United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.S., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Grand Rapids, MI, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 13-1037
Issued: September 9, 2013

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 26, 2013 appellant filed a timely appeal from a February 7, 2013 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) denying her traumatic
injury claim. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.2
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained an
injury in the performance of duty on October 1, 2012.
1
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

The Board notes that appellant submitted additional evidence after OWCP rendered its February 7, 2013
decision. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the evidence that was before OWCP at the time of its final
decision. Therefore, this additional evidence cannot be considered by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 510.2(c)(1); Dennis E.
Maddy, 47 ECAB 259 (1995); James C. Campbell, 5 ECAB 35, 36 n.2 (1952). Appellant may submit this evidence
to OWCP, together with a formal request for reconsideration, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§ 10.606(b)(2).

FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 2, 2012 appellant, then a 54-year-old city carrier, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on October 1, 2012 she sustained a back injury when she was
twisting, turning, stepping down, bending and lifting a tray of mail for delivery. She notified her
supervisor and first received medical care on October 1, 2012.3
Appellant submitted medical reports dated October 1 to November 29, 2012 from
Dr. Loida S. Medina, a treating physician. In her October 1, 2012 report, Dr. Medina reported
that on that same date, appellant was picking up a tray and turned when she felt a sharp pain on
her left side. She diagnosed lumbar strain and restricted appellant from working. Appellant
sought continued treatment with Dr. Medina due to pain and in subsequent visits, the physician
provided diagnoses of low back pain, left middle back pain, muscle spasm, neck pain and hip
pain.
In an October 1, 2012 Attending Physician’s Report (Form CA-20), Dr. Medina
diagnosed lumbar strain and checked the box marked “yes” when asked if she believed
appellant’s condition was caused or aggravated by her employment condition. The form did not
contain a history of injury as provided by appellant.
In Duty Status Reports (Form CA-17) dated October 1 to November 29, 2012,
Dr. Medina stated that appellant injured her back while lifting. The physician diagnosed low
back pain and provided appellant with work restrictions.
In an October 5, 2012 physical therapy report, Jerry Espiritu, a physical therapist (PT),
reported that on October 1, 2012 appellant twisted her body and lifted a tray of mail while at
work when she felt immediate sharp pain on the left side of her lower back. He noted that
appellant was diagnosed with low back pain and presented with possible strain on left upper
lumbar and posterior thigh. Physical therapy was recommended three to four times a week. On
October 8, 2012 Dr. Medina signed a statement in the October 5, 2012 report stating, “I certify
the need for skilled physical therapy services as outlined above.” Physical therapy reports
documenting appellant’s treatment were also submitted dated October 29 and November 29,
2012, signed by both Mr. Espiritu and Dr. Medina.
On October 22, 2012 appellant accepted an offer of modified assignment which provided
her with work restrictions.
By letter dated January 3, 2013, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence of record
was insufficient to support her claim. Appellant was advised of the medical and factual evidence
needed and was asked to respond to the questions provided in the letter within 30 days.
In support of her claim, appellant submitted a chiropractic record dated December 5,
2012 and January 9, 2013 from McDonald Chiropractic Clinic. The record noted that she
3

The Board notes that appellant has 9 other traumatic and occupational injury claims before OWCP beginning
January 26, 2006 to July 12, 2012. The record before the Board contains no other information regarding these
additional claims.

2

complained of numbness and tingling in her left leg and foot, as well as numbness in her hand.
The treatment notes contained no legible signature.
By decision dated February 7, 2013, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding that the
medical evidence of record failed to establish that her injury was causally related to the accepted
October 1, 2012 employment incident.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of establishing the essential
elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an “employee of the United
States” within the meaning of FECA; that the claim was filed within the applicable time
limitation; that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged and that any
disability or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are causally related to the
employment injury.4 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim
regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.5
In order to determine whether an employee actually sustained an injury in the
performance of duty, OWCP begins with an analysis of whether fact of injury has been
established. Generally, fact of injury consists of two components which must be considered in
conjunction with one another. The first component to be established is that the employee
actually experienced the employment incident which is alleged to have occurred.6 The second
component is whether the employment incident caused a personal injury and generally can be
established only by medical evidence.
When an employee claims that he or she sustained an injury in the performance of duty
he or she must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he or she experienced a specific event,
incident or exposure occurring at the time, place and in the manner alleged. He or she must also
establish that such event, incident or exposure caused an injury.7 Once an employee establishes
that he or she sustained an injury in the performance of duty, he or she has the burden of proof to
establish that any subsequent medical condition or disability for work, for which he or she claims
compensation is causally related to the accepted injury.8
To establish that an injury occurred as alleged, the injury need not be confirmed by
eyewitnesses, but the employee’s statements must be consistent with the surrounding facts and
circumstances and his or her subsequent course of action. In determining whether a case has
been established, such circumstances as late notification of injury, lack of confirmation of injury
4

Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143, 1154 (1989).

5

Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).

6

Elaine Pendleton, supra note 4 at 1143.

7

See generally John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989); see also 5 U.S.C. § 8101(5) (injury defined); 20 C.F.R.
§ 10.5(q) and (ee) (1999) (occupational disease or illness and traumatic injury defined). See Victor J. Woodhams, 41
ECAB 345 (1989) regarding a claimant’s burden of proof in an occupational disease claim.
8

Supra note 5.

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and failure to obtain medical treatment may, if otherwise unexplained, cast substantial doubt on
the employee’s statements. The employee has not met his or her burden when there are such
inconsistencies in the evidence as to cast serious doubt on the validity of the claim.9
To establish a causal relationship between the condition, as well as any attendant
disability claimed and the employment event or incident, the employee must submit rationalized
medical opinion evidence based on a complete factual and medical background, supporting such
a causal relationship.10 The opinion of the physician must be based on one of reasonable medical
certainty and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship
between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by the claimant.
This medical opinion must include an accurate history of the employee’s employment injury and
must explain how the condition is related to the injury. The weight of medical evidence is
determined by its reliability, its probative value, its convincing quality, the care of analysis
manifested and the medical rationale expressed in support of the physician’s opinion.11
ANALYSIS
OWCP accepted that the October 1, 2012 employment incident occurred as alleged. The
issue is whether appellant established that the incident caused her a back injury. The Board finds
that she did not submit sufficient medical evidence to support that her back injury is causally
related to the October 1, 2012 employment incident.12
In medical reports and CA-17 forms dated October 1 to November 29, 2012, Dr. Medina
reported that on October 1, 2012 appellant was picking up a tray and turned when she felt a sharp
pain on her left side. She diagnosed lumbar strain, low back pain, left middle back pain, muscle
spasm, neck pain and hip pain and provided appellant with work restrictions. In an October 1,
2012 Form CA-20, Dr. Medina diagnosed lumbar strain and checked the box marked “yes” when
asked if she believed that appellant’s condition was caused or aggravated by her employment
condition. The form did not contain a history of injury as provided by appellant.
The Board finds that the opinion of Dr. Medina is not well rationalized. Dr. Medina
failed to provide any details regarding appellant’s medical history. She provided a diagnosis of
lumbar strain but her medical reports failed to state any opinion on causal relationship. While
Dr. Medina noted that appellant was picking up a tray and turned when she felt a sharp pain on
her left side, she failed to state that the incident caused appellant’s injury and did not provide an
explanation on how this incident would result in lumbar strain. She also provided additional
diagnoses of low back pain, left middle back pain, muscle spasm, neck pain and hip pain. The
Board has held that pain is a description of a symptom rather than a clear diagnosis of the

9

Betty J. Smith, 54 ECAB 174 (2002).

10

See 20 C.F.R. § 10.110(a); John M. Tornello, 35 ECAB 234 (1983).

11

James Mack, 43 ECAB 321 (1991).

12

See Robert Broome, 55 ECAB 339 (2004).

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medical condition.13 It is not possible to establish the cause of a medical condition, if the
physician has not stated a diagnosis, but only notes pain.14
Dr. Medina’s October 1, 2012 Form CA-20 diagnosed lumbar strain and the physician
checked the box marked “yes” when asked if she believed that appellant’s condition was caused
or aggravated by her employment condition. However, the form contained no history of injury
and it is unclear what employment incident Dr. Medina is attributing to appellant’s lumbar strain.
The Board has held that an opinion on causal relationship which consists only of a physician
checking “yes” on a medical form report without further explanation or rationale is of diminished
probative value.15 Medical reports without adequate rationale on causal relationship are of
diminished probative value and do not meet an employee’s burden of proof.16 The opinion of a
physician supporting causal relationship must rest on a complete factual and medical background
supported by affirmative evidence, address the specific factual and medical evidence of record
and provide medical rationale explaining the relationship between the diagnosed condition and
the established incident or factor of employment.17 Dr. Medina’s reports do not meet that
standard and are insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.
The remaining medical evidence is also insufficient to support appellant’s claim.
Mr. Espiritu’s October 5, 2012 report was not signed by a physician. Rather, Dr. Medina signed
a certification approving physical therapy. Registered nurses, physical therapists and physicians
assistants, they are not physicians as defined under FECA, their opinions are of no probative
value.18 The Chiropractic Record from McDonald Chiropractic Clinic did not contain a legible
signature and thus, it is unclear if the treatment notes were signed by a physician.19 These notes
lack probative medical value as the author(s) cannot be identified as a physician.20

13

C.F., Docket No. 08-1102 (issued October 10, 2008).

14

T.G., Docket No. 13-76 (issued March 22, 2013).

15

Alberta S. Williamson, 47 ECAB 569 (1996).

16

Ceferino L. Gonzales, 32 ECAB 1591 (1981).

17

See Lee R. Haywood, 48 ECAB 145 (1996).

18

5 U.S.C. § 8102(2) of FECA provides as follows: (2) physician includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical
psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined
by State law. FECA provides that the term “physician” includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical
psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined
by State law. See also Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238 (2005).
19

Nurses, physician’s assistants, physical and occupational therapists are not “physicians” as defined by FECA,
their opinions regarding diagnosis and causal relationship are of no probative medical value. 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2).
20

See Ricky S. Storms, 52 ECAB 349 (2001); Morris Scanlon, 11 ECAB 384, 385 (1960). A chiropractor is not
considered a physician under FECA unless their reimbursable services are limited to treatment consisting of manual
manipulation of the spine to correct a subluxation as demonstrated by x-ray to exist and subject to regulation by the
Secretary. 5 U.S.C. § 8102(2); see Sean O’Connell, 56 ECAB 195 (2004); Mary A. Ceglia, 55 ECAB 626 (2004).

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In the instant case, the record lacks rationalized medical evidence establishing a causal
relationship between the October 1, 2012 employment incident and appellant’s injury. Thus,
appellant has failed to meet her burden of proof.
Appellant may submit additional evidence, together with a written request for
reconsideration, to OWCP within one year of the Board’s merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.606 and 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish that her back
injury is causally related to the October 1, 2012 employment incident, as alleged.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the February 7, 2013 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: September 9, 2013
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
R.H., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Memphis, TN, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 09-2139
Issued: May 11, 2010

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 10, 2009 appellant filed a timely appeal from a February 20, 2009 nonmerit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, denying her request for
reconsideration on the grounds that it was not timely filed and did not present clear evidence of
error. There is no merit decision within one year of the last merit decision dated
March 19, 2007. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board lacks jurisdiction to
review the merits of the claim.
ISSUE
The issue is whether the Office properly denied appellant’s December 31, 2008 request
for reconsideration on the grounds that it was not timely filed and did not establish clear
evidence of error.
On appeal, appellant asserts that she submitted clear evidence of error.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On March 17, 2006 appellant, then a 56-year-old modified mail processor detailed to the
injury compensation office, filed a notice of occupational disease (Form CA-2) claiming anxiety
attacks while in the performance of duty on or before February 17, 2005. She stopped work on
November 3, 2005 and returned on March 7, 2006. In an April 26, 2006 letter, the Office
advised appellant of the additional evidence needed to establish her claim, including a
description of work factors alleged to have caused her claimed emotional condition.
Appellant submitted a statement attributing her condition to the following incidents: on
February 12, 2005 a supervisor stated that appellant signed a letter without authority; on
March 17, 2005 a supervisor excluded her from a conversation; on April 5, 2005 supervisors
stated that appellant should not work in injury compensation; on July 6, 2005 a supervisor stated
that appellant had no common sense; on July 12, 2005 a supervisor criticized her handling of
files; on July 13, 2005 she was accused of having a conversation with a supervisor that did not
occur; a July 14, 2005 meeting regarding her work limitations; an October 12, 2005 panic attack
upon entering the employing establishment; on October 31, 2005 appellant was asked to case
mail but did not do so, causing a supervisor to yell at her; a November 5, 2005 job offer;
November 21 and December 2, 2005 communications regarding leave use. Appellant also
submitted reports dated from March 20 to June 19, 2006 from Paul J. Neal, Ph.D., an attending
licensed clinical psychologist.
The employing establishment submitted March 2007 supervisory and witness statements
denying that appellant was harassed, intimidated or verbally abused. The supervisors denied that
the February 12 and April 5, 2005 incidents occurred, as alleged.
By decision dated March 19, 2007, the Office denied appellant’s claim, finding that the
claimed emotional condition did not arise in the performance of duty. It found that the
February 12 and April 5, 2005 incidents were not established as factual. The Office found the
remaining incidents were administrative actions for which appellant did not establish
administrative error or abuse.
In a letter dated and postmarked April 26, 2007, appellant requested an oral hearing.
By decision dated May 31, 2007, the Office denied appellant’s hearing request under
5 U.S.C. § 8124(b) on the grounds it was not timely filed within 30 days of the March 19, 2007
decision. It exercised its discretion and further denied appellant’s hearing request on the grounds
that the issues involved could be addressed equally well by submitting new, relevant evidence
accompanying a valid request for reconsideration.
On January 10 and February 11, 2008 appellant submitted additional reports from
Dr. Neal. She telephoned the Office on March 24, 2008 and was advised to submit a request for
reconsideration. Appellant telephoned again on December 1, 2008 and was advised that a
request for reconsideration must be submitted in writing. On December 8, 2008 she submitted a
new report from Dr. Neal and a September 30, 2008 timekeeping form.

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In a December 31, 2008 letter, appellant’s attorney requested reconsideration. He
asserted that appellant expressed her desire for reconsideration by telephoning the Office and
submitting medical reports from Dr. Neal. The attorney noted that appellant was initially
misdiagnosed, exacerbating her stress and physical problems.
By decision dated February 20, 2009, the Office denied reconsideration on the grounds
that appellant’s request was not timely filed and failed to establish clear evidence of error. The
Office found that the December 31, 2008 request was not filed within one year of the March 19,
2007 merit decision, the most recent merit decision of record. The evidence and argument
submitted following the March 19, 2007 decision was not relevant as it did not address the
critical issue of performance of duty. Therefore, it was not sufficient to establish clear error in
the March 19, 2007 decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Section 8128(a) of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 does not entitle a claimant
to a review of an Office decision as a matter of right.2 This section vests the Office with
discretionary authority to determine whether it will review an award for or against
compensation.3 The Office, through regulations, has imposed limitations on the exercise of its
discretionary authority. One such limitation is that the Office will not review a decision denying
or terminating a benefit unless the application for review is filed within one year of the date of
that decision.4 The Board has found that the imposition of this one-year time limitation does not
constitute an abuse of the discretionary authority granted the Office under 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).5
In those cases where requests for reconsideration are not timely filed, the Office must
nevertheless undertake a limited review of the case to determine whether there is clear evidence
of error pursuant to the untimely request in accordance with section 10.607(b) of its regulations.6
Office regulations state that the Office will reopen a claimant’s case for merit review,
notwithstanding the one-year filing limitation set forth in the Office’s regulations, if the
claimant’s request for reconsideration shows “clear evidence of error” on the part of the Office.7
To establish clear evidence of error, a claimant must submit evidence relevant to the issue
which was decided by the Office.8 The evidence must be positive, precise and explicit and must
1

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

2

Thankamma Mathews, 44 ECAB 765, 768 (1993).

3

Thankamma Mathews, supra note 2; see also Jesus D. Sanchez, 41 ECAB 964, 966 (1990).

4

20 C.F.R. §§ 10.607; 10.608(b). The Board has concurred in the Office’s limitation of its discretionary
authority; see Gregory Griffin, 41 ECAB 186 (1989), petition for recon. denied, 41 ECAB 458 (1990).
5

5 U.S.C. § 10.607(b); Thankamma Mathews, supra note 2; Jesus D. Sanchez, supra note 3.

6

Thankamma Mathews, supra note 2.

7

20 C.F.R. § 10.607(b).

8

Thankamma Mathews, supra note 2.

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be manifest on its face that the Office committed an error.9 Evidence which does not raise a
substantial question concerning the correctness of the Office’s decision is insufficient to establish
clear evidence of error.10 It is not enough merely to show that the evidence could be construed
so as to produce a contrary conclusion.11 This entails a limited review by the Office of how the
evidence submitted with the reconsideration request bears on the evidence previously of record
and whether the new evidence demonstrates clear error on the part of the Office.12
To show clear evidence of error, the evidence submitted must not only be of sufficient
probative value to create a conflict in medical opinion or establish a clear procedural error, but
must be of sufficient probative value to shift the weight of the evidence in favor of the claimant
and raise a substantial question as to the correctness of the Office’s decision.13 The Board must
make an independent determination of whether a claimant has submitted clear evidence of error
on the part of the Office such that the Office abused its discretion in denying merit review in the
face of such evidence.14
ANALYSIS
In its February 20, 2009 decision, the Office properly determined that appellant failed to
file a timely application for review. It issued its most recent merit decision on March 19, 2007.
Appellant requested reconsideration on December 31, 2008, more than one year after
March 19, 2007. Accordingly, her request for reconsideration was not timely filed.
The Board finds that appellant’s December 31, 2008 letter does not raise a substantial
question as to whether the Office’s March 19, 2007 decision was in error or shift the weight of
the evidence in her favor. In that letter, and on appeal, appellant contends that she indicated that
she wanted reconsideration by submitting additional medical reports and a timekeeping form
after the March 19, 2007 merit decision. She also asserts that these additional documents
established clear evidence of error. These documents do not address performance of duty, the
critical issue in the March 19, 2007 decision. Irrelevant evidence is insufficient to demonstrate
clear evidence of error.15 Therefore, it is insufficient to raise a substantial question as to the
correctness of the Office’s March 19, 2007 decision. Similarly, the attorney’s remarks regarding
appellant’s misdiagnosis are irrelevant to the performance of duty issue.
Appellant contends that she telephoned the Office, advising that she wanted
reconsideration. The record contains March 24 and December 1, 2008 telephone memoranda,
9

Leona N. Travis, 43 ECAB 227 (1991).

10

Jesus D. Sanchez, supra note 3.

11

Leona N. Travis, supra note 9.

12

Nelson T. Thompson, 43 ECAB 919, 922 (1992).

13

James R. Mirra, 56 ECAB 738 (2005).

14

Gregory Griffin, supra note 4

15

Thankamma Mathews, supra note 2.

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showing that appellant was asked to submit a written request for reconsideration. These calls,
however, do not constitute a valid request for reconsideration. Under the Act’s implementing
regulations, a request for reconsideration must “be submitted in writing.”16
Appellant has not otherwise provided any argument or evidence of sufficient probative
value to shift the weight of the evidence in her favor and raise a substantial question as to the
correctness of the Office’s decision.
Consequently, the Office properly denied her
reconsideration request as her request does not establish clear evidence of error.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant’s December 31, 2008 request for reconsideration was
untimely filed and failed to show clear evidence of error.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated February 20, 2009 is affirmed.
Issued: May 11, 2010
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

16

Section 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(a)(1) of the Act’s implementing regulations provides, in pertinent part, that an
application for reconsideration must “be submitted in writing.”

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
K.S., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Abilene, TX, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-1049
Issued: October 10, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 19, 2012 appellant filed a timely appeal from a November 17, 2011 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant established an injury in the performance of duty on
May 13, 2010.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On May 21, 2010 appellant, then a 56-year-old letter carrier, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1) alleging that he sustained a throat injury on May 13, 2010 when a strobe
light bulb in his vehicle burned out. The reverse of the claim form indicated that he did not stop
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

work. Appellant submitted a duty status report (Form CA-17) dated May 28, 2010 from
Dr. Michael Jenks, a family practitioner, who diagnosed chemical irritation.
OWCP did not initially adjudicate the claim. On April 27, 2011 appellant submitted a
claim for recurrence of disability (Form CA-2a). He stated that he still felt pressure on the right
side of his chest when inhaling deeply, his eyesight was changing and he tired more quickly.
Appellant submitted a May 10, 2011 CA-17 form from Dr. Jenks diagnosing chemical
pneumonitis.
By letter dated May 13, 2011, the employing establishment stated that an investigation
revealed that a circuit board, located inside the strobe light modulator, had overheated and filled
the cab with smoke. The employing establishment stated that the manufacturer of the part was
no longer in business. The record contains a February 3, 2011 letter from the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) stating that a May 27, 2010 inspection of appellant’s
vehicle had been performed. OSHA reported that air sampling at that time revealed an absence
of aldehydes and phenols, noting that the inspection was conducted nearly 14 days after the
incident and there was no way to determine what contaminants may have been present on
May 13, 2010.
In a decision dated June 9, 2011, OWCP denied the claim for compensation. It found
that appellant had not established the factual or medical elements of the claim.
Appellant requested a hearing before an OWCP hearing representative, which was held
on September 22, 2011. He resubmitted medical evidence that had previously been signed by a
nurse and now signed by Dr. Jenks. This included the attending physician’s report (Form CA20) dated May 13, 2010, diagnosing inhalation of toxic fumes/smoke and checking a box “yes”
that the condition was causally related to employment. Dr. Jenks also signed treatment notes
dated May 28 and June 3, 2010.
In a May 4, 2011 letter, a regional administrator of OSHA reiterated that the air sampling
results were negative and there was no way to determine contaminant concentrations. The letter
stated that, with respect to the strobe light circuit board, OSHA did not perform hazard
determinations on such items. Further, there was no information indicating that the employing
establishment was aware of these modules burning out or causing a potential toxic exposure and
no violations were found during the inspection.
By decision dated November 17, 2011, the hearing representative affirmed the June 9,
2011 OWCP decision, with modification. The hearing representative found that appellant
experienced smoke inhalation on May 13, 2010 but the medical evidence was insufficient to find
that such exposure caused the chest pain or vision condition.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
FECA provides for the payment of compensation for “the disability or death of an
employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty.”2 The
2

Id. at § 8102(a).

2

phrase “sustained while in the performance of duty” in FECA is regarded as the equivalent of the
commonly found requisite in workers’ compensation law of “arising out of an in the course of
employment.”3 An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of establishing that
he or she sustained an injury while in the performance of duty.4 In order to determine whether
an employee actually sustained an injury in the performance of duty, OWCP begins with an
analysis of whether “fact of injury” has been established. Generally, “fact of injury” consists of
two components which must be considered in conjunction with one another. The first
component to be established is that the employee actually experienced the employment incident
which is alleged to have occurred. The second component is whether the employment incident
caused a personal injury and generally this can be established only by medical evidence.5
OWCP’s procedures recognize that a claim may be accepted without a medical report
when the condition is a minor one which can be identified on visual inspection.6 In clear-cut
traumatic injury claims, such as a fall resulting in a broken arm, a physician’s affirmative
statement is sufficient and no rationalized opinion on causal relationship is needed. In all other
traumatic injury claims, a rationalized medical opinion supporting causal relationship is
required.7
To constitute rationalized medical evidence, the opinion of the physician must be based
on a complete factual and medical background, must be of reasonable medical certainty and
supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed
condition and the specific employment factors identified by the claimant. The weight of medical
evidence is determined by its reliability, its probative value, its convincing quality, the care of
the analysis manifested and the medical rationale expressed in support of the physician’s
opinion.8
ANALYSIS
The June 9, 2011 decision found that appellant had not established a May 13, 2010
incident as alleged. The hearing representative modified this determination to find that the
evidence established a 20 minute period of smoke/fumes inhalation on that date. OSHA
indicated that it could not make a determination as to any specific contaminants, as an
investigation was 13 days later and at that time did not reveal any aldehydes or phenols. The
May 13, 2010 incident is established as appellant was exposed to smoke and fumes of uncertain
composition. The issue is whether the medical evidence is sufficient to establish a diagnosed
condition casually related to the employment incident. The medical evidence must contain a
rationalized medical opinion on the issue.
3

Valerie C. Boward, 50 ECAB 126 (1998).

4

Melinda C. Epperly, 45 ECAB 196, 198 (1993); see also 20 C.F.R. § 10.115.

5

See John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354, 357 (1989).

6

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.3(d) (June 1995).

7

Id.

8

Jennifer Atkerson, 55 ECAB 317, 319 (2004).

3

In this case, appellant submitted a May 13, 2010 form report with a box checked “yes” as
to causal relationship. The Board has held that checking “yes” on a form report, without
additional explanation or rationale, is not sufficient to establish causal relationship.9 This is
particularly true in this case, as the form report lacked a firm medical diagnosis and was apparently
signed by Dr. Jenks at a later date without any additional explanation. The treatment notes do not
provide a rationalized opinion on causal relationship between any medical diagnosed condition and
the employment incident. Dr. Jenks submitted a May 10, 2011 CA-17 form diagnosing
pneumonitis, without addressing causal relationship with the accepted incident.
On appeal, appellant stated that he had a right to know what substances to which he was
exposed and contended this information was being withheld. In this case, the evidence from
OSHA stated that there was no way to determine what specific substances may have been present
in the smoke or fumes in his vehicle. There is no probative evidence to establish that any further
factual development is warranted or would result in relevant information regarding the
compensation claim. As noted, the deficiency in establishing the claim for compensation was the
medical evidence of record.
In the absence of a narrative report with a complete and accurate factual and medical
history, findings on examination, a firm medical diagnosis and a rationalized opinion on causal
relationship between the diagnosed condition and the May 13, 2010 employment incident, the
Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof in this case.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not established an injury in the performance of duty on
May 13, 2010.

9

See Barbara J. Williams, 40 ECAB 649, 656 (1989).

4

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated November 17, 2011 is affirmed.
Issued: October 10, 2012
Washington, DC

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Colorado Springs, CO, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 20-0069
Issued: June 25, 2020

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On October 9, 2019 appellant filed a timely appeal from a September 3, 2019 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.2
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish a back condition
causally related to the accepted July 22, 2018 employment incident.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

2
The Board notes that OWCP received additional evidence following the September 3 2019 decision. However,
the Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record
that was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the
Board for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this
additional evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 25, 2018 appellant, then a 46-year-old postal support employee mail processing
clerk, filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on July 22, 2018 he injured his
lower back when lifting a parcel “marked heavy” while in the performance of duty.
On July 25, 2018 the employing establishment issued an authorization for examination
and/or treatment (Form CA-16), which allowed appellant to seek medical treatment for his alleged
injury.
A July 25, 2018 attending physician’s report (Part B of the Form CA-16), bearing an
illegible signature, indicated that appellant lifted a heavy box and experienced low back pain.
Appellant’s x-rays were noted as negative for acute bony injury. His diagnosis was listed as
lumbar strain and it was noted that this was an aggravation of a preexisting injury. Appellant was
released to light-duty work.
Appellant was also seen by Steven Byrne, a certified physician assistant, on July 25, 2018.
Mr. Byrne noted the history of the claimed July 22, 2018 employment incident. He reported that
appellant had been followed by the Veterans Administration for lumbar spine problems and
chronic right knee complaints. Mr. Byrne diagnosed lumbar sprain related to work activities and
released appellant to modified duty. An October 30, 2018 progress report from Mr. Byrne was
also received which repeated his previous diagnosis, etiology of complaints, and restrictions.
In a July 26, 2018 report, Dr. Jay Neubauer, Board-certified in aerospace medicine, noted
the history of appellant’s July 22, 2018 employment incident. He also noted that appellant had a
history of chronic back pain and sciatica. Dr. Neubauer indicated that appellant’s July 25, 2018
x-rays were negative for acute bony injury, but showed that degenerative changes had occurred
since his previous examination in 2015. He diagnosed lumbar sprain which he opined appeared
to be, in part, related to work activities. Appellant was released to modified-duty work. In followup reports, a Form CA-17, and a visit summary all dated August 1, 2018 Dr. Neubauer diagnosed
lumbar back sprain due to the July 22, 2018 incident. He advised that appellant could resume parttime, limited-duty work with restrictions.3
In an initial August 8, 2018 report and follow up reports dated August15, 22, 29, 2018,
Dr. Thomas Centi, an occupational medicine specialist, provided evaluations of appellant’s lumbar
strain, which he indicated began on July 22, 2018 when appellant was bending over and lifting a
heavy box. He diagnosed lumbar sprain, which he opined was related to work activities. Appellant
was continued on modified duty and physical therapy.
Appellant voluntarily resigned from the employing establishment on September 4, 2018.
A November 28, 2018 x-ray of appellant’s lumbar spine revealed moderate L3-4 and L5-S1
degenerative disc disease and four centimeter anterior sagittal imbalance.
In a March 13, 2019 development letter, OWCP advised appellant that, when his claim was
received, it appeared to be a minor injury that resulted in minimal or no lost time from work. The
claim was administratively approved to allow payment for limited medical expenses, but the merits
3

On July 31, 2018 appellant accepted a part-time modified limited-duty assignment.

2

of the claim had not been formally adjudicated. OWCP requested that he submit factual and
medical information, including a comprehensive report from his physician regarding how the
July 22, 2018 employment incident contributed to his claimed injury. It afforded appellant 30 days
to submit the necessary evidence. No additional evidence was received.
By decision dated April 16, 2019, OWCP denied the claim. It found that the evidence
failed to establish that the July 22, 2018 incident occurred as alleged. OWCP concluded, therefore,
that the requirements had not been met to establish an injury as defined by FECA.
Following the decision, OWCP received duplicative evidence, previously of record. A
new report dated April 22, 2019 was received from Dr. Venu Akuthota, Board-certified in physical
medicine and rehabilitation, pain medicine, and sports medicine. He related: appellant was being
treated for the conditions of myofascial strain, following a fall backwards from a chair at work;
mild concussion and occipital headache following the fall; a history of lumbar degenerative disc
disease, most significant at L5-Sl; and history of bilateral radicular lower extremity pain.
On April 22, 2019 appellant requested a telephonic hearing before an OWCP hearing
representative that was held on July 26, 2019. He testified that on July 22, 2018 he lifted
approximately 375 to 450 parcels weighing 20 to 75 pounds. Appellant also indicated that he had
developed a lumbar condition when he was on active military duty in June 2001. He reported that
he sustained another injury on November 15, 2018 at a different employing establishment which
also affected his back.
By decision dated September 3, 2019, an OWCP hearing representative found that the
July 22, 2018 incident occurred as alleged, but affirmed the denial of the claim, as modified to find
that causal relationship had not been established.4
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA5 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable
time limitation of FECA,6 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and
that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to
the employment injury.7 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim,
regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.8
4

OWCP’s hearing representative also noted that appellant had filed a subsequent claim for a lumbar injury in
November 2018 under OWCP File No. xxxxxx146 he recommended that the claim files be consolidated.
5

Supra note 1.

6

J.P., Docket No. 19-0129 (issued April 26, 2019); S.B., Docket No. 17-1779 (issued February 7, 2018); Joe D.
Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).
7

J.M., Docket No. 17-0284 (issued February 7, 2018); R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40
ECAB 312 (1988).
8

R.R., Docket No. 19-0048 (issued April 25, 2019); L.M., Docket No. 13-1402 (issued February 7, 2014);
Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).

3

To determine if an employee sustained a traumatic injury in the performance of duty,
OWCP begins with an analysis of whether fact of injury has been established.9 Fact of injury
consists of two components that must be considered in conjunction with one another. The first
component is whether the employee actually experienced the employment incident that allegedly
occurred.10 The second component is whether the employment incident caused a personal injury.11
Rationalized medical opinion evidence is required to establish causal relationship. The
opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background, must be
one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the
nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment incident.12
In any case where a preexisting condition involving the same part of the body is present
and the issue of causal relationship therefore involves aggravation, acceleration, or precipitation,
the physician must provide a rationalized medical opinion that differentiates between the effects
of the work-related injury or disease and the preexisting condition.13
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a back condition
causally related to the accepted July 22, 2018 employment incident.
In his July 26, 2018 report, Dr. Neubauer noted the history of the July 22, 2018 incident.
He also noted that appellant had a history of chronic back pain and sciatica and that the July 25,
2018 x-rays showed degenerative changes had occurred since appellant’s previous examination in
2015. Dr. Neubauer diagnosed a lumbar sprain that appeared to be, in part, related to work
activities. In follow-up reports, a Form CA-17, and a visit summary, all dated August 1, 2018, he
diagnosed lumbar back sprain due to the July 22, 2018 injury. Although his reports generally
supported causal relationship, Dr. Neubauer did not provide any rationale explaining his
conclusion. He did not differentiate between the effects of the work-related injury or disease and
the preexisting condition.14 Additionally, Dr. Neubauer did not specifically discuss how or why
appellant’s back strain was caused by the July 22, 2018 employment incident.15 Thus, his medical
reports are insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
Dr. Centi’s reports noted the history of the July 22, 2018 injury as appellant was bending
over and lifting a heavy box. He diagnosed lumbar spine sprain causally related to work activities.
Dr. Centi, however, failed to provide a rationalized medical opinion which explained how
9

E.M., Docket No. 18-1599 (issued March 7, 2019); T.H., 59 ECAB 388, 393-94 (2008).

10

L.T., Docket No. 18-1603 (issued February 21, 2019); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

11

B.M., Docket No. 17-0796 (issued July 5, 2018); John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989).

12

M.A., Docket No. 19-1551 (issued April 30, 2020); Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215 (1997).

13
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.3e (January 2013); see
A.S., Docket No. 19-1955 (issued April 9, 2020).
14

Id.

15

Supra note 11.

4

appellant’s bending and lifting of a heavy box caused or aggravated appellant’s back condition.
Additionally, Dr. Centi failed to mention appellant’s preexisting back condition. To be of
probative medical value, a medical opinion must explain how, physiologically, the movements
involved in the employment incident caused or contributed to the diagnosed conditions.16 Thus,
Dr. Centi’s reports are insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
OWCP also received an April 22, 2019 report from Dr. Akuthota. Dr. Akuthota noted
diagnoses of myofascial strain and mild concussion with occipital headache. However, he failed
to provide an opinion on the issue of causal relationship. The Board has held that medical evidence
that does not offer an opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of no probative
value on the issue of causal relationship.17 This report, therefore, is insufficient to establish
appellant’s claim.
Appellant also submitted reports from Mr. Byrne, a certified physician assistant. A
physician assistant, however, is not considered a “physician” as defined under FECA, and thus
these records are of no probative value.18
Appellant also submitted a November 28, 2018 lumbar x-ray. The Board has held,
however, that diagnostic studies standing alone lack probative value as they do not address whether
the employment incident caused any of the diagnosed conditions.19
OWCP also received a July 25, 2018 Form CA-20 containing an illegible signature. The
Board has held that reports that are unsigned or bear an illegible signature lack proper identification

16

A.W., Docket No. 19-0327 (issued July 19, 2019).

17

See L.B., Docket No. 18-0533 (issued August 27, 2018); D.K., Docket No. 17-1549 (issued July 6, 2018).

18

5 U.S.C. § 8102(2) of FECA provides as follows: physician includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical
psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined
by State law. See also David P. Sawchuk, 57 ECAB 316, 320 n.11 (2006) (lay individuals such as physician assistants,
nurses, and physical therapists are not competent to render a medical opinion under FECA). 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2);
20 C.F.R. § 10.5(t). R.K., Docket No. 20-0049 (issued April 10, 2020) (a physician assistant is not considered a
“physician” as defined under FECA).
19

N.B., Docket No. 19-0221 (issued July 15, 2019).

5

and cannot be considered probative medical evidence as the author cannot be identified as a
physician.20 Therefore, this report has no probative value and is insufficient to establish the claim.
The Board finds that appellant has not submitted rationalized medical evidence establishing
a back condition causally related to the accepted July 22, 2018 employment incident and therefore
has not met his burden of proof to establish his claim.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.21
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a back condition
causally related to the accepted July 22, 2018 employment incident.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 3, 2019 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: June 25, 2020
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

20

See T.O., Docket No. 19-1291 (issued December 11, 2019).

21

The Board notes that the employing establishment issued a Form CA-16. A completed Form CA-16 authorization
may constitute a contract for payment of medical expenses to a medical facility or physician, when properly executed.
The form creates a contractual obligation, which does not involve the employee directly, to pay for the cost of the
examination or treatment regardless of the action taken on the claim. See 20 C.F.R. § 10.300(c); C.B., Docket No.
20-0250 (issued April 28, 2020); J.G., Docket No. 17-1062 (issued February 13, 2018); Tracy P. Spillane, 54 ECAB
608 (2003).

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.H., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
New Orleans, LA, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 19-0906
Issued: September 19, 2019

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 26, 2019 appellant filed a timely appeal from a January 11, 2019 nonmerit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). As more than 180 days has
elapsed from the last merit decision, dated October 17, 2017, to the filing of this appeal, pursuant
to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board lacks jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly denied appellant’s request for reconsideration of the
merits of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On September 1, 2017 appellant, then a 50-year-old program support assistant, filed a
traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on August 16, 2017 she developed mental stress
due to an employment incident while in the performance of duty. She attributed her condition to
a negative confrontation with her acting manager which had escalated, causing her to lose her
breath, feel dizzy, and collapse. The employing establishment indicated on Form CA-1 that there
were no witnesses to the collapse.
In a medical emergency report from the employing establishment’s primary emergency
response team dated August 16, 2017, D.A. indicated that appellant was found seated against the
wall experiencing hyperventilation, pain and numbness in her right arm, her eyes were rolling
back, and she had pain in her left leg. Appellant was given oxygen and transported by ambulance
to the hospital.
The employing establishment submitted a statement from M.D., dated August 31, 2017, in
which he indicated that appellant had long-standing anxiety issues. M.D. noted that appellant was
provided reasonable accommodation based on her medical condition, which permitted her to use
liberal leave when there was heavy traffic or inclement weather provided her work requirements
were met satisfactorily. Appellant requested an extension of her reasonable accommodation.
Based on the customers she supports, M.D. determined that the tasks assigned to her were not
being carried out satisfactorily. On the day of the incident he requested that appellant provide a
roadmap as to how she would carry out her duties effectively so that the reasonable
accommodation request could be extended. Appellant referred to this request as a negative
interaction. M.D. indicated that during the discussion appellant seemed to get anxious and left the
room twice and reported a panic attack.
On September 7, 2017 Dr. Rory J. Duffour, a Board-certified family practitioner, indicated
that appellant presented with some neurologic symptoms and could not return to work for at least
two weeks until she had a complete work up.
In a September 11, 2017 development letter, OWCP advised appellant of the deficiencies
in her claim. It requested additional factual and medical evidence from her and provided a
questionnaire for her completion. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to respond.
An August 16, 2017 after visit summary from Dr. Ashley Shreves, a Board-certified
emergency room physician, diagnosed panic attack and anxiety problem. Similarly, an August 18,
2017 after visit summary from Dr. Scott Thames, a Board-certified emergency room physician,
diagnosed anxiety problem, chest pain, and acute nonintractable headache.
An August 18, 2017 note from Chris Gee, a registered nurse, indicated that appellant was
treated in the emergency room and could return to work on August 22, 2017.
On August 23, 2017 Dr. Duffour noted that appellant could return to work on September 5,
2017 with “reasonable accommodations in place.” On September 7, 2017 he noted that appellant
was treated on September 6, 2017 and developed neurologic symptoms and was unable to perform
her administrative duties until she was seen by a neurologist.

2

In an undated statement, appellant indicated that on August 16, 2017 she was approached
by M.D. who indicated that her reasonable accommodation was not approved and that management
required updated medical documentation. She reported that before she initiated the process for an
extension she spoke with the reasonable accommodation department and was informed that she
did not need additional information. Appellant indicated that she would update the medical
documentation. She advised that M.D. proceeded to inform her of the negative feedback from her
coworkers regarding her leave, annual reports, leave changes, not answering the telephones, and
timely entering forms into the system.
A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the brain dated September 20, 2017
demonstrated no evidence of an acute infarct, intracranial bleed, or malignancy.
Appellant was treated by Alison Johnston, a licensed social worker, on October 1, 2017
who diagnosed unspecified depressive disorder and panic disorder. Ms. Johnston reported a
significant degree of work-related stress.
On October 5, 2017 Dr. Ramy E. Khoury, a Board-certified neurologist, treated appellant
for severe headaches. He diagnosed migraines, depression, and panic attack.
On October 11, 2017 appellant was treated by Desiree Norman, a nurse practitioner, who
diagnosed major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, insomnia, and panic disorder
related to her work.
By decision dated October 17, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition claim,
finding that the evidence submitted was insufficient to establish the factual component of her
claim.
On November 29, 2017 appellant requested reconsideration of the October 17, 2017
decision.
By decision dated December 13, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s request for
reconsideration pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
On October 17, 2018 appellant again requested reconsideration. In an undated statement,
she indicated that she had an existing disability for which management had offered a reasonable
accommodation. Appellant asserted that management knew of her condition and harassed her,
exacerbating her symptoms and causing her to be hospitalized on August 16 and 17, 2017. She
indicated that she was removed from service on May 10, 2018 and had filed two Equal Opportunity
Employment complaints. In support of her reconsideration request, appellant submitted an
earnings and leave statement dated December 27, 2015 and a timesheet from January 22, 2017.
She also submitted an e-mail dated March 9, 2017 in which her reasonable accommodation request
was granted and she was permitted to telework twice a week to minimize her anxiety level
associated with long commutes.
Also received were April 12 and August 4, 2017 notes from Dr. Edward Dauterive, III, a
Board-certified gastroentologist, who treated appellant for various digestive system concerns.

3

In an August 4, 2017 after visit summary, Dr. Duffour treated appellant for various
digestive system maladies.
In an undated statement, Dr. Khoury noted treating appellant for headaches related to her
work environment and recommended that she switch her current work environment.
In a December 1, 2017 statement, Dr. James M. Houser, a Board-certified neurologist,
treated appellant for migraine headaches. Appellant reported an increase in the frequency and
intensity of her headaches associated with work-related stress and anxiety. Dr. Houser indicated
that it would be in appellant’s best interest to be transferred to another facility.
By decision dated January 11, 2019, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration
of the merits of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Section 8128(a) of FECA does not entitle a claimant to review of an OWCP decision as a
matter of right.2 OWCP has discretionary authority in this regard and has imposed certain
limitations in exercising its authority.3 One such limitation is that the request for reconsideration
must be received by OWCP within one year of the date of the decision for which review is sought.4
Upon receipt of a timely application, OWCP exercises its discretion in accordance with the
guidelines set forth in section 10.606(b)(3) of the implementing federal regulations, which
provides that a claimant may obtain review of the merits of his or her written application for
reconsideration, including all supporting documents, sets forth arguments and contains evidence
which either: (1) shows that OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law;
(2) advances a relevant legal argument not previously considered by OWCP; or (3) constitutes
relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously considered by OWCP.5
Section 10.608(b) provides that any application for review of the merits of the claim which
does not meet at least one of the requirements listed in section 10.606(b) will be denied by OWCP
without review of the merits of the claim.6

2

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

3

20 C.F.R. § 10.607.

4

Id. at § 10.607(a); C.C., Docket No. 18-0316 (issued March 14, 2019). For merit decisions issued on or after
August 29, 2011, a request for reconsideration must be received by OWCP within one year of OWCP’s decision for
which review is sought. Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Reconsiderations, Chapter 2.1602.4
(February 2016). Timeliness is determined by the document receipt date of the request for reconsideration as indicated
by the received date in the integrated Federal Employees Compensation System. Id. at Chapter 2.1602.4b.
5

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3).

6

Id. at § 10.608(b).

4

ANALYSIS
The Board finds that OWCP properly denied appellant’s request for reconsideration of the
merits of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
Appellant’s October 17, 2018 request for reconsideration did not show that OWCP
erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law, or advance a new and relevant legal
argument not previously considered by OWCP. Consequently, she was not entitled to a review of
the merits based on the first and second above-noted requirements under 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3).
With her reconsideration request, appellant submitted April 12 and August 4, 2017 notes
from Dr. Dauterive, an August 4, 2017 report of Dr. Duffour, an undated statement from
Dr. Khoury, and a December 1, 2017 statement from Dr. Houser. All of these reports fail to
address the underlying issue on appeal of whether appellant had established the factual component
of her claim. The submission of evidence or argument which does not address the particular issue
involved does not constitute a basis for reopening a case.7
Appellant submitted an earnings and leave statement dated December 27, 2015 and a
timesheet from January 22, 2017. Also received was an e-mail dated March 9, 2017, noting that
appellant’s reasonable accommodation was granted and appellant was permitted to telework twice
a week. However, these submissions likewise fail to address the underlying issue in this case.8
Because appellant’s request for reconsideration did not include relevant and pertinent new
evidence not previously considered, she is not entitled to a review of the merits based on the third
requirement under section 10.606(b)(3).9
The Board accordingly finds that appellant has not met any of the requirements of 20 C.F.R.
§ 10.606(b)(3). Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 10.608, OWCP properly denied merit review.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly denied appellant’s request for reconsideration of the
merits of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

7

M.B., Docket No. 17-1980 (issued May 14, 2019); E.G., Docket No. 18-0270 (issued August 24, 2018); Eugene F.
Butler, 36 ECAB 393, 398 (1984).
8

Id.

9

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3)(iii); see D.P., Docket No. 17-0290 (issued May 14, 2018).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the January 11, 2019 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: September 19, 2019
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
_________________________________________
)
)
)
and
)
)
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
)
LONG ISLAND MACARTHUR AIRPORT,
)
Ronkonkoma, NY, Employer
)
___________________________________________ )
L.G., Appellant

Appearances:
Thomas S. Harkins, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 16-1065
Issued: October 13, 2016

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 26, 2016 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal of a February 26,
2016 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to
the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for
legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An
attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject
to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish a traumatic injury
causally related to a December 24, 2014 employment incident.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On December 31, 2014 appellant, then a 57-year-old supervisory transportation security
officer, filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on December 24, 2014 she was
working with checked baggage and caught a bag that was rolling off of a “CT-80” machine,
injuring her neck, right shoulder, and right arm. The employing establishment checked the box
marked “yes” in response to whether appellant was injured in the performance of duty and in
response to whether the knowledge of the facts about the injury agreed with the statements of the
employee. Appellant stopped work on December 28, 2014.
On December 31, 2014 the employing establishment completed an authorization for
examination or treatment (Form CA-16) for a period of 60 days.
In January 5 and 12, 2015 reports, Dr. Ronald Fagan, a Board-certified internist, advised
that the date of injury was December 24, 2014 and occurred while appellant was working in
checked baggage, loading baggage onto the belt. He indicated that she pulled her back and right
arm catching a piece of luggage at work and diagnosed cervical lordosis, cervical degenerative
disc disease, cervical muscle spasm, lumbar sacral spasm and strain and radiculopathy of the
right leg. OWCP received doctor’s progress reports on State of New York Workers’
Compensation Board Forms C-4.2 dated January 12 and 30, 2015 from Dr. Fagan who diagnosed
L5 and C-S spondylosis and exacerbation of degenerative disc disease.
In a January 5, 2015 treatment note, Dr. Stuart Horowitz, an osteopath, Board-certified in
family medicine, advised that appellant was under treatment for workers’ compensation which
prevented a return to work. In a January 12, 2015 disability certificate and a physician work
capacity statement of the same date, he advised that appellant was being treated for exacerbation
of degenerative disc disease and traumatic injury. Dr. Horowitz noted that the “prognosis was
unknown.”
Dr. Fagan saw appellant on February 20, 2015 for follow up and recommended physical
therapy and keeping appellant off work for an additional three weeks. On March 13, 2015 he
recommended additional therapy and referral to an orthopedist.
In a March 19, 2015 report, Dr. Brett Spain, an osteopath, Board-certified in orthopedics
and sports medicine, noted that appellant reported an injury at work on December 24, 2014. He
advised that appellant related that her coworker tossed a suitcase on the conveyor belt which
rolled off and she tried to catch it. Appellant indicated that it caused a forceful pulling of the
right arm/shoulder and neck. Dr. Spain related that appellant indicated that her pain was mostly
in the neck into the right shoulder and she was currently not working.
OWCP received several physical therapy notes and prescriptions.

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In a letter dated April 1, 2015, OWCP noted that appellant’s claim initially appeared to
be a minor injury that resulted in minimal or no lost time from work and because the employing
establishment did not controvert continuation of pay or challenge the merits of the case,
appellant’s claim was administratively handled to allow a limited amount of medical expenses.
However, appellant’s claim was now being reopened because a claim for wage loss was
received. OWCP informed appellant of the type of evidence needed to support her claim and
afforded her 30 days to submit such evidence.
Dr. Spain provided attending physician’s reports (Form CA-20) dated April 7
and 8, 2015. He indicated that appellant had back and right arm neck pain. Dr. Spain diagnosed
cervical lordosis, exacerbation of cervical disc disease, and L5 and C-S spondylosis. He checked
the box marked “yes” in response to whether he believed the condition was caused or aggravated
by an employment activity and filled in that appellant pulled her back and cervical spine with
luggage. Regarding appellant’s ability to work, Dr. Spain indicated that appellant saw an
orthopedist and would decide disability. OWCP also received additional physical therapy
reports.
On April 7, 2015 OWCP received a statement from appellant. Appellant explained that
she was in checked baggage loading bags when her injury occurred. She noted that a coworker
lifted a heavy bag and dropped it on the belt, but it rolled toward her and she instinctively caught
the bag. Appellant explained that the momentum pulled her right arm, neck, and lower back, and
she immediately felt pain. In a separate April 7, 2015 statement, she noted that the employing
establishment had a video of the injury and that she requested a copy, but her request was denied.
Appellant denied having any similar injuries.
By decision dated May 11, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim as she had not
established a claimed medical condition causally related to the established work-related event.
A May 19, 2015 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan read by Dr. Katya Shpilberg, a
Board-certified diagnostic radiologist, revealed multilevel degenerative disc disease with mild
spinal canal stenosis at C3-4 and C6-7 and up to moderate foraminal stenosis at C5-6 on the right
with no cord compression.
On September 22 and 30, 2015 counsel for appellant requested reconsideration. He
argued that the medical evidence of record established that appellant’s condition was causally
related to the December 24, 2014 work incident. Counsel also submitted new medical evidence.
In a May 28, 2015 report, Dr. Luis Alejo, a Board-certified physiatrist, noted that
appellant related being injured at work on December 24, 2014, when her coworker tossed a
suitcase on the conveyor belt and she tried to catch it. He advised that she pulled her right
arm/shoulder and neck. Dr. Alejo indicated that appellant was currently not working. He
examined her and diagnosed cervical radiculopathy (brachial neuritis or radiculitis). In a
separate May 28, 2015 report, Dr. Alejo checked a box marked “yes” in response to whether the
incident appellant described was the competent cause of the injury or illness. He also checked a
box marked “yes” in response to whether appellant’s complaints were consistent with the history
of the injury/illness and with the objective findings. Dr. Alejo indicated that appellant was 100
percent totally disabled. He saw appellant again on August 18, 2015 and repeated the history of

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injury. Dr. Alejo examined appellant and noted that MRI scans revealed herniated nucleus
pulposus at C5-6 and C6-7 with multiple bulges. He diagnosed cervical radiculopathy (brachial
neuritis or radiculitis). Dr. Alejo opined “[i]n my opinion the accident is causally related to her
current painful condition.”
Dr. Horowitz, in a June 29, 2015 report, noted appellant’s history of injury on
December 24, 2014, where she caught a large bag that was falling off of the conveyor belt and
pulled her right arm, neck, and back. He related that appellant reported the incident and
attempted to keep working, but the pain increased and major headaches developed.
Dr. Horowitz advised that she was seen on January 5, 2015 and taken off work. He explained
that objective findings included spasm, tenderness, range of motion (ROM) loss, muscle
guarding, and some upper extremity weakness. Dr. Horowitz diagnosed cervical and lumbar
pain with spasm and signs of radiculopathy. He indicated that appellant underwent physical
therapy. Dr. Horowitz advised that appellant subsequently had a cervical spine MRI scan and
the results showed degenerative disc disease and stenosis affecting the right greater than the left.
An EMG was pending. Dr. Horowitz noted that appellant had a prior history of umbilical hernia,
with surgical repair and mesh in 2011. He opined that appellant had no history of prior injury to
those areas and it was “more than reasonable to find these current injuries as causally related to
the work incident” and “to conclude that the incident described above was the proximate cause
of the described medical condition.” Dr. Horowitz advised that appellant had a good, but
guarded recovery and she remained on full temporary disability.
OWCP also received a July 9, 2015 report from Dr. Aristide Burducea, Board-certified in
anesthesiology and pain medicine, who noted seeing appellant for evaluation of the cervical
spine. Dr. Burducea noted that the locale of the injury was in the workplace. He examined
appellant and diagnosed cervical radiculopathy. OWCP continued to receive physical therapy
reports.
By decision dated February 26, 2016, OWCP denied modification of the May 11, 2015
decision. It explained that appellant’s treating physicians did not provide a sufficiently
rationalized medical opinion on how catching a falling bag caused or aggravated the diagnosed
neck and arm condition. OWCP noted that there were no objective findings or an explanation to
show how the event caused, contributed to, or aggravated the diagnosed conditions.
Furthermore, there was no differentiation from symptoms of any preexisting neck condition.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an “employee of
the United States” within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the
applicable time limitation period of FECA,3 and that an injury was sustained in the performance

3

Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).

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of duty.4 These are the essential elements of each compensation claim, regardless of whether the
claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.5
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty, it first must be determined whether the fact of injury has been established.
There are two components involved in establishing the fact of injury. First, the employee must
submit sufficient evidence to establish that she actually experienced the employment incident at
the time, place, and in the manner alleged. 6 Second, the employee must submit sufficient
evidence, generally only in the form of medical evidence, to establish that the employment
incident caused a personal injury.7
Rationalized medical opinion evidence is generally required to establish causal
relationship. The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical
background, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical
rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the
specific employment factors identified by the claimant.8
ANALYSIS
In this case, appellant alleged that she sustained injuries to her neck, right shoulder, and
right arm on December 24, 2014 while catching a bag that was rolling off the conveyor belt
while in the performance of duty. There is no dispute that the claimed event occurred, as
alleged.
The Board finds that, while the medical evidence is insufficiently rationalized to establish
that appellant sustained a work-related condition, the medical reports from Dr. Horowitz and
Dr. Alejo are supportive of causal relationship and sufficient to require further development of
the case record by OWCP. 9 The most relevant report is the June 29, 2015 report from
Dr. Horowitz. The Board notes that he documented appellant’s history of injury on
December 24, 2014, where she caught a large bag that was falling off the conveyor belt and
pulled her right arm, neck, and back. Dr. Horowitz related that she reported the incident and
attempted to keep working, but her symptoms increased. He noted diagnostic test results
provided examination findings which included spasm, tenderness, ROM loss, muscle guarding,
and some upper extremity weakness. Dr. Horowitz diagnosed cervical and lumbar pain with
spasm with signs of radiculopathy. He opined that appellant had no prior history of injury in
those areas and it was “more than reasonable to find these current injuries as causally related to
4

James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB 312 (1988).

5

Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).

6

Julie B. Hawkins, 38 ECAB 393, 396 (1987).

7

Id. For a definition of the term “traumatic injury,” see 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(ee).

8

I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989).

9

See John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989); Horace Langhorne, 29 ECAB 820 (1978).

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the work incident” and “to conclude that the incident described above was the proximate cause
of the described medical condition.”
Dr. Alejo also provided May 28 and August 18, 2015 reports which noted the history of
the December 24, 2014 work incident and diagnosed cervical radiculopathy. He opined in these
reports that the work incident caused appellant’s condition and that she was totally disabled.
The Board finds that these reports support that appellant’s condition was caused or
aggravated by the December 24, 2014 work incident. While these reports are not completely
rationalized, the physicians are consistent in indicating that appellant sustained an employmentrelated condition. The Board further notes that the employing establishment has not controverted
the claim and there is no contradictory medical evidence.
Proceedings under FECA are not adversarial in nature nor is OWCP a disinterested
arbiter. While the claimant has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to compensation,
OWCP shares responsibility in the development of the evidence to see that justice is done.10
On remand, OWCP should refer appellant, the case record, and a statement of accepted
facts to an appropriate Board-certified specialist for an evaluation and a rationalized medical
opinion regarding whether the December 24, 2014 work incident caused or contributed to
appellant’s diagnosed conditions. After such further development of the case record as OWCP
deems necessary, a de novo decision shall be issued.
The Board also notes that the employing establishment issued an authorization for
medical treatment (Form CA-16) on December 31, 2014. Where an employing establishment
properly executes a Form CA-16, which authorizes medical treatment as a result of an
employee’s claim for an employment-related injury, the Form CA-16 creates a contractual
obligation, which does not involve the employee directly, to pay for the cost of the examination
or treatment regardless of the action taken on the claim.11 The period for which treatment is
authorized by a Form CA-16 is limited to 60 days from the date of issuance, unless terminated
earlier by OWCP.12 In this case, it is unclear whether OWCP paid for the cost of appellant’s
examinations. On return of the case record, OWCP should further address this matter as
appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

10

William J. Cantrell, 34 ECAB 1223 (1983).

11

A.B., Docket No. 15-1002 (issued August 14, 2015); Tracey P. Spillane, 54 ECAB 608 (2003).

12

20 C.F.R. § 10.300(c).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the February 26, 2016 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and remanded for further action consistent with
this decision.
Issued: October 13, 2016
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
S.T., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, DENVERMONTEBELLO STATION POST OFFICE,
Denver, CO, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

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Docket No. 21-0668
Issued: October 29, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
Before:
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On February 8, 2021 appellant filed an appeal from a May 7, 2020 merit decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 1 The Clerk of the Appellate Boards
assigned Docket No. 21-0668.
The Board, having duly considered the matter, notes that the Board has jurisdiction to
review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act
(FECA).2 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s
review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of
OWCP’s decision.3
The 180 th day following the May 7, 2020 decision was November 3, 2020. As appellant
did not file an appeal with the Board until February 8, 2021, more than 180 days after the May 7,
1

The Board notes that appellant’s appeal form indicates that she is requesting an appeal from various other
purported decisions. However, the last final adverse decision of record is OWCP’s May 7, 2020 decision.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

3

Id. at § 501.3(e).

2020 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 21 -0668 is untimely filed.
The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not explained the failure to
timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish compelling
circumstances. Because there is no adverse, final decision issued by OWCP within 180 days of
the February 8, 2021 filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed as
No. 21-0668, must be dismissed. 4 Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-0668 is dismissed.
Issued: October 29, 2021
Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id. at
§ 501.6(d).
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