United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
F.C., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Kansas City, MO, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 07-395
Issued: June 12, 2007

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On December 6, 2006 appellant filed a timely appeal from a merit decision of the Office
of Workers’ Compensation Programs dated March 9, 2006 denying her claim for wage-loss
compensation. She also filed a timely appeal of an Office nonmerit decision dated
November 14, 2006 denying her request for reconsideration. Pursuant 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over both the merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant has established entitlement to compensation for
wage loss for the period March 19, 2002 through August 30, 2004; and (2) whether the Office
properly denied appellant’s request for further review of the merits of her claim pursuant to
5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

FACTUAL HISTORY
This case was before the Board on a prior appeal.1 The facts and the history of the case
are contained in the Board’s prior decision and are incorporated herein by reference. On
April 17, 2002 appellant, then a 74-year-old clerk, filed a traumatic injury claim alleging that on
March 19, 2002 she aggravated a preexisting back subluxation while carrying empty buckets and
lifting boxes, which caused pain in her shoulder and back. The Office accepted the claim for a
thoracic subluxation. Appellant stopped work on March 21, 2002.2 She filed a recurrence claim
on July 24, 2002 and a claim for wage-loss compensation (Form CA-7) for the period March 20
to June 19, 2002. By decision dated October 29, 2002, the Office denied appellant’s claim for
recurrence of disability. On August 22, 2003 the Board found the evidence insufficient to
support appellant’s claimed period of disability and affirmed the October 29, 2002 Office
decision.
On January 18, 2005 the Office received an August 31, 2004 report by Dr. Richard E.
Rattay, appellant’s treating Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed “impingement
pathology with supraspinatus and subscapularis tendinisis, possible even partial rotator cuff tear”
based upon review of reports and a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan. Dr. Rattay
attributed appellant’s shoulder pain, disuse dysfunction and other problems to the two
employment injuries sustained on March 19, 2002. He opined that appellant sustained a
permanent injury as a result of her employment injury, “which consists of progressive left
shoulder arthritic change, probable labral tear, partial rotator cuff tear and impingement
syndrome.” Dr. Rattay also opined that appellant “has a loss of use of her left arm at or above
the shoulder level and has constant pain” including “loss of wage-earning capacity due to disuse
and dysfunction of her left shoulder.”
On April 29, 2005 the Office accepted appellant’s claim for dislocated thoracic vertebra,
not to exceed May 31, 2002, left shoulder osteoarthrosis, left shoulder adhesive capsulitis and
left shoulder enthesopathy.3 On May 5, 2005 appellant filed a claim for wage-loss compensation
for the period March 21, 2002 to the present.
On August 9, 2005 Dr. Rattay diagnosed severe degenerative joint disease of the left
shoulder. He opined that appellant was unable to use her left arm or shoulder for any work
activity.
The Office paid appellant wage-loss compensation for the period August 31, 2004 to
November 26, 2005 and subsequently placed her on the periodic rolls for temporary total
disability.

1

Docket No. 03-713 (issued August 22, 2003).

2

The employing establishment terminated her employment effective June 14, 2002 because she was absent
without leave (AWOL) following the work injury for an extended period of time.
3

The Office issued a decision vacating prior decisions denying appellant’s claim for a shoulder condition.

2

On January 24, 2006 the Office received additional medical and factual evidence from
appellant. In a July 31, 2002 report Dr. Pamela Maben, a treating Board-certified internist,
diagnosed tendinitis, chronic back pain and sleep apnea. She noted that appellant had not been
released to go back to work until June 19, 2002 due to her medical problems. The Office also
received a billing statement for chiropractor treatment received March 22 to June 10, 2002 and a
billing statement by Dr. Howard A. Aks, a treating Board-certified anesthesiologist with a
subspecialty in pain medication, for treatment given on June 4 and 18, 2002.
In a letter dated January 31, 2006, the Office informed appellant that the medical
evidence of record was insufficient to support her claim for wage-loss compensation due to her
thoracic spine and shoulder injuries for the period March 19, 2002 through August 30, 2004.
The Office advised appellant as to the medical information to submit. She submitted reports
dated March 26, 2001, April 1 and June 10, 2002 from Dr. Carlos Bateman, a chiropractor, who
released appellant to work effective April 1, 2002 and noted that appellant could not lift more
than 20 pounds. On June 10, 2002 Dr. Bateman released appellant to light-duty work effective
June 11, 2002 with restrictions of no lifting more than 20 pounds.
In a report dated March 4, 2006, Dr. Rattay stated that appellant was disabled from work
for the period March 2004 through August 31, 2004.
By decision dated March 9, 2006, the Office awarded 8 hours of continuation of pay for
April 1 and May 1, 2002 and 76 hours of compensation for medical appointments during the
period May 3, 2002 to August 12, 2004. The Office denied appellant’s request for wage-loss
compensation for the remaining disability claimed between March 19, 2002 to August 30, 2004
on the grounds that the record was devoid of any supporting medical evidence.
On October 10, 2006 the Office received appellant’s reconsideration requests dated
August 25 and September 1, 2006 containing arguments that were previously considered by the
Office.
By decision dated November 14, 2006, the Office denied appellant’s request for
reconsideration.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
An employee seeking benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act4 has the
burden of proof to establish the essential elements of her claim by the weight of the evidence.5
For each period of disability claimed, the employee has the burden of establishing that she was
disabled for work as a result of the accepted employment injury.6 Whether a particular injury
causes an employee to become disabled for work and the duration of that disability, are medical
issues that must be proved by a preponderance of probative and reliable medical opinion
4

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

5

See Amelia S. Jefferson, 57 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 04-568, issued October 26, 2005); see also Nathaniel
Milton, 37 ECAB 712 (1986); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55 (1968).
6

See Amelia S. Jefferson, supra note 5. See also David H. Goss, 32 ECAB 24 (1980).

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evidence.7 The Board will not require the Office to pay compensation for disability in the
absence of medical evidence directly addressing the specific dates of disability for which
compensation is claimed. To do so, would essentially allow an employee to self-certify their
disability and entitlement to compensation.8
Under the Act the term “disability” means incapacity, because of an employment injury,
to earn the wages that the employee was receiving at the time of injury.9 Disability is, thus, not
synonymous with physical impairment which may or may not result in an incapacity to earn
wages.10 An employee who has a physical impairment causally related to her federal
employment, but who nonetheless has the capacity to earn the wages she was receiving at the
time of injury, has no disability and is not entitled to compensation for loss of wage-earning
capacity.11 When, however, the medical evidence establishes that the residuals or sequelae of an
employment injury are such that, from a medical standpoint, they prevent the employee from
continuing in her employment, she is entitled to compensation for any loss of wages.12
To meet this burden, a claimant must submit rationalized medical opinion evidence based
on a complete factual and medical background supporting such a causal relationship.
Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s opinion
on the issue of whether there is a causal relationship between the claimant’s diagnosed condition
and the implicated employment factor(s).13 The opinion of the physician must be based on a
complete factual and medical background, must be one of reasonable medical certainty and must
be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the
diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by the claimant.14
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Office accepted appellant’s claim for dislocated thoracic vertebra, not to exceed
May 31, 2002, left shoulder osteoarthrosis, left shoulder adhesive capsulitis and left shoulder
enthesopathy. She filed a claim for wage-loss compensation for the period March 19, 2002
through August 30, 2004. The Office advised appellant that she must support her disability for
work with medical evidence. In order to establish disability for the period March 19, 2002
through August 30, 2004, appellant must submit rationalized medical evidence demonstrating
that she was disabled for work due to her employment injury. The Office found that appellant
7

See Edward H. Horton, 41 ECAB 301 (1989).

8

See William A. Archer, 55 ECAB 674 (2004); Fereidoon Kharabi, 52 ECAB 291 (2001).

9

S.M., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-536, issued November 24, 2006); Bobbie F. Cowart, 55 ECAB 746 (2004);
Conard Hightower, 54 ECAB 796 ( 2003); 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(f).
10

Roberta L. Kaaumoana, 54 ECAB 150 (2002).

11

Merle J. Marceau, 53 ECAB 197 (2001).

12

Bobby W. Hornbuckle, 38 ECAB 626 (1987).

13

A.D., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1183, issued November 14, 2006).

14

Judith A. Peot, 46 ECAB 1036 (1995); Ruby I. Fish, 46 ECAB 276 (1994).

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was entitled to compensation for 8 hours of continuation of pay for April 1 and May 1, 2002 and
76 hours of compensation for medical appointments during the period May 3, 2002 to
August 12, 2004. The issue is whether appellant submitted sufficient medical evidence to
establish her disability for the remaining dates during the period March 19, 2002 through
August 30, 2004.
Appellant submitted a July 31, 2002 report by Dr. Maben; a March 4, 2006 report by
Dr. Rattay; reports dated March 26, 2001, April 1 and June 10, 2002 by Dr. Bateman; a
chiropractor; a June 5, 2002 MRI scan of the left shoulder; a May 12, 2002 thoracic spine x-ray
interpretation; and a June 4, 2002 report by Dr. Aks. Dr. Maben diagnosed tendinitis, chronic
back pain and sleep apnea. She indicated that appellant was not released to work until June 19,
2002 due to her medical problems. Dr. Maben’s opinion is insufficient to show that appellant
was disabled from March 19 to June 19, 2002 as the Office has not accepted the conditions of
tendinitis and chronic back pain and the opinion did not address causal relationship, which would
have assisted appellant in meeting her burden of proving the causal nexus.
The record contains reports dated August 31, 2004 and August 9 and March 4, 2006 by
Dr. Rattay. In the August 31, 2004 report, he diagnosed “impingement pathology with
supraspinatus and subscapularis tendinitis, possible even partial rotator cuff tear” due to her
March 19, 2002 employment injury, Dr. Rattay opined that appellant “has a loss of use of her left
arm at or above the shoulder level and has constant pain” including “loss of wage-earning
capacity due to disuse and dysfunction of her left shoulder.” Dr. Rattay diagnosed severe
degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder in his August 9, 2005 report. He opined that
appellant was unable to use her left arm or shoulder for any work activity. In the March 4, 2006
report, Dr. Rattay stated that appellant was totally disabled for the period March 19, 2002
through August 31, 2004. The August 31, 2004 and August 9, 2006 reports are insufficient to
support appellant’s claim that she was totally disabled as he did not address the issue of whether
appellant was totally disabled from working and why. The August 31, 2004 report was silent as
to the issue of disability while the August 9, 2005 report merely noted that appellant was unable
to use her left shoulder or arm for any work activity. In a March 4, 2006 report, Dr. Rattay states
that appellant was totally disabled for the period March 19, 2002 through August 30, 2004 with
no diagnosis or explanation supporting his conclusion that appellant was totally disabled for this
period. These reports do not provide any explanation as to why appellant’s accepted
employment injuries prevented her from performing the duties her position for the period
March 19, 2002 through August 30, 2004.15 The Board has held that a medical report is of
limited probative value on a given medical question if it is unsupported by medical rationale.16
Dr. Rattay’s reports are insufficient to establish disability for the period March 19, 2002 through
August 30, 2004.

15

See Sandra D. Pruitt, 57 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 05-739, issued October 12, 2005); Michael E. Smith,
50 ECAB 313 (1999) (the issue of whether a claimant’s disability is related to an accepted condition is a medical
question which must be established by a physician who, on the basis of a complete and accurate factual and medical
history, concludes that the disability is causally related to employment factors and supports that conclusion with
sound medical reasoning).
16

T.F., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1186, issued October 19, 2006).

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Appellant also submitted various reports by Dr. Bateman and Dr. Nicholson, treating
chiropractors. However, as they did not diagnose subluxation by x-ray, they are not physicians
as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2).
Appellant had the burden of proving by the preponderance of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence that she was disabled for work as a result of her employment injury. The
Board finds that appellant has failed to establish her entitlement to compensation due to her
accepted thoracic spine and shoulder injuries for the period March 19, 2002 through August 30,
2004, except for those dates accepted by the Office and the hearing representative.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
The Act17 provides that the Office may review an award for or against payment of
compensation at any time on its own motion or upon application.18 The employee shall exercise
this right through a request to the district Office. The request, along with the supporting
statements and evidence, is called the application for reconsideration.19
An employee (or representative) seeking reconsideration should send the application for
reconsideration to the address as instructed by the Office in the final decision. The application
for reconsideration, including all supporting documents, must be in writing and must set forth
arguments and contain evidence that either: (1) shows that the Office erroneously applied or
interpreted a specific point of law; (2) advances a relevant legal argument not previously
considered by the Office; or (3) constitutes relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously
considered by the Office.20
An application for reconsideration must be sent within one year of the date of the Office
decision for which review is sought.21 A timely request for reconsideration may be granted if the
Office determines that the employee has presented evidence or argument that meets at least one
of these standards. If reconsideration is granted, the case is reopened and the case is reviewed on
its merits. Where the request is timely but fails to meet at least one of these standards, the Office
will deny the application for reconsideration without reopening the case for a review on the
merits.22
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
The Office received appellant’s August 25 and September 1, 2006 requests for
reconsideration on October 10, 2006. Appellant has not shown that the Office erroneously
17

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

18

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a). See Tina M. Parrelli-Ball, 57 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-121, issued June 6, 2006).

19

20 C.F.R. § 10.605.

20

20 C.F.R. § 10.606. See Susan A. Filkins, 57 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-868, issued June 16, 2006).

21

20 C.F.R. § 10.607(a). See Joseph R. Santos, 57 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-452, issued May 3, 2006).

22

20 C.F.R. § 10.608(b). See Candace A. Karkoff, 56 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 05-677, issued July 13, 2005).

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applied or interpreted a specific point of law. She did not advance a relevant legal argument not
previously considered by the Office. Appellant did not submit any new medical evidence in
connection with her reconsideration requests which addresses the relevant issue of whether she
was entitled to wage-loss compensation for the period March 19, 2002 through August 30, 2004.
In addition, appellant’s reconsideration requests contain arguments that are cumulative and
repetitive of contentions that were presented and rejected by the Office in its previous decisions.
The Board finds that the Office properly refused to reopen appellant’s claim for reconsideration.
The Board finds that the Office properly determined that appellant was not entitled to a
review of the merits of his claim pursuant to any of the three requirements under section
10.606(b)(2) and properly denied her August 25 and September 1, 2006 requests for
reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not established that she was disabled for work and
entitled to wage-loss compensation for the period March 19, 2002 through August 30, 2004. The
Board further finds that the Office properly refused to reopen her case for further review of the
merits of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated November 14 and March 9, 2006 are affirmed.
Issued: June 12, 2007
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.D., Appellant
and
U.S. POSAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Malden, MA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 07-2025
Issued: January 10, 2008

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On July 26, 2007 appellant filed a timely appeal of an April 30, 2007 decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs denying merit review of his claim. Since more than
one year has elapsed between the last merit decision on February 7, 2006 and the filing of this
appeal, the Board lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the claim pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§§ 501.2(c), 501.3(d)(2) and 501.6(c) and (d).
ISSUE
The issue is whether the Office properly determined that appellant’s application for
reconsideration was insufficient to warrant merit review of the claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b).
FACTUAL HISTORY
The Office accepted that appellant sustained a right hip strain in the performance of his
duties as a letter carrier on April 19, 2004. On October 15, 2004 the employing establishment
offered appellant a limited-duty assignment as a modified carrier at four hours per day. The

Office advised appellant by letter dated October 19, 2004, that it found the offered job to be
suitable. Appellant submitted reports from attending physician, Dr. Kunwar Singh, an internist,
and Joseph Abate, an orthopedic surgeon, which indicated that he was totally disabled. By letter
dated November 19, 2004, the Office advised him that his reasons for refusing the position were
unacceptable and that he had an additional 15 days to accept the offered job. In a decision dated
December 9, 2004, it terminated appellant’s compensation for wage loss effective November 27,
2004, on the grounds that he refused an offer of suitable work pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8106(c)(2).
The Office found that the weight of the medical evidence was represented by Dr. Richard
Alemian, a second opinion physician.
An Office hearing representative, by decision dated February 7, 2006, affirmed the
December 9, 2004 decision.
On February 13, 2006 the Office received form reports (CA-20), dated January 20 and
February 3, 2006 indicating that appellant had been disabled since April 19, 2004.
In an undated letter received on February 5, 2007, appellant requested reconsideration of
his claim. He stated that his physician indicated that he was totally disabled. Appellant argued
that Dr. Alemian had only suggested that he try to return to work, but he was not sure appellant
could perform the job. Appellant also argued, as he had before the hearing representative, that
the Office terminated his compensation effective 8 days after the November 19, 2004 letter, not
15 days as stated in the letter.
Appellant submitted additional evidence in support of his reconsideration request. In a
report dated December 13, 2004, Dr. Singh stated that appellant was having difficulty lifting,
moving and standing. He stated that appellant had been referred for a functional capacity
evaluation. In a report dated April 28, 2006, Dr. Richard Tyler, a neurologist, stated that
appellant had a painful radiculopathy secondary to disc disease and he was unable to work at the
present. The record also contains a February 28, 2006 magnetic resonance imaging scan of the
lumbar spine. The remainder of the medical evidence submitted was previously of record. With
respect to nonmedical evidence, appellant submitted a June 22, 2005 employing establishment
letter providing notes of a predisciplinary interview for failure to accept a modified-job offer. He
was asked if he accepted or refused the job offer and he answered he did not accept it or refuse
the offer. A November 7, 2005 letter advised appellant that his work status was being changed
from part-time flexible to full-time regular.
By decision dated April 30, 2007, the Office determined that the application for
reconsideration was insufficient to warrant merit review of the claim.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
To require the Office to reopen a case for merit review under section 8128(a) of the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act,1 the Office’s regulations provide that a claimant may
obtain review of the merits of the claim by submitting a written application for reconsideration
1

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) (providing that “[t]he Secretary of Labor may review an award for or against payment of
compensation at any time on his own motion or on application”).

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that sets forth arguments and contains evidence that either: “(i) shows that [the Office]
erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law; (ii) advances a relevant legal argument
not previously considered by [the Office]; or (iii) constitutes relevant and pertinent evidence not
previously considered by[the Office].”2 Section 10.608(b) states that any application for review
that does not meet at least one of the requirements listed in section 10.606(b)(2) will be denied
by the Office without review of the merits of the claim.3
ANALYSIS
Appellant submitted an application for reconsideration on February 5, 2007. He
reiterated his belief that the position was not medically suitable and the Office had terminated his
compensation effective only eight days after the November 19, 2004 letter. He did not show that
the Office erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law; or advance a relevant legal
argument not previously considered. The record indicated that appellant had previously argued
that the effective date of the termination was less than 15 days after the November 19, 2004
Office letter.
With respect to the evidence submitted, most of this evidence was previously of record
and was considered by the Office in its merit decisions. Of the evidence that had not been
previously submitted, none is relevant and pertinent to the termination of wage-loss
compensation pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8106(c)(2). The Forms CA-20 from Dr. Singh dated
January 20 and February 3, 2006 do not discuss appellant’s ability to perform the offered
position on October 15, 2004. They represent a continuation of prior form reports from
Dr. Singh indicating total disability from April 19, 2004. The December 13, 2004 report also
fails to discuss the offered position and provide relevant and pertinent evidence. In his April 28,
2006 report, Dr. Tyler referred to appellant’s inability to currently work, without discussing the
relevant medical issue regarding his ability to perform the offered position at the time it was
offered.
The Board finds that appellant did not submit relevant and pertinent evidence not
previously considered by the Office. The June 22, 2005 letter regarding a predisciplinary
interview and a November 7, 2005 letter regarding work status do not provide any new and
relevant information regarding the termination of compensation under 5 U.S.C. § 8106(c)(2).
Appellant did not meet any of the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(2) and therefore the
Office properly denied the application for reconsideration without reopening the claim for review
of the merits.
CONCLUSION
Appellant did not meet the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(2) and therefore the
Office properly refused to reopen the claim for merit review.

2

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(2).

3

20 C.F.R. § 10.608(b); see also Norman W. Hanson, 45 ECAB 430 (1994).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated April 30, 2007 is affirmed.
Issued: January 10, 2008
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees' Compensation Appeals Board

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.D., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL
CENTER, Knoxville, IA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 06-2016
Issued: March 2, 2007

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 30, 2006 appellant filed a timely appeal from a February 10, 2006 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs denying his occupational disease
claim and a July 10, 2006 nonmerit decision finding that he had abandoned his request for an
oral hearing. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the
merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant sustained an injury in the performance of duty
causally related to factors of his federal employment; and (2) whether the Office properly
determined that he had abandoned his hearing request.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 26, 2004 appellant, a 52-year-old counseling psychologist, filed an
occupational disease claim alleging that on October 7, 2004 he first realized that his positive

tuberculosis test was employment related. He noted that some of the patients he treated had been
diagnosed with tuberculosis.
On November 9, 2004 the Office requested that appellant submit additional evidence
including a detailed description of the employment activities he believed contributed to his
pulmonary condition. The Office instructed him to submit comprehensive medical reports
addressing the cause and extent of the claimed pulmonary condition. Appellant was afforded 30
days to submit the requested factual and medical evidence.
On December 13, 2004 the Office received a copy of appellant’s position description and
an undated letter from Mary Walker, acting clinical coordinator mental health service line.
Ms. Walker noted that as appellant’s supervisor she attributed his condition to “his contact with
veterans in his official capacity.” Ms. Walker noted that there was documentation showing that
appellant treated patients who tested positive for tuberculosis.
In a February 11, 2005 decision, the Office denied appellant’s claim, finding that he
failed to establish that he sustained an injury in the performance of duty. The Office found that
he “may have had the exposure claimed,” but noted that he failed to submit any medical
evidence in support of his claim.
On March 3, 2005 appellant requested an oral hearing and submitted medical evidence in
support of his request.
In a notice dated May 3, 2006, the Office informed appellant that a telephonic hearing on
his claim would be held on June 12, 2006. He was advised to call the toll free number provided
at the scheduled hearing time and to enter the pass code provided when prompted. Appellant did
not appear.
By decision dated July 10, 2006, the Office determined that appellant had abandoned his
request for a hearing. It noted that he failed to appear for the scheduled telephonic hearing on
June 12, 2006 and had not contacted the Office either before or after the scheduled hearing to
explain his failure to appear.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
A claimant seeking benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 has the
burden of proving the essential elements of his claim by the weight of the reliable, probative and

1

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

2

substantial evidence, including that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged
and that any specific condition or disability claimed is causally related to the employment
injury.2
In an occupational disease claim, to establish that an injury was sustained in the
performance of duty, a claimant must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing
the presence or existence of the disease or condition for which compensation is claimed; (2) a
factual statement identifying employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the
presence or occurrence of the disease or condition; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the employment factors identified by the claimant.3
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Office did not dispute that appellant was exposed to patients with positive
Tuberculin test results. However, at the time the Office issued its decision on February 10, 2006,
the record was devoid of any medical information that would support appellant’s assertion that
he sustained tuberculosis while in the performance of duty. There is no medical evidence
documenting an employment-related medical condition.
In this case, appellant did not provide the required medical evidence necessary to
establish a prima facie claim for compensation benefits under the Act.4 Although Ms. Walker
attributed appellant’s condition to “his contact with veterans in his official capacity,” she is not a
physician as defined under the Act5 and thus her opinion does not constitute competent medical
opinion evidence. Accordingly, appellant has failed to establish that he sustained an injury in the
performance of duty.

2

20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e), (f); see D.D., 57 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1315, issued September 14, 2006);
Jacquelyn L. Oliver, 48 ECAB 232 (1996). Causal relationship is a medical question that can generally be resolved
only by rationalized medical opinion evidence. See Donna M. Schmiedeknecht, 56 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 05-494,
issued September 2, 2005); Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996). A physician’s opinion on the issue of whether
there is a causal relationship between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors
must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant. Gary M. DeLeo, 56 ECAB ___
(Docket No. 05-1099, issued August 8, 2005); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989). Additionally, in
order to be considered rationalized, the opinion must be expressed in terms of a reasonable degree of medical
certainty and must be supported by medical rationale, explaining the nature of the relationship between the
diagnosed condition and appellant’s specific employment factors. Id.
3

Daniel O. Vasquez, 57 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-568, issued May 5, 2006); Donald W. Wenzel, 56 ECAB ___
(Docket No. 05-146, issued March 17, 2005); Victor J. Woodhams, supra note 2.
4

See Richard A. Weiss, 47 ECAB 182 (1995).

5

5 U.S.C. § 8101(2).

3

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
With respect to hearing requests, Chapter 2.1601.6(e) the Office’s procedure manual
provides in relevant part:
“(1) A hearing can be considered abandoned only under very limited
circumstances. All three of the following conditions must be present: the
claimant has not requested a postponement; the claimant has failed to appear at a
scheduled hearing; and the claimant has failed to provide any notification for such
failure within 10 days of the scheduled hearing request.
“Under these circumstances, [the Branch of Hearings and Review] will issue a
formal decision finding that the claimant has abandoned his or her request for a
hearing and return the case to the [district Office].
“(2) However, in any case where a request for a postponement has been received,
regardless of any failure to appear for the hearing, [the Branch of Hearings and
Review] should advise the claimant that such a request has the effect of
converting the format from an oral hearing to a review of the written record.
“This course of action is correct even if [the Branch of Hearings and Review] can
advise the claimant far enough in advance of the hearing that the request is not
approved and that the claimant is, therefore, expected to attend the hearing and
the claimant does not attend.”6
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
In finding that appellant had abandoned his March 3, 2005 request for a hearing the
Office noted that a telephone hearing had been scheduled for June 12, 2006. The record shows
that the Office mailed appellant appropriate notice of the hearing to his last known address. He
received written notification of the hearing 30 days in advance, but failed to telephone the
hearing representative as instructed. The record contains no evidence that appellant contacted
the Office to reschedule the hearing or explain his failure to participate in the scheduled
telephonic hearing.
The Board finds that the record contains no evidence that appellant requested
postponement of the hearing. Appellant failed to participate in the scheduled hearing and did not
provide any notification of such failure within 10 days of the scheduled hearing. As the
circumstances of this case meet the criteria for abandonment as provided in Chapter 2.1601.6(e)
of the Office’s procedure manual, the Board finds that appellant abandoned his request for an
oral hearing.

6

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Hearing and Reviews of the Written Record, Chapter
2.1601.6(e) (January 1999); see also Claudia J. Whitten, 52 ECAB 483 (2001); 20 C.F.R. § 10.622.

4

CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant failed to establish that his tuberculosis condition was
sustained in the performance of duty. The Board further finds that the Office properly
determined that he abandoned his request for an oral hearing.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated July 10 and February 10, 2006 are affirmed.
Issued: March 2, 2007
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.E., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Pasco, WA, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

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Docket No. 18-0151
Issued: April 9, 2018

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER REMANDING CASE
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
On October 23, 20171 appellant filed a timely application for review of an April 25, 2017
merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), which denied
appellant’s claim for wage-loss compensation for the period January 9 through February 13, 2017.
The Board docketed the appeal as No. 18-0151.
The Board has duly considered the matter and finds that the case is not in posture for a
decision and must be remanded to OWCP. In the case of William A. Couch,2 the Board held that
when adjudicating a claim, OWCP is obligated to consider all evidence properly submitted by a
claimant and received by OWCP before the final decision is issued. Appellant submitted a
1

Under the Board’s Rules of Procedure, an appeal must be filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of an
OWCP decision. An appeal is considered filed upon receipt by the Clerk of the Appellate Boards. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.3(e)-(f). One hundred and eighty days from April 25, 2017, the date of OWCP’s last decision was
October 22, 2017. As that date fell on Sunday, appellant had until the next business day, Monday, October 23, 2017
to file a timely appeal. Since using October 26, 2017, the date the appeal was received by the Clerk of the Appellate
Boards would result in the loss of appeal rights, the date of the postmark is considered the date of filing. The date of
the U.S. Postal Service postmark is October 23, 2017, rendering the appeal timely filed. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.3(f)(1)(2).
2

41 ECAB 548 (1990).

January 3, 2017 medical report from Dr. David W. Fischer, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon.
On February 22, 2017 she filed a claim (Form CA-7), requesting compensation for leave without
pay (LWOP) beginning January 2 through February 17, 2017. In time analysis forms (Form CA7a) dated February 22, 2017, appellant claimed LWOP for 23.48 total hours during the period
January 9 through February 13, 2017 due to a doctor’s appointment and physical therapy sessions.
OWCP, by letter dated February 24, 2017, authorized a payment of wage-loss
compensation for 2.52 hours for a doctor’s visit on January 3, 2017. It advised appellant that it
had not received any evidence to support the remainder of her claim for wage-loss compensation
on January 9, 11, 20, 23 and 30 and February 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, and 13, 2017. OWCP requested that
she submit a medical note or therapy slip verifying treatment due to her accepted work-related
injuries for the claimed dates. Appellant was afforded 30 days to submit the requested medical
evidence. She resubmitted Dr. Fischer’s January 3, 2017 report. Appellant submitted an
additional report dated February 21, 2017 from Dr. Fischer and reports dated June 6 through
December 30, 2016 and January 9 through March 15, 2017 from her physical therapists and
physical therapist assistant.
In its April 25, 2017 decision, OWCP noted that 2.52 hours of wage-loss compensation on
January 3, 2017 had been processed for payment, but denied appellant’s claim for the remaining
20.96 hours of wage-loss compensation for the period January 9 through February 13, 2017. It
noted that, in response to its February 24, 2017 development letter, it received Dr. Fischer’s
January 3 and February 21, 2017 examination notes and physical therapy notes dated June 6,
October 3, 7, 11, 12, November 8, 10, 14, 18, 21, 30, December 5, 9, 12, 28, and 30, 2016.”
OWCP found that “[y]ou failed to submit further supporting medical evidence to establish your
claimed disability.” It did not note receipt or consideration of the additional reports from
appellant’s physical therapists and physical therapist assistant.
The Board finds that OWCP, in its April 25, 2017 decision, did not review the reports from
appellant’s physical therapists and physical therapist assistant dated January 9 through
March 15, 2017. For this reason, the case will be remanded to OWCP to enable it to properly
consider all the evidence submitted at the time of the April 25, 2017 decision. Following such
further development as OWCP deems necessary, it shall issue an appropriate merit decision on the
claim.

2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 25, 2017 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is set aside. The case is remanded to OWCP for further proceedings
consistent with this order of the Board.
Issued: April 9, 2018
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.C., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL
CENTER, Washington, DC, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 17-0680
Issued: June 1, 2017

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On February 6, 2017 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a
December 27, 2016 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for
legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An
attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject
to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish left carpal tunnel
syndrome causally related to factors of her federal employment.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On November 6, 2015 appellant, then a 48-year-old food service worker, filed an
occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) for left carpal tunnel syndrome.3 She first became
aware of her condition on February 12, 2013. However, it was not until July 14, 2015 that
appellant realized the condition was employment related. On her Form CA-2, appellant omitted
any description of the particular employment activity/activities she believed either caused or
contributed to her left carpal tunnel syndrome. The employing establishment represented that
appellant continued to work, albeit in a light-duty capacity.
OWCP received September 1 and 14, 2015 records from the employing establishment’s
occupational health unit where appellant was seen for left hand complaints and initially advised
not to use her left hand until further evaluation and diagnosis. The occupational health unit
records are unsigned.
OWCP also received a September 8, 2015 “Disability Certificate” from Howard
University’s Orthopedics and Rehabilitative Services.4 The document indicated that appellant
had been a patient there since 2003. The certificate included the diagnoses of cervical and
lumbar disc herniation, with neck and back pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, and trigger finger.
Appellant had been totally incapacitated, but had sufficiently recovered such that she could
perform light-duty work, effective September 14, 2015. Appellant’s work restrictions included a
five-pound lifting limitation and she was advised to reduce the frequency of repetitive hand
action/movements.
In a December 14, 2015 claim development letter, OWCP informed appellant that the
documentation received to date, both factual and medical evidence, was insufficient to establish
entitlement to FECA benefits. It afforded appellant at least 30 days to submit a detailed factual
statement regarding her implicated employment activities, as well as a narrative medical report
that included, among other things, a specific diagnosis and a discussion regarding the etiology of
any diagnosed conditions.
In a January 6, 2016 narrative statement, appellant indicated that as of November 23,
2015 she continuously engaged in repetitive motion(s) to complete her assigned duties, which
included stacking supplies for the steam line, lifting and repositioning materials, preparing meats
and vegetables for the deli, and lifting/repositioning metal food containers. Additional duties
3

Appellant has an accepted occupational disease claim for right carpal tunnel syndrome, which arose on or about
June 10, 2013 (OWCP File No. xxxxxx156). She was also injured in a July 7, 1998 work-related fall, which OWCP
accepted for cervical and lumbar sprains, post-traumatic headache, and left forearm bruise/contusion (OWCP File
No. xxxxxx966). Appellant initially filed the current left CTS claim as a recurrence (Form CA-2a) of her July 7,
1998 employment injury.
4

The certificate bears no signature, signature stamp, or signature block.

2

included stocking clear trays, labeling Grab-Go foods, sanitizing the coffee area, refilling coffee
containers, and providing supplies for the coffee area. Appellant explained that continuous
lifting and repositioning of equipment and supplies caused a lot of stress on both hands. She also
indicated that she had been diagnosed with diabetes, but this condition was under control.
OWCP received a May 13, 2015 left upper extremity electromyography and nerve
conduction velocity (EMG/NCV) study, which revealed mild carpal tunnel syndrome with no
evidence of axonapathy.
OWCP also received another disability certificate from Howard University’s Orthopedics
and Rehabilitative Services. This one, dated November 23, 2015, was electronically signed by
Dr. Janaki Kalyanam, a Board-certified physiatrist. Dr. Kalyanam noted that appellant had been
under her care since 2003. She also noted that appellant was recently evaluated in 2015 and
diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Kalyanam reiterated the diagnosis of
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and recommended that appellant continue with occupational
therapy, twice weekly.
In a February 17, 2016 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, as the evidence of
record failed to establish fact of injury. It explained that the medical evidence did not contain a
diagnosis and also did not establish that the diagnosed condition was causally related to the
accepted employment factors.
Counsel timely requested an oral hearing before a representative of OWCP’s Branch of
Hearings and Review, which was held on October 13, 2016. During the telephonic hearing,
OWCP’s hearing representative noted that appellant’s accepted claims included a 1998 neck and
low back injury, and right carpal tunnel syndrome, which arose in 2013. Appellant testified
during the hearing and the record was kept open for at least 30 days post-hearing in order for
appellant to submit additional medical evidence.
OWCP subsequently received a November 3, 2016 report from Dr. Kalyanam, who
diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, decreased activity tolerance, paresthesias in the left
hand, and left wrist pain. Dr. Kalyanam noted that appellant had been a patient of hers since
2003 due to a work injury sustained from a fall, and episodically for exacerbation or reinjury at
work since 2013 for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which was confirmed by electrodiagnostic
studies. She asserted that appellant had reported symptom exacerbation with increased activity
and repetitive movements. Appellant’s current hand complaints included pain, stiffness, weak
grasp, difficulty opening jars, and numbness.
By decision dated December 27, 2016, the hearing representative affirmed OWCP’s
February 17, 2016 denial of appellant’s occupational disease claim, finding that appellant had
not provided sufficient medical evidence of an employment-related condition to establish her
claim.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
A claimant seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the essential
elements of his or her claim by the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence,

3

including that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged and that any specific
condition or disability claimed is causally related to the employment injury.5
In an occupational disease claim, for a claimant to establish that an injury was sustained
in the performance of duty he or she must submit: (1) medical evidence establishing the
presence or existence of the disease or condition for which compensation is claimed; (2) a factual
statement identifying employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence
or occurrence of the disease or condition; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the identified employment factors.6
To establish causal relationship between the condition, as well as any attendant disability
claimed, and the employment event or incident, the employee must submit rationalized medical
opinion evidence based on a complete factual and medical background supporting such causal
relationship.7 The opinion of the physician must be one of reasonable medical certainty and
must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the
diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by the claimant. This
medical opinion must include an accurate history of the employee’s employment injury and must
explain how the condition is related to the injury. The weight of medical evidence is determined
by its reliability, its probative value, its convincing quality, the care of analysis manifested, and
the medical rationale expressed in support of the physician’s opinion.8
A medical report should bear the physician’s signature or signature stamp.9 OWCP may
require an original signature on the report.10
Certain healthcare providers such as physician assistants, nurse practitioners, physical
therapists, and social workers are not considered “physician[s]” as defined under FECA.11

5

20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e), (f); see Jacquelyn L. Oliver, 48 ECAB 232, 235-36 (1996). Causal relationship is a
medical question, which generally requires rationalized medical opinion evidence to resolve the issue. See
Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996). A physician’s opinion on whether there is a causal relationship between
the diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors must be based on a complete factual and medical
background. Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989). Additionally, the physician’s opinion must be
expressed in terms of a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale,
explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and appellant’s specific employment
factors. Id.
6

Victor J. Woodhams, supra note 5.

7

See C.F.R. § 10.110(a); John M. Tornello, 35 ECAB 234 (1983).

8

James Mack, 43 ECAB 321 (1991).

9

20 C.F.R. § 10.331(a).

10

Id.

11

5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(t).

4

Consequently, their medical findings and/or opinions will not suffice for purposes of establishing
entitlement to FECA benefits.12
ANALYSIS
Appellant claimed that her duties as a food service worker either caused or contributed to
her diagnosed left carpal tunnel syndrome.13 The Board finds that appellant did not meet her
burden of proof to establish that the implicated employment factors either caused or contributed
to her diagnosed left carpal tunnel syndrome.
Appellant identified the factors of her federal employment that she believed caused her
left hand/wrist condition, which included stacking supplies, lifting and repositioning materials,
preparing meats and vegetables for the deli, stocking clear trays, labeling Grab-Go foods,
sanitizing the coffee area, refilling coffee containers, and providing supplies for the coffee area.
She explained that continuous lifting and repositioning of equipment and supplies caused a lot of
stress on both of her hands. However, in order to establish that she sustained an employmentrelated injury, appellant must submit rationalized medical evidence, which explains how her
medical condition was caused or aggravated by the implicated employment factors.14
The May 13, 2015 left upper extremity EMG/NCV study confirmed the diagnosis of mild
carpal tunnel syndrome; however, the electrodiagnostic study did not address the etiology of
appellant’s left hand/wrist condition. As such, the evidence is not probative on the issue of
causal relationship.15
With respect to the September 1 and 14, 2015 employing establishment occupational
health unit records, the Board notes that these were unsigned and did not specifically address the
cause of appellant’s left hand/wrist complaints. Also, the September 8, 2015 disability slip from
Howard University’s Orthopedics and Rehabilitative Services is similarly unsigned, and the
author did not specifically address the cause of appellant’s diagnosed conditions, which included
carpal tunnel syndrome. Consequently, the above-noted evidence is insufficient to satisfy
appellant’s burden of proof with respect to causal relationship.16
Dr. Kalyanam found on November 23, 2015 that electrodiagnostic testing of the left
upper extremity revealed mild carpal tunnel syndrome with no evidence of axonapathy. She
12

K.W., 59 ECAB 271, 279 (2007); David P. Sawchuk, 57 ECAB 316, 320 n.11 (2006). A report from a
physician assistant or certified nurse practitioner will be considered medical evidence if countersigned by a qualified
physician. Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.3a(1)
(January 2013).
13

Appellant’s personal belief that employment activities either caused or contributed to her condition is
insufficient, by itself, to establish causal relationship. 20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e); Phillip L. Barnes, 55 ECAB 426,
440 (2004).
14

See A.C., Docket No. 08-1453 (issued November 18, 2008).

15

See T.C., Docket No. 16-1652 (issued May 9, 2017); G.G., Docket No. 16-0907 (issued March 20, 2017).

16

See supra notes 7-10.

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indicated that appellant had been under her care since 2003 due to a work injury sustained from a
fall and episodically for exacerbation or reinjury at work since 2013 for her diagnosis of bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome. On November 3, 2016 Dr. Kalyanam diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome
of the left wrist and paresthesias in the left hand. She asserted that appellant had reported
symptomatic exacerbation with increased activity and repetitive movements, including pain,
stiffness, weak grasp, difficulty opening jars, and numbness. However, Dr. Kalyanam failed to
provide a rationalized opinion explaining how factors of appellant’s federal employment, such as
repetitive motions required to stack supplies, lift and reposition materials, prepare meats and
vegetables, stock trays, label Grab-Go foods, sanitize coffee areas, and refill coffee containers at
work, caused or aggravated her left carpal tunnel syndrome. She noted that appellant’s condition
occurred while she was at work, but such generalized statements do not establish causal
relationship because they merely repeat appellant’s allegations and are unsupported by adequate
medical rationale explaining how her physical activity at work actually caused or aggravated the
diagnosed condition.17 As such, the Board finds that Dr. Kalyanam’s reports are insufficient to
establish that appellant’s condition was either caused or aggravated by factors of her federal
employment.
As appellant has not submitted rationalized medical evidence to support her allegation
that she sustained an injury causally related to her duties as a food service worker, she failed to
meet her burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish left carpal
tunnel syndrome causally related to factors of her federal employment.

17

See K.W., Docket No. 10-98 (issued September 10, 2010).

6

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the December 27, 2016 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: June 1, 2017
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.K., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, CO, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 09-983
Issued: December 24, 2009

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 18, 2009 appellant filed an appeal from a January 9, 2009 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3,
the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether the Office met its burden of proof to reduce appellant’s
compensation benefits based on her capacity to earn wages in the constructed position of
surveillance system monitor. On appeal, appellant argues that she cannot work due to extreme
pain.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 2, 1984 appellant, then a 28-year-old shipment clerk, sustained an
employment-related muscle spasm and disc herniation at L5-S1 when she slipped on a tile floor.
She had surgery on February 5, 1985 and returned to full duty in April 1985. Appellant
continued to work until May 1990 and missed intermittent periods thereafter until she stopped

work in the fall of 1991 and had additional surgery on December 4, 1991. She returned to
limited duty for four hours a day from February 10, 1992 to March 16, 1993, returned to four
hours of daily limited duty on July 26, 1993, worked until August 9, 1993, did not return and was
placed on the periodic rolls.1
Appellant moved to Michigan in 1999 and in August 2001 the Office referred her to
Adolph Cwik, a rehabilitation counselor, for vocational rehabilitation. By decision dated
November 21, 2003, the Office reduced her monetary compensation to zero based on her
capacity to earn wages as a surveillance systems monitor. Appellant timely requested a hearing
and in an April 13, 2004 decision, an Office hearing representative reversed the November 21,
2003 decision on the grounds that the medical evidence did not establish that she was capable of
working eight hours daily due to the October 2, 1984 employment injury.2 She was returned to
the periodic rolls and received appropriate retroactive compensation.
On February 7, 2007 the Office referred appellant to Dr. Jeffrey F. Lawley, an osteopath
Board-certified in orthopedic surgery, for a second opinion evaluation. In an August 18, 2007
report, Dr. Lawley noted his review of the medical records including magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) scan films, the history of injury and her medical history and complaints of
constant, severe lower back pain that at times radiated to the left lower extremity with occasional
left lower extremity numbness. Straight leg raising test was positive on the left and negative on
the right. Sensory examination for both lower extremities was normal with the exception of
sharp pinprick at the lateral border of the left leg and foot consistent with the S1 dermatomal
distribution. Appellant was unable to toe walk on the left because of complaints of pain and
weakness but could heel walk for a short distance. Dr. Lawley noted x-ray findings of
postoperative changes and significant disc degeneration at the L5-S1 level and facet joint early
degenerative changes consistent with age. He diagnosed status post lumbar laminectomy times
two with persistent lower back and left leg pain and advised that appellant had residuals of the
L5-S1 disc herniation with a sensory deficit but no evidence of muscle spasm. Dr. Lawley
opined that she could not return to her date-of-injury position but could work eight hours a day
with permanent restrictions that she stand and walk to her tolerance and avoid excessive
repetitive bending, twisting and reaching. He provided a 10-pound restriction on lifting, pushing
and pulling and recommended a repeat MRI scan study, a home exercise program and that
appellant lose weight, noting that she was morbidly obese.
In February 2008, the Office again referred appellant to Mr. Cwik for vocational
rehabilitation. On May 25, 2008 Mr. Cwik identified the positions of general office clerk,
cashier and surveillance systems monitor, finding that they were within the sedentary strength
category, within her work restrictions and qualification and reasonably available in the local
labor market. Appellant began a job search under protest. In a June 18, 2008 report,
1

Nonwork-related injuries include a left carpal tunnel syndrome release performed on August 10, 1987 and a
December 1993 motor vehicle accident that resulted in fractures to the pelvis and left clavicle and a closed head
injury.
2

Appellant had subsequently acquired the medical condition polycythemia vera. The hearing representative
determined that the record was unclear as to whether appellant’s disability to work eight hours a day was due to
work-related and preexisting conditions or to the subsequently acquired condition.

2

Dr. Craig Caldwell, an osteopath Board-certified in family practice, noted appellant’s report that
the job search made her back hurt more, that she could no longer shop and needed help with her
housework. On physical examination, he noted that appellant could not stand fully erect and had
limitations of lumbar spine motion. Dr. Caldwell diagnosed chronic low back pain, prescribed a
single post cane and medications and advised that she could perform surveillance or
uncomplicated clerical work for short periods at a time, as long as she could stand and reposition
herself at will, but that this would be difficult for her due to weather-related and transportation
issues. By report dated November 6, 2008, he reviewed Dr. Lawley’s report and stated that he
substantially agreed with his findings and had further reviewed the job description for
surveillance system monitor, advising that he believed that she could perform the position as
described.
By letter dated December 3, 2008, the Office proposed to reduce appellant’s
compensation benefits based on her capacity to earn wages as a surveillance system monitor.3 It
advised her that, if she disagreed with the proposed reduction, she should submit additional
evidence or argument within 30 days. Appellant disagreed with the proposed reduction, stating
that the physicians did not comprehend the amount of unbearable pain she had. In a January 9,
2009 decision, the Office reduced her compensation benefits, effective January 18, 2009, based
on her capacity to earn wages as a surveillance system monitor. It credited the opinions of the
office referral physician, Dr. Lawley, and appellant’s attending physician, Dr. Caldwell, both of
whom advised that she was medically capable of performing the duties of surveillance system
monitor.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Once the Office accepts a claim, it has the burden of proof to justify termination or
modification of compensation benefits.4 An injured employee who is either unable to return to
the position held at the time of injury or unable to earn equivalent wages, but who is not totally
disabled for all gainful employment, is entitled to compensation computed on loss of wageearning capacity.5
Section 8115 of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act6 and Office regulations
provide that wage-earning capacity is determined by the actual wages received by an employee if
the earnings fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity. If the actual earnings do
not fairly and reasonably represent wage-earning capacity or the employee has no actual
earnings, his or her wage-earning capacity is determined with due regard to the nature of the
injury, the degree of physical impairment, usual employment, age, qualifications for other

3

The physical demands of the position are sedentary, exerting up to 10 pounds of force occasionally and a
negligible amount of force frequently.
4

James M. Frasher, 53 ECAB 794 (2002).

5

20 C.F.R. §§ 10.402, 10.403; John D. Jackson, 55 ECAB 465 (2004).

6

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

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employment, the availability of suitable employment and other factors or circumstances which
may affect his or her wage-earning capacity in the disabled condition.7
The Office must initially determine a claimant’s medical condition and work restrictions
before selecting an appropriate position that reflects his or her wage-earning capacity. The
medical evidence upon which it relies on must provide a detailed description of the condition.8
Additionally, the Board has held that a wage-earning capacity determination must be based on a
reasonably current medical evaluation.9
When the Office makes a medical determination of partial disability and of specific work
restrictions, it may refer the employee’s case to a vocational rehabilitation counselor authorized
by the Office for selection of a position listed in the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of
Occupational Titles or otherwise available in the open market, that fits that employee’s
capabilities with regard to his or her physical limitations, education, age and prior experience.
Once this selection is made, a determination of wage rate and availability in the open labor
market should be made through contact with the state employment service or other applicable
service.10 Finally, application of the principles set forth in Albert C. Shadrick will result in the
percentage of the employee’s loss of wage-earning capacity.11
In determining an employee’s wage-earning capacity based on a position deemed
suitable, but not actually held, the Office must consider the degree of physical impairment,
including impairments resulting from both injury-related and preexisting conditions, but not
impairments resulting from post injury or subsequently acquired conditions. Any incapacity to
perform the duties of the selected position resulting from subsequently acquired conditions is
immaterial to the loss of wage-earning capacity that can be attributed to the accepted
employment injury and for which appellant may receive compensation.12
ANALYSIS
The medical evidence as characterized by Dr. Lawley’s August 18, 2007 report
established that appellant was no longer totally disabled and the Office referred her for
vocational rehabilitation in February 2008. The rehabilitation counselor, Mr. Cwik, identified
three positions, general office clerk, cashier and surveillance systems monitor, that he felt fit her
7

5 U.S.C. § 8115; 20 C.F.R. § 10.520; John D. Jackson, supra note 5.

8

William H. Woods, 51 ECAB 619 (2000).

9

John D. Jackson, supra note 5.

10

James M. Frasher, supra note 4.

11

The formula for determining loss of wage-earning capacity based on actual earnings, developed in Albert C.
Shadrick, 5 ECAB 376 (1953), has been codified at 20 C.F.R. § 10.403 of the Office’s regulations. The Office
calculates an employee’s wage-earning capacity in terms of percentage by dividing the employee’s earnings by the
current pay rate for the date-of-injury job.
See J.C., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-1165, issued
September 21, 2007).
12

John D. Jackson, supra note 5.

4

capabilities, noting that the positions were within the sedentary strength category and her work
restrictions and qualifications and reasonably available in the local labor market. The Office
determined that appellant had the capacity to earn wages as a surveillance systems monitor.
The Board finds that the Office met its burden of proof in reducing appellant’s wageearning capacity based on her ability to earn wages as a surveillance systems monitor. The
relevant medical evidence includes Dr. Lawley’s August 18, 2007 report, in which he advised
that appellant could work for eight hours a day with permanent restrictions that she stand and
walk to her tolerance and avoid excessive repetitive bending, twisting, reaching and a 10-pound
weight restriction on lifting, pushing and pulling. In a November 6, 2008 report, Dr. Caldwell,
an attending physician, advised that he had reviewed Dr. Lawley’s report and substantially
agreed with his findings and, after review of the job description, opined that she could perform
the surveillance systems monitor position. The medical evidence of record therefore established
that appellant could perform the duties of the surveillance systems monitor position, which is a
sedentary position with a 10-pound weight restriction13
The Board finds that the Office considered the proper factors, such as availability of
suitable employment and appellant’s physical limitations, usual employment, age and
employment qualifications, in determining that the position of surveillance system monitor
represented her wage-earning capacity.14 Despite appellant’s contention that pain precluded her
for working, medical evidence did not establish that. The evidence of record establishes that she
had the requisite physical ability, skill and experience to perform the position and that such a
position was reasonably available within the general labor market of her commuting area. The
Office therefore properly determined that the position of contract clerk reflected appellant’s
wage-earning capacity and using the Shadrick formula,15 properly reduced her compensation
effective June 10, 2007.16
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office properly reduced appellant’s compensation benefits based
on her capacity to earn wages in the constructed position of surveillance systems monitor.

13

William H. Woods, supra note 8; see supra note 3.

14

James M. Frasher, supra note 4.

15

Shadrick supra note 11.

16

James Smith, 53 ECAB 188 (2001).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated January 9, 2009 is affirmed.
Issued: December 24, 2009
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.D., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, SAN FRANCISCO
AIR MAIL CENTER, San Francisco, CA,
Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 21-0349
Issued: July 1, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 4, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from a December 9, 2020 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of this case.2
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a right middle finger
condition causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.

1
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

The Board notes that, following the December 9, 2020 decision, OWCP received additional evidence and
appellant also submitted additional evidence on appeal. However, the Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The
Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record that was before OWCP at the time of its final
decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the Board for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this additional evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 5, 2020 appellant, then, a 56-year-old parcel post distributor (machine), filed
an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she developed right middle trigger finger
due to factors of her federal employment, including repetitive motion. She asserted that she
experienced pain in her right middle finger and when she closed her hand, her middle finger makes
a clicking sound and locks, forcing her to use her left hand. Appellant noted that she first became
aware of her condition and its relation to her federal employment on September 21, 2020. She did
not stop work.
In an October 16, 2020 development letter, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence
submitted was insufficient to establish her claim. It advised her of the type of factual and medical
evidence necessary to establish her claim and attached a factual questionnaire for her completion.
In a separate development letter of even date, OWCP requested that the employing establishment
provide additional information including comments from a knowledgeable supervisor and an
explanation of appellant’s work activities. It afforded both parties 30 days to submit the necessary
evidence.
In a September 21, 2020 report, Dr. Karl Lee, an internist, diagnosed right middle trigger
finger. In a work status report of even date, he found that appellant was unable to work from
September 21 to October 6, 2020 due to pain in her right hand. In a separate work status report of
even date, Dr. Douglas Thierer, Board-certified in occupational medicine, also diagnosed right
middle trigger finger and provided work restrictions.
Appellant, in an October 9, 2020 statement, contended that her work activities contributed
to her injury. She noted that her work duties consisted of repetitive keying, feeding mail to and
clearing mail from machines, lifting, tying sacks, gripping bundles of mail to process, and sorting
mail. Appellant explained that she performed these repetitive activities every day at the employing
establishment for eight hours a day. She noted that she had no hobbies or activities outside work
that were relevant to her working conditions and indicated that she only used her personal
computer limited to checking e-mail and paying bills. Appellant asserted that she experienced
pain in her middle finger, which would get stuck in a bent position and would only bend or
straighten with a snap. She indicated that she was diagnosed with right middle trigger finger on
September 21, 2020 and received a cortisone injection in her right palm.
In an October 16, 2020 response to OWCP’s development questionnaire, the employing
establishment concurred with appellant’s allegations and noted that appellant’s work duties
consisted of keying, lifting, tying sacks, feeding mail to machines, clearing mail from machines,
and sorting mail.
In an October 21, 2020 doctor’s first report of occupational injury or illness, Dr. Thierer
noted that appellant had been working at the employing establishment since February 13, 1988.
Appellant reported that, when she made a fist, her right middle finger would lock and she could
not extend at the proximal interphalangeal joint. Dr. Thierer summarized appellant’s job duties as
requiring repetitive hand activities, including gripping, grasping, pushing, pulling, lifting, and
keyboard use. He conducted a physical examination and diagnosed right middle trigger finger.
Dr. Thierer also noted that appellant had pain related to repetitive pulling, pushing, lifting, and
keyboard use. He provided work restrictions.
2

In an October 26, 2020 response to OWCP’s development questionnaire, appellant again
asserted that her repetitive work duties, including repetitive keying, feeding mail to machines,
clearing mail from machines, lifting, tying sacks, gripping pouches/bundles of mail to process, and
sorting mail daily, caused her injury. She reiterated that she performed these work duties every
day at the employing establishment for eight hours per day.
Dr. Thierer, in a November 3, 2020 report, indicated that he had conducted a physical
examination, which demonstrated full range of motion except for slightly decreased range of
motion in the right middle finger’s metacarpophalangeal joint and proximal interphalangeal joint
with flexion and extension. He reviewed an October 21, 2020 x-ray of appellant’s right hand,
which revealed no acute fracture or dislocation, but demonstrated ulnar styloid old tiny avulsion
fracture and mild degenerative joint disease at right thumb joints. Dr. Thierer diagnosed right
middle trigger finger and repetitive strain injury. He indicated that appellant could return to work
with restrictions.
In a November 17, 2020 report, Dr. Thierer reiterated his findings and diagnoses.
In a November 24, 2020 report, Dr. David W. Zeltser, a vascular surgeon, noted that
appellant previously received a corticosteroid injection. He diagnosed right middle trigger finger
and noted that her condition was aggravated by repetitive motions. Dr. Zeltser indicated that
appellant no longer experienced pain or clicking in her right middle finger.
In a December 1, 2020 work status report, Dr. Thierer reiterated his diagnoses.
By decision dated December 9, 2020, OWCP denied appellant’s occupational disease
claim, finding that the medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish causal relationship
between her diagnosed right middle finger condition and the accepted factors of her federal
employment.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA3 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including that the individual is an employee of the United
States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time
limitation of FECA,4 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and that
any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the
employment injury.5 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim,
regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.6
3

Supra note 1.

4

J.W., Docket No. 18-0678 (issued March 3, 2020); S.B., Docket No. 17-1779 (issued February 7, 2018); J.P., 59
ECAB 178 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).
5

J.S., Docket No.18-0657 (issued February 26, 2020); J.M., Docket No. 17-0284 (issued February 7, 2018);
James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB 312 (1988).
6

L.J., Docket No. 19-1343 (issued February 26, 2020); R.R., Docket No. 18-0914 (issued February 24, 2020);
Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).

3

To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational
disease claim, a claimant must submit: (1) a factual statement identifying employment factors
alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence or occurrence of the disease or condition;
(2) medical evidence establishing the presence or existence of the disease or condition for which
compensation is claimed; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the diagnosed condition is
causally related to the employment factors identified by the claimant.7
Causal relationship is a medical issue, and the medical evidence required to establish causal
relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence.8 The opinion of the physician must be based
on a complete factual and medical background of the employee, must be one of reasonable medical
certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship
between the diagnosed condition and specific employment factors identified by the employee.9
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a right middle
finger condition causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.
In his October 21, 2020 report, Dr. Thierer noted that appellant’s job required repetitive
activities, including gripping, grasping, pushing, pulling, lifting, and keyboard use. He conducted
a physical examination and diagnosed right middle trigger finger. Although he noted that appellant
engaged in such activities as gripping and grasping at work, Dr. Thierer offered no opinion on the
causal relationship of appellant’s job duties and the diagnosed right middle trigger finger. The
Board has held that a report is of limited probative value regarding causal relationship if it does
not contain medical rationale explaining how an employment activity could have caused or
aggravated a medical condition.10 As such, Dr. Thierer’s October 21, 2020 report is insufficient
to establish appellant’s claim.
In a November 24, 2020 report, Dr. Zelster diagnosed right middle trigger finger and
opined that appellant’s condition was aggravated by repetitive motions. However, he did not
describe appellant’s work duties in detail or provide adequate medical rationale in support of his
opinion that appellant’s job duties aggravated right middle trigger finger. As previously stated, a
report is of limited probative value regarding causal relationship if it does not contain medical
rationale explaining how an employment activity could have caused or aggravated a medical
condition.11 Thus, Dr. Zelster’s report is also insufficient to establish causal relationship.
In reports dated September 21, November 3 and 17, and December 1, 2020, Dr. Thierer
conducted a physical examination, reviewed the October 21, 2020 x-ray of appellant’s hand, and
7

S.C., Docket No. 18-1242 (issued March 13, 2019); R.H., 59 ECAB 382 (2008).

8

A.M., Docket No. 18-1748 (issued April 24, 2019); T.H., 59 ECAB 388, 393 (2008); Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB
238 (1996).
9
R.G., Docket No. 18-0792 (issued March 11, 2020); D.J., Docket No. 19-1301 (issued January 29, 2020); I.J., 59
ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).
10

M.R., Docket No. 19-1954 (issued March 1, 2021); V.L., Docket No. 20-0884 (issued February 12, 2021).

11

Id.

4

diagnosed right middle trigger finger and repetitive strain injury. However, these reports are of no
probative value because Dr. Thierer failed to provide an opinion as to whether appellant’s right
middle trigger finger condition was related to the accepted employment factors. Similarly, in his
September 21, 2020 report, Dr. Lee also failed to provide an opinion on causation. The Board has
held that medical evidence that does not offer an opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s
condition is of no probative value on the issue of causal relationship.12 Thus, these reports are
insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
Dr. Lee, in his September 21, 2020 work status report, opined that appellant was unable to
work due to pain in her right hand. The Board has consistently held that a diagnosis of “pain” does
not constitute the basis for payment of compensation, as pain is a symptom not a specific
diagnosis.13 Furthermore, the Board has held that a medical report lacking a firm diagnosis and a
rationalized medical opinion regarding causal relationship is of no probative value. 14 As Dr. Lee
did not offer a valid medical diagnosis, his report is insufficient to establish causation.
Appellant has not submitted rationalized medical evidence establishing that her diagnosed
right middle trigger finger condition is causally related to the accepted factors of her federal
employment. Thus, the Board finds that she has not met her burden of proof to establish her claim.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a right middle
finger condition causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.

12

D.M., Docket No. 20-1347 (issued January 29, 2021); S.J., Docket No. 19-0696 (issued August 23, 2019); M.C.,
Docket No. 18-0951 (issued January 7, 2019).
13

T.S., Docket No. 20-0343 (issued July 15, 2020); D.H., Docket No. 19-0931 (issued October 2, 2019); R.R.,
Docket No. 18-1093 (issued December 18, 2018); A.C., Docket No. 16-1587 (issued December 27, 2016); Robert
Broome, 55 ECAB 339 (2004).
14

J.P., Docket No. 20-0381 (issued July 28, 2020); R.L., Docket No. 20-0284 (issued June 30, 2020).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the December 9, 2020 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: July 1, 2021
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6