United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
K.F., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE
LOGISTICS AGENCY, New Cumberland, PA,
Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Randolph Elliott, for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 17-1125
Issued: January 11, 2018

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 1, 2017 appellant, through his representative, filed a timely appeal from a
December 5, 2016 merit decision and an April 10, 2017 nonmerit decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs.2 Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act3
(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this
case.
1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for
legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An
attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject
to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2
Appellant timely requested oral argument before the Board. By order dated September 22, 2017, the Board
exercised its discretion and denied the request, finding that the issues could be adequately adjudicated based on the
evidence of record. Order Denying Oral Argument, Docket No. 17-1125 (issued September 22, 2017).
3

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant has established an injury to his left shoulder and
neck causally related to a July 26, 2016 employment incident; and (2) whether OWCP properly
denied his request for reconsideration of the merits of his claim under 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
FACTUAL HISTORY
On August 8, 2016 appellant, then a 56-year-old packer, filed a traumatic injury claim
(Form CA-1) alleging that, on July 26, 2016, he injured his left shoulder and the left side of his
neck lifting an unexpectedly heavy parcel. The employing establishment did not controvert the
claim, but noted that he might have experienced an aggravation of a prior work injury, assigned
File No. xxxxxx956.
In an August 1, 2016 statement accompanying his claim, appellant related that a
coworker asked him for help to move a parcel. He did not know what was in the parcel and it
was much heavier than he had expected. Appellant felt a twinge in his left shoulder at the time
that he believed was a pulled muscle. His neck was stiff and he had left shoulder pain.
Dr. Kevin J. Poole, Board-certified in family medicine, evaluated appellant on August 4,
2016 for cervical pain with radiculopathy, neck pain, and a left shoulder injury. He referred him
for diagnostic studies and, in an accompanying disability slip, found that he could work with
restrictions.
A computerized tomography (CT) scan of the left shoulder, obtained on August 10, 2016,
revealed fraying of the undersurface of the anterior supraspinatus without a discrete tear and mild
acromioclavicular (AC) joint degeneration. An August 10, 2016 CT scan of the cervical spine
revealed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C5-6 with straightening of the cervical
lordosis, a mature fusion at C6-7, an incomplete fusion at C5-6, and bilateral hypertrophy at C56 and C6-7 with some neural foraminal stenosis.
Dr. Poole, in a report dated August 16, 2016, reviewed the results of objective studies and
diagnosed a “[w]ork injury with neural foraminal stenosis of the cervical spine and supraspinatus
tendinitis and AC joint arthritis.” He opined that appellant should be evaluated by an
orthopedist.
On August 23, 2016 Dr. Matthew J. Espenshade, an osteopath, discussed appellant’s
history of an injury at work on July 26, 2016 when he helped a coworker pick up material. He
subsequently experienced pain in the front and back of his left shoulder, but no cervical pain.
Dr. Espenshade diagnosed a left shoulder rotator cuff strain and left shoulder bursitis and
referred appellant for therapy.
Appellant underwent physical therapy in August and September 2016.
In a September 19, 2016 progress report, Dr. Espenshade noted that appellant’s condition
had improved with physical therapy. He diagnosed left shoulder bursitis and a rotator cuff strain
and opined that he could resume his “permanent light-duty restrictions.”

2

OWCP, by letter dated November 2, 2016, advised appellant that it had paid a limited
amount of medical expenses as his claim initially appeared minor and was uncontroverted. It
was now formally adjudicating his claim. OWCP requested that appellant submit medical
evidence from his attending physician explaining the causal relationship between a diagnosed
condition and the identified work incident.
By decision dated December 5, 2016, OWCP denied appellant’s traumatic injury claim.
It found that he had failed to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish that he sustained a
diagnosed condition causally related to the July 26, 2016 employment incident.
In a December 28, 2016 addendum to his September 19, 2016 report, Dr. Espenshade
related that he began treating appellant for his left shoulder condition on August 23, 2016 and
that it was his “professional opinion that his left shoulder strain was directly related to his work
injury that occurred on July 26, 2016.”
Appellant, on January 10, 2017, requested reconsideration.
By decision dated April 10, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration
as he had not submitted evidence or raised an argument sufficient to warrant reopening his case
for further merit review under section 8128(a). It found that he had not submitted any new
evidence. OWCP noted that in his September 19, 2016 report, Dr. Espenshade did not provide
rationale explaining how the lifting incident caused the diagnosed condition.
On appeal appellant, through his representative, contends that he submitted the medical
evidence requested and that it is sufficient to establish that he sustained a work injury.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
An employee seeking benefits under FECA4 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time
limitation,5 that he or she sustained an injury in the performance of duty as alleged, and that
disability from work, if any, was causally related to the employment injury.6
To determine whether an employee sustained a traumatic injury in the performance of
duty, OWCP must determine whether fact of injury is established. First, an employee has the
burden of demonstrating the occurrence of an injury at the time, place, and in the manner
alleged, by a preponderance of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.7 Second, the
employee must submit sufficient evidence, generally only in the form of medical evidence, to

4

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

5

See R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008).

6

Id.; Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1142 (1989).

7

David Apgar, 57 ECAB 137 (2005); Delphyne L. Glover, 51 ECAB 146 (1999).

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establish causal relationship between the employment incident and the alleged disability and/or
condition for which compensation is claimed.8
Causal relationship is a medical issue, and the medical evidence generally required to
establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence.9 The opinion of the
physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant,10 must
be one of reasonable medical certainty11 explaining the nature of the relationship between the
diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by the claimant.12
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
Appellant alleged that he sustained an injury to his left shoulder and neck on July 26,
2016 when he lifted a heavy parcel. He has established that the July 26, 2016 incident occurred
at the time, place, and in the manner alleged. The issue, consequently, is whether the medical
evidence of record establishes an injury as a result of this incident.
The Board finds that appellant has not established that the July 26, 2016 employment
incident resulted in an injury. The determination of whether an employment incident caused an
injury is generally established by medical evidence.13
In a report dated August 4, 2016, Dr. Poole discussed appellant’s complaints of cervical
radicular pain, neck pain, and an injury to the left shoulder. He found that he could perform
modified employment and recommended diagnostic testing. Dr. Poole did not address causation.
Medical evidence that does not offer any opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition
is of diminished probative value on the issue of causal relationship.14
On August 16, 2016 Dr. Poole found that CT scans of the left shoulder and cervical spine
revealed cervical neural foraminal stenosis, AC joint arthritis, and supraspinatus tendinitis. He
noted that appellant had sustained a work injury. Dr. Poole, however, did not provide a history
of the July 26, 2016 employment incident or explain how it resulted in the diagnosed conditions.
A physician must provide a narrative description of the identified employment incident and a
reasoned opinion on whether the employment incident described caused or contributed to a
diagnosed medical condition.15 Consequently, Dr. Poole’s report is of diminished probative
value.
8

Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001); Shirley A. Temple, 48 ECAB 404, 407 (1997).

9

John J. Montoya, 54 ECAB 306 (2003).

10

Tomas Martinez, 54 ECAB 623 (2003); Gary J. Watling, supra note 8.

11

Supra note 9.

12

Judy C. Rogers, 54 ECAB 693 (2003).

13

Lois E. Culver (Clair L. Culver), 53 ECAB 412 (2002).

14

See T.M., Docket No. 16-1456 (issued January 10, 2017); S.E., Docket No. 08-2214 (issued May 6, 2009).

15

See supra note 9.

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Dr. Espenshade, in an August 23, 2016 report, obtained a history of appellant
experiencing left shoulder pain after helping a coworker lift material on July 26, 2016. He
diagnosed a strain of the left rotator cuff and left shoulder bursitis. In a progress report dated
September 19, 2016, Dr. Espenshade noted that appellant’s condition had improved with
physical therapy and diagnosed left shoulder bursitis and a strain of the left rotator cuff. He did
not, however, specifically attribute the diagnosed conditions to the July 26, 2016 work incident.
As he did not address causation, Dr. Espenshade’s report is of little probative value on the issue
of causal relationship.16
Appellant submitted physical therapy reports dated August and September 2016.
Physical therapists, however, are not considered physicians as defined under FECA and their
reports have no probative value. Thus these reports are insufficient to establish his claim.17
On appeal appellant asserts that he submitted sufficient medical evidence to establish his
claim. As discussed, however, he has the burden to furnish reasoned medical evidence
supporting that the July 26, 2016 work incident caused or aggravated a diagnosed condition.18
The medical evidence of record is currently insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.19
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
To require OWCP to reopen a case for merit review under section 8128(a) of FECA,20
OWCP’s regulations provide that a claimant must: (1) show that OWCP erroneously applied or
interpreted a specific point of law; (2) advance a relevant legal argument not previously
considered by OWCP; or (3) constitute relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously
considered by OWCP.21 To be entitled to a merit review of an OWCP decision denying or
terminating a benefit, OWCP must receive the request for reconsideration within one year of the
date of OWCP’s decision for which review is sought.22 When a claimant fails to meet one of the
above standards, OWCP will deny the application for reconsideration without reopening the case
for review on the merits.23

16

See A.W., Docket No. 17-0638 (issued August 29, 2017); A.D., 58 ECAB 149 (2006).

17
5 U.S.C. § 8101(2) of FECA provides that the term “physician” includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical
psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined
by State law. See E.W., Docket No. 16-1729 (issued May 12, 2017).
18

See S.C., Docket No. 17-0490 (issued June 27, 2017).

19

Id.

20
5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. Section 8128(a) of FECA provides that “[t]he Secretary of Labor may review an award
for or against payment of compensation at any time on his or her own motion or on application.”
21

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3).

22

Id. at § 10.607(a).

23

Id. at § 10.608(b).

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In order to require merit review, it is not necessary that the new evidence be sufficient to
discharge appellant’s burden of proof. Instead, the requirement pertaining to the submission of
evidence in support of reconsideration only specifies that the evidence be relevant and pertinent
and not previously considered by OWCP.24
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
In its December 5, 2016 merit decision, OWCP found that appellant had not submitted
sufficient medical evidence to establish a medical condition causally related to the July 26, 2016
employment incident. With his request for reconsideration, appellant submitted a December 28,
2016 addendum from Dr. Espenshade included as part of his September 19, 2016 medical report.
Dr. Espenshade noted that he had treated appellant since August 23, 2016 for a left shoulder
condition. He opined that appellant sustained left shoulder strain directly related to the accepted
July 26, 2016 employment incident. In its April 10, 2017 decision, OWCP found that he had not
submitted new evidence, noting that Dr. Espenshade addressed causation in his September 19,
2016 report without supporting medical rationale. OWCP, however, did not previously consider
Dr. Espenshade’s December 28, 2016 addendum to the September 19, 2016 report addressing
causal relationship. As his finding regarding causal relationship pertained directly to the relevant
issue of whether appellant sustained an injury due to the July 26, 2016 work incident and was not
previously of record, it is sufficient to warrant reopening the case for further merit review.25
As discussed, to require merit review it is not necessary that the new evidence be
sufficient to discharge appellant’s burden of proof. Instead, the requirement pertaining to the
submission of evidence in support of reconsideration only specifies that the evidence be relevant
and pertinent and not previously considered by OWCP.26 If OWCP determines that the new
evidence lacks probative value, it may deny modification of its prior decision, but only after the
case has been reviewed on the merits.27 As Dr. Espenshade’s December 28, 2016 addendum
constituted pertinent new and relevant medical evidence, the Board finds that OWCP improperly
denied appellant’s request for review of the merits of the claim.28 The case will be remanded to
OWCP to conduct an appropriate merit review of the claim. Following this and such other
development as deemed necessary, it shall issue an appropriate merit decision on the claim.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not established an injury to his left shoulder and neck
causally related to the accepted July 26, 2016 work incident. The Board further finds that
OWCP improperly denied his request for reconsideration of the merits of his claim under 5
U.S.C. § 8128(a).
24

See C.L., Docket No. 14-1904 (issued May 18, 2015).

25

See J.H., Docket No. 14-1777 (issued December 1, 2015).

26

See D.M., Docket No. 17-0038 (issued June 8, 2017).

27

See D.W., Docket No. 15-1225 (issued February 22, 2016); C.M., Docket No. 14-1887 (issued May 6, 2015).

28

See J.A., Docket No. 14-1939 (issued January 9, 2015).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 10, 2017 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the December 5, 2016 decision is affirmed.
The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion of the Board.
Issued: January 11, 2018
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
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and
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. MARSHALS )
SERVICE, New York, NY, Employer
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__________________________________________ )
L.F., Appellant

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 11-1219
Issued: April 13, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 25, 2011 appellant timely appealed the March 25, 2011 merit decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly calculated appellant’s pay rate for his schedule
award.
FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant, a 41-year-old detention enforcement officer, injured his right index finger in
the performance of duty on December 28, 2004.2 OWCP accepted his claim for closed fracture
1

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

2

Appellant caught his right index finger in a cellblock door.

of the middle phalanx of the right index finger. On September 26, 2008 appellant received a
schedule award for one percent impairment of the right upper extremity. He also received an
award on July 6, 2010 for an additional 12 percent impairment. Under both awards, OWCP paid
compensation based on appellant’s December 28, 2004 date-of-injury weekly pay rate of
$866.52.3
On July 17, 2010 appellant requested reconsideration. He challenged the July 6, 2010
schedule award on the basis that OWCP had not included overtime (OT) pay in calculating his
weekly pay rate. Appellant did not take issue with the additional 12 percent impairment OWCP
awarded.
OWCP subsequently contacted the employing establishment to determine if appellant’s
job required mandatory OT and, if so, the amount of OT he worked during the one-year period
preceding his December 28, 2004 employment injury.
By letter dated December 3, 2010, the employing establishment advised OWCP that OT
was not a mandatory component of appellant’s position as a detention enforcement officer. The
employing establishment explained that OT was flexible and granted on an as-needed basis
according to the needs of the agency at the time. The employing establishment documented
197.5 hours of work beyond appellant’s regular 40-hour weekly schedule. The OT was sporadic
and covered 15 of 26 pay periods in the year that preceded his employment injury.4
In a letter dated January 3, 2011, appellant indicated that he was aware that his employer
did not consider OT mandatory. However, he noted that there were plenty of times when he and
other detention officers were instructed by supervisors not to leave at the end of their shift until
court was done for the day and the last inmate was out of the cellblock. Under the
circumstances, appellant considered the OT “mandatory” despite his employer’s statement to the
contrary. He later submitted various provisions from the Union contract indicating, inter alia,
that OT must be worked when scheduled. The master agreement also recognized that there
would be situations where advance notice of an OT assignment could not be provided.
In a February 15, 2011 letter, appellant reiterated that there were numerous occasions
when he was prohibited from leaving at the conclusion of his shift if court was still in session or
when inmates or new arrests remained in the cellblock. He also noted that other instances where
he was required to work OT when transporting prisoners to and from jail. Appellant continued
to argue that OT was mandatory.

3

At the time of injury, appellant was a GS-7, Step 5, with an annual base salary of $45,059.00. Appellant’s
December 29, 2004 Form CA-1 indicated that he regularly worked weekdays (Monday to Friday), 7:00 a.m. to 3:30
p.m. The employing establishment provided similar information on appellant’s July 26, 2007 schedule award claim
(Form CA-7). The CA-7 also noted an OT hourly rate of $32.39.
4

There was no OT reported for pay periods 1 to 7 and 18 to 21. Some of the OT (48.5 hours) was reported as
night differential, but with the same $32.39 hourly rate. There is no indication that appellant regularly worked the
night shift. It appears that a night differential was reported because his OT occasionally extended into the evening
hours. Based on the data provided by the employing establishment, appellant averaged 3.79 hours of OT per week.

2

By decision dated March 25, 2011, OWCP denied modification of the July 6, 2010
schedule award decision. The senior claims examiner explained that, while it was evident the
employing establishment at times required appellant to work OT, FECA nonetheless precluded
OT when computing one’s pay rate for compensation purposes.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
The amount of compensation paid is a function of the injured employee’s pay rate.5
Monthly pay for compensation purposes means the “monthly pay at the time of injury or the
monthly pay at the time disability begins or the monthly pay at the time compensable disability
recurs, whichever is greater.”6 Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8114(e)(1), “[OT] pay” shall not be taken
into account in determining the employee’s effective pay rate.7 OWCP has administratively
determined that certain premium pay, such as night and shift differentials, holiday and Sunday
pay and premium pay for administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), shall be included for
purposes of computing an employee’s pay rate.8
ANALYSIS
Appellant did not specifically challenge OWCP’s decision to grant an additional 12
percent impairment of the right upper extremity. He has not submitted any competent medical
evidence demonstrating a greater impairment than the combined 13 percent he already received.
But while appellant did not challenge the percentage of impairment awarded, he questioned
OWCP’s calculation of his date-of-injury pay rate. OWCP utilized his base weekly pay rate of
$866.52, which was in effect on December 28, 2004. Appellant believed that OWCP should
have taken into account his OT pay when determining his rate of pay for compensation purposes.
The employing establishment documented 197.5 hours of OT in the one-year period preceding
his December 28, 2004 employment injury. That represented an average of 3.79 hours per week
or an additional $123.02 in weekly pay.
In various communications with OWCP, appellant argued that he considered OT
mandatory because he was ordered by his supervisor to remain on duty and essentially had no
choice in the mater. On appeal, he continues to argue that OT was mandatory and, therefore,
should have been included in calculating his pay rate for compensation purposes.
FECA is specific as to the preclusion of OT pay in calculating an injured employee’s pay
rate. OWCP clearly explained this point in its March 25, 2011 decision. However, it has
5

20 C.F.R. §§ 10.401(b) and 10.404(b).

6

5 U.S.C. § 8101(4); see Samuel C. Miller, 55 ECAB 119, 120 (2003).

7

See also Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Determining Pay Rate, Chapter 2.900.7a(1)
(March 2011).
8

Id. at Chapter 2.900.6b. AUO arises where an employee is in a position in which the hours of duty cannot be
controlled administratively and which requires substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled OT duty with the
employee generally being responsible for recognizing, without supervision, circumstances which require the
employee to remain on duty. FECA Program Memorandum No. 280 (issued February 11, 1991).

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administratively determined that it will include in the pay rate calculation certain “premium pay”
for AUO. This type of premium pay arises where an employee is in a position in which the
hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively and which requires substantial amounts of
irregular, unscheduled OT duty with the employee generally being responsible for recognizing,
without supervision, circumstances which require the employee to remain on duty.9 Such OT is
paid on an annual basis and included in the employee’s base pay.
The Board finds that appellant’s OT did not constitute AUO as it was not part of his
annual pay rate. As such, OWCP properly excluded OT pay when calculating his date-of-injury
pay rate.
CONCLUSION
OWCP properly excluded appellant’s OT pay when determining his effective pay rate for
compensation purposes.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 25, 2011 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: April 13, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

9

Id.

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
G.J., claiming as widow of D.J., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, BRIGHTON POST
OFFICE, Brighton, CO, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Timothy Quinn, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 08-1025
Issued: March 23, 2009

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On February 22, 2008 appellant, through her attorney, filed a timely appeal of a
March 22, 2007 decision of an Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs hearing
representative denying her claim for death benefits and a January 24, 2008 nonmerit decision
denying her request for reconsideration. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this appeal.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether the employee’s stroke on October 29, 1998 and his death on
October 31, 1998 were causally related to his October 28, 1998 employment-related surgery; and
(2) whether the Office properly denied appellant’s request for a merit review of her claim
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
FACTUAL HISTORY
This case has previously been before the Board. In a November 16, 2001 decision, the
Board set aside the Office’s October 20, 2000 and January 16, 2001 decisions which denied

appellant’s claim for survivor’s benefits.1 The Board found a conflict in the medical opinion
evidence between the employee’s attending physician and an Office medical adviser as to
whether the employee’s stroke and resultant death on October 31, 1998 were causally related to
his employment-related surgery on October 28, 1998. The Board remanded the case to the
Office for referral to an impartial medical specialist to resolve the conflict in the medical opinion
evidence. The facts and the history relevant to the present appeal are set forth.
On August 14, 1998 the Office accepted that the employee, a 48-year-old manual
distribution clerk, sustained right wrist tendinitis, carpal tunnel syndrome and lateral
epicondylitis on April 9, 1998. It authorized right carpal tunnel release, radial nerve
decompression and lateral elbow fasciotomy, which were performed on October 28, 1998. On
October 29, 1998 the employee sustained a right cerebral stroke while at home eating breakfast.
He was hospitalized and died on October 31, 1998. On March 9, 1999 the employee’s widow
filed a claim for survivor’s benefits contending that her husband’s death was caused by the
stroke that resulted from complications of his accepted work-related surgery. The death
certificate listed the immediate cause of death as cerebrovascular accident.
On January 10, 2002 the Office referred a statement of accepted facts, the case record and
question to be addressed, to Dr. Peter S. Quintero, a Board-certified neurologist, for an impartial
medical examination. In a February 11, 2002 medical report, Dr. Quintero opined that the
employee’s stroke and resultant death were not causally related to his October 28, 1998
employment-related surgery.
By decision dated February 22, 2002, the Office denied appellant’s claim.2 It accorded
special weight to Dr. Quintero’s February 11, 2002 report as an impartial medical specialist.
In a March 8, 2002 letter, appellant, through counsel, requested an oral hearing before an
Office hearing representative.
By decision dated January 16, 2003, an Office hearing representative set aside the
February 22, 2002 decision and remanded the case to obtain a supplemental report from
Dr. Quintero. She found that his opinion was not entitled to special weight because he did not
review all the relevant medical evidence and he was not given the Office’s definitions of causal
relationship for determining whether a relationship existed between the employee’s stroke and
death and his October 28, 1998 employment-related surgery.
In an April 15, 2003 supplemental report, Dr. Quintero stated that the employee’s stroke
and resultant death were not caused by the accepted employment-related surgery. The Office
issued an April 17, 2003 decision again denying appellant’s claim. It accorded special weight to
Dr. Quintero’s February 11, 2002 and April 15, 2003 reports. In a May 6, 2003 letter, appellant,
through counsel, requested an oral hearing.

1

Docket No. 01-911 (issued November 16, 2001).

2

The Board notes that the Office’s February 22, 2002 decision is not contained in the case record.

2

In a February 5, 2004 decision, an Office hearing representative set aside the April 17,
2003 decision and remanded the case to the Office. He found that a new conflict in medical
opinion evidence arose between Dr. Quintero and Dr. Victoria J. Simpson, a Board-certified
anesthesiologist, regarding the issue of whether the presence of a cardiac defect was necessary to
allow emboli to move to the brain after the release of a tourniquet. On remand, the hearing
representative instructed the Office to refer the case record to an impartial panel of physicians
specializing in neurology, internal medicine and anesthesiology.
By letter dated March 23, 2004, the Office referred the case record, a statement of
accepted facts and question to be addressed, to Dr. Anthony D. Piccone, a Board-certified
anesthesiologist, Dr. Stanley H. Ginsburg, a Board-certified neurologist and Dr. Annu
Ramaswamy, a Board-certified internist.
Dr. Ginsburg’s March 30, 2004 report and
Drs. Piccone’s and Ramaswamy’s April 23, 2004 report found that the employee’s stroke and
subsequent death were not caused by his employment-related surgery.
By decision dated May 13, 2004, the Office again denied appellant’s claim. It accorded
special weight to the reports of the impartial medical panel.
On May 31, 2004 appellant, through her attorney, requested an oral hearing. Counsel
contended that Dr. Ginsburg was associated with a physician of record who was previously
associated with appellant’s case. He further contended that Dr. Piccone and Dr. Ramaswamy
were not properly selected under the Physician’s Directory System (PDS).
By decision dated December 17, 2004, an Office hearing representative, set aside the
May 13, 2004 decision and remanded the case to the Office. She found that the impartial
physicians of record were not properly selected through the PDS and, thus, constituted second
opinion physicians. The Office hearing representative determined that an unresolved conflict
remained as to the causal relationship between the employee’s stroke and death and his accepted
employment-related surgery. On remand, she instructed the Office to utilize the PDS to select a
panel of impartial medical specialists to resolve the conflict.
On January 28, 2005 the Office referred the case record, a statement of accepted facts and
questions to be addressed, to Dr. Richard B. Green, a Board-certified anesthesiologist,
Dr. Sander H. Orent, a Board-certified internist and Dr. Amelia Scott Barrett, a Board-certified
neurologist, for impartial medical review. Copies of the PDS note that appellant’s zip code was
entered as 80631 during the selection process. The record reflects that numerous physicians
were contacted and bypassed during the selection process and a notation was made explaining
the reason for each bypass. The various reasons included that certain physicians did not perform
impartial medical examinations, their telephone numbers had been disconnected or they had
moved or retired.
In a February 3, 2005 letter, counsel requested that the Office provide copies of the
appointment screen from the PDS pursuant to FECA Bulletin No. 00-01 together with any other
documentation regarding the selection of the panel. He also requested the statement of accepted
facts and questions posed to each physician. On February 3, 2005 the Office provided counsel
with copies of the statement of accepted facts and questions posed to the selected impartial
medical specialists.

3

By letter dated March 3, 2005, the Office advised counsel that the impartial medical
specialists did not have all the medical records necessary for completion of their reports. It
requested that he provided additional medical evidence, including the actual anesthesia record
and the employee’s admitting laboratory test results and vital signs. Counsel submitted the
requested evidence by letter dated March 14, 2005.
In a February 8, 2005 report, Dr. Orent reviewed the employee’s medical records. He
opined that the employee’s stroke on October 29, 1998 and resultant death on October 30, 1998
were not caused by his October 28, 1998 employment-related surgery. Dr. Orent disagreed with
the opinion that prolonged occlusion time with a tourniquet created a thrombus in the employee’s
extremity, which somehow embolized through his heart to the carotid artery. He stated that this
was not only physiologically improbable but essentially impossible. Dr. Orent explained that, in
order for the clot to have reached the employee’s brain, there would have to be a hole in his
heart, i.e., some sort of shunt between the venous and arterial circulations. He related that this
was neither present nor proven as fact by test results. Dr. Orent stated that echocardiograms of
the heart would certainly have detected the presence of a hole. Given the complete lack of
mechanism to explain how such an embolus could travel from a vein in the arm to the brain, it
was not possible to postulate a relationship between the surgical procedure and subsequent
stroke. Dr. Orent noted that another possibility would have been a complication of anesthesia
such that the employee was hypoxic for some period of time. However, there was no
documentation to this effect in the medical record. Dr. Orent stated that additional information
was required. He wanted to review the actual anesthesia record to be certain that there was no
drop in blood pressure or other untoward event during the course of the anesthesia. Dr. Orent
also wished to review the employee’s admitting laboratory tests and vital signs to be sure that no
abnormalities were overlooked prior to the surgery. He opined that, if no abnormalities were
demonstrated then, it was more probable than not that the employee’s death was caused by a
coincidental event and not the October 28, 1998 employment-related surgery.
In a February 23, 2005 report, Dr. Barrett stated that it was well documented in medical
literature that up to two percent of patients undergoing surgery including, the employee, was at
risk for perioperative stroke. However, the employee’s perioperative stroke was due to several
risk factors which caused his death. Dr. Barrett reviewed the employee’s medical records and
death certificate. She disagreed with the theory that the tourniquet time of 60 minutes might
have caused a venous embolism that traveled to the right major coronary artery (MCA) through a
right-to-left shunt in the heart. Dr. Barrett related that no such stunt was found on transthoracic
echocardiogram, which excluded this mechanism as the cause of the stroke. She stated that the
employee’s nonemployment-related risk factors included obesity, a history of smoking,
hypercholesterolemia, a family history of early vascular death and possible diabetes. Dr. Barrett
related that it was no coincidence that it occurred one day following surgery based on these risk
factors. She opined that although a risk of stroke was associated with surgical procedures, there
was no causal relationship between the employee’s work-related surgery and his subsequent
stroke and death.
In a February 24, 2005 report, Dr. Green stated that the sudden onset of symptoms while
eating breakfast was suggestive of an embolus versus thrombotic event which occurred over
time. He stated that the embolus could have originated from the arterial or venous circulation.
Dr. Green explained the development of clots in the venous system, which later lead to an

4

embolus affecting pulmonary circulation, could have resulted in shortness of breath or if large
enough sudden death. He stated that the use of a tourniquet has been associated with venous
thrombosis more likely in the lower extremity rather than in the upper extremity. Dr. Green
related that during the employee’s surgery, a tourniquet was used for one hour, which was within
the acceptable range of less than two hours. He noted that the employee did not complain about
any postoperative pain in either his upper or lower extremities. The employee did not have a
shunt or patent foramen ovale, which would have resulted in an embolus from venous
circulation. Dr. Green also did not have a history of valsalva while eating his breakfast prior to
the onset of his symptoms, which would have increased the chances of detecting a patent
foramen ovale.
Based on his review of the anesthesia and recovery room records, no significant event
occurred during this time period. Dr. Green opined that the general anesthesia was not directly
related to the employee’s stroke. He noted that cerebral embolisms can occur from the heart but
the employee had an echocardiogram in the emergency room, which showed no sign of atrial clot
or fibrillation or lesions on the mitral or aortic valves. Dr. Green stated that more than likely the
heart was not the source. He indicated that embolic strokes occurred with disease of the internal
carotid or at the bifurcation of the internal and external carotid arteries. Studies of the
employee’s carotid artery showed minimal disease and no emboli from the aorta or major
arteries. Dr. Green stated that the employee was not diagnosed with diabetes but he had a fasting
glucose of 305 upon arrival at the emergency room, which was above 200 and suggestive of
diabetes. The employee’s other conditions included a body mass index (BMI) of 34.8, near
morbid obesity in a body mass index of more than 35. He had a history of hypercholesterolemia
and an elevated sedimentary rate of 46 while the range was from 0 to 20. Dr. Green noted that
hypercholesterolemia was associated with vascular disease. Dr. Green stated that increased
sedimentary rates were a sign of chronic infection and were associated with increased chance of
arterial endothelial damage and, therefore, formation of arterial clots. He noted that stress
hormones were released during general anesthesia and unavoidable which increased the chance
of clot formation. Dr. Green related that this most likely occurred in the venous system rather
than in the arterial system. He opined that anesthesia does have its inherent risk but what
happened to the employee was more likely associated with his medical health rather than any
specific anesthesia risk or surgery.
In a supplemental report dated March 23, 2005, Dr. Orent reviewed the anesthesia report
and employee’s records on admission to the hospital on the date of surgery. The employee’s
blood pressure during anesthesia never dropped below 110 systolic either in the operating or
recovery room. Dr. Orent further stated that the employee’s pulse oximetry remained at a 96
percent level throughout the entire procedure. There were no complications of intubation or
drops in blood pressure that might have resulted in a stroke at a later date. Dr. Orent related that
the admission history and physical examination did not contain symptoms suggestive of a risk
for stroke prior to the surgery. He did not review any preoperative laboratory tests but, stated
that it was unlikely that they would substantially change or alter his previously expressed
opinions. Dr. Orent opined that it was more probable than not that the employee’s stroke was
coincidental to surgery and anesthesia based on his review of the medical records.
By decision dated April 8, 2005, the Office denied appellant’s claim. It found that the
opinions of Dr. Orent, Dr. Green and Dr. Barrett were entitled to special weight as impartial

5

medical specialists in finding that the employee’s stroke and death on October 30, 1998 were not
caused by his October 28, 1998 employment-related surgery. The Office further found that the
record established that the physicians were properly selected from the PDS.
On April 25, 2005 appellant, through counsel, requested an oral hearing.
At the August 22, 2006 hearing, counsel contended that the Office failed to utilize the
PDS in selecting the impartial medical panel. He contended that the hearing representative
improperly denied his request to subpoena a medical examination scheduler used by the Office.3
Counsel further contended that neither Dr. Orent nor Dr. Green reviewed the anesthesia,
recovery room or laboratory test reports. He contended that Dr. Barrett did not address the issue
of whether the October 28, 1998 employment-related surgery caused the employee’s stroke.
By decision dated March 22, 2007, the Office hearing representative affirmed the April 8,
2005 decision. She accorded special weight to the opinions of Dr. Orent, Dr. Green and
Dr. Barrett as impartial medical specialists in finding that the employee’s stroke and death were
not caused by his October 28, 1998 employment-related surgery.
In a letter dated December 7, 2007, appellant, through counsel, requested
reconsideration.4 Counsel contended that the Office used its second opinion service rather than
the PDS to select Dr. Barrett and Dr. Green as impartial medical specialists. He also contended
that the statement of accepted facts was incomplete as it did not mention the employee’s
accepted cervical disc herniation at C5-6, which led to a fusion in 1992. Counsel stated that an
Office medical adviser determined that the absence of this condition was relevant. He contended
that the opinions of Dr. Orent and Dr. Green were not rationalized and that Dr. Barrett failed to
address the issue of whether the employee’s work-related surgery caused his stroke. Appellant
submitted a deposition of an individual on behalf of plaintiffs who had filed a lawsuit in district
court in Denver, Colorado against Medical OPS Management, a company used by the Office to
select the impartial medical specialists. The lawsuit alleged that Medical OPS Management was
engaged in biased procurement of medical evidence for insurance companies. Appellant
submitted a list of neurologists and anesthesiologists skipped by the medical examination
scheduler.
By decision dated January 24, 2008, the Office denied appellant’s request for
reconsideration, finding that the evidence submitted did not warrant further merit review of its
prior decisions.

3

By decision dated July 18, 2006, the hearing representative denied appellant’s request to subpoena the medical
examination scheduler used by the Office to select the panel of impartial medical specialists.
4

Prior to appellant’s request for reconsideration of the March 22, 2007 decision, she appealed the decision to the
Board. By order dated November 29, 2007, the Board dismissed her appeal because she wished to seek
reconsideration before the Office. Docket No. 07-1801 (issued November 29, 2007).

6

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
The United States shall pay compensation for the death of an employee resulting from
personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty.5 An appellant has the burden of
proving by the weight of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence that the employee’s
death was causally related to his or her federal employment. This burden includes the necessity
of furnishing medical opinion evidence of a cause and effect relationship based on a proper
factual and medical background. The opinion of the physician must be one of reasonable
medical certainty and must be supported by medical rationale.6 The mere showing that an
employee was receiving compensation for total disability at the time of death does not establish
that the employee’s death was causally related to his or her federal employment.7
Section 8123(a) of the Act8 provides that, if there is disagreement between the physician
making the examination for the United States and the physician of the employee, the Secretary
shall appoint a third physician who shall make an examination.9 The implementing regulations
states that, if a conflict exists between the medical opinion of the employee’s physician and the
medical opinion of either a second opinion physician or an Office medical adviser, the Office
shall appoint a third physician to make an examination. This is called a referee examination and
the Office will select a physician who is qualified in the appropriate specialty and who has no
prior connection with the case.10
When there exists opposing medical reports of virtually equal weight and rationale and
the case is referred to an impartial medical specialist for the purpose of resolving the conflict, the
opinion of such specialist, if sufficiently well rationalized and based upon a proper factual
background, must be given special weight.11
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that appellant has not established that the employee’s stroke on
October 29, 1998 or death on October 31, 1998 resulted from his October 28, 1998 employmentrelated surgery.
The Board on prior appeal found a conflict in medical opinion evidence. The Office
properly referred the employee’s medical records to a team of impartial medical specialists
consisting of Drs. Orent, Barrett and Green to resolve the issue of whether the employee’s stroke
5

5 U.S.C. § 8102(a).

6

Jacqueline Brasch (Ronald Brasch), 52 ECAB 252 (2001).

7

Susanne W. Underwood (Randall L. Underwood), 53 ECAB 139 (2001).

8

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

9

Id. at § 8123(a).

10

20 C.F.R. § 10.321.

11

Barry Neutuch, 54 ECAB 313 (2003); David W. Pickett, 54 ECAB 272 (2002).

7

on October 29, 1998 or death on October 31, 1998 were causally related to his October 28, 1998
surgery. In a February 8, 2005 report, Dr. Orent, reviewed the case record in detail. Although he
wished to review the anesthesia record to determine whether there was a drop in blood pressure
and the employee’s admitting laboratory tests and vital signs to determine whether any
abnormalities were overlooked prior to surgery, he concluded that it was more probable than not
that the employee’s death was caused by a coincidental event and not the October 28, 1998
employment-related surgery. Dr. Orent disagreed with the opinion of prior physicians that
prolonged occlusion time with a tourniquet created a thrombus in the employee’s extremity
which somehow embolized through his heart to the carotid artery. He explained that this was not
only physiologically improbable but essentially impossible as test results such as, an
echocardiogram, did not demonstrate that the employee had a hole in his heart or shunt between
the venous and arterial circulations which would have allowed a clot to reach his brain.
Dr. Orent also explained that given the complete lack of mechanism to explain how such an
embolus could travel from the vein in the arm to the brain, it was not possible for him to
postulate a relationship between the surgical procedure and stroke. While he noted that another
possibility would have been a complication of anesthesia such that the employee was hypoxic for
some period of time, he stated that clearly there was no documentation to this effect in the
medical record.
In a supplemental report dated March 23, 2005, Dr. Orent again opined that it was more
probable than not that the employee’s stroke was coincidental to his surgery and anesthesia based
on his review of the anesthesia report and the employee’s initial history and physical
examination for admission to the hospital on October 28, 1998. He explained that the
employee’s blood pressure during anesthesia never dropped below 110 systolic either in the
operating or recovery room. Dr. Orent further explained that the employee’s pulse oximetry
remained at a 96 percent level throughout the entire procedure. He related that there were no
complications of intubation or as stated any drops in blood pressure that might have resulted in a
stroke at a later date. Dr. Orent noted that the admission history and physical did not contain
symptoms that might have suggested a risk for stroke prior to the surgery. Although he did not
review any preoperative laboratory tests, he opined that it was unlikely that they would
substantially change or alter his previously expressed opinions.
In a February 23, 2005 report, Dr. Barrett opined that although a risk of stroke was
associated with surgical procedures, there was no causal relationship between the employee’s
work-related surgery and his subsequent stroke and death based on her review of the case record
and his death certificate. She indicated that it was well documented that two percent of patients
undergoing surgery, which included the employee, were at risk for perioperative stroke.
Dr. Barrett, however, attributed the employee’s perioperative stroke to his nonemploymentrelated risk factors, such as obesity, a history of smoking, hypercholesterolemia, a family history
of early vascular death and possible diabetes. She stated that it was no coincidence that the
stroke occurred one day following surgery based on these risk factors. Dr. Barrett related that
since a transthoracic echocardiogram did not identify a stunt, the tourniquet time of 60 minutes
could not have caused a venous embolism to travel to the right MCA via a right-to-left shunt in
the heart.
Dr. Green’s February 24, 2005 report found that general anesthesia was not directly
related to the employee’s stroke. He stated that the sudden onset of symptoms while eating

8

breakfast was suggestive of an embolus versus thrombotic event which occurred over time.
Dr. Green explained the development of clots in the venous system which could later lead to an
embolus that affected pulmonary circulation resulting in either shortness of breath or sudden
death. He stated that the use of a tourniquet has been associated with venous thrombosis more
likely in the lower extremity rather than in the upper extremity. Dr. Green, however, stated that
the use of a tourniquet for one hour during the employee’s surgery was within the acceptable
range of less than two hours. He related that the employee did not complain about any
postoperative pain in either his upper or lower extremities. In addition, Dr. Green did not find
any evidence either a shunt or patent foramen ovale, which would have resulted in an embolus
from venous circulation. He noted that the employee did not have a history of valsalva while
eating his breakfast prior to the onset of his symptoms, which would have increased the chances
of detecting a patent foramen ovale. Based on his review of interpretations of the anesthesia and
recovery room records, Dr. Green determined that no significant event occurred during this time
period. He stated that more than likely the heart was not the source. Dr. Green related that
although cerebral embolisms can occur from the heart, an echocardiogram which was performed
in the emergency room did not show a sign of atrial clot or fibrillation or lesions on the mitral or
aortic valves. Further, he related that although embolic strokes occurred with disease of the
internal carotid or at the bifurcation of the internal and external carotid arteries, the employee’s
carotid showed minimal disease and no emboli from the aorta or major arteries. Dr. Green
opined that anesthesia does have its inherent risk but what happened to the employee was more
likely associated with his medical health, which included diabetes, near morbid obesity,
hypercholesterolemia and an elevated sedimentary rate, rather than any specific anesthesia risk
or surgery. He stated that hypercholesterolemia was associated with vascular disease and that
increased sedimentary rates were a sign of chronic infection and were associated with an
increased chance of arterial endothelial damage which leads to the formation of arterial clots.
The Board finds that the opinions of Drs. Orent, Barrett and Green are well rationalized
and based on a proper factual and medical background and, thus, entitled to special weight
afforded impartial medical specialists. They found that the employee’s stroke and death on
October 31, 1998 were not caused by his October 28, 1998 employment-related surgery. For
these reasons, their reports constitute the special weight of the medical opinion evidence afforded
an impartial medical specialist.12
Counsel contended that Dr. Orent, Dr. Barrett and Dr. Green were not properly selected
under the PDS. An impartial medical specialist is selected using a rotational system based on the
PDS.13 The services of all available and qualified Board-certified specialists will be used as far
as possible to eliminate any inference of bias or partiality. This is accomplished by selecting
specialists in alphabetical order as listed in the roster chosen under the specialty and/or
subspecialty heading in the appropriate geographic area and repeating the process when the list is
exhausted.14 The Board notes that appellant’s challenge to the selection of Drs. Orent, Barrett
12

See Darlene R. Kennedy, 57 ECAB 414 (2006).

13

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 3 -- Medical, Medical Examinations, Chapter 3.500.4.b(1)(May 2003);
L.W., 59 ECAB ____ (Docket No. 07-1346, issued April 23, 2008).
14

Id.

9

and Green did not occur until after issuance of the Office’s April 8, 2005 decision which
accorded special weight to their opinions. If appellant disagreed with this selection, she should
have noted her objections at or near the time the employee’s case record was referred to the
physicians on January 28, 2005. Counsel complied with the Office’s March 3, 2005 request for
submission of additional medical evidence for review by the impartial medical panel without
stating any objections to their selection. Moreover, the Board notes that the Office followed its
procedures and provided the evidence necessary to establish the physicians were selected in a
fair and unbiased manner. The record demonstrates that the Office adhered to the selection
procedures, that reasons were provided for each physician who was bypassed and that the only
zip code utilized was the zip code of appellant’s address of record. The Board finds that
appellant has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that Dr. Orent, Dr. Barrett and
Dr. Green were improperly selected as the impartial medical panel.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
To require the Office to reopen a case for merit review under section 8128 of the Act,15
the Office’s regulations provide that a claimant must: (1) show that the Office erroneously
applied or interpreted a specific point of law; (2) advance a relevant legal argument not
previously considered by the Office; or (3) constitute relevant and pertinent new evidence not
previously considered by the Office.16 To be entitled to a merit review of an Office decision
denying or terminating a benefit, a claimant also must file his or her application for review
within one year of the date of that decision.17 When a claimant fails to meet one of the above
standards, the Office will deny the application for reconsideration without reopening the case for
review of the merits.
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
In a letter dated December 7, 2007, appellant, through counsel, disagreed with the Office
hearing representative’s March 22, 2007 decision. The relevant issue in the case, whether the
employee’s stroke and death were caused by the accepted employment-related surgery, is
medical in nature.
In the request for reconsideration, counsel argued that the Office used its second opinion
service rather than the PDS to select Dr. Barrett and Dr. Green as impartial medical specialists.
He contended that the second opinion service was biased. Counsel further argued that the
statement of accepted facts was incomplete as it did not mention the employee’s accepted
cervical disc herniation at C5-6, which led to a fusion in 1992. He stated that an Office medical
adviser determined that the absence of this condition was relevant. Counsel contended that the
opinions of Dr. Orent and Dr. Green were not rationalized and that Dr. Barrett failed to address
the issue of whether the employee’s work-related surgery caused his stroke. Evidence that
15

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193. Under section 8128 of the Act, the Secretary of Labor may review an award for or
against payment of compensation at any time on her own motion or on application. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
16

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(1)-(2).

17

Id. at § 10.607(a).

10

repeats or duplicates evidence already in the case record has no evidentiary value and does not
constitute a basis for reopening a case.18 Counsel’s contentions were previously made and
addressed by the Office in its prior decisions and, thus, do not constitute relevant and pertinent
new evidence not previously considered by the Office. The Board finds that this evidence does
not require reopening appellant’s claim for further review on the merits.
Appellant submitted a deposition regarding a lawsuit filed against Medical OPS
Management alleging that it was engaged in biased procurement of medical evidence for
insurance companies and provided a list containing the names of neurologists and
anesthesiologists allegedly skipped by the medical examination scheduler. The Board has held
that the submission of evidence which does not address the particular issue involved in the case
does not constitute a basis for reopening the claim.19 As the issue in this case is medical in
nature, the factual evidence submitted by appellant is not relevant and, thus, insufficient to
warrant further merit review of her claim.
The evidence submitted by appellant did not show that the Office erroneously applied or
interpreted a specific point of law, advance a relevant legal argument not previously considered
by the Office or constitute relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously considered by the
Office. As she did not meet any of the necessary regulatory requirements, the Board finds that
she is not entitled to further merit review.20
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the employee’s stroke and death on October 31, 1998 were not
causally related to his October 28, 1998 employment-related surgery. The Board further finds
that the Office properly denied appellant’s request for a merit review of her claim pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 8128(a).

18

James W. Scott, 55 ECAB 606, 608 n.4 (2004); Freddie Mosley, 54 ECAB 255 (2002).

19

D’Wayne Avila, 57 ECAB 642 (2006).

20

See 20 C.F.R. § 10.608(b); Richard Yadron, 57 ECAB 207 (2005).

11

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the January 24, 2008 and March 22, 2007 decisions
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed.
Issued: March 23, 2009
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

12


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.C., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY
PENTAGON, Washington, DC, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 18-0466
Issued: July 27, 2018

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 8, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a December 13, 2017 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish more than 48 percent
permanent impairment of his eyes, for which he previously received a schedule award.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On September 14, 2001 appellant, then a 51-year-old accountant, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1) alleging that, on September 11, 2001, he sustained multiple injuries due to the

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

terrorist attack on the Pentagon. He indicated that he sustained burns over 75 percent of his body.
Appellant stopped work on September 11, 2001 and has not returned.
OWCP accepted that appellant sustained third degree burns of his eyes/eyelids and other
parts of his face, profound vision impairment of both eyes, after-cataract (obscuring vision) of his
right eye, peripheral opacity of the cornea of his right eye, senile ectropion of both corneas, partial
recent retinal detachment (with single defect) of his right eye, carcinoma in situ both eyes, posttraumatic stress disorder, and multiple other burn-related injuries to his eyes, face/head, trunk, and
extremities.
Beginning September 11, 2001 appellant underwent multiple OWCP-approved surgeries
which addressed the effects of the severe burns he sustained on September 11, 2001. These
surgeries included skin excision, debridement, and grafting procedures, and reconstruction of his
right upper eyelid, nose, lower lip, chin, and ears.2
Appellant received disability compensation on the periodic rolls beginning June 16, 2002
and continuing.
In 2003, appellant began treatments for his eye condition with Dr. Salim I. Butrus, a Boardcertified ophthalmologist.
On January 6, 2005 appellant underwent OWCP-approved right eye surgery, including
penetrating keratoplasty, limited anterior vitrectomy, and removal of posterior chamber implant.3
On January 4, 2007 he underwent OWCP-approved retina detachment repair surgery of his right
eye.
In a March 31, 2009 report, Dr. Butrus indicated that appellant was status post thermal burn
to both eyes, corneas, and ocular surfaces sustained on September 11, 2001. He noted that a failed
cornea transplant to appellant’s right eye was performed on September 21, 2006 and that appellant
also developed a retina detachment in that eye.4 Dr. Butrus indicated that appellant’s left eye had
cornea scarring with 20/40 vision and that his right eye had 100 percent permanent visual loss.
Dr. Butrus continued to periodically evaluate appellant’s eye condition, including
occasions when he examined appellant and performed testing on September 12, 2014 and
January 12, 2015.
In a March 7, 2016 report, Dr. Butrus advised that appellant sustained severe thermal burns
in both eyes due to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. Due to these injuries, appellant had
total blindness in his right eye secondary to total retina detachment and other damage, and his left
2

With respect to his right upper eyelid, appellant underwent surgery on April 28, 2004 in the form of cicatrix
reduction, full-thickness grafting, lateral canthopexy, and reconstruction of medial canthal webbing and sulcus
deformity.
3

The record does not contain a report indicating when appellant received the right cornea transplant that was
removed on January 6, 2005.
4

The record does not contain a report of the September 21, 2006 surgery.

2

eye was affected with corneal scarring, haze, cataract, and severe dryness. Dr. Butrus indicated
that appellant still complained of foggy vision, grittiness, foreign body sensation, decreased
contrast sensitivity, light sensitivity, ghosting, night halos, starbursts, and double vision in his left
eye. Upon his last examination on January 12, 2015, appellant’s visual acuity in his right eye was
“no light perception” and he had 20/100 vision in his left eye. Dr. Butrus noted that appellant’s
left cornea showed diffuse haze, scarring, medium cataract, and borderline intraocular pressures.
Appellant’s eye condition made it difficult for him to read, drive, work on a computer, and perform
tasks on an up-close basis.
On August 31, 2017 appellant filed a claim for compensation (Form CA-7) seeking a
schedule award due to the accepted employment injuries relating to his eyes.
In a September 5, 2017 development letter, OWCP requested that appellant obtain a report
from an attending physician which addressed whether he had reached maximum medical
improvement (MMI) with respect to his eye conditions. It advised that, if the physician determined
that MMI had been reached, he or she should provide an opinion on the extent of the permanent
impairment of appellant’s eyes under the standards of the sixth edition of the American Medical
Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (A.M.A., Guides).5 OWCP
afforded appellant 30 days to respond to the letter.
Appellant submitted a September 25, 2017 report from Dr. Butrus who indicated that
appellant’s eye condition had been stable and unchanged since he produced his last report on
March 7, 2016. Dr. Butrus discussed the history of appellant’s eye condition since September 11,
2001, noting the total blindness in his right eye and the foggy vision in his left eye. He advised
that appellant underwent right penetrating keratoplasty and had a keratoprosthesis (artificial
cornea) in his right eye.6 During Dr. Butrus’ last examination,7 appellant complained of marked
blurry vision in his left eye with glare, haze, double vision, and halos more pronounced at night.
The examination revealed no light perception in appellant’s right eye and 20/80 vision in his left
eye. Dr. Butrus noted that appellant had intraocular pressure of 20 millimeters of mercury
(mm Hg) in his right eye and 21 mm Hg in his left eye, and he indicated that appellant had diffuse
corneal haze and scarring in his left cornea. He determined that appellant reached MMI as of his
September 12, 2014 examination and noted, “The right eye is 100 [percent] impaired due to retinal
detachment and total blindness. [Appellant’s] left eye impairment is about 65 [percent].”
Dr. Butrus advised that appellant’s eye condition, which he did not expect to improve, would cause
difﬁculty in driving, reading, and performing most daily tasks.
On October 20, 2017 OWCP referred appellant’s case to Dr. Kevin R. Yuhan, a Boardcertified ophthalmologist serving as an OWCP medical adviser. It requested that Dr. Yuhan
review the evidence of record, including Dr. Butrus’ September 25, 2017 report and provide an

5

A.M.A., Guides (6th ed. 2009).

6

The record does not contain a report indicating when appellant had a keratoprosthesis implanted in his right eye.

7

Dr. Butrus listed appellant’s last examination as occurring on October 2, 2017 and the record contains examination
findings from that date. Therefore, his report dated September 25, 2017 actually was completed after the October 2,
2017 examination was completed.

3

opinion regarding the permanent impairment of appellant’s eyes under the standards of the sixth
edition of the A.M.A., Guides.
In a November 10, 2017 report, Dr. Yuhan discussed the history of appellant’s eye
conditions, noting that appellant had a keratoprosthesis in his right eye.8 He indicated that the
medical evidence of record showed that appellant’s right eye had no light perception, and he
advised that appellant had 20/30 vision in his left eye with correction and 20/100 vision in his left
eye without correction. The visual field in appellant’s left eye was normal, but there was no visual
field in his right eye due to lack of vision. Dr. Yuhan evaluated the permanent impairment of
appellant’s eyes under Table 12-2 on page 288 of the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides. He
found that appellant had a visual acuity score (VAS) of 0 for his right eye due to no light perception
in that eye, which equaled 100 percent permanent impairment of his right eye. Appellant had a
VAS of 65 for his left eye due to his uncorrected vision of 20/100, which equaled 35 percent
permanent impairment of his left eye. Dr. Yuhan indicated, under Table 12-3 on page 289 of the
sixth edition, the formula for the functional acuity score (FAS) is (3 x VASOU +VASOD+VASOS)/5
where OU is binocular vision, OD is vision in the right eye and OS is vision in the left eye.9 The
result for appellant’s FAS under this formula was 52. Dr. Yuhan noted that the acuity-related
impairment rating was calculated by subtracting the FAS from 10010 and he then subtracted the
FAS of 52 from 100 to conclude that appellant had a combined 48 percent permanent impairment
of both eyes under the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides based on impairment of visual acuity.
He advised that there was “no visual field loss per provider” and he indicated that appellant reached
MMI by September 12, 2014. Dr. Yuhan noted that Dr. Butrus did not explain how his finding of
about 65 percent permanent impairment of the left eye was derived under the A.M.A., Guides.
By decision dated December 13, 2017, OWCP granted appellant a schedule award for 48
permanent impairment of both his eyes. The award ran for 76.80 weeks from December 10, 2017
to May 31, 2019 and was based on the opinion of Dr. Yuhan.11
LEGAL PRECEDENT
The schedule award provisions of FECA12 and its implementing regulations13 set forth the
number of weeks of compensation payable to employees sustaining permanent impairment from

8

Dr. Yuhan indicated that appellant underwent failed cornea transplant surgery of his right eye in 2006 and bilateral
cataract surgeries on unspecified dates. The record does not contain reports of these surgeries, although Dr. Butrus
had noted in his March 31, 2009 report that the failed cornea transplant surgery occurred on September 21, 2006.
9

A.M.A., Guides 284, Table 12-3.

10

Id.

11

The schedule award listed the date of MMI as September 12, 2014. OWCP noted that the starting date of the
schedule award had been adjusted to December 10, 2017 because appellant received disability compensation through
December 9, 2017.
12

5 U.S.C. § 8107.

13

20 C.F.R. § 10.404.

4

loss or loss of use of scheduled members, organs, or functions of the body.14 For 100 percent loss
of an eye, as with blindness, FECA provides a maximum 160 weeks of compensation.15 A loss of
80 percent or more of the vision of an eye is considered the same as loss of the eye.16 Partial losses
are compensated proportionately.17
Such loss or loss of use is known as permanent impairment. OWCP evaluates the degree
of permanent impairment according to the standards set forth in the specified edition of the
A.M.A., Guides.18 For decisions issued after May 1, 2009, the sixth edition is used to calculate
schedule awards.19
Although the A.M.A., Guides provides that impairment ratings should be based on the bestcorrected visual acuity,20 FECA mandates that the degree of loss of vision must be determined
without regard to correction.21
OWCP procedures provide that, after obtaining all necessary medical evidence, the file
should be routed to an OWCP medical adviser for an opinion concerning the nature and percentage
of impairment in accordance with the A.M.A., Guides, with the medical adviser providing
rationale for the percentage of impairment specified.22
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has 100 percent permanent impairment of his right eye
entitling him to 160 weeks of compensation and that the case is not in posture for decision
regarding the permanent impairment of appellant’s left eye.
OWCP issued appellant a schedule award for 48 percent permanent impairment of both of
his eyes, or 76.80 weeks of compensation. The issue on appeal is whether appellant is entitled to
more than 76.80 weeks of compensation.
OWCP based its schedule award on the permanent impairment rating of Dr. Yuhan, an
OWCP medical adviser. Dr. Yuhan’s calculation of 48 percent permanent impairment of
14

Supra note 12.

15

Id. at § 8107(c)(5).

16

Id. at § 8107(c)(14).

17

Id. at § 8107(c)(19).

18

Supra note 14.

19
See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 3 -- Medical, Schedule Awards, Chapter 3.700, Exhibit 1
(January 2010); Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Schedule Awards and Permanent Disability
Claims, Chapter 2.808.5a (March 2017).
20

A.M.A., Guides 287, Chapter 12.2c.

21

5 U.S.C. § 8107(c)(19).

22

See supra note 19 at Chapter 2.808.6f (March 2017).

5

appellant’s eyes was not representative of his total permanent impairment. He determined that
appellant had a total loss of vision in his right eye due to no light perception or visual function in
that eye, and the Board finds that this constitutes 100 percent loss of function of appellant’s right
eye.
The Board notes that the compensation schedule provides that total loss of an eye equals
160 weeks of compensation.23 The medical evidence of record in this case establishes that
appellant has total loss of vision of the right eye which entitles him to additional schedule award
compensation beyond that already granted.
The Board has previously considered what constitutes total loss of vision of an eye. In
Michael C. Knorr, the employee had no light perception and no visual function of his left eye.24
The Board found that he had sustained total loss of his left eye and was entitled to 160 weeks
compensation for loss of the left eye, rather than the 40 weeks granted by OWCP. The Board
made similar findings in A.G.,25 and C.P.,26 wherein the medical evidence also established, in each
case, that the employee had no light perception or vision function in an eye.
The Board finds that, while OWCP properly found that appellant was entitled to a schedule
award, it was incorrect in finding that he was only entitled to 76.80 weeks of compensation, despite
having 100 percent permanent impairment of his right eye due to having no light perception and
no chance of improvement in his right eye condition.27 The schedule award is, therefore, modified
to reflect that appellant is entitled to the full 160 weeks of compensation for total loss of his right
eye, or an additional 83.20 weeks of compensation. OWCP should amend the schedule award
determination to reflect the total loss of the right eye and award the appropriate schedule award
benefit.
The Board further finds that the case is not is posture for decision regarding the permanent
impairment of appellant’s left eye. The evidence of record suggests that appellant has permanent
impairment of his left eye for which he has not yet been compensated.28 The Board notes that a
complete evaluation of his left eye permanent impairment, which fully considers permanent
impairment of visual acuity and visual field, has not yet been conducted. Dr. Yuhan did not
conduct a complete rating of appellant’s left eye permanent impairment under the relevant
standards. Although he opined that appellant did not have impairment of the visual field of the
23

20 C.F.R. § 8107(c)(5).

24

Docket No. 99-2059 (issued September 15, 2000).

25

Docket No. 11-1512 (issued April 9, 2012) (finding that the claimant was entitled to the full 160 weeks of
compensation for total permanent loss of vision in his right eye).
26

Docket No. 17-0630 (issued July 18, 2017) (finding that the claimant was entitled to the full 160 weeks of
compensation for total permanent loss of vision in his right eye).
27

See A.G., supra note 25 and C.P., id.

28

Dr. Yuhan provided a calculation for appellant’s left eye under Table 12-2 (Impairment of Visual Acuity), finding
a visual acuity score of 65 and permanent impairment of 30 percent due to 20/100 vision in that eye without correction.
See A.M.A., Guides 288, Table 12-2.

6

left eye, he did not provide a clear explanation for this opinion. Therefore, the case shall be
remanded to OWCP for consideration of the permanent impairment of appellant’s left eye. After
carrying out such development, it shall issue a de novo decision regarding the permanent
impairment of his eyes.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has 100 percent permanent impairment of his right eye
entitling him to 160 weeks of compensation and that the case is not in posture for decision
regarding the permanent impairment of appellant’s left eye.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the December 13, 2017 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside, and the case is remanded to OWCP for further
action consistent with this decision.
Issued: July 27, 2018
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
E.I., Appellant
and
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,
TRANSMISSION CONSTRUCTION BRANCH,
Chattanooga, TN, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-1471
Issued: November 6, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On June 28, 2012 appellant filed a timely appeal from the April 23, 2012 nonmerit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), which denied his
reconsideration request. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20
C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to review this nonmerit decision. Since
more than 180 days elapsed from OWCP’s most recent merit decision of December 5, 2011 to
the filing of this appeal, the Board lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the claim.2
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly denied appellant’s reconsideration request under
5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
1
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

Appellant requested an oral argument. The Clerk of the Board mailed a letter to appellant to confirm a
continuing desire for an oral argument in Washington, DC. No written confirmation was received; thus the Board
has decided the appeal on the record.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On May 12, 1986 appellant, a 37-year-old grounds man, sustained a traumatic injury in
the performance of duty while operating a jackhammer. OWCP accepted his claim for herniated
nucleus pulposus at C5-6 and left muscle strain. It also accepted a herniated disc at C6-7 and
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. In 1990 appellant received a schedule award for a two percent
impairment of the right upper extremity and a nine percent impairment of the left.3
In 2011 appellant filed a claim for an increased schedule award. Dr. Timothy J. Renfree,
a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, found a five percent impairment of the right upper
extremity due to loss of wrist motion (45 degrees dorsiflexion, 55 degrees volar flexion). He
cited Table 15-32 of the American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment (6th ed. 2009).
An OWCP medical adviser found that Dr. Renfree rated appellant “without clear
explanation.” He added that Dr. Renfree’s rating was incorrect as it did not follow the A.M.A.,
Guides. The medical adviser calculated a diagnosis-based impairment of two percent for
entrapment neuropathy, citing Table 15-23 of the A.M.A., Guides.
On May 18, 2011 OWCP denied an increased schedule award on the grounds that the
medical evidence did not demonstrate right upper extremity impairment greater than had been
awarded. In a December 5, 2011 decision, an OWCP hearing representative affirmed.
Noting that he was repeatedly denied the five percent impairment rating given by
Dr. Renfree, appellant requested reconsideration. OWCP received this request on April 9, 2012.
In an April 23, 2012 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s reconsideration request. It
found that the evidence received since the hearing representative’s December 5, 2011 decision
was irrelevant to the issue decided because it did not address whether appellant had greater than
a two percent impairment of his right upper extremity.
On appeal, appellant contends that he still has pain and numbness in his right hand,
causing him to drop things. He is also dropping things with his left. Appellant asked permission
to have surgery on his left hand and receive an award of the five percent impairment rating found
by Dr. Renfree.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
OWCP may review an award for or against payment of compensation at any time on its
own motion or upon application.4 An employee (or representative) seeking reconsideration
should send the request for reconsideration to the address as instructed by OWCP in the final
decision. The request for reconsideration, including all supporting documents, must be in
3

The record indicates that appellant suffered a post-traumatic bronchial plexus nerve injury in 1981and right
forearm contusion in 1984, both in the performance of duty.
4

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

2

writing and must set forth arguments and contain evidence that either: (1) shows that OWCP
erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law; (2) advances a relevant legal argument
not previously considered by OWCP; or (3) constitutes relevant and pertinent new evidence not
previously considered by OWCP.5
A request for reconsideration must be received by OWCP within one year of the date of
OWCP’s decision for which review is sought.6 A timely request for reconsideration may be
granted if OWCP determines that the employee has presented evidence or argument that meets at
least one of the standards above. If reconsideration is granted, the case is reopened and the case
is reviewed on its merits. Where the request is timely but fails to meet at least one of these
standards, OWCP will deny the request for reconsideration without reopening the case for a
review on the merits.7
ANALYSIS
As the filing of this appeal leaves the Board no jurisdiction to review either OWCP’s
May 18, 2011 merit decision denying an increased schedule award or the hearing
representative’s December 5, 2011 merit decision affirming that denial the only issue the Board
may review is whether OWCP properly denied appellant’s reconsideration request.
OWCP received appellant’s reconsideration request within one calendar year of the most
recent merit decision. The request is therefore timely. The question for determination is whether
this request met at least one of the three standards for reopening his case.
Appellant did not show that OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of
law. He did not identify a specific point of law or show that OWCP erroneously applied or
interpreted it.
Appellant did not advance a new and relevant legal argument. He simply noted that he
had repeatedly been denied the five percent impairment rating found by Dr. Renfree. OWCP
reviewed and adjudicated that issue in both its May 18, 2011 decision and in the hearing
representative’s December 5, 2011 decision. Appellant offered no new argument.
Appellant did not submit any relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously
considered by OWCP. As OWCP correctly found, none of the evidence received after the
hearing representative’s December 5, 2011 decision addressed whether appellant had more than
a two percent impairment of his right upper extremity. Appellant submitted no new impairment
evaluation to establish that he had an increased impairment.
The Board finds that appellant’s reconsideration request did not meet any of the
requirements for reopening his case. Accordingly, the Board finds that OWCP properly denied a
merit review. The Board will affirm OWCP’s April 23, 2012 decision.
5

20 C.F.R. § 10.606.

6

Id. at § 10.607(a).

7

Id. at § 10.608.

3

Appellant argued that he still has pain and numbness in his right hand, causing him to
drop things. The question of whether he should receive an increased schedule award depends on
a medical evaluation of his right upper extremity and the proper application of the sixth edition
of the A.M.A., Guides. As for permission for appellant to have surgery on his left hand, the
Board has no authority to grant it. Appellant may ask OWCP for authorization.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly denied appellant’s reconsideration request.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 23, 2012 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: November 6, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

4