United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.G., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Las Vegas, NV, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-932
Issued: November 14, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 20, 2012 appellant filed a timely appeal of November 14, 2011 and March 8,
2012 merit decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to
the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish a back condition
due to factors of his federal employment.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On August 25, 2011 appellant, then a 64-year-old postal clerk, filed an occupational
disease claim alleging that he developed radiculopathy while performing limited duty including
pitching mail, bending and twisting.
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

In a letter dated September 9, 2011, OWCP requested additional factual and medical
evidence from appellant and allowed 30 days for a response. Appellant submitted a report dated
July 14, 2011 from Dr. Brandon Nguyen, an osteopath and a Board-certified anesthesiologist,
who reported appellant’s complaints of low back and right leg pain following twisting his back at
work on June 23, 2011. Dr. Nguyen noted that appellant had back surgery in 1985 for disc
protrusion and laminectomy L4-5. He performed a physical examination and diagnosed
lumbago and right lumbar radiculopathy.
On September 2, 2011 Dr. William Baumgartl, a Board-certified anesthesiologist,
diagnosed lumbar radiculopathy with stenosis of L3-4. He noted that appellant had no leg
numbness, that his gait was steady and that he could both heel and toe walk.
Dr. Sudhir Khemka, a Board-certified anesthesiologist, examined appellant on August 19,
2011 due to lower back and left shoulder pain. He found lumbar spine tenderness, positive
lumbar paraspinous spasms and decreased range of motion of the lumbar spine. Dr. Khemka
diagnosed lumbago, lumbar radiculopathy and left shoulder pain. Appellant underwent a
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of his lumbar spine on August 26, 2011 which
demonstrated moderate central canal stenosis at L3-4 with a diffuse annular bulge and facet
arthropathy as well as moderate disc osteophyte complex at L4-5 and L5-S1.
By decision dated November 14, 2011, OWCP denied appellant’s claim on the grounds
that he had not established a causal relationship between his diagnosed conditions and his
accepted employment activities.
On November 19, 2011 appellant requested a review of the written record before an
OWCP hearing representative and submitted an October 31, 2011 electromyogram and nerve
conduction studies which demonstrated the formation of chronic neurogenic firing pattern on
needle examination of L4-5 innervated muscles on the left. He also requested reconsideration on
November 19, 2011. In a letter dated December 2, 2011, OWCP requested that appellant clarify
which appeal right he wished to follow. On December 16, 2011 the Branch of Hearings and
Review noted that appellant withdrew his request for a review of the written record.
In a report dated December 13, 2011, Dr. Aury N. Nagy, a Board-certified neurosurgeon,
noted appellant’s history of back surgery during the 1980’s and his shoulder injury in 2009
which resulted in surgery. He reported appellant’s complaints of low back pain and the MRI
scan results which demonstrated lumbar stenosis with disc protrusion at L3-4. Dr. Nagy noted
that appellant attributed his back and leg pain to work and that he stated that his pain had
resolved after he stopped work. He stated, “It may be the case that if [appellant] had a more
sedentary job that would have allowed him the kind of rest that he is getting now that he is at
home, he would not have had the pain that he was in, so it is possible that this recurrent work
exacerbated his issues from the 1980s, but hard to say for sure he does have significant
degenerative changes in his lumbar spine.” Dr. Nagy noted that appellant did not provide a
particular inciting event as causing his back pain. He diagnosed low back pain with rest.
By decision dated March 8, 2012, OWCP reviewed the merits of appellant’s claim and
denied modification of its prior decision. It stated that Dr. Nagy’s report did not provide an

2

opinion on the causal relationship between appellant’s diagnosed conditions and his implicated
employment duties.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
OWCP’s regulations define an occupational disease as “a condition produced by the work
environment over a period longer than a single workday or shift.”2 To establish that an injury
was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational disease claim, a claimant must
submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing the presence or existence of the disease
or condition for which compensation is claimed; (2) a factual statement identifying employment
factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence or occurrence of the disease or
condition; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the employment factors identified by the
claimant were the proximate cause of the condition for which compensation is claimed or, stated
differently, medical evidence establishing that the diagnosed condition is causally related to the
employment factors identified by the claimant. The evidence required to establish causal
relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence, based upon a complete factual and medical
background, showing a causal relationship between the claimed condition and identified factors.
The belief of a claimant that a condition was caused or aggravated by the employment is not
sufficient to establish causal relation.3
ANALYSIS
Appellant alleged that he developed lumbar radiculopathy due to his employment duties
of throwing mail, bending and twisting. He submitted a report diagnosing lumbago and right
lumbar radiculopathy. OWCP accepted that appellant had established the first two elements of
his occupational disease claim, but denied his claim on the grounds that he failed to submit
medical opinion evidence establishing a causal relationship between his diagnosed condition and
his accepted employment duties.
Dr. Nguyen examined appellant on July 14, 2011 and reported appellant’s complaints of
low back and right leg pain following twisting his back at work on June 23, 2011. He diagnosed
lumbago and right lumbar radiculopathy. Dr. Nguyen did not attribute appellant’s condition to
his alleged employment duties, but instead to a specific employment incident on June 23, 2011.
This history of injury does not comport with that appellant provided to OWCP and if accurate
would result in a traumatic injury rather than an occupational disease claim. While Dr. Nguyen
did indicate that appellant believed he injured his back at work, he did not provide an
independent medical opinion describing how the twisting incident resulting in his diagnosed
conditions. Due to this deficiency, this report is not sufficient to meet appellant’s burden of
proof.
In a report dated September 2, 2011, Dr. Baumgartl diagnosed lumbar radiculopathy with
stenosis of L3-4. He did not provide a history of injury and did not attribute appellant’s
condition to his employment. Without an accurate factual background and an opinion that
2

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(q).

3

Lourdes Harris, 45 ECAB 545, 547 (1994).

3

appellant’s condition was due to factors of employment, this report does not provide the
necessary medical opinion evidence to establish a causal relationship between his current back
condition and his employment. This report is not sufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof
in establishing an occupational disease claim.
On August 19, 2011 Dr. Khemka examined appellant on August 19, 2011 and found
lumbar spine tenderness, positive lumbar paraspinous spasms and decreased range of motion of
the lumbar spine. He diagnosed lumbago, lumbar radiculopathy and left shoulder pain. This
report does not contain a factual history describing appellant’s accepted employment duties and
does not contain any medical opinion evidence attributing his diagnosed conditions to his federal
job. Without the necessary description of a causal relationship between appellant’s diagnosed
back conditions and job duties, this report cannot meet his burden of proof to establish an
occupational disease.
Dr. Nagy examined appellant on December 13, 2011 and provided appellant’s history of
back surgery during the 1980’s and his shoulder injury and resulting surgery in 2009. He noted
that appellant attributed his back and leg pain to work and that he stated that his pain had
resolved after he stopped work. Dr. Nagy suggested that appellant might have avoided his pain
with a more sedentary job, but also noted that appellant’s symptoms could be attributed to his
degenerative lumbar condition. While he provided a history including appellant’s prior back
surgery and mentioned the accepted employment factors of twisting and bending, he did not
provide a clear opinion attributing appellant’s current back condition to his employment.
Dr. Nagy offered an equivocal opinion regarding whether appellant’s recent back condition was
due to his employment duties or to his nonemployment-related degenerative condition. Without
a clear statement attributing appellant’s condition to his work duties this report is not sufficient
to meet his burden of proof. The Board also notes that Dr. Nagy did not provide a definitive
diagnosis, instead merely diagnosing low back pain. The Board has held that the mere diagnosis
of “pain” does not constitute the basis for payment of compensation.4 As the report lacks the
necessary elements of a diagnosis and a clear opinion on causal relationship, this report is not
sufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not submit sufficient medical opinion evidence to
establish a causal relationship between his employment and his diagnosed condition to establish
an occupational disease claim.

4

Robert Broome, 55 ECAB 339 (2004).

4

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated March 8, 2012 and November 14, 2011 are affirmed.
Issued: November 14, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
P.F., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, MAIN POST OFFICE,
Humble, TX, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 21-0166
Issued: March 8, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On November 12, 2020 appellant filed an appeal from a May 8, 2020 merit decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of Appellate Boards docketed
the appeal as Docket No. 21-0166.
The Board, having duly considered the matter, notes that its jurisdiction is limited to the
review of final adverse OWCP decisions issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. 1
For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s authority
is limited to appeals, which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of OWCP’s
decision.2
The 180 th day following the most recent OWCP decision, dated May 8, 2020, was
November 4, 2020. As appellant did not file an appeal with the Board until November 12, 2020,
more than 180 days after the May 8, 2020 decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as
No. 21-0166 is untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant
has not offered a reason to explain her failure to timely file an appeal with supporting
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e).

documentation sufficient to establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse
decision issued by OWCP within 180 days of the filing of this appeal over which the Board may
properly exercise jurisdiction, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed as No. 21-0166 must
be dismissed. 3 Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-0166 is dismissed.
Issued: March 8, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” 20
C.F.R. § 501.6(d).
3

2


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
S.T., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Riverdale, IL, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 11-1089
Issued: November 1, 2011

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 29, 2011 appellant timely appealed the October 27, 2010 merit decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), which granted a schedule award.
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA)1 and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has more than two percent impairment of the right leg.
FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant, a 56-year-old letter carrier, has an accepted claim for right knee sprain, which
arose on August 20, 2009. On February 5, 2010 he underwent a right knee partial lateral
meniscectomy which OWCP authorized. Appellant received wage-loss compensation and

1

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

returned to work without restrictions on May 3, 2010. He subsequently filed a claim for a
schedule award (Form CA-7).
On May 24, 2010 OWCP asked Dr. Kevin C. Tu, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
to provide an impairment rating of the right lower extremity under the American Medical
Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (6th ed. 2008). The letter
included a four-page worksheet for determining right knee impairment under the A.M.A.,
Guides. Dr. Tu completed and returned the worksheet on June 3, 20102 but did not provide a
specific impairment rating for the lower extremity. He noted right knee pain of 5 out of 10.
Dr. Tu also noted that appellant had difficulty walking greater than three blocks. Regarding
range of motion, appellant’s knee flexion was 140 degrees bilaterally, with 150 degrees
representing normal. Dr. Tu also noted normal extension bilaterally (zero degrees) and no
ankylosis. Additionally, appellant had no weakness, no ligament instability and no varus or
valgus deformity of the knee. Dr. Tu further noted that appellant had a partial meniscectomy
with a stable rim remaining. He estimated that appellant had 25 percent loss of shock absorption
following the meniscectomy. Dr. Tu reported no loss of leg length and no need for prosthetic
devices. Regarding evidence of post-traumatic irregularity or arthritis, he noted medial
compartment chondromalacia. Lastly, Dr. Tu reported that appellant reached maximum medical
improvement on May 3, 2010.
OWCP referred the case to Dr. David H. Garelick, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon
and district medical adviser. In a report dated July 5, 2010, Dr. Garelick found two percent
impairment of the right lower extremity based on appellant’s February 5, 2010 partial lateral
meniscectomy.3 He referenced the April 28, 2010 treatment notes of Dr. Tu and noted a paucity
of complaints and a normal physical examination.
On July 22, 2010 OWCP granted a schedule award for two percent impairment of the
right lower extremity. The award covered a period of 5.76 weeks from May 1 through
June 10, 2010.
Appellant requested a review of the written record. By decision dated September 28,
2010, an OWCP hearing representative set aside the July 22, 2010 schedule award. OWCP’s
hearing representative noted that Dr. Garelick had not referenced the June 3, 2010 right knee
impairment worksheet prepared by Dr. Tu.
On remand, Dr. Garelick reviewed the record, including Dr. Tu’s June 3, 2010
worksheet, and rated two percent impairment of the right lower extremity. In his October 4,
2010 report, he explained that, while the June 3, 2010 report suggested ongoing complaints not
previously noted, the physical examination remained essentially normal.

2

Dr. Tu is a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon. He had previously examined appellant on April 28, 2010 and
released him to resume work without restrictions. At that time, Dr. Tu noted that appellant “really [had] no
complaints with respect to his right knee.” He reported range of motion from 0 to 135 degrees, no joint line
tenderness, no tenderness with circumduction maneuvers, no laxity, 5/5 quad strength and normal sensation.
3

Table 16-3, Knee Regional Grid (LEI), A.M.A., Guides 509.

2

In a decision dated October 27, 2010, OWCP found that appellant had two percent
impairment of the right lower extremity.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Section 8107 of FECA sets forth the number of weeks of compensation to be paid for the
permanent loss of use of specified members, functions and organs of the body.4 FECA,
however, does not specify the manner by which the percentage loss of a member, function or
organ shall be determined. To ensure consistent results and equal justice under the law, good
administrative practice requires the use of uniform standards applicable to all claimants. The
implementing regulations have adopted the A.M.A., Guides as the appropriate standard for
evaluating schedule losses.5 Effective May 1, 2009, schedule awards are determined in
accordance with the sixth edition of the A.M.A., Guides (2008).6
ANALYSIS
Appellant argued that OWCP should have awarded 25 percent impairment based on
Dr. Tu’s June 3, 2010 report. Dr. Tu estimated there was 25 percent loss of shock absorption
following appellant’s meniscectomy. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, Dr. Tu did not indicate
that appellant had 25 percent impairment.
Lower extremity impairment is covered by Chapter 16 of the A.M.A., Guides (6th ed.
2008). Dr. Garelick reviewed the record, including the reports of Dr. Tu and found two percent
impairment of the right lower extremity. Under Table 16-3, A.M.A., Guides 509, a partial
medial or lateral meniscectomy represents a class one impairment for the diagnosed condition
(CDX) with a default grade of two percent lower extremity impairment.
After determining the impairment class and default grade, Dr. Garelick determined if
there were any applicable grade adjustments for nonkey factors or modifiers. These include
adjustments for Functional History (GMFH), Physical Examination (GMPE) and Clinical
Studies (GMCS).7 The grade modifiers are used in the net adjustment formula to calculate a net
adjustment.8 The final impairment grade is determined by adjusting the grade up or down from
the default value by the calculated net adjustment. Dr. Garelick found a grade zero modifier for
GMPE, a grade 1 modifier for GMCS and a grade 2 modifier for GMFH. Applying the net
adjustment formula resulted in no adjustment from the default grade of two percent.9
4

For a total loss of use of a leg, an employee shall receive 288 weeks’ compensation. 5 U.S.C. § 8107(c)(2).

5

20 C.F.R. § 10.404.

6

See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 3 -- Medical, Schedule Awards, Chapter 3.700, Exhibit 1
(January 2010); see also Part 2 -- Claims, Schedule Awards & Permanent Disability Claims, Chapter 2.808.6a
(January 2010).
7

See Table 16-5, Table 16-6, Table 16-7 and Table 16-8, A.M.A., Guides 515-17, 519-20.

8

Net Adjustment = (GMFH – CDX) + (GMPE – CDX) + (GMCS – CDX). Section 16.3d, A.M.A., Guides 521.

9

Net Adjustment (0) = GMFH (2) – CDX (1) + GMPE (0) – CDX (1) + GMCS (1) – CDX (1).

3

The Board finds that Dr. Garelick’s October 4, 2010 impairment rating conforms to the
A.M.A., Guides (6th ed. 2008) and represents the weight of the medical evidence as to
appellant’s right leg impairment. Appellant has not submitted any credible medical evidence
indicating that he has a greater impairment than previously awarded.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has not established that he has greater than two percent impairment of the right
lower extremity.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the October 27, 2010 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: November 1, 2011
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
T.P., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
Fort Monmouth, NJ, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Thomas R. Uliase, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 10-2178
Issued: June 3, 2011

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 24, 2010 appellant, through his attorney, filed a timely appeal from a May 25,
2010 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. Pursuant to the
Employees’ Compensation Act1 and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction
over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has more than a four percent left leg permanent
impairment or a three percent right leg permanent impairment.
FACTUAL HISTORY
This case was before the Board on a prior appeal. In a decision dated April 7, 2010, the
Board affirmed an August 26, 2008 schedule award decision, finding that appellant did not

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

establish more than a four percent left leg and three percent right leg permanent impairment.2
The Board found that a referee physician, Dr. Ian Fries, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
represented the weight of the medical evidence. With respect to a May 19, 2009 Office decision,
the Board found the Office had applied the standard of review for an untimely application for
reconsideration, but the application was timely filed. The case was remanded for proper
consideration of the February 23, 2009 application for reconsideration. The history of the case
provided in the Board’s prior decision is incorporated herein by reference.
By letter dated April 13, 2010, appellant’s representative stated that appellant wanted to
participate in the selection of an impartial specialist, should such a referral be necessary. He
requested the name of three physicians in appellant’s area.
In a decision dated May 25, 2010, the Office reviewed the case on its merits. It discussed
the arguments raised by appellant in a February 23, 2009 application for reconsideration,
including: (1) there was no conflict in the medical evidence; (2) the referee physician was not
properly selected; (3) Dr. Fries did not represent the weight of the evidence; and (4) the
representative did not timely receive a copy of the August 26, 2008 Office decision. The Office
denied modification of its prior decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Section 8107 of the Act provides that, if there is permanent disability involving the loss
or loss of use of a member or function of the body, the claimant is entitled to a schedule award
for the permanent impairment of the scheduled member or function.3 Neither the Act nor the
regulations specify the manner in which the percentage of impairment for a schedule award shall
be determined. For consistent results and to ensure equal justice for all claimants the Office has
adopted the American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
as the uniform standard applicable to all claimants.4
The Board has held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a
notice mailed to an addressee in the ordinary course of business was received by the addressee.5
This presumption applies equally to the Office and claimant’s representatives.6
ANALYSIS
In his February 23, 2009 application for reconsideration, appellant raised a number of
arguments with respect to the medical evidence. He argued that there was no conflict under 5
2

Docket No. 09-1562 (issued April 7, 2010).

3

5 U.S.C. § 8107. This section enumerates specific members or functions of the body for which a schedule
award is payable and the maximum number of weeks of compensation to be paid; additional members of the body
are found at 20 C.F.R. § 10.404(a).
4

A. George Lampo, 45 ECAB 441 (1994).

5

See Larry L. Hill, 42 ECAB 596, 600 (1991).

6

Id.

2

U.S.C. § 8123(a) requiring referral to a referee physician.7 The Board addressed this argument
in the April 7, 2010 decision, finding there was a conflict between attending osteopath Dr. Weiss
and Dr. Krisiloff, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon serving as a second opinion physician.
Appellant argued that Dr. Fries was not properly selected as a referee physician in accord
with Office procedures. The Board also addressed this issue in its prior decision, noting there
was no probative evidence of record that the selection of Dr. Fries was improper. The decision
explained that the evidence of record indicated that two physicians were bypassed as being
unable to schedule an examination in a reasonable time. Appellant did not submit any additional
probative evidence on the issue. With respect to the probative value of Dr. Fries’ May 19, 2008
report, the Board reviewed the report in detail in its prior decision and found that it represented
the weight of the medical evidence.
As to the representative’s statement that he did not receive a copy of the August 26, 2008
schedule award decision, the Board notes that the decision contains end notations with the
representative’s name and address, as well as, the address of the employing establishment. The
notation includes the address of record for appellant’s representative. The evidence therefore on
its face indicated that notice of the decision was sent to the representative of record.8 As noted
above, it is presumed that a mailing in the ordinary course of business was received by the
addressee, absent contrary evidence. No probative contrary evidence was submitted in this case.
Appellant did not submit any additional medical evidence regarding a right or left leg
permanent impairment causally related to his federal employment. The Board accordingly finds
that the record does not establish more than a four percent left leg or three percent right leg
permanent impairment.
On appeal, appellant reiterated the arguments that Dr. Fries was not properly selected and
the probative value of his report was insufficient to constitute the weight of the evidence. The
Board has addressed these issues and reaffirms that Dr. Fries represents the weight of the
medical evidence on the issue presented.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not established more than a four percent left leg and
three percent right leg permanent impairment.

7

The Act provides that, if there is a disagreement between the physician making the examination for the United
States and the physician of the employee, the Secretary shall appoint a third physician who shall make the
examination. 5 U.S.C. § 8123(a). The implementing regulations states that, if a conflict exists between the medical
opinion of the employee’s physician and the medical opinion of either a second opinion physician or an Office
medical adviser, the Office shall appoint a third physician to make an examination. This is called a referee
examination and the Office will select a physician who is qualified in the appropriate specialty and who has no prior
connection with the case. 20 C.F.R. § 10.321 (1999).
8

Newton D. Lashmett, 45 ECAB 181 (1993) (where a notice of hearing did not on its face establish that it was
properly sent to the representative).

3

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated May 25, 2010 is affirmed.
Issued: June 3, 2011
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
E.L., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NORFOLK
NAVAL SHIPYARD, Portsmouth, VA, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 16-0371
Issued: April 13, 2016

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On December 22, 2015 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from August 20
and November 9, 2015 nonmerit decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
(OWCP). As more than 180 days elapsed since the last merit decision dated October 1, 2014, to
the filing of this appeal, pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and
20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board lacks jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly denied appellant’s requests for reconsideration
without merit review of the claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
FACTUAL HISTORY
On February 24, 2014 appellant, then a 45-year-old ship fitter, filed an occupational
disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he sustained knee joint pain and swelling as a result of
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

his federal employment. On the claim form he reported that he performed work while on his
knees and this had contributed to his knee condition. Appellant submitted a February 12, 2014
statement that described his work activity as requiring a kneeling position for 75 percent of his
work hours. He reported that the kneeling position was required for job duties that included deck
plate work, tank work, or grinding deck surfaces. Appellant also noted that he accessed work
areas through ladders and gangways, which had contributed to a knee condition.
OWCP, by letters dated March 19, 2014, requested that additional evidence from
appellant and the employing establishment be submitted within 30 days. The record contains a
March 5, 2014 letter from a supervisor indicating that the supervisor did not concur with
appellant’s allegations. The supervisor reported that appellant had been on work restrictions
since June 11, 2013 that had restricted him from grinding or dust producing activities. In a letter
dated March 28, 2014, an employee of the employing establishment’s occupational safety office
indicated that his office did not concur with the accuracy of appellant’s claim. The safety officer
reported that a review of appellant’s work history showed that the alleged conditions did not
occur at the employing establishment. The safety officer reported that there was an ergonomics
program that, provided guidance regarding work equipment, there were ergonomic training
programs and employees are notified of safety regulations.
As to medical evidence, the record includes a report dated April 10, 2014 from
Dr. Arthur Waddell, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Waddell diagnosed left knee
medial and lateral meniscus tears, and left knee popliteal cyst. He opined that the diagnoses
were the result of repetitive work activities. In a form report (Form CA-20) dated July 24, 2014,
Dr. Waddell diagnosed left knee internal derangement and reported that appellant was totally
disabled from January 7 to August 7, 2014. On August 8, 2014 appellant, through counsel,
submitted copies of training certificates and photographs of employees working in a kneeling
position.
By decision dated October 1, 2014, OWCP denied the claim for compensation. It found
that the factual element of the claim was not established. According to OWCP, appellant’s
description of job tasks in a kneeling position was inconsistent with evidence from the
employing establishment regarding the frequency of such activity. OWCP found that the factual
evidence did not establish that the employment incidents occurred as alleged. In addition, it
found that the medical evidence was of diminished probative value.
On January 28, 2015 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration. Counsel
indicated that a December 30, 2014 report from Dr. Waddell had been submitted. In this report,
Dr. Waddell reported that appellant had a 1994 left knee arthroscopic surgery, but was
asymptomatic until January 7, 2014, when he had pain and swelling as a result of repetitive work
activity. He indicated that appellant had undergone additional left knee arthroscopic surgery,
and the findings were the result of his injury on January 7, 2014. Appellant submitted additional
reports from Dr. Waddell, including an attending physician’s report (Form CA-20) dated
January 13, 2015 indicating that appellant continued to be totally disabled.
Appellant also submitted an April 13, 2015 report from Dr. Naveen Akkina, a Boardcertified pulmonologist. Dr. Akkina indicated that appellant was being treated for asthma,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and allergic rhinitis. In an April 20, 2015 report, he

2

opined that employment exposure to lead dust and rust had contributed to his pulmonary
condition.
By decision dated August 20, 2015, OWCP found that the reconsideration request was
insufficient to warrant merit review of the claim. It found that the evidence did not address the
factual issue on which the claim was denied.
On September 15, 2015 appellant, through counsel, again requested reconsideration. He
resubmitted the April 13 and 20, 2015 reports from Dr. Akkina. Appellant also submitted an
undated statement from a supervisor indicating that, when cleaning out the bottom of a tank,
appellant was exposed to dust.
By decision dated November 9, 2015, OWCP found that the reconsideration request was
insufficient to warrant merit review of the claim.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
To require OWCP to reopen a case for merit review under section 8128(a) of FECA,2
OWCP’s regulations provides that a claimant may obtain review of the merits of the claim by
submitting a written application for reconsideration that sets forth arguments and contains
evidence that either: “(1) shows that OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point
of law; (2) advances a relevant legal argument not previously considered by OWCP; or
(3) constitutes relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously considered by OWCP.”3 20
C.F.R. § 10.608(b) states that any application for review that does not meet at least one of the
requirements listed in 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3) will be denied by OWCP without review of the
merits of the claim.4
ANALYSIS
Appellant filed an occupational disease claim alleging that he sustained a left knee injury
as a result of his federal employment as a ship fitter. The claim was denied by decision dated
October 1, 2014. As noted above, the Board does not have jurisdiction over this particular
decision. The issue before the Board is whether appellant met one of the requirements of
20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3) that would establish a basis for a merit review of the claim for
compensation. In this case, there were two reconsideration requests submitted by appellant’s
counsel: January 28 and September 15, 2015. The Board has reviewed the reconsideration
requests and the evidence submitted on reconsideration, and finds that appellant has not met any
of the three requirements under 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3).

2

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) (providing that “[t]he Secretary of Labor may review an award for or against payment of
compensation at any time on his own motion or on application”).
3

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3).

4

Id. at § 10.608(b); see also Norman W. Hanson, 45 ECAB 430 (1994).

3

In the October 1, 2014 decision, OWCP denied the claim because there were factual
issues that remained unresolved. Appellant had referred to extensive work in a kneeling
position, but the employing establishment had contested that allegation.
The first basis for a merit review is if appellant shows that OWCP erroneously applied or
interpreted a specific point of law. Appellant did not attempt to show that OWCP erroneously
applied or interpreted a specific point of law. The second basis is the advancement of a relevant
legal argument not previously considered by OWCP. Again, appellant did not raise a new and
relevant legal argument in this case.
The final basis for establishing a merit review is the submission of relevant and pertinent
new evidence not previously considered by OWCP. The claim in this case was denied based on
a finding there were factual inconsistencies in the case. Relevant evidence would therefore be
evidence as to the factual element of the claim, such as specific work factors identified, and the
nature and duration of the performance of these work factors.5 In this case, the factual issues
relate to the frequency of kneeling, the use of ladders, and other relevant information. Appellant
did not submit any new and relevant evidence in this regard. The medical evidence submitted
from Dr. Waddell and Dr. Akkina is irrelevant as the claim was denied because the factual
component of the claim was not established.6
For the above reasons, the Board finds that appellant did not meet any of the
requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3). Appellant did not show that OWCP erroneously
applied or interpreted a specific point of law, advance a relevant legal argument not previously
considered by OWCP, or submit relevant and pertinent evidence not previously considered by
OWCP. The Board finds that OWCP properly denied merit review in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly denied the reconsideration requests without merit
review of the claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

5

See P.D., Docket No. 14-1273 (issued January 23, 2015).

6

See D.P., Docket No. 13-1849 (issued December 19, 2013). The Board also notes that Dr. Akkina refers to
exposure to lead dust and other particles, which is not the claim on appeal.

4

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated November 9 and August 20, 2015 are affirmed.
Issued: April 13, 2016
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
B.H., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Oak Harbor, WA, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 12-1851
Issued: February 20, 2013

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On August 31, 2012 appellant filed a timely appeal from a March 22, 2012 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) denying her emotional condition
claim and a July 26, 2012 nonmerit decision denying reconsideration. Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of this claim.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant established that she sustained an emotional
condition in the performance of duty on February 3, 2012 as alleged; and (2) whether OWCP
properly denied appellant’s request for further merit review of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 8128(a).

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On February 4, 2012 appellant, then a 52-year-old letter carrier, filed a traumatic injury
claim asserting that on February 3, 2012 she became incapacitated and unable to work due to
stress. On the claim form, appellant’s supervisor, Brian G. Wade, stated that appellant became
angry after being denied an early release request. On February 6, 2012 appellant filed an
occupational disease claim alleging stress due to factors of her employment on February 3, 2012.
In a February 13, 2012 letter, OWCP requested additional factual and medical evidence
in support of appellant’s claim. It noted that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that she
experienced an employment factor alleged to have caused injury and there was no medical
evidence detailing how her employment activities caused or contributed to any diagnosed
condition. OWCP asked appellant to describe what happened on February 3, 2012 that caused
her claimed condition. It asked that she be as specific as possible and not to respond in terms of
general stress. Appellant was provided 30 days to submit the requested information.
In a February 16, 2012 statement, appellant advised that she would be submitting a Form
CA-1 for her on-the-job injury claim. She submitted provider notes dated February 3 to
March 12, 2012, which noted situational anxiety -- stress; a February 16, 2012 affidavit for timeloss compensation; a June 24, 2009 designation notice under the Family and Medical Leave Act;
a February 3, 2012 activity restriction form; work excuses dated June 4 and September 1, 2009,
March through December 2011 and January 4, February 3 and 24, 2012; a February 20, 2012
return to work letter; and a February 24, 2012 list of questions from the employing establishment
to appellant’s physician.
In a February 21, 2012 letter, Lonnie Clark, lead health and resources management
specialist for the employing establishment, controverted appellant’s claim. He noted that other
than her CA-1 form, appellant did not submit any statement regarding her allegations. On
February 3, 2012 appellant was assigned to collection duties and she submitted a request to leave
one hour early. When she was told her request was denied due to staffing, she became upset and
left anyway. Mr. Clark noted that statements from the supervisor and other employees verified
that appellant left the premises without permission.2 He contended that her stress was a selfgenerated reaction to administrative procedures.
By decision dated March 22, 2012, OWCP denied appellant’s claim. It found that she did
not provide any specific details surrounding the events leading to her claim and, without such
evidence, there was no factual basis to support a compensable work factor.
On June 7, 2012 appellant requested reconsideration. In a June 12, 2012 statement, she
listed her need to take time off for physical reasons due to: verbal harassment by her immediate
supervisor; physical and mental intimidation by the use of belittling comments; promoting and
allowing coworkers to harass and belittle her; sharing personal information about her with
coworkers; assignment of more work than she was able to handle; and being called crazy on
May 12, 2012. Appellant alleged that stress was aggravated and it was hard for her to perform
her duties in a safe manner without harm to herself or others. She submitted a previously

2

Witness statements were not provided.

2

received copy of a February 3, 2012 medical report and medical reports dated March 2
to 22, 2012.
By decision dated July 26, 2012, OWCP denied appellant’s reconsideration request.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
To establish her claim that she sustained an emotional condition in the performance of
duty, appellant must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing that she has an
emotional or psychiatric disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or
incidents alleged to have caused or contributed to her condition; and (3) rationalized medical
opinion evidence establishing that the identified compensable employment factors are causally
related to her emotional condition.3
Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is
somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,4 the Board
explained that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a
compensable emotional condition arising under FECA.5 There are situations where an injury or
illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within
coverage under FECA.6 When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or
her employment duties and the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from an
emotional reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury
arising out of and in the course of employment. This is true when the employee’s disability
results from an emotional reaction to a special assignment or other requirement imposed by the
employing establishment or by the nature of the work.7 On the other hand, the disability is not
covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force or his or
her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold a
particular position.8
Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s
employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially
assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA. However, the Board has
held that where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing
establishment in what would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded.
In determining whether the employing establishment has erred or acted abusively, the Board will

3

Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

4

28 ECAB 125 (1976).

5

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

6

See Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 137 (1999).

7
8

Lillian Cutler, supra note 4.
Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001).

3

examine the factual evidence of record to determine whether the employing establishment acted
reasonably.9
In emotional condition claims, when working conditions are alleged as factors in causing
a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its adjudicatory function, must make findings of fact
regarding which working conditions are deemed compensable factors of employment and are to
be considered by a physician when providing an opinion on causal relationship and which
working conditions are not deemed factors of employment and may not be considered. If a
claimant does implicate a factor of employment, OWCP should then determine whether the
evidence of record substantiates that factor. When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of
employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must
base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.10
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish that she
sustained stress in the performance of duty causally related to factors of her federal employment.
Appellant alleged that she sustained stress as a result of a February 3, 2012 incident. OWCP
denied her claim finding that she did not establish a factual basis for the claim as she did not
provide any specific details surrounding her claim.
On February 13, 2012 OWCP asked appellant to provide a detailed description of what
happened on February 3, 2012 that caused her claimed condition. Appellant did not submit a
response that provided a detailed description of what happened at work that caused her claimed
stress. Without a detailed description from appellant regarding the basis of her claim, she has not
met her burden of proof to establish the factual component of her claim. Mr. Wade and
Mr. Clark of the employing establishment, indicated that appellant was denied an early release
request on February 3, 2012. To the extent that appellant claimed stress due to the denial of
leave, the Board has held that allegations regarding leave concern an administrative matter and
are not compensable absent a showing of error or abuse on the part of the employing
establishment.11 Appellant did not provide a factual statement detailing other work events that
caused her stress on or about February 3, 2012. Thus, she did not submit sufficient evidence to
establish error or abuse in the leave denial. Appellant has not established a compensable
employment factor with regard to February 3, 2012.
To establish entitlement to benefits, a claimant must establish a factual basis for the claim
by supporting his or her allegations with probative and reliable evidence.12 In this case,
appellant did not provide a factual statement outlining her claim or provide any corroborating
evidence, such as witness statements, to support her claim. Without such evidence appellant
failed to provide a factual basis to support her emotional condition claim.

9

Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 566 (1991).

10

Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001).

11

See C.S., 58 ECAB 137 (2006); Lori A. Facey, 55 ECAB 217 (2004).

12

See Frank A. McDowell, 44 ECAB 522 (1993); Ruthie M. Evans, 41 ECAB 416 (1990).

4

For the foregoing reasons, appellant has not established any compensable employment
factors under FECA and, therefore, has not met her burden of proof in establishing that she
sustained an emotional condition in the performance of duty.13
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
To require OWCP to reopen a case for merit review under section 8128 of FECA,14
OWCP’s regulations provide that a claimant must: (1) show that OWCP erroneously applied or
interpreted a specific point of law; (2) advance a relevant legal argument not previously
considered by OWCP; or (3) constitute relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously
considered by OWCP.15 To be entitled to a merit review of an OWCP decision denying or
terminating a benefit, a claimant also must file his or her application for review within one year
of the date of that decision.16 When a claimant fails to meet one of the above standards, OWCP
will deny the application for reconsideration without reopening the case for review of the merits.
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
On reconsideration, appellant submitted a statement in which she provided vague and
general information regarding her claim without supporting evidence or specific examples. The
Board notes that this statement does not show that OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted a
specific point of law and it does not advance a relevant legal argument not previously considered
by OWCP. Furthermore, appellant’s statement, while new, does not contain any supporting
evidence or specific examples from which appellant can establish a factual basis for her claim.
Appellant also submitted a duplicative medical report along with new medical evidence.
The medical evidence is not relevant to the issue of whether appellant established a compensable
factor of employment based on the employing establishment denying a request for leave. The
Board has held that the submission of evidence which does not address the particular issue
involved does not constitute a basis for reopening a case.17 Furthermore, the submission of
evidence which repeats or duplicates evidence that is already in the case record does not
constitute a basis for reopening a case for merit review.18

13

As appellant has not established any compensable employment factors, the Board need not consider the medical
evidence of record. See Lori A. Facey, 55 ECAB 217 (2004); Margaret S. Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496 (1992).
14

Under section 8128 of FECA, the Secretary of Labor may review an award for or against payment of
compensation at any time on his own motion or on application. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
15

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(1)-(2).

16

Id. at § 10.607(a).

17

Jimmy O. Gilmore, 37 ECAB 257 (1985); Edward Matthew Diekemper, 31 ECAB 224 (1979).

18

See A.K., Docket No. 09-2032 (issued August 3, 2010); M.E., 58 ECAB 694 (2007); Betty A. Butler, 56 ECAB
545 (2005).

5

The Board finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant was not entitled to
further review of the merits of her claim pursuant to any of the three requirements under section
10.606(b)(2) and properly denied her request for reconsideration.19
On appeal, appellant set forth allegations of what happened on February 3, 2012. She
also alleged that she has been harassed and intimidated by Mr. Wade on other occasions. The
Board has no jurisdiction to review new evidence for the first time on appeal.20
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has failed to establish that she sustained an emotional
condition in the performance of duty. The Board also finds that OWCP properly refused to
reopen appellant’s case for further review of the merits pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 26 and March 22, 2012 decisions of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed.
Issued: February 20, 2013
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

19

M.E., 58 ECAB 694 (2007) (when an application for reconsideration does not meet at least one of the three
requirements enumerated under section 10.606(b)(2), OWCP will deny the application for reconsideration without
reopening the case for a review on the merits).
20

20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c); James C. Campbell, 5 ECAB 35 (1952).

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.S., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Durham, NC, Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 07-435
Issued: April 26, 2007

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On December 6, 2006 appellant filed a timely appeal from the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs’ November 16, 2006 decision denying his recurrence of disability
claim. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of
this claim.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish that he sustained a
recurrence of total disability on or after July 29, 2006 due to his December 10, 2004 employment
injury.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On December 13, 2004 appellant, then a 57-year-old building equipment manager, filed a
traumatic injury claim that he sustained injury when he slipped and fell on wet grass on
December 10, 2004. Appellant began working in a light-duty position which limited the use of
his upper extremities.

The findings of December 10, 2004 x-ray testing showed degenerative changes in the left
shoulder with joint space narrowing and spurring of the glenoid and humeral head. The Office
accepted that appellant sustained sprains of his left shoulder and left upper arm, including the
infraspinatus muscle.1
On August 23, 2006 appellant filed a Form CA2a alleging that he sustained a recurrence
of disability on July 29, 2006 due to his December 10, 2004 employment injury.2
On September 20, 2006 Dr. David W. Boone, an attending Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, stated that he was seeing appellant for left shoulder pain which he related to a
December 2004 fall. He indicated that on examination appellant exhibited limited range of
motion and give-away weakness of the left shoulder. Dr. Boone stated that appellant’s left
shoulder pain was not from adhesive capsulitis but rather was from degenerative arthritis.
On October 19, 2006 Dr. Robert T. Wyker, an attending Board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, stated that appellant reported that he injured his left shoulder in a December 2004 fall at
work. He noted that appellant complained of persistent pain and stiffness in his left shoulder
since that time. Dr. Wyker diagnosed “end-stage post-traumatic arthritis involving his left
shoulder” and recommended a total left shoulder replacement.
In a November 16, 2006 decision, the Office denied appellant’s claim on the grounds that
he did not submit sufficient medical evidence to establish that he sustained a recurrence of
disability on or after July 29, 2006 due to his December 10, 2004 employment injury.3
LEGAL PRECEDENT
When an employee, who is disabled from the job he held when injured on account of
employment-related residuals, returns to a light-duty position or the medical evidence of record
establishes that he can perform the light-duty position, the employee has the burden to establish by
the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence a recurrence of total disability and
show that she cannot perform such light duty. As part of this burden the employee must show a
change in the nature and extent of the injury-related condition or a change in the nature and extent
of the light-duty job requirements.4
1

In its acceptance letter, the Office inadvertently made reference to the right arm rather than the left arm.

2

It is unclear from the record whether appellant stopped work around this time.

3

Appellant submitted additional evidence in connection with the present appeal before the Board, but the Board
cannot consider such evidence for the first time on appeal. See 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c).
4

Cynthia M. Judd, 42 ECAB 246, 250 (1990); Terry R. Hedman, 38 ECAB 222, 227 (1986). 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(x)
provides, “Recurrence of disability means an inability to work after an employee has returned to work, caused by a
spontaneous change in a medical condition which had resulted from a previous injury or illness without an
intervening injury or new exposure to the work environment that caused the illness. This term also means an
inability to work that takes place when a light-duty assignment made specifically to accommodate an employee’s
physical limitations due to his or her work-related injury or illness is withdrawn (except when such withdrawal
occurs for reasons of misconduct, nonperformance of job duties or a reduction-in-force), or when the physical
requirements of such an assignment are altered so that they exceed his or her established physical limitations.”

2

ANALYSIS
The Office accepted that on December 10, 2004 appellant sustained sprains of his left
shoulder and left upper arm, including the infraspinatus muscle. Appellant subsequently alleged
that he sustained a recurrence of total disability on July 29, 2006 due to his December 10, 2004
employment injury.
The Board finds that appellant did not submit sufficient medical evidence to show that he
sustained a recurrence of total disability on or after July 29, 2006 due to his December 10, 2004
employment injury.
Appellant submitted a September 20, 2006 report in which Dr. Boone, an attending
Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, stated that appellant reported that he had left shoulder pain
due to a December 2004 fall. Dr. Boone indicated that on examination appellant exhibited
limited range of motion and give-away weakness of the left shoulder. He stated that appellant’s
left shoulder pain was not from adhesive capsulitis but rather was from degenerative arthritis.
Appellant also submitted an October 19, 2006 report in which Dr. Wyker, an attending Boardcertified orthopedic surgeon, stated that appellant reported that he injured his left shoulder in a
December 2004 fall at work. Dr. Wyker diagnosed “end-stage post-traumatic arthritis involving
his left shoulder” and recommended a total left shoulder replacement.
These reports, however, are of limited probative value on the relevant issue of the present
case in that they do not contain an opinion that appellant sustained an employment-related
recurrence of total disability.5 Neither Dr. Boone nor Dr. Wyker provided an opinion that
appellant sustained a recurrence of total disability on or after July 29, 2006 due to his
December 10, 2004 employment injury. Although both physicians noted that appellant
suggested that he had disabling residuals of his December 10, 2004 employment injury, they did
not provide any indication that they agreed that such a recurrence of disability occurred. A wellrationalized medical opinion supporting appellant’s recurrence of disability claim is especially
necessary in the present case in that the record does not contain any medical evidence regarding
appellant’s left or upper arm shoulder condition from 2005 or the first half of 2006. The record
is devoid of evidence bridging the treatment appellant received in December 2004 to that
received in August 2006.

5

See Charles H. Tomaszewski, 39 ECAB 461, 467-68 (1988) (finding that medical evidence which does not offer
any opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of causal
relationship).

3

For these reasons, appellant has not shown that a change in the nature and extent of his
injury-related condition caused him to sustain a recurrence of total disability on or after
July 29, 2006. In addition, he has not alleged or otherwise shown that a change in the nature and
extent his light-duty job requirements rendered him totally disabled. Therefore, the Office
properly denied his claim for recurrence of total disability.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet his burden or proof to establish that he
sustained a recurrence of total disability on or after July 29, 2006 due to his December 10, 2004
employment injury.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’
November 16, 2006 decision is affirmed.
Issued: April 26, 2007
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
C.E., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, PUGET
SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD, Bremerton, WA,
Employer
__________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:
John Eiler Goodwin, Esq., for the appellant
No appearance, for the Director

Docket No. 07-1546
Issued: August 12, 2008

Oral Argument July 16, 2008

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 21, 2007 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs’ March 21, 2007 schedule award decision. Pursuant to 20
C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether the Office’s March 21, 2007 schedule award decision was
properly issued; and (2) whether appellant has more than a 14 percent permanent impairment of
the left lower extremity for which he received a schedule award.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On February 10, 1992 appellant, then a 50-year-old insulator, filed an occupational
disease claim alleging that he realized that factors of his federal employment aggravated a
preexisting osteoarthritis ankle condition.1 The Office accepted appellant’s claim for
1

The Office assigned claim number 14-0271154.

aggravation of left osteoarthritis talonavicular joint and authorized left ankle arthrotomy
surgery,2 which occurred on March 15, 1993, and left ankle triple arthrodesis surgery, which
occurred on April 20, 1998.3 Appellant subsequently filed a claim for a schedule award.
In a July 28, 2004 report, Dr. Patrick N. Bays, a second opinion osteopath, concluded that
appellant had a five percent impairment of the left lower extremity using Table 17-12 at page
537.
On September 7, 2004 the Office medical adviser concluded that appellant had a 14
percent left lower extremity impairment using Tables 17-12 and 17-11 at page 537.
On February 17, 2006 the Office received an attorney authorization form for John E.
Goodwin’s law firm for claim numbers 14-0271154 and 14-0341116.
By decision dated March 21, 2007, the Office granted appellant a schedule award for a 14
percent impairment of the left lower extremity. It addressed and mailed this decision to appellant
at his address of record and also mailed a copy to the employing establishment.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
Section 10.127 of the Office’s regulations directs the Office to mail a copy of any
decision it may issue to claimant’s last known address. If the claimant has a designated
representative, then a copy of the decision must also be mailed to the representative.4
A properly appointed representative who is recognized by the Office may make a request
or give direction to the Office regarding the claims process, including a hearing. This authority
includes presenting or eliciting evidence, making arguments on facts or the law and obtaining
2

Initially, appellant identified the ankle in question as the right ankle and the Office accepted appellant’s claim
for aggravation of right osteoarthritis talonavicular joint. However, in an August 10, 1992 report, Dr. Larry M.
Gorman, appellant’s treating Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, stated there was a mix-up in the identification of
the ankle in question and that he “mistakenly said the right ankle but it should have been the left.” In a June 21,
2004 statement of accepted facts, the Office noted appellant’s claim had been accepted for a left ankle injury and
that two left ankle surgeries had been approved. It also stated that a February 28, 1992 traumatic injury claim had
been accepted for left lower leg contusion and right wrist sprain. This was assigned claim number 14-0341116.
Appellant retired from the employing establishment effective June 3, 2001.
3

It noted that a February 28, 1992 traumatic injury claim had been accepted for left lower leg contusion and right
wrist sprain. The Office assigned claim number 14-0341116. Appellant retired from the employing establishment
effective June 3, 2001.
4

20 C.F.R. § 10.127 (if the employee has a designated representative before the Office, a copy of the decision
will also be mailed to the representative). See Travis L. Chambers, 55 ECAB 138 (2003) (holding that section
10.127 requires that a copy of an Office decision be sent to the authorized representative and that any other
interpretation of the language of the regulation would be inconsistent with the clear language of its initial
provisions). See also Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Fees for Representative’s Services,
Chapter 2.1200.2(b)(2) (February 2005) (copies of all correspondence and decisions should be sent to both the
claimant and the authorized representative); Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Development of
Claims, Chapter 2.800.3(c)(1) (April 1993) (the Office must provide information about procedures involved in
establishing a claim, including detailed instructions for developing the required evidence to all interested parties (the
claimant, the employing establishment and the representative, if any).

2

information from the case file, to the same extent as the claimant. Any notice requirement
contained in the regulation or the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act5 is fully satisfied if
served on the representative and has the same force and effect as if it had been sent to the
claimant.6
A decision under the Act is not deemed to have been properly issued unless both
appellant and the authorized representative have been sent copies of the decision.7
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The record reflects that the Office issued its schedule award decision on March 21, 2007,
which it addressed and mailed to appellant and mailed a copy to the employing establishment.
On February 17, 2006 appellant had advised the Office of the name and address of his designated
representative. However, the Office failed to send a copy of its March 21, 2007 decision to the
authorized representative as required. The record contains no evidence that the Office sent a
copy of its March 21, 2007 decision to appellant’s designated representative.
The Board has held that a decision under the Act is not deemed to have been issued
unless both appellant and the authorized representative have been sent copies of the decision.8
Since the record in this case indicates that the Office’s March 21, 2007 decision was not sent to
the authorized representative on that date, it was not properly issued. The Office’s failure to
timely notify appellant’s representative of the March 21, 2007 schedule award decision denied
him the opportunity to have his representative assist him in exercising his appeal rights,
including the right to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of the decision. As a result,
appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the omission.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the Office’s March 21, 2007 decision was not properly issued. This
case will be remanded to the Office for further action in conformance with this decision in order
to protect appellant’s appeal rights.9

5

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq.

6

20 C.F.R. § 10.700(c); see also Sara K. Pearce, 51 ECAB 517 (2000).

7

See Travis L. Chambers, supra note 4.

8

Belinda J. Lewis, 43 ECAB 552 (1992); Thomas H. Harris, 39 ECAB 899 (1988).

9

In light of the Board’s resolution of the procedural issue, the case is not in posture for the Board to render a
decision on the second issue.

3

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated March 21, 2007 be set aside and the case is remanded for further
action consistent with this decision of the Board.
Issued: August 12, 2008
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

4


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
S.F., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Southampton, NY, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Capp P. Taylor, for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 20-1503
Issued: August 3, 2021

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On August 11, 2020 appellant, through her representative, filed a timely appeal from a
June 24, 2020 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).
Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and
501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a bilateral knee
condition causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
This case has previously been before the Board.3 The facts and circumstances as set forth
in the Board’s prior decision are incorporated herein by reference. The relevant facts are as
follows.
On May 15, 2014 appellant, then a 53-year-old letter carrier, filed an occupational disease
claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she sustained a bilateral knee condition due to factors of her
federal employment, including standing for long periods of time. She noted that she first became
aware of her condition and its relationship to her federal employment on April 29, 2014. Appellant
stopped work on April 29, 2014 and returned to work in a modified-duty capacity on
May 10, 2014.
In support of her claim, appellant submitted a June 12, 2014 report from Dr. Allen Fein, a
Board-certified specialist in family medicine, who provided physical examination findings and
diagnosed osteoarthritis. Dr. Fein opined that appellant’s federal employment was partially
responsible, along with her weight, for her bilateral knee condition.
By decision dated August 8, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that the
medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish that her diagnosed knee condition was
causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.
On September 4, 2014 appellant requested an oral hearing before a representative of
OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review.
In support of her request, appellant submitted medical reports, dated April 25, 2013
through August 28, 2014, from Dr. Peter G. Sultan, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon.
A hearing was held on February 9, 2015. During the hearing, appellant discussed her
employment duties and indicated that she required bilateral knee replacement surgery.
By decision dated March 18, 2015, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed the August 8,
2014 decision, finding that the evidence of record was insufficient to establish that appellant’s
bilateral knee osteoarthritis was causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.
On June 9, 2015 appellant requested reconsideration and submitted additional medical
evidence, including a March 12, 2015 report from Dr. Fein and an April 17, 2015 report from a
physician assistant.
By decision dated September 2, 2015, OWCP denied modification of the March 18, 2015
decision.
On August 15, 2016 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration.

3

Docket No. 18-1030 (issued April 5, 2019).

2

In an August 9, 2016 report, Dr. Fein described appellant’s employment duties and history
of injury. He indicated that appellant’s employment duties and obesity caused abnormal wear and
tear on her knees and hips sufficient to wear down the cartilage.
By decision dated December 26, 2017, OWCP denied modification of the September 2,
2015 decision.
On April 23, 2018 appellant, through counsel, appealed to the Board. By decision dated
April 5, 2019,4 the Board affirmed the December 26, 2017 decision, finding that appellant had not
met her burden of proof to establish a bilateral knee condition causally related to the accepted
factors of her federal employment.
On April 9, 2020 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration.
In a February 20, 2020 report, Dr. Fein reviewed Dr. Sultan’s May 23, 2013 and August 28,
2014 reports. He noted that osteoarthritis in the knees caused cartilage to become stiff and lose
elasticity, making the knees more susceptible to damage. Dr. Fein indicated that, over time,
cartilage degradation stretched the tendons and ligaments causing pain. He described appellant’s
employment activities and noted that she frequently walked on uneven concrete surfaces, entered
and exited her vehicle, and ascended and descended stairs. Dr. Fein opined that appellant’s
employment duties caused wear and tear in the cartilage of her knees. He found that the thinning
of the cartilage and the smaller than usual joint space could be seen in appellant’s x-rays. Dr. Fein
noted that the osteophytes on the edges of the joint reflected inflammation usually caused by
repeated wear as opposed to a single event. He opined that appellant’s obesity was a contributing
factor to her osteoarthritis, but indicated that the movement of her knees provided the wear and
tear on the cartilage and not the weight itself. Dr. Fein explained that appellant’s diagnoses of
hypertension, Type 2 diabetes mellitus, thrombocytopenia, and leukopenia were not known causes
of osteoarthritis.
By decision dated June 24, 2020, OWCP denied modification, finding that the medical
evidence of record was insufficient to establish causal relationship between the diagnosed bilateral
knee condition and the accepted factors of appellant’s federal employment.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA5 has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable
time limitation period of FECA,6 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged,
and that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related

4

Id.

5

Supra note 2.

6
R.M., Docket No. 20-0342 (issued July 30, 2020); J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB
153 (1989).

3

to the employment injury.7 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim,
regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.8
To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational
disease claim, a claimant must submit the following: (1) a factual statement identifying
employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence or occurrence of the
disease or condition; (2) medical evidence establishing the presence or existence of the disease or
condition for which compensation is claimed; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the identified employment factors.9
Causal relationship is a medical question that requires rationalized medical opinion
evidence to resolve the issue.10 The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual
and medical background of the claimant, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must
be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed
condition and the specific employment factors identified by the claimant.11
In any case where a preexisting condition involving the same part of the body is present,
and the issue of causal relationship, therefore, involves aggravation, acceleration, or precipitation,
the physician must provide a rationalized medical opinion that differentiates between the effects
of the work-related injury or disease and the preexisting condition.12
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.
In support of her claim, appellant submitted a February 20, 2020 report from Dr. Fein who
reviewed Dr. Sultan’s May 23, 2013 and August 28, 2014 reports and described appellant’s work
activities. Dr. Fein explained that osteoarthritis in the knees caused cartilage to become stiff and
lose elasticity, making the knees more susceptible to damage. He noted that over time, cartilage
degradation stretched the tendons and ligaments causing pain. Dr. Fein indicated that appellant
frequently walked on uneven concrete surfaces, entered and exited her vehicle, and ascended and
descended stairs. He opined that appellant’s employment activities caused wear and tear in the
cartilage of her knees. Dr. Fein noted that the thinning of the cartilage and the smaller than usual
7

V.P., Docket No. 20-0415 (issued July 30, 2020); R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB
312 (1988).
8

20 C.F.R. § 10.115; S.A., Docket No. 20-0458 (issued July 23, 2020); L.M., Docket No. 13-1402 (issued
February 7, 2014); Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).
9
See B.H., Docket No. 18-1693 (issued July 20, 2020); Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238, 241 (2005); Victor J.
Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).
10

L.S., Docket No. 19-1769 (issued July 10, 2020); Jacqueline M. Nixon-Steward, 52 ECAB 140 (2000).

11

B.C., Docket No. 20-0221 (issued July 10, 2020); Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

12
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 – Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.3e (January 2013); see
S.M., Docket No. 19-1634 (issued August 25, 2020).

4

joint space could be seen in appellant’s x-rays. He indicated that the osteophytes on the edges of
the joint reflected inflammation usually caused by repeated wear as opposed to a single event. Dr.
Fein opined that appellant’s obesity was a contributing factor to her osteoarthritis, but indicated
that the movement of her knees provided the wear and tear on the cartilage and not the weight
itself. He advised that appellant’s hypertension, Type 2 diabetes mellitus, thrombocytopenia, and
leukopenia were not known causes of osteoarthritis.
The Board finds that this report from Dr. Fein is sufficient to require further development
of the medical evidence. Dr. Fein provided a comprehensive understanding of the medical record
and case history. His affirmative opinion on causal relationship provides a pathophysiological
explanation as to how appellant’s work activities caused her diagnosed condition. Accordingly,
the Board finds that Dr. Fein’s opinion, while insufficiently rationalized to meet appellant’s burden
of proof, is sufficient, to require further development of the medical record as to whether her
bilateral knee osteoarthritis is causally related to the accepted factors of her federal employment.13
It is well established that proceedings under FECA are not adversarial in nature and that,
while appellant has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to compensation, OWCP shares
responsibility in the development of the evidence. OWCP has an obligation to see that justice is
done.14
On remand, OWCP shall refer appellant, a statement of accepted facts, and the medical
record to a specialist in the appropriate field of medicine. The chosen physician shall provide a
rationalized opinion as to whether appellant’s diagnosed conditions are causally related to the
accepted factors of her federal employment. If the physician opines that the diagnosed conditions
are not causally related, he or she must explain, with rationale, how or why the opinion differs
from that of Dr. Fein. Following this and such other further development as deemed necessary,
OWCP shall issue a de novo decision on appellant’s claim.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

13

See J.S., Docket No. 19-0892 (issued November 4, 2020); E.J., Docket No. 09-1481 (issued February 19, 2010);
John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354, 360 (1989).
14

T.S., Docket No. 20-1177 and 20-1296 (issued May 28, 2021).

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 24, 2020 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this decision of the Board.
Issued: August 3, 2021
Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

6