United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.T., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, SHREVEPORT
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE FACILITY,
Shreveport, LA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 08-1851
Issued: April 6, 2009

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On June 19, 2008 appellant filed a timely appeal of an April 17, 2008 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, finding that he had no more than a seven
percent impairment of the left upper extremity. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has more than a seven percent impairment of the left upper
extremity, for which he received a schedule award.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On May 11, 2005 appellant, then a 59-year-old automobile mechanic, filed a traumatic
injury claim alleging that on May 10, 2005 he lost the end of his left index finger when it became
caught between sections of a vehicle door he was working on. The Office accepted the claim for

traumatic amputation of the left finger without complications and open wound of the finger with
complications.
On May 10, 2005 Dr. Stephen J. Ramey, an attending Board-certified plastic surgeon,
amputated the tip of appellant’s left index finger.
On November 16, 2005 appellant filed a claim for a schedule award.
By letter dated December 30, 2005, the Office requested that Dr. Ramey determine,
among other things, whether appellant sustained any work-related permanent impairment based
on the American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
(A.M.A., Guides) (5th ed. 2001). Dr. Ramey did not respond.
On August 14, 2006 the Office accepted appellant’s claim for an open fracture of the
metacarpal bone of the neck and infection and inflammatory reaction due to nervous system
device, implant and graft.
By letter dated November 8, 2007, the Office referred appellant, together with a
statement of accepted facts, the case record and a list of questions to be addressed, to
Dr. Robert E. Holladay, IV, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, for a second opinion medical
examination.
In a December 10, 2007 medical report, Dr. Holladay reviewed a history of appellant’s
May 10, 2005 employment injuries and medical treatment. He used a finger goniometry to
measure range of motion and a two-point discrimination device to measure sensory loss of the
left index finger. Dr. Holladay reported very minimal sensory loss at the very tip of the more or
less scar. He found no evidence of residual damage or sensory loss to either digital nerve injury.
Regarding the metacarpophalangeal (MCP) joint, Dr. Holladay reported 85 degrees of flexion
which constituted three percent impairment and 0 degrees of extension which represented zero
percent impairment, resulting in three percent impairment (A.M.A., Guides 464, Figure 16-25).
Regarding the proximal interphalangeal (PIP) joint, he reported 70 degrees of flexion which
constituted 18 percent impairment and 0 degrees of extension which represented 0 percent
impairment, resulting in 18 percent impairment (A.M.A., Guides 463, Figure 16-23).
Dr. Holladay stated that the distal interphalangeal (DIP) joint had 38 degrees of flexion which
constituted 15 percent impairment and 0 degrees of extension which represented 0 percent
impairment, resulting in 15 percent impairment (A.M.A., Guides 461, Figure 16-21). He
combined the 3 percent impairment of the MCP joint and the 18 percent impairment of the PIP
joint to calculate 20 percent impairment (A.M.A., Guides 604, Combined Values Chart).
Dr. Holladay combined the 20 percent impairment rating with the 15 percent impairment of the
DIP joint to calculate a 32 percent impairment of the left index finger. He determined that the 32
percent impairment of the left finger constituted a 6 percent impairment of the hand1 (A.M.A.,
Guides 438, Table 16-1). Dr. Holladay further determined that the six percent hand impairment
represented a five percent impairment of the left upper extremity (A.M.A, Guides 439, Table
1

It appears that Dr. Holladay inadvertently stated that appellant sustained a six percent impairment of the whole
person rather than a six percent impairment of the hand as he utilized Table 16-1 on page 438 of the A.M.A.,
Guides.

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16-2). He opined that appellant sustained five percent impairment or a three percent impairment
of the whole person due to the May 10, 2005 employment injuries (A.M.A., Guides 439, Table
16-3).
On January 22, 2008 Dr. Ronald Blum, an Office medical adviser, reviewed
Dr. Holladay’s December 10, 2007 report. He stated that appellant reached maximum medical
improvement on December 10, 2007. Dr. Blum determined that he sustained 10 percent
impairment for amputation of the tip of his left index finger (A.M.A., Guides 447, Figure 16-7)
noting that Dr. Holladay did not provide such an impairment rating. He agreed with
Dr. Holladay that appellant sustained a 15 percent impairment of the DIP joint, an 18 percent
impairment of the PIP joint and a 3 percent impairment of the MCP joint, resulting in a 32
percent impairment of the left index finger (A.M.A., Guides 461, 463, 464 and 604, Figures 1621, 16-23 and 16-25 and Combined Values Chart). Dr. Blum combined the 32 percent
impairment rating for decreased range of motion with the 10 percent impairment for amputation
of the left finger to calculate a 39 percent impairment of the left index finger (A.M.A., Guides
604, Combined Values Chart). He determined that the 39 percent impairment of the left index
finger represented an 8 percent impairment of the hand (A.M.A., Guides 438 Table 16-1) which
constituted a 7 percent impairment of the left upper extremity (A.M.A., Guides 439, Table 16-2).
By decision dated April 17, 2008, the Office granted appellant a schedule award for a
seven percent impairment of the left upper extremity.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
The schedule award provision of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 and its
implementing regulations3 set forth the number of weeks of compensation to be paid for
permanent loss, or loss of use of the members of the body listed in the schedule. Where the loss
of use is less than 100 percent, the amount of compensation is paid in proportion to the
percentage of loss of use.4 However, neither the Act nor the regulations specify the manner in
which the percentage of impairment shall be determined. For consistent results and to ensure
equal justice for all claimants, the Office adopted the A.M.A., Guides as a standard for
determining the percentage of impairment and the Board has concurred in such adoption.5
The standards for evaluation of the permanent impairment of an extremity under the
A.M.A., Guides are based on loss of range of motion, together with all factors that prevent a limb
from functioning normally, such as pain, sensory deficit and loss of strength. All of the factors
should be considered together in evaluating the degree of permanent impairment.6

2

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193; see 5 U.S.C. § 8107(c).

3

20 C.F.R. § 10.404.

4

5 U.S.C. § 8107(c)(19).

5

20 C.F.R. § 10.404.

6

See Paul A. Toms, 28 ECAB 403 (1987).

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ANALYSIS
The Office granted appellant a schedule award for seven percent impairment of the left
upper extremity. On appeal, appellant contends that he is entitled to greater than the schedule
award he previously received. The Board, however, finds that appellant has not established that
he has more than a seven percent impairment of the left upper extremity.
Dr. Holladay, an Office referral physician, opined that appellant sustained minimal
sensory loss and no residual damage of the left index finger. He determined that appellant
sustained a five percent impairment of the left upper extremity or a three percent impairment of
the whole person, combining impairments of decreased range of motion related to the left index
finger. Regarding the MCP joint, Dr. Holladay rated three percent impairment for 85 degrees of
flexion and zero percent impairment for 0 degrees of extension, resulting in three percent
impairment (A.M.A., Guides 464, Figure 16-25). Regarding the PIP joint, he rated 18 percent
impairment for 70 degrees of flexion and 0 percent impairment for 0 degrees of extension,
resulting in 18 percent impairment (A.M.A., Guides 463, Figure 16-23). Dr. Holladay
determined that the DIP joint had 38 degrees of flexion which constituted 15 percent impairment
and 0 degrees of extension represented 0 percent impairment, resulting in 15 percent impairment
(A.M.A., Guides, 461, Figure 16-21). He combined the 3 percent impairment of the MCP joint
and the 18 percent impairment of the PIP joint to calculate 20 percent impairment (A.M.A.,
Guides, 604, Combined Values Chart). Dr. Holladay combined the 20 percent impairment rating
with the 15 percent impairment of the DIP joint to calculate a 32 percent impairment of the left
index finger. He determined that the 32 percent impairment of the left finger constituted a 6
percent impairment of the hand (A.M.A., Guides 438, Table 16-1). Dr. Holladay found that
appellant’s six percent impairment of the hand represented a five percent impairment of the left
upper extremity (A.M.A, Guides 439, Table 16-2). He opined that appellant sustained a five
percent impairment or a three percent impairment of the whole person due to the May 10, 2005
employment injuries (A.M.A., Guides 439, Table 16-3). The Board, however, finds that
Dr. Holladay’s impairment rating is of diminished probative value. While the A.M.A., Guides
provides an impairment rating for amputation of a finger (A.M.A., Guides 437, Figure 16-7),
Dr. Holladay did not provide such an impairment rating for the May 10, 2005 amputation of
appellant’s left index finger. He did not explain why appellant was not entitled to an impairment
rating for the amputation. For these reasons, the Board finds that Dr. Holladay’s impairment
rating of the left upper extremity is insufficient to establish that appellant has more than a seven
percent impairment of the left upper extremity.
Dr. Blum, an Office referral physician, reviewed Dr. Holladay’s findings. He determined
that appellant sustained 10 percent impairment for amputation of the tip of his left index finger
(A.M.A., Guides 447, Figure 16-7). Dr. Blum determined that appellant sustained a 15 percent
impairment of the DIP joint, an 18 percent impairment of the PIP joint and a 3 percent
impairment of the MCP joint, resulting in a 32 percent impairment of the left index finger due to
decreased range of motion (A.M.A., Guides 461, 463, 464 and 604, Figures 16-21, 16-23 and 1625 and Combined Values Chart). He combined the 32 percent impairment rating for decreased
range of motion with the 10 percent impairment for amputation of the left finger to calculate a 39
percent impairment of the left index finger (A.M.A., Guides 604, Combined Values Chart).
Dr. Blum determined that the 39 percent impairment of the left index finger represented an 8

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percent impairment of the hand (A.M.A., Guides 438 Table 16-1) which constituted a 7 percent
impairment of the left upper extremity (A.M.A., Guides 439, Table 16-2).
Dr. Blum properly applied the A.M.A., Guides and provided rationale for rating a seven
percent impairment of the left upper extremity. The Board finds that Dr. Blum’s opinion
represents the weight of the medical evidence of record. Appellant has no more than a seven
percent impairment of the left upper extremity.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has no more than a seven percent impairment of the left
upper extremity.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 17, 2008 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: April 6, 2009
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
B.M., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
GREENVILLE VETERANS AFFAIRS CLINIC,
Greenville, NC, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 21-0198
Issued: June 29, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On November 16, 2020 appellant filed a timely appeal from a September 11, 2020 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a degenerative disc
condition causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On June 19, 2019 appellant, then a 66-year-old staff specialty registered nurse, filed an
occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that her preexisting degenerative disc disease
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

worsened due to factors of her federal employment, including walking on uneven floors. She
explained that she first became aware of her condition its relationship to her federal employment
in June 2016; however, she had previously submitted the wrong form for her claim. On the reverse
side of the claim form, a supervisor indicated that appellant stopped work on December 19, 2017
and returned to work on January 3, 2018.
In a development letter dated October 21, 2019, OWCP advised appellant that it did not
receive any documentation with her claim form. It requested that she submit a narrative medical
report from her attending physician, which included the physician’s opinion supported by a
medical explanation as to how the work activities in her federal employment caused, contributed
to, or aggravated her medical condition. OWCP also attached a questionnaire for appellant’s
completion. It afforded her 30 days to submit the necessary evidence. No additional evidence was
received.
By decision dated December 2, 2019, OWCP denied appellant’s claim as the employment
factors were not established. It concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been met to
establish an injury as defined by FECA.
On December 26, 2019 appellant timely requested a telephonic hearing before a
representative of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review, which was held on March 13, 2020.
At the telephonic hearing, she alleged that she was required to lift, stoop, and bend in her federal
employment which worsened her degenerative disc condition. Appellant also stated that she fell
during her federal employment in 2016 and 2017 which also worsened her condition. The hearing
representative gave her 45 days to submit documentation. No additional evidence was received.
By decision dated June 30, 2020, the hearing representative determined that OWCP’s
December 2, 2019 decision should be vacated and the case remanded to the district office. The
representative remanded the case to OWCP to combine the instant case with appellant’s prior
claims, and then review the factual and medical evidence and issue a de novo decision.2
OWCP received a position description from the employing establishment detailing the
position of a registered nurse.
In a report dated June 9, 2016, Dr. Deanna L. Lassegard, an emergency medicine specialist,
related that appellant sought treatment at the emergency room after a fall at work and complained
of left hip pain. The report listed degenerative disc disease as part of her medical history.
Appellant also submitted a nurse’s note dated June 9, 2016 which related the same.
In a report dated November 9, 2017, Dr. John Edward Gough, a Board-certified emergency
medicine specialist, stated that appellant fell at work and landed on her knees and chin. He related
that she had similar falls every other month and that her fall could have been caused by a syncope.

2

On January 10, 2018 appellant filed a traumatic injury claim (FormCA-1) under OWCP File No. xxxxxx580,
alleging that on December 19, 2017 she fell and sustained neck, left arm, and chin injuries. OWCP accepted this claim
for a chin laceration. OWCP File No. xxxxxx580 has been administratively combined with the instant claim and
OWCP File No. xxxxxx580 serves as the master file.

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The report listed degenerative disc disease as part of her medical history. Appellant also submitted
the corresponding nurse’s notes dated November 9, 2017 detailing the same.
OWCP received a report dated November 14, 2017 from Dr. Myriam Daniel, an internist.
Dr. Daniel related that appellant sustained a fall recently and suffered pain in her knees and low
back. She diagnosed degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees and lumbar spine.
OWCP also received a report dated November 15, 2017 from Dr. Ronald M. Sayers, a
Board-certified diagnostic radiology and neuroradiology specialist, which revealed that appellant
had a history of back pain. Dr. Sayers diagnosed moderate lumbar spondylosis as well as a
rightward curvature and degenerative anterolisthesis.
In a report dated December 19, 2017, Dr. Jennifer M. Bennett, a Board-certified
emergency medicine specialist, stated that appellant fell at work and her chin laceration was
repaired with sutures. She stated that appellant had known spinal stenosis and had intermittent leg
weakness due to spinal stenosis and that appellant’s fall was likely related to such diagnosis.
Appellant also submitted a nurse’s note dated December 19, 2017 detailing the same.
In a consultation note dated January 3, 2018, Elwood Moore, a physician assistant, stated
that appellant experienced varying degrees of low back pain for years. He noted a diagnosis of
idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura in 1997 and rheumatoid arthritis in 2004. The consultation
note also listed degenerative disc disease as a part of appellant’s medical history. Mr. Moore
diagnosed degenerative spondylolisthesis at L4-5, acquired lumbar scoliosis, and advanced lumbar
spondylosis.
OWCP received a Family and Medical Leave Act form report dated February 9, 2018 from
Dr. Daniel. Dr. Daniel related that appellant was unable to do the following: stand or sit for a
long period of time; bend; or lift weight over 10 pounds. She stated that appellant was diagnosed
with moderate lumbar stenosis, lumbar region without neurogenic claudication, degenerative
arthritis, bulging disc, and scoliosis of the spine.
In a report dated December 19, 2019, Dr. Gregory G. Klingstein, a Board-certified
orthopedic surgeon and a hip and knee specialist, related that appellant was seen for low back pain.
By de novo decision dated September 11, 2020, OWCP accepted the implicated
employment factors, but denied appellant’s claim as causal relationship was not established
between a diagnosed medical condition and the accepted employment factors.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA3 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including that the individual is an employee of the United
States within the meaning FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time

3

Supra note 1.

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limitation period of FECA,4 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged,
and that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related
to the employment injury.5 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim,
regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.6
To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational
disease claim, a claimant must submit the following: (1) a factual statement identifying
employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence or occurrence of the
disease or condition; (2) medical evidence establishing the presence or existence of the disease or
condition for which compensation is claimed; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the identified employment factors.7
Causal relationship is a medical question that requires rationalized medical opinion
evidence to resolve the issue.8 The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual
and medical background of the claimant, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must
be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed
condition and the specific employment factors identified by the claimant.9 Neither the mere fact
that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period of employment, nor the belief that the
disease or condition was caused or aggravated by employment factors, is sufficient to establish
causal relationship.10
In any case where a preexisting condition involving the same part of the body is present
and the issue of causal relationship, therefore, involves aggravation, acceleration, or precipitation,
the physician must provide a rationalized medical opinion that differentiates between the effects
of the work-related injury or disease and the preexisting condition.11

4
F.H., Docket No. 18-0869 (issued January 29, 2020); J.P., Docket No. 19-0129 (issued April 26, 2019); Joe D.
Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).
5

L.C., Docket No. 19-1301 (issued January 29, 2020); J.H., Docket No. 18-1637 (issued January 29, 2020);
James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB 312 (1988).
6

P.A., Docket No. 18-0559 (issued January 29, 2020); K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016);
Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).
7

See T.L., Docket No. 18-0778 (issued January 22, 2020); Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238, 241 (2005); Victor J.
Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).
8

J.F., Docket No. 18-0492 (issued January 16, 2020); Jacqueline M. Nixon-Steward, 52 ECAB 140 (2000).

9

A.M., Docket No. 18-0562 (issued January 23, 2020); Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

10

E.W., Docket No. 19-1393 (issued January 29, 2020); Gary L. Fowler, 45 ECAB 365 (1994).

11
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.3e (January 2013). See
R.D., Docket No. 18-1551 (issued March 1, 2019).

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ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a degenerative
disc disease causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.
In a report dated June 9, 2016, Dr. Lassegard noted that appellant’s medical history
included degenerative disc disease. Similarly, a report dated November 9, 2017 from Dr. Gough
also noted that appellant’s medical history included degenerative disc disease. However, neither
physician provided their own diagnosis or medical opinion explaining the cause of appellant’s
diagnosed condition. The Board has held that a medical report is of no probative value if it does
not provide a firm diagnosis of a particular medical condition, or offer a specific opinion as to
whether the accepted employment incident caused or aggravated the claimed condition.12
OWCP received a report dated November 14, 2017 from Dr. Daniel which related a
diagnosis of degenerative disc disease, a November 15, 2017 report from Dr. Sayers which noted
a diagnosis of spondylosis, a December 19, 2017 report from Dr. Bennet which noted a diagnosis
of spondylosis, and a February 9, 2018 report from Dr. Daniel which noted diagnoses of spinal
stenosis and degenerative disc disease. However, none of these reports provided an opinion
regarding causal relationship of the diagnosed conditions to appellant’s alleged factors of her
federal employment. The Board has held that medical evidence that does not offer an opinion
regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of no probative value on the issue of causal
relationship.13 As such, these reports are insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
In a report dated December 19, 2019, Dr. Klingstein noted that appellant was seen for back
pain. The Board has held that pain is a symptom and not a compensable medical diagnosis.14 This
report is, therefore, insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
OWCP also received nurse’s notes and a consultation note from a physician assistant.
However, certain healthcare providers such as physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and
physical therapists are not considered physicians as defined under FECA.15 Consequently, the
nurse’s notes and consultation form will not suffice for purposes of establishing entitlement to
FECA benefits.16
12

L.E., Docket No. 19-0470 (issued August 12, 2019); M.J., Docket No. 18-1114 (issued February 5, 2019).

13

D.C., Docket No. 19-1093 (issued June 25, 2020); see L.B., Docket No. 18-0533 (issued August 27, 2018); D.K.,
Docket No. 17-1549 (issued July 6, 2018).
14

See S.L., Docket No. 19-1536 (issued June 26, 2020); D.Y., Docket No. 20-0112 (issued June 25, 2020).

Section 8101(2) provides that physician “includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists,
optometrists, chiropractors, and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by State law,”
5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(t). See also supra note 11 at Chapter 2.805.3a(1) (January 2013); M.F., Docket
No. 19-1573 (issued March 16, 2020); N.B., Docket No. 19-0221 (issued July 15, 2019); David P. Sawchuk, 57 ECAB
316, 320 n.11 (2006) (lay individuals such as physician assistants, nurses, and physical therapists are not competent
to render a medical opinion under FECA).
15

16
See M.C., Docket No. 19-1074 (issued June 12, 2020) (nurse practitioners are not considered physicians under
FECA).

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As the medical evidence of record is insufficient to establish causal relationship between
appellant’s degenerative disc condition and the accepted factors of her federal employment, the
Board finds that she has not met her burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a degenerative
disc disease causally related to her accepted factors of her federal employment.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 11, 2020 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: June 29, 2021
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
T.N., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, PROCESSING &
DISTRIBUTION CENTER, Santa Ana, CA,
Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 17-0387
Issued: November 28, 2018

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On December 8, 2016 appellant filed a timely appeal from a November 2, 2016 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction to consider the merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant received an overpayment of compensation in the
amount of $2,919.61 for the period April 5 to July 8, 2016; and (2) whether appellant was at fault
in the creation of the overpayment, thereby precluding waiver of recovery of the overpayment.
On appeal appellant contends that OWCP erred in finding an overpayment and in
requiring repayment.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 23, 2013 appellant, then a 55-year-old clerk, filed a traumatic injury claim
(Form CA-1) alleging that, on October 22, 2013, she hit her right eye lid and neck when walking
through a turnstile. On November 15, 2013 she accepted a modified job offer for four hours of
work per day. OWCP paid partial wage-loss compensation on the supplemental rolls as of
December 6, 2013.
Appellant sought treatment from Dr. Edward Mittleman, a treating physician specializing
in family medicine, beginning November 14, 2013. In various duty status (Forms CA-17) and
medical reports, Dr. Mittleman provided work restrictions which he attributed were due to her
accepted conditions. He released appellant to working four hours per day in a modified job,
which was increased to five and one-half hours per day. Dr. Mittleman noted that the accepted
employment injury diagnoses included neck sprain and contusion of the neck, face, and scalp
(except eyes).
On August 25, 2015 OWCP referred appellant, a statement of accepted facts, and list of
questions, to Dr. Michael J. Einbund, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, for a second opinion
evaluation to determine the extent of her disability and work capacity.
In a report dated October 6, 2015, Dr. Einbund noted appellant’s history of injury and
that appellant has been working a modified job part-time since December 26, 2013. He related
that appellant’s physical examination revealed tenderness on the left trapezius and left side of her
neck, negative Spurling’s test and cervical compression test, full bilateral shoulder, elbow, wrist,
and hand range of motion, normal upper extremity sensation, and no evidence of biceps, triceps
or deltoid muscle weakness. Dr. Einbund reviewed x-ray interpretation and found no evidence
of dislocation or fracture and very mild C5 and C6 anterior aspect degeneration. He noted that a
November 18, 2013 magnetic resonance imaging scan revealed clinically insignificant very small
disc bulges and no evidence of spondylosis. Dr. Einbund also reviewed a December 18, 2013
electromyography (EMG) study which he found showed no evidence of cervical radiculopathy.
He opined that appellant no longer had any residuals or disability due to the accepted
October 22, 2013 employment injury based on the lack of any objective findings. Dr. Einbund
observed that appellant had preexisting and nonwork-related mild degeneration and the
degenerative changes which were consistent with her age.
In a November 25, 2015 report, Dr. Mittleman reviewed Dr. Einbund’s report and
concurred with Dr. Einbund’s opinion that appellant no longer had any residuals from the
accepted October 22, 2013 employment injury. However, he disagreed with Dr. Einbund
regarding appellant’s physical restrictions. Dr. Mittleman imposed a 25-pound lifting and
carrying intermittently weight restriction to prevent any further aggravation of appellant’s back
or neck symptoms. He noted the work restrictions from a March 5, 2015 functional capacity
evaluation (FCE).
In a letter dated March 3, 2016, OWCP proposed to terminate appellant’s wage-loss
compensation and medical benefits as the evidence of record established that appellant was no

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longer partially disabled and could resume full-time work without restrictions.2 It accorded the
weight of the medical evidence to Dr. Einbund and noted that Dr. Mittleman, in his
November 25, 2015 report, indicated that his work restrictions were only to prevent further
injury to her neck and back. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to respond to the proposed
termination. By decision dated April 5, 2016, it finalized the termination of appellant’s wageloss compensation and medical benefits, effective that date.3 OWCP, however, continued to pay
partial wage-loss compensation benefits until July 8, 2016.4
On September 9, 2016 OWCP issued a preliminary determination of an overpayment of
compensation in the amount of $2,919.61 for the period April 5 to July 8, 2016 as she continued
to receive compensation following the termination of her benefits. It found that appellant was at
fault in the creation of the overpayment as she had accepted a payment, which she knew or
reasonably should have known was incorrect.
In a letter dated October 1, 2016, received by OWCP on October 6, 2016, appellant
disagreed with the proposed overpayment determination. She contended that she was not at fault
in its creation and that her treating physician never received anything from OWCP regarding the
closing of her claim. Appellant further requested that OWCP reimburse her for her leave without
pay until she returns to full-duty work.
By decision dated November 2, 2016, OWCP finalized its determination that appellant
had received an overpayment of compensation in the amount of $2,919.61 for the period April 5
to July 8, 2016, and that she was at fault in its creation. It directed recovery of the overpayment
in full.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
Section 8102(a) of FECA provides that the United States shall pay compensation for the
disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the
performance of duty.5 Section 8129(a) of FECA provides, in pertinent part:
“When an overpayment has been made to an individual under this subchapter
because of an error of fact or law, adjustment shall be made under regulations

2

The letter was addressed and mailed to her last known address in Huntington Beach, CA.

3

The decision was addressed and mailed to her last known address in Huntington Beach, CA. On April 4, 2016
the day prior to the final termination decision, appellant had filed a claim for leave buy-back (Form CA-7) on which
appellant had reported the same address as that used by OWCP as its address of record.
4
The record contains OWCP payment records and calculation sheets showing that appellant was overpaid
$397.33, $127.30, $305.33, $442.56, $451.41, $404.64, $408.07, and $382.97 totaling $2,919.61 for the period
April 5 to July 8, 2016. The initial payment made by direct deposit covered the period April 5 to 15, 2016 was made
on May 2, 2016. The second payment was made on May 9, 2016.
5

5 U.S.C. § 8102(a).

3

prescribed by the Secretary of Labor by decreasing later payments to which an
individual is entitled.”6
Section 8102 of FECA provides that the United States shall pay compensation for the
disability of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of
duty.7 Section 8116 of FECA defines the limitations on the right to receive compensation
benefits. This section of FECA provides that, while an employee is receiving compensation, he
or she may not receive salary, pay, or remuneration of any type from the United States, except in
limited circumstances.8 OWCP’s regulations state in pertinent part that compensation for wage
loss due to disability is available only for any periods during which the employee’s work-related
medical condition prevents her from earning the wages earned before the work-related injury.9
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant received an overpayment
of compensation in the amount of $2,919.61 for the period April 5 to July 8, 2016. The record
reflects that OWCP terminated appellant’s wage-loss compensation and medical benefits,
effective April 5, 2016. However, appellant continued to receive wage-loss compensation on the
supplemental rolls until July 8, 2016.
The case record contains OWCP payment records and calculations showing that
payments totaling $2,919.61 in compensation benefits for the period April 5 to July 8, 2016 were
electronically deposited into appellant’s bank account.10 As appellant was paid compensation
from April 5 to July 8, 2016 following the termination of her benefits as of April 5, 2016, the
entire amount of compensation appellant received during this period, $2,919.61, constituted an
overpayment of compensation. The Board thus finds that appellant received an overpayment of
compensation in the amount of $2,919.61 for the period April 5 to July 8, 2016.11
On appeal appellant contends that she never received the April 5, 2016 termination
decision. As she was unaware that her benefits had been terminated, she contended that OWCP
should have continued to pay wage-loss compensation for the period April 5 to July 8, 2016 as
her wage loss was due to her accepted employment injuries. Appellant also contends that she
continues to have problems with her neck injury and OWCP should have paid for her lost wages
from July 8 to September 17, 2016 when she returned to full-time work.

6

Id. at § 8129(a).

7

5 U.S.C. § 8102.

8

Id. at § 8116(a).

9

20 C.F.R. § 10.500.

10

Supra note 4.

11

See K.D., Docket No. 13-0451 (issued April 12, 2013); M.G., Docket No. 08-1942 (issued September 3, 2009).

4

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a decision mailed to an
addressee in the ordinary course of business was received by the addressee.12 The April 5, 2016
decision was properly addressed to appellant’s last known address and there is no evidence that it
was returned as undeliverable.13 Consequently, the decision is presumed to be received under
the “mailbox rule.”
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
Section 8129(b) of FECA14 provides: “Adjustment or recovery by the United States may
not be made when incorrect payment has been made to an individual who is without fault and
when adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of FECA of would be against equity and
good conscience.”15
OWCP may consider waiving an overpayment of compensation only if the individual to
whom it was made was not at fault in accepting or creating the overpayment. Each recipient of
compensation benefits is responsible for taking all reasonable measures to ensure that payments
he or she received from OWCP are proper. The recipient must show good faith and exercise a
high degree of care in reporting events, which may affect entitlement to or the amount of
benefits. A recipient who has done any of the following will be found to be at fault with respect
to creating an overpayment: (1) made an incorrect statement as to a material fact which he or she
knew or should have known to be incorrect; (2) failed to provide information which he or she
knew or should have known to be material; or (3) accepted a payment which he or she knew or
should have known to be incorrect.16
Whether or not OWCP determines that an individual was at fault with respect to the
creation of an overpayment depends on the circumstances surrounding the overpayment. The
degree of care expected may vary with the complexity of those circumstances and the
individual’s capacity to realize that he or she is being overpaid.17
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
OWCP determined that appellant was at fault in the creation of the overpayment because
she accepted payments that she knew or should have known to be incorrect. The Board finds,
however, that OWCP failed to establish that, at the time appellant accepted the initial payment of
compensation, she knew or should have known that the payment was incorrect.
12

See R.H., Docket No. 09-1981 (issued June 11, 2010); Joseph R. Giallanza, 55 ECAB 186 (2003); Larry L.
Hill, 42 ECAB 596, 600 (1991).
13

20 C.F.R. § 10.127 provides that a copy of the decision shall be mailed to the employee’s last known address.

14

5 U.S.C. § 8129(b).

15

J.K., Docket No. 08-1761 (issued January 8, 2009); Joan Ross, 57 ECAB 694 (2006); Desiderio Martinez, 55
ECAB 245 (2004).
16

20 C.F.R. § 10.433(a).

17

Id. at § 10.433(b).

5

In cases where a claimant receives compensation through direct deposit, the Board has
held that OWCP must establish that, at the time a claimant received the direct deposit in
question, he or she should have known that the payment was incorrect.18 The Board has held
that an employee who receives payments from OWCP in the form of a direct deposit might not
be at fault for the first incorrect deposit into his or her account since the acceptance of the
overpayment, at the time of receipt of the direct deposit, lacks the requisite knowledge.19
Because fault is defined by what the claimant knew or should have known at the time of
acceptance, one of the consequences of electronic fund transfers is that the claimant lacks the
requisite knowledge at the time of the first incorrect payment.20 Whether or not OWCP
determines that an individual is at fault with respect to the creation of an overpayment depends
on the circumstances surrounding the overpayment.21 It is not appropriate, however, to make a
finding that a claimant has accepted an overpayment via direct deposit until such time as a
reasonable person would have been aware that this overpayment had occurred. This awareness
could be established either through documentation such as a bank statement or notification from
OWCP or where a reasonable period of time has passed during which a claimant could have
reviewed independent confirmation of the incorrect payment.22
The record establishes that appellant received compensation by direct deposit for the
period April 5 to July 8, 2016. The evidence of record does not establish that, on the date of the
first direct deposit of compensation following the termination of her compensation, appellant
knew or should have known that she was accepting a direct deposit to which she was not entitled.
The record does not contain any documentation or other evidence to demonstrate that appellant
had knowledge at the time of the May 2, 2016 direct deposit covering the period April 5 to 15,
2016 that the payment was incorrect or that a reasonable period of time passed during which she
could have reviewed bank statements or been informed of the incorrect payment. Thus, the
Board finds that when the initial direct deposit was made, appellant had no knowledge that this
direct deposit was incorrect. Appellant, therefore, cannot be found to be at fault in the
acceptance of the initial May 2, 2016 direct deposit. The case must therefore be remanded for
OWCP to determine whether she is entitled to waiver of the recovery of the overpayment for the
first incorrect compensation payment made on May 2, 2016.
The Board had held that for subsequent payments through direct deposit, a claimant may
be found to have accepted payments he or she knew or should have known to be incorrect.23 By
the time OWCP issued the second compensation payment on May 9, 2016, appellant should have
known that she was no longer entitled to compensation, as OWCP had notified her that her
compensation was formally terminated, effective April 5, 2016. Therefore, the Board finds that
18

C.K., Docket No. 12-0746 (issued May 1, 2012).

19

Tammy Craven, 57, ECAB 589 (2006).

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

See K.H., Docket No. 06-0191 (issued October 30, 2006).

23

Supra note 18.

6

appellant was at fault in the creation of the remainder of the overpayment as she knew or should
have known at the time of the second incorrect payment that she was no longer entitled to
additional wage-loss compensation. Appellant had the obligation to return all payments she
received after that.24 The Board, therefore, finds that appellant was at fault for the remaining
portion of the period of overpayment
On appeal, appellant contends that she did not know of the termination decision and
believed that she was entitled to wage-loss compensation benefits until returning to full-duty
work on September 17, 2016. Her contentions, however, are without merit. The Board notes
that, even if OWCP may have been negligent in issuing continuing compensation for temporary
disability, it does not excuse her acceptance of such checks, which she knew or should have been
expected to know should be returned to OWCP.25 As discussed above, under the “mailbox rule”
the April 5, 2016 decision was presumed to be delivered to appellant as it had been properly
addressed and it had not been returned to OWCP. The Board therefore finds that OWCP has
established that appellant accepted payments which she knew or should have known to be
incorrect.
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision regarding the issue of waiver
of the overpayment for the initial direct deposit made on May 2, 2016. The Board will set aside
the November 2, 2016 decision regarding the issue of fault as to the initial May 2, 2016 direct
deposit and will remand the case for OWCP to determine whether appellant is entitled to waiver
of recover for the remaining period of overpayment.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant received an overpayment of compensation in the amount
of $2,919.61 for the period April 5 to July 8, 2016. The Board further finds that appellant was
not at fault in the creation of the portion of the $2,919.61 overpayment for the period April 5
to 15, 2016, and the case is remanded to OWCP to consider whether waiver of recovery is
warranted. The Board further finds that appellant was at fault in the creation of the remaining
portion of the overpayment of compensation for the period April 16 to July 8, 2016 and,
therefore, is ineligible for waiver of recovery for this remaining portion.

24

Sinclair L. Taylor, 52 ECAB 442 (2001).

25

Supra note 18.

7

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated November 2, 2016 is affirmed in part and set aside in part. The
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.26
Issued: November 28, 2018
Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

26
Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge, participated in this decision, but was no longer a member of the Board effective
December 11, 2017.

8


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.H., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, ST. PETERSBURG
MAIN POST OFFICE, St. Petersburg, FL,
Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Misty L. Wenger, for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 22-0470
Issued: February 28, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
Before:
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On February 9, 2022 appellant, through his representative, filed an appeal from an
August 9, 2021 nonmerit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).
The Clerk of the Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 22-0470.
The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to
review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. 2
For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s review
authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of OWCP’s
decision.3
1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

3

Id. at § 501.3(e).

The 180 th day following the August 9, 2021 decision was February 5, 2022. As this fell on
a Saturday, appellant had until the next business day, Monday, February 7, 2022, to file the appeal. 4
As he did not file an appeal with the Board until February 9, 2022, more than 180 days after the
August 9, 2021 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 22-0470 is
untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered
a reason to explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to
establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP
within 180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed
as No. 22-0470, must be dismissed.5 Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 22-0470 is dismissed.
Issued: February 28, 2022
Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

4

20 C.F.R. §§ 501.3(f)

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” 20
C.F.R. § 501.6(d).
5

2


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.F., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
New Orleans, LA, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Hollis Shepherd, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 11-1028
Issued: April 13, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 18, 2011 appellant, through her attorney, filed a timely appeal from a
September 21, 2010 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP),
which denied her claim for a recurrence. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation
Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of
this case.
ISSUES
The issues is whether appellant has established a recurrence of total disability
commencing September 4, 2009 causally related to the July 12, 2007 employment injury.
On appeal, appellant’s attorney contends: (1) that the date of recurrence is September 4,
2009 and not April 22, 2009 as indicated in the September 21, 2010 OWCP decision; and
(2) OWCP should have referred appellant to an impartial medical examiner (IME) to resolve
conflicting medical opinions in the case record under 5 U.S.C. § 8123(a) or, alternatively, found
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

that the medical evidence established a consequential injury. Appellant’s attorney requests that
OWCP pay appellant’s outstanding medical bills from Metropolitan Health Group, Dr. Rudolf
Vaclav Hamsa, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. John D. Olson, a neurologist, for treatment
related to the accepted employment injury.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 12, 2007 appellant, then a 23-year-old rural carrier associate, filed a traumatic
injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that she sustained a head and neck injury that same day while
in the performance of duty.
By decision dated July 27, 2007, OWCP accepted appellant’s claim for neck sprain.
On September 4, 2009 appellant filed a notice of recurrence. She reported that when she
returned to work she was limited due to the fact that pulling, casing and delivering mail caused
excessive stress and strain on her right upper body region, right clavicle, back and right arm.
The employing establishment indicated that the date of recurrence was September 4, 2009. It
reported that appellant was provided limited-duty work within her medical restrictions until her
release to full duty from her physician on September 24, 2007 without restrictions.
An April 22, 2009 report from Dr. Hamsa diagnosed cervical discogenic sprain with
post-traumatic spondylitis, traumatic bulging at C5-6 and to a lesser degree, C6-7, tension
headache syndrome and thoracic sprain with spondylitis.
In a June 30, 2009 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan report, Dr. Lawrence W.
Glorioso, III, a Board-certified radiologist, diagnosed posterior bulging of the C5-6 intervertebral
disc and reversal of the cervical lordosis indicating muscle spasm.
Dr. Hamsa indicated on August 6, 2009 that the June 30, 2009 MRI scan revealed that the
C6-7 level had shrunken and settled down somewhat. He reported that appellant still had
stiffness and deep aching with a reduced range of motion with no sustained spasm and that the
radicular component continued to be in the basilar regions bilaterally, the left more than the right
and into the upper back, midline. Dr. Hamsa opined that her situation was fairly stable except
for the inflammatory spondylitis. In a September 3, 2009 progress report, he indicated that
appellant was seen on a semi-emergent basis and was in significant distress and showed the
inability to totally utilize the right dominant extremity in a free manner and with the weight of
the arm. Appellant was having extreme difficulty pulling her mail. Dr. Hamsa opined that she
showed signs of a ruptured disc at C6-7 and had a manifest of the 6 root into and through the
shoulder, directly into the posterior of the right upper arm which could be C5-6. He referred
appellant to Dr. Olson for an electromyogram (EMG) and nerve conduction studies.
On September 23, 2009 Dr. Olson conducted an EMG and nerve conduction study of the
right upper extremity and diagnosed right C7 radiculopathy.
By letter dated November 4, 2009, OWCP requested additional factual and medical
information from appellant. It allotted her 30 days to submit additional evidence and respond to
its inquiries.

2

In a November 30, 2009 narrative statement, appellant indicated that her duties upon
returning to work were casing, pulling of letters, flat mail, loading packages and curbside
delivery. She had been experiencing intense sharp pains in her neck, which radiated down her
arm, muscle spasms and a burning sensation of the right upper arm and body region and muscle
tightening in her right hand.
In a November 30, 2009 report, Dr. Hamsa reiterated his diagnosis and indicated that
appellant was not able to continue her work activities after October 3, 2009. He reported that she
wore an arm sling and was scheduled to undergo cervical facet/nerve blocks at C5-6 and C6-7 on
the right side. Dr. Hamsa opined that appellant did not completely recover from the original
injury, returned to regular duty and was unable to perform. He stated that lingering signs and
symptoms have been described and any aspects of recurrence or increased problems would be on
the basis of appellant’s attempt to do her regular scope of job activity.
By decision dated December 30, 2009, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for a recurrence
of total disability on the basis that the medical evidence submitted was insufficient to establish
that she sustained a recurrence of disability commencing September 4, 2009 causally related to
the July 12, 2007 employment injury.
On January 7, 2010 appellant requested an oral hearing.
On September 16, 2009 Dr. Hamsa reiterated his diagnosis and reported that appellant
had flares with acute cervical spasm, a moderate tension headache with moderate pain involving
the right dominant extremity, increased by extended use. He indicated on October 12, 2009 that
appellant remained with adjusted activity and was in and out of a sling for support of the right
upper extremity due to traction pain syndrome with the already demonstrated disc lesions at C5-6
and C6-7.
Dr. Michael Serou, a Board-certified radiologist, reported on January 19, 2010 that the
right shoulder radiograph was unremarkable. In another radiological report of the cervical spine
bearing the same date, he diagnosed slight reversal of cervical curvature that may be due to
spasm and indicated that it was an otherwise unremarkable cervical spine radiograph.
In a January 19, 2010 report, Dr. Gregory Stewart, a physician Board-certified in physical
medicine and rehabilitation, indicated that originally he diagnosed cervical spine injury
secondary to motor vehicle crash with a right C7 radiculopathy on EMG, however, at present
appellant’s bigger problems were due to inactivity. He diagnosed right elbow medial
epicondylitis and opined that appellant had rotator cuff syndrome. Dr. Stewart recommended
reentering a course of physical therapy.
Dr. Olson reported on January 20, 2010 that appellant complained of neck pain with
radiation into the right arm, right arm and hand weakness and right shoulder pain that seems to
be separate from the neck pain. Upon neurological examination, he reported that Dr. Hamsa’s
C6-7 findings correlated with the C7 nerve root and opined that she had also sustained a shoulder
injury. Dr. Olson opined that it was obvious that appellant’s condition was directly attributable
to the July 12, 2007 employment injury as there had been no subsequent accident and she had
continued to be symptomatic and received medical treatment. He stated that she was able to

3

work in a light-duty status but was recently terminated because her position was no longer
available. Appellant was unable to take a job as a full-duty letter carrier due to continuing
shoulder complaints associated with carrying the heavy bag.
Dr. Hamsa reported on January 25, 2010 that appellant was at first mutually able to
continue her light-duty work and stated that he was not aware of the exact mechanism for which
she was now not at duty.
In a February 19, 2010 report, Dr. Stewart diagnosed cervical spine pain, rotator cuff
syndrome and right elbow medial epicondylitis with a component of reflex sympathetic
dystrophy.
On May 11, 2010 Dr. Patrick H. Waring, a physician Board-certified in anesthesiology
and pain medicine, conducted fluoroscopic cervical medial branch facet nerve block steroid
injections at the right C4, C5 and C6 levels. His pre- and post-procedure diagnoses were cervical
spondylosis and cervicalgia.
Appellant’s attorney notified OWCP on July 7, 2010 that appellant had agreed to a
review of the written record by an OWCP hearing representative.
By decision dated September 21, 2010, an OWCP hearing representative denied
appellant’s claim for a recurrence based on a review of the written record conducted on
September 2, 2010. The hearing representative affirmed the December 30, 2009 OWCP
decision, finding that the medical evidence submitted was insufficient to establish that appellant
sustained a recurrence of disability commencing on September 4, 2009 causally related to the
accepted employment injury.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
A recurrence of disability means an inability to work after an employee has returned to
work, caused by a spontaneous change in a medical condition which has resulted from a previous
injury or illness without an intervening injury or new exposure to the work environment that
caused the illness.2 This term also means an inability to work that takes place when a light-duty
assignment made specifically to accommodate an employee’s physical limitations due to his or
her work-related injury or illness is withdrawn (except when such withdrawal occurs for reasons
of misconduct, nonperformance of job duties or a reduction-in-force) or when the physical
requirements of such an assignment are altered so that they exceed his or her established physical
limitations.3
When an employee who is disabled from the job he held when injured on account of
employment-related residuals returns to a limited-duty position or the medical evidence of record
establishes that he can perform the limited-duty position, the employee has the burden to
establish by the weight of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence a recurrence of total
2

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(x). See T.S., Docket No. 09-1256 (issued April 15, 2010).

3

Id.

4

disability and to show that he cannot perform such limited-duty work. As part of this burden, the
employee must show a change in the nature and extent of the injury-related condition or a change
in the nature and extent of the limited-duty job requirements.4
ANALYSIS
On July 27, 2007 OWCP accepted appellant’s claim for neck sprain. The issue on appeal
is whether she has established a recurrence of disability commencing on September 4, 2009 as a
result of her July 12, 2007 employment injury. Although the record indicates that appellant had
worked in a limited-duty capacity for a period of time, she did not submit evidence to show that
the requirements of her job changed from the time she began work. Therefore, she has the
burden of proof to show a spontaneous change in her medical condition or a change in the nature
and extent of her injury-related condition.
In a series of medical reports, Dr. Hamsa diagnosed cervical discogenic sprain with
post-traumatic spondylitis, traumatic bulging at C5-6 and to a lesser degree, C6-7, tension
headache syndrome and thoracic sprain with spondylitis. On September 3, 2009 he indicated
that appellant was seen on a semi-emergent basis after having extreme difficulty pulling her mail
and opined that she showed signs of a ruptured disc at C6-7 and had a manifest of the 6 root into
and through the shoulder, directly into the posterior of the right upper arm which could be C5-6.
On November 30, 2009 Dr. Hamsa concluded that appellant was not able to continue her work
activities after October 3, 2009. He further concluded that appellant did not completely recover
from the original injury, returned to regular duty and was unable to perform. Although
Dr. Hamsa suggested that, any recurrence or increased problems would be on the basis of her
attempt to do her regular scope of job activity, he did not provide any rationale explaining how
her employment duties resulted in a change in her employment-related condition or why she was
totally disabled for work. Therefore, his reports are insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
The reports of Drs. Waring, Glorioso and Serou also provided firm diagnoses based on
various diagnostic tests. However, due to the nature of their reports, they did not offer any
opinion on causal relationship. The Board has held that medical evidence that does not offer any
opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue
of causal relationship.5 Thus, these reports are insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
On January 20, 2010 Dr. Olson opined that appellant had sustained a shoulder injury and
stated that it was obvious that her condition was directly attributable to the July 12, 2007
employment injury. On February 19, 2010 Dr. Stewart diagnosed rotator cuff syndrome and
right elbow medial epicondylitis with a component of reflex sympathetic dystrophy. OWCP did
not accept a shoulder, right elbow or rotator cuff condition causally related to appellant’s
July 12, 2007 employment injury prior to the filing of her claim on September 4, 2009. For
conditions not accepted by OWCP as employment related, she has the burden of proof to

4

See A.M., Docket No. 09-1895 (issued April 23, 2010). See also Joseph D. Duncan, 54 ECAB 471, 472 (2003);
Terry R. Hedman, 38 ECAB 222, 227 (1986).
5

See K.W., 59 ECAB 271 (2007); A.D., 58 ECAB 149 (2006); Linda I. Sprague, 48 ECAB 386 (1997).

5

establish causal relationship.6 Appellant has failed to do so. The issue here is a recurrence of
accepted medical conditions. Thus, these medical reports are immaterial in nature.
The Board finds that the evidence submitted by appellant does not provide adequate
rationale to show a spontaneous change in her medical condition which has resulted from the
July 12, 2007 employment injury nor a change in the nature and extent of the injury-related
condition. Moreover, appellant has not shown a change in her light-duty requirements.
Therefore, she did not meet her burden of proof to establish disability as a result of a recurrence.
On appeal, appellant’s attorney contends that OWCP should have referred appellant to an
IME to resolve conflicting medical opinions in the case record under 5 U.S.C. § 8123(a) or,
alternatively, found that the medical evidence established a consequential injury. Due to the
deficiencies in the reports, the Board finds no conflict in the medical opinion evidence and no
evidence of a consequential injury. Thus, the Board finds that the attorney’s argument is not
substantiated.
With regard to appellant’s attorney’s contention that the September 21, 2010 OWCP
hearing representative’s decision referred to an incorrect date of recurrence, the Board notes that
the hearing representative affirmed the December 30, 2009 OWCP decision, finding that
appellant did not sustain a recurrence of disability commencing September 4, 2009 causally
related to the July 12, 2007 employment injury.
OWCP, however, did not adjudicate the issue of appellant’s incurred medical expenses.
On appeal, appellant’s attorney requested that OWCP pay appellant’s outstanding medical bills
from Metropolitan Health Group, Dr. Hamsa and Dr. Olson for treatment related to the accepted
employment injury. Ordinarily, the employing establishment will authorize treatment of a jobrelated injury by providing the employee a properly executed CA-16 within four hours.7 Under
section 8103 of FECA, OWCP has broad discretionary authority to approve unauthorized
medical care which it finds necessary and reasonable in cases of emergency or other unusual
circumstances, to be determined on a case-by-case basis.8 The Board finds that the
circumstances of the case warrant additional development of this issue. The case will be
remanded to OWCP for further development, to be followed by the issuance of a de novo
decision on this issue.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.

6

See Jaja K. Asaramo, 55 ECAB 104 (2004).

7

See Val D. Wynn, 40 ECAB 666 (1989); see also Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 3 -- Medical,
Authorizing Examination and Treatment, Chapter 3.300.3(a)(3) (September 1995).
8

5 U.S.C. § 8103; 20 C.F.R. § 10.304. See L.B., Docket No. 10-469 (issued June 2, 2010); see also Federal
(FECA) Procedure Manual, id.

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CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden to establish that she sustained a
recurrence of total disability commencing September 4, 2009 causally related to the July 12,
2007 employment injury. The case will be returned to OWCP for consideration of whether her
medical expenses should be reimbursed.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 21, 2010 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed and the case is remanded for further development
regarding the reimbursement of medical expenses.
Issued: April 13, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.C., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
BUREAU OF ENGRAVING & PRINTING,
Washington, DC, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Lloyd Trueheart, for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-556
Issued: February 21, 2013

Oral Argument January 2, 2013

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On January 13, 2012 appellant filed a timely appeal from an August 3, 2011 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’ (OWCP) hearing representative
denying her occupational disease claim. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1
(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this
case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish that her bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome was causally related to factors of her employment.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On June 1, 2009 appellant, then a 49-year-old final verifier, filed an occupational disease
claim alleging that she developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of repetitively hand
counting invisible sheets of currency, placing the sheets on a skid and stacking the skids load by
load. She first became aware of her condition and realized that it resulted from her employment
on June 1, 2009. The employing establishment noted that appellant first reported her alleged
injury on May 13, 2010.
In January 5 and 9, 2007 progress notes, Dr. Daniel Jimenez, Board-certified in
occupational medicine, related appellant’s complaints of recurrent pain on her left wrist and
forearm from counting currency beginning in November 2006. He noted that, as a currency
examiner, she used her left hand to count individual sheets with her wrist in a constantly
extended position. Upon examination, Dr. Jimenez observed tenderness especially on wrist
extension and swelling of the extensor tendon to the index finger. Full range of motion was
noted. Dr. Jimenez authorized appellant to return to regular duty.
In a February 16, 2010 diagnostic report, Dr. Chee-Hahn Hung, Board-certified in
physical medicine and rehabilitation, related appellant’s complaints of left hand numbness since
December 2009. The motor nerve and sensory nerve studies revealed severe median neuropathy
at the carpal tunnel but no evidence of ulnar neuropathy across the elbow.
In a March 17, 2010 progress note, a registered nurse stated that appellant was seen at the
employee health unit on January 22, 2010 for work-related pain in both her wrists. She noted
that appellant underwent nerve conduction studies and was diagnosed with carpal tunnel
syndrome.
In an April 27, 2010 attending physician’s report, Dr. Edward Rabbitt, a Board-certified
orthopedic surgeon, described appellant’s complaints of bilateral wrist and left heel pain. He
noted that an electromyography (EMG) revealed severe carpal tunnel syndrome and median
nerve entrapment. Dr. Rabbitt diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and plantar fasciitis.
He checked a box marked “yes” that appellant’s condition was caused or aggravated by her
employment and stated that her job as currency examiner “has precipitated and aggravated
[carpal tunnel syndrome].”
Dr. Rabbitt authorized her to return to regular duty on
January 8, 2010.
Appellant submitted physical and occupational therapy reports indicating that she
underwent physical therapy treatments for carpal tunnel syndrome from March 11 to
April 14, 2010.
Appellant submitted her work history and position descriptions for a support services
technician, secretary, division secretary, currency note examiner and final verifier.
On July 5, 2010 OWCP advised appellant that the evidence submitted was insufficient to
establish her claim. It requested that she submit a detailed description of the employment
activities that she believed caused her condition and respond to specific questions. OWCP also
requested that appellant submit a comprehensive medical report, including a diagnosis, results of

2

examinations and tests and a physician’s opinion with medical rationale explaining the cause of
her condition.
In an April 14, 2010 incident report, the employing establishment noted that appellant
began to notice discomfort and constant aching in her wrists over the past two years. Appellant
was treated at the employee health unit and by her physician. She related that she was diagnosed
with carpal tunnel syndrome and underwent physical therapy treatments. Appellant believed that
her carpal tunnel syndrome was brought on by her job duties as a final verifier for the past 17
years. In the April 14, 2010 incident report, the employing establishment described her work
duties and stated that the primary cause of her illness was the repetitive task of fanning the
currency sheets and hand counting each sheet for several years.
In an undated personal statement, appellant reported that, as a final verifier, she was
responsible for final count verification of test and mutilated currency sheets, and blind count of
individual unit sheets and whole subject sheets. She stated that it was necessary to use her hand
to count numerous sheets one by one and to use the counting machine. Appellant explained that
she lifted a full skid of currency from another skid, put it on a counter, fanned through each stack
before and after count checking and stacked some skids 2 to 4 feet high. She stated that she
worked 40 hours a week, 5 days a week and spent at least 5 hours a day hand counting currency.
Appellant reported that she also worked as an optical assistant at Wal-Mart Vision Center a few
days of the week. Her duties included helping patients that needed to fix their glasses or contact
lenses, filing medical charts, setting up and confirming appointments and setting up the office for
the next business day. Appellant stated that she first noticed pain, tingling and numbness in her
hands and wrists in June 2009 and continued to complain of tingling and numbness, especially
with intensive use of her hands.
In a decision dated August 11, 2010, OWCP accepted that appellant worked as a final
verifier and that she suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. However, it denied her claim finding
insufficient medical evidence to establish that her conditions were causally related to her
employment duties.
On August 30, 2010 appellant submitted a request for an oral hearing, which was held on
June 8, 2011. She was represented by Lloyd Trueheart of the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers’ Union. Appellant stated that her claim was improperly
handled because her supervisor did not turn in the proper documentation on time. She noted that
she had documents to establish what her job requirements were and that her alleged injury was
related to the type of work she did. The hearing representative advised appellant that the issue of
her employment duties was already established and that the evidence needed was a medical
report from a physician with examination findings, diagnoses and a medical opinion explaining
why he or she believed that her condition was related to her federal employment duties.
In a June 20, 2011 report, Dr. Rabbitt stated that he reviewed appellant’s job description
and discussed her work history. He opined, within a reasonable degree of medical probability,
that her carpal tunnel syndrome was a result of repetitive motion and use. Dr. Rabbitt considered
her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome to be work related with regard to her work over the last 18
years with the Federal Government and was in no way caused by her job at Wal-Mart.

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By decision dated August 3, 2011, the hearing representative denied modification of the
August 11, 2010 decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim by the weight of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence2 including that he or she sustained an injury in the performance of duty and that any
specific condition or disability for work for which he or she claims compensation is causally
related to that employment injury.3 In an occupational disease claim, appellant’s burden requires
submission of the following: (1) a factual statement identifying employment factors alleged to
have caused or contributed to the presence or occurrence of the disease or condition; (2) medical
evidence establishing the presence or existence of the disease or condition for which
compensation is claimed; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the diagnosed condition is
causally related to the employment factors identified by the employee.4
Causal relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence generally required to
establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence.5 The opinion of the
physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the employee, must be
one of reasonable medical certainty and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the
nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors
identified by the employee.6 This medical opinion must include an accurate history of the
employee’s employment injury and must explain how the condition is related to the injury.7 The
weight of medical evidence is determined by its reliability, its probative value, its convincing
quality, the care of analysis manifested and the medical rationale expressed in support of the
physician’s opinion.8

2

J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 58 (1968).

3

M.M., Docket No. 08-1510 (issued November 25, 2010); G.T., 59 ECAB 447 (2008); Elaine Pendleton, 40
ECAB 1143, 1145 (1989).
4

R.H., 59 ECAB 382 (2008); Ernest St. Pierre, 51 ECAB 623 (2000).

5

I.R., Docket No. 09-1229 (issued February 24, 2010); D.I., 59 ECAB 158 (2007).

6

I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 465 (2005).

7

See L.F., Docket No. 10-2287 (issued July 6, 2011); Solomon Polen, 51 ECAB 341 (2000) (rationalized medical
evidence must relate specific employment factors identified by the claimant to the claimant’s condition, with stated
reasons by a physician). See also E.R., Docket No. 12-793 (issued October 3, 2012); L.Y., Docket No. 07-219
(issued April 20, 2007) (medical evidence that does not offer a medical opinion explaining how the accepted
employment duties would have pathologically caused an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the
issue of causal relationship).
8

James Mack, 43 ECAB 321 (1991).

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ANALYSIS
Appellant alleged that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome resulted from her duties as a
final verifier. OWCP accepted that her duties included repetitively hand counting individual
sheets of currency, placing the sheets on a skid and stacking the skids load by load and that she
was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. It denied appellant’s claim finding
insufficient medical evidence to establish that her condition was causally related to those duties.
The Board finds that appellant has failed to provide sufficient medical evidence to establish that
she developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her employment duties.
Appellant submitted reports by Dr. Rabbitt, who described her complaints of bilateral
wrist and left heel pain. In an April 27, 2010 report, Dr. Rabbitt diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome and plantar fasciitis. He checked a box marked “yes” that appellant’s condition was
caused or aggravated by her employment and stated that her job as currency examiner “has
precipitated and aggravated [carpal tunnel syndrome].” The Board has held, however, that when
a physician’s opinion on causal relationship consists only of checking “yes” to a form question,
without explanation or rationale, that opinion is of diminished probative value and is insufficient
to establish a claim.9
In a June 20, 2011 report, Dr. Rabbitt stated that he reviewed appellant’s job description
and discussed her work history. He opined that her carpal tunnel syndrome was a result of
repetitive motion and use. Dr. Rabbitt explained that appellant’s condition was work related in
regards to her work at the Federal Government and was in no way caused by her job at WalMart. Although he provides an opinion on causal relationship, the Board finds that his opinion is
not well rationalized and fails to meet appellant’s burden of proof. Dr. Rabbitt concludes that
appellant’s condition was work related, but he does not provide medical rationale explaining how
her employment duties would have caused her condition. The Board has held that medical
evidence that states a conclusion but does not offer any rationalized medical explanation
regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of
causal relationship.10 Because his reports do not meet the standard of rationalized medical
evidence then they are insufficient to establish her claim.
Appellant also submitted progress notes by Dr. Jimenez who related her complaints of
recurrent pain on her left wrist and forearm from counting currency. Dr. Jimenez noted that as a
currency examiner she used her left hand to count individual sheets with her wrist in a constantly
extended position. The Board notes that while Dr. Jimenez accurately described one of
appellant’s duties as a currency examiner, he does not provide any medical diagnosis of her
condition, nor provide an opinion on the cause of her condition. The Board has held that medical
evidence that does not offer any opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of
limited probative value on the issue of causal relationship.11 Similarly, Dr. Hung’s February 16,
9

D.D., 57 ECAB 734, 738 (2006); Deborah L. Beatty, 54 ECAB 340 (2003).

10

J.F., Docket No. 09-1061 (issued November 17, 2009); A.D., 58 ECAB 149 (2006).

11

C.B., Docket No. 09-2027 (issued May 12, 2010); J.F., Docket No. 09-1061 (issued November 17, 2009); A.D.,
58 ECAB 149 (2006).

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2010 diagnostic report noted appellant’s complaints of left hand pain and numbness, but likewise
provided no opinion on the cause of appellant’s left hand pain. Thus, the Board finds that these
reports are also insufficient to establish causal relationship.
The additional medical evidence was also insufficient to establish appellant’s complaints.
Appellant submitted a progress note by a registered nurse and handwritten physical therapy
notes. Because nurses and physical therapists are not considered physicians under FECA, their
reports are of no probative value.12
During oral argument, appellant demonstrated how she reviewed and counted currency at
the employing establishment and pointed out that she repetitively used her hands to carry large
skids of currency sheets and flip through the sheets. She also described her duties at Wal-Mart
Vision Center and noted that she mostly worked with patients and rarely used her hands.
Appellant and her representative requested that the Board review her case as she believed that
the evidence was sufficient to establish that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was causally
related to her employment duties. However, it is well established that an employee’s belief of
causal relation does not establish the fact of such medical question.13 The issue of causal
relationship is a medical question that must be established by probative medical opinion from a
physician.14 The physician must accurately describe appellant’s work duties and medically
explain the pathological process by which these duties would have caused her condition.15
Because appellant has not provided such medical opinion evidence in this case, she has failed to
meet her burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish that her
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was causally related to factors of her employment.

12

E.H., Docket No. 08-1862 (issued July 8, 2009); S.E., Docket No. 08-2214 (issued May 6, 2009); FECA
provides as follows: the term physician includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists,
chiropractors and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by State law. 5 U.S.C.
§ 8101(2).
13

See Patricia J. Glenn, 53 ECAB 159 (2001).

14

W.W., Docket No. 09-1619 (issued June 2, 2010); David Apgar, 57 ECAB 137 (2005).

15

Supra note 7.

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 3, 2011 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: February 21, 2013
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7