WARNING

The President
    of the panel hearing this appeal directs that the following should be attached
    to the file:

An order
    restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (3) or (4)
    or 486.6(1) or (2) of the
Criminal Code
shall continue.  These
    sections of
the Criminal Code
provide:

486.4     (1)
Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or
    justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify
    the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or
    broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a)     any of
    the following offences;

(i)   an offence
    under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1,
    172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011,
    279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 346 or 347,

(ii) an
    offence under section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent
    assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or
    subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the
Criminal Code
, chapter
    C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before
    January 4, 1983, or

(iii) an
    offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or
    (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or section 151
    (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with
    step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent
    or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of
    the
Criminal Code
, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada,
    1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or

(b)     two
    or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which
    is an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (iii).

(2)
In
    proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b),
    the presiding judge or justice shall

(a)  at the first
    reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and
    the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b)  on application
    made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(3)
In
    proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice
    shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a
    witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the
    subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes
    child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in
    any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(4)
An
    order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of
    information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the
    purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005,
    c. 32, s. 15, c. 43, s. 8;2010, c. 3, s. 5;2012, c. 1, s. 29.

486.6     (1)
Every person who fails to comply with
    an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is
    guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2)
For
    greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit,
    in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with
    the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission
    in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice
    system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s.
    15.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. M.C., 2014 ONCA 611

DATE: 20140827

DOCKET: C55380

Strathy C.J.O., Watt and Hourigan JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

M.C.

Appellant

Marie Henein and Matthew Gourlay, for the appellant

Benita Wassenaar and Jennifer Mannen, for the respondent

Heard: June 25, 2014

On appeal from the convictions entered on March 1, 2012
    by Justice Julie A. Thorburn of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting without
    a jury.

Watt J.A.:

[1]

About two years after an alleged sexual assault, the complainant
    collapsed on the floor. He began to scream. He gestured with his hands. He did
    not respond to his mother. He did not respond to a police officer who had
    answered a 911 call. The episode lasted about 20 or 30 minutes.

[2]

At M.C.s trial for several sexual and other offences arising out of the
    original incident, the trial Crown proffered the evidence of a clinical
    psychologist who linked the complainants seizure-like behaviour to the prior
    sexual assault the complainant alleged M.C. had committed.

[3]

Trial counsel for M.C. (not Ms. Henein or Mr. Gourlay) objected to the
    admissibility of the evidence of the clinical psychologist. The objection
    failed. The trial judge admitted the evidence, found it most compelling and
    important independent corroboration of the complainants allegations, and found
    M.C. guilty of all the offences with which he was charged.

[4]

M.C. renews his objection to the admissibility of this evidence. This
    time, his objection prevails. These reasons explain why.

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

[5]

A brief reference to the underlying allegations and their journey to
    trial provides a suitable frame for discussion of the admissibility issue
    raised here.

The Setting

[6]

M.C. and the complainant are related, members of a large family who get
    together frequently at social gatherings. One of those gatherings occurred in
    the summer of 2007. Both M.C. and the complainant
[1]
were guests at a relatives home.

The Allegations

[7]

The complainant said that he entered a second floor bathroom and closed,
    but did not lock the door behind him. While he was seated on the toilet, M.C.
    opened the bathroom door. The complainant said someones in here. M.C. walked
    into the bathroom, closed the door behind him, and locked it.

[8]

The complainant was worried. He began to scream. M.C. put a towel in his
    mouth. The complainant stood up. His pants were around his ankles. M.C. pushed
    the complainant against the bathroom wall, fondled the complainants penis and
    squeezed his scrotum.

[9]

As time passed, the complainant added further details to his initial
    account. He alleged that M.C. turned him to face the wall, pulled down his
    pants, inserted his penis in the complainants anus and moved his penis in and
    out of the complainants anus. This anal penetration was very painful for the
    complainant.

[10]

The
    complainant heard a noise on the stairs. M.C. pulled his penis out of the
    complainants anus, pulled up his pants and washed his hands. M.C. told the
    complainant that if he (the complainant) said anything to anybody about what
    had happened in the bathroom, he (the complainant) would be in trouble and M.C.
    would kill the complainant and his family.

[11]

After
    M.C. left the bathroom, an adult relative of the complainant entered and asked
    whether everything was alright. The complainant did not tell the relative that
    anything was wrong.

The Consequences

[12]

The
    complainant alleged that he suffered rectal bleeding after the incident in the
    bathroom.

[13]

The
    complainant was prone to unprovoked outbursts of anger during his childhood.
    Several witnesses testified about these episodes, providing different versions
    about when they commenced and their intensity. The complainants mother
    testified that the outbursts intensified after the alleged sexual assault and
    included the complainant punching holes in the wall and attacking her. Other
    relatives said that the complainant had been given to such conduct since he was
    a toddler.

The First Disclosure

[14]

The
    complainant said nothing to anybody about the bathroom incident until several
    months later during the winter of 2008. The complainant was living with his
    mother after his parents had separated in 2006. The initial disclosure made no
    reference to anal intercourse or any threats to the complainant about the
    consequences of disclosure.

[15]

The
    complainants mother reported the disclosure to child welfare authorities and
    to the police, but no charges were laid. The complainant was enrolled in
    counselling.

The Second Disclosure

[16]

About
    a year later, shortly after his therapy had ceased, the complainant became
    quite insistent about telling his mother more about the incident with M.C.
    Despite his mothers advice to tell his therapist about what had happened, the
    complainant told his mother that M.C. put his penis in my bum and thats all.

[17]

The
    complainant repeated this disclosure to his therapist who provided the
    information to the CAS the following day. After the therapy session, the
    complainant told his mother that M.C. threatened to kill the complainant and
    his mother. He had not told his mother about the threats earlier because he
    took them seriously and was scared.

The Second Police Statement

[18]

About
    a month after the disclosure to his therapist, the complainant provided a statement
    to the police. He described the bathroom incident including anal intercourse
    and the threats M.C. made as he left the bathroom.

[19]

Police
    arrested M.C. the next day.

The Seizure-like Episode

[20]

Within
    a day of the complainants second police interview, he told his mother that he
    wanted to talk to her about what had happened to him. His mother tried to
    deflect his request because she was mindful of the admonition police had given
    her not to discuss the incident with her son. The complainant became frustrated.
    He told his mother that he just wanted to tell her how much it hurt.

[21]

A
    couple of hours later the complainant and his mother were at another relatives
    home. The complainant got up to get a toy. Suddenly, he screamed and collapsed
    to the floor. His body convulsed. His eyes rolled back. He had difficulty
    breathing. His mother called 911. A police officer responded to the call.

[22]

The
    seizure-like episode continued for 20 to 30 minutes. The complainant screamed.
    He did not respond either to his mother or to the police officer. He held his
    penis. He held his bum. He said hes going to kill me. He moaned. His
    breathing was laboured. He rolled around on the floor.

[23]

When
    the telephone rang in the house, the complainant panicked. He moved towards the
    wall. He identified the caller as uncle, but did not refer to him by name.
    The complainant was taken by ambulance to the Hospital for Sick Children.
    There, the complainant asked his mother why they had gone to the hospital.

The Expert Evidence

[24]

At
    trial, Crown counsel (not Ms. Wassenaar or Ms. Mannen) called a clinical
    psychologist, Dr. David Wolfe, to give evidence about:

i.

delayed, incremental and inconsistent disclosure by victims of child
    sexual abuse; and

ii.

symptoms of non-epileptic seizures (NES), Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
    (PTSD) and their relation to the seizure-like episode involving the complainant
    on April 25, 2009.

[25]

Trial
    counsel for the appellant objected to the admissibility of the evidence about
    delayed, incremental and inconsistent disclosure on the ground that it did not
    satisfy the necessity requirement for expert evidence. Counsel contended
    further that the witness was not qualified to give an opinion about NES, PTSD
    and their relation to the seizure-like episode.

[26]

The
    trial judge permitted Dr. Wolfe to give evidence on:

·

delayed, incremental and inconsistent disclosure as it relates to
    child victims of sexual abuse and the variations, combinations and changes
    involving disclosure by child victims of sexual abuse and the current literature
    regarding these behaviour patterns;

·

the symptoms he was told were exhibited by the complainant on the
    evening of his seizure-like event, and compare them to the symptoms of those
    who suffer non-epileptic seizures and the symptoms associated with post
    traumatic stress; and

·

the research regarding the alleged statistical correlation
    between child sexual abuse and non-epileptic seizures and post traumatic stress
    disorder.

[27]

The
    trial judge permitted Dr. Timothy Moore, a cognitive psychologist proffered by
    trial counsel for the appellant, to give evidence on the same issues as Dr.
    Wolfe.

THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

[28]

The
    appellant advances four grounds of appeal. The first two, which are related,
    are the principal grounds. They have to do with the admissibility and the trial
    judges use of evidence about the seizure-like episode, and of Dr. Wolfes
    opinion about the link between that episode and the sexual assault alleged to
    have occurred two years earlier. The third ground relates to the propriety of
    the trial Crowns cross-examination of the appellant. And the final ground
    concerns the comparative scrutiny that the trial judge applied to the evidence
    of the principal witnesses  the complainant and the appellant.

[29]

For
    discussion purposes, I would collapse the grounds of appeal into three and
    paraphrase them as alleged errors in:

i.

admitting and relying upon evidence of the complainants utterances
    during the seizure-like episode, and on Dr. Wolfes opinion about the
    connection between those utterances and the alleged sexual assault as
    confirmatory of the complainants evidence;

ii.

permitting the trial Crown to cross-examine the appellant about the
    possible motive of complainant to lie; and

iii.

applying a more rigorous standard of scrutiny to the testimony of the
    appellant than to that of the complainant.

Ground #1: Admissibility and Use of Evidence about the NES
    Episode

[30]

This
    ground of appeal is concerned with both the admissibility and the use of two
    aspects of the evidence about the NES episode:

i.

the
utterances
made by the complainant during the episode; and

ii.

the
opinion
of Dr. Wolfe concerning the nature of the episode
    and its relationship to the alleged sexual assault of the complainant by the
    appellant two years earlier.

[31]

To
    situate the appellants complaints of error in their proper setting, it is
    helpful to recall what the trial judge said about the
admissibility
of
    the evidence as well as the
use
she made of it in concluding that the
    Crown had proven the appellants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Admissibility Ruling

[32]

Trial
    counsel for the appellant does not appear to have challenged the relevance,
    materiality or admissibility of the evidence of those who witnessed the
    complainants seizure-like activity and what he said as the event unfolded.
    Thus, the focus of the trial judges ruling was on the admissibility of Dr.
    Wolfes opinions about the symptoms of NES and PTSD and how either could
    explain the seizure-like episode.

[33]

The
    trial judge took her lead in ruling on the admissibility of Dr. Wolfes opinion
    from the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in
R. v. Mohan
,
    [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 and of this court in
R. v. Abbey
, 2009 ONCA 624.

[34]

On
    the
necessity
of Dr. Wolfes evidence about the seizure-like episode,
    the trial judge concluded:

[58] Finally, Dr. Wolfe is permitted to articulate the symptoms
    he was told were exhibited by the Complainant on the evening of his
    seizure-like event, and compare them to the symptoms of those who suffer
    non-epileptic seizures and the symptoms associated with post traumatic stress.
    He is also permitted to discuss the research regarding the alleged statistical
    correlation between child sexual abuse and non-epileptic seizures and post
    traumatic stress disorder.

[59] Moreover, the examination of the psychological data and
    case studies referred to in the article D. Sharpe & C. Faye, Non-epileptic
    seizures and child sexual abuse: A critical review of the literature (2006) 26
    Clinical Psychology Review 1020.to explain the Complainants seizure-like
    episodes require expert understanding and an ability to analyze and fully
    understand the underlying data and methodology behind the 34 studies examined.

[35]

The
    trial judge was satisfied that Dr. Wolfe had the
expertise
necessary
    to proffer the opinion the trial Crown sought to elicit. The trial judge
    reasoned:

[60] Defence counsel argued that Dr. Wolfe is not qualified to
    provide expert evidence, since his testimony was predicated upon one article
    and not upon clinical research conducted personally. This assumes that Dr.
    Wolfe must have personal experience in the field of child psychology in order
    to testify. He does not need personal experience. As stated above, where the
    court is satisfied that the witness has expertise in the subject matter at
    issue, the admissibility of expert evidence does not depend on how the
    expertise was acquired:
R. v. N.O., supra
. The fact that Dr. Wolfe
    does not have personal experience is relevant to the weight that I assign to
    his evidence. I note, however, that the Sharpe and Faye article referred to and
    relied upon by Dr. Wolfe is a peer reviewed article which enhances its
    reliability.

[61] Dr. Wolfe is a child psychologist with a specific
    expertise in trauma and child abuse and can therefore opine on the effect of
    delayed, incremental and inconsistent disclosure by child victims of trauma
    including child abuse, and analyze the findings in the key publications he
    reviewed and considered.

[36]

The
    trial judge conducted the cost-benefit analysis required by
Mohan
and
Abbey
.
    She concluded that the probative value of Dr. Wolfes testimony exceeded its
    prejudicial effect and admitted it as evidence at trial.

The Reasons for Judgment

[37]

The
    trial judge found the complainants account of what happened was reliable and
    credible for several reasons. The complainants account of the events was
    specific and clear, barren of material inconsistencies and untainted by
    improper influence.

[38]

The
    trial judge also found the complainants account of what had happened credible
    and reliable because his account was
corroborated
by other evidence
    adduced at trial. The most important corroborative evidence was the testimony
    about the seizure-like episode of April 25, 2009. Of that evidence, the trial
    judge said:

[123] Most importantly, I find that the Complainants
    spontaneous utterance while in a dissociated state of trauma and unaware of
    what he was saying at the time, confirms important aspects of his allegation of
    sexual abuse and uttering death threats.

[124] The Complainants evidence concerning the incident is
    consistent with the symptoms of trauma exhibited by him during his seizure on
    April 25, 2009. He had never suffered a seizure of this type before. The
    seizure was preceded earlier that day by a request to tell his mother more
    about how he felt during the incident and her reticence to engage in that
    conversation.

[125] Officer Shedes testified that during the seizure, the
    Complainant held his penis and said Hes going to kill meit hurts and when
    the telephone rang expressed extreme fear panic and yelled, Its uncle.
    Finally, the incident on April 27, 2009 where the Complainant saw two of the
    accused brothers is corroboration of the link between his disclosure of the
    threat made by the accused in the summer of 2007, his fear of the accused and
    the fact that the extreme fear was linked to the accused.

[126] I accept Dr. Wolfes opinion that it is harder to
    embellish the story where disclosure is made in the context of an emotional
    outburst.

[127] The evidence regarding this traumatic event leads me to
    believe that the Complainant suffered trauma and that the source of this trauma
    was the incident with his uncle, the accused. I say this not because he had the
    seizure but because while he had the seizure and was unaware of what was
    happening to him, he made statements expressing fear of uncle, indicated that
    someone was going to kill him and held his penis and behind.

[128] For all of these reasons I find the Complainants testimony
    to be both credible and reliable. When viewed in the context of the evidence as
    a whole, I do not find the accuseds blanket denial that the event took place
    to be believable nor does his evidence leave me with a reasonable doubt as to
    his guilt.

The Arguments on Appeal

[39]

For
    the appellant, Ms. Henein contends that the trial judge erred in admitting and
    relying upon evidence of the complainants
utterances
during the
    seizure-like episode as independent corroboration of the complainants
    allegations.

[40]

Ms.
    Henein says that reception and use of the complainants utterances as evidence
    of the truth of their contents offended both the hearsay rule and the rule that
    bars the introduction of prior consistent statements of a witness. No effort
    was made at trial to have the utterances admitted under either a traditional or
    the principled exception to the hearsay rule. Further, the utterances did not
    qualify for reception under any recognized exception to the rule relating to
    prior consistent statements. But even if a diligent search could unearth such
    an exception, the utterances would not be admissible for the proof of their
    contents, thus could not be corroborative of the complainants account.

[41]

Ms.
    Henein submits further that the trial judge erred in admitting and relying upon
    the
opinion
evidence of Dr. Wolfe about the value of the utterances
    and their origins in the alleged conduct that forms the subject-matter of the
    charge. Critical to the opinion of Dr. Wolfe was that the episode was an NES.
    But there was no admissible evidence that what occurred was an NES. Dr. Wolfe
    lacked the expertise to make such a characterization. He was not qualified to
    proffer any opinion about the nexus between the episode and the antecedent
    conduct.

[42]

For
    the respondent, Ms. Wassenaar takes the position that the evidence of the
    complainants conduct during the seizure-like episode was relevant and
    admissible at trial where no objection was taken. The complainants utterances
    were admissible under the narrative exception to the prior consistent statement
    rule and were available for use as circumstantial evidence that could assist
    the trial judge in her evaluation of the complainants testimony.

[43]

Besides,
    Ms. Wassenaar adds, the utterances of the complainant during the episode were
    admissible as evidence of the truth of their contents under both the
res
    gestae
exception to the hearsay rule, as well as in accordance with the
    principled approach. It follows that their use as corroboration of the
    complainants allegations was proper.

[44]

Ms.
    Wassenaar resists any claim that the opinion proffered by Dr. Wolfe should have
    been excluded. Dr. Wolfe was properly qualified to offer an opinion on the
    issue. His opinion did not extend beyond his expertise. The weight to be
    assigned to the opinion was for the trial judge to determine. Her assessment of
    it is subject to deference in this court.

The Governing Principles

[45]

Several
    principles have a say in whether evidence should be received in a criminal case
    and, if received, how the trier of fact is entitled to use it in reaching their
    conclusion.

[46]

Three
    fundamental principles determine whether evidence will be received in a
    criminal trial:

·

relevance;

·

materiality; and

·

admissibility.

[47]

The
    dispute here has to do with admissibility. Neither at trial nor on appeal did
    counsel for M.C. take issue with the relevance or materiality of the evidence
    of the witnesses who saw and heard what has been described as the seizure-like
    episode.

[48]

Admissibility
    is a legal concept, something that the law interposes for various reasons
    between relevance and materiality, on the one hand, and receivability on the
    other. Admissibility is not an inherent characteristic of any individual item
    of evidence, rather is a quality that the law attaches to it when it has
    satisfied all the auxiliary tests and extrinsic policies of the law of
    evidence. Evidence that fails to satisfy the requirements of relevance or
    materiality engages no rule of admissibility, rather is excluded as irrelevant
    or immaterial, as the case may be.

[49]

Among
    the rules of admissibility, three are at work here. Typical of such rules, each
    is predominantly exclusionary, negative by nature. Equally typical, each is
    subject to well-defined and limited exceptions. Our concern is with the rules
    relating to the admissibility of:

·

hearsay;

·

prior consistent statements; and

·

opinion.

The Hearsay Rule

[50]

Like
    admissibility, hearsay is not an inherent characteristic of an item of
    evidence:
R. v. Baldree
, 2013 SCC 35, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 520, at paras.
    30 and 36. The defining features of hearsay are two-fold:

i.

the statement is adduced to prove the truth of what was said; and

ii.

the absence of a contemporaneous opportunity to cross-examine the
    declarant.

Baldree
, at para. 30; and
R. v. Khelawon
,
    2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, at para. 56. The touchstone for the
    admissibility of evidence that is said to be hearsay is the purpose for which
    the evidence is adduced. Evidence is hearsay  and presumptively inadmissible
    if it is offered to prove the truth of its contents:
Baldree
, at para.
    36; and
Khelawon
, at para. 36.

[51]

The
    typical hearsay situation involves:

·

a declarant (who does not testify);

·

a recipient (who does testify);

·

a statement (that is offered in evidence); and

·

a purpose (proof of the truth of the contents of the statement).

[52]

The
    hearsay rule applies equally to out-of-court statements made by a witness who
    does testify in the proceedings when they are offered as proof of the truth of
    their contents:
Khelawon
, at para. 37;
R. v. B. (K.G.)
,
    [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, at pp. 763-764; and
R. v. Starr
, 2000 SCC 40,
    [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, at para. 158. The hearsay issue emerges in these cases
    when the witness does
not
repeat or adopt the information contained in
    the out-of-court statement and the proponent tenders the statement for the
    truth of its contents:
Khelawon
, at para. 38.

[53]

The
    exclusionary effect of the hearsay rule is not absolute. Hearsay evidence may
    be admitted under the traditional exceptions, which remain presumptively valid
    but subject to challenge on the basis of lack of necessity or reliability:
Khelawon
,
    at para. 42;
R. v. Mapara
, 2005 SCC 23, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 358, at para.
    15. Hearsay evidence may also be admitted if the proponent establishes the
    indicia of necessity and reliability under the principled exception:
Khelawon
,
    at para. 42; and
Mapara
, at para. 15.

[54]

When
    the hearsay rule is summoned as a basis upon which evidence should be excluded,
    the first inquiry should be whether the proposed evidence is hearsay:
Khelawon
,
    at para. 56. The central focus of this inquiry should be on the
purpose
for which the statement is being adduced. It is only where that purpose is to
    prove the truth of the contents of the statement that the hearsay rule is
    engaged and refuge must be sought under a traditional or principled exception
    for the evidence to be admitted.

[55]

A
    traditional hearsay exception permits the introduction of evidence of
    spontaneous statements about a declarants current physical condition, mental
    state or sensory impression, as well as excited utterances. Necessity is based
    on expediency since no other equally satisfactory source for the evidence
    exists either from the declarant or elsewhere. Reliability is rooted in the
    spontaneous origin of the statement before there is time for concoction.

[56]

Under
    the principled exception, the necessity requirement may be met where the
    declarant is unable (or unwilling) to provide a full and frank account of the
    relevant events, including the ability to recall significant details. The
    reliability requirement may be satisfied by:

i.

compliance with the indicia of
B. (K.G.)
;

ii.

the presence of adequate substitutes for testing truth and accuracy
    (procedural reliability); or

iii.

sufficient circumstantial guarantees of reliability or an inherent
    trustworthiness (substantive reliability).

See,
R. v. Youvarajah
, 2013 SCC 41, at para. 30.

[57]

Where
    the hearsay rule is engaged, the prior statement is presumptively inadmissible.
    Whether the exception invoked to justify admission of the hearsay is
    traditional or principled, the conditions precedent or indicia are established
    on a
voir dire
:
Mapara
, at para. 15.

The Prior
    Consistent Statement Rules

[58]

A
    second group of rules  the prior consistent statement rules  also has a say
    in the admissibility of the complainants utterances during the seizure-like
    episode. Like the hearsay rule, these rules are exclusionary, either
    restricting or prohibiting reception of evidence of declarations made by witnesses
    prior to trial consistent with their in-court testimony at trial:
R. v.
    Stirling
, 2008 SCC 10, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 272, at para. 5.

[59]

Prior
    consistent statements are an amalgam of two elements  a hearsay element and a
    declaration element: Paciocco,
The Perils and Potential of Prior Consistent
    Statements: Lets Get it Right
(2013), 17 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 181, at p.
    184. The hearsay rule takes care of the hearsay element. The prior consistent
    statement rules generally exclude the declaration element. Their rationale for
    doing so is that prior consistent statements lack probative value:
Stirling
,
    at para. 5.

[60]

Like
    other exclusionary rules, however, the prior consistent statement rules have
    exceptions. And as with other exclusionary rules, the exceptions to the prior
    consistent statement rules tend to exist where the purposes that underpin the
    general exclusionary rule would not be served by excluding the evidence:
Paciocco
,
    at p. 187. Typically, the exceptions permit introduction of the prior
    consistent statement where proof of it is relevant without an inference of
    credibility enhancement because the witness said the same thing previously:
R.
    v. T. (W.P.)
(1993), 83 C.C.C. (3d) 5 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 36.

[61]

Where
    prior consistent statements are admitted by exception, the statements tend to
    be admissible for limited or restricted purposes. Sometimes, the hearsay part
    is admitted. Other times, however, the declaration part comes in. At all
    events, the exceptions are rules of limited or restricted admissibility.

[62]

Among
    the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule for prior consistent statements
    are statements admitted as:

i.

circumstantial evidence;

ii.

narrative; and

iii.

narrative as circumstantial evidence.

[63]

Where
    prior consistent statements are admitted as circumstantial evidence, the
    statement is
not
received as evidence of the truth of its contents,
    rather only to establish that the statement was made. That the statement was
    made may afford circumstantial evidence of some fact of importance in the
    proceeding, as for example the declarants state of mind:
R. v. Edgar
,
    2010 ONCA 529, 260 C.C.C. (3d) 1. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that where
    the basis upon which the prior statement is admitted is that it affords
    circumstantial evidence of the declarants state of mind, that state of mind
    must itself be relevant in the proceedings:
R. v. Mathisen
, 2008 ONCA
    747, 239 C.C.C. (3d) 63, at para. 104.

[64]

Within
    limits, prior consistent statements that are necessary to unfold the
    narrative of a case and make material events comprehensible may be admitted
    in evidence. This exception permits proof of how a complaint got before the
    court, even though how it did is not a material fact that will assist the trier
    of fact in evaluating the adequacy of the Crowns proof of guilt, or in
    determining whether a defence, justification or excuse raises a reasonable
    doubt. The admission of narrative permits the decision-maker to understand the
    chronological cohesion of the case:
R. v. F. (J.E.)
(1993), 85
    C.C.C. 457 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 474.

[65]

Evidence
    of prior consistent statements admitted under this exception is not evidence
    that can be used to prove the truth of what was said. Nor can the prior
    statements sponsor an inference that makes the case for the party adducing the
    statement more compelling. The prior statement is admitted to help the trier
    the fact understand the case as a whole:
R. v. R. (A.E.)
(2001), 156
    C.C.C. (3d) 335 (Ont. C.A.), at para 15.

[66]

Sometimes,
    a prior consistent statement admitted as narrative may be of service to the trier
    of fact in the assessment of the truthfulness or reliability of the declarant:
F.
    (J.E.)
, at p. 476;
R. v. Dinardo
, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
    788, at para. 39; and
R. v. Evans
, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 629, at para. 32.

The Opinion Rule

[67]

The
    law of evidence distinguishes between fact and opinion. The distinction seems
    more and ultimately one of convenience rather than of objective reality. All
    sensory data is mediated by our powers of perception, assimilation and
    expression. But the distinction remains and is expressed in the rule that
    generally, but not universally, excludes evidence of opinion.

[68]

Among
    the exceptions to the opinion rule are the opinions of experts. Duly qualified
    experts may testify about subjects that are within their field of expertise, logically
    relevant to a material issue in the proceedings, and outside the experience and
    knowledge of the trier of fact:
Mohan
, at p. 20.

[69]

Experts
    combine information accumulated from their own work and experience, marry it
    with evidence adduced through exhibits, admissions and the testimony of other
    witnesses in the proceedings, and express an opinion about a factual inference
    that should be drawn from the accumulated materials:
Abbey
, at para.
    71.  These opinions are evaluated by the trier of fact, like any other evidence
    admitted in the proceedings, in determining whether the allegations contained
    in the indictment have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

[70]

The
    factual premise or construct to which the expert applies his or her expertise
    must be established, however, by evidence that is otherwise properly admissible
    in the proceedings. Mere reliance by the expert on a state of facts as the
    basis for his or her opinion does not amount to evidence much less proof of
    those facts. For example, a psychiatrist proffers an opinion about criminal
    responsibility based on an account of events provided to him or her by an accused.
    The account relied upon must be established by other admissible evidence:
R.
    v. Abbey
, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24, at p. 46 (
Abbey
82);
R. v. Boucher
,
    2005 SCC 72, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 499, at para. 31; and
R. v. D. (D.)
, 2000
    SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, at para. 55. Where the factual premise of the
    experts opinion is not established by otherwise admissible evidence, the opinion
    is entitled to less, in some cases, to no weight:
Abbey
82, at p. 46;
    and
R. v. Lavallee
, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, at p. 893.

[71]

Deciding
    the admissibility of expert opinion evidence involves two steps. The first requires
    a determination of whether the conditions precedent to admissibility have been
    met. The second, only undertaken on satisfaction of the first, consists of a
    cost-benefit analysis that asks whether the benefits of receiving the evidence
    to a correct decision exceed the costs to the litigation process of admitting
    the evidence:
Abbey
, at para. 76.

[72]

The
    criteria applicable to the first step in the admissibility inquiry are:

i.

relevance;

ii.

necessity;

iii.

absence of an exclusionary rule; and

iv.

a properly qualified expert.

Mohan
, at p. 20; and
Abbey
, at paras.
    75 and 80.

[73]

Among
    the
Mohan
criteria, two are of particular importance in this case: the
    absence of an exclusionary rule, and a properly qualified expert.

[74]

The
    absence of an exclusionary rule refers to an exclusionary rule other than the
    opinion rule itself:
Abbey
, at para. 80. For example, expert opinion
    evidence of an accuseds disposition must not contravene the bad character
    rule.

[75]

Whether
    a proposed witness is a properly qualified expert about subject-matter that is
    properly the subject of expert opinion evidence is determined on a
voir
    dire
after counsel proffering the evidence has defined the nature and
    scope of the proposed opinion:
Abbey
, at paras. 62-63;
R. v.
    Marquard
, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223, at pp. 242-244; and
R. v. McIntosh
(1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.), at p. 104. The trial judges task extends
    beyond deciding whether the proposed expert is qualified to proffer an opinion.
    The judge should also determine the nature and scope of the expert evidence and
    ensure that the experts reach does not exceed his or her grasp or extend
    beyond boundaries established by the trial judge:
Abbey
, at para. 62;
R.
    v. Sekhon
, 2014 SCC 15, at paras. 46-47; and
Marquard
, at pp.
    242-244.

[76]

An
    expert may refer to and be cross-examined upon authoritative works in the
    field. But without express adoption of the content by the expert, the opinions
    expressed in the works cannot become expert evidence for the trier of fact to
    consider in reaching their decision:
Marquard
, at p. 251. A review,
    even an extensive review by an expert of literature in a related field does
    not, without more, permit the expert to proffer an opinion on a subject outside
    the area of the experts field of expertise:
Mathisen
, at para. 126.

[77]

Evidence
    that meets the
Mohan
criteria will not necessarily be received and
    available for consideration by the trier of fact. At the second stage, the
    trial judge exercises a gatekeeper function. The judge decides whether the
    expert opinion evidence is sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to
    warrant its admission despite the potential harm to that same process that may
    ensue from the introduction of that very evidence:
Abbey
, at para.
    76.  It is only where the benefits gained by the introduction of the evidence
    predominate over the costs associated with its introduction that the evidence
    will be admitted.

[78]

To
    determine the benefits associated with the introduction of expert opinion
    evidence, the judge considers the probative value of the evidence, the
    significance of and the issue to which the evidence is relevant. Potential
    probative value includes an assessment of the reliability of the evidence, not
    merely of its subject-matter, but also the experts methodology, expertise and
    objectivity:
Abbey
, at para. 87.

[79]

On
    the cost side, the trial judge considers the consumption of time, prejudice
    and confusion. The trier of fact may not be adequately equipped to effectively
    and critically assess the evidence. The underlying material may be complex, the
    witness jargon impenetrable, and the evidence resistant to effective cross-examination:
Abbey
, at para. 90.

The Principles
    Applied

[80]

As
    I will explain, I would give effect to this ground of appeal. Evidence of the
    complainants
utterances
during the seizure-like episode was not
    admissible as evidence of the truth of their contents, and thus could not be
    relied upon as independent corroboration of the complainants allegations.
    And Dr. Wolfes
opinion
about the nature of the seizure-like episode
    and its origins in the sexual assault alleged by the complainant was beyond the
    scope of his expertise and otherwise inadmissible for want of proof of
    essential foundational facts.

[81]

Evidence
    about the seizure-like episode of April 25, 2009 consisted of two parts.

[82]

Two
    witnesses, the complainants mother and the police officer who responded to a
    911 call, gave evidence about their observations of the incident. They
    described what the complainant did and what he said during the episode. No
    objection appears to have been taken to this evidence.

[83]

Dr.
    Wolfe, a clinical psychologist, who had never met or spoken to the complainant,
    gave evidence about the symptoms of NES, PTSD and their relation to the
    seizure-like episode. He characterised the episode as symptomatic of NES and
    the behaviour as causally connected to the alleged sexual assault. Trial
    counsel for the appellant opposed the admission of Dr. Wolfes evidence in its
    entirety.
[2]

[84]

The
    appellants objections on appeal extend both to the admissibility of the
    evidence about the seizure-like episode and to its use by the trial judge in
    finding the Crowns case against the appellant proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt.

[85]

The
admissibility
of the evidence about the seizure-like episode, both the
    accounts of the eyewitnesses and the opinion of Dr. Wolfe about its nature and
    relationship to the prior allegations, is the fundamental issue we are required
    to decide. A trier of fact, whether a judge or jury, is disentitled to rely on
    inadmissible evidence in reaching a conclusion about guilt.

[86]

In
    the absence of any objection to the relevance or materiality of the witnesses
    accounts of the seizure-like episode, it is helpful to begin with a
    consideration of the admissibility of the
utterances
of the
    complainant during the episode. When considered together with the complainants
    gestures at the time, the evidence appears to amount to at least an implied
    assertion of the sexual assault the complainant alleged the appellant committed
    nearly two years earlier.

[87]

Two
    admissibility rules confront the utterances made by the complainant during the
    seizure-like episode.

[88]

When
    the dots are connected, the complainants words, coupled with his actions
    during the seizure-like episode, amount to a statement consistent with his
    testimony at trial that the appellant, whom he described as uncle but not by
    name, had sexually assaulted him in a particular way.

[89]

As
    a prior consistent statement, the complainants utterances during the
    seizure-like episode were inadmissible unless they fell within an exception to
    the exclusionary rule:
Stirling
, at para. 5.

[90]

The
    only relevant exception under which the complainants utterances can gain
    admission is the narrative exception  to explain how the complaint got into
    the court system and afford some chronological cohesion to the story:
F.
    (J.E.)
, at para. 42.

[91]

To
    be admissible under the narrative exception, however, a prior consistent
    statement must be truly essential in unfolding the narrative of how the
    allegations got before the courts:
R. (A.E.)
, at para. 15; and
F.
    (J.E.)
, at para. 33. The utterances made during the seizure-like episode
    are not truly essential to the unfolding of the narrative. The episode occurred
after
the complainant had made his second police statement and after
    the appellant had been charged with the offences for which he was being tried.

[92]

Further,
    even if the utterances during the seizure-like episode were admissible under
    the narrative exception to the prior consistent statement rule, admission on
    this basis neither proves the truth of what was said, nor furnishes a basis for
    any inference that the case for their truth is more compelling. Narrative
    enters merely to aid in understanding the case as a whole:
R. (A.E.)
,
    at para. 15.

[93]

The
    hearsay rule extends its exclusionary reach to implied assertions and requires
    them to shelter under a traditional or the principled exception to the rule if
    they are to be received at trial:
Baldree
, at paras. 48 and 78.

[94]

The
    record reveals no application by the trial Crown to have the assertions implied
    in the complainants utterances received as evidence of the truth of the facts
    they imply. Thus the trial record yields no basis upon which we could conclude
    that the factual predicate necessary to engage a traditional or the principled
    exception to the hearsay rule has been established on the balance of
    probabilities.

[95]

In
    the traditional exception relating to spontaneous statements, reliability is
    established by the spontaneous nature of the statement and the absence of any
    time for concoction. Necessity is based on expediency: the absence of any other
    equally satisfactory source of evidence from the declarant or elsewhere. But
    the statements admitted under this collection of exceptions refer to a
    then-existing state of physical or mental condition, not as here, one about an
    event that allegedly had occurred two years earlier.

[96]

For
    similar reasons, the utterances lack sufficient threshold reliability to
    justify their reception under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

[97]

In
    the result, even if the utterances portion of the seizure-like episode was
    properly admitted under the narrative exception to the prior consistent
    statement rule, the utterances were not admissible to prove the truth of their
    contents, the purpose for which the trial judge used them to corroborate the
    complainants account.

[98]

The
    opinion evidence of Dr. Wolfe should have not been admitted essentially for two
    reasons.

[99]

First,
    Dr. Wolfe, a clinical psychologist with neither practical nor academic
    expertise in NES episodes, proffered an opinion beyond the scope of his
    expertise.

[100]

Dr. Wolfe read
    an article, one survey article that critically reviewed existing literature on
    non-epileptic seizures and child sexual abuse. The article concluded that it
    was premature to draw
any
definitive conclusions regarding the
    relationship between child sexual abuse and non-epileptic seizures in
    adulthood. A review of a single survey article did not qualify Dr. Wolfe to
    give an expert opinion outside the field of his expertise:
Mathisen
,
    at para. 126.

[101]

Second, critical
    to Dr. Wolfes opinion were several foundational facts:

i.

that the episode, was in fact, a non-epileptic seizure;

ii.

that the assertions implied in the utterances were true; and

iii.

that utterances made during such episodes are reliable.

There was no admissible evidence of any of these
    foundational facts. In the absence of this evidence, the opinion of Dr. Wolfe
    should not have been admitted.

CONCLUSION

[102]

The trial judge admitted
    and relied upon evidence that should not have been received. This evidence was
    critical to her acceptance of the testimony of the complainant. Without this
    evidence, I cannot say that the trial judges conclusion would necessarily have
    been the same.

[103]

My conclusion on
    this ground of appeal renders it unnecessary to consider the other grounds
    advanced on the appellants behalf.

[104]

I would allow
    the appeal, set aside the convictions and order a new trial.

Released: August 27, 2014 (DW)

David
    Watt J.A.

I
    agree G.R. Strathy C.J.O.

I
    agree C.W. Hourigan J.A.

[1]
The complainant was seven years old when the relevant events allegedly
    occurred. He was 12 years old when he testified outside the courtroom at trial
    on a promise to tell the truth.

[2]
Dr. Wolfe also gave evidence about delayed, incremental and inconsistent
    disclosure by victims of child sexual abuse. This portion of his opinion was
    challenged as unnecessary. The challenge to his opinion about NES was based on
    his lack of qualifications to proffer the opinion.


WARNING

The President of the panel hearing this appeal directs
    that the following should be attached to the file:

An order restricting publication in this proceeding
    under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the
Criminal Code
shall continue.  These sections of
the Criminal Code
provide:

486.4(1)       Subject to subsection (2), the
    presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information
    that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any
    document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a)     any of the following offences;

(i)      an offence under section 151, 152, 153,
    153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212,
    213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 or 347,

(ii)      an offence under section 144 (rape), 145
    (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent
    assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with
    intent) of the
Criminal Code
, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of
    Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983, or

(iii)     an offence under subsection 146(1)
    (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a
    female between 14 and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and
    18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality),
    157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167
    (householder permitting defilement) of the
Criminal Code
, chapter C-34
    of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January
    1, 1988; or

(b)     two or more offences
    being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence
    referred to in any of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (iii).

(2)     In proceedings in respect of the offences
    referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a)     at the first reasonable opportunity,
    inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the
    right to make an application for the order; and

(b)     on application made by the complainant,
    the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(3)     In proceedings in respect of an offence under
    section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any
    information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen
    years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material
    or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that
    section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in
    any way.

(4)     An order made under this section does not
    apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the
    administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make
    the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s.
    8(3)(b).

486.6(1)       Every person who fails to comply with
    an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is
    guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2)     For greater certainty, an order referred to
    in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against
    any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document
    or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could
    identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is
    protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
R. v. Medeiros, 2014 ONCA 602

DATE: 20140821

DOCKET: C57636

Laskin, Cronk and Blair JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Gilberto Medeiros

Appellant

Angela Ruffo, for the appellant

Dena Bonnet, for the respondent

Heard: June 17, 2014

On appeal from the sentence imposed on February 4, 2013
    by Justice A.M. Molloy of the Superior Court of Justice.

ENDORSEMENT

By the Court:

[1]

The appellant was convicted of five counts of sexual assault and four
    counts of sexual exploitation involving B.R., his girlfriends young daughter.
    The sexual exploitation convictions were stayed in accordance with
R. v.
    Kienapple
, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729.  The appellant was sentenced to five years
    imprisonment, less credit for 56 days pre-trial custody, yielding an effective
    sentence of four years, ten months and five days imprisonment.  Ancillary DNA and sex offender registration orders were also imposed.

[2]

The appellant seeks leave to appeal and, if leave be granted, appeals against
    sentence on the sole ground that the sentencing judge erred in her
    determination of the appropriate range of sentences.  He submits that his
    five-year jail sentence is unfit, harsh and excessive, that the sentence
    imposed should therefore be set aside and that a sentence of three years
    imprisonment should be substituted in its stead.

[3]

While I would grant leave to appeal, I would dismiss the appellants
    sentence appeal for the following reasons.

[4]

In the sentencing judges view, this was a case involving an adult
    offender in a position of trust who sexually abused an innocent young child on
    a regular and persistent basis over a period of about two years.  Based on
    this description of this offender and these offences, the sentencing judge held
    that the general range of applicable sentences was between five and nine years
    imprisonment.

[5]

The appellant does not challenge the sentencing judges characterization
    of the nature of this case.  That characterization is fully supported by the
    evidentiary record.  On the sentencing judges undisputed factual findings, the
    appellant sexually abused B.R. on multiple occasions in 2006  2007, when B.R.
    was eleven and one-half to twelve-years old.  The assaultive incidents occurred
    when the appellant, upon whom B.R. and her mother were financially dependent,
    was in a position of trust and authority over B.R.  As the sentencing judge put
    it, the appellant was an adult in [B.R.s] life that she trusted and relied
    upon as she would a stepfather.  [The appellant] had access to her because her
    mother trusted him completely.

[6]

The appellant contends, however, that the sentencing judge erred by
    applying the mid-to upper single digit penitentiary range of sentences
    identified by this court in
R. v. D.(D.)
(2002), 163 C.C.C. (3d) 471.
    He argues that this case is distinguishable from
D.(D.)
and similar
    cases because none of his assaults against B.R. involved actual penetration.
    Relying principally on the decisions of this court in
R. v. D.M.
(2012),
    ONCA 894 and
R. v. A.G.
(2004), 191 O.A.C. 386, the appellant submits
    that where there is no penetration, the starting point for sentences for sexual
    offences against a child by an adult in a position of trust or authority is
    three years in jail.  As a result, the appellant says, his five-year term of
    imprisonment represents a marked departure from the sentences imposed for
    similar offences in the [appellants] circumstances, and the sentence imposed
    is harsh and excessive and cannot stand.

[7]

We reject this ground of appeal.  It is immaterial in this case whether
    the appropriate starting point for the fashioning of a fit sentence for the
    appellant was three years in jail, as now urged by the appellant, or five years
    in jail, on the authority of
D.(D.)
.  Counsel for the appellant
    submitted at the sentencing hearing that the appropriate range of sentences on
    the facts here was between two to five years imprisonment.  Thus, the sentence
    imposed by the sentencing judge was at the upper end of the range acknowledged
    by the appellant as appropriate in all the circumstances, and at the low end of
    the range contemplated in
D.(D.)
.

[8]

In our view, it cannot be said that the sentence imposed in this case
    was manifestly unfit.  The appellant supplied B.R. with drugs and alcohol and
    exploited her vulnerable state after her consumption of the drugs and alcohol
    he provided.  He did so on numerous occasions when B.R.s mother was unable to
    assist B.R. due to her own drug and alcohol consumption.  This pattern of
    grooming conduct by the appellant was an aggravating circumstance, as was
    B.R.s virtually helpless condition and extreme vulnerability at the time of
    the assaults.  An accuseds grooming of his or her child victim is one of the
    aggravating factors identified by this court in
D.M.
as justifying a
    penitentiary sentence of five years or more.

[9]

It is true that, in some cases, this court has upheld or imposed
    sentences of less than five years imprisonment for conduct that might be
    regarded as more egregious than that of the appellant.  In this case, while it
    was open to the sentencing judge to impose a lower sentence, she was not
    obliged to do so.  Whether calculated from a starting point of three or five
    years imprisonment, the sentence imposed reflects no error in principle and is
    neither outside the applicable range nor manifestly unfit for these serious
    crimes.

[10]

In
    these circumstances, the sentencing judges decision attracts significant
    deference from this court.  We see no basis for appellate interference with
    it.  Nor does the fresh evidence sought to be filed by the appellant alter this
    conclusion.

[11]

Accordingly,
    while leave to appeal sentence is granted, the sentence appeal is dismissed.

J.I. Laskin J.A.

E.A. Cronk J.A.

R.A. Blair J.A.


WARNING

THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE

YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT

AND IS SUBJECT TO:

110(1)          Subject to this section, no person
    shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a
    young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt
    with under this Act.

111(1)          Subject to this section, no person
    shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information
    related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young
    person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in
    connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a
    young person.

138(1)          Every person who contravenes
    subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity
    of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless
    authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no
    subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be
    published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure
    by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of
    records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the
Young Offenders
    Act
, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
    to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary
    conviction.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. P.C., 2014 ONCA 577

DATE: 20140812

DOCKET: M43452 (C56813)

Weiler, Feldman and Hourigan JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

P.C. (A Young Person)

Applicant (Appellant)

John R. Mann III, for the applicant

J. Sandy Tse, for the respondent

Heard: April 23, 2014

On an application for a declaration that s. 684(1) of the
Criminal Code
violates the applicants rights under the
Charter of
    Rights and Freedoms
and is of no force and effect.

Weiler J.A.:

A.

overview

[1]

The accused, a young offender at the time, was tried by a judge and jury
    and found guilty of manslaughter. He wishes to appeal his conviction but lacks
    the resources to retain counsel.

[2]

Section 684(1) of the
Criminal Code
,

R.S.C., 1985, c.C-34
    gives a judge the discretion to appoint counsel for an indigent accused on
    appeal, where it appears desirable in the interests of justice.

[3]

The accused submits that an indigent person has an automatic right to
    state funded counsel for a first appeal especially when he is subject to
    imprisonment. In addition, the accused submits that any prerequisite on him to
    show that the appeal has some merit offends his
Charter
rights
[1]
.
    He relies specifically on ss. 15 (right to equal benefit and protection of the
    law), 10(b) (the right to counsel on arrest or detention), 7 (right to life,
    liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
    without due process of law), and 11(d) (right to a fair trial).

[4]

For the reasons that follow I would dismiss the appeal and uphold the
    constitutionality of s. 684. Because the accuseds liberty interests are
    affected, s. 7 gives him the right to state funded counsel where it is
    essential to ensure the exercise of his right of appeal is both meaningful and
    effective. This determination is made on a case-specific basis. The fact that
    s. 684 does not give an accused person an automatic right to publicly funded
    counsel in all cases does not violate the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Contrary to the appellants submission, s. 684 does not undermine an accuseds
Charter
right to fair treatment; it enhances them.

B.

Background

[5]

At his trial, the accused had the benefit of assistance from two legal aid-funded
    counsel. In addition, he required the assistance of an interpreter throughout
    the trial. Following his conviction, the accused filed a notice of appeal and
    applied for legal aid to fund his appeal. His request was denied on the basis
    of lack of merit. His appeal from that decision was also denied.

[6]

The accused then brought a motion to have counsel appointed for him to
    argue his appeal pursuant to s. 684(1). The Crown conceded that the second
    requirement of s. 684(1) was met, as the accused does not have sufficient means
    to retain counsel.

[7]

The Crown submitted, however, that the accused had failed to satisfy the
    first requirement of showing that it appeared desirable in the interests of
    justice that the accused should have legal assistance. In support of this
    submission, the Crown asserted that the accused must show that the appeal has
    merit in the sense of being an arguable appeal. The Crown relied on the
    decision of Doherty J.A. in
R. v. Bernardo
(1997), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 123
    (Ont. C.A.), at para. 22, that it was appropriate for the court to begin with
    an inquiry into the merits of the appeal to determine whether the appeal was
    arguable. The Crown also relied on Doherty J.A.s comment, at para. 22, that [a]ppeals
    which are void of merit will not be helped by the appointment of counsel. In
    support of its position, the Crown filed the reports refusing the accused legal
    aid for his appeal.

[8]

The motions judge dismissed the application for the appointment of
    counsel pursuant to s. 684(1). The accused also requested that the transcripts
    of the trial necessary for the appeal be produced at public expense, and this
    request was granted.

[9]

The accused now challenges the constitutionality of s. 684 of the
Criminal
    Code
.

C.

analysis

[10]

Section
    684(1) provides:

A court of appeal or a judge of that court may, at
    any time, assign counsel to act on behalf of an accused who is a party to an
    appeal or to proceedings preliminary or incidental to an appeal where, in the
    opinion of the court or judge, it appears desirable in the interests of justice
    that the accused should have legal assistance and where it appears that the
    accused has not sufficient means to obtain that assistance.

(1)

Section 15

[11]

The
    accused argues that because persons with means can hire counsel for an appeal
    irrespective of whether the appeal has merit, indigent accused should have the
    same right.

[12]

Section
    15(1) gives every individual a guarantee of equality before and under the law
    as well as the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
    discrimination. The grounds of discrimination enumerated in s. 15(1) are not
    exhaustive. Discrimination on grounds analogous to those set out in s. 15(1),
    generally discrimination on the basis of irrelevant personal characteristics, is
    also prohibited:
Andrews v. Law Society of B.C.
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at
    p. 165.

[13]

The
    accuseds argument was directly addressed by the Alberta Court of Appeal in
R.
    v. Robinson
(1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 452 (Alta. C.A.) which held that the
Charter
did not require an automatic right to publicly funded counsel for an accuseds
    appeal. In relation to s. 15, the court held, at p. 485, that:

The Canadian public would hardly class as discriminatory social
    schemes that make public legal assistance available to the deserving. Quite the
    reverse.

If, somehow, the inability to pay for advocacy can be an
    irrelevant personal characteristic and therefore, discriminatory, then section
    684 and the other legal aid schemes combat it.

[14]

I
    agree with these comments. Section 684 is an ameliorative program that falls
    within s. 15(2) of the
Charter
. Even assuming that poverty is an
    analogous ground for the purposes of s. 15  an argument that this court
    rejected in
R. v. Banks
, 2007 ONCA 19, 84 O.R. (3d) 1, leave to appeal
    to S.C.C. refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 139  s. 684 remedies any disadvantage suffered
    by low-income appellants by supplying them with state-funded counsel provided it
    is desirable in the interests of justice to do so. A remedial program need not
    assist all members of a disadvantaged group:
Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs
    and Northern Development) v. Cunningham
, 2011 SCC 37, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670,
    at para. 41. Therefore, the fact that s. 684 does not provide state-funded
    counsel for all indigent accused does not mean that it automatically violates
    the
Charter
. I would dismiss the applicants challenge on the basis of
    s. 15.

(2)

Sections 10(b), 11(d) and 7 of the
Charter

[15]

In
    interpreting the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter
, the
    proper approach is to adopt a purposive analysis:
R. v. Big M. Drug Mart
    Ltd.,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. The purpose of s. 684 is to provide counsel for
    an indigent accused person on a case-specific basis where it is in the
    interests of justice to do so.

[16]

Section
    10(b) gives a person the right to retain and instruct counsel upon arrest or
    detention. I am not aware of any Canadian jurisprudence holding that s. 10(b)
    has application on an appeal. The s. 10(b) right has two main purposes: to
    ensure individuals who are arrested or detained are informed of their legal
    rights and obligations, and to permit them to obtain information about how to
    exercise those rights:
R. v. Manninen
, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, at pp.
    1242-43. In so doing, s. 10(b) aims to foster the principle of adjudicative
    fairness by ensuring the accused is treated fairly:
R. v. Brydges
,
    [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, at p. 203.

[17]

This
    concept of fairness also underlies the guarantees in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the
Charter
.
    For example, s. 7 guarantees a fair process, having regard to the nature of
    the proceedings at issue:
United States of America v. Ferras
, 2006
    SCC 33, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 77, at para. 14. Similarly, the right to a fair trial
    in s. 11(d) recognizes the vital importance in ensuring that the state
    treat each individual in accordance with basic principles of decency and fair
    play:
R. v. Burlingham
, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206, at para. 86. Thus,
    together, ss. 10(b), 7 and 11(d) promote fair treatment of the accused, from
    the point of arrest or detention and throughout his or her interactions with
    the criminal justice system.

[18]

Robinson
points out that the
Charter
does not contain specific reference to
    appeals. I do not read
Robinson
as saying the fact that there is no
    constitutionally protected right of appeal does not mean that the
Charter
has no application to s. 684. As I have said, ss. 10(b), 7 and 11(d)
    together protect an accuseds right to fair treatment from the point of arrest
    or detention through to the end of the adjudicative process. The liberty
    interests protected by s.7 would also encompass appeals. Moreover, to the
    extent the phrase the interests of justice in s. 684 is considered to be
    ambiguous, any ambiguity in a statute must be resolved in light of
Charter
values:
Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex
, 2002 SCC 42, [2002]
    2 S.C.R. 559, at paras. 62-64. The
Charter
s silence respecting the
    right to an appeal therefore does not mean that the underlying value of fair
    treatment of an accused enshrined in the
Charter
does not apply to
    appeals.

[19]

An
    indication of what the international community considers to be fair treatment
    towards an indigent accused is contained in Article 14 of the International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, to which Canada is a
    signatory. Article 14 guarantees the right of a person accused of criminal
    charges to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the
    interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if
    he does not have sufficient means to pay for it. The phrase the interests of
    justice mirrors that used in s. 684 and mandates an individual case-specific
    approach. A factor to consider in deciding whether s. 684 is constitutional is
    the the fact that the international community, and Canadas obligations as part
    of that community, do not automatically require state-funded counsel for all
    indigent accused persons facing criminal proceedings. See by analogy
R. v.
    Stucky
, 2009 ONCA 151, 240 C.C.C. (3d) 141,

at paras. 37, 42,
    leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 186 (appeal subsequently
    abandoned); and
R. v. Keegstra
, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at pp. 733-34.

[20]

Our
    court has held that in the context of a trial, an indigent accused has no
    automatic right to be provided with publicly funded counsel but, in cases not
    falling within provincial legal aid plans, ss. 7 and 11(d) may require the
    appointment of counsel if that is necessary for a fair trial
[2]
:
R. v. Rowbotham
(1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 66.

[21]

In
    asserting that the
Charter
gives an indigent accused an automatic
    right to state funded counsel without a preliminary showing of merit on an
    appeal, the accused relies on jurisprudence respecting the Sixth Amendment to
    the United States Constitution and decisions such as
Gideon v. Wainwright,
372
    U.S. 335 (1963);
Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Miranda
    v. Arizona
, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and
Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407
    U.S. 25 (1972).

[22]

This
    American jurisprudence has already been considered in
Rowbotham
and
    rejected as inapplicable to the Canadian context, partly on the basis of the
    comprehensive legal aid plans in each province. The Supreme Court has also
    emphasized the importance of the legal aid and duty counsel systems in carrying
    out the purposes of s. 10(b):
Brydges
, at pp. 206-14. In addition,
Rowbotham
recognizes that on a case-specific basis the appointment of counsel may be
    required under the
Charter.

[23]

Thus,
    unlike the American jurisprudence, the
Charters
s. 11(d) fair trial
    jurisprudence requires a case-specific determination of whether the assistance
    of counsel is essential to maintain a constitutionally appropriate level of
    fair treatment of an accused. It makes no sense to suggest that an accused can
    have a constitutionally fair trial without a lawyer, but that a
    constitutionally fair appeal without a lawyer is impossible. In interpreting a
    statute, courts are reluctant to accept interpretations that violate legal
    norms such as rationality and coherence. Ruth Sullivan,
Sullivan on the
    Construction of Statutes
, 5
th
ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 2008),
    at p. 8. Sullivans conclusion applies equally to the interpretation of rights
    under the
Charter
.

[24]

Robinson
also rejected the American jurisprudence on which the appellant relies. The
    accused seeks to distinguish
Robinson
on the basis that [t]he Alberta
    Court of Appeal did not address the conflict raised here between the express
    language of section 10(b) with section 684 of the
Criminal Code
. I
    disagree that
Robinson
can be distinguished on this basis. The accused
    in
Robinson
initially sought the appointment of counsel under s. 684(1),
    and the issue before the court was whether, when ss. 7, 10(b), 11(d) and 15 of the
Charter
are considered, s. 684(1) is unconstitutional. That is
    precisely the question before this court.

[25]

The
    Crown concedes that ss. 7 and 11(d) of the
Charter
give an indigent
    accused the right to counsel in certain circumstances but submits that a
    preliminary showing of merit is always necessary. The Crown states that:

Sections 7 and 11(d) of the
Charter
only demand that counsel
    be provided where it is necessary to ensure a fair trial or appeal. As noted by
    this Court in
Bernardo
"Appeals which are void of merit will
    not be helped by the appointment of counsel.

[26]

The
    Crowns position is too narrow. I say this for two reasons. First, Doherty J.A.
    noted that he was not dealing with the constitutionality of s. 684(1).
    Therefore, the Crown cannot use his comments as determinative of the
    constitutional issue before this court. Second, the interests of justice
    involve other considerations besides the effective presentation of an appeal,
    and
Bernardo
does not cover all of the situations in which an
    application under s. 684 arises. As I will explain, the need to appoint counsel
    in order for the accuseds appeal to be fair has two aspects. The accused must
    have a full and fair opportunity to
exercise
any right of appeal he
    has and he must be able to
effectively present it
.

[27]

As
    a preliminary step, meaningful exercise of a right of appeal may, in
    exceptional circumstances, require the appointment of counsel to assist an
    accused in ascertaining whether he has identified an arguable ground of appeal.
    When this is the case at the time of a s. 684 application, the motion judge can
    appoint counsel for that limited purpose: see e.g.
R. v. J. N.
, 2013
    ONCA 251, 305 O.A.C. 175.

[28]

In
Bernardo
,

the court was dealing with the second aspect of an
    appeal  the presentation or argument of the appeal itself. The grounds of
    appeal had been determined. As this was the second request to appoint counsel,
    the court had the benefit of an expanded record as well as an opinion with
    respect to the merits of the appeal from a well-regarded defence counsel. On
    the initial application to appoint counsel under s. 684, the motion judge did
    not find the appeal to be frivolous and the Crown had not suggested otherwise. The
    question was whether the appellant required the assistance of counsel to
    effectively present the grounds of appeal.

[29]

Once
    the grounds of appeal have been ascertained and the question is whether to
    appoint counsel under s. 684 for the purposes of effectively presenting the
    appeal, the appeal must be arguable. In this context, the comment of Doherty
    J.A. in
Bernardo,
at para. 22,

that [a]ppeals which are void
    of merit will not be helped by the appointment of counsel is a common-sense
    one. The accused is entitled to conduct his appeal as he sees fit. It is not
    unheard of for an accused to raise a ground of appeal for which there is a
    complete lack of support in the trial record, such as alleging that the trial
    judge was biased. Although the appeal does not raise an arguable issue, the
    accused can still make the submission. However, assuming the accused has the
    ability to have his submission communicated to the court, either directly or
    through an interpreter, the appointment of counsel will not assist the accused
    in effectively presenting his appeal. Nor will the panel hearing the appeal
    require the assistance of counsel in order to decide the appeal. Thus,
    requiring the accused to demonstrate that he has an arguable appeal does not
    treat the accused unfairly.

[30]

The inquiry as to whether an appeal is arguable imports an
    aspect of rational objectivity into the appeal process. Rational objectivity
    does not equate to unfair treatment of an accused and is not contrary to the
Charter.
For example, to make out a breach of
    the s. 7 right to make full answer and defence under the
Charter
on the ground of lost evidence, the
    accused must establish actual prejudice:
R. v. La,
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 680.  Thus, there is a balancing of
    the accuseds right to fair treatment against the states interest in effective
    and efficient conclusion of litigation. Similarly, in
R. v.
    Hebert,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, the
    Supreme Court held that in determining whether an accuseds right to silence
    has been breached under s. 7, the test is essentially objective and it seeks to
    effect a balance between the respective interests of the accused and the state.

[31]

Four
    aspects of the manner in which s. 684 functions ensure that an accused person
    is treated fairly and support its constitutionality. First, the fact that legal
    aid has been refused is certainly not determinative of whether the interests
    of justice require counsel to be appointed. Were this so, s. 684 would be
    redundant. The criteria for determining whether it is justified to fund an
    appeal under the legal aid plan pursuant to s. 25(1) of the
Legal Aid
    Services Act,
1998, S.O. 1998, c. 26, are not the same as those considered
    under s. 684(1) in determining whether the interests of justice require the
    appointment of counsel. Second, the courts decision under s. 684(1) is
    not in any way a review of the correctness of Legal Aids decisions:
Bernardo
,
    at para. 4.

[32]

Second,
    unlike legal aid, the cost of assigning counsel cannot affect the courts
    determination under s. 684(1) because the costs associated with the
    appointment of counsel must be accepted as the price of the proper
    administration of justice.
Bernardo
, at para. 28.

[33]

Third,
    an indigent accused almost always has the assistance of duty counsel or legal
    aid-funded counsel to argue the s. 684 motion. And, as I have said, the court
    may in exceptional circumstances provide a limited s. 684 appointment for the
    purpose of assisting the accused in determining whether there are arguable
    grounds of appeal. If duty counsel has been asked to make the application on
    behalf of the accused, then, in addition to the notice of appeal, the reasons
    of the trial judge or the charge to the jury, duty counsel may have access to
    the opinion letter containing a written analysis of the grounds of appeal done
    for the purposes of requesting funding from legal aid for the appeal. If the
    accused has legal aid funded counsel for the s. 684 application, then, in
    addition to the record, counsels opinion respecting the legal issues will go a
    long way towards ensuring that any arguable issues are raised for the courts
    consideration. This assistance helps ensure that the accuseds exercise of his
    right of appeal is meaningful.

[34]

The
    assistance of legal aid funded counsel may also include assistance in preparing
    an affidavit to address the various criteria relevant to whether the accused
    can meaningfully exercise his right of appeal and effectively present it. In
    addition to information respecting the accuseds means, a non-exhaustive list
    of relevant considerations includes the seriousness of the charge of which the
    accused was convicted; the sentence he received; his age, education, and ability
    to speak, understand and write English or French; any disability he has; his
    familiarity or lack thereof with the criminal justice system; the length of the
    trial; the complexity of the appeal; the legal principles engaged; and the
    appellants ability or lack thereof to effectively relate them to the facts of
    the case. The fact that the accused is a youthful offender is also a factor of
    concern:
Robinson
, at p. 461.

[35]

Fourth,
    a decision on a motion pursuant to s. 684 is not a final one. The accused may
    ask that a panel review the motion judges decision refusing the appointment of
    counsel. An accused may also renew his application for the appointment of
    counsel. The decision as to whether or not to appoint counsel pursuant to s.
    684 is often made on the basis of a preliminary record. If that preliminary
    record does not disclose any arguable grounds of appeal, the accused, with the
    benefit of the trial transcripts often paid for with public funds, may reapply
    to have counsel appointed to assist him. These procedural aspects reinforce the
    case-specific approach to ensuring fair treatment of an accused.

[36]

Indeed,
    it may be that in this case, although the accuseds motion to have counsel
    appointed pursuant to s. 684 was dismissed, a renewed application would
    succeed. The accuseds counsel has chosen to continue to represent him and is
    to be commended for doing so. I understand that the trial transcripts have been
    obtained and a full appreciation of the record can now be had. If he renews his
    s. 684 motion, it may be that, on the basis of the expanded record, an
    arguable issue or issues have been raised. Based on the issues disclosed by the
    expanded record, the court may decide that the accused is unable to effectively
    present his appeal without the assistance of counsel, having regard to the
    serious crime of which the accused was convicted, the fact he was a young
    offender at the time, his inability to communicate in English except through an
    interpreter, and his lack of familiarity with the legal system and its
    principles.

[37]

For
    the reasons I have given, I would dismiss the accuseds application to declare
    s. 684(1) unconstitutional.

Released: August 12, 2014

(KMW)
    Karen M. Weiler J.A.

I agree K. Feldman J.A.

I agree C.W. Hourigan J.A.

[1]

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982
,
    being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

[2]
The Crown took the position that the holding in
Rowbotham
is binding on
    this court unless and until a five-judge panel holds otherwise: see
R. v. Docherty
, 2012 ONCA 76, 292 C.C.C.
    (3d) 465, at para. 43, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2013] S.C.C.A. No.
    18. The accused requested that a five-judge panel hear his application, but
    that request was denied.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Sinclair, 2014 ONCA 586

DATE:  20140814

DOCKET: C56873

Hoy A.C.J.O., Gillese and Lauwers JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Venese Sinclair

Appellant

Najma Jamaldin and Paul Genua, for the appellant

Nick Devlin, for the respondent

Heard:  July 17, 2014

On appeal from the conviction entered by a jury presided
    over by Justice Fitzpatrick of the Superior Court of Justice, dated July 26,
    2012 and the sentence imposed on May 21, 2013.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellants request for a new trial on the ground that it cannot
    safely be concluded that the jurys rejection of the appellants evidence was
    not influenced by the admission of hearsay evidence that the appellant was
    subject to a drug look-out when she arrived at Pearson from Trinidad is not
    opposed by the Crown.

[2]

We are satisfied that this appeal should be allowed.  The appellants
    conviction is quashed and a new trial ordered.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
R. v. Stevens, 2014 ONCA 591

DATE: 20140818

DOCKET: C55995

Sharpe, Simmons and Pardu JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Keifer Stevens

Appellant

Timothy Breen, for the appellant

Grace Choi, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: August 13, 2014

On appeal from the convictions entered on May 29, 2012 by
    Justice G. Miller of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting without a jury:
    2012 ONSC 3166.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

This appeal arises from a tragic motor vehicle collision that resulted
    in three deaths. The appellant, 19 at the time of the incident, was convicted
    of three counts of dangerous driving causing death and sentenced to one year
    imprisonment. He appeals the convictions.

[2]

Despite the capable argument presented by Mr. Breen, we are not
    persuaded that the trial judge erred in convicting the appellant of these
    offences.

[3]

The appellant attempted to pass three vehicles on a two-lane highway.
    The road was wet, the traffic was heavy and the appellant was proceeding up a
    hill so that the view of oncoming traffic was obscured. While the appellant was
    passing the other vehicles, the oncoming vehicle came over the crest of the
    hill. The fatal collision occurred in the oncoming lane. Both passengers in the
    oncoming vehicle were killed as was the passenger in the appellants vehicle.
    At the point of collision, the appellant was on the wrong side of the solid
    line.

[4]

The trial judge gave careful reasons reviewing the evidence in
    considerable detail and concluded as follows, at paras 82 and 83:

Was Keifer Stevens decision to pass at that location dangerous
    to the public having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature,
    condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and
    the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be
    at that place? I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was. The
    weather conditions, the heavy southbound traffic, the limited distances between
    the three vehicles Mr. Stevens attempted to pass and the limited visibility for
    oncoming traffic created by the existence of the hill and pointed out by the
    commencement of the solid line for southbound traffic all lead me to conclude
    that Mr. Stevens decision and action taken to pass those three vehicles at
    that location was dangerous to himself and his passenger, the vehicles he was
    passing and any oncoming traffic whether or not that oncoming traffic could be
    seen by him at the time.

Did Keifer Stevens conduct constitute a marked departure from
    the standard of care of a reasonable person? I am satisfied beyond a reasonable
    doubt that it did. In this case there was no direct evidence as to Mr. Stevens
    actual state of mind at the time but assessing his dangerous conduct as against
    the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver it is apparent to me Mr.
    Stevens was reckless in taking the decision to pass those three vehicles at
    that location and in those weather conditions and at the very least there was
    evidence that that two apparently reasonably prudent drivers, Mr. Hodsman and
    Ms. Kemp, were so shocked by Mr. Stevens decision to pass at that location
    that they each exclaimed aloud. I come to this conclusion even without any
    definitive evidence as to the speed Mr. Stevens was travelling at the time he
    made the pass and/or the time of the collision.

[5]

As for the argument that the cause of the collision was that the
    oncoming vehicle lost control, the trial judge found, at para 93:

I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the evasive
    action taken by Mr. Blake in driving onto the shoulder of the roadway when he
    saw Mr. Stevens vehicle in the northbound lane is a factor which Mr. Stevens
    would have seen as a likely consequence of his conduct. I am satisfied beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the subsequent loss of control by Mr. Blakes vehicle was
    also a factor which Mr. Stevens would have seen as a likely consequence of his
    conduct, given the weather conditions. I do not find that Mr. Blakes youth or
    inexperience as a driver was an intervening factor. I expect even an
    experienced driver, given the weather conditions and faced with Mr. Stevens
    vehicle in his lane, might well have attempted the same evasive action and with
    the same result.

[6]

On appeal, the appellant attacks the factual findings of the trial
    judge. The central point raised by the appellant is that the trial judge failed
    to take into account all of the evidence when concluding that the appellant
    initiated the pass in close proximity to the commencement of the solid line.

[7]

Mr. Breen advances calculations of the speed of both vehicles required
    to support the trial judges findings as to how this collision occurred and
    submits that the required speeds are unrealistically high.

[8]

We reject those submissions for the following reasons.

[9]

First, while derived from the evidence adduced at trial, the
    assumptions, calculations and conclusions we are asked to draw on appeal were
    not subjected to the requisite scrutiny of the trial process.

[10]

Second,
    as demonstrated by the submissions of the respondent, small changes in the
    variables significantly alter the calculations and we are not convinced that
    the calculations relied on by the appellant are sufficiently sound to upset the
    careful and thorough reasons of the trial judge.

[11]

Third,
    even if we were to accept those calculations, the result would be that the
    appellant travelled in the passing lane for an even longer distance without
    ever returning to his proper lane.

[12]

We
    do not agree that the trial judge erred in putting some weight on the
    contemporaneous utterances of two of the drivers expressing alarm at the
    appellants attempt to pass. In our view, the trial judge was entitled to view
    those first-hand reactions as supporting Ms. Kemps evidence as to the
    approximate location at which the appellant commenced his manoeuvre and the
    dangerousness of his driving.

[13]

Nor
    are we persuaded that the fact that the RV was able to stop safely before the
    point of collision detracts from the trial judges findings as to the appellants
    responsibility for the collision. No one saw the appellant successfully return
    to his own lane and we do not agree that the fact that he may have passed the
    RV demonstrates that he was able to complete the pass in safety. We note as
    well that the RV driver applied his brakes to attempt to allow the appellant to
    re-enter his lane.

[14]

Finally,
    we agree with the trial judges finding that, to the extent that the oncoming
    vehicle lost control, that cannot absolve the appellant of responsibility for
    the collision. We agree that given the manner of the appellants driving and
    attempt to pass three vehicles on the hill in wet conditions and heavy traffic,
    evasive action on the part of an oncoming driver was entirely foreseeable and
    caused by the appellants own conduct.

[15]

Accordingly,
    the appeal is dismissed.

Robert J. Sharpe J.A.

Janet
    Simmons J.A.

G.
    Pardu J.A.