United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
P.H., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
North Brookfield, MA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 18-1806
Issued: October 10, 2019

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 27, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a June 29, 2018 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees ’
Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over
the merits of this case.2
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether appellant has received an overpayment of compensation in the
amount of $106,475.38 because she concurrently received Social Security Administration (SSA)
age-based benefits while also receiving FECA benefits for the period December 1, 2005 through
1
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

The Board notes that, following the June 29, 2018 decision, OWCP received additional evidence. However, the
Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record that
was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the Board
for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this additional
evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.

March 31, 2018; (2) whether OWCP properly denied waiver of recovery of the overpayment; and
(3) whether it properly required recovery of the overpayment by deducting $1,000.00 every 28
days from appellant’s continuing compensation payments.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On April 17, 1991 appellant, then a 54-year-old rural mail carrier, filed an occupational
disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she sustained numbness in her hands and arms due to
factors of her federal employment. She noted that she first became aware of her condition on
January 22, 1988 and related it to her federal employment on January 22, 1990. OWCP accepted
the claim for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, traumatic left thumb arthritis, and bilateral trigger
finger. It paid appellant wage-loss compensation on the periodic rolls based upon her loss of wageearning capacity as of February 14, 1996. Appellant retired from the employing establishment on
December 31, 2006.
An OWCP telephone memorandum (Form CA-110) dated July 28, 2006 noted that
appellant called OWCP to discuss her FECA payments as she had received a lump-sum payment
from SSA in the amount of $7,942.00 for benefits due from December 2005 until July 2006.
Appellant further noted that she would receive $1,143.00 in SSA benefits each month, and
questioned whether her FECA compensation would be affected. OWCP requested that she
forward the SSA documentation.
On August 11, 2006 appellant forwarded to OWCP a July 23, 2006 letter from SSA that
advised her that she was entitled to monthly age-related benefits beginning December 2005.
In a form dated September 6, 2007, SSA advised OWCP that appellant had concurrently
received FECA and SSA retirement benefits based upon the Federal Employees Retirement
System (FERS) contributions as of December 2005. It provided the amounts that she had received
in retirement benefits, including the amount earned through FERS and the hypothetical amount
that she would have received without FERS. With FERS, effective December 1, 2005, appellant
was entitled to a monthly SSA rate of $1,084.80, without FERS $584.30; effective January 1, 2006
with FERS $1,143.60, without FERS $584.30; effective December 1, 2006 with FERS $1,181.30,
without FERS $603.50.
In a form dated March 23, 2018, SSA advised OWCP that appellant had concurrently
received FECA benefits and SSA age-based benefits beginning December 1, 2005. It provided
the amount that she had received in retirement benefits, including the amount earned through FERS
contributions and the hypothetical amount that she would have received without FERS. Including
FERS, appellant was entitled to a monthly SSA rate of $1,084.80, effective December 1, 2005;
$1,143.60, effective January 1, 2006; $1,181.30, effective December 1, 2006; $1,189.90, effective
January 1, 2017; $1,217.30, effective December 1, 2007; $1,287.80, effective December 1, 2008;
$1,287.80, effective December 1, 2009; $1,287.80, effective December 1, 2010; $1,334.10,
effective December 1, 2011; $1,356.70, effective December 1, 2012; $1,377.10, effective
December 1, 2013; $1,400.40 effective December 1, 2014; $1,400.40 effective December 1, 2015;
$1,404.50, effective December 1, 2016; and $1,432.50, effective December 1, 2017.

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SSA further advised that, without FERS, appellant would have been entitled to a monthly
SSA rate of $521.20, effective December 1, 2005; $521.20, effective January 1, 2006; $538.30,
effective December 1, 2006; $538.30, effective January 1, 2017; $550.60, effective December 1,
2007; $582.50, effective December 1, 2008; $582.50, effective December 1, 2009; $582.50,
effective December 1, 2010; $603.40, effective December 1, 2011; $613.60 ,effective
December 1, 2012; $622.80, effective December 1, 2013; $633.30, effective December 1, 2014;
$633.30, effective December 1, 2015; $635.10, effective December 1, 2016; and $647.80,
effective December 1, 2017.
OWCP completed an SSA offset calculation form on April 3, 2018. It determined the 28day FERS SSA offset amount for the days in each period December 1, 2005 through March 31,
2018, which totaled $106,475.38.
OWCP, in an April 11, 2018 letter, adjusted appellant’s compensation benefits to offset the
portion of her SSA retirement benefits attributable to her federal service on account of age. It
informed her that she would receive net compensation of $1,749.34 every 28 days beginning
April 28, 2018.3
In a preliminary determination dated May 2, 2018, OWCP notified appellant that she had
received an overpayment of compensation in the amount of $106,475.38 because it had failed to
reduce her wage-loss compensation benefits for the period December 1, 2005 through March 31,
2018 by the portion of her SSA benefits that were attributable to her federal service. It calculated
the overpayment amount by determining the difference between her SSA amount with and without
FERS for each period and adding these amounts to find a total overpayment of $106,475.38.
OWCP further advised appellant of its preliminary determination that she was without fault in the
creation of the overpayment. It requested that she complete an enclosed overpayment recovery
questionnaire (Form OWCP-20) and submit supporting financial documentation. Additiona lly,
OWCP notified appellant that, within 30 days of the date of the letter, she could request a
telephonic hearing, a final decision based on the written evidence, or a prerecoupment hearing.
Appellant, on May 29, 2018, requested that OWCP make a decision based on the written
record and requested waiver of recovery of the overpayment. In an accompanying overpayment
recovery questionnaire (Form OWCP-20), she advised that she had monthly income of $3,047.00
and monthly expenses of $1,851.00. Appellant also related that she had assets of $48,500.00. No
evidence documenting her expenses was provided. Appellant indicated that she was 81 years old
with many medical issues and that she was living off of her social security and FECA
compensation with no other income. She further noted that she was in no position to repay this
compensation error which had occurred through no fault of her own.
By decision dated June 29, 2018, OWCP finalized its preliminary overpayment
determination finding that appellant had received an overpayment of compensation in the amount
of $106,475.38 for the period December 1, 2005 through March 31, 2018, because it failed to
offset her compensation payments by the portion of her SSA age-related benefits that were
attributable to her federal service. It determined that she was without fault in the creation of the
overpayment, but denied waiver of recovery of the overpayment of compensation based on the
3

This covered the compensation period of April 1 through 28, 2018.

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financial information provided. OWCP found that it would recover the overpayment by deducting
$1,000.00, every 28 days, from appellant’s continuing compensation payments.
LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1
Section 8102(a) of FECA provides that the United States shall pay compensation for the
disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the
performance of duty. 4 Section 8116 limits the right of an employee to receive compensation.
While an employee is receiving compensation, he or she may not receive salary, pay, or
remuneration of any type from the United States. 5
Section 10.421(d) of OWCP’s implementing regulations requires that it reduce the amount
of compensation by the amount of any SSA benefits that are attributable to the federal service of
the employee.6 FECA Bulletin No. 97-09 states that FECA benefits have to be adjusted for the
FERS portion of SSA benefits because the portion of the SSA benefit earned as a federal employee
is part of the FERS retirement package, and the receipt of FECA benefits and federal retirement
concurrently is a prohibited dual benefit. 7
Section 404.310 of SSA regulations provides that entitlement to SSA benefits begins at 62
years of age.8 Section 404.409 of SSA regulations provides that for individuals born from 1943
to 1954, full retirement age is 66 years. 9
OWCP s procedures provide that, once an overpayment is identified, it is responsible for
determining whether the claimant was with fault or without fault, issuing a preliminary finding,
and unless a hearing is requested, OWCP is responsible for issuing a final decision. 10 These
procedures note that, if the claimant is determined to be without fault, a Form CA-2202
(preliminary finding notice) must be released (along with a Form OWCP-20) within 30 days of
the date the overpayment is identified. Both, the reason that the overpayment occurred and the
reason for the finding of without fault must be clearly stated. A Form CA-2202 informs the
claimant of the right to submit evidence and the right to a prerecoupment hearing on the issue of:
(a) fact and amount of overpayment; and (b) waiver. Along with the Form CA-2202, OWCP
should provide a clearly written statement explaining how the overpayment was created.

4

5 U.S.C. § 8102(a).

5

Id. at § 8116.

6

20 C.F.R. § 10.421(d); see S.M., Docket No. 17-1802 (issued August 20, 2018).

7
FECA Bulletin No. 97-09 (issued February 3, 1997); see also A.C., Docket No. 18-1550 (issued February 21,
2019); N.B., Docket No. 18-0795 (issued January 4, 2019).
8

20 C.F.R. § 404.310.

9

Id. at § 404.409.

10
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 6 -- Debt Management, Initial Overpayment Actions, Chapter
6.200.4(a)(2) (May 2004).

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ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1
The Board finds that OWCP improperly determined that appellant received an
overpayment of compensation in the amount of $106,475.38 for the period December 1, 2005
through March 31, 2018.
Beginning December 1, 2005, appellant received age-related retirement benefits from
SSA, while she continued to receive FECA wage-loss compensation. As noted, a claimant cannot
receive concurrent compensation for wage loss and SSA retirement benefits attributable to federal
service for the same period. 11
The Board finds however that OWCP failed to follow its procedures in issuing the June 29,
2018 overpayment decision.12 As noted, OWCP procedures provide that a Form CA-2202
(preliminary finding notice) must be released along with an OWCP-20 within 30 days of the date
the overpayment is identified.13
In this case, OWCP was first formally placed on notice that appellant was receiving SSA
age-based benefits by form dated September 6, 2007. Therein SSA advised OWCP that she had
concurrently received FECA and SSA age-based benefits based on FERS contributions as of
December 2005. It again identified the overpayment of compensation for OWCP on March 23,
2018, by advising OWCP that appellant had concurrently received FECA benefits and SSA
benefits based on her FERS contributions as of December 1, 2005. However, OWCP did not issue
a preliminary notice regarding the overpayment until May 2, 2018. This preliminary notice was
therefore not issued within 30 days after the overpayment was identified.
Timely, issuance of a preliminary overpayment notice was necessary because, as the facts
of this case demonstrate, payment of improper FECA compensation benefits continued for an
extended period of time because OWCP took no action and appellant accrued a large sum of
overpayment. Once OWCP learned of the commencement date of SSA age-based benefits which
ran concurrently with FECA compensation benefits, it should have proceeded to issue a
preliminary notice of overpayment. In this case, OWCP’s continued payment of improper amounts
of wage-loss compensation, after notice by SSA that appellant was receiving SSA age-based
benefits, led to an overpayment exceeding $100,000.00.
The Board thus finds that OWCP failed to follow its established procedures in determining
that appellant received an overpayment of compensation in the amount of $106,475.38 during the
period December 1, 2005 through March 23, 2018.14

11

See supra note 7; D.M., Docket No. 17-0983 (issued August 3, 2018).

12

P.H., Docket No. 18-1539 (issued August 2, 2019).

13

Supra note 10.

14
Based on the Board’s disposition of whether an overpayment of compensation was created, the issues of waiver
and recovery are moot. See C.C., Docket No. 16-1190 (issued May 12, 2017).

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CONCLUSION
The Board finds that OWCP failed to follow its established procedures in determining that
appellant received an overpayment of compensation in the amount of $106,475.38 for the period
December 1, 2005 through March 23, 2018.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 29, 2018 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is reversed.
Issued: October 10, 2019
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
D.S., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Rockwall, TX, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 11-2018
Issued: May 7, 2012

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On September 8, 2011 appellant filed a timely appeal from an August 15, 2011 merit
decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act1 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has
jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained a
traumatic injury in the performance of duty on June 25, 2011.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On June 27, 2011 appellant, then a 49-year-old rural carrier, filed a traumatic injury claim
alleging that she sustained lower back and left leg symptoms on June 25, 2011 due to excessive
lifting, twisting and turning at the employing establishment’s facility as well as pulling trays
1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

while delivering mail on her motorized route. She stopped work on June 28, 2011 and did not
return. The employing establishment controverted the claim, asserting that appellant neither
reported an injury nor sought medical treatment immediately and that there were no eyewitnesses
supporting her account.
In a work status report dated July 6, 2011, Dr. Les T. Sandknop, an osteopath specializing
in family medicine, related that appellant injured herself on June 26, 2011 as a result of twisting,
turning and lifting at work. He diagnosed lumbar pain and placed her off duty for the period
June 27 to July 13, 2011. June 27 and July 6, 2011 notes signed by a physician assistant also
diagnosed lumbar strain.
A July 7, 2011 physical therapy evaluation report signed by a physical therapist and a
physician assistant stated that appellant was delivering mail on June 26, 2011 when she
experienced lower back and left lower extremity pain. On physical examination, she exhibited
straightening cervical and lumbar lordosis, thoracic kyphosis, forward head posture, rounded
shoulders, restricted range of motion (ROM) of the trunk, diminished left lower extremity
muscle strength and sensation to light touch, left foot tenderness to palpation and a positive left
straight leg raise test. Appellant was diagnosed with lumbar strain and pain.
OWCP informed appellant in a July 11, 2011 letter that additional evidence was needed
to establish her claim. It gave her 30 days to submit a factual statement detailing the June 25,
2011 employment incident and a medical report from a physician explaining how this alleged
event caused or contributed to a lower back and left leg condition.
Appellant submitted medical evidence. In a June 27, 2011 duty status report,
Dr. Sandknop noted her belief that “she hurt her back lifting, twisting [and] turning in her
vehicle” in the performance of duty on June 25, 2011. He diagnosed lumbar strain and left leg
pain and scheduled July 7, 2011 as the return-to-work date.2 In attending physician’s reports
dated June 28, 2011, Dr. Sandknop specified that appellant injured her back by twisting, turning
and lifting at work on June 27, 2011. He diagnosed lumbar sprain and checked a “yes” box
indicating that the condition was causally related to employment activity. In July 13 and 27,
2011 work status reports, Dr. Sandknop remarked that appellant twisted, turned and lifted on
June 26, 2011. He diagnosed lumbar pain and placed her off duty for the period July 13 to
August 5, 2011.
Progress notes from the physician assistant dated June 27, July 13 and 27, 2011
diagnosed lumbar strain and pain and left foot numbness.
Appellant clarified in a July 13, 2011 statement that she initially experienced mild lower
back pain, which later worsened and radiated to the left leg.
By decision dated August 15, 2011, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that she did
not sufficiently establish that a June 25, 2011 employment incident occurred as alleged.

2

Another June 27, 2011 note from Dr. Sandknop also diagnosed lumbar pain.

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LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking compensation under FECA has the burden of establishing the
essential elements of her claim by the weight of reliable, probative and substantial evidence,3
including that she is an “employee” within the meaning of FECA and that she filed her claim
within the applicable time limitation.4 The employee must also establish that she sustained an
injury in the performance of duty as alleged and that her disability for work, if any, was causally
related to the employment injury.5
To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the
performance of duty, it first must be determined whether fact of injury has been established.
There are two components involved in establishing fact of injury. First, the employee must
submit sufficient evidence to establish that she actually experienced the employment incident at
the time, place and in the manner alleged. Second, the employee must submit evidence, in the
form of medical evidence, to establish that the employment incident caused a personal injury.6
An employee’s statement that an injury occurred at a given time and in a given manner is
of great probative value and will stand unless refuted by strong or persuasive evidence.7
Moreover, an injury does not have to be confirmed by eyewitnesses. The employee’s statement,
however, must be consistent with the surrounding facts and circumstances and her subsequent
course of action. An employee has not met her burden in establishing the occurrence of an injury
when there are such inconsistencies in the evidence as to cast serious doubt upon the validity of
the claim. Circumstances such as late notification of injury, lack of confirmation of injury,
continuing to work without apparent difficulty following the alleged injury and failure to obtain
medical treatment may, if otherwise unexplained, cast doubt on an employee’s statement in
determining whether a prima facie case has been established.8
Causal relationship is a medical issue and the evidence generally required to establish
causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence. Rationalized medical opinion
evidence is evidence which includes a physician’s opinion on the issue of whether there is a
causal relationship between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and the implicated employment
factors. The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical
background, must be one of reasonable medical certainty and must be supported by medical
rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the
specific employment factors identified by the claimant.9
3

J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 57 (1968).

4

R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008).

5

Id.; Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143, 1145 (1989).

6

T.H., 59 ECAB 388 (2008).

7

R.T., Docket No. 08-408 (issued December 16, 2008); Gregory J. Reser, 57 ECAB 277 (2005).

8

Betty J. Smith, 54 ECAB 174 (2002).

9

I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).

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ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant sufficiently established that she lifted, twisted and turned
at work and pulled trays on her delivery route on June 25, 2011. The employing establishment
did not dispute her account that she performed these activities in the Form CA-1. Instead, it
controverted the traumatic injury claim on the basis that appellant neither reported an injury nor
sought medical treatment promptly and that there were no eyewitnesses supporting her account.
The alleged date of appellant’s injury June 25, 2011 was a Saturday. The case record shows,
however, that she filed her claim and first received medical treatment two days later on Monday
June 27, 2011. The fact that appellant took no action on Sunday, June 26, 2011 is not fatal to her
claim. She stopped work on June 28, 2011 and was advised to remain off duty through
August 5, 2011 due to a lumbar condition. The Board finds that appellant established that the
June 25, 2011 employment incident occurred as alleged.
The Board finds that appellant did not establish her traumatic injury claim because the
medical evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that June 25, 2011 employment incident
caused or contributed to a lower back and left leg condition. In a June 27, 2011 duty status
report, Dr. Sandknop appears to be merely relating her belief that “she hurt her back lifting,
twisting [and] turning in her vehicle” in the performance of duty on June 25, 2011.10 To the
extent that this represents his own opinion on causal relationship, he did not explain how this
employment incident pathophysiologically caused or contributed to appellant’s lumbar strain and
left leg pain.11 In addition, Dr. Sandknop’s work status and attending physician’s reports for the
period June 28 to July 27, 2011 were of limited probative value because they identified the date
of injury as either June 26 or 27, 2011.12
The remaining medical evidence of record lacked probative value. A medical issue such
as causal relationship can only be resolved through the submission of probative medical evidence
from a physician.13 Because neither a physical therapist nor a physician assistant is a
“physician” as defined under FECA,14 the documents signed by these health care professionals
cannot constitute competent medical evidence. In the absence of rationalized medical opinion
evidence, appellant failed to meet her burden.

10

See P.K., Docket No. 08-2551 (issued June 2, 2009) (an award of compensation may not be based on a
claimant’s belief of causal relationship).
11

Joan R. Donovan, 54 ECAB 615, 621 (2003); Ern Reynolds, 45 ECAB 690, 696 (1994).

12

M.W., 57 ECAB 710 (2006); James A. Wyrick, 31 ECAB 1805 (1980) (medical opinions based on an
incomplete or inaccurate history are of diminished probative value). The Board points out that none of these reports
offered fortifying medical rationale. See George Randolph Taylor, 6 ECAB 986, 988 (1954).
13

See Gloria J. McPherson, 51 ECAB 441 (2000); Charley V.B. Harley, 2 ECAB 208, 211 (1949) (medical
opinion, in general, can only be given by a qualified physician).
14

5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238, 242 (2005) (nurses and physician assistants); Jennifer L.
Sharp, 48 ECAB 209 (1996) (physical therapists).

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The Board notes that appellant submitted new evidence after issuance of the August 15,
2011 decision. The Board lacks jurisdiction to review evidence for the first time on appeal.15
However, appellant may submit new evidence or argument as part of a formal written request for
reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not establish that she sustained a traumatic injury in
the performance of duty on June 25, 2011.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 15, 2011 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed as modified.
Issued: May 7, 2012
Washington, DC

Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

15

20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c).

5


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
H.E., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Detroit, MI, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

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Docket No. 21-1070
Issued: March 18, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER REMANDING CASE
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On July 8, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from an April 28, 2021 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards
docketed the appeal as No. 21-1070.
On December 9, 2020 appellant, then a 53-year-old rural carrier, filed an occupational
disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he developed left cubital and carpal tunnel syndrome due
to factors of his federal employment, including sorting, casing, and delivering mail; lifting and
delivering packages; and unloading tubs, bags, and parcels. He indicated that he first became
aware of his condition on September 3, 2020, and that it was related to his federal employment on
November 30, 2020. OWCP assigned this claim File No. xxxxxx436.
Appellant had previously filed a Form CA-2 on November 5, 2020 alleging that he had
sustained carpal tunnel syndrome due to factors of his federal employment including sorting,
casing and delivering mail, as well as lifting packages. He related that he first became aware of
his condition and its relationship to his federal employment on September 3, 2020. OWCP
assigned this claim File No. xxxxxx310.
In a development letter dated December 15, 2020 in the instant claim, OWCP File No.
xxxxxx436, OWCP informed appellant of the deficiencies of his claim. It advised him regarding

the type of medical evidence necessary to establish his claim and provided 30 days for him to
submit the requested evidence.
In response, appellant submitted a medical report dated September 10, 2020 from Dr. Ryan
Beekman, a Board-certified orthopedic and hand surgeon. Dr. Beekman diagnosed tendinosis and
tenosynovitis involving the extensor carpi ulnaris without tendon tear, minimal tenosynovitis of
the extensor carpi radialis longus and brevis tendons. In reports dated September 24 and
November 5, 2020, he diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and also cubital tunnel
syndrome.
In a report dated November 30, 2020, Amy Herrick, a nurse practitioner, related that
appellant was seen for a follow-up appointment for his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and that
he was scheduled for a right carpal tunnel release.
In a letter dated January 8, 2021, Dr. Beekman related that appellant underwent bilateral
right and left carpal tunnel release on January 5, 2021. He noted that appellant had indicated that
his hand symptoms of numbness and tingling were significantly exacerbated by his work activities
including lifting heavy objects and repetitive heavy gripping. Dr. Beekman concluded that it was
reasonable to believe that appellant’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and left cubital tunnel
syndrome were causally related to his employment.
By decision dated February 4, 2021, OWCP denied appellant’s claim as causal relationship
was not established between the diagnosed medical conditions and the accepted employment
factors. It concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been met to establish an injury or
medical condition causally related to the accepted employment factors.
In a letter dated March 2, 2021, Dr. Beekman related that appellant had reported that his
symptoms were significantly exacerbated by his work activities of lifting heavy objects and
gripping. He also stated that medical literature supported that repetitive heavy gripping was a
known cause of carpal tunnel and that he believed that appellant’s work duties caused his bilateral
carpal and left cubital tunnel syndrome.
On March 11, 2021 appellant requested reconsideration of OWCP’s February 4, 2021
decision.
By decision dated April 28, 2021, OWCP denied modification of its February 4, 2021
decision.
The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that this case is not in posture for
decision. OWCP’s procedures provide that cases should be administratively combined when
correct adjudication of the issues depend on frequent cross-referencing between the files. 1 For
example, if a new injury case is reported for an employee who previously filed an injury claim for

1

See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, File Maintenance and Management, Chapter 2.400.8(c)
(February 2000).

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a similar condition or the same part of the body, doubling is required.2 Herein, appellant filed a
claim for carpal tunnel syndrome, assigned OWCP File No. xxxxxx310 on November 5, 2020, and
subsequently filed an occupational disease claim on December 9, 2020 for cubital and carpal
tunnel syndrome, assigned OWCP File No. xxxxxx436. The evidence pertaining to OWCP File
No. xxxxxx310, however, is not part of the case record presently before the Board.
For a full and fair adjudication, the case must be returned to OWCP to administratively
combine the current case record with OWCP File No. xxxxxx310. Following this and such further
development as OWCP deems necessary, it shall issue a de novo decision. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 28, 2021 decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this order of the Board.
Issued: March 18, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

2

Id.; D.C., Docket No. 19-0100 (issued June 3, 2019); N.M., Docket No. 18-0833 (issued April 18, 2019); K.T.,
Docket No. 17-0432 (issued August 17, 2018).

3


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
L.C., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Philadelphia, PA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Thomas R. Uliase, Esq., for the appellant1
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 19-1301
Issued: January 29, 2020

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 24, 2019 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a February 26,
2019 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board
has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal
or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e).
No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or
representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or
imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a
representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish a left foot condition
causally related to the accepted factors of his federal employment.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On January 22, 2018 appellant, then a 56-year-old city carrier, filed an occupational disease
claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he sustained a foot strain or fracture due to factors of his federal
employment. He explained that as a city carrier he walked each day while in the performance of
duty. Appellant stopped work on January 16, 2018.
In a narrative statement dated January 16, 2018, appellant indicated that he was injured
while delivering mail on approximately September 27 or 28, 2017 around 11:00 a.m. when he felt
a severe pain on the outside of his left foot. He indicated that he had neither stumbled, tripped,
nor fell, nor could he remember a specific incident where he would have injured his foot.
Appellant only remembered that he experienced sharp pain in his foot while delivering mail and
the pain increased throughout the day. By the time he had returned to the station around 6:30 p.m.,
he noted that he had to limp in order to walk, as the pain in his foot was severe. Appellant notified
his nighttime supervisor and then went to urgent care on September 29, 2017 to see a physician
and have an x-ray completed. The x-ray did not show a fracture, but he scheduled an appointment
with a podiatrist to find out what was causing his pain. Appellant noted that he continued to work
because the x-ray failed to demonstrate that he had broken his foot. On December 22, 2017 he
had another x-ray completed which showed a significant break in the fifth metatarsal on his left
foot. Appellant noted that his podiatrist advised that the fracture could have initially been minor
and, therefore, difficult to detect on the original x-ray. However, walking on the fractured foot for
a few months would have caused the fracture to worsen. Appellant was given a boot and advised
to take four weeks off from work in order for the fracture to heal.
In a January 15, 2018 report, Dr. Larry Menacker, a podiatrist, noted that appellant reported
that he had aching pain and the symptoms had remained the same over time as a result of delivering
mail in late September 2017. He diagnosed fifth metatarsal base fracture, avulsion-type left, and
noted that appellant presented with pain in the area for the past five months.
An x-ray of the left foot dated February 8, 2018 demonstrated no significant interval
change in the fifth metatarsal fracture.
On February 12, 2018 Dr. Menacker reported that appellant’s symptoms had improved
since he had been immobilized in a boot. He indicated that appellant would continue to be
immobilized in a fracture walker. Dr. Menacker noted that appellant’s condition could require
surgical intervention if it went on to nonunion.
In a development letter dated March 9, 2018, OWCP informed appellant that the factual
and medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish his claim. It advised him regarding
the evidence necessary to establish his claim and afforded him 30 days to submit the necessary
evidence.

2

In an April 6, 2018 response to OWCP’s questionnaire, appellant indicated that his
employment duties required standing on his feet casing mail, driving a postal vehicle, constantly
stepping in and out of his truck making deliveries and carrying packages, walking up and down
steps for homes with porches, and walking to deliver a portion of his mail route on foot. He
explained that he was working 6 days per week for 50 to 60 hours per week. Appellant stood at
his case for two hours and the rest of the time, excluding breaks, he was constantly on his feet, in
and out of his vehicle, walking, doing steps, and carrying mail and packages. He noted that he did
not have time for hobbies and took a bike ride only about four times per year.
By decision dated April 30, 2018, OWCP accepted that the alleged employment factors
occurred while in the performance of duty, as alleged. However, it denied his claim because the
medical evidence of record failed to establish a causal relationship between his diagnosed left foot
condition and the accepted factors of his federal employment.
On May 15, 2018 appellant, through counsel, requested an oral hearing before a
representative of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review.
In a narrative report dated July 25, 2018, Dr. Menacker indicated that he first saw appellant
as a new patient in his office on November 20, 2017 for a painful left foot. During that visit,
appellant described the left foot injury as an ankle sprain-type mechanism which resulted in pain
and swelling in his left foot. He explained that it occurred while delivering the mail on his route
and he lost his balance due to a crack in the pavement. Dr. Menacker believed that it was the
sudden traction of the fifth metatarsal base from that inversion injury that had led to the fracture
in that location. He concluded that appellant injured his left foot while working as a postal
employee delivering mail on his route in late September 2017. Dr. Menacker’s final diagnoses
were an avulsion-type fracture of the fifth metatarsal tuberosity and peroneal tendinitis of the left
foot. He advised that appellant’s left foot would also be prone to reinjury and appellant would
have some chronic pain with exertion and extreme temperature changes during his lifetime as he
aged.
The hearing was held on September 11, 2018. Appellant testified that he had two prior
injuries to his left ankle, one in 2009 while on his route and another on February 13, 2012 when
he twisted his ankle. He explained that he had filed a claim for his 2012 injury, and that claim had
been assigned OWCP File No. xxxxxx355. An OWCP hearing representative held the case record
open for 30 days for the submission of additional evidence. OWCP did not receive additional
evidence.
By decision dated October 23, 2018, an OWCP hearing representative affirmed the
April 30, 2018 decision finding that the medical evidence of record failed to provide a wellrationalized opinion regarding the issue of causal relationship. The hearing representative also
found that the opinion of Dr. Menacker did not contain an accurate history of injury as reported by
appellant.
On November 28, 2018 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration.
In support of his request for reconsideration appellant provided an October 30, 2018
statement regarding how he had injured his foot. He indicated that the first time he remembered

3

rolling his ankle was in May 2009. Appellant noted that he injured his ankle in 2012 when he
twisted his ankle and fell. He explained that after the 2012 injury his ankle was prone to give out
on him and it got to the point where he was rolling it a few times every week. Appellant indicated
that since breaking the bone in his foot in September 2017 he received a brace from Dr. Menacker
and when he went back to work in August 2018, wearing that brace allowed him to work without
fear of rolling his ankle. He explained why this information had not been provided when
responding to the claim development questionnaire.
In an amended report dated November 12, 2018, Dr. Menacker reiterated the contents of
his July 25, 2018 report, but updated the history of injury as reported by appellant. He opined that
there was no question in his mind that the fracture suffered by appellant in 2017 was caused by a
sudden inversion ankle injury that frequently occurred while appellant delivered mail on his
regular daily route.
By decision dated February 26, 2019, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the
essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the
United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable
time limitation period of FECA,3 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged,
and that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related
to the employment injury.4 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim,
regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.5
To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational
disease claim, an employee must submit the following: (1) a factual statement identifying
employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence or occurrence of the
disease or condition; (2) medical evidence establishing the presence or existence of the disease or
condition for which compensation is claimed; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the employment factors identified by the employee.6
Causal relationship is a medical question that requires rationalized medical opinion
evidence to resolve the issue.7 A physician’s opinion on whether there is causal relationship
3
S.B., Docket No. 17-1779 (issued February 7, 2018); J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB
153 (1989).
4

J.M., Docket No. 17-0284 (issued February 7, 2018); R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40
ECAB 312 (1988).
5

K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016); L.M., Docket No. 13-1402 (issued February 7, 2014);
Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).
6

R.G., Docket No. 19-0233 (issued July 16, 2019). See also Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238, 241 (2005); Ruby I.
Fish, 46 ECAB 276, 279 (1994); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989).
7

T.H., 59 ECAB 388, 393 (2008); Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996).

4

between the diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors must be based on a
complete factual and medical background.8 Additionally, the physician’s opinion must be
expressed in terms of a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and must be supported by medical
rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and appellant’s
specific employment factors.9
In any case where a preexisting condition involving the same part of the body is present
and the issue of causal relationship, therefore, involves aggravation, acceleration, or precipitation,
the physician must provide a rationalized medical opinion that differentiates between the effects
of the work-related injury or disease and the preexisting condition.10
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a left foot
condition causally related to the accepted factors of his federal employment.
In support of his claim appellant submitted medical reports from his treating podiatrist,
Dr. Menacker. In reports dated January 15 and February 12, 2018, Dr. Menacker provided
diagnoses and possible treatment options, but did not opine as to causal relationship. The Board
has held that medical evidence that does not offer an opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s
condition is of no probative value on the issue of causal relationship.11 These reports, therefore,
are insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
In reports dated July 25 and November 12, 2018, Dr. Menacker noted the history of injury
and diagnosed medical conditions related to the left foot. He opined that appellant was injured
while delivering mail on his route and there had been sudden traction on the fifth metatarsal base.
While Dr. Menacker clearly expressed his belief that there was “no question” that the foot fracture
occurred due to a sudden inversion ankle injury while delivering mail, he did not provide a
pathophysiological explanation as to how the accepted factors of appellant’s employment either
caused or contributed to his diagnosed conditions.12 The Board has consistently held that complete
medical rationalization is particularly necessary when there are preexisting conditions involving
the same body part,13 and has required medical rationale differentiating between the effects of the

8

M.V., Docket No. 18-0884 (issued December 28, 2018).

9

Id.; Victor J. Woodhams, supra note 6.

10
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.3e (January 2013). See
R.D., Docket No. 18-1551 (issued March 1, 2019).
11

See L.B., Docket No. 18-0533 (issued August 27, 2018); D.K., Docket No. 17-1549 (issued July 6, 2018).

12

Supra notes 9 and 10.

13

K.R., Docket No. 18-1388 (issued January 9, 2019).

5

work-related injury and the preexisting condition in such cases.14 Thus, the Board finds that these
two reports from Dr. Menacker are also insufficient to establish causal relationship.
Appellant also submitted diagnostic imaging studies in the form of x-rays. The Board has
held that diagnostic studies lack probative value as they do not provide an opinion on causal
relationship between accepted employment factors and a claimant’s diagnosed conditions.15 This
evidence is therefore insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.
As appellant has not submitted the necessary rationalized medical evidence to support his
claim for a left foot condition causally related to the accepted factors of his federal employment,
he has failed to meet his burden of proof.
Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration
to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 10.605 through 10.607.16
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a left foot
condition causally related to the accepted factors of his federal employment.

14

See e.g., A.J., Docket No. 18-1116 (issued January 23, 2019); M.F., Docket No. 17-1973 (issued December 31,
2018); J.B., Docket No. 17-1870 (issued April 11, 2018); E.D., Docket No. 16-1854 (issued March 3,
2017); P.O., Docket No. 14-1675 (issued December 3, 2015).
15

See I.C., Docket No. 19-0804 (issued August 23, 2019).

16
Upon return of the case record OWCP should consider administratively combining this claim with appellant’s
prior left lower extremity traumatic injury claim in OWCP File No. xxxxxx355.

6

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the February 26, 2019 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: January 29, 2020
Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

7


United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
S.M., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Broadview Heights, OH, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 07-1319
Issued: October 3, 2007

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On April 17, 2007 appellant filed a timely appeal from a March 26, 2007 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs that affirmed the denial of her occupational
disease claim. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the
merits of the claim.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof in establishing that she developed
a cervical condition in the performance of duty.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On September 28, 2005 appellant, then a 48-year-old distribution clerk, filed an
occupational disease claim alleging that she developed neck, shoulder and arm pain in the
performance of duty. She first became aware of her condition on September 5, 2005 and first
related it to her employment on September 19, 2005. Appellant attributed the development of
her condition to continuous heavy lifting and pushing and stated that her symptoms were “a

repeat” of symptoms previously experienced in December 2001.1
September 20, 2005.

She stopped work on

Appellant submitted a September 2, 2005 duty status report from Dr. Joseph Zayat, a
Board-certified neurologist, who stated that she was capable of performing full-duty work at that
time. In a September 24, 2005 note, Dr. James D. Krystosik, a chiropractor, indicated that
appellant was currently receiving treatment for a “severe sprain/strain of the cervical spine.” In
an October 10, 2005 attending physician’s report, Dr. Krystosik diagnosed bulging discs at the
C5-6 and C6-7 levels as well as degenerative changes from C3 to C7. He indicated that
appellant’s condition was employment related and that her medical history was significant for a
prior cervical strain. In a September 2, 2005 treatment note, Dr. Zayat diagnosed cervical
herniated disc with associated cervicalgia and cervical radiculopathy.
In an October 3, 2005 diagnostic report, Dr. Ramon R. De Guzman, a neuroradiologist,
indicated that a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of appellant’s cervical spine revealed
“diffuse degenerative changes of the cervical spine with the posterior disc bulges at C3-4 through
C6-7.” He also concluded that there was no evidence of spinal canal or neural foraminal
stenosis.
In an undated statement received on October 27, 2005, appellant stated that she had
experienced neck and shoulder pain in 2001. However, Dr. Zayat gave her a “clean bill of
health” on September 2, 2005 with regard to her neck and shoulder, which “at that time was an
old injury.” Appellant stated that she worked her “usual job” on Labor Day weekend of 2005,
which involved throwing parcels, sorting carrier routes and pushing and pulling loads. She
explained that the first two weeks of September 2005 involved an unusually heavy mail load and
she experienced pain and stiffness in her neck, right shoulder and right arm.
Jeff Masno, a medical technician in Dr. Krystosik’s office, stated that appellant presented
with complaints of neck and right arm pain. In an October 24, 2005 disability certificate,
Dr. Krystosik diagnosed a severe strain/sprain of the neck with associated bulging discs.
On November 14, 2005 the Office advised appellant of the evidence needed to establish
her claim. The Office also advised appellant of the circumstances under which a chiropractor
may be considered a physician under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. No additional
evidence was received.
By decision dated December 30, 2005, the Office denied appellant’s claim, finding that
she did not establish that a specific incident or exposure occurred at the time, place and in the
manner alleged.
The Office received a November 30, 2005 statement from appellant further describing
her job duties and the origins of her claimed condition. In a November 25, 2005 report,
Dr. Krystosik stated that she was asymptomatic prior to September 2005. He explained that, in
1

The record reflects that appellant had previously submitted an occupational disease claim in December 2001,
which was assigned file number 092017609 by the Office and was accepted for cervical strain. Claim No.
092017609 is not before the Board on the present appeal.

2

early September 2005, appellant experienced “an exacerbation of her original injury” of
December 2001. Dr. Krystosik provided the results of his physical examination and explained:
“Subluxation of C3-4 and C6-7 were noted … and a bulging disc at C3-4 and C6-7 was verified
by [an] MRI [scan] performed on October 3, 2005.” He stated: “In my expert opinion there is a
causal relation between the C3-4 and C6-7 bulging discs and associated subluxations …
triggered by the physical demands of [appellant’s] job duties.”
In a December 12, 2005 report, Dr. Zayat stated that he examined appellant on
September 2, 2005 and that she presented with complaints of pain extending into the right
shoulder blade aggravated by moving the head and neck. Her pain as of September 2, 2005 was
intense enough to make her arm tired and weak and she had a pulling sensation along the neck.
However, Dr. Zayat noted that his physical examination on September 2, 2005 revealed normal
findings, no significant tenderness and full cervical range of motion. He opined that appellant
was a good candidate for evaluation and treatment by a chiropractor based upon a December 29,
2001 MRI scan report which revealed minimal disc bulging at the C5-6 level, right lateral disc
herniation at C6-7 and minimal left hypertrophy at C7-T1.
Appellant requested reconsideration on January 3, 2006. She indicated that she filled out
both an occupational disease claim form and a recurrence of disability claim form, but that the
employing establishment only submitted the occupational disease claim. Appellant stated:
“even though I received conflicting information it is clear that they selected the CA-2 for a new
injury and gave me a new file number 092064525 which is not right.”
By decision dated February 3, 2006, the Office modified the December 30, 2005 decision
to reflect that appellant had established her work duties as alleged. The claim was denied on the
grounds that the medical evidence was not sufficient to establish a causal relationship between
her claimed condition and the factors of her employment.
In a February 20, 2006 report, Dr. Zayat noted reviewing the Office’s February 3, 2006
decision. He stated: “Based upon [appellant’s] history and that her symptoms developed in the
aftermath of her having engaged in heavy manual labor at work … it is conceivable that the
exacerbation of pain and symptoms were a result of her employment.”
In a January 11, 2007 letter, the Office advised appellant that her claim had been
processed as an occupational disease claim because she had attributed the onset of her symptoms
to a period of heavy labor over the course of several weeks.
On January 27, 2007 appellant requested reconsideration. She provided chart notes from
Dr. Zayat, dated May 31, 2002 to April 21, 2006. On February 8, 2007 appellant requested that
the case files in the present appeal, file number 092064525, and her prior claim, file
number 2017609, be combined.
By decision dated March 26, 2007, the Office denied modification of the February 3,
2006 decisions.

3

LEGAL PRECEDENT
An employee seeking benefits under the Act2 has the burden of establishing the essential
elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an “employee of the United
States” within the meaning of the Act, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time
limitation period of the Act, that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged
and that any disabilities and/or specific conditions for which compensation is claimed are
causally related to the employment injury.3 These are the essential elements of each and every
compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an
occupational disease.4
An occupational disease or injury is one caused by specified employment factors
occurring over a longer period than a single shift or workday.5 The test for determining whether
appellant sustained a compensable occupational disease or injury is three pronged. To establish
the factual elements of the claim, appellant must submit: “(1) medical evidence establishing the
presence or existence of the disease or condition for which compensation is claimed; (2) a factual
statement identifying the factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence or
occurrence of the disease or condition; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the factors
identified by the claimant were the proximate cause of the condition for which compensation is
claimed or, stated differently, medical evidence establishing that the diagnosed condition is
causally related to the factors identified by the claimant.”6
The medical evidence required to establish causal relationship generally is rationalized
medical opinion evidence. Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence which
includes a physician’s rationalized opinion on the issue of whether there is a causal relationship
between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors.7 The
opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the
claimant8 and must be one of reasonable medical certainty9 explaining the nature of the
relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by
the claimant.10

2

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

3

Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

4

Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989).

5

D.D., 57 ECAB ___ (Docket No. 06-1315, issued September 14, 2006).

6

Michael R. Shaffer, 55 ECAB 386, 389 (2004), citing Lourdes Harris, 45 ECAB 545 (1994); Victor J.
Woodhams, supra note 4.
7

Conard Hightower, 54 ECAB 796 (2003); Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

8

Tomas Martinez, 54 ECAB 623 (2003); Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).

9

John W. Montoya, 54 ECAB 306 (2003).

10

Judy C. Rogers, 54 ECAB 693 (2003).

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ANALYSIS
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish that her
cervical condition was caused by her federal employment. The evidence supports that she
performed lifting and pushing duties during the first two weeks of September 2005. However,
appellant has submitted insufficient medical evidence to support that these accepted employment
activities caused or aggravated her diagnosed cervical condition.
Appellant submitted several reports from Dr. Krystosik and Mr. Masno, a medical
technician in Dr. Krystosik’s chiropractic practice. These reports are not probative because
Dr. Krystosik and Mr. Masno are not physicians within the meaning of the term as defined by the
Act.11 Mr. Masno is a layperson and, as such, is not considered competent to render a medical
opinion pursuant to Board precedent.12 Dr. Krystosik is a chiropractor. The Board has held that
a chiropractor’s report may be considered competent medical evidence only where the
chiropractor used x-ray testing to diagnose a spinal subluxation.13 The chiropractor’s use of
other tests, such as the October 3, 2005 MRI scan, to diagnose spinal subluxation does not
qualify Dr. Krystosik as a physician under the Act.14 Dr. Krystosik did not diagnose a spinal
subluxation based on x-ray testing. The question of causal relationship is a medical issue which
must be established through probative, rationalized medical opinion.15 Dr. Krystosik’s reports
are not competent given the limitations of section 8101(2).
The reports of Dr. Zayat are insufficient to establish appellant’s claim because the
physician did not address causal relationship between the diagnosed conditions and appellant’s
employment duties.16 Dr. Zayat addressed causal relationship in a February 20, 2006 report,
stating: “Based upon [appellant’s] history that her symptoms developed in the aftermath of her
having engaged in heavy manual labor at work … it is conceivable that the exacerbation of pain
and symptoms were a result of her employment.” This report is insufficient to establish causal
relationship as his opinions on causal relationship is speculative. Dr. Zayat merely noted that
appellant’s symptoms began after she performed duties at work. However, the Board has held
that the mere fact that a disease or condition manifests itself or worsens during a period of
employment17 or that work activities produce symptoms revelatory of an underlying condition18
11

See 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2). This subsection defines the term “physician.” See also Charley V.B. Harley, 2 ECAB
208 (1949) (where the Board held that a medical opinion, in general, can only be given by a qualified physician).
12

James A. Long, 40 ECAB 538 (1989).

13

See Jay K. Tomokiyo, 51 ECAB 361 (2000).

14

See id. Dr. De Guzman, who obtained the MRI scan report, did not find any subluxation of the cervical spine.
Rather, he noted disc bulging from C3 to C7.
15

See Steven S. Saleh, 55 ECAB 169 (2003).

16

See, e.g. Charles H. Tomaszewski, 39 ECAB 461, 467-68 (1988) (medical evidence which does not offer any
opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of causal
relationship).
17

William Nimitz, Jr., 30 ECAB 567, 570 (1979).

18

Richard B. Cissel, 32 ECAB 1910, 1917 (1981).

5

does not raise an inference of causal relationship between the condition and the employment
factors. Dr. Zayat’s opinion also lacks rationale or any explanation supporting his opinion on
causal relationship. He does not describe in detail the processes by which specific work factors
would have caused or aggravated appellant’s cervical condition.19 His opinion is speculative as
he did not conclusively support causal relationship but rather merely opined that it was
“conceivable” that her condition could be related to her employment.20 For these reasons,
appellant did not establish her claim for an occupational disease.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof in establishing that she
developed a cervical condition in the performance of duty.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 26, 2007 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.
Issued: October 3, 2007
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

19

See Victor J. Woodhams, supra note 4.

20

See Leonard J. O’Keefe, 14 ECAB 42, 48 (1962) (where the Board held that medical opinions based upon an
incomplete history or which are speculative or equivocal in character have little probative value).

6


United States Department of Labor
Employees Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
R.R, Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, Denver, CO,
Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 07-1660
Issued: November 21, 2007

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On May 27, 2007 appellant timely appealed the April 25, 2007 merit decision of the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs which granted a schedule award for nine percent
hearing loss of the right ear. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(d), the Board has
jurisdiction over the merits of the schedule award.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant has more than nine percent right ear hearing loss for which
he received a schedule award.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On August 30, 2006 appellant, then a 59-year-old supervisory mine safety and health
inspector, filed an occupational disease claim alleging that he sustained a hearing loss in the
performance of duty. He submitted audiograms from December 10, 1981 through June 26, 2006.
In a November 7, 2006 letter, the Office informed appellant that he was scheduled for an
appointment with Dr. Richard Cundy, an otolaryngologist, on November 28, 2006. Dr. Cundy

submitted a report detailing the examination on November 28, 2006 with an accompanying
audiogram made on the same day. The audiogram reflected testing at the frequency levels of
500, 1,000, 2,000 and 3,000 cycles per second (cps) and revealed the following: right ear
decibels 30, 30, 30 and 35; left ear decibels 25, 20, 20 and 25. Dr. Cundy opined that appellant’s
exposure to drills and other machines was intense enough to cause the hearing loss, especially in
closed spaces. He diagnosed neurosensory hearing loss and recommended hearing aids. On
December 6, 2006 the district medical adviser reviewed Dr. Cundy’s report and opined that
appellant had a nine percent hearing loss in the right ear.
In a December 15, 2007 decision, the Office accepted appellant’s claim for noise-induced
hearing loss. On January 8, 2007 appellant requested a schedule award for his hearing loss. On
April 25, 2007 the Office granted a schedule award for nine percent right ear permanent
impairment.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Section 8107 of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act sets forth the number of
weeks of compensation to be paid for the permanent loss of use of specified members, functions
and organs of the body.1 The Act, however, does not specify the manner by which the
percentage loss of a member, function or organ shall be determined. To ensure consistent results
and equal justice under the law, good administrative practice requires the use of uniform
standards applicable to all claimants. The implementing regulations have adopted the American
Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment as the appropriate
standard for evaluating schedule losses.2 Effective February 1, 2001, schedule awards are
determined in accordance with the A.M.A., Guides (5th ed. 2001).3
Using the frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000 and 3,000 cycles per second, the losses at each
frequency are added up and averaged.4 Then, the “fence” of 25 decibels is deducted because, as
the A.M.A., Guides points out, losses below 25 decibels result in no impairment in the ability to
hear everyday speech under everyday conditions.5 The remaining amount is multiplied by a
factor of 1.5 to arrive at the percentage of monaural hearing loss.6

1

The Act provides that, for complete or 100 percent loss of hearing in one ear an employee shall receive 52
weeks’ compensation. For complete loss of hearing of both ears, an employee shall receive 200 weeks’
compensation. 5 U.S.C. § 8107(c)(13) (2000).
2

20 C.F.R. § 10.404 (2006).

3

Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 3 -- Medical, Schedule Awards, Chapter 3.700.2 (June 2003).

4

A.M.A., Guides at 250 (5th ed. 2001).

5

Id.

6

Id.

2

ANALYSIS
Appellant’s November 28, 2006 audiogram, recorded the frequency levels at 500, 1,000,
2,000 and 3,000 hertz for the right ear, revealing decibel losses of 30, 30, 30 and 35 respectively,
for a total of 135 decibels. This amount, when divided by four, results in an average hearing loss
of 31.25 decibels. The average loss of 31.25 is reduced by 25 decibels to 6.25, which is then
multiplied by 1.5 to total 9.375, which represents a nine percent ratable monaural hearing loss for
the right ear. Testing for the left ear at frequency levels of 500, 1,000, 2,000 and 3,000 hertz
revealed decibel losses of 25, 20, 20 and 25 respectively, for a total of 90 decibels. This figure
when divided by four results in an average hearing loss of 22.50 decibels. The average loss of
22.50 is reduced by 25 decibels to 0, which represents a zero percent ratable monaural hearing
loss for the left ear. Accordingly, appellant’s most recent audiogram establishes a ratable
hearing loss of nine percent for the right ear.
On appeal, appellant contends that he should be compensated for a longer period of time,
contending that his award should cover a period of two years.
Under the Act, the maximum award for monaural hearing loss is 52 weeks of
compensation.7 Since the monaural hearing loss in this case is nine percent, appellant is entitled
to nine percent of 52 weeks or 4.68 weeks of compensation. His schedule award ran from
November 28 through December 30, 2006, which represent to four weeks and three days. The
Office properly determined the number of weeks for compensation for which appellant is entitled
under the schedule award.8
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant has not established that he is entitled to a schedule award
for his employment-related hearing loss greater than the nine percent awarded.

7

5 U.S.C. 8107(c)(13)(A).

8

Appellant also required generally about hearing aids. The Board’s review is limited to final decisions of the
Office. See 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c). As there is no denial of any request for a hearing aid by the Office, it is not an
issue on the appeal in this case.

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated April 25, 2007 be affirmed.
Issued: November 21, 2007
Washington, DC

David S. Gerson, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
F.L., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Bellwood, PA, Employer
__________________________________________

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Appearances:
Aaron B. Aumiller, Esq., for the appellant
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

Docket No. 10-65
Issued: July 21, 2010

Case Submitted on the Record

DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge
JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION
On October 7, 2009 appellant filed a timely appeal from a May 4, 2009 merit decision of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3,
the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant established a left knee injury causally related to factors of
his federal employment.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 19, 2006 appellant, then a 55-year-old city carrier, filed an occupational disease
claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he sustained a torn meniscus as a result of walking with mail for
four to five hours a day. He became aware of his condition on May 17, 2006 and he received
emergency room treatment on May 18, 2006.
In a report dated July 25, 2006, Dr. Joshua Port, an orthopedic surgeon, noted that a
July 14, 2006 magnetic resonance imaging scan showed a tear of the medial meniscus of the left

knee. Appellant underwent left knee surgery on August 30, 2006. On September 18, 2006
Dr. Port stated that appellant had a history of arthritis in the knee. He reported an onset of knee
pain on May 17, 2006 while appellant was on his mail route. Appellant may have twisted the
knee but he could not recall a specific incident. Dr. Port stated that the “arthritis that exists
within his knee was likely a chronic condition but was not bothering him and the meniscus tear is
likely new and directly work related, any exacerbation of the arthritis is work related as well.”
By decision dated October 20, 2006, the Office denied appellant’s claim for
compensation. It found the medical evidence was insufficient to establish causal relation.
Appellant requested reconsideration and submitted a November 27, 2007 report from
Dr. Port, who stated his impression that the meniscus tear was work related because appellant’s
symptoms were basal and allowed him to work until the day that he injured himself. Dr. Port
stated, “[Appellant] is stating to me that he reported pain at the end of the day shift. To me, that
represents reported injury. It can happen from a twist or it can happen from repeated daily
injury; regardless, the symptoms were not present at the beginning of the day, were present at the
end of the day, and were related to work. I cannot be any more clear.”
In a decision dated February 7, 2008, the Office denied modification of the October 20,
2006 decision. Appellant again requested reconsideration and submitted a January 24, 2009
report from Dr. Gary Goldstein, an orthopedic surgeon, who reviewed the medical evidence and
noted that appellant was having trouble with both knees “predating the accident.” He described
the meniscus as a cushion between the femur and the tibia, and the left knee was stable prior to
the May 17, 2006 accident. Dr. Goldstein concluded that the “knee replacement was made
necessary in an overtly premature way as a result of the May 17, 2006 accident.”1
By decision dated May 4, 2009, the Office reviewed the case on its merits and denied
modification of the prior decisions.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
A claimant seeking benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 has the
burden of establishing the essential elements of his claim by the weight of the reliable, probative
and substantial evidence, including that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as
alleged and that any specific condition or disability claimed is causally related to the
employment injury.3
To establish that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty, a claimant must
submit: (1) medical evidence establishing the presence or existence of the disease or condition
for which compensation is claimed; (2) a factual statement identifying employment factors
alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence or occurrence of the disease or condition;
1

Dr. Port reported on November 27, 2007 that radiographs showed a total knee arthroplasty.

2

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

3

20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e), (f) (2005); see Jacquelyn L. Oliver, 48 ECAB 232, 235-36 (1996).

2

and (3) medical evidence establishing that the diagnosed condition is causally related to the
employment factors identified by the claimant.4
Causal relationship is a medical question that can generally be resolved only by
rationalized medical opinion evidence.5 A physician’s opinion on the issue of whether there is a
causal relationship between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and the implicated employment
factors must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant.6
Additionally, in order to be considered rationalized, the opinion must be expressed in terms of a
reasonable degree of medical certainty and must be supported by medical rationale, explaining
the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and appellant’s specific
employment factors.7
ANALYSIS
Appellant filed an occupational disease claim for a left medial meniscus that he attributed
to carrying of mail for several hours a day. To establish his claim, he has the burden to submit
rationalized medical evidence on causal relationship between the diagnosed condition and
accepted employment factors.
In this case, the medical evidence is not of sufficient probative value to meet appellant’s
burden of proof. Dr. Port advised that the meniscal tear was work related, but he appeared to
base his opinion on appellant being relatively asymptomatic and then experiencing knee pain
while at work on May 17, 2006. A medical opinion stating that a condition is causally related to
an employment injury because the employee was asymptomatic before the injury but became
symptomatic is insufficient, without supporting rationale, to establish causal relationship.8
Appellant’s claim is based on carrying mail over a period of time resulting in a left knee
injury. An occupational disease or illness is an injury produced over more than one workday or
shift.9 Dr. Port briefly stated that an injury can happen from a twist or from repeated daily
injury. The Board notes that appellant did not report a specific twisting or traumatic incident on
May 17, 2006. To the extent that Dr. Port refers to repeated daily injury, he did not provide
adequate medical opinion that the diagnosed meniscal tear in this case was causally related to the
factor of carrying mail for several hours each day.
Dr. Goldstein did not provide an opinion addressing the issue presented. He referred to
an “accident” on May 17, 2006, without providing a complete or accurate factual background.
4

Ruby I. Fish, 46 ECAB 276, 279 (1994).

5

See Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996).

6

Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).

7

Id.

8

T.M., 60 ECAB
480 (1996).
9

(Docket No. 08-0975, issued February 6, 2009); Cleopatra McDougal-Saddler, 47 ECAB

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(q).

3

As noted, the claim for compensation was based on walking with mail for several hours a day
over a period of time. Dr. Goldstein referred to appellant’s surgeries, without providing a
explanation of how the diagnosed torn meniscus related to appellant’s duties of mail delivery.
The Board finds the medical evidence is of diminished probative value on the issue of causal
relation.
On appeal, appellant asserted that the November 27, 2007 report of Dr. Port and the
January 24, 2009 report from Dr. Goldstein are sufficient to further develop the claim. As noted,
however, the Board finds the medical evidence is of diminished probative value on the issue of
causal relationship and the Office properly denied the claim.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that appellant did not meet his burden of proof to establish a left knee
injury causally related to factors of his federal employment.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs dated May 4, 2009 is affirmed.
Issued: July 21, 2010
Washington, DC

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________
I.S., Appellant
and
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,
Cranston, RI, Employer
__________________________________________
Appearances:
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

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Docket No. 21-0921
Issued: March 15, 2022

Case Submitted on the Record

ORDER REMANDING CASE
Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On May 27, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from a January 28, 2021 merit decision
of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards
docketed the appeal as Docket No. 21-0921.
On August 24, 2020 appellant, then a 34-year-old mail handler, filed a traumatic injury
claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on August 18, 2020 she sustained shoulder and lower back sprains
when trying to avoid a dog attack while in the performance of duty. She stopped work on
August 18, 2020.
On August 20, 2020 the employing establishment executed an authorization for
examination and/or treatment (Form CA-16) authorizing appellant to seek medical care related to
her back strain. The portion of the form designated as Part B attending physician’s report was
signed on August 20, 2020 by Dr. Alexandra S. Ruggiero, a Board-certified family medicine
physician, who noted appellant’s history of injury and diagnosed a muscle strain. In a duty status
form (Form CA-17) dated August 20, 2020, Dr. Ruggiero diagnosed lumbar and right shoulder
strains due to the claimed August 20, 2020 employment incident.
OWCP subsequently received CA-17 form reports dated August 27 and September 3
and 17, 2020 diagnosing low back muscle sprain/pain/low back pain, and narrative reports dated

August 27 and September 3, 2020 diagnosing acute midline low back pain without sciatica and
acute left-side low back pain without sciatica from Dr. Manoj Garg, an osteopath Board-certified
in family practice. In August 27, 2020 x-ray report, Dr. Christina Pinto, an osteopath Boardcertified in family medicine, diagnosed mild multilevel degenerative disc disease most pronounced
in the lower thoracic and lower lumbar spine. OWCP also received an August 27, 2020 report
from Dr. Mark Mulak, a chiropractor, who diagnosed lower back and thorax muscle and tendon
strains and thoracic and lumbar segmental and somatic dysfunction, which he attributed to the
claimed August 18, 2020 employment incident.
By decision dated October 2, 2020, OWCP denied the claim, finding that appellant failed
to submit any medical evidence diagnosing a medical condition in connection with the accepted
August 24, 2020 employment incident. It concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been
met to establish an injury as defined by FECA.
Subsequent to the denial of her claim, OWCP received an October 1, 2020 Form CA-17
from Dr. Garg diagnosing low back and right shoulder strain, and an October 22, 2020 Form
CA-17 which diagnosed lumbar strain from Barbara Burchard, an advanced practice registered
nurse.
On October 23 and November 2, 2020 appellant requested reconsideration. She submitted
a November 4, 2020 report and referral by Ms. Burchard.
By decision dated January 28, 2021, OWCP denied modification. It found that the medical
evidence of record did not include a valid diagnosis from a qualified physician under FECA.
The Board, having duly considered the matter, finds that this case is not in posture for
decision.
OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding that the medical evidence of record did not
establish a diagnosed medical condition. It however failed to review the August 20, 2020 Part B
attending physician’s report and August 20, 2020 Form CA-17 report from Dr. Ruggiero. In the
case of William A. Couch,1 the Board held that, when adjudicating a claim, OWCP is obligated to
consider all evidence properly submitted by a claimant and received by OWCP befo re the final
decision is issued. As the Board’s decisions are final as to the subject matter appealed, it is crucial
that all evidence relevant to the subject matter of the claim which was properly submitted to OWCP
prior to the time of issuance of its final decision be reviewed and addressed by OWCP. 2 Because
OWCP did not review and address the August 20, 2020 medical evidence from Dr. Ruggiero, the
Board cannot review such evidence for the first time on appeal.3 The case will therefore be
remanded to OWCP to enable a proper consideration of the evidence that was of record at the time

1

41 ECAB 548 (1990).

2

Id.; see also E.P., Docket No. 20-0655 (issued March 17, 2021); J.S., Docket No. 18-1111 (issued April 30, 2020);
S.K., Docket No. 18-0478 (issued January 2, 2019); Yvette N. Davis, 55 ECAB 475 (2004).
3

20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c). A.C., Docket No. 20-0917 (issued January 27, 2021); E.P., id.

2

of its January 28, 2021 decision to be followed by an de novo decision regarding appellant’s
request for reconsideration. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the January 28, 2021 decision of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this order of the Board.
Issued: March 15, 2022
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3