United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
B.W., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Memphis, TN, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 16-1059
Issued: September 19, 2016

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 25, 2016 appellant filed a timely appeal of a December 14, 2015 nonmerit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). As more than one year
elapsed since the last merit decision on March 25, 1993,1 pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2 (c) and 501.3, the Board lacks jurisdiction
over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly found appellant’s reconsideration request was
untimely and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error.

1

For final adverse decisions issued by OWCP before November 19, 2008, a claimant had up to one year to file an
appeal with the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2).
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
This case has been before the Board on numerous prior appeals. Appellant, then a 33year old clerk, filed an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) on April 20, 1989 alleging that
she developed stress due to harassment and discrimination at work. OWCP accepted the claim
for generalized anxiety disorder.
OWCP terminated appellant’s compensation in an April 17, 1992 decision on the basis
that she refused an offer of suitable work. By decision dated March 25, 1993, it reviewed the
merits and denied modification. In each appeal, the Board found that appellant had untimely
requested reconsideration before OWCP and had not demonstrated clear evidence of error in the
decision terminating benefits for refusal of suitable work.3 The facts and circumstances of the
case as discussed in the prior appeals are hereby incorporated by reference.
Appellant again requested reconsideration on November 12, 2014. By decision dated
January 20, 2015, OWCP again found the application for reconsideration was untimely and
failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error. On September 15, 2015 appellant filed an appeal
with the Board of the January 20, 2015 OWCP decision. By order dated October 20, 2015, the
Board dismissed the appeal as untimely filed.4
On June 15, 2015 appellant submitted a June 12, 2015 application for reconsideration.
She reiterated arguments that the job offer was incomplete, violated OWCP regulations, and was
never offered in writing after a physician’s approval. Appellant resubmitted a copy of a
September 15, 1992 letter from the employing establishment, a September 14, 1992 note
purporting to accept the position, and a March 3, 1993 letter from OWCP requesting additional
information from the employing establishment. By letters dated September 8 and October 28,
2015, appellant again asserted the job offer was invalid.
By decision dated December 14, 2015, OWCP found the application for reconsideration
was untimely filed. It denied merit review, finding appellant had not demonstrated clear
evidence of error.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
FECA provides that OWCP may review an award for or against compensation upon
application by an employee (or his or her representative) who receives an adverse decision.5 The

3

Docket No. 92-2518 (issued October 1, 1998); Docket No. 02-1814 (issued January 23, 2003); Docket No. 032128 (issued October 30, 2003); Docket No. 04-1429 (issued November 23, 2004); Docket No. 07-1697 (issued
December 27, 2007); Docket No. 08-1420 (issued January 6, 2009); Docket No. 09-1497 (issued February 16,
2010); Docket No. 10-1335 (issued February 8, 2011); Docket No. 11-1261 (issued December 6, 2011); Docket No.
11-1261 (issued December 6, 2011); Docket No. 12-1065 (issued October 12, 2012); Docket No. 14-0070 (issued
March 24, 2014).
4

Docket No. 15-1897 (issued October 20, 2015).

5

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

2

employee shall exercise this right through a request to the district office. The request, along with
the supporting statements and evidence, is called the “application for reconsideration.”6
According to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a), a claimant is not entitled to a review of an OWCP
decision as a matter of right.7 This section vests the OWCP with discretionary authority to
determine whether it will review an award for or against compensation.8 OWCP, through
regulations, has imposed limitations on the exercise of its discretionary authority under 5 USC
§ 8128(a) of FECA.9 As one such limitation, 20 C.F.R. § 10.607 provides that an application for
reconsideration must be received within one year of the date of OWCP’s decision for which
review is sought.10 OWCP will consider an untimely application only if the application
demonstrates clear evidence of error on the part of OWCP in its most recent merit decision. The
evidence must be positive, precise, and explicit and must manifest on its face that OWCP
committed an error.11
To show clear evidence of error, the evidence submitted must not only be of sufficient
probative value to create a conflicting medical opinion or establish a clear procedural error, but
must be of sufficient probative value to shift the weight of the evidence in favor of the claimant
and raise a substantial question as to the correctness of OWCP’s decision.12 Evidence that does
not raise a substantial question concerning the correctness of OWCP’s decision is insufficient to
establish clear evidence of error.13 It is not enough merely to show that the evidence could be
construed so as to produce a contrary conclusion.14 A determination of whether the claimant has
established clear evidence of error entails a limited review of how the evidence submitted with
the reconsideration request bears on the evidence previously of record.15
ANALYSIS
The last decision on the merits of the claim was the March 25, 1993 OWCP decision,
denying modification of an April 17, 1992 determination that appellant had refused an offer of

6

20 C.F.R. § 10.605 (2012).

7

Leon D. Faidley, Jr., 41 ECAB 104 (1989).

8

Under section 8128 of FECA, “[t]he Secretary of Labor may review an award for or against payment of
compensation at any time on his own motion or on application.”
9

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq.

10

20 C.F.R. § 10.607 (2012).

11

D.O., Docket No. 08-1057 (issued June 23, 2009); Robert F. Stone, 57 ECAB 292 (2005).

12

Annie L. Billingsley, 50 ECAB 210 (1998).

13

Jimmy L. Day, 48 ECAB 652 (1997).

14

Id.

15

K.N., Docket No. 13-911 (issued August 21, 2013); J.S., Docket No. 10-385 (issued September 15, 2010).

3

suitable work. The application for reconsideration received on June 15, 2015 is untimely and,
therefore, appellant must demonstrate clear evidence of error.
The Board noted in the March 24, 2014 decision that appellant has argued repeatedly that
the 1992 job offer was inadequate, not properly sent to OWCP, failed to include dates of
availability, and violated OWCP regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 10.507. All of these arguments have
been raised by appellant and addressed in a series of prior appeals. The Board has held that the
evidence of record does not establish clear evidence of error with respect to the job offer. With
the current application for reconsideration, appellant resubmitted evidence of record and again
argued the job offer was invalid. The subject matter previously reviewed by the Board, absent
further merit review by OWCP, is res judicata and thus the arguments will not be further
reviewed on this appeal.16
Appellant’s application for reconsideration was untimely filed. A claimant may receive a
merit review only if clear evidence of error is established. On appeal appellant argues that there
were errors and the April 17, 1992 decision should be vacated. She has not demonstrated clear
evidence of error, and the Board finds OWCP properly denied appellant’s application for
reconsideration in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly found appellant’s reconsideration request was
untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error.

16

See J.F., Docket No. 14-1589 (issued November 24, 2014); see also J.V., Docket No. 14-0788 (issued
October 19, 2015).

4

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs December 14, 2015 is affirmed.
Issued: September 19, 2016
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
G.S., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Scranton, PA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Michael R. Mey, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 17-0498
Issued: June 5, 2017

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 3, 2017 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an August 30,
2016 merit decision and a December 9, 2016 nonmerit decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2
(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this
case.

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for
legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An
attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject
to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant has more than 21 percent permanent impairment of
the right lower extremity, for which he has received a schedule award; and (2) whether OWCP
properly denied appellant’s request for reconsideration of the merits of his claim pursuant to
5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant, then a 46-year old letter carrier, filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) on
June 29, 1994 alleging that on that date he sustained a right knee injury in the performance of
duty. He alleged that he was ascending stairs to deliver mail when the steps gave way. OWCP
initially denied the claim for compensation on December 20, 1994. Appellant underwent right
knee arthroscopic surgery, including a partial medial meniscectomy, on June 3, 1996. By
decision dated January 27, 1997, an OWCP hearing representative reversed the December 20,
1994 decision, and accepted that appellant sustained a right knee sprain as a result of the
employment incident.
By letter dated August 7, 1998, OWCP advised appellant that the accepted conditions had
been expanded to include right medial meniscus tear, fracture tibia plateau, and degenerative
joint disease of the right knee.
On August 25, 1998 appellant’s treating physician, Dr. Thomas W. Byron, Boardcertified in orthopedic surgery, related that following appellant’s June 29, 1994 right knee
meniscal injury he had developed extra articular changes in the right knee, consistent with
degenerative arthritis. He opined that he expected appellant would require a total knee
replacement in the future. Dr. Byron related that appellant currently had structural alignment
deficits, with mild varus inclination of the knee, and moderate occasional pain. He related that
appellant had 10 percent permanent impairment of the right lower extremity.
In a September 9, 1998 report, an OWCP medical adviser opined that appellant had 20
percent permanent impairment of the right lower extremity under the fourth edition of the
American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (hereinafter
A.M.A., Guides).3 He indicated that the permanent impairment was based on Table 36 of the
A.M.A., Guides.
OWCP issued a schedule award on September 16, 1998 for 20 percent permanent
impairment of the right lower extremity.
In a report dated December 5, 2007, Dr. Byron diagnosed right knee osteoarthritis, and
noted a June 3, 1996 right medial meniscectomy. He provided results on examination and
indicated that appellant was working modified duty. Dr. Byron noted that appellant was
scheduled to retire.4
3

A.M.A., Guides (6th ed. 2009).

4

An April 3, 2015 statement of accepted facts (SOAF) reported appellant retired in 2008.

2

Appellant underwent a total right knee replacement surgery on January 9, 2014. On
July 14, 2014 he filed a Form CA-7 (claim for compensation) requesting an additional schedule
award.
By report dated October 7, 2014, Dr. Eugene Kim, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
reported appellant was nine months status post total right knee surgery. He provided physical
examination results, noting minimal swelling of the right knee with no instability.
OWCP prepared a SOAF dated April 3, 2015 and referred the case to an OWCP medical
adviser. In a report dated April 3, 2015, Dr. Morley Slutsky, an OWCP medical adviser, opined
that appellant had 21 percent permanent impairment of the right lower extremity. He indicated
that appellant’s permanent impairment had been rated under the sixth edition of the A.M.A.,
Guides based on the diagnosis of total knee replacement with good result.
By decision dated May 12, 2015, OWCP issued a schedule award for an additional one
percent permanent impairment of the right lower extremity.
On May 19, 2015 appellant requested a hearing before an OWCP hearing representative.
A hearing was held on December 14, 2015.
Appellant submitted a report from Dr. Kim dated October 14, 2015. He reported that
appellant had complained of medial discomfort in the right knee. Dr. Kim provided results on
examination, and noted tender palpation over medial retinaculum, with no instability. By report
dated November 23, 2015, he wrote that appellant had reported significant improvement with a
Flector patch. Dr. Kim reported minimal tenderness of the right knee, with no swelling or
instability.
In a report dated February 4, 2016, Dr. David Cooper, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, provided a history and results on examination. He wrote that appellant reported pain
and weakness of the right leg, with numbness outside of the surgery scar. Dr. Cooper reported
reduced right knee range of motion, with 5 degrees extension and 95 degrees flexion. He
reported diffuse tenderness both medially and laterally, laxity on the knee with some degree of
mid flexion instability. Dr. Cooper opined that appellant had 71 percent permanent impairment
of the right lower extremity, based on a total knee replacement with a poor result.
By decision dated February 22, 2016, OWCP’s hearing representative remanded the case
for further development. He directed OWCP to refer the case back to the OWCP medical
adviser for an opinion as to whether appellant had more than 21 percent right lower extremity
permanent impairment.
In a report dated February 28, 2016, an OWCP medical adviser, Dr. Herbert White, Jr.,
opined that Dr. Cooper’s report was of diminished probative value as it was “so different” from
Dr. Kim’s reports. He opined that examination findings that differed from previously recorded
observations may be excluded from the impairment calculation.
By decision dated March 14, 2016, OWCP found appellant was not entitled to an
additional schedule award. It found the weight of the evidence was represented by Dr. White’s
report.
3

On April 5, 2016 appellant, through counsel requested a hearing before an OWCP
hearing representative. A hearing was held on July 13, 2016. The record indicates that appellant
submitted reports from Dr. Kim dated May 23 and June 1, 2016. In the June 1, 2016 report,
Dr. Kim provided results on examination, noting tenderness over the medial femoral condyle,
with trace swelling, no effusion or instability.
By decision dated August 30, 2016, the hearing representative affirmed the March 14,
2016 OWCP decision. He found the weight of the medical evidence was represented by
Dr. White.
On September 13, 2016 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration.
additional evidence was submitted.

No

By decision dated December 9, 2016, OWCP denied merit review of the claim. It found
appellant had not met any of the requirements for a merit review.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
5 U.S.C. § 8107 provides that, if there is permanent disability involving the loss or loss of
use of a member or function of the body, the claimant is entitled to a schedule award for the
permanent impairment of the scheduled member or function.5 Neither FECA nor the regulations
specify the manner in which the percentage of impairment for a schedule award shall be
determined. For consistent results and to ensure equal justice for all claimants OWCP has
adopted the A.M.A., Guides as the uniform standard applicable to all claimants.6 For schedule
awards after May 1, 2009, the impairment is evaluated under the sixth edition.7
With respect to a knee impairment, the A.M.A., Guides provides a regional grid at Table
16-3. The Class of Diagnosis (CDX) impairment is determined based on specific diagnosis, and
then the default value for the identified CDX is determined. The default value (grade C) may be
adjusted by using grade modifiers for Functional History (GMFH) Table 16-6, Physical
Examination (GMPE) Table 16-7, and Clinical Studies (GMCS) Table 16-8. The adjustment
formula is (GMFH - CDX) + (GMPE - CDX) + (GMCS - CDX).8
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
In the present case, OWCP issued a schedule award decision dated September 16, 1998
for 20 percent permanent impairment of the right lower extremity. An additional one percent
permanent impairment award was granted in a decision dated May 12, 2015. The May 12, 2015
5

5 U.S.C. § 8107. This section enumerates specific members or functions of the body for which a schedule
award is payable and the maximum number of weeks of compensation to be paid; additional members of the body
are found at 20 C.F.R. § 10.404(a).
6

A. George Lampo, 45 ECAB 441 (1994).

7

FECA Bulletin No. 09-03 (March 15, 2009).

8

The net adjustment is up to +2 (grade E) or -2 (grade A).

4

award was based upon the report from OWCP’s medical adviser, Dr. Slutsky. Dr. Slutsky
reported on April 3, 2015 that appellant’s permanent impairment had been rated under the sixth
edition of the A.M.A., Guides based on the diagnosis of total knee replacement with good result.9
Appellant thereafter submitted a report dated February 4, 2016 from Dr. Cooper. Based
on his examination, Dr. Cooper found that appellant had a 71 percent right lower extremity
permanent impairment, for total knee replacement with a poor result.
The case was remanded to an OWCP medical adviser, Dr. White, to review Dr. Cooper’s
report. According to Dr. White, the February 4, 2016 report could not provide a basis for a
permanent impairment rating because the examination results were inconsistent with another
attending physician, Dr. Kim. He referred to a section of the A.M.A., Guides, with regard to
examination findings that differed from previously recorded observations.10 This section
explains that an examining physician may exclude some findings from the impairment
calculation “as described later in this chapter.” The A.M.A., Guides relate that physical
examination findings the examiner determines to be “unreliable or inconsistent” are excluded
from grading the impairment, such as inconsistent range of motion results.11
In this case, Dr. White was not the examining physician. The examining physician,
Dr. Cooper, gave no indication that he felt the examination results were unreliable or
inconsistent. He did not indicate, for example, that range of motion results were unreliable, and
the Board notes that Dr. Kim had not provided range of motion results in his reports.
If OWCP’s medical adviser felt that the physical findings reported by Dr. Cooper were
inconsistent with other medical evidence of record, the proper procedure would have been to
refer the case for a second opinion examination. In A.H., OWCP’s medical adviser opined that
the physical examination findings from the attending physicians were inconsistent.12 The case
was properly referred for a second opinion examination as to a permanent impairment under the
A.M.A., Guides. Under OWCP procedures, when OWCP’s medical adviser cannot make a
proper determination as to permanent impairment based on the evidence, the case should be
referred for additional development.13
The case will accordingly be remanded to OWCP for further development. OWCP
should refer the case for a second opinion examination and report as to a permanent impairment
to the right lower extremity. After such further development as is deemed necessary, it should

9

A.M.A. Guides 511, Table 16-3. A grade A impairment for good result from total knee replacement is 21
percent.
10

Id. at 496.

11

Id. at 517-518.

12

Docket No. 10-0687 (issued October 20, 2010).

13

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Schedule Awards and Permanent Disability Claims,
Chapter 2.808.6(d) (February 2013); see also Chapter 2.808.6(f)(2)(c) (February 2013) (when OWCP’s medical
adviser believes the permanent impairment has not been properly described, a new evaluation may be obtained).

5

issue an appropriate decision. In light of the Board’s findings, the second issue is moot and will
not be addressed on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds the case is not in posture for decision.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated August 30, 2016 is set aside and the case is remanded for further
action consistent with this decision of the Board.
Issued: June 5, 2017
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
B.B., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Brooklyn, NY, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 16-0304
Issued: June 1, 2016

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On December 8, 2015 appellant filed a timely appeal of a July 1, 2015 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has established a traumatic injury on August 23, 2014
causally related to the accepted employment incident.
On appeal appellant argued that she disagreed with OWCP’s decision denying her claim
because her injury occurred on August 23, 2014, not over a period of years.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On August 23, 2014, appellant, then a 58-year-old mail processing clerk, filed a traumatic
injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on that date, while dispatching mail, she picked up heavy
trays and felt a pain in her left arm, shoulder, and chest. She stopped work on August 23, 2014.
The employing establishment, through appellant’s supervisor, controverted the claim on
August 27, 2014. Appellant’s supervisor stated that appellant failed to inform her of the incident
immediately, but rather worked for another hour and then went to lunch, so there was no way for
her to inspect the tray. She further alleged that appellant would not recreate the action she took
while dispatching mail when asked, that the other employees did not see or hear anything, and
that appellant may have failed to follow safety rules and regulations.
Appellant was seen on August 23, 2014 at JFK Advanced Medical, PC. A form with an
illegible signature, indicated that appellant was not fit for duty and was diagnosed with cervical
strain/sprain, cervical radiculopathy, and left shoulder strain/sprain. OWCP thereafter received a
number of attending physician forms (Form CA-20) from JFK Advanced Medical, PC, all
bearing illegible signatures. In a September 2, 2014 form, appellant was diagnosed with left
shoulder, arm, chest, and back strain/sprain. A box marked “no” was checked indicating that
appellant’s condition was not caused or aggravated by an employment activity. Appellant’s date
of injury was listed as August 23, 2014, and her period of disability was noted as August 23
through September 11, 2014. A September 25, 2014 attending physician’s report (Form CA-20)
indicated that the activity was not related to employment. October 4 and 9, 2014 reports
indicated that appellant’s left shoulder, arm, and lumbar strain, and sprain was caused by
employment-related activity. In an October 30, 2014 report, a box marked “yes” was checked
indicating that appellant’s condition was caused or aggravated by employment activity.
Appellant was diagnosed with left shoulder, arm, and lumbar strain/sprain with radiculopathy,
and referred to a pain management specialist. A November 12, 2014 attending physician’s report
(Form CA-20) offered the same conclusions.
Appellant was seen at New York Methodist Hospital on August 26, 2014 by Dr. Ayisha
Tene Edwards, a Board-certified internist, who diagnosed musculoskeletal chest pain.
In an August 27, 2014 attending physician’s report (Form CA-20), Dr. Manuel Ceja, an
internist, diagnosed appellant with left shoulder, arm, chest wall, and lumbar strain. He checked
a box marked “yes” without explanation indicating that he believed that this condition was
caused or aggravated by appellant’s employment activity. Dr. Ceja listed appellant’s period of
total disability from August 23 through September 2, 2014. He also noted that, due to
appellant’s symptomology and past medical history, she was referred to a local emergency room
for cardiac evaluation, which was negative for cardiomyopathy. Dr. Ceja gave appellant a
prescription for physical therapy. In a follow-up report of the same date, he noted that appellant
indicated that her injury was sustained on August 23, 2014 while she was at work and was lifting
a tray of mail off a pie wagon when the pain suddenly appeared in her shoulder radiating down
the anterior and lateral chest wall, and was aggravated by lifting her arm, twisting, or taking a
deep breath. Appellant also described a tingling sensation in her left arm. Dr. Ceja assessed
appellant with sprain and strain of unspecified site of shoulder and upper arm, sprain and strain

2

of unspecified site of back, lumbar sprain and strain, and pain in shoulder region joint. He
indicated that appellant was not fit for duty.
In a September 25, 2014 progress report, Dr. Ceja described the injury of August 2014.
He assessed appellant with sprain and strain of unspecified site of shoulder and upper arm, sprain
and strain of unspecified site of back, lumbar sprain and strain, and pain in joint shoulder region.
In an October 6, 2014 report, Dr. R.C. Krishna, a Board-certified neurologist, noted
appellant’s statement as to how she was injured and described her symptoms followed by his
examination. He concluded that appellant’s clinical findings were consistent with a cervical
strain injury and cervical disc herniation resulting in cervical radiculopathy, left shoulder
derangement, and neuropathic pain syndrome. Dr. Krishna recommended that appellant obtain
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans of her cervical spine and left shoulder.
The record also contains notes from appellant’s visit to the emergency room on
August 23, 2014 with Karen McNeil, a registered nurse.
In an October 9, 2014 progress report, Dr. Ceja reiterated appellant’s history of injury,
and again assessed appellant with sprain/stain of unspecified site of shoulder and upper arm,
sprain and strain of unspecified site of back, lumbar sprain and strain, and pain in joint, shoulder
region.
By letter to appellant dated October 30, 2014, OWCP noted that when her claim was first
received, it appeared to be a minor injury that resulted in minimal or no lost time from work. It
noted that based on these criteria and because the employing establishment did not controvert
continuation of pay or challenge the merits of the case, payment of a limited amount of medical
expenses were administratively approved, but the merits of the claim were not formally
considered. OWCP informed appellant of the necessary information that was needed for
approval of her claim and afforded her 30 days to submit the material.
By decision dated December 1, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim. It determined
that appellant did not establish that the events occurred as alleged.
On December 9, 2014 OWCP received a number of medical reports. In an October 7,
2014 report from Dr. Harold S. Barnes, a Board-certified radiologist, appellant’s MRI scan was
interpreted as showing a partial tear of the supraspinatus tendon and a partial tear of the mid
anterior/posterior superior inferior glenoid labrum. In an October 16, 2014 report, Dr. Barnes
interpreted the MRI scan of appellant’s cervical spine and noted straightening as well as reversal
of normal curvature of the cervical spine, with mild narrowing of the AP diameter of the spinal
canal at the C4-C5 level.
OWCP also received a November 13, 2014 progress note from Dr. Ceja. Dr. Ceja
reiterated his assessment of appellant as sprain and strain of unspecified site of shoulder and
upper arm, sprain and strain of unspecified site of back, lumbar sprain and strain, and pain in
joint, shoulder region.
On December 9, 2014 appellant requested an oral hearing before a hearing representative
of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review.
3

Appellant continued to submit medical reports dated from August 23 through
December 8, 2014 by Dr. Ceja. In the August 23, 2014 report, submitted to OWCP, Dr. Ceja
noted appellant’s history of an injury to her left arm, anterior chest, and low back on that date
while she was lifting a tray of mail off a pie wagon. Appellant told Dr. Ceja that she was
bending down when the pain suddenly appeared in her shoulder and radiated down the anterior
and lateral chest wall. She further told Dr. Ceja that the pain was aggravated by lifting her arm,
twisting and taking a deep breath, and that she also described a tingling sensation in her left arm.
Dr. Ceja assessed appellant with lumbar sprain and strain, pain in joint of shoulder region, sprain
and strain of unspecified site of back, sprain and strain of unspecified site of shoulder and upper
arm, and brachial neuritis or radiculitis. He indicated that appellant was not currently fit for
duty.
Appellant wrote a December 9, 2014 letter to OWCP wherein she stated that she injured
herself on August 23, 2014 while sleeving a heavy tray of mail. She noted that she was treated at
JFK’s Advanced Medical P.C., where the doctor informed her that the incident of lifting the
heavy tray caused her injuries, and that she should not return to work.
OWCP received further medical evidence on December 29, 2014. In a November 24,
2014 progress note, Dr. Louis Francis McIntyre, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, noted
appellant’s history as working on August 23, 2014 and bending down when she had a sudden
onset of left shoulder pain that radiated to her left lateral chest wall, and that she also complained
of low back discomfort. He listed impressions of cervical strain, left shoulder strain, and lumbar
strain. In a December 12, 2014 note detailing a clinical visit, Dr. McIntyre noted that appellant
sustained an injury to the left side of her neck and shoulder pain radiating to her elbow. He
diagnosed cervical strain, partial tear of left rotator cuff, and left bicipital tendinitis.
In a letter dated December 29, 2014, Dr. Rita Albano, a Board-certified internist with
Advantage Care Physicians, noted that appellant has been under their care for an injury sustained
on August 23, 2014, and that she may return to work full duty and without restrictions on
January 12, 2015.
In a December 30, 2014 attending physician’s report (Form CA-20) from JFK Advanced
Medical, P.C., with an illegible signature, it was noted that appellant’s injuries to her shoulder
and arm and her radiculopathy were caused or aggravated by employment activity.
At the hearing on August 16, 2015, appellant indicated that she was injured while
sleeving a tray of mail. She noted that she had a preexisting neck/lumbar spine injury which
occurred when she was hit by a Hi-Lo. The hearing representative explained to appellant that
she needed to submit medical evidence establishing a causal relationship between the incident of
employment and her injury within 30 days.
In an undated report from Dr. Ceja received by OWCP on May 8, 2015, Dr. Ceja noted
that he initially saw appellant on the date of her employment incident, at which time she did
complain of pain which seemed to have stemmed from aggravation of a nerve. He noted that
although appellant could lift up to 20 to 25 pounds, the tray appellant lifted exceeded the amount.
He noted appellant’s description as to how the incident occurred. He concluded that other
contributing factors to her injury would be the repetitive nature of her job function so it may not

4

have been this particular incident that was the causative factor but a build up to this point of
repetitiveness with the weight and motion. He noted that there was no previous examination to
provide a baseline but that he did note appellant’s subjective complaints along with the objective
findings from his office, the orthopedist, and the neurologist.
In a decision dated July 1, 2015, the hearing representative found that appellant
established that the employment incident occurred on August 23, 2014 as alleged. However, he
determined that appellant did not establish that the employment incident caused her medical
diagnosis. Therefore, the hearing representative affirmed the December 1, 2014 OWCP decision
as modified.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable
time limitation period of FECA, that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as
alleged, and that any disability and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are
causally related to the employment injury. These are the essential elements of each and every
compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an
occupational disease.2
In order to determine whether an employee actually sustained an injury in the
performance of duty, OWCP begins with an analysis of whether fact of injury has been
established. Generally, fact of injury consists of two components, which must be considered in
conjunction with one another. The first component to be established is that the employee
actually experienced the employment incident or exposure, which is alleged to have occurred.3
In order to meet his or her burden of proof to establish the fact that he or she sustained an injury
in the performance of duty, an employee must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he or
she actually experienced the employment injury or exposure at the time, place, and in the manner
alleged.4
The second component is whether the employment incident caused a personal injury and
generally can be established only by medical evidence.5 The medical evidence required to
establish causal relationship is usually rationalized medical evidence. Rationalized medical
opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s rationalized opinion on the
issue of whether there is a causal relationship between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and
the implicated employment factors. The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete
factual and medical background of the claimant, must be one of reasonable medical certainty,

2

Jussara L. Arcanjo, 55 ECAB 281, 283 (2004).

3

See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Fact of Injury, Chapter 2.803(2)(a) (August 2012).

4

Linda S. Jackson, 49 ECAB 486 (1998).

5

John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989); Horace Langhorne, 29 ECAB 820 (1978).

5

and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the
diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by the claimant.6
ANALYSIS
Appellant alleged that she sustained an injury on August 23, 2014 when she picked up
heavy trays and felt a pain in her left arm, shoulder, and chest. The hearing representative found
that the incident occurred as alleged. Appellant initially treated with Dr. Ceja who diagnosed
appellant with left shoulder, arm, chest wall, and lumbar strain. However, OWCP denied
appellant’s claim as it found that she failed to establish a causal relationship between the
accepted employment incident and the medical diagnosis.
In support of her claim, appellant submitted multiple reports by her treating internist,
Dr. Ceja. Dr. Ceja treated appellant on August 23, 2014, the date of the employment incident.
He described appellant’s account of the injury, and his reports appear to be based on an accurate
recitation of the facts of the employment incident of August 23, 2014. Dr. Ceja assessed
appellant with lumbar sprain and strain, pain in the joint of the shoulder region, sprain and strain
of unspecified site of back, sprain and strain of unspecified site of shoulder and upper arm, and
brachial neuritis or radiculitis. In his summary report, received by OWCP on May 8, 2015, he
opined that appellant was initially seen on the date of the August 23, 2014 incident, but that there
were multiple contributing factors to her injury, including the repetitive nature of her job
function. Accordingly, Dr. Ceja indicated that it may not have been the incident of August 23,
2014 that was the causative factor, but rather a build up to this point of repetitiveness with the
weight and motion. His opinion regarding causal relationship is speculative in nature. While the
opinion of a physician supporting causal relationship need not be one of absolute medical
certainty, the opinion must not be speculative or equivocal. The opinion should be expressed in
terms of a reasonable degree of medical certainty.7 Furthermore, the Board notes that Dr. Ceja’s
reports appear to be more supportive of an occupational disease claim, then a traumatic injury.8
His reports do not offer adequate rationale for the finding that the August 23, 2014 employment
incident caused appellant’s injuries. Dr. Ceja offered no medical explanation as to how the
accepted incident of lifting trays would have caused physiologically the diagnosed condition.
His opinion is therefore of limited value in establishing causal relationship.9
The Board further finds that multiple attending physicians’ reports were submitted
bearing an illegible signature. When it cannot be determined whether the person who signed a
report is a physician as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2), the report cannot constitute competent
medical evidence.10 The Board does note that these attending physician reports were issued by a
6

Judith A. Peot, 46 ECAB 1036 (1995); Ruby I. Fish, 46 ECAB 276 (1994).

7

See Ricky S. Storms, 52 ECAB 349 (2001); Morris Scanlon, 11 ECAB 384, 385 (1960).

8

The primary difference between a traumatic injury and an occupational disease is that a traumatic injury must
occur within a single work shift while an occupational disease occurs over more than one work shift. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.5(ee), 10.5(q).
9

See F.H., Docket No. 16-204 (issued April 18, 2016).

10

M.M., Docket No. 11-1544 (issued March 12, 2012).

6

person at JFK Advanced Medical, P.C., that Dr. Ceja is employed at JFK Advanced Medical,
P.C., and that the reports from JFK Advanced Medical, P.C. generally mirror the dates and
diagnoses of Dr. Ceja’s reports.
However, even if the Board were to consider these reports as signed by Dr. Ceja, they
still would not constitute rationalized medical evidence. In the reports dated September 2 and
25, 2014, a box marked “no” was checked indicating that appellant’s medical condition was not
caused or aggravated by an employment injury. However, in all of the reports commencing
October 4, 2014, the box marked “yes” was checked indicating that appellant’s left shoulder,
arm, and lumbar strain/sprain was caused by an employment-related activity. The explanation
provided was simply “condition was caused by work-related activity.” These reports did not
discuss the August 23, 2014 employment incident or provide any explanation for the conclusion
that appellant’s diagnoses were causally related to the employment incident. A report that
addresses causal relationship with a checkmark, without medical rationale explaining how the
work condition caused the alleged injury, is of diminished probative value and is insufficient to
establish causal relationship. Therefore, these reports are insufficient to meet appellant’s burden
of proof.11
The remaining evidence is also insufficient to establish causal relationship. These reports
are of limited probative value as they fail to discuss the causal relationship between appellant’s
August 23, 2014 employment incident and the diagnosed medical conditions.12 In her
August 26, 2014 report, Dr. Edwards indicated that appellant had cervical strain/sprain, cervical
radiculopathy, and left shoulder sprain/strain. She noted that appellant was not fit for duty, but
did not give an opinion relative to causation. On October 6, 2014 Dr. Krishna noted appellant’s
statement as to how she was injured and concluded that appellant’s clinical findings were
consistent with a cervical strain injury and cervical disc herniation resulting in cervical
radiculopathy, left shoulder derangement, and neuropathic pain syndrome. However, she also
did not make any independent conclusion on causation. Similarly, Dr. McIntyre did not make
any conclusion on causation of appellant’s cervical strain, partial tear of left rotator cuff, and left
bicipital tendinitis. Dr. Albano indicated that appellant had been under her care for an injury
sustained on August 23, 2014 and gave no further explanation. Dr. Barnes interpreted the MRI
scans, but did not discuss appellant’s employment incident, and therefore his report is of limited
probative value.13 The reports by Nurse McNeil do not constitute medical evidence, as a nurse is
not considered a physician as defined under FECA.14
An award of compensation may not be based on surmise, conjecture, or speculation.
Neither the fact that appellant’s claimed condition became apparent during a period of
employment nor her belief that the condition was caused by her employment is sufficient to

11

See D.M., Docket 16-0372 (issued April 6, 2016).

12

A.D., 58 ECAB 149 (2006) (medical evidence which does not offer any opinion regarding the cause of an
employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of causal relationship).
13

See G.M., Docket No. 14-2057 (issued May 12, 2015).

14

5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(t); see also K.W., 59 ECAB 271, 279 (2007).

7

establish causal relationship.15 As appellant did not establish that her medical condition was
causally related to the accepted incident of her employment, OWCP properly denied appellant’s
claim.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not establish that she sustained a traumatic injury on
August 23, 2014, causally related to the accepted employment incident.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated July 1, 2015 is affirmed.
Issued: June 1, 2016
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

15

D.I., 59 ECAB 158 (2007); Ruth R. Price, 16 ECAB 688, 691 (1965).

8


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
W.H., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Newark, NJ, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 10-683
Issued: April 22, 2011

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 7, 2010 appellant filed a timely appeal from the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs’ decision dated July 13, 2009 approving an attorney’s fee. She also
appealed an October 30, 2009 decision which denied her request for an oral hearing as untimely.
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board has jurisdiction over the attorney fee.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether the Office abused its discretion by approving an attorney’s
fee in the amount of $22,282.25; and (2) whether the Office properly denied appellant’s request
for an oral hearing.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 12, 1994 appellant, then a 36-year-old flexi-clerk, sustained a left shoulder
injury when she fell off of a platform while trying to retrieve mail sacks. The Office accepted
the claim for left shoulder sprain, contusion to the ribs and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Appellant stopped work on October 12, 1994, worked intermittently thereafter and received
wage-loss compensation. In a letter to the Office dated April 19, 1995, she appointed legal
counsel with respect to the claim.2
On February 20, 2008 Mr. Uliase provided appellant with a statement of his fee that
detailed the services provided to appellant and the amount of time he spent on each. The listed
fees totaled $22,282.25 for the period March 27, 1995 to April 12, 2007 for 111.54 hours the fee
request detailed individual such services as conducting research, reviewing the case record,
attending hearings regarding the claim, speaking to appellant about her claim and speaking to
employing establishment and Office officials.3 Mr. Uliase requested that appellant sign her
agreement to the fee request; however, she submitted a March 10, 2008 statement noting that
disagreement with the February 20, 2008 invoice for his fees. Appellant requested that counsel
provide her with a copy of her claim file.
On April 9, 2008 Mr. Uliase submitted his fee application to the Office for its approval.
He requested approval in the amount of $22,282.25 for the period March 27, 1995 to
April 12, 2007. Mr. Uliase submitted a copy of the March 10, 2008 statement from appellant
which disputed his fee.
On April 21, 2008 the Office forwarded a copy of Mr. Uliase’s fee application to
appellant and provided her 15 days within which to submit a statement regarding any objection
to the request. It asked that appellant specifically state why she disagreed with the fee request
and submit any information she had to support her objection. Appellant did not respond.
In letters dated May 22, 2008 to June 16, 2009, counsel inquired as to the status of his fee
request.
In a decision dated July 13, 2009, the Office approved the fee for services rendered on
behalf of appellant in the amount of $22,282.25.
In an appeal request form dated October 13, 2009, appellant requested an oral hearing.
In a decision dated October 30, 2009, the Office denied appellant’s request for an oral
hearing. It found that her request was not timely filed. Appellant was informed that her case had
been considered in relation to the issues involved, and that the request was further denied for the
2

In a January 12, 2008 letter, appellant authorized Aaron B. Aumiller, Esq., as attorney of record with respect to
her claim and terminated the appointment of any previous representative.
3

Mr. Uliase claimed 71.34 hours at the rate of $250.00 per hour. Counsel claimed 9.07 hours for work performed
by attorney Carolyn Uliase at the hourly rate of $225.00. The remainder of the claimed time was performed by
paralegals at the rate of $100.00 per hour and office staff at the rate of $50.00 per hour.

2

reason that the issues in this case could be addressed by requesting reconsideration from the
office and submitting evidence not previously considered.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
It is not the Board’s function to determine the fee for representative services performed
before the Office. That is a function within the discretion of the Office based on the criteria set
forth in Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations and mandated by Board decisions. The
Board’s sole function is to determine whether the action by the Office constituted an abuse of
discretion.4 Generally, an abuse of discretion is shown through proof of manifest error, clearly
unreasonable exercise of judgment, or actions taken which are contrary to both logic and
probable deductions from established facts.5
Section 10.703 of the Code of Federal Regulations provide in pertinent part that a
representative must submit a fee application, which includes a statement of agreement or
disagreement with the amount charged, signed by the claimant.6 When a fee application has
been disputed, the Office is required to provide the claimant with a copy of the fee application
and request the submission of further information in support of any objection.7 After the
claimant has been afforded 15 days from the date the request was forwarded to respond to the
request, the Office will then proceed to review the fee application to determine whether the
amount of the fee is substantially in excess of the value of services received by looking at the
following factors: (i) usefulness of the representative’s services; (ii) the nature and complexity
of the claim; (iii) the actual time spent on development and presentation of the claim; and
(iv) customary local charges for similar services.8
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that the Office considered the relevant criteria of section 10.703 in its
July 13, 2009 decision approving an attorney’s fee of $22,282.25. The evidence of record does
not establish that the Office abused its discretion with regard to this matter. Counsel provided
the Office with a detailed list of the services provided in representation of appellant and the
amount of time he spent on each type of service.9

4

Regina G. Jackson, 41 ECAB 321, 325 (1989); Charles A. Mikalaynas, 40 ECAB 1277, 1279-80 (1989);
William Lee Gargus, 25 ECAB 187, 194 (1974).
5

Daniel J. Perea, 42 ECAB 214, 221 (1990).

6

20 C.F.R. § 10.703(a)(i).

7

Id. at § 10.703(c).

8

Id.

9

The Office’s regulations provide that a fee request should include a description of the representative’s hourly
rate, the number of hours worked, the work performed during the hours identified and the total amount charged for
the representation (excluding administrative costs); see 20 C.F.R. § 10.703(a)(i).

3

Appellant submitted a March 10, 2008 statement that disagreed with the February 20,
2008 attorney fee request. Mr. Uliase submitted her statement of disagreement to the Office.
Consistent with its regulations pertaining to a disputed fee application, the Office provided
appellant with a copy of the application and allowed her the opportunity to submit further
information in support of any specific objection to the requested fee. Appellant did not
respond.10 The Board notes that, after Mr. Uliase was returned, the claim was accepted for left
shoulder sprain, contusion to the ribs and post-traumatic stress disorder. Appellant received
wage-loss compensation for periods of disability.
Appellant stated generally that she was not in agreement with the fee application;
however, she failed to address any specific objection or submit information related to the
services provided. Where the representative lists the time devoted to each task, his word is
entitled to considerable weight. Unless the Office can demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the representative did not, in fact, spend the time alleged it must accept as given
the figures that he reports.11 The record in the present case does not contain any such clear and
convincing evidence and the amounts of time listed for the various services do not appear
inordinate.
On appeal appellant disputed the attorney fee request noting that counsel failed to
competently analyze the medical and legal issues and exercise knowledge of the law. She further
asserted that counsel missed a deadline which caused the statute of limitations to run and
precluded her from pursuing her claim. The Board notes that appellant failed to submit any
evidence in support of her objection to the fee application before the Office and her unsupported
assertions on appeal that counsel failed to competently represent her is insufficient to establish
that the Office abused its discretion by approving the fee application. The Board notes that
appellant submitted evidence on appeal; however, the Board’s jurisdiction is limited to the
evidence that was before the Office at the time it issued its final decision; therefore, the Board is
unable to review evidence submitted by appellant on appeal.12
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
Section 8124(b)(1) of the Act provides that “a claimant for compensation not satisfied
with a decision of the Secretary ... is entitled, on request made within 30 days after the date of
the issuance of the decision, to a hearing on his claim before a representative of the Secretary.”13
Sections 10.617 and 10.618 of the federal regulations implementing this section of the Act
provides that a claimant shall be afforded a choice of an oral hearing or a review of the written
record by a representative of the Secretary.14 A claimant is entitled to a hearing or review of the
written record as a matter of right only if the request is filed within the requisite 30 days as
10

See V.T., 58 ECAB 133 (2006); see also Alvin T. Groner, Jr., 47 ECAB 588, 590 (1996).

11

Id.; Cf. C.H., Docket No. 10-987 (issued March 22, 2011).

12

20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c).

13

5 U.S.C. § 8124(b)(1).

14

20 C.F.R. §§ 10.616, 10.617.

4

determined by postmark or other carrier’s date marking and before the claimant has requested
reconsideration.15 Although there is no right to a review of the written record or an oral hearing
if not requested within the 30-day time period, the Office may within its discretionary powers
grant or deny appellant’s request and must exercise its discretion.16 The Office’s procedures
require that it exercise its discretion to grant or deny a hearing when the request is untimely or
made after reconsideration under section 8128(a).17
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
Appellant requested a hearing in an appeal form dated October 13, 2009. As the hearing
request was made more than 30 days after issuance of the July 13, 2009 Office decision, her
request for an oral hearing was untimely filed and she is not entitled to a hearing as a matter of
right.
The Office also notified appellant that it had considered the matter in relation to the issue
involved and indicated that additional argument and evidence could be submitted with a request
for reconsideration. It has broad administrative discretion in choosing means to achieve its
general objective of ensuring that an employee recovers from his or her injury to the fullest
extent possible in the shortest amount of time. An abuse of discretion is generally shown
through proof of manifest error, a clearly unreasonable exercise of judgment, or actions taken
which are contrary to both logic and probable deductions from established facts.18 There is no
indication that the Office abused its discretion in this case in finding that appellant could further
pursue the matter through the reconsideration process.
Consequently, the Office properly denied appellant’s request for a hearing.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office did not abuse its discretion by approving an application
for attorney’s fees in the amount of $22,282.25. The Board further finds the Office properly
denied appellant’s request for a hearing as untimely.

15

Id. at § 10.616(a).

16

Eddie Franklin, 51 ECAB 223 (1999); Delmont L. Thompson, 51 ECAB 155 (1999).

17

See R.T., Docket No. 08-408 (issued December 16, 2008); Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims,
Hearings and Reviews of the Written Record, Chapter 2.1601.4(b)(3) (October 1992).
18

Samuel R. Johnson, 51 ECAB 612 (2000).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’
decisions dated October 30 and July 13, 2009 are affirmed.
Issued: April 22, 2011
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
R.G., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Surfside, FL, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Joanne M. Wright, for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 17-1536
Issued: December 5, 2017

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On July 6, 2017 appellant, through his representative, filed a timely appeal from a
June 16, 2017 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish a right shoulder injury
due to factors of his federal employment.
1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for
legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An
attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject
to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On June 29, 2015 appellant, then a 58-year-old letter carrier, filed an occupational disease
claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he sustained a right shoulder condition in the form of a rotator
cuff tear due to performing his work duties as a letter carrier over a period of time.3 He indicated
that he had engaged in repetitive motions on a daily basis for the past 33¾ years while working
as a letter carrier. Appellant advised that he first reported his right shoulder pain when he
previously filed a separate claim for an alleged August 18, 2007 right shoulder injury (under
OWCP File No. xxxxxx964),4 and indicated that he continued to experience right shoulder pain
consistent with a right rotator cuff tear when casing mail, lifting, and otherwise reaching out with
his arms. Section 11 of the form asks the claimant to provide the date he or she first became
aware of the claimed condition and appellant provided the dates August 18, 2007 and
April 16, 2015. Section 12 asks the claimant to provide the date he or she realized when the
claimed condition was caused or aggravated by the employment and appellant provided the dates
August 18, 2007 and May 6, 2015. Appellant stopped work on May 5, 2015.
In an accompanying undated statement, appellant provided further details of the repetitive
letter carrier duties which he felt caused a new occupational right shoulder injury. He indicated
that his work task of casing mail, which he performed up to 10 hours per day, required him to
reach forward with his right arm and work with his arms above the level of his head. Appellant
reported that, on a daily basis, he carried a mailbag weighing up to 35 pounds on his right
shoulder, and pushed and pulled mail gurneys weighing more than 100 pounds. He advised that
he experienced increased right shoulder pain in October 2014 and that he underwent right
shoulder surgery on May 6, 2015.
In a July 17, 2015 letter, OWCP requested that appellant submit additional evidence in
support of his claim, including a physician’s opinion supported by a medical explanation as to
how his work activities caused, contributed to, or aggravated his claimed medical condition.
In an undated statement received in August 14, 2015, appellant provided additional
details about the repetitive duties of his letter carrier job. He indicated that his duties as a letter
carrier included casing mail and putting mail into mailboxes (tasks which required reaching out
and working above shoulder height), lifting and carrying trays and tubs of mail weighing
approximately 25 to 30 pounds, pushing and pulling hampers full of mail and parcels in excess
of 100 pounds, lifting parcels of all sizes weighing up to 70 pounds, and taking trays full of flats
(weighing 10 to 40 pounds or more) off racks above shoulder height.
Appellant submitted reports from several attending physicians detailing the treatment of
his various medical conditions. In two reports dated July 29, 2013, Dr. Alex M. Lam, a Boardcertified internist and rheumatologist, diagnosed diffuse arthralgia and primary localized

3

The claim was assigned OWCP File No. xxxxxx065.

The Board notes that appellant’s prior claim for an August 18, 2007 right shoulder injury is not the subject of
the present appeal. Appellant also filed an occupational disease claim in 2013 for joint pain in multiple sites
(OWCP File No. xxxxxx181) which is not the subject of the present appeal.
4

2

osteoarthritis.5 In a September 9, 2013 report, Dr. Hugh Fonesca, a Board-certified internist,
rheumatologist, and osteopath, described his injection of Lidocaine into appellant’s right bicipital
tendon and diagnosed diffuse arthralgia, primary localized osteoarthritis, sarcoidosis, Crohn’s
disease, synovitis, and tenosynovitis.
Beginning in March 2015, appellant received treatment for his right shoulder condition
from Dr. Marc Z. Hammerman, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon. In a March 27, 2015
report, Dr. Hammerman advised that appellant presented complaining of having right shoulder
pain for an unspecified period. He reported the findings of his physical examination on that date
noting tenderness in the right acromion without effusion or instability. Dr. Hammerman
diagnosed right rotator cuff tendinitis/bursitis in the shoulder region, scapular elastofibroma of
the right shoulder (with possible tear) as seen on prior diagnostic testing, and degeneration of
cervical intervertebral disc.
Appellant submitted an April 10, 2015 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of
appellant’s right shoulder which contained an assessment of partial rotator cuff tear, degenerative
joint disease of the shoulder region (unspecified whether generalized or localized), labral tear,
superior glenoid labrum lesions, and bicipital tenosynovitis.6 He also submitted a May 6, 2015
report showing that Dr. Hammerman performed right shoulder surgery on that date, including
rotator cuff repair involving the supraspinatus muscle, acromioplasty, resection of the distal
clavicle, subacromial bursectomy, and arthroscopic labral debridement. The surgery was not
approved by OWCP.
In an August 14, 2015 report, Dr. Hammerman indicated that appellant was seen on
March 27, 2015 for an initial evaluation of his right shoulder and he described the results of an
April 10, 2015 MRI scan of appellant’s right shoulder. He reported that the scan revealed 60 to
70 percent articular-sided partial thickness tear involving the supraspinatus, fraying involving the
infraspinatus tendon, cystic changes of the humeral head, subscapularis tendinitis, moderate
acromion joint degeneration with subacromial spur formation, moderate biceps tendinosis, and
labral fraying with a chronic superior anterior to posterior labral tear lesion. Dr. Hammerman
indicated that considering appellant’s 33 years of employment as a letter carrier with the
employing establishment which required a great deal of repetitive motions in both the
preparation and delivery of his mail route, it was within all reasonable medical probability there
was a causal relationship between his letter carrier duties and the clinical findings. He noted that
appellant underwent right shoulder surgery on May 6, 2015 and had been undergoing physical
therapy to rehabilitate his right shoulder.
In a September 1, 2015 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for a work-related
occupational condition based on its finding that it was untimely filed. It noted that appellant had
failed to file his claim within three years of August 18, 2007, the date listed on his claim form as
5

Appellant reported that he had experienced the arthralgia for two years. Dr. Lam noted that appellant had a past
history of hypertension, Crohn’s disease, and rheumatoid arthritis.
6

Appellant also submitted an August 20, 2007 MRI scan of his right shoulder which specifically indicated that no
rotator cuff tear, retraction, or atrophy was seen. The scan did show a suspected muscle strain or partial tear
involving the anterior head of the deltoid muscle.

3

the date that he first realized his claimed condition was caused or aggravated by factors of his
federal employment.
In a November 25, 2015 letter received on that date, appellant requested reconsideration
of OWCP’s September 1, 2015 decision. He discussed why he felt that the medical evidence
already in the case record supported his claim for a work-related occupational right shoulder
injury. Appellant did not submit any additional medical evidence.
In a January 26, 2016 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for a work-related
occupational right shoulder condition. It modified its September 1, 2015 decision to reflect that
appellant filed a timely claim, but found that appellant’s claim was denied because he failed to
submit sufficient medical evidence to establish causal relationship between his claimed right
shoulder injury and the accepted factors of federal employment, i.e., his letter carrier duties
which included casing mail, carrying a mailbag, delivering mail, and pushing mail gurneys.
In a May 6, 2016 letter, received on that date, appellant requested reconsideration of
OWCP’s January 26, 2016 decision. He indicated that an enclosed May 4, 2016 report from
Dr. Hammerman supported his claim for a work-related right shoulder condition.
In his May 4, 2016 report, Dr. Hammerman noted that he had reviewed an August 20,
2007 MRI scan of appellant’s right shoulder that was negative for rotator cuff tear, retraction, or
muscle atrophy. He indicated that the August 20, 2007 MRI scan showed a muscle strain or
partial tear involving the anterior head of the deltoid muscle and noted that office notes showed
that appellant was apparently diagnosed with biceps tendinitis and rotator cuff tendinitis.
However, Dr. Hammerman posited that these conditions were not workers’ compensation
injuries and were not related to the current right shoulder problem that appellant had. He advised
that appellant was seen on March 21, 2015 for an initial evaluation of his right shoulder and he
discussed the April 10, 2015 MRI scan of appellant’s right shoulder and the May 6, 2015 right
shoulder surgery. Dr. Hammerman noted that appellant’s duties as a letter carrier included
casing mail and putting mail into mailboxes (tasks which required reaching out and working
above shoulder height), lifting and carrying trays and tubs of mail weighing approximately 25 to
30 pounds, pushing and pulling hampers full of mail and parcels in excess of 100 pounds, lifting
parcels of all sizes weighing up to 70 pounds, and taking trays full of flats (weighing 10 to 40
pounds or more) off racks above shoulder height. He opined that, considering appellant’s 34
years of employment as a letter carrier with the employing establishment which required a great
deal of repetitive motions including lifting tubs and trays of mail and repetitive motion of
reaching above shoulder height to case mall, it was within all reasonable medical probability
there was a causal relationship between his letter carrier duties and the clinical findings.
Dr. Hammerman indicated that, if appellant could work with a system that allowed him to avoid
excessive repetitive stretch maneuvers, there would be less stress across his right rotator cuff
repair and he would be able to perform his work activities for longer periods.
In a June 2, 2016 decision, OWCP denied modification of its January 26, 2016 decision
denying appellant’s claim for a work-related occupational right shoulder condition. It found that
appellant failed to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish a causal relationship between
his claimed right shoulder condition and the accepted employment factors, i.e., his letter carrier

4

duties which included casing mail, carrying a mailbag, delivering mail, and pushing mail
gurneys.
In an August 2, 2016 letter, received on that date, appellant, through his representative,
requested reconsideration of OWCP’s June 2, 2016 decision. The representative argued that
Dr. Hammerman’s May 4, 2016 report established appellant’s claim for a work-related
occupational right shoulder condition.
In a December 20, 2016 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration
of the merits of his claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a). It found that the argument submitted
by appellant’s representative was repetitious in nature.
In a March 28, 2017 letter, received on that date, appellant, through his representative,
requested reconsideration of OWCP’s June 2, 2016 decision.
Appellant submitted a March 20, 2017 report from Dr. Martin E. Hale, an attending
Board-certified orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Hale indicated that, beginning in January 2012, he
initially treated appellant for complaints of neck pain radiating to the shoulders, numbness and
tingling in the hands, thoracolumbar pain without radiation into the lower extremities, and
bilateral knee pain. He noted that in 2013 appellant started complaining of right shoulder pain,
which he related to his overhead casing at work, and indicated that he later complained of having
left shoulder pain caused by using his left shoulder to compensate for his right shoulder pain.
Dr. Hale noted that appellant’s right shoulder condition worsened to the point where he needed
right shoulder mini-arthrotomy and indicated that appellant was still recovering from the surgery.
He posited that, based on appellant’s letter regarding his duties as a carrier, his continued work
with overhead reaching for casing as well as repetitive reaching and twisting of his arm during
the delivery portion of his route “are significantly contributing to his continuing shoulder
problems.” Dr. Hale found that it was more likely than not that appellant’s injuries were a direct
result of his work-related activities as a letter carrier with more than 50 percent of the injury
being referable to his occupation.
In a June 16, 2017 decision, OWCP denied modification of its June 2, 2016 decision
denying appellant’s claim for a work-related occupational right shoulder condition. It found that
appellant failed to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish causal relationship between his
claimed right shoulder condition and the accepted employment factors, i.e., his letter carrier
duties which included casing mail, carrying a mailbag, delivering mail, and pushing mail
gurneys.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA7 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable
time limitation period of FECA, that the injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as
alleged, and that any disability and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are
7

Supra note 2.

5

causally related to the employment injury.8 To establish fact of injury, an employee must submit
evidence sufficient to establish that he or she experienced a specific event, incident, or exposure
occurring at the time, place, and in the manner alleged.9 An employee must also establish that
such event, incident, or exposure caused an injury.10 These are the essential elements of each
and every compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic
injury or an occupational disease.11
OWCP regulations define the term “[o]ccupational disease or illness” as a condition
produced by the work environment over a period longer than a single workday or shift.12 To
establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational disease
claim, an employee must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing the presence
or existence of the disease or condition for which compensation is claimed; (2) a factual
statement identifying employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence
or occurrence of the disease or condition; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the employment factors identified by the employee.13
The medical evidence required to establish causal relationship generally is rationalized
medical opinion evidence.14 The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual
and medical background of the employee, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must
be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the
diagnosed condition and the established employment factors.15
ANALYSIS
On June 29, 2015 appellant filed an occupational disease claim alleging that he sustained
a right shoulder injury due to performing his work duties as a letter carrier over a period of time.
In decisions dated January 26, June 2, 2016, and June 16, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s claim
because he failed to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish causal relationship between
his claimed right shoulder condition and the accepted employment factors, i.e., his letter carrier

8

5 U.S.C. § 8101(1); B.B., 59 ECAB 234 (2007); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

9

J.C., Docket No. 16-0057 (issued February 10, 2016); E.A., 58 ECAB 677 (2007).

10

Id.

11

R.H., 59 ECAB 382 (2008); Ellen L. Noble, 55 ECAB 530 (2004).

12

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(q); see also Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Initial Development of
Claims, Chapter 2.800.2b (June 2011).
13

D.H., Docket No. 15-1876 (issued January 29, 2016); D.I., 59 ECAB 158 (2007); Victor J. Woodhams, 41
ECAB 345 (1989).
14

F.S., Docket No. 15-1052 (issued July 17, 2015); Tomas Martinez, 54 ECAB 623 (2003).

15

P.K., Docket No. 08-2551 (issued June 2, 2009); John W. Montoya, 54 ECAB 306 (2003).

6

duties which included casing mail, carrying a mailbag, delivering mail, and pushing mail
gurneys.16
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish an
occupational right shoulder condition due to factors of his federal employment.
In an August 14, 2015 report, Dr. Hammerman indicated that appellant was seen relative
to March 27, 2015 for an initial evaluation of his right shoulder and described the results of an
April 10, 2015 MRI scan of his right shoulder. He also referenced appellant’s May 6, 2015 right
shoulder surgery. Dr. Hammerman reported that the MRI scan revealed a 60 to 70 percent
articular-sided partial thickness tear involving the supraspinatus, fraying involving the
infraspinatus tendon, cystic changes of the humeral head, subscapularis tendinitis, moderate
acromion joint degeneration with subacromial spur formation, moderate biceps tendinosis, and
labral fraying with a chronic superior anterior to posterior labral tear lesion. He noted that,
considering appellant’s 33 years of employment as a letter carrier with the employing
establishment which required a great deal of repetitive motions in both the preparation and
delivery of his mail route, it was within all reasonable medical probability there was causal
relationship between his letter carrier duties and the clinical findings.
The Board notes that Dr. Hammerman’s August 14, 2015 report is of limited probative
value regarding appellant’s claimed work-related injury because he did not provide adequate
medical rationale in support of his opinion that a specific medical condition was caused or
aggravated by the reported employment activities. Dr. Hammerman indicated that there was a
causal relationship between appellant’s employment activities and the “clinical findings” but he
did not identify the specific diagnosed conditions which he felt were related to the employment
activities or describe the medical mechanism through which the activities could have caused or
aggravated such specific conditions. The Board has held that a medical report is of limited
probative value on the issue of causal relationship if it contains a conclusion regarding causal
relationship which is unsupported by medical rationale.17 Dr. Hammerman did not cite specific
objective findings on physical examination or diagnostic testing which supported his opinion on
causal relationship. He provided an extremely limited history of appellant’s right shoulder
problems and, therefore, his August 14, 2015 report is of limited probative value regarding
appellant’s claimed work-related injury for the further reason that it is not based on a complete
factual and medical history. The Board has held that an opinion on a given medical question is
of limited probative value if it is not based on a complete and accurate factual and medical
history.18
In a May 4, 2016 report, Dr. Hammerman discussed the April 10, 2015 MRI scan of
appellant’s right shoulder and the May 6, 2015 right shoulder surgery. He indicated that
16

In a September 1, 2015 decision, OWCP had denied appellant’s claim for an occupational right shoulder
condition because it was untimely filed. In its January 26, 2016 decision, OWCP modified its September 1, 2015
decision to reflect that appellant filed a timely claim, but found that appellant’s claim was denied because he failed
to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish causal relationship.
17

C.M., Docket No. 14-88 (issued April 18, 2014).

18

See supra note 14.

7

appellant’s duties as a letter carrier included casing mail and putting mail into mailboxes (tasks
which required reaching out and working above shoulder height), lifting and carrying trays and
tubs of mail weighing approximately 25 to 30 pounds, pushing and pulling hampers full of mail
and parcels in excess of 100 pounds, lifting parcels of all sizes weighing up to 70 pounds, and
taking trays full of flats (weighing 10 to 40 pounds or more) off racks above shoulder height.
Dr. Hammerman opined that, considering appellant’s 34 years of employment as a letter carrier
with the employing establishment, which required a great deal of repetitive motions including
lifting tubs and trays of mail and repetitive motion of reaching above shoulder height to case
mall, it was within all reasonable medical probability that there was causal relationship between
his letter carrier duties and the clinical findings.
The Board notes that, in his May 4, 2016 report, Dr. Hammerman provided a more
detailed description of appellant’s work duties, but he still did not provide sufficient medical
rationale to establish causal relationship between these duties and the claimed right shoulder
condition. Dr. Hammerman’s May 4, 2016 report is of limited probative value on the relevant
issue of this case because he did not provide adequate medical rationale explaining how the
described employment activities could have caused or aggravated appellant’s right shoulder
condition.19
His opinion on causal relationship is vague and generalized in nature.
Dr. Hammerman simply listed appellant’s work duties and concluded that they caused the
“clinical findings.” However, he did not specify which clinical findings were related to
appellant’s employment duties. Dr. Hammerman did not indicate how often appellant performed
the listed employment activities, correlate the activities to specific objective findings on physical
examination and diagnostic testing, or describe the medical processes through which the
activities could have been competent to cause or aggravate a specific diagnosed condition. He
did not provide an opinion which included a comprehensive account of the prior treatment for
appellant’s right shoulder problems. Therefore, Dr. Hammerman’s May 4, 2016 report is of
limited probative value regarding appellant’s claimed work-related right shoulder condition for
the further reason that it is not based on a complete factual and medical history.20
In a March 20, 2017 report, Dr. Hale, an attending physician, noted that in 2013 appellant
started complaining of right shoulder pain, which he related to his overhead casing at work, and
indicated that he later complained of having left shoulder pain caused by using his left shoulder
to compensate for his right shoulder pain. He noted that appellant’s right shoulder condition
worsened to the point where he needed right shoulder mini-arthrotomy and indicated that
appellant was still recovering from the surgery. Dr. Hale posited that, based on appellant’s letter
regarding his duties as a carrier, his continued work with overhead reaching for casing as well as
repetitive reaching and twisting of his arm during the delivery portion of his route “are
significantly contributing to his continuing shoulder problems.” He advised that it was more
likely than not that appellant’s injuries were a direct result of his work-related activities as a
letter carrier with more than 50 percent of the injury being referable to his occupation.

19

Y.D., Docket No. 16-1896 (issued February 10, 2017) (finding that a report is of limited probative value if it
lacks medical rationale in support of an opinion on causal relationship).
20

E.R., Docket No. 15-1046 (issued November 12, 2015).

8

The Board finds that Dr. Hale’s March 20, 2017 report is of limited probative value
regarding appellant’s claimed work-related occupational right shoulder condition because he did
not provide adequate medical rationale explaining how appellant’s employment activities could
have caused or aggravated his right shoulder condition.21 Dr. Hale did not describe appellant’s
work duties in any detail or explain the medical processes through which the activities could
have been competent to cause or aggravate a specific diagnosed condition. He did not present
objective findings on physical examination or diagnostic testing which supported his opinion on
causal relationship, identify the specific diagnosed conditions which he felt were work related, or
provide a complete factual and medical history.22
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a right
shoulder injury due to factors of his federal employment.

21

D.R., Docket No. 16-0528 (issued August 24, 2016).

On appeal appellant’s representative argues that appellant’s attending physicians provided medical rationale in
support of their opinions that appellant sustained a work-related occupational condition of his right shoulder.
However, the Board has explained why the opinions of appellant’s attending physicians did not contain adequate
medical rationale on the matter of causal relationship.
22

9

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 16, 2017 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: December 5, 2017
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

10