United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
Z.H., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD
SAFETY INSPECTION SERVICE, Hope, AR,
Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 09-2121
Issued: July 2, 2010

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 18, 2009 appellant filed a timely appeal from a June 1, 2009 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3,
the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether the Office properly terminated compensation for wage-loss and
medical benefits effective June 6, 2009.
On appeal appellant asserts that the opinions of the physician who provided a second
opinion evaluation for the Office and her attending physician are deficient. She contends that
she remains disabled from the employment-related condition.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 12, 1989 appellant, then a 28-year-old food inspector, filed a Form CA-2,
occupational disease claim, alleging that her job duties caused left carpal tunnel syndrome. She

stopped work on July 10, 1989 and on August 18, 1989 underwent a left carpal tunnel release.
On November 1, 1989 the Office accepted the claim for left carpal tunnel syndrome. Appellant
was placed on the periodic compensation rolls. She was referred for vocational rehabilitation
and received training as a licensed vocational nurse and college courses in education but dropped
out of both programs. By decision dated August 18, 1994, the Office reduced appellant’s
compensation benefits based on her capacity to earn wages as a cashier II. Appellant continued
to receive monetary compensation based on her loss of wage-earning capacity.
Appellant was treated by Dr. Steven Rowlan, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who
submitted reports from August 23, 1995. Dr. Rowlan found a negative examination and advised
that appellant was capable of most work activities. On September 16, 2007 he noted a history of
stroke in 2001 with residual left-sided weakness and a conversion reaction with paralysis,
gastrointestinal problems, and complaints of neck pain, cramping left arm pain and numbness
and shoulder tightness. Dr. Rowlan advised that appellant could perform sedentary work.1 In an
October 1, 2007 report, Dr. Joseph R. Xavier, a Board-certified physiatrist, noted a history that
appellant had a back injury in January 2007 when an elderly gentleman she was caring for fell on
her. He advised that left upper extremity examination showed no obvious atrophy or skin
changes and advised that she had good grip and muscle strength. Dr. Xavier performed an
electromyography (EMG) study of the left upper extremity that was normal with no evidence of
left carpal tunnel syndrome or cervical radiculopathy. In a January 27, 2009 report, Dr. Rowlan
reviewed Dr. Xavier’s findings and noted that appellant had chronic pain complaints involving
both upper extremities; however, he saw nothing that required further treatment.
In February 2009, the Office referred appellant to Dr. Robert Holladay, IV, a Boardcertified orthopedic surgeon, for a second opinion evaluation. In a March 5, 2009 report,
Dr. Holladay reviewed the statement of accepted facts and medical record.2 He provided
findings on physical examination of the cervical spine and upper extremities, noting full
extension of all digits bilaterally, motor strengths of 5/5 in all muscle groups of both upper
extremities and intact sensory function in all dermatomes of both upper extremities except for
decreased sensation on the left index and left middle finger. Tinel’s and Phalen’s signs were
negative. Dr. Holladay diagnosed a history of left carpal tunnel syndrome, postoperative left
carpal tunnel release and advised that the condition was not active or disabling. Based on his
examination, appellant was physically capable of returning to her date-of-injury job and did not
require active treatment for the accepted condition. In an April 6, 2009 report, Dr. Rowlan
advised that he agreed with Dr. Holladay’s conclusions.
On April 15, 2009 the Office proposed to terminate appellant’s compensation benefits on
the grounds that the weight of medical evidence from Dr. Holladay and Dr. Rowlan established
that she was no longer disabled due to the accepted condition and therefore the wage-earning

1

A February 19, 2007 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the left shoulder demonstrated a torn rotator
cuff. An April 11, 2007 MRI scan of the cervical spine demonstrated degenerative disc disease. A functional
capacity evaluation was done on November 14, 2006.
2

The statement of accepted facts included a description of appellant’s regular job duties.

2

capacity determination should be modified. Appellant was given 30 days to present additional
evidence or argument but did not timely respond.3
In a June 1, 2009 decision, the Office finalized the termination of appellant’s monetary
and medical benefits effective June 6, 2009, modifying the wage-earning capacity determination
to find she was no longer disabled.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Once the Office accepts a claim, it has the burden of proving that the disability has
ceased or lessened in order to justify termination or modification of compensation benefits.
After it has determined that an employee has disability causally related to his or her federal
employment, the Office may not terminate compensation without establishing that the disability
has ceased or that it is no longer related to the employment. Furthermore, the right to medical
benefits for an accepted condition is not limited to the period of entitlement for disability. To
terminate authorization for medical treatment, the Office must establish that appellant no longer
has residuals of an employment-related condition, which require further medical treatment.4
Appellant’s claim was accepted for left carpal tunnel syndrome for which she underwent
surgery on August 18, 1989.
ANALYSIS
In 1994 appellant was found to have the wage-earning capacity of a cashier II. The
Board has held that once the wage-earning capacity of an injured employee is determined, a
modification of such determination is not warranted unless there is a material change in the
nature and extent of the injury-related condition, the employee has been retrained or otherwise
vocationally rehabilitated, or the original determination was, in fact, erroneous.5 The burden of
proof is on the party attempting to show a modification of the wage-earning capacity
determination.6 In certain situations, however, if the medical evidence is sufficient to meet the
Office’s burden of proof to terminate benefits, the same evidence may also negate a loss of
wage-earning capacity such that a separate evaluation of the existing wage-earning capacity
determination is unnecessary.7 The Office’s burden to demonstrate no further disability is
effectively the same, irrespective of whether there is an existing determination in place finding
loss of earning capacity. While a claimant may still have unrelated medical conditions or
3

In a letter dated May 19, 2009, received by the Office on June 9, 2009, appellant objected to the proposed
termination and submitted additional evidence.
4

Fred Simpson, 53 ECAB 768 (2002).

5

Stanley B. Plotkin, 51 ECAB 700 (2000).

6

Id.

7

A.P., 60 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 08-1822, issued August 5, 2009). There may exist a situation where a separate
analysis would be necessary, based on preexisting conditions or other medical conditions, but that situation does not
present itself in this case. Should those particular facts arise, this decision does not preclude a further consideration
of the matter. Id.

3

impairments, as in this case, the medical evidence must establish that the employment-related
disability and medical conditions no longer exist.
The Board finds that the Office properly terminated appellant’s compensation benefits
effective June 6, 2009. In a March 5, 2009 report, Dr. Holladay, an Office referral physician,
reviewed the statement of accepted facts and medical records and provided findings on physical
examination. He described examination of appellant’s cervical spine and left upper extremity,
noting negative Tinel’s and Phalen’s signs, and normal strength and sensory examinations.
Dr. Holladay diagnosed resolved left carpal tunnel syndrome, postsurgical release and found that
the accepted condition was not active or disabling. He advised that appellant was physically
capable of returning to her date-of-injury job and did not require any ongoing medical treatment
for left carpal tunnel syndrome.
The weight of the medical evidence is determined by its reliability, its probative value, its
convincing quality, the care of analysis manifested and the medical rationale expressed in
support of the physician’s opinion.8 Dr. Holladay provided a comprehensive evaluation based on
his review of the statement of accepted facts and medical record and advised that appellant had
no objective findings of left carpal tunnel syndrome on her physical examination, and concluded
that there was no need for further treatment referable to the accepted condition. Moreover,
Dr. Rowlan, the attending physician, reviewed Dr. Holladay’s report and agreed with his
conclusions. The weight of the medical evidence establishes that appellant has no residuals of
the accepted left carpal tunnel syndrome.
Appellant’s disagreement with the probative value of the medical evidence fails to
establish any error or deficiency in her examinations. Dr. Holladay provided a thorough report
and, contrary to appellant’s assertion, did not provide any history that she underwent a liver
transplant. Dr. Rowlan who had treated appellant since 1995 agreed with the assessment of
Dr. Holladay. The Board finds that the Office properly terminated her compensation benefits.9
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s
compensation effective June 6, 2009.

8

C.B., 60 ECAB ____ (Docket No. 08-1583, issued December 9, 2008).

9

The Board notes that appellant submitted evidence subsequent to the Office’s June 1, 2009 decision and with her
appeal to the Board. The Board cannot consider this evidence as its review of the case is limited to the evidence of
record that was before the Office at the time of its final decision. 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c); Sandra D. Pruitt, 57 ECAB
126 (2005).

4

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 1, 2009 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs be affirmed.
Issued: July 2, 2010
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
S.M., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, Lihue, HI, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 14-107
Issued: March 27, 2014

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On October 21, 2013 appellant filed a timely appeal of the October 2, 2013 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merit decision of the case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an occupational
disease in the performance of duty.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On August 12, 2013 appellant then a 38-year-old transportation security officer filed a
Form CA-2, occupational disease claim alleging that she developed heat stroke while working at
1

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

a checkpoint while in the performance of duty. She became aware of her condition and realized
it was causally related to her employment on July 30, 2013. Appellant did not stop work.
On August 19, 2013 OWCP advised appellant of the type of evidence needed to establish
her claim. It particularly requested that she submit a physician’s reasoned opinion addressing the
relationship of her claimed condition and specific work factors.
The employing establishment submitted an August 7, 2013 incident report from
Crystal M. DeRego, supervisory transportation security officer, who noted that on August 7,
2013 appellant reported that she felt ill and was hot and had a headache. Ms. DeRego noted
appellant reported feeling ill one week prior with the same symptoms, refused medical attention
but rested in the break room for two hours. Appellant refused to go home because she did not
have enough leave and indicated that she would file a claim for compensation. Ms. DeRego
noted that appellant reported to the break room and then was taken to the hospital for treatment.
In a letter of contravention dated August 30, 2013, the employing establishment asserted that
appellant had not established her claim.
In a statement dated September 6, 2013, appellant indicated that on July 30, 2013 it was
extremely hot and humid as a tropical storm had passed through the area. She noted working in
the airport main checkpoint and noticed the temperature was 86.1. Appellant noted that she was
scheduled to be an x-ray operator in a lane that was close to a wall without air circulation. She
advised that by 1:55 p.m. she was overheated and developed heat stroke and her heart started to
race, she began to pant, she became nauseous, weak and dizzy and requested to sit in the break
room. Appellant reported the symptoms of weakness, dizziness, fatigue, headaches, nausea
lasted for three weeks.
Appellant submitted a Hawaii emergency medical services (EMS) report prepared by an
unidentifiable health care provider on August 1, 2013 which noted her complaints of a frontal
headache for two days. She reported not feeling well with symptoms of fever and chills.
Appellant was diagnosed with frontal headache, possible migraine versus rebound headaches and
anxiety.
Appellant was treated by Dr. Erik J. Schumacher, Board-certified in emergency
medicine, on August 1, 2013, for a headache present for two days which developed at work. She
reported resting and within a couple of hours the headache resolved. Appellant returned to work
and stated that the headache and nausea returned and attributed the symptoms to an extremely
hot day. Dr. Schumacher noted normal examination findings. He diagnosed acute headache and
discharged appellant from his care in satisfactory condition. Appellant was provided discharge
instructions for headaches.
Appellant was treated by Dr. Spencer Smith, Board-certified in emergency medicine, on
August 7, 2013, for headache, dizziness and nausea. She reported that she “overdid it” at work
last week and was treated in the emergency room for heat stroke. Appellant indicated that she
was discharged from the emergency room in stable condition and attempted to return to work but
continued to feel dizzy, nauseated with a persistent headache. Dr. Smith noted normal
examination findings. He diagnosed headache, dizziness and nausea and discharged appellant.
Dr. Smith noted that she was given valium for the dizziness but she continued to have lingering
2

symptoms. He noted that appellant requested a lengthy release from work to rest. Dr. Smith
provided her with discharge instructions for self-care for headaches. In a medical excuse form
dated August 7, 2013, he treated appellant for an illness and diagnosed “medical” and stated that
she could not work from August 8 to 17, 2013. Appellant submitted laboratory reports dated
August 7, 2013 and discharge instructions for self-care for headaches.
In an October 2, 2013 decision, OWCP denied the claim on the grounds that the medical
evidence was insufficient to establish that appellant’s claimed conditions were casually related to
work events.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim. When an employee claims that he or she sustained an
injury in the performance of duty, he or she must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he
or she experienced a specific event, incident or exposure occurring at the time, place and in the
manner alleged. Appellant must also establish that such event, incident or exposure caused an
injury.2
To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational
disease claim, a claimant must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing the
presence or existence of the disease or condition for which compensation is claimed; (2) factual
statement identifying employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence
or occurrence of the disease or condition; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the
employment factors identified by the claimant were the proximate cause of the condition for
which compensation is claimed or, stated differently, medical evidence establishing that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the employment factors identified by claimant. The
medical evidence required to establish causal relationship is generally rationalized medical
opinion evidence. Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a
physician’s rationalized opinion on the issue of whether there is a causal relationship between the
claimant’s diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors. The opinion of the
physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must be
one of reasonable medical certainty and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the
nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors
identified by the claimant.3
ANALYSIS
It is not disputed that appellant’s duties as transportation security officer included
prolonged standing and being exposed to temperatures of approximately 85 degrees while
performing her duties. It is also not disputed that she has been diagnosed with acute headache,
dizziness and nausea. However, appellant has not submitted sufficient medical evidence to
2

See Walter D. Morehead, 31 ECAB 188, 194 (1979) (occupational disease or illness); Max Haber, 19 ECAB
243, 247 (1967) (traumatic injury). See generally John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989); Elaine Pendleton, 40
ECAB 1143 (1989).
3

Solomon Polen, 51 ECAB 341 (2000).

3

establish that any of these conditions are causally related to specific employment factors or
conditions.
Appellant submitted an August 1, 2013 report from Dr. Schumacher who, had treated her
for a headache two days prior at work. She reported her headache resolved after rest but, upon
returning to work, the headache and nausea returned. Appellant attributed her symptoms to an
extremely hot day. Dr. Schumacher noted normal findings on examination and diagnosed acute
headache and discharged her from his care in satisfactory condition. He appears to be repeating
the history of injury as reported by appellant without providing own opinion regarding whether
her condition was work related. To the extent that Dr. Schumacher is providing his own opinion,
he did not provide a rationalized opinion regarding the causal relationship between her
headaches, dizziness and nausea and the factors of employment believed to have caused or
contributed to such condition.4 Therefore, this report is insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of
proof.
In an August 7, 2013 report, Dr. Smith treated appellant for headache, dizziness and
nausea. Appellant reported that she overdid it at work and was treated in the emergency room
for heat stroke. She indicated that she was discharged from the emergency room in stable
condition and attempted to return to work but continued to feel dizzy, nauseated with a persistent
headache. Dr. Smith noted an essentially normal examination and diagnosed headache, dizziness
and nausea and discharged appellant. As noted above, he appears to be repeating the history of
injury as reported by her without providing his own opinion regarding whether her condition was
work related. Even if this could be construed as an opinion supporting causal relationship,
Dr. Smith did not provide medical rationale explaining that particular work factors caused or
aggravated appellant’s headaches, dizziness and nausea.5 Therefore, this report is insufficient to
meet appellant’s burden of proof. Also submitted was an August 7, 2013 medical excuse form
from Dr. Smith who treated her for an illness and diagnosed “medical” and stated that appellant
could not work from August 8 to 17, 2013. However, this note is of limited probative value as it
does not address whether employment factors caused appellant’s disability. Therefore this note
in insufficient to meet her burden of proof.
Other medical evidence submitted by appellant including laboratory reports and
discharge instructions for a headache are also insufficient as such evidence does not provide a
physician’s opinion on the causal relationship between her job and her diagnosed headaches,
dizziness and nausea. Consequently, the medical evidence is not sufficient to meet her burden of
proof.
Appellant also submitted an August 1, 2013 Hawaii EMS report prepared by an
unidentifiable health care provider which noted her complaints of a frontal headache and
diagnosed frontal headache, possible migraine versus rebound headaches and anxiety. However,
this is of no probative medical weight as there is no evidence that this document is from a
physician. The Board has held that a medical report may not be considered as probative medical
4

Jimmie H. Duckett, 52 ECAB 332 (2001); Franklin D. Haislah, 52 ECAB 457 (2001) (medical reports not
containing rationale on causal relationship are entitled to little probative value).
5

See supra note 5.

4

evidence if there is no indication that the person completing the report qualifies as a physician as
defined in 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2).6
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish that her
claimed conditions were causally related to her employment.7
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the October 2, 2013 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: March 27, 2014
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6

C.B., Docket No. 09-2027 (issued May 12, 2010).

7

With her request for an appeal, appellant submitted additional evidence. However, the Board may not consider
new evidence on appeal; see 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c).

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.T., widow of J.T., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, Belcourt, ND, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 21-0153
Issued: July 21, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER REVERSING CASE
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

On November 9, 2020 appellant, the employee’s widow, filed a timely appeal from a
July 10, 2020 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The
Clerk of the Appellate Boards docketed the appeal as No. 21-0153.
In a January 4, 2010 memorandum of telephone call (Form CA-110), the employee
informed OWCP that he did not know if he was in the Federal Employees Retirement System
(FERS) or the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS).
In a January 27, 2010 election of benefits form, the employee elected to receive Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) benefits in preference to any benefits to which he may
have been entitled to under CSRS or FERS.
In a letter dated February 19, 2010, the Office of Personnel Management informed OWCP
that the employee elected to receive FECA benefits in lieu of Civil Service benefits effective
December 4, 2009.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

On March 9, 2020 OWCP issued a preliminary determination finding that an overpayment
of compensation in the amount of $15,899.82 had been created.2 It explained that the overpayment
occurred because the employee’s Social Security Administration (SSA) age-related retirement
benefits that he received from January 1, 2010 through February 1, 2020 were partially based on
credits earned while working for the federal government, and that this portion of his SSA benefit
constituted a prohibited dual benefit. OWCP found appellant at fault in the creation of the
overpayment because the employee failed to provide information, which he knew or should have
known, to be material. It forwarded an overpayment action request form and an overpayment
recovery questionnaire (Form OWCP-20) and requested that appellant provide supporting
financial documentation, including income tax returns, bank account statements, bills and
cancelled checks, pay slips, and any other records to support her reported income and expenses.
OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to respond.
By decision dated July 10, 2020, OWCP finalized its preliminary determination finding
that appellant had received an overpayment of compensation in the amount of $15,899.82, for the
period January 1, 2010 through February 1, 2020, because it had failed to offset the employee’s
compensation payments by the portion of his SSA age-related retirement benefits that were
attributable to federal service. It further found that appellant was without fault in the creation of
the overpayment, but denied waiver of recovery of the overpayment because the evidence of record
was insufficient to establish that recovery of an overpayment would defeat the purpose of FECA
or would be against equity and good conscience. OWCP required recovery of the overpayment by
forwarding payment in the amount of $125.00 each month.
The issues on appeal before the Board relate to OWCP’s finding of an overpayment of
wage-loss compensation benefits due to appellant’s alleged concurrent receipt of FECA wage-loss
compensation and SSA age-related retirement benefits without an appropriate offset for benefits
attributable to FERS.
The Board finds that OWCP failed to properly develop the underlying issue of what portion
of appellant’s SSA age-related retirement benefits were attributable to federal service.3
OWCP’s procedures provide that an overpayment occurs when FECA compensation is not
reduced by the FERS/FECA offset amount. Since the SSA will not report an offset amount until
after SSA benefits are received, an overpayment will almost always occur and will need to be
calculated for each period in which the offset amount was not withheld from compensation.4 The
2

The case record in indicates that the preliminary overpayment was sent to appellant, employees widow. OWCP’s
procedures in effect at the time of OWCP’s December 4, 2018 decision, provide for recovery from a deceased debtor’s
estate. The procedures specifically require that, if the claimant recently passed away, OWCP should refer the debt to
the financial management system (FMS) for offset of the deceased claimant’s last federal tax refund under the
Treasury’s Offset Program (TOP). OWCP has a special profile with FMS under TOP for the collection of these
specific estate debts. The claims examiner should follow the referral procedures set forth in Chapter 6.500.12,
including sending the complete referral package to the National Office for final review and forwarding to the FMS.
See R.B., Docket No. 19-0700 (issued March 16, 2021).
3

J.L., Docket No. 19-1806 (issued July 29, 2020).

4
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 6 -- Debt Management, Identifying and Calculating an Overpayment,
Chapter 6.200.1(h) (September 2018).

2

offset provision of 5 U.S.C. § 8116(d)(2) and applicable regulations apply to SSA age-related
retirement benefits that are attributable to federal service.5 FECA Bulletin No. 97-09 provides that
FECA benefits have to be adjusted for the FERS portion of SSA age-related retirement benefits
because the portion of the SSA benefit earned as a federal employee is part of the FERS retirement
package, and the receipt of FECA benefits and federal retirement concurrently is a prohibited dual
benefit.6 In identifying the fact and amount of an overpayment of compensation following a
claimant s receipt of age-related SSA retirement benefits, the Board has observed that OWCP uses
a FERS Offset Calculation Worksheet.7 This calculation worksheet is sent to SSA and the
completed form is returned to OWCP setting forth purported SSA calculations as to the effective
date and rate of SSA benefits without FERS and the effective date and rate of SSA benefits with
FERS.8 Following receipt of the purported SSA calculations, a preliminary determination of
overpayment is issued if a prohibited dual benefit was received.9
The Board has observed, however, that not all federal employees are enrolled in FERS.
Some FECA claimants are enrolled in another retirement program, such as the Civil Service
Retirement System. Other federal employees are not eligible to be enrolled in a federal retirement
program. Therefore, OWCP’s procedures with regard to requesting offset information are not
applicable to all recipients of FECA compensation and SSA age-related retirement benefits.
Therefore, the information solicited on the FERS Offset Calculation Worksheet that OWCP sends
to SSA is not applicable to non-FERS claimants and does not establish either the fact or amount
of an overpayment.
Herein, the evidence of record does not establish that appellant was enrolled in FERS. The
record is devoid of evidence as to which retirement system was applicable to appellant. The Board
therefore finds that the April 2, 2020 decision must be reversed.

5

See 5 U.S.C. § 8116(a), (d); 20 C.F.R. § 10.421(a).

6

FECA Bulletin No. 97-09 (February 3, 1997).

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Supra note 2.

3

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 10, 2020 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is reversed.
Issued: July 21, 2021
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.E., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Austin, TX, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 11-2088
Issued: May 7, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 23, 2011 appellant filed a timely appeal from a March 31, 2011 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) which denied her claim for
a schedule award. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20
C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of the case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant sustained permanent impairment warranting a schedule
award.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On May 26, 2009 appellant, then a 47-year-old motor carrier safety specialist, was
injured when she fell on her back and hit her head while exiting her truck. OWCP accepted a

1

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

lumbar sprain. Appellant stopped work after the injury and received appropriate continuation of
pay and wage-loss compensation until she returned to restricted work on August 17, 2009.
From May 29 to June 7, 2012 appellant was initially treated by Dr. Daniel Guerra, a
family practitioner, for head, neck and back injuries sustained after a fall at work. In work status
reports dated May 29 to September 15, 2010, Dr. Guerra diagnosed head contusion, contusion of
the neck/thorax and lumbar strain. He returned appellant to work with restrictions on August 24,
2009 and to regular duty on March 2, 2010. On September 15, 2010 Dr. Guerra determined that
appellant reached maximum medical improvement. A July 15, 2009 magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) scan of the lumbar spine revealed mild bilateral foraminal disc bulges at L5-S1
causing mild narrowing of the bilateral neural foramina. Appellant was also treated by
Dr. Dennis Slavin, a Board-certified anesthesiologist, from January 5 to September 14, 2010, for
persistent low back pain after a work injury. He diagnosed myofascial pain syndrome and
recommended trigger point injections.
On September 29, 2010 appellant was seen by Dr. Lionel Moreno, a Board-certified
family practitioner, who noted a history of injury and advised that appellant was asymptomatic
except for minor neck pain. Dr. Moreno opined that appellant sustained five percent impairment
of her back pursuant to the fifth edition of the American Medical Association, Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (A.M.A., Guides).2 He noted that appellant was at
maximum medical improvement and would fall into a lumbosacral Category II for a bulging disc
at L5-S1, for five percent impairment. On December 23, 2010 appellant filed a claim for a
schedule award.
In a January 18, 2011 report, an OWCP medical adviser noted that Dr. Moreno’s
impairment rating was not probative as the spine was not a scheduled member upon which a
schedule award could be made pursuant to FECA. He further noted that the rating should use the
sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides.3 The medical adviser recommended referring appellant for
a second opinion examination.
OWCP referred appellant to Dr. Jorge E. Tijmes, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
for a second opinion evaluation. In a March 15, 2011 report, Dr. Tijmes reviewed appellant’s
history of injury and described his findings on examination. Appellant had normal neck range of
motion, palpation of the paravertebral muscles was supple, reflexes at the biceps, triceps,
extensor, carpi ulnaris and carpi radialis were normal, muscle strength at the extensor carpi
radialis, carpi ulnaris, pollicis longus and flexors was normal and distal sensation and circulation
was normal. He further noted examination of the upper back was normal, paravertebral muscle
palpation was supple, examination of the lower back revealed mild tenderness to palpation with
mild paravertebral muscle spasms bilaterally, range of motion was limited, straight leg raising
was negative bilaterally, both hips, knees and ankles were normal, distal sensation and
circulation was normal, reflexes were normal, equal and reactive and muscle testing at extensor
hallucis longus, anterior tibialis, extensor hallucis communis, extensor digitorum communis and
2

A.M.A., Guides (5th ed. 2001).

3

A.M.A., Guides (6th ed. 2009).

2

gastrocnemius was normal. Dr. Tijmes noted that x-rays of the lumbar spine revealed normal
lordosis, intervertebral disc height, with no fractures, dislocations or subluxations seen. He
diagnosed low back pain. Dr. Tijmes opined that, pursuant to the A.M.A., Guides, appellant had
no lumbar radiculopathy, no sensory or motor deficits and therefore no impairment for peripheral
nerve pathology. He noted no impairment was applicable for complex regional pain syndrome.
Dr. Tijmes concluded that appellant sustained no permanent impairment due to the accepted
injury. He noted that appellant reached maximum medical improvement on March 15, 2011.
On March 31, 2011 OWCP denied appellant’s claim for a schedule award.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
The schedule award provision of FECA4 and its implementing federal regulations,5 set
forth the number of weeks of compensation payable to employees sustaining permanent
impairment from loss or loss of use, of scheduled members or functions of the body. However,
FECA does not specify the manner in which the percentage of loss shall be determined. For
consistent results and to ensure equal justice under the law for all claimants, OWCP has adopted
the A.M.A., Guides as the uniform standard applicable to all claimants.6 For decisions after
February 1, 2001, the fifth edition of the A.M.A., Guides is used to calculate schedule awards.7
For decisions issued beginning May 1, 2009, the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides will be
used.8
No schedule award is payable for a member, function or organ of the body not specified
in FECA or in the implementing regulations.9 FECA and the implementing regulations do not
provide for the payment of a schedule award for the permanent loss of use of the back or the
body as a whole.10 The Board notes that section 8101(19) specifically excludes the back from
the definition of organ.11 However, a claimant may be entitled to a schedule award for
permanent impairment to an upper or lower extremity even though the cause of the impairment
originated in the neck, shoulders or spine.12

4

5 U.S.C. § 8107.

5

20 C.F.R. § 10.404.

6

Id. at § 10.404(a).

7

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 3 -- Medical, Schedule Awards, Chapter 3.700, Exhibit 4 (June 2003).

8

FECA Bulletin No. 09-03 (issued March 15, 2009).

9

Thomas J. Engelhart, 50 ECAB 319 (1999).

10

See Jay K. Tomokiyo, 51 ECAB 361 (2000).

11

5 U.S.C. § 8101(19).

12

Thomas J. Engelhart, supra note 9.

3

ANALYSIS
On appeal, appellant contends that she is entitled to a schedule award. OWCP accepted
her claim for a lumbar sprain. FECA does not provide for a schedule award based on
impairment to the back or spine. Appellant may only be granted a schedule award for
impairment to the lower extremities if such impairment is established as being caused by her
accepted lumbar condition.
Appellant submitted a September 29, 2010 report from Dr. Moreno, who opined that
appellant had five percent impairment of the whole person based on the fifth edition of the
A.M.A., Guides.13 The Board has carefully reviewed Dr. Moreno’s report and notes that his
findings do not support any permanent impairment of the upper or lower extremities.
Dr. Moreno’s examination did not reveal significant sensory loss, motor loss or reflex changes in
the lower extremities. He did not reference any tables or charts in the sixth edition of the
A.M.A., Guides, and he did not attribute any impairment to a scheduled body member as a result
of the accepted condition. Dr. Moreno did not explain how appellant’s lumbar condition caused
impairment to either lower extremity or provide an adequate description of her physical
condition so that an impairment rating could be determined by an OWCP medical adviser. His
rating is of limited probative value and is insufficient to establish a basis for the payment of a
schedule award.14
OWCP referred appellant to Dr. Tijmes who found that appellant had no permanent
impairment due to her accepted injury. Dr. Tijmes noted active and equal reflexes with no
significant muscle weakness in either leg and no sensory loss or significant hypesthesia.
Appellant had mild paravertebral muscle spasms in the low back but straight leg raising was
negative bilaterally, with distal sensation was normal in the lower extremities. Dr. Tijmes
diagnosed low back pain. He found that appellant did not have any lumbar radiculopathy, no
sensory or motor deficits in either extremity related to her lumbar spine pathology and therefore
no basis for rating any impairment based on appellant’s accepted condition. Dr. Tijmes further
noted no impairment was applicable for complex regional pain syndrome. He found no basis to
rate impairment of a scheduled body member under the A.M.A., Guides, based on the accepted
condition. The Board finds that his opinion constitutes the weight of the medical evidence of
record on the issue of permanent impairment.
As there is no medical evidence in conformance with the A.M.A., Guides, supporting
ratable impairment of a scheduled body member, causally related to the accepted condition,
OWCP properly denied appellant’s claim for a schedule award.
On appeal, appellant contended that she is entitled to a schedule award. As noted,
Dr. Moreno did not attribute any impairment to a scheduled member, such as appellant’s legs, as
13

A.M.A., Guides (5th ed. 2001). As noted, supra note 8, OWCP began using the sixth edition of the A.M.A.,
Guides effective May 1, 2009.
14

See Carl J. Cleary, 57 ECAB 563, 568 at note 14 (2006) (an opinion which is not based upon the standards
adopted by OWCP and approved by the Board as appropriate for evaluating schedule losses is of little probative
value in determining the extent of a claimant’s impairment).

4

a result of the accepted lumbar sprain. He did not explain how appellant’s lumbar condition
caused impairment to either lower extremity. OWCP referred appellant to Dr. Tijmes who
considered the medical evidence and found no basis to rate impairment of the legs due to
appellant’s accepted condition. The Board also notes that factors such as employability or
limitations on daily activities have no bearing on the calculation of a schedule award.15
Appellant may request a schedule award or increased schedule award based on evidence
of a new exposure or medical evidence showing progression of an employment-related condition
resulting in permanent impairment or increased impairment.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not establish that she sustained permanent impairment
of her lower extremity based on her accepted lumbar condition.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 31, 2011 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: May 7, 2012
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

15

Kimberly M. Held, 56 ECAB 670 (2005).

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.S., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
Bedford, MA, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 09-703
Issued: October 6, 2009

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 14, 2009 appellant filed a timely appeal from August 25 and November 18,
2008 merit decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs denying her claim.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of
appellant’s claim.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained
an injury in the performance of duty causally related to her federal employment. On appeal,
appellant argues that her employment duties and prior injuries caused her current back condition.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On June 12, 2008 appellant, a 55-year-old nurse, filed an occupational disease claim
(Form CA-2) for a back condition. She alleged that she experienced a lot of stress in her back as
well as back spasms which she attributed to standing for long periods of time in one spot while

dispensing medications. Appellant realized her back condition was caused by her federal
employment on May 9, 2008. She stopped work on May 12, 2008.
Appellant submitted a report dated May 19, 2008, signed by Dr. Atul L. Bhat, Boardcertified physiatrist, which noted that appellant indicated that she experienced symptoms of “left
low back/posterior buttock discomfort” that began to radiate along her left anterolateral thigh
“sometime 10 days ago spontaneously without any acute event or trauma.” Dr. Bhat also noted
that appellant believed that her condition may have been caused by standing for prolonged
durations at work. Physical examination revealed multiple areas exhibiting significant
tenderness to palpation along the left paralumbar region in the general vicinity of the highest
iliac crest as well as along the left greater trochanter and left piriformis. An MRI scan revealed
no evidence of abnormality such as a compression fracture or disc herniation but did reveal fluid
in the right and left joint of the L4-5 segment. Dr. Bhat reported that he would arrange for
appellant to undergo a single left L4-5 facet lumbar joint injection.
In a report dated June 13, 2008, Dr. Bhat reported that appellant was “nontender” to
direct palpation along the thoracolumbar paraspinal muscles. Physical examination revealed
significant tenderness along the left trochanteric region and mild tenderness in the left piriformis.
Dr. Bhat noted that appellant continued to experience significant resolution of her distal lumbar
pain stemming from her facet joints at the L4-5 level following a facet joint injection. He also
noted that appellant continued to experience persistent left lateral thigh pain more consistent with
left greater trochanteric bursitis.
By decision dated August 25, 2008, the Office denied appellant’s claim because the
evidence of record was insufficient to establish that she sustained an injury as defined by the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. While the Office accepted that appellant’s federal
employment involved periods of prolonged standing, it found that the medical evidence was
insufficient because it lacked a diagnosis of an injury.
On September 18, 2008 appellant requested reconsideration.
Appellant submitted a report dated September 3, 2008, in which Dr. Bhat diagnosed
lower back pain, facet syndrome and lumbar degenerative disc disorder. In response to the
question of whether these conditions were related to her employment, Dr. Bhat checked the box
“unknown.” He noted that he instructed appellant to return to work in a light-duty capacity and
to a sedentary position on June 13, 2008.
Appellant submitted a May 12, 2008 note signed by Dr. Paul P. Harcourt, Board-certified
in family medicine, excusing appellant from work “due to a back and leg problem.” In a report
also dated May 12, 2008, Dr. Harcourt reported findings upon examination and diagnosed
appellant with herniated disc syndrome as well as radiculopathy.
In a report dated May 18, 2008, Dr. Michael Ruhoy, a Board-certified diagnostic
radiologist, reported that an MRI scan of the lumbosacral spine revealed mild to moderate
multilevel degenerative disc disease and facet arthritis which was causing multilevel neural
foraminal narrowing at multiple levels. He noted that the most prominent foramen was at the

2

L4-5 level, which evidenced degenerative changes and further encroachment on the left L4 nerve
root.
By decision dated November 18, 2008, the Office denied modification of its August 25,
2008 decision. It accepted that appellant’s duties as a nurse required long periods of standing
while dispensing medications and found that the evidence of record established the existence of
medically-diagnosed conditions. The Office found that the evidence appellant submitted was
insufficient to establish the existence of a causal relationship between the diagnosed conditions
and the identified employment factor.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in a claim for
occupational disease, an employee must submit: (1) a factual statement identifying employment
factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence or occurrence of the disease or
condition; (2) medical evidence establishing the presence or existence of the disease or condition
for which compensation is claimed; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the diagnosed
condition is causally related to the employment factors identified by the employee.1
Causal relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence generally required to
establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence. Rationalized medical
opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s rationalized opinion on
whether there is a causal relationship between the employee’s diagnosed condition and the
compensable employment factors. The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete
factual and medical background of the employee, must be one of reasonable medical certainty,
and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the
diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by the employee.2
ANALYSIS
Appellant identified long periods of standing while dispensing medication as the
employment factor that caused her back condition.3 Her burden was to establish, through
production of probative rationalized medical evidence, that her alleged back condition was

1

See Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238, 241 (2005); Ruby I. Fish, 46 ECAB 276, 279 (1994).

2

I.J., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-2362, issued March 11, 2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345,
352 (1989).
3

Appellant submitted evidence pertaining to traumatic injury claims (Form CA-1) she filed in 1991 and 1996.
Her current claim is for an occupational disease (Form CA-2) not recurrence of disability or medical condition
(Form CA-2a) and therefore, as this evidence concerned incidents and injuries arising under prior unrelated claims it
has no evidentiary value on the issue of causal relationship.

3

caused by the identified employment factor.4 Appellant has not met her burden of proof and
therefore the Office properly denied appellant’s claim.
The relevant medical evidence of record consisted of reports from Drs. Bhat, Harcourt
and Ruhoy.5 Dr. Bhat’s May 19 and June 13, 2008 reports lack an opinion on the causal
relationship between a compensable diagnosed condition and the identified employment factor.6
These reports concerned treatment for thigh and soft tissue pain. Pain is a symptom, not a
compensable medical diagnosis.7 In neither report did Dr. Bhat address whether appellant’s
condition was caused or aggravated by her federal employment. While Dr. Bhat reported that
appellant believed her condition may have been caused by prolonged standing at work, he was
merely repeating appellant’s subjective complaints and provided no objective medical rationale
supporting this conclusion.8 These deficiencies reduce the probative value of these reports and,
as such, they are insufficient to satisfy appellant’s burden of proof.
Dr. Bhat’s September 3, 2008 report is of little probative value as it lacks a rationalized
opinion on causal relationship. He diagnosed lower back pain, facet syndrome and lumbar
degenerative disc disorder. In response to the question of whether appellant’s condition was
related to her employment, Dr. Bhat checked the box “unknown.” An opinion on causal
relationship consisting of merely checking a box on a form report, without further explanation or
rationale, is of little probative value.9 Because Dr. Bhat provided no substantive explanation for
his opinion concerning whether appellant’s condition was related to appellant’s employment, his
September 3, 2008 report is of little probative value and therefore insufficient to satisfy
appellant’s burden.

4

Appellant submitted an article concerning safe patient handling which she argued “Reenforcing my position of
injury on the job related to long periods of standing in one position.” She also submitted articles on topics including
back safety, occupational overuse syndrome and lower back pain. Articles such as newspaper clippings, medical
texts and excerpts from publications are of no evidentiary value in establishing the causal relationship between a
claimed condition and a claimant’s federal employment as such materials are of general application and are not
determinative of whether the specific condition claimed is related to particular employment factors or incidents.
Richard Yadron, 57 ECAB 207 (2005); Eugene Butler, 36 ECAB 393 (1984). As such, these articles are of no
evidentiary value in establishing a causal relationship between appellant’s back condition and her federal
employment.
5

Appellant submitted reports and notes from a physician’s assistant, a registered nurse, and a licensed practical
nurse. Because healthcare providers such as nurses, acupuncturists, physician’s assistants and physical therapists are
not considered “physicians” under the Act, their reports and opinions do not constitute competent medical evidence.
5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); see also G.G., 58 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1564, issued February 27, 2007); Jerre R.
Rinehart, 45 ECAB 518 (1994); Barbara J. Williams, 40 ECAB 649 (1989); Jan A. White, 34 ECAB 515 (1983).
Thus these reports and notes are of no probative value.
6

S.S., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-579, issued January 14, 2008).

7

C.F., 60 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 08-1102, issued October 10, 2008).

8

Edgar G. Maiscott, 4 ECAB 558 (1952) (holding appellant’s subjective symptoms and self-serving declarations
do not, in the opinion of the Board, constitute evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature).
9

See Alberta S. Williamson, 47 ECAB 569 (1996).

4

Dr. Harcourt’s May 12, 2008 report and Dr. Ruhoy’s May 18, 2008 report lack an
opinion on the causal relationship between the conditions they diagnosed and the identified
employment factor. As such, they are of no probative value on the issue of causal relationship
and are insufficient to satisfy appellant’s burden.
An award of compensation may not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation.
Neither the fact that appellant’s claimed condition became apparent during a period of
employment nor her belief that her condition was aggravated by her employment is sufficient to
establish causal relationship.10 Appellant must submit a physician’s report which reviews the
identified employment factors which she claimed caused her condition and, incorporating these
identified factors together with findings upon examination and a review of appellant’s medical
history, explains how the identified employment factors caused or aggravated a diagnosed
condition and presents a medical rationale in support of his or her opinion.11 She did not submit
sufficient probative medical evidence in support of her claim and therefore has not met her
burden of proof.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained
an injury in the performance of duty causally related to her federal employment.

10

D.I., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-1534, issued November 6, 2007); Ruth R. Price, 16 ECAB 688, 691 (1965).

11

Robert Broome, 55 ECAB 339 (2004).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the November 18 and August 25, 2008 decisions of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs be affirmed.
Issued: October 6, 2009
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
G.E., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Little Rock, AR, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-1286
Issued: December 21, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 24, 2012 appellant filed a timely appeal from the January 20 and March 26, 2012
merit decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant sustained injuries to his head, neck and back while
in the performance of duty on November 8, 2010; and (2) whether OWCP properly refused to
reopen his case for reconsideration under 5 U.S.C. § 8128.
FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant, a 50-year-old city carrier, filed a claim for benefits on November 9, 2010,
alleging that he sustained injuries to his head, neck and lumbar spine as a result of a motor
vehicle collision in the performance of duty on November 8, 2010.
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

By letter dated November 16, 2010, OWCP advised appellant that it required additional
factual and medical evidence to determine whether he was eligible for compensation benefits. It
asked him to submit a comprehensive medical report from a treating physician describing his
symptoms and the medical reasons for his condition and an opinion as to whether his claimed
condition was causally related to his federal employment.
An Arkansas Uniform Motor Vehicle Collision Report dated November 8, 2010 stated
that appellant had not reported any injury. Appellant appeared to be in normal condition and his
vehicle had an estimated $800.00 of property damage.
In a form report dated November 30, 2010, Dr. William F. Hefley, Board-certified in
orthopedic surgery, stated that appellant had strained his neck and back on November 8, 2010
due to a motor vehicle accident. He diagnosed a cervical strain and checked a box indicating that
the condition found was caused or aggravated by an employment activity. This form report also
described an October 13, 2010 knee injury.
On December 7, 2010 OWCP received the November 5, 2010 narrative report of
Dr. Hefley who described a left shoulder injury that appellant sustained in April 2008, as well as
a right shoulder injury in October 2008. Dr. Hefley noted that appellant hung his mailbag over
each shoulder alternately while walking his mail route. He diagnosed bilateral shoulder
impingement with advanced acromioclavicular degenerative joint disease.
By decision dated December 17, 2010, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that he
failed to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish that he sustained head, neck or back
injuries on November 8, 2010.
Appellant requested reconsideration on December 31, 2010.
On January 4, 2011 OWCP received emergency room records from the Baptist Health
Medical Center dated November 8, 2010. The records provided a history that appellant came to
the emergency room after his postal vehicle was rear-ended by another motor vehicle and was
spun around. He complained of back, neck and head pain. Appellant’s diagnosis was stated as
cervical, thoracic and lumbar strain.
On January 4, 2011 OWCP received a November 15, 2010 report from Dr. Hefley, who
noted that appellant had been involved in a motor vehicle collision one-week prior while driving
his mail truck. Appellant’s vehicle was struck at a high rate of speed and he felt his neck snap.
Dr. Hefley concluded that appellant was one week postmotor vehicle collision with a cervical
sprain/strain.
In a January 7, 2011 report, Dr. Hefley noted that the employing establishment had not
yet accepted his injuries from the motor vehicle collision November 2010 as work related
because of appellant’s multiple orthopedic issues and multiple dates of injury. He stated that
appellant had not returned to work since the motor vehicle accident. Dr. Hefley diagnosed right
knee strain, bilateral shoulder impingement and status postmotor vehicle accident, which resulted
in cervical strain/sprain with brachial radiculopathy.
In a January 12, 2011 report, Dr. Brad A. Thomas, a Board-certified neurosurgeon, stated
that appellant had a very confusing and complex history. Appellant had complaints of neck pain
2

stemming from a 2008 incident when a door from a truck fell and hit him. In October 2010, he
was put in a headlock by his boss, which hurt his neck. On November 8, 2010 appellant was hit
while driving a mail truck and had not returned to work. The accident resulted in neck pain and
pain in his right arm and hand. Appellant related that he had weakness in both arms; he rated the
pain in his neck and right arm as a 7 on a scale of 1 to 10. On examination, appellant had full
range of motion in the cervical spine and in all of the joints of the upper extremities, with no pain
or tenderness. He advised that cervical x-rays showed no fractures, subluxations or abnormal
motion. Appellant underwent a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan which indicated a
moderate, right-sided, C6-7 herniated disc that could be causing his right arm and hand pain.
Dr. Thomas recommended light duty, no heavy lifting greater than 15 pounds. He also
recommended a course of physical therapy and medication. Dr. Thomas stated that if appellant’s
condition did not improve with conservative management he might schedule appellant for a C6-7
anterior cervical discectomy with fusion.
On March 17, 2011 OWCP received a November 24, 2010 report from Dr. Kenneth R.
Johnston, Board-certified in family practice, who reported a history that appellant had pulled his
back on October 13, 2010 while “playing around” with his boss, and that he was involved in a hit
and run collision with his mail truck on October 8, 2010, which was severe enough to spin the
mail truck around. Dr. Johnston diagnosed tenderness of the lumbar spine and pelvis.
In a progress report dated June 17, 2011, Dr. Thomas noted that appellant had two
accidents one in October 2010 and one in November 2010. He stated that appellant had returned
for evaluation with complaints of continued pain in both arms. Dr. Thomas recommended that
appellant undergo an MRI scan examination of the cervical spine. On July 1, 2011 he reported
that appellant had undergone an MRI scan examination of the cervical spine, which showed a
right-sided C6-7 herniated disc. Dr. Thomas offered no opinion regarding the cause of this
condition.
In an August 12, 2011 report, Dr. Thomas advised that appellant’s condition was
essentially unchanged, as he continued to experience pain down his right arm and right shoulder.
He stated that he had scheduled him to undergo physical therapy on July 1, 2011; however, this
had been not approved and appellant had not received any physical therapy. Dr. Thomas stated
that he would try to reorder physical therapy.
By decision dated September 19, 2011, OWCP denied modification of the December 17,
2010 decision.
On September 19, 2011 appellant requested reconsideration.
In a report dated October 10, 2011, Dr. Thomas advised that appellant continued to have
pain down his right arm in a C7 distribution. He recommended physical therapy; but it had not yet
been approved. Dr. Thomas noted no changes in the medical history. He advised that the MRI
scan showed a right-sided, C6-7 foraminal stenosis that could impinge the C1 nerve root.
Dr. Thomas reiterated that he would try to schedule appellant for physical therapy and prescribe
medication.
In a report dated March 9, 2011, received by OWCP on November 15, 2011, Dr. Thomas
noted that appellant had undergone physical therapy. He stated that it had significantly improved
appellant’s condition, to the extent that he was ready to return to work. Dr. Thomas advised that
3

appellant had good strength throughout bilateral upper and lower extremities.
appellant to return to regular duty as of March 14, 2011.

He released

By decision dated January 20, 2012, OWCP denied modification of the September 19,
2011 decision.
On March 9, 2012 appellant requested reconsideration. He alleged that OWCP’ decision
had made findings which were not pertinent to this claim. Appellant did not submit any additional
medical evidence.
By decision dated March 26, 2012, OWCP denied appellant’s application for review on
the grounds that it neither raised substantive legal questions nor included new and relevant
evidence sufficient to require it to review its prior decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
An employee seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of establishing that the
essential elements of his or her claim including the fact that the individual is an “employee of the
United States” within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable
time limitation period of FECA, that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged,
and that any disability and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are causally
related to the employment injury.3 These are the essential elements of each and every
compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an
occupational disease.4
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty, it must first be determined whether a “fact of injury” has been established.
First, the employee must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he or she actually
experienced the employment incident at the time, place and in the manner alleged.5 Second, the
employee must submit sufficient evidence, generally only in the form of medical evidence, to
establish that the employment incident caused a personal injury.6 The medical evidence required
to establish causal relationship is usually rationalized medical evidence. Rationalized medical
opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s rationalized opinion on the
issue of whether there is a causal relationship between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and
the implicated employment factors.7

2

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

3

Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

4

Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989).

5

John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989).

6

Id. For a definition of the term “injury,” see 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(a)(14).

7

Id.

4

The Board has held that the mere fact that a condition manifests itself during a period of
employment does not raise an inference that there is a causal relationship between the two.8
An award of compensation may not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation.
Neither the fact that appellant’s condition became apparent during a period of employment nor
the belief that his condition was caused, precipitated or aggravated by his employment is
sufficient to establish causal relationship.9 Causal relationship must be established by
rationalized medical opinion evidence and appellant failed to submit such evidence.
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
OWCP accepted that appellant’s postal truck was struck from behind by another vehicle on
November 8, 2010. The question of whether the employment incident caused a personal injury
can only be established by probative medical evidence.10 The Board finds that appellant has not
submitted sufficient rationalized, medical evidence to establish that the November 8, 2010
employment incident caused the claimed head, neck and back injuries.
Appellant submitted reports from Drs. Hefley, Thomas and Johnston. In a November 15,
2010 report, Dr. Hefley addressed prior treatment of appellant in 2008. He stated that appellant’s
vehicle had been struck at a high rate of speed and that appellant felt his head snap. Dr. Hefley
concluded that appellant was one-week postcervical sprain/strain. The police report noted that
appellant had snapped his head, but stated that he had not sustained any injury and appeared to
be in normal conation. In a November 30, 2010 report, Dr. Hefley advised that appellant had
been involved in a motor vehicle collision on November 8, 2010, as a result of which he strained
his neck and back. He diagnosed cervical strain/sprain with brachial radiculopathy and bilateral
shoulder impingement. However, Dr. Hefley did not provide any medical rationale explaining
how these conditions were causally related to the November 8, 2010 incident. He noted causal
relationship with a checkmark, which the Board has held is not sufficient to establish causation.11
Dr. Thomas submitted several reports from January to October 2011. He noted that
appellant had a complex and confusing medical history. Dr. Thomas advised that appellant had
complaints of neck pain stemming from a November 2008 incident in which he was hit by a
truck door; neck pain from an October 2010 incident during which his boss placed him in a neck
hold and that appellant had not returned to work following the November 8, 2010 motor vehicle
incident while driving a mail truck. He noted appellant’s complaints that the accident resulted in
neck pain and pain in his right arm and hand. Dr. Thomas stated findings on examination and
diagnosed moderate, right-sided, C6-7 herniated, as showed by MRI scan. He stated that this
could be the cause of his neck, right arm and right hand pain. Dr. Thomas prescribed medication
and physical therapy, which temporarily ameliorated appellant’s condition. He indicated that he
would consider performing surgery if his condition did not improve with conservative
management. The weight of medical opinion is determined by the opportunity for and
8

See Joe T. Williams, 44 ECAB 518, 521 (1993).

9

Id.

10

Carlone, supra note 5.

11

Debra S. King, 44 ECAB 203 (1992); Salvatore Dante Roscello, 31 ECAB 247 (1979).

5

thoroughness of examination, the accuracy and completeness of the physician’s knowledge of
the facts of the case, the medical history provided, the care of analysis manifested and the
medical rationale expressed in support of stated conclusions.12 Dr. Thomas’ reports diagnosed a
herniated disc at C6-7 but did not provide a rationalized medical opinion addressing how this
condition related to the November 8, 2010 work incident. His opinion on causal relationship is
of limited probative value in that he did not provide adequate medical rationale in support of his
conclusions.13 Dr. Thomas did not describe appellant’s accident in any detail or how the
accident would have been competent to cause an injury. Moreover, his opinion is of limited
probative value for the further reason that it is generalized in nature and equivocal in that he only
noted summarily that appellant’s condition was causally related to the November 8, 2010 work
incident. Dr. Thomas did not explain why that November 8, 2010 incident caused the herniated
disc and neck strain, rather than the earlier October 2010 incident wherein appellant was placed
in a neck hold by his boss, or the 2008 incident when a truck door fell on his head. Therefore,
appellant failed to provide a medical report from a physician that explains how the work incident
of November 8, 2010 caused or contributed to the claimed neck and back injury.
Dr. Johnston stated in his November 24, 2010 report that appellant had pulled his back
while “playing around” with his boss. He also noted that appellant had been involved in the
October 8, 2010 motor vehicle incident. Dr. Johnston diagnosed tenderness of the lumbar spine
and pelvis, but offered no opinion or explanation as to whether the diagnosed condition was
causally related to the October 2010 incident or the November 8, 2010 event.
OWCP advised appellant of the evidence required to establish his claim; however,
appellant failed to submit such evidence. Appellant did not provide a medical opinion which
describes or explains the medical process through which the November 8, 2010 work accident
would have caused the claimed injuries. Accordingly, he did not establish that he sustained
injuries to his neck and back in the performance of duty. OWCP properly denied appellant’s
claim for compensation.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
Under 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b), a claimant may obtain review of the merits of his or her
claim by showing that OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law; by
advancing a relevant legal argument not considered by OWCP; or by constituting relevant and
pertinent evidence not previously considered by OWCP.14 Evidence that repeats or duplicates
evidence already in the case record has no evidentiary value and does not constitute a basis for
reopening a case.15

12

See Anna C. Leanza, 48 ECAB 115 (1996).

13

William C. Thomas, 45 ECAB 591 (1994).

14

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(1); see generally 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

15

Howard A. Williams, 45 ECAB 853 (1994).

6

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
Appellant has not shown that OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point
of law; he has not advanced a relevant legal argument not previously considered by OWCP; and
he has not submitted relevant and pertinent evidence not previously considered by OWCP. He
alleged that OWCP made findings which were not pertinent to this claim. However appellant did
not explain how factual findings which incorporate appellant’s entire medical history constituted
error by OWCP. The Board also notes that appellant did not submit any new medical evidence
with his request for reconsideration. OWCP did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen
appellant’s claim for a review on the merits in its March 26, 2012 nonmerit decision.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has failed to establish that he sustained neck and back
injuries in the performance of duty on November 8, 2010. The Board finds that OWCP properly
refused to reopen appellant’s case for reconsideration on the merits of his claim under 5 U.S.C.
§ 8128(a).
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 26 and January 20, 2012 decisions of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed.
Issued: December 21, 2012
Washington, DC

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.S., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY
MEDICAL COMMAND, Fort Rucker, AL,
Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 16-0921
Issued: September 9, 2016

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 1, 2016 appellant filed a timely appeal from a December 22, 2015 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish a traumatic injury on
August 15, 2012.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On February 13, 2015 appellant, then a 53-year-old personnel operation specialist, filed
an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging central retinal vein occlusion with dry eye
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

as a result of working all day on a computer on August 15, 2012. She noted that, after being on
sick leave from June 21 to August 14, 2012 for elevated blood pressure and central retinal vein
occlusion, she returned to work on August 15, 2012. After working all day on the computer
appellant stated that her eye was aching and she did not return to work on August 16, 2012. She
thereafter requested to be reassigned on September 25, 2012 due to eye pain after working on the
computer all day but she was told that nothing was available. Appellant became aware of her
condition on June 21, 2012 and first realized its connection to her federal employment on
August 15, 2012. A human resources specialist noted that appellant had retired effective
September 30, 2012.
In a memorandum dated August 16, 2012, a human resources officer noted that appellant
returned to work the previous day after being out 15 days. Appellant provided a note from her
doctor relating that she had been seen on August 13, 2012, and could return to work on
August 15, 2012. When she was informed by the employing establishment that further
documentation would be needed, she advised that the documentation she had provided was all
she had. Appellant also noted that she was sick, her eye was bothering her, and so she did not
come to work.
By letter dated April 8, 2015, OWCP informed appellant of the evidence necessary to
establish her claim. It noted that she had not submitted sufficient factual evidence to establish
that her claimed injuries actually occurred, and further noted that she had not submitted
sufficient medical evidence to establish her claim. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to submit
additional evidence and to respond to its inquiries.
In a report dated July 24, 2012, Dr. Warren A. Thompson, a Board-certified
ophthalmologist, diagnosed central retinal vein occlusion. Appellant reported that her problem
worsened when reading, writing, driving, watching television, looking at straight lines, and when
she was outdoors. He recommended increasing her magnification when reading on a computer
and adding artificial tears throughout the day for comfort.
By letter dated April 14, 2015, Dr. Thompson related that appellant was referred to his
office on June 26, 2012 with an acute central vein occlusion in her left eye. Appellant’s initial
visual acuity was able to count fingers only at six feet in the left eye and 20/20 in the right eye.
Dr. Thompson explained that the risk factors for a central retinal vein occlusion are hypertension,
diabetes, high cholesterol, and age. The prognosis long term was dependent on the level of
perfusion in the retina. Dr. Thompson also related that appellant’s previous occupation required
her to work at a computer all day. Following the development of her vein occlusion, appellant
began experiencing eye strain, visual fatigue, and dry eye symptoms that caused significant pain
and discomfort especially late in the workday. This was not unusual as most patients with
decreased vision in one eye will blink less which exacerbates the dry eye symptoms. The
treatment for this condition is the liberal use of artificial tears combined with frequent breaks to
allow for adequate ocular lubrication.

2

By decision dated May 5, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for compensation. It
found that she had not submitted sufficient medical evidence to establish a causal relationship
between the employment factors of August 15, 2012 and her diagnosed conditions.2
Appellant submitted a letter dated September 2, 2014 from Dr. Thompson, which was
identical to Dr. Thompson’s letter dated April 14, 2015.
By decision dated May 22, 2015, OWCP vacated its decision of May 5, 2015 and
reopened the claim for review, because the claim had been prematurely adjudicated prior to the
expiration of 30 days for submission of additional evidence.
On June 3, 2015 OWCP received a letter dated June 26, 2012, by Dr. Thompson who
diagnosed central retinal vein occlusion in her left eye. Dr. Thompson noted that her long-term
prognosis was very poor due to the ischemic nature of the vein occlusion.
By letter dated June 22, 2015, Dr. Thompson noted that appellant had a history of central
retinal vein occlusion in her left eye and keraconjunctivitis sicca or severe dry eyes in both eyes.
He noted that the vein occlusion did not cause the dry eye problem but could exacerbate the
symptom because people with limited vision in one eye will often blink less while reading or
working on a computer. Dr. Thompson attached general information regarding the diagnosed
conditions.
By decision dated June 23, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for compensation,
finding that she failed to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish a causal relationship
between the work factors on August 15, 2012 and her federal employment.
On June 30, 2015 appellant requested a review of the written record before an OWCP
hearing representative. She also submitted several work excuse notes from Dr. Thompson.
By decision dated December 22, 2015, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed
OWCP’s decision of June 23, 2015, finding that appellant had failed to establish that
employment activities on August 15, 2012 caused or aggravated her diagnosed conditions.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA3 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time
limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any
disability and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are causally related to the

2

The Board notes that OWCP administratively converted appellant’s claim for an occupational disease to a claim
for traumatic injury based on the description of her injury contained in the original claim Form CA-2.
3

Supra note 1.

3

employment injury.4 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim
regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.5
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty it must first be determined whether a fact of injury has been established.6
First, the employee must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he actually experienced the
employment incident at the time, place, and in the manner alleged.7 Second, the employee must
submit sufficient evidence, generally only in the form of medical evidence, to establish that the
employment incident caused a personal injury.8
The claimant has the burden of establishing by the weight of reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence that the condition for which compensation is sought is causally related to a
specific employment incident or to specific conditions of employment.9 An award of
compensation may not be based on appellant’s belief of causal relationship. Neither the mere
fact that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period of employment nor the belief that
the disease or condition was caused or aggravated by employment factors or incidents is
sufficient to establish a causal relationship.10
Causal relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence generally required to
establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence.11 Rationalized medical
opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s rationalized opinion on
whether there is a causal relationship between the employee’s diagnosed condition and
compensable employment factors.12 The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete
factual and medical background of the employee, must be one of reasonable medical certainty,
and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the
diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by the employee.13

4

C.S., Docket No. 08-1585 (issued March 3, 2009); Bonnie A. Contreras, 57 ECAB 364, 366 (2006).

5

S.P., 59 ECAB 184, 188 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153, 157 (1989).

6

B.F., Docket No. 09-60 (issued March 17, 2009); Bonnie A. Contreras, supra note 4.

7

D.B., 58 ECAB 464, 466 (2007); David Apgar, 57 ECAB 137, 140 (2005).

8

C.B., Docket No. 08-1583 (issued December 9, 2008); D.G., 59 ECAB 734, 737 (2008); Bonnie A. Contreras,
supra note 4.
9

Roma A. Mortenson-Kindschi, 57 ECAB 418, 428 n.37 (2006); Katherine J. Friday, 47 ECAB 591, 594 (1996).

10

P.K., Docket No. 08-2551 (issued June 2, 2009); Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215, 218 (1997).

11

Y.J., Docket No. 08-1167 (issued October 7, 2008); A.D., 58 ECAB 149, 155-56 (2006); D’Wayne Avila, 57
ECAB 642, 649 (2006).
12

J.J., Docket No. 09-27 (issued February 10, 2009); Michael S. Mina, 57 ECAB 379, 384 (2006).

13

I.J., 59 ECAB 408, 415 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).

4

ANALYSIS
The Board finds that the medical evidence submitted by appellant is insufficient to
establish that employment activities on August 15, 2012 caused or aggravated appellant’s
diagnosed medical conditions.
Appellant submitted several letters from Dr. Thompson. In his letter dated April 14,
2015, Dr. Thompson noted, “[Appellant’s] previous occupation by report required her to work at
a computer all day. Following the development of her vein occlusion, she began experiencing
eye strain, visual fatigue, and dry eye symptoms that caused significant pain and discomfort
especially late in the workday.” In his letter dated June 22, 2015, Dr. Thompson noted that the
vein occlusion did not cause the dry eye problem, but could exacerbate the symptom because
people with limited vision in one eye will often blink less while reading or working on a
computer. While he explained in generalized terms the factors that could exacerbate the
condition of dry eye in relation to appellant’s vein occlusion, Dr. Thompson did not offer a
rationalized medical explanation as to how working on a computer on August 15, 2012 caused or
aggravated appellant’s specific conditions.14
Medical evidence submitted to support a claim for compensation should reflect a correct
history, and the physician should offer a medically sound explanation of how the claimed work
Lacking such an explanation,
event caused or aggravated the claimed condition.15
Dr. Thompson’s opinions are not sufficient to establish a causal relationship between the
employment events of August 15, 2012 and appellant’s diagnosed conditions. As appellant has
not submitted any rationalized medical evidence to support her allegation that she sustained an
injury causally related to duties of her employment on August 15, 2012, she has not met her
burden of proof to establish her claim.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish an
employment-related traumatic injury on August 15, 2012.

14

Id.

15

D.D., Docket No. 13-1517 (issued April 14, 2014).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the December 22, 2015 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: September 9, 2016
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6