United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
T.D., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Philadelphia, PA, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Thomas R. Uliase, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 06-1087
Issued: May 1, 2007

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 4, 2006 appellant filed an appeal from decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated March 7 and November 7, 2005 which denied that she sustained a
recurrence of disability. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction
over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant sustained a recurrence of disability on January 18, 2005
causally related to her March 26, 1985 employment injury. On appeal, she contends that she
stopped work because her light duty was withdrawn and she was working beyond her medical
restrictions.
FACTUAL HISTORY
This case has previously been before the Board. In a December 3, 2002 decision, the
Board affirmed a May 16, 2002 Office decision which found that appellant had not established a
recurrence of disability on March 14, 2002. It set aside a June 4, 2002 decision on the grounds

that properly submitted medical evidence had not been reviewed by the Office.1 The law and the
facts of the previous Board decision are incorporated herein by reference.
Subsequent to the Board’s decision, on February 13, 2003 appellant filed a recurrence
claim. She stated that she was still working but because of overuse of her left upper extremity,
her right upper extremity had been injured. In a merit decision dated March 31, 2003, the Office
found that appellant had not established a recurrence of disability. In March 2003, the Office
referred her to Dr. Tim Lachman, a Board-certified neurologist, for a second opinion evaluation.
In reports dated April 25 and May 1, 2003, Dr. Lachman diagnosed right lateral epicondylitis,
reduced cervical range of motion from a nonemployment-related 1982 automobile accident and
residual numbness of fingers four and five from ulnar neuropathy at the elbow. He advised that
appellant could continue with her current job.
Appellant continued to submit reports from an attending neurologist, Dr. Sondra M.
DeAntonio, and on July 20, 2004 accepted a limited mail handler position for four hours a day.
The job description indicated that she was to check that employees’ identification badges were
worn properly in the truck terminal annex and processing and distribution center. Physical
restrictions were that she not use either arm, not lift over five pounds with no bending, stooping,
reaching over the shoulders or repetitive activities of the upper extremities and no exposure to
extreme temperatures and no work around fans, cold air or drafts.
On January 18, 2005 appellant submitted a recurrence claim and stopped work. In an
attached statement, she reported that she could not continue to work due to constant pain which
also made it difficult to perform everyday tasks, and caused sleeplessness and inability to
concentrate. Appellant submitted a January 17, 2005 report in which Dr. DeAntonio advised that
appellant’s pain symptoms had worsened and her condition had progressed to a complex regional
pain syndrome which involved both upper extremities. Dr. DeAntonio also noted a history of
cervical radiculopathy and disc disease that occurred subsequent to the 1980s motor vehicle
accident, appellant’s report that movement exacerbated her symptoms, right lateral ulnar
chondritis and median nerve dysfunction at the wrist. Findings on examination included
decreased upper extremity strength and sensory deficit. Electromyography (EMG) examination
was reported as abnormal with evidence of compression neuropathy of the ulnar nerve on the
left, bilateral median nerve dysfunction at the wrist and findings consistent with C5-6
radiculopathy. Dr. DeAntonio recommended that appellant stop work, stating that her work
restrictions had not been followed. In a January 17, 2005 work capacity evaluation, she stated
that appellant could not work due to progressive worsening of a complex regional pain syndrome
and ulnar compression neuropathy with developing cervical myelomalacia.
By letter dated February 9, 2005, the Office informed appellant of the evidence needed to
support her claim. On February 14, 2005 it referred her to Dr. Steven Mandel, a Board-certified
neurologist.2
1

Docket No. 02-1819 (issued December 3, 2002). The accepted conditions at that time were strains of the neck
and left shoulder and cubital ulnar palsy of the left elbow.
2

Dr. Mandel was furnished with the medical record, a set of questions and a statement of accepted facts with a
job description that indicated that right lateral epicondylitis was also an accepted condition.

2

In a statement dated February 16, 2005, appellant described her job history and stated that
her most recent limited-duty job was to check employee badges and deliver small letters which
consisted of walking throughout all five floors of the building and occasionally required her to
open doors which, she stated, was not in accordance with her medical restrictions and that she
stopped work on the advice of her physician. She submitted Dr. DeAntonio’s January 17, 2005
EMG study and a disability slip dated that day in which she advised that appellant could not
work. In a report dated February 23, 2005, Dr. DeAntonio reiterated her opinion that appellant
had a complex regional pain syndrome that had worsened, noting her complaints of worsening
left upper extremity and low back pain, weakness and atrophy with positive EMG findings. She
stated that, as described by appellant, her job duties exceeded her restrictions, but that she could
work four hours a day at a sedentary position. Dr. DeAntonio also submitted a March 1, 2005
report in which Dr. D. Greg Anderson, Board-certified in orthopedic surgery, noted appellant’s
history that her neck complaints began after a motor vehicle accident in approximately 1982 and
that her current complaint was of progressive weakness in her arms and legs with difficulty in
balance and ambulating and with fine motor activities of her hands. He reported that appellant
“says pain is really not the major problem, although she does have some intermittent pain that
radiates in the right shoulder to the arm” and some mild low back pain, “but nothing of a severe
nature.” Findings on examination included mild neck tenderness with a shooting sensation into
the upper spinal region but near normal neck range of motion and 5/5 upper extremity strength
except for wrist flexors which were 4/5. Dr. Anderson stated that on examination she became
very unbalanced, and noted that a January 22, 2005 cervical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
scan demonstrated age appropriate degenerative changes with slight subluxation at C6-7 and a
positive upright T2 weighted signal within the substance of the spinal cord which could be
consistent with myelomalacia or a demyelinating cord process. Cervical spine x-rays
demonstrated focal kyphosis at C6-7 which he suspected was due to her past injury.
Dr. Anderson diagnosed cervical myelopathy and recommended a cervical collar and further
neurologic workup.
In a report dated March 1, 2005, Dr. Mandel noted his review of the statement of
accepted facts and the medical record and appellant’s report that she could not perform her
limited duty because of extreme temperatures, that she could not stand and walk for four hours
because her arms hurt, that she ached all over when walking around, and that she had difficulty
opening doors, including the door to the ladies room with pain around both regions of the elbows
going down to the fourth and fifth fingers of the left hand. He stated that she continued to drive
and dress herself. Physical examination demonstrated no evidence of muscle atrophy and
bilateral positive Tinel’s signs. Dr. Mandel noted diffuse weakness in the left hand that did not
follow any specific nerve root or peripheral nerve pattern with tremulousness and reduced
sensation in both median and ulnar distributions. No weakness or sensory loss was present on
the right. Dr. Mandel opined that appellant had no evidence to indicate a complex regional pain
syndrome and diagnosed employment-related bilateral ulnar neuropathy and left carpal tunnel
syndrome. In answer to specific questions, he advised that appellant was capable of performing
her limited-duty job for four hours a day, five days a week, with a lifting restriction of five
pounds. In an attached work capacity evaluation dated March 25, 2005, Dr. Mandel reiterated
his diagnoses, advised that she could work 4 hours a day, and provided restrictions that she could
sit, stand and walk for 8 hours a day, reach, twist and drive for 2 hours a day, push, pull and lift

3

five pounds for 4 hours a day, could not repetitively move her wrists or elbows, should not climb
a ladder and should have a 15-minute break every 4 hours.
In a March 22, 2005 statement, the employing establishment advised that appellant’s
assigned limited-duty job required her to walk throughout the postal facility to monitor
compliance of wearing identification badges from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. daily and noted that
there were few doors except at the elevators. Two or three times a week appellant would have to
deliver a letter to an office with a normal office door. She was not required to reach above her
shoulders, lift, push or pull, was not assigned to sort mail, work with equipment or write
anything and could stroll through the building at her own pace. Twice a day appellant would
carry a bundle of mail weighing less than one pound to another department, was allowed a break
at noon and essentially stopped work at 1:45 pm.
By decision dated March 7, 2005, the Office found that the opinion of Dr. Mandel
represented the weight of medical opinion and that appellant did not establish that she sustained
a recurrence of disability on January 18, 2005.
On March 22, 2005 appellant, through counsel, requested a hearing that was changed to a
request for a review of the written record. She submitted a report dated December 22, 2004 in
which Dr. DeAntonio stated that she reported that her job entailed going in and out of many
doors and noted her complaints of significant hand, arm and shoulder pain. Upper extremity
examination demonstrated sensory and motor deficits bilaterally. Dr. DeAntonio diagnosed
ulnar compression neuropathy and complex regional pain syndrome of both upper extremities.
She advised, “it seems that her condition has worsened. In particular, this is likely because work
restrictions have not been observed.” Dr. DeAntonio recommended further evaluation. In a
July 25, 2005 report, she reiterated her previous findings and conclusions and also noted that
appellant’s workplace was very cold which indicated that her work restrictions were not being
met. Dr. DeAntonio noted cervical MRI scan findings of a bulging disc at C5 and C6-7 with
myelomalacia at T2, as confirmed by repeat study with gadolinium. She concluded that
appellant should work at a sedentary occupation for 20 hours a week with no repetitive use of
either arm or hand, no lifting over five pounds, no bending, stooping, reaching above the
shoulder and no extremes of temperature, specifically no working around fans, cold air or drafts.
In a November 7, 2005 decision, an Office hearing representative affirmed the March 7,
2005 decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
A recurrence of disability means an inability to work after an employee has returned to
work, caused by a spontaneous change in a medical condition which had resulted from a
previous injury or illness without an intervening injury or new exposure to the work environment
that caused the illness.3 This term also means an inability to work when a light-duty assignment
made specifically to accommodate an employee’s physical limitations due to his or her workrelated injury or illness is withdrawn (except when such withdrawal occurs for reasons of
misconduct, nonperformance of job duties or a reduction-in-force), or when the physical
3

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(x); see Theresa L. Andrews, 55 ECAB 719 (2004).

4

requirements of such an assignment are altered so that they exceed his or her established physical
limitations.4
When an employee, who is disabled from the job he or she held when injured on account
of employment-related residuals, returns to a light-duty position or the medical evidence
establishes that light duty can be performed, the employee has the burden to establish by the
weight of reliable, probative and substantial evidence a recurrence of total disability. As part of
this burden of proof, the employee must show either a change in the nature and extent of the
injury-related condition, or a change in the nature and extent of the light-duty requirements.5
Under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, the term “disability” means the
incapacity, because of an employment injury, to earn the wages that the employee was receiving
at the time of injury. Disability is thus not synonymous with physical impairment, which may or
may not result in an incapacity to earn wages. An employee who has a physical impairment
causally related to a federal employment injury, but who nevertheless has the capacity to earn the
wages he or she was receiving at the time of injury, has no disability as that term is used in the
Act.6 Whether a particular injury causes an employee to be disabled for employment and the
duration of that disability are medical issues which must be proved by a preponderance of the
reliable, probative and substantial medical evidence.7
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that the weight of the medical evidence rests with the opinion of
Dr. Mandel, the second opinion examiner. Dr. Mandel reviewed the medical record and a
statement of accepted facts which included an accurate job description. The accepted conditions
in this case are neck and left shoulder strain, left elbow cubital nerve palsy and right lateral
epicondylitis. In 1982 appellant sustained a cervical injury in a nonwork-related automobile
accident. In assessing medical evidence, the number of physicians supporting one position or
another is not controlling. The weight of such evidence is determined by its reliability, its
probative value and its convincing quality. The factors that comprise the evaluation of medical
evidence include the opportunity for and the thoroughness of physical examination, the accuracy
and completeness of the physician’s knowledge of the facts and medical history, the care of
analysis manifested and the medical rationale expressed in support of the physician’s opinion.8
By report dated March 1, 2005, Dr. Mandel reviewed the medical records and set forth
findings on examination. Appellant had no evidence of a complex regional pain syndrome.
Dr. Mandel diagnosed employment-related bilateral ulnar neuropathy and left carpal tunnel
4

Id.

5

Shelly A. Paolinetti, 52 ECAB 391 (2001); Robert Kirby, 51 ECAB 474 (2000); Terry R. Hedman, 38 ECAB
222 (1986).
6

Cheryl L. Decavitch, 50 ECAB 397 (1999).

7

Fereidoon Kharabi, 52 ECAB 291 (2001).

8

Anna M. Delaney, 53 ECAB 384 (2002).

5

syndrome. In answer to specific questions, he advised that appellant was capable of performing
her limited-duty job for four hours a day, five days a week, with a lifting restriction of five
pounds. In an attached work capacity evaluation dated March 25, 2005, Dr. Mandel reiterated
his diagnoses and advised that appellant could work 4 hours a day with restrictions that she could
sit, stand and walk for 8 hours a day, reach, twist and drive for 2 hours a day, push, pull and lift
five pounds for 4 hours a day, could not repetitively move her wrists or elbows, should not climb
a ladder and should have a 15-minute break every 4 hours.
In his March 1, 2005 report, Dr. Anderson stated that appellant reported that pain was not
the major problem, although she complained of intermittent pain in the right shoulder to the arm
and some mild low back pain and had her current complaints of progressive weakness in her
arms and legs with difficulty in balance and ambulating and with fine motor activities of her
hands. Dr. Anderson diagnosed cervical myelopathy. However, he did not provide an opinion
as to the cause of this condition. Medical evidence that does not offer any opinion regarding the
cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of causal
relationship.9
Appellant’s attending neurologist Dr. DeAntonio submitted a number of reports.
However, she did not provide a rationalized explanation on why appellant’s employment-related
conditions prevented her from performing her light-duty work.10 Although Dr. DeAntonio
advised that appellant was working outside her restrictions, she stated that this was based on
appellant’s description of her work activities. It is well established that medical reports must be
based on a complete and accurate factual and medical background, and medical opinions based
on an incomplete or inaccurate history are of little probative value.11 In a March 22, 2005
statement, the employing establishment described appellant’s limited-duty job, stating that she
walked throughout the postal facility to monitor compliance of wearing identification badges
from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. daily and noted that there were few doors except at the elevators.
Two or three times a week appellant would have to deliver a letter to an office with a normal
office door. She was not required to reach above her shoulders, lift, push or pull, was not
assigned to sort mail, work with equipment or write anything and could stroll through the
building at her own pace. Twice a day appellant would carry a bundle of mail weighing less than
one pound to another department and was allowed a break at noon and essentially stopped work
at 1:45 pm. Her job description further advised that she was not to use either arm, not lift over
five pounds with no bending, stooping, reaching over the shoulders or repetitive activities of the
upper extremities and have no exposure to extreme temperatures and no work around fans, cold
air or drafts.
Dr. DeAntonio provided essentially the same work restrictions as Dr. Mandel and
appellant’s limited-duty job at the time of the claimed recurrence was well within those
restrictions. Dr. Mandel reviewed the job description and advised that appellant could perform
her limited-duty job for four hours a day. Appellant worked inside a postal facility building and
9

Willie Miller, 53 ECAB 697 (2002).

10

See Shelly A. Paolinetti, supra note 5.

11

Douglas M. McQuaid, 52 ECAB 382 (2001).

6

merely walked and checked employee’s identification, only occasionally having to open a door.
The evidence therefore does not establish that appellant had to work in extreme cold conditions
or otherwise work outside her restrictions. Dr. DeAntonio also noted appellant’s complaints and
diagnoses involving her cervical spine condition and lumbosacral spine complaints. A lumbar
spine condition has not been accepted as work related, and, while a neck strain was accepted as
employment related, appellant initially injured her cervical spine in a nonwork-related
automobile accident in 1982 and the accepted neck strain occurred in March 1985. Furthermore,
Dr. DeAntonio advised that appellant’s complex pain syndrome was her primary diagnosis, and
the Office has not rendered a final diagnosis on whether this condition is employment related.12
A medical opinion regarding causal relationship must be based on a complete factual and
medical background with an accurate history of the claimant’s employment injury and must
explain from a medical perspective how the current condition is related to the employment
injury.13 The Board finds that, as Dr. DeAntonio did not adequately explain how the
employment-related conditions caused appellant’s recurrence of disability because she based her
opinion on an inaccurate work history and on conditions not employment related, her reports are
of diminished probative value and insufficient to establish that appellant’s absence from work
beginning on January 18, 2005 was caused by the employment injuries.14
Dr. Mandel’s opinion that appellant was capable of performing her limited-duty job for
four hours a day, five days a week, was supported by his physical findings, based on an accurate
job description. He submitted a comprehensive report, answered specific Office questions, and
provided a work capacity evaluation. Medical reports, such as Dr. Mandel’s, which present
medical evidence as to why a claimed recurrence was not caused by the employment injury and
which presents that conclusion with sound medical reasoning is entitled to great weight.15
It is appellant’s burden of proof to submit the necessary medical evidence to establish a
claim for a recurrence. A mere conclusion without the necessary medical rational explaining
how and why the physician believes that a claimant’s accepted exposure would result in a
diagnosed condition is not sufficient to meet her burden of proof. The medical evidence must
also include rationale explaining how the physician reached the conclusion he or she is
supporting.16 The record in this case does not contain a medical report providing a reasoned
medical opinion that appellant’s claimed recurrence of disability was caused by the accepted
conditions.

12

The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing final decisions of the Office. 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c); Karen L.
Yaeger, 54 ECAB 323 (Docket No. 02-499, issued January 7, 2003).
13

Joan R. Donovan, 54 ECAB 615 (2003).

14

Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

15

See John D. Jackson, 55 ECAB 465 (2004).

16

Beverly A. Spencer, 55 ECAB 501 (2004).

7

CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant failed to meet her burden of proof to establish that she
sustained a recurrence of disability on January 18, 2005 causally related to her March 26, 1985
employment injury.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated November 7 and March 7, 2005 be affirmed.
Issued: May 1, 2007
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.S., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NAVAL AIR
WARFARE CENTER AIRCRAFT DIVISION,
Lakehurst, NJ, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Robert D. Campbell, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 17-1277
Issued: April 20, 2018

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 22, 2017 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a March 29, 2017
merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of the claim.3

1
In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2
3

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

The Board notes that, in his May 16, 2017 appeal, counsel contended that appellant’s schedule award should have
been paid at a July 2009 recurrent pay rate. Counsel did not contest OWCP’s determination regarding the degree of
permanent impairment of appellant’s left lower extremity.

ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly determined appellant’s pay rate in calculating his
September 22, 2016 schedule award.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On November 12, 2003 appellant, then a 49-year-old welder, filed an occupational disease
claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he sustained injury due to working in a stooped or kneeling
position in confined areas since November 3, 2003. Following a brief work absence, he returned
to work in a light-duty job on or about November 6, 2003. OWCP accepted the claim for
lumbosacral and thoracic strain.
On January 19, 2016 appellant filed a claim for a schedule award (Form CA-7).
In a May 27, 2016 e-mail, the employing establishment noted that appellant had retired,
effective June 30, 2008. In May 31 and July 8, 2016 e-mails, it found that medical records in
appellant’s personnel file indicated that he remained on light duty from 2003 through 2007,
although there were no specific duty status notations dated after 2005.
By letter dated July 28, 2016, appellant asserted that, from November 6, 2003 to his
retirement, he was assigned miscellaneous light duties, such as checking identifications or posting
signs, as he was medically disqualified from welding.
In a July 14, 2016 letter, counsel contended that appellant had in effect returned to full
duty, as his light-duty position was at a retained rate of pay. He enclosed a leave buy back
worksheet (Form CA-7b) and employing establishment pay record indicating that appellant had
no wage loss while on light duty.
In a July 26, 2016 telephone memorandum of a conversation with counsel, OWCP
acknowledged that appellant “never returned to full duty,” but performed full-time light-duty
work. Counsel reiterated in an August 2, 2016 letter that appellant “performed other work at the
welder pay rate.”
By decision dated September 22, 2016, OWCP granted appellant a schedule award for 38
percent permanent impairment of his left lower extremity. It utilized November 3, 2003 as the
effective date of pay rate. The period of the award, equivalent to 109.44 weeks, ran from
November 16, 2015 to December 21, 2017.
Counsel timely requested a review of the written record by OWCP’s Branch of Hearings
and Review. He contended in a February 23, 2017 letter that appellant was entitled to a recurrent
pay rate as he performed light duty with no wage loss, although he did not return to full duty.
Counsel asserted that OWCP should have based the schedule award on appellant’s pay rate as of
July 17, 2009, when he resumed treatment with Dr. Donald. He did not argue that appellant had
more than 38 percent permanent impairment of the left lower extremity.

2

By decision dated March 29, 2017, an OWCP hearing representative affirmed OWCP’s
September 22, 2016 decision. The hearing representative found that appellant was not entitled to
a recurrent pay rate as he did not return to regular work at any time following the accepted injury.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Section 8102 of FECA4 provides that the United States shall pay compensation for the
disability of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of
duty.9
Under FECA, monetary compensation for disability or impairment due to an employment
injury is paid as a percentage of the pay rate.5 Section 8101(4) provides that monthly pay means
the monthly pay at the time of injury or the monthly pay at the time disability begins or the monthly
pay at the time compensable disability recurs, if the recurrence begins more than six months after
the injured employee resumes regular full-time employment with the United States, whichever is
greater.6 OWCP procedures provide that, if the employee did not stop work on the date of injury
or immediately afterwards, defined as the next day, the record should indicate the pay rate for the
date of injury and the date disability began. The greater of the two should be used in computing
compensation, and if they are the same, the pay rate should be effective on the date disability
began.7
Where an employee has a recurrence of disability more than six months after resuming
regular, full-time employment with the employing establishment, under section 8101(4) of FECA,
the employee is entitled to have his or her compensation increased based on his pay at the time of
this first recurrence of disability.8 The Board has defined regular employment as established and
not fictitious, odd-lot, or sheltered and has contrasted it with a job that was created especially for
the claimant. The duties of regular employment are covered by a specific job classification and
such duties would have been performed by another employee if the claimant did not perform them.
The test is not whether the tasks the claimant performed during his or her limited duty would have
been done by someone else, but instead whether he or she occupied a regular position that would
have been performed by another employee.9
In applying section 8101(4), the statute requires OWCP to determine monthly pay by
determining the date of the greater pay rate, based on the date of injury, date of disability, or the
date of recurrent disability. The Board has held that rate of pay for schedule award purposes is the
4

5 U.S.C. § 8102.

5

See id. at §§ 8105-8107.

6

Id. at § 8101(4). K.B., Docket No. 13-0569 (issued June 17, 2013).

7

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Determining Pay Rates, Chapter 2.900.5(a)(3)
(September 2011).
8

Id. at § 8101(4); see Jon L. Hoagland, 57 ECAB 635 (2006).

9

See Jeffrey T. Hunter, 52 ECAB 503 (2001).

3

highest rate which satisfies the terms of section 8101(4).10 Where an injury is sustained over a
period of time, the date of injury is the date of last exposure to the employment factors causing the
injury.11
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that OWCP properly computed appellant’s pay rate for compensation
purposes. The record demonstrates that appellant stopped work briefly on or about November 3,
2003, the date of the accepted lumbar injuries. Appellant returned to work in a light-duty capacity
on November 6, 2003, but did not resume full duty in his date-of-injury welder position.
The employing establishment confirmed that appellant did not resume full duty. It noted
in May 27 and 31 and July 8, 2016 e-mails that appellant’s personnel records showed that he
worked only light duty following the accepted November 3, 2003 lumbar injuries. Appellant also
explained that he did not resume full duty. He asserted in a July 28, 2016 letter that following the
November 3, 2003 injuries, he was assigned miscellaneous light-duty tasks as he was medically
disqualified from his job as a welder.
Counsel acknowledged in a July 14, 2016 letter, July 26, 2016 telephone conversation, and
an October 18, 2016 letter that appellant did not return to full duty after November 3, 2003. He
contended, however, that appellant should be entitled to a recurrent pay rate as he was paid at a
retained pay rate while on light duty. However, appellant did not resume “regular full-time
employment with the United States” for the requisite six-month period to entitle him to a recurrent
pay rate.12
Appellant suffered no qualifying recurrence.13 As there is no evidence that he physically
resumed regular full-time work with the employing establishment, as required under section
8104(4) of FECA,14 OWCP properly calculated his pay rate for compensation purposes based on
the date of injury, November 3, 2003.15
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

10

Robert A. Flint, 57 ECAB 369, 374 (2006).

11

See Barbara A. Dunnavant, 48 ECAB 517 (1997).

12

Id.; see also Samuel C. Miller, 55 ECAB 119 (2003).

13

D.R., Docket No. 16-0378 (issued November 16, 2016).

14

5 U.S.C. § 8104(4).

15

See T.K., Docket No. 13-1833 (issued March 10, 2014).

4

CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly determined appellant’s pay rate in calculating his
September 22, 2016 schedule award.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs dated March 29, 2017 is affirmed.
Issued: April 20, 2018
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.W., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
El Paso, TX, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 15-0719
Issued: July 8, 2015

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On February 2, 2015 appellant filed a timely appeal from a November 12, 2014 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish a left shoulder
condition causally related to the accepted left radial styloid tenosynovitis or to any factors of his
federal employment.
On appeal, appellant generally asserts that his left shoulder condition be accepted.

1

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On March 22, 2007 appellant, then a 62-year-old communications operator, filed an
occupational disease claim alleging that constant computer use at work caused left wrist and
thumb pain. OWCP accepted the condition on May 7, 2007.
Appellant retired on August 31, 2007. He relocated to Georgia, and on June 27, 2011
filed a schedule award claim. In correspondence dated July 7 and September 13, 2011, OWCP
informed appellant of the evidence needed to support a schedule award for the accepted
condition of left radial styloid tenosynovitis.
On June 16, 2011 Dr. Vineet Shah, a Board-certified osteopath specializing in orthopedic
surgery, noted a six-month history of bilateral shoulder pain. He reported that appellant had a
previous right shoulder rotator cuff repair and right elbow nerve decompression. Dr. Shah
described physical examination findings of decreased shoulder range of motion and biceps
tendon tenderness. He diagnosed biceps tendinitis and rotator cuff tendinitis.
Dr. Timothy Henderson, Board-certified in orthopedic surgery, completed an attending
physician’s report on September 19, 2011. He diagnosed left shoulder rotator cuff tear, based on
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan, and physical examination.2 Dr. Henderson advised
that appellant needed surgical repair. In a June 27, 2012 treatment note, he reported appellant’s
complaint of left shoulder pain that had been ongoing for several months and a past history of
surgery to the right hand, elbow, and shoulder. Dr. Henderson provided physical examination
findings and diagnosed rotator cuff tendinitis. In reports dated July 23 through October 18,
2012, he indicated that appellant had left shoulder arthroscopy and rotator cuff repair on July 19,
2012 and described physical examination findings and follow-up care.3
In a December 18, 2013 report, Dr. Chealon Miller, an orthopedic surgeon, noted treating
appellant for bilateral knees. He stated that appellant wanted an impairment rating following a
rotator cuff repair with some residuals. Dr. Miller referred appellant for a functional capacity
evaluation and impairment rating. Coleen Rodney-Brown, a physical therapist, performed a
functional capacity evaluation and impairment evaluation on January 21, 2014. She advised that
appellant was capable of working a light to medium eight-hour workday.
On February 25, 2014 appellant requested that the accepted condition be expanded to
include his left shoulder. He resubmitted the schedule award claim.
In correspondence dated March 27, 2014, OWCP informed appellant that the medical
evidence of record was insufficient to support that his left shoulder condition was caused by the
work incident or the accepted left radial styloid tenosynovitis. Appellant was asked to provide
detailed medical information regarding the cause of the claimed left shoulder condition and was
2

A copy of the MRI scan report is not found in the case record.

3

On May 24, 2013 appellant filed a recurrence claim, stating that he sustained a recurrence of disability on
June 16, 2011. He indicated that, after he retired, his condition worsened and he had not done anything to injure his
shoulder since retirement.

2

given 30 days to respond. In an April 8, 2014 response, he listed his physicians, attached a copy
of the May 7, 2007 acceptance decision, and correspondence from OWCP. A telephone
memorandum dated June 12, 2014, indicated that OWCP informed appellant of the need to
provide medical evidence, as indicated in the March 27, 2014 letter. Appellant submitted no
additional medical evidence.
By decision dated November 12, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim to expand the
accepted condition to include a left shoulder condition because he submitted no medical
evidence to show that the claimed condition was a consequence of the accepted right wrist
injury.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Causal relationship is a medical issue, and the medical evidence required to establish a
causal relationship is rationalized medical evidence.4 The opinion of the physician must be
based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must be one of reasonable
medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the
relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by
the employee.5
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has failed to establish a left shoulder condition causally
related to his accepted left wrist radial styloid tenosynovitis or to other factors of his federal
employment.
On his March 22, 2007 claim form appellant indicated that constant computer use at work
had caused left wrist and thumb pain. He did not mention a shoulder condition. The medical
evidence at that time consisted of an April 3, 2007 report from Dr. Bell who reported a history of
bilateral wrist pain with a positive Finkelstein’s test. Dr. Bell provided no physical findings for
the left shoulder. He diagnosed only the accepted radial styloid tenosynovitis. It was not until
June 27, 2011, almost four years after appellant retired, that he alleged a shoulder condition or
filed a schedule award claim. None of the subsequently submitted medical reports from
Dr. Shah, Dr. Henderson, and Dr. Miller included an opinion on causation for a diagnosed left
shoulder rotator cuff tendinitis or rotator cuff tear. OWCP informed appellant on several
occasions of the type of evidence needed to establish that his left shoulder condition was
employment related. In medical evidence provided, none of the physicians have explained the
relationship between the diagnosed left shoulder condition and the accepted wrist injury.6

4

Jacqueline M. Nixon-Steward, 52 ECAB 140 (2000).

5

Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000); Gary L. Fowler, 45 ECAB 365 (1994).

6

See Leslie C. Moore, id.

3

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet his burden of proof to establish a left
shoulder condition causally related to his accepted left radial styloid tenosynovitis or any factors
of his federal employment.7
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the November 12, 2014 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: July 8, 2015
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7

The Board notes that the record contains a recurrence claim, filed by appellant on May 24, 2013. The record
does not indicate that OWCP has not issued a final decision on this claim, and the Board’s jurisdiction extends only
to the review of final decisions by OWCP. 20 C.F.R. 501.2(c); J.B., Docket No. 09-2191 (issued May 14, 2010).

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
M.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Brooklyn, NY, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Thomas R. Harkins, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-1884
Issued: February 22, 2013

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 24, 2012 appellant, through her attorney, filed a timely appeal from June 6
and 27, 2012 merit decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) which
denied disability compensation for the period August 6 through December 3, 2010. Pursuant to
the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant was disabled from August 6 through December 3, 2010
causally related to her accepted August 6, 2010 employment injury.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 14, 2010 appellant, then a 59-year-old mail clerk, filed a traumatic injury
claim alleging that on August 6, 2010 she experienced shoulder pain when she distributed first
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

class mail at work. She stopped work.2 OWCP accepted appellant’s claim for right shoulder
impingement.
On April 18, 2012 appellant submitted a claim for disability compensation for the period
September 21 to December 3, 2010. On May 9, 2012 she submitted a request for disability
compensation for the period August 6 to September 20, 2010.
By letters dated May 2 and 22, 2012, OWCP advised appellant that the evidence
submitted was insufficient to establish her compensation claims. It requested additional
evidence to establish that she was disabled from work during the claimed periods as a result of
her August 6, 2010 employment injury.
In handwritten August 11, September 22 and October, 2010 notes, Dr. Eric L. Freeman
diagnosed right shoulder impingement pain. He indicated that appellant was totally disabled
from work. In the August 11, 2010 note, Dr. Freeman advised that she may not return to work
for three weeks.
OWCP also received August 11, September 1 and 22 and October 20, 2010 reports from
Dr. Freeman, who conducted orthopedic follow-up evaluations and noted a date of injury of
April 4, 2009. In the August 11, 2010 report, Dr. Freeman stated that appellant was not working
after a flare-up from work. Upon examination, he observed focal discomfort over the right
shoulder and greater tuberosity discomfort. Dr. Freeman also noted positive impingement signs.
The reports listed “no clinical change” in appellant’s physical examination. Neer and Hawkins
testing were positive. Range of motion revealed abduction and forward flexion to 160 degrees,
internal rotation to L2 and external rotation to 35 degrees. On September 1, 2010 Dr. Freeman
stated that he would keep appellant out of work until he determined whether surgery was needed.
Appellant remained off work.
In a December 1, 2010 report, Dr. Freeman again noted a date of injury of April 4, 2009.
Upon examination, he reported no change in appellant’s range of motion and observed that she
was neurologically intact. Dr. Freeman stated that she was capable of working with no lifting
more than 10 pounds.
In a November 17, 2011 report, Dr. Freeman noted a follow-up orthopedic evaluation and
stated the date of injury as April 4, 2009. The examination revealed right shoulder abduction and
forward flexion to 165 degrees, internal rotation to L2 and external rotation to 35 degrees.
Dr. Freeman related that appellant’s cervical spine was bothering her and noted positive Spurling
maneuver. He explained that her cervical condition was a consequential injury related to the
shoulder. Appellant was eligible for strict light duty only.
In a March 8, 2012 report, Dr. Freeman noted a date of injury of April 4, 2009. He stated
that appellant’s right shoulder and cervical region were unchanged, but he observed some mild

2

The Board notes that appellant originally filed a recurrence claim, but OWCP treated the claim as a traumatic
injury claim since appellant was describing a new injury that occurred during one day or work shift. The Board
further notes that OWCP previously accepted a claim for an April 4, 2009 employment incident.

2

bicipital tendinitis. Neer and Hawkins testing’s and Spurling maneuver were positive.
Dr. Freeman stated that light duty was not available and that appellant was still not working.
Dr. Freeman completed an April 2, 2012 work limitation, restricting appellant to no
lifting over 10 pounds and no repetitive work. He authorized her to return to a desk job only
with breaks every 30 minutes.
On April 19, 2012 Dr. Freeman obtained a history that on August 6, 2010 appellant
delivered mail and was unable to move her right shoulder the next day. He listed appellant’s
complaints of cervical pain and numbness and tingling in her hands. Upon examination,
Dr. Freeman observed positive impingement signs and Neer and Hawkins testing’s in her right
shoulder. Abduction and forward flexion was to 170 degrees and external rotation to 35 degrees.
Dr. Freeman reported that radiographs of the shoulder did not demonstrate any acute bony
abnormality. Examination of the cervical spine revealed positive Spurling maneuver.
Dr. Freeman recommended surgery for appellant’s right shoulder and physical therapy.
Regarding her cervical condition, he opined that it was a consequential injury that was
compensatory to the right shoulder condition and recommended it be accepted as part of this
case. Dr. Freeman restricted appellant to no repetitive lifting or lifting more than 5 pounds and
no carrying, pushing or pulling until further notice.
On May 24, 2012 Dr. Freeman diagnosed right shoulder impingement and stated that
appellant was treated that day. He authorized her to return to light duty. Dr. Freeman restricted
appellant to no lifting over 10 pounds with breaks every 30 minutes.
By decision dated June 6, 2012, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for wage-loss
compensation from September 21 to December 3, 2010. It noted that the medical evidence did
not establish that she was disabled from work as her physician indicated that she was capable of
performing light duty.
In a letter dated June 25, 2012, appellant’s counsel requested that a decision be issued by
OWCP concerning the period August 5, 2010 to September 20, 2012.3 Appellant resubmitted
various medical reports from Dr. Freeman.
By decision dated June 26, 2012, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for disability
compensation for the period August 5 to September 20, 2010.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA bears the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim by the weight of the evidence.4 The term disability as used
in FECA means the incapacity because of an employment injury to earn the wages that the
3

The Board notes that appellant’s counsel indicated that she requested disability compensation for the period
August 5, 2010 to September 20, 2012. The records show compensation claims for August 6 to September 20, 2010
and September 21 to December 3, 2010.
4

J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 58 (1968).

3

employee was receiving at the time of injury.5 Monetary compensation benefits are payable to
an employee who has sustained wage loss due to disability for employment resulting from the
employment injury.6 Whether a particular injury causes an employee to become disabled for
work and the duration of that disability are medical issues that must be proved by a
preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial medical opinion evidence. For each period
of disability claimed, the employee must establish that he or she was disabled for work as a result
of the accepted employment injury.7 The medical evidence must include findings on
examination and the physician’s opinion, supported by medical rationale, showing how the
injury caused the employee disability for his or her particular work.8 The Board will not require
OWCP to pay compensation for disability in the absence of medical evidence directly addressing
the specific dates of disability for which compensation is claimed. To do so would essentially
allow an employee to self-certify his or her disability and entitlement to compensation.9
ANALYSIS
OWCP accepted that on August 6, 2010 appellant sustained a right shoulder impingement
in the performance of duty. The record also reveals that she had a previously accepted claim for
an April 4, 2009 injury. Appellant stopped work on August 6, 2010. She submitted claims for
disability compensation for the period August 6 to December 3, 2010. Appellant bears the
burden of proof to establish that her disability from work during that period was causally related
to her accepted employment injury.10 The Board finds that she has failed to meet her burden of
proof to establish that she was disabled from work from August 6 to December 3, 2010 as a
result of her August 6, 2010 employment injury.
Appellant submitted numerous reports from Dr. Freeman.
In August 11,
September 1 and 22 and October 20, 2010 reports, Dr. Freeman noted a date of injury of April 4,
2009 and stated that he was conducting follow-up orthopedic evaluations. The examination
revealed positive impingement signs and Neer and Hawkins testing. Range of motion revealed
abduction and forward flexion to 160 degrees, internal rotation to L2 and external rotation to 35
degrees. In a September 1, 2010 report, Dr. Freeman stated that appellant remain out of work
until he determined whether surgery was needed. In subsequent reports, he noted that she
remained disabled. Although Dr. Freeman concluded that appellant was disabled from work, the
Board finds that he did not adequately explain how her disability for work was causally related to
the August 6, 2010 employment injury. The Board notes that he listed the date of injury as
April 4, 2009 and not August 6, 2010. The Board has held that medical reports must be based on
a complete and accurate factual and medical background and medical opinions based on an
5

Paul E. Thams, 56 ECAB 503 (2005).

6

Laurie S. Swanson, 53 ECAB 517, 520 (2002); see also Debra A. Kirk-Littleton, 41 ECAB 703 (1990).

7

Amelia S. Jefferson, 57 ECAB 183 (2005); William A. Archer, 55 ECAB 674 (2004).

8

Dean E. Pierce, 40 ECAB 1249 (1989).

9

Amelia S. Jefferson, supra note 7.

10

Supra note 7.

4

incomplete or inaccurate history are of limited probative value.11 Dr. Freeman did not mention
the August 6, 2010 employment incident or describe any details regarding her injury. The only
mention of an August 6, 2010 injury was two years later in his April 19, 2012 report.
Dr. Freeman failed to explain how appellant’s disability from work was causally related to her
August 6, 2010 employment injury. The issue of whether a claimant’s disability is related to an
accepted condition is a medical question which must be established by a physician who, on the
basis of a complete and accurate factual and medical history, concludes that the disability is
causally related his or her employment injury and supports that conclusion with sound medical
reasoning.12 As these reports fail to meet that standard, they are insufficient to establish
appellant’s claim.
In August 11, September 22 and October 22, 2010 disability notes, Dr. Freeman
diagnosed right shoulder impingement pain and indicated that appellant was totally disabled
from work. Although he found that appellant was disabled from work, he did not attribute her
disability to the August 6, 2010 employment injury. Medical evidence that does not offer any
opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of diminished probative value on the
issue of causal relationship.13 In the August 11, 2010 report, Dr. Freeman noted that appellant
could not return to work for three weeks. He still, however, did not relate her inability to work to
the accepted injury. Thus, these reports are insufficient to establish that appellant was disabled
from work as a result of her August 6, 2010 injury.
In a December 1, 2010 report, Dr. Freeman noted a date of injury of April 4, 2009 and
reported no change in appellant’s range of motion. He observed that she was neurologically
intact and stated that she was capable of working with no lifting more than 10 pounds. The
Board finds that this report does not support that appellant was disabled from work through
December 3, 2010. Dr. Freeman opined that she was capable of working with restrictions prior
to December 3, 2010. Similarly, the Board finds that the subsequent reports of his dated
November 17, 2011, March 8, April 19 and May 24, 2012 are insufficient to establish appellant’s
claimed disability as he authorized light-duty work. None of the reports provide any rationalized
medical explanation as to why she was disabled and incapable of performing her employment
duties from August 6 to December 3, 2010 as a result of the August 6, 2010 employment injury.
On appeal, appellant’s counsel contends that the medical evidence is sufficient to
establish appellant’s entitlement to compensation for wage-loss disability. He stated that
Dr. Freeman’s reports demonstrate that she was unable to perform the duties of the limited-duty
position she was working at the time of the August 6, 2010 employment incident. Dr. Freeman’s
reports fail to establish that appellant was disabled from her employment from August 6 to
December 3, 2010 as a result of the August 6, 2010 employment injury. Appellant has not
submitted any rationalized medical evidence establishing that her disability from August 6 to
December 3, 2010 was causally related to the August 6, 2010 employment injury.
11

J.R., Docket No. 12-1099 (issued November 7, 2012); Douglas M. McQuaid, 52 ECAB 382 (2001).

12

V.L., Docket No. 12-1444 (issued November 27, 2012); see also R.D., Docket No. 11-1551 (issued
August 8, 2012).
13

R.E., Docket No. 10-679 (issued November 16, 2010); K.W., 59 ECAB 271 (2007).

5

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish that she was
disabled from August 6 through December 3, 2010 as a result of her August 6, 2010 employment
injury.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 27 and 6, 2012 decisions of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed.
Issued: February 22, 2013
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
P.B., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, BULK MAIL
CENTER, Jacksonville, FL, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Leslie Nitsch, for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 21-1242
Issued: March 17, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On August 17, 2021 appellant sought an appeal from a purported July 14, 2021 decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards
assigned Docket No. 21-1242.2
The Board, having duly considered the matter, notes that the Board has jurisdiction to
review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. 3
This jurisdiction encompasses any final decision issued by OWCP within 180 days of the date
appellant filed his appeal. 4
1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

This case has previously been before the Board. Docket No. 14-557 (issued April 6, 2015).

3

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) provides in pertinent part: “Any notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days from the
date of issuance of a decision of the OWCP.”
4

The Board notes that the case record does not contain a final adverse decision of OWCP
dated July 14, 2021. The case record does contain a letter from OWCP dated July 14, 2021 to
appellant; however, it merely apprised appellant of the appeal rights accompanying the previously
issued decisions and that no further action would be taken until he specified w hat avenue of appeal
he wished to pursue..5 The most recent final adverse decision of OWCP was dated August 30,
2017, more than 180 days before appellant’s current August 17, 2021 appeal and is not subject to
review by this Board.6 As there is no final adverse decision of OWCP over which the Board may
properly exercise jurisdiction, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed as No. 21-1242 must
be dismissed. 7 Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-1242 is dismissed.
Issued: March 17, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5

See Order Dismissing Appeal, K.S., Docket No. 20-1401 (issued March 17, 2021); Order Dismissing Appeal,
S.U., Docket No. 20-0636 (issued December 3, 2020) (correspondence that is purely informational in nature does not
constitute a final adverse decision of OWCP from which appellant may properly appeal).
6

See supra note 4.

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” 20
C.F.R. § 501.6(d).
7

2


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.S., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
Denver, CO, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-1498
Issued: January 14, 2013

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge

JURISDICTION
On July 2, 2012 appellant filed a timely appeal from a January 6, 2012 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs concerning her schedule award. Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this claim.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has established greater than seven percent impairment of
her right thumb, for which she received a schedule award.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On December 17, 2008 appellant, then a 61-year-old medical instrument technician,
injured her right thumb when she slipped in a stairwell. OWCP accepted the claim for right hand
sprain and right thumb sprain and paid appropriate benefits.
On May 5, 2010 appellant requested a schedule award. In an April 28, 2010 report,
Dr. Diego Osuna, a Board-certified family practitioner, noted the history of injury and treatment.
Right hand examination revealed no swelling, painful right thumb carpometacarpal (CMC) joint
and normal hair pattern. Right hand was slightly colder than left with negative Finkelstein’s and
Phalen’s test and normal coloration, but has appeared purplish in past. Tinel’s at wrist and elbow
were negative. Negative grind test of CMC and no ulnar collateral ligament laxity. Two-point
discrimination in thumb was less than five millimeters. Range of motion distal interphalangeal
(DIP) joint flexion was 60 degrees extension + 10; metacarpophalangeal (MCP) flexion 60
degrees neutral; CMC abduction 50 degrees, adduction 4 centimeters and opposition 7
centimeters. An assessment of CMC arthritis exacerbated by fall and strain of thumb and
possible complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) was provided. Dr. Osuna opined that
appellant reached maximum medical improvement. Under the sixth edition of the American
Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (A.M.A., Guides), he
noted that appellant had 5 percent total digit impairment under Table 15-30 based on loss of
range of motion and a 13 percent right upper extremity impairment based on a diagnosis of
CRPS type 1.
For the CRPS diagnosis, Dr. Osuna found that, under Table 15-24, page 453, appellant
had pain greater than one year disproportionate to the inciting event and temperature asymmetry,
with reports of skin color changes and asymmetry, sweating and edema in the right hand and
motor dysfunction including weakness. There was also displayed and observed evidence of
temperature asymmetry and color changes; decreased thumb range of motion and smooth skin.
Dr. Osuna advised that no other diagnosis better explained the signs and symptoms. Under
Table 15-25, page 453, he assigned four total objective diagnostic criteria points of one each for
cyanotic skin color; cool skin temperature cool; skin smooth and joint stiffness. Dr. Osuna also
noted that an OWCP referral physician had agreed with a diagnosis of probable CPRS. He
opined that the CPRS condition was ratable as it was present for a year or more, verified by more
than one physician and met objective criteria. Under Table 15-7, Table 15-8 and Table 15-9
respectively, Dr. Osuna found a grade 2 modifier for functional history, a grade 1 modifier for
physical examination and a grade 2 modifier for clinical studies for an average of grade
modifiers of 1.6, which rounded up to 2. Under Table 15-26, he found a grade modifier average
of 2 corresponded to a class 2 impairment. Dr. Osuna next found that the criteria points for
CRPS corresponded to class 1, grade E, upper extremity impairment rating of 13 percent.
On January 7, 2011 an OWCP medical adviser reviewed the medical record, including
Dr. Osuna’s April 28, 2010 report, for impairment rating. He opined that appellant reached
maximum medical improvement on April 28, 2010. Under the A.M.A., Guides, the medical
adviser opined that appellant had seven percent right thumb digit impairment secondary to right
thumb CMC joint arthritis. He stated that Dr. Osuna only documented one motion per thumb
joint movement, which was not consistent with the requirements of section 15.7 and, thus, such

2

measurements were not valid for impairment rating purposes. The medical adviser stated that
the three main criteria for rating appellant for CRPS had not been met under Table 15-13 and
Table 15-24. For the objective criteria, he found the right hand skin discoloration and sensory
findings met CRPS criteria. However, while appellant had reported symptoms of a temperature
disparity between the two extremities, hand swelling and sudomotor/edema, there was no
objective evidence between different physicians over a years’ period of time documenting such
symptoms. The medical adviser noted that appellant had significant right thumb CMC arthritis
and that any decreased motion finding were not valid given the pathology in that area and there
had been no documented objective evidence documenting decreased motion/trophic changes. He
further stated that a comprehensive differential diagnostic process had not been undertaken to
clearly rule out all other differential diagnoses, noting that rheumatologic conditions and other
autonomic conditions could produce appellant’s symptoms.
Under Table 15-2, page 392, the medical adviser found that the most impairing diagnosis
was right thumb arthritis (post-traumatic degenerative joint disease) which had diagnosis class 1
with default grade C which equaled six percent digit impairment. Under Table 15-7, page 406,
he found grade modifier for functional history not applicable as OWCP’s second opinion
examiner had performed the most comprehensive symptom assessment and had indicated that
there may be some dramatization of symptoms and symptom magnification.2 Under Table 15-8,
page 408, the medical adviser found grade modifier of 2 for physical examination given
moderate palpatory findings consistent with significant degenerative joint disease. Under Table
15-9, page 410, he found grade modifier for clinical studies not applicable as the diagnostic tests
were used to place appellant’s thumb into the correct diagnosis and diagnosis class. Under the
net adjustment formula, the medical adviser found grade modifier physical examination
(2) minus diagnostic class (1) equaled 1, which moved the grade one step to the right of default
grade C for a final grade of D or seven percent right thumb impairment under Table 15-2. He
noted that seven percent right thumb impairment converted to three percent upper extremity
impairment.
By decision dated January 6, 2012, OWCP granted appellant a schedule award for seven
percent impairment of the right thumb digit. The award represented 5.25 weeks of compensation
and covered the period April 28 to June 3, 2010.
OWCP subsequently accepted right metacarpophalangeal sprain and right localized
unspecified osteoarthritis.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
The schedule award provision of FECA and its implementing regulations3 set forth the
number of weeks of compensation payable to employees sustaining permanent impairment from
loss or loss of use, of scheduled members or functions of the body. However, FECA does not
2

In a February 24, 2010 report, Dr. Hendrick Arnold, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon to whom OWCP
referred appellant, regarding the extent of her work-related condition, opined that, while appellant’s accepted
condition remained symptomatic, she exaggerated and dramatized her symptoms.
3

20 C.F.R. § 10.404.

3

specify the manner in which the percentage of loss shall be determined. For consistent results
and to ensure equal justice under the law to all claimants, good administrative practice
necessitates the use of a single set of tables so that there may be uniform standards applicable to
all claimants. The A.M.A., Guides has been adopted by the implementing regulations as the
appropriate standard for evaluating schedule losses.4 For decisions issued after May 1, 2009, the
sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides will be used.5
The sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides provides a diagnosis-based method of evaluation
utilizing the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability
and Health (ICF).6 Under the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides, for upper extremity
impairments the evaluator identifies the impairment class for the diagnosed condition (CDX),
which is then adjusted by grade modifiers based on Functional History (GMFH), Physical
Examination (GMPE) and Clinical Studies (GMCS).7 The net adjustment formula is GMFH CDX + GMPE - CDX + GMCS - CDX.8
ANALYSIS
OWCP accepted appellant’s claim for right hand sprain and right thumb sprain and she
claimed a schedule award.
In an April 28, 2010 report, Dr. Osuna provided physical examination findings and
opined that appellant was at maximum medical improvement. Under the sixth edition of the
A.M.A., Guides, he opined that she had 5 percent digit impairment based on range of motion
findings and 13 percent digit impairment based on a diagnosis of CRPS type 1. Based on
Dr. Osuna’s physical examination, an OWCP medical adviser utilized the sixth edition of the
A.M.A., Guides to rate a seven percent impairment to appellant’s right thumb.
The A.M.A., Guides explains that diagnosis-based impairment is the method of choice
for calculating impairment, while range of motion is used principally as an adjustment factor.
When other grids refer the evaluator to the range of motion section or when no other diagnosisbased system is applicable, range of motion impairment serves as a stand-alone rating, one that
cannot be combined with a diagnosis-based estimate.9 Under the range of motion method,
Dr. Osuna found five percent digit impairment while the medical adviser found no ratable
impairment. The medical adviser noted and the Board agrees that Dr. Osuna did not document
valid range of motion measurements as required by section 15.7. This section requires the rating
4

See id.; Jacqueline S. Harris, 54 ECAB 139 (2002).

5

See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 3 -- Medical, Schedule Awards, Chapter 3.700, Exhibit 1; Federal
(FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Schedule Awards and Permanent Disability Claims, Chapter 2.808.6a.
6

A.M.A., Guides at 3, section 1.3, The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF):
A Contemporary Model of Disablement.
7

A.M.A., Guides 385-419.

8

Id. at 411.

9

Id. at 461.

4

physician to perform three measurements per joint motion, that the measurements be averaged
and that each of the three measurements be within 10 degrees of the calculated average. The
measurements for the affected extremity must also be compared with that of the opposite
extremity to determine the percentage of relative deficit of the affected extremity.10 Dr. Osuna
did not document performing valid range of motion measurements as required by section 15.7,
thus his range of motion calculation is not valid for impairment rating purposes.
Dr. Osuna opined that appellant had 13 percent arm impairment based on CRPS. The
medical adviser disagreed on the basis there was no objective findings to qualify for an
impairment rating for a CRPS diagnosis. Table 15-24 page 453 outlines the diagnostic criteria
for CRPS. The employee must have: (1) continuing pain which is disproportionate to any
inciting event; (2) must report at least one symptom in three of the four categories: sensory,
vasomotor, sudomotor/edema, motor/trophic; (3) must display at least one sign at the time of
evaluation in two or motor of the following categories of sensory, vasomotor, sudomotor/edema,
motor/tropic; and (4) there is no other diagnosis that better explains the signs and symptoms. A
sign is counted only if it is observed and documented at the time of the impairment evaluation.
To be a ratable diagnosis, page 452 further requires the diagnosis be present for at least one year,
verified by more than one physician and a comprehensive differential diagnostic process has
clearly ruled out all other differential diagnoses. While the medical adviser agreed that appellant
had symptoms of right hand skin discoloration and sensory findings, he found her symptoms of a
temperature disparity between the two extremities, sudomotor/edema and motor/trophic changes
failed to meet the diagnostic criteria as they were not documented between different physicians
over a years’ period of time. He noted that appellant had significant right thumb CMC arthritis
and that any decreased motion finding were not valid given the pathology in that area.
Moreover, the medical adviser found that the last requirement that there was no other diagnosis
that better explained the signs and symptoms was not met. He noted that a comprehensive
differential diagnostic process had not been undertaken to clearly rule out all other diagnoses and
stated that appellant’s symptoms could be produced by rheumatologic conditions as well as other
autonomic conditions. As appellant failed to meet the necessary diagnostic criteria for CRPS
under Table 15-23, it is not a ratable diagnosis for impairment purposes.
It is well established that, when the attending physician fails to provide an estimate of
impairment conforming to the A.M.A., Guides, his or her opinion is of diminished probative
value in establishing the degree of permanent impairment and OWCP may rely on the opinion of
its medical adviser to apply the A.M.A., Guides to the findings of the attending physician.11 The
medical adviser opined that appellant’s right thumb CMC arthritis (post-traumatic degenerative
joint disease) resulted in seven percent impairment to appellant’s right thumb and three percent
arm impairment. Under Table 15-2, page 392, he found that post-traumatic degenerative joint
disease was class 1 with default grade C equaled six percent digit impairment. Under Table 157, page 406, the medical adviser found a grade modifier for functional history was not applicable
as there was evidence of record of dramatization of symptoms and symptom magnification.
Under Table 15-8, page 408, he found a grade modifier of 2 for physical examination given
moderate palpatory findings consistent with significant degenerative joint disease. Under
10

Id. at 461-64.

11

A.M.A., Guides 521. J.B., Docket No. 09-2191 (issued May 14, 2010).

5

Table 15-9, page 410, the medical adviser found a grade modifier for clinical studies not
applicable as the diagnostic tests were used to place appellant’s thumb into the correct diagnosis
and diagnosis class. Under the net adjustment formula, he found a grade modifier physical
examination (2) minus diagnostic class (1) equaled 1, which moved the grade one step to the
right of default grade C for a final grade of D or seven percent right thumb impairment under
Table 15-2 which equated to three percent arm impairment under Table 15-12 at page 421.
The Board finds that the medical adviser properly applied the sixth edition of the A.M.A.,
Guides to the clinical findings of Dr. Osuna, to rate impairment due to appellant’s accepted right
hand and thumb sprain. The weight of the medical evidence rests with his opinion and
establishes the extent of permanent impairment in this case. Although the medical adviser
provided a rating for appellant’s thumb, he indicated that the impairment extended to the arm by
also converting this rating to a rating of appellant’s arm. OWCP issued the schedule award
based on appellant’s thumb impairment. The Board has held that, where the residuals of an
injury to a member of the body specified in the schedule extend into an adjoining area of a
member also enumerated in the schedule, such as an injury of a finger into the hand, of a hand
into the arm or of a foot into the leg, the schedule award should be made on the basis of the
percentage loss of use of the larger member.12 Consequently, the schedule award for impairment
is modified to reflect that impairment should be for three percent of the arm instead of seven
percent of the thumb.13
On appeal appellant disagreed with the January 6, 2012 schedule award, noting that she
continues to live with pain and symptoms from her injury and that she refused injections and
invasive thumb surgery because of her medications and stent placement. However, she has not
identified any other medical evidence demonstrating impairment in excess of the seven percent
right thumb impairment or three percent arm impairment. As explained, Dr. Osuna’s opinion is
insufficient to support greater impairment under the A.M.A., Guides.
Appellant may request a schedule award or increased schedule award based on evidence
of a new exposure or medical evidence showing progression of an employment-related condition
resulting in permanent impairment or increased impairment.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not established that she has more than three percent
impairment of the right arm.

12

George A. Boyd, 56 ECAB 707 (2005).

13

This results in appellant receiving additional compensation. Under 5 U.S.C. § 8107(c), impairment for 100
percent impairment of an arm yields entitlement to 312 weeks of compensation while 100 percent impairment of the
thumb yields 75 weeks of compensation. Seven percent impairment of the thumb results in 5.25 weeks of
compensation (7 percent times 75) which is what OWCP has paid appellant. However, three percent of 312 weeks
of compensation results in 9.36 weeks of compensation (3 percent times 312). This produces a difference of 4.11
weeks of compensation (9.36 minus 5.25). Upon return of the case record, OWCP shall issue appellant a payment
for the additional 4.11 weeks of compensation.

6

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated January 6, 2012 is affirmed as modified.
Issued: January 14, 2013
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.P., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, KELLY
AIR FORCE BASE, San Antonio, TX, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 07-1535
Issued: October 24, 2007

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 12, 2007 appellant filed a timely appeal from a July 14, 2006 Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs’ nonmerit decision. Because more than one year has elapsed between
the last merit decision dated April 22, 2005 and the filing of this appeal, the Board lacks
jurisdiction to review the merits of appellant’s claim pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501(c)(2) and
501.3(d)(2).
ISSUE
The issue is whether the Office properly refused to reopen appellant’s case for
reconsideration of his claim under 5 U.S.C. § 8128.
FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant, a 54-year-old mechanical engineer, injured his neck and right shoulder on
April 8, 1992 when he slipped on some liquid which was on the floor. He filed a claim for
benefits on April 9, 1992, which the Office accepted for cervical sprain.

On November 22, 2004 appellant filed a Form CA-2a claim for benefits, alleging that he
sustained a recurrence of disability on June 10, 2003 causally related to his accepted cervical
strain condition.
By letter dated December 13, 2004, the Office requested that appellant submit additional
factual and medical evidence in support of his claim.
Appellant submitted a January 7, 2005 report from Dr. Thomas H. Raetzsch, a Boardcertified family practitioner, who related appellant’s complaints of significant neck pain which
kept him awake at night. Dr. Raetzsch advised that appellant needed to hold his neck in an
awkward position and had difficulty turning his head side to side or up and down. He noted that
appellant’s neck pain radiated down his arms, bilaterally. Dr. Raetzsch diagnosed herniated
nucleus pulposus at C2-3, C6-7 and C7-T1 by history with exacerbation and recommended that
appellant undergo diagnostic testing, including x-ray and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
scan.
By decision dated April 22, 2005, the Office denied appellant compensation for a
recurrence of his accepted cervical strain condition. The Office found that appellant failed to
submit medical evidence sufficient to establish that the claimed condition or disability was
caused or aggravated by the accepted condition.
By letter dated April 10, 2006, appellant requested reconsideration of the April 22, 2005
Office decision. He submitted a May 16, 2006 report of a cervical MRI scan from Dr. Raetzsch.
The report noted multilevel degenerative disc disease, fairly advanced; retrolisthesis and mild
spinal stenosis at C3-4; and a large disc protrusion at C6-7. Dr. Raetzsch recommended an MRI
scan of the thoracic spine. Appellant also submitted the following reports which he had
submitted previously: a July 17, 1992 report from Dr. Gerald Q. Greenfield, Board-certified in
orthopedic surgery, Dr. Raetzsch’s January 7, 2005 report; a May 12, 1992 MRI scan report and
a December 21, 1992 report from Dr. Daniel C. Valdez, Board-certified in orthopedic surgery.
By decision dated July 14, 2006, the Office denied appellant’s application for review on
the grounds that it neither raised substantive legal questions nor included new and relevant
evidence sufficient to require the Office to review its prior decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Under 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b), a claimant may obtain review of the merits of his or her
claim by showing that the Office erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law; by
advancing a relevant legal argument not previously considered by the Office; or by constituting
relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously considered by the Office.1 Evidence that
repeats or duplicates evidence already in the case record has no evidentiary value and does not
constitute a basis for reopening a case.2

1

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(1); see generally 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

2

Howard A. Williams, 45 ECAB 853 (1994).

2

ANALYSIS
In the present case, appellant has not shown that the Office erroneously applied or
interpreted a specific point of law; nor has he advanced a relevant legal argument not previously
considered by the Office. The evidence appellant submitted is not pertinent to the issue on
appeal. The Board has held that the submission of evidence which does not address the
particular issue involved in the case does not constitute a basis for reopening the claim.3
Appellant has not submitted any new medical evidence which addresses the relevant issue of
whether appellant’s current condition was causally related to his accepted cervical condition.
Dr. Raetzsch’s May 16, 2006 cervical MRI scan report indicated findings of degenerative disc
disease and noted some mild irregularities, but did not present any additional evidence pertaining
to the relevant issue of whether appellant sustained a recurrence of disability as of June 10, 2003.
The other medical reports appellant submitted were duplicative and repetitive of previous reports
which were considered by the Office in prior decisions; three of these reports were from 1992,
eleven years prior to the alleged recurrence of disability. Appellant’s reconsideration request
failed to show that the Office erroneously applied or interpreted a point of law nor did it advance
a point of law or fact not previously considered by the Office. The Office did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to reopen appellant’s claim for a review on the merits.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office properly refused to reopen appellant’s case for
reconsideration on the merits of his claim under 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

3

See David J. McDonald, 50 ECAB 185 (1998).

3

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 14, 2006 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs be affirmed.
Issued: October 24, 2007
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

4