United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.H., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, Coppell, TX, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 14-1219
Issued: November 24, 2014

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 1, 2014 appellant filed a timely appeal from the March 26, 2014 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish that he sustained an
injury in the performance of duty on January 18, 2014.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On January 24, 2014 appellant, then a 68-year-old lead transportation security officer,
filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that at 6:20 p.m. on January 18, 2014 he was
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

struck by a motor vehicle that had failed to yield the right of way at a pedestrian crosswalk
located between an airport terminal and a parking garage. He claimed injuries of a cracked rib,
bruised legs and hips, knee and leg sprain and cuts and scrapes of the hips, knees and elbows.
Appellant’s regular work shift was from 12:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., Friday through Tuesday. The
employing establishment checked a box indicating that he was not injured in the performance of
duty, as he was struck by a vehicle in a space not occupied by the employing establishment. It
noted that the injury had been caused by a third party. The employing establishment
controverted continuation of pay, noting that appellant was not performing screening and was not
in a space controlled by the employing establishment.
In a note dated January 23, 2014, Dr. Allen R. Schneider, a Board-certified internist,
stated that appellant was struck by a sport utility vehicle (SUV) in a crosswalk. He sustained a
right rib fracture and contusions of the hips and knee. Dr. Schneider recommended that
appellant return to work on January 31, 2014.
By letter dated February 12, 2014, OWCP advised appellant that the evidence submitted
was insufficient to establish his claim. It noted that the evidence received was not sufficient to
establish that he actually experienced the incident alleged to have caused injury and that the
medical portion of his claim had also been found to be insufficient. OWCP requested that
appellant respond to its queries and provide a physician’s report which included findings on
examination, the results of all x-ray and laboratory tests and a diagnosis and medical opinion
with medical rationale explaining how the reported work incident caused or aggravated his
claimed injury. It also requested that the employing establishment provide additional
information as to whether it owned, operated or controlled the property where the injury
occurred; the exact time of the injury; whether he was engaged in official duties at the time of
injury requiring him to be off the premises; and whether he was riding in or driving a
government-owned vehicle at the time of injury.
In a work activity status report dated January 19, 2014, Dr. Christopher L. Neill, a Boardcertified obstetrician and gynecologist, diagnosed appellant with a contusion of the chest wall,
elbow pain, hip and pelvic pain, knee pain and a knee/leg sprain. He recommended that
appellant return to work on January 19, 2014 with restrictions of no lifting over 10 pounds, no
prolonged standing or walking, no pushing or pulling over 20 pounds of force and no squatting
or kneeling. Dr. Neill also stated that appellant should not use stairs or ladders, that he should be
allowed to sit as needed and that he should be off work for the rest of his shift on
January 19, 2014. In a narrative report of the same date, he reviewed appellant’s history of
injury and diagnosed a chest wall contusion, knee abrasion, knee strain, knee pain, hip abrasion,
hip contusion, hip/pelvic pain, elbow abrasion, elbow contusion, elbow pain and a closed
fracture of one rib.
Dr. Neill stated that appellant worked for the employing establishment at the Dallas Fort
Worth International Airport and was struck by an SUV limousine at the airport at approximately
6:30 p.m. on January 18, 2014. Appellant told Dr. Neill that he was exiting the upper level of
Terminal C and was within a crosswalk on the way to his car when the injury occurred. He was
struck initially in the left knee, went up onto the hood of the vehicle and was thrown
approximately 10 feet. Appellant was unsure how fast the vehicle was traveling at the time, but
thought he landed on his right elbow, right anterior chest and right lateral knee area. Emergency

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medical services responded to the scene and treated him on-site. Appellant declined to be
transported to the hospital. Pain began immediately in his left knee, left chest, right hip and right
lateral knee, while his anterior mid-chest wall appeared to be causing the greatest pain. Dr. Neill
noted that appellant had a right total knee replacement and a “left quad removal.” He stated that
appellant should return for evaluation in two days or sooner if his condition worsened. On
examination, Dr. Neill noted abrasions and tenderness of the olecranon and lateral epicondyle of
the right elbow, abrasions of the right knee and abrasions and tenderness of the right hip.
On January 21, 2014 Dr. Neill recommended that appellant return to work on that date
with restrictions of no lifting over 10 pounds, no pushing or pulling over 20 pounds of force and
no squatting or kneeling. In progress notes of the same date, he examined appellant, noting
abrasions of the right elbow, abrasions of the right knee and tenderness, abrasions and
ecchymosis of the right hip. Dr. Neill recommended that appellant return for evaluation in seven
days or sooner if his condition worsened.
By decision dated March 26, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for compensation. It
found that he did not submit sufficient medical evidence to establish a causal relationship
between his diagnosed conditions and the incident of January 18, 2014.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of establishing the essential
elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an “employee of the United
States” within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time
limitation period of FECA, that an injury3 was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged
and that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally
related to the employment injury.4
FECA provides for the payment of compensation for the disability or death of an
employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty.5 The phrase
“sustained while in the performance of duty” has been interpreted by the Board to be the
equivalent of the commonly found prerequisite in workers’ compensation law of arising out of
and in the course of employment.6 The phrase “in the course of employment” is recognized as
relating to the work situation and more particularly, relating to elements of time, place and
circumstance. To arise in the course of employment, an injury must occur at a time when the
2

Id.

3

OWCP’s regulations define a traumatic injury as a condition of the body caused by a specific event or incident
or series of events of incidents, within a single workday or shift. Such condition must be caused by external force,
including stress or strain, which is identifiable as to time and place of occurrence and member or function of the
body affected. 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(ee).
4

T.H., 59 ECAB 388, 393 (2008); see Steven S. Saleh, 55 ECAB 169, 171-72 (2003); Elaine Pendleton, 40
ECAB 1143, 1145 (1989).
5

5 U.S.C. § 8102(a).

6

Charles Crawford, 40 ECAB 474, 476-77 (1989).

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employee may reasonably be stated to be engaged in the master’s business, at a place where he
may reasonably be expected to be in connection with the employment and while he was
reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental
thereto.7 Whereas arising out of the employment addresses the causal connection between the
employment and the injury, arising in the course of employment pertains to work connection as
to time, place and activity.8 For the purposes of determining entitlement to compensation under
FECA, arising in the course of employment (i.e., performance of duty) must be established
before arising out of the employment (i.e., causal relation) can be addressed.9
As to the phrase in the course of employment, the Board has accepted the general rule of
workers’ compensation law that, as to employees having fixed hours and places of work, injuries
occurring on the premises of the employing establishment are compensable.10 Regarding what
constitutes the premises of an employing establishment, the Board has stated:
“The term ‘premises’ as it is generally used in workmen’s compensation law, is
not synonymous with ‘property.’ The former does not depend on ownership, nor
is it necessarily coextensive with the latter. In some cases ‘premises’ may include
all the ‘property’ owned by the employ[ing] [establishment]; in other cases even
though [it] does not have ownership and control of the place where the injury
occurred the place is nevertheless considered part of the ‘premises.’”11
The Board notes that the mere fact that an alleged injury did not occur on the employing
establishment premises would not be fatal to an employee’s claim.12 With regards to off7

Mary Keszler, 38 ECAB 735, 739 (1987).

8

See also G.W., Docket No, 12-1416 (issued January 16, 2013).
199 (1988).
9

See Robert J. Eglinton, 40 ECAB 195,

Kenneth B. Wright, 44 ECAB 176, 181 (1992).

10

Narbik A. Karamian, 40 ECAB 617, 618 (1989). The Board has also applied this general rule of workers’
compensation law in circumstances where the employee was on an authorized break. See Eileen R. Gibbons,
52 ECAB 209, 211 (2001).
11

Wilmar Lewis Prescott, 22 ECAB 318, 321 (1971). The Board has also stated, “The ‘premises’ of the
employ[ing] [establishment], as that term is used in workmen’s compensation law, are not necessarily coterminous
with the property owned by the employ[ing] [establishment]; [they] may be broader or narrower and are dependent
more on the relationship of the property to the employment than on the status or extent of legal title.” Dollie J.
Braxton, 37 ECAB 186, 188-89 (1985). The proximity rule dictates that under special circumstances the industrial
premises are constructively extended to hazardous conditions which are proximately located to the premises and
may therefore be considered as hazards of the employing establishment. The main consideration in applying the
rule is whether the conditions giving rise to the injury are causally connected to the employment. See William L.
McKenney, 31 ECAB 861, 865 (1980).
12

As a general rule, off-premises injuries sustained by employees having fixed hours and place of work, are not
compensable. However, exceptions to the general rule have been made in order to protect activities that are so
closely related to the employment itself as to be incidental thereto (see Betty R. Rutherford, 40 ECAB 496, 499
(1989)) or which are in the nature of necessary personal comfort or ministration. See Mary M. Martin, 34 ECAB
525, 527 (1983). See, e.g., Harris Cohen, 8 ECAB 457, 457-58 (1954) (incident occurred while the employee was
obtaining coffee); Abraham Katz, 6 ECAB 218, 218-19 (1953) (incident occurring while the employee was on the
way to the lavatory).

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premises breaks, the operative principle used to determine whether the off-premises injury is
within the course of employment is whether the employing establishment, in all of the
circumstances including duration, shortness of off-premises distance and limitations of offpremises activity during the interval, can be deemed to have retained authority over the
employee. If so, the off-premises injury may be found to be within the performance of duty.13
OWCP is not a disinterested arbiter but rather performs the role of adjudicator on the one
hand and gatherer of relevant facts and protector of the compensation fund on the other, a role
that imposes an obligation on OWCP to see that its administrative processes are impartially and
fairly conducted.14 While a claimant has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to
compensation, OWCP shares responsibility in the development of the claim.15
ANALYSIS
Appellant stated that at 6:20 p.m. on January 18, 2014 he was struck by a vehicle that had
failed to yield the right of way at a pedestrian crosswalk between an airport terminal and a
parking garage. This incident occurred during his regular work hours of 12:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.,
Friday through Tuesday. OWCP accepted that the incident occurred as alleged but denied his
claim on the basis that he had not established a causal relationship between his diagnosed
conditions and the incident of January 18, 2014. Based on the evidence of record, the Board is
unable to determine whether his injury occurred in the performance of duty. The Board finds
therefore that the case is not in posture for decision.
The Board notes that OWCP did not adequately develop the evidence to support the
finding that appellant was within the performance of duty. OWCP did not make findings of fact
regarding whether the injury took place at a time when he may reasonably be stated to be
engaged in the master’s business, at a place where he may reasonably be expected to be in
connection with the employment or while he was reasonably fulfilling the duties of his
employment or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.16 The decision of March 26,
2014 is devoid of analysis on these issues, which are clearly relevant to appellant’s entitlement to
compensation.
On the Form CA-1, the employing establishment controverted continuation of pay and
contended that appellant was not within the performance of duty at the time of his injury,
explaining that he was not within an employing establishment-controlled space. While OWCP
began development on this issue by sending development letters to the employing establishment
and to appellant on February 12, 2014, neither he nor the employing establishment responded. It
stated that he was within the performance of duty at the time of the incident of January 18, 2014,
but did not analyze this issue in its decision.

13

See Lola M. Thomas, 37 ECAB 572-74 (1986).

14

Thomas M. Lee, 10 ECAB 175, 177 (1958).

15

See William J. Cantrell, 34 ECAB 1233, 1237 (1983); Gertrude E. Evans, 26 ECAB 195, 200 (1974).

16

See supra note 7.

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On appeal, appellant argues that he was walking to his car to retrieve paperwork needed
for his job when he was struck by an SUV and that this action should suffice to establish that he
was on duty in a marked crosswalk. However, he did not raise this contention before OWCP at
the time of its final decision.
The Board reviewed a similar case in J.B.,17 the employee was a transportation security
officer who claimed multiple injuries as a result of being struck by a shuttle bus in the crosswalk
of an airport. OWCP requested and received additional information from the employing
establishment and the employee relevant to the issue of whether she was injured in the
performance of duty. The Board found that the pedestrian crosswalk outside the airport terminal
was not considered to be part of the employing establishment’s premises, as it did not own,
control or maintain the area outside the airport and this was an area that was open to the public.
The Board further found that this area did not constitute a hazardous condition proximately
located to the premises of the employing establishment such that it could be constructively
considered part of its premises under the proximity rule, as motor vehicle traffic was a hazard
common to all travelers on the road outside the airport building. The Board noted that even if
the location of the appellant’s traumatic incident was considered to be part of the employing
establishment’s premises, it must also be established that appellant was engaged in activities that
were reasonably incidental to her employment. The Board found that searching for a cellphone,
even with the permission of her supervisor, was not reasonably incidental to her employment.
In T.M., the employee was a security screener who claimed head injuries as a result of
being struck by the mirror of a passing shuttle on a pedestrian walkway near a parking lot outside
of an airport. OWCP requested and received additional information from the employing
establishment relevant to the issue of whether she was injured in the performance of duty, but did
not receive information requested from appellant on this issue. The Board found that the
pedestrian walkway was not part of the employing establishment’s premises, noting that the
crosswalk where the incident occurred was open to the general public and was not owned or
maintained by the employing establishment. The Board further found the risk of being struck by
a shuttle bus was a risk faced by all travelers to the airport, not a special hazard faced by
employees.
In the present case, unlike in J.B., or T.M., OWCP did not adequately develop issue of
whether appellant was injured in the performance of duty at the time of its March 26, 2014
decision. The employing establishment controverted appellant’s claim stating that he was not in
an employing establishment-occupied space when injured. OWCP requested information from
the employing establishment and appellant, but did not receive a response.
The Board finds that the factual evidence of record was not sufficiently developed by
OWCP to permit a fully informed adjudication of the issue to determine whether appellant was
fulfilling duties incidental to his employment at the time of the injury. The questions of whether
the incident occurred on the premises of the employment establishment or during the fulfillment
of duties incidental to his employment remain unresolved.18 OWCP began factual development
17

Docket No. 11-106 (issued August 17, 2011).

18

See L.Y., Docket No. 13-761 (issued July 18, 2013).

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concerning performance of duty, but did not adequately ascertain whether appellant was in the
performance of duty at the time of the alleged injury before denying his claim on the basis of
insufficient medical evidence to establish a causal relationship. As noted above, for the purposes
of determining entitlement to compensation under FECA, arising in the course of employment
(i.e., performance of duty) must be established before arising out of the employment (i.e., causal
relation) can be addressed.19 The case will be remanded for OWCP to undertake further
development on the issue of performance of duty.20
For these reasons, additional development by OWCP is required with respect to the
question of whether the January 18, 2014 incident occurred on the premises of the employing
establishment or in the fulfillment of duties incidental to appellant’s employment. The
information regarding employing establishment premises is the type of information usually
obtained from the employing establishment.21 After such development as it deems necessary,
OWCP shall issue a de novo decision regarding whether appellant sustained an injury in the
performance of duty on January 18, 2014.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision, as further development of the
evidence is warranted.

19

Supra note 9.

20

See D.M., Docket No. 13-1821 (issued March 26, 2014) (finding that OWCP did not fully develop the issue of
whether appellant was in the performance of duty at the time of his alleged injury and remanding the case for further
factual development).
21

Willie A. Dean, 40 ECAB 1208, 1212 (1989); Willie James Clark, 39 ECAB 1311, 1318-19 (1988).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated March 26, 2014 is set aside and the case remanded for further
development consistent with the above opinion.
Issued: November 24, 2014
Washington, DC

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
R.S., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Jersey City, NJ, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 17-1139
Issued: November 16, 2017

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 2, 2017 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a February 9,
2017 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to
the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish a traumatic injury
causally related to the accepted February 3, 2015 employment incident.
1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for
legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An
attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject
to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On May 1, 2015 appellant, then a 57-year-old tractor trailer operator, filed a traumatic
injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on February 3, 2015 he slipped on ice and fell backwards
while he was walking out from the rear of a trailer. He noted that when he attempted to get up,
he fell on his knees. Appellant listed the nature of his injury as soreness to his back and both
knees. He did not stop work.
Appellant was treated by multiple chiropractors at the Jersey City Rehabilitation Clinic
from February 23 through April 3, 2015, including Dr. John Bortolussi, Dr. Louis Stimmel,
Dr. James Prette, and Dr. Charles Collins. These chiropractors treated appellant for neck pain
and stiffness in both shoulders, upper and lower back pain, pain radiating into both legs, and pain
in both knees. Appellant was treated with traction, moist heat cryotherapy, and vibratory
massage therapy.
On March 31, 2015 appellant underwent a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the
right knee that was interpreted by Dr. Alkies Lapas, a diagnostic neuroradiologist and osteopath,
as showing horizontal cleavage tear at the posterior horn of the medial meniscus, and
osteochondral erosions at the posterior aspect of the medial femoral condyle and at the medial
femoral trachlear surface.
OWCP also received physical therapy notes from the Jersey City Rehabilitation Clinic
dated April 8, 2015.
By letter dated June 25, 2015, OWCP informed appellant that further factual and medical
evidence was necessary to support his claim, and afforded him 30 days to submit the requested
information. Appellant did not respond within the allotted time.
In a decision dated August 7, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim. It found that,
although appellant had established that an incident occurred as alleged, he failed to submit
medical evidence containing a medical diagnosis in connection with the incident.
On September 1, 2015 appellant requested a telephonic hearing before an OWCP hearing
representative. OWCP received additional medical evidence on January 7, 2016.
Appellant was treated at the emergency department of Christ Hospital on
February 4, 2015. He reported that, while at work the day before, he slipped and fell onto the
ice, landing on his upper back. Appellant noted that he then jumped up quickly and fell forward,
landing on his knees. He complained of pain in his upper back, neck and bilateral knee pain.
Dr. Tania A. Afonso, an osteopath and emergency medicine physician, diagnosed sprain of the
knee and whiplash injury to the neck. On the same date Dr. Supreet Singh, a Board-certified
radiologist, interpreted an x-ray of appellant’s cervical spine as evincing no fracture or joint
dislocation.
On November 17, 2015 weight bearing x-rays were taken of both knees and Dr. Nina L.
Brogle, a Board-certified radiologist, found moderate osteoarthrosis, right greater than left, and
enthesopathy. She found no acute fracture or dislocation.

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An MRI scan of the right knee taken on December 11, 2015 was interpreted by
Dr. Stacey Siegel, a Board-certified radiologist, as showing tear posterior horn and body medial
meniscus with irregularity along the inferior articular surface; interstitial tear anterior cruciate
ligament; abnormal signal low on T1 with increased signal on the T2 weighted images at the
anterior and lateral aspect of the medial femoral condyle which may represent a cyst or chondral
lesion; bone marrow edema anterior aspect of the medial femoral condyle; and osteoarthritis
medial to lesser extent lateral tibiofemoral joint space, and small joint effusion.
At the hearing held on April 13, 2016, appellant testified that he had been a tractor/trailer
driver for 10 years, that on February 3, 2015 he had a slip and fall at work and landed on ice, and
that in the process of trying to get up he fell onto his knees. He noted that he finished his shift on
the day he fell, but went to the hospital the next day. Appellant testified that he was still having
trouble with his back and both of his knees. He noted that in November 2014, prior to his
employment injury, he had surgery to fix a tear in his right medial meniscus. Appellant indicated
that the problem recurred after the fall.
By decision dated May 18, 2016, the hearing representative affirmed the August 7, 2015
decision. He noted that the file was devoid of medical evidence in which a physician provided
an accurate history of injury and an unequivocal medical opinion addressing causal relationship
between the accepted employment incident and a definitive diagnosis supported by medical
rationale.
On December 28, 2016 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration.
Appellant submitted progress notes from the Veterans Administration (VA) Medical
Center in East Orange New Jersey dated from December 28, 2006 through November 30, 2016.
In an MRI scan of the right knee taken on June 18, 2014, Dr. Joan K. Kowalec, a Boardcertified internist, found a tear of the posterior horn and body medial meniscus with irregularity
along the inferior articular surface, interstitial tear anterior cruciate ligament, abnormal signal
low on T1 with increased signal on the T2, bone marrow edema anterior aspect of the medial
femoral condyle, osteoarthritis medial to lesser extent lateral tibiofemoral joint space, and small
joint effusion.
In a March 10, 2015 note, Dr. Alycia N. Antoine, an internist, noted that on February 3,
2015 appellant fell and injured his back and both knees. She stated that appellant was
experiencing swelling in his legs at the end of the day.
In a July 27, 2015 note, Dr. Rashima Jain-Ahuja, a Board-certified family practitioner,
listed appellant’s active problems as tear of the medial meniscus of knee (August 11, 2014),
essential hypertension, chronic hepatitis C, osteoarthritis, and open angle glaucoma. She also
noted that he had a history of right knee diagnostic arthroscopy and medial meniscus partial
meniscectomy on November 15, 2014. Dr. Jain-Ahuja further indicated that appellant had a fall
at work on February 3, 2015 at which time he sustained injuries to his back and both knees.
With regard to assessment/plan for this chronic right knee pain, she indicated that she
encouraged appellant to follow up with workers’ compensation and ambulate with a cane.

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Appellant underwent an MRI scan of his knees on November 4, 2015 that was interpreted
by Dr. Brogle as showing no acute fracture or dislocation in either knee and moderate
osteoarthritis, right greater than left.
On July 13, 2016 Dr. Jain-Ahuja noted right knee pain and ankle pain.
Numerous x-rays were taken on October 30, 2016 and were interpreted by Dr. Joey
Philip, a radiologist.
X-rays of knees showed no significant interval change, mild
tricompartmental degenerative changes of the knee, no acute osseous abnormality, and
generalized osteopenia of the visual bony structures. X-rays of the left shoulder showed no acute
osseous abnormality, mild degenerative osteoarthritic changes suspected in the left
acromioclavicular joint, generalized osteopenia of the visualized bony structures, and prominent
subacromial osteophytic spurring suspected which may clinically contribute to impingement of
the rotator cuff. X-rays of cervical spine showed moderate degenerative spondylitic changes at
C5-6 level, generalized osteopenia of the visualized bony structures, no definite acute displaced
fracture or subluxation, and straightening of the normal cervical lordotic curvature. X-rays of the
lumbar spine showed mild grade 1 retrolisthesis of the L5 with respect to L4, mild multilevel
degenerative spondylotic changes in the lumbosacral spine, no acute fracture or subluxation,
generalized osteopenia of the visualized bony structures, moderate-to-severe facet degenerative
changes suspected in the lower lumbosacral spine bilaterally, and straightening of the normal
lumbar lordotic curvature.
In a December 15, 2016 report, Dr. David B. Basch, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, noted that appellant slipped and fell on ice on February 3, 2015 and injured his neck
and lower back as well as his knees. He noted that appellant continued to experience persistent
neck and lower back pain with occasional numbness and tingling throughout his bilateral upper
extremities. Dr. Basch noted that appellant was also experiencing a sense of instability in his
knees. He diagnosed chronic cervical and lumbar strains (whiplash injury), rule out internal disc
disruption and disc herniation; and bilateral knee internal derangement with horizontal cleavage
tear of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus with osteochondral lesion to the posterior
aspect of the medial femoral condyle and the medial femoral trochlear surface.
By decision dated February 9, 2017, OWCP modified the May 18, 2016 decision. It
determined that the evidence now established the factors of employment and that a medical
condition had been diagnosed, but that the claim remained denied because the evidence of record
did not establish causal relationship between the accepted employment incident and the
diagnosed conditions of cervical and lumbar strains and bilateral knee internal derangement with
horizontal cleavage tear to the posterior horn of the medial meniscus. Thus, an injury “within the
meaning of … (FECA) has not been demonstrated.”
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA3 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable
3

Id.

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time limitation period of FECA, that an injury was caused in the performance of duty as alleged,
and that any disability and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are causally
related to the employment injury.4 These are the essential elements of each and every
compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an
occupational disease.5
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty, it must first be determined whether a fact of injury has been established.
First, the employee must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he or she actually
experienced the employment incident at the time, place and in the manner alleged.6 Second, the
employee must submit sufficient evidence, generally only in the form of medical evidence, to
establish that the employment incident caused a personal injury.7
The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical
background of the employee, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be
supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed
condition and the specific employment factors identified by the employee.8 The weight of the
medical evidence is determined by its reliability, its probative value, its convincing quality, the
care of analysis manifested, and the medical rationale expressed in support of the physician’s
opinion.9
ANALYSIS
OWCP accepted that the employment incident occurred as alleged and that appellant
established a medical diagnosis. However, it denied his claim as the medical evidence failed to
establish that the diagnosed medical conditions were causally related to the accepted
employment incident.
The Board finds that appellant has failed to submit a rationalized medical opinion
establishing causal relationship between the accepted February 3, 2015 incident and any medical
diagnosis.
Causal relationship is a medical question that must be established by probative medical
opinion from a physician.10 In support of his claim, appellant submitted multiple notes from
chiropractors at the Jersey City Rehabilitation Clinic, including Drs. Bortolussi, Stimmel, Prette,
4

Joe D. Cameron, 42 ECAB 153 (1989); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

5

Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989).

6

John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989).

7

Id.

8

I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); supra note 5.

9

James Mack, 43 ECAB 321 (1991).

10

C.S., Docket No. 17-0399 (issued June 19, 2017).

5

and Collins. A chiropractor is considered a physician as defined by section 8101(2) of FECA
only if his or her services consist of manual manipulation of the spine to correct a subluxation as
demonstrated by x-ray to exist.11 No chiropractors of record indicated that x-rays showed a
spinal subluxation. Accordingly, these chiropractors are not considered physicians under FECA
and their opinions do not constitute competent medical evidence.12
OWCP also received a report from appellant’s physical therapist. However, reports by a
physical therapists have no probative value as a physical therapists are not considered
physicians.13 Therefore, the reports from appellant’s physical therapist are insufficient to meet
appellant’s burden of proof.14
Appellant submitted the results of multiple diagnostic studies, including x-rays
interpreted by Dr. Brogle, Dr. Singh, and Dr. Philip, and MRI scans interpreted by Dr. Lapas,
Dr. Siegel, and Dr. Brogle. These diagnostic studies are of limited probative value as they do not
address whether the February 3, 2015 work incident caused any of the diagnosed conditions.15
The reports of the remaining physicians also do not establish a medical diagnosis causally
related to the February 3, 2015 accepted work injury. Appellant received treatment at the
emergency department by Dr. Alfonso on February 4, 2015. Dr. Alfonso described the work
incident and diagnosed a sprain of the knees and whiplash injury to appellant’s neck. However,
the mere fact that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period of employment does not
raise an inference of causal relationship between the condition and the employment.16 A
physician must provide a reasoned opinion on whether the employment incident described had
caused or contributed to appellant’s diagnosed medical conditions.17 As Dr. Alfonso offered no
opinion regarding the cause of appellant’s diagnosed conditions, her report was of limited
probative value.
Appellant also submitted multiple progress notes from the VA Medical Center. These
reports show that appellant had preexisting issues with his right knee as evidenced by the MRI
scan by Dr. Kowalec taken on June 18, 2014, and the fact that appellant underwent a right knee
diagnostic arthroscopy and medial meniscus partial meniscectomy on November 15, 2014.
These reports are of limited probative value as none of the physicians from the VA Medical
11

5 U.S.C. § 8101(2).

12

See Jay K. Tomokiyo, 51 ECAB 361 (2000).

13

The term physician includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors,
and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by State law. 5 U.S.C. § 8102(2); J.G.,
Docket No. 15-251 (issued April 13, 2015); A.C., Docket No. 08-1453 (issued November 18, 2008) (records from a
physical therapist do not constitute competent medical opinion in support of causal relation, as physical therapists
are not considered physicians as defined under FECA).
14

L.W., Docket No. 16-1317 (issued June 21, 2017).

15

G.M., Docket No. 14-2057 (issued May 12, 2015).

16

K.W., Docket No. 17-0205 (issued June 12, 2017).

17

John W. Montoya, 54 ECAB 306 (2003).

6

Center provided a rationalized opinion explaining how the February 3, 2015 accepted
employment incident caused an injury. Dr. Jain-Ahuja mentioned appellant’s employment
incident, noted active problems including osteoarthritis, and noted the prior surgery of
November 15, 2014. Although Dr. Jain-Ahuja indicated that appellant sustained injuries to his
back and knees during the February 3, 2015 fall, she did not provide any rationalized medical
opinion explaining causal relationship. A conclusion without the necessary rationale explaining
how and why the physician believes that a claimant’s accepted employment incident could result
in a diagnosed condition is not sufficient to meet a claimant’s burden of proof.18 Dr. Antoine
noted the employment incident and injury to appellant’s knees, but offered no firm medical
diagnosis and no opinion regarding causal relationship. Lacking a firm diagnosis and medical
rationale on the issue of causal relationship, Dr. Antoine’s report is insufficient to establish that
appellant sustained an employment-related injury.19
Finally, Dr. Basch, in his December 15, 2016 report, notes the February 3, 2015
employment incident and diagnoses of chronic cervical and lumbar strains and bilateral knee
internal derangement. However, he provided no rationalized opinion on causal relationship, and
his opinion is, therefore, insufficient to establish that the February 3, 2015 fall caused or
aggravated a medical diagnosis.20
An award of compensation may not be based on surmise, conjecture, speculation, or
appellant’s belief of causal relationship.21 Appellant has failed to submit rationalized medical
evidence sufficient to meet his burden of proof to establish an employment-related injury.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a traumatic
injury causally related to the accepted February 3, 2015 employment incident.

18

J.S., Docket No. 14-818 (issued August 7, 2014).

19

See E.S., Docket No. 16-0267 (issued May 17, 2016).

20

Id.

21

John D. Jackson, 55 ECAB 465 (2004); William Nimitz¸ 30 ECAB 57 (1979).

7

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated February 9, 2017 is affirmed.
Issued: November 16, 2017
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.C., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Brooklyn, NY, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Thomas S. Harkins, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 14-120
Issued: April 9, 2014

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On October 24, 2013 appellant, through her attorney, filed a timely appeal from a
May 29, 2013 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are:
(1) whether OWCP properly terminated appellant’s wage-loss
compensation and medical benefits effective March 28, 2012 on the grounds that she no longer
had any residuals causally related to her accepted employment-related injury; and (2) whether
appellant had continuing employment-related residuals or disability after March 28, 2012.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On June 3, 2010 appellant, then a 34-year-old clerk, sustained injury to her right knee and
lower thigh when she attempted to move a tray that was stuck on the tray line. She stopped work
that day. OWCP accepted appellant’s claim for a right knee contusion and paid compensation
benefits. She has not returned to work.
In medical reports of record Dr. Ronald D. Richman, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon and appellant’s treating physician, opined that a left knee condition and a back condition
became evident since the accepted work injury. He recommended surgical consultation for a
possible right anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) and medial cruciate ligament (MCL) tears.
Dr. Richman also recommended a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the left knee.
OWCP referred appellant for a second opinion evaluation. In an October 26, 2011 report,
Dr. Leon Sultan, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, noted a history of appellant’s injury,
reviewed the medical records and reported findings on right knee examination. He advised that
her right knee was unremarkable and demonstrated no residual disuse atrophy, ligamentous
instability or motion restriction. Dr. Sultan found that there was no localized swelling or
deformity. Spurling and McMurray testing were negative. Dr. Sultan found no disabling
residuals from the June 3, 2010 employment incident or any continuing disability. He further
opined that no further medical treatment was needed for the employment-related right knee
condition, there was no concurrent nonwork-related disability and appellant could return to her
date-of-injury position full time as a mail clerk with no restrictions.
Following the second opinion examination, OWCP received Dr. Richman’s prescription
notes for internal derangement of the left knee; a referral to physical therapy for the left knee;
and physical therapy notes for both knees. A September 8, 2011 Form CA-20 listed a June 3,
2010 history of striking right knee on railing. Appellant submitted magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) scans showing tears of the MCL and ACL on the right with instability and weakness of
both knees. Dr. Richman advised that surgical intervention was needed. A January 4, 2012
Form CA-20 noted physical therapy continued for the right knee, with possible surgical
intervention required for both knees.
In a January 3, 2012 report, Dr. Richman stated that appellant showed a slight
improvement in her right knee. He recommended that she continue with physical therapy and
treatment of both knees. Appellant brought a note from the Department of Labor inquiring why
her left knee should be considered in her right knee case. Dr. Richman advised that a complete
explanation was dictated in an August 2011 report, for which he provided a copy. He advised
that he was retiring in two weeks. In the August 30, 2011 note, Dr. Richman recommended that
appellant should obtain authorization for an MRI scan of the left knee and a second opinion for
surgery. He opined that the left knee became stressed due to increased weight bearing, which
subsequently produced symptoms requiring treatment.
In a December 22, 2011 report, Dr. Richman noted that a left knee MRI scan showed
findings of MCL sprain with disruption and a partial ACL tear. He noted that the right knee had
medial instability and pain to palpation along the medial joint line. Dr. Richman reiterated that

2

appellant should continue with physical therapy for both knees and undergo arthroscopy of the
right knee.
OWCP found a conflict in medical opinion between Dr. Richman and Dr. Sultan
regarding continuing residuals of the right knee due to the June 3, 2010 employment injury and
whether appellant was disabled for work. It referred appellant, the medical record, a statement of
accepted facts and a list of questions, to Dr. Norman Sveilich, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, for an impartial medical evaluation.
In a February 7, 2012 report, Dr. Sveilich noted a history of injury and review of
appellant’s medical treatment. On examination he noted findings on range of motion. The right
knee was described as normal with no erythema, no crepitus of the patella, no tenderness to
palpation. There was no medial instability or laxity. X-ray findings of the right and left lower
extremities showed mild narrowing of the medial compartments. The left and right knees were
essentially normal. Dr. Sveilich opined that appellant had reached maximum medical
improvement and the contusion to her right knee had resolved. Appellant could work full duty
without restriction. Dr. Sveilich also opined that all other orthopedic symptoms had resolved.
He attributed her ongoing complaints to her morbid obesity and disease muscle atrophy of the
right thigh.
In a letter dated February 23, 2012, OWCP proposed to terminate appellant’s wage-loss
compensation and medical benefits based on Dr. Sveilich’s report.
In a February 7, 2012 report, Dr. Shepard Splain, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
noted the history of injury to appellant’s right knee. He stated that physical therapy has not
relieved her discomfort. Examination revealed a markedly overweight female but no findings of
disability or a medical condition. Dr. Splain noted that an MRI scan of the right knee did not
reveal evidence of internal derangement or any other pathology. He concluded that appellant
was not a surgical candidate for her right knee.
By report dated February 27, 2012, Dr. Neofitos Stefanides, an orthopedic surgeon,
reported that appellant had low back pain since her June 3, 2010 work injury, when her knee
struck a railing. The pain radiated down into the thigh past the knee into the leg and foot.
Dr. Stefanides listed findings of the back and both knees with an upper extremity
musculoskeletal examination.
An assessment of neuritis/radiothorastic/lumbar and
chondromalacia patella was provided. Dr. Stefanides opined that, based on appellant’s history,
physical examination, and radiographic findings, her conditions were causally related to the work
injury and she remained totally disabled from her usual work activities.
By decision dated March 28, 2012, OWCP terminated appellant’s compensation benefits
based on Dr. Sveilich’s impartial medical report.
On April 20, 2012 appellant requested an oral hearing before an OWCP hearing
representative that was scheduled for September 18, 2012. In a September 7, 2012 letter,
appellant’s attorney requested that the scheduled hearing be cancelled. By decision dated
September 28, 2012, OWCP accepted appellant’s request to withdraw the hearing and returned
the case to the district Office.

3

Appellant’s counsel requested reconsideration. In a March 20, 2013 brief, he contended
that OWCP failed to accept all of the conditions related to the work injury and that she continued
to have residuals from her injuries. Counsel contended that appellant had bilateral knee medial
meniscus tears and lumbar radiculopathy as noted in Dr. Stefanides November 11, 2012 report.
In a November 11, 2012 report, Dr. Stefanides noted that he initially evaluated appellant
on March 25, 2011. Thereafter, he treated her on several occasions, most recently on
October 19, 2012. Appellant had low back pain since her work injury on June 3, 2010 when her
knee struck a railing. Dr. Stefanides listed examination findings of both knees and the lumbar
spine. He noted impression of bilateral knee medial meniscal tear; and lumbar radiculopathy.
Based on appellant’s history, physical examination, and radiographic findings, Dr. Stefanides
reiterated his opinion that her physical injuries were causally related to the work-related injury.
He found her totally disabled from her usual work activities. With regard to the right and left
knees, appellant sustained a mild-to-moderate injury and the most recent MRI scan indicated
meniscal tears without ligament disruption, which would best be treated with arthroscopic
procedures. She also sustained permanent orthopedic disability with regard to her lumbar spine
due to lumbar radiculopathy. Dr. Stefanides recommended lumbar epidurals and further
diagnostic testing to confirm the diagnosis.
By decision dated May 29, 2013, OWCP denied modification of the March 28, 2012
termination decision. It found that Dr. Stefanides’ report was insufficient to outweigh the special
weight accorded to Dr. Sveilich as the impartial medical specialist.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
Once OWCP accepts a claim, it has the burden of justifying termination or modification
of compensation. After it has been determined that an employee has disability causally related to
her employment, OWCP may not terminate compensation without establishing that the disability
had ceased or that it was no longer related to the employment.2 Its burden of proof includes the
necessity of furnishing rationalized medical opinion evidence based on a proper factual and
medical background.3 Furthermore, the right to medical benefits for an accepted condition is not
limited to the period of entitlement for disability. To terminate authorization for medical
treatment, OWCP must establish that a claimant no longer has residuals of an employmentrelated condition that requires further medical treatment.4
Section 8123(a) of FECA provides that, if there is disagreement between the physician
making the examination for the United States and the physician of the employee, the Secretary
shall appoint a third physician who shall make an examination.5 The implementing regulations
state that, if a conflict exists between the medical opinion of the employee’s physician and the
medical opinion of either a second opinion physician or an OWCP medical adviser, OWCP shall
2

Jason C. Armstrong, 40 ECAB 907 (1989).

3

See Del K. Rykert, 40 ECAB 284, 295-96 (1988).

4

Mary A. Lowe, 52 ECAB 223 (2001); Wiley Richey, 49 ECAB 166 (1997).

5

5 U.S.C. § 8123(a).

4

appoint a third physician to make an examination. This is called a referee examination and
OWCP will select a physician who is qualified in the appropriate specialty and who has no prior
connection with the case.6 In situations where there exist opposing medical reports of virtually
equal weight and rationale and the case is referred to an impartial medical specialist for the
purpose of resolving the conflict, the opinion of such specialist, if sufficiently well rationalized
and based upon a proper factual background, must be given special weight.7
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
OWCP accepted the claim for right knee contusion. On March 28, 2012 it terminated
appellant’s compensation benefits based on the opinion of the impartial medical examiner,
Dr. Sveilich. The issue is whether OWCP met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s
compensation benefits.
OWCP relied on the medical opinion of Dr. Sveilich, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, who was selected to resolve a conflict in the medical opinion between Dr. Sultan, an
OWCP referral physician, and Dr. Richman, appellant’s treating physician, who found that
appellant continued to have residuals and disability from her accepted June 3, 2010 employment
injury while Dr. Sveilich opined that appellant no longer had any residuals or disability due to
the accepted employment injury. OWCP properly found a conflict in medical opinion on the
issues of medical residuals and disability. It properly referred appellant to Dr. Sveilich to resolve
the conflict in the medical opinion evidence pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8123(a).
In a February 7, 2012 report, Dr. Sveilich provided findings based on a physical
examination, a review of the statement of accepted facts and medical history. He determined
that appellant no longer had residuals of her accepted right knee contusion. Dr. Sveilich stated
that the left and right knees were essentially normal on examination. Swelling was noted on the
right knee but there was a negative fluctuation test and no tenderness on palpation. Dr. Sveilich
found that appellant had no disability or residuals due to her accepted right knee contusion;
rather he noted that her ongoing symptoms were due to her morbid obesity and disease atrophy
of the right thigh. He opined that she reached maximum medical improvement and that the right
knee contusion had resolved and she could return to work full duty.
The Board finds that Dr. Sveilich had an accurate knowledge of the relevant facts and
evaluated the course of appellant’s condition. Dr. Sveilich is a specialist in the appropriate field.
At the time benefits were terminated, he determined that appellant had no work-related residuals
or disability for full-time employment. Dr. Sveilich’s opinion as set forth in his February 7,
2012 report is found to be probative evidence and reliable. The Board finds that Dr. Sveilich’s
opinion constitutes the special weight of the medical evidence and is sufficient to justify
OWCP’s termination of benefits for the accepted condition of right knee contusion.
Prior to the termination of her compensation benefits, appellant submitted a February 7,
2012 report from Dr. Splain and the February 27, 2012 report from Dr. Stefanides. However,
6

20 C.F.R. § 10.321.

7

Gloria J. Godfrey, 52 ECAB 486 (2001); Jacqueline Brasch (Ronald Brasch); 52 ECAB 252 (2001).

5

these reports are insufficient to create a conflict with Dr. Sveilich. Dr. Splain made no findings
of disability or a medical condition. He noted that the MRI scan did not reveal evidence of
internal derangement or any other pathology and concluded that appellant was not a surgical
candidate for her right knee. Dr. Splain’s report is insufficient to create a conflict with
Dr. Sveilich.
In his February 27, 2012 report, Dr. Stefanides noted that appellant had low back pain
since her June 3, 2010 work injury. He opined that her conditions of neuritis/radio
thoracic/lumbar and chondromalacia patella were causally related to the work injury and that she
remained totally disabled from her usual work activities. The Board finds that Dr. Stefanides’
report is of limited probative value. Dr. Stefanides diagnosed chondromalacia patella, but did
not indicate which knee was affected. He provides insufficient rationale for continued
employment-related residuals and disability due to the accepted right knee condition. OWCP has
not accepted either a left knee condition or a back condition. For conditions not accepted by
OWCP as being employment related, it is the claimant’s burden to provide rationalized medical
evidence sufficient to establish causal relation.8 Thus, this report is insufficient to create a
conflict in medical opinion with Dr. Sveilich.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
As OWCP met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s compensation benefits, the
burden shifted to her to establish that she had any disability causally related to her accepted
injury.9
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
The Board finds that appellant has not established that she has any continuing residuals of
her work-related right knee contusion on or after March 28, 2012.
After the termination of benefits on March 28, 2012, appellant’s counsel requested
reconsideration and submitted a November 11, 2012 report from Dr. Stefanides. In his report,
Dr. Stefanides noted that he last examined appellant on October 19, 2012 and he opined that her
conditions of bilateral knee meniscal tear and lumbar radiculopathy were causally related to the
work-related injury and that she was totally disabled. While he opined that the most recent MRI
scan indicated bilateral meniscal tear without ligament disruption, he provides no rationale for
continued employment-related residuals and disability due to the accepted right knee condition.
OWCP has not accepted either a left knee condition or a back condition and Dr. Stefanides has
not provided any medical rationale which causally relates a left knee or back condition to the
accepted work-related injury of June 3, 2010.10 Thus, Dr. Stefanides’ report is insufficiently
rationalized to establish a causal relationship between her condition on and after March 28, 2012
8

G.A., Docket No. 09-2153 (issued June 10, 2010); Jaja K. Asaramo, 55 ECAB 200 (2004).

9

See I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Michael Hughes, 52 ECAB 387 (2001); Howard Y. Miyashiro, 43 ECAB 1101,
1115 (1992); Dorothy Sidwell, 41 ECAB 857 (1990).
10

See supra note 9.

6

and the accepted right knee contusion. Therefore, appellant has failed to meet her burden of
proof.
None of the reports submitted by appellant after the termination of benefits included a
rationalized opinion regarding the causal relationship between her current condition and her
accepted work-related conditions. Consequently, appellant did not establish that she had any
employment-related condition or disability after March 28, 2012.
On appeal appellant’s counsel argues that OWCP improperly terminated appellant’s
compensation benefits as the medical evidence of file establishes that she continues to suffer
disability from her injuries and conditions causally related to the employment injury of
June 3, 2010. However OWCP met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s compensation
benefits and she failed to meet her burden of proof in establishing any continuing disability or
medical residuals on or after March 28, 2012. Appellant’s counsel also contends that OWCP
must expand the class of accepted conditions in this case. While the record contains evidence of
a left knee condition and a back condition, appellant has not met her burden of proof in providing
rationalized medical evidence sufficient to establish causal relation.
Appellant must submit medical evidence which based upon an accurate history of injury,
explains with medical rationale how appellant’s employment injury physiologically caused the
diagnosed conditions.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s
compensation benefits and that appellant has failed to meet her burden of proof in establishing
any continuing disability or medical residuals on or after March 28, 2012.

7

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 29, 2013 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: April 9, 2014
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.H., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL,
Edmonton Alberta, Canada, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-1109
Issued: December 14, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 24, 2012 appellant filed a timely appeal from the March 16, 2012 merit decision
denying his occupational disease claim in File No. xxxxxx385; the March 19, 2012 merit
decision denying his occupational disease claim in File No. xxxxxx576; and the March 16, 2012
merit decision denying his occupational disease claim in File No. xxxxxx549. Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of these cases.2
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant sustained a left shoulder injury in the performance
of duty pursuant to his claim in File No. xxxxxx385; (2) whether he developed a respiratory
1
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

Appellant requested an oral argument. The Clerk of the Board mailed a letter to appellant to confirm a
continuing desire for an oral argument in Washington, DC. No written confirmation was received; thus, the Board
has decided the appeal on the record.

condition in the performance of duty pursuant to his claim in File No. xxxxxx576; and
(3) whether appellant developed a respiratory condition in the performance of duty pursuant to
his claim in File No. xxxxxx549.
FACTUAL HISTORY
OWCP accepted appellant’s November 28, 2007 and December 21, 2008 claims (Nos.
xxxxxx846 and xxxxxx995), for acute episodic allergic bilateral conjunctivitis/rhinitis.
Appellant has filed similar occupational disease claims based on employment-related exposure to
toxic fumes and claims alleging an occupational shoulder injury, including those cases that are
the subject of this appeal.3 These claims have been consolidated, with File No. xxxxxx846
serving as the master file.4
On April 1, 2011 appellant, a 56-year-old customs and border protection officer, filed an
occupational disease claim alleging that he sustained a left shoulder injury as a result of
repetitive employment activities. He stated that he was required to rotate his left shoulder while
fingerprinting individuals, who routinely bumped his left arm due to the configuration of his
work space.5
In a letter dated April 18, 2011, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence and
information submitted were insufficient to establish his claim. Appellant was advised to submit
additional evidence, including a medical report containing a diagnosis and a reasoned opinion as
to how his employment activities caused or aggravated his diagnosed condition.
Appellant submitted a January 18, 2011 report of a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
scan of the left shoulder, reflecting an anterior glenoid labral tear.

3

Other claims include a pending May 18, 2011 occupational disease claim (No. xxxxxx270), in which appellant
alleged occupational asthma and allergic rhinitis due to employment-related exposure to jet and diesel fumes, dust
and toxins and a November 18, 2010 occupational disease claim (No. xxxxxx576), in which he alleged severe sinus
headaches, breathing difficulties and nausea due to employment-related exposure to jet and diesel fumes, dust and
toxins. In an April 1, 2011 occupational disease claim (No. xxxxxx385), he alleged a shoulder injury as a result of
repetitive fingerprinting activities.
4

These cases have been before the Board on prior appeal. In File No. xxxxxx576, appellant appealed nonmerit
decisions dated May 19 and September 29, 2011 denying his request for an oral hearing and his request for
reconsideration. By order dated December 19, 2011, the Board remanded the case for consolidation of case File
Nos. xxxxxx995, xxxxxx846, xxxxxx270 and xxxxxx576. Docket No. 12-69 (issued December 19, 2011). In File
No. 092522549, appellant appealed a May 23, 2011 decision denying his occupational disease claim. By order
dated December 19, 2011, the Board remanded the case for consolidation of case File Nos. xxxxxx549, xxxxxx995,
xxxxxx846, xxxxxx576, xxxxxx385 and xxxxxx270. Docket No. 11-1458 (issued December 19, 2011). In File No.
xxxxxx385, appellant appealed a June 28, 2011 decision denying his April 1, 2011 occupational disease claim. By
order dated December 12, 2011, the Board remanded the case for consolidation of the case File Nos. xxxxxx385
and xxxxxx549 and consideration of the evidence in all files. Docket No. 11-1946 (issued December 12, 2011).
5

File No. xxxxxx385. The Board notes that in his April 16, 2011 occupational disease claim in File No. xxxxxx549,
appellant also alleged that he sustained a shoulder injury as a result of repetitive fingerprinting activities. As noted,
File No. xxxxxx549 has been combined with the instant case file.

2

On May 24, 2011 OWCP again informed appellant that the evidence submitted was
insufficient to establish his claim and that he should submit a rationalized medical report
explaining how his claimed left shoulder condition resulted from his employment activities.
Appellant submitted a March 31, 2011 report from Dr. Christopher Lee, a treating
physician, who diagnosed left shoulder anterior glenoid labral tear and Hill-Sachs deformity. In
response to an inquiry by the employing establishment, Dr. Lee stated that appellant’s left
shoulder joint instability would affect his ability to perform the duties required of his position, as
his shoulder would likely dislocate during any potential physical altercation.
The record contains an April 1, 2011 report from Dr. Lawrence W. Raymond, an
employing establishment physician, who opined that appellant’s sinus and respiratory conditions
would not prevent him from performing the duties of his border protection assignment.
In letters dated April 1 and June 7, 2011, the employing establishment controverted
appellant’s claim.
By decision dated June 28, 2011, OWCP denied appellant’s claim on the grounds that the
medical evidence was insufficient to establish that his claimed left shoulder injury was causally
related to his accepted employment activities. Appellant disagreed with the decision and
appealed to the Board.
In an order dated December 12, 2011, the Board set aside the June 28, 2011 decision and
remanded the case for consolidation with appellant’s April 16, 2011 occupational disease claim
in File No. xxxxxx549, in which he also alleged that he sustained a work-related left shoulder
condition.
On remand, OWCP combined the instant case with File No. xxxxxx549 in accordance
with the Board’s directive.
By decision dated March 16, 2012, OWCP denied appellant’s claim. After reviewing the
evidence in the consolidated files, the claims examiner determined that the medical evidence was
insufficient to establish a causal relationship between appellant’s left shoulder condition and the
accepted employment activities. He noted that neither File No. xxxxxx549, nor any other file
that had been consolidated with this case, contained medical evidence relating to the claimed left
shoulder condition.
On November 18, 2010 appellant filed an occupational disease claim alleging that he
sustained eye irritation, breathing difficulties, nausea, chronic sinusitis and allergic bilateral
rhinitis due to employment-related exposure to varying levels of jet exhaust fumes, dust, toxins,
poisons and construction materials for the period April 18 through November 5, 2010 (File No.
xxxxxx576).6 He submitted statements from the employing establishment, accompanied by
informal environmental studies and reports, reflecting that he periodically worked approximately

6

File Nos. xxxxxx576 and xxxxxx549. Appellant also submitted Form CA-2s that were associated with the file
for periods through January 15, 2011.

3

75 to 120 yards from the opening of the Jetway and was exposed to exhaust from baggage
towing vehicles and increased levels of dust due to construction.
Appellant submitted a March 30, 2009 report from Dr. Lawrence W. Raymond, a Boardcertified internist, who diagnosed recurrent rhinitis and conjunctivitis related to unidentified
stimuli. Dr. Raymond suspected that jet fuel vapors and exhausts were possible participants. In
a May 29, 2009 report, Dr. Steven Bauer, a Board-certified internist, treated appellant for
symptoms of acute episodic allergic bilateral conjunctivitis/rhinitis, allergic chronic sinusitis and
laryngitis. He opined that appellant’s conditions were likely related to jet fumes, dirt and debris
caught in carpeting and possibly materials emitted from forced hot air and cold air systems in
appellant’s indoor work environment.
In a letter dated December 30, 2010, OWCP informed appellant that the information and
evidence submitted was insufficient to establish his claim. It advised him to submit detailed
factual information regarding the duties he performed that created his claimed hazardous
exposure and a rationalized medical report containing examination findings, a diagnosis and an
opinion explaining how the identified exposure caused or aggravated a diagnosed condition.
Appellant was treated by Dr. Jordanka Angelova, a family physician. On December 13,
2010 Dr. Angelova diagnosed sinusitis, which he opined was likely related to dust, fumes and
construction materials at work. On January 6, 2011 he stated that he had been treating appellant
since November 6, 2010 for symptomatology relating to allergic rhinitis, acute/chronic sinusitis,
and most recently laryngitis. Dr. Angelova opined that the symptoms were due to exposure to
airport-caused exhaust fumes, dust, as well as indoor allergens, such as carpeted areas. In a
January 26, 2011 report, he diagnosed chronic, recurrent allergic rhinitis, which he opined
developed as a result of appellant’s exposure at work to fumes, dust and chemicals present at
airports. Dr. Angelova noted that appellant’s symptoms, which included nasal congestion, itchy
eyes, dry throat, laryngitis, markedly improved or resolved when his exposure to these elements
was limited.
By decision dated March 1, 2011, OWCP denied appellant’s claim in File No. xxxxxx576
on the grounds that the medical evidence failed to establish a causal relationship between his
sinus condition and factors of his employment. On March 2, 2011 appellant requested review of
the written record. OWCP denied his request as untimely by decision dated May 18, 2011.
The record contains a second opinion report dated May 6, 2011 from Dr. Benjamin
Chiam, a pulmonologist, who provided a history of appellant’s employment-related exposure to
jet fuel, paint and other toxins. Examination revealed clear lungs on auscultation. Pulmonary
function testing identified minor airway obstruction. Dr. Chiam diagnosed a symptom complex
(with pulmonary and extrapulmonary symptoms) aggravated by his work environment. He
stated that the breadth of appellant’s symptoms made a respiratory disease such as asthma alone
less likely. Dr. Chiam opined, however, that appellant did certainly have respiratory symptoms
that may be explained by asthma/reactive airway disease. He stated, “In this context, asthma,
work-aggravated asthma and possibly occupational asthma could be considered.” Dr. Chiam
agreed with appellant’s treating physicians that allergy could be a contributing factor, but stated
that allergic response to fuel fumes does not have a biologic plausibility. He opined that
appellant might have multiple chemical sensitivity disorder. Dr. Chiam stated that in order to

4

clarify appellant’s diagnosis, specific allergen/fume challenge testing would be required. As his
expertise was in the area of respiratory disease, he indicated that he would not be able to perform
the necessary tests. Dr. Chiam further stated that he had not reviewed appellant’s imaging, but
assumed it was unremarkable. As appellant refused further testing, he stated that he was unable
to offer a complete opinion.
In a supplemental report dated May 20, 2011, Dr. Chiam stated that labeling appellant as
strictly allergic was probably not appropriate until further understanding of his case was
achieved. He offered multiple possibilities for appellant’s symptoms, including asthma,
bronchitis or allergic bronchopulmonary aspergillosis and recommended an examination by an
allergist/immunologist. Finally, Dr. Chiam stated that, without further testing, he was unable to
provide an accurate opinion on the cause of appellant’s condition.
On April 16, 2011 appellant filed another occupational disease claim alleging that he
sustained a medical condition as a result of exposure to paint and diesel fumes on April 14, 2011
(File No. xxxxxx549).
By decision dated May 23, 2011, OWCP denied appellant’s claim in File No. xxxxxx549
on the grounds that he failed to establish that he had developed a diagnosed condition as a result
of the claimed chemical exposure.
By decision dated September 29, 2011, OWCP denied appellant’s request for merit
review in File No. xxxxxx576.
Appellant appealed OWCP’s May 23, 2011 decision in File No. xxxxxx549 and the
May 18 and September 29, 2011 decisions in File No. xxxxxx576 to the Board. In separate
decisions dated December 19, 2011, the Board set aside OWCP’s September 29, 2011 decision
in File No. xxxxxx576 and the May 23, 2011 decision in File No. xxxxxx549 and remanded both
cases for consolidation of appellant’s occupational disease claims related to his sinus/respiratory
conditions and for consideration of the medical evidence contained in all of those files.7
By decision dated March 16, 2012, OWCP denied modification of its March 1, 2011
decision in File No. xxxxxx576 on the grounds that the medical evidence was insufficient to
establish a causal relationship between the accepted exposure and a diagnosed condition. The
claims examiner noted that appellant refused to undergo additional testing, as requested by the
second opinion examiner.
By decision dated March 19, 2012, OWCP denied appellant’s claim in File No.
xxxxxx549, finding that appellant had failed to establish a causal relationship between the
accepted exposure to paint fumes and diesel fuel and the claimed medical condition. The claims
examiner noted that the second opinion examiner was unable to provide an opinion on the cause
of appellant’s condition due to incomplete testing.

7

See supra note 4.

5

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUES 1, 2 & 3
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of establishing the essential
elements of his claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the United States
within the meaning of FECA; that the claim was filed within the applicable time limitation; that
an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged; and that any disability
and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are causally related to the
employment injury.8 These are the essential elements of each compensation claim regardless of
whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.9
To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational
disease claim, a claimant must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing the
presence or existence of the disease or condition for which compensation is claimed;10 (2) a
factual statement identifying employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the
presence or occurrence of the disease or condition;11 and (3) medical evidence establishing the
employment factors identified by the claimant were the proximate cause of the condition for
which compensation is claimed or stated differently, medical evidence establishing that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the employment factors identified by the claimant.12
Generally, causal relationship may be established only by rationalized medical opinion
evidence. Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence that includes a physician’s
rationalized opinion on the issue of whether there is a causal relationship between the claimant’s
diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors.13 The opinion of the physician
must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant,14 must be one of
reasonable medical certainty15 and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature
of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors
identified by the claimant.16

8

Caroline Thomas, 51 ECAB 451 (2000); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

9

See Irene St. John, 50 ECAB 521 (1999); Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).

10

Solomon Polen, 51 ECAB 341 (2000).

11

Marlon Vera, 54 ECAB 834 (2003); Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468 (2001).

12

Ernest St. Pierre, 51 ECAB 623 (2000).

13

Conard Hightower, 54 ECAB 796 (2003); Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

14

Tomas Martinez, 54 ECAB 623 (2003); Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).

15

John W. Montoya, 54 ECAB 306 (2003).

16

Judy C. Rogers, 54 ECAB 693 (2003).

6

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The medical evidence submitted by appellant is insufficient to establish that his
diagnosed left shoulder condition was caused or aggravated by factors of his federal
employment. Therefore, appellant has failed to meet his burden of proof.
Relevant medical evidence of record consisted of a March 31, 2011 report from Dr. Lee
and a January 18, 2011 MRI scan report. Neither report is sufficient to establish appellant’s
claim. Dr. Lee diagnosed left shoulder anterior glenoid labral tear and Hill-Sachs deformity. His
report, however, did not contain examination findings or a complete factual or medical
background. Dr. Lee stated that appellant’s left shoulder joint instability would affect his ability
to perform the duties required of his position. He did not, however, provide an opinion as to the
cause of the diagnosed shoulder condition. The Board has long held that medical evidence
which does not offer any opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited
probative value.17 Similarly, the January 18, 2011 MRI scan report, lacking any opinion on
causal relationship, is of limited probative value.
The remaining medical evidence of record, which relates to appellant’s respiratory
condition, is not relevant to his claim for a left shoulder injury. Therefore, it is insufficient to
establish his claim.
Appellant expressed his belief that his left shoulder condition resulted from his duties as a
border protection officer. The Board has held, however, that the mere fact that a condition
manifests itself during a period of employment does not raise an inference that there is a causal
relationship between the two.18 Neither the fact that the condition became apparent during a
period of employment, nor the belief that the condition was caused or aggravated by employment
factors or incidents, is sufficient to establish causal relationship.19 Causal relationship must be
substantiated by reasoned medical opinion evidence, which it is appellant’s responsibility to
submit. Therefore, appellant’s belief that his condition was caused by the alleged work-related
injury is not determinative.
OWCP advised appellant that it was his responsibility to provide a comprehensive
medical report which described his symptoms, test results, diagnosis, treatment and the doctor’s
opinion, with medical reasons, on the cause of his condition. Appellant failed to do so. As there
is no probative, rationalized medical evidence addressing how his claimed condition was caused
or aggravated by his employment, he has not met his burden of proof to establish that he
sustained an occupational disease in the performance of duty causally related to factors of
employment.

17

Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).

18

See Joe T. Williams, 44 ECAB 518, 521 (1993).

19

Id.

7

ANALYSIS -- ISSUES 2 & 3
The Board finds that appellant’s claims in File Nos. xxxxxx385 and xxxxxx576 are not in
posture for a decision.
In separate decisions dated December 19, 2011, the Board set aside OWCP’s
September 29, 2011 decision in File No. xxxxxx576 and the May 23, 2011 decision in File No.
xxxxxx549 and remanded both case for consolidation of appellant’s occupational disease claims
related to his sinus/respiratory conditions and for consideration of the medical evidence
contained in all related files. On remand, OWCP found in each case that the medical evidence
failed to establish that appellant developed a respiratory condition due to employment-related
exposure to toxins, based on Dr. Chiam’s May 20 and 6, 2011 second opinion reports. The
Board finds, however, that Dr. Chiams’ reports are insufficient to form the basis of OWCP’s
March 16 and 19, 2012 decisions denying appellant’s claims.
OWCP referred appellant to Dr. Chiam for an opinion as to the cause of appellant’s
current condition. On May 6, 2011 Dr. Chiam diagnosed a symptom complex (with pulmonary
and extrapulmonary symptoms) aggravated by his history of employment-related exposure to jet
fuel, paint and other toxins. He stated that the breadth of appellant’s symptoms made a
respiratory disease such as asthma alone less likely. Dr. Chiam opined, however, that appellant
did certainly have respiratory symptoms that may be explained by asthma/reactive airway
disease. He stated, “In this context, asthma, work-aggravated asthma and possibly occupational
asthma could be considered.” Dr. Chiam agreed with appellant’s treating physicians that allergy
could be a contributing factor, but stated that allergic response to fuel fumes does not have a
biologic plausibility. He opined that appellant might have multiple chemical sensitivity disorder.
The Board finds that Dr. Chiam’s report is vague and speculative and is therefore of diminished
probative value. Dr. Chiam admittedly was unable to offer an unequivocal opinion as to causal
relationship because he was not qualified to perform the specific allergen/fume challenge testing
that would be necessary to clarify appellant’s diagnosis. The Board notes that he did not review
appellant’s imaging results. Therefore, it is of diminished probative value
Dr. Chiam’s supplemental report of May 20, 2011 is equally vague and equivocal. He
stated that labeling appellant as strictly allergic was probably not appropriate until further
understanding of his case was achieved. Dr. Chiam offered multiple possibilities for appellant’s
symptoms, including asthma, bronchitis or allergic bronchopulmonary aspergillosis and
recommended an examination by an allergist/immunologist. Finally, he stated that, without
further testing, which appellant refused, he was unable to provide an accurate opinion on the
cause of appellant’s condition.
The Board notes that OWCP found that appellant’s refusal to undergo further testing was
reason to deny his claim. Appellant’s agreement to further testing, however, would not cure the
deficiencies in Dr. Chiam’s reports. Dr. Chiam was admittedly not qualified to render an opinion
or to perform the required testing.
In a December 13, 2012 report, appellant was treated by Dr. Angelova, a family
physician, who diagnosed sinusitis and opined that it was likely related to dust and fumes at
work. Later, in a report dated January 6, 2011, he stated that he was treating appellant for

8

allergies related to acute/chronic sinusitis and laryngitis due to exposure of fumes, dust and
indoor allergies.
Proceedings under FECA are not adversarial in nature, and OWCP is not a disinterested
arbiter. While the claimant has the responsibility to establish entitlement to compensation,
OWCP shares responsibility in the development of the evidence. It has the obligation to see that
justice is done.21 Accordingly, once OWCP undertakes to develop the medical evidence further,
it has the responsibility to do so in the proper manner.22 As it undertook development of the
medical evidence by referring appellant to Dr. Chiam, it had an obligation to secure a report
adequately addressing the relevant issue in each case.23 The obligation continues until it receives
a proper report. Therefore, these cases shall be remanded to OWCP for a proper second opinion
report from an appropriate specialist. Once OWCP has developed the evidence as it deems
necessary, it should issue an appropriate decision.
20

CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish that he
sustained a left shoulder injury in the performance of duty. The Board further finds that the
issues in File Nos. xxxxxx576 and xxxxxx549 regarding whether he developed a respiratory
condition in the performance of duty are not in posture for a decision.

20

Vanessa Young, 55 ECAB 575 (2004).

21

Richard E. Simpson, 55 ECAB 490 (2004).

22

Melvin James, 55 ECAB 406 (2004).

23

Peter C. Belkind, 56 ECAB 580 (2005).

9

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 16, 2012 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs in File No. xxxxxx385 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the March 19 and 16, 2012 decisions in File Nos.
xxxxxx576 and xxxxxx549 are set aside and the case is remanded for further development
consistent with the provisions of this decision.
Issued: December 14, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

10