United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.C., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
Canandaigua, NY, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Jeffrey P. Zeelander, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 15-297
Issued: May 12, 2015

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On November 14, 2014 appellant filed a timely appeal from a June 9, 2014 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish an emotional
condition in the performance of duty.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On January 9, 2013 appellant, then a 45-year-old lead police officer, filed an occupational
disease claim alleging that he sustained high blood pressure due to the “anxiety and stress of the
job.” He stopped work on January 2, 2013.
1

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

In a January 24, 2013 development letter, OWCP requested that appellant submit
additional factual and medical evidence in support of his claim, including a detailed description
of the implicated work factors and medical evidence describing his medical condition with an
explanation of the cause of any such condition.
Appellant submitted a January 2, 2013 emergency room report in which an attending
physician assistant reported blood pressure of 156/100 when he first arrived, but that it was
136/88 after he had settled down for a while. The physician assistant diagnosed mild anemia and
headache. In other notes from that visit, a registered nurse noted that appellant had a history of
hypertension.
In a May 29, 2013 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition claim
because he failed to establish any compensable work factors. It noted that he only provided a
vague and general statement that job-related stress caused his claimed medical condition.
By letter dated October 30, 2013, appellant requested reconsideration of his claim and
described the incidents and conditions at work which he believed caused a stress-related
condition. He alleged that in late 2010, while suffering from bladder cancer caused by his
military service, the employing establishment mishandled his request for a transfer to another
position. Appellant received his requested transfer to Canadaigua, NY, in August 2011 but was
immediately transferred again to Rochester, NY, based on a false assertion by management that
he did not have enough seniority to remain in the Canadaigua position. He alleged that this
action was part of retaliatory and discriminatory actions that lasted for five months and that he
was brought before an interview panel whose members attempted to discredit his character. In a
written report, management officials allegedly called him unprofessional and accused him of
being a liar. Appellant indicated that, in early December 2011, during his yearly psychological
evaluation he lost confidence in the ability and character of Jay Supnick, the civilian contractor
carrying out the evaluation, when he denied knowing about a coworker who had failed his
entrance examination. During an early March 2012 evaluation, Mr. Supnick misinterpreted a
comment that appellant had made about a former supervisor’s propensity for violence and
reacted as though appellant had made an “emotionally unstable remark.” Appellant indicated
that Mr. Supnick became visibly irate and requested that he leave the room so that he could
speak to the police chief. He stated that he was wrongly removed from service the day after this
evaluation, but that Mr. Supnick denied that he was responsible for removing him from service.
Appellant was placed on administrative leave until March 14, 2012 when he was recommended
for discontinued service.
In his October 30, 2013 letter, appellant further alleged that between March and
October 2012 he witnessed numerous criminal actions by employees and patients, but that
management did not take steps to prevent such actions. He filed complaints with the Office of
the Inspector General for the employing establishment concerning fraud, waste, and abuse, but
the response of the factfinders was that the employing establishment was “not responsible for the
actions of others.” Appellant’s promotion to the lieutenant rank in October 2012 had been
improperly delayed by a human resources official who made remarks that made him feel
uncomfortable. He alleged that after his promotion he was exposed to additional acts of
retaliation by management and placed in hostile environments. In early January 2013, appellant
experienced an emotional incident when he was abandoned at work after other officers called in
sick and a police officer assigned to the union office was hostile toward him. Beginning
2

January 23, 2013, he was wrongly placed on administrative leave for eight months, a situation
which exacerbated his prostate and bone cancers. Appellant alleged that he was placed in a
hostile work environment when he returned to work in August 2013, and that human resource
officials stole his military health records from the mail. Also, a union member stated that
appellant belonged in a secured unit for the mentally unstable. Appellant alleged that a number
of employees who had harassed him had been removed from their jobs or were being
investigated.2
Appellant submitted an October 15, 2012 letter to the chief of his workplace in which he
asserted that management officials made misleading statements about his military-connected
health issues, mental health, and fitness for duty. He was subjected to harassment and
discrimination by these officials and the human resources office failed to notify him about
opportunities for advancement. In a November 25, 2012 e-mail, appellant discussed a tort claim
he filed with the Office of General Counsel of the employing establishment alleging that he
received improper medical care for his bladder cancer from a physician who worked for the
employing establishment.
In January 24 and May 6, 2013 e-mails to Eric Shinseki, then Secretary of the employing
establishment, appellant asserted that a human resources manager at the employing establishment
subjected him to sexual advances and that management illegally removed him from active
service. Appellant generally alleged that he was subjected to harassment after he began working
at the employing establishment.
In a May 24, 2013 statement, Steve Barone, a coworker, described a meeting on that date
with Brian Wert, a union official, and several others. He asserted that Mr. Wert called appellant
“crazy” and “nuts” and stated that he “could easily be a patient [in 3 Building].” Mr. Wert also
stated that appellant was “certifiable” and that coworkers felt unsafe around him. In a June 19,
2013 e-mail to Craig Howard, the Medical Center Director for the employing establishment in
Canandaigua, appellant alleged that an unspecified person used vulgar language to tell him to
shut up when he was contacted regarding his return to duty. He indicated that Mr. Wert and
others subjected him to harassment, retaliation, discrimination, sexual harassment, privacy
violations, civil rights violations, and unfounded accusations.3
Appellant submitted several medical reports of Dr. Aurelian Niculescu, an attending
Board-certified psychiatrist, including an October 8, 2013 report in which he diagnosed major
depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and anxiety disorder with mixed features of
panic disorder and agoraphobia. Dr. Niculescu posited that these conditions were aggravated by
appellant’s being placed on administrative leave at work.
In a June 9, 2014 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition claim because
he failed to establish any compensable work factors. It found that he had not submitted
sufficient corroborative documentation, such as witness statements or grievance findings that
2

In a separate undated statement, appellant generally alleged that he had suffered numerous acts of
discrimination, harassment, hostility, false accusations and “administrative/managerial harassing actions.”
3

On June 20, 2013 Mr. Howard responded that no removal action was being contemplated regarding his
employment.

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documented his claims of harassment, discrimination, and other acts of wrongdoing by the
employing establishment.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is
somehow related to an employee’s employment. There are situations where an injury or an
illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the
concept or coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s
emotional reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed
by the employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.4 On the other hand, the
disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reductionin-force or his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or
to hold a particular position.5
Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s
employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially
assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA.6 However, the Board
has held that, where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing
establishment in what would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded.7
In determining whether the employing establishment has erred or acted abusively, the Board will
examine the factual evidence of record to determine whether the employing establishment acted
reasonably.8
To the extent that disputes and incidents alleged as constituting harassment and
discrimination by supervisors and coworkers are established as occurring and arising from
appellant’s performance of his or her regular duties, these could constitute employment factors.9
However, for harassment or discrimination to give rise to a compensable disability under FECA,
there must be evidence that harassment or discrimination did in fact occur. Mere perceptions of
harassment or discrimination are not compensable under FECA.10
Appellant has the burden of establishing by the weight of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence that the condition for which he claims compensation was caused or
adversely affected by employment factors.11 This burden includes the submission of a detailed
4

Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

5

Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).

6

Matilda R. Wyatt, 52 ECAB 421 (2001); Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42
ECAB 556 (1991).
7

William H. Fortner, 49 ECAB 324 (1998).

8

Ruth S. Johnson, 46 ECAB 237 (1994).

9

David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603, 608 (1991).

10

Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991).

11

Pamela R. Rice, 38 ECAB 838, 841 (1987).

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description of the employment factors or conditions which he believes caused or adversely
affected a condition for which compensation is claimed and a rationalized medical opinion
relating the claimed condition to compensable employment factors.12
In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working
conditions are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its
adjudicatory function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are
deemed compensable factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when
providing an opinion on causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed
factors of employment and may not be considered.13 If a claimant does implicate a factor of
employment, OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that
factor. When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of
record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of
the medical evidence.14 Causal relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence
generally required to establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence.
Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s detailed
explanation regarding the causal relationship between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and the
compensable employment factors.15
ANALYSIS
Appellant alleged that the employing establishment sustained an emotional condition as a
result of a number of employment incidents and conditions. OWCP denied his emotional
condition claim because he had failed to establish any compensable employment factors. The
Board must, thus, initially review whether these alleged incidents and conditions of employment
are covered employment factors under the terms of FECA. The Board notes that appellant’s
allegations do not pertain to his regular or specially assigned duties under Cutler.16 Rather,
appellant has alleged error and abuse in administrative matters and harassment and
discrimination on the part of his supervisors.
Appellant alleged that his employer committed wrongdoing by mishandling his transfer
to another work location, violating his privacy by improperly handling and discussing his
medical records, and wrongly placing him on administration leave. He also alleged improper
actions with respect to carrying out improper investigatory actions which impugned his
character, ignoring his claims of fraud and waste, mishandling his annual psychological
evaluation, and allowing him to work on one occasion without adequate coworker support. Such
administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s employment,
12

Effie O. Morris, 44 ECAB 470, 473-74 (1993).

13

See Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992).

14

Id.

15

Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730, 741-42 (1990).

16

See supra note 4. On appeal counsel asserted that appellant implicated work duties as causing his claimed
stress-related condition. However, the Board has reviewed appellant’s statements of records and notes that he has
not implicated any work duties in this regard.

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are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially assigned work
duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA. However, the Board has held that,
where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment in what
would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded.17
Appellant has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the employing
establishment committed error or abuse with regard to these matters. He did not submit the
findings of any grievances or complaints showing that the employing establishment had been
found to have committed wrongdoing with respect to administrative or personnel actions.18
Appellant submitted various e-mails and letters in which he provided additional details about his
claims of employing establishment wrongdoing in administrative and personnel matters, but he
did not submit corroborative evidence to support the assertions contained in these documents.
For these reasons, he has not established a compensable work factor with respect to
administrative or personnel matters.
Appellant claimed that he was subjected to harassment and discrimination at work. He
generally alleged that managers and others subjected him to retaliatory actions, privacy, and civil
rights violations, sexual harassment, and hostile work environments. Appellant further claimed
that Mr. Wert, a union official, stated during a meeting with management officials and others that
he was “crazy” and “nuts” and “could easily be a patient [in 3 Building].” He claimed that, in a
written report, managers officials wrongly called him unprofessional and a liar and that his
character was unfairly impugned during an investigatory meeting.
The Board finds that appellant did not submit sufficient evidence to establish that he was
harassed or discriminated against by his supervisors or others.19 Appellant alleged that
supervisors made statements and engaged in actions which he believed constituted harassment
and discrimination, but he provided no corroborating evidence, such as witness statements, to
establish that the statements actually were made or that the actions actually occurred.20 The
record contains a statement in which a witness attributed various comments about appellant’s
emotional state to Mr. Wert. However, there is no indication, and appellant does not claim, that
he was present when these ostensible comments were made. Thus, he has not established a
compensable employment factor under FECA with respect to the claimed harassment and
discrimination.
For the foregoing reasons, appellant has not established any compensable employment
factors under FECA and, therefore, has not met his burden of proof in establishing that he
sustained an emotional condition in the performance of duty. He may submit new evidence or
argument with a written request for reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit
decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
17

See supra notes 6 through 8.

18

Appellant alleged that he received improper treatment from employing establishment physicians, but he did not
provide evidence to support this assertion or adequately explain how such a matter was related to his employment.
19

See Joel Parker, Sr., 43 ECAB 220 (1991) (finding that a claimant must substantiate allegations of harassment
or discrimination with probative and reliable evidence).
20

See supra notes 9 and 10.

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CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet his burden of proof to establish that he
sustained an emotional condition in the performance of duty.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 9, 2014 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: May 12, 2015
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
R.R., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
Ronkonkoma, NY, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 13-548
Issued: June 13, 2013

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 2, 2013 appellant filed a timely appeal from a July 5, 2012 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of this case.2
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly suspended appellant’s compensation benefits
effective July 1, 2012 for failure to submit a completed Form CA-1032 when requested.

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2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

Since using January 8, 2012, the date the appeal was received by the Clerk of the Board, would result in the loss
of appeal rights, the date of the postmark is considered the date of filing. The date of the U.S. Postal Service
postmark is January 2, 2013, which renders the appeal timely filed. See 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(f)(1).

FACTUAL HISTORY
On November 29, 1993 appellant, then a 41-year-old pilot, filed an occupational disease
claim alleging that he sustained a herniated lumbar disc causally related to factors of his federal
employment. OWCP accepted the claim for a herniated nucleus pulposus at L4-5.
By decision dated May 28, 1996, OWCP reduced appellant’s compensation based on its
finding that he had the capacity to earn wages as a paralegal effective June 23, 1996.
By letter dated May 10, 2012, OWCP requested that appellant complete, sign and return
an enclosed Form EN1032 detailing his earnings and employment for the previous 15 months. It
advised him that his benefits would be suspended pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 10.528 if OWCP did
not receive the completed document within 30 days. The letter was mailed to appellant’s address
of record.
In a decision dated July 5, 2012, OWCP suspended appellant’s wage-loss compensation
effective July 1, 2012 as he did not submit a completed Form EN1032 as requested. It informed
him that, when he completed the EN1032 form, it would restore his compensation retroactive to
the date of suspension.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
FECA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to require a partially disabled employee to report
his or her earnings from employment or self-employment, by affidavit or otherwise, in the
manner and at the times the Secretary specifies.3
Under section 10.528 of OWCP’s implementing federal regulations, an employee in
receipt of compensation benefits must complete an affidavit as to any work or activity indicating
an ability to work which the employee has performed for the prior 15 months.4 If an employee
who is required to file such a report fails to do so within 30 days of the date of the request, his or
her right to compensation for wage loss is suspended until OWCP receives the requested report.5
At that time, OWCP will reinstate compensation retroactive to the date of suspension if the
employee remains entitled to compensation.6
ANALYSIS
On May 10, 2012 OWCP provided appellant with a Form EN1032 requesting
information about his earnings and employment activities for the prior 15 months. It explained
that federal regulations required him to complete, sign and return the form. OWCP notified

3

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

4

20 C.F.R. § 10.528.

5

See Lucille A. Pettaway, 55 ECAB 228 (2004); Demetrius Beverly, 53 ECAB 305 (2002).

6

See supra note 3.

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appellant that if he did not completely answer all questions and return the signed statement
within 30 days, it would suspend his benefits.
Notwithstanding such notice, appellant did not return the form within 30 days as
requested. As he did not complete and sign the Form EN1032 affidavit reporting all employment
and self-employment, as required by federal regulations, OWCP properly suspended his right to
compensation for wage loss under section 10.528.7
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128 and
20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly suspended appellant’s compensation benefits based
on his failure to timely submit a completed EN1032 form when requested.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 5, 2012 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: June 13, 2013
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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See James A. Igo, 49 ECAB 189 (1997).

3


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.V., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, SACRAMENTO
PERFORMANCE CLUSTER,
West Sacramento, CA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 21-1259
Issued: March 15, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 16, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from April 9 and July 21, 2021 merit
decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a right foot condition
causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On February 4, 2021 appellant, then a 55-year-old letter carrier, filed an occupational
disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she began experiencing occasional burning and pain on
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

the side and bottom of her right heel due to factors of her federal employment, including excessive
walking. She explained that approximately two months prior to filing her claim she began
experiencing burning pain in her heel at the end of her workday, which worsened with increased
walking pace. Appellant alleged that she first became aware of her claimed condition and realized
its relation to her federal employment on January 18, 2021. She stopped work on
February 1, 2021.
In a statement dated January 27, 2021, appellant reiterated the details of the pain symptoms
she experienced due to her employment activities, which culminated in November 2020. She
related that, thereafter, she experienced worsened pain in the last two weeks. Appellant asserted
that she did not injure her foot and that the ongoing pain caused her to seek medical treatment.
On January 29, 2021 Dr. Wanda Blaylark, a Board-certified occupational medicine
specialist, diagnosed right plantar fasciitis and indicated that appellant should only perform
stationary work duties through February 5, 2021.
In a February 4, 2021 development letter, OWCP informed appellant of the deficiencies of
her claim. It advised her of the type of factual and medical evidence necessary to establish her
claim and provided a questionnaire for her completion. OWCP also requested a narrative medical
report from appellant’s treating physician containing a detailed description of findings and a
diagnosis, explaining how her work activities caused, contributed to, or aggravated her medical
condition. In a separate development letter of even date, it requested that the employing
establishment provide comments from a knowledgeable supervisor regarding the accuracy of her
allegations. OWCP afforded both parties 30 days to respond.
A January 29, 2021 note from Dr. Blaylark recounted appellant’s complaints of pain that
she alleged began two months prior and had worsened in the last two weeks. Dr. Blaylark noted
that appellant’s official work duties required her to constantly walk during her delivery route and
that she indicated brisk walking worsened the pain. She also related that appellant denied any
previous right foot condition and that her condition was a work-related injury. In a medical report
of even date, Dr. Blaylark noted appellant’s diagnosed condition and modified work schedule.
On February 5, 2021 appellant followed up with Dr. Blaylark and advised that she had not
experienced improvement in her symptoms following her medical treatment, but that she can
return to work with modified duties. In a work duty status report of even date, Dr. Blaylark
indicated that appellant was in a temporary alternate work status from February 5 to 22, 2021 and
provided modified duties requiring no more than 20 minutes per hour of standing or walking during
that period.
On February 18, 2021 appellant responded to OWCP’s development questionnaire
explaining that her official duties require her to continuously walk an average of five to six hours
while carrying up to 30 pounds of mail on her delivery route. She further asserted that she did not
experience any foot pain previously and that she began experiencing increased pain by the end of
her delivery route. Appellant also indicated that she did not engage in any sports or physical
activities outside of her federal employment.

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In a February 22, 2021 note, Dr. Blaylark reported that appellant’s condition had slightly
improved with the prescribed medical treatment; however, she continued to experience significant
discomfort when she walked. In a work duty status report of even date, she indicated that appellant
should continue her current work restrictions until March 15, 2021.
A March 15, 2021 note from Dr. Blaylark noted that appellant had seen improvement from
her medical treatment; however, she indicated that appellant was unable to perform the duties of
her date-of-injury position. In a work duty status report of even date, Dr. Blaylark modified her
work restrictions to a maximum of 30 minutes of prolonged standing or walking until
April 26, 2021.
By decision dated April 9, 2021, OWCP denied appellant’s occupational disease claim,
finding that the medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish a right heel condition
causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment. Consequently, it found that
she had not met the requirements to establish an injury or medical condition causally related to the
accepted employment factors.
OWCP received a March 25, 2021 note from Dr. Timothy Bernard, a podiatrist, who
opined that appellant’s right plantar fasciitis was aggravated by her prolonged walking and
standing. Dr. Bernard further noted that she did not experience any prior injury or condition of
her right foot before the onset of her current pain.
On April 24, 2021 appellant requested reconsideration of OWCP’s April 9, 2021 decision
and attached additional medical evidence. In a letter of even date, Dr. Blaylark reiterated that her
official duties require her to walk up to 30,000 steps per day on her route and that she did not
experience any prior injuries with her right foot. She opined that appellant’s right heel condition
was causally related to her work activities of prolonged walking and standing.
By decision dated July 21, 2021, OWCP denied modification of its April 9, 2021 decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA 2 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including that the individual is an employee of the United
States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time
limitation of FECA, 3 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and that
any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the

2

Supra note 1.

3

F.H., Docket No.18-0869 (issued January 29, 2020); J.P., Docket No. 19-0129 (issued April 26, 2019); Joe D.
Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).

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employment injury. 4 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim,
regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.5
To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational
disease claim, a claimant must submit: (1) a factual statement identifying employment factors
alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence or occurrence of the disease or condition;
(2) medical evidence establishing the presence or existence of the disease or condition for which
compensation is claimed; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the diagnosed condition is
casually related to the identified employment factors by the claimant.6
The medical evidence required to establish causal relationship between a claimed specific
condition and an employment incident is rationalized medical opinion evidence. 7 The opinion of
the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the employee, must
be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the
nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and specific employment factors. 8
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a right foot
condition causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.
In support of her claim, appellant submitted a letter from Dr. Blaylark dated April 24, 2021
wherein she opined that prolonged standing and walking of up to 30,000 steps a day as part of
appellant’s official duties as a mail carrier aggravated her right plantar fasciitis. The Board finds
that, while she provides an opinion on causal relationship, her reports are insufficient to meet
appellant’s burden of proof, as she did not provide adequate medical reasoning to explain how
prolonged standing and walking caused or contributed to appellant’s diagnosed medical condition.
The Board has held that medical evidence that does not offer a rationalized medical explanation
regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of causal
relationship.9 Thus, Dr. Blaylark’s April 24, 2021 report is insufficient to meet appellant’s burden
of proof.

4

L.C., Docket No. 19-1301 (issued January 29, 2020); J.H., Docket No. 18-1637 (issued January 29, 2020);
James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB 312 (1988).
5

P.A., Docket No. 18-0559 (issued January 29, 2020); K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016);
Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).
6

T.W., Docket No. 20-0767 (issued January 13, 2021); L.D., Docket No. 19-1301 (issued January 29, 2020); S.C.,
Docket No. 18-1242 (issued March 13, 2019).
7

S.S., Docket No. 19-0688 (issued January 24, 2020); A.M., Docket No. 18-1748 (issued April 24, 2019); Robert G.
Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996).
8

T.L., Docket No. 18-0778 (issued January 22, 2020); Y.S., Docket No. 18-0366 (issued January 22, 2020);
Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).
9

M.E., Docket No. 18-0940 (issued June 11, 2019).

4

Likewise, in a March 25, 2021 medical report from Dr. Bernard, he opined that appellant’s
right plantar fasciitis was aggravated by prolonged walking and standing at work. He noted that,
prior to November 2020, she had no pain or symptoms in her right foot. As noted above, the Board
has held that a medical opinion without adequate rationale is insufficient to establish appellant’s
burden of proof. Moreover, an opinion that a condition is causally related to an employment
incident because the employee was asymptomatic before the injury is insufficient, without
adequate rationale, to establish causal relationship. 10 Therefore, Dr. Bernard’s report is
insufficient to establish appellant’s burden of proof.
The remaining evidence of record includes notes dated January 29 to March 15, 2021 from
Dr. Blaylark where she recounted appellant’s history of injury and medical treatment. Dr. Blaklark
diagnosed right plantar fasciitis and provided work restriction. However, she did not offer an
opinion on causal relationship. The Board has held that medical evidence that does not offer an
opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of no probative value on the issue of
causal relationship. 11 As such, Dr. Blaylark’s remaining reports are of no probative value and are
insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
As there is no rationalized medical evidence explaining how appellant’s employment duties
caused or aggravated her diagnosed condition, the Board finds that she has not met her burden of
proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a right foot
condition causally related to the factors of her federal employment.

10

See S.D., Docket No. 20-1255 (issued February 3, 2021); F.H., Docket No. 18-1238 (issued January 18, 2019);
J.R., Docket No. 18-0206 (issued October 15, 2018).
11

L.B., Docket No. 18-0533 (issued August 27, 2018); D.K., Docket No. 17-1549 (issued July 6, 2018).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 9 and July 21, 2021 decisions of the Office
of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed.
Issued: March 15, 2022
Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
N.S., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, Denver, CO, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 21-1357
Issued: March 15, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 14, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from a May 19, 2021 nonmerit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). As more than 180 days has
elapsed from OWCP’s last merit decision, dated March 5, 2021 to the filing of this appeal, pursuant
to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board lacks jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly denied appellant’s request for reconsideration of the
merits of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 18, 2019 appellant, then a 57-year-old scheduling officer, filed a traumatic
injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on October 17, 2019 she experienced an asthma attack
when exposed to dust while in the performance of duty. She stopped work on the date of injury.
In support of her claim, appellant submitted an October 17, 2019 hospital emergency
department report by Dr. Richard D. Zane, Board-certified in emergency medicine. Dr. Zane
related that appellant had a history of asthma, and had not experienced a severe exacerbation since
2014 until that day while in her office in the baggage claim area at work. He attributed the current
episode to odor and mold caused by water leaking through the ceiling tiles in her office. On
examination, Dr. Zane observed diminished expiratory sounds with end expiratory wheezing,
coughing, tachycardia, dyspnea, respiratory distress, and tremulousness. As nebulizer treatments
in the emergency department did not improve appellant’s symptoms, she was admitted to the
intensive care unit. Dr. Zane diagnosed an asthma exacerbation attack.
In an October 17, 2019 intensive care unit report, Dr. Richard William Vandivier, Boardcertified in internal medicine and pulmonology, noted that appellant presented with acute shortness
of breath while at work. He noted “[s]he states that there has been some construction and leaking
of moldy odor fluid in her office which likely precipitated her shortness of breath.”
In an October 18, 2019 hospital discharge report, Dr. Vandivier diagnosed an asthma
exacerbation and prescribed medication. He noted that it was important for appellant to avoid any
environmental triggers, particularly at her workplace, “to prevent this from occurring again.”
In a development letter dated June 12, 2020, OWCP informed appellant of the deficiencies
of her claim. It advised her of the type of factual and medical evidence necessary to establish her
claim and provided a questionnaire for her completion. In a separate development letter of even
date, OWCP requested that the employing establishment provide comments from a knowledgeable
supervisor on the accuracy of appellant’s statements and the type of tasks performed which
resulted in the exposure and the duration. It afforded both parties 30 days to provide the necessary
evidence.
In response, the employing establishment provided a June 22, 2020 statement confirming
that in the area where appellant was seated on October 17, 2019, there were missing ceiling tiles
and large trashcans placed to collect dripping water. There was also a “smell that was not right.
[Appellant] began coughing and using her emergency inhaler.” She left the area at her supervisor’s
instruction, but her breathing became more erratic. Paramedics were called to the scene and
recommended appellant be taken to an emergency department. Appellant’s husband then
transported her to the hospital.
In a June 24, 2020 statement, appellant’s supervisor, asserted that on the date appellant
experienced an asthma attack, “[w]hen entering the office there was a strong mildew smell with
several wet ceiling tiles and trash cans filled with water.” Appellant began coughing 30 minutes
after her arrival. She exited the office to get fresh air, then began struggling to breathe. Paramedics
were summonsed and administered medication, which did not relieve appellant’s symptoms.
Appellant’s husband then transported her to the hospital.

2

By decision dated July 23, 2020, OWCP accepted that the October 17, 2019 incident
occurred as alleged but denied appellant’s claim as the medical evidence of record did not contain
a diagnosis causally related to the accepted incident. It concluded, therefore, that the requirements
had not been met to establish an injury as defined by FECA.
On August 11, 2020 appellant requested reconsideration.
medical evidence.

She submitted additional

In an August 4, 2020 report, Dr. Mark Nathanson, an osteopath specializing in family
medicine, noted treating appellant for severe, persistent asthma for more than five years.
Appellant also submitted employing establishment e-mails dated from October 18
through 20, 2019 noting that a water pipe had broken above her work area, causing extensive
leakage and significant odor. In an October 18, 2019 e-mail, a safety specialist, cautioned that
there were “layers of particles that can easily set off [appellant’s] asthma again.”
By decision dated September 16, 2020, OWCP denied reconsideration of the merits of
appellant’s claim.
On December 2, 2020 appellant requested reconsideration. She submitted an October 1,
2020 report by Dr. Nathanson, who noted that appellant had been doing fairly well with her asthma
until an exacerbation at work caused by black mold on waterlogged tiles which caused appellant
to be hospitalized due to the injury. Dr. Nathanson diagnosed a resolved severe exacerbation of
moderate persistent allergic asthma, vocal cord dysfunction, and stable asthma. He prescribed
medication.
By decision dated March 5, 2021, OWCP modified its July 23, 2020 decision to find that
appellant had established a diagnosis that could reasonably be connected to the claimed condition.
The claim remained denied as the medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish causal
relationship.
On May 12, 2021 appellant requested reconsideration. She submitted a May 7, 2021
statement reiterating her account of the events of October 17, 2019. Appellant also submitted an
April 26, 2021 note from Dr. Nathanson noting that her “[a]cute attack which led to
hospitalization” was “caused by dust and other particulate components which stemmed from wet
ceiling tiles at her place of work.” He opined, “this is what brought on her attack.”
By decision dated May 19, 2021, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration. It
found, “[s]pecifically, causal relationship is a medical issue and you did not submit any medical
evidence in support of your request for reconsideration. We have not received a well-rationalized
medical report.…”

3

LEGAL PRECEDENT
Section 8128(a) of FECA vests OWCP with discretionary authority to determine whether
to review an award for or against compensation. The Secretary of Labor may review an award for
or against compensation at any time on his own motion or on application. 2
To require OWCP to reopen a case for merit review pursuant to FECA, the claimant must
provide evidence or an argument which: (1) shows that OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted
a specific point of law; (2) advances a relevant legal argument not previously considered by
OWCP; or (3) constitutes relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously considered by
OWCP.3
A request for reconsideration must be received by OWCP within one year of the date of
OWCP’s decision for which review is sought. 4 If it chooses to grant reconsideration, it reopens
and reviews the case on its merits. 5 If the request is timely, but fails to meet at least one of the
requirements for reconsideration, OWCP will deny the request for reconsideration without
reopening the case for review on the merits. 6
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.
In denying appellant’s request for reconsideration, OWCP did not reference
Dr. Nathanson’s April 26, 2021 report addressing the causal relationship between the claimed
asthma attack to appellant’s exposure to wet ceiling tiles and particulates at the employing
establishment.
In the case of William A. Couch,7 the Board held that, when adjudicating a claim, OWCP
is obligated to consider all evidence properly submitted by a claimant and received by OWCP
before the final decision is issued. While OWCP is not required to list every piece of evidence
submitted to the record, there is no indication that Dr. Nathanson’s April 26, 2021 report was
reviewed and considered by OWCP in its May 19, 2021 decision. 8 In its May 19, 2021 decision,
OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration, finding that she failed to submit any medical
evidence in support of her request for reconsideration. As it did not review or consider
2

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

3

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3).

4

Id. at § 10.607(a).

5

Id. at § 10.608(a).

6

Id. at § 10.608(b).

7

41 ECAB 548, 553 (1990).

8

See T.G., Docket No. 19-1930 (issued January 8, 2021).

4

Dr. Nathanson’s April 26, 2021 report, it failed to follow its own procedures by properly
discussing the relevant evidence of record. 9
As the Board’s decisions are final as to the subject matter appealed, it is crucial that OWCP
address all relevant evidence properly submitted to OWCP prior to the issuance of its decision. 10
For this reason, the case will be remanded to OWCP to properly consider all of the evidence
of record. Following this and other such further development as deems necessary, OWCP shall
issue a de novo decision.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

9
All evidence submitted should be reviewed and discussed in the decision. Evidence received following
development that lacks probative value should also be acknowledged. Whenever possible, the evidence should be
referenced by author and date. Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Initial Denials, Chapter
2.1401.5(b)(2) (November 2012).
10

20 C.F.R. § 501.6(d); supra note 8; W.G., Docket No. 20-1536 (issued December 17, 2021); see also A.V., Docket
No. 20-1251 (issued January 28, 2021).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 19, 2021 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is set aside, and the case is remanded to OWCP for further proceedings
consistent with this decision of the Board.
Issued: March 15, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.H., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, PROCESSING &
DISTRIBUTION CENTER, Orlando, FL,
Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
C.B., Weiser, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-130
Issued: December 4, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On October 11, 2011 appellant, through her attorney, filed a timely appeal from a
May 10, 2011 decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) denying her
occupational disease claim. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and
20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant sustained an emotional condition in the performance of
duty.
FACTUAL HISTORY
This case was previously before the Board. In a February 23, 2011 decision, the Board
set aside a February 9, 2010 OWCP decision denying appellant’s January 22, 2010 request for
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

reconsideration on the grounds that it was not timely filed and failed to present clear evidence of
error.2 The Board found that the request was timely filed and remanded the case to OWCP for a
review of the claim under the proper standard of review. The facts of the case as set forth in the
Board’s prior decision are incorporated by reference.
Appellant, a 53-year-old air transportation specialist, filed a claim for an emotional
condition on December 20, 2009. She attributed her condition to harassment, excessive work
assignments and schedule changes by Samuel Glover, the transportation manager. Appellant
alleged that he assigned her deadline work while she was on vacation and to tasks outside of her
work area. On April 13, 2007 she felt threatened when Mr. Glover allegedly used aggressive
movements and a raised voice. Mr. Glover noted that the employing establishment controverted
the claim and that appellant had stopped work on May 8, 2007.
Appellant submitted a May 3, 2007 letter of warning for failing to follow up on errors in
distribution tables on April 9, 2007 and failing to leave an April 13, 2007 meeting to which she
had been invited but was later instructed not to attend. In a June 6, 2007 memorandum, an
employing establishment official and a union official noted that the letter of warning would not
be removed or modified as she failed to attend an appeal meeting.
In a January 31, 2008 statement, Mr. Glover noted that on the morning of April 13, 2007
he stopped at the door to appellant’s office and informed her that she did not need to attend the
service meeting. Appellant responded abruptly that he put it in writing. Mr. Glover stated that
he reiterated that she did not attend the meeting and spoke to her in a stern tone of voice as she
had shrugged her head and shoulders. He submitted a statement from Juan Collazo, a shipment
clerk situated in a nearby office. Mr. Collazo noted that, during his conversation with appellant,
Mr. Glover had raised his voice about three times stating “what part do n[o]t you understand so I
can explain it to you.” Mr. Glover noted that on April 9, 2007 a teleconference was held
concerning a three-day conference with Atlanta during which it was determined that the
distribution tables were not correct.
This required a subsequent three-hour separate
teleconference to make corrections. Mr. Glover noted this could have been avoided had
appellant followed up with several individuals during the prior week by telephone. Appellant
had relied on certain e-mails but had not made verbal contact as suggested.
In a May 21, 2007 report, Dr. Gregory P. Samano, an attending osteopath, diagnosed
severe anxiety due to an abusive situation at work. Gerard E. Boutin, Ph. D., an attending
clinical psychologist, submitted reports dated November 7, 2007 to January 22, 2008 reports
diagnosing anxiety disorder, acute stress disorder and depressive disorder. He found appellant
totally disabled for work from May 8, 2007 through May 8, 2008 due to panic attacks related to
severe stress with the assignments provided and changed at work.
In a June 24, 2008 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s claim. As to April 13, 2007,
which resulted in a disciplinary letter, the evidence did not establish that she was threatened by
Mr. Glover. The witness statement did not confirm aggressive behavior on his part, as alleged.
The May 3, 2007 letter of warning was based on incorrect distribution tables noted during an
April 9, 2007 conference call. It was also based on appellant attending the April 13, 2007
2

Docket No. 10-1456 (issued February 23, 2011).

2

meeting and failing to follow instructions for which she was charged with unsatisfactory
performance. No error in this administrative action was found. As to her remaining allegations,
OWCP found that appellant submitted insufficient evidence to establish a compensable work
factor. Appellant did not corroborate her account of work being assigned to her while she was
on vacation, that her duties were changed on short notice or that she was assigned work outside
of her area.
Counsel requested an oral hearing, held on November 7, 2008. At the hearing, appellant
asserted that a manager approved her request to use annual leave from September 4 to 8, 2006,
but deliberately assigned work on September 5, 2006 so she would not be able to meet a
September 13, 2006 deadline. The manager also criticized her on September 11, 2006 for failing
to meet the deadline. Appellant alleged that, while on vacation in October 2006, Mr. Glover
deleted her work e-mails, thereby denying information needed to timely complete her work. On
December 11, 16 and 22, 2006 Mr. Glover changed her work schedule and days off, resulting in
back-to-back shifts from December 22 to 23, 2006. Appellant contended that she had
insufficient training regarding changes in distribution procedures and was accused of not
notifying him of the difficulties with the new plan. Dr. Boutin testified that she related accounts
of a hostile work environment competent to cause the diagnosed anxiety and depression.
Following the hearing, appellant submitted leave forms approving her request for annual
leave from September 4 to 8, 2006, an e-mail from Mr. Glover sent on September 5, 2006
instructing her to complete reports by September 13, 2008, timekeeping forms showing changes
to her shift schedule and days off on December 11 and 22, 2006 and April 2007 e-mails
regarding changes in distribution table procedures.3
In a December 3, 2008 statement, Mr. Glover responded that mail was assigned to
designated modes of transportation based on a one time or several times a week frequency.
Appellant was assigned to track the mail volume being assigned, a task that took about 10 to 15
minutes to complete. There were several computer applications used to perform this task to
which she had access and training. As to the mail volumes in December 2006, Mr. Glover noted
that it increased due to the Christmas season. He noted that appellant worked little overtime for
the two to three weeks prior to the holidays and let it be known that she expected two days off.
Mr. Glover stated that he tried to oblige her request. He sent an e-mail to his staff on
December 2, 2006 advising of the schedule changes effective December 11, 2006. Mr. Glover
stated that appellant was aware of the schedules ahead of time and of the need for her to work on
T-3 from 2:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. to assist mail processing in case there were issues assigning
express mail. He noted that he followed up by e-mail to assure that she received pay for working
her day off on December 16, 2006. Mr. Glover noted that appellant also received verbal
notification concerning the schedule changes by e-mail of December 15, 2006. He stated that
she took it upon herself to change her reporting time on December 23, 2006, one of the days with
the heaviest volumes of outgoing mail assigned to air transportation. Mr. Glover denied that he
required her to work back-to-back shifts as alleged.
3

The employing establishment submitted an August 5, 2008 report from Dr. Jeffrey A. Danziger, a Boardcertified psychiatrist, performing a fitness-for-duty examination for the employing establishment, opining that
appellant could not return to work in her date-of-injury position due to anxiety, depression and panic attacks.

3

Mr. Glover addressed the process for monitoring mail distribution tables in the computer
with windows that allowed various functions. Appellant’s responsibility was to assure that
correct modes of transportation were assigned to the mail handing unit being processed,
distinguishing between ground and air transportation. Once a particular designation was
assigned, it was locked and could not be changed unless management was notified. Similarly,
destination codes were locked in order to assure that the proper transportation mode was
available and assigned. Mr. Glover noted that appellant’s job required monitoring and correcting
discrepancies by notifying team support by telephone. When there was a change in operations,
surface routings and air transports were monitored to assure correct mail assignments.
Mr. Glover noted that he determined that appellant was not properly following up by telephone
but was sending e-mails with no reply. He intervened by following up on messages, making
telephone calls and holding a telephone conference with the nine districts of the Southeast area.
While eight of the districts did not have concerns, it was determined that the mail distribution
tables were not correct for one district and it took approximately three hours to correct.
Mr. Glover stated that appellant failed to make verbal contact with the support team in the
district.
As to certain e-mails when appellant was on leave in September 2006, Mr. Glover noted
that she had delegated mail transportation responsibility to James Pierson, the schemes and
schedules clerk. He requested that Mr. Pierson advise when he next had access to the e-mails, as
he wanted to locate a copy of an e-mail on which she was included but he had deleted. When
Mr. Glover subsequently reviewed the e-mails, he noted duplicate messaging that he deleted in
order that she not feel overwhelmed on her return to work. He noted that the deletion of
duplicative messages would not cause any type of delays in appellant’s work as an air
transportation specialist. Mr. Glover did not delete any message or file containing information
that she needed in the course of her work.
By decision dated and finalized January 26, 2009, an OWCP hearing representative
affirmed the June 24, 2008 decision, finding that a compensable employment factor was not
established. The hearing representative found that appellant was not given last minute
assignments with unreasonable deadlines, assigned work outside of her area or that she could not
timely complete work due to schedule changes. The hearing representative further found that
changes to her work schedule and the letter of warning were administrative actions not in the
performance of duty and that no error or abuse was shown. The hearing representative found
that appellant did not establish her allegations of supervisory harassment as factual.
In a January 22, 2010 letter, counsel requested reconsideration. He submitted the
June 30, 2009 and January 13, 2010 reports of Dr. Boutin, who discussed appellant’s account of
workplace events and noted psychological test results.
By decision dated February 9, 2010, OWCP denied reconsideration on the grounds that
appellant’s January 22, 2010 request for reconsideration was not timely filed and failed to
present clear evidence of error. Counsel then appealed to the Board, which remanded the case to
OWCP for merit review.
By decision dated May 10, 2011, OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition claim on
the grounds that she failed to establish any compensable factors of employment.

4

LEGAL PRECEDENT
Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is
somehow related to an employee’s employment. There are situations where an injury or an
illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the
concept or coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s
emotional reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed
by the employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.4 On the other hand, the
disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reductionin-force or his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or
to hold a particular position.5
In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working
conditions are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its
adjudicatory function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are
deemed compensable factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when
providing an opinion on causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed
factors of employment and may not be considered.6 If a claimant does implicate a factor of
employment, OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that
factor. When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of
record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of
the medical evidence.7
ANALYSIS
In the present case, appellant alleged that she sustained a stress condition as a result of a
number of employment incidents, which OWCP found to be noncompensable. The Board must
review whether the alleged incidents are compensable employment factors under the terms of
FECA.
Appellant alleged a general pattern of harassment by management. Incidents of
harassment, discrimination or retaliation by supervisors and coworkers, if established as
occurring and arising from the employee’s performance of his or her regular duties, could
constitute employment factors.8 To give rise to a compensable disability under FECA, there
must be probative and reliable evidence that harassment did in fact occur.9 Mere perceptions of

4

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

5

See Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 566 (1991); Lillian Cutler,
28 ECAB 125 (1976).
6

See Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384. (1992).

7

Id.

8

Janice I. Moore, 53 ECAB 777 (2002). See David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783 (1991).

9

Marlon Vera, 54 ECAB (2003).

5

harassment are not compensable under FECA.10 Appellant did not submit evidence, such as
witness statements, corroborating her allegations of harassment. The statement of Mr. Collazo
noted only that Mr. Glover had raised his voice during a discussion with appellant on
April 13, 2007. Mr. Glover stated that he spoke to her from her office doorway. The evidence
does not establish that he yelled at appellant or harassed her. The Board has held that the raising
of a voice during the course of a conversation does not warrant a finding of verbal abuse.11
Appellant has not established a compensable employment factor under FECA with respect to the
claimed harassment.
Appellant also attributed her condition to a May 3, 2007 letter of warning. The Board has
characterized supervisory disciplinary matters as administrative or personnel matters of the
employing establishment, which are covered only when a showing of error or abuse is made.12
In determining whether the employing establishment erred or acted abusively, the Board has
examined whether the employing establishment acted reasonably.13 To support such a claim, a
claimant must establish a factual basis by providing probative and reliable evidence.14 In this
case, appellant did not submit evidence corroborating her allegation that the letter was
improperly issued. As she did not establish that the disciplinary letter constituted error or abuse,
she has thus failed to establish a compensable factor of employment in this respect.
Appellant also attributed her condition to schedule changes in December 2006. She
submitted documentation of certain changes. The Board has held that work assignments and
schedules are administrative functions of the employing establishment, actions not considered
compensable employment factors in the absence of error or abuse.15 Mr. Glover addressed the
mail volumes for December 2006 and noted that he attempted to accommodate appellant’s
requests for days off. He noted that he followed up to make sure she was paid for work on
December 16, 2006. Appellant did not submit any evidence to establish that the employing
establishment erred in her work schedule in December 2006. Mr. Glover noted that she was
notified of the T-3 work schedule by e-mail in early December 2006 and she did not establish
that she was required to work back-to-back shifts. Appellant did not establish error or abuse in
her supervisor’s assignment of work or handling of her leave request.16 Therefore, she has not
established a compensable factor of employment.
Appellant also attributed her condition to being made to work outside of her work area.
However, she did not submit evidence corroborating such assignments. The Board has held that
10

Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001).

11

Carolyn S. Philpott, 51 ECAB 175 (1999).

12

Roger W. Robinson, 54 ECAB 846 (2003).

13

Ruth S. Johnson, 46 ECAB 237 (1994).

14

See Barbara J. Nicholson, 45 ECAB 843 (1994).

15

V.W., 58 ECAB 428 (2007).

16

In determining whether the employing establishment erred or acted abusively, the Board has examined whether
the employing establishment acted reasonably. Brian H. Derrick, 51 ECAB 417 (2000).

6

mere allegations, in the absence of factual corroboration, are insufficient to meet a claimant’s
burden of proof.17 Appellant has failed to establish this allegation as factual.
Appellant also alleged that her manager assigned time value work to her while he knew
she was on vacation in order to cause her to miss the deadline. She submitted leave records
showing that the manager approved her leave request for September 4 to 8, 2006 and a
September 5, 2006 e-mail from Mr. Glover assigning reports due on September 13, 2006 after
her return to work. The fact of the work assignment made on September 5, 2006 does not
establish error. The deadline for the work to be completed was September 13, 2006,
approximately a week after her return to duty. Appellant has not adequately explained how the
work assignment rises to error or abuse by her supervisor. She has not established that the
assigned deadline was abusive or erroneous.18
Appellant also attributed her emotional condition to her manager deleting certain e-mails
from her work computer while on vacation in October 2006. Mr. Glover submitted a statement
addressing the assignment of work at various districts by which mail was designated for
distribution by ground or air transportation. He noted that several aspects of the distribution
tables provided locks for such items as particular destinations or assignment of transportation
methods. These aspects were, in turn, reviewed by management. During her absence,
appellant’s work was assigned to a schemes and schedules clerk. Mr. Glover acknowledged that
he reviewed various e-mails but only deleted those that were duplicative and not essential to
appellant’s work as an air transportation specialist. He addressed his supervision of appellant’s
work and the occasional need that she follow up on certain assignments by telephone calls to
assigned teams, rather than send e-mails. The Board finds that Mr. Glover, as her supervisor,
monitored her work in making entries for ground or air transportation of mail and her
communications with the relevant teams in the various districts. Appellant has not established
that her supervisor erred or was abusive in this regard.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not establish that she sustained an emotional condition
due to a compensable factor of her federal employment.

17

Bonnie Goodman, 50 ECAB 139 (1998).

18

V.W., supra note 15.

7

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 10, 2011 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: December 4, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.D., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, FLORISSANT MAIN
POST OFFICE, Florissant, MO, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 21-1270
Issued: March 21, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 18, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from a July 15, 2021 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish disability from work
for the period May 3 through August 30, 2020, causally related to his accepted December 12, 2019
employment injury.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On December 16, 2019 appellant, then a 62-year-old letter carrier, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on December 12, 2019 he injured his right shoulder and lower
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

back when he picked up a parcel while in the performance of duty. He stopped work on
December 17, 2019 and returned on December 24, 2019.
By decision dated September 8, 2020, OWCP accepted the condition of right rotator cuff
capsule sprain, initial encounter.
In support of his disability claim, appellant submitted a June 6, 2020 report by
Dr. Jonathan L. Ben-Zev, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed right shoulder pain, unspecified
chronicity, and ordered diagnostic testing.
In a June 8, 2020 right shoulder magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan report,
Dr. Stephen B. Huebner, a Board-certified diagnostic radiologist, provided an impression of highgrade supraspinatus tendon tear, including at least two areas of full-thickness tear and mild muscle
atrophy, moderate infraspinatus tendinosis and possible small partial thickness tear and moderate
subscapularis tendinosis, moderate acromioclavicular (AC) osteoarthritis, and minimal
glenohumeral arthritis and small tear of the superior glenoid labrum.
An August 31, 2020 operative report by Dr. Scott G. Kaar, an attending Board-certified
orthopedic surgeon, provided preoperative and postoperative diagnoses of right shoulder rota tor
cuff tear involving the supraspinatus tendons, and AC joint arthritis. Dr. Kaar performed right
shoulder arthroscopic rotator cuff repair, subacromial decompression, and distal clavicle excision.
In progress notes dated September 15 and October 13, 2020, he provided an impression that
appellant was six weeks status post right shoulder arthroscopic rotator cuff repair, subacromial
decompression, and distal clavicle excision. Dr. Kaar noted appellant’s physical restrictions.
Appellant filed a claim for compensation (Form CA-7) for disability from work for the
period May 3, 2020 and continuing.
OWCP, in a November 30, 2020 development letter, informed appellant of the deficiencies
in his claim and requested that he submit medical evidence to support his reported surgery and
disability during the period claimed causally related to the accepted December 12, 2019
employment injury. It afforded him 30 days to respond.
In response, appellant submitted an undated statement in which he described his
December 12, 2019 employment injury and resultant medical treatment. He also submitted
medical evidence.
In progress notes dated June 11, 2020, Dr. Jeffrey C. Faron, a Board-certified internist,
noted appellant’s left shoulder pain. He indicated that there were no contraindications for
appellant’s planned right shoulder surgery.
An additional progress note dated August 11, 2020 and letters dated September 15,
October 16, and December 11, 2020 by Dr. Kaar noted an impression of full-thickness
supraspinatus tear with, mild retraction, mild supraspinatus atrophy and partial thickness tearing
involving the supraspinatus, subscapularis tendinosis, ﬂuid along the biceps, and moderate AC
joint arthrosis. Additionally, he noted that appellant was doing well status post appellant’s
August 31, 2020 arthroscopic right shoulder surgery. In the October 16, 2020 letter, Dr. Kaar

2

advised that appellant was unable to work beginning March 26, 2020 and continuing following his
August 31, 2020 surgery.
OWCP subsequently received additional medical evidence. In letters dated October 13 and
November 24, 2020 and January 5, 2021, Dr. Kaar reiterated that appellant was status post
arthroscopic right shoulder surgery and was “doing well.” In the January 5, 2021 letter, he advised
that appellant would remain off work until his next visit. Dr. Kaar, in a March 5, 2021 letter,
opined that appellant’s full-thickness rotator cuff tear and AC joint arthrosis and resultant
August 31, 2020 surgery were directly related to appellant’s December 2019 employment injury.
In a March 11, 2021 letter, Dr. Karr restated his opinion that appellant’s right rotator cuff
and bicep tear and resultant August 31, 2020 surgical repair was due to his December 12, 2019
employment injury. He advised that appellant could return to full-duty work without restrictions
as of March 9, 2021.
OWCP, by decision dated July 15, 2021, denied appellant’s claim for disability from work
for the period May 3 through August 30, 2020 because the medical evidence of record was
insufficient to establish disability.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including that any disability or specific condition for which
compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment injury.3 For each period of
disability claimed, the employee has the burden of proof to establish that he or she was disabled
from work as a result of the accepted employment injury.4 Whether a particular injury causes an
employee to become disabled from work, and the duration of that disability, are medical issues
that must be proven by a preponderance of probative and reliable medical opinion evidence.5
Under FECA, the term disability means an incapacity because of an employment injury, to
earn the wages the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.6 When, however, the medical
evidence establishes that the residuals or sequelae of an employment injury are such that, from a

2

Supra note 1.

3

See D.S., Docket No. 20-0638 (issued November 17, 2020); F.H., Docket No. 18-0160 (issued August 23, 2019);
C.R., Docket No. 18-1805 (issued May 10, 2019); Kathryn Haggerty, 45 ECAB 383 (1994); Elaine Pendleton, 40
ECAB 1143 (1989).
4

See L.F., Docket No. 19-0324 (issued January 2, 2020); T.L., Docket No. 18-0934 (issued May 8, 2019);
Fereidoon Kharabi, 52 ECAB 291, 293 (2001).
5

See 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(f); N.M., Docket No. 18-0939 (issued December 6, 2018).

6

Id. at § 10.5(f); see e.g., G.T., 18-1369 (issued March 13, 2019); Cheryl L. Decavitch, 50 ECAB 397 (1999).

3

medical standpoint, prevent the employee from continuing in his or her employment, he or she is
entitled to compensation for any loss of wages.7
To establish causal relationship between the disability claimed and the employment injury,
an employee must submit rationalized medical evidence, based on a complete factual and medical
background, supporting such causal relationship.8 The opinion of the physician must be one of
reasonable medical certainty and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of
the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment incident identified
by the employee.9
The Board will not require OWCP to pay compensation for disability in the absence of
medical evidence directly addressing the specific dates of disability for which compensation is
claimed. To do so would essentially allow an employee to self-certify his or her disability and
entitlement to compensation. 10
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish disability from
work for the period May 3 through August 30, 2020, causally related to his accepted December 12,
2019 employment injury.
In support of his disability claim, appellant submitted progress notes and letters from
Dr. Kaar. Dr. Kaar’s August 11, 2020 progress note provided an impression of full-thickness
supraspinatus tear with, mild retraction, mild supraspinatus atrophy and partial thickness tearing
involving the supraspinatus, subscapularis tendinosis’ ﬂuid along the biceps, and moderate AC
joint arthrosis. He also provided an impression that appellant was doing well status post
arthroscopic right shoulder surgery. However, Dr. Kaar offered no opinion regarding appellant’s
disability status during the period May 3 through August 30, 2020. The Board has held that
medical evidence that does not provide an opinion as to whether a period of disability is due to an
accepted employment condition is insufficient to meet a claimant’s burden of proof. 11 In an
October 16, 2020 letter, Dr. Kaar noted appellant’s inability to work commencing March 26, 2020
and continuing following his authorized August 31, 2020 surgery. While he noted appellant’s
inability to work on the claimed dates, he did not provide any medical reasoning to support his
opinion on disability nor did he attribute appellant’s disability to the accepted December 12, 2019

7

G.T., id.; Merle J. Marceau, 53 ECAB 197 (2001).

8

See S.J., Docket No. 17-0828 (issued December 20, 2017); Kathryn E. DeMarsh, 56 ECAB 677 (2005).

9

C.B., Docket No. 18-0633 (issued November 16, 2018); Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000); Gary L. Fowler,
45 ECAB 365 (1994).
10

See S.G., Docket No. 18-1076 (issued April 11, 2019); William A. Archer, 55 ECAB 674 (2004); Fereidoon
Kharabi, supra note 4.
11

See B.M., Docket No. 20-0826 (issued May 10, 2021); Y.D., Docket No. 20-0097 (issued August 25, 2020); M.A.,
Docket No. 19-1119 (issued November 25, 2019); S.I., Docket No. 18-1582 (issued June 20, 2019).

4

employment injury. 12 Dr. Kaar’s remaining letters dated September 15, 2020 through March 5,
2021 do not address appellant’s inability to work on the claimed dates. 13 For these reasons, the
Board finds that his letters and progress note are insufficient to establish appellant’s disability
claim.
Appellant also submitted progress notes by Dr. Faron dated June 11, 2020. The Board
finds that Dr. Faron’s progress notes are of no probative value as they did not address appellant’s
disability status and are therefore insufficient to establish the disability claim. 14
Likewise, Dr. Ben-Zev’s June 6, 2020 report diagnosed right shoulder pain, unspecified
chronicity, but does not offer an opinion regarding appellant’s disability status during the claimed
period.15 For this reason, the Board finds that this evidence from Dr. Ben-Zev is insufficient to
establish appellant’s disability claim.
The record also contains diagnostic reports. However, the Board has long held, however,
that diagnostic studies, standing alone, lack probative value as they do not address whether the
employment injury caused any of the diagnosed conditions or associated disability. 16 For this
reason, the Board finds that the diagnostic reports of record are insufficient to establish appellant’s
disability claim.
For each period of disability claimed, the employee has the burden of proof to establish
that he or she was disabled from work during the claimed period as a result of the accepted
employment injury. 17 Because appellant has not submitted rationalized medical opinion evidence
sufficient to establish employment-related total disability during the claimed period due to his
accepted condition, the Board finds that he has not met his burden of proof to establish his claim.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128 and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

12

M.A., Docket No. 20-0033 (issued May 11, 2020); F.S., Docket No. 18-0098 (issued August 13, 2018); P.W.,
Docket No. 17-0154 (issued June 9, 2017).
13
M.A., id.; C.S., Docket No. 19-1279 (issued December 30, 2019); L.B., Docket No. 18-0533 (issued August 27,
2018); D.K., Docket No. 17-1549 (issued July 6, 2018); see also William A. Archer, supra note 10 (the Board will not
require OWCP to pay compensation for disability in the absence of medical evidence directly addressing the specific
dates of claimed disability).
14
S.S., Docket No. 21-0763 (issued November 12, 2021); M.V., Docket No. 20-0872 (issued January 27, 2020);
P.R., Docket No. 20-0596 (issued October 6, 2020); M.L., Docket No. 18-1058 (issued November 21, 2019); D.J.,
Docket No. 18-0200 (issued August 12, 2019).
15

Supra note 13.

16

See T.W., Docket No. 20-1669 (issued May 6, 2021); J.S., Docket No. 17-1039 (issued October 6, 2017).

17

Supra note 5.

5

CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish disability from
work for the period May 3 through August 30, 2020, causally related to his accepted December 12,
2019 employment injury.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 15, 2021 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: March 21, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.P., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
U.S. SECRET SERVICE, Laurel, MD, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 16-0510
Issued: April 22, 2016

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 26, 2016 appellant filed a timely appeal from a November 5, 2015 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish a left upper extremity
condition causally related to a June 30, 2015 employment incident.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 1, 2015 appellant, a 31-year-old federal police officer, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1), alleging that he sustained a left upper extremity injury on June 30, 2015 as a
result of performing pull-ups while participating in mandatory physical fitness training. The
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

employing establishment advised that appellant was in the performance of duty. Appellant did
not stop work.
An OWCP Form CA-16, authorization for examination, was issued by the employing
establishment. Appellant was authorized to visit Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore,
Maryland. He submitted two reports dated June 30, 2015 from Dr. Trisha Anest, an emergency
medicine specialist. Dr. Anest diagnosed left upper extremity neuropraxia and weakness. She
found decreased left hand grip strength. A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the
cervical spine dated June 30, 2015 showed no significant stenosis. In an attending physician’s
report, Dr. Anest checked a box marked “yes” indicating her support for causal relationship,
noting that the injury occurred while appellant was doing pull-ups in the performance of duty.
She provided work restrictions limiting the use of the left upper extremity and advised that
appellant was able to resume light-duty work on July 1, 2015.
In a July 23, 2015 letter, OWCP advised appellant of the evidence needed to establish his
claim and afforded him 30 days to submit additional evidence and respond to its inquiries.
Subsequently, appellant submitted June 30, 2015 hospital records from Johns Hopkins
Hospital. Dr. Linda Regan, a Board-certified emergency medicine physician, asserted that
appellant had been involved in rigorous training which involved getting thrown into walls and
onto the floor as part of work training exercises. Appellant noted paresthesias to the left
shoulder radiating into the back of the upper arm and into his left hand. Upon examination,
Dr. Regan found motor deficit and weakness, as well as subjective sensory decrease along the
radial and median distribution of his left hand, but not ulnar. Dr. Anest noted that appellant was
left-hand dominant and had physical training with pull-ups, but could not complete the training
as his left arm was weak. Appellant had reported that he was lifting heavy boxes and had
combat training the day before, but without any complaints or pain. A June 30, 2015
computerized tomography (CT) scan of the head/brain showed no evidence of acute intracranial
abnormality. A June 30, 2015 MRI scan of the cervical spine demonstrated minimal disc bulges
without significant spinal, canal, or neuroforaminal stenosis. An x-ray of the cervical spine
dated June 30, 2015 revealed no acute displaced fracture or dislocation.
In a June 30, 2015 report, Dr. Lenora Higginbotham, a neurologist, diagnosed
myelopathy versus radiculopathy versus peripheral nerve injury, noting that appellant’s
distribution did not fit one particular nerve. She asserted that appellant presented to the
emergency department with complaints of new-onset left upper extremity paresthesias,
weakness, and pain. Appellant stated that he was in his usual state of health upon awakening at
approximately 4:30 a.m. on the morning of June 30, 2015 and was able to get ready for work
without difficulty. He “was driving to work, when all of a sudden he developed left arm tingling
(‘as if it was asleep’) primarily in his triceps extending down throughout his hand/fingers.”
While at work later in the morning, he then developed shooting pains from his triceps down to
his fingers. “Finally, while doing pull-ups, he noticed he was uncharacteristically able to
perform two reps before [his] arm/hand tired out.” Appellant told his supervisor about his
symptoms and was referred to Johns Hopkins Hospital emergency department. He reported that
he had been lifting heavy objects and performing rigorous training the day before, but sustained
no injuries to the left arm specifically. On August 11, 2015 Dr. Higginbotham noted that
appellant continued to suffer pain when his arms were in an abducted and hyperextended

2

position and while doing push-ups. Despite the pain, appellant was still managing to pass his
training drills and would finish training in approximately four weeks. Dr. Higginbotham
diagnosed left arm muscle strain and advised that appellant could continue his training with the
understanding that his muscle strain would not completely resolve until it was rested.
On August 16, 2015 Dr. Dan Gold, a neurologist, asserted that appellant presented with
arm numbness that additionally sounded radicular and now sounded more musculoskeletal. He
found that appellant’s symptoms had resolved, aside from a residual tenderness to palpation.
Dr. Gold found that a neurologic workup was unrevealing and no further testing was indicated.
By decision dated November 5, 2015, OWCP found that the medical evidence was not
sufficient to establish a causal relationship between appellant’s left upper extremity condition
and the June 30, 2015 employment incident.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of establishing the essential
elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an “employee of the United
States” within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time
limitation period of FECA, that an injury3 was sustained in the performance of duty, as alleged,
and that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally
related to the employment injury.4
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty, it must first be determined whether a “fact of injury” has been established.
A fact of injury determination is based on two elements. First, the employee must submit
sufficient evidence to establish that he actually experienced the employment incident at the time,
place, and in the manner alleged. Second, the employee must submit sufficient evidence,
generally only in the form of medical evidence, to establish that the employment incident caused
a personal injury. An employee may establish that the employment incident occurred as alleged
but fail to show that his or her condition relates to the employment incident.5
Causal relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence generally required to
establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence. The opinion of the
physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the employee, must be
one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the

2

Id.

3

OWCP regulations define a traumatic injury as a condition of the body caused by a specific event or incident, or
series of events or incidents, within a single workday or shift. Such condition must be caused by external force,
including stress or strain, which is identifiable as to time and place of occurrence and member or function of the
body affected. 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(ee).
4

See T.H., 59 ECAB 388 (2008).

5

Id.

3

nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors
identified by the employee.6
ANALYSIS
OWCP has accepted that the employment incident of June 30, 2015 occurred at the time,
place, and in the manner alleged. The issue is whether appellant’s left upper extremity
diagnosed condition resulted from the June 30, 2015 employment incident. The Board finds that
the medical evidence is insufficient to establish causal relationship.
On June 30, 2015 Dr. Anest found that appellant had decreased left hand grip strength
and diagnosed left upper extremity neuropraxia and weakness. She noted that appellant was lefthand dominant and had physical training with pull-ups, but could not complete it due to the
weakness of his left arm. Appellant reported that he was lifting heavy boxes and had combat
training the day before, but without any complaints or pain. In an attending physician’s report,
Dr. Anest checked a box marked “yes” indicating her support for causal relationship, noting that
the injury occurred while appellant was doing pull-ups in the performance of duty. The Board
has held that a physician’s opinion that consists of checking a box marked “yes” on a form
report, without more in the way of medical rationale, is of diminished probative value in
establishing causal relationship.7 No rationale or explanation was provided by Dr. Anest on the
issue of causal relationship.8 Dr. Anest failed to provide a rationalized opinion explaining how
factors of appellant’s federal employment, such as lifting heavy boxes, combat training, and
doing pull-ups, caused or aggravated his left upper extremity conditions. He noted that
appellant’s conditions occurred while he was at work, but such generalized statements do not
establish causal relationship because they merely repeat appellant’s allegations and are
unsupported by adequate medical rationale explaining how his physical activity at work actually
caused or aggravated the diagnosed conditions.9 Dr. Anest failed to provide an opinion
adequately addressing how the June 30, 2015 work incident contributed to appellant’s
conditions. Thus, the Board finds that this evidence is insufficient to establish that appellant
sustained an employment-related injury.
In her reports, Dr. Higginbotham diagnosed left arm muscle strain and myelopathy versus
radiculopathy versus peripheral nerve injury, noting that appellant’s distribution did not fit one
particular nerve. She asserted that appellant presented to the emergency department with
complaints of new-onset left upper extremity paresthesias, weakness, and pain. Appellant
related that, on the morning of June 30, 2015, he “was driving to work, when all of a sudden he
developed left arm tingling (‘as if it was asleep’) primarily in his triceps extending down
throughout his hand/fingers.” While at work later in the morning, he then developed shooting
pains from his triceps down to his fingers. “Finally, while doing pull-ups, he noticed he was
uncharacteristically able to perform two reps before [his] arm/hand tired out.” On August 11,
6

Id.

7

See Calvin E. King, 51 ECAB 394 (2000).

8

See Sedi L. Graham, 57 ECAB 494 (2006).

9

See K.W., Docket No. 10-98 (issued September 10, 2010).

4

2015 Dr. Higginbotham noted that appellant continued to suffer pain when his arms were in an
abducted and hyperextended position and while doing push-ups. She noted that appellant’s
conditions occurred while he was at work but, as noted above, such generalized statements do
not establish causal relationship.10 Moreover, Dr. Higginbotham failed to provide an opinion
regarding the cause of appellant’s left arm symptoms. The Board has held that the mere fact that
appellant’s symptoms arise during a period of employment or produce symptoms revelatory of
an underlying condition does not establish a causal relationship between appellant’s condition
and her employment factors.11 The Board finds that Dr. Higginbotham did not provide sufficient
medical rationale explaining how appellant’s left upper extremity conditions were caused or
aggravated by doing pull-ups at work on June 30, 2015. Therefore, the Board finds that the
reports from Dr. Higginbotham are insufficient to establish causal relationship.
The reports from Drs. Regan and Gold failed to provide a rationalized opinion explaining
how the June 30, 2015 work incident caused or contributed to a diagnosed medical condition.
Medical evidence that does not offer any opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition
is of diminished probative value on the issue of causal relationship.12 Thus, the Board finds that
this evidence is insufficient to establish that appellant sustained an injury in the performance of
duty on June 30, 2015.
The diagnostic studies dated June 30, 2015 are of limited probative medical value as they
do not specifically address whether appellant’s conditions are attributable to his accepted work
incident.13
On appeal appellant contends that his injury was work related due to training for his job,
noting that he was sent to a neurologist at Johns Hopkins Hospital because the training center
medical staff thought he had nerve damage. He indicates that the neurologist ruled out nerve
damage after performing several tests. Appellant then followed-up with a sports medicine doctor
who diagnosed left shoulder strain, administered a cortisone injection, and recommended
physical therapy. The sports medicine doctor states that appellant was currently attending
therapy and had notes from his doctor and physical therapist supporting causal relationship.
Based on the reasons stated above, however, the Board finds the medical evidence is
insufficient to establish the claim. As appellant has not submitted sufficiently rationalized
medical evidence to support his claim that he sustained an injury causally related to the June 30,
2015 employment incident, he has failed to meet his burden of proof. Consequently, the Board
will affirm OWCP’s November 5, 2015 decision.

10

Id.

11

See A.A., Docket No. 15-870 (issued March 14, 2016); Richard B. Cissel, 32 ECAB 1910, 1917 (1981).

12

See L.M., Docket No. 16-188 (issued March 24, 2015); Jaja K. Asaramo, 55 ECAB 200 (2004).

13

See K.W., 59 ECAB 271 (2007); A.D., 58 ECAB 149 (2006); Linda I. Sprague, 48 ECAB 386 (1997) (medical
evidence that does not offer any opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative
value on the issue of causal relationship).

5

The Board also notes that the employing establishment issued appellant a Form CA-16 on
June 22, 2015 authorizing medical treatment. The Board has held that where an employing
establishment properly executes a Form CA-16, which authorizes medical treatment as a result of
an employee’s claim for an employment-related injury, it creates a contractual obligation, which
does not involve the employee directly, to pay the cost of the examination or treatment regardless
of the action taken on the claim.14 Although OWCP denied appellant’s claim for an injury, it did
not address whether he was entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses pursuant to the Form
CA-16. Upon return of the case record, OWCP should further address this matter.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a left upper
extremity condition causally related to a June 30, 2015 employment incident.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the November 5, 2015 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: April 22, 2016
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
14

See D.M., Docket No. 13-535 (issued June 6, 2013). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.300, 10.304.

6