United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
P.B., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CENSUS
BUREAU, Atlanta, GA, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-438
Issued: August 22, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On December 27, 2011 appellant filed a timely appeal of a July 14, 2011 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) finding overpayment of
compensation and denying waiver of recovery. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of the case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether OWCP properly determined that appellant received an
overpayment in the amount of $7,277.85 for the period March 31, 2009 to August 14, 2010; and
(2) whether OWCP properly determined that appellant was not entitled to waiver of recovery.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On March 30, 2009 appellant, then a 74-year-old census enumerator, tripped and fell in a
parking lot while in the performance of duty. On April 1, 2009 he filed a Form CA-1 indicating
that he was paid an hourly wage of $14.25 to work eight-hour shifts five times a week. The
form, which was originally signed by a field operations supervisor and crew leader assistant, was
amended by Donna Hines, the employing establishment’s regional administrative specialist, to
specify that appellant may work “up to 40 hours.”
OWCP accepted appellant’s traumatic injury claim for right closed proximal humerus
fracture, adhesive capsulitis, and other unclassified shoulder affections and authorized right
shoulder arthroscopic surgery, which was performed on February 16, 2011. Appellant received
disability compensation from March 31, 2009 to December 5, 2011.2 Payments totaling
$20,575.27 for the period March 31, 2009 to August 14, 2010 were based on a weekly rate of
$328.85.3
In a Form CA-7 dated May 28, 2009, appellant stated that he worked from March 27
to 30, 2009. The employer added that he was scheduled to work a variable number of hours four
days a week.
OWCP asked appellant and the employing establishment in two June 22, 2009 letters to
furnish additional information regarding appellant’s job status. In a Form EN1030 dated July 2,
2009, the employer detailed that he was hired on March 27, 2009 as an intermittent term
employee and scheduled to work “up to 40 hours per week, hours varied.” Appellant remarked
in a separate Form EN1030 dated July 3, 2009 that he was appointed to temporary full-time duty.
Both parties confirmed that his hourly wage was $14.25.
An undated and unsigned document from the employer titled “Pay Rate Computation for
Census 2010 Enumerators and Crew Leaders” noted that appellant was hired as a temporary
intermittent worker with no expectation of recurrent employment. The document pointed out
that such individuals averaged 4.5-hour shifts four times a week based on 2000 personnel data.
In a Form EN1032 dated December 11, 2009, appellant listed March 27 to April 8, 2009 as his
term of service as an enumerator. He was not otherwise employed in the previous 15 months.4
OWCP informed appellant in a November 30, 2010 letter that his compensation was
incorrectly based on an 8-hour workday instead of a 4.5-hour workday. Therefore, the weekly

2

OWCP finalized termination on December 6, 2011. Appellant does not appeal this decision at present.

3

To obtain this weekly rate, OWCP multiplied the $14.25 hourly rate by 8 hours per day to calculate a $144.00
daily wage, multiplied this amount by 150 and divided by 52.
4

The case record shows that appellant is a retired mechanical engineer and has volunteered as a mediator since
August 2006.

2

rate was reduced from $328.85 to $184.98.5
adjusted accordingly.

Payments made after August 14, 2010 were

Appellant subsequently provided a Form CA-1 signed by a crew leader assistant on
April 1, 2009 indicating that he worked eight-hour shifts five days a week for an hourly wage of
$14.75.6 In a January 25, 2011 letter, the employing establishment cited FECA Circular No.
10-01 and contended that $184.98 was the proper weekly rate because the enumerator position
was temporary and intermittent.7
On May 27, 2011 OWCP made preliminary findings that appellant received an
overpayment of $7,277.85 for the period March 31, 2009 to August 14, 2010. Specifically, he
was paid $20,575.27 during this period based on a rate of $328.85 per week when he should have
received $13,297.42 based on a rate of $184.98 per week.8 OWCP noted that appellant was
without fault in the creation of the overpayment, informed him of his options if he wished to
contest the fact or amount of overpayment or request waiver of recovery, and gave him 30 days
to submit a Form OWCP-20, overpayment recovery questionnaire, along with supporting
financial documentation.
Appellant maintained in a June 15, 2011 statement that he was hired full time for the
period March 27 to May 27, 2009 as demonstrated by the original Form CA-1 filed April 1, 2009
and signed by a field operations supervisor and crew leader assistant. He also concluded that
FECA Circular 10-01 did not apply to him.
A SF-50 “Notification of Personnel Action” form dated March 25, 2009 showed that
appellant was hired as a census enumerator for an hourly wage of $14.25 effective
March 27, 2009. Box 32, titled “Work Schedule,” described the job as “Intermittent.” Box 45,
titled “Remarks,” added that there was “[n]o regular tour of duty during each administrative
workweek” and the “[n]ature of the work is strictly temporary.”
In a June 27, 2011 letter, the employing establishment reiterated that appellant’s position
was temporary and intermittent. He was hired for the period March 27 to May 27, 2009 without
fixed hours, reinstatement rights, or any assurances during the application, recruiting, and hiring
processes that the job was more than temporary or intermittent. As a result, the pay rate standard
outlined in FECA Circular 10-01 was applicable. Regarding appellant’s Form CA-1, the
employer clarified that Ms. Hines was the only individual authorized to sign on its behalf.

5

To obtain this updated weekly rate, OWCP multiplied the $14.25 hourly rate by 4.5 hours per day to calculate a
$64.125 daily wage, multiplied this amount by 150 and divided by 52.
6

This was not the same Form CA-1 filed on April 1, 2009.

7

FECA Circular No. 10-01, Guidance for claims filed as a result of the 2010 Decennial Census
(January 15, 2010). The circular updated provisions in the FECA Procedure Manual and provided a formula for
calculating pay rates and compensation for employees who were disabled for more than 90 days, but did not have
similar employment during the year prior to the injury. See infra notes 10, 12-13.
8

OWCP provided various compensation histories, tables and calculation worksheets.

3

By decision dated July 14, 2011, OWCP finalized the $7,277.85 overpayment and found
that appellant, who was not at fault in the creation of the overpayment, was not entitled to waiver
of recovery because he did not show that recovery would either defeat the purpose of FECA or
be against equity and good conscience.9
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
OWCP procedures ascribe special rules for computing compensation to claimants
employed by the Census Bureau.10 These employees “can be either full-time 40-hour per week
regular employees, or may be hired every 10 years to work in temporary appointments (not to
exceed 180 days) as enumerators, crew leaders or clerks.”11 When a claimant’s disability does
not exceed 90 days, compensation should be computed on the basis of actual daily wages
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8114(c).12 When disability extends beyond 90 days and the claimant had
similar employment during the year prior to the injury, compensation should allocated in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 8114(d)(1) or (2). Otherwise, compensation should be paid weekly
using the following formula: actual daily wage multiplied by 150, then divided by 52. Actual
daily wage is calculated by multiplying the hourly pay rate by 4.5 hours.13
An overpayment of compensation may occur when a claimant is not entitled to
compensation already paid.14
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The case record establishes that appellant injured his right shoulder on March 30, 2009,
was disabled for the period March 31, 2009 to December 5, 2011, and did not work as a census
enumerator during the year immediately preceding the injury. Therefore, neither section 8114(c)
nor section 8114(d)(1)-(2) of FECA applies. Both appellant and the employing establishment
agreed that his hourly wage was $14.25. Applying the weekly pay rate standard set forth in
Chapter 2.901.9(a)(2) of OWCP’s procedure manual, as well as FECA Circular No. 10-01,
$14.25 is multiplied by 4.5 hours to calculate a daily wage rate of $64.125. This, in turn, is
multiplied by 150 and divided by 52 to calculate a weekly wage rate of $184.98. Following this
determination, OWCP calculated that appellant should have received $13,297.42 in
9

OWCP noted that the employing establishment submitted evidence showing that appellant concurrently received
continuation of pay (COP) and disability compensation, thereby increasing the amount of overpayment. OWCP
identified this as a separate issue to be addressed in a future decision.
10

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Computing Compensation, Chapter 2.901.9(a)(1)
(October 2009).
11

Id., Determining Pay Rates, Chapter 2.900.3(e) (March 2011).

12

Id. at Chapter 2.901.9(a)(1).

13

Id. at Chapter 2.901.9(a)(2). See also id. Chapter 2.900.12(e)(3) (Census Bureau analyzed 2000 census data,
determined that enumerators worked an average of 4.5 hours per day four times a week, and anticipated similar
patterns for 2010).
14

R.T., Docket No. 07-1454 (issued December 14, 2007); FECA Procedure Manual, id., Part 6 -- Debt
Management, Identification of Overpayments and Debts, Chapter 6.200.2d (May 2004).

4

compensation for the period March 31, 2009 to August 14, 2010 based on a $184.98 weekly
wage rate. Instead, he received $20,575.27 based on a $328.85 weekly wage rate. OWCP
subtracted the two amounts and found an overpayment of $7,277.85. The Board finds that
OWCP properly determined the fact and amount of the overpayment.
Appellant contends on appeal that he was hired to work full time as a census enumerator.
The weight of the evidence indicates that his job was temporary and intermittent. The SF-50
“Notification of Personnel Action” form dated March 25, 2009, which predated appellant’s
employment, clearly shows that the position of census enumerator was temporary in nature and
did not guarantee a regular tour of duty each administrative week. In the Form CA-1 filed on
April 1, 2009, Ms. Hines, the regional administrative specialist who was designated as the
employer’s agent in matters of workers’ compensation, wrote that appellant could work up to 40
hours per week. Additional documents from July 2, 2009 to June 27, 2011 consistently held that
he was a term employee without fixed hours, reinstatement rights, or any assurances of continued
work. Furthermore, appellant conceded that he was only hired for the period March 27 to
May 27, 2009.
With respect to FECA Circular 10-01, and by extension Chapter 2.901.9(a)(2) of
OWCP’s procedure manual, appellant first asserts that the circular’s provisions do not apply to
him because his March 30, 2009 injury predated their January 15, 2010 date of issuance. Date of
issuance is not necessarily the same as date of effect.15 FECA Circular 10-01 unequivocally
states that its instructions apply to “claims filed by employees of the Department of Commerce
as a result of the 2010 Decennial Census.”16 Next, appellant argues that the weekly pay rate
formula, namely the 4.5-hours-per-day constant, is arbitrary and based on obsolete data. The
evidence shows that this figure constituted the average number of hours of work performed by
enumerators in 2000, the year of the most recent census. Lastly, appellant claims that his hourly
pay rate should have been $16.52, the average of $10.93 and $22.10. This is a disingenuous
argument since he and the employer stated on numerous occasions that his hourly wage was
$14.25.17
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
An overpayment in compensation shall be recovered by OWCP unless incorrect payment
has been made to an individual who is not at fault with respect to its creation and when
adjustment or recovery would either defeat the purpose of FECA or be against equity and good

15

See R.H., Docket No. 07-2256 (issued March 3, 2008).

16

See supra note 7 (Emphasis added).

17

The Board adds that FECA Circular 10-01 and Chapter 2.901.9(a)(2) of OWCP’s procedure manual provide a
range of hourly wages between $10.93 and $22.10 due to geographical variance. Appellant’s $14.25 hourly wage
falls within this continuum.

5

conscience.18 Thus, a finding that a claimant was without fault does not automatically result in
waiver of recovery.19
Recovery of an overpayment will defeat the purpose of FECA if such recovery would
impose hardship because: (1) the beneficiary needs substantially all of his or her current income
(including compensation benefits) to meet ordinary and necessary living expenses; and (2) the
beneficiary’s assets do not exceed the resource base of $4,800 for an individual or $8,000 for an
individual with a spouse or one dependent, plus $960 for each additional dependent.20 An
individual is deemed to need substantially all of his or her current income to meet ordinary and
necessary living expenses if his or her monthly income does not exceed monthly expenses by
more than $50.00.21
Recovery of an overpayment is considered to be against equity and good conscience
when: (1) the individual who received an overpayment would experience severe financial
hardship attempting to repay the debt; or (2) the individual, in reliance on such payments or on
notice that such payments would be made, gives up a valuable right or changes his or her
position for the worse.22 To establish that a valuable right has been relinquished, it must be
shown that the right was in fact valuable, that it cannot be regained, and that the action was based
chiefly or solely in reliance on the payments or on the notice of payment.23
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
OWCP issued preliminary findings on May 27, 2011, finding that appellant received an
overpayment but was not at fault in its creation. He was afforded 30 days to submit a
Form OWCP-20 requesting waiver of recovery. Appellant submitted a June 15, 2011 statement
offering various arguments, but did not request waiver. Because he failed to submit
Form OWCP-20 as well as supporting financial documentation needed to determine whether
recovery of overpayment would defeat the purpose of FECA or be against equity and good
conscience, the Board finds that OWCP properly denied waiver of recovery.24
Appellant contends on appeal that he was entitled to waiver because recovery of
overpayment was against equity and good conscience. As noted, he did not timely submit the

18

See 5 U.S.C. § 8129(b); Linda E. Padilla, 45 ECAB 768 (1994).

19

L.S., 59 ECAB 350, 354 (2008). OWCP must exercise its discretion to determine whether recovery would
defeat the purpose of FECA or be against equity and good conscience. Id.
20

D.C., Docket No. 09-2042 (issued August 9, 2010). See also supra note 10 at Part 6 -- Debt Management,
Initial Overpayment Actions, Chapter 6.200.6a(1)(b) (June 2009).
21

J.O., Docket No. 09-264 (issued August 10, 2009).

22

L.S., supra note 19 at 354.

23

J.O., supra note 21.

24

See 20 C.F.R. § 10.438.

6

requested information.25 Appellant also claims that the Form OWCP-20 that he received after
the May 27, 2011 preliminary decision was outdated. A review of the case record does not
corroborate this allegation.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant received an overpayment
in the amount of $7,277.85 for the period March 31, 2009 to August 14, 2010; and OWCP
properly determined that appellant was not entitled to waiver of recovery.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 14, 2011 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs be affirmed.
Issued: August 22, 2012
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

25

See R.W. (A.T.), 59 ECAB 241 (2007) (where the claimant did not submit an OWCP-20 or other relevant
financial information, the Board found that OWCP properly denied waiver of the recovery of the overpayment).

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.C., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Los Angeles, CA, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of the Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-362
Issued: August 8, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On December 5, 2011 appellant filed a timely appeal from an August 18, 2011 decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’ (OWCP) decision denying continuation of
pay. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c)
and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of the case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant is entitled to continuation of pay.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On January 12, 2011 appellant, then a 57-year-old electronic technician, filed a traumatic
injury claim for post-traumatic stress disorder. He alleged that, on December 18, 2010, while
being escorted off premises by employing establishment police, a police officer attacked him and
his wife who was also employed at the employing establishment. The employer indicated that
1

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

appellant was injured when he resisted the police while being escorted off the property.
Appellant stopped work on December 18, 2010. He was removed from his job on March 28,
2011 for failure to follow instructions and leave his place of business when instructed.
In a January 10, 2011 statement, appellant noted that, after he and his wife clocked into
work on December 18, 2010, Supervisor Roy Evans notified them that they had been suspended
on December 17, 2010. As they were leaving, they were stopped at the front door by Officer
Francoise Carter, who told them they were to be escorted off the property. Appellant stated that
the Manager of Operations Richard Lopez was watching from a few feet away and had given the
instruction to have them escorted off the property. Officer Carter twisted appellant’s wife’s arm
behind her back. While appellant was yelling for her to release his wife and looking for his
camera, Officer Carter grabbed his arm and pushed him about 40 yards through the parking lot.
He stated that Officer Carter ordered them to stop when they arrived at their car and they were
taken back inside the building to wait for Postal Inspectors. They were told to leave after about
15 minutes and were followed off the property. Appellant submitted documents that included
November 8, 2010 civil minutes from appellant’s wife’s claim against Postmaster John E. Potter.
In a December 18, 2010 e-mail, Supervisor Evans related the events of
December 16, 2010. He had contacted appellant and his wife on the work floor and informed
them that he was instructed to give them different work assignments, but they disagreed with the
assignments. When they informed Supervisor Evans that they had submitted a request to be
moved to a different area, he stated that he was unaware of the request and that they were to
work as assigned until he obtained clarification. Supervisor Evans indicated that appellant stated
“we’ll leave” and then told his wife to ask for sick leave. Appellant then stated “we’ll both take
off sick.” He demanded the appropriate forms to fill out. Another manager provided the forms
which appellant and his wife completed before they left.
In a December 18, 2010 U.S. Postal Inspection Service Security Force Incident Report,
Officer Carter and Assisting Officer Eugene Rollins related the events of December 18, 2010
when they were told by Mr. Lopez that appellant and his wife were not allowed to be on the
property and were to be escorted out. Officer Carter related that both appellant and his wife were
talking loud and at the same time stating that they were not notified they could not be on the
employer’s property, that they did not need an escort and that they would file a lawsuit.
Appellant did not want to walk because it was raining and he called her a liar. Officer Carter
gave him and his wife numerous opportunities to walk to their car, but he started yelling at her
and waving his hands while stating, “What are you going to do, shoot me, are you going to shoot
me?” She placed the wife in a c-clamp and saw the situation escalating when appellant became
angry. Appellant started yelling at her and got close to her so she put him in a c-clamp. He
resisted and did not walk, despite Officer Carter’s order to do so. Appellant claimed that his
arms and ankles were injured and tried to twist away. Officer Carter noted that back-up arrived
and appellant and his wife were taken to the conference room, which was used as a holding area.
She stated that other police officers escorted them to their vehicle and they were followed out in
a marked car.
In a January 20, 2011 statement, Roger Quinney, a licensed clinical social worker, stated
that appellant and his wife were being seen weekly for post-traumatic stress disorder and were
taken off work from December 18, 2010 to February 18, 2011.

2

In a January 31, 2011 letter, OWCP requested that appellant provide factual and medical
evidence along with additional explanation to support his claim. It received material pertaining
to his wife; a leave analysis; a February 6, 2011 statement from his wife related the events of
December 18, 2010 and a January 13, 2011 investigative interview. On February 24, 2011 a
notice of proposed removal was issued for appellant’s failure to follow instructions and
insubordination on December 16, 2010.
A January 21, 2011 investigative interview related that on December 16, 2010 at
approximately 22:00 hours appellant was given an assignment that required him to work apart
from his wife. Appellant did not agree with the assignment and advised his wife to request sick
leave. He also demanded a leave form. The document related that appellant’s response was
irrational and his actions violated the regulations. A voice mail was left on his home answering
machine informing him of the Emergency Placement and asking him to remain off the premises.
The document also detailed the December 18, 2010 incident and requested that appellant respond
to several questions (i.e., to explain his reasons for not following Supervisor Evans’ instructions
on December 16, 2010 why he did not follow postal police instructions to leave the premises on
December 18, 2010, to explain his reason for challenging the postal police authority and to
provide any additional comments or statements).
In a February 6, 2011 statement, appellant denied that he and his wife refused any
assignment on December 16, 2010, that they called in on the automated sick leave system on
December 17, 2010. On December 18, 2010 they clocked in and were provided written
notification on December 18, 2010 by Mr. Evans of their suspensions. They were stopped by
Officer Carter as they were trying to exit the premises. Appellant informed Mr. Evans on
December 16, 2010 that he and his wife had requested assignment to another area on
December 13, 2010 and had to be reassigned. He alleged that Mr. Evans became argumentative.
As they were not feeling well they did not argue and told Mr. Evans that they would take sick
leave the rest of the shift. They asked Mr. Evans if they needed to complete forms. Mr. Evans
initially replied no and refused to provide such forms. Subsequently, he threatened them with
absent without leave (AWOL) if they did not complete the forms and followed them through the
building telling them “all hell will break loose” if they left. Appellant denied receiving a
telephone message from Mr. Evans and alleged that Mr. Evans forged the signature of
Gregory Anderson, Manager Maintenance Operations, on documents. He and his wife filed
complaints with various agencies and a law suit for excessive use of force. In a February 24,
2011 statement, appellant alleged that Supervisor Evans lied, forged signatures and falsified both
his and his wife’s attendance records on December 18, 2010.
In a February 4, 2011 statement, Mr. Anderson controverted appellant’s claim. He stated
that appellant was escorted off postal premises by uniformed postal police when he refused to
cooperate, causing the police to restrain him.
In a March 10, 2010 report, Dr. Rodney D. Collins, a psychiatrist, opined that appellant
has post-traumatic disorder and acute stress reaction. He opined that appellant’s symptoms
existed from the conditions that were placed on him through his employment.

3

By decision dated March 9, 2011, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding that his
allegations were administrative in nature and his claim did not arise within the performance of
duty.
On March 16, 2011 appellant requested reconsideration. He alleged that his suspension
was illegal. Appellant stated that he reported to work on December 18, 2010 and clocked in as
usual, but his attendance record was altered. He was unaware that an action had been taken
against him. As appellant left the building, he and his wife were attacked by Officer Carter.
In statements of December 17, 2010 and March 30, 2011, appellant alleged that the
employing establishment retaliated against him and his wife because they had filed a complaint
with Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA) on November 10, 2010. He alleged
that, after a safety inspection, his work duties were doubled and Mr. Evans threatened to prohibit
him from working with his wife if he submitted notice of missing safety precautions. On
December 13, 2010 they requested a reassignment which Mr. Evans refused. On December 16,
2010 they were ordered separated and prohibited from working together and were threatened
with AWOL when they requested sick leave. Copies of material concerning the alleged OSHA
violations and retaliation allegations were submitted.
A July 29, 2011 decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) found that
appellant’s March 28, 2011 removal was in error and violated his due process guarantee to notice
since it relied upon ex parte communications. The decision held that “the agency’s error cannot
be excused as harmless” and stated that the agency could not attempt to remove appellant for
misconduct on December 16 and 18, 2010 until he was afforded a constitutional correct
procedure. The employing establishment was ordered to cancel the removal and to retroactively
restore appellant effective March 21, 2011.
In a March 21, 2011 attending physician’s report, Dr. Collins opined that appellant’s
post-traumatic stress disorder was caused or aggravated by employment activity.
In an August 18, 2011 decision, OWCP accepted the claim for acute stress reaction. It
found that the July 29, 2011 MSPB decision established a compensable work factor, that
appellant’s March 28, 2011 removal from employment was in error.
By decision dated August 18, 2011, OWCP found that appellant was not entitled to
continuation of pay as his disability was not the result of a traumatic injury occurring in a single
work shift.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Section 8118 of FECA2 provides for payment of continuation of pay, not to exceed 45
days, to an employee who has filed a claim for a period of wage loss due to traumatic injury with
his immediate supervisor on a form approved by the Secretary of Labor within the time specified
in section 8122(a)(2) of this title. Section 8122(a)(2) provides that written notice of injury must
be given as specified in section 8119. The latter section provides in part that notice of injury
2

5 U.S.C. § 8118.

4

shall be given in writing within 30 days after the injury.3 A traumatic injury refers to injury
caused by a specific event or incident or series of incidents occurring within a single workday or
work shift whereas an occupational disease refers to an injury produced by employment over a
period longer than a single workday or shift.4
Continuation of pay requires the employing establishment to continue the employee’s
regular pay during any periods of disability, up to a maximum of 45 calendar days. This is paid
by the employing establishment, not OWCP. However, the ultimate decision as to whether
appellant is eligible for continuation of pay rests with OWCP.5
ANALYSIS
On January 12, 2011 appellant filed a claim alleging that he sustained a work-related
emotional condition. OWCP denied entitlement to continuation of pay because his disability was
not the result of a traumatic injury. On appeal, appellant asserts that he is entitled to continuation
of pay for his absence from work as his emotional condition arose out of the traumatic event of
December 18, 2010, when he was escorted off premises by police, he had a verbal altercation
with the police and he was placed in a “c clamp.” He argues that the evidence supports a
traumatic injury. Appellant additionally asserts that he was paid administrative leave as a result
of this injury.
Although appellant filed a traumatic injury claim for the December 18, 2010 work
incident, a review of the record reflects that he and his wife disagreed with a December 16, 2010
work assignment made by Mr. Evans. They were suspended on December 17, 2010 after using
sick leave instead of performing the work assignments given by Mr. Evans. These events
beginning December 16, 2010 resulted in both the December 18, 2010 incident at work and
appellant’s subsequent removal on March 28, 2011. Although the only work factor accepted by
OWCP was his removal of March 28, 2011, the nature of his claim is that of an occupational
disease due to incidents arising over more than one work shift. As appellant’s claim involves
matter extending beyond a single work shift, it was not a traumatic injury claim and he is not
entitled to continuation of pay.6 Furthermore, any administrative leave he may have been
granted has no bearing on whether he is entitled to continuation of pay.7
3

Id. at § 8119(a)(c).

4

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(q)(ee); Brady Fowler, 44 ECAB 343, 351 (1992).

5

Id. at § 10.200.

6

Id. at § 10.220(a); see also K.P., Docket No. 10-294 (issued November 30, 2010); B.W., Docket No. 10664 (issued October 14, 2010).
7

See Daniel Deparini, 44 ECAB 657 (1993) (findings of administrative agencies with respect to entitlement to
benefits under a specific statutory authority have no bearing on compensation entitlement under FECA). Also, if
appellant received administrative leave for the same period in which he seeks continuation of pay, he would not be
eligible for continuation of pay, even if he sustained a traumatic injury, as 5 U.S.C. § 8118 contemplates that
continuation of pay should only authorized where there is wage loss. Cf. James A. Zeman, Docket No. 93-2329
(issued March 27, 1995) (no entitlement to continuation of pay where the claimant had no wage loss as the record
showed that he used annual leave for the period at issue).

5

For these reasons, OWCP properly denied entitlement to continuation of pay.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly denied appellant’s claim for continuation of pay.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 18, 2011 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: August 8, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Cleveland, OH, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 08-2310
Issued: February 23, 2009

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 20, 2008 appellant filed a timely appeal from the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs’ July 2, 2008 merit decision concerning an overpayment of
compensation and an August 5, 2008 nonmerit decision denying his request for a hearing.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(d)(2), the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of
this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether the Office properly determined that appellant received an
$11,376.03 overpayment of compensation; (2) whether the Office properly determined that
appellant was at fault in creating the overpayment, thereby precluding waiver of recovery of the
overpayment; and (3) whether the Office properly denied appellant’s request for a
prerecoupment hearing as untimely filed.

FACTUAL HISTORY
In early 1996, the Office accepted that appellant, then a 45-year-old distribution clerk,
sustained several left shoulder conditions due to his repetitive work duties, including a rotator
cuff sprain, tendinitis and impingement syndrome. In early 1999, it accepted that he sustained
impingement syndrome of his right shoulder due to his repetitive work duties. Appellant
received compensation from the Office for periods of disability.
In an October 8, 1999 decision, the Office determined that appellant’s actual earnings as
a modified distribution clerk fairly and reasonably represented his wage-earning capacity. In this
decision, appellant was advised that he was not entitled to Office benefits while in receipt of
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) benefits. The decision stated, “You are advised that
receipt of [Office] benefits for loss of wage-earning capacity and receipt of an annuity from
OPM constitutes a dual benefit. If you receive such benefits from OPM, you should so advise
this [O]ffice immediately. You will be asked to make an election between the two benefits.”
In a Form EN1032 completed on February 11, 2008, appellant indicated that he had been
receiving both OPM and Office benefits.1 He advised the Office via telephone that he had
received OPM benefits since he retired from the employing establishment effective June 19,
2004 and had received both OPM and Office benefits since that time.
The Office asked appellant to elect whether to receive Office or OPM benefits.2 In a
form received by the Office on April 16, 2008, appellant elected to receive OPM benefits
effective June 19, 2004. The record documents that appellant received $11,376.03 in Office
compensation for the period June 19, 2004 to April 2, 2008. The documents identify the amount
of Office compensation appellant received every 28 days.
In an April 28, 2008 letter, the Office advised appellant of its preliminary determination
that he received an $11,376.03 overpayment of compensation because he received Office
compensation for the period June 19, 2004 to April 2, 2008 while also receiving OPM benefits.3
It also made a preliminary determination that he was at fault in the creation of the overpayment
because he accepted payments that he knew or should have known to be incorrect. The Office
advised appellant that he could submit evidence challenging the fact, amount, or finding of fault
and request waiver of the overpayment. It informed him that he could submit additional
evidence in writing or at prerecoupment hearing, but that a prerecoupment hearing must be
requested within 30 days of the date of the written notice of overpayment. The Office requested
that appellant complete and return an enclosed financial information questionnaire (Form
OWCP-20) within 30 days even if he was not requesting waiver of the overpayment.

1

At that time, appellant was receiving $938.00 per month in OPM benefits and $238.00 every four weeks in
Office benefits. He had also provided similar information regarding benefits received on prior EN1032 forms.
2

Appellant advised the Office via telephone that he wished to elect OPM benefits because such benefits were
greater than Office benefits.
3

The Office indicated that appellant elected to receive OPM benefits effective June 19, 2004.

2

In a form received by the Office on May 7, 2008, appellant requested waiver of the
overpayment and indicated that he did not believe he was at fault in its creation.4 On May 7,
2008 the Office also received a completed Form OWCP-20.5
In a July 2, 2008 decision, the Office finalized the $11,376.03 overpayment of
compensation for the period June 19, 2004 to April 2, 2008. It found that appellant was at fault
in the creation of the overpayment because he accepted payments that he knew or should have
known to be incorrect. The Office determined that the overpayment would be repaid through
payments of $100.00 each month.6
On July 18, 2008 the Office received appellant’s request for a prerecoupment hearing
regarding his overpayment.7 In an August 5, 2008 decision, it denied his request for a
prerecoupment hearing as untimely filed.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
Section 8102(a) of the Act8 provides that the United States shall pay compensation for the
disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the
performance of his duty.9 Section 8129(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
“When an overpayment has been made to an individual under this subchapter
because of an error of fact or law, adjustment shall be made under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor by decreasing later payments to which an
individual is entitled.”10
Section 8116(a) of the Act provides that while an employee is receiving compensation or
if he has been paid a lump sum in commutation of installment payments until the expiration of
the period during which the installment payments would have continued, the employee may not
receive salary, pay or remuneration of any type from the United States, except in limited
specified instances.11
4

Appellant did not check the portion of the form for requesting a prerecoupment hearing.

5

On this form, appellant stated, “I did not know that OPM and OWCP was the same. I did not know what this
money was for.”
6

As recovery from continuing compensation benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act is not
involved in this case, the Board has no jurisdiction over the amount the Office determined that appellant should repay
every 28 days. Levon H. Knight, 40 ECAB 658, 665 (1989).
7

Appellant completed the hearing request form on July 15, 2008. He alleged that he had not received a Form
OWCP-20 from the Office. However, in May 2008 appellant returned a completed Form OWCP-20 to the Office.
8

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

9

Id. at § 8102(a).

10

Id. at § 8129(a).

11

Id. at § 8116(a).

3

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that appellant received an $11,376.03 overpayment of compensation. In
the present case, appellant received Office compensation for the period June 19, 2004 to
April 2, 2008. However, he was not entitled to Office compensation for this period because he
had elected to receive OPM benefits effective June 19, 2004 and began receiving such benefits
starting that date. The record contains evidence which shows that appellant received $11,376.03
in Office compensation for the period June 19, 2004 to April 2, 2008 when he was not entitled to
receive any Office compensation. Therefore, the Office properly determined that appellant
received an $11,376.03 overpayment.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
Section 8129(a) of the Act12 provides that where an overpayment of compensation has
been made “because of an error of fact or law,” adjustment shall be made by decreasing later
payments to which an individual is entitled.13 The only exception to this requirement is a
situation which meets the tests set forth as follows in section 8129(b): “Adjustment or recovery
by the United States may not be made when incorrect payment has been made to an individual
who is without fault and when adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of this
subchapter or would be against equity and good conscience.”14 No waiver of payment is
possible if the claimant is not “without fault” in helping to create the overpayment.15
In determining whether an individual is not “without fault” or alternatively, “with fault,”
section 10.433(a) of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides in relevant part:
“An individual is with fault in the creation of an overpayment who:
(1) Made an incorrect statement as to a material fact which he or she
knew or should have known to be incorrect; or
(2) Failed to provide information which he or she knew or should have
known to be material; or
(3) Accepted a payment which he or she knew or should have known to be
incorrect….”16

12

Id. at §§ 8101-8193.

13

Id. at § 8129(a).

14

Id. at 8129(b).

15

Diana L. Booth, 52 ECAB 370 (2001).

16

20 C.F.R. § 10.433(a).

4

Section 10.433(c) of the Office regulations provides:
“Whether or not [the Office] determines that an individual was at fault with
respect to the creation of an overpayment depends on the circumstances
surrounding the overpayment. The degree of care expected may vary with the
complexity of those circumstances and the individual’s capacity to realize that he
or she is being overpaid.”17
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
The Board finds that the Office properly determined that appellant was at fault in the
creation of the $11,376.03 overpayment because he accepted payments which he knew or should
have known to be incorrect.18 In an October 8, 1999 decision, the Office specifically advised
appellant that he was not entitled to Office benefits while in receipt of OPM benefits. The
decision stated, “You are advised that receipt of [Office] benefits for loss of wage-earning
capacity and receipt of an annuity from OPM constitutes a dual benefit. If you receive such
benefits from OPM, you should so advise this office immediately. You will be asked to make an
election between the two benefits.”
Appellant acknowledged receiving both Office and OPM benefits since June 19, 2004,
the date that he retired from the employing establishment. He believed that the Office and OPM
payments were for different purposes but he did not provide any basis for this apparent belief.19
The Board notes that the explicit notice to appellant that he could not receive both Office and
OPM benefits and the fact that appellant received such dual benefits for almost four years shows
that he knew or should have known that the payments were incorrect. There is nothing unduly
complex about the circumstances of the overpayment or appellant’s ability to understand these
circumstances that would lead to the conclusion that he did not know or should not have known
that he was being overpaid between June 19, 2004 and April 2, 2008.20 Even though the Office
may have been negligent in continuing to issue appellant checks after learning that he was
receiving both Office and OPM benefits, this does not excuse appellant’s acceptance of such
checks which he knew or should have known were incorrect.21 Because the Office properly
found that appellant was at fault in the creation of the overpayment, it also properly found that
the overpayment was not subject to waiver.22

17

Id. at § 10.433(c).

18

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

19

In a May 2008 Form OWCP-20, appellant stated, “I did not know that OPM and OWCP was [sic] the same. I
did not know what this money was for.”
20

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

21

Robert W. O’Brien, 36 ECAB 541, 547 (1985).

22

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

5

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 3
The Office regulations on the recovery of overpayments provide that before collecting an
overpayment, it must provide the claimant with written notice of the fact and amount of
overpayment, the finding of fault, the right to submit evidence challenging the fact, amount, or
finding of fault, and the right to request waiver of the overpayment.23 The regulations also
provide that a claimant is entitled to submit additional evidence in writing or at prerecoupment
hearing, that a prerecoupment hearing must be requested within 30 days of the date of the written
notice of overpayment, and that “[f]ailure to request the hearing within this 30-day time period
shall constitute a waiver of that right.”24
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 3
The Office issued a preliminary finding of overpayment on April 28, 2008 and informed
appellant that any request for a prerecoupment hearing must be filed within 30 days of the date
of the preliminary finding. It did not receive a request from appellant for a prerecoupment
hearing until July 18, 2008. As appellant did not request the prerecoupment hearing within 30
days of the required 30-day time period, the Board finds that he waived his right to this hearing.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office properly determined that appellant received an
$11,376.03 overpayment of compensation and that he was at fault in creating the overpayment
such that the overpayment was not subject to waiver. The Board further finds that the Office
properly denied appellant’s request for a prerecoupment hearing as untimely filed.

23

20 C.F.R. § 10.431.

24

Id. at § 10.432.

6

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’
August 5 and July 2, 2008 decisions are affirmed.
Issued: February 23, 2009
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
S.W., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Luray, VA, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 07-2436
Issued: March 24, 2008

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 25, 2007 appellant filed an appeal from decisions of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs dated January 16 and July 27, 2007. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant sustained a recurrence of disability on July 26,
2006; and (2) whether the Office properly denied her request for a review of the written record.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On March 13, 2002 appellant, then a 56-year-old city carrier, sustained an employmentrelated contusion to the left hand and a right knee meniscal tear when she slipped and fell in the
course of her federal duties. She did not stop work until January 14, 2003 when Dr. Dwight D.
Kemp, a Board-certified osteopath specializing in orthopedic surgery, performed arthroscopic
repair of the right knee. On March 3, 2003 appellant returned to limited duty and thereafter to
regular duty. Dr. Kemp submitted reports describing appellant’s condition and treatment.

On July 8, 2004 appellant submitted a (Form CA-2a) recurrence of disability claim, that
was denied by the Office in an October 19, 2004 decision. In an October 28, 2004 report,
Dr. Kemp noted findings on examination of the knee including a flexion contracture and effusion
and that appellant walked with a limp. He reported that appellant’s job duties as a city carrier
required constant walking and climbing stairs and advised that her knee condition was due to a
degenerative process greatly exacerbated by the employment injury, noting that approval for her
surgery was delayed for nine months which entailed more walking, causing more wear upon the
articular cartilage surfaces. Dr. Kemp opined that appellant’s knee dysfunction greatly limited
her work and all personal walking activities, concluding that she could not “continue to work
indefinitely in her usual job.”
On October 16, 2006 appellant submitted a CA-2a form recurrence of disability claim,
alleging that she sustained a recurrence of disability on July 26, 2006. She did not stop work.
By letter dated December 6, 2006, the Office informed appellant of the evidence needed to
support her claim, including a medical report addressing the medical history, examination
findings and a firm diagnosis of the condition with an opinion regarding the relationship between
the need for continuing medical treatment and the accepted conditions. In an undated response,
appellant stated that since the March 13, 2002 employment injury she had increasing knee pain.
By decision dated January 16, 2007, the Office denied appellant’s recurrence of disability
claim.
On an undated form, received by the Office on June 6, 2007, appellant requested
reconsideration and submitted treatment notes from Dr. Kemp dating from December 16, 2002 to
July 14, 2004, that were previously of record. On June 22, 2007 she requested a review of the
written record.
In a July 27, 2007 decision, the Office denied her request for written record review.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
A recurrence of disability means an inability to work after an employee has returned to
work, caused by a spontaneous change in a medical condition which had resulted from a
previous injury or illness without an intervening injury or new exposure to the work environment
that caused the illness.1 A recurrence of medical condition means a documented need for further
medical treatment after release from treatment for the accepted condition or injury when there is
no accompanying work stoppage. Continuous treatment for the original condition or injury is
not considered a “need for further medical treatment after release from treatment,” nor is an
examination without treatment.2

1

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(x); see Theresa L. Andrews, 55 ECAB 719 (2004).

2

Id. at § 10.5(y); see Mary A. Ceglia, 55 ECAB 626 (2004).

2

The employee has the burden of establishing by the weight of reliable, probative and
substantial evidence that the recurrence of disability is causally related to the original injury and
should submit a detailed medical report.3
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish that she
sustained a recurrence of disability on July 26, 2006. Appellant did not submit any
contemporaneous medical evidence to establish that she was disabled due to her accepted
conditions or that she had a continuing employment-related condition, which required continuing
medical treatment.4 By letter dated December 6, 2006, the Office informed appellant of the
evidence needed to establish her recurrence claim. However, appellant did not submit any
medical evidence in response to the request. She merely appended statements regarding her
condition. The most recent medical report of record is Dr. Kemp’s October 24, 2004 report.
While he opined that appellant’s job duties could exacerbate her knee condition, this report is not
probative regarding appellant’s medical condition as of July 26, 2006. A physician’s statement
that exposure to employment factors may cause a recurrence of symptoms in the future is not a
sufficient basis on which to establish a claim as the fear of a recurrence of a condition if a
claimant returns to work does not constitute a basis for compensation.5 Appellant did not submit
medical evidence sufficient to establish her claim. She did not meet her burden of proof to
establish that she sustained a recurrence of disability or of a medical condition and the Office
properly denied her claim.6
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
A claimant dissatisfied with a decision of the Office shall be afforded an opportunity for
an oral hearing or, in lieu thereof, a review of the written record. A request for either an oral
hearing or a review of the written record must be submitted, in writing, within 30 days of the
date of the decision for which a hearing is sought.7 If the request is not made within 30 days or if
it is made after a reconsideration request, a claimant is not entitled to a hearing or a review of the
written record as a matter of right.8 The Board has held that the Office, in its broad discretionary
authority in the administration of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, has the power to
hold hearings in certain circumstances where no legal provision was made for such hearings and
that the Office must exercise this discretionary authority in deciding whether to grant a hearing.9
Office procedures, which require the Office to exercise its discretion to grant or deny a hearing
3

Id. at § 10.404(b).

4

See J.F., 58 ECAB ____ (Docket No. 06-186, issued October 17, 2006).

5

Virginia Dorsett, 50 ECAB 478 (1999).

6

20 C.F.R. § 10.404(b); see id.

7

See 5 U.S.C. § 8124, 20 C.F.R. § 10.616.

8

Claudio Vazquez, 52 ECAB 496 (2001).

9

Marilyn F. Wilson, 52 ECAB 347 (2001).

3

when the request is untimely or made after reconsideration, are a proper interpretation of the Act
and Board precedent.10
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
The Office denied appellant’s request for a review of the written record on the grounds
that it was untimely filed. In a July 27, 2007 decision, the Office found that appellant was not, as
a matter of right, entitled to a record review as her request, dated June 22, 2007, had not been
made within 30 days of the January 16, 2007 decision. As appellant’s request was dated June 22,
2007, more than 30 days after the date of the January 16, 2007 decision, the Office properly
determined that she was not entitled to a review of the written record as a matter of right as her
request was untimely filed.11
The Office also has the discretionary power to grant a request for a record review when a
claimant is not entitled to such as a matter of right. In the July 27, 2007 decision, the Office
properly exercised its discretion by stating that it had considered the matter in relation to the
issue involved and had denied appellant’s request on the basis that the issue in this case could be
addressed through a reconsideration application. The Board has held that, as the only limitation
on the Office’s authority is reasonableness, abuse of discretion is generally shown through proof
of manifest error, clearly unreasonable exercise of judgment or actions taken which are contrary
to both logic and probable deduction from established facts.12 In the present case, the evidence
of record does not indicate that the Office committed any act in connection with its denial of
appellant’s request for a review of the written record which could be found to be an abuse of
discretion. The Office therefore properly denied her request.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant failed to meet her burden of proof to establish that she
sustained a recurrence of disability or recurrence of medical condition on July 26, 2006. The
Board further finds that the Office did not abuse its discretion in denying her request for a review
of the written record.

10

Claudio Vazquez, supra note 8.

11

Id. The Board notes that the copy of the envelope addressed to the Branch of Hearings and Review found in
the case record does not contain a postmark.
12

See Claudio Vazquez, supra note 8; Daniel J. Perea, 42 ECAB 214 (1990).

4

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated July 27 and January 16, 2007 are affirmed.
Issued: March 24, 2008
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
___________________________________________
)
)
)
and
)
)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
)
PRISONS, U.S. PENITENTIARY, Atlanta, GA,
)
Employer
)
___________________________________________ )
S.T., Appellant

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 08-1047
Issued: October 15, 2008

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On February 27, 2008 appellant filed a timely appeal from an Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs’ merit decision dated January 8, 2008 which denied his claim for a
traumatic injury. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of the case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof in establishing that he
sustained a chest injury on October 20, 2007.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On November 7, 2007 appellant, then a 38-year-old correctional officer, filed a traumatic
injury claim alleging that on October 20, 2007 he was responding to an emergency and

experienced a sharp pain in his chest while running. He stopped work on October 21, 2007 and
returned on November 28, 2007. The employing establishment did not controvert the claim.
By letter dated December 4, 2007, the Office requested additional factual and medical
information from appellant noting that the initial information submitted was insufficient to
establish his claim. It asked him to submit a medical report from a treating physician containing
a reasoned explanation as to how the specific incident identified by him contributed to his
claimed chest injury.
In a report dated October 20, 2007, Dr. Scott L. Ediger, a Board-certified internist, noted
treating appellant for chest pain. He stated that the physical examination was unremarkable,
appellant’s lungs were clear to auscultation and percussion, the heart had a regular rate and
rhythm without significant murmur and the laboratory results revealed no abnormalities.
Dr. Ediger diagnosed atypical chest pain, possible coronary artery disease with underlying risk
factors of hypertension, controlled essential hypertension and recent noncompliance on
antihypertensive therapy. Appellant’s chest pain was consistent with musculoskeletal discomfort
and he was admitted to a hospital to rule out a myocardial infarction. A chest x-ray dated
October 20, 2007 revealed no focal lung consolidation. An October 22, 2007 nuclear profusion
study revealed excellent exercise capacity with normal stress electrocardiogram, small anterior
apical reversible defect which was borderline for ischemia and normal left ventricular function.
Appellant also submitted an attending physician’s report dated November 15, 2007 from
Dr. Kristen Foster, a Board-certified internist, who noted a date of injury of October 20, 2007
and indicated that appellant reported no history of injury. Dr. Foster noted negative findings for
the heart catheterization, blood laboratory studies, chest x-ray and spirometry. She diagnosed
muscle injury and noted with a checkmark “yes” that appellant’s condition was caused or
aggravated by an employment activity. Appellant was hospitalized from October 20 to 23, 2007
and was totally disabled from October 20 to November 28, 2007. He also submitted laboratory
results.
In a decision dated January 8, 2008, the Office denied appellant’s claim, finding that the
evidence was not sufficient to establish that he sustained an injury on October 20, 2007. It found
that the initial evidence of file was insufficient to establish that appellant experienced the
claimed incident on October 20, 2007 or that the medical evidence established a causal
relationship between the alleged injury and his work duties.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 has the
burden of establishing the essential elements of his or her claim including the fact that the
individual is an employee of the United States within the meaning of the Act, that the claim was
filed within the applicable time limitation of the Act, that an injury was sustained in the
performance of duty as alleged and that any disability and/or specific condition for which
compensation is claimed are causally related to the employment injury. These are the essential

1

Id.

2

elements of each and every compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated
upon a traumatic injury or occupational disease.2
In order to determine whether an employee actually sustained an injury in the
performance of duty, the Office begins with an analysis of whether fact of injury has been
established. Generally, fact of injury consists of two components which must be considered in
conjunction with one another. The first component to be established is that the employee
actually experienced the employment incident which is alleged to have occurred.3 The second
component is whether the employment incident caused a personal injury and generally can be
established only by medical evidence. To establish a causal relationship between the condition,
as well as any attendant disability, claimed and the employment event or incident, the employee
must submit rationalized medical opinion evidence, based on a complete factual and medical
background, supporting such a causal relationship.4
Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s
rationalized opinion on the issue of whether there is a causal relationship between the claimant’s
diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors. The opinion of the physician must
be based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must be one of
reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature
of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors
identified by the claimant.5 The weight of medical evidence is determined by its reliability, its
probative value, its convincing quality, the care of analysis manifested and the medical rationale
expressed in support of the physician’s opinion.6
ANALYSIS
The Office denied appellant’s claim on the grounds that he failed to establish that the
events occurred as alleged. It is not disputed that appellant ran at work on October 20, 2007 and
the employing establishment did not otherwise controvert the claim. The Board finds that the
evidence establishes that appellant ran as part of his job duties on October 20, 2007.
The Board finds, however, that the medical evidence is insufficient to establish that
appellant sustained a chest injury causally related to the October 20, 2007 incident. On
December 4, 2007 the Office advised appellant of the medical evidence needed to establish his
claim. Appellant did not submit a medical report from an attending physician addressing how
the October 20, 2007 incident caused or contributed to his claimed condition.

2

Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 357 (2001).

3

Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).

4

Id.

5

Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

6

Franklin D. Haislah, 52 ECAB 457 (2001) (medical reports not containing rationale on causal relationship are
entitled to little probative value); Jimmie H. Duckett, 52 ECAB 332 (2001).

3

On October 20, 2007 Dr. Ediger treated appellant for complaints of chest pain. He noted
appellant’s lungs were clear and his heart had a regular rate and rhythm. Dr. Ediger diagnosed
atypical chest pain, rule out coronary artery disease and myocardial infarction. He listed
underlying risk factors as hypertension, controlled essential hypertension and recent
noncompliance on antihypertensive therapy. However, Dr. Ediger’s report is insufficient to
establish the claim as the physician did not provide a history of injury or specifically address
how the October 20, 2007 incident caused or aggravated the diagnosed chest pain.7 Therefore,
this report is insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.
On November 15, 2007 Dr. Foster listed a date of injury of October 20, 2007 but advised
that appellant reported no specific history of injury. She noted the heart catheterization, blood
laboratory studies, chest x-ray and spirometry revealed no abnormalities. Dr. Foster diagnosed
muscle injury and noted with a checkmark “yes” that appellant’s condition was caused or
aggravated by an employment activity. The Board has held that an opinion on causal
relationship which consists only of a physician checking “yes” to a medical form report question
on whether the claimant’s condition was related to the history given is of little probative value.
Without any explanation or rationale for the conclusion reached, her report is insufficient to
establish causal relationship.8
The remainder of the medical evidence consists of diagnostic studies which do not
provide any opinion on the causal relationship between appellant’s job and his diagnosed chest
injury. For this reason, this evidence is not sufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.
An award of compensation may not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation.
Neither the fact that appellant’s condition became apparent during a period of employment nor
the belief that his condition was caused, precipitated or aggravated by his employment is
sufficient to establish causal relationship.9
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that he
sustained a chest injury causally related to his October 20, 2007 employment incident.

7

A.D., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1183, issued November 14, 2006) (medical evidence which does not offer
any opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of causal
relationship).
8

Lucrecia M. Nielson, 41 ECAB 583, 594 (1991).

9

See Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215 (1997).

4

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the January 8, 2008 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed, as modified.
Issued: October 15, 2008
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.P., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
St. Louis, MO, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 20-1668
Issued: March 2, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 28, 2020 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an August 5,
2020 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 3
1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). No
contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a representative,
prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2
3

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

The Board notes that appellant submitted additional evidence to OWCP following the August 5, 2020 decision.
However, the Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case
record that was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by
the Board for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this
additional evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.

ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that OWCP should
expand the acceptance of her claim to include a low back injury, pelvic or hip condition, right lower
extremity pain, and a balance disorder causally related to an accepted July 23, 2019 employment
injury.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 23, 2019 appellant, then a 52-year-old city carrier assistant, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on that date she injured her right shin when she stepped into a hole
on a customer’s property while in the performance of duty. She stopped work on July 23, 2019. On
August 7, 2019 OWCP accepted the claim for right ankle sprain, a right lower extremity laceration,
and cellulitis of the right lower extremity.
In an August 8, 2019 report, Dr. Amy S. Beck, an osteopath Board-certified in internal
medicine, noted that the right anterior shin laceration was healing poorly, with serous sanguineous
fluid and mild surrounding reactive erythema. In a separate note of the same date, she held appellant
off work through August 29, 2019.
OWCP paid appellant wage-loss compensation on the supplemental rolls from September 7
through 13, 2019.
In September 18, 2019 reports, Dr. David S. German, a Board-certified plastic surgeon,
noted that appellant sustained a right lower leg injury with flap laceration on July 23, 2019. He
diagnosed a healed chronic ulcer of the right anterior lower leg and right lower leg discomfort with
activity. In a work status report of the same date, Dr. German returned appellant to light-duty work
with a restriction against operating vehicles.
Appellant returned to part-time, light-duty work on or about September 18, 2019 and again
stopped work on September 21, 2019.
In a September 23, 2019 prescription note, Dr. German held appellant off work through
October 3, 2019. In a report dated September 27, 2019, he returned her to light-duty work for four
hours a day with restrictions. Dr. German released appellant to full-duty work as of
October 14, 2019.4
Appellant resumed light-duty work on October 5, 2019. She stopped shortly afterward due
to right lower extremity pain. 5

4

Dr. German submitted periodic reports dated through November 6, 2019 noting appellant’s continuing lumbar and
right lower extremity symptoms.
5

OWCP received an October 5, 2019 hospital emergency department report signed by Nichole MacLellan, a family
nurse practitioner.

2

In a letter dated October 10, 2019, appellant requested that OWCP expand its acceptance of
her claim to include a balance problem, paraspinal muscle spasms, back pain, right hip pain,
coccygeal pain right lower extremity pain, right knee pain, and right-sided pelvic pain.
In an October 11, 2019 report, Dr. Mahesh Bagwe, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
noted appellant’s complaints of back discomfort due to a slight limp. He opined that October 10,
2019 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans of the right lower extremity demonstrated edema at
the anterior tibia wound site, and mild tendinitis along multiple tendons of the right ankle. 6
Dr. Bagwe recommended physical therapy to address muscle weakness in the right lower extremity.
In a development letter dated October 22, 2019, OWCP informed appellant of the additional
evidence needed to expand her claim for additional conditions causally related to the July 23, 2019
employment incident. It afforded her 30 days to submit the necessary evidence.
In response, appellant submitted an October 5, 2019 emergency department report by
Dr. John P. Fortney, Board-certified in emergency medicine, who diagnosed low back pain and
sequela of the accepted right lower extremity injury.
In an October 6, 2019 emergency department report, Dr. Steven Hilton, Board-certified in
emergency medicine, noted appellant’s complaints of back pain after lifting items and placing
weight on her right leg while at work. Appellant also experienced right-sided low back spasms
while pushing and pulling carts at work. Dr. Hilton opined that her back pain and spasms were due
to not bearing weight on her right leg for some time and continuing to favor it.
In an October 8, 2019 report, Dr. Beck diagnosed acute right-sided low back pain, neck pain,
weakness, and gait instability.
In an October 30, 2019 report, Dr. Bagwe noted slight weakness of right plantar flexion. He
recommended physical therapy to address deficits in balance and strength.
Appellant returned to work for four hours a day in early November 2019.
In a November 6, 2019 emergency department report, Dr. Thomas F. Wheeler, Boardcertified in emergency medicine, diagnosed lumbar spasm.
In reports dated November 8 and 13, 2019, Dr. Bagwe opined that appellant had right leg
weakness as she had not been physically active for months during recuperation from the July 23,
2019 employment injury. He recommended a work conditioning program. 7
In a December 12, 2019 development letter, OWCP again informed appellant of the type of
medical evidence needed to expand acceptance of her claim to include additional conditions causally

6

An October 10, 2019 MRI scan of the right lower extremity demonstrated subcutaneous edema in the region of a
skin wound anterior to the tibia, intramuscular edema within the tibialis anterior muscle and mild irregularity of its
myotendinous junction, and possible fluid collection along the anterior margin of the tibialis anterior muscle.
7

November 14, 2019 electromyography/nerve conduction velocity testing of the right lower extremity was within
normal limits.

3

related to the July 23, 2019 employment incident. It noted that there was no deadline for her to
request expansion of her claim.
In a December 13, 2019 report, Dr. Bagwe noted that appellant was able to balance easily
on her right lower extremity and had run half a mile on a treadmill without difficulty. He noted that
an MRI scan demonstrated an injury to the tibialis anterior musculature with soft tissue injury and
a partial tear of the tibialis anterior tendon. In reports through January 15, 2020, Dr. Bagwe
recommended that appellant gradually increase her work hours.
By decision dated January 29, 2020, OWCP denied expansion of the claim to include
additional diagnosed conditions of the back or right knee, finding that the medical evidence of record
did not diagnose a back or knee condition or support a causal relationship between any additional
conditions and the July 23, 2019 employment injury.
On February 4, 2020 appellant, through counsel, requested a telephonic hearing before a
representative of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review held on June 5, 2020. She submitted
additional evidence.
In January 31, 2020 reports, Dr. Bagwe noted that appellant had scar tissue at the site of the
accepted injury that moved with flexion of the tibialis anterior muscle. He opined that she had
residual weakness in her tibialis anterior musculature that affected her balance. Dr. Bagwe
permanently restricted lifting to 60 pounds.
In an April 2, 2020 report, Dr. Bagwe opined that appellant had attained maximum medical
improvement (MMI) on January 31, 2020. He opined that she had sustained 15 percent permanent
impairment of the right lower extremity. Dr. Bagwe noted permanent work restrictions against
working more than eight hours a day and lifting more than 60 pounds. He opined that these
restrictions and permanent impairment were “the result of [appellant’s] loss of strength of the tibialis
anterior musculature due to a partial tendon and muscular laceration.” Appellant had chronic right
lower extremity weakness that precipitated “early fatigue and poor balance with isolated weight
bearing on [her] right lower extremity.”
By decision dated August 5, 2020, the hearing representative affirmed the prior decision.
She found that the medical evidence was insufficient to establish causal relationship between the
July 23, 2019 employment incident and right knee, pelvis, hip, low back, or balance conditions.
Additionally, appellant related her conditions to restricted duties performed following the accepted
injury.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Where an employee claims that a condition not accepted or approved by OWCP was due to
an employment injury, he or she bears the burden of proof to establish that the condition is causally
related to the employment injury.8

8

D.B., Docket No. 20-1280 (issued March 2, 2021); R.R., Docket No. 19-0086 (issued February 10, 2021); K.T.,
Docket No. 19-1718 (issued April 7, 2020); Jaja K. Asaramo, 55 ECAB 200 (2004).

4

Causal relationship is a medical question that requires medical opinion evidence to resolve
the issue.9 The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical
background, must be one of reasonable certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale
explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the accepted
employment injury.10
To establish causal relationship between the condition as well as any attendant disability
claimed and the employment injury, an employee must submit rationalized medical evidence. 11 The
opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the
claimant, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale
explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific
employment factors identified by the claimant. 12 The weight of medical evidence is determined by
its reliability, its probative value, its convincing quality, the care of analysis manifested, and the
medical rationale expressed in support of the physician’s opinion.13
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that OWCP
should expand the acceptance of her claim to include additional medical conditions as causally
related to an accepted July 23, 2019 employment injury.
Dr. Fortney indicated in his October 5, 2019 report that appellant had low back pain related
to sequela of the accepted right lower extremity injury. Dr. Hilton opined on October 6, 2019 that
appellant’s lumbar spasms were caused by not bearing weight on her right lower extremity during
recuperation and continuing to favor it. Both physicians provided a conclusory opinion and did not
explain, with rationale, their opinions as to how the accepted employment injury had caused or
aggravated additional diagnosed conditions. The Board has held that a report is of limited probative
value regarding causal relationship if it does not contain medical rationale explaining how a given
medical condition/disability was causally related to employment factors.14 Thus, their opinions are
of limited probative value and insufficient to establish expansion of the claim.
In an August 8, 2019 reports, Dr. Beck held appellant off work noting that her right anterior
shin laceration was healing poorly. She observed objective right leg weakness and acute right-sided
lumbar pain, as noted in her October 8, 2019 report. Dr. Wheeler diagnosed gait instability and
right lower extremity weakness in his November 6, 2019 report. However, these medical reports
9

E.M., Docket No. 18-1599 (issued March 7, 2019); Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996).

10

Id.

11

T.K., Docket No. 18-1239 (issued May 29, 2019); M.W., 57 ECAB 710 (2006); John D. Jackson, 55 ECAB
465 (2004).
12

D.S., Docket No. 18-0353 (issued February 18, 2020); T.K., id.; I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams,
41 ECAB 345 (1989).
13

See P.M., Docket No. 18-0287 (issued October 11, 2018).

14

D.S., Docket No. 21-0673 (issued October 10, 2021); A.L., Docket No. 18-1706 (issued May 20, 2019); Y.D.,
Docket No. 16-1896 (issued February 10, 2017).

5

do not offer an opinion as to whether these diagnosed conditions were causally related to the
accepted employment injury. The Board has held that medical evidence that does not offer an
opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of no probative value on the issue of
causal relationship. 15 These reports are, therefore, of no probative value on the issue of causal
relationship and are insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.
In an October 11, 2019 report, Dr. Bagwe noted appellant’s complaints of back discomfort
due to a slight limp. In an October 30, 2019 report, he noted slight weakness of right plantar flexion.
In November 8 and 13, 2019 reports, Dr. Bagwe attributed this weakness to physical inactivity
during recuperation from the July 23, 2019 employment injury. He opined in January 31, 2020
reports that residual weakness in the tibialis anterior musculature affected appellant’s balance.
Dr. Bagwe noted in an April 2, 2020 report that the accepted laceration caused weakness of the
tibialis anterior musculature that precipitated poor balance with isolated weight bearing on
appellant’s right lower extremity. Although Dr. Bagwe indicated that the accepted injury could
cause or contribute to the additional conditions, he did not specify the objective clinical findings
that established causation. The Board has held that a medical opinion must provide an explanation
of how the specific employment incident or employment factors physiologically caused or
aggravated the additional diagnosed conditions. 16 Therefore, the Board finds that Dr. Bagwe’s
reports are of limited probative value and insufficient to establish appellant’s burden of proof.
In September 18, 2019 reports, Dr. German noted that appellant sustained a right lower leg
injury with flap laceration on July 23, 2019 and diagnosed a healed chronic ulcer of the right anterior
lower leg and right lower leg discomfort with activity. In a work status report of the same date, he
returned appellant to light-duty work with a restriction against driving vehicles. In a September 23,
2019 prescription note, Dr. German held appellant off work through October 3, 2019. In a report
dated September 27, 2019, he returned her to light-duty work for four hours a day with restrictions,
releasing appellant to full-duty work as of October 14, 2019. Dr. German also submitted periodic
reports through November 6, 2019, noting appellant’s continuing lumbar and right lower extremity
symptoms. In none of those reports, however, did Dr. German provide an opinion regarding causal
relationship between appellant’s additional diagnosed conditions and the accepted July 23, 2019
employment injury. The Board has held that medical evidence that does not offer an opinion
regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of no probative value on the issue of causal
relationship. 17 Thus, the Board finds that the reports of Drs. German are of no probative value on
the issue of causal relationship and are insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.

15

S.S., Docket No. 21-0837 (issued November 23, 2021); see J.M., Docket No. 19-1926 (issued March 19, 2021);
L.D., Docket No. 20-0894 (issued January 26, 2021); T.F., Docket No. 18-0447 (issued February 5, 2020); L.B., Docket
No. 18-0533 (issued August 27, 2018); D.K., Docket No. 17-1549 (issued July 6, 2018).
16

See Y.D., Docket No. 16-1896 (issued February 10, 2017) (finding that a report is of limited probative value
regarding causal relationship if it does not contain medical rationale describing the relation between work factors and a
diagnosed condition/disability).
17

Id.

6

Appellant also submitted diagnostic studies that addressed her right lower extremity.
However, the Board has held that diagnostic studies, standing alone, lack probative value on the
issue of causal relationship. 18
As the medical evidence of record is insufficient to establish expansion of the acceptance of
the claim to include additional conditions causally related to or as a consequence of her accepted
employment injury, the Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that OWCP
should expand the acceptance of her claim to include a low back injury, pelvic or hip condition,
right lower extremity pain, and a balance disorder causally related to an accepted July 23, 2019
employment injury.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 5, 2020 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: March 2, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

18

S.S., id.; C.H., Docket No. 20-0228 (issued October 7, 2020); E.G., Docket No. 17-1955 (issued
September 10, 2018).

7