United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
N.W., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, MARINE
CORPS LOGISTICS BASE, Albany, GA,
Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 09-1008
Issued: March 24, 2010

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 6, 2009 appellant filed a timely appeal from decisions of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs dated July 3 and October 3, 2008 and February 11, 2009
denying modification of a July 18, 2006 loss of wage-earning capacity determination. Pursuant
to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish that a modification of
the Office’s July 18, 2006 loss of wage-earning capacity determination was warranted.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 11, 1988 appellant, then a 38-year-old sandblaster, sustained a low back
strain while in the performance of his duties. On January 11, 1989 he underwent surgery for
excision of an extruded fragment of a herniated disc at L5-S1 on the left. Appellant was placed
on the periodic compensation rolls effective December 26, 1988 to receive compensation for
temporary total disability. He returned to limited-duty work on October 2, 1989.

On February 28, 1991 appellant sustained a lumbosacral strain at work that was accepted
under OWCP File No. xxxxxx280. On March 9, 1994 he sustained a recurrence of total
disability and returned to work on April 18, 1994. On March 18, 1996 the Office accepted a
November 28, 1995 recurrence of disability and a left-side herniated disc at L5-S1.
On May 21, 1996 he underwent surgery for excision of another extruded fragment of the
herniated disc at L5-S1. In reports dated August 20 and September 26, 1996, Dr. Robert E.
Hanchey, an attending neurosurgeon, stated that appellant could not return to his job as a
sandblaster but could return to his light-duty job as a timekeeper.1 On October 15, 1996
appellant returned to work in his limited-duty job as a timekeeper. On April 2, 1997 the Office
issued a loss of wage-earning capacity decision based on his reemployment as a timekeeper. On
June 5, 1998 the employing establishment withdrew the position because it could not
accommodate his physical restrictions. Appellant’s claim was placed back on the periodic rolls
and appellant was paid temporary total disability benefits.
Appellant was referred to the Office’s vocational rehabilitation program in
November 1999 and underwent a vocational evaluation of his job skills and interests. He
completed two semesters of prevocational development studies training at the Albany Technical
College in 2000 and then commenced a two-year program in computer information systems at
the college. Appellant’s courses included Business English, Business Mathematics, Introduction
to Computers, Computer Concepts, Interpersonal Relations, Program Design and Development,
Word Processing, Networking Concepts, Introduction to Data Communications, Multiple
Networks and WANS (wide area networks), Operating Systems Concepts, Advanced Routers
and Switches, Microsoft Installation and Maintenance, WAN Design, Client Serve Database
Management and Business Communication. In an August 7, 2002 progress report, a
rehabilitation counselor reported that appellant repeated two courses, Networking Concepts and
Business English, because he received a grade of D in each, but passed the courses the second
time. He noted that appellant needed four more courses to receive a diploma in computer
information systems, Math 098, a prerequisite to Math 103 (Algebraic Concepts), Introduction to
Visual Basic Programming and Implementing Windows 2000 Professional and Service. A
computer instructor and appellant’s adviser stated that appellant should be employable if he
passed the two computer courses, even without a diploma and could complete the mathematics
requirement at night while working. The Office authorized an additional quarter at the college,
the 2002 fall quarter, so that he could complete the two computer courses.
On October 3, 2002 the rehabilitation counselor noted that appellant was scheduled to
begin a job search in January 2003 pursuant to his rehabilitation plan. On February 11, 2003 he
stated that appellant had completed all requirements to earn his certificate in computer
information systems at the end of December 2002 with the exception of Math 103, Algebraic
Concepts.2 The rehabilitation counselor advised appellant during the last college term that no
further extensions of training would be provided and he was scheduled to begin an active job
search by January 2003. His authorized job placement assistance expired April 6, 2003. On
March 18, 2003 the rehabilitation counselor stated that, during the effort to find appellant a
1

Appellant began performing his job as a timekeeper following the November 28, 1995 recurrence.

2

The record shows that appellant passed the prerequisite course, Math 098, Pre-Algebra, but received a D in
Math 103, Algebraic Concepts, in the 2003 spring quarter.

2

position, it became apparent that having an “A Plus Certification” as a computer technician
would make him even more marketable. He registered for the first of two sections of the
certification course beginning April 7, 2003. The counselor indicated that he would see if the
Office would be willing to fund the cost of the two certification tests costing $149.00 each. On
September 17, 2003 the rehabilitation counselor stated that, based on appellant’s experience,
education, medical restrictions and a labor market survey, he was employable as a Quality
Assurance Analyst. He noted that appellant completed a two-year computer training program
with the exception of a mathematics course. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)
describes the position of Quality Assurance Analyst as follows:
“Evaluates and tests new or modified software programs and software
development procedures used to verify that programs function according to user
requirements and conform to establishment guidelines: Writes, revises, and
verifies quality standards and test procedures for program design and product
evaluation to attain quality of software economically and efficiently. Reviews
new or modified program, including documentation, diagram, and flow chart, to
determine if program will perform according to user request and conform to
guidelines. Recommends program improvements or corrections to programmers.
Reviews computer operating log to identify processing errors. Enters instructions
into computer to test program for validity of results, accuracy, reliability, and
conformance to establishment standards. Observes computer monitor screen
during program test to detect error codes or interruption of program and corrects
errors.
Identifies differences between establishment standards and user
applications and suggests modifications to conform to standards. Sets up tests at
request of user to locate and correct program operating error following installation
of program. Conducts compatibility tests with vendor-provided programs.
Monitors program performance after implementation to prevent reoccurrence of
program operating problems and ensure efficiency of operation. Writes
documentation to describe program evaluation, testing and correction. May
evaluate proposed software or software enhancement for feasibility. May develop
utility program to test, track, and verify defects in software program. May write
programs to create new procedures or modify existing procedures. May train
software program users.”3
The physical strength demand for the position was described as “light.” The vocational
training necessary for the position was one to two years. The counselor reported that this
position was reasonably available in appellant’s commuting area and paid $384.00 a week. After
90 days of placement assistance, appellant failed to find employment in these positions or any
other position. On September 29, 2003 an Office rehabilitation specialist stated that appellant
received vocational and college level training in computer information systems and was qualified
for employment as a quality assurance analyst. His rehabilitation file was closed because,
although he had not secured a quality assurance analyst position, the position continued to be
performed in sufficient numbers in his commuting area.
3

An attachment to the DOT position description lists the skills and physical requirements needed to perform the
position and rates the importance of each skill. Three of the 42 skills and physical requirements are rated as
“extremely important”: written comprehension, written expression and mathematical reasoning.
Rated as
“important” skills are wrist-finger speed and handling and moving objects.

3

On March 2, 2006 appellant underwent a functional capacity evaluation to determine his
physical ability to perform work. The evaluation revealed that he could perform duties in the
light work category. On April 28, 2006 the Office asked Dr. Paul E. Peach, an attending Boardcertified physiatrist, to review the job descriptions, including the physical requirements, for the
positions of network control operator and quality assurance and advise the Office as to whether
appellant could perform those positions. On May 9, 2006 Dr. Peach stated that, based on the
March 2, 2006 functional capacity evaluation and his review of the position descriptions,
appellant was physically capable of performing both the network control operator and quality
assurance analyst positions which were considered to be in the light physical demand category.
On May 31, 2006 the Office advised appellant that the quality assurance analyst position
was medically and vocationally suitable for him and fairly and reasonably represented his wageearning capacity. It advised that it proposed to reduce his compensation benefits based on his
ability to earn the wages of a quality assurance analyst at the rate of $384.00 a week. Appellant
was allotted 30 days in which to submit evidence or argument regarding his capacity to earn
wages in the selected position. The Office noted that appellant’s rehabilitation counselor had
confirmed that the position remained reasonably available within appellant’s commuting area
and paid a weekly salary of $384.00.
On July 18, 2006 the Office finalized its decision to reduce appellant’s wage-loss
compensation effective July 13, 2006 because the factual and medical evidence established that
he was no longer totally disabled and the selected position of quality assurance analyst, paying
$384.00 a week, fairly and reasonably represented his wage-earning capacity. It provided a copy
of its wage-earning capacity computation form and loss of wage-earning capacity worksheet.
Appellant was advised to submit within 30 days evidence or argument regarding his capacity to
earn wages in the position described.4
On August 9, 2006 appellant requested an oral hearing that was held on January 25, 2007.
He testified that the quality assurance analyst job description used by the Office was from 1991
and did not reflect the technology in 2006. Appellant testified that he had no keyboard
experience and could not type. He contended that he had received no training at the Albany
Technical College in several of the tasks listed in the quality assurance analyst job description.
Appellant’s training involved basic education in installing, maintaining and repairing computers.
He asserted that the selected position was more advanced than the training he received.
Additionally, appellant never successfully completed a required mathematics course. Following
the hearing, he submitted reports dated July 27 and September 27, 2006 in which Dr. Peach
described chronic low back pain. In a February 22, 2007 report, Dr. Harry C. Weiser, a Boardcertified neurosurgeon, opined as to whether appellant could perform the position of a network
control operator. He did not provide an opinion regarding the selected position of quality
assurance analyst.
By decision dated April 9, 2007, an Office hearing representative affirmed the July 18,
2006 decision, finding that appellant failed to establish that he was unable to perform the
selected position of quality assurance analyst.

4

The Office initially finalized the reduction of appellant’s compensation on July 13, 2006 but issued a revised
decision on July 18, 2006 using his recurrent pay rate rather than his date of injury pay rate.

4

On April 8, 2008 appellant requested reconsideration. He argued that the position of
quality assurance analyst required training and certification in a contemporary major network
protocol, such as Microsoft DB2, A+ or Cisco, which was not included in his coursework at the
college. Appellant contended that he was not vocationally rehabilitated and that the July 18,
2006 wage-earning capacity decision should be modified. In an undated statement, Michael G.
Ray, vice-president of a computer company, stated that, based on his experience in the computer
networking and information industry and his review of the job description for quality assurance
analyst and the computer information systems coursework completed by appellant, it was his
opinion that appellant was not qualified for the position. The classes appellant completed were
basic, entry level courses that would provide an overview and understanding of computer
networks. Mr. Ray stated that the quality assurance analyst position would require, at a
minimum, Microsoft Certified Professional Developer Certification. Appellant’s minimal course
work in Cisco and Microsoft technologies did not qualify him for the position.
By decision dated July 3, 2008, the Office denied modification of the July 18, 2006
wage-earning capacity decision on the grounds that appellant did not establish any of the three
accepted reasons for modification of a loss of wage-earning capacity decision: that the July 18,
2006 wage-earning capacity decision was issued in error, his medical condition had materially
changed or he was vocationally rehabilitated and his wage-earning capacity had substantially
increased.
On September 16, 2008 appellant requested reconsideration. He argued that Dr. Peach
erred in stating that he could perform the quality assurance analyst position. Appellant stated
that Dr. Hanchey performed his two back surgeries and knew his condition better than Dr. Peach
who was selected by the rehabilitation counselor and prescribed pain medication but did little
else. He submitted reports dated January 3, 2007 to July 25, 2008 in which Dr. Peach diagnosed
chronic low back pain and left lower extremity neuropathy. In reports dated August 13 and
September 4, 2008, Dr. Mark A. Wolgin, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, provided a
medical history and findings on physical examination. He stated that x-rays of appellant’s
lumbar spine revealed narrowing of the L4-5 and L5-S1 disc spaces. A magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) scan revealed mild facet arthrosis at L5 to S1 and significant disc degeneration at
L4-5. It also revealed bilateral foraminal stenosis at the L4-5 level and some suggestion of a
mild herniation at the L4-5 level. Dr. Wolgin noted that appellant had a 20-year history of low
back pain. He did not provide an opinion regarding appellant’s capacity for work.
By decision dated October 3, 2008, the Office denied modification of its July 18, 2006
loss of wage-earning capacity determination on the grounds that appellant failed to provide
sufficient evidence that modification of the decision was warranted.
On November 20, 2008 appellant requested reconsideration. He argued that Dr. Peach
did not have sufficient understanding of his physical condition until after his May 9, 2006 report
stating appellant could perform the quality assurance analyst position. Dr. Peach was not fully
aware of his physical condition until August 2006 when he referred him to Dr. Weiser for
diagnosis and treatment. Appellant also reiterated his contention that his coursework in
computer information systems did not qualify him for the quality assurance analyst position. In
reports dated October 29 and November 14, 2008, Dr. Peach stated that appellant had chronic
low back pain, failed back syndrome, left lower extremity neuropathy, hamstring contractures,
hypertension and diabetes. Appellant was totally disabled due to these conditions. In reports
dated October 17 to November 20, 2008, Dr. Wolgin provided findings on physical examination
5

and noted that an August 19, 2008 MRI scan revealed residual disc degeneration at the L4-5
level since his two back surgeries with foraminal stenosis on the left at L4-5. He opined that
appellant’s accepted injury had not resolved and was disabling. Appellant’s symptoms
represented an aggravation of his employment injury. Dr. Wolgin stated that appellant had
severe degeneration of his spine at the L4-5 level and, without surgery, he was totally disabled.
By decision dated February 11, 2009, the Office denied modification of its July 18, 2006
decision on the grounds that the evidence did not warrant modification.5 It found that appellant
did not meet his burden of proof to establish one of the accepted reasons for seeking
modification of the July 18, 2006 loss of wage-earning capacity decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Once a loss of wage-earning capacity is determined, a modification of such determination
is not warranted unless there is a material change in the nature and extent of the injury-related
condition, the employee has been retrained or otherwise vocationally rehabilitated, or the original
determination was, in fact, erroneous.6 The burden of proof is on the party attempting to show
modification of the award.7 When a formal decision on loss of wage-earning capacity is in place
and a claimant requests compensation for total wage loss, the Office must evaluate the request
according to the established criteria for modifying a formal loss of wage-earning capacity.8
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant met his burden of proof to establish that the July 18, 2006
loss of wage-earning capacity decision should be modified.
Appellant has established that the July 18, 2006 wage-earning capacity decision was
erroneous. On February 11, 2003 appellant’s rehabilitation counselor stated that he had
completed all requirements to earn his certificate in computer information systems at the end of
December 2002 with the exception of Math 103 and Algebraic Concepts. On September 29,
2003 an Office rehabilitation specialist stated that appellant received vocational and college level
training in computer information systems and was qualified for employment as a quality
assurance analyst. Appellant’s rehabilitation file was closed because, although he had not
secured a quality assurance analyst position, the position continued to be performed in sufficient
numbers in his commuting area. However, an attachment to the DOT position description for
quality assurance analyst lists the skills and physical requirements needed to perform the position
and rates the importance of each skill. Three of the 42 skills and physical requirements are rated
as “extremely important”: written comprehension, written expression and mathematical
5

Subsequent to the February 11, 2009 Office decision, additional evidence was associated with the file. The
Board’s jurisdiction is limited to the evidence that was before the Office at the time it issued its final decision. See
20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c). The Board may not consider this evidence for the first time on appeal.
6

W.G., 58 ECAB 243 (2006); Elmer Strong, 17 ECAB 226 (1965); Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -Claims, Reemployment: Determining Wage-Earning Capacity, Chapter 2.814.9a, 11.a (December 1995).
7

S.M., 58 ECAB 166 (2006); Jack E. Rohrabaugh, 38 ECAB 186 (1986); Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual,
Part 2 -- Claims, Reemployment: Determining Wage-Earning Capacity, Chapter 2.814.11.b (December 1995).
8

See D.S., 58 ECAB 392 (2007); Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Reemployment:
Determining Wage-Earning Capacity, Chapter 2.814.9.a (December 1995).

6

reasoning. The record shows that appellant did not complete a required mathematics course,
Math 103 and Algebraic concepts. Because mathematical reasoning is rated as “extremely
important” in the DOT list of skills required for the quality assurance analyst position,
appellant’s failure to complete a required mathematics course establishes that he did not have the
necessary mathematics skill level necessary for the quality assurance analyst position. Appellant
argued that he was not qualified for the quality assurance analyst position because he did not
receive typing or keyboard training. The DOT job description for quality assurance analyst rates
wrist-finger speed and handling and moving objects as “important” skills. The evidence
establishes that the Office’s July 18, 2006 wage-earning capacity decision was erroneous in
finding that appellant was capable of earning wages in the position of quality assurance analyst.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant met his burden of proof that the July 18, 2006 loss of
wage-earning capacity should be modified.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated February 11, 2009 and October 3, 2008 are set aside and the case
is remanded for further action consistent with this decision.
Issued: March 24, 2010
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
San Juan, PR, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 08-1163
Issued: October 3, 2008

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On March 11, 2008 appellant filed a timely appeal of decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated August 31, 2007 and February 27, 2008 denying his emotional
condition claim. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant sustained an emotional condition in the performance of
duty.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 19, 2007 appellant, a 46-year-old modified letter carrier, filed an occupational
disease claim, alleging stress and depression as a result of conditions of his federal employment.
He stated that he was harassed and discriminated against on the basis of his race and disability
resulting from a May 30, 1995 on-the-job injury.

The record reflects that appellant’s July 23, 1998 occupational disease claim (File
No. 90442891) was accepted for left knee strain and left knee meniscal tear. The Office issued
an August 8, 2000 decision finding that appellant’s actual earnings as a modified city carrier
technician fairly and reasonably represented his wage-earning capacity, and that appellant had no
loss of wage-earning capacity based on his actual earnings in the modified position. On
November 27, 2004 appellant voluntarily transferred from his job in Michigan to a part-time
flexible (PTF) postal position in Puerto Rico. The PTF position did not guarantee more than four
hours of work per pay period and was based on the work available in the office. Appellant
subsequently claimed wage-loss compensation, as he was not being provided full-time
employment in his PTF position in Puerto Rico. By decisions dated April 5 and August 25, 2006
and March 21, 2007, the Office denied modification of the August 8, 2000 loss of wage-earning
capacity decision. On November 13, 2007, the Board affirmed the Office’s decisions, finding
that the fact that appellant voluntarily transferred to a position which provided fewer hours of
work than the position for which the wage-earning capacity was based, was not a basis for
modification of the wage-earning capacity decision or evidence that the reduction in hours was
due to residuals of his accepted conditions.1
The record contains a June 25, 2007 letter from the employing establishment advising him
that “effective immediately” he would only be allowed to be on the clock while performing work
on his daily assignment and that once the assignment was completed, he had to clock out and
leave the postal premises. In a note dated July 18, 2007, Dr. Angel L. Ramos Casanova, a
treating physician, diagnosed anxiety and depression.
On July 30, 2007 the Office informed appellant that the information submitted was
insufficient to establish his claim. It advised him to submit details of alleged employment
incidents that caused or contributed to his claimed condition. The Office also asked for a
medical report containing a description of his symptoms, a diagnosis, and an opinion, with
medical reasons, on the cause of his condition.
By decision dated August 31, 2007, the Office denied appellant’s claim, finding that he had
failed to establish a compensable factor of employment. It did not address the sufficiency of the
medical evidence. On September 8, 2007 appellant requested a telephonic hearing.
In an October 5, 2006 letter, the employing establishment stated that appellant was a part-time
flexible letter carrier at the time of his 1995 injury. In a letter dated June 26, 2007, Postmaster
Hernandez notified appellant that he was being placed in an off-duty status because he left a
threatening voice mail message on the answering machine of Zan Dakarp in violation of employing
establishment procedures.
The record contains numerous statements and letters from appellant concerning
allegations against employing establishment personnel. In a letter dated December 8, 2006,
appellant stated that he felt discriminated against because of his 1995 knee injury, and that other
casual carriers received more work hours than he did. He noted, “The joke of the day is
Marshall you can work more hours if you fix your left leg or get a new one.” In a May 9, 2007
1

See D.M., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-1230, issued November 13, 2007). The facts and conclusions of law
contained in that case are incorporated herein by reference.

2

letter to the Department of Justice, appellant contended that the employing establishment had
violated the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act by refusing to comply with an August 2000
loss of wage-earning capacity decision, which required it to provide him with an eight-hour
workday. On June 26, 2007 appellant contended that Postmaster Hernandez had precluded him
from completing his assigned duty and had “punched him out” without telling him. On July 17,
2007 he stated that the employing establishment was refusing to honor the Office’s instructions
and had been discriminating against him for the past 21 months on the basis of race and
disability. On August 20, 2007 he alleged that his anxiety was due to the employing
establishment’s failure to accommodate his 1995 injury following his voluntary relocation to
Puerto Rico. On November 13, 2007 he stated that he was sent home on November 10, 2007
after working only two hours. In an undated statement of disability, appellant alleged that the
employing establishment had failed to provide him with work within his restrictions, in spite of
repeated requests.
Appellant submitted documents related to an unsigned, undated “Complaint” against the
employing establishment.2 He alleged that the employing establishment in Puerto Rico sent him
home from work on September 5, 2005 without cause and did not attempt to accommodate the
40 hours per week compensation he received prior to May 30, 1995; that the establishment
treated him differently than other disabled employees; and that he had been unable to receive
fair accommodations for the past 18 months. Appellant asked for 30 million dollars in
compensatory damages.
The record contains personnel records, including undated “vehicle time records;”
undated evaluations; and a description of a limited-duty position for a “casual trigger.”
Appellant submitted a November 17, 2007 report from Dr. Casanova diagnosing anxiety and
depression.
During the December 14, 2007 telephonic hearing, appellant acknowledged that he
voluntarily transferred from a part-time carrier position in Michigan to a position in Puerto Rico
which did not guarantee him eight hours of work per day. He stated that he had not worked
outside his restrictions. Appellant contended that the employing establishment’s failure to
provide him with as many hours as other part-time flexible employees constituted
discrimination.
In a January 18, 2008 letter, the employing establishment controverted appellant’s claim.
Antonio Guzman, manager of health resource management and safety of the Caribbean district,
stated that the post office in which appellant worked had two routes. The first, an eight-hour
shift, was satisfied by a full-time carrier; the second, a seven-hour shift, was divided by two PTF
employees, one of who was appellant. He noted that PTF employees were not guaranteed eighthour workdays.
The record contains a February 11, 2008 memorandum notifying appellant that effective
February 12, 2008 his schedule would require him to work from 8:00 a.m. to noon. A portion of
an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) investigative affidavit, signed by Antonio Guzman on
January 24, 2006, contained appellant’s allegation that his transfer was discriminatory because it
2

The documents do not reflect whether, or the jurisdiction in which, they were filed.

3

“violated his permanent job offer.” Appellant submitted a February 12, 2008 “undelivered
mail” report, which contained his notation that his manager had instructed him to return the mail
to the post office and go home, rather than deliver the mail. On February 13, 2008 he contended
that the employing establishment hired temporary workers to perform his duties in order to save
money. On February 16, 2008 appellant alleged that management had informed him that his
loss of wage-earning capacity determination had been cancelled.
In a January 22, 2008 report, Dr. Hector L. Rodriguez-Martinez, a psychiatrist,
diagnosed major mood disorder, depressed, with anxiety. He stated, “Apparently, [appellant’s]
work situation has been contributing to his emotional condition.” On February 16, 2008
Dr. Rodriguez-Martinez opined that appellant was disabled until March 22, 2008.
By decision dated February 27, 2008, an Office hearing representative affirmed the
August 31, 2007 decision, finding that appellant had failed to establish a compensable factor of
employment. Noting that appellant’s voluntary transfer did not carry with it a guarantee of fulltime work, the representative found that the evidence did not establish that the employing
establishment had committed error or abuse in assigning his work duties and schedule.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is
somehow related to an employee’s employment. There are situations where an injury or an
illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the
concept or coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s
emotional reaction to his regular or specially assigned work duties or to a requirement imposed
by the employment, the disability comes within the coverage of the Act. On the other hand, the
disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reductionin-force or his frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold
a particular position.3
Generally, actions of the employing establishment in administrative or personnel matters,
unrelated to the employee’s regular or specially assigned work duties, do not fall within coverage
of the Act. However, where the evidence demonstrates that the employing establishment either
erred or acted abusively in the administration of personnel matters, coverage may be afforded.4
Assignment of work is an administrative function of the employer.5 Likewise, an employee’s
dissatisfaction with perceived poor management is not compensable under the Act.6

3

Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

4

Michael Thomas Plante, 44 ECAB 510 (1993).

5

James W. Griffin, 45 ECAB 774 (1994).

6

Id.

4

ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not established any compensable factors of
employment under the Act. Therefore, he has failed to establish that he sustained an emotional
condition in the performance of duty.
Appellant did not attribute his emotional condition to the performance of his regular
duties or to any special work requirement arising from his employment duties under Cutler; nor
did he implicate his workload as having caused or contributed to his emotional condition.
Rather, appellant contended that the failure to provide him with a 40-hour workweek following
his transfer to Puerto Rico caused his emotional stress and depression. He complained that
management violated the August 8, 2000 loss of wage-earning capacity after the transfer, by
failing to provide him with work within his restrictions and by reducing the number of hours he
was allowed to work. The Board finds that appellant’s allegations that the employing
establishment improperly reduced his work schedule and unfairly assigned more work hours per
shift to other PTF employees, relate to administrative or personnel matters, unrelated to his
regular or specially assigned work duties and do not fall within the coverage of the Act.7
Although the handling of disciplinary actions, the assignment of work duties and the monitoring
of work activities are generally related to the employment, they are administrative functions of
the employer and not duties of the employee.8 However, the Board has also found that an
administrative or personnel matter will be considered to be an employment factor where the
evidence discloses error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment. In determining
whether the employing establishment erred or acted abusively, the Board has examined whether
the employing establishment acted reasonably.9
The Board finds that appellant has not submitted sufficient evidence to show that the
employing establishment committed error or abuse with respect to these administrative matters.
The record reflects that appellant voluntarily transferred to a position in Puerto Rico which
provided fewer hours of work than the position for which his wage-earning capacity was based.
Appellant was aware that the new position did not come with a guarantee of more than four
hours per pay period and was based on the availability of work in the office. The employing
establishment explained that the post office in which appellant worked had two routes. The first,
an eight-hour shift, was satisfied by a full-time carrier; the second, a seven-hour shift, was
divided between two PTF employees, one of whom was appellant. Therefore, as appellant was a
PTF employee, it was not only reasonable, but necessary, for the employing establishment to
assign him to a shift that was less than full time. The Board finds that the employing
establishment’s act of placing appellant in an off-duty status because he left a threatening voice mail
message on a coworker’s answering machine in violation of employing establishment procedures was
reasonable under the circumstances. Appellant has provided no evidence to show that the employing
establishment required him to work beyond his restrictions, or failed to provide work for him
7

See Lori A. Facey, 55 ECAB 217 (2004). See also Janet I. Jones, 47 ECAB 345, 347 (1996); Jimmy Gilbreath,
44 ECAB 555, 558 (1993); Apple Gate, 41 ECAB 581, 588 (1990); Joseph C. DeDonato, 39 ECAB 1260, 126667 (1988).
8

Id.

9

See Richard J. Dube, 42 ECAB 916, 920 (1991).

5

within his restrictions. In fact, he acknowledged during the telephonic hearing that he had been
provided with work that satisfied his limitations. Thus, appellant has not established a
compensable employment factor under the Act with respect to administrative matters.
Appellant alleged that he was harassed and discriminated against on the basis of his race
and disability. He stated that he felt discriminated against because of his 1995 knee injury and
that the employing establishment treated him differently than other disabled employees. The
Board finds that appellant has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish his claim of
harassment or discrimination.10 To the extent that disputes and incidents alleged as constituting
harassment and discrimination by supervisors are established as occurring and arising from
appellant’s performance of his regular duties, these could constitute employment factors.11
However, to give rise to a compensable disability under the Act, there must be evidence that
harassment or discrimination did, in fact, occur. Mere perceptions of harassment or
discrimination are not compensable under the Act.12 In the instant case, appellant has not cited
specific examples of harassment or discrimination, supported by corroborative evidence, such as
witness statements. His general allegations alone are insufficient to establish a factual basis for
his claim.13 Appellant reported that he was depressed and stressed as a result of management’s
treatment. However, under the circumstances of this case, the Board finds that his emotional
reaction must be considered self-generated, in that it resulted from his perceptions regarding his
supervisors’ actions.14 Thus, the Board finds that appellant has not established a compensable
employment factor under the Act with respect to these above-described allegations of harassment
and discrimination.
The record reflects that appellant filed an EEO complaint. Grievances and EEO
complaints, by themselves, do not establish that workplace harassment or unfair treatment
occurred.15 Where an employee alleges harassment and cites specific incidents, the Office or
other appropriate fact finder must determine the truth of the allegations. The issue is not whether
the claimant has established harassment or discrimination under EEO Commission standards.
Rather, the issue is whether the claimant under the Act has submitted sufficient evidence to
establish a factual basis for the claim by supporting his or her allegations with probative and
reliable evidence.16 Appellant has failed to do so in the instant case.

10

See Joel Parker, Sr., 43 ECAB 220, 225 (1991) (finding that a claimant must substantiate allegations of
harassment or discrimination with probative and reliable evidence).
11

See Lori A. Facey, supra note 7. See also David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. Walker,
42 ECAB 603, 608 (1991).
12

Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991).

13

See Charles E. McAndrews, 55 ECAB 711 (2004).

14

See David S. Lee, 56 ECAB 602 (2005).

15

See James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 93 (2000). See also Parley A. Clement, 48 ECAB 302 (1997).

16

See James E. Norris, supra note 15. See also Michael Ewanichak, 48 ECAB 354 (1997).

6

For the foregoing reasons, appellant has not established any compensable employment
factors under the Act. Therefore, he has not met his burden of proof to establish that he
sustained an emotional condition as a result of conditions of his employment.17
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that he
sustained an emotional condition in the performance of duty causally related to factors of
employment.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated February 27, 2008 and August 31, 2007 are affirmed.
Issued: October 3, 2008
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

17

As appellant has not established any compensable employment factors, the Board need not consider the medical
evidence of record. See Margaret S. Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496 (1992).

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
W.L., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CIVIC CENTER
POST OFFICE, Oakland, CA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 08-1856
Issued: February 5, 2009

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On June 23, 2008 appellant filed a timely appeal from decisions of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs dated October 1 and December 21, 2007 denying his claims
for occupational disease and a period of disability and a March 24, 2008 nonmerit decision
denying his request for a merit review. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(d), the
Board has jurisdiction over the merits of the claim and the nonmerit denial of a merit review.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant established that he sustained a bilateral upper
extremity condition in the performance of duty due to work factors from February 5, 2005 to
January 18, 2007; (2) whether appellant established that he was totally disabled for work from
July 24, 2007 causally related to accepted upper extremity conditions; and (3) whether the Office
properly denied appellant’s February 27, 2008 request for a merit review.

FACTUAL HISTORY
On November 26, 2006 appellant, then a 56-year-old modified letter carrier, filed a claim
for recurrence of disability1 (Form CA-2a) alleging that carrying mail from February 5, 2005 to
January 18, 2007 aggravated accepted bilateral lateral epicondylitis and a right wrist sprain/strain
sustained prior to February 3, 2005.2
In a January 22, 2007 letter, the Office advised appellant that as he alleged new work
factors, it would develop the claim as one for occupational disease.3 It noted the type of medical
and factual evidence needed to establish his claim. The Office emphasized the importance of
submitting a rationalized report from his attending physician explaining how and why work
factors would cause the claimed condition.
Appellant submitted reports from Dr. Mark Hebrard, an attending Board-certified
physiatrist, dated from January 18 to July 31, 2007. Dr. Hebrard diagnosed right lateral
epicondylitis, right de Quervain’s tendinitis and right carpal tunnel syndrome. He noted work
restrictions against repetitive upper extremity activity and lifting more than five pounds. In an
April 6, 2007 report, Dr. Robert Wagner, a Board-certified internist, noted appellant’s account of
lifting tubs of mail without a handcart on March 5, 2007, followed by right wrist pain.
Dr. Wagner diagnosed a right wrist sprain and right lateral epicondylitis. He released appellant
to regular duty.4
The employing establishment terminated appellant on July 24, 2007. On August 8, 2007
appellant filed a claim for compensation (Form CA-7) for the period July 24, 2007 and
continuing. In an August 29, 2007 letter, the Office advised appellant of the medical evidence
needed to establish his claim.
Appellant submitted job offers showing that he accepted light-duty positions on June 14
and September 21, 2005, with lifting limited to 40 pounds and limited use of the right arm. In a
September 4, 2007 report, Dr. Hebrard related appellant’s account that he was forced to retire. In
a September 19, 2007 letter, Sonia Ortega, a union steward, asserted that management refused to
accommodate appellant’s work restrictions.
By decision dated October 1, 2007, the Office denied appellant’s claim on the grounds
that causal relationship was not established. It found that appellant submitted insufficient
1

Appellant filed a duplicate claim on February 7, 2007.

2

The prior upper extremity claim was assigned File No. xxxxxx064, accepted for bilateral lateral epicondylitis
and a right wrist/hand strain.
3

In a March 8, 2007 decision, the Office denied continuation of pay from November 28, 2006 to January 12,
2007 as appellant claimed an occupational disease, not a traumatic injury. This claim is not before the Board on the
present appeal.
4

Appellant also submitted reports from Ellen Brennan, a nurse practitioner. The Board has held that treatment
notes signed by a nurse are not considered medical evidence as a nurse is not a physician under the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); Sedi L. Graham, 57 ECAB 494 (2006); Paul Foster, 56
ECAB 208 (2004).

2

rationalized medical evidence supporting a causal relationship between the identified work
factors and the claimed conditions. The Office further found that appellant had not established
total disability for work from July 24, 2007 onward.
In an October 8, 2007 letter, appellant requested reconsideration.
additional evidence.

He submitted

In an October 4, 2007 letter, appellant contended that he refused a light-duty job offer
made on March 1, 2007 as it was made on the last effective date. A copy of the job offer showed
effective dates from February 8 to March 1, 2007. An official noted that appellant refused to
sign the job offer on March 1, 2007. A May 16, 2007 Step B grievance settlement stated that
appellant agreed to retire voluntarily or be terminated from the employing establishment.
In reports from June 14 to October 24, 2007, Dr. Hebrard noted appellant’s continuing
symptoms. He diagnosed right wrist tendinitis and right carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Hebrard
stated in an October 4, 2007 report that he had not found appellant totally disabled for work for
any period.
By decision dated December 21, 2007, the Office affirmed the previous decision on the
grounds that the evidence submitted was insufficient to warrant modification. The Office found
that appellant submitted insufficient medical evidence to establish causal relationship or a period
of total disability.
In a February 21, 2008 letter, appellant requested reconsideration. He submitted
December 5, 2007 and January 22, 2008 reports from Dr. Hebrard noting work restrictions.
Dr. Hebrard repeated previous diagnoses, emphasizing that he never held appellant off work.
Appellant also provided a February 8, 2008 letter from an employing establishment official
stating that appellant was offered a light-duty job on March 1, 2007, the last effective date for the
position.
By decision dated March 24, 2008, the Office denied merit review on the grounds that
appellant’s February 21, 2008 request and the evidence submitted did not raise substantive legal
questions or include new, relevant evidence.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
An employee seeking benefits under the Act5 has the burden of establishing the essential
elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an “employee of the United
States” within the meaning of the Act; that the claim was filed within the applicable time
limitation; that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged; and that any
disability and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are causally related to the

5

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

3

employment injury.6 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim
regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.7
To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational
disease claim, a claimant must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing the
presence or existence of the disease or condition for which compensation is claimed; (2) factual
statement identifying employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence
or occurrence of the disease or condition; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the
employment factors identified by the claimant were the proximate cause of the condition for
which compensation is claimed or, stated differently, medical evidence establishing that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the employment factors identified by the claimant.
The medical evidence required to establish causal relationship is generally rationalized medical
opinion evidence. Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a
physician’s rationalized opinion on the issue of whether there is a causal relationship between the
claimant’s diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors. The opinion of the
physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must be
one of reasonable medial certainty and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the
nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors
identified by the claimant.8
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
Appellant claimed that he sustained bilateral wrist conditions due to work factors from
February 5, 2005 to January 18, 2007. He submitted repots from Dr. Hebrard, an attending
Board-certified physiatrist, diagnosing right lateral epicondylitis, right de Quervain’s tendinitis
and carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Hebrard did not provide medical rationale explaining how and
why work factors would cause the claimed conditions. Therefore, his opinion is insufficient to
meet appellant’s burden of proof in establishing causal relationship.9
Dr. Wagner, a Board-certified internist, noted in an April 6, 2007 report that appellant
recalled the onset of right wrist symptoms after lifting mail on March 5, 2007. He diagnosed a
right wrist sprain. However, Dr. Wagner did provide medical rationale explaining how or why
lifting mail would cause the diagnosed condition. His opinion is therefore insufficient to
establish causal relationship.10
The Board notes that appellant was advised by January 22, 2007 letter of the necessity of
submitting medical evidence explaining how and why work factors would cause or contribute to
6

Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).

7

See Irene St. John, 50 ECAB 521 (1999); Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).

8

Solomon Polen, 51 ECAB 341 (2000).

9

Deborah L. Beatty, 54 ECAB 340 (2003) (medical reports not containing rationale on causal relationship are
entitled to little probative value).
10

Id.

4

the claimed conditions. (R 27-26) He did not submit such evidence. Therefore, appellant failed
to meet his burden of proof in establishing causal relationship.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2
To establish a causal relationship between a claimed period of disability claimed and the
accepted employment injury, an employee must submit rationalized medical evidence based on a
complete medical and factual background, supporting such a causal relationship.11 Causal
relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence required to establish a causal
relationship is rationalized medical evidence.12 Rationalized medical evidence is evidence which
includes a physician’s rationalized medical opinion on the issue of whether there is a causal
relationship between the claimant s diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors.
The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the
claimant, must be one of reasonable medical certainty and must be supported by medical
rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the
specific employment factors identified by the claimant.13
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2
Under a previous claim, the Office accepted that appellant sustained bilateral lateral
epicondylitis and a right wrist sprain/strain due to work factors on or before February 3, 2005.
Appellant claimed wage-loss compensation for total disability from July 24, 2007 onward due to
sequelae of those conditions. By decisions dated October 1 and December 21, 2007, the Office
denied compensation for the claimed period of disability.
Dr. Hebrard submitted reports from January 18 to October 24, 2007 noting appellant’s
upper extremity symptoms and prescribing work limitations. He stated in an October 4, 2007
report that he did not find appellant totally disabled for work for any period. Similarly,
Dr. Wagner, a Board-certified internist, released appellant to full duty as of April 6, 2007. As
Dr. Hebrard and Dr. Wagner did not find appellant totally disabled for work for the claimed
period, their opinions are insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.
Consequently, appellant has failed to establish the claimed period of total disability, as he
submitted insufficient rationalized medical evidence establishing total disability for work for any
period due to the accepted injuries.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 3
14

Act,

To require the Office to reopen a case for merit review under section 8128(a) of the
section 10.606(b)(2) of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that a

11

Manuel Gill, 52 ECAB 282 (2001).

12

Jacqueline M. Nixon-Steward, 52 ECAB 140 (2000).

13

Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

14

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

5

claimant must: (1) show that the Office erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law;
(2) advance a relevant legal argument not previously considered by the Office; or (3) submit
relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously considered by the Office.15 Section
10.608(b) provides that when an application for review of the merits of a claim does not meet at
least one of the three requirements enumerated under section 10.606(b)(2), the Office will deny
the application for reconsideration without reopening the case for a review on the merits.16
In support of a request for reconsideration, an appellant is not required to submit all
evidence which may be necessary to discharge his or her burden of proof.17 He need only submit
relevant, pertinent evidence not previously considered by the Office.18 When reviewing an
Office decision denying a merit review, the function of the Board is to determine whether the
Office properly applied the standards set forth at section 10.606(b)(2) to the claimant’s
application for reconsideration and any evidence submitted in support thereof.19
ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 3
The Office denied appellant’s claims for occupational disease and wage-loss
compensation by October 1, 2007 decision, affirmed by December 21, 2007 decision. Appellant
requested reconsideration by letter dated February 21, 2008. He submitted December 5, 2007
and January 22, 2008 reports from Dr. Hebrard reiterating previous findings. Appellant also
provided an employing establishment letter highly similar to previously submitted evidence
regarding the date of a light-duty job offer. The Board has held that evidence or argument which
is duplicative or cumulative in nature is insufficient to warrant reopening a claim for merit
review.20 The duplicative nature of this evidence does not require reopening the record for
further merit review.
Appellant’s February 21, 2008 letter and the evidence submitted did not establish that the
Office improperly refused to reopen his claim for a review of the merits under section 8128(a) of
the Act. He did not show that the Office erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of
law, advance a relevant legal argument not previously considered by the Office or submit
relevant and pertinent evidence not previously considered by the Office. Therefore, the Office
properly denied appellant’s request for a merit review.

15

20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(2).

16

20 C.F.R. § 10.608(b). See also T.E.., 59 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 07-2227, issued March 19, 2008).

17

Helen E. Tschantz, 39 ECAB 1382 (1988).

18

See 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3). See also Mark H. Dever, 53 ECAB 710 (2002).

19

Annette Louise, 54 ECAB 783 (2003).

20

Denis M. Dupor, 51 ECAB 482 (2000).

6

CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not establish that he sustained upper extremity
conditions in the performance of duty due to work factors from February 5, 2005 to
January 18, 2007. The Board further finds that appellant did not establish a period of total
disability for work from July 24, 2007 onward. The Board further finds that the Office properly
denied appellant’s February 21, 2008 request for a merit review.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decisions of the Office dated March 24, 2008,
December 21 and October 1, 2007 are affirmed.
Issued: February 5, 2009
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
A.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Washington, DC, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Stephen Larkin, for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 14-1351
Issued: October 20, 2014

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 28, 2014 appellant, through her representative, filed a timely appeal of a
March 12, 2014 decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), finding
that appellant’s request for reconsideration was untimely and failed to show clear evidence of
error. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA), the Board has
jurisdiction over the March 12, 2014 decision. The Board does not have jurisdiction over a
decision on the merits of the claim.2
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly found that appellant’s application for
reconsideration was untimely and failed to show clear evidence of error.
1
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

The last merit decision was an OWCP decision dated November 10, 2011. For final adverse OWCP decisions
issued on or after November 19, 2008, a claimant has 180 days to file an appeal with the Board. 20 C.F.R.
§ 501.3(e).

FACTUAL HISTORY
The case has been before the Board on two prior appeals. In an order dated May 18,
2010, the Board remanded the case to OWCP for a decision on the merits of the claim.3 The
Board found that OWCP had delayed issuance of a decision regarding appellant’s
reconsideration request that jeopardized her appeal rights. By decision dated June 28, 2010,
OWCP denied merit review of the claim. The Board issued an order dated September 28, 2011,
remanding the case to OWCP to issue a decision on the merits.4
In a decision dated November 10, 2011, OWCP reviewed the merits of the claim and
denied modification. It found that appellant had not established any compensable work factors.
According to the Integrated Federal Employee’s Compensation System (iFECS) record,
on November 15, 2012 OWCP received a request for reconsideration dated October 20, 2012 and
additional evidence. The additional evidence included statements by appellant, time sheets,
correspondence and medical evidence.
On January 9, 2014 appellant resubmitted the October 20, 2012 reconsideration request.5
By decision dated March 12, 2014, OWCP found that the reconsideration request received on
January 9, 2014 was untimely. It found that appellant had only provided a statement in her
reconsideration request with her opinion that administrative error had occurred, without
including evidence of error.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
FECA provides that OWCP may review an award for or against compensation upon
application by an employee (or his or her representative) who receives an adverse decision.6 The
employee shall exercise this right through a request to the district office. The request, along with
the supporting statements and evidence, is called the “application for reconsideration.”7
According to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a), a claimant is not entitled to a review of an OWCP
decision as a matter of right.8 This section vests OWCP with discretionary authority to

3

Docket No. 09-2022 (issued May 18, 2010). Appellant had filed a CA-2 claim for compensation on
December 29, 2005 alleging mental and physical stress from actions of her supervisor. The claim was denied by
decision dated June 27, 2006, and an OWCP hearing representative affirmed the denial of the claim by decision
dated March 15, 2007.
4

Docket No. 11-512 (issued September 28, 2011).

5

The request contains a stamp purporting to indicate receipt by OWCP on November 7, 2012, with the number
seven handwritten.
6

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

7

20 C.F.R. § 10.605 (2012).

8

Leon D. Faidley, Jr., 41 ECAB 104 (1989).

2

determine whether it will review an award for or against compensation.9 OWCP, through
regulations, has imposed limitations on the exercise of its discretionary authority under 5 U.S.C.
§ 8128(a) of FECA.10 As one such limitation, 20 C.F.R. § 10.607 provides that an application
for reconsideration must be received within one year of the date of OWCP’s decision for which
review is sought.11 OWCP will consider an untimely application only if the application
demonstrates clear evidence of error on the part of OWCP in its most recent merit decision. The
evidence must be positive, precise and explicit and must manifest on its face that OWCP
committed an error.12
To show clear evidence of error, the evidence submitted must not only be of sufficient
probative value to create a conflicting medical opinion or establish a clear procedural error, but
must be of sufficient probative value to shift the weight of the evidence in favor of the claimant
and raise a substantial question as to the correctness of OWCP’s decision.13 Evidence that does
not raise a substantial question concerning the correctness of OWCP’s decision is insufficient to
establish clear evidence of error.14 It is not enough merely to show that the evidence could be
construed so as to produce a contrary conclusion.15 A determination of whether the claimant has
established clear evidence of error entails a limited review of how the evidence submitted with
the reconsideration request bears on the evidence previously of record.16
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that the March 12, 2014 OWCP decision did not properly address the
issue and evidence of record. OWCP does not acknowledge that appellant had previously
submitted the October 20, 2012 reconsideration request prior to January 9, 2014. The decision
only focused on the January 9, 2014 resubmission of the reconsideration request. As to
timeliness, the Board notes that the reconsideration request was established as received by iFECS
on November 15, 2012. Although receipt in iFECS is considered the date of receipt under
OWCP procedures for decisions after August 29, 2011,17 the Board notes that this document
itself contains a stamp that purports to offer an earlier date of receipt on November 7, 2012.
Appellant had one year from November 10, 2011 to timely request reconsideration; therefore the

9

Under section 8128 of FECA, “[t]he Secretary of Labor may review an award for or against payment of
compensation at any time on his own motion or on application.”
10

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

11

20 C.F.R. § 10.607 (2012).

12

D.O., Docket No. 08-1057 (issued June 23, 2009); Robert F. Stone, 57 ECAB 292 (2005).

13

Annie L. Billingsley, 50 ECAB 210 (1998).

14

Jimmy L. Day, 48 ECAB 652 (1997).

15

Id.

16

K.N., Docket No. 13-911 (issued August 21, 2013); J.S., Docket No. 10-385 (issued September 15, 2010).

17

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Reconsiderations, Chapter 2.1602.4(b) (October 2011).

3

earlier date would render the reconsideration request timely.18 OWCP made no findings as to
whether the stamp on the document represents an OWCP date stamp of receipt or otherwise
address the issue of timeliness with respect to the submission of the original reconsideration
request. On return of the case record OWCP should make proper findings on the issue of
timeliness.
Once a proper determination is made as to timeliness, OWCP should address the
evidence that was submitted with the reconsideration request in accord with the appropriate
standard of review. The March 12, 2014 decision refers only to the document received on
January 9, 2014. Appellant had submitted additional evidence with the initial reconsideration
request. Even if the reconsideration request was untimely, OWCP must properly review all the
evidence to determine if the clear evidence of error standard has been met in this case. As noted
above, the clear evidence of error standard requires a determination of how the evidence
submitted with the reconsideration request bears on the evidence previously of record.
A claimant is entitled to a proper decision with findings of fact and a statement of
reasons.19 Since the March 12, 2014 decision fails to make proper findings with respect to the
reconsideration request and the evidence submitted, the case will be remanded to OWCP. After
such further development as OWCP deems necessary, it should issue an appropriate decision.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP did not properly adjudicate the issues and the case is
remanded for proper findings with respect to the request for reconsideration.

18

November 10, 2012 was a Saturday, so appellant had until Monday, November 12, 2012 to timely request
reconsideration. See P.R., Docket No. 14-300 (issued May 12, 2014).
19

20 C.F.R. § 10.126.

4

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated March 12, 2014 is set aside and the case remanded for further
action consistent with this decision of the Board.
Issued: October 20, 2014
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
J.P., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL
CENTER, Sheridan, WY, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 17-1024
Issued: December 27, 2017

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 10, 2017 appellant filed a timely appeal from a February 17, 2017 nonmerit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). As more than 180 days
elapsed from the last merit decision, dated June 1, 2015, to the filing of this appeal, pursuant to
the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the
Board lacks jurisdiction over the merits of the claim.
ISSUE
The issue is whether OWCP properly determined that appellant’s request for
reconsideration was untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

FACTUAL HISTORY
This case has previously been before the Board. The facts and circumstances outlined in
the Board’s prior decision are incorporated herein by reference.2 The relevant facts are set forth
below.
OWCP accepted that on or before September 28, 1990 appellant, then a 49-year-old
engineering technician, experienced a six-year pattern of supervisory harassment, causing
dysthymic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and major depression, recurrent
episode, severe, without mention of psychotic behavior. It accepted the following incidents as
factual and in the performance of duty: in August 1989, Supervisor D.M. assigned appellant
work, but Supervisor W.S. instructed shop workers not to cooperate with appellant; on August 3,
1989 Supervisor W.S. kicked appellant’s chair out from under him; on September 13, 1989
Supervisor W.S. became physically abusive; on September 23, 1989 appellant was required to
remove asbestos without necessary training in remediation or use of a respirator; on
September 26, 1990 Supervisor W.S. called managers and told them to discourage appellant
from taking breaks in the shop area; and on September 28, 1990 Supervisor D.M. screamed at
appellant while appellant was on the telephone to the central office obtaining job specifications.3
Appellant stopped work on September 28, 1990 and returned to work in a light-duty position on
October 31, 1990.
Dr. Hugh K. Batty, an attending internist, provided an October 26, 1990 report
diagnosing reactive depression due to occupational stress. He found appellant totally disabled
from work for the period September 28 to October 22, 1990.
On June 5, 1991 appellant filed a claim for recurrence of disability (Form CA-2a)
alleging a recurrence of psychiatric symptoms related to the accepted September 28, 1990 work
injury and that his recurrence required his hospitalization from May 1 to 31, 1991. He did not
return to work.
2

OWCP initially denied the claim in a November 21, 1990 decision, based on a lack of factual evidence
supporting any compensable employment factors. After a request for reconsideration, it denied modification in a
February 21, 1991 decision finding that the medical evidence did not establish a work-related condition. Appellant
again requested reconsideration on July 29, 1991, denied by OWCP in a September 26, 1991 decision. He appealed
to the Board. By Order Remanding Case issued August 24, 1992, the Board set aside OWCP’s February 21 and
September 26, 1991 decisions, finding that OWCP did not make sufficient findings of fact prior to analyzing the
medical evidence. Docket No. 92-0275. The Board remanded the case to OWCP for additional development and
issuance of a new decision.
3

OWCP found that certain occupational incidents occurred but were not within the performance of duty. These
included alcohol use at the employing establishment by coworkers and managers; denial of a promotion; a question
about the use of annual or sick leave; a performance discussion; denial of asbestos management training; a number
of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) claims; revision of performance standards; prank telephone calls; matters
involving Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); encountering coworkers in public places outside
of work; removal of personal property from appellant’s prior duty station; and being pressured to take a GS-3
position. OWCP further found that certain claimed matters did not occur. These included attacks on appellant’s
family; an incident regarding sprinkler head specifications; Supervisor W.S. accusing appellant of costing him a
shop position so appellant could be hired; a discussion with a union representative and supervisor regarding job
assignments; and Supervisor D.M. screamed at him for reaching for a reference book.

2

On February 18, 1993 OWCP obtained a second opinion from Dr. David Schaffer, a
Board-certified psychiatrist, who diagnosed major depression, single episode, due to the accepted
work factors. Dr. Schaffer opined that appellant was temporarily unable to work eight hours a
day.4
Appellant elected FECA benefits on May 14, 1993, effective July 15, 1991. OWCP paid
him wage-loss compensation on the periodic roll, effective May 30, 1993.5
Dr. Carlos Guerra, Jr., an attending Board-certified psychiatrist, diagnosed appellant with
severe major depression on September 6, 1993 and had him hospitalized for treatment. On
September 20, 1993 Dr. Thomas Brandon, an attending Board-certified psychiatrist, diagnosed
major depression, severe, single episode, and mixed personality disorder with obsessive,
paranoid, and schizoid features.
Dr. Stephen J. Rojcewicz, an attending Board-certified psychiatrist, opined on March 1,
1995 that appellant’s major depression was due to the accepted work factors. He noted that
appellant experienced traumatic hearing loss at age 17 when he was physically assaulted while
serving in the U.S. Marine Corps.
The employing establishment terminated appellant in early 1996.
Dr. Arthur W. Peskind, an attending licensed clinical psychologist, followed appellant
from December 1997 through July 2001. He diagnosed PTSD and major depressive disorder
related to a 1958 assault while appellant was serving in the U.S. Marine Corps. Appellant
asserted that a sergeant instructed the unit to wrap him in a blanket, throw him to the floor, and
then kick and strike him.
Dr. Laura Dahmer-White, an attending clinical psychologist, treated appellant beginning
on March 23, 1998. She diagnosed recurrent, severe, major depressive disorder, cognitive
disorder not otherwise specified, paranoid personality disorder, and possible personality changes
due to aggressive head trauma from the 1958 assault. Dr. Dahmer-White noted that
psychological test results demonstrated cognitive and attention deficits precluding appellant from
participating in vocational training. Dr. Randall E. Currier, an attending Board-certified family
practitioner, diagnosed anxiety and depression on June 2, 2003.
On September 7, 2004 OWCP obtained a second opinion from Dr. Sharon K. Melnick, a
Board-certified psychiatrist. Dr. Melnick reviewed the medical record and a statement of
4

Appellant participated in vocational rehabilitation from September 1993 through 1999, including taking
community college courses in building design technology. The effort did not result in reemployment.
5

In a May 6, 1994 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s request to expand his claim to accept hypertension and an
enlarged heart. It found that he had submitted insufficient medical evidence to establish causal relationship. After
the May 6, 1994 decision, appellant appealed to the Board. In an April 24, 1995 order, the Board dismissed the
appeal at appellant’s request as he wished to submit additional evidence and a request for reconsideration to OWCP.
Order Dismissing Appeal, Docket No. 95-1551. By decisions dated December 13, 1994 and April 3, 1997, OWCP
denied modification of its prior decision. It found that appellant submitted insufficient medical evidence to establish
causal relationship.

3

accepted facts (SOAF). She opined that appellant was totally and permanently disabled for work
due to major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, PTSD, delusional disorder, a cognitive
disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), paranoid personality disorder, and possible
dementia. Dr. Melnick explained that the accepted work factors triggered PTSD, and that the
accepted supervisory confrontations were sufficient to precipitate delusional disorder, major
depressive disorder, and PTSD.
In December 2, 2004 and January 15, 2005 reports, Dr. James F. Harper, an attending
licensed clinical psychologist, opined that the 1958 assault caused PTSD, while appellant’s
major depressive disorder was caused by the accepted work factors.
OWCP found a conflict of medical opinion between Dr. Harper, for appellant, and
Dr. Melnick, for the government, regarding the origin of appellant’s depression, PTSD, and other
psychiatric conditions. To resolve the conflict, OWCP selected Dr. Bazil Freedman, a Boardcertified psychiatrist. Dr. Freedman submitted a May 11, 2005 report, reviewing the medical
record and SOAF. He opined that the accepted work factors caused appellant’s PTSD, and
caused a recurrence of his major depressive disorder and dysthymic disorder. OWCP continued
to pay appellant compensation for total disability on the periodic roll. Appellant remained under
treatment.
Dr. David Powley, an attending osteopathic physician Board-certified in internal
medicine, submitted July 22, 2011 and February 19, 2013 reports, finding appellant permanently
and totally disabled due to PTSD, depression, and dysthymic disorder. He attributed these
conditions to the accepted September 28, 1990 work incident.
On June 12, 2013 OWCP obtained a second opinion from Dr. Landy E. Sparr, a Boardcertified psychiatrist. Dr. Sparr reviewed the medical record and a SOAF. On examination and
testing he observed difficulties with memory, severe anxiety, and moderately-severe depression.
Dr. Sparr diagnosed recurrent major depressive disorder, and PTSD by history. He opined that
appellant’s depression and PTSD were no longer work related, but due to deteriorating physical
health, advancing age, and an underlying mood disorder. Dr. Sparr noted that appellant was
permanently and totally disabled due to multiple idiopathic medical issues and depression. He
provided an October 29, 2013 addendum report, clarifying that appellant no longer had
“dysthymic disorder, which is moderate depression, but instead suffers from a depressive
disorder, which is now listed as major depression.” Dr. Sparr emphasized that the accepted work
factors had “no current etiologic significance.”
By notice of proposed termination dated March 6, 2014, OWCP notified appellant of its
proposal to terminate his wage-loss compensation and medical benefits, based on Dr. Sparr’s
opinion that the accepted emotional conditions had ceased without residuals. It afforded him 30
days to submit additional evidence or argument. Appellant did not submit additional evidence.
By decision dated April 22, 2014, OWCP finalized its termination of appellant’s wageloss compensation and medical benefits effective May 4, 2014, based on Dr. Sparr’s opinion as
the weight of the medical evidence.

4

In an August 6, 2014 letter, received on August 14, 2014, appellant, through his thencounsel,6 requested reconsideration. He asserted that new medical evidence from Dr. Jennifer R.
Rossi, a licensed clinical psychologist, established that the accepted conditions remained active
and disabling.
In a July 3, 2014 report, Dr. Rossi reviewed medical records and related appellant’s
account of workplace events. On examination she observed “a large variety of depressive
features” of a severe and persistent nature. Dr. Rossi diagnosed major depressive disorder,
recurrent, moderate, and PTSD. She attributed appellant’s major depressive disorder to “work
stress” at the employing establishment.
By decision dated June 1, 2015, OWCP denied modification, finding that Dr. Rossi’s
opinion was insufficient to outweigh or create a conflict with that of Dr. Sparr, as she did not use
the SOAF as a framework for her opinion.
In November 10 and 18, 2016 letters, appellant contended that OWCP failed to respond
to a December 10, 2015 request for reconsideration. He noted that he had telephoned OWCP in
September 2016 and was informed that OWCP had not received a request for reconsideration or
a notice of legal representation.
In documents received by OWCP on November 3 and 21, 2016, appellant requested
reconsideration of OWCP’s June 1, 2015 decision. He also provided a November 15, 2016 letter
and affidavit from his then-counsel contending that he mailed a request for reconsideration on
December 10, 2015. Counsel also provided a copy of a December 10, 2015 request for
reconsideration, and correspondence to and from appellant’s elected representative regarding the
December 10, 2015 reconsideration request. Additionally, he submitted new medical evidence.
In an undated report of September 28 and October 26, 2015 evaluations, Dr. Robert E.
Schneider, an attending licensed clinical psychologist, reviewed medical records and related
appellant’s account of occupational and nonoccupational stressors. He opined that Dr. Sparr
provided no rationale explaining how and why the accepted conditions had ceased, and were
subsequently related to other factors. Dr. Schneider indicated that he reviewed the SOAF, but
that “the events that occurred at [the employing establishment] ha[d] become amalgamated in
[appellant’s] mind as a hostile work environment that he thought was threatening and abusive. It
[was] impossible … to separate out the three accepted facts” from the remainder of appellant’s
experiences. However, Dr. Schneider explained that it was “medically reasonable to accept that
the three accepted facts represent the experience that he had during his working years at [the
employing establishment] and precipitated his major depressive disorder, dysthymia and
rekindled the nascent PTSD that had been sub-clinical to that point.” He diagnosed major
depressive disorder, PTSD, and status post-traumatic brain injury with “subtle neurocognitive
problems” attributable to the 1958 assault while in the Marine Corps.
In a February 17, 2017 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s reconsideration request,
finding that it was untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error. It explained
that his reconsideration request of the June 1, 2015 merit decision was not received within one
6

Counsel withdrew from representation, effective August 9, 2014.

5

year of that decision. OWCP further found that appellant’s reconsideration request and evidence
submitted failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error in OWCP’s June 1, 2015 decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
To be entitled to a merit review of an OWCP decision denying or terminating a benefit, a
claimant’s application for review must be received within one year of the date of that decision.7
The Board has found that the imposition of the one-year limitation does not constitute an abuse
of the discretionary authority granted OWCP under section 8128(a) of FECA.8 The one-year
period begins on the next day after the date of the contested decision. For merit decisions issued
on or after August 29, 2011, a request for reconsideration must be received by OWCP within one
year of OWCP’s decision for which review is sought.9 Timeliness is determined by the
document receipt date of the request for reconsideration as indicated by the received date in the
integrated Federal Employees’ Compensation System (iFECS).10
OWCP, however, may not deny an application for review solely on the grounds that the
application was not timely filed. When an application for review is untimely filed, it must
nevertheless undertake a limited review to determine whether the application establishes clear
evidence of error.11 OWCP regulations and procedures provide that OWCP will reopen a
claimant’s case for merit review, notwithstanding the one-year filing limitation set forth in 20
C.F.R. § 10.607(a), if the claimant’s application for review shows clear evidence of error on the
part of OWCP.
To establish clear evidence of error, a claimant must submit evidence relevant to the issue
which was decided by OWCP.12 The evidence must be positive, precise and explicit and must
manifest on its face that OWCP committed an error.13 Evidence which does not raise a
substantial question concerning the correctness of OWCP’s decision is insufficient to establish
clear evidence of error.14 It is not enough merely to show that the evidence could be construed
as to produce a contrary conclusion.15 This entails a limited review by OWCP of how the

7

20 C.F.R. § 10.607(a).

8

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a); Leon D. Faidley, Jr., 41 ECAB 104, 111 (1989).

9

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Reconsiderations, Chapter 2.1602.4 (February 2016).

10

Id. at Chapter 2.1602.4b.

11

See 20 C.F.R. § 10.607(b); Charles J. Prudencio, 41 ECAB 499, 501-02 (1990).

12

See Dean D. Beets, 43 ECAB 1153, 1157-58 (1992).

13

See Leona N. Travis, 43 ECAB 227, 240 (1991).

14

See Jesus D. Sanchez, 41 ECAB 964, 968 (1990).

15

See supra note 13.

6

evidence submitted with the reconsideration request bears on the evidence previously of record
and whether the new evidence demonstrates clear error on the part of OWCP.16
The Board makes an independent determination as to whether a claimant has submitted
clear evidence of error on the part of OWCP such that it abused its discretion in denying merit
review in the face of such evidence.17 To show clear evidence of error, the evidence submitted
must not only be of sufficient probative value to create a conflict in medical opinion or establish
a clear procedural error, but must be sufficient probative value to prima facie shift the weight of
the evidence in favor of the claimant and raise a substantial question as to the correctness of
OWCP’s decision.
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that, in its February 17, 2017 decision, OWCP properly determined that
appellant failed to file a timely application for review. It rendered its most recent merit decision
with regard to the termination of all compensation benefits on June 1, 2015. Appellant requested
reconsideration by letter received by OWCP on November 3, 2016.
With his request for reconsideration, appellant provided a November 15, 2016 letter and
affidavit, when his then-counsel contended that he had timely requested reconsideration on
December 10, 2015. He made similar contentions in his November 21, 2016 letter and in the
correspondence to and from his elected representative. OWCP’s procedures provide that
timeliness is determined by the document receipt date of the request for reconsideration as
indicated by the received date in the iFECS systems.18 In this instance, the iFECS record reflects
that OWCP first received appellant’s request for reconsideration on November 3, 2016.
OWCP denied the request by February 17, 2017 decision, finding that it was untimely
filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error. As the reconsideration request was
untimely filed, it must now be determined whether the request demonstrated clear evidence of
error in OWCP’s June 1, 2015 decision.
Appellant also submitted a new medical report from Dr. Schneider, an attending licensed
clinical psychologist, generally supporting a continued causal relationship between the accepted
work factors and the accepted psychiatric conditions. However, even a detailed, wellrationalized medical report which, if submitted before the denial was issued, would have created
a conflict in medical evidence requiring further development is insufficient to demonstrate clear
evidence of error.19
The Board finds that the additional evidence submitted does not demonstrate clear
evidence of error. Appellant has not provided argument or evidence of sufficient probative value
16

See Nelson T. Thompson, 43 ECAB 919, 922 (1992).

17

B.L., Docket No. 17-1452 (issued October 25, 2017).

18

Supra note 10.

19

See G.M., Docket No. 17-0149 (issued May 11, 2017).

7

to shift the weight of the evidence in his favor and raise a substantial question as to the
correctness of OWCP’s June 1, 2015 merit decision. Consequently, OWCP properly denied
appellant’s reconsideration request as his request does not demonstrate clear evidence of error.
On appeal appellant contends that his former attorney timely requested reconsideration of
OWCP’s June 1, 2015 decision. As noted, the record establishes that the reconsideration request
was not received by OWCP until November 3, 2016. Appellant also argued that Dr. Schneider’s
report was sufficient to create a conflict with that of Dr. Sparr. As explained above, medical
evidence sufficient to create a conflict if it were received prior to the termination is insufficient
to demonstrate clear evidence of error.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant’s request for
reconsideration was untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated February 17, 2017 is affirmed.
Issued: December 27, 2017
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8