United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.K., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, SOUTH PARK
STATION, Alexandria, LA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Daniel E. Broussard, Jr., Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 18-0907
Issued: February 7, 2019

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 26, 2018 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a September 25,
2017 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).2 Pursuant to the

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

Under the Board’s Rules of Procedure, an appeal must be filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of an
OWCP decision. An appeal is considered filed upon receipt by the Clerk of the Appellate Boards. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.3(e)-(f). One hundred and eighty days from OWCP’s September 25, 2017 decision was Saturday,
March 24, 2018. Because the last day of the 180-day filing period fell on a Saturday, the filing period is extended
until the close of the next business day, which was Monday, March 26, 2018. Accordingly, the appeal is timely filed
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(f)(2).

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act3 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.4
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly reduced appellant’s wage-loss compensation
effective November 13, 2016 under 20 C.F.R. § 10.500(a) based on his earnings had he accepted
a temporary, limited-duty assignment.
FACTUAL HISTORY
This case has previously been before the Board.5 The facts and circumstances of the case
as set forth in the prior Board decision are incorporated herein by reference. The relevant facts are
as follows.
On May 13, 1996 appellant, then a 38-year-old rural carrier associate (RCA), filed a
traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on that day he sustained whiplash, a broken right
shoulder, and lacerations on his head and chin as a result of a motor vehicle accident while in the
performance of duty. He stopped work on May 14, 1996.
OWCP accepted the claim for right scapula pain, right knee contusion, rib fracture, right
rotator cuff tendinitis, post-traumatic headaches, chest wall contusion, and back sprain
Appellant returned to work in a modified position on October 7, 1997. On November 19,
1997 he filed a claim for compensation (Form CA-7) for wage loss commencing
November 5, 1997. After an initial denial of wage-loss benefits, appellant continued to pursue his
appeal rights. By decision dated May 18, 2001, OWCP accepted his claim for recurrence of
disability compensation effective November 5, 1997 and paid wage-loss compensation on the daily
rolls and thereafter on the periodic rolls as of February 24, 2002.
A work capacity evaluation (Form OWCP-5c) dated February 16, 2015 from
Dr. Stephen P. Katz, an attending pain medicine specialist advised that appellant could return to
full-time sedentary light-duty work with restrictions that included pushing, pulling, and lifting up
to 25 pounds for 8 hours, and squatting, kneeling, and climbing up to 30 minutes.
In a June 10, 2015 report, Dr. Erich W. Wolf, II, an attending Board-certified
neurosurgeon, diagnosed cervical spondylosis with myelopathy, intervertebral cervical disc
disorders with myelopathy, and degeneration of the cervical intervertebral disc. He recommended
3

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

4
The Board notes that appellant submitted additional evidence on appeal. However, the Board’s Rules of Procedure
provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record that was before OWCP at the
time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the Board for the first time on appeal.”
20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this additional evidence for the first time on
appeal. Id.
5

Docket No. 00-1772 (issued November 27, 2000).

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a computerized tomography (CT) cervical myelogram to better assess osteophytes and nerve root
impingement prior to pursuing surgical intervention.
On September 15, 2015 OWCP referred appellant, along with a statement of accepted facts
(SOAF), the medical record, and a set of questions, to Dr. Douglas C. Brown, a Board-certified
orthopedic surgeon, for a second opinion as to whether he had any continuing employment-related
disability.
In an October 26, 2015 report, Dr. Brown reviewed the SOAF and medical record. He
noted a history of the May 13, 1996 employment injury and appellant’s medical background.
Dr. Brown reported appellant’s physical examination findings and reviewed diagnostic test results.
He provided an impression of C4-5, C5-6 mild degenerative spondylosis and degenerative disc
disease, healed right knee sprain, healed lumbar strain, healed right clavicle and scapular fractures
by history, and chronic headaches, muscular in nature and possibly psychological.
Dr. Brown advised that appellant could not perform the duties of his rural mail carrier
position which he described as heavy-duty work. He noted, however, that although appellant was
addicted to Hydrocodone, Soma, and Xanax, he was capable of performing sedentary medium
work full time with permanent restrictions that included reaching above the shoulder and twisting
up to 4 hours, 1/2 hour of operating a motor vehicle at work, and 1 hour of operating a motor
vehicle to and from work due to his Percocet addiction, and pushing, pulling, and lifting up to 35
pounds for 4 hours. Dr. Brown recommended that he undergo a functional capacity evaluation
(FCE) and then return to work within identified physical restrictions. On January 12 and 13, 2016
appellant underwent an FCE with Samuel Forester, a physical therapist. By addendum report dated
January 27, 2016, Dr. Brown reviewed the January 19, 2016 FCE vocational report and found that
it demonstrated appellant’s ability to function at a sedentary work level with lifting, carrying, and
pushing 10 pounds up to 1/3 of the day. He noted that appellant was balancing well up to 1/3 of
the day and was unable to crouch and work at a low level or above the shoulder. Dr. Brown
released appellant to return to sedentary light work with the above-noted limitations.
On May 18, 2016 the employing establishment offered appellant a modified temporary
position for three hours per day, six days per week, effective June 11, 2016. The job title was an
RCA, grade 5, step Z with an hourly salary of $21.40. The job duties consisted of logging in blue
box and nil bills/regulations highway contract route drivers, hanging express sacks (waist level
work putting empty sacks on a rack), and office duties (sedentary desk work i.e., computer input,
reconciling invoices, etc.). Physical requirements were intermittent sitting, standing, and walking
for three hours, intermittent lifting and pushing no more than 10 pounds for two hours, and
intermittent simple grasping and reaching for three hours.
The employing establishment, in a May 19, 2016 e-mail, advised that it was unable to
provide appellant with a permanent job offer and that the availability of hours were limited due to
the severity of his restrictions.
In correspondence dated May 25, 2016, appellant rejected the employing establishment’s
offer of a temporary modified-duty assignment as an RCA.

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On June 2, 2016 the employing establishment informed OWCP that appellant was a
permanent employee. Appellant had worked an average of 32.87 hours per week and had actual
earnings of $17,615.84 per year. On November 5, 1997 the date his recurrence of disability began,
he had worked 37.68 hours per week and earned $29,118.94 per year.
By letter dated June 2, 2016, OWCP informed the employing establishment that the offered
temporary position was not suitable. It explained that appellant was released to return to work 8
hours per day, 40 hours per week, but the offered position was not for at least half of the total hours
he was released to work. OWCP further explained that he could not be offered a temporary
position under section 8106(c) of FECA as the evidence of record did not establish that he was a
temporary employee on the date of injury.
In an amended job offer dated June 2, 2016, the employing establishment noted the revised
work hours as four and one-half hours per day, six days per week. The job duties and physical
requirements were exactly the same.
On June 16, 2016 appellant again rejected the employing establishment’s offer of a
temporary modified-duty position.
On June 21, 2016 the employing establishment confirmed to OWCP that the offered
position remained available.
By letter dated September 23, 2016, OWCP informed appellant of its proposed reduction
of his wage-loss compensation as he had refused to accept a temporary limited-duty assignment
which accommodated his work-related limitations as determined by Dr. Brown and would have
paid him $449.40 a week for working 21 hours. It advised him of the provisions of 20 C.F.R.
§ 10.500(a) and explained to him that his entitlement to wage-loss compensation would be reduced
under this provision if he did not accept the offered temporary assignment or provide a written
explanation with justification for his refusal within 30 days.
In an October 18, 2016 letter, appellant related that he was not accepting the offered
assignment due to his medical conditions. He resubmitted Dr. Wolf’s June 10, 2015 report and an
April 10, 2001 report from Dr. Robert R. Po, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon and OWCP
second opinion physician.6
By decision dated November 3, 2016, postmarked November 9, 2016, OWCP reduced
appellant’s wage-loss compensation, effective November 13, 2016, as he had not accepted the
temporary limited-duty position offered on June 2, 2016 by the employing establishment. Using
the formula set forth in Albert C. Shadrick7 it noted that his salary on the date when he was injured,
May 13, 1996, was $546.71 per week and the current pay rate for his job and step when injured
was $787.33, effective August 30, 2016. OWCP found appellant capable of earning $449.40 per
week, the pay rate of a modified RCA. It determined that he had 57 percent wage-earning
6

Dr. Po reported on April 10, 2001 that appellant was totally disabled for work due to the effects of the May 13,
1996 employment injury.
7

5 ECAB 376 (1953) (codified by regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 10.403).

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capacity which resulted in an adjusted wage-earning capacity of $235.09 per week. This yielded
a new compensation rate equal to $934.00 each four weeks.
In a November 18, 2016 appeal request form, postmarked December 7, 2016, appellant,
through counsel, requested an oral hearing before an OWCP hearing representative regarding the
November 3, 2016 OWCP decision, postmarked on November 9, 2016.8
During the July 13, 2017 telephonic hearing, appellant contended that residuals from his
work-related conditions, as well as the medication he took for them, prevented him from accepting
the temporary limited-duty RCA position offered to him by the employing establishment.
Following the July 13, 2017 telephonic hearing, appellant submitted further medical
evidence. A series of medical records from Dr. Michael W. Dole, a Board-certified physiatrist,
included a transcript of his deposition taken on May 12, 2017. He noted a history of the May 13,
1996 employment injury and appellant’s medical treatment. Dr. Dole examined appellant and
diagnosed cervical radiculopathy, chronic low back pain syndrome, depression, and anxiety. He
advised that appellant’s conditions were due to the accepted work injuries and loss of function.
Dr. Dole maintained that appellant showed no signs of malingering and that his subjective
complaints were supported by objective test results. He opined that appellant was unable to return
to his job at the employing establishment or perform any other job because he had residuals of his
accepted employment-related injuries.
In a report and letter dated June 27, 2017, Dr. James W. Quillin, a psychologist, related
appellant’s history and discussed findings on physical and mental examination. He provided an
impression of persisting depressive disorder, chronic pain syndrome, cannabis use, aberrant urine
drug testing secondary to cannabis use, somatization with anxiety, obsessive compulsive traits,
and interpersonally distressed pain adjustment classification.
By decision dated September 25, 2017, an OWCP hearing representative affirmed
OWCP’s November 3, 2016 decision. She found that the medical evidence submitted by appellant
was insufficient to outweigh Dr. Brown’s opinion.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
OWCP’s regulations at section 10.500(a) provide in relevant part:
“(a) Benefits are available only while the effects of a work-related condition
continue. Compensation for wage loss due to disability is available only for any
periods during which an employee’s work-related medical condition prevents [him
or her] from earning the wages earned before the work-related injury. For example,
an employee is not entitled to compensation for any wage loss claimed on a [Form]
CA-7 to the extent that evidence contemporaneous with the period claimed on a
8

By decision dated December 20, 2016, OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review initially determined that
appellant’s request for an oral hearing was untimely filed. On January 31, 2017 the Chief Judge of the Branch of
Hearings and Review found that the December 7, 2016 request was timely filed as the November 3, 2016 decision
was not mailed until November 9, 2016.

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[Form] CA-7 establishes that an employee had medical work restrictions in place;
that light duty within those work restrictions was available; and that the employee
was previously notified in writing that such duty was available. Similarly, an
employee receiving continuing periodic payments for disability was not prevented
from earning the wages earned before the work-related injury if the evidence
establishes that the employing [establishment] had offered, in accordance with
OWCP procedures, a temporary light-duty assignment within the employee’s work
restrictions.”9
When it is determined that an appellant is no longer totally disabled from work and is on
the periodic rolls, OWCP procedures provide that the claims examiner should evaluate whether
the evidence establishes that light-duty work was available within his or her restrictions. The
claims examiner should provide a pretermination or prereduction notice if appellant is being
removed from the periodic rolls.10 When the light-duty assignment either ends or is no longer
available, the claimant should be returned to the periodic rolls if medical evidence supports
continued disability.11
OWCP procedures further advise, “If there would have been wage loss if the claimant had
accepted the light-duty assignment, the claimant remains entitled to compensation benefits based
on the temporary actual earnings WEC [wage-earning capacity] calculation (just as if he/she had
accepted the light-duty assignment).”12
A part-time light-duty assignment may be appropriate if it is for at least half of the total
hours that the claimant was released for work, is not less than two hours per day, and there is
written verification from the employing establishment verifying that it is not able to provide work
for the total hours that the claimant was released for work.13
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that OWCP properly reduced appellant’s wage-loss compensation
effective November 3, 2016 pursuant to section 10.500(a), for refusing a temporary limited-duty
position.
On May 18, 2016 the employing establishment offered appellant a temporary limited-duty
assignment as an RCA for three hours per day, six days per week. The written job offer noted
duties including logging in blue box and nil bills/regulations highway contract route drivers,
hanging express sacks (waist level work putting empty sacks on a rack), and office duties
9

20 C.F.R. § 10.500(a).

10
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Job Offers and Return to Work, Chapter 2.814.9(c)(1)
(June 2013).
11

Id.

12

Id. at Chapter 2.814.8(c)(10).

13

Id. at Chapter 2.814.9(d).

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(sedentary desk work i.e., computer input, reconciling invoices, etc.). The assignment required
intermittent sitting, standing, and walking for three hours, intermittent lifting and pushing no more
than 10 pounds for two hours, and intermittent simple grasping and reaching for three hours.
After OWCP found that the offered position was not suitable due to the hours of work
offered, the employing establishment amended the prior job offer on June 2, 2016 to reflect the
requirement that appellant work four and one-half hours per day, six days per week. The job duties
and physical requirements remained exactly the same.
The determination of whether an employee has the physical ability to perform a position
offered by the employing establishment is primarily a medical question that must be resolved by
the medical evidence.14
The Board finds that the medical evidence of record shows that appellant could perform
the temporary limited-duty assignment offered by the employing establishment in June 2016. The
physical requirements of the offered temporary limited-duty assignment were within the medical
restrictions as provided by Dr. Brown in his October 26, 2015 and January 27, 2016 reports.15 The
Board finds that the medical restrictions provided by Dr. Brown in these reports reflected
appellant’s ability to work at the time that the employing establishment offered him the temporary
limited-duty assignment. Dr. Brown’s report, which is detailed and well rationalized, is entitled
to the weight of the evidence and establishes that appellant has the ability to perform the offered
limited-duty employment.16
The Board further finds that OWCP complied with its procedural requirements by advising
appellant on September 23, 2016 of the offered assignment in writing and by providing him a
pretermination notice, with opportunity to respond, since he was receiving wage-loss benefits on
the periodic rolls. The Board notes that no procedural requirements beyond those set forth in 20
C.F.R. § 10.500(a) need be afforded to appellant prior to reduction of his benefits.17 OWCP
properly applied the provisions of Shadrick in determining his loss of wage-earning capacity. The
offered position was for four and one-half hours per day and the employing establishment verified

14

See J.J., Docket No. 17-0885 (issued June 16, 2017); G.C., Docket No. 17-0140 (issued April 13, 2017); N.D.,
Docket No. 15-0027 (issued February 4, 2016); T.T., 58 ECAB 296 (2007).
15
Dr. Brown noted in his October 26, 2015 report that appellant could perform sedentary medium work for eight
hours per day with permanent restrictions. He could reach above the shoulder and twist up to 4 hours, operate a motor
vehicle at work for 1/2 hour, operate a motor vehicle to and from work for 1 hour, and push, pull, and lift up to 35
pounds for 4 hours. After the FCE was performed on January 19, 2016, Dr. Brown reviewed the findings in an
addendum report of January 27, 2016. He noted that appellant could perform sedentary light work. Appellant could
lift, carry, and push 10 pounds up to 1/3 of the day and balance well up to 1/3 of the day. He was unable to crouch
and work at low level or above the shoulder.
16

See supra note14.

17

G.C., supra note14.

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that it was unable to provide a job offer for more hours per day due to the severity of appellant’s
work restrictions.18
The remaining evidence of record is insufficient to contradict that appellant had the
capacity to perform the offered limited-duty position. In a May 12, 2017 deposition, Dr. Dole, an
attending physician, diagnosed cervical radiculopathy, chronic low back pain syndrome,
depression, and anxiety due to the accepted work injuries and appellant’s loss of function. He
opined that appellant was unable to return to his position at the employing establishment or
perform any other position because he had residuals of his accepted employment injuries.
However, this report is of limited probative value regarding appellant’s ability to work because
Dr. Dole did not explain how appellant’s conditions and residuals prevented his return to work in
the offered limited-duty position. The Board has held that a medical opinion not fortified by
medical rationale is of diminished probative value.19
On June 10, 2015 Dr. Wolf diagnosed cervical spondylosis with myelopathy, intervertebral
cervical disc disorders with myelopathy, and degeneration of the cervical intervertebral disc, and
recommended that appellant undergo a cervical CT myelogram to better asses his cervical
condition. However, he did not address the relevant issue of whether appellant could perform the
offered limited-duty employment for four and one-half hours, six days per week, and thus his
opinion is of limited probative value.20
Likewise, Dr. Quillin’s June 27, 2017 reports are of limited probative value. He provided
an impression of persisting depressive disorder, chronic pain syndrome, cannabis use, aberrant
urine drug testing secondary to cannabis use, somatization with anxiety, obsessive compulsive
traits, and interpersonally distressed pain adjustment classification, but failed to address
appellant’s ability to perform the duties of the offered limited-duty position.21
The evidence of record reflects that appellant declined the temporary limited-duty
assignment offered by the employing establishment, which was suitable and would have provided
earnings of $449.40 per week. Therefore, OWCP properly reduced his wage-loss compensation,
effective November 13, 2016, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 10.500(a) based on his earnings had he
accepted the temporary limited-duty assignment.
On appeal, counsel contends that Dr. Brown’s opinion cannot constitute the weight of the
medical opinion evidence as OWCP engaged in “[physician] shopping.” He notes that Dr. Brown
was the fifth second opinion physician to examine appellant. The Board notes, however, that there
is no indication of record that any of OWCP’s medical referrals were improper and that OWCP

18

Id.

19

R.P., Docket No. 14-1264 (issued March 9, 2015); F.T., Docket No. 09-0919 (issued December 7, 2009);
Elizabeth H. Kramm, 57 ECAB 117, 124 (2005); Franklin D. Haislah, 52 ECAB 457 (2001); Jimmie H. Duckett, 52
ECAB 332 (2001) (medical reports not containing rationale on causal relationship are entitled to little probative value).
20

G.C., supra note 14.

21

Id.

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has the discretion to have a claimant submit to an examination by a physician designated by OWCP
as frequently and at the times and places as may be reasonably required.22
Counsel further contends on appeal that OWCP erred in discounting Dr. Dole’s deposition
testimony regarding appellant’s disability and the medical evidence of record which established
that appellant’s medication limited his ability to drive. As discussed above, however, Dr. Dole
failed to provide medical rationale in support of his opinion that residuals of the accepted May 13,
1996 employment injuries prevented appellant from performing the duties of the offered limitedduty position.
Lastly, counsel asserts that OWCP improperly calculated appellant’s loss of wage-earning
capacity as his annual salary was $37,776.59 in 1995 and $32,632.77 for four months in 1996, and
not $28,429.10 as used by OWCP.
The Board notes that section 8101(4) of FECA defines monthly pay for purposes of
computing compensation benefits as follows: “[T]he monthly pay at the time of injury, or the
monthly pay at the time disability begins, or the monthly pay at the time compensable disability
recurs, if the recurrence begins more than six months after the injured employee resumes regular
full-time employment with the United States, whichever is greater....”23 The record documents
that, on the date of injury and the date disability began, May 13, 1996, he earned $28,429.10 per
year or $546.71 per week based on his base pay as a GS-5, Step Z. While appellant sustained an
accepted recurrence of disability on November 5, 1997, after returning to modified work on
October 7, 1997, the recurrence did not occur more than six months after he resumed regular fulltime employment. The Board finds that OWCP properly based its calculations on the $546.71 per
week pay rate and correctly applied the Shadrick formula to calculate appellant’s loss of wageearning capacity.24
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly reduced appellant’s wage-loss compensation
effective November 13, 2016 under 20 C.F.R. § 10.500(a) based on his earnings had he accepted
a temporary limited-duty assignment.

22

A.C., Docket No. 12-1114 (issued March 25, 2013); William B. Webb, 56 ECAB 156 (2004).

23

5 U.S.C. § 8101(4).

24

See N.C., Docket No. 18-0172 (issued August 7, 2018).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 25, 2017 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: February 7, 2019
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.S., Appellant
and
U.S. ARMY, CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
ST. LOUIS DISTRICT, St. Louis, MO, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 09-461
Issued: October 15, 2009

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On December 8, 2008 appellant filed a timely appeal from an October 7, 2008 decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs that modified his wage-earning capacity to zero
and terminated his medical benefits. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether the Office met its burden of proof to modify a May 13, 1988
wage-earning capacity determination; and (2) whether the Office met its burden of proof to
terminate appellant’s medical benefits. On appeal, appellant contends that his chronic radiculitis
is an aggravation of the employment injury and generally alleges that his bilateral shoulder
condition is employment related.1
1

The Board notes that appellant submitted additional medical evidence with his appeal to the Board. The
Board cannot consider this evidence as its review of the case is limited to the evidence that was before the Office at
the time it issued its final decision. 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1) (2009); see J.T., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-1898,
issued January 7, 2008).

FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 6, 1984 appellant, then a 37-year-old temporary seasonal deck hand,
sustained an employment-related cervical strain and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.2 He
stopped work on November 15, 1984, when his temporary duty ended and was terminated from
employment effective December 30, 1984. On February 7, 1985 appellant underwent a left
carpal tunnel release and was placed on the periodic rolls. On April 16, 1986 Dr. Sam E. Hunter,
Board-certified in internal medicine, advised that appellant could return to work with no
restrictions3 and on October 31, 1986, appellant had a left wrist ganglion excision. In
January 1988, appellant returned to private employment as a campus security guard and by
decision dated May 13, 1988, the Office reduced his compensation benefits based on his actual
earnings as a security guard. He continued at this job until August 14, 1990 when the college
hired contract employees. Appellant, thereafter, worked at a number of private jobs, including
carpet cleaning and at Lowe’s. By report dated December 28, 1998, Dr. S.C. Ray, a Boardcertified family practitioner, advised that appellant was under his care for an employment-related
knee injury.4 In 2001, appellant began employment as a building assistant for the city of
Jackson, Tennessee, where he was trained to operate a forklift, personnel lift, backhoe, table
saws and drills.
In May and June 2007, the employing establishment offered appellant a temporary
position as a lock and dam operator, which he refused, stating that he had multiple medical
problems including neck, arm and shoulder pain which he stated were directly related to the
employment injury. Appellant submitted an April 17, 2007 cervical spine x-ray that
demonstrated a degenerative process, and a May 7, 2007 computerized tomography (CT) scan of
the head that was within normal limits. A July 20, 2007 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan
of the cervical spine that revealed a mild disc bulge at C6-7 and blocked vertebrae at C5 and C6,
and a left shoulder MRI scan demonstrated diffuse tendinopathy with partial tear and
degenerative changes. On September 27, 2007 the Office requested additional medical
information. Appellant submitted unsigned notes stating that he was last seen on November 1,
2007 and was being treated for a left shoulder partial rotator cuff tear and left shoulder arthritis.
On January 22, 2008 the Office referred appellant to Dr. Carl W. Huff, Board-certified in
orthopedic surgery and occupational medicine. On March 13, 2008 Dr. Jason T. Hutchison, a
Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, performed left shoulder surgery and advised that appellant
could return to limited duty. By report dated June 26, 2008, he noted his review of the statement
of accepted facts including the history of injury, appellant’s past medical history and
employment history and the medical record.5 Dr. Huff reported appellant’s complaint of
2

In separate claims, appellant has an accepted right knee condition, for which he received a schedule award on
March 2, 1977 for a 27 percent impairment of the right leg, and a binaural hearing loss for which he received a
schedule award on March 2, 1977 for a 13 percent hearing loss.
3

Dr. Hunter’s credentials could not be ascertained.

4

Id.

5

The medical record consisted of reports dating from October 7, 1984 to October 31, 1986 and May 16 to
July 20, 2007.

2

generalized neck pain, radiating to his left shoulder and left hand numbness, and his report that
he fell on February 12, 2008, injuring his left shoulder, for which he had surgery on
March 13, 2008. He performed physical examination, noting mild tenderness with firm
palpation in the midline from C4-6 with minimal tenderness in the posterior cervical triangle
bilaterally. The nerve root compression test bilaterally caused neck pain. The vertex
compression test was negative and the shoulder abduction test had no effect on the pain
bilaterally. The maneuvers for thoracic outlet compression were negative bilaterally. No muscle
spasm or muscle atrophy was noted. Left shoulder and left wrist and hand examinations
demonstrated full range of motion with minimally positive shoulder impingement signs and 5/5
shoulder strength. Right wrist and hand examination was normal. X-rays of the cervical spine
demonstrated a congenital block vertebra at C5-6 with failure of segmentation and degenerative
disc disease. Electromyography (EMG) demonstrated C6-7 radiculopathy and nerve conduction
study (NCS) was normal. Dr. Huff’s impression was postoperative status carpal tunnel release
on the left without residual median neuropathy; cervical degenerative disc disease at C6-7 with
radiculopathy on the left; postoperative status of left rotator cuff repair due to a February 12,
2008 injury, unrelated to the October 6, 1984 employment injury; and hypertension and diabetes,
not work related. He opined that there was no indication of any pathological condition of either
wrist or hand except for a nonanatomical sensory loss of the left upper extremity which
suggested some degree of symptom magnification and that in the absence of positive physical or
EMG findings, there was no hint that any condition of appellant’s wrists and hands was in
anyway related to the October 6, 1984 employment injury or any work duties at the employing
establishment. Regarding the cervical spine, Dr. Huff advised that, while appellant had a
cervical strain, this had resolved, noting that x-rays of the cervical spine on October 7, 1984 were
normal except for the congenital blocked vertebra. He stated that any further condition or
complaint of pain was related to a chronic arthritic condition which was not caused, aggravated
or accelerated by the October 6, 1984 employment injury. Dr. Huff concluded that appellant had
reached maximum medical improvement with regard to the employment injury, having returned
to baseline on or about April 6, 1985 and had no employment-related diagnosed conditions.
On August 14, 2008 the Office proposed to modify appellant’s wage-earning capacity to
a zero loss and terminate his medical benefits. In an undated response, appellant asserted that he
continued to be handicapped due to the October 6, 1984 injury, stating that he did not have full
use of his arms and shoulders, was in constant pain and could no longer perform hard physical
labor. He also noted that he injured his left shoulder when he slipped and fell while working for
the city of Jackson, but did not injure his right shoulder there and that he was awarded full Social
Security Act (SSA) disability benefits. Appellant submitted a May 3, 1985 report in which
Dr. William G. Jennings, a general practitioner, noted that he was injured on October 6, 1984
and diagnosed musculoskeletal headaches and bilateral polyneuropathy of the upper extremities
and a June 26, 1985 report in which Dr. Hunter diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome and noted that
he underwent left decompression surgery on February 6, 1985. A July 20, 2007 MRI scan of the
right shoulder demonstrated two partial tears and degenerative changes. In an August 15, 2008
letter, the SSA informed appellant that he would begin receiving disability benefits in
September 2008.
By decision dated September 25, 2008, the Office modified the May 13, 1988 decision to
reflect that appellant had no loss of wage-earning capacity and finalized the termination of his
medical benefits, effective September 28, 2008.
3

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
A wage-earning capacity decision is a determination that a specific amount of earnings,
either actual earnings or earnings from a selected position, represents a claimant’s ability to earn
wages. Compensation payments are based on the wage-earning capacity determination and it
remains undisturbed until properly modified.6 The Office’s procedure manual provides that, “[i]f
a formal loss of wage-earning capacity decision has been issued, the rating should be left in place
unless the claimant requests resumption of compensation for total wage loss. In this instance the
[claims examiner] will need to evaluate the request according to the customary criteria for
modifying a formal loss of wage-earning capacity.”7 Once the wage-earning capacity of an
injured employee is determined, a modification of such determination is not warranted unless
there is a material change in the nature and extent of the injury-related condition, the employee
has been retrained or otherwise vocationally rehabilitated, or the original determination was, in
fact, erroneous.8 The burden of proof is on the party attempting to show a modification of the
wage-earning capacity determination.9
In addition, Chapter 2.814.11 of the procedure manual contains provisions regarding the
modification of a formal loss of wage-earning capacity. The relevant part provides that a formal
loss of wage-earning capacity will be modified when: (1) the original rating was in error; (2) the
claimant’s medical condition has changed; or (3) the claimant has been vocationally
rehabilitated. Office procedures further provide that the party seeking modification of a formal
loss of wage-earning capacity decision has the burden to prove that one of these criteria has been
met. If the Office is seeking modification, it must establish that the original rating was in error,
that the injury-related condition has improved or that the claimant has been vocationally
rehabilitated.10
ANALYSIS--ISSUE 1
The Office accepted that appellant sustained bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and a
cervical strain caused by an October 6, 1984 employment injury. The Board finds that it
presented sufficient medical evidence to meet its burden of proof to modify appellant’s wageearning capacity, effective September 28, 2008. In a comprehensive report dated June 26, 2008,
Dr. Huff, an Office referral physician, noted his review of the complete record and appellant’s
complaints. He provided physical examination findings, performed x-ray, EMG and NCS
studies. Dr. Huff opined that there was no indication of any pathological condition of either
wrist or hand except for a nonanatomical sensory loss of the left upper extremity, which
6

Katherine T. Kreger, 55 ECAB 633 (2004).

7

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Reemployment, Determining Wage-Earning Capacity,
Chapter 2.814.9(a) (December 1995).
8

Stanley B. Plotkin, 51 ECAB 700 (2000).

9

Id.

10

See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Reemployment:
Capacity, Chapter 2.814.11 (June 1996).

4

Determining Wage-Earning

suggested some degree of symptom magnification and that in the absence of positive physical or
EMG findings, there was no hint that appellant had a continuing condition of his wrists and
hands related to the October 6, 1984 employment injury or any work duties at the employing
establishment. Regarding the cervical spine, he advised that, while appellant had a cervical
strain, this had resolved, and that any further condition or complaint of pain was related to a
chronic arthritic condition that was not caused, aggravated or accelerated by the October 6, 1984
employment injury. Dr. Huff concluded that appellant had reached maximum medical
improvement with regard to the employment injury having returned to baseline on or about
April 6, 1985 and had no current employment-related diagnosed conditions.
The medical evidence contemporaneous with Dr. Huff’s June 26, 2008 opinion included
Dr. Hutchinson’s March 18, 2008 report in which he noted that he had performed left shoulder
surgery and advised that appellant could return to limited duty. Appellant also submitted CT and
MRI scans. These, however, did not provide an opinion regarding the cause of the diagnosed
conditions and medical evidence that does not offer any opinion regarding the cause of an
employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of causal relationship.11
Furthermore, the record does not contain an opinion by a physician that appellant’s contention
that his current degenerative disc disease and bilateral shoulder conditions were caused by the
October 6, 1984 employment injury. The medical evidence must demonstrate that the claimed
conditions were caused, precipitated, accelerated or aggravated by the accepted injury. In this
regard, the record must contain medical evidence of bridging symptoms between the current
conditions and the accepted injury with a physician’s conclusion of a causal relationship.12
Appellant began private employment in 1988 and continued until he fell at work in
January 2008, injuring his right shoulder for which he had surgery. There is no medical evidence
to suggest that either of these claimed conditions was caused by the October 6, 1984 employment
injury, and while he was determined to be disabled by the SSA, entitlement to benefits under one
act does not establish entitlement to benefits under the other. The findings of other
administrative agencies have no bearing on proceedings under the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act (FECA)13 which is administered by the Office and the Board. The question
of disability found under one statute does not prove disability under the other. Under FECA, for
a disability determination, a claimant’s injury must be shown to have arisen during the course of
federal employment due to compensable factors of federal employment. Under the SSA,
conditions which are not work related may be considered in determining disability. For this
reason, a decision of the SSA finding a claimant disabled is not binding upon the Office in the
adjudication of a claim under the FECA.14
The Board, therefore, finds that the Office properly modified the May 13, 1988 wageearning capacity decision on the grounds that appellant’s condition had changed. The June 26,
2008 report of Dr. Huff, who advised that appellant had no residuals of the October 6, 1984
11

Willie M. Miller, 53 ECAB 697 (2002).

12

See generally C.W., 60 ECAB ____ (Docket No. 07-1816, issued January 16, 2009).

13

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

14

See James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 93 (2000).

5

employment injury, shows that there was a material change in the nature and extent of his
employment-related conditions, i.e., for the better, such that he no longer had wage loss due to
his accepted conditions. Dr. Huff provided rationale for his opinion, explaining that in the
absence of positive physical findings and negative studies, appellant’s employment-related
conditions had ceased. The Office, therefore, properly reduced appellant’s wage-loss
compensation to zero effective September 28, 2008.15
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
Once the Office accepts a claim, it has the burden of proving that the disability has
ceased or lessened in order to justify termination or modification of compensation benefits.
After it has determined that an employee has disability causally related to his or her federal
employment, the Office may not terminate compensation without establishing that the disability
has ceased or that it is no longer related to the employment. The right to medical benefits for an
accepted condition is not limited to the period of entitlement for disability. To terminate
authorization for medical treatment, the Office must establish that appellant no longer has
residuals of an employment-related condition, which require further medical treatment.16
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
The Board finds that the Office met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s
authorization for medical treatment for his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and cervical strain.
As discussed above in a well-rationalized opinion, Dr. Huff advised that appellant had no current
employment-related diagnosed conditions. His opinion is sufficient to establish that appellant
has no residuals of his employment-related conditions that would require further medical
treatment.17 Thus, the Office met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s medical benefits.18
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office met its burden of proof to modify the May 13, 1988
wage-earning capacity determination and to terminate appellant’s medical benefits.

15

L.C., 60 ECAB ____ (Docket No. 08-2271, issued August 6, 2009).

16

Kathryn E. Demarsh, 56 ECAB 677 (2005).

17

E.J., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 08-1350, issued September 8, 2008).

18

Kathryn E. Demarsh, supra note 16.

6

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated October 7, 2008 be affirmed.
Issued: October 15, 2009
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.T., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, BULK MAIL
CENTER, Los Angeles, CA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 13-12
Issued: February 25, 2013

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On October 1, 2012 appellant filed a timely appeal from a September 19, 2012 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) granting a schedule award.
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the schedule award decision.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has more than a 10 percent permanent impairment of the
right upper extremity and a 5 percent permanent impairment of the left upper extremity.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 7, 2009 appellant, then a 66-year-old maintenance support clerk, filed a traumatic
injury claim alleging that on July 5, 2009 he broke both wrists when he fell on asphalt. OWCP
accepted the claim for a closed fracture of the lower end of the right forearm and a closed
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

fracture of the left distal radius. Appellant underwent bilateral wrist surgery to repair the
fractures on July 5, 2009. On September 11, 2009 he underwent surgery to excise wires from his
left wrist. Appellant stopped work on July 5, 2009 and returned to work on January 3, 2010.
On May 17, 2011 appellant underwent an authorized ulnar nerve decompression of the
right elbow with medial epicondylectomy.
In a report dated July 29, 2011, Dr. John T. Knight, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
found that appellant was permanent and stationary. On examination he found right hand atrophy
and 15 millimeters two-point discrimination of the right little finger. Dr. Knight measured full
range of motion of the hands, elbows and fingers with normal sensation except for the right little
finger. He applied the fifth edition of the American Medical Association, Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (5th ed. 2001) (A.M.A., Guides). Dr. Knight found that
appellant had an 8 percent impairment of the right upper extremity due to loss of range of motion
of the right wrist and a 4 percent right upper extremity impairment due to a sensory deficit of the
ulnar nerve, for a total right upper extremity impairment of 12 percent. He further found a five
percent impairment of the left upper extremity due to reduced motion of the left wrist.
Dr. Knight indicated that appellant had a 10 percent whole person impairment.
On October 26, 2011 Dr. Ellen Pichey, an OWCP medical adviser, reviewed Dr. Knight’s
report and applied the provisions of the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides to his clinical
findings. She identified the diagnosis as a class 1 bilateral wrist fracture using the wrist regional
grid set forth in Table 15-3 on page 396. This yielded a default value of three percent. After
determining the impairment class and default grade, the medical adviser considered whether
there were any applicable grade adjustments for functional history, physical examination and
clinical studies. She found grade modifiers of 2 for both functional history and physical
examination. Dr. Pichey noted that clinical studies were used to identify the diagnosis. Utilizing
the net adjustment formula, she moved the default position by two places to find a five percent
impairment of the upper extremities bilaterally.
Dr. Pichey next evaluated appellant’s right cubital tunnel syndrome in accordance with
Table 15-23 on page 449, relevant to determining impairments due to entrapment neuropathy.
She found a grade modifier of 3 for history and physical findings and a grade modifier of 1 for
clinical studies, for an average grade modifier of 2, and an upper extremity impairment of five
percent. Dr. Pichey noted that the functional impairment of two did not change the impairment
rating. She concluded that appellant had a 10 percent impairment of the right upper extremity
and a 5 percent impairment of the left upper extremity. Dr. Pichey found that appellant reached
maximum medical improvement on August 1, 2011.
By decision dated February 13, 2012, OWCP granted appellant a schedule award for a 10
percent permanent impairment of the right upper extremity and a 5 percent permanent
impairment of the left upper extremity. The period of the awards ran for 46.80 weeks from
August 1, 2011 to June 23, 2012.
On April 12, 2012 appellant requested reconsideration. In an accompanying statement,
he related that he had to retire because of his work injuries and also had to stop working at a
second job.

2

By decision dated September 19, 2012, OWCP denied modification of its February 13,
2012 decision.
On appeal appellant noted that OWCP did not discuss his surgeries of July 6, 2009.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
The schedule award provision of FECA,2 and its implementing federal regulations,3 set
forth the number of weeks of compensation payable to employees sustaining permanent
impairment from loss, or loss of use, of scheduled members or functions of the body. However,
FECA does not specify the manner in which the percentage of loss shall be determined. For
consistent results and to ensure equal justice under the law for all claimants, OWCP has adopted
the A.M.A., Guides as the uniform standard applicable to all claimants.4 As of May 1, 2009, the
sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides is used to calculate schedule awards.5
The sixth edition requires identifying the impairment class for the diagnosed condition
(CDX), which is then adjusted by grade modifiers based on Functional History (GMFH),
Physical Examination (GMPE) and Clinical Studies (GMCS).6 The net adjustment formula is
(GMFH-CDX) + (GMPE-CDX) + (GMCS-CDX).
ANALYSIS
OWCP accepted that appellant sustained bilateral wrist fractures and a right ulnar nerve
decompression with medial epicondylectomy. Appellant’s attending physician, Dr. Knight,
found that he was permanent and stationary on July 29, 2011. Appellant had atrophy of the right
hand with loss of sensation in the right little finger. Dr. Knight measured range of motion for
both extremities and concluded that, pursuant to the fifth edition of the A.M.A., Guides,
appellant had an eight percent impairment of the right upper extremity and a five percent
impairment of the left upper extremity due to loss of range of motion of the wrists. He further
found a 4 percent impairment of the right upper extremity due to a sensory deficit of the ulnar
nerve, for a total right upper extremity impairment of 12 percent and left upper extremity
impairment of 5 percent. Effective May 1, 2009, however, the sixth edition of the A.M.A.,
Guides is to be used to rate impairment for schedule award purposes.7 As Dr. Knight’s report

2

5 U.S.C. § 8107.

3

20 C.F.R. § 10.404.

4

Id. at § 10.404(a).

5

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Schedule Awards & Permanent Disability Claims, Chapter
2.808.6.6a (January 2010); see also Part 3 -- Medical, Schedule Awards, Chapter 3.700.2 and Exhibit 1
(January 2010).
6

A.M.A., Guides 494-531.

7

See supra note 5.

3

was not in accordance with the appropriate edition of the A.M.A., Guides, his opinion is of
diminished probative value.8
Dr. Pichey, an OWCP medical adviser, applied the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides to
Dr. Knight’s findings. The sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides provides that upper extremity
impairments be classified by diagnosis and then adjusted by grade modifiers according to the
above-noted formula. Dr. Pichey found that appellant’s diagnosis was a class 1 bilateral wrist
fracture, which yielded a default value of three percent pursuant to Table 15-3. She applied
grade modifiers 2 for functional history and physical examination. Dr. Pichey found that clinical
studies were not applicable in the net adjustment formula as they were used to identify the
diagnosis. She applied the net adjustment formula to move the default value right two places and
find a five percent impairment of the upper extremities bilaterally.9
Dr. Pichey evaluated appellant’s right cubital tunnel syndrome or ulnar nerve entrapment
of the elbow, in accordance with Table 15-23. She found a grade modifier of 3 for history and
physical findings and a grade modifier of 1 for clinical studies for an average grade modifier
of 2, which yielded an upper extremity impairment of five percent. Dr. Pichey concluded that
appellant had a 10 percent impairment of the right upper extremity and a 5 percent impairment of
the left upper extremity. Appellant has not submitted sufficient medical evidence to show a
greater impairment in accordance with the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides.
On appeal appellant argues that OWCP did not consider his prior wrist surgeries in
July 2009. OWCP’s medical adviser, however, considered the clinical findings of his attending
physician and applied the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides to these findings.
Appellant may request a schedule award or increased schedule award based on evidence
of a new exposure or medical evidence showing progression of an employment-related condition
resulting in permanent impairment or increased impairment.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has no more than a 10 percent permanent impairment of
the right upper extremity and a 5 percent permanent impairment of the left upper extremity.

8

See A.B., Docket No. 10-2124 (issued August 10, 2011).

9

GMFH-CDX (2-1=1); GMPE-CDX (2-1=1). Adding one plus one yielded a new adjustment of two.

4

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 19, 2012 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: February 25, 2013
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.E., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
London, KY, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 10-2009
Issued: June 8, 2011

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On July 27, 2010 appellant, through her attorney, filed a timely appeal from a June 22,
2010 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’ hearing representative
denying her occupational disease claim. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish that her right shoulder
condition was causally related to factors of her employment.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On September 30, 2009 appellant, then a 47-year-old rural mail carrier, filed an
occupational disease claim alleging that she sustained right shoulder impingement and a rotator

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

cuff tear as a result of repetitive motion of her arms, shoulders and hands at work.2 She first
became aware of her condition and realized it was caused by her employment on
October 8, 2008.
In an October 5, 2009 letter, the Office advised appellant that the evidence submitted was
insufficient to establish her claim and requested additional information. It asked her to describe
the employment-related activities she believed caused her condition, how often and for how long
she performed these activities, any activities she participated in outside of her federal
employment, the development of her claimed condition and any previous orthopedic injuries.
The Office also asked appellant to submit medical evidence in support of her claim.
In an October 9, 2009 statement, appellant noted that she had worked as a rural mail
carrier since January 6, 1996. Her route consisted of approximately 570 active deliveries with up
to 100 left and right hand turns. Appellant’s duties included casing mail, which required folding
newspapers and large envelopes and putting mail in the appropriate customer slot. She cased
approximately 500 to 1,000 magazines and/or large envelopes and 150 to 400 letters a day.
Appellant also retrieved parcels, letters and box holders, placed them in a buggy, which could
weigh up to several hundred pounds, and arranged them in delivery sequence before loading
them into her vehicle. On her delivery route, she sat on the right side passenger seat with a
bundle of mail on her lap, reached into the tub on her lap and into box holders behind her and
placed the mail into the appropriate mailbox. Appellant stated that she reached over her shoulder
four to five hours a day, drove with her left hand and reached with her right hand when
delivering mail. She reported having great stress and pain on her shoulders from driving her
vehicle and making the appropriate turns.
Appellant provided several CA-7 forms for leave without pay for the periods
September 27 to October 9, 2009 and October 10 to 23, 2009 with the corresponding time
analysis forms. She also provided several work status reports by an unknown provider
authorizing her to return to light duty and diagnosing thoracic outlet, carpal tunnel and cubital
tunnel syndrome. Appellant submitted various handwritten notes from an unknown provider
describing her conditions, including left shoulder rotator cuff tear and bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome.
In a September 28, 2009 medical note, Dr. Robert T. Grant, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, reported appellant’s complaint of pain and popping in her right shoulder as a result of a
workman’s compensation injury. Upon physical examination, he observed crepitus in the
subacromial space through range of motion and pain in the impingement position.
In an October 14, 2009 attending physician’s report, Dr. Grant noted that he saw
appellant for right shoulder impingement. Appellant experienced pain in the impingement
position, but x-rays showed no bony abnormalities. Dr. Grant diagnosed subacromial
2

On September 30, 2009 appellant also filed an occupational disease claims for cubital tunnel syndrome and
thoracic outlet syndrome. The Office accepted her claim (File No. xxxxxx493) for bilateral ulna nerve, bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome, so the only claim to consider on appeal is the right
shoulder impingement condition. Appellant submitted medical evidence pertaining solely to these other claims,
which will not be evaluated as part of this appeal.

2

impingement of the right shoulder and checked a box marked “yes” that her condition was
caused or aggravated by her employment activities. He explained that appellant was having pain
with mail delivery activities. Dr. Grant proscribed physical therapy from August 3 to
September 28, 2009.
In an October 29, 2009 attending physician’s report, Dr. Erdogan Atasoy, a Boardcertified surgeon, observed that appellant reported upper extremity pain with numbness and
tingling since December 2006. He diagnosed bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome and bilateral
cubital tunnel. Dr. Atasoy also checked a box marked “yes” that appellant’s conditions were
caused or aggravated by her employment activities and explained that repetitive small muscle
trauma resulted in inflammation and swelling with compression of nerves.
In a letter dated November 6, 2009, the employing establishment controverted appellant’s
claim. It included a copy of her position description and a job offer for a modified assignment as
a duty clerk, which she accepted.
In a letter dated October 14, 2009, the postmaster contended that appellant planned to file
her claim in advance. He was unaware of any work-related injuries until she completed a duty
status report after her September 28, 2009 doctor’s appointment. On November 10, 2009
appellant’s supervisor stated that, after appellant’s September 28, 2009 doctor’s appointment, she
informed him that she needed to be on limited duty. Prior to her claimed condition, he stated that
she performed her duties as a rural carrier without restrictions or complaints of pain.
On November 18, 2009 the Office received appellant’s response to the employing
establishment’s controversion letter with copies of evidence previously submitted. In a
November 30, 2009 duty status report, Dr. Atasoy stated her history of injury included thoracic
outlet syndrome, cubital tunnel and a 2006 left shoulder injury with development of upper
extremity never compression. He noted that she tested positive for Tinel’s sign, hyperabduction
and costcoclavicular compression and that her electromyogram/nerve conduction study revealed
ulnar nerve neuropathy. Dr. Atasoy checked a box marked “yes” that he believed her condition
was caused or aggravated by her employment activities, but did not provide an explanation.
In a decision dated January 15, 2010, the Office denied appellant’s claim finding that the
medical evidence was insufficient to establish that her right shoulder condition resulted from her
mail carrier employment duties.
On January 29, 2010 appellant, through her attorney, requested a telephone hearing that
was held on April 14, 2010. She reiterated that her right shoulder condition was caused by
delivering mail and repetitively raising her arm over her shoulder at work for the past 15 years.
Appellant had about 580 people on her route, which required her to deliver mail roughly 500
times a day and case mail at least two hours a day. She sat on the passenger side of her vehicle,
drove with her left arm on the steering wheel and reached to put mail into the mailboxes with her
right arm. Appellant also delivered packages about 20 to 25 times a day, which required her to
exit her vehicle and carry the package to the house. She further explained that she did not
participate in any other activities outside of her federal employment which required extensive
use of her right arm. Appellant first noticed her right shoulder symptoms in 2008 and sought

3

treatment shortly thereafter. Her representative referenced a September 28, 2009 medical report
from Dr. Grant, who found a shoulder impingement.
In a February 2, 2010 medical report, Dr. Atasoy stated that he treated appellant for
thoracic outlet compression and opined that her condition was a result of her work as a mail
carrier. He explained that her mail carrier duties produced muscle spasms that put compression
on the neurovascular structures within the thoracic outlet space.
In April 29 and May 4, 2010 letters, appellant’s supervisor again pointed out that
appellant returned to full duty and performed her rural mail carrier duties for several months. He
explained that she requested sick leave for a September 28, 2009 doctor’s appointment but did
not mention that the appointment related to a work-related injury. Appellant subsequently
accepted a modified job assignment offer with restrictions and was released to full-duty status.
By decision dated June 22, 2010, an Office hearing representative affirmed the
January 15, 2010 decision. She accepted that appellant’s duties as a rural carrier required
repetitive pulling, casing, reaching and delivering mail with her arms but found that the medical
evidence of record failed to establish causal relationship.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under the Act3 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of her claim by the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence4
including that she sustained an injury in the performance of duty and that any specific condition
or disability for work for which she claims compensation is causally related to that employment
injury.5 In an occupational disease claim, appellant’s burden requires submission of the
following: (1) a factual statement identifying employment factors alleged to have caused or
contributed to the presence or existence of the disease or condition; (2) medical evidence
establishing the presence or existence of the disease or condition for which compensation is
claimed; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the diagnosed condition is causally related to
the employment factors identified by the employee.6
Causal relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence generally required to
establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence.7 Rationalized medical
opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s rationalized opinion on
whether there is a causal relationship between the employee’s diagnosed condition and the
3

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

4

J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 58 (1968).

5

G.T., 59 ECAB 447 (2008); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143, 1145 (1989); M.M., Docket No. 08-1510 (issued
November 25, 2010).
6

R.H., 59 ECAB 382 (2008); Ernest St. Pierre, 51 ECAB 623 (2000); D.U., Docket No. 10-144 (issued July 27,
2010).
7

D.I., 59 ECAB 158 (2007); I.R., Docket No. 09-1229 (issued February 24, 2010); W.D., Docket No. 09-658
(issued October 22, 2009).

4

specified employment factors or incident.8 The opinion of the physician must be based on a
complete factual and medical background of the employee, must be one of reasonable medical
certainty and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship
between the diagnosed condition and the employment factors identified by the employee.9
An award of compensation may not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation.
Neither the fact that an employee’s condition surfaced during a period of employment nor his
belief that his condition was aggravated by his employment is sufficient to establish causal
relationship.10 The mere fact that work activities may produce symptoms revelatory of an
underlying condition does not raise an inference of an employment relation. Such a relationship
must be shown by rationalized medical evidence of a causal relation based upon a specific and
accurate history of employment conditions which are alleged to have caused or exacerbated a
disabling condition.11
ANALYSIS
The Office accepted that appellant’s duties as a rural mail carrier involved casing mail,
reaching over her shoulder and reaching with her right arm to deliver mail. The Board finds that
she failed to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish that her right shoulder condition was
causally related to her employment activities.
In a September 28, 2009 report, Dr. Grant noted appellant’s complaints of pain and
popping in her right shoulder due to a workman’s compensation injury. He observed that her
right shoulder showed crepitus in the subacromial space and pain in the impingement position.
In an October 14, 2009 physician’s report, Dr. Grant diagnosed appellant with right shoulder
subacromial impingement and checked a box marked “yes” that her condition was caused by her
employment activities. He stated that she experienced pain with her mail delivery activities.
The Board notes that Dr. Grant’s reports are not based upon a full and accurate medical history
or description of the duties appellant performed as a rural mail carrier. The medical evidence of
record indicates that appellant had prior history of shoulder complaints in 2008 of unknown
origin. Dr. Grant did not indicate an awareness of this prior history. He failed to describe any
specific work duties or explain how the accepted employment factors would cause or aggravate
appellant’s shoulder condition. Rationalized medical opinion evidence must relate specific
employment factors identified by the claimant to the claimant’s condition, with stated reasons by
a physician.12 Dr. Grant only generally referenced mail delivery activities, but he did not discuss

8

I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989).

9

B.B., 59 ECAB 234 (2007); D.S., Docket No. 09-860 (issued November 2, 2009).

10

See Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238, 241 (2005); Ruby I. Fish, 46 ECAB 276, 279 (1994).

11

Patricia Bolleter, 40 ECAB 373 (1988).

12

Solomon Polen, 51 ECAB 341 (2000); J.J., Docket No. 09-27 (issued February 10, 2009).

5

appellant’s specific duties, such as folding, pulling and reaching mail over her shoulder, nor
explain how these specific activities caused or aggravated her right shoulder impingement.13
On October 29, 2009 Dr. Atasoy diagnosed thoracic outlet compression syndrome and
opined that appellant’s work as a mail carrier caused muscle spasms with compression on the
neurovascular structures within the thoracic outlet space. His report is of limited probative value
as he failed to relate a complete history of appellant’s right shoulder condition, or an
understanding of the specific details of her job duties. Therefore, Dr. Atasoy’s report does not
actually provide a probative medical opinion explaining how specific work duties caused the
diagnosed right shoulder condition.
Appellant, therefore, failed to submit sufficient medical evidence which explained, with
medical rationale, how her accepted employment factors caused her right shoulder condition.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish that her right
shoulder impingement was causally related to her employment.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 22, 2010 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Program is affirmed.
Issued: June 8, 2011
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
13

C.B., Docket No. 09-2027 (issued May 12, 2010); A.C., Docket No. 08-1453 (issued November 18, 2008).

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.S., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Griffith, IN, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 19-1809
Issued: July 29, 2020

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Deputy Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 27, 2019 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a March 12,
2019 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.3

1
In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

3
The Board notes that, following the March 12, 2019 decision, OWCP received additional evidence. However, the
Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record that
was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the Board
for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this additional
evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.

ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a right knee
condition causally related to the accepted July 17, 2018 employment incident.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 25, 2018 appellant, then a 29-year-old city carrier, filed a traumatic injury claim
(Form CA-1) alleging that on July 17, 2018 she experienced limited mobility and inflammation in
the tendon of the right knee as a consequence of descending stairs and planting her right foot on
the ground while in the performance of duty. She stopped work on July 17, 2018.
In a supplemental statement dated July 23, 2018, appellant described the incident of
July 17, 2018. She noted that, on that date, as she was delivering mail on her route, she descended
some steps and after planting her right foot on the ground she felt a sharp pain in her right knee.
Appellant attempted to continue her route, but eventually drove back to the employing
establishment in order to inform management of her injury.
By letter dated July 23, 2018, Dr. Ninos M. Oda, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
confirmed that appellant had been seen on July 18, 2018 for a right knee injury that occurred on
July 17, 2018. He indicated that she was incapacitated from work until a follow-up appointment
on August 29, 2018.
On July 24, 2018 an employing establishment official executed an authorization for
examination and/or treatment (Form CA-16) authorizing appellant to obtain treatment at a local
orthopedic clinic for the claimed July 17, 2018 employment injury.
In a report dated July 30, 2018, Dr. Oda noted that appellant was seen on July 18, 2019 and
indicated that she had sustained a work-related injury the previous day. He explained that she had
previously been treated for right knee quadriceps tendinitis secondary to prolonged walking and
that he had released her to return to work on June 13, 2018. On physical examination, Dr. Oda
noted moderate knee swelling associated with moderate effusion, range of motion from full
extension to 90 degrees of flexion, and tenderness to palpation over the quadriceps tendon. He
diagnosed right quadriceps tendinitis and opined that this condition occurred “directly as a result
of prolonged standing and walking at work.” Dr. Oda recommended that appellant not return to
work until her symptoms resolved.
In an occupational health status form report dated July 30, 2018, Dr. Oda noted an injury
to the right knee, which was unchanged in severity and that appellant was not working.
In a development letter dated August 15, 2018, OWCP informed appellant of the
deficiencies of her claim and advised her of the type of factual and medical evidence necessary to
establish her claim. It requested that she clarify whether she was filing a claim for traumatic injury
or a claim for occupational disease. OWCP also provided a questionnaire for appellant’s
completion. It afforded her 30 days to submit the requested evidence.
In an attending physician’s report (Form CA-20) dated August 22, 2018, Dr. Oda
diagnosed right knee tendinitis and quadriceps tendinitis. He noted a history of right knee pain
and quadriceps tendinitis. Dr. Oda reported that appellant had returned to work at eight hours per
2

day and had experienced a recurrence of symptoms, including right knee swelling and pain when
bending the knee. He checked a box marked “yes” indicating his belief that the diagnosed
conditions were caused or aggravated by an employment activity, listing “prolong[ed] standing
[and] walking” as an explanation. Dr. Oda advised that appellant continued to be totally disabled
from work, which commenced on July 30, 2018.
In a report dated August 29, 2018, Dr. Oda noted that appellant had presented on July 30,
2018 complaining of right knee pain. He also noted that she had initially been assessed on
March 3, 2018 for similar symptoms that resolved with activity modification and physical therapy.
However, appellant’s symptoms had recurred when she returned to work. Dr. Oda indicated her
physical examination findings and reported that an x-ray performed on July 18, 2018 demonstrated
no evidence of fracture or arthritis, while a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan performed on
March 9, 2018 demonstrated extensor mechanism tendinopathy. He opined that appellant’s
symptoms were a result of prolonged walking at work. In an accompanying occupational health
status report of the same date, Dr. Oda noted that she had sustained a right knee injury on July 17,
2018 and advised that she could work with restrictions.
On September 12, 2018 the employing establishment controverted appellant’s claim. It
noted that she had submitted a claim for occupational disease (Form CA-2) on March 31, 2018
which OWCP had denied. The employing establishment contended that appellant’s injury under
the current claim was the same injury that had been denied previously.
In a duty status report (Form CA-17) dated September 6, 2018, Dr. Oda diagnosed
quadriceps tendinitis and advised that appellant could return to work on August 29, 2018 with
restrictions of no standing, walking, climbing, kneeling, bending/stooping, twisting, or
pulling/pushing.
By decision dated September 20, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for traumatic
injury finding that she had not established causal relationship between the accepted July 17, 2018
employment incident and her diagnosed right knee conditions.
OWCP received progress notes from a physical therapist dated August 29 through
September 26, 2018.
Dr. Oda continued to recommend the same work restrictions he had provided on
September 6, 2018 in Form CA-17 reports dated October 5 and 17, November 8, and
December 20, 2018.
In an October 5, 2018 progress report, Dr. Oda noted that appellant was seen for follow up
regarding her right knee pain. He indicated that she had sustained a work-related injury several
months prior related to overuse, as she was required to stand and walk during 12-hour shifts,
resulting in right knee quadriceps tendon inflammation. Dr. Oda noted that an initial MRI scan
had demonstrated evidence of tendinitis, which had recurred as soon as appellant returned to work.
On physical examination, he observed tenderness to palpation over the quadriceps tendon with
pain associated with flexion. In an occupational health status report of the same date, Dr. Oda
diagnosed right knee quadriceps tendinitis related to a right knee injury on July 17, 2018 and
recommended that appellant not return to work. He referred her to Dr. Nikhil Pandhi, an
orthopedic surgeon.

3

On October 19, 2018 Dr. Pandhi noted that appellant was seen for complaints of right knee
pain, which began around February 20, 2018 after she had worked 15 12-hour shifts consecutively,
with no specific inciting injury. Appellant returned to work by the end of June 2018, and began
to experience knee pain and instability about a week to a week and a half later. Dr. Pandhi noted
her physical examination findings and diagnosed acute right knee pain. In an occupational health
status report of the same date, he diagnosed right knee pain related to a right knee injury on July 17,
2018 and recommended another MRI scan.
On November 8, 2018 Dr. Pandhi noted that a right knee MRI scan demonstrated no
evidence of quadriceps tear or tendon contracture. On physical examination, he observed reduced
right knee range of motion. In an occupational health status form report of the same date,
Dr. Pandhi diagnosed right quadriceps tendinitis related to a right knee injury of July 17, 2018 and
recommended that appellant not return to work.
In a report dated December 20, 2018, Dr. Pandhi diagnosed right quadriceps tendinosis and
right knee synovitis. He recommended that appellant return to work in a sedentary position. In an
occupational health status report of the same date, Dr. Pandhi diagnosed right quadriceps tendinitis
and right knee pain related to a right knee injury on July 17, 2018. He noted that appellant’s right
knee condition was improving.
On February 8, 2019 appellant requested reconsideration of OWCP’s September 20, 2018
decision and submitted additional medical evidence.
In a report dated July 18, 2018, Dr. Oda indicated that appellant had returned to work the
week before after being seen a few months prior for “right knee quadriceps tendon tendinitis.” He
noted that her current symptoms included swelling of the right knee and pain when bending the
knee. On physical examination, Dr. Oda observed moderate knee swelling and effusion with
reduced flexion and tenderness to palpation. He opined that appellant’s right quadriceps tendinitis
was directly related to her prolonged standing and walking at work.
In a letter dated December 3, 2018, Dr. Oda indicated that appellant had sustained right
quadriceps tendon inflammation due to factors of her federal employment, including standing and
sorting mail, and carrying the mail over uneven surfaces. He noted that her initial MRI scan
demonstrated evidence of tendinitis. After a period of rest, appellant returned to work and the
tendinitis returned. An October 31, 2018 MRI scan demonstrated no damage to the tendons of
meniscus. Appellant walked with a constant limp and had difficulty bending her knee. Dr. Oda
opined that the duties of her employment, including lifting and carrying 35 pounds continuously
and 70 pounds intermittently and walking up to eight hours per day on uneven surfaces, were the
primary cause of her right knee tendinitis. He explained that “the mechanism of [appellant’s]
injury is the additional stress placed on her knee joint by loading 35 pounds in her satchel and
walking on uneven surfaces.”
An October 31, 2018 MRI scan of the right knee demonstrated an intact and normal
quadriceps tendon and a diminutive appearance of the medial meniscus anterior horn.
Appellant submitted Form CA-17 reports by Dr. Oda reiterating his restrictions dated
February 20, 2019, and an occupational health status report containing an illegible signature, dated
February 26, 2019.

4

By decision dated March 12, 2019, OWCP denied modification of the decision dated
September 20, 2018.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable
time limitation period of FECA,4 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged,
and that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related
to the employment injury.5 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim,
regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.6
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty, it must first be determined whether fact of injury has been established. A
fact of injury determination is based on two elements. First, the employee must submit sufficient
evidence to establish that he or she actually experienced the employment incident at the time,
place, and in the manner alleged. Second, the employee must submit sufficient evidence to
establish that the employment incident caused a personal injury. An employee may establish that
the employment incident occurred as alleged, but fail to show that his or her condition relates to
the employment incident.7
To establish causal relationship between the condition, as well as any attendant disability
claimed and the employment event or incident, the employee must submit rationalized medical
opinion evidence sufficient to establish such causal relationship.8 The opinion of the physician
must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the employee, must be one of
reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of
the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified
by the employee.9
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision.

4

S.B., Docket No. 17-1779 (issued February 7, 2018); J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB
153 (1989).
5

J.M., Docket No. 17-0284 (issued February 7, 2018); R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40
ECAB 312 (1988).
6

N.C., Docket No. 19-1191 (issued December 19, 2019); K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016);
L.M., Docket No. 13-1402 (issued February 7, 2014); Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).
7
See B.B., Docket No. 19-1541 (issued March 2, 2020); Shirley A. Temple, 48 ECAB 404, 407 (1997); John J.
Carlone 41 ECAB 354, 356-57 (1989).
8

S.A., Docket No. 19-1765 (issued March 13, 2020); T.H., 59 ECAB 388 (2008).

9

D.J., Docket No. 19-0130 (issued January 29, 2020).

5

The Board notes that appellant claimed a traumatic injury by filing a Form CA-1. The
medical evidence of record, however, provided support for an occupational disease due to factors
of standing and walking with a satchel.10 OWCP adjudicated appellant’s claim as a traumatic
injury having occurred within a single workday or shift, and informed her that she could file a new
claim for occupational disease. Under the circumstances of the case, however, the Board finds
that she is alleging an occupational disease resulting from her work environment over a period
longer than a single workday or shift.11
In support of her claim, appellant submitted a number of reports from her treating
physician, Dr. Oda. Dr. Oda noted a history that she had been evaluated during March 2018 for
right knee tendinitis, and that she had returned to work in the week prior to July 18, 2018.12 In
reports dated July 18 and 30, August 22 and 29, and October 5, 2018, he opined that appellant’s
right quadriceps tendinitis was directly related to carrying mail and prolonged standing and
walking at work. Dr. Oda further explained the cause of her right knee condition in his
December 3, 2018 report by relating that the mechanism of injury was the additional stress placed
on her knee joint by loading 35 pounds in her satchel and walking on uneven surfaces.
The Board finds that the reports from Dr. Oda are sufficient to require further development
of the medical evidence, for a claim of occupational disease. Dr. Oda provided a comprehensive
understanding of the medical record and case history. His reports provide a pathophysiological
explanation as to how appellant’s standing and walking carrying a 35-pound satchel over a period
of time resulted in her diagnosed right knee condition. The Board has long held that it is
unnecessary that the evidence of record in a case be so conclusive as to suggest causal connection
beyond all possible doubt. Rather, the evidence required is only that necessary to convince the
adjudicator that the conclusion drawn is rational, sound, and logical.13 Accordingly, the Board
finds that Dr. Oda’s medical opinion is well rationalized and logical and is therefore sufficient to
require further development of appellant’s claim.14
It is well established that, proceedings under FECA are not adversarial in nature and, while
appellant has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to compensation, OWCP shares

10

A traumatic injury is defined as a condition of the body caused by a specific event or incident, or series of events
or incidents, within a single workday or shift. 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(ee). An occupational disease is defined as a condition
produced by the work environment over a period longer than a single workday or shift. 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(q).
11

A.J., Docket No. 18-0727 (issued February 21, 2019); J.F., Docket No. 13-1082 (issued September 18, 2013).

12

On return of the case record, OWCP shall combine this case with appellant’s occupational disease claim in OWCP
File No. xxxxxx588.
13

W.M., Docket No. 17-1244 (issued November 7, 2017); E.M., Docket No. 11-1106 (issued December 28, 2011);
Kenneth J. Deerman, 34 ECAB 641, 645 (1983) and cases cited therein.
14

J.H., Docket No. 18-1637 (issued January 29, 2020); D.S., Docket No. 17-1359 (issued May 3, 2019); X.V.,
Docket No. 18-1360 (issued April 12, 2019); C.M., Docket No. 17-1977 (issued January 29, 2019); William J.
Cantrell, 34 ECAB 1223 (1983).

6

responsibility in the development of the evidence.15 OWCP has an obligation to see that justice is
done.16
On remand OWCP shall refer appellant to an appropriate specialist, along with the case
record and a statement of accepted facts. Its referral physician shall provide a well-rationalized
opinion as to whether her diagnosed right knee condition is causally related to or aggravated by
the accepted employment factors. After such further development of the case record as OWCP
deems necessary, it shall issue a de novo decision.17
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

15
See id. See also A.P., Docket No. 17-0813 (issued January 3, 2018); Jimmy A. Hammons, 51 ECAB 219,
223 (1999).
16

See B.C., Docket No. 15-1853 (issued January 19, 2016); E.J., Docket No. 09-1481 (issued February 19, 2010);
John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989).
17

The Board notes that the case record contains an authorization for examination and/or treatment (Form CA-16)
dated July 24, 2018. A properly completed Form CA-16 form authorization may constitute a contract for payment of
medical expenses to a medical facility or physician, when properly executed. The form creates a contractual
obligation, which does not involve the employee directly, to pay for the cost of the examination or treatment regardless
of the action taken on the claim. The period for which treatment is authorized by a Form CA-16 is limited to 60 days
from the date of issuance, unless terminated earlier by OWCP. 20 C.F.R. § 10.300(c); P.R., Docket No. 18-0737
(issued November 2, 2018); N.M., Docket No. 17-1655 (issued January 24, 2018); Tracy P. Spillane, 54 ECAB
608 (2003).

7

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 12, 2019 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and this case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this decision of the Board.
Issued: July 29, 2020
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8