United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.P., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
St. Louis, MO, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 20-1668
Issued: March 2, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 28, 2020 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an August 5,
2020 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 3
1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). No
contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a representative,
prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2
3

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

The Board notes that appellant submitted additional evidence to OWCP following the August 5, 2020 decision.
However, the Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case
record that was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by
the Board for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this
additional evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.

ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that OWCP should
expand the acceptance of her claim to include a low back injury, pelvic or hip condition, right lower
extremity pain, and a balance disorder causally related to an accepted July 23, 2019 employment
injury.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 23, 2019 appellant, then a 52-year-old city carrier assistant, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on that date she injured her right shin when she stepped into a hole
on a customer’s property while in the performance of duty. She stopped work on July 23, 2019. On
August 7, 2019 OWCP accepted the claim for right ankle sprain, a right lower extremity laceration,
and cellulitis of the right lower extremity.
In an August 8, 2019 report, Dr. Amy S. Beck, an osteopath Board-certified in internal
medicine, noted that the right anterior shin laceration was healing poorly, with serous sanguineous
fluid and mild surrounding reactive erythema. In a separate note of the same date, she held appellant
off work through August 29, 2019.
OWCP paid appellant wage-loss compensation on the supplemental rolls from September 7
through 13, 2019.
In September 18, 2019 reports, Dr. David S. German, a Board-certified plastic surgeon,
noted that appellant sustained a right lower leg injury with flap laceration on July 23, 2019. He
diagnosed a healed chronic ulcer of the right anterior lower leg and right lower leg discomfort with
activity. In a work status report of the same date, Dr. German returned appellant to light-duty work
with a restriction against operating vehicles.
Appellant returned to part-time, light-duty work on or about September 18, 2019 and again
stopped work on September 21, 2019.
In a September 23, 2019 prescription note, Dr. German held appellant off work through
October 3, 2019. In a report dated September 27, 2019, he returned her to light-duty work for four
hours a day with restrictions. Dr. German released appellant to full-duty work as of
October 14, 2019.4
Appellant resumed light-duty work on October 5, 2019. She stopped shortly afterward due
to right lower extremity pain. 5

4

Dr. German submitted periodic reports dated through November 6, 2019 noting appellant’s continuing lumbar and
right lower extremity symptoms.
5

OWCP received an October 5, 2019 hospital emergency department report signed by Nichole MacLellan, a family
nurse practitioner.

2

In a letter dated October 10, 2019, appellant requested that OWCP expand its acceptance of
her claim to include a balance problem, paraspinal muscle spasms, back pain, right hip pain,
coccygeal pain right lower extremity pain, right knee pain, and right-sided pelvic pain.
In an October 11, 2019 report, Dr. Mahesh Bagwe, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
noted appellant’s complaints of back discomfort due to a slight limp. He opined that October 10,
2019 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans of the right lower extremity demonstrated edema at
the anterior tibia wound site, and mild tendinitis along multiple tendons of the right ankle. 6
Dr. Bagwe recommended physical therapy to address muscle weakness in the right lower extremity.
In a development letter dated October 22, 2019, OWCP informed appellant of the additional
evidence needed to expand her claim for additional conditions causally related to the July 23, 2019
employment incident. It afforded her 30 days to submit the necessary evidence.
In response, appellant submitted an October 5, 2019 emergency department report by
Dr. John P. Fortney, Board-certified in emergency medicine, who diagnosed low back pain and
sequela of the accepted right lower extremity injury.
In an October 6, 2019 emergency department report, Dr. Steven Hilton, Board-certified in
emergency medicine, noted appellant’s complaints of back pain after lifting items and placing
weight on her right leg while at work. Appellant also experienced right-sided low back spasms
while pushing and pulling carts at work. Dr. Hilton opined that her back pain and spasms were due
to not bearing weight on her right leg for some time and continuing to favor it.
In an October 8, 2019 report, Dr. Beck diagnosed acute right-sided low back pain, neck pain,
weakness, and gait instability.
In an October 30, 2019 report, Dr. Bagwe noted slight weakness of right plantar flexion. He
recommended physical therapy to address deficits in balance and strength.
Appellant returned to work for four hours a day in early November 2019.
In a November 6, 2019 emergency department report, Dr. Thomas F. Wheeler, Boardcertified in emergency medicine, diagnosed lumbar spasm.
In reports dated November 8 and 13, 2019, Dr. Bagwe opined that appellant had right leg
weakness as she had not been physically active for months during recuperation from the July 23,
2019 employment injury. He recommended a work conditioning program. 7
In a December 12, 2019 development letter, OWCP again informed appellant of the type of
medical evidence needed to expand acceptance of her claim to include additional conditions causally

6

An October 10, 2019 MRI scan of the right lower extremity demonstrated subcutaneous edema in the region of a
skin wound anterior to the tibia, intramuscular edema within the tibialis anterior muscle and mild irregularity of its
myotendinous junction, and possible fluid collection along the anterior margin of the tibialis anterior muscle.
7

November 14, 2019 electromyography/nerve conduction velocity testing of the right lower extremity was within
normal limits.

3

related to the July 23, 2019 employment incident. It noted that there was no deadline for her to
request expansion of her claim.
In a December 13, 2019 report, Dr. Bagwe noted that appellant was able to balance easily
on her right lower extremity and had run half a mile on a treadmill without difficulty. He noted that
an MRI scan demonstrated an injury to the tibialis anterior musculature with soft tissue injury and
a partial tear of the tibialis anterior tendon. In reports through January 15, 2020, Dr. Bagwe
recommended that appellant gradually increase her work hours.
By decision dated January 29, 2020, OWCP denied expansion of the claim to include
additional diagnosed conditions of the back or right knee, finding that the medical evidence of record
did not diagnose a back or knee condition or support a causal relationship between any additional
conditions and the July 23, 2019 employment injury.
On February 4, 2020 appellant, through counsel, requested a telephonic hearing before a
representative of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review held on June 5, 2020. She submitted
additional evidence.
In January 31, 2020 reports, Dr. Bagwe noted that appellant had scar tissue at the site of the
accepted injury that moved with flexion of the tibialis anterior muscle. He opined that she had
residual weakness in her tibialis anterior musculature that affected her balance. Dr. Bagwe
permanently restricted lifting to 60 pounds.
In an April 2, 2020 report, Dr. Bagwe opined that appellant had attained maximum medical
improvement (MMI) on January 31, 2020. He opined that she had sustained 15 percent permanent
impairment of the right lower extremity. Dr. Bagwe noted permanent work restrictions against
working more than eight hours a day and lifting more than 60 pounds. He opined that these
restrictions and permanent impairment were “the result of [appellant’s] loss of strength of the tibialis
anterior musculature due to a partial tendon and muscular laceration.” Appellant had chronic right
lower extremity weakness that precipitated “early fatigue and poor balance with isolated weight
bearing on [her] right lower extremity.”
By decision dated August 5, 2020, the hearing representative affirmed the prior decision.
She found that the medical evidence was insufficient to establish causal relationship between the
July 23, 2019 employment incident and right knee, pelvis, hip, low back, or balance conditions.
Additionally, appellant related her conditions to restricted duties performed following the accepted
injury.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Where an employee claims that a condition not accepted or approved by OWCP was due to
an employment injury, he or she bears the burden of proof to establish that the condition is causally
related to the employment injury.8

8

D.B., Docket No. 20-1280 (issued March 2, 2021); R.R., Docket No. 19-0086 (issued February 10, 2021); K.T.,
Docket No. 19-1718 (issued April 7, 2020); Jaja K. Asaramo, 55 ECAB 200 (2004).

4

Causal relationship is a medical question that requires medical opinion evidence to resolve
the issue.9 The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical
background, must be one of reasonable certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale
explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the accepted
employment injury.10
To establish causal relationship between the condition as well as any attendant disability
claimed and the employment injury, an employee must submit rationalized medical evidence. 11 The
opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the
claimant, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale
explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific
employment factors identified by the claimant. 12 The weight of medical evidence is determined by
its reliability, its probative value, its convincing quality, the care of analysis manifested, and the
medical rationale expressed in support of the physician’s opinion.13
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that OWCP
should expand the acceptance of her claim to include additional medical conditions as causally
related to an accepted July 23, 2019 employment injury.
Dr. Fortney indicated in his October 5, 2019 report that appellant had low back pain related
to sequela of the accepted right lower extremity injury. Dr. Hilton opined on October 6, 2019 that
appellant’s lumbar spasms were caused by not bearing weight on her right lower extremity during
recuperation and continuing to favor it. Both physicians provided a conclusory opinion and did not
explain, with rationale, their opinions as to how the accepted employment injury had caused or
aggravated additional diagnosed conditions. The Board has held that a report is of limited probative
value regarding causal relationship if it does not contain medical rationale explaining how a given
medical condition/disability was causally related to employment factors.14 Thus, their opinions are
of limited probative value and insufficient to establish expansion of the claim.
In an August 8, 2019 reports, Dr. Beck held appellant off work noting that her right anterior
shin laceration was healing poorly. She observed objective right leg weakness and acute right-sided
lumbar pain, as noted in her October 8, 2019 report. Dr. Wheeler diagnosed gait instability and
right lower extremity weakness in his November 6, 2019 report. However, these medical reports
9

E.M., Docket No. 18-1599 (issued March 7, 2019); Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996).

10

Id.

11

T.K., Docket No. 18-1239 (issued May 29, 2019); M.W., 57 ECAB 710 (2006); John D. Jackson, 55 ECAB
465 (2004).
12

D.S., Docket No. 18-0353 (issued February 18, 2020); T.K., id.; I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams,
41 ECAB 345 (1989).
13

See P.M., Docket No. 18-0287 (issued October 11, 2018).

14

D.S., Docket No. 21-0673 (issued October 10, 2021); A.L., Docket No. 18-1706 (issued May 20, 2019); Y.D.,
Docket No. 16-1896 (issued February 10, 2017).

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do not offer an opinion as to whether these diagnosed conditions were causally related to the
accepted employment injury. The Board has held that medical evidence that does not offer an
opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of no probative value on the issue of
causal relationship. 15 These reports are, therefore, of no probative value on the issue of causal
relationship and are insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.
In an October 11, 2019 report, Dr. Bagwe noted appellant’s complaints of back discomfort
due to a slight limp. In an October 30, 2019 report, he noted slight weakness of right plantar flexion.
In November 8 and 13, 2019 reports, Dr. Bagwe attributed this weakness to physical inactivity
during recuperation from the July 23, 2019 employment injury. He opined in January 31, 2020
reports that residual weakness in the tibialis anterior musculature affected appellant’s balance.
Dr. Bagwe noted in an April 2, 2020 report that the accepted laceration caused weakness of the
tibialis anterior musculature that precipitated poor balance with isolated weight bearing on
appellant’s right lower extremity. Although Dr. Bagwe indicated that the accepted injury could
cause or contribute to the additional conditions, he did not specify the objective clinical findings
that established causation. The Board has held that a medical opinion must provide an explanation
of how the specific employment incident or employment factors physiologically caused or
aggravated the additional diagnosed conditions. 16 Therefore, the Board finds that Dr. Bagwe’s
reports are of limited probative value and insufficient to establish appellant’s burden of proof.
In September 18, 2019 reports, Dr. German noted that appellant sustained a right lower leg
injury with flap laceration on July 23, 2019 and diagnosed a healed chronic ulcer of the right anterior
lower leg and right lower leg discomfort with activity. In a work status report of the same date, he
returned appellant to light-duty work with a restriction against driving vehicles. In a September 23,
2019 prescription note, Dr. German held appellant off work through October 3, 2019. In a report
dated September 27, 2019, he returned her to light-duty work for four hours a day with restrictions,
releasing appellant to full-duty work as of October 14, 2019. Dr. German also submitted periodic
reports through November 6, 2019, noting appellant’s continuing lumbar and right lower extremity
symptoms. In none of those reports, however, did Dr. German provide an opinion regarding causal
relationship between appellant’s additional diagnosed conditions and the accepted July 23, 2019
employment injury. The Board has held that medical evidence that does not offer an opinion
regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of no probative value on the issue of causal
relationship. 17 Thus, the Board finds that the reports of Drs. German are of no probative value on
the issue of causal relationship and are insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.

15

S.S., Docket No. 21-0837 (issued November 23, 2021); see J.M., Docket No. 19-1926 (issued March 19, 2021);
L.D., Docket No. 20-0894 (issued January 26, 2021); T.F., Docket No. 18-0447 (issued February 5, 2020); L.B., Docket
No. 18-0533 (issued August 27, 2018); D.K., Docket No. 17-1549 (issued July 6, 2018).
16

See Y.D., Docket No. 16-1896 (issued February 10, 2017) (finding that a report is of limited probative value
regarding causal relationship if it does not contain medical rationale describing the relation between work factors and a
diagnosed condition/disability).
17

Id.

6

Appellant also submitted diagnostic studies that addressed her right lower extremity.
However, the Board has held that diagnostic studies, standing alone, lack probative value on the
issue of causal relationship. 18
As the medical evidence of record is insufficient to establish expansion of the acceptance of
the claim to include additional conditions causally related to or as a consequence of her accepted
employment injury, the Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that OWCP
should expand the acceptance of her claim to include a low back injury, pelvic or hip condition,
right lower extremity pain, and a balance disorder causally related to an accepted July 23, 2019
employment injury.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 5, 2020 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: March 2, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

18

S.S., id.; C.H., Docket No. 20-0228 (issued October 7, 2020); E.G., Docket No. 17-1955 (issued
September 10, 2018).

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
K.J., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Princeton Junction, NJ, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Thomas R. Uliase, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-195
Issued: September 14, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On November 2, 2011 appellant, through her attorney, filed a timely appeal from a
July 29, 2011 decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) denying
modification of a September 24, 1998 loss of wage-earning capacity decision. Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has established that OWCP’s September 24, 1998 loss of
wage-earning capacity determination should be modified.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On December 6, 1996 appellant, then a 36-year-old letter carrier, filed a traumatic injury
claim alleging that on December 5, 1996 she sustained a broken right femur when the postal
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

truck she was driving was hit by an automobile. OWCP later accepted the claim for cerebral
concussion without loss of consciousness and fractured teeth.2 Appellant stopped work on
December 5, 1996.
On July 13, 1998 appellant accepted a rehabilitation job as modified clerk.3 The duties of
the position included answering telephones, providing customer support, photocopying, scanning
incoming Express Mail labels, light filing, filing Express Mail labels, nixie mail, data
entry/station input delivery point sequencing, filing change of address cards and clearing carriers
on their return to the office. All of the above-noted duties were to conform to appellant’s
physical restrictions, which included no walking, standing, reaching, twisting, operating a motor
vehicle, reaching above the shoulder, pushing, pulling, lifting, squatting, kneeling and climbing
and up to eight hours of sitting, simple grasping and fine manipulation of the hands. The
modified clerk position paid an hourly rate of $14.37. Appellant assumed her new duties on
July 18, 1998.
By decision dated September 24, 1998, OWCP issued a loss of wage-earning capacity
determination based upon her actual earnings as modified clerk working eight hours a day
beginning July 18, 1998 and earning a weekly salary of $644.40. It found no wage loss and that
the position fairly and reasonably represented her wage-earning capacity.
On September 28, 2010 appellant filed a recurrence of disability claim beginning that
date due to the employing establishment’s withdrawal of her limited-duty under the National
Reassessment Program (NRP). She also filed claims for wage-loss compensation (Form CA-7)
beginning September 28, 2010.
By letter dated December 6, 2010, OWCP informed appellant of criteria and evidence
required for establishing modification of a loss of wage-earning capacity. Appellant was given
30 days to provide the evidence.
In a November 17, 2010 report, Dr. Michael L. Silverstein, a treating Board-certified
orthopedic surgeon, conducted a physical examination and noted that appellant’s work
restrictions had not changed since his February 26, 2007 evaluation. The restrictions included
sitting up to eight hours, walking up to 100 yards, standing for 10 to 15 minutes, no reaching
above the shoulder, driving a postal vehicle, squatting, kneeling or climbing, lifting up to 5
pounds and pushing and pulling up to 20 pounds
In correspondence dated December 13, 2010, appellant informed OWCP that the
modified position upon which the loss of wage-earning capacity was based and its duties was
specifically tailored for her work restrictions. She also alleged a worsening in her medical
condition.

2

On February 18, 1999 OWCP granted appellant a schedule award for a 39 percent permanent impairment of the
right lower extremity.
3

Appellant noted that her acceptance of the position was under protest.

2

By decision dated January 6, 2011, OWCP denied modification of the September 24,
1998 loss of wage-earning capacity determination.4
In a January 17, 2011 letter, appellant’s attorney requested a hearing before an OWCP
hearing representative, which was held on May 19, 2011.
In a report dated January 31, 2011, Dr. Silverstein provided physical findings and
concluded that appellant was capable of performing her limited-duty job.
Subsequent to the May 19, 2011 hearing, counsel submitted statements from two
coworkers in support of appellant’s contention that the modified clerk position was makeshift
work and not a real position. In a February 18, 2011 statement, Marianne Moore, a coworker,
stated that appellant had worked as supervisor assistant and provided her training for her role as a
supervisor. She noted that appellant never performed any clerk functions in the office and that
her duties included maintaining daily reports, passport appointments, reconciling billing
statements, carrier attendance, customer forwarding, vehicle maintenance and customer service.
In a March 16, 2011 statement, Pamela Archer, a coworker, agreed with Ms. Moore that
appellant did not perform clerk duties and that her primary duties were scheduling passport
appointments and answering the telephone. She also stated that appellant would be assigned
work from the supervisor duties and computer work to keep her busy.
In e-mail correspondence dated June 18, 2010, Carmela McDonough, a supervisor, noted
that no work was available for appellant within her restrictions that were not duties of a
supervisor. She also noted that appellant no longer performed supervisor work, answering the
telephone, writing up second notice or doing any automated vehicle utilization system.
By decision dated July 29, 2011, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed the denial of
modification of the September 24, 1998 loss of wage-earning capacity determination.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
FECA provides compensation for the disability of an employee resulting from personal
injury sustained while in the performance of duty.5 When an employee cannot return to the dateof-injury job because of disability due to work-related injury or disease, but does return to
alternative employment with an actual wage loss, OWCP must determine whether the earnings in
the alternative employment fairly and reasonably represent the employee’s loss of wage-earning
capacity.6
4

OWCP also issued a separate decision dated January 6, 2011 denying appellant’s claim for a recurrence of
disability beginning September 28, 2010. As more than 180 days has elapsed from the date of issuance of the
January 6, 2011 decision, to the filing of this appeal, the Board concludes that it has no jurisdiction to review it. See
20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e).
5

5 U.S.C. § 8102(a).

6

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Reemployment: Determining Wage-Earning Capacity,
Chapter 2.814.7 (October 2009).

3

Once the wage-earning capacity of an injured employee is determined, a modification of
such determination is not warranted unless there is a material change in the nature and extent of
the injury-related condition, the employee has been retrained or otherwise vocationally
rehabilitated or the original determination was, in fact, erroneous.7 The burden of proof is on the
party attempting to show a modification of the wage-earning capacity determination.8
FECA Bulletin No. 09-05, however, outlines OWCP procedures when limited-duty
positions are withdrawn pursuant to NRP. If, as in the present case, a formal wage-earning
capacity decision has been issued, OWCP must develop the evidence to determine whether a
modification of that decision is appropriate.9
ANALYSIS
OWCP accepted that appellant sustained cerebral concussion without loss of
consciousness, closed fracture of the tibia and fibula shafts and fractured teeth due to a
December 5, 1996 employment injury. On September 24, 1998 it found that her actual earnings
as a modified clerk effective July 18, 1998 fairly and reasonably represented her wage-earning
capacity and reduced her compensation to zero. On September 28, 2010 appellant filed a
recurrence of disability and claims for wage-loss beginning that day due to the withdrawal of her
limited-duty assignment as part of NRP.
On appeal to the Board, counsel argues that the September 24, 1998 loss of wage-earning
capacity was erroneous as the clerk position upon which it was based was odd-lot and makeshift
work. The hearing representative considered the issue of whether the light-duty job had been a
makeshift position.10
As noted above, OWCP issued a formal wage-earning capacity decision on
September 24, 1998. The employing establishment reassessed appellant’s rated position under
NRP, resulting in a withdrawal of limited duty and a claim for wage-loss compensation
beginning September 28, 2010. OWCP analyzed the case under the customary criteria for
modifying a loss of wage-earning capacity determination, but did not acknowledge FECA
Bulletin No. 09-05 or fully follow the procedures outlined therein for claims, such as this, in
which limited-duty positions are withdrawn pursuant to NRP.
When a loss of wage-earning capacity decision has been issued, FECA Bulletin No. 0905 requires OWCP to develop the evidence to determine whether a modification of the decision
is appropriate.11 FECA Bulletin No. 09-05 asks OWCP to confirm that the file contain
7

Harley Sims, Jr., 56 ECAB 320 (2005); Tamra McCauley, 51 ECAB 375 (2000).

8

Id.

9

FECA Bulletin No. 09-05 (issued August 18, 2009).

10

A position that is makeshift in nature is not appropriate for a wage-earning capacity determination. See
Selden H. Swartz, 55 ECAB 272 (2004).
11

Supra note 9.

4

documentary evidence supporting that the position was an actual bona fide position. It requires
OWCP to review whether a current medical report supports work-related disability and
establishes that the current need for limited duty or medical treatment is a result of injury-related
residuals, and to further develop the evidence from both the claimant and the employing
establishment if the case lacks current medical evidence.12
Further, FECA Bulletin No. 09-05 states that OWCP, in an effort to proactively manage
these types of cases, may undertake further nonmedical development, such as requiring that the
employing establishment address in writing whether the position on which the loss of wageearning capacity determination was based was a bona fide position at the time of the rating, and
to direct the employing establishment to review its files for contemporaneous evidence
concerning the position.13
If, after development and review by OWCP, the evidence establishes that the loss of
wage-earning capacity decision was proper and none of the customary criteria for modifying the
determination were met, then OWCP may issue a decision denying modification of the loss of
wage-earning capacity determination.14
As OWCP failed to follow the guidelines in FECA Bulletin No. 09-05, the Board will set
aside the July 29, 2011 decision and remand the case for further consideration. After proper
compliance with FECA Bulletin No. 09-05 guidelines, OWCP shall issue an appropriate de novo
decision on appellant’s entitlement to wage-loss compensation beginning September 28, 2010.15
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision and will be remanded to
OWCP for further development.

12

Id. at §§ I.A.1-2.

13

Id. at § I.A.3.

14

Id. at (Section I.A.1-4).

15

See M.E., Docket No. 11-1416 (issued May 17, 2012).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 29, 2011 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case remanded for further action
consistent with this decision of the Board.
Issued: September 14, 2012
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
K.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Flint, MI, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 11-298
Issued: August 30, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On November 17, 2010 appellant, through his attorney, filed a timely appeal of an
October 22, 2010 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly denied modification of the December 15, 1994
wage-earning capacity determination.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On August 26, 1993 appellant, then a 36-year-old letter carrier, sustained a right elbow
injury in the performance of duty. His claim was accepted for right elbow traumatic synovitis
and post-traumatic osteoarthritis.2
Appellant was treated by Dr. Ishwar Dass, an orthopedic surgeon, who released him to
return to full-time modified duty on August 1, 1994. He was restricted from pushing, pulling,
reaching, making repetitive movements or lifting more than five pounds.
On October 24, 1994 appellant accepted a full-time limited-duty assignment as a city
carrier. The written job offer indicated that his duties would be limited to those within the
restrictions provided by his treating physician. Accordingly, appellant would not be required to
lift, push or pull more than five pounds; to reach; to drive right-handed vehicles; or to engage in
repetitive movements with his right arm.
On December 15, 1994 OWCP issued a formal wage-earning capacity decision. It found
that the wages of the modified position fairly and reasonably represented appellant’s wageearning capacity, and that, as his wages were equal to or greater than those he earned on the date
of injury, he had no loss of wage-earning capacity.
Appellant worked in his limited-duty job until February 9, 2010, when the employing
establishment informed him that, pursuant to the guidelines established under the National
Reassessment Process (NRP), it was unable to identify enough available necessary tasks within
his medical restrictions in order for him to complete a full day of work.
On April 21, 2010 appellant filed a claim for a recurrence of disability based on the
employing establishment’s withdrawal of his limited-duty position. He alleged that the
employing establishment was unable to accommodate his medical condition. Appellant
submitted numerous medical reports from his treating physician tracing his history of treatment.
In an April 26, 2010 decision, OWCP denied modification of the 1994 LWEC decision.
In a letter dated July 22, 2010, the employing establishment notified appellant of its
determination that there was no operationally-necessary work available for him within his
current medical restrictions.
On May 6, 2010 appellant requested a telephonic hearing, which was held on
August 4, 2010. Counsel for appellant argued that the modified position on which the
December 15, 1994 LWEC decision was based was “make work” and that, therefore, the initial
decision was erroneous and should be set aside.
By decision dated October 22, 2010, an OWCP hearing representative affirmed the
OWCP’s April 26, 2010 decision denying modification of the December 15, 1994 LWEC
2

OWCP accepted appellant’s September 8, 1999 traumatic injury claim for left elbow strain and left elbow lateral
and medial epicondylitis. (File No. xxxxxx544) On July 11, 2001 the files were consolidated, with File No.
xxxxxx038 serving as the master file.

2

determination. He found that the limited-duty position was not makeshift, as it was not designed
for appellant’s particular needs and the duties described were considered normal duties
performed by a clerk. The hearing representative further found that the medical evidence did not
support any material change in appellant’s work-related condition such that he could no longer
perform the modified job.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Once the wage-earning capacity of an injured employee is determined, a modification of
such determination is not warranted unless there is a material change in the nature and extent of
the injury-related condition, the employee has been retrained or otherwise vocationally
rehabilitated, or the original determination was, in fact, erroneous.3 The burden of proof is on
the party attempting to show a modification of the wage-earning capacity determination.4
FECA Bulletin No. 09-05 outlines very specific procedures for light-duty positions
withdrawn pursuant to the NRP. Regarding claims for total disability when a wage-earning
capacity decision has been issued, OWCP should develop the evidence to determine whether a
modification of that loss of wage-earning capacity position is appropriate.
ANALYSIS
The Board finds this case not in posture for decision. OWCP accepted appellant’s claims
for right elbow traumatic synovitis and post-traumatic osteoarthritis. Based upon the medical
restrictions recommended by appellant’s treating physician, the employing establishment offered
him a modified city carrier position, which he accepted on October 24, 1994. By decision dated
December 15, 1994, OWCP found that appellant’s actual earnings in the modified position fairly
and reasonably represented his wage-earning capacity and reduced his compensation benefits to
zero.
The record reflects that appellant worked in the full-time modified position until
February 9, 2010, when the employing establishment informed him that there was no productive
work available for him. He filed a claim for a recurrence of disability based on the withdrawal
of his job offer under the NRP. Appellant argued that the original LWEC decision was
erroneous because the position on which it was based was makeshift in nature and that his
condition had worsened since the decision was issued.
In its April 26, 2010 decision, OWCP denied modification of the December 15, 1994
LWEC decision, finding that the modified carrier position was not makeshift in nature and that
the evidence did not establish a worsening of appellant’s condition. The hearing representative
did not, however, acknowledge that the original modified position was withdrawn pursuant to the
NRP or make any relevant findings on the issue. In this regard, FECA Bulletin No. 09-05

3

Sue A. Sedgwick, 45 ECAB 211 (1993).

4

Id.

3

provides specific guidelines for developing the issue of modification of a wage-earning capacity
determination when the job has been withdrawn pursuant to NRP.5
In light of the requirements of FECA Bulletin No. 09-05, OWCP did not discuss the
medical evidence of record as it pertains to appellant’s residuals due to the accepted right elbow
condition. The case will be remanded to OWCP to properly analyze the modification issue
presented in accord with FECA Bulletin No. 09-05. After such further development as OWCP
deems necessary, it should issue an appropriate decision.
The Board finds the case is not in posture for decision and will be remanded to OWCP.
On remand, OWCP should follow the procedures found in FECA Bulletin No. 09-05 and issue
an appropriate decision on appellant’s claim for benefits.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision and will be remanded to
OWCP for further development.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated October 22, 2010 is set aside and the case remanded for further
action consistent with this decision of the Board.
Issued: August 30, 2012
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5

FECA Bulletin No. 09-05 (issued August 18, 2009).

4


Dr. Gao United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.S., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, RADIO CITY
STATION, New York, NY, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 08-94
Issued: January 16, 2009

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On October 10, 2007 appellant filed a timely appeal from a June 18, 2007 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs denying his claim that he sustained an injury
in the performance of duty on December 13, 2006. He also appealed a nonmerit decision dated
September 17, 2007, denying his request for reconsideration. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c)
and 501.3(d), the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this claim.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant sustained an injury in the performance of duty on
December 13, 2006, as alleged; and (2) whether the Office properly denied further review of the
merits of his claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
FACTUAL HISTORY
On December 13, 2006 appellant, then a 50-year-old city carrier, filed a traumatic injury
claim alleging that he injured his neck on that date while lifting mail. The employing

establishment controverted the claim on the grounds that he lifted the tray with one hand instead
of both hands as instructed.
In support of his claim, appellant submitted medical scripts and a December 13, 2006
hospital emergency room report indicating that x-rays had been taken of his neck and
interpretations of the x-rays would be issued later.
In a letter dated December 19, 2006, the Office informed appellant that the evidence of
record was insufficient to establish his claim. Appellant was advised to submit medical and
factual evidence to support his claim and was given 30 days to provide the requested
information.
By decision dated January 22, 2007, the Office denied appellant’s claim as he failed to
submit evidence to support his claim in the time allotted. Following the January 22, 2007
decision, it received additional medical and factual information. In an undated statement,
appellant related that he felt a sharp pain in his neck on the right side while picking up mail on
December 13, 2006. He informed his supervisors of his sharp neck pain and then completed his
deliveries. Upon returning to the station, appellant informed Ms. Korger, a supervisor, about his
neck pain. Ms. Korger referred him to Claudia Jordan, a supervisor, who sent him to the
hospital.
In a January 5, 2007 report, Dr. Juan J. Fernandez-Madrid stated that he saw appellant for
right sternoclavicular joint pain that had been asymptomatic until he was lifting mail on
December 13, 2006.
A physical examination revealed tenderness, swelling on the
sternoclavicular joint, right neck pain, right shoulder internal rotation pain and right lateral
rotation pain. Dr. Fernandez-Madrid diagnosed right sternoclavicular joint subluxation. In a
January 5, 2007 disability certificate, he indicated that appellant was totally disabled for the
period December 13, 2006 through January 7, 2007. He released appellant to light-duty work on
January 8, 2007 with lifting restrictions of no more than 10 to 15 pounds.
In a January 19, 2007 attending physician’s state workers’ compensation form, appellant
was diagnosed with a thoracic sprain.1
On January 26, 2007 appellant requested a review of the written record by an Office
hearing representative. He submitted medical and factual evidence including January 26 and
February 26, 2007 reports of Dr. Fernandez-Madrid; December 13, 2006 hospital reports; the
December 14, 2006 clavicle and chest x-ray interpretations by Dr. James Marino, a radiologist;
and an April 3, 2007 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan. Dr. Marino reported a normal
right clavicle with no evidence of arthritis based on the December 14, 2006 x-ray interpretation.
The December 14, 2006 chest x-ray was interpreted by Dr. Marino as having no active infiltrate.
On January 26, 2007 Dr. Fernandez-Madrid stated that appellant injured himself on
December 13, 2006 and that he continued to have right shoulder pain. He reported an unchanged
physical examination. Dr. Fernandez-Madrid diagnosed right sternoclavicular joint subluxation.
On February 26, 2007 he diagnosed right sternoclavicular joint subluxation and noted that
1

There is no physician’s name or signature on the form, but St. Vincent’s Midtown Hospital is noted on the form.

2

appellant continued to work with pain in his right shoulder. A physical examination revealed
“pain on motion of the shoulder.”
The April 3, 2007 MRI scan revealed findings, which were most suggestive of
osteoarthritis of the right sternoclavicular joint and the possibility of an inflammatory
arthropathy or septic arthritis cannot be completely excluded.
By decision dated May 3, 2007, the Office hearing representative affirmed the denial of
appellant’s claim. He found that the medical evidence failed to establish that appellant sustained
a chest or neck condition causally related to accepted December 13, 2006 employment incident.
On May 22, 2007 appellant requested reconsideration. On March 12, 2007 Dr. Ossama
Maloule, an internist, related that appellant was seen for sternoclavicular pain which had been
present for three months. Appellant denied any fall or trauma but noted he worked hard using
the right arm which might have led to his injury.
In a May 9, 2007 report, Dr. Bernard D. Nidus, an internist, diagnosed right
sternoclavicular joint osteoarthritis, which had been symptomatic since December 2006. He
noted that this condition limited appellant’s “range of motion and force he can exert with his
right arm.”
On May 16, 2007 Dr. Nidus diagnosed swelling and pain in the right
sternoclavicular joint. He reported that appellant was first seen on March 12, 2007 for treatment
of this condition which had been present for the prior three months and while he was performing
hard work. Appellant related that he lifted heavy loads with his right arm.
By decision dated June 18, 2007, the Office denied modification of the May 3, 2007
decision. It found that the medical evidence did not adequately explain how the diagnosed
conditions were causally related to the December 13, 2006 employment incident.
Appellant requested reconsideration, on June 22, 2007, he submitted a June 11, 2007
report by Eli Fontanilla, physical therapist, and reports dated May 18 to June 11, 2007 from
Dr. Xiao-ke Gao, a treating Board-certified neurologist, who diagnosed right shoulder
osteoarthrosis, right shoulder tendinitis and clavicle strain. Dr. Gao noted that appellant stated
that he had injured himself at employing establishment while reaching “out to pick up some
meals and in the process, he injured his shoulder.” He opined that appellant was partially
disabled as a result of the December 13, 2006 incident. Appellant had right shoulder pain and
difficulty raising his right arm.
On a June 11, 2007 Mr. Fontanilla diagnosed right elbow epicondylitis and ulnar
neuropathy. Appellant attributed his condition to his employment. He related that “he must
have pulled something over his [right] shoulder from pulling and pushing mail carts.”
On a June 11, 2007 Dr. Gao diagnosed right epicondylitis, ulnar neuropathy and right
subluxation of the sternoclavicular joint. A physical examination revealed bilateral epicondyle
tenderness, 90 degrees right shoulder abduction and intact sensory examination.
By decision dated September 17, 2007, the Office denied his request for reconsideration,
finding that none of the medical reports were relevant to his claim.

3

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
An employee seeking benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act has the
burden of proof to establish the essential elements of his claim including the fact that the
individual is an employee of the United States within the meaning of the Act, that the claim was
timely filed within the applicable time limitation period of the Act, that an injury was sustained
in the performance of duty as alleged and that any disability or specific condition for which
compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment injury.2
The claimant has the burden of establishing by the weight of reliable, probative and
substantial evidence that the condition for which compensation is sought is causally related to a
specific employment incident or to specific conditions of employment.3 An award of
compensation may not be based on appellant’s belief of causal relationship. Neither the mere
fact that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period of employment nor the belief that
the disease or condition was caused or aggravated by employment factors or incidents is
sufficient to establish a causal relationship.4
The medical evidence required to establish causal relationship generally is rationalized
medical opinion evidence. Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence which
includes a physician’s rationalized opinion on the issue of whether there is a causal relationship
between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors.5 The
opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the
claimant6 and must be one of reasonable medical certainty7 explaining the nature of the
relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by
the claimant.8
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that appellant failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing that he
sustained a traumatic injury on December 13, 2006. The Office accepted that the December 13,
2006 mail lifting incident occurred as alleged. However, appellant did not meet his burden of
proof in establishing the relationship of his claimed neck or sternoclavicular conditions and the

2

Robert Broome, 55 ECAB 339 (2004); see also Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

3

See Paul Foster, 56 ECAB 208 (2004); see also Katherine J. Friday, 47 ECAB 591 (1996).

4

Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215 (1997).

5

G.G., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1564, issued February 27, 2007); Conard Hightower, 54 ECAB 796
(2003); Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).
6

L.D., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1627, issued February 8, 2007); Tomas Martinez, 54 ECAB 623 (2003);
Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).
7

Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238 (2005); John W. Montoya, 54 ECAB 306 (2003).

8

J.M., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-2094, issued January 30, 2007); Judy C. Rogers, 54 ECAB 693 (2003).

4

lifting incident. The medical evidence does not provide a rationalized narrative explanation of
how the December 13, 2006 lifting mail incident caused or aggravated his diagnosed conditions.
On March 12, 2007 Dr. Maloule related that appellant was seen for sternoclavicular pain.
She stated that appellant denied any fall or trauma but related that working with his right arm
may have caused his injury. In a May 9, 2007 orthopedic surgery outpatient report, Dr. Baskies
diagnosed right sternoclavicular arthritis. On May 9, 2007 Dr. Nidus diagnosed severe right
sternoclavicular joint osteoarthritis. In a May 16, 2007 report, he diagnosed swelling and pain in
the right sternoclavicular joint. Appellant informed Dr. Nidus that he lifted heavy loads with his
right arm. None of these reports provide the physicians opinion as to the cause of appellant’s
diagnosed conditions or address the December 13, 2006 mail lifting incident. The Board has
long held that medical evidence which does not offer an opinion regarding the cause of an
employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of causal relationship.9 These
reports are insufficient to establish that appellant sustained a neck or sternoclavicular condition
as a result of the December 13, 2006 employment incident.
On January 5, 2007 Dr. Fernandez-Madrid diagnosed a right sternoclavicular joint
subluxation. He noted that appellant was seen for right sternoclavicular joint pain that had been
asymptomatic until appellant lifted mail on December 13, 2006. The Board has held that the
opinion of a physician that a condition is causally related to an employment injury because the
employee was asymptomatic before the injury is insufficient, without supporting medical
rationale, to establish causal relationship.10 Dr. Fernandez-Madrid did not adequately address
how appellant’s right sternoclavicular condition was caused or contributed to by the lifting
incident. His opinion is insufficient to establish a causal relationship between appellant’s right
sternoclavicular joint pain and the accepted December 13, 2006 incident.
The Board notes that the remaining medical evidence of record includes hospital records
and x-ray and MRI scan reports. None of the diagnostic studies provide any opinion as to the
cause of appellant’s alleged neck or sternoclavicular conditions. They are of diminished
probative value and are insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.11
The Board finds that appellant submitted insufficient rationalized medical evidence to
establish the causal relationship asserted in this case.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
To require the Office to reopen a case for merit review under section 8128 of the Act,12
the Office’s regulation provide that a claimant must: (1) show that the Office erroneously
applied or interpreted a specific point of law; (2) advance a relevant legal argument not
9

A.D., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1183, issued November 14, 2006).

10

Jaja K. Asaramo, 55 ECAB 200 (2004).

11

Elizabeth H. Kramm (Leonard O. Kramm), 57 ECAB 117 (2005).

12

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193. Under section 8128 of the Act, [t]he Secretary of Labor may review an award for or
against payment of compensation at anytime on her own motion or on application. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

5

previously considered by the Office; or (3) constitute relevant and pertinent new evidence not
previously considered by the Office.13 To be entitled to a merit review of an Office decision
denying or terminating a benefit, a claimant also must file his or her application for review
within one year of the date of that decision.14 When a claimant fails to meet one of the above
standards, the Office will deny the application for reconsideration without reopening the case for
review of the merits.15
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
The Office denied appellant’s traumatic injury claim by decisions dated January 22,
May 3 and June 18, 2007, finding that he submitted insufficient evidence to establish causal
relationship. Appellant requested reconsideration on June 22, 2007. The underlying issue is
whether he established a causal relationship between the accepted December 13, 2006
employment incident and the claimed neck or sternoclavicular conditions. To be relevant, the
evidence must address this issue.16
Appellant submitted reports from Dr. Gao, an attending Board-certified neurologist, and
June 11, 2007 report by Mr. Fontanilla, a physical therapist, who’s report does not constitute a
basis for reopening appellant’s claim for a merit review. A physical therapist is not a physician
as defined under the Act.17 The Board finds that Mr. Fontanilla’s report does not constitute
competent medical evidence as a physical therapist is not a physician under the Act. This
evidence is not relevant to the medical issue of whether appellant sternoclavicular condition is
causally related to the accepted December 13, 2006 employment incident.
However, Dr. Gao diagnosed right shoulder osteoarthrosis, right shoulder tendinitis and
clavicle strain. He noted that appellant injured himself at work while reaching out at work.
Dr. Gao found that appellant was partially disabled as a result of the December 13, 2006
employment incident due to right shoulder pain and had difficulty raising his right arm. The
Board notes that Dr. Gao’s description of appellants employment incident corresponds with the
history on appellant’s claim form. Dr. Gao also provided reasoning for his opinion that
appellant’s diagnosed condition was due to his employment incident. The Office found that this
report was not relevant. The Board notes that the reports from Dr. Gao offer medical opinion
evidence on the causal relationship, the reason for which the Office denied appellant’s claim on
January 22, May 3 and June 18, 2007. Therefore, these reports constitute pertinent new and
relevant evidence. As appellant has submitted relevant and pertinent new evidence not

13

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(1)-(2). See Susan A. Filkins, 57 ECAB 630 (2006).

14

Id. at § 10.607(a).

15

Id. at § 10.608(b). See Tina M. Parrelli-Ball, 57 ECAB 598 (2006) (when an application for review of the
merits of a claim does not meet at least one of the three regulatory requirements the Office will deny the application
for review without reviewing the merits of the claim).
16

Joseph A. Brown, Jr., 55 ECAB 542 (2004).

17

5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); Vickey C. Randall, 51 ECAB 357.

6

previously considered by the Office, under 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(2)(iii), he is entitled to a
review of the merits of the claim. The case will be remanded to the Office for a merit decision.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not established that he sustained an injury in the
performance of duty on December 13, 2006, as alleged. The Board further finds that the Office
improperly denied appellant’s May 22 and June 22, 2007 requests for reconsideration without
reviewing the case on the merits.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated June 18 and May 3, 2007 are affirmed. The Office decision dated
September 17, 2007 is set aside and the case remanded for further action consistent with this
decision.
Issued: January 16, 2009
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.D., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, NATIONAL
DISTRIBUTION CENTER, Seattle, WA,
Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Rainer Brown, for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

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Docket No. 10-2261
Issued: June 28, 2011

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER REMANDING CASE
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
On September 8, 2010 appellant, through his representative, filed a timely appeal from a
June 2, 2010 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs denying his
occupational disease claim and an August 27, 2010 nonmerit decision denying his request for
reconsideration. The Board docketed the appeal as No. 10-2261.
The Board has considered the matter and notes that in the case of William A. Couch1 it
held that, when adjudicating a claim, the Office is obligated to consider all evidence properly
submitted by a claimant and received by the Office before the final decision is issued. On
April 27, 2010 appellant, then a 58-year-old mail handler, filed an occupational disease claim
alleging that he sustained bilateral arm pain extending from his elbows to hands causally related
to factors of his federal employment. By letter dated April 29, 2010, the Office requested
additional factual and medical information, including a detailed report from appellant’s physician
addressing the relationship between any bilateral arm or hand condition and factors of his federal
employment.
In a report dated April 26, 2010, received by the Office on June 1, 2010, Dr. Kelvin K.
Ma, a Board-certified neurologist, discussed appellant’s complaints of pain in the left shoulder,
1

41 ECAB 548 (1990).

right arm and neck, intermittent pain over the left elbow radiating into the left forearm and
numbness in both hands. He noted that appellant attributed his symptoms to lifting, pushing and
pulling during the course of his federal employment. Dr. Ma requested that a claim be opened
“for arms and hands bilaterally, to rule out carpal tunnel syndrome, rule out ulnar neuropathy,
rule out thoracic outlet syndrome, and rule out cervical radiculopathy.”
By decision dated June 2, 2010, the Office denied appellant’s claim after finding that he
had not submitted any medical evidence in support of his claim and thus had not shown a
condition causally related to the accepted work factors. It indicated that he had not responded to
its April 29, 2010 request for information. The Board thus concludes that the Office did not
review the April 26, 2010 medical report entered into the record on June 1, 2010.
As appellant submitted evidence which was received but not reviewed by the Office prior
to the issuance of its last merit decision dated June 2, 2010, the case will be remanded to the
Office for consideration of all the evidence submitted at the time of its June 2, 2010 decision.
Following such further development as the Office deems necessary, it shall issue a de novo
decision.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated August 27 and June 2, 2010 are set aside and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.
Issued: June 28, 2011
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

2


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.F., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CRANEY ISLAND
PROJECT, Portsmouth, VA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 19-0324
Issued: January 2, 2020

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On November 26, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from an October 17, 2018 merit
decision and an October 24, 2018 nonmerit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and
20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.2
ISSUES
The issue are: (1) whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish intermittent
disability for the period October 6, 1987 through June 13, 1994 causally related to his accepted
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

The Board notes that appellant submitted additional evidence on appeal. However, the Board’s Rules of Procedure
provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record that was before OWCP at the
time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the Board for the first time on appeal.”
20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this additional evidence for the first time on
appeal. Id.
2

October 6, 1987 employment injury; and (2) whether OWCP properly denied appellant’s request
for reconsideration finding it was untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 8, 1987 appellant, then a 48-year-old engineering equipment operator, filed a
traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on October 6, 1987 he was struck in both knees
and the chest and knocked down by a truck while in the performance of duty. He stopped work
on October 6, 1987 and returned to work on November 9, 1987. Appellant received continuation
of pay from October 7 through November 8, 1987. On November 22, 1987 OWCP accepted his
claim for hemarthrosis of the right knee and contusion of the left knee. Appellant was terminated
for cause by the employing establishment on November 24, 1987.
On June 22, 1988 appellant’s attending physician, Dr. Sterling R. Williamson, a Boardcertified orthopedic surgeon, discharged appellant from treatment due to his accepted employment
injuries. He examined appellant on April 6, 1989 and noted that he had treated appellant from
January 7 through August 12, 1988 due to severe underlying degenerative osteoarthritis of both
knees.
On July 16, 1993 appellant requested that his claim be reopened. In a note dated July 15,
1993, Dr. Williamson opined that appellant’s October 6, 1987 employment injury had not caused
his tricompartmental degenerative arthritis, but that it aggravated this preexisting condition. In a
September 3, 1993 note, he recommended that appellant undergo total knee replacements. On
November 8, 1993 Dr. Williamson found that since the October 6, 1987 employment injury
appellant had significant discomfort and disability with difficulty maintaining his employment.
In a report dated May 19, 1994, Dr. David L. Durica, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon
and second opinion physician, diagnosed bilateral severe arthritis of the knees related by
aggravation to appellant’s October 6, 1987 employment injury. He further found that even with
joint replacement surgery appellant would be unable to return to his date-of-injury position in
construction or other outside activities requiring lifting, carrying, stooping, or climbing.
Dr. Durica also noted that appellant had permanent impairment to his knees bilaterally.
On May 31, 1994 OWCP expanded acceptance of appellant’s claim to include aggravation
of severe bilateral knee arthritis. On June 13, 1994 appellant filed a claim for compensation (Form
CA-7) alleging that he was totally disabled from October 6, 1987 through June 13, 1994. OWCP
sent him a letter dated June 27, 1994 requesting that he provide medical evidence in support of his
claim for wage-loss compensation. On the same date the employing establishment was instructed
to indicate the date that appellant had been terminated from employment along with documentation
to confirm his termination. On June 27, 1994 OWCP received an itemization of the dates he
claimed he had been disabled from work. On July 7, 1994 the employing establishment provided
OWCP with the Form SF-50 confirming appellant’s termination from employment. In a letter
dated June 22, 1994, appellant asserted that his knee condition adversely impacted his ability to
work. He claimed wage-loss compensation from November 8 through December 31, 1987, and
intermittent periods from 1988 through 1994.

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In a medical note dated September 26, 1994, Dr. Williamson provided a listing of days for
which appellant had been removed from work due to his disability.
In a December 9, 1994 development letter, OWCP requested additional information
regarding appellant’s claimed periods of disability from work.
OWCP paid wage-loss compensation from June 26, 1994. Dr. Williamson performed right
total knee replacement surgery on June 30, 1994. On July 15, 1994 OWCP accepted appellant’s
claim for total knee replacement and entered him on the periodic rolls. On April 27, 1995 it
authorized left total knee replacement surgery. On February 3, 1997 Dr. John S. Wagner, a Boardcertified orthopedic surgeon, performed appellant’s left total knee replacement surgery.
On May 28, 2014 OWCP requested that appellant completed a Form EN1032 addressing
his work and earnings for the previous 15 months. By decision dated July 24, 2014, it suspended
his compensation benefits as he had failed to timely submit a Form EN1032. Appellant completed
the requested form on July 18, 2014 and submitted it to OWCP on July 28, 2014.
On July 31, 2015 a special agent for the employing establishment completed an
investigative memorandum finding that appellant was employed as a farmer during a period that
he had completed a Form EN1032 and indicated that he had no employment or earnings.
On December 4, 2015 appellant entered into a plea agreement in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina pleading guilty to one count of false statements to obtain
FECA benefits. On June 10, 2016 the judge accepted appellant’s guilty plea and sentenced him to
three years’ probation, restitution, and a fine.
By decision dated July 25, 2016, OWCP found that, on December 4, 2015, appellant
pleaded guilty to defrauding the FECA program, specifically by making false statements to obtain
federal workers’ compensation benefits. It informed him that due to this fraud conviction, he
forfeited entitlement to receive further benefits under FECA and that his wage-loss compensation
and medical benefits were terminated effective December 4, 2015. OWCP further noted that it
would pay for authorized medical treatment appellant had received prior to the date of the decision.
In a July 27, 2016 letter, OWCP informed appellant of its preliminary determination that
he had received an overpayment of compensation in the amount of $21,229.83 for the period
December 4, 2015 to July 23, 2016, following his fraud conviction. It determined that he was at
fault in the creation of the overpayment and therefore was not entitled to waiver of recovery of the
overpayment.
On August 8, 2016 appellant, through counsel, filed a claim for a schedule award (Form
CA-7) for bilateral knee conditions. Appellant also provided an August 1, 2016 narrative
statement through the office of his congressman asserting that he had been fired from the
employing establishment in November 1987 because he could not perform his regular duties as an
engineering equipment operator. In a letter dated September 2, 2016, OWCP informed appellant’s
congressman that appellant was not entitled to further workers’ compensation benefits, including
schedule award compensation. It also noted that appellant had not submitted evidence supporting
his claimed disability from work for the period from 1987 through 1994.

3

By decision dated September 6, 2016, OWCP finalized its preliminary overpayment
determination and found that appellant had received an overpayment of compensation in the
amount of $21,229.83, that he was at fault in the creation of the overpayment and therefore
precluded from waiver of recovery of the overpayment, and that the overpayment should be
recovered in full within 30 days.
On September 14, 2016 appellant requested a review of the written record from the July 25,
2016 forfeiture decision by an OWCP hearing representative.
In response to the September 6, 2016 overpayment decision, on September 16, 2016
appellant requested a prerecoupment hearing before an OWCP hearing representative. By decision
dated October 13, 2016, an OWCP hearing representative denied appellant’s request for an oral
hearing regarding the July 25, 2016 forfeiture decision finding that it was untimely. She further
exercised her discretion by finding that the issue in the case could equally well be addressed by
requesting reconsideration.
On July 2, 2018 appellant requested reconsideration of the July 25, 2016 decision which
affirmed his forfeiture of benefits. He contended that he was entitled to back pay for the period
1987 through 1994 and to two schedule awards. On October 12, 2018 appellant contended that he
had not knowingly or intentionally made a false statement to obtain FECA benefits. He alleged
that he was unable to read or write and that his wife was writing the letter for him. Appellant
indicated that he had a learning disability. He alleged that his doctor released him to light-duty
work, but that he was told by the employing establishment that there was no light-duty work
available for him. Appellant also asserted that he had previously requested schedule awards, but
had not received such an award. He alleged that the new evidence required to warrant
reconsideration was his physical and mental disability which should have been considered as a
mitigating factor in his case. Appellant denied that he owned or operated the farm as it was solely
owned by his wife. He alleged that he was forced to plead guilty to fraud to avoid jail. Appellant
resubmitted medical evidence already of record.
By decision dated October 17, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for disability
compensation for the period November 6, 1987 through June 13, 1994. It found that he had not
provided medical evidence addressing his specific periods of disability from October 6, 1987
through June 13, 1994. OWCP also found that appellant failed to provide information setting forth
the periods that he performed private sector work from October 6, 1987 through June 13, 1994. It
further found that he was not entitled to schedule award compensation following the forfeiture
decision.
By decision dated October 24, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration
of the July 25, 2016 forfeiture decision finding that it was untimely filed and failed to demonstrate
clear evidence of error.

4

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
An employee seeking benefits under FECA3 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including that any disability or specific condition for which
compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment injury.4
Under FECA, the term disability means “the incapacity, because of an employment injury,
to earn the wages the employee was receiving at the time of injury.”5 The question of whether an
employee is disabled from work is an issue that must be resolved by competent medical evidence.6
The employee is responsible for providing sufficient medical evidence to justify payment of any
compensation sought.7
The Board will not require OWCP to pay compensation for disability in the absence of
medical evidence directly addressing the specific dates of disability for which compensation is
claimed. To do so, would essentially allow an employee to self-certify his or her disability and
entitlement to compensation.8
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish intermittent to
disability for the period October 6, 1987 through June 13, 1994 causally related to his accepted
October 6, 1987 employment injury.
OWCP accepted appellant’s October 6, 1987 employment injury for hemarthrosis of the
right knee and contusion of the left knee, aggravation of severe bilateral knee arthritis, and total
knee replacement surgeries bilaterally with a revision of the right. Appellant received continuation
of pay from October 7 through November 8, 1987. He returned to work on November 9, 1987 and
stopped work on November 24, 1987 when he was terminated for cause. Appellant worked
intermittently in the private sector from November 2, 1987 through June 26, 1994. OWCP
authorized wage-loss compensation from June 26, 1994 through December 4, 2015.
Beginning on April 6, 1989, Dr. Williamson diagnosed severe underlying degenerative
osteoarthritis of both knees, but failed to opine whether this condition was related to appellant’s
October 6, 1987 employment injury. In a December 21, 1992 note, he reported that appellant’s
left knee remained symptomatic and opined that the October 6, 1987 employment injury
aggravated his underlying diagnosis of degenerative osteoarthritis of the knees, bilaterally. On
3

Supra note 1.

4

See C.R., Docket No. 18-1805 (issued May 10, 2019); Kathryn Haggerty, 45 ECAB 383 (1994); Elaine Pendleton,
40 ECAB 1143 (1989).
5

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(f).

6

S.A., Docket No. 18-0399 (issued October 16, 2018); see also R.C., 59 ECAB 546, 551 (2008).

7

Id.; see T.A., Docket No. 18-0431 (issued November 7, 2018); see also Amelia S. Jefferson, 57 ECAB 183 (2005).

8

T.L., Docket No. 18-0934 (issued May 8, 2019); Sandra D. Pruitt, 57 ECAB 126 (2005).

5

November 8, 1993 Dr. Williamson found since the October 6, 1987 employment injury appellant
had significant discomfort and disability with difficulty maintaining his employment. However,
he did not address specific periods of disability for work due to appellant’s bilateral knee
osteoarthritis. The Board finds that Dr. Williamson’s reports are not sufficiently detailed to
establish appellant’s disability for work for the periods claimed. Evidence that does not address
appellant’s accepted conditions and dates of disability, is insufficient to establish the claim.
In a second opinion report dated May 19, 1994, Dr. Durica found that appellant was unable
to return to his date-of-injury position in construction or other outside activities requiring lifting,
carrying, stooping, or climbing due to the employment-related aggravation of his underlying
bilateral knee osteoarthritis.9 While he indicated that appellant had work restrictions, he did not
opine that appellant was totally disabled from work due to the accepted employment injuries and
did not address a specific period of disability due to his accepted employment-related conditions.10
Therefore, this report does establish disability for work during that period. The Board has held
that a conclusory medical opinion without explanation as to how the accepted conditions caused
disability is of limited probative value.11 Without a medical explanation, supported by objective
findings, explaining why appellant was disabled on specific dates due to the accepted employment
injury, appellant would be self-certifying disability.12
For each period of disability claimed, the employee has the burden of proof to establish
that he or she was disabled from work as a result of the accepted employment injury.13 Because
appellant has not submitted rationalized medical opinion evidence to establish employment-related
disability for the period October 6, 1987 through June 13, 1994 as a result of his accepted bilateral
knee conditions, the Board finds that he has not met his burden of proof to establish his claim for
disability compensation.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
LEGAL PRECEDENT - ISSUE 2
Pursuant to section 8128(a) of FECA, OWCP has the discretion to reopen a case for further
merit review.14 This discretionary authority, however, is subject to certain restrictions. For
instance, a request for reconsideration must be received within one year of the date of OWCP’s
9

Appellant has admitted to working in the private sector from January through May 1994.

10

T.L., supra note 8; see also Jaja K. Asaramo, 55 ECAB 200 (2004).

11

S.G., Docket No. 18-1076 (issued April 11, 2019); R.T., Docket No. 15-0907 (issued August 18, 2015).

12

C.V., Docket No. 18-1106 (issued March 20, 2019); K.A., Docket No. 17-1718 (issued February 12, 2018);
Fereidoon Kharabi, 52 ECAB 291, 293 (2001).
13

T.L., supra note 8; Fereidoon Kharabi, id.

14
5 U.S.C. § 8128(a); L.W., Docket No. 18-1475 (issued February 7, 2019); Y.S., Docket No. 08-0440 (issued
March 16, 2009).

6

decision for which review is sought.15 Timeliness is determined by the document receipt date of
the request for reconsideration as indicated by the received date in the integrated Federal
Employees’ Compensation System (iFECS).16 Imposition of this one-year filing limitation does
not constitute an abuse of discretion.17
OWCP may not deny a reconsideration request solely because it was untimely filed. When
a claimant’s request for reconsideration is untimely filed, it must nevertheless undertake a limited
review to determine whether it demonstrates clear evidence of error.18 If an application
demonstrates clear evidence of error, OWCP will reopen the case for merit review.19
To demonstrate clear evidence of error, a claimant must submit evidence relevant to the
issue which was decided by OWCP. The evidence must be positive, precise, and explicit and must
manifest on its face that OWCP committed an error. Evidence that does not raise a substantial
question concerning the correctness of OWCP’s decision is insufficient to demonstrate clear
evidence of error. It is not enough to merely show that the evidence could be construed so as to
produce a contrary conclusion. This entails a limited review by OWCP of how the evidence
submitted with the reconsideration request bears on the evidence previously of record and whether
the new evidence demonstrates clear error on the part of OWCP. To demonstrate clear evidence
of error, the evidence submitted must be of sufficient probative value to shift the weight of the
evidence in favor of the claimant and raise a substantial question as to the correctness of OWCP’s
decision.20
OWCP procedures note that the term clear evidence of error is intended to represent a
difficult standard. The claimant must present evidence which on its face shows that OWCP made
an error (for example, proof that a schedule award was miscalculated). Evidence such as a detailed,
well-rationalized medical report which, if submitted before the denial was issued, would have
created a conflict in medical opinion requiring further development, is not clear evidence of error.21
The Board makes an independent determination of whether a claimant has demonstrated clear
evidence of error on the part of OWCP.22

15

20 C.F.R. § 10.607(a).

16

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Reconsiderations, Chapter 2.1602.4(b) (February 2016).

17

G.G., Docket No. 18-1072 (issued January 7, 2019); E.R., Docket No. 09-0599 (issued June 3, 2009); Leon D.
Faidley, Jr., 41 ECAB 104 (1989).
18

20 C.F.R. § 10.607(b); M.H., Docket No. 18-0623 (issued October 4 2018); Charles J. Prudencio, 41 ECAB 499,
501-02 (1990).
19
L.C., Docket No. 18-1407 (issued February 14, 2019); M.L., Docket No. 09-0956 (issued April 15, 2010). See
also 20 C.F.R. § 10.607(b); supra note 16 at Chapter 2.1602.5 (February 2016).
20

J.W., Docket No. 18-0703 (issued November 14, 2018); Robert G. Burns, 57 ECAB 657 (2006).

21

J.S., Docket No. 16-1240 (issued December 1, 2016); supra note 16 at Chapter 2.1602.5(a) (February 2016).

22

S.C., Docket No. 18-0126 (issued May 14, 2019); D.S., Docket No. 17-0407 (issued May 24, 2017).

7

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
The Board finds that OWCP properly denied appellant’s request for reconsideration finding
it was untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error.
OWCP’s regulations and procedures23 establish a one-year time limitation for requesting
reconsideration, which begins on the date of the last OWCP merit decision. A right to
reconsideration within one year also accompanies any subsequent merit decision on the issues.24
The most recent merit decision on the forfeiture issue was OWCP’s July 25, 2016 decision
which found that appellant’s FECA benefits had been terminated due to his fraud conviction. As
his request for reconsideration was not received by OWCP until July 2, 2018, more than one year
after the July 25, 2016 decision, the Board finds that it was untimely filed. Because appellant’s
request was untimely, he must demonstrate clear evidence of error on the part of OWCP in
terminating his compensation benefits.
The Board finds that the arguments raised by appellant in support of his request for
reconsideration do not raise a substantial question as to the correctness of OWCP’s July 25, 2016
decision or shift the weight of the evidence in his favor. OWCP terminated his compensation
effective December 4, 2015 as he pleaded guilty to defrauding FECA. In support of his request
for reconsideration, appellant argued that his physical and mental disability should have been
considered as a mitigating factor in his case. He denied that he owned or operated the farm as it
was solely owned by his wife. Appellant alleged that he was forced to plead guilty to fraud to
avoid jail. His contentions, however, do not show that OWCP erred in terminating his
compensation under section 8148 based on his guilty plea. There is no evidence that the
December 4, 2015 guilty plea was ever reversed, vacated, or set aside. Consequently, appellant’s
arguments are insufficient to establish clear evidence of error by OWCP.25
The Board therefore finds that appellant failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish intermittent
disability for the period October 6, 1987 through June 13, 1994, causally related to his accepted
October 6, 1987 employment injury. The Board also finds that OWCP properly determined that
appellant’s request for reconsideration was untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence
of error.

23

J.W., Docket No. 18-0703 (issued November 14, 2018); 20 C.F.R. § 10.607(a); see Alberta Dukes, 56 ECAB
247 (2005).
24

Supra note 16 at Chapter 2.1602.4 (February 2016); see Veletta C. Coleman, 48 ECAB 367, 370 (1997).

25

C.I., Docket No. 15-0301 (issued April 2, 2015); G.H., Docket No. 58 ECAB 183 (2006).

8

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the October 24 and 17, 2018 decisions of the Office
of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed.
Issued: January 2, 2020
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

9