United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
N.G., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, BLUE LAGOON
BRANCH, Miami, FL, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 07-689
Issued: July 23, 2007

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 16, 2007 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an
October 18, 2006 decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs denying her
emotional condition claim. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has established that she sustained an emotional condition
in the performance of duty.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On May 25, 2005 appellant, then a 44-year-old postal window clerk, filed both traumatic
injury and occupational disease claims alleging an emotional condition due to her employment.
In the traumatic injury claim, she alleged that on April 24, 2006 she sustained an emotional
condition due to hostile and abusive behavior/treatment by Larry Alfonso, station manager. In
the occupational disease claim, appellant alleged that her depression and fear were due to

abusiveness and hostility by Mr. Alfonso. She stopped work on April 25, 2005 and has not
returned.1
In a May 27, 2005 attending physician’s report (Form CA-20), Dr. Beatriz Liliane
Villafane, a treating psychiatrist, diagnosed depressive disorder since February 2005 due to
problems with her supervisor at work. She checked “yes” to the question of whether the
condition had been caused or aggravated by her employment.
On June 6, 2005 the Office received appellant’s February 4 and May 9, 2005 statements
and Mr. Alfonso’s June 2, 2005 statement. Appellant related an incident with a customer on
February 4, 2005 and Mr. Alfonso’s screaming at her. The incident involved a customer asking
the person in the window next to her if the person spoke Spanish. Appellant stated that she
started to giggle, finished with her customer and left for lunch. At this point, the customer “went
to Larry and started pointing at me and yelling in Spanish.” Once the customer left, appellant
alleged that Mr. Alfonso started to tell her that she had been rude to the customer and screamed
at her. She alleged that she was afraid to move while Mr. Alfonso was screaming at her as he
stated “this was an official discussion.” Lastly, appellant stated that a customer told her
supervisor that all employees should speak Spanish as “this was a Latin community and Larry’s
response was ‘I’m working on it!’”
In his June 2, 2005 statement, Mr. Alfonso stated that appellant had been addressed “for
two instances in which she had arguments with customers in the lobby.” The incidents occurred
on January 21 and February 4, 2005. Mr. Alfonso noted that during the period January 24 to
April 26, appellant “has been on vacation leave or sick leave for a previous condition for over
thirty[-]five days.”
In a May 9, 2005 statement, appellant alleged that Mr. Alfonso continually harassed her
and subjected her to disparaging and hostile treatment. She attributed her migraines, depression,
anxiety, fear for her well-being and safety due to Mr. Alfonso’s “continual actions, words and
demeanor.” Appellant noted two grievances had been filed by the employees against
Mr. Alfonso.
On May 25, 2005 appellant filed a claim for compensation (Form CA-7) for lost wages
beginning April 26, 2005.
The employing establishment submitted a June 8, 2005 investigative memorandum with
exhibits regarding appellant by Ingrid Petrakis, postal inspector. In a June 3, 2005 memorandum
of interview with Mr. Alfonso, Ms. Petrakis noted that he denied screaming or yelling at
appellant and that it was his duty to address work problems and direct employees. Mr. Alfonso
informed Ms. Petrakis that appellant “has had numerous performance issues which include being
disrespectful to customers and poor attendance.” On June 6, 2005 Ms. Petrakis interviewed Josie
Moretti, workplace improvement analyst for the employing establishment. Ms. Moretti related
investigating appellant’s claim of a hostile work environment and finding that “no credible threat

1

The employing establishment approved appellant’s request for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) for the period April 26 to July 20, 2005.

2

could be substantiated.” She noted that Mr. Alfonso’s “regular tone of voice is loud and may be
misinterpreted by others.”
In a June 13, 2005 letter, the Office informed appellant that the evidence of record was
insufficient to support her claim. It advised her of the medical and factual evidence required to
support her claim and gave her 30 days to submit the requested evidence.
In response appellant submitted additional medical and factual evidence including a
report dated June 23, 2005 and a June 2, 2005 health care certification for the FMLA by
Dr. Villafane and an April 14, 2005 statement and several letters written in April, May and
June 2005 by Maria A. Andrés, a coworker, a March 22, 2005 statement, an undated statement
by Sharon Rush, a coworker, a statement by Claude Caidor, a coworker, a May 27, 2005
settlement agreement of mediation between Ms. Andrés and Mr. Alfonso and her statement dated
June 18, 2005.
In her statement, Ms. Rush alleged that she was being discriminated against based on her
sex and race by Mr. Alfonso. She proceeded to describe incidents involving her and
Mr. Alfonso. Ms. Rush made no mention of appellant in her statement.
In the April 14, 2005 statement, Ms. Andrés related her problems with Mr. Alfonso and
the preferential treatment he accords Jose Lopez, a coworker. She opined that Mr. Alfonso “has
no people skills, looses (sic) his temper, screams at his employees and is incapable of being fair
to his employees regardless of sex.” Ms. Andrés does not address appellant’s allegations in her
April 14 and 15 and May 9, 18 and 20, 2005 letters. She alleged that Mr. Alfonso created a
hostile work environment with his abusive treatment of her and his mistreatment of her
coworkers. Ms. Andrés, in her May 22, 2005 letter, responded to Mr. Alfonso regarding her
annual leave usage. In a June 17, 2005 letter, she details what she considers is a hostile work
environment created by Mr. Alfonso.
In a March 22, 2005 statement, Ms. Caidor stated that on February 4, 2005 she was
waiting on a customer who asked if she spoke Spanish and if there was an employee who spoke
Spanish. She noted that appellant giggled when she informed the customer that there was no
Spanish speaking clerk. After Ms. Caidor had finished with the customer, she noted that he went
directly to speak to Mr. Alfonso. She related the customer was talking in a very loud voice and
pointing to appellant saying the “words “‘GRINGA’ and ‘PUERTA.’” (Emphasis in the
original.) Once the customer had finished talking with Mr. Alfonso, he requested that appellant
come to see him. Ms. Caidor indicated that she could hear Mr. Alfonso yelling at appellant due
to the thin walls. When she saw Mr. Alfonso later, he informed her that this was the second
complaint that week he had about appellant. In concluding, she stated that Mr. Alfonso’s
reprimand of appellant “was completely in-accurate (sic) and totally out of context with the
situation.”
In the June 2, 2005 medical certification, Dr. Villafane diagnosed depression and anxiety
which was “triggered and exacerbated by [a] [February]/[20]05 relationship with supervisor.”
She indicated that appellant was totally disabled for an unknown period of time. On June 23,
2005 Dr. Villafane diagnosed major depressive disorder and job-related problems. She related
that appellant’s anxiety and depression “apparently started in February 2005, after a work-related

3

incident involving [her] supervisor.” Dr. Villafane noted that appellant had no symptoms prior
to the February 2005 incident.
In her June 18, 2005 statement, appellant noted that Mr. Alfonso’s abusive behavior has
caused her depression, anxiety, migraines and fear for her well being and safety. She noted that
following the February 4, 2005 incident Mr. Alfonso began harassing Ms. Andrés and
Ms. Caidor. Appellant alleged that the harassment of Ms. Caidor was due to her defending
appellant regarding the February 4, 2005 incident and that Ms. Andrés was harassed due to their
friendship. She alleged that Mr. Alfonso’s harassment and hostile actions grew worse following
the February 4, 2005 incident. Appellant relates that just thinking about Mr. Alfonso makes her
nauseous. She stated that all was well with her and her work environment prior to the arrival of
Mr. Alfonso as manager.
By decision dated July 15, 2006, the Office denied appellant’s traumatic injury and
occupational disease claims on the grounds that she failed to establish any compensable factors
of employment. The Office found that the incident on February 4, 2005 occurred when
Mr. Alfonso disciplined appellant and provided counseling for an argument with a customer.
The Office also found the record devoid of any evidence supporting her allegation that
Mr. Alfonso was harassing her.
Subsequent to the decision, the Office received a July 14, 2005 letter from appellant.
Appellant noted that she filed two Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Commission
complaints against Mr. Alfonso. She alleged that Mr. Alfonso’s letter informing her to report to
duty and a letter charging her with being absent without leave was a continuation of his
harassment of her.
Appellant requested reconsideration on September 7, 2005. She submitted previously
submitted evidence as well as new evidence in support of her claim. The new evidence included
an August 16, 2005 report by Sanford Mintz, Ph.D., and an August 1, 2005 letter from appellant
reiterating problems she and others had with Mr. Alfonso. Appellant also submitted copies of
grievance and evidence regarding approval of her FMLA request.
On March 25, 2005 Lori M. Costa, manager customer service, and Omar Hechavarria
noted that a meeting was held on February 28, 2005 to discuss “an allegation of harassment and
discrimination at the [employing establishment].” The parties agreed “that all employees will be
treated with dignity and respect.” Appellant noted that Mr. Hechavarria addressed the letter
regarding the settlement. She indicated that the letter regarding the settlement of the harassment
grievance was addressed to her as she “originally filed this grievance and then it became a class
action.” The record also contains copies of a class grievance settled on September 13, 2005
regarding absence of April 13, 2005 to be considered scheduled leave.
In the August 1, 2005 letter, appellant alleged that Mr. Alfonso was being protected by
Jesus Galvez, postmaster, and that Ms. Petrakis had been Mr. Galvez’s secretary. She stated that
Ms. Petrakis failed to interview the three employees alleging that Mr. Alfonso harassed them and
opined that her investigation was biased. Appellant reiterated what occurred on February 4,
2005 and how Mr. Alfonso screamed and yelled at her. She noted her disagreement with
Mr. Alfonso’s allegation that she had many performance and attendance problems. Next,

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appellant noted the preferential treatment Mr. Alfonso accorded to Jose Lopez, who was the only
male clerk.
In an August 16, 2005 report, Dr. Mintz noted that he had been treating appellant since
June 7, 2005. He related that on February 4, 2005 Mr. Alfonso “verbally assaulted her in front of
customers and coworkers.” Since the February 4, 2005 incident with Mr. Alfonso, appellant
“has experienced a heightened level of anxiety.” Dr. Mintz diagnosed major depressive disorder
and concluded that she was currently totally disabled.
On February 13, 2006 the Office denied appellant’s request for reconsideration.
On July 13, 2006 appellant requested reconsideration and submitted additional medical
and factual evidence in support of her request. She alleged that Ms. Petrakis did not perform a
thorough investigation and omitted pertinent information. The evidence included treatment notes
for the period January 22 to May 28, 2004 by Dr. Norman Moskowitz, a treating Board-certified
orthopedic surgeon; a July 26 2006 report by Dr. Mintz; a December 21, 2005 statement by
Calixto Oria, a coworker; a July 10, 2006 email from Carmen Gil, Mr. Oria’s girlfriend
regarding Mr. Alfonso’s rude and unprofessional behavior; appellant’s letters dated July 11, 12
and 13, 2006; and an undated witness statement which appellant and her coworkers signed.2
In an undated witness statement, appellant and seven coworkers signed a statement
regarding Mr. Alfonso’s behavior. They alleged that they witnessed Mr. Alfonso losing his
temper and being out of control, screaming, yelling, harassing employees, being vindictive,
trembling with anger, eyes glazed over with anger and veins bulging from forehead/neck while
screaming and yelling, demeaning employees and mismanagement.
Mr. Oria, in his December 21, 2005 statement, described Mr. Alfonso’s discriminatory
behavior towards him.
In a July 12, 2005 letter, appellant alleged that Mr. Alfonso’s harassment began because
he instructed her to speak Spanish and she refused.
Appellant, in a July 13, 2005 letter, alleged that Mr. Alfonso’s harassment of her began in
January 2006 when he stated that all of his clerks had to speak Spanish and she disagreed. Next,
she noted the February 4, 2005 incident with a Hispanic customer and Mr. Alfonso’s yelling and
screaming at her. Subsequent to February 4, 2005, appellant alleged that she was subjected to
daily harassment by Mr. Alfonso which included denying sick leave requests and charging her
with being absent without leave. Next, she related Mr. Alfonso arguing with customers
dissatisfied with Mr. Lopez’s behavior. In concluding, she alleged that Mr. Alfonso is vindictive
and employees are afraid of him.

2

The names of the coworkers are Ms. Andrés, Mr. Caidor, David Alonso, Victor Crespo, Jr., Maria Falcon,
Osvaldo Hernandez, Jr., Ross Williams, Mr. Oria and Ms. Gil.

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By decision dated October 18, 2006, the Office denied appellant’s request for
modification.3
LEGAL PRCEDENT
To establish her claim that she sustained an emotional condition in the performance of
duty, appellant must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing that she has an
emotional or psychiatric disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or
incidents alleged to have caused or contributed to her condition; and (3) rationalized medical
opinion evidence establishing that the identified compensable employment factors are causally
related to her emotional condition.4
Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is
somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,5 the Board
explained that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a
compensable emotional condition arising under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.6
There are situations where an injury or illness has some connection with the employment but
nevertheless does not come within coverage under the Act.7 When an employee experiences
emotional stress in carrying out his employment duties, and the medical evidence establishes that
the disability resulted from an emotional reaction to such situation, the disability is generally
regarded as due to an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. This is true when
the employee’s disability results from an emotional reaction to a special assignment or other
requirement imposed by the employing establishment or by the nature of the work.8 On the other
hand, the disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a
reduction-in-force or his frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment
or to hold a particular position.9
In emotional condition claims, when working conditions are alleged as factors in causing
a condition or disability, the Office, as part of its adjudicatory function, must make findings of
fact regarding which working conditions are deemed compensable factors of employment and
are to be considered by a physician when providing an opinion on causal relationship and which
working conditions are not deemed factors of employment and may not be considered. If a
claimant does implicate a factor of employment, the Office should then determine whether the
3

The Board notes that, following the October 18, 2006 decision, the Office received additional evidence.
However, the Board may not consider new evidence on appeal. See 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c); Donald R. Gervasi, 57
ECAB ___ (Docket No. 05-1622, issued December 21, 2005); Rosemary A. Kayes, 54 ECAB 373 (2003).
4

Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

5

28 ECAB 125 (1976).

6

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

7

See Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 137 (1999).

8

Lillian Cutler, supra note 5.

9

Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001).

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evidence of record substantiates that factor. When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of
employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, the Office
must base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.10
As a general rule, an employee’s emotional reaction to administrative or personnel
actions taken by the employing establishment is not covered because such matters pertain to
procedures and requirements of the employer and are not directly related to the work required of
the employee.11 An administrative or personnel matter will be considered to be an employment
factor where the evidence discloses error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment.12
An employee’s frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to
hold a particular position is not compensable.13 Similarly, an employee’s dissatisfaction with
perceived poor management is not compensable under the Act.14
For harassment or discrimination to give rise to a compensable disability under the Act,
there must be evidence introduced which establishes that the acts alleged or implicated by the
employee did, in fact, occur. Mere perceptions of harassment or discrimination are not
compensable under the Act. Unsubstantiated allegations of harassment or discrimination are not
determinative of whether such harassment or discrimination occurred. Rather, the issue is
whether the claimant under the Act has submitted sufficient evidence to establish a factual basis
for the claim by supporting his allegations with probative and reliable evidence.15
ANALYSIS
Appellant made general allegations of harassment and a hostile work environment caused
by her supervisor, Mr. Alfonso. The perception of harassment or mistreatment is not sufficient
to establish a compensable work factor. There must be probative and reliable evidence in
support of the allegation.16
Appellant alleged that she was subjected to harassment and a hostile work environment
caused by Mr. Alfonso. She contended that the harassment began following her refusal of his
instruction to learn Spanish in January 2005. The perception of harassment or mistreatment is
not sufficient to establish a compensable work factor. There must be probative and reliable

10

Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001).

11

Felix Flecha, 52 ECAB 268 (2001).

12

Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001).

13

Barbara J. Latham, 53 ECAB 316 (2002).

14

Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-734, issued June 16, 2006).

15

James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 93 (2000)

16

See Beverly R. Jones, 55 ECAB 411 (2004). In evaluating workers’ compensation claims, the term harassment
is synonymous with a persistent disturbance, torment or persecution, i.e., mistreatment by coemployees or
coworkers.

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evidence in support of the allegation.17 The evidence of record does not contain probative and
reliable evidence sufficient to establish harassment or a hostile work environment. There are, for
example, no findings by the EEO Commission or other administrative agencies on the issue.18
The grievances submitted by appellant are insufficient to establish either harassment or a hostile
work environment. The witness statements and the documents from coworkers made allegations
of harassment by Mr. Alfonso towards them, but do not provide specific examples of harassment
involving appellant. These statements by Ms. Andrés, Ms. Rush, Mr. Oria and Ms. Gil describe
incidents they have had with Mr. Alfonso, but do not mention any incidents pertaining to
appellant and Mr. Alfonso. In the undated statement signed by appellant and seven coworkers,
they allege witnessing Mr. Alfonso losing his temper and being out of control, screaming,
yelling, harassing employees, being vindictive, trembling with anger, eyes glazed over with
anger and veins bulging form forehead/neck while screaming and yelling, demeaning employees
and mismanagement. However, this statement is insufficient as these are general perceptions by
appellant and her coworkers without describing in detail specific incidents. They merely note
that they have witnessed the described behavior by Mr. Alfonso. No mention is made of when or
where the individuals signing the statement were allegedly subjected to this behavior. Moreover,
any alleged harassment or hostile behavior by Mr. Alfonso towards appellant’s coworkers does
not establish that appellant was subjected to the same harassment and hostile behavior.
Furthermore, the employing establishment provided a June 8, 2005 investigative memorandum
by Ms. Petrakis, postal inspector, finding the evidence insufficient to support appellant’s
allegations of a hostile work environment and no credible evidence of any threats made by
Mr. Alfonso. While appellant has alleged bias by Ms. Petrakis and Ms. Moretti, she has
submitted no supporting factual evidence supporting a bias. Allegations alone are insufficient to
establish a factual basis and thus appellant has failed to show that the investigative report was
biased.19 The Board has long held that mere perceptions of harassment or discrimination are not
compensable.20 Thus, appellant has not established a compensable factor with respect to
harassment or a hostile work environment.
The record contains copies of two grievance which were settled on March 25 and
September 13, 2005. Neither grievance references appellant as a grievant. The March 25, 2005
grievance noted that a meeting was held on February 28, 2005 to discuss “an allegation of
harassment and discrimination at the [employing establishment].” The parties agreed “that all
employees will be treated with dignity and respect.” This is not an admission of guilt or
wrongdoing on the part of the employing establishment. The record also contains copies of a
class grievance involving settled on September 13, 2005. The agreements do not describe the
specific subject matter of the settled grievances with specificity nor do they admit any

17

Ronald K. Jablanski, 56 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 05-482, issued July 13, 2005) (A claimant must establish a
factual basis for his or her allegations with probative and reliable evidence).
18

Such evidence, while not determinative, may constitute substantial evidence regarding a compensable work
factor. See Walter Asberry, Jr., 36 ECAB 686 (1985)
19

L.S., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1808, issued December 29, 2006); Pamela D. Casey, 57 ECAB ___
(Docket No. 05-1768, issued December 13, 2005).
20

L.S., supra note 19.

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wrongdoing on the part of the employing establishment.21 Thus, the grievances submitted by
appellant are insufficient to establish a hostile work environment as a compensable factor of
employment.
Appellant also alleged that Mr. Alfonso yelled at her on February 4, 2005 following an
incident with a customer who was dissatisfied with her giggling at a comment made by a
coworker who was serving him. She submitted statements from coworkers who noted that on
February 4, 2005 Mr. Alfonso yelled at her, not every statement uttered in the workplace will
give rise to coverage under the Act and a raised voice in the course of a conversation does not in
itself warrant a finding of verbal abuse.22 The evidence supports that Mr. Alfonso raised his
voice on February 4, 2005. This factual scenario, however, does not rise to the level of error or
verbal abuse.23 There is no evidence that Mr. Alfonso’s actions were unwarranted.24 Thus, the
Board finds that the February 4, 2005 conversation is not a compensable factor of employment.
Based on the evidence of record, appellant has not substantiated a compensable work
factor. Since she has not established a compensable work factor, the Board will not address the
medical evidence.25
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not established an emotional condition in the
performance of duty.

21

D.L., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-2018, issued December 12, 2006) (the Board has held that grievances and
EEO complaints, by themselves, do not establish wrongdoing by an employing establishment).
22

Karen K. Levene, 54 ECAB 671 (2003).

23

Id.

24

See Carolyn S. Philpott, 51 ECAB 175 (1999).

25

T.G., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1411, issued November 28, 2006); D.L., supra note 21; Margaret S.
Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496 (1992).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated October 18, 2006 is affirmed.
Issued: July 23, 2007
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

10


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
N.L., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Santa Clarita, CA, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

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Docket No. 18-0166
Issued: May 2, 2018

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER REMANDING CASE
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

On October 30, 2017 appellant filed a timely appeal from an October 12, 2017 nonmerit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The appeal was docketed
as No. 18-0166.
On July 20, 2017 appellant, then a 46-year-old mail handler, filed an occupational disease
claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she developed a right shoulder and neck injury as a result of her
repetitive employment duties.
In support of her claim, appellant submitted an August 3, 2017 medical report from
Dr. Adam Sherman, Board-certified in family medicine, who provided physical examination
findings, review of diagnostic testing, and treatment pertaining to the right shoulder.
By decision dated September 22, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that the
medical evidence of record did not show that her diagnosed condition was causally related to the
established factors of federal employment.
On September 29, 2017 appellant requested reconsideration of OWCP’s September 22,
2017 decision. She requested that OWCP review a new report submitted from Dr. Sherman with
highlighted language.

On October 11, 2017 OWCP received a September 29, 2017 medical report from
Dr. Sherman who provided detailed findings pertaining to appellant’s right shoulder magnetic
resonance imaging scan which revealed a full thickness rotator cuff tear. Dr. Sherman reported
that her work-related duties over time had exacerbated her degenerative joint disease of the right
shoulder. He described appellant’s employment activities and opined that her long-standing,
strenuous work activities directly caused, contributed, and aggravated her diagnosed medical
conditions.
By decision dated October 12, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration,
finding that she neither raised substantive legal questions, nor submitted relevant and pertinent
new evidence.
Having reviewed the case record submitted by OWCP, the Board finds that this case is not
in posture for a decision. In its October 12, 2017 denial, OWCP found that appellant failed to
submit any medical evidence as there were no notes attached to her request and no evidence
submitted subsequent to the September 22, 2017 decision. However, the record reflects that on
October 11, 2017 OWCP received Dr. Sherman’s September 29, 2017 medical report.
As the Board’s decisions are final as to the subject matter appealed, it is crucial that all
evidence relevant to the subject matter of the claim which was properly submitted to OWCP prior
to the time of issuance of its final decision be reviewed and addressed by OWCP.1 It makes no
difference that the claims examiner may not have been directly in possession of the evidence.
Indeed, Board precedent envisions evidence received by OWCP, but not yet associated with the
case record when the final decision is issued must be provided merit review.2 In its final decision,
OWCP found that no medical evidence was received. Because OWCP did not consider
Dr. Sherman’s September 29, 2017 medical report, the Board cannot review such evidence for the
first time on appeal.3
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for a decision. Consequently, the case will
be remanded for OWCP to fully consider all of the evidence that was of record at the time of
OWCP’s October 12, 2017 decision. Following this and such other development as deemed
necessary, OWCP shall issue an appropriate merit decision.

1

See Yvette N. Davis, 55 ECAB 475 (2004); see also William A. Couch, 41 ECAB 548 (1990) (OWCP did not
consider new evidence received four days prior to the date of its decision); see Linda Johnson, 45 ECAB 439 (1994)
(applying Couch where OWCP did not consider a medical report received on the date of its decision).
2

Id.

3

20 C.F.R. 501.2(c).

2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the October 12, 2017 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further development
consistent with this order.
Issued: May 2, 2018
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.J., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Vancouver, WA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 20-1044
Issued: July 9, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 15, 2020 appellant filed a timely appeal from an October 29, 2019 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has established more than 12 percent permanent impairment
of the right upper extremity, for which she previously received a schedule award.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 3, 2015 appellant, then a 55-year-old rural carrier, filed a traumatic injury claim
(Form CA-1) alleging that on May 1, 2015 she sustained a right upper arm injury when she picked
up an oversized and heavy package out of the back of the truck. OWCP accepted the claim for
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

right shoulder and upper arm sprains and subsequently expanded acceptance of the claim to include
right rotator cuff muscle/tendon strain. It authorized right rotator cuff repair, right shoulder
arthroscopic surgery, clavicle excision/reconstruction, and right arthroscopic biceps tenodesis
surgery, which occurred on March 3, 2016 and repeat right rotator cuff repair surgery, which
occurred on August 4, 2017.
In a May 21, 2019 report, Dr. Paul M. Puziss, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
diagnosed history of right rotator cuff repair, open distal clavicle resection, biceps tenodesis,
limited arthroscopic glenohumeral debridement with acromioplasty, right rotator cuff arthroscopic
revision and repair, currently healed mildly captured right shoulder and failed recent rotator cuff
repair. Referring to Table 15-5, page 403 of the sixth edition of the American Medical Association,
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (A.M.A., Guides)2 and the diagnosis-based
impairment (DBI) method, he determined that appellant had a class of diagnosis (CDX) of 1, grade
C impairment, for a primary diagnosis of rotator cuff tear with residual loss and functional with
normal motion. Dr. Puziss derived a grade modifier for functional history (GMFH) of 2,3 a grade
modifier for physical examination (GMPE) of 1,4 and a grade modifier for clinical studies (GMCS)
of 2.5 The net adjustment formula resulted in a plus 2 movement to the right, resulting in seven
percent right upper extremity permanent impairment. Dr. Puziss also calculated appellant’s
permanent impairment using the range of motion (ROM) method, which was measured three times,
pursuant to Table 15-34, page 475 to find three percent permanent impairment for 150 degrees of
flexion, one percent impairment for 20 degrees of adduction, two percent impairment for 20
degrees external rotation and 70 degrees internal rotation, three percent impairment for 140
degrees, zero percent impairment for 50 degrees extension, no impairment for 70 degrees external
rotation/abduction, two percent impairment for 70 degrees internal rotation, and three percent
impairment for 160 degrees abduction, resulting in a total of eight percent impairment for her
multiple rotator cuff repairs. Using Table 15-5, page 403 and diagnosis of distal clavicle resection,
he determined appellant was a class 1 with 10 percent impairment according to Table 15-5, page
403. Dr. Puziss then combined the ROM and DBI impairment ratings, finding a total 18 percent
right upper extremity permanent impairment.
On September 10, 2019 appellant filed a claim for a schedule award (Form CA-7).
On September 19, 2019 OWCP referred the case record to Dr. Michael M. Katz, a Boardcertified orthopedic surgeon serving as a DMA, for review. In a September 25, 2019 report, the
DMA reviewed the medical record including the impairment rating by Dr. Puziss. Dr. Katz
utilized the ROM method in Table 15-34, page 475 of the A.M.A., Guides to find three percent
impairment for 150 degrees flexion, zero percent impairment for 50 degrees extension, three
percent impairment for 160 degrees abduction, one percent impairment for 20 degrees adduction,
zero percent impairment for 70 degrees internal rotation, and two percent impairment for 30
degrees external rotation, totaling nine percent right upper extremity permanent impairment due
2

A.M.A., Guides (6th ed. 2009).

3

Id. at 406, Table 15-7.

4

Id. at 408, Table 15-8.

5

Id. at 410, Table 15-9.

2

to a rotator cuff tear. Under Table 2.1, page 20 and page 389 of the A.M.A., Guides, he explained
that as appellant had more than one diagnosis, the diagnosis of distal clavicle resection yielded the
highest impairment rating. Under Table 15-5, page 403, the DMA found CDX of 1 for the
diagnosis of distal clavicle resection was with a default value of 10 percent impairment. Under
Table 15-7, page 406, he found a GMFH of 2; under Table 15-8, page 408, he found a GMPE of
1; and under Table 15-9, page 410, he found a GMCS of 2. Utilizing the net adjustment formula
calculation, the DMA found a net adjustment of 2,6 which resulted in grade E or 12 percent
permanent impairment for right shoulder distal clavicle resection. The DMA advised that the DBI
method should be used as it provided the higher rating percentage of permanent impairment. He
noted that ROM impairment for a given region cannot be combined with any other DBI impairment
for the same region. Dr. Katz determined the date of maximum medical improvement (MMI) to
be May 21, 2019, the date of Dr. Puziss’ examination.
By decision dated October 29, 2019, OWCP granted appellant a schedule award for 12
percent permanent impairment of the right upper extremity. The award ran for 262.08 weeks from
May 21, 2019 to February 7, 2020.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
The schedule award provisions of FECA,7 and its implementing federal regulations,8 set
forth the number of weeks of compensation payable to employees sustaining permanent
impairment from loss, or loss of use, of scheduled members or functions of the body. However,
FECA does not specify the manner in which the percentage loss of a member shall be determined.
The method used in making such a determination is a matter which rests in the discretion of
OWCP. For consistent results and to ensure equal justice, the Board has authorized the use of a
single set of tables so that there may be uniform standards applicable to all claimants. OWCP
evaluates the degree of permanent impairment according to the standards set forth in the specified
edition of the A.M.A., Guides, published in 2009.9 The Board has approved the use by OWCP of
the A.M.A., Guides for the purpose of determining the percentage loss of use of a member of the
body for schedule award purposes.10

6

(GMFH - CDX)(2-1) + (GMPE - CDX)(1-1) + (CMCS - CDX)(2-1) = 2.

7

Supra note 1 at § 8107.

8

20 C.F.R. § 10.404.

9
For decisions issued after May 1, 2009 the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides is used. A.M.A., Guides (6th ed.
2009); Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Schedule Awards and Permanent Disability Claims,
Chapter 2.808.5(a) (March 2017); see also Part 3 -- Medical, Schedule Awards, Chapter 3.700, Exhibit 1
(January 2010).
10
See T.J., Docket No. 19-1656 (issued September 18, 2020); K.J., Docket No. 19-1492 (issued February 26, 2020);
P.R., Docket No. 19-0022 (issued April 9, 2018); Isidoro Rivera, 12 ECAB 348 (1961).

3

It is the claimant’s burden of proof to establish permanent impairment of a scheduled
member or function of the body as a result of an employment injury. 11 OWCP’s procedures
provide that, to support a schedule award, the file must contain competent medical evidence which
shows that the impairment has reached a permanent and fixed state and indicates the date on which
this occurred, describes the impairment in sufficient detail so that it can be visualized on review,
and computes the percentage of impairment in accordance with the A.M.A., Guides.12
In addressing upper extremity impairments, the sixth edition requires identification of the
impairment CDX condition, which is then adjusted by GMFH, GMPE, and GMCS.13 The net
adjustment formula is (GMFH - CDX) + (GMPE - CDX) + (GMCS - CDX).14
The A.M.A., Guides also provide that the ROM impairment methodology is to be used as
a standalone rating for upper extremity impairments when other grids direct its use or when no
other DBI sections are applicable.15 If ROM is used as a standalone approach, the total of motion
impairment for all units of function must be calculated. All values for the joint are measured and
added.16 Adjustments for functional history may be made if the evaluator determines that the
resulting impairment does not adequately reflect functional loss and functional reports are
determined to be reliable.17
OWCP issued FECA Bulletin No. 17-06 to explain the use of the DBI methodology versus
the ROM methodology for rating of upper extremity impairments.18 Regarding the application of
ROM or DBI impairment methodologies in rating permanent impairment of the upper extremities,
FECA Bulletin No. 17-06 provides in pertinent part:
“Upon initial review of a referral for upper extremity impairment evaluation, the
DMA should identify (1) the methodology used by the rating physician (i.e., DBI
or ROM) and (2) whether the applicable tables in Chapter 15 of the [A.M.A.,]
Guides identify a diagnosis that can alternatively be rated by ROM. If the [A.M.A.,]
Guides allow for the use of both the DBI and ROM methods to calculate an

11

See P.W., Docket No. 19-1493 (issued August 12, 2020); T.H., Docket No. 19-1066 (issued January 29, 2020);
D.F., Docket No. 18-1337 (issued February 11, 2019); Tammy L. Meehan, 53 ECAB 229 (2001).
12

See 5 U.S.C. § 8101(19); J.K., Docket Nos. 19-1420 & 19-1422 (issued August 12, 2020); Francesco C.
Veneziani, 48 ECAB 572 (1997).
13

A.M.A., Guides 383-492.

14

Id. at 411.

15

Id. at 461.

16

Id. at 473.

17

Id. at 474.

18

FECA Bulletin No. 17-06 (May 8, 2017).

4

impairment rating for the diagnosis in question, the method producing the higher
rating should be used.” (Emphasis in the original.)19
The Bulletin further advises:
“If the rating physician provided an assessment using the ROM method and the
[A.M.A.,] Guides allow for use of ROM for the diagnosis in question, the DMA
should independently calculate impairment using both the ROM and DBI methods
and identify the higher rating for the CE.”20
OWCP’s procedures provide that, after obtaining all necessary medical evidence, the file
should be routed to a DMA for an opinion concerning the nature and percentage of impairment in
accordance with the A.M.A., Guides, with the DMA providing rationale for the percentage of
impairment specified.21
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish greater than 12
percent permanent impairment of the right upper extremity, for which she previously received a
schedule award.
In a permanent impairment evaluation dated May 21, 2019, Dr. Puziss advised that
appellant had eight percent permanent impairment of the right upper extremity due to loss of ROM.
He also advised that using the DBI method appellant had 10 percent permanent impairment due to
distal clavicle resection. Dr. Puziss combined these impairments to find a total of 18 percent right
upper extremity permanent impairment. If a claimant has two significant diagnoses, the examiner
should use the diagnosis with the highest causally related impairment rating for the impairment
calculation.22 In addition, the A.M.A., Guides state that ROM measurements for a given region
must standalone and not be combined with any DBI rating for the same region.23 Dr. Puziss
combined DBI and ROM methods for the same region instead of using the higher rated impairment
rating as required by the A.M.A., Guides. As a result, Dr. Puziss’ impairment rating did not
comply with the A.M.A., Guides and his report is of limited probative value.24
The Board finds that Dr. Katz, OWCP’s DMA, properly determined that appellant had no
more than 12 percent permanent impairment of her right upper extremity. Utilizing the ROM
methodology found in Table 15-34, page 475 of the A.M.A., Guides, the DMA found that appellant
19

Id.

20

Id.; see also H.H., Docket No. 19-1530 (issued June 26, 2020); A.G., Docket No. 18-0329 (issued July 26, 2018).

21
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, supra note 9 at Chapter 2.808.6(f); P.W., Docket No. 19-1493 (issued
August 12, 2020).
22

A.M.A., Guides 387.

23

Id.

24

See L.D., Docket No. 19-0495 (issued February5, 2020); S.R., Docket No. 18-1307 (issued March 27, 2019).

5

had nine percent upper extremity permanent impairment. He calculated: 150 degrees flexion
equaled three percent impairment; 50 degrees extension equaled zero percent impairment; 90
degrees abduction equaled three percent impairment; 20 degrees adduction equaled one percent
impairment; 70 degrees internal rotation equaled zero percent impairment; and 30 degrees external
rotation equaled two percent impairment. The Board notes, however, that pursuant to Table 1534, page 475, 70 degrees of internal rotation equals two percent permanent impairment. Therefore,
appellant’s loss of ROM of the right shoulder totaled 11 percent permanent impairment.
The DMA properly noted that appellant had more than one diagnosis of the right upper
extremity and found that the diagnosis of distal clavicle resection yielded the highest impairment
rating. Under Table 15-5, page 405, a CDX 1 distal clavicle resection has a default impairment
value of 10 percent impairment. The DMA assigned: under Table 15-7, page 406, GMFH of 2;
under Table 15-8, page 408, GMPE of 1; and under Table 15-9, page 410, GMCS of 2. He properly
calculated a net adjustment from the net adjustment formula,25 which resulted in a grade E or 12
percent maximum permanent impairment for right shoulder distal clavicle resection. The DMA
explained that as the DBI rating resulted in the greater percentage of impairment than the ROM
rating and, under the A.M.A., Guides, the method producing the highest rating should be used. He
concluded that this resulted in 12 percent right upper extremity permanent impairment based upon
the DBI rating method. The DMA’s report constitutes the weight of the medical evidence.
The Board, thus, finds that appellant has not established more than 12 percent permanent
impairment of her right upper extremity, for which she previously received a schedule award.26
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish greater than 12
percent permanent impairment of the right upper extremity, for which she previously received
schedule award compensation.

25

(GMFH-CDX)(2-1) + (GMPE-CDX)(1-1) + (CMCS-CDX)(2-1) = 2.

26

See L.D., supra note 24; M.H., Docket No. 19-0290 (issued June 18, 2019).

6

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the October 29, 2019 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: July 9, 2021
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.P., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, SAN FRANCISCO
BULK MAIL CENTER, Richmond, CA,
Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 09-1030
Issued: January 27, 2010

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 9, 2009 appellant filed a timely appeal of a January 26, 2009 decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs denying her request for reconsideration on the
grounds that it was untimely filed and failed to establish clear evidence of error. Because more
than one year has elapsed from the last merit decision dated April 24, 2006 to the filing of this
appeal on March 9, 2009, the Board lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of this case pursuant
to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3.
ISSUE
The issue is whether the Office properly denied appellant’s request for reconsideration on
the grounds that it was untimely filed and failed to establish clear evidence of error.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 27, 1981 appellant, then a 33-year-old clerk, was injured when she was
struck on the head, face and right eye after pushing books onto a belt. She stopped work on

October 28, 1981 for 30 days and returned to light duty intermittently until May 15, 1988.
Appellant has not returned to work since then. The Office accepted her claim for cervical sprain
and chronic muscular strain of the right shoulder and neck. It subsequently accepted her claim
for dysthymic disorder. The Office paid appellant appropriate compensation benefits.
On June 27, 2005 the Office referred appellant to Dr. John Randall Chu, a Board-certified
orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Robert Hepps, a Board-certified psychiatrist, for second opinion
evaluations. On July 14, 2005 Dr. Chu noted appellant’s complaint of right shoulder and upper
back pain. He diagnosed a history of cervical and shoulder strain. Dr. Chu opined that there
were no orthopedic residual disabilities from the October 1981 injury as there was no muscle
atrophy or neurological deficits. He also advised that no further medical treatment was
necessary. In a report of the same date, Dr. Hepps diagnosed adjustment disorder with depressed
mood caused by a struggle to regain compensation benefits. He opined that counseling would
not resolve the problems as they were entirely related to a lack of income and perceived unfair
treatment from the Office. Dr. Hepps further opined that appellant’s present emotional condition
was not the result of the 1981 physical injury and depression as those conditions had resolved in
1998. He advised that she could work eight hours per day performing her usual job.
On March 15, 2006 the Office issued a proposed notice of termination of compensation.
It found that the weight of the medical evidence, represented by Drs. Chu and Hepps’ reports,
demonstrated that appellant no longer had any disability or residuals due to her accepted
October 27, 1981 work-related injury. The Office allowed 30 days for her to submit additional
evidence. Appellant submitted a March 21, 2006 statement requesting a “signed release return to
work form” to submit to her surgeon and hospitals that had documented total disability on her
behalf.
In an April 24, 2006 decision, the Office terminated appellant’s compensation benefits
effective that day. It found that her statement was insufficient evidence to overcome the reports
of Drs. Chu and Hepps finding that she had no continued disability or residuals from the
accepted work-related injury.
In a July 18, 2006 statement, submitted through her congressman, appellant requested
compensation for June and July 2006 to pay her rent. On September 29, 2006 the Office
informed appellant’s congressman that she must follow the appeal rights that accompanied the
April 24, 2006 decision if she disagreed with that decision. The record also contains a
January 31, 2007 statement to an Office district director in which she indicated that her
compensation was terminated in April 2006 because she requested retroactive compensation
payment from 2003 through 2005.1 Appellant noted that she had not recovered from her chronic
permanent injury. She further noted that withheld compensation caused her undue hardship and
mental anguish. Appellant requested that her compensation be reinstated. In a February 14,
2007 letter, the Office advised her that she must review the appeal rights that accompanied the
April 24, 2006 decision if she disagreed with that decision. In a March 9, 2007 statement,
appellant noted previously sending her appeal to the district director and the postmaster general.
1

The record indicates that appellant’s compensation was suspended on several occasions from 2001 to 2003
because she either did not attend directed medical examinations or she did not submit documentation requested by
the Office.

2

She indicated that she did not receive any forms for appeal. Appellant noted that her treating
physician stated that she had permanent disability and advised that the Office call him to resolve
the matter. In a March 21, 2007 letter, the Office referred her to its February 14, 2007 letter and
provided her another copy of that letter regarding her denied claim and advised that she must
successfully appeal the April 2006 decision if she wanted to have benefits reinstated. It further
advised that appellant’s treating physician could submit medical reports but the Office would not
contact him unless at his request.
In a January 17, 2008 letter, appellant asserted that the claims examiner did not reply
after she submitted her appeal information and physician’s request for a telephone call. She
requested wage compensation. On January 24, 2008 the Office reiterated that it would not
contact appellant’s treating physician without a request from him. It also advised her to appeal
the Office’s decision.
In a June 25, 2008 statement, appellant indicated “This is the letter of appeal that was
mailed April 2007.” She also noted that she was in urgent need of income. Appellant attached
another letter, also dated June 25, 2008, stating that her termination of compensation was based
on second opinion examinations, which were not valid as the examinations were brief, without
x-rays and without knowledge of her medical complications. She subsequently submitted a
July 29, 2008 statement to the employing establishment human resources department noting that
her new claims examiner had no knowledge of the previous appeal letter she sent. Appellant
also noted that her physician did not change his assessment regarding her health and chronic
condition and that he requested a call concerning this matter. She asserted that she would not
need to be examined further and requested help to correct the situation. In subsequent telephone
conversation memoranda, the Office notified appellant that there was no reconsideration request
of record.
On September 17, 2008 appellant indicated that she was submitting an “additional letter
of appeal.” She further indicated that her first appeal letter was sent in April 2007. Appellant
noted submitting documentation for many years establishing that her chronic medical condition
made her unable to work. She asserted that repetitive fitness-for-duty examinations caused stress
and depression. Appellant also questioned the second opinion reports asserting that her
examinations were brief and no x-rays were viewed. She requested that the Office contact the
employing establishment with a reply.
In an October 6, 2008 letter, the Office advised appellant that her September 17, 2008
letter did not specify the type of appeal she was requesting. On October 29, 2008 appellant
submitted an appeal request form requesting reconsideration. In a statement of the same date,
she indicated that she might pursue a “malpractice charge.” In a November 20, 2008 telephone
conversation memorandum, appellant stated that she submitted a reconsideration request the
prior year.
In a January 26, 2009 decision, the Office denied appellant reconsideration request
finding it was untimely filed and did not establish clear evidence of error.

3

LEGAL PRECEDENT
The Office, through regulations, has imposed limitations on the exercise of its
discretionary authority under section 8128(a) of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.2
The Office will not review a decision denying or terminating a benefit unless the application for
review is filed within one year of the date of that decision.3 In implementing the one-year time
limitation, the Office’s procedures provide that the one-year time limitation period for requesting
reconsideration begins on the date of the original Office decision. However, a right to
reconsideration within one year accompanies any subsequent merit decision on the issues.4
When an application for review is untimely, the Office undertakes a limited review to
determine whether the application presents clear evidence that the Office’s final merit decision
was in error.5 Its procedures state that the Office will reopen a claimant’s case for merit review,
notwithstanding the one-year filing limitation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 10.607(a), if the claimant’s
application for review shows clear evidence of error on the part of the Office.6 In this regard, the
Office will limit its focus to a review of how the newly submitted evidence bears on the prior
evidence of record.7
To establish clear evidence of error, a claimant must submit evidence relevant to the issue
which was decided by the Office. The evidence must be positive, precise and explicit and must
manifest on its face that the Office committed an error. Evidence which does not raise a
substantial question concerning the correctness of the Office’s decision is insufficient to establish
clear evidence of error. It is not enough merely to show that the evidence could be construed so
as to produce a contrary conclusion. This entails a limited review by the Office of how the
evidence submitted with the reconsideration request bears on the evidence previously of record
and whether the new evidence demonstrates clear error on the part of the Office. To show clear
evidence of error, the evidence submitted must not only be of sufficient probative value to create
a conflict in medical opinion or establish a clear procedural error, but must be of sufficient
probative value to raise a substantial question as to the correctness of the Office’s decision. The
Board makes an independent determination of whether a claimant has submitted clear evidence
of error on the part of the Office, such that the Office abused its discretion in denying merit
review in the face of such evidence.8

2

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

3

20 C.F.R. § 10.607; see also D.K., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-1441, issued October 22, 2007).

4

Veletta C. Coleman, 48 ECAB 367 (1997).

5

A.F., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 08-977, issued September 12, 2008).

6

E.R., 60 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 09-599, issued June 3, 2009).

7

D.G., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 08-137, issued April 14, 2008).

8

Id.

4

ANALYSIS
The Board finds that the Office properly found that appellant filed an untimely request
for reconsideration. The one-year period for requesting reconsideration begins on the date of the
original decision. A right to reconsideration within one year accompanies any subsequent merit
decision on the issues. This includes any hearing or review of the written record decision, any
denial of modification following reconsideration, any merit decision by the Board and any merit
decision following action by the Board, but does not include prerecoupment-hearing decisions.9
Therefore, appellant had one year from April 24, 2006 to submit a timely request for
reconsideration. As her October 29, 2008 reconsideration request form was made more than one
year after the April 24, 2006 merit decision, the request was untimely.
In certain instances, the Board has held that a letter may constitute a request for
reconsideration even if it does not contain the word “reconsideration.”10 The Office’s procedures
provide that while no special form is required, the request must be in writing, identify the
decision and the specific issues, for which reconsideration is being requested and be
accompanied by relevant new evidence or argument not considered previously.11
The Board finds that none of appellant’s statements submitted within one year from the
April 24, 2006 decision constitute a valid request for reconsideration. In a July 18, 2006 letter,
appellant requested compensation from June and July 2006 solely for the purpose of allowing her
to pay her rent. This letter does not constitute a request for reconsideration as she did not
indicate the date of the decision she disagreed with or specify any particular issue she wanted
addressed. Appellant also did not submit any new evidence or raise new legal arguments. In a
January 31, 2007 letter to an Office district director, she asserted that her compensation was
terminated in April 2006, because she had requested retroactive compensation between 2003 and
2005 and that the withheld compensation caused her undue hardship and mental anguish.
Appellant requested that the Office reinstate her compensation. Although she requested
reinstatement of her compensation, she did not identify the date of any Office decisions she
wished to have reconsidered and she did not submit any additional evidence in support of her
claim.12 Additionally, appellant’s March 9, 2007 letter noted previously sending an “appeal” to
the district director and advised the Office to call her treating physician regarding her permanent
disability condition. Although she alluded to submitting a previous “appeal,” the context of this
letter and the surrounding circumstances do not clearly support that she was attempting to
overturn the Office’s April 24, 2006 decision. Appellant did not indicate any particular decision
or issue she wanted to “appeal.” Moreover, the context of the March 9, 2007 letter indicated that
9

Leon D. Faidley, 41 ECAB 104, 111 (1989). Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims,
Reconsiderations, Chapter 2.1602.3.b(1) (January 2004).
10

See Jack D. Johnson, 57 ECAB 593 (2006); Gladys Mercado, 52 ECAB 255 (2001); Richard J. Chabot,
43 ECAB 357 (1991).
11

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, supra note 9 at Chapter 2.1602.2(a) (May 1996); Vincente P. Taimanglo,
45 ECAB 504 (1994); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605, 10.606(b).
12

See Mercado, 52 ECAB 255 (2001); Taimanglo supra note 11, (where appellant’s letter constituted a timely
reconsideration request as it identified the decision date or case number and was submitted with new evidence).

5

her request for resolution of this matter referred to her request to have the Office contact her
treating physician to discuss her medical condition. This letter is insufficient to be considered as
an attempt to request reconsideration and was not accompanied by any supporting evidence.13
Additionally, the Office advised appellant in a February 14, 2007 letter that she must
follow the appeal rights accompanying the April 24, 2006 decision if she disagreed with that
decision. In a March 21, 2007 letter, it referred her to its February 14, 2007 letter and provided
her another copy of the letter which clearly advised her of how to proceed if she disagreed with
the Office’s April 24, 2006 decision. These letters also provided notice well over a month before
her one-year time limitation expired such that she could still submit a timely reconsideration
request with supporting evidence or argument.
As noted, when an application for review is untimely, the Office undertakes a limited
review to determine whether the application presents clear evidence that the Office’s final merit
decision was in error.14 The Board finds that appellant did not submit any evidence with her
reconsideration request that raises a substantial question concerning the correctness of the
Office’s April 24, 2006 decision and establishes clear evidence of error. Appellant submitted
several statements noting that she was permanently disabled and in need of income. She also
advised that her treating physician should be contacted by the Office to discuss her condition.
Appellant also questioned the validity of the second opinion evaluations asserting they were brief
and did not involve x-rays. However, these are broad and general statements that do not
specifically address the relevant issue, which is medical in nature, regarding whether she had any
continued disability or residuals as a result of the accepted October 27, 1981 work injury.
Moreover, appellant’s arguments are not supported by any additional evidence submitted to the
record. Therefore, her statements do not raise a substantial question as to the correctness of the
Office’s decision.
On appeal, appellant asserts that the Office would not contact her treating physician
concerning her condition and that her physician indicates that she is still disabled to work. The
Board notes that the Office advised her that it would contact her treating physician if he
requested to be contacted, but no such request from him was of record. Additionally, as noted,
the issue regarding whether appellant is disabled is medical in nature and must be supported by
medical evidence. Appellant did not submit any additional medical evidence to support her
claim and establish clear evidence of error by the Office. She also asserts that she requested
reconsideration on April 2, 2007 but received no response. The record does not contain evidence
supporting this assertion.

13

Compare Francine Bibbs, Docket No. 03-416 (issued March 26, 2003) (appellant’s letter found not to
constitute a reconsideration request where appellant stated that she would like her case reopened and noted her case
number but she did not identify the decision being appealed, state the specific issues she was contesting and did not
submit any new evidence or raise any legal arguments previously not considered) with Richard J. Chabot, 43 ECAB
357 1991 (where appellant’s letter referred to reconsideration of his claim and contained new evidence to support his
reconsideration request for the Board to deem it a valid request).
14

See supra note 5.

6

CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office properly denied appellant’s request for reconsideration on
the grounds that it was untimely filed and failed to establish clear evidence of error.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’
decision dated January 26, 2009 is affirmed.
Issued: January 27, 2010
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
W.W., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, OLD HAMMOND
STATION, Baton Rouge, LA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
J. Arthur Smith, III, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 14-1018
Issued: December 23, 2014

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge
JURISDICTION
On March 31, 2014 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an October 4,
2013 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to
the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant established that his stress and anxiety were causally
related to the accepted employment factors.
On appeal, counsel contends that OWCP erred in failing to comply with the Board’s
remand instructions. He also contends that the medical evidence establishes that appellant’s
emotional condition and disability were caused by his employment.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On February 4, 2004 appellant, then a 43-year-old city carrier, filed an occupational
disease claim alleging that he first became aware of his anxiety and stress on
December 16, 1999. It was not until October 23, 2003 that he realized these conditions were
employment related. Appellant stated that his health had worsened over the past six or seven
years due to stress. On the back of the form, the employing establishment controverted the
claim. It noted that this was the third claim appellant filed for stress.2 Appellant stopped work
on October 23, 2003 and did not return.3
In a letter dated February 20, 2004, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence of record
was insufficient to support his claim. Appellant was advised as to the medical and factual
evidence required to support his claim and given 30 days to submit the requested information.
Appellant submitted an August 25, 2000 report from Dr. Carmen M. Sugai, a treating
Board-certified psychiatrist, who diagnosed major depression, generalized anxiety disorder,
hypertension, and job stress. Dr. Sugai provided a medical and factual history, including
appellant’s statement that he felt more stress and was not happy with his job. Appellant
identified increased time demands a tense workplace.
In a December 17, 2003 report, Dr. Gerald C. Heintz, a Board-certified psychiatrist,
stated that appellant was seen for complaints of work stress, depression, and anxiety attacks. He
diagnosed anxiety disorder and depression. Dr. Heintz related that appellant is “an excessive
worrier in general.” He attributed appellant’s anxiety to the employment conditions appellant
described.
In a February 4, 2004 report, Dr. Edward E. Jeffries, an attending Board-certified family
practitioner and sleep medicine physician, reviewed the employment factors identified by
appellant. As a result of the excessive work stress, appellant sustained an acute anxiety attack.
Dr. Jeffries stated that appellant had been having work problems for some time and became
disabled commencing October 24, 2003 due to his work-related emotional condition. He
recommended a disability retirement.
By decision dated April 8, 2004, OWCP denied appellant’s claim. It found that he failed
to establish any compensable factors of employment.
On April 14, 2004 appellant requested an oral hearing before an OWCP hearing
representative, which was held on October 20, 2004. Appellant submitted a May 13, 2004 report
from Dr. Jeffries, who noted that appellant had been treated by his practice since 1993 and
provided a medical history of complaints and illnesses. The diagnoses included recurrent
depression, panic disorder anxiety, hypertension, allergic rhinitis, shortness of breath, and work2

The employing establishment noted the prior claim file numbers as xxxxxx640 and xxxxxx704. Claim file
number xxxxxx640 was an occupational disease claim which OWCP denied on February 4, 2004. Claim file
number xxxxxx704 was a traumatic injury claim which OWCP denied on December 24, 2003.
3

On November 8, 2007 appellant was informed that his disability retirement under the Office of Personnel
Management had been approved.

2

related stress. Dr. Jeffries related that appellant was first seen for stress-related headaches,
anxiety and job-related depression in 1999. He noted that appellant’s job-related anxiety
continued over the next few years. In September 2002, appellant was put on antidepressant and
antianxiety medicine for his job-related stress. At times, his work stress was overwhelming and
the medication helped. Dr. Jeffries stated that in October 2003 appellant sustained an acute
anxiety attack due to the severity of his work problems. Dr. Jeffries concurred with the opinion
of appellant’s psychiatrist that he was totally disabled due to his work-related depression and
extreme anxiety.
By decision dated January 5, 2005, an OWCP hearing representative affirmed the April 8,
2004 decision as modified. He found that appellant had established compensable factors with
respect to overtime and working parts of different routes. The hearing representative found the
medical evidence was insufficient to establish a causal relationship between the accepted factors
and his anxiety and stress.
In a letter dated January 3, 2006, counsel requested reconsideration. Appellant
mentioned medical and factual evidence that he was submitting in support of his claim; but no
evidence was attached.
By decision dated February 14, 2006, OWCP denied appellant’s request for
reconsideration.
On May 11, 2006 counsel filed an appeal with the Board and requested an oral argument.
By order dated December 29, 2006, the Board granted the Director of OWCP’s motion to
remand the case and cancel oral argument. On remand, OWCP was to consider all the evidence
of record, including appellant’s submissions in support of his reconsideration request.4
On January 3, 2006 counsel requested reconsideration and submitted evidence in support
of his request.
In an August 23, 2006 report, Dr. Jeffries diagnosed shortness of breath, possible asthma;
allergic rhinitis, hypertension, fatigue, and significant anxiety due to appellant’s job situation.
He had treated appellant since 1993 and provided a history of his respiratory problems.
Dr. Jeffries stated that during the period of treatment, appellant complained about work problems
and the work environment. In August 2003, appellant complained that he was unable to get his
work done in the specified time, that he was under constant scrutiny, and worked longer in order
to get the work done on his route. Dr. Jeffries stated that appellant was “under pressure to
continue to perform his duties despite his physical limitations.”
In a June 22, 2005 deposition, Dr. Jeffries testified that appellant’s primary problems
with respect to his disability were his panic disorder and anxiety. He testified that appellant has
been totally disabled from work since October 23, 2003. Dr. Jeffries attributed appellant’s
depression and anxiety to his work. He provided testimony regarding treatment of appellant and
noted that a psychiatrist was also treating appellant for his psychiatric conditions.
4

Order Granting Remand and Cancelling Oral Argument, Docket No. 06-1765 (issued December 29, 2006).

3

In a December 7, 2006 addendum, Dr. Jeffries diagnosed recurrent depression, anxiety
with panic attacks, allergic rhinitis, and hypertension. He stated that appellant’s condition had
deteriorated since May 2004. Dr. Jeffries noted that appellant was totally disabled from work
due to the extreme anxiety caused by the possibility of returning to work at the employing
establishment.
By decision dated April 30, 2007, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision. It
found the medical evidence insufficient to establish causal relation.
On April 17, 2008 counsel requested reconsideration. In a July 4, 2003 report, Dr. Philip
Louis Cenac, Jr., a treating Board-certified psychiatrist, listed diagnoses including paranoid
personality disorder, somatization disorder, dipsomania with excessive daytime sleepiness. He
opined that appellant probably would not return to work and was totally disabled.
On April 9, 2007 Dr. Jeffries diagnosed recurrent depression and anxiety with panic
disorder. He opined that he doubted that appellant would ever return to work as a result of “the
work conditions he experienced at the postal service and his extreme anxiety.”
On April 23, 2008 OWCP received an undated report from Dr. David C. Greeson, a
treating Board-certified psychiatrist, who provided a medical and social history and findings on
mental status examination. Dr. Greeson’s diagnoses included post-traumatic stress disorder,
panic disorder with agoraphobia, and problems with occupational environment. He stated that
appellant probably had panic attacks and generalized anxiety disorder prior to working for the
employing establishment and opined that the conditions were aggravated by his employment.
Specifically, Dr. Greeson attributed the aggravation to appellant’s confrontation with his
supervisor and inability to escape. He opined that appellant “has been traumatized by being
reprimanded on the job while experienc[ing] panic attacks” which aggravated and largely caused
his anxiety and depression.
By decision dated July 2, 2008, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision.
By order dated July 14, 2009, the Board set aside the July 2, 2008 decision. The Board
found that OWCP failed to make findings addressing why the medical evidence was insufficient
to support appellant’s claim.
On October 7, 2009 OWCP referred appellant for a second opinion evaluation to
Dr. Arthur S. Samuels, a Board-certified psychiatrist, to determine whether his emotional
condition was caused or aggravated by the accepted employment factors. In the attached
September 30, 2009 statement of accepted facts, it listed two compensable work factors: (1) that,
in addition to his regular route, appellant worked parts of different routes; and (2) he worked
overtime.
In an October 29, 2009 report, Dr. Samuels diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder and
panic disorder with agoraphobia. He opined that appellant was totally disabled due to his
physical and severe emotional limitations. Dr. Samuels attributed appellant’s condition to his
employment. He related that the factors identified in the statement of accepted facts had
aggravated and accelerated appellant’s symptoms. Dr. Samuels stated that appellant’s mail route
was slowed down by his asthmatic condition. Criticisms by appellant’s supervisor exacerbated
4

his breathing difficulties as well as causing anxiety. Dr. Samuels attributed appellant’s shortness
of breath to his asthma which was aggravated by his work situation and dusty work environment.
He concluded that appellant’s condition was permanent due to his failure to respond to treatment
and the persistence of his symptoms.
In a supplemental report dated January 14, 2010, Dr. Samuels noted that appellant “was
particularly sensitive to dust on his route” as a result of his asthma and resulting difficulty
breathing. As a result of this difficulty in breathing, appellant’s work performance was slowed
down. Dr. Samuels stated that both overtime work and route changes contributed to appellant’s
problems and the fear of an asthmatic attack resulted in a panic disorder. While the statement of
accepted facts did not support that appellant’s supervisors criticized his work, appellant was selfcritical due to his being “very proud of his abilities and somewhat a perfectionist.”
By decision dated May 10, 2010, OWCP denied appellant’s claim. It found that the
medical evidence was insufficient to establish a causal relationship between the compensable
work factors and his emotional condition.
Subsequent to the May 10, 2010 decision, appellant submitted medical and factual
evidence.
By order dated August 12, 2011, the Board set aside the May 10, 2010 decision denying
appellant’s claim and remanded it for evaluation and review of all the medical evidence.5 The
Board found that OWCP failed to consider all the medical evidence as it only discussed
Dr. Samuel’s opinion.
By decision dated February 13, 2012, OWCP denied modification.
On February 8 and 13, 2013 counsel requested reconsideration. In a supplemental report
dated February 2, 2013, Dr. Greeson stated that he has treated appellant since February 2008 for
his psychiatric condition. He opined that the employing establishment aggravated his condition
by requiring appellant to work overtime as it increased his level of stress. This increased
appellant’s vulnerability to other conditions:
asthma, panic disorder and depression.
Dr. Greeson stated that appellant “was traumatized by panic attacks while at the work setting”
and that his stress was increased by working overtime. He provided a description of a panic
attack which he opined caused appellant’s post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr. Greeson opined
that appellant’s stress was increased as due to being required to work on different routes.
In a February 8, 2013 report, Dr. Brad J. Gaspard, an attending Board-certified family
practitioner, related that appellant had been treated for asthma, shortness of breath, and chronic
anxiety. He reviewed appellant’s medical record and noted that appellant stopped work for the
employing establishment due to anxiety, his other medical problems, and extreme work stress.
After reviewing Dr. Greeson’s report, Dr. Gaspard stated that it was clear that appellant’s
“anxiety problems were a direct result of the stressors placed on him” at the employing
establishment. Appellant related stress due to being frequently asked to work overtime and
being required to work on routes that were not his regular route. Dr. Gaspard opined that
5

Order Remanding Case, Docket No. 11-229 (issued August 12, 2011).

5

appellant’s emotional condition was due to being required to work overtime and variation in
appellant’s work schedule.
On October 4, 2013 OWCP issued new statement of accepted facts. The accepted factors
of employment were listed as: (1) appellant worked light duty with work restrictions due to his
asthma of not walking more than two and one-half hours a day; (2) an accommodation of casing
mail or riding assignments for the two and one-half hours to ensure that appellant had an eighthour workday; (3) appellant assisted other carriers by working parts of different routes for two
and one-half hours to ensure an eight-hour workday; and (4) that appellant worked overtime
when needed, but was not required to work overtime.
By decision dated October 4, 2013, OWCP denied modification.6
LEGAL PRECEDENT
To establish his claim that he sustained an emotional condition in the performance of
duty, appellant must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing that he has an
emotional or psychiatric disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or
incidents alleged to have caused or contributed to his condition; and (3) rationalized medical
opinion evidence establishing that the identified compensable employment factors are causally
related to his emotional condition.7
Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is
somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,8 the Board
explained that there are distinctions to the type of employment situations giving rise to a
compensable emotional condition arising under FECA.9 There are situations where an injury or
an illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the
concept or coverage under FECA.10 When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying
out his employment duties and the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from
his emotional reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury
arising out of and in the course of employment. This is true when the employee’s disability
results from his emotional reaction to a special assignment or other requirement imposed by the
employing establishment or by the nature of his work.11 There are situations where an injury or
an illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the
6

The Board notes that, following the October 4, 2013 decision, OWCP received additional evidence. However,
the Board may only review evidence that was in the record at the time OWCP issued its final decision. See 20
C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1); M.B., Docket No. 09-176 (issued September 23, 2009); J.T., 59 ECAB 293 (2008); G.G., 58
ECAB 389 (2007); Donald R. Gervasi, 57 ECAB 281 (2005); Rosemary A. Kayes, 54 ECAB 373 (2003).
7

Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).

8

28 ECAB 125 (1976).

9

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

10

See Anthony A. Zircon, 44 ECAB 751 (1993).

11

Supra note 8.

6

concept or coverage under FECA. Where the disability results from an employee’s emotional
reaction to his regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the
employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA. On the other hand, the
disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reductionin-force or his frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold
a particular position.12
In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working
conditions are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its
adjudicatory function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are
deemed compensable factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when
providing an opinion on causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed
factors of employment and may not be considered.13 If a claimant does implicate a factor of
employment, OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that
factor. When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of
record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, it must base its decision on an analysis of the
medical evidence.14
ANALYSIS
OWCP accepted two compensable work factors that, apart from his usual route, he
worked parts of different routes and also worked overtime. It denied his claim on the grounds
that the medical evidence failed to establish that his emotional condition was causally related to
the accepted compensable factors of employment. The Board finds that the weight of medical
evidence establishes appellant’s emotional condition was caused by the accepted employment
factors.
OWCP referred appellant to Dr. Samuels for a second opinion evaluation to determine
whether appellant’s emotional condition was causally related to the compensable factors of
employment. In an October 29, 2009 report, Dr. Samuels diagnosed the psychiatric conditions of
post-traumatic stress disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia. He stated that the
compensable employment factors noted in the statement of accepted facts aggravated appellant’s
condition. In a supplemental January 4, 2010 report, Dr. Samuels stated that appellant was also
slowed down by his asthma which was due to dust on his route. He opined that appellant’s
condition had been aggravated by his overtime work and route change as well as the fear of an
asthmatic attack resulted in a panic disorder.15

12

See Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 566 (1991); Lillian Cutler, supra
note 8.
13

See Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992).

14

Id.

15

The Board notes that the reports from Drs. Gaspard, Greeson, Heintz, Jeffries and Sugai all opined that
appellant’s emotional condition was employment related. All of appellant’s treating physicians including Dr. Cenac
concluded that appellant was totally disabled due to his emotional condition.

7

This is a substantial and probative medical opinion, one that establishes the essential
element of causal relationship. Dr. Samuels based his opinion on a complete factual and medical
background, expressed his opinion with reasonable medical certainty, and supported his opinion
with medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition
and the established factors of employment. He demonstrated that his conclusion is rational,
sound, and logical. Further, there is no medical opinion to the contrary. The Board finds that the
clear weight of the medical evidence establishes that appellant sustained post-traumatic stress
disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia in the performance of duty and will reverse
OWCP’s October 4, 2013 decision.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the weight of the medical evidence establishes that appellant
sustained post-traumatic stress disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia in the performance
of duty. The Board reverses OWCP’s decision and remands the case for a determination of
appellant’s entitlement to compensation for wage loss and medical expenses.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated October 4, 2013 is reversed and the case remanded for further
action consistent with the above opinion.
Issued: December 23, 2014
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8