United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.H., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Knoxville, TN, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-1421
Issued: November 28, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On June 20, 2012 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a May 4, 2012
nonmerit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) denying his
request for reconsideration. Because more than 180 days has elapsed between the last merit
decision dated July 22, 2011 to the filing of this appeal, the Board lacks jurisdiction to review the
merits of appellant’s claim. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and
20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to review the May 4, 2012 nonmerit
decision.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly refused to reopen appellant’s case for further
review of the merits pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On May 9, 2007 appellant, then a 45-year-old tax compliance officer, filed an
occupational disease claim alleging that on April 11, 2007 he first realized that his allergic
reaction to the handling of paper and ink was employment related. OWCP accepted the claim
for aggravated atopic dermatitis and aggravated allergic rhinitis due to other allergens, which
was expanded to include aggravation of psoriasis. Appellant stopped work on September 10,
2007 and has not returned.
In a November 2, 2009 work capacity evaluation form, Dr. Tidence L. Prince, an
attending physician Board-certified in allergy and immunology, indicated that appellant was
capable of working an eight-hour day with restrictions. He noted that appellant was capable of
working with a computer but could not come into contact with paper as part of his job duties.
On November 10, 2009 OWCP referred appellant for vocational rehabilitation services.
On September 7, 2010 a vocational rehabilitation counselor issued a report summarizing
her efforts to find vocational training or suitable alternate employment for appellant within his
physical restrictions. The vocational counselor recommended five positions listed in the
Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), one of which, a telephone
solicitor, DOT #299.357.014, was within appellant’s restrictions and reasonably reflected his
ability to earn wages. She found that he had the education, skills and training to qualify for job
openings in this occupation and his treating physician had approved these positions.
On November 19, 2010 OWCP issued a notice proposing to reduce his compensation
because the factual and medical evidence established that he was no longer totally disabled and
had the capacity to earn wages as a telephone solicitor, DOT #299.357.014, at the rate of
$323.60 per week, in accordance with the factors outlined at 5 U.S.C. § 8115.2 The position was
based on his work experience, education, medical restrictions and labor market survey. OWCP
gave appellant 30 days to submit evidence if he disagreed with this finding.
By decision dated February 1, 2011, OWCP reduced appellant’s wage-loss compensation
effective February 13, 2011 based on its finding that the position of telephone solicitor
reasonably represented his wage-earning capacity.
In a letter dated February 7, 2011, appellant’s counsel requested a telephonic hearing
before an OWCP hearing representative, which was held on May 10, 2011. At the hearing, he
argued that the selected position was inappropriate as the salary was based on commissions.
By decision dated July 22, 2011, an OWCP hearing representative affirmed the
February 1, 2011 decision. She found no evidence that the salary for the position was based on
commissions.

2

5 U.S.C. § 8115.

2

By letter dated September 28, 2011, counsel requested reconsideration. He provided a
copy of the Board’s decision in M.V., Docket 10-1642 contending that the July 22, 2011 OWCP
decision should be reversed.
By decision dated May 4, 2012, OWCP denied appellant’s application for review on the
grounds that it neither raised substantive legal questions nor included new and relevant evidence
sufficient to require it to review its prior decision. It stated that, while counsel submitted a
decision by the Board, he did not present any argument based on that decision in his
reconsideration request. Thus, the request did not constitute relevant evidence or warrant a merit
review.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
To require OWCP to reopen a case for merit review under section 8128(a) of FECA,3
OWCP’s regulations provide that a claimant must: (1) show that OWCP erroneously applied or
interpreted a specific point of law; (2) advance a relevant legal argument not previously
considered by OWCP; or (3) constitute relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously
considered by OWCP.4 To be entitled to a merit review of an OWCP decision denying or
terminating a benefit, a claimant also must file his or her application for review within one year
of the date of that decision.5 When a claimant fails to meet one of the above standards, OWCP
will deny the application for reconsideration without reopening the case for review on the
merits.6
ANALYSIS
In the present case, the Board finds that appellant has not shown that OWCP erroneously
applied or interpreted a specific point of law; nor did he submit any pertinent and new medical
evidence not previously considered by OWCP.
In support of his request for reconsideration, appellant’s representative submitted a copy
of the Board’s decision in M.V., Docket No. 10-1642 (issued June 15, 2011). He did not
articulate any reason how the M.V. decision was applicable to his case. Appellant did not set

3

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193. Section 8128(a) of FECA provides that the Secretary of Labor may review an award
for or against payment of compensation at any time on his own motion or on application.
4

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3). See J.M., Docket No. 09-218 (issued July 24, 2009); Susan A. Filkins, 57 ECAB
630 (2006).
5

20 C.F.R. § 10.607(a). See S.J., Docket No. 08-2048 (issued July 9, 2009); Robert G. Burns, 57 ECAB
657 (2006).
6

20 C.F.R. § 10.608(b). See Y.S., Docket No. 08-440 (issued March 16, 2009); Tina M. Parrelli-Ball, 57 ECAB
598 (2006).

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forth any argument as to why OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law,
nor did appellant set forth a relevant legal argument not previously considered by OWCP.7
The Board has held that, while reopening of a case may be predicated on a legal premise
not previously considered, such reopening for further review of the merits is not required where
the legal contention does not have a reasonable color of validity.8 OWCP found that appellant
did not present any argument based on the Board decision he referenced in the reconsideration
request. Therefore the argument proffered by him has no reasonable color of validity and does
not serve as a basis for merit review. The Board has held that the submission of evidence which
does not address the particular issue involved in the case does not constitute a basis for reopening
the claim.9
The Board also notes that appellant has not submitted any new medical evidence which
addresses the relevant issue of whether OWCP’s February 1, 2011 decision reducing his
compensation was proper.
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that OWCP did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to reopen appellant’s claim for a review on the merits.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly refused to reopen appellant’s case for further
review of the merits pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

7

See also C.H., Docket No. 12-795 (issued august 21, 2012); Emmit Taylor, Docket No. 03-1178 (issued
July 21, 2004). A request for modification of a wage-earning capacity determination must be distinguished from a
request for reconsideration of a prior decision. It is a request for additional compensation. A request for
modification of a wage-earning capacity determination which is supported by new and relevant evidence requires a
merit review and is not subject to a time limitation.
8

L.T., Docket No. 09-1798 (issued August 5, 2010); L.H., 59 ECAB 253 (2007); Elaine M. Borghini, 57 ECAB
549 (2006); Cleopatra McDougal-Saddler, 50 ECAB 367 (1999).
9

See S.J., supra note 5; D’Wayne Avila, 57 ECAB 642 (2006); David J. McDonald, 50 ECAB 185 (1998).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated May 4, 2012 is affirmed.
Issued: November 28, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, AIRPORT STATION,
Mobile, AL, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 10-2252
Issued: June 15, 2011

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 8, 2010 appellant, through her attorney, filed a timely appeal from an
August 11, 2010 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP)
denying her claim for a schedule award. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1
(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the schedule award
decision.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant is entitled to a schedule award for permanent impairment
of the upper extremities.
FACTUAL HISTORY
This case was previously before the Board. On December 30, 2002 appellant, then a 39year-old rural carrier, filed a claim alleging that she sustained an injury to her left elbow and
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

forearm on that date when she slammed it into a door while loading a tray of flats. OWCP
accepted the claim for a contusion of the left elbow and bilateral lateral epicondylitis. On
December 23, 2003 appellant underwent a Boyd-McLeod procedure on the left elbow and on
July 5, 2005 she underwent a Boyd-McLeod procedure on the right elbow.
On December 19, 2005 Dr. William A. Crotwell, III, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, found that appellant had a 10 percent right upper extremity impairment according to
fifth edition of the American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment (A.M.A., Guides). On December 29, 2004 OWCP’s medical adviser reviewed the
report and noted that she had essentially normal range of motion and no objective evidence of a
loss of grip strength. Dr. Crotwell found that appellant had no impairment of the right or left
upper extremity.
By decision dated January 12, 2006, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for a schedule
award. On March 14, 2006 appellant requested reconsideration and submitted the results of a
December 15, 2005 functional capacity evaluation. OWCP’s medical adviser reviewed the
functional capacity evaluation on May 18, 2006 and asserted that she had a two percent
impairment of the right upper extremity due to loss of strength and no impairment of the left
upper extremity.
By decision dated June 2, 2006, OWCP vacated its January 12, 2006 decision after
finding a conflict between Dr. Crotwell and OWCP’s medical adviser. In a report dated July 14,
2006, Dr. Christo W. Koulisis, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon and impartial medical
examiner, found that appellant had no impairment of the left upper extremity and a two percent
whole person impairment based on her right upper extremity impairment. On October 18, 2006
OWCP requested that he clarify how he applied the fifth edition of the A.M.A., Guides in
reaching his impairment determination.
On January 27, 2007 appellant filed a claim for a schedule award. On April 23, 2007
OWCP’s medical adviser reviewed the evidence and found that she had no impairment of either
upper extremity.
By decision dated May 1, 2007, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for a schedule award
based on the findings of OWCP’s medical adviser.2
In a report dated December 17, 2008, Dr. Crotwell determined that appellant had a 10
percent impairment to each upper extremity according to the fifth edition of the A.M.A., Guides.
OWCP’s medical adviser reviewed the evidence on April 30, 2009 and found that appellant had
no upper extremity impairment.
On May 13, 2009 OWCP informed appellant’s attorney that it had referred Dr. Crotwell’s
report to OWCP’s medical adviser, who found no impairment of either upper extremity.

2

By decision dated August 31, 2007, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for compensation from November 30 to
December 5, 2006, as the medical evidence failed to show that she was disabled from employment.

2

In a May 20, 2010 order remanding case, the Board found that OWCP’s May 13, 2009
correspondence constituted a decision denying appellant’s schedule award claim.3 The Board
remanded the case for OWCP to provide an appropriate decision containing adequate factual
findings and explaining the basis for its denial.
On remand OWCP determined that a conflict existed between Dr. Crotwell and OWCP’s
medical adviser. It referred appellant to Dr. Raymond Fletcher, a Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, for an impartial medical examination.
In an impairment evaluation dated July 7, 2010, Dr. Fletcher reviewed the medical
evidence of record and discussed appellant’s complaints of bilateral elbow pain which increased
with activity. On examination he found no atrophy and measured grip strength on the right as
15, 15 and 10 and the left as 10, 10 and 8. Dr. Fletcher found “moderate subacromial tenderness
with impingement” on the right and bilateral tenderness at the joint line with “mild crepitus at the
radiohumeral joint during passive forearm rotation.” He found normal range of motion of the
bilateral elbows with a “positive long arm extension test referring pain to lateral epicondyle and
dorsal forearm muscle compartments.” Dr. Fletcher determined that appellant had good results
from her bilateral lateral epicondyle debridement with residual impairment. He asserted that her
subjective complaints correlated with “several abnormal musculoskeletal findings” and found
that she provided good effort and cooperation on examination. Dr. Fletcher diagnosed right and
left lateral epicondylitis and a bilateral permanent aggravation of elbow arthrosis. He opined that
appellant reached maximum medical improvement on the right side in December 2004 and for
the left side in July 2006. Citing the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides, Dr. Fletcher concluded
that she had a six percent permanent impairment of each elbow according to Table 15-4 on page
399 of the A.MA., Guides.
On July 20, 2010 OWCP’s medical adviser discussed Dr. Fletcher’s finding that appellant
had a good result from her bilateral lateral elbow releases with full range of motion. He
determined that she had a Class 0 permanent impairment of each upper extremity due to lateral
epicondylitis as there were no objective findings of impairment on examination. The medical
adviser noted that appellant also had no impairment based on loss of range of motion.
By letter dated July 22, 2010, OWCP requested that Dr. Fletcher review OWCP’s
medical adviser’s report and provide the objective findings he relied upon in reaching his
impairment determination. It also requested that he cite to the tables used.
In a supplemental report dated July 27, 2010, Dr. Fletcher diagnosed as employment
related right and left elbow lateral epicondylitis and a permanent aggravation of arthrosis. He
listed the objective findings that he relied upon in reaching his impairment rating as surgical
scars over the lateral epicondyle, tenderness at the joint line, radiohumeral crepitus during
passive forearm rotation, a positive extension test of the long arm with pain referred to the lateral
epicondyle and dorsal forearm and grip strength weakness with good effort. Dr. Fletcher
reaffirmed the impairment determination from his July 7, 2010 report.

3

Order Remanding Case, Docket No. 09-1847 (issued May 20, 2010).

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On July 28, 2010 OWCP’s medical adviser related that Dr. Fletcher merely repeated his
opinion from his prior report and also included in his diagnoses a condition not accepted as
employment related, an aggravation of arthrosis. Dr. Fletcher concurred with the findings of the
medical adviser on July 20, 2010.
By decision dated August 11, 2010, OWCP denied modification of its May 13, 2009
decision. It found that OWCP’s medical adviser’s opinion constituted the weight of the evidence
and established that appellant had no impairment of the right or left upper extremity.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
The schedule award provision of FECA4 and its implementing federal regulations,5 set
forth the number of weeks of compensation payable to employees sustaining permanent
impairment from loss or loss of use, of scheduled members or functions of the body. However,
FECA does not specify the manner in which the percentage of loss shall be determined. For
consistent results and to ensure equal justice under the law for all claimants, OWCP has adopted
the A.M.A., Guides as the uniform standard applicable to all claimants.6 As of May 1, 2009, the
sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides is used to calculate schedule awards.7
The sixth edition requires identifying the impairment class for the diagnosed condition
(CDX), which is then adjusted by grade modifiers based on Functional History (GMFH),
Physical Examination (GMPE) and Clinical Studies (GMCS).8 The net adjustment formula is
(GMFH - CDX) + (GMPE - CDX) + (GMCS - CDX).
Section 8123(a) provides that, if there is disagreement between the physician making the
examination for the United States and the physician of the employee, the Secretary shall appoint
a third physician who shall make an examination.9 When a case is referred to an impartial
medical examiner for the purpose of resolving a conflict, the opinion of such specialist, is
sufficiently well rationalized and based on a prior factual and medical background, must be
given special weight.10 OWCP procedures indicate that referral to OWCP’s medical adviser is
appropriate when a detailed description of the impairment from the attending physician is
obtained. Where a medical conflict is present, it is the impartial medical specialist who should
provide a reasoned opinion as to a permanent impairment to a scheduled member of the body in

4

5 U.S.C. § 8107.

5

20 C.F.R. § 10.404.

6

Id. at § 10.404(a).

7

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Schedule Awards and Permanent Disability Claims,
Chapter 2.808.6.6a (January 2010); see also Part 3 -- Medical, Schedule Awards, Chapter 3.700.2 and Exhibit 1
(January 2010).
8

A.M.A., Guides at 494-531.

9

5 U.S.C. § 8123(a).

10

Barry Neutuch, 54 ECAB 313 (2003); David W. Pickett, 54 ECAB 272 (2002).

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accordance with the A.M.A., Guides.11 OWCP’s medical adviser may review the opinion, but
the resolution of the conflict is the responsibility of the impartial medical examiner.12
ANALYSIS
OWCP accepted that appellant sustained a left elbow contusion and bilateral lateral
epicondylitis due to factors of her federal employment. The appellant underwent left elbow
surgery on December 23, 2003 and right elbow surgery on July 5, 2005.
OWCP determined that a conflict existed between Dr. Crotwell, appellant’s attending
physician and OWCP’s medical adviser regarding whether appellant had a permanent
impairment of the upper extremities. It referred her to Dr. Fletcher for an impartial medical
examination.13 On July 7, 2010 Dr. Fletcher found subacromial tenderness on the right and at
the joint line bilaterally with some creiptus at the radiohumeral joint. He further found a positive
long arm extension test. Dr. Fletcher opined that appellant had a good result from her bilateral
lateral epicondyle debridement surgery but had a resulting impairment. He diagnosed right and
left lateral epicondylitis and a permanent bilateral aggravation of arthrosis. Citing Table 15-4 of
the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides, Dr. Fletcher found that appellant had a six percent
permanent impairment of each elbow.
On July 20, 2010 OWCP’s medical adviser found that appellant had no upper extremity
impairment based on Dr. Fletcher’s finding that she had a good result from her bilateral lateral
releases of the elbows. At OWCP’s request, Dr. Fletcher described the objective findings that he
relied upon in reaching his impairment determination. On July 28, 2010 OWCP’s medical
adviser concurred with the findings by OWCP’s medical adviser on July 20, 2010 that appellant
had no permanent impairment.14
The Board finds that OWCP’s medical adviser improperly substituted his own judgment
for that of the impartial medical examiner. The role of the medical adviser is to verify the
correct application of the A.M.A., Guides. It is the impartial medical specialist, however, who
must resolve the conflict on the degree of permanent impairment in accordance with the A.M.A.,
Guides.15 Although Dr. Fletcher provided a thorough examination and cited to the sixth edition
of the A.M.A., Guides, he did not apply the grade modifiers required to determine the extent of
permanent impairment when using Table 15-4. Consequently, the conflict in medical evidence is
unresolved and the case will be remanded to OWCP to secure a supplemental report from him
11

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, supra note 7, Medical Examinations, Chapter 3.500.5(c) (October 1995).

12

See Thomas J. Fragale, 55 ECAB 619 (2004).

13

OWCP initially referred appellant to Dr. Koulisis for an impartial medical examination; however, Dr. Koulisis
did not respond to its request for clarification.
14

OWCP medical adviser further found that Dr. Fletcher improperly included a nonaccepted condition, that of an
aggravation of arthrosis. However, Dr. Fletcher, the impartial medical examiner, found that the condition was
related to appellant’s work injury.
15

See Richard R. LeMay, 56 ECAB 341 (2005); Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, supra note 7, Medical
Examinations, Chapter 3.500.5(c) (October 1995).

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further explaining his impairment rating consistent with the A.M.A., Guides.16 If Dr. Fletcher is
unable to provide an appropriate opinion, OWCP should refer the case to another impartial
medical examiner.17 After such further development as OWCP deems necessary, it should issue
a de novo decision on the extent of appellant’s permanent impairment.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated August 11, 2010 is set aside and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion of the Board.
Issued: June 15, 2011
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

16

In its July 22, 2010 request for clarification, OWCP primarily asked Dr. Fletcher to provide the objective
findings that he relied upon in reaching his impairment determination.
17

See Nancy Keenan, 56 ECAB 687 (2005).

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
W.L., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY
DEPOT, Tooele, UT, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Apellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 07-2411
Issued: March 4, 2008

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 26, 2007 appellant filed a timely appeal from the September 28, 2006
nonmerit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs which denied his request
for reconsideration. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to
review the denial. The Board has no jurisdiction to review the Office hearing representative’s
September 27, 2005 merit decision affirming the denial of an additional schedule award, as more
than one year has passed from the date of that decision to the date of this appeal.
ISSUE
The issue is whether the Office properly denied appellant’s September 21, 2006 request
for reconsideration.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 24, 1995 appellant, then a 34-year-old maintenance mechanic, filed a claim
alleging that his carpal tunnel condition was a result of his federal employment: “By working as
a mechanic and using tools such an impact wrenches, hammers, pliers, screw drivers, saws and

hand tools, my hands become numb from gripping tools.” The Office accepted his claim for
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and approved surgery. On September 26, 2000 appellant
received a schedule award for a 10 percent permanent impairment to each upper extremity.
On March 7, 2002 appellant advised: “My condition has gradually worsened to the point
where I cannot sleep at night with elbows bent. My forearms and two outside fingers go numb.
Pain in forearms and elbows, [b]oth arms, hurts to rest elbows on any surfaces.” The Office
expanded its acceptance of appellant’s claim to include bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome and
approved surgery on the right.
Appellant filed a claim for a schedule award. He submitted reports from Dr. Ripley J.
Siggard, the orthopedic surgeon, who performed the cubital tunnel surgery and Dr. John F.
Bermen who earlier rated the impairment due to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Siggard
reported and Dr. Bermen agreed, that appellant had a six percent impairment of the right upper
extremity and a two percent impairment on the left upper extremity due to ulnar nerve
involvement at the elbow. Following a second opinion by Dr. Thomas D. Noonan, also an
orthopedic surgeon, an Office medical adviser calculated that appellant had a nine percent
impairment of the right and a four percent impairment on the left due to ulnar nerve involvement
at the elbow.
In a decision dated August 23, 2004, the Office denied appellant’s claim for an additional
schedule award. It explained that impairments found were less than the Office previously
awarded.
In a decision dated September 27, 2005, the Office hearing representative affirmed the
denial of an additional schedule award:
“In this case, the claimant sustained an occupational injury that resulted in
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome with repair as well as bilateral ulnar nerve
syndrome with nerve transposition. The Office initially awarded the claimant 10
percent permanent impairment bilaterally to his upper extremities as a result of his
carpal tunnel condition with surgery. Following surgery to his ulnar nerve,
[appellant] filed a claim for increased permanent impairment.
“While the treating physicians opined that [appellant] had a 26 percent
impairment to the right and a 22 percent impairment to the left, he did not provide
specific detailed findings nor compare these findings to specific tables and charts
in the A.M.A., [American Medical Association] Guides, [to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment] 5th ed. The Office referred the claimant for an evaluation
with Dr. Noonan who concluded that [appellant] had a permanent impairment
because of sensory changes from his ulnar nerve as a result of his condition.
“[Appellant] argued at the hearing that Dr. Noonan’s examination was not
thorough and therefore his report was not representative of his impairment.
However, in reviewing his report, Dr. Noonan discusses his findings in more
detail tha[n] those provided by the treating physician. [Appellant] and
Dr. Bermen argued that Dr. Noonan did not include the impairment for [his]

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carpal tunnel condition only for his ulnar nerve because Dr. Noonan was not
asked to include this condition. I find that, while the Office did not specifically
ask Dr. Noonan if [appellant] had an impairment as a result of the carpal tunnel,
the statement of accepted facts as well as the medical evidence of file clearly
showed that [he] had developed this condition and this was accepted by the
Office. Dr. Noonan’s report states that he reviewed the statement of accepted
facts submitted to him. In addition, the Office requested [appellant] [sic] provide
a diagnosis of all current conditions based on his findings and test results and
Dr. Noonan opined that [appellant] had bilateral cubital syndrome. There was no
mention by Dr. Noonan, nor have the treating physicians for the last several years
diagnosed, continued carpal tunnel syndrome. The Office further requested
Dr. Noonan [to] discuss permanent functional loss to all the compensable areas
permanently impaired. Dr. Noonan responded by only opining that the claimant
currently only has an impairment due to sensory impairment from the ulnar nerve.
There is no evidence in any of the contemporary medical evidence that the
claimant continues to have residuals of the carpal tunnel syndrome or that this
condition continues to result in a permanent impairment. Although Dr. Bermen
states that Dr. Noonan did not consider this, neither Dr. Bermen’s reports nor
Dr. Siggard’s reports discuss any current permanent impairment resulting from
this condition.
“After careful consideration, I find that [the] thorough well-reasoned report of
Dr. Noonan has the weight of the medical opinion and supports that [appellant]
does not have a greater impairment to his upper extremities tha[n] what was
previously awarded.”
Appellant requested reconsideration. In an undated letter received by the Office on
September 21, 2006, appellant expressed his disagreement with the hearing representative’s
decision:
“I feel that the rating from Dr. Noonan is calculated incorrectly only taking into
consideration my ulnar nerve involvement not my whole upper extremity as
explained by my physician Dr. Bermen in his letter dated July 18, 2005. I would
like Dr. Noonan to take into consideration my carpal tunnel rating as well as my
ulnar nerve rating and combine those for total upper extremity rating as did
Dr. Bermen and Dr. Siggard.
“I would appreciate it if you could send me back to Dr. Noonan to have this
calculated correctly.”
In a decision dated September 28, 2006, the Office denied appellant’s request for
reconsideration. It found that his letter neither raised substantive legal questions nor included
new and relevant evidence and was therefore insufficient to warrant a review of the prior
decision.

3

LEGAL PRECEDENT
The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act provides that the Office may review an
award for or against compensation upon application by an employee (or his or her representative)
who receives an adverse decision. The employee shall exercise this right through a request to the
district office. The request, along with the supporting statements and evidence, is called the
“application for reconsideration.”1 An application for reconsideration must be sent within one
year of the date of the Office decision for which review is sought.2
An employee (or representative) seeking reconsideration should send the application for
reconsideration to the address as instructed by the Office in the final decision. The application
for reconsideration, including all supporting documents, must be in writing and must set forth
arguments and contain evidence that either: (1) shows that the Office erroneously applied or
interpreted a specific point of law; (2) advances a relevant legal argument not previously
considered by the Office; or (3) constitutes relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously
considered by the Office.3
A timely request for reconsideration may be granted if the Office determines that the
employee has presented evidence or argument that meets at least one of these standards. If
reconsideration is granted, the case is reopened and the case is reviewed on its merits. Where the
request is timely but fails to meet at least one of these standards, the Office will deny the
application for reconsideration without reopening the case for a review on the merits.4
ANALYSIS
Appellant’s undated request for reconsideration, received by the Office on September 21,
2006, was timely. He made the request within one year of the Office hearing representative’s
September 26, 2005 merit decision affirming the denial of an additional schedule award. The
question, therefore, is whether appellant’s request for reconsideration meets at least one of the
standards for obtaining a merit review of his case.
To support his request, appellant submitted no additional evidence. So he is not entitled
to a merit review of his case under the third standard. Rather, he argued that the Office should
have combined the ratings for his elbows with the ratings for his wrists, but this is not a new
argument. It is the same argument he made to the Office hearing representative. The Office
hearing representative answered this argument in her September 27, 2005 decision by explaining
that there was no contemporary medical evidence that appellant continued to experience
residuals of the carpal tunnel syndrome or that this condition resulted in permanent impairment.
Because appellant simply repeated an argument the Office previously considered, he is not
entitled to a merit review of his case under the second standard.
1

20 C.F.R. § 10.605 (1999).

2

Id. at § 10.607(a).

3

Id. at § 10.606.

4

Id. at § 10.608.

4

Appellant’s request for reconsideration does not show that the Office erroneously applied
or interpreted a specific point of law. He merely repeated his prior argument. He mentions no
specific point of law, nor does appellant show that the Office erroneously applied or interpreted a
specific point of law. For this reason appellant is not entitled to a merit review of his case under
the first standard.
The Board will affirm the Office’s September 28, 2006 decision denying appellant’s
request for reconsideration. His request does not meet at least one of the three standards for
obtaining a merit review of his case.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office properly denied appellant’s September 21, 2006 request
for reconsideration.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 28, 2006 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: March 4, 2008
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.G., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Farmers Branch, TX, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Tim Egbuchunam, for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 15-1251
Issued: October 15, 2015

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 12, 2015 appellant, through her representative, filed a timely appeal from a
February 27, 2015 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of the case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained
an occupational disease in the performance of duty.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 28, 2014 appellant, then a 38-year-old clerk, filed an occupational disease claim
alleging that on July 15, 2014, while performing her duties, she had a sharp, burning, stabbing,
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

electroylic pain from her lower neck to her elbow. She noted being in pain and going to an
emergency room on July 21, 2014 where she was diagnosed with a muscle sprain and taken off
work for three days. Appellant stated that she returned to work on July 25, 2014, but still had
pain such that she left work early and went to the emergency room on July 26, 2014 where she
was diagnosed with a rotator cuff tear. She noted reporting her condition to her manager on
July 15, 2014 during a meeting.
Appellant’s supervisor, N.W., noted that, while appellant alleged reporting the injury to
her on July 15, 2014, she was on leave from July 10 to 15, 2014 and therefore appellant could
not have reported the injury to her. She further indicated that appellant did not report any injury
on that day to the acting supervisor, F.C. N.W. noted meeting with appellant on July 16, 2014 to
discuss tardiness, break and lunch time, and absences. She related that appellant reported being
under a lot of stress and had pains in her back but she never indicated an injury related to her job
duties.
In a statement dated July 21, 2014, appellant indicated that she was under a doctor’s care
from July 21 to 23, 2014 and requested advanced sick leave. She also submitted coworker
statements. In a July 28, 2014 statement, C.B. noted that she had witnessed appellant in pain and
having issues with her shoulders, neck, and back. A July 25, 2014 statement from C.C. noted
that appellant advised her that she was having some discomfort in her shoulders and neck on
July 15, 2014. Appellant reported a sharp burning pain and noted she was using a heating pad
for comfort and ice packs.
Appellant was treated in the emergency room by Dr. Sarah Shoemaker Way, Boardcertified in emergency medicine, on July 21, 2014 for left shoulder pain. Dr. Way diagnosed left
shoulder pain, arthralgia, and muscle strain and noted appellant was off work for three days. In a
note dated July 21, 2014, she noted that appellant was treated on July 21, 2014 and would not be
able to work for three days. Appellant submitted a July 26, 2014 note from a health care
provider with an illegible signature who noted that appellant could return to work on
July 29, 2014.
Appellant was treated by Dr. Kelly D. Alana, a chiropractor, on July 29, 2014 for therapy
and an examination. Dr. Alana took appellant off work on July 29, 2014.
Appellant was seen in an emergency room on July 26, 2014 by Dr. Dirk Perritt, Boardcertified in emergency medicine, for a rotator cuff injury. Dr. Perritt noted that appellant’s
condition was good and discharged her with prescriptions for hydrocodone and prednisone.
By letter dated August 6, 2014, OWCP advised that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that appellant actually experienced the incident alleged to have caused the injury. It
also noted that there was no physician’s opinion as to how work activities caused or aggravated a
medical condition and requested that she provide such an opinion. OWCP asked that appellant
specifically describe the employment-related activities that contributed to her condition, the
frequency of the work, and report any activities outside her employment. It also requested that
the employing establishment provide comments from a knowledgeable supervisor.

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Appellant provided a July 28, 2014 note from Dr. Shamim Khambati, a Board-certified
internist, who treated appellant for left shoulder and arm pain. Dr. Khambati noted that appellant
was excused from work until she saw an orthopedist.
In a July 30, 2014 report, Dr. Ira O. Murchison, an osteopath, noted that appellant
presented with sharp and stabbing pain in the cervical spine, left shoulder, and elbow. He noted
that she worked as a clerk which involved repetitive duties including typing, keyboarding, using
a mouse, grabbing, lifting, holding, and carrying boxes that weighed between 5 and 50 pounds,
restocking supplies on shelves above and below shoulder level. Dr. Murchison noted that
appellant was reaching above her head along with bending and stooping to put supplies away
which involved constant use of hands, wrists, elbows, shoulders, and her neck on a constant basis
eight hours a day five days a week. He noted findings and diagnosed sprain/strain of the cervical
spine, sprain/strain left rotator cuff, impingement syndrome left shoulder, bursitis left shoulder,
cubital tunnel syndrome left elbow, sprain/strain left elbow, sprain/strain left wrist, sprain/strain
left hand, muscle spasms, and left shoulder muscle weakness. Dr. Murchison opined that
appellant sustained injuries to her cervical spine, left shoulder, left elbow, and left wrist/hand
while working as a clerk. He noted that the injury occurred due to the repetitive nature of her job
duties. Dr. Murchison opined that the daily repetitive activities over the past 15 years put wear
and tear on appellant’s neck, shoulder, elbow, wrist, and hand joints and resulted in her injuries.
In a September 3, 2014 duty status report, he noted findings and opined that she was unable to
work from August 25 to September 5, 2014. Appellant also provided reports of diagnostic
testing and records from a rehabilitation facility.
Appellant submitted a statement dated August 30, 2014 and noted on July 15, 2014 while
sitting at her desk performing her duties she received a sharp, burning, stabbing, and electroylic
pain from her lower neck to her mid elbow. She reported her injury to her manager as they were
conducting a meeting together. Appellant reported performing her job for a minimum of 40
hours a week.
The employing establishment provided an outside employment or business activity
request dated January 24, 2013 prepared by appellant which noted that she worked a position
outside the government at Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, Texas as a part-time dispatch operator
beginning January 28, 2013 which connected rooms and doctors in the evenings and nights. The
employing establishment submitted a statement from Gerri Soden, human resources specialist,
dated August 8, 2014 who noted appellant’s manager, N.W., disagreed with appellant’s claimed
date of injury and advised that she was not in the office on July 15, 2014 so appellant could not
have informed her of her injury as she claimed. N.W. noted that appellant’s job duties included
stocking forms but she has not done that job in over a month prior to this claim. The employing
establishment indicated that it received a July 29, 2014 medical form from Centralrehab advising
that appellant was off work and her return was yet to be determined. However, on July 31, 2014
appellant sent a text to N.W. requesting time off to help her daughter move. The employing
establishment submitted a text message from appellant to N.W. dated June l6, 2014 at 7:28 p.m.
regarding the daughter’s move. In an August 12, 2014 statement, N.W. described appellant’s
tasks as mainly sitting at the initial receptionist desk and performing data entry, screening
taxpayers, supplying them with information, offering assistance to taxpayers at the machines
which required her to verbally guide them through computer program, and stock forms.
However, due to office staffing issues the task of offering actual assistance was rare. N.W. noted

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assistance from the male employees in the office was provided with lifting heavy boxes. She
provided a copy of a job description for a clerk.
In a decision dated October 27, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding that the
evidence did not support that the injury or events occurred as alleged.
On November 2 and 25, 2014 appellant requested reconsideration. She submitted a
report from Dr. Murchison dated July 30, 2014, reports of diagnostic testing, and a job
description for a clerk, all previously of record.
The employing establishment submitted a statement from N.W. dated December 15,
2014, who disagreed with appellant’s statement concerning the description of her duties. N.W.
noted appellant’s statement that she consistently stocked shelves in the lobby and storage room
on a daily basis was not accurate. She indicated that while appellant’s manager and acting
manager she stocked the forms in the lobby and storage room every three weeks and appellant
would use a cart to pull out forms to assist in stocking. N.W. never witnessed appellant carrying
boxes, rather she would take out a handful of forms from a box and place them on the cart.
In a decision dated February 27, 2014, OWCP denied modification of the decision dated
October 27, 2014.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim. When an employee claims that he or she sustained an
injury in the performance of duty, he or she must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he
or she experienced a specific event, incident or exposure occurring at the time, place, and in the
manner alleged. Appellant must also establish that such event, incident or exposure caused an
injury.2
An employee’s statement that an injury occurred at a given time and in a given manner is
of great probative value and will stand unless refuted by strong or persuasive evidence.3
Moreover, an injury does not have to be confirmed by eyewitnesses. The employee’s statement,
however, must be consistent with the surrounding facts and circumstances and her subsequent
course of action. An employee has not met his or her burden in establishing the occurrence of an
injury when there are such inconsistencies in the evidence as to cast serious doubt upon the
validity of the claim. Circumstances such as late notification of injury, lack of confirmation of
injury, continuing to work without apparent difficulty following the alleged injury, and failure to
obtain medical treatment may, if otherwise unexplained, cast doubt on an employee’s statement
in determining whether a prima facie case has been established.4
2

See Walter D. Morehead, 31 ECAB 188, 194 (1979) (occupational disease or illness); Max Haber, 19 ECAB
243, 247 (1967) (traumatic injury). See generally John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989); Elaine Pendleton, 40
ECAB 1143 (1989).
3

R.T., Docket No. 08-408 (issued December 16, 2008); Gregory J. Reser, 57 ECAB 277 (2005).

4

Betty J. Smith, 54 ECAB 174 (2002).

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ANALYSIS
Appellant, a clerk, filed an occupational disease claim, alleging that while performing her
duties, she had a sharp, burning, stabbing, electroylic pain from her lower neck to her elbow.
She became aware of the condition on July 15, 2014 but did not stop work at that time. The
Board finds that there are inconsistencies in the evidence which cast serious doubt upon the
validity of the claim.
Appellant indicated that, while performing her duties, she had a sharp, burning, stabbing,
electroylic pain from her lower neck to her elbow, but she did not specifically indicate what
duties she was performing when her condition commenced. She noted reporting her condition to
her manager N.W. on July 15, 2014 during a meeting. However, N.W. noted that appellant
could not have reported the injury to her at that time as she was on leave from July 10
to 15, 2014. She further indicated that appellant did not report an injury on July 15, 2014 to the
acting supervisor. N.W. stated that she did meet with appellant on July 16, 2014 but, while
appellant reported being under a lot of stress and had pains in her back, she did not indicate that
she sustained an injury related to her job duties. Appellant’s statement conflicts with that of
N.W. and she had not provided any statement that seeks to clarify or explain this discrepancy.
Additionally, the employing establishment noted that it received a July 29, 2014 medical
form advising that appellant was off work and her return was yet to be determined, but on
July 31, 2014 appellant sent a text message to N.W. requesting time off to help her daughter
move. This is inconsistent behavior for a person who has sustained a shoulder, neck, and back
injury and also serves to cast serious doubt upon the validity of the claim.
Appellant submitted coworker statements from coworkers C.C. and C.B., but neither
person noted witnessing appellant performing specific duties at a particular time which are
alleged to have caused or contributed to her condition. She also provided numerous medical
records. However, the medical evidence did not provide a clear history of injury consistent with
appellant’s statements. Dr. Murchison noted certain of appellant’s duties and opined that her
condition was employment related, but he did not provide any particulars regarding the history of
injury that appellant reported regarding the onset of her symptoms from July 15 to 25, 2014.
Under these circumstances, the lack of confirmation of the claimed incident and inconsistencies
about the manner of how she was injured cast serious doubt upon the validity of the claim.
For these reasons, the Board finds that appellant has not established that she sustained an
occupational disease in the performance of duty. As appellant has not established that the
claimed work incidents occurred as alleged, it is not necessary for the Board to consider the
medical evidence regarding causal relationship.5 Consequently, she has not met her burden of
proof in establishing her claim.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
5

See S.P., 59 ECAB 184 (2007).

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CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has failed to meet her burden of proof to establish that she
sustained an occupational disease in the performance of duty.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the February 27, 2015 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: October 15, 2015
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
K.F., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, Dulles, VA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 18-0485
Issued: February 18, 2020

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 3, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a November 15, 2017 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a back injury in the
performance of duty on December 21, 2016, as alleged.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On January 8, 2017 appellant, then a 47-year-old transportation security officer, filed a
traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on December 21, 2016, while grabbing the strap
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

of a bag that was stuck on a belt in an x-ray tunnel, she strained her lower back in the performance
of duty. On the reverse side of the claim form a supervisor noted that appellant’s manager received
two separate e-mail notifications from appellant on different dates indicating conflicting dates and
times that the injury was alleged to have occurred.
In a development letter dated January 19, 2017, OWCP informed appellant of the
deficiencies of her claim and requested that she respond to a questionnaire and submit additional
evidence. Appellant was afforded 30 days to provide the requested information. She did not
respond.
By decision dated February 21, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding that she had
not submitted documentation in support of her claim and had not responded to its development
letter of January 19, 2017.
Following OWCP’s decision, appellant submitted medical evidence.
In a note dated December 27, 2016, Dr. Thomas Ball, Board-certified in family medicine,
noted that appellant had been evaluated in his office on that date. He indicated that she should be
able to return to work on January 2, 2016.2 Appellant also submitted a duty status report (Form
CA-17) from Dr. Ball dated December 27, 2016 that diagnosed a low back strain and indicated
that appellant required no restrictions and could return to work on January 1, 2017.
In a note dated January 3, 2017, Dr. Ball indicated that appellant’s absence be excused
through January 6, 2017.
In a note dated January 4, 2017, Dr. Scott Cabazolo, a chiropractor, indicated that appellant
had been under his care for back pain and would be unable to work from January 8 through
21, 2017.
In a note dated January 23, 2017, Dr. Cabazolo requested that appellant be excused from
work from January 22 to 29, 2017 and noted that she could return to work on January 29, 2017
without restrictions. Appellant also submitted Form CA-17 reports from Dr. Cabazolo dated
January 9, 12, and 23, 2017, which diagnosed low back pain and kept her off work
through January 29, 2017.
On March 4, 2017 appellant requested a telephonic hearing before OWCP’s Branch of
Hearings and Review. With her request, she submitted a report, dated December 27, 2016 from
Dr. Ball, which noted a diagnosis of back pain.
In a letter dated March 4, 2017, appellant explained that she had not received a
development letter from OWCP. She stated that she had submitted medical evidence to the
employing establishment for submission to the record, including reports from her physicians.

2
The Board notes that the return to work date is a typographical error and should have been noted as
January 2, 2017.

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The hearing was held on September 12, 2017. Appellant stated that there had been a mixup regarding the date of injury as she had thought December 21, 2016 was a Wednesday, but that
it was a Tuesday. She explained that she had initially filled out her Form CA-1 claiming a
traumatic injury on December 25, 2016, but that the claimed injury had occurred on
December 21, 2016. Appellant stated that she must have listed the date of injury as December 22,
2016 in her e-mail because she could not remember the appropriate day of the week. The hearing
representative asked directly if the injury occurred on December 21, 2016 and appellant answered
that it had. He asked when she had reported the injury, and appellant responded that she had told
someone that she was hurt on December 21, 2016 and that she had subsequently reported it to a
supervisor on December 27, 2016. Appellant reiterated that she had not received a development
letter from OWCP requesting further documentation. The hearing representative afforded 30 days
for the submission of additional evidence to the record.
In a report dated December 27, 2016, Dr. Ball examined appellant for complaints of back
pain. He noted that the onset of the low back pain followed an incident at work in which appellant
reached to pull a backpack out of an x-ray machine and felt a “tweak” in her back at that time,
which became sore on the evening of incident. Dr. Ball noted that she had back pain for five days.
He also noted that appellant was off work for two days following the incident and that, two days
before his examination, she had returned to work, experiencing increased pain in her lower back.
On examination Dr. Ball noted no swelling, pain, or deformities of appellant’s spine, with full
range of motion, a negative crossed straight leg raising test, and no paraspinous muscle spasm. He
diagnosed low back strain due to a pulling injury at work on December 22, 2016.
On October 4, 2017 the employing establishment noted discrepancies in e-mail
correspondence between appellant and her supervisors as well as her testimony at the hearing
regarding the date of her claimed injury and provided the e-mail correspondence it had referenced.
It stated that, while appellant had identified her date of injury as a Tuesday at the hearing,
December 21, 2016 was a Wednesday. OWCP further noted that, while appellant stated that she
reported her injury to a supervisor on December 27, 2016, she had e-mailed a supervisor regarding
her injury on December 22, 2016. The employing establishment attached an e-mail from appellant
to a supervisor dated Thursday, December 22, 2016 in which she wrote, “Sorry I couldn’t make it
in today but on Monday I tweaked my lower back divesting.” In an e-mail dated December 29,
2016, a supervisor told appellant that she would need to make a correction on her form, as she had
previously claimed that she hurt her back divesting on Monday, December 19, 2016. In an e-mail
dated December 29, 2016, appellant stated that she mixed up the date and that she had been injured
on Wednesday, December 21, 2016.
By decision dated November 15, 2017, the hearing representative affirmed OWCP’s
February 21, 2017 decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable

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time limitation period of FECA,3 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty, as
alleged, and that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally
related to the employment injury.4 These are the essential elements of each and every
compensation claim, regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an
occupational disease.5
To determine whether an employee sustained a traumatic injury in the performance of duty,
OWCP begins with an analysis of whether fact of injury has been established.6 Fact of injury
consists of two components that must be considered conjunctively. First, the employee must
submit sufficient evidence to establish that he or she actually experienced the employment incident
that is alleged to have occurred.7 Second, the employee must submit sufficient medical evidence
to establish that the employment incident caused a personal injury.8
An employee’s statement that an injury occurred at a given time and in a given manner is
of great probative value and will stand unless refuted by strong or persuasive evidence.9 Moreover,
an injury does not have to be confirmed by eyewitnesses. The employee’s statement, however,
must be consistent with the surrounding facts and circumstances and his or her subsequent course
of action. An employee has not met his or her burden of proof to establish the occurrence of an
injury when there are such inconsistencies in the evidence as to cast serious doubt upon the validity
of the claim. Circumstances such as late notification of injury, lack of confirmation of injury,
continuing to work without apparent difficulty following the alleged injury, and failure to obtain
medical treatment may, if otherwise unexplained, cast doubt on an employee’s statement in
determining whether a prima facie case has been established.10
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a back injury in the
performance of duty on December 21, 2016, as alleged.

3

S.B., Docket No. 17-1779 (issued February 7, 2018); J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB
153 (1989).
4
J.M., Docket No. 17-0284 (issued February 7, 2018); R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40
ECAB 312 (1988).
5

K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016); L.M., Docket No. 13-1402 (issued February 7, 2014);
Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).
6

D.B., Docket No. 18-1348 (issued January 4, 2019); T.H., 59 ECAB 388, 393-94 (2008).

7
C.B., Docket No. 18-0071 (issued May 13, 2019); D.S., Docket No. 17-1422 (issued November 9, 2017); Elaine
Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).
8

B.M., Docket No. 17-0796 (issued July 5, 2018); John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989).

9

M.S., Docket No. 18-0059 (issued June 12, 2019); D.B., 58 ECAB 464, 466-67 (2007).

10

D.R., Docket No. 19-0072 (issued June 24, 2019).

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While appellant provided conflicting evidence as to the day of the week on which her
claimed injury occurred, that discrepancy is found to be insufficient to cast serious doubt as to the
claimed employment incident alleged in her claim. Appellant indicated in her first e-mail to a
supervisor on Thursday, December 22, 2016 that she had injured her back on Monday,
December 19, 2016. Dr. Ball reported in one report that the incident had occurred on
December 22, 2016. Shortly, after her initial e-mail, she corrected the date of injury to
December 21, 2016. The Board finds that these inconsistencies are insufficient to cast serious
doubt as to whether the specific event or incident occurred at the time, place, and in the manner
alleged. Appellant has otherwise consistently alleged an injury in the performance of duty on
December 21, 2016. Her Form CA-1 listed December 21, 2016 as the date of injury. Due to the
initial discrepancy in her initial e-mail, appellant clarified to her supervisor in an e-mail dated
December 29, 2016 that she had been incorrect as to the day, but she was alleging an injury on
Wednesday, December 21, 2016. Her notification to the employing establishment of her injury
occurred in a timely manner and she obtained medical treatment, submitting a report with a
diagnosis of low back strain from Dr. Ball dated December 27, 2016. Appellant provided notes
from physicians as to dates of disability from work consistent with a contemporaneous
employment injury. Finally, she sufficiently explained that she had been incorrect as to the day of
the week on which her claimed injury had occurred.
The Board finds that, although OWCP claimed inconsistencies in the record, they are
insufficient to cast serious doubt as to whether the event of December 21, 2016 occurred as alleged.
As such, appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that the employment incident of
December 21, 2016 occurred as alleged.
As appellant has established that the December 21, 2016 employment incident occurred as
alleged, further consideration of the medical evidence is necessary.11 Therefore, the case will be
remanded to OWCP to evaluate the medical evidence and determine whether she has met her
burden of proof to establish a medical condition causally related to the accepted December 21,
2016 employment incident.12 Following such further development as deemed necessary, OWCP
shall issue a de novo decision.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an employment
injury in the performance of duty on December 21, 2016, as alleged. The Board further finds that
the case is not in posture for decision with regard to causal relationship between her claimed back
conditions and the accepted December 21, 2016 employment incident.

11

D.C., Docket No. 19-0716 (issued September 13, 2019); M.D., Docket No. 18-1365 (issued March 12, 2019).

12
D.C., id.; A.R., Docket No. 18-0924 (issued August 13, 2019); Constance G. Patterson, 41 ECAB 206 (1989);
Thelma S. Buffington, 34 ECAB 104 (1982).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the November 15, 2017 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this decision of the Board.
Issued: February 18, 2020
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees' Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees' Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees' Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.K., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Newark, NJ, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 20-1574
Issued: June 23, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 4, 2020 appellant filed a timely appeal from a May 7, 2020 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to
consider the merits of this case.2
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether OWCP properly determined that appellant received an
overpayment of compensation in the amount of $11,556.62 for which she was without fault,
because she concurrently received FECA wage-loss compensation and Social Security
Administration (SSA) age-related retirement benefits for the period September 1, 2014 through
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

2
The Board notes that, following the May 7, 2020 decision, appellant submitted additional evidence. However,
the Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record
that was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the
Board for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this
additional evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.

March 30, 2019, without an appropriate offset; (2) whether appellant received an overpayment of
compensation for the period September 1, 2014 through March 30, 2019 for which she was without
fault because OWCP did not make proper deductions for life insurance premiums; (3) whether
OWCP properly denied waiver of recovery of the overpayment; and (4) whether it properly
required recovery of the overpayment by deducting $305.53 from appellant’s continuing
compensation payments every 28 days.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 6, 1996 appellant then a 45-year-old clerk, filed a traumatic injury claim (Form
CA-1) alleging that on June 25, 1996 she sustained an injury to the right-side of her neck when
lifting a tray of mail while in the performance of duty. OWCP accepted her claim for aggravation
of cervical sprain and later expanded the acceptance of her claim to include prolonged depressive
reaction.3 Appellant stopped work on June 25, 1996. OWCP paid her wage-loss compensation on
the periodic rolls beginning August 10, 1996. Appellant was paid on the supplemental rolls
beginning May 21, 2002. Beginning June 16, 2002, OWCP paid appellant pursuant to a loss of
wage-earning capacity determination through July 7, 2007 and placed her back on the periodic
rolls effective August 5, 2007.
On December 14, 2012 OWCP informed appellant that section 8116(d)(2) of FECA
(5 U.S.C. § 8116(d)(2)) required that the claimant’s continuing compensation benefits be reduced
if she begins receiving SSA retirement benefits based upon her age and federal service. Because
appellant was approaching her 62nd birthday, the minimum age at which an individual is eligible
to receive SSA retirement benefits, it was notifying her of this requirement. OWCP further noted
that failure to report receipt of such retirement benefits could result in an overpayment of
compensation that could be subject to recovery.
In a letter dated August 7, 2014, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) notified
OWCP that appellant was eligible to continue Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance (FEGLI)
coverage. It requested that OWCP deduct for code “C0: Basic” with no reduction. OPM noted
that the commencing date for the post-retirement deduction was April 12, 2008. It noted that
appellant had elected to cancel Option B and Option C coverage, effective March 1, 2014, and
referenced her letter dated February 26, 2014.4 OPM noted that her final salary upon which FEGLI
was based was $52,191.00. It further noted that OWCP was not withholding for the Post
Retirement Basic Life Insurance (PRBLI) no reduction coverage.
In an internal memorandum dated August 8, 2014, OWCP requested that deductions be
made for code C0. It indicated that OPM had advised that life insurance coverage should be
continued past age 65 for this claimant and that appellant’s final salary upon which FEGLI was
based was $52,191.00. The PRBLI was “No Reduction” coverage. OPM further noted that the

3

Appellant filed another claim for an injury sustained on January 10, 1995, which OWCP accepted for sprain of
the neck under OWCP File No. xxxxxx166. This case is closed. OWCP administratively combined File Nos.
xxxxxx005 and xxxxxx166, with the current claim serving as the master file
4

In a letter dated February 26, 2014, appellant elected to cancel her optional life insurance and retain only the basic
life insurance.

2

commencing date for the postretirement deduction was April 12, 2008 and that the claimant
elected to cancel Option B and Option C coverage, effective March 1, 2014.5
In a letter dated September 17, 2014, OPM notified OWCP that appellant was eligible to
continue FEGLI coverage. It requested that OWCP deduct for code “C0 Basic.” OPM noted that
the commencement date for the postretirement amended deductions was September 1, 2014. It
further noted that appellant had elected to change to 75 percent reduction of her Basic Life
Insurance and cancel all other insurance. OPM also noted that appellant’s final salary upon which
FEGLI was based was $52,191.00.
In an internal memorandum dated September 17, 2014, OWCP again requested that
deductions be made for code “C0.” It indicated that OPM had advised that life insurance coverage
should be continued past age 65 for this claimant and that appellant’s final salary, upon which
FEGLI was based, was $52,191.00. The PRBLI was 75 percent reduction coverage. OPM also
noted that the commencement date for the postretirement deduction was September 1, 2014. The
memorandum further indicated that OPM had received written notification from the claimant that,
effective immediately, she requested to change to 75 percent reduction of her Basic Life Insurance
and cancel all other insurance she may have.
On EN1032 forms dated December 25, 2014, December 16, 2015, December 7, 2016,
January 11, 2018, and January 4, 2019, appellant indicated that she was not in receipt of Social
Security disability benefits.
On January 27, 2015 OWCP sent a FERS/SSA dual benefits calculation form to SSA.
On January 28, 2015 OWCP received a FERS/SSA dual benefits calculation form from
SSA wherein SSA advised that appellant had not applied for SSA benefits.
On January 28, 2019 OWCP sent a FERS/SSA dual benefits calculation form to SSA.
On March 22, 2019 SSA submitted a completed FERS/SSA dual benefits calculation form,
which indicated SSA benefit rates with a FERS offset and without a FERS offset from
December 2016 through December 2018. Beginning December 2016, the SSA rate with FERS
was $1,441.30 and without FERS was $812.90. Beginning December 2017, the SSA rate with
FERS was $1,470.10 and without FERS was $829.10. Beginning December 2018, the SSA rate
with FERS was $1,511.20 and without FERS was $852.30.
In an April 19, 2019 referral note, OWCP requested a fiscal review and indicated that the
claimant received an overpayment of compensation due to FERS offset. It noted preparing two
memoranda: one for the period December 1, 2016 through March 30, 2019 and the other for the
period September 1, 2014 through March 30, 2019 set out in the paragraphs below. OWCP noted
that the claimant was owed compensation for making zero reduction PRBLI instead of 75 percent
reduction. It indicated that “technically” the period should be December 1, 2016 through
March 30, 2019 since FERS was effective December 1, 2016. OWCP indicated that “the OP
5

In a notice dated September 17, 2014, OWCP informed appellant that certain claimants were inadvertently
underpaid compensation due to an over deduction of life insurance premiums. Appellant was identified as a claimant
who had benefits over deducted and would be reimbursed for the underpaid amount of compensation benefits.

3

amount would be higher and we’d have to issue direct payment for 9/1/14 – 11/30/16.” It requested
guidance as to whether a direct payment should be issued.
On April 19, 2019 OWCP prepared an overpayment calculation memorandum from
December 1, 2016 through March 30, 2019. From November 13 through December 10, 2016,
appellant received net compensation of $2,705.16. OWCP calculated that from the period
December 1 through 10, 2016 appellant received $966.13. For the period of December 11, 2016
through March 30, 2019, she received a net amount of $83,658.29. For the period December 1,
2016 through March 30, 2019, appellant received a total of $84,624.42. OWCP indicated that for
the same period appellant should have received $70,074.07 with FERS offset and 75 percent
reduction of PRBLI. It calculated that the overpayment amount was $14,550.35.
On April 19, 2019 OWCP prepared another overpayment calculation memorandum from
September 1, 2014 through March 30, 2019. From August 24 through September 20, 2014,
appellant received net compensation of $2,690.47. OWCP calculated that from the period
September 1 through 20, 2014, appellant received net compensation of $1,921.76. For the period
September 21, 2014 through March 30, 2019, appellant received a net amount of $161,958.11. For
the period September 1, 2014 through March 30, 2019, she received a total of $163,879.87.
OWCP indicated that, for the same period, appellant should have received $152,323.25 with FERS
offset and 75 percent reduction of PRBLI. The overpayment amount was calculated as $11,556.62.
In a FERS offset calculation worksheet received on April 19, 2019, OWCP noted the
calculation of appellant’s SSA offset overpayment from December 1, 2016 through March 30,
2019 and computed a total overpayment amount of $17,832.29. This form indicated: from
December 1, 2016 through November 30, 2017, appellant received an overpayment of
compensation in the amount of $7,540.80; from December 1, 2017 through November 30, 2018,
she received an overpayment of compensation in the amount of $7,692.00; and from December 1,
2018 through March 30, 2019, appellant received an overpayment of compensation in the amount
of $2,599.49.
On June 3, 2019 OWCP issued a preliminary overpayment determination, finding that an
overpayment of compensation in the amount of $11,556.62 had been created because appellant
received SSA age-related retirement benefits from September 1, 2014 through March 30, 2019
that were partially based on credits earned while working in the Federal Government, which
constituted a prohibited dual benefit, and incorrect life insurance reduction was applied as of
September 1, 2014. It determined that she was without fault in the creation of the overpayment.
OWCP requested that appellant submit a completed overpayment recovery questionnaire (Form
OWCP-20) to determine a reasonable payment method, and advised her that she could request
waiver of recovery of the overpayment. It further requested that she provide supporting financial
documentation, including copies of income tax returns, bank account statements, bills, canceled
checks, pay slips, and any other records, which support income and expenses. Additionally,
OWCP provided her with an overpayment action request form and further notified her that, within
30 days of the date of the letter, she could request a telephone conference, a final decision based
on the written evidence, or a prerecoupment hearing.
On June 27, 2019 appellant completed an overpayment action request form and requested
that OWCP make a decision based on the written evidence. She noted disagreement that an
overpayment occurred and the amount of the overpayment and requested waiver of recovery of
4

the overpayment because she was found to be without fault in its creation. Appellant attached
financial information including bank statements, benefit statements, automobile expenses, and
medical expenses.
In a partially completed Form OWCP-20 dated June 27, 2019, appellant reported cash on
hand of $60.00, a checking account balance of $2,192.06, and a savings account balance of
$1,700.00. She did not provide information on monthly income, reported expenses, or monthly
installment loans.
By decision dated May 7, 2020, OWCP finalized the preliminary overpayment
determination, finding that appellant had received an overpayment of compensation in the amount
of $11,556.62, for the period September 1, 2014 through March 30, 2019, because it failed to offset
her compensation payments by the portion of her SSA age-related retirement benefits that were
attributable to her federal service and applied an incorrect life insurance reduction as of
September 1, 2014. It further found that she was without fault in the creation of the overpayment,
but denied waiver of recovery of the overpayment because the evidence of record failed to establish
that recovery of an overpayment would defeat the purpose of FECA or be against equity and good
conscience. OWCP required recovery of the overpayment by deducting $305.53 from appellant’s
continuing compensation payments every 28 days.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
Section 8102(a) of FECA provides that the United States shall pay compensation for the
disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the
performance of his or her duty.6 Section 8116 limits the right of an employee to receive
compensation. While an employee is receiving compensation, he or she may not receive salary,
pay, or remuneration of any type from the United States.7
Section 10.421(d) of OWCP’s implementing regulations requires OWCP to reduce the
amount of compensation by the amount of any SSA age-related retirement benefits that are
attributable to the employee’s federal service.8 FECA Bulletin No. 97-09 states that FECA
benefits have to be adjusted for the FERS portion of SSA benefits because the portion of the SSA
age-related retirement benefits earned as a federal employee is part of the FERS retirement
package, and the receipt of FECA benefits and federal retirement concurrently is a prohibited dual
benefit.9
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant received an overpayment
of compensation for the period December 1, 2016 through March 30, 2019 for which she was
without fault, because she concurrently received FECA wage-loss compensation and SSA age6

5 U.S.C. § 8102(a).

7

Id. at § 8116.

8

20 C.F.R. § 10.421(d); see S.M., Docket No. 17-1802 (issued August 20, 2018).

9

FECA Bulletin No. 97-09 (February 3, 1997); see also N.B., Docket No. 18-0795 (issued January 4, 2019).

5

related retirement benefits for the period September 1, 2014 through March 30, 2019, without an
appropriate offset.
OWCP paid appellant wage-loss compensation for total disability following her injury. It
subsequently paid her wage-loss compensation for partial disability pursuant to a loss of wageearning capacity determination from June 16, 2002 through July 7, 2007 and placed her back on
the periodic rolls effective August 5, 2007. Beginning December 1, 2016, appellant received SSA
age-related retirement benefits. As noted, a claimant cannot receive compensation for wage-loss
compensation and SSA age-related retirement benefits attributable to federal service for the same
period.10 The information provided by SSA indicated that a portion of appellant’s SSA age-related
retirement benefits were attributable to her federal service. As OWCP neglected to offset her
FECA benefits for the period December 1, 2016 through March 30, 2019, she received an
overpayment of wage-loss compensation.11 Therefore, fact of overpayment is established.12
Although the Board finds that the fact of overpayment has been established with regard to
appellant concurrently receiving FECA wage-loss compensation and SSA age-related retirement
benefits, the Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision with respect to the amount of
the overpayment.
OWCP identified a second overpayment due to the application of an incorrect life insurance
deduction. Appellant had elected to change to 75 percent reduction of her Basic Life Insurance
and cancel all other insurance. The commencement date for the post-retirement amended
deductions was September 1, 2014. However, OWCP failed to clearly separate the two distinct
overpayments that were identified and did not properly explain how the amount of each
overpayment was derived. The record reveals that the incorrect life insurance reduction
commenced on September 1, 2014. However, the period of concurrent receipt of SSA age-related
benefits and compensation for wage loss began on December 1, 2016.
The Board has held that, in overpayment cases, it is essential that OWCP provide the
recipient of compensation with a clear statement showing how the overpayment was calculated.13
OWCP received documentation from SSA with respect to the specific amount of agerelated SSA retirement benefits that were attributable to federal service. SSA provided the SSA
rate with FERS and without FERS for specific periods commencing December 1, 2016 through
March 30, 2019. As noted, the record establishes that appellant received SSA age-related
retirement benefits, which were attributable to her federal service.
Based on the rates provided by SSA, OWCP calculated the overpayment of compensation
by determining the portion of SSA benefits that were attributable to appellant’s federal service.
After calculating the amount that it should have offset for each relevant period based on the SSA
worksheet and adding these amounts together, it concluded that she had received an overpayment
10

20 C.F.R. § 10.421(d); see S.M., supra note 16; A.C., Docket No. 18-1550 (issued February 21, 2019).

11

Id.

12

See K.H., Docket No. 18-0171 (issued August 2, 2018).

13

J.M., Docket No. 18-1505 (issued June 21, 2019); Teresa A. Ripley, 56 ECAB 528 (2005).

6

of compensation in the amount of $17,832.29. OWCP then found, however, without explanation,
that the total amount of the overpayment was $11,556.62 for the period September 1, 2014 through
March 30, 2019, because it failed to offset her compensation payments by the portion of her SSA
age-related retirement benefits that were attributable to her federal service and applied an incorrect
life insurance reduction as of September 1, 2014. It did not explain the discrepancy between the
overpayment amount calculated of $17,832.29 and the final overpayment determination calculated
of $11,556.62. Further, OWCP did not clearly address what portion of the $11,556.62
overpayment was attributed to the concurrent receipt of FECA wage-loss compensation and SSA
age-related retirement benefits and what portion was due to OWCP’s failure to not make proper
deductions for life insurance premiums.
A claimant is entitled to an overpayment decision that clearly explains how the amount
was calculated.14 The Board will, therefore, remand the case for OWCP to explain its calculation
of the amount of the overpayment.
On remand OWCP shall prepare detailed calculations setting forth how it determined the
overpayment. It shall then issue a new preliminary overpayment determination, along with an
overpayment action request, Form OWCP-20, and instructions for appellant to provide supporting
financial information.15 After this and other such further development as deemed necessary,
OWCP shall issue a de novo decision.16
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant received an overpayment of wage-loss compensation from
December 1, 2016 through March 30, 2019 for which she was without fault because she
concurrently received FECA wage-loss compensation and SSA age-related retirement benefits

14

R.B., Docket No. 20-0022 (issued October 28, 2020); O.R., 59 ECAB 432 (2008).

15

See L.K., Docket No. 20-0416 (issued November 12, 2020).

16

In light of the Board’s disposition of Issue 1, Issues 2, 3, and 4 are rendered moot.

7

without an appropriate offset. The Board further finds, however, that the case is not in posture for
decision regarding the amount of the overpayment.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 7, 2020 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is affirmed in part and set aside in part and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this decision of the Board.
Issued: June 23, 2021
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8