoses were sustained in connection with the
reported incident.
On October 20, 2007 appellant requested a review of the written record.
In a report dated August 20, 2007, received by the Office on November 1, 2007,
Dr. Parnes stated that appellant sustained an injury by pulling a heavy mail cart from the elevator
to the flat sorter. Dr. Parnes indicated that as a result of this injury she developed pain in the left
hand, left wrist, left arm and left shoulder with numbness in the fingers of the left hand. He
noted on examination that appellant sustained traumatic contusion and sprain of the left shoulder
and left wrist, which caused pain along the left arm and limited movement of the left arm at the
shoulder, in addition to numbness in the fingers of the left hand and CTS. Dr. Parnes also noted
left-sided neck pain.
Dr. Parnes also stated that appellant had sustained a traumatic contusion and sprain of the
left shoulder with internal derangement and pain radiating up to the left side of the neck and
down the left arm. He advised that she also had a traumatic contusion and sprain of the left wrist
and left hand with edema and CTS.
In a September 11, 2007 report, received by the Office on November 30, 2007,
Dr. Howard I. Baum, Board-certified in orthopedic surgery, related that appellant sustained an
injury to his right arm while working as a mail handler on July 25, 2007 while pulling a heavy
cart. Dr. Baum advised that she experienced tingling to the left upper extremity from her neck
and pain with tingling and numbness into the left fingers.
In an October 24, 2007 statement, appellant reiterated that on July 25, 2007 she sustained
a traumatic injury to her left arm and hand by pulling on a heavy mail cart.

3

By decision dated February 13, 2008, an Office hearing representative affirmed the
September 25, 2007 Office decision.
On December 17, 2008 appellant requested reconsideration.
In a December 5, 2008 report, received by the Office on December 29, 2007, Dr. Parnes
reiterated that appellant was injured on July 25, 2007 while pulling a heavy postal cart, injuring
her neck, left shoulder and left wrist. He advised that this incident was so severe that appellant
had been unable to return to work due to her severe pain since August 16, 2007. Dr. Parnes
indicated that she experienced persistent spasms and pain in her neck, left shoulder and left wrist,
with decreased range of motion at the cervical spine and multiple tender points as well as along
the cervical spine. He stated that on examination appellant sustained a traumatic cervical
derangement with sprain, strain and spasm with painful, spastic and significantly limited rotation
of the cervical spine to the left at 60 degrees with pain radiating to the left side of the neck.
Dr. Parnes related that she had painful, spastic and significantly limited rotation of the cervical
spine to the right at 60 degrees with pain radiating to the right side of the neck. He noted that
appellant was evaluated by a neurologist who had her undergo a magnetic resonance imaging
scan; the results of this test revealed herniations and bulging discs at multiple cervical disc
levels.
Dr. Parnes advised that examination of the left wrist revealed a sustained traumatic sprain
and strain and limited range of motion. He noted that appellant still suffered from intense pain
and stiffness of the left shoulder and left wrist. Dr. Parnes concluded that, as a result of her
various injuries, she had been disabled from work since August 16, 2007. He opined that the
injuries appellant sustained in the July 25, 2007 work incident resulted in a permanent, totally
disabling condition, which prevented her from performing all of her usual daily activities and
limited her functioning of the injured areas. Dr. Parnes noted that she had sustained severe
ligamentous and discogenic injuries to the cervical spine, including bulging and herniated discs
and a left rotator cuff tear, which had caused her to become incapacitated from performing any
type of work, even sedentary work. He stated that appellant was unable to climb, pull, push,
crouch, balance, crawl, bend, reach or lift; she was unable to walk, sit or stand for more than two
hours in an eight-hour day and required frequent periods of rest where she had to lie down.
By decision dated March 30, 2009, the Office denied modification of its prior decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 has the
burden of establishing that the essential elements of his or her claim including the fact that the
individual is an “employee of the United States” within the meaning of the Act, that the claim was
timely filed within the applicable time limitation period of the Act, that an injury was sustained in
the performance of duty as alleged and that any disability and/or specific condition for which
compensation is claimed are causally related to the employment injury.3 These are the essential
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

3

Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

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elements of each and every compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon
a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.4
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty, it must first be determined whether a “fact of injury” has been established.
First, the employee must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he or she actually experienced
the employment incident at the time, place and in the manner alleged.5 Second, the employee must
submit sufficient evidence, generally only in the form of medical evidence, to establish that the
employment incident caused a personal injury.6
The Office cannot accept fact of injury if there are such inconsistencies in the evidence as
to seriously question whether the specific event or incident occurred at the time, place and in the
manner alleged or whether the alleged injury was in the performance of duty,7 nor can the Office
find fact of injury if the evidence fails to establish that the employee sustained an “injury” within
the meaning of the Act. An injury does not have to be confirmed by eyewitnesses in order to
establish the fact that an employee sustained an injury in the performance of duty, as alleged, but
the employee’s statements must be consistent with surrounding facts and circumstances and her
subsequent course of action.8 Such circumstances as late notification of injury, lack of
confirmation of injury, continuing to work without apparent difficulty following the alleged
injury and failure to obtain medical treatment may cause doubt on an employee’s statements in
determining whether he or she has established his or her claim.9
ANALYSIS
In the present case, the Office found that the record contained conflicting and inconsistent
evidence regarding whether the claimed event occurred at the time, place and in the manner
alleged. It noted that although appellant stated on her CA-1 form and in her October 24, 2007
statement that she injured herself while pulling a cart on July 25, 2007, she failed to provide a clear
account of the manner in which the July 25, 2007 incident resulted in her claimed injury. The
Office concluded that she did not establish that she sustained the injury in the performance of duty
on July 25, 2007. The Board finds, however, that appellant presented sufficient evidence to
establish that she injured her left hand, left wrist, left arm and left shoulder at the time, place and in
the manner alleged.10 The Board notes that appellant’s supervisor, Mr. Outlaw, did not consider
her injury work related because she made no mention of any accident which allegedly occurred
4

Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989).

5

John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989).

6

Id. For a definition of the term “injury,” see 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(e)(e).

7

Elaine Pendleton, supra note 3.

8

See Gene A. McCracken, Docket No. 93-2227 (issued March 9, 1995); Joseph H. Surgener, 42 ECAB 541,
547 (1991).
9

See Constance G. Patterson, 41 ECAB 206 (1989).

10

Id.

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on July 25, 2007 until August 13, 2007, despite the fact that she called the employing
establishment seven times while off work during that period. He asserted that appellant merely
stated on July 25, 2007 that she was not feeling well and that her arm hurt; she did not indicate
that this was work related or that her absence was due to a work-related incident. Mr. Outlaw
also expressed skepticism regarding the work relatedness of appellant’s left hand, wrist, arm and
shoulder injuries because she did not seek medical attention until 13 days after the alleged injury
occurred.
As stated above, however, the Board has held that an employee’s statement alleging that an
injury occurred at a given time and in a given manner is of great probative value and will stand
unless refuted by strong or persuasive evidence.11 Although no one witnessed the incident and
Mr. Outlaw did not believe appellant’s account of how the injury occurred, her statement that she
experienced pain on July 25, 2007 while pulling a cart was not contradicted by any evidence in the
record. In addition, appellant sought medical attention on August 6, 2007, less than two weeks
after the date that she allegedly sustained injuries to her left wrist, hand, arm and shoulder causally
related to her employment. Dr. Parnes initially indicated in his August 20, 2007 CA-17 form
report that he did not believe that the conditions appellant had were caused by the type of accident
she described. In several subsequent reports he submitted, however, dated August 20, 24 and 28,
2007 and December 5, 2008, Dr. Parnes stated unequivocally that appellant sustained these injuries
on July 25, 2007 at the place and in the manner she described.12
The Board finds that the totality of this evidence, which includes appellant’s August 15,
2007 statement and a report indicating that she was examined and treated for left shoulder and
wrist conditions on August 6, 2007, approximately two weeks after she allegedly experienced
significant pain in her left hand, wrist, arm and shoulder, is sufficient to establish that she sustained
the alleged employment incident in the performance of duty on July 25, 2007. The Office
controverted the claim and contended that she did not experience the incident as alleged on the date
in question. However, the record contains no contemporaneous factual evidence indicating that the
claimed July 25, 2007 work incident did not occur as alleged.13 Under the circumstances of this
case, therefore, the Board finds that appellant’s allegations have not been refuted by sufficiently
strong or persuasive evidence. The Board finds that the evidence of record is sufficient to establish
that the incident involving her left hand, wrist, arm and shoulder on July 25, 2007 occurred at the
time, place and in the manner alleged.
The Board finds, however, that appellant failed to submit rationalized medical opinion
evidence to sufficiently describe or explain the medical process by which the claimed July 25,
2007 work incident would have been competent to cause the claimed injuries. In this regard, the
Board has held that the mere fact that a condition manifests itself during a period of employment
does not raise an inference that there is a causal relationship between the two.14
11

Constance G. Patterson, supra note 9; Thelma S. Buffington, 34 ECAB 104 (1982).

12

The Board notes that Dr. Baum presented the same history of injury in his September 11, 2007 report.

13

See Thelma Rogers, 42 ECAB 866 (1991).

14

See Joe T. Williams, 44 ECAB 518, 521 (1993).

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An award of compensation may not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation.
Neither the fact that appellant’s condition became apparent during a period of employment nor
the belief that his condition was caused, precipitated or aggravated by his employment is
sufficient to establish causal relationship.15 Causal relationship must be established by
rationalized medical opinion evidence and appellant failed to submit such evidence.
Dr. Parnes noted in several reports from August and September 2007 that appellant had
been experiencing pain and numbness in the left hand; tingling and numbness in the fingers of
the left hand; pain radiating up the left hand into the left wrist, left forearm and left shoulder; and
severe pain in the left shoulder with limited abduction of the left arm at the shoulder. He stated
that she had left shoulder bursitis; left CTS; left shoulder spasm and pain; left arm and wrist
spasm and pain; numbness in fingers of the left hand; left wrist sprain; left shoulder sprain; and
an unspecified injury to the left wrist and left hand. Dr. Parnes opined that appellant was totally
disabled during this period due to these injuries. These reports, however, are not probative with
regard to causal relationship because they do not contain rationalized medical opinion
evidence.16 In addition, Dr. Parnes failed to present a diagnosis of appellant’s condition causally
related to the July 25, 2007 employment injury. Dr. Baum stated the history of injury, stated
findings on examination noted that she experienced tingling to the left upper extremity from her
neck and pain with tingling and numbness into the left fingers. However, he did not provide an
opinion regarding the work relatedness of appellant’s alleged conditions. There is no indication
in the record, therefore, that her claimed left hand, wrist, arm and shoulder conditions were work
related.
In his December 5, 2008 report, Dr. Parnes stated that appellant experienced persistent
spasms and pain in her neck, left shoulder and left wrist, with decreased range of motion and
pain in the cervical spine. He diagnosed traumatic sprain and strain of the left wrist and
traumatic cervical derangement with sprain, strain and spasm. Dr. Parnes opined that the injuries
appellant sustained in the July 25, 2007 work incident resulted in a permanent, totally disabling
condition which prohibited her from performing her daily activities and limited her functioning
of the injured areas. He prescribed restrictions on climbing, walking, sitting and standing, in
addition to prohibiting pulling, pushing, crouching, balancing, crawling, bending, reaching and
lifting. This report, however, is of limited probative value in that Dr. Parnes did not provide
adequate medical rationale in support of his conclusions.17 He did not describe appellant’s
accident in any detail or how the accident would have been competent to cause the claimed hand,
wrist, arm and shoulder conditions. Moreover, Dr. Parnes’ opinion is of limited probative value
for the further reason that it is generalized in nature and equivocal in that he only noted
summarily that appellant’s conditions were causally related to the July 25, 2007 incident in

15

Id.

16

Furthermore, the September 20, 2007 CA-16 form report from Dr. Parnes which supports causal relationship
with a checkmark is insufficient to establish the claim, as the Board has held that without further explanation or
rationale, a checked box is not sufficient to establish causation. Debra S. King, 44 ECAB 203 (1992); Salvatore
Dante Roscello, 31 ECAB 247 (1979).
17

William C. Thomas, 45 ECAB 591 (1994).

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which she was pulling a heavy mail cart.18 The weight of medical opinion is determined by the
opportunity for and thoroughness of examination, the accuracy and completeness of physician’s
knowledge of the facts of the case, the medical history provided, the care of analysis manifested
and the medical rationale expressed in support of stated conclusions.19 Appellant failed to
provide a rationalized, probative medical opinion relating her current condition to any factors of
her employment. Therefore, she failed to provide a medical report from a physician that the
work incident of July 25, 2007 caused or contributed to the claimed left hand, wrist, arm and
shoulder injuries.
The Office advised appellant of the evidence required to establish her claim; however,
she failed to submit such evidence. Appellant, therefore, did not provide a medical opinion to
sufficiently describe or explain the medical process through which the July 25, 2007 work
incident would have caused the claimed injuries. Accordingly, as she has failed to submit any
probative medical evidence establishing that she sustained injuries to her left hand, wrist, arm
and shoulder in the performance of duty, the Office properly denied her claim for compensation.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office properly found that appellant failed to meet her burden of
proof to establish that she sustained injuries to her left hand, left wrist, left arm and left shoulder
in the performance of duty.

18

The Board notes that Dr. Parnes made findings regarding a cervical condition, which he also attributed to the
July 25, 2007 work incident. However, appellant did not claim a cervical injury based on the July 25, 2007 incident
in her August 15, 2007 CA-1 form or at any time subsequently.
19

See Anna C. Leanza, 48 ECAB 115 (1996).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 30, 2009 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed, as modified.
Issued: March 16, 2010
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
Y.K., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
NORTH TEXAS HEALTH CARE SYSTEM,
Dallas, TX, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 10-1296
Issued: March 7, 2011

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 24, 2010 appellant filed a timely appeal from a March 5, 2010 decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs denying her claim for wage-loss compensation.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of the
claim.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant established that she was disabled for work 16.25 hours to
attend four medical appointments July 9 to 28, 2009.
On appeal, appellant asserted that new evidence accompanying her appeal request
established that she attended medical appointments on July 9, 15, 21 and 28, 2009, incurring
16.25 hours of wage loss.

FACTUAL HISTORY
The Office accepted that on June 20, 2008 appellant, then a 56-year-old traveling
registered nurse, sustained rib and finger fractures, a dislocated right little finger, a right shoulder
injury, neck and back sprains, displaced lumbar discs, contusions of the chest, thorax and left leg
in a motor vehicle accident while returning from a patient home care visit. It also accepted a
transfusion reaction due to treatment related to the accepted injuries. Appellant received
wage-loss compensation for temporary total disability through September 28, 2008. She
returned to full-time light duty on September 29, 2008.1 Appellant remained under medical care
and participated in physical therapy through September 2009. She received wage loss for
intermittent work absences to attend medical appointments.
On July 14 and 31, 2009 appellant filed a claim for 16.25 hours of wage loss to attend
medical appointments from July 9 to 28, 2009: 4 hours for x-rays on July 9, 2009; 4 hours for a
medical appointment on July 15, 2009; 4.25 hours for a medical appointment and physical
therapy on July 21, 2009 and 4 hours for a medical appointment and physical therapy on
July 28, 2009.
In a September 17, 2009 letter, the Office advised appellant of the evidence needed to
establish her claim for wage loss from July 9 to 28, 2009. It noted that there were no medical
reports of record to support that she attended appointments on the dates claimed. Appellant was
afforded 30 days to submit additional evidence.2 She did not submit any response.
By decision dated March 5, 2010, the Office denied appellant’s claim for wage-loss
compensation from July 9 to 28, 2009. It found that she did not submit medical documentation
supporting that she attended medical appointments on July 9, 15, 21 and 28, 2009 as claimed.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act3 has the
burden of establishing the essential elements of his or her claim by the weight of the evidence.4
Under the Act, the term disability is defined as an inability, due to an employment injury, to earn
the wages the employee was receiving at the time of injury, i.e., an impairment resulting in loss
of wage-earning capacity.5 For each period of disability claimed, the employee has the burden of

1

By decision dated February 12, 2009, the Office found a $5,282.56 overpayment of compensation as appellant
received temporary total disability compensation from September 29 to October 25, 2008 after she returned to fulltime work. This decision is not before the Board on the present appeal.
2

By decision dated September 17, 2009, the Office denied appellant’s claim for 10.5 hours of compensation from
May 24 to June 6, 2009 as she submitted insufficient evidence to establish disability for that period. This decision is
not before the Board on the present appeal.
3

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

4

Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).

5

See Prince E. Wallace, 52 ECAB 357 (2001).

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establishing that he or she was disabled for work as a result of the accepted employment injury.6
Whether a particular injury caused an employee disability for employment is a medical issue
which must be resolved by competent medical evidence.7 The Board will not require the Office
to pay compensation for disability in the absence of any medical evidence directly addressing the
specific dates of disability for which compensation is claimed. To do so would essentially allow
an employee to self-certify their disability and entitlement to compensation.8
An injured employee is entitled to compensation for lost wages incurred while obtaining
authorized medical services.9 This includes the actual time spent obtaining the medical services
and a reasonable time spent traveling to and from the medical provider’s location.10 As a matter
of practice, the Office generally limits the amount of compensation to four hours with respect to
routine medical appointments.11 Longer periods of time may be allowed when required by the
nature of the procedure or the need to travel a substantial distance to obtain the medical care.
ANALYSIS
The Office accepted that appellant sustained multiple fractures and contusions in a
June 20, 2008 motor vehicle accident. Appellant claimed a total of 16.25 hours of wage-loss
compensation for attending medical appointments on July 9, 15, 21 and 28, 2009. The Office
advised her in a September 17, 2009 letter that she must submit medical reports supporting that
she attended appointments on the dates claimed. However, appellant did not submit such
evidence.
As stated, the Office is not required to pay wage-loss compensation in the absence of
medical evidence documenting disability for the dates claimed.12 Appellant did not submit
medical documentation showing that she attended medical appointments on July 9, 15, 21 and
28, 2009. Therefore, the Office’s March 5, 2010 decision denying her claim for wage loss from
July 9 to 28, 2009 is proper under the law and facts of this case.
On appeal, appellant asserted that new evidence accompanying her appeal request
established that she attended medical appointments on July 9, 15, 21 and 28, 2009, entitling her
to 16.25 hours of wage-loss compensation as claimed. The Board may not consider evidence for
the first time on appeal that was not before the Office at the time of the final decision in the

6

Sandra D. Pruitt, 57 ECAB 126 (2005); Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001).

7

G.T., 59 ECAB 447 (2008); Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).

8

Amelia S. Jefferson, 57 ECAB 183 (2005); Fereidoon Kharabi, 52 ECAB 291 (2001).

9

5 U.S.C. § 8103(a); see Gayle L. Jackson, 57 ECAB 546 (2006).

10

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Computing Compensation, Chapter 2.901.16a
(December 1995).
11

Id. at Part 3 -- Medical, Administrative Matters, Chapter 3.900.8 (November 1998).

12

Amelia S. Jefferson, supra note 8; Fereidoon Kharabi, supra note 8.

3

case.13 Therefore, the Board will not review the documents accompanying appellant’s request
for appeal. However, appellant may submit such evidence to the Office accompanying a valid
request for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not established that she was disabled for work for
16.25 hours to attend four medical appointments from July 9 to 28, 2009.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated March 5, 2010 is affirmed.
Issued: March 7, 2011
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

13

20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c).

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.H., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Gastonia, NC, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

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Docket No. 21-0372
Issued: September 20, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER REMANDING CASE
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On July 8, 2020 appellant filed a timely appeal from a May 21, 20201 merit decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 2 The Clerk of the Appellate Boards
assigned the appeal Docket No. 21-0372.
On September 28, 2014 appellant, then a 48-year-old supervisor/letter carrier, filed a
traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on September 27, 2014 he sustained lower back
and bilateral leg, knee, and foot injuries when a coworker drove off in a vehicle as appellant was

1

The Board notes that appellant references a purported June 16, 2020 decision on his appeal form. However, the
record contains no final adverse OWCP decision dated June 16, 2020. The only final adverse OWCP decision within
the Board’s jurisdiction is dated May 21, 2020.
2

Appellant submitted a timely request for oral argument before the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.5(b). Pursuant to the
Board’s Rules of Procedure, oral argument may be held in the discretion of the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.5(a). In
support of his oral argument request, appellant asserted that he wanted to explain how his manager “dropped the ball”
regarding his return to work. The Board, in exercising its discretion, denies appellant’s request for oral argument
because this matter requires an evaluation of the medical evidence presented. As such, the arguments on appeal can
be adequately addressed in a decision based on a review of the case record. Oral argument in this appeal would further
delay issuance of a Board decision and not serve a useful purpose. As such, the oral argument request is denied and
this decision is based on the case record as submitted to the Board.

attempting to open its back door while in the performance of duty. 3 On January 14, 2015 OWCP
accepted the claim for lumbar and neck sprains. It paid appellant intermittent wage-loss
compensation on the supplemental rolls as of November 12, 2014 and on the periodic rolls for
partial disability from September 18, 2016 until April 27, 2019. Appellant returned to full-time
regular work on March 16, 2019.
Appellant filed a claim for compensation (Form CA-7) for disability for the period
February 29 through March 13, 2020.
In a development letter dated March 24, 2020, OWCP informed appellant of the
deficiencies of his claim for compensation. It advised him of the type of medical evidence
necessary to establish his claim and provided 30 days for him to submit the requested evidence.
No response was received within the allotted time.
By decision dated May 21, 2020, OWCP denied appellant’s disability claim for the period
February 29 through March 13, 2020. It noted that, while appellant claimed disability under the
current claim, it was clear he was off work under a separate claim, OWCP File No. xxxxxx824.
OWCP further noted that the employing establishment did not fail to accommodate his restrictions
under the current claim.
The Board, having duly considered the matter, finds that this case is not in posture for a
decision.
OWCP’s procedures provide that cases should be administratively combined when correct
adjudication of the issues depends on frequent cross-referencing between files. 4 For example,
where two or more separate injuries (not recurrences) have occurred on the same date, doubling is
required.5 In the instant claim, OWCP File No. xxxxxx326, OWCP accepted lumbar and neck
sprains due to the accepted September 27, 2014 employment injury. Under OWCP File No.
xxxxxx824, appellant filed a claim for a traumatic injury (Form CA-1) on January 8, 2020 alleging
that he developed an emotional condition from the same September 27, 2014 incident accepted
under the current claim, OWCP File No. xxxxxx326. In the present claim, OWCP denied
appellant’s claim for wage-loss compensation as it attributed any disability to his claim under
OWCP File No. xxxxxx824 rather than the current claim. It further found that there was no
evidence supporting appellant’s claim that work was not available within his restrictions, under
the current claim, OWCP File No. xxxxx326, or that the employing establishment failed to
accommodate those restrictions.

3

OWCP assigned the present claim OWCP File No. xxxxxx326. Appellant has a prior claim for a November 30,
2005 employment injury. OWCP assigned that claim OWCP File No. xxxxxx269 and accepted it for left upper and
lower extremity conditions, neck and thoracic sprains, and a concussion. On January 18, 2018 it administratively
combined OWCP File Nos. xxxxxx326 and xxxxx269, with the latter serving as the master file.
4

T.L., Docket No. 18-0935 (issued February 25, 2020); D.M., Docket No. 19-0340 (issued October 22, 2019);
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, File Maintenance and Management, Chapter 2.400.8(c)
(February 2000).
5

Id. at Chapter 2.400.8(c)(2) (February 2000).

2

The case record before the Board does not contain the evidence from OWCP File No.
xxxxxx824, thus, precluding a full and proper adjudication of the issue presented in the present
case, OWCP File No. xxxxxx326. Therefore, for a full and fair adjudication of appellant’s claims
pertaining to injury or illness and disability stemming from the September 27, 2014 injury, the
cases should be administratively combined pursuant to OWCP’s procedures. The case shall,
therefore, be remanded to OWCP to administratively combine File No. xxxxxx824 into master
File No. xxxxxx269. Following this and other such further development as it may deem necessary,
OWCP shall issue a de novo decision.6
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 21, 2020 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is set aside and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this order of the Board.
Issued: September 20, 2021
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6
See R.H., Docket No. 19-1467 (issued July 17, 2020); see also T.M., Docket No. 18-0887 (issued
February 21, 2019).

3


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, GREENE POST
OFFICE, Greene, NY, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Daniel M. Goodkin, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 21-0644
Issued: March 15, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 19, 2021 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an October 5,
2020 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 3

1
In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2
3

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

The Board notes that OWCP received additional evidence following the October 5, 2020 decision. However, the
Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record that
was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the Board
for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this additional
evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.

ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that the acceptance
of her claim should be expanded to include additional conditions as a consequence of the accepted
December 12, 2014 employment injury.
FACTUAL HISTORY
This case has been previously before the Board.4 The facts and circumstances as set forth
in the Board’s prior decision are incorporated herein by reference. The relevant facts are as
follows.
On January 5, 2015 appellant, then a 51-year-old rural carrier, filed a notice of recurrence
(Form CA-2a) claiming disability under OWCP File No. xxxxxx938.5 She alleged that she
reinjured her left shoulder moving mail from her vehicle to her supervisor’s vehicle on
December 12, 2014 while in the performance of duty. Appellant stopped work on that date.
OWCP converted the recurrence claim to a new traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) and assigned
OWCP File No. xxxxxx312. On January 14, 2016 OWCP accepted the claim for partial rotator
cuff tear of the left shoulder and paid appellant retroactive wage-loss compensation on the
supplemental rolls as of February 1, 2015 and on the periodic rolls as of July 24, 2016.
In a May 5, 2016 report, Dr. Thomas Van Gorder, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
diagnosed status post shoulder repair for rotator cuff tear of the left shoulder and a partial cuff tear
of the right shoulder. He noted her initial injury to her left shoulder in June 2013, and her
subsequent injury to her left shoulder in December 2014. He related that appellant had developed
discomfort in the right shoulder, noting that she did not have specific trauma to the right shoulder,
and opined that her right shoulder condition resulted from favoring her left shoulder. Dr. Van
Gorder noted that a right shoulder magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan in June 2015 revealed
a partial cuff tear and tendinitis, and that appellant was unable to obtain treatment for the right
shoulder. He also noted that the right shoulder had excellent strength and a little subacromial
crepitus.
In a July 28, 2016 report, Dr. Van Gorder diagnosed status post rotator cuff tear of the left
shoulder and a partial tear with tendinitis of the right shoulder. Regarding the right shoulder, he
explained that appellant developed impingement pain, tendinitis, and discomfort of the right
shoulder, which he opined “is definitely related to her left shoulder injury.” Dr. Van Gorder
concluded that her right shoulder condition was caused by overuse secondary to favoring her left
shoulder, which had been injured at work.
In an August 3, 2016 report, Dr. Van Gorder repeated his opinion from his July 28, 2016
report regarding the status and casual relationship of the right shoulder condition.

4

Docket No. 18-1514 (issued July 18, 2019).

5

In OWCP File No. xxxxxx938, OWCP accepted appellant’s July 22, 2013 occupational disease claim (Form
CA-2) for complete tear of the left rotator cuff.

2

In a letter dated August 29, 2016, counsel requested that the acceptance of appellant’s
claim be expanded to include the additional conditions of impingement, tendinitis, and a partial
rotator cuff tear of the right shoulder. He alleged that the conditions were a consequence of overuse
of the right shoulder due to her accepted left shoulder conditions. Counsel argued that
Dr. Van Gorder provided an unequivocal opinion and the requisite medical rationale to establish
that appellant’s right shoulder condition was related to overuse to compensate for the work-related
injury to her left shoulder.
In a development letter dated November 18, 2016, OWCP advised appellant of the
evidence needed to establish her claim for consequential injury to her right shoulder. It afforded
appellant 30 days to submit additional evidence.
OWCP thereafter received a June 12, 2015 MRI scan of the right shoulder interpreted by
Dr. Imanual Somers-Dehaney, a Board-certified diagnostic radiologist, which revealed a partial
tear of the supraspinatus partial articular surface tendon with avulsion of approximately 50 percent,
impingement on the myotendinous junction of the supraspinatus tendon with fluid along both
articular and bursal substance of subacromial subdeltoid bursa, bursitis, and biceps tendon
tenosynovitis.
On December 16, 2016 OWCP requested that a district medical adviser (DMA) provide an
opinion as to whether the accepted employment injury to appellant’s left shoulder was competent
to produce the injury to the right shoulder. It requested that the DMA review and specifically
comment on the opinion provided by Dr. Van Gorder in his July 28 and August 3, 2016 reports
regarding the conditions of right shoulder impingement, right shoulder tendinitis, and right partial
rotator cuff tear.
In a December 29, 2016 report, Dr. David J. Slutsky, a Board-certified orthopedic hand
surgeon serving as a DMA, noted appellant’s history of injury and medical treatment. Regarding
the right shoulder conditions, the DMA concluded that the acceptance of appellant’s claim should
not be expanded to include the consequential conditions of right shoulder impingement, right
shoulder tendinitis, and right partial rotator cuff tear. He advised that it was impossible to
determine with any certainty whether the left shoulder condition had caused the right shoulder
condition, unless an MRI scan of the right shoulder was performed prior to the work-related injury
of the left shoulder on December 12, 2014. The DMA explained that an asymptomatic partial right
rotator cuff tear of the right shoulder could not be ruled out and that an MRI scan of the right
shoulder prior to the December 12, 2014 left shoulder injury was “the only way to determine if
this lesion was preexisting or whether it developed following the accepted work -related injury.”
He referred to Dr. Van Gorder’s December 18, 2014 notes that appellant was pain free with normal
shoulder ROM following the left rotator cuff repair and explained that overuse of the right shoulder
was “not medically probable in view of the normal functioning of her left shoulder. ” The DMA
also reviewed Dr. Van Gorder’s medical reports dated July 28 and August 3, 2016 and noted that
appellant stopped work in December 2014 and remained off work since that time, and that there
was no mention of appellant’s right shoulder pain until May 5, 2016, almost two years later. He
further noted that appellant had a right shoulder MRI scan on June 12, 2015, more than one year
following the left rotator cuff repair, and explained that if she “had remained working in some
capacity, especially at a job that required overhead lifting, it would be reasonable to assign the
patient’s development of right shoulder pain and partial rotator cuff tear to overuse, but this is not
the case.” The DMA noted that, if additional medical records were provided that documented the
3

onset of appellant’s right shoulder pain while she was still employed by the employing
establishment or at any other job following the left rotator cuff repair, then the issue of causation
could be revisited.
By decision dated March 8, 2017, OWCP denied expansion of the acceptance of
appellant’s claim, finding that the medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish that the
conditions of right shoulder impingement, right shoulder tendinitis, and right partial rotator cuff
tear were consequential to the accepted left shoulder employment injury.
By letter dated June 20, 2017, OWCP referred appellant for a second opinion examination
with Dr. Kevin Scott, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, to assess appellant’s current condition.
An August 31, 2017 MRI scan of the right shoulder interpreted by Dr. Andrew
Goldschmidt, a Board-certified diagnostic radiologist, revealed the absence of a full-thickness
rotator cuff tear. In a July 13, 2017 report, Dr. Scott noted appellant’s history of injury and
treatment, examined appellant, and provided physical examination findings. He found full range
of motion (ROM) of both shoulders and diagnosed left shoulder rotator cuff tear. Dr. Scott
explained that there were no other injuries due to the December 12, 2014 employment injury. He
noted appellant’s preexisting left shoulder rotator cuff tear from her 2013 injury. Dr. Scott
reviewed the June 12, 2015 MRI scan of the right shoulder, which revealed partial tearing of the
supraspinatus tendon, subacromial bursitis, and biceps tendon tenosynovitis. He concluded that
the accepted conditions had resolved.
On March 6, 2018 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration. Counsel argued
that OWCP had reached a false conclusion based upon the report of the DMA, Dr. Slutsky, that
the DMA’s report should not have been relied upon, and that appellant should have been referred
for a second opinion evaluation regarding the right shoulder.
OWCP received additional medical evidence.
In a March 20, 2018 report, Dr. Michael B. Lax, Board-certified in occupational medicine,
examined appellant and provided his findings. He diagnosed bilateral rotator cuff tears. Dr. Lax
opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, appellant’s work as a rural postal
delivery worker with many years of exposure to heavy lifting (40-pound buckets of mail) in small
spaces (her delivery car), repetitive movements (upwards of 500 stops for mail), and also a few
specific events, including lifting heavy buckets of mail in December 2014 and turning in her car
to grab a package, contributed significantly to the development of both bilateral chronic shoulder
pain and rotator cuff tears.
On April 30, 2018 OWCP requested clarification from Dr. Scott, regarding whether
appellant developed a right shoulder condition as a consequence of her accepted work-related left
shoulder condition.
In a May 3, 2018 addendum, Dr. Scott noted the definition of a consequential condition,
referred to his prior report and examination, and opined, “I do not find a consequential injury for
the left or right shoulder.”
By decision dated May 29, 2018, OWCP denied modification of the March 8, 2017
decision.
4

On August 2, 2018 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from the May 29, 2018
OWCP merit decision. By decision dated July 18, 2019, the Board affirmed the May 29, 2018
decision.6
OWCP continued to receive medical evidence regarding appellant’s left shoulder
condition.
On July 17, 2020 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration and submitted a
March 7, 2018 report from Dr. Lax. Counsel argued that a conflict existed between Dr. Lax and
the DMA, Dr. Slutsky, as to whether appellant suffered a consequential injury.
In a March 7, 2018 letter, Dr. Lax noted that he saw appellant on August 8, 2017,
referenced his physical findings from August 8, 2017, and advised that appellant suffered from a
right shoulder condition characterized by a rotator cuff tear and impingement. He related that
appellant gave a history that her right shoulder became symptomatic in 2014, shortly after she had
returned to work following a left shoulder rotator cuff repair and subsequent surgical repair related
to OWCP File No. xxxxxx938. Dr. Lax explained that appellant had just recuperated from surgery
and was protecting her left shoulder and utilizing her right arm to compensate. He opined that the
“same work duties, which caused the left shoulder injury then contributed to the injury in the right
shoulder. Consequently, it is my opinion that [appellant’s] right shoulder impingement and rotator
cuff tear was caused or aggravated by her attempting to compensate for the left shoulder injury.”
Dr. Lax noted that he had reviewed the DMA’s December 29, 2016 report and disagreed that
normal ROM and reduced pain in the left shoulder precluded the likelihood that appellant was
compensating for the left shoulder by using her right shoulder. He opined that “it was only natural
for her to protect the left shoulder from reinjury by using the right arm more.” Dr. Lax noted that
Dr. Van Gorder obtained an MRI scan of her right shoulder in June 2015, which supported that
the symptoms were present. He explained that an MRI scan was not usually pursued until the
symptoms became chronic.
By decision dated October 5, 2020, OWCP denied modification of the July 18, 2019
decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, 7 that the claim was filed within the applicable time
limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any
disability or specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the

6

Supra note 4.

7

K.R., Docket No. 20-0995 (issued January 29, 2021); A.W., Docket No. 19-0327 (issued July 19, 2019); S.B.,
Docket No. 17-1779 (issued February 7, 2018); J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).

5

employment injury.8 These are the essential elements of every compensation claim regardless of
whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease. 9
The general rule respecting consequential injuries is that, when the primary injury is shown
to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from
the injury is deemed to arise out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause, which is attributable to the employee’s own intentional conduct. 10 The
subsequent injury is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary
injury. With respect to consequential injuries, the Board has held that, where an injury is sustained
as a consequence of an impairment residual to an employment injury, the new or second injury,
even though nonemployment related, is deemed, because of the chain of causation, to arise out of
and in the course of employment and is compensable. 11
A claimant bears the burden of proof to establish a claim for a consequential injury.12 As
part of this burden, he or she must present rationalized medical opinion evidence, based on a
complete factual and medical background, establishing causal relationship. The opinion must be
one of reasonable medical certainty and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the
nature of the relationship of the diagnosed condition and the accepted employment injury. 13
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that acceptance
of her claim should be expanded to include additional conditions as a consequence of the
December 12, 2014 employment injury.
Preliminarily, the Board notes that it is unnecessary for the Board to consider the evidence
appellant submitted prior to the issuance of OWCP’s May 29, 2018 merit decision because the
Board considered that evidence in its July 18, 2019 decision. Findings made in prior Board
decisions are res judicata absent further review by OWCP under section 8128 of FECA. 14

8

J.B., Docket No. 20-1566 (issued August 31, 2021); see J.M., Docket No. 17-0284 (issued February 7, 2018);
R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB 312 (1988).
9

K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016); L.M., Docket No. 13-1402 (issued February 7, 2014);
Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).
10

See L.M., Docket No. 18-1514 (issued July 18, 2019); K.D., Docket No. 17-1894 (issued August 6, 2018); A.M.,
Docket No. 18-0685 (issued October 26, 2018); Mary Poller, 55 ECAB 483, 487 (2004); Arthur Larson & Lex K.
Larson, The Law of Workers’ Compensation § 10-1.
11

See K.D, id.; see also S.S., 59 ECAB 315 (2008).

12

See C.H., Docket No. 20-0228 (issued October 7, 2020); P.P., Docket No. 19-1359 (issued April 30, 2020).

13

See T.S., Docket No. 20-0968 (issued August 17, 2021); K.W., Docket No. 18-0991 (issued December 11, 2018);
P.M., Docket No. 18-0287 (issued October 11, 2018).
14

See M.F., Docket No. 21-0390 (issued August 23,2021); P.B., Docket No. 20-0124 (issued March 10, 2021);
J.S., Docket No. 19-0022 (issued November 4, 2020); Clinton E. Anthony, Jr., 49 ECAB 476 (1998).

6

In a March 7, 2018 letter, Dr. Lax referred to appellant’s right shoulder MRI scan from
June 2015, which revealed a partial cuff tear and tendinitis. He explained that it was his “opinion
that [appellant’s] right shoulder impingement and rotator cuff tear was caused or aggravated by
her attempting to compensate for the left shoulder injury.” However, the record reflects that, while
appellant had returned to work following her left shoulder injury in OWCP File xxxxxx938, she
did not return to work following the accepted December 12, 2014 employment injury. Therefore,
it is unclear how Dr. Lax formulated his opinion that appellant compensated for her left shoulder,
following the accepted December 12, 2014 employment injury. The Board has held that a medical
opinion that lacks medical rationale is of limited probative value. 15 Moreover, in this letter,
Dr. Lax opined that the “same work duties, which caused the left shoulder injury then contributed
to the injury in the right shoulder.” He did not further explain in this report what activities
appellant engaged in that caused her right shoulder conditions. His opinion was, therefore, not
based on a complete factual background.16 The Board also finds that as Dr. Lax attempted to relate
appellant’s diagnosed right shoulder conditions to performance of her employment duties, and
conversely attempted to opine that her right shoulder condition was a consequence of her
December 12, 2014 left shoulder injury, his opinion was internally consistent. The Board has held
that medical reports are of limited probative value if they are internally inconsistent.17
In his March 20, 2018 report, Dr. Lax opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, appellant’s work as a rural postal delivery worker with many years of exposure to heavy
lifting (40-pound buckets of mail) in small spaces (her delivery car), repetitive movements
(upwards of 500 stops for mail), and also a few specific events, including lifting heavy buckets of
mail in December 2014 and turning in her car to grab a package, contributed significantly to the
development of both bilateral chronic shoulder pain and rotator cuff tears.
As Dr. Lax did not provide the necessary medical rationale to establish that appellant’s
right shoulder conditions were a consequence of the accepted left shoulder injury of December 12,
2014, his reports were insufficient to overcome the weight accorded to Dr Scott or to create a
conflict in the medical opinion evidence. The Board thus finds that appellant has not met her
burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that the
acceptance of her claim should be expanded to include the additional conditions as a consequence
of the accepted December 12, 2014 employment injury.

15

J.P., Docket No. 19-0129 (issued April 26, 2019).

16

Y.H., Docket No. 19-0835 (issued October 4, 2019); see F.C., Docket No. 19-0594 (issued August 13, 2019).

17

S.H., Docket No. 19-0631 (issued September 5, 2019); L.L., Docket No. 18-0861 (issued April 5, 2019).

7

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the October 5, 2020 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: March 15, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.R., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Clearfield, UT, Employer
__________________________________________

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)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 15-0791
Issued: July 21, 2015

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On February 14, 20151 appellant filed a timely appeal from an August 18, 2014 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

1

Under the Board’s Rules of Procedure, an appeal must be filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of an
OWCP decision. An appeal is considered filed upon receipt by the Clerk of the Appellate Boards. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.3(d)-(f). One hundred and eighty days from August 18, 2014, the date of OWCP’s last decision, was
February 14, 2015. As this fell on a Saturday, the appeal would have been due the following business day. As
Monday, February 16, 2015 was a federal holiday, the appeal would have been due on February 17, 2015. Since
using February 24, 2015, the date the appeal was received by the Clerk of the Appellate Boards would result in the
loss of appeal rights, the date of postmark is considered the date of filing. The date of the U.S. Postal Service
postmark is February 14, 2015, rendering the appeal timely filed. See 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(f)(1).
2

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant received an overpayment in compensation in the
amount of $810.09; and (2) whether OWCP properly found appellant at fault in the creation of
the overpayment and therefore was not entitled to waiver.
On appeal appellant asserts that she was not at fault because she had no way of
calculating the amount of compensation to which she was entitled and that repayment would
create a hardship for her.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On February 7, 2014 appellant, then a 46-year-old rural carrier, filed a traumatic injury
claim alleging that on February 5, 2014 she sprained her right knee when she slipped on ice. She
began modified duty. On March 27, 2014 OWCP accepted a right knee sprain, and on April 23,
2014 authorized surgery. Appellant stopped work on March 23, 2014 because the employing
establishment could not accommodate her restrictions, and she was paid appropriate
compensation. On May 6, 2014 she was placed on the periodic compensation rolls with a
payment of $3,007.81 for the period May 4 through 31, 2014 and every four weeks thereafter. A
net periodic rolls payment of $2,973.37 was issued for the period June 1 through 28, 2014.
Dr. B. Thomas Watson, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, performed a right knee
chondroplasty on May 15, 2014. On May 28, 2014 he advised that appellant could return to
modified duty.
Appellant returned to part-time modified duty on June 18, 2014. The record indicates
that she worked 2.5 hours June 18, 19, and 20, 2014, 3.5 hours on June 21, and 6 hours on
June 23, 24, and 25, 2014, for a total of 29 hours. Appellant took sick leave on June 27, 28 and
30, 2014. June 22, 24, and 29, 2014 were nonscheduled days.
By letter dated July 17, 2014, OWCP issued a preliminary determination that appellant
received an $810.09 overpayment of compensation because she received disability compensation
after her return to work.3 It explained the calculation of the overpayment, stating that for the
period June 1 through 28, 2014 she received compensation totaling $2,973.37 when she should
have received compensation of $2,163.28, which yielded an overpayment of $810.09. OWCP
found appellant at fault because she should have been aware or reasonably been aware that she
was not entitled to the compensation.
Appellant was provided an overpayment action request form and an overpayment
questionnaire and was given 30 days to respond. An overpayment worksheet indicated that she
returned to work on June 18, 2014 working intermittent hours and that she worked 35 hours from
June 15 to 28, 2014. The worksheet confirmed that appellant received an overpayment of
compensation of $810.09.

3

The cover letter advised that the amount of the overpayment was $810.99. However, the attached memorandum
and OWCP worksheets indicate that the amount of the overpayment was $810.09.

2

Appellant did not respond to OWCP’s preliminary overpayment determination. On
August 18, 2014 OWCP attempted to telephone appellant to discuss the overpayment but she
was not available.
By decision dated August 18, 2014, OWCP finalized the preliminary overpayment
decision, finding that appellant was at fault in the creation of an overpayment in compensation in
the amount of $810.09, and thus not entitled to waiver. It advised her to repay the full amount
within 30 days or to contact it to make appropriate repayment arrangements.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
Section 8102 of FECA provides that the United States shall pay compensation for the
disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the
performance of duty.4
Section 8116 of FECA defines the limitations on the right to receive compensation
benefits. This section of FECA provides that while an employee is receiving compensation, he
or she may not receive salary, pay or remuneration of any type from the United States, except in
limited circumstances.5 Section 10.500 of OWCP regulations provide that “compensation for
wage loss due to disability is available only for any periods during which an employee’s workrelated medical condition prevents him or her from earning the wages earned before the workrelated injury.”6
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that appellant received an overpayment in compensation because she
received wage-loss compensation for the period June 1 through 28, 2013 when she had returned
to part-time work on June 18, 2014. As noted, both FECA and implementing regulations of
OWCP provide that a claimant may not receive wage-loss compensation concurrently with a
federal salary or other remuneration.7 An overpayment of compensation was therefore created.8
The Board, however, finds the case is not in posture for decision regarding the amount of
the overpayment. An employing establishment official signed a time analysis form on July 14,
2014 confirming that appellant worked a total of 29 hours from June 18 through 26, 2014 and
took sick leave on June 27 and 28, 2014. An overpayment worksheet indicated that appellant
worked 35 hours for this period. Nothing in the record, including the overpayment worksheet or
other record materials, explained the discrepancy between the 29 hours of work confirmed on the
time analysis form and the 35 hours listed on the overpayment worksheet. It was on the basis of

4

5 U.S.C. § 8102(a).

5

Id. at § 8116(a); see Danny E. Haley, 56 ECAB 393 (2005).

6

20 C.F.R. § 10.500.

7

5 U.S.C. § 8116(a); 20 C.F.R. § 10.500.

8

Id.

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a 35-hour period of work that the amount of the overpayment was calculated. The record does
not include a sufficient explanation as to how the amount of the overpayment was calculated.
Because OWCP did not fully explain the basis it used to determine that appellant worked
35 hours during the period after she returned to work and continued to receive compensation, it
did not provide a sufficient explanation as to how it calculated the amount of the overpayment.
The Board, therefore, does not have sufficient evidence to permit an informed adjudication of the
case. The case will therefore be remanded to OWCP to more fully explain its calculation of the
overpayment, to be followed by an appropriate decision.9 After this and such further
development deemed necessary, OWCP shall render a de novo overpayment decision.
As the amount of the overpayment is not yet established, it is premature to address the
issue of fault.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds this case is not in posture for decision regarding the amount of the
overpayment of compensation.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 18, 2014 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case remanded to OWCP for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion of the Board.
Issued: July 21, 2015
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
9

See L.D., Docket No. 12-1408 (issued April 26, 2013).

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.W., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Tulsa, OK, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
No appearance, for the Director

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Docket No. 08-1034
Issued: February 13, 2009

Oral Argument January 8, 2009

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On February 25, 2008 appellant filed a timely appeal from the May 3 and December 3,
2007 merit decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, which denied
compensation. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to review
the merits of the case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant sustained a traumatic emotional injury in the performance
of duty on or about July 24, 2006.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On February 8, 2007 appellant, then a 54-year-old modified distribution clerk, filed a
claim alleging that she sustained an emotional injury on July 24, 2006. She explained:
“On July 24, 2006, I left work, and called my psychiatrist, because I had
developed physical symptoms such as diarrhea and vomiting from finding out that
[my recording supervisor] Randy Cameron was going to become the supervisor

on the DBCS [Delivery Bar Code Sorter] machines, because [my immediate
supervisor] Janice Cooper had bid to another position.”
Appellant referred to an incident on March 11, 2005 when Mr. Cameron and another
individual “cornered me on the DBCS machines, I felt trapped. Out of fear, I talked loud to get
the attention of others in the area.” After that incident, appellant tried to avoid Mr. Cameron as
much as possible.1
Appellant submitted a July 24, 2006 disability slip from her psychiatrist, Dr. Mark A.
Kelley: “[Appellant] is disabled from her current work assignment starting today. This
disability will continue from now for a length of time that is not able to be determined.” On
September 11, 2006 Dr. Kelley wrote:
“[Appellant’s] on-the-job injury was the change in her work setting in which her
supervisor, who she could work well with, suddenly was no longer going to be her
supervisor and Mr. Cameron, who she has had problems with previously,
specifically two years ago, was announced to be her supervisor. In my opinion
she will not be able to return to work under the supervision of Mr. Cameron.”
On March 14, 2007 Dr. Kelley stated: “Due to the distress and psychological trauma
[appellant] experienced with Mr. Cameron she was not able to work under his supervision and
she became disabled from work when he was assigned to be her supervisor.” On November 1,
2006 he added:
“[Appellant] did have exacerbation of symptoms regarding [borderline personality
disorder] with finding herself in distressing circumstances by suddenly finding
[Mr.] Cameron becoming her immediate boss with her supervisor, [Ms.] Cooper,
moving to a different position. This change in her working circumstances was so
distressing for her she was not able to work. This disability was manifested with
a variety of symptoms of anxiety, belief that she was being deliberately treated
badly with paranoid features, having both anxiety symptoms and psychotic
symptoms, with difficulty with properly evaluating reality. These symptoms
included psychophysiological symptoms and conversion symptoms in which
physical complaints emerged in response to the mental distress she experienced.
Currently she has developed physical symptoms particularly involved in the
digestive track of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and abdominal discomfort.”
In a decision dated May 3, 2007, the Office denied appellant’s claim for compensation. It
found that she failed to establish a compensable factor of employment.
Following an oral hearing on September 19, 2007, an Office hearing representative issued
a decision on December 3, 2007 affirming the denial of appellant’s claim. The hearing
representative found that appellant submitted no evidence to support her assertion that she was to
work with Mr. Cameron.
1

In a separate case, OWCP File No. xxxxxx532, appellant claimed compensation for a traumatic emotional injury
on March 11, 2005. On appeal, Docket No. 08-2038, the Board affirmed the Office decisions denying benefits.

2

LEGAL PRECEDENT
The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act provides compensation for the disability of
an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty.2 But
workers’ compensation does not cover each and every illness that is somehow related to the
employment. When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out her employment
duties or has fear and anxiety regarding her ability to carry out her duties, and the medical
evidence establishes that the disability resulted from her emotional reaction to such situation, the
disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of and in the course of
employment. By contrast, there are disabilities having some kind of causal connection with the
employment that are not covered under workers’ compensation because they are not found to
have arisen out of employment, such as when disability results from an employee’s fear of a
reduction-in-force or frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or
to hold a particular position.3
Workers’ compensation does not cover an emotional reaction to an administrative or
personnel action unless the evidence shows error or abuse on the part of the employing
establishment.4 Fear of future injury is not a compensable factor of employment.5
ANALYSIS
Appellant alleged a psychological trauma on or about July 24, 2006 but it did not arise
from the duties she performed at work. She noted that she found out that Mr. Cameron was
going to become her immediate supervisor. Although this had some kind of connection to her
employment, workers’ compensation does not cover appellant’s emotional reaction to such news.
The organization of personnel is a managerial function. It lies outside the performance of
appellant’s assigned duties. In the absence of administrative error or abuse directly affecting
appellant, her disagreement with or objection to the reassignment of Mr. Cameron is not
compensable.
Appellant did not submit any evidence of administrative error or abuse. Although she
alleged a run-in with Mr. Cameron on March 11, 2005, the record does not establish that she was
medically restricted from working with him prior to July 24, 2006. The earliest such restriction
the Board can find comes from Dr. Kelley on September 11, 2006. Any administrative decision
to make Mr. Cameron the supervisor of the DBCS machines, and thereby appellant’s immediate
supervisor, did not violate any medical restriction that was in effect at that time.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8102(a).

3

Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

4

Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 566, 572-73 (1991).

5

Helen E Paglinawan, 51 ECAB 591 (2000) (the attending psychiatrist reported that work at the Guam duty
station might cause a relapse of the employee’s symptoms); Virginia Dorsett, 50 ECAB 478 (1999) (the employee’s
reaction to the proposed change of work shifts was held to be, in essence, a fear of future injury, and the possibility
of a future injury did not constitute an injury under the Act); Nicholas R. Kothe, 29 ECAB 4 (1977) (fear of future
injury).

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To the extent that appellant feared what might happen to her if Mr. Cameron became her
immediate supervisor, the Board finds that such fear is not compensable. An emotional reaction
caused by fear of future injury is considered self-generated. It does not constitute an injury
arising out of the performance of her duties.
The Board will affirm the Office decisions denying appellant’s claim for benefits.
Appellant describes an emotional injury that is not compensable, one that did not arise in the
performance of her duties.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden to establish that she sustained a
traumatic emotional injury in the performance of duty on or about July 24, 2006.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the December 3 and May 3, 2007 decisions of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed.
Issued: February 13, 2009
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Richmond, VA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 11-14
Issued: July 21, 2011

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On October 1, 2010 appellant filed a timely appeal from the July 13, 2010 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) denying her claim for a recurrence
of disability due to a consequential work injury. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Programs1 and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained a
recurrence of disability on or after August 2, 2009 due to her accepted work injuries.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
In mid 2006 OWCP accepted that appellant, then a 50-year-old mail handler, sustained
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome due to her repetitive work duties over an extended period.2
On November 1, 2009 appellant filed a claim for a recurrence of disability beginning
August 2, 2009 which was due to her “March 11, 2006” work injury. She indicated that she
stopped her light-duty work on August 2, 2009 and returned to work on August 22, 2009.3
Appellant stated that she had lifting restrictions and pushing and pulling restrictions when she
returned to work after her injury. She indicated that she was depressed all the time and had to
seek help from a doctor for depression and pain in her hands. Appellant stated that her
recurrence occurred when she was reinjured on May 15, 2009 and was unable to work as usual.4
Prior to the filing of her recurrence claim, the record contained a September 14, 2009 report in
which Dr. Timothy Marqueen, an attending Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, stated that
appellant could continue with light-duty work that restricted use of the left hand.
In a statement accompanying her recurrence of disability claim, appellant indicated that
she could only lift 5 pounds before May 15, 2009 and was sent to work on the dumper, which
dumped out parcels from 5 to 80 pounds or more. She noted that she was asked to work on the
dump position and that the job was out of her work restrictions. Appellant stated that she lifted a
box that was too heavy and was reinjured, which resulted in surgery. She noted after that
incident she was sent downtown and had to sit in a chair on a daily basis and fix damaged mail.
Appellant stated that this caused her depression and by August 2009 she had to see a doctor for it
and take medication. She stated that she was depressed as the result of pain in her hands and that
she felt worthless because she could not perform the jobs she used to perform when she was
younger. Appellant provided further description of earlier injuries and surgeries.5
In a December 1, 2009 letter, OWCP requested that appellant submit additional factual
and medical evidence in support of her claim.
Appellant submitted a January 4, 2010 report produced by Dr. Banerje Koduru, an
attending Board-certified psychiatrist, who stated:
“Initially seen on September 24, 2009 and then on October 8 and
December 8, 2009. [Appellant] reported that she has been suffering with anxiety
for the past 18 years and depression since 2006 after being injured on her job.

2

On her claim form, appellant indicated that she first became aware of the claimed injury on March 11, 2006.

3

Although appellant returned to work on August 22, 2009, it appears that she stopped work for additional
extended periods after that date.
4

Appellant also filed a claim for compensation for wage loss beginning on August 2, 2009. The record shows
that appellant retired on disability retirement beginning January 5, 2010.
5

In mid 2008 OWCP accepted that appellant sustained work-related left wrist tenosynovitis under a different
claim file. The claim file for this injury has combined into the claim file for the present case.

2

She reports that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral surgery did
not improve her condition.
“[Appellant] claims that her depression has been getting worse and feels it is due
to ongoing disability and is unable to be employed gainfully due to carpal tunnel
syndrome.”6
In a January 12, 2010 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s claim that she sustained a
work-related recurrence of disability on or after August 2, 2009 on the grounds that she did not
submit sufficient medical evidence to show that she sustained a consequential injury due to “the
established work-related event(s).”7 It indicated that Dr. Koduru’s January 4, 2010 report did not
contain adequate medical rationale on causal relationship to establish her claim.
Appellant requested a telephone hearing before an OWCP hearing representative in
connection with her claim. During the April 26, 2010 hearing, she testified that she first had
problems with depression due to her work-related bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.8
In a July 13, 2010 decision, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed OWCP’s
January 12, 2010 decision. She found that appellant did not establish a consequential injury in
the form of depression and therefore did not show that she sustained a work-related recurrence of
disability on or after August 2, 2009. The hearing representative accepted employment factors
stating, “I find that the claimant’s pain from her work injury and her inability to do her daily
activities and perform work like she once did are compensable factors of employment.”9 She
found, however, that appellant did not submit sufficient rationalized medical evidence to
establish that she sustained a consequential emotional condition or a recurrence of disability due
to the established employment factors.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
When an employee, who is disabled from the job she held when injured on account of
employment-related residuals, returns to a light-duty position or the medical evidence of record
establishes that she can perform the light-duty position, the employee has the burden to establish
by the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence a recurrence of total disability
and show that she cannot perform such light duty. As part of this burden the employee must

6

Appellant also submitted a December 24, 2009 report describing Dr. Marqueen’s performance of a left wrist
de Quervain’s release and a left extensor tendon release.
7

OWCP did not provide any further description of what employment factors were accepted.

8

Appellant indicated that in August 2006 she filed a claim for work-related depression under a different claim
file. The record contains some documents from this emotional condition claim, but it is not the subject of the
present appeal before the Board. In her August 11, 2006 claim form, appellant asserted that she sustained
depression and stress related to financial difficulties caused by her work limitations.
9

The hearing representative stated that appellant’s financial difficulties due to the accepted work injuries and her
resultant inability to work in a particular position were not compensable employment factors.

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show a change in the nature and extent of the injury-related condition or a change in the nature
and extent of the light-duty job requirements.10
The general rule respecting consequential injuries is that, when the primary injury is
shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that
flows from the injury is deemed to arise out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause, which is attributable to the employees own intentional conduct.11
A claimant bears the burden of proof to establish a claim for a consequential injury. As part of
this burden, she must present rationalized medical opinion evidence.12
Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is
somehow related to an employee’s employment. There are situations where an injury or an
illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the
concept or coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s
emotional reaction to her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the
employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.13 On the other hand, the
disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reductionin-force or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to
hold a particular position.14 The Board has held that an emotional condition related to chronic
pain and limitations resulting from an employment injury is covered under FECA.15
ANALYSIS
In connection with the present case, OWCP has accepted that appellant sustained bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome and left wrist tenosynovitis. Appellant filed a claim alleging that she
sustained a recurrence of disability on August 2, 2009 due to a consequential depression
condition that she sustained as a result of the pain in her hands from her work-related physical
conditions.16 The evidence indicates that the employer made appropriate light-duty work
available to appellant.
In decisions dated January 12 and July 13, 2010, OWCP denied appellant’s claim on the
grounds that she did not submit sufficient rationalized medical evidence linking her claimed
emotional condition (and resultant disability beginning August 2, 2009) to the accepted
employment factors. With respect to the accepted employment factors, it stated in its July 13,
10

Cynthia M. Judd, 42 ECAB 246, 250 (1990); Terry R. Hedman, 38 ECAB 222, 227 (1986).

11

S.S., 59 ECAB 315 (2008).

12

Charles W. Downey, 54 ECAB 421 (2003).

13

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193; Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

14

Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).

15

See Arnold A. Alley, 44 ECAB 912, 921-22 (1993); Charles J. Jenkins, 40 ECAB 362, 367 (1988).

16

Appellant also suggested that the physical condition of her hands directly caused disability beginning
August 2, 2009. She mentioned a May 15, 2009 incident at work but did not describe any details.

4

2010 decision, “I find that the claimant’s pain from her work injury and her inability to do her
daily activities and perform work like she once did are compensable factors of employment.”
The Board finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant established employment
factors with respect to pain from her work-related upper extremity conditions and with respect to
the manner in which this pain affected her ability to work and perform the activities of daily
living. As noted above, the Board has held that an emotional condition related to chronic pain
and limitations resulting from an employment injury is covered under FECA.17
The Board further finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant did not submit
sufficient rationalized medical evidence to establish that she sustained a consequential emotional
condition or a recurrence of disability due to the established employment factors.
Appellant submitted a January 4, 2010 report in which Dr. Koduru, an attending Boardcertified psychiatrist, reported her belief that her work-related carpal tunnel syndrome
contributed to her depression since at least 2006. Dr. Koduru stated, “[Appellant] claims that her
depression has been getting worse and feels it is due to ongoing disability and is unable to be
employed gainfully due to carpal tunnel syndrome.” However, this report is of limited probative
value on the relevant issue of the present case because Dr. Koduru merely restated appellant’s
opinion and did not provide his own opinion on appellant’s emotional condition and its causes,
whether work related or not. Appellant did not submit any other medical evidence relating to her
claimed consequential emotional condition.
The record also contains limited medical evidence relating to appellant’s physical
condition during the period of claimed recurrence of disability beginning August 2, 2009. In a
September 14, 2009 report, Dr. Marqueen, an attending Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
stated that appellant could continue with light-duty work that restricted use of the left hand. In a
December 24, 2009 report, Dr. Marqueen described his performance of a left wrist de Quervain’s
release and a left extensor tendon release. However, these reports do not contain a clear opinion
that the described disability and need for surgery were related to appellant’s work-related
conditions. Appellant has not submitted rationalized medical evidence showing that her workrelated physical condition directly contributed to her sustaining a recurrence of disability on or
after August 2, 2009.
For these reasons, appellant did not show that she sustained a recurrence of disability on
or after August 2, 2009 due to her accepted work injuries.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish that she
sustained a recurrence of disability on or after August 2, 2009 due to her accepted work injuries.
17

See supra note 14.

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 13, 2010 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: July 21, 2011
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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