COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. McFarlane, 2020 ONCA 548

DATE: 20200902

DOCKET: C63447, C63575 & C63583

Strathy C.J.O., Simmons and
    Miller JJ.A.

DOCKET: C63447

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Dwayne McFarlane

Appellant

DOCKET: C63575

AND BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Robert Roy Gardener

Appellant

DOCKET: C63583

AND BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Priscilla Bekoe

Appellant

Breana Vandebeek, for the appellant,
    Dwayne McFarlane

Tina Yuen, for the appellant, Robert
    Roy Gardener

Owen Goddard and Emily Quail, for the
    appellant, Priscilla Bekoe

Thomas Lemon and Ira Glasner, for the
    respondent

Heard: March 2, 2020

On appeal from the convictions entered
    on October 18, 2016 by Justice Jamie K. Trimble of the Superior Court of
    Justice, sitting with a jury.

B.W.
    Miller J.A.:

[1]

On June 20, 2011, Ms. Tania Whilby landed at
    Toronto Pearson International Airport with 1.4 kilograms of cocaine hidden in
    her suitcase. A jury found Ms. Whilby guilty of importing cocaine, contrary to s.
    6(1) of the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
, S.C. 1996, c. 19, on
    October 18, 2012. She was sentenced on January 21, 2013 to two years less a
    day imprisonment, to be served conditionally.

[2]

Prosecuted separately, the three appellants were
    found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine
    into Canada. The Crown alleged that Mr. Robert Gardener coordinated Ms.
    Whilbys travel to and from Jamaica, where she received the cocaine, and that
    Mr. Dwayne McFarlane and Ms. Priscilla Bekoe provided Ms. Whilby with her plane
    ticket and drove her to the airport in Toronto at the beginning of her trip.

[3]

Ms. Whilby was the main witness in the
    prosecution of the appellants. In the days before her sentencing, she
    identified Ms. Bekoe and Mr. McFarlane from photo line-ups as the people who
    drove her to the airport, following failed identifications several months
    prior, before her trial had started. The Crowns case against Mr. Gardener was
    based largely on text messages between him and Ms. Whilby over BlackBerry
    Messenger (BBM), in which he agreed to refer her to another person who would
    give her a plane ticket to Jamaica.

[4]

On appeal, the appellants each argue that their
    verdicts are unreasonable, and they challenge various aspects of the trial
    judges charge to the jury, including that he gave an insufficient caution with
    respect to the evidence of Ms. Whilby, pursuant to
Vetrovec v. The Queen
,
    [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811, and that his instructions with respect to Ms. Whilbys
    eyewitness identifications failed to focus the jurys attention on the
    frailties of that evidence.

[5]

For the reasons that follow, I would allow the
    appeals. I would order that all appellants receive new trials on the basis of
    errors in the jury charge.

A.

The Alleged Drug Importation Scheme

[6]

At trial, the Crowns theory was that Mr.
    Gardener assisted Ms. Whilby in obtaining plane tickets to and from Jamaica by
    referring her to an intermediary. That intermediary, who contacted Ms. Whilby
    through a BBM profile called Diggzz T dot, was alleged to be Mr. McFarlane.
    On the day of Ms. Whilbys flight to Jamaica, a man and a woman, alleged to be
    Mr. McFarlane and Ms. Bekoe, drove her to the airport in a black Cadillac. Ms.
    Bekoe also allegedly called Ms. Whilby while she was in Jamaica and told her to
    bring back alcohol and various food items for her. On Ms. Whilbys evidence, she
    was given a suitcase in Jamaica to carry these items. On her return to Canada,
    the suitcase was found to contain the cocaine.

(1)

Ms. Whilby Receives a Plane Ticket to Jamaica

[7]

Ms. Whilby testified that she was friends with
    benefits with Mr. Gardener, whom she knew by the alias Bliitsz. The two had met
    in person three times and communicated extensively on social media and BBM.

[8]

Ms. Whilby testified that she asked Mr. Gardener
    if he had a contact who could get her a plane ticket to Jamaica, where her
    boyfriend resided. She testified that Mr. Gardener said he could.

[9]

Sections of Ms. Whilbys BBM conversations with Bliitsz
    were introduced at trial. There was no serious dispute that Mr. Gardener was
    Bliitsz. Starting on Thursday, May 26, 2011, Ms. Whilby and Bliitsz spoke daily
    to discuss the status of the plane ticket. They discussed whether her flight
    would go to Kingston or Montego Bay, and at no point did Ms. Whilby or Mr.
    Gardener refer to the cost of the plane ticket or who would pay for it.

[10]

On Tuesday, May 31, 2011, Ms. Whilby again asked
    Bliitsz for the status of the ticket. He responded that the ticket would come
    over the course of the week. The week came and went. Their final communication was
    on Monday, June 6, 2011, when Ms. Whilby pointed out that the week had ended,
    and Bliitsz responded with an emoji. The record contains no further
    communications between Ms. Whilby and Bliitsz related to the plane ticket.

[11]

One week later, on Monday, June 13, 2011, Ms. Whilby
    confirmed her travel details with a BBM contact named Diggzz T dot, as part
    of a conversation that was also introduced into evidence. Diggzz sent Ms.
    Whilby a picture of her travel itinerary, indicating roundtrip flights to
    Montego Bay. Her flight would depart the next day. He asked her if she had a
    criminal record, and when she said no, he responded, K alright. Everything is
    good then, Ill text to later on tonight. He told Ms. Whilby he would pick her
    up the next morning at 6:15 a.m. in a black Cadillac.

[12]

The Crown alleged that Diggzz was Mr. McFarlane.
    Ms. Whilby testified that she came into contact with Diggzz through Mr.
    Gardener, but did not recall who initiated contact with whom on BBM. Ms. Whilby
    testified that Diggzz was Mr. McFarlane, but on cross-examination, she agreed
    that Diggzz could have been a woman.

(2)

A Man and a Woman Drive Ms. Whilby to the
    Airport

[13]

On the morning of June 14, 2011, Ms. Whilby
    provided directions for Diggzz to pick her up. He told Ms. Whilby that her
    luggage can only way up to 100lbs all together, and she responded that she
    only had two handbags.

[14]

Ms. Whilby testified that a man and a woman came
    to pick her up in a black Cadillac. She had never met the man who drove the car
    or the woman who was sitting in the passenger seat, and she did not recall hearing
    their names. Ms. Whilby testified that from her vantage point in the back seat,
    behind the passenger seat, she could only see the back and right side of the
    drivers face. She testified that she never looked into his eyes, and he never
    exited the vehicle. The woman accompanied Ms. Whilby to check in at the airport
    while the man remained in the car.

[15]

The Crown alleged that the driver was Mr.
    McFarlane and that the woman was Ms. Bekoe, based largely on eyewitness
    identification evidence from Ms. Whilby.

[16]

Initially, Ms. Whilby testified that she did not
    recall having conversations with the people in the car. Moments later, she
    testified that the woman told her a man named Ed would pick her up in Jamaica. She
    also testified that the driver provided her with her ticket, but then said it
    was the woman, after reviewing her preliminary inquiry testimony.

(3)

Ms. Whilbys Time in Jamaica and Return to
    Toronto

[17]

Ms. Whilby testified that while she was in
    Jamaica, she spoke with a woman over the phone and this woman requested that
    she bring a few beverages and snacks back to Toronto. The woman also told Ms.
    Whilby that she was flying to Jamaica on Tuesday. Ms. Whilby understood this
    woman to be the same woman who accompanied her to the airport in Toronto, based
    on the nature of the conversation and because she recognized her voice. In
    cross-examination, Ms. Whilby agreed that she believed it was the woman from
    the ride to the airport not because she recognized her voice, but because of
    the content of the conversation, as the woman asked about the flight and about
    Ed.

[18]

Ms. Whilby testified that Ed, who drove her around
    Jamaica, gave her the suitcase that was eventually apprehended by customs
    officials in Toronto. Ms. Whilby packed the womans beverages and snacks into
    the suitcase.

[19]

When Ms. Whilby returned to Toronto, Diggzz sent
    her a message to coordinate pick-up at the airport. Ms. Whilby was apprehended
    shortly after her landing, when police found the cocaine hidden in a false
    bottom of her suitcase. After Ms. Whilbys arrest, the RCMP seized her phone
    and used it to communicate with Diggzz, while posing as Ms. Whilby. The police
    never found Diggzz.

B.

The Police Investigation of the Appellants

[20]

On April 11, 2012, the police obtained a
    production order in relation to the BBM profile associated with Diggzz. The
    records revealed that a credit card registered in Ms. Bekoes name was used for
    a purchase through the BlackBerry account on July 23, 2011, one month after Ms.
    Whilbys trip to Jamaica.

[21]

On April 23, 2012, the police showed Ms. Whilby
    a photo line-up containing a picture of Mr. McFarlane. She did not identify him.
    On July 10, 2012, while Ms. Whilby was awaiting trial, the police showed Ms.
    Whilby three identical photographic line-ups containing a picture of Ms. Bekoe.
    Each time, Ms. Whilby failed to identify Ms. Bekoe.

[22]

The circumstances of these line-ups are not clear
    on the evidence. Ms. Whilby testified that police officers showed her photos
    sequentially in the back of a police car in Montreal. Ms. Whilby could not
    remember when the line-ups happened or which police officers conducted them,
    and her evidence is unclear on how many line-ups occurred. The Crown adduced no
    additional evidence on these points.

[23]

On January 16, 2013, days before Ms. Whilby was
    scheduled to be sentenced on January 21, 2013, the police conducted three more line-ups
    with Ms. Whilby in which she identified the three appellants. Ms. Whilby
    confirmed that on the back of Ms. Bekoes photo, she wrote, Without the wig
    her face shape her eyes, her look I remember it. On the back of Mr.
    McFarlanes photo, she wrote, eyes  hair was little longer then  shape of
    face conplexion of skin  Asian look. Finally, on the back of Mr. Gardeners
    photo, she wrote Facial  hair  I reconazize him quick eyes .

[24]

There is no police evidence in the record as to how
    the January 2013 line-up was conducted. What is known is that on January 20,
    2013, the day before Ms. Whilbys sentencing, the lead investigator interviewed
    Ms. Whilby. He told her that the Crown and the judge would know, during the
    sentencing proceedings, that she helped the police.

C.

Issues on Appeal

[25]

On appeal, the appellants each argue that their
    guilty verdicts were unreasonable because the evidence was too weak to sustain
    their convictions. Mr. Gardener also alleges that the trial judge erred in
    denying his application for a directed verdict of acquittal on both counts.

[26]

Relying on one anothers submissions, the
    appellants also challenge various aspects of the jury charge. They argue that
    the trial judge gave deficient instructions on the probative value of Ms.
    Whilbys evidence, as he failed to explain the basis for the
Vetrovec
caution
    and provided improper examples of independent confirmatory evidence. Moreover,
    the appellants also argue that the trial judge failed to convey the specific
    frailties of Ms. Whilbys identification evidence, reverting instead to
    boilerplate instructions. Finally, the appellants argue that the trial judge misapplied
    the Supreme Courts directions in
R. v. Carter
, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 938, when
    explaining which evidence the jury could consider at each stage of the
    conspiracy analysis.

[27]

I begin with the appellants unreasonable
    verdict arguments, as a court sitting in review of a criminal verdict must
    assume the correctness of the underlying jury charge:
R. v. Biniaris
,
    2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 38.

D.

The Unreasonable Verdict Appeals

[28]

When assessing the reasonableness of a criminal
    verdict under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the
Criminal Code
, the appellate
    court must consider the totality of the evidence to determine whether a properly
    instructed jury, acting judicially, could have returned the verdict:
Biniaris
,
    at para. 40. In this context, acting judicially means not only acting
    dispassionately but also arriving at a conclusion that does not conflict with
    the bulk of judicial experience:
Biniaris
, at para. 40. While the
    court must give due deference to the jurys advantages in the fact-finding
    process, the court must still assess the evidence, not merely identify its
    existence:
R. v. Phillips
, 2018 ONCA 651, 364 C.C.C. (3d) 220, at para.
    67;
R. v. W.H.
, 2013 SCC 22, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 180, at paras. 27-28. In
    a case such as this one, which relies heavily and perhaps entirely on
    circumstantial evidence, the question is whether the trier of fact, acting
    judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accuseds guilt was the only
    reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence:
R. v.
    Villaroman
, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 55.

[29]

Each appellant was convicted of conspiracy,
    contrary to s. 465(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code
, and of aiding Ms.
    Whilby in importing cocaine into Canada, contrary to s. 6(1) of the
CDSA
.
    On the conspiracy count, the Crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
    alleged conspirators intention to agree, the completion of an agreement, and a
    common unlawful design:
R. v. Root
, 2008 ONCA 869, 241 C.C.C. (3d)
    125, at para. 66, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 282;
Papalia
    v. R.
, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 256, at pp. 276-77;
The Queen v. OBrien
,
    [1954] S.C.R. 666. The appellants were convicted of the importing count as
    aiders, pursuant to s. 21(1)(b) of the
Criminal Code
. The Crown had to
    prove that the appellants each provided actual assistance to the principal by
    doing something that assisted the principal to commit the offence, that they
    intended to help the principal commit the offence, and that they knew the
    principal intended to commit the offence:
R. v. Huard
, 2013 ONCA 650,
    302 C.C.C. (3d) 469, at paras. 62-63, leave to appeal refused, [2014] 1 S.C.R.
    ix (note);
R. v. Briscoe
, 2010 SCC 13, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 411, at paras.
    14-17.

[30]

For the reasons that follow, I have concluded
    that the guilty verdicts of Mr. Gardener, Mr. McFarlane, and Ms. Bekoe are not unreasonable.

(1)

The Gardener Appeal

[31]

Mr. Gardener argues that his verdicts are
    unreasonable as the totality of the evidence was insufficient to establish that
    he was a member of the conspiracy, or that he did anything to assist Ms. Whilby
    in importing the drugs into Canada with the requisite intent and knowledge of
    her criminal intent.

[32]

Mr. Gardener did not testify. The Crowns case relied
    on circumstantial evidence from two sources: Ms. Whilbys trial testimony and
    BBM messages between Ms. Whilby and Mr. Gardener. A further BBM message from
    Diggzz was also potentially relevant.

[33]

Ms. Whilby testified that she knew Mr. Gardener
    before they communicated about the plane ticket via BBM. In the BBM
    conversations, Mr. Gardener and Ms. Whilby do not discuss what was to transpire
    in Jamaica, though they did address whether the ticket would take her to
    Kingston or Montego Bay. Ms. Whilby testified that she requested the ticket in
    order to visit her boyfriend. She responded no when asked whether she was
    curious at all that  about the fact that you didnt have to pay for [the
    ticket]. She testified that she had no intention to import cocaine when she
    left for Jamaica, and that she never discussed importing cocaine with Mr.
    Gardener.

[34]

Ms. Whilby was evidently frustrated when the
    ticket did not materialize in the time frame promised by Mr. Gardener. Over 12
    days, the BBM conversations between the two centred on Ms. Whilby asking Mr.
    Gardener whether his contact had fallen through, and Mr. Gardeners reassurances
    that despite the apparent delay, it had not. By the time of their final BBM
    exchange, on June 6, 2011, Ms. Whilby was still pressing Mr. Gardener for
    confirmation that his contact would come through.

[35]

One week later, on June 13, Ms. Whilby sent a BBM
    message to Diggzz  without any apparent introduction  asking him to provide
    her with a picture of her plane ticket to Jamaica. He responded with Ye hol
    up; Cuz Im driving and then later forwarded an image of the travel itinerary
    issued in her name for a flight leaving the next day for Montego Bay.

[36]

There is no BBM evidence of how Ms. Whilby and
    Diggzz were introduced, or who added whom on BBM. Neither are there any BBM messages
    in evidence between Diggzz and Mr. Gardener. Ms. Whilby testified that it was Mr.
    Gardener who put her in contact with Diggzz.

[37]

During the BBM conversations, Mr. Gardener
    referred to his contact who would provide the ticket as a he. Ms. Whilby
    testified that one of the two people who drove her to the airport on the day of
    her flight was a man.

[38]

When police officers seized Ms. Whilbys cell
    phone following her arrest, they communicated with Diggzz via BBM. In those
    communications, Diggzz asked: U tlk tu ur friend? and U spoke to b?. On
    appeal, the Crown suggests that b may have been a reference to Mr. Gardeners
    alias Bliitsz.

[39]

To establish Mr. Gardeners participation in the
    conspiracy and the importing offences, the Crown relied on Ms. Whilbys
    testimony that it was Mr. Gardener who put her in touch with Diggzz. It also
    relied on inferences drawn from Mr. Gardeners BBM messages with Ms. Whilby,
    and from Ms. Whilbys BBM messages with Diggzz. A week after Ms. Whilby had
    been messaging with Mr. Gardener to get her a free ticket to Jamaica through an
    unnamed source, she messaged Diggzz to provide her with an image of her
    itinerary, and he did so immediately. There was no evidence that Ms. Whilby had
    been pursuing a ticket through anyone other than Mr. Gardener.

[40]

It is obvious there must have been some prologue
    to these messages between Ms. Whilby and Diggzz. How did Ms. Whilby become
    known to Diggzz? Who asked Diggzz to procure a plane ticket for her and why?
    How did she know that a ticket for a flight leaving the next day had been
    issued in her name and that she should ask Diggzz for it? Who paid for the
    ticket? Why did Ms. Whilby  who had no means of paying for the ticket  not
    expect to pay? Why did she ask Mr. Gardener if he could arrange for a $20
    Rogers phone card for her?

[41]

A reasonable jury, properly instructed, was
    entitled to consider the entire context in which the communications between Ms.
    Whilby and Mr. Gardener and Diggzz occurred, and draw the inference that Diggzz
    was the contact that Mr. Gardener had promised, that Mr. Gardener introduced
    them, that Ms. Whilby had to have known that she was given a free ticket for a
    criminal purpose, and that Mr. Gardener, having arranged for the ticket, must also
    have known.

[42]

In short, there was sufficient evidence on which
    a reasonable jury, properly instructed could find Mr. Gardener guilty of the
    offences. This conclusion also disposes of the argument that the trial judge
    erred in not allowing the motion for a directed verdict.

(2)

The McFarlane Appeal

[43]

Mr. McFarlane argues that his guilty verdicts
    were unreasonable because the only evidence connecting him to the drug
    importation was Ms. Whilbys testimony alleging that he was Diggzz and that he drove
    her to the airport on the day she flew to Jamaica. Given concerns over the
    reliability and credibility of Ms. Whilbys testimony and in particular her
    eyewitness identification evidence, Mr. McFarlane contends that the probative
    value of that evidence was too weak to sustain his convictions.

[44]

Prior to her trial, Ms. Whilby failed to
    identify Mr. McFarlane in a photo line-up. Days before her sentencing, Ms.
    Whilby identified Mr. McFarlane from a photo line-up as the driver of the black
    Cadillac that took her to the airport. On the back of his photo, she wrote her
    basis for having identified him: eyes  hair was little longer then  shape of
    face complexion of skin  Asian look. The circumstances in which police
    conducted both line-ups are unknown, though Ms. Whilbys evidence was that the
    first line-up took place in the back of a police car, where she reviewed each
    photo sequentially. There is no evidence of Ms. Whilby providing any prior
    description of Mr. McFarlane to the police. At the appellants trial, Ms.
    Whilby repeatedly identified Mr. McFarlane in the courtroom as both Diggzz and the
    driver.

[45]

In cross-examination, Ms. Whilby testified that
    she and the driver of the black Cadillac never spoke. Moreover, she testified
    that she could only see the back and right side of the drivers head, as she
    was sitting behind the passenger seat. She never saw his face from head-on or looked
    into his eyes, and she could not estimate his height as he had never left the
    vehicle.

[46]

With respect to the Diggzz BBM account, Ms.
    Whilby testified that Mr. McFarlane was Diggzz. In cross-examination, however, she
    conceded that the person communicating with her from the Diggzz account could
    have been a woman.

[47]

Without Ms. Whilbys eyewitness identification,
    there would have been no case against Mr. McFarlane. There were, as counsel for
    Mr. McFarlane argued, difficulties with that evidence. Eyewitness
    identification evidence, in general, can pose a risk of wrongful conviction:
R.
    v. Tat
(1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 99;
R. v. Miaponoose
(1996), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 445, at pp. 450-51. Eyewitness identification evidence
    is particularly suspect where the person identified is a stranger to the
    witness, where the circumstances of the identification are not conducive to an
    accurate identification, where pre-trial identification processes are flawed,
    and where there is no other evidence tending to confirm the identification
    evidence:
Tat
, at para. 100.

[48]

Even setting aside the questions raised by the
    suspect timing of the successful photo line-up, immediately before sentencing,
    and having followed on from previous unsuccessful line-ups, there are
    difficulties raised by Ms. Whilbys testimony. On Ms. Whilbys testimony, the
    driver of the black Cadillac was a stranger and he did not introduce himself to
    her or speak to her. She never saw the front of his face or looked into his
    eyes  and yet she referred to these characteristics in explaining why she
    picked Mr. McFarlane out of the line-up. There is no evidence concerning the
    conduct of the pre-trial identification processes, other than that they occurred
    roughly 19 months after the drive to the airport, days before Ms. Whilbys
    sentencing and following an unsuccessful line-up roughly nine months prior. Ms.
    Whilby gave no explanation for the sudden change in her ability to identify the
    driver. Other than Ms. Whilbys testimony that Mr. McFarlane drove the black
    Cadillac and communicated with her under the Diggzz alias, there is no evidence
    linking Mr. McFarlane to the offences.

[49]

Of course, a jury is entitled to accept all,
    some, or none of a witnesss testimony. A jury was entitled to accept Ms.
    Whilbys identification of Mr. McFarlane, and reject her testimony about the
    limits of her observations of, and interactions with the driver. A jury could
    reasonably have concluded that Ms. Whilby was significantly more familiar with
    Diggzz than she let on, and if that was the case, it would bolster her ability
    to identify him. The BBM messages between Ms. Whilby and Diggzz, particularly
    an exchange after Ms. Whilby arrived at Pearson airport and was waiting to
    board her flight, suggested a greater degree of familiarity than would be
    expected if Diggzz was the driver, as Ms. Whilby testified, and that they had
    no conversation on the way to the airport, as she also testified:

Diggzz: U on da plane or too early.

Whilby: Im chillin .. Still .. My cuzzy is
    actually flyin too.

Diggzz: Da same plane?

Whilby: Yup.

Diggzz: Danm whats da odds of dat.. dats
    fuqin proper.

[50]

It would not have been unreasonable for the jury
    to have concluded, on this evidence, that Ms. Whilby had greater dealings with Diggzz/the
    driver than she admitted, and this familiarity supported her identification of
    Mr. McFarlane. On the totality of the evidence, I cannot hold that the jurys
    findings of guilt were unreasonable.

(3)

The Bekoe Appeal

[51]

Ms. Bekoes notice of appeal included a
    challenge to the reasonableness of her guilty verdicts, but her factum did not
    pursue those arguments. Counsel only devoted brief submissions to the issue
    during the hearing. In essence, Ms. Bekoe submitted that if this court found
    Mr. McFarlanes guilty verdicts to be unreasonable, it ought also to find Ms.
    Bekoes guilty verdicts unreasonable, as those verdicts are based on Ms.
    Whilbys testimony and eyewitness identification.

[52]

While I agree that the Crowns case against Ms.
    Bekoe was far from overwhelming, I am persuaded that the evidence established a
    sufficient connection between Ms. Bekoe and the drug importation scheme, such
    that a trier of fact acting judiciously could have convicted her. In
    particular, I note that a credit card in Ms. Bekoes name was associated with
    the Diggzz BlackBerry account. Although the relevant credit card transaction
    occurred a month after the drive to the airport and this credit card evidence
    is by no means a smoking gun, as counsel for Ms. Bekoe argued on appeal, it
    provides some support for Ms. Whilbys eyewitness identification of Ms. Bekoe
    and it links Ms. Bekoe to the Diggzz BBM account.

[53]

In the circumstances, Ms. Bekoes verdicts of
    guilty are not unreasonable.

E.

Errors in the Jury Charge

[54]

Having determined that the guilty verdicts at
    trial were reasonable, I address the appellants remaining submissions
    challenging the adequacy of the trial judges instructions to the jury. Of the
    many grounds of appeal that the appellants advanced collectively, two are
    particularly relevant.

[55]

First, the appellants argue that the
Vetrovec
caution with respect to Ms. Whilby was inadequate and distracted the jury
    from the main issues affecting her credibility. Second, they argue that those
    sections of the jury charge pertaining to Ms. Whilbys eyewitness
    identification evidence were also inadequate, in failing to focus the jurys
    attention on the specific frailties of that evidence.

[56]

For the reasons that follow, I accept these
    submissions. It is unnecessary to address the appellants submissions on the
    trial judges instructions on evidentiary principles flowing from
Carter
.

(1)

The
Vetrovec
Caution

[57]

As already noted above, Ms. Whilbys testimony
    suffered from numerous frailties. Apart from her conviction for personally
    importing cocaine into Canada, she was unable to identify the appellants from
    photo line-ups over the course of the police investigation until she positively
    identified all three appellants in the days preceding her sentencing hearing. This
    identification occurred roughly 19 months after Mr. McFarlane and Ms. Bekoe
    allegedly drove her to the airport, while the prior failed line-ups occurred within
    13 months of the drive.

[58]

The appellants challenge two aspects of the
Vetrovec
caution: first, that the caution failed to explain to the jury the reason
    why Ms. Whilbys testimony ought to attract special scrutiny in their
    deliberations, and second, that the trial judge gave incorrect instructions on
    material confirmatory evidence. I will address each argument in turn.

(a)

The Basis for the Caution

[59]

The trial judge explained that Ms. Whilbys
    evidence was subject to special scrutiny because she was convicted of bringing
    a suitcase containing cocaine into Canada, but maintained her innocence during
    the appellants trial. He also provided the following instruction in relation
    to her cooperation with the authorities:

Between her conviction and her sentencing,
    including on the day before her sentencing, Ms. Whilby met with RCMP Constable
    Dionne. In cross-examination, Ms. Whilby denied the suggestion that she made a
    deal with the police or the Crown that might lighten her sentence in exchange
    for her cooperation here. She admitted that she was sentenced to two years,
    less a day, served by house arrest. There is no evidence brought in this court
    about Ms. Whilbys sentence other than her evidence. When cross-examined on
    this issue, Ms. Whilby did not admit that she received a lighter sentence in
    exchange for her cooperation.

I will caution you now about hearsay briefly
    and return to it later. Ms. Whilby was cross-examined on a typewritten version
    of an audio or video recording, it is unclear which, of her conversation with
    RCMP Constable Dionne the day before her sentencing. The audio or visual
    recording was not played to you. The portions of that interview that were put
    to her read aloud are not evidence of the truth of their contents. It was not
    put into evidence, and Officer Dionne did not testify as to the conversations
    that were put to Ms. Whilby in cross-examination. Remember, that evidence is
    that which comes from the witnesses, the exhibits, or admissions. The
    transcript of the conversation that was put to Ms. Whilby in cross-examination
    was put there for the purposes of testing her credibility. Ms. Whilby, in the
    witness box, did not agree with the statements or adopt them as correct. The
    only purpose to which you can put the cross-examinations is assessing Ms.
    Whilbys credibility. In other words, use it to determine the extent to which
    you believe or rely on or accept her evidence. You may not accept what was
    reportedly said in that interview as being true.

[60]

The appellants argue that the trial judges
    instruction on hearsay was misplaced, as it distracted the jury from the fact
    that Ms. Whilby cooperated with the police and was led to believe that doing so
    would result in a lesser sentence. Instead, the instruction improperly
    discussed hearsay, focusing the jurys attention on whether Ms. Whilby in fact
    received a lesser sentence, which, the appellants submit, was irrelevant to her
    state of mind when she identified the appellants and the reliability of those
    identifications.

[61]

I accept this submission.

[62]

As the Supreme Court explained in
R. v.
    Khela
, 2009 SCC 4, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, a proper
Vetrovec
caution
    will generally explain to the jury why the evidence at issue is subject to
    special scrutiny: at para. 37;
R. v. Smith
, 2009 SCC 5, [2009] 1
    S.C.R. 146, at para. 14;
R. v. Maestrello
, 2019 ONCA 952, 383 C.C.C.
    (3d) 236, at para. 52, leave to appeal refused, [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 34. In
    addition to her conviction for the underlying importing offence, Ms. Whilby
    testified about her cooperation with the authorities on the eve of her
    sentencing. She denied that she did so to receive any benefit. However, in
    cross-examination, defence counsel put transcripts from Ms. Whilbys police
    interview to her. She agreed that the lead investigator described the effect of
    her cooperation with the authorities in the following terms:

CONSTABLE DIONNE: We, um, we, we had, we were
    able to add that. Um, but I mean, like tomorrow,
tomorrow
    is a big day for you and hopefully what we did today is going to help you.
Like I said, I cannot promise, but for sure the Crown and the judge does.
Theyre going to be aware that you helped us.
Okay?
    [Emphasis added.]

[63]

She conceded in cross-examination that the
    allusion to her big day referred to her impending sentencing hearing.

[64]

The trial judge fell into legal error in
    characterizing the excerpt above as hearsay. The excerpt was not proffered for
    the truth of its contents. It was immaterial whether the trial judge and trial
    Crown actually learned of Ms. Whilbys cooperation with the authorities, or
    whether her cooperation actually resulted in a lesser sentence. The purpose of
    this section of Ms. Whilbys cross-examination was to demonstrate that on the
    eve of her sentencing, Ms. Whilby had every reason to believe that she would
    benefit from cooperating with the authorities  even if doing so meant lying or
    identifying innocent suspects.

[65]

Although it was open to the trial judge to
    instruct the jury that Constable Dionnes statement could not be used for the
    truth of its content, the hearsay instruction effectively mischaracterized the
    evidence by not recognizing that Ms. Whilby accepted that Constable Dionne had
    told her that the Crown and the Court would be aware that Ms. Whilby had helped
    the prosecution, and that this would hopefully help her in her sentencing . The
    hearsay aspect of the statement was irrelevant to the necessary
Vetrovec
caution,
    and the focus on hearsay, and the related failure to explain the significance
    of the statement being made detracted considerably from the trial judges
    obligation to explain to the jury which circumstances brought Ms. Whilbys
    credibility into serious question. The instruction could only have generated confusion
    about whether Ms. Whilbys motive to cooperate with the authorities was or was
    not a factor in weighing her credibility. The trial judges instruction
    distracted the jury from considering one of the main reasons why Ms. Whilbys
    evidence was subject to special scrutiny.

[66]

In this respect, the trial judge fell into legal
    error. Because of the centrality of Ms. Whilbys evidence to the Crowns case
    against all three appellants, this error in the
Vetrovec
caution necessitates
    that the convictions of all three appellants be quashed, and new trials ordered
    on all counts. The potential impact of the error on the identification of Ms.
    Bekoe and Mr. McFarlane is readily apparent. Even though identity was was not seriously
    at issue with respect to Mr. Gardener, the
Vetrovec
error impacted him
    as well. Ms. Whilbys testimony that Mr. Gardener introduced her to Diggzz was
    central to the case against Mr. Gardener. As noted above, deciding whether to believe
    Ms. Whilby was no less important with respect to the the question of whether
    Mr. Gardener introduced Ms. Whilby to Diggzz, than it was with respect to her identification
    of Mr. McFarlane and Ms. Bekoe.

[67]

Although, in my view, this is sufficient to
    dispose of the appeals, I will nevertheless address some of the other alleged
    errors as they may bear on a retrial.

(b)

The Confirmatory Evidence

[68]

The trial judge explained to the jury the
    importance of searching in the record for evidence that was independent from
    Ms. Whilbys testimony and confirmatory of that testimony. He stated that her own
    BBM messages to other people did not qualify as independent. He then catalogued
    the evidence that was potentially independent and confirmatory, such as photos
    of her suitcase and the credit card records. He noted that she and Diggzz must
    have exchanged BBM PIN numbers in order to communicate, regardless of who gave
    whose to whom. He also referred to the following BBM messages:

·

Her BBM messages with Mr. Gardener, including
    her request for a ticket and the lack of any discussion about payment;

·

Her BBM messages with Diggzz, which confirm her
    discussions with Blitz about wanting to obtain the ticket to Jamaica and that
    she neither asked for payment, nor was asked for it;

·

Diggzz sent her a picture of her plane ticket
    and asked whether she had a criminal record;

·

Diggzz confirmed that he would pick her up in a
    black Cadillac and they exchanged messages on the morning of their drive to the
    airport;

·

Diggzz communicated further with Ms. Whilby when
    she was in the departure lounge and later, on the day of her return flight.

[69]

The appellants argue that the trial judge erred
    in referring to the BBM conversations, as they were not independent of Ms.
    Whilbys testimony, and they were also not material. I am not persuaded that these
    aspects of the
Vetrovec
caution were improper.

[70]

First, with respect to the independence of the
    evidence from Ms. Whilby, the appellants are correct that Ms. Whilbys own
    messages as part of these conversations were not independent of her and thus
    could not have constituted confirmatory evidence:
Khela
, at para. 39.
    However, the trial judge gave specific instructions to this effect:

The statements made by Ms. Whilby in [the BBM
    conversations] cannot be confirmatory of her evidence in the witness box. They
    are her statements, notwithstanding that they are record[ed] on her Blackberry.
    They are not independent.

The statements by others may be taken as
    confirmatory if they support her evidence in the witness box if you find that
    they are untainted and independent. That is for you to decide.

[71]

When read in context, the trial judges focused
    instructions in respect of the BBM messages equipped the jury with the tools
    necessary to determine whether those messages were independent. The appellants
    argue that even the messages of others were tainted by Ms. Whilby, as only she
    could authenticate their contents. From my review of the trial transcripts,
    there was no suggestion that Ms. Whilby had fabricated any of the contents of
    the messages on her BBM. The messages she received from Mr. Gardener and Diggzz
    satisfied the criterion of independence.

[72]

Second, with respect to the materiality
    criterion, the appellants argue that the evidence identified by the trial judge
    was not material as it did not go to identification, which was the main issue
    in the prosecution of Mr. McFarlane and Ms. Bekoe.

[73]

To be material, confirmatory evidence must be
    capable of restoring the triers faith in
relevant
aspects of the
    witness account (emphasis in original):
Khela
, at para. 43;
R.
    v. Kehler
, 2004 SCC 11, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 328, at para. 15. In
Kehler
,
    at para. 15, the Supreme Court explained that confirmatory evidence need not
    address only those parts of the witnesss testimony that are disputed in order
    to be material:

The appellant wrongly equates relevant with
    disputed. Mr. Greenwoods detailed account of the robbery, though undisputed,
    was no less relevant to the offences charged than his implication of the
    appellant in their commission. And while confirmatory evidence should be
    capable of restoring the triers faith in relevant aspects of the witnesss
    account, it hardly follows that the confirmatory evidence must, as a matter of
    law, implicate the accused where the only disputed issue at trial is whether
    the accused was a participant in the crimes alleged.

[74]

The trial judge conveyed to the jury that the
    confirmatory evidence must tend to show that [Tania] Whilby is telling the
    truth that any, some, or all of the three accused committed the offences with
    which they are charged. The evidence must also give you comfort that [Tania]
    Whilby can be trusted when she says that any, some, or all of these three
    people committed the offences with which they are charged. This court has
    determined that similar formulations adequately conveyed to the jury the scope
    of the materiality criterion for confirmatory evidence: see
R. v. Saleh
,
    2013 ONCA 742, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 431, at para. 99;
R. v. Saleh
, 2019
    ONCA 819, 380 C.C.C. (3d) 445, at para. 172.

[75]

Accordingly, I see no error in the trial judges
    instructions on material confirmatory evidence.

(2)

The Eyewitness Identification Evidence

[76]

The crux of the Crowns case against Ms. Bekoe
    and Mr. McFarlane was Ms. Whilbys eyewitness identification of these two
    appellants from her drive to the airport.

[77]

Ms. Bekoe and Mr. McFarlane argue that the trial
    judges caution on Ms. Whilbys eyewitness identification evidence was
    deficient in that it relied on boilerplate from specimen jury instructions,
    raising a number of irrelevant factors and failing to give due prominence to
    others that directly affected the reliability of Ms. Whilbys evidence. In
    particular, Ms. Bekoe and Mr. McFarlane argue that the trial judge should have
    drawn the jurys attention to the fact that Ms. Whilby failed to identify Ms.
    Bekoe and Mr. McFarlane from a line-up three times in one day 13 months after
    the drive to the airport, to the lack of evidence on whether Ms. Whilby had
    provided any descriptions of the appellants to the police before her ultimate
    identification days before her sentencing, and to the generality of her
    explanations for having identified the appellants.

[78]

I agree. Much like the trial judges
Vetrovec
caution, his discussion of eyewitness identification effectively deprived the
    jury of a proper understanding of the dangers of Ms. Whilbys evidence.

[79]

The jurisprudence has long recognized the
    potential risks of eyewitness identification evidence, requiring special
    scrutiny from triers of fact:
R. v. Goran
, 2008 ONCA 195, 234 O.A.C.
    283, at para. 19;
R. v. Hanemaayer
, 2008 ONCA 580, 234 C.C.C. (3d) 3,
    at para. 29. In most cases, the danger is an honest but inaccurate
    identification by a credible and confident witness:
R. v. Jack
, 2013
    ONCA 80, 294 C.C.C. (3d) 163, at para. 14;
R. v. Hibbert
, 2002 SCC 39,
    [2002] 2 S.C.R. 445, at para. 52. Trial judges enjoy significant discretion in
    crafting an appropriate caution, but where the evidence contains significant
    frailties, the trial judge must identify these specific frailties rather than
    rely upon boilerplate instructions:
R. v. Baltovich
(2004), 73 O.R.
    (3d) 481 (C.A.), at para. 78.

[80]

This was not the typical eyewitness
    identification case. The danger was not only  or not primarily  that Ms.
    Whilby would honestly identify the wrong suspects, but that Ms. Whilby could
    not be trusted to identify anybody. This was very much a case that required a
    bespoke instruction on the specific frailties of Ms. Whilbys eyewitness
    evidence. Instead, the jury received a lengthy caution that largely recited
    specimen jury instructions which raised factors that had no basis in the
    evidence, such as whether Ms. Whilby had compromised vision, or whether
    anything impaired her ability to observe the appellants, or whether she had
    seen other photos of the appellants in other contexts.

[81]

The jurisprudence cautions trial judges to
    remain alive to badges of unreliability in a witnesss identification of an
    accused:
Jack
, at para. 29. In this case, one important badge was the
    lack of any evidence concerning Ms. Whilbys prior descriptions of the
    appellants, followed by her subsequent generic explanations for why she chose
    their photos from the line-ups. The trial judge failed to draw sufficient
    attention to these frailties in the evidence.

[82]

On the subject of the lack of a prior description,
    the trial judge told the jury the following: In this case, it is unclear
    whether Ms. Whilby gave a description to the police of the three accused. You
    may consider whether she must have given descriptions in order that the RCMP
    could assemble the photo arrays.

[83]

I agree that this framing of the issue was
    improper. It tipped the scales in favour of the reliability of Ms. Whilbys
    ultimate identification, as it permitted the jury to infer an indicator of
    reliability from an absence of any evidence. Further, as this instruction was
    given immediately after standard instructions concerning the evaluation of the
    impact of a prior description, it effectively undervalued the important role a
    prior description plays in permitting a trier of fact to assess the reliability
    of a subsequent identification through comparison of the original description
    to the person identified.

[84]

The impact of this error was heightened with
    respect to Ms. Bekoe, as the RCMP may well have identified Ms. Bekoe as a
    suspect on the basis of the credit card associated with the Diggzz BlackBerry,
    not from any identification by Ms. Whilby. Indeed, the first photo line-up
    featuring a photo of Ms. Bekoe took place roughly two months after the
    BlackBerry production order yielded the credit card evidence.

[85]

The trial judges treatment of the lack of any
    prior description of Ms. Bekoe and Mr. McFarlane as a non-issue persisted when
    the jury asked a question about how the police got Mr. McFarlanes name and
    picture. The trial judge told the jury that [t]here is no evidence before you
    as to how the police got any of the accuseds names and pictures and he
    reminded the jury that the record in any criminal prosecution rarely answers
    every question one might have about the facts. With respect, this instruction
    was also deficient, as it seemed to validate what was in reality a troubling
    aspect of the circumstances surrounding Ms. Whilbys identification of the
    appellants.

[86]

Importantly, even when Ms. Whilby ultimately
    identified Ms. Bekoe and Mr. McFarlane, her stated bases for doing so were generic.
    At trial, she agreed that her identification of Ms. Bekoe was based on a general
    impression.

[87]

The trial judge instructed the jury to consider
    the traits Ms. Whilby wrote on the back of the photo of the appellants. A
    proper instruction would have pointed out that the descriptions were generic:
Jack
,
    at para. 16. Although the appellants have not alleged that Ms. Whilby failed to
    mention some distinctive characteristics of their appearances, as was the case
    in
R. v. Yigzaw
, 2013 ONCA 547, 301 C.C.C. (3d) 266, at para. 63, I am
    satisfied that the trial judge erred in failing to acknowledge that Ms. Whilbys
    descriptions of the appellants gave little reason to believe her identifications
    were reliable.

[88]

Finally, given the frailties in Ms. Whilbys
    evidence, the trial judge ought to have cautioned the jury that the repeated
    in-court identifications of the appellants by Ms. Whilby, which the Crown
    elicited, were entitled to little weight:
Yigzaw
, at para. 71;
Hibbert
,
    at para. 50;
R. v. Pelletier
, 2012 ONCA 566, 291 C.C.C. (3d) 279, at
    para. 93.

(3)

The Cumulative Impact of the Errors

[89]

The trial judges instructions failed to convey all
    the reasons why the jury ought to subject Ms. Whilbys testimony to special
    scrutiny. Moreover, with respect to Ms. Whilbys identifications of the
    appellants, the trial judge left the jury with an unfocused treatise on factors
    that may come to bear on the reliability of eyewitness evidence, many of which
    had no basis in the evidence. Cumulatively, the instructions failed to impress
    upon the jury that there were significant reasons to doubt both Ms. Whilbys
    credibility and the reliability of her identifications.

[90]

These errors are serious. The jurys most
    significant task in this trial was deciding whether to believe Ms. Whilby. On
    the basis of the jury instructions, I am unable to conclude that the jury was
    properly equipped to assess her evidence.

[91]

It is immaterial that defence counsel failed to
    object to the aspects of the jury charge that are at issue in this appeal. I am
    satisfied that these errors left the jury inadequately equipped to properly
    evaluate important evidence:
R. v. Bailey
, 2016 ONCA 516, 339 C.C.C.
    (3d) 463, at para. 56. Irrespective of any oversight by their lawyers, the
    appellants were entitled to a fair trial, and there was no tactical advantage
    to be gained from the failure to object:
Phillips
, at para. 31.

[92]

Accordingly, on the basis of these errors, I
    would set aside the convictions of the appellants and order that they receive
    new trials.

F.

Disposition

[93]

I would allow the appeals. I would set aside the
    convictions of the appellants and order new trials on all counts.

Released: G.R.S. SEP 02 2020

B.W.
    Miller J.A.

I
    agree. G.R. Strathy C.J.O.

I
    agree. Janet Simmons J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Nguyen, 2020 ONCA 609

DATE: 20200930

DOCKET: C67134 and C67136

Strathy C.J.O., Gillese and Watt
    JJ.A.

DOCKET:
    C67134

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Phuong Nguyen

Appellant

DOCKET: C67136

AND BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Leonardo Graci

Appellant

Tiran Diran Tutunjian, for the
    appellants

Chris G. Bendick, for the respondent Her
    Majesty the Queen ex rel. the Regional Municipality of York

Heard: in writing

On appeal from the decision of Justice
    Mary E. Misener of the Ontario Court of Justice dated April 18, 2019, dismissing
    the appeal from conviction entered on May 22, 2018, by Justice of the Peace
Marie-Christine
Smythe of the Ontario Court of Justice (C67134).

On appeal from the decision of Justice
    Mary E. Misener of the Ontario Court of Justice dated April 18, 2019, dismissing
    the appeal from conviction entered on May 14, 2018, by Justice of the Peace Rhonda
    Shousterman of the Ontario Court of Justice (C67136).

Gillese J.A
.:

[1]

These appeals raise the following questions
    about s. 11(b) applications in proceedings under Part 1 of the
Provincial
    Offences Act
, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33 (the
POA
):

1. Is 18 months the presumptive ceiling for Part I
POA
proceedings?

2. Are the Appellants entitled to a stay of proceedings despite the
    delay being less than the presumptive ceiling?

[2]

As I explain below, my answer to the first
    question is yes and to the second is no. Accordingly, I would dismiss the
    appeals.

Background in Brief

[3]

On March 8, 2017, Leonardo Graci was charged
    under the
Highway Traffic Act
, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the
HTA

)

with speeding 80 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone.

[4]

On April 12, 2017, Phuong Nguyen was charged
    under the
HTA

with failing to stop at a red light.

[5]

Both Mr. Graci and Mr. Nguyen (together, the
    Appellants) requested a trial date, received a Notice of Trial in the mail,
    ordered and received disclosure, and then filed a s. 11(b)
Charter
application that was returnable on their trial date.

[6]

Justice of the Peace Shousterman heard and
    dismissed Mr. Gracis s. 11(b) application on May 14, 2018. Following a trial,
    Mr. Graci was convicted of speeding, pursuant to s. 128 of the
HTA
. He
    was fined $90 and given 30 days to pay the fine.

[7]

Justice of the Peace Smythe heard and dismissed
    Mr. Nguyens s. 11(b) application on May 22, 2018. Following a trial, Mr.
    Nguyen was convicted of failing to stop at a red light, pursuant to s. 144 of
    the
HTA
.
He was fined $260 and given five months to pay the
    fine.

[8]

Messrs. Gracie and Nguyen brought appeals
    against the dismissal of their s. 11(b) applications and convictions.

The Summary Conviction Appeals

[9]

The appeals were heard together by Misener J. of
    the Ontario Court of Justice (the Appeals Judge). On April 18, 2019, the
    Appeals Judge released reasons for judgment in which she dismissed the appeals
    (the Reasons Below).

[10]

The Appeals Judge first addressed the question
    of what presumptive ceiling applied to Part I
POA

proceedings.
    In this regard, she declined to follow
York (Regional Municipality) v. Tomovski
,
2017 ONCJ 785 (leave to appeal to Ont. C.A. refused, 2018 ONCA 57). In
Tomovski
,
    the court held that the 18-month presumptive ceiling set out in
R. v.
    Jordan
, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, did not apply to proceedings under
    Part I of the
POA
and that a lower case specific presumptive ceiling
    ought to be imposed. In
Tomovski
, a ceiling of 14 months was set,
    above which delay was presumed to be unreasonable.

[11]

In the Appeals Judges view,
Jordan

clearly
    held that the ceiling for matters proceeding in provincial court is 18 months
    and Part I offences are proceedings in the provincial court (para. 15, Reasons
    Below). She gave compelling reasons for her view, including that differing
    presumptive ceilings would represent a return to the litigation-generating
    uncertainty of
Morin
 (para. 21, Reasons Below).

[12]

The Appeals Judge then dealt with whether the
    Appellants were entitled to a stay of proceedings despite the delay being less
    than the presumptive ceiling. The net delay for Mr. Graci was 12 months and 12
    days and the net delay for Mr. Nguyen was 13 months and 10 days. As the delays
    were less than the presumptive ceiling, the Appellants had the burden to
    establish that (1) they took steps to move their cases along and (2) their cases
    took markedly longer than they reasonably should have.

[13]

Before the Appeals Judge, the Appellants argued
    that the justices of the peace held them to a standard of perfection, rather
    than of reasonableness, when considering whether they had taken meaningful efforts
    to move their cases along. The Appeals Judge disagreed, expressly accepting the
    findings of the justices of the peace that the Appellants had done nothing to
    secure earlier trial dates.

[14]

The Appeals Judge also rejected the Appellants
    submission that, because proceedings for Part I offences are straightforward,
    anything in excess of 10-11 months from offence date to trial is markedly
    longer than is reasonable. The Appeals Judge acknowledged that Part I
    proceedings are simple and streamlined. However, she noted, the test for
    whether a case takes markedly longer than reasonable, as set out in
Jordan
,
directs the court to consider a variety of factors including case
    complexity, local considerations, and whether the Crown took reasonable steps
    to expedite the proceedings. Further, trial judges are directed to use their
    knowledge of their own jurisdictions local and systemic considerations and the
    length of time a similar case typically takes to reach trial in assessing the
    reasonableness of the time to trial in cases where the delay is below the
    ceiling.

[15]

The Appeals Judge observed that the justices of
    the peace who tried the Appellants cases regularly preside in the jurisdiction
    and were capable of quickly applying their extensive knowledge of local conditions
    and their experience with similar cases to assess the delays in the cases before
    them.

[16]

The Appeals Judge then dealt with whether the
    Crown had taken reasonable steps to expedite the process. The Appellants
    submitted that it had not because it failed to offer earlier trial dates after
    being served with the s. 11(b) applications.

[17]

The Appeals Judge disagreed. She saw no error on
    the part of the justices of the peace in concluding that the prosecutions had
    not taken markedly longer than usual. She observed that the Appellants had been
    provided with the earliest available trial dates after they filed their Notices
    of Intention to Appeal and that those dates were well below the presumptive
    ceiling. She stated that the filing of a s. 11(b) application did not trigger
    an obligation on the prosecution to obtain earlier dates and noted that the
    prosecution was ready to proceed on the first trial date, having provided the
    Appellants with timely disclosure. She concluded that the prosecution acted
    reasonably in expediting the matters.

[18]

Accordingly, the Appeals Judge dismissed the
    summary conviction appeals.

The Issues

[19]

The Appellants raise the following issues:

1.
Does the 18-month presumptive ceiling
    established in
Jordan
apply to proceedings under Part 1 of the
POA

or should the ceiling be lower?

2.
Are the Appellants entitled to stays
    despite the delays being below the presumptive ceiling?

Issue #1:  18 months is the presumptive
    ceiling for Part I
POA
proceedings

The Parties
    Positions

[20]

The Appellants position on this issue can be
    summarized as follows. In setting the 18-month presumptive ceiling for criminal
    cases in provincial courts,
Jordan

made no reference to if, or
    how, the presumptive ceiling would apply to
POA

proceedings.
    They say that the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in
Jordan

was premised on factors that do not  or minimally  apply to such proceedings.
    As the
POA
was meant to provide a speedy, streamlined procedure for
    regulatory offences, the Appellants contend that a lower presumptive ceiling
    for such matters is warranted.

[21]

The Crown submits that
R. v. K.J.M.
,
2019 SCC 55,

a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada released
    after the appeals in this matter were decided, is a full answer to the
    Appellants contention. It says that
K.J.M.
makes it clear that the
    presumptive ceiling for all provincial court proceedings is 18 months.

Analysis

[22]

I accept the Crowns submission on this issue.

[23]

In
K.J.M.
, the Supreme Court considered
    whether the presumptive ceilings in
Jordan

apply to youth
    justice court proceedings. Justice Moldaver, writing for the majority,
    concluded that they did. While Moldaver J. acknowledged the many reasons why
    youth matters should proceed expeditiously, he found there was no need to
    introduce a lower presumptive ceiling for such matters.

[24]

At para. 65 of
K.J.M.
,
Moldaver
    J. states that
Jordan

established uniform ceilings irrespective
    of the varying degrees of prejudice that might be experienced by different
    groups and individuals. He explains that setting different ceilings would
    quickly become impracticable. Moreover, he concludes, setting different ceilings
    would be incompatible with the uniform-ceiling approach adopted in
Jordan

and would undermine its objective of simplifying and streamlining the s.
    11(b) framework.

[25]

In
K.J.M.
,
the Supreme Court reasoned
    that the creation of a separate criminal justice system, which codifies the
    need for timeliness in youth cases, does not justify the use of a different
    presumptive ceiling. That same reasoning applies to proceedings under Part I of
    the
POA
.

[26]

The language in
K.J.M.
is categorical: the
    ceilings established in
Jordan

apply uniformly. Accordingly, while
    the
POA

is intended to provide a speedy and efficient process
    for dealing with regulatory offences, the 18-month presumptive ceiling for
    single-stage provincial court proceedings established in
Jordan

applies
    to proceedings under Part 1.

Issue #2:     Neither Appellant is entitled
    to a stay of proceedings

[27]

These appeals were conducted in writing. The Appellants
    factum focuses almost exclusively on the first issue. Their arguments on this,
    the second issue, are cursory. They basically amount to a reiteration of the
    complaints that they advanced in the appeals court below, although the
    complaints are now levied against the decision of the Appeals Judge rather than
    those of the justices of the peace.

[28]

The Appellants say that the Appeals Judge erred
    by holding them to a standard of perfection, rather than reasonableness, when
    considering their efforts to move their cases along. They repeat their
    complaint that the prosecution took no steps to mitigate the delay once served
    with notices of the s. 11(b) applications. And, the Appellants submit, it
    should not have taken more than 11-12 months from the offence dates to bring
    the Appellants to trial.

[29]

I see no basis on which to interfere with the
    decisions under appeal. The Appeals Judge carefully reviewed the determinations
    of the justices of the peace on the issues of whether the Appellants took
    meaningful steps to move their cases along and whether their cases took
    markedly longer than they reasonably should have. In her reasons, the Appeals
    Judge thoroughly addresses the Appellants complaints relating to those
    determinations. I agree with her determinations and with the reasons that she
    gave for them.

[30]

As I have summarized the reasons of the Appeals
    Judge above, I will not repeat them here. Suffice to say that in her reasons,
    the Appeals Judge correctly articulates and applies the governing legal
    principles to unimpeachable factual findings. She made no error in concluding
    that the Appellants had failed to take reasonable steps to move their cases
    along or that their cases had not taken markedly longer than they reasonably should
    have.

Disposition

[31]

Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeals.

Released: September 30, 2020 (G.R.S.)

E.E. Gillese
    J.A.

I agree.
    G.R. Strathy C.J.O.

I agree.
    David Watt J.A.


WARNING

The
    President of the panel hearing this appeal directs that the following should be
    attached to the file:

An order
    restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1),
    (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the
Criminal Code
shall
    continue.  These sections of
the Criminal Code
provide:

486.4(1)       Subject to subsection
    (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any
    information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published
    in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in
    respect of

(a)     any of the following
    offences;

(i)      an offence
    under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1,
    172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02,
    279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii)      any offence
    under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this
    subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of
    the complainants sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence
    referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(iii)     REPEALED: S.C.
    2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).

(b)     two or more offences being dealt with in
    the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in
    paragraph (a).

(2)     In proceedings in respect of
    the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or
    justice shall

(a)     at the first reasonable
    opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim
    of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b)     on application made by
    the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2),
    in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in
    subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge
    or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify
    the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted
    in any way.

(2.2) In proceedings in respect of
    an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim
    is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) as soon as feasible, inform
    the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application of the victim
    or the prosecutor, make the order.

(3)     In proceedings in respect of
    an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order
    directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the
    age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation,
    written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the
    meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or
    transmitted in any way.

(4)     An order made under this
    section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the
    course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the
    disclosure to make the information known in the community.
2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s.
    8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25, ss. 22,48; 2015, c.
    13, s. 18..

486.6(1)       Every person who
    fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or
    486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2)     For greater certainty, an
    order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to
    proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the
    publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of
    information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant
    whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. P.G., 2020 ONCA 588

DATE:  20200921

DOCKET: C68036

Fairburn A.C.J.O., MacPherson
    and Coroza JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

P.G.

Appellant

P.G., acting in person

Mark Halfyard, appearing as duty
    counsel

Andrew Hotke, for the respondent

Heard: September 8, 2020 by
    video conference

On appeal from the convictions entered
    on December 9, 2019 and the sentence imposed on February 5, 2020 by Justice Kelly
    A. Gorman of the Superior Court of Justice.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

In December 2019, the appellant was convicted of
    sexual assault, forcible confinement and assault by Gorman J. of the Superior
    Court of Justice following a trial in Windsor. In February 2020, the appellant
    received a custodial sentence of two years less a day and s. 109 firearms (10
    years) and SOIRA (20 years) orders.

[2]

The appellant appeals the convictions and the
    sentence.

[3]

The appellant and the complainant met on
    Instagram and then in person. The appellant was 19 years old and the
    complainant was 17 years old.

[4]

On April 21, 2017, the appellant and the
    complainant were arguing by text message about the complainants plan to attend
    a local festival. The appellant invited the complainant to his house to
    continue the discussion in person. Later, they went, along with friends, to a
    bowling alley. At the end of the evening, the complainant drove the appellant back
    to his house and she accepted his invitation inside.

[5]

Once inside, the appellant and the complainant
    went to the appellants bedroom. According to the complainant, she agreed to
    cuddle but within a few minutes the appellant was trying to have sex. She
    refused. The appellant tried to take off her clothes and kept telling her that
    he wanted to have sex. She tried to push off the appellant but he told her to
    stop fighting because he was stronger. He put his penis in her vagina and told
    her that she was not allowed to leave and not permitted to go to the festival.
    He began wrestling with her, held her hands above her head, and called her
    names.

[6]

The complainant then heard a text alert and
    asked the appellant to permit her to respond to it or to go to the bathroom.
    The appellant told her again that she was not allowed to leave. She was
    sobbing. The appellants parents entered the room, told the appellant to give
    the complainant her clothes, and told the complainant she could leave the room.

[7]

The appellants father walked the complainant to
    the door. She told him that she would not press charges. She testified that she
    said this because she thought she would not otherwise be allowed to leave.

[8]

The trial judge found the complainant to be
    entirely credible  her evidence [was] internally consistent and not [overreaching].

[9]

The appellant testified at the trial. The trial
    judge said this about his testimony:

I found the accused to be incredulous. On many
    occasions he went out of his way in an effort to paint [the complainant] in a
    negative light. His testimony that she was drinking at the bowling alley,
    driving poorly, and that she banged her head while exiting the vehicle was
    entirely self-serving.

[10]

Against this backdrop of her assessments of the
    two principal witnesses, the trial judge convicted the appellant of the three
    offences with which he had been charged.

[11]

The appellant, assisted by duty counsel,
    advances three arguments on the conviction appeal.

[12]

First, the appellant points out that the
    complainant was 17, a child, when the alleged sexual assault, confinement, and
    assault took place. She was 19, an adult, when she testified at the trial. In
    her reasons, the trial judge said:

With these principles in mind, it should be
    noted that [the complainant] was 17 years old at the time of the allegations.
    While not a very young child, she was a child nonetheless. As the court stated
    in
R. v. B.(G.)
, [1990] CarswellSask 20, at para. 56:

While children may not be able to recount
    precise details and communicate the when and where of an event with exactitude,
    this does not mean that they have misconceived what happened to them and who
    did it.

Applying the law to the evidence, I found [the
    complainant] to be entirely credible. She testified about matters that occurred
    two years ago when she was 17 years old. I agree with the submission of the
    Crown that she did her best. I found her evidence to be internally consistent
    and not [overreaching].

[13]

Based on this passage, the appellant contends
    that the trial judge erred by giving the complainant testimonial latitude on
    account of her age by improperly treating her as a child witness when, in fact,
    she testified as an adult.

[14]

We are not persuaded by this submission. In our
    view, in this passage the trial judge was simply stating that the complainant
    was a child  and indeed not a very young child  when the assaults and
    confinement occurred; she was not saying that the complainant was a child when
    she testified or that she was treating the complainants testimony as that of a
    child witness. All the trial judge said, accurately, was: [The complainant]
    testified about matters that occurred two years ago when she was 17 years old.

[15]

Second, the appellant submits that the age
    difference between the appellant (19 at the time of the events) and complainant
    (17) led to the trial judge applying a different standard of scrutiny to their
    evidence.

[16]

We do not accept this submission. It is anchored
    in the same assertion as that made in the appellants first ground of appeal:
    the trial judge treated the complainant as a child witness. Since we have
    rejected that assertion, it follows that we are satisfied that the trial judge
    considered the appellants and the complainants testimony in a proper and
    balanced fashion.

[17]

Third, the appellant asserts that the trial
    judge erred in finding collusion between the appellant and his parents, both of
    whom testified.

[18]

We disagree. The trial judge made no finding of
    collusion. All she did was point to the similarity of their evidence to support
    her rejection of the appellants testimony that he had not talked to his
    parents about the case.

[19]

Neither the appellant nor duty counsel made submissions
    about the sentence.

[20]

The conviction and sentence appeals are
    dismissed.

Fairburn A.C.J.O.

J.C. MacPherson J.A.

S. Coroza J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Perreault, 2020 ONCA 580

DATE: 20200915

DOCKET: C66449

Paciocco, Nordheimer and Thorburn JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Appellant

and

Francois Perreault

Respondent

Andrew Cappell, for the appellant

Howard L. Krongold, for the respondent

Heard: September 9, 2020 by video conference

On appeal from the order of Justice
    David Berg of the Ontario Court of Justice, dated December 21, 2018.

REASONS FOR
    DECISION

[1]

The issue in this Crown appeal is narrow. If the trial dates of November
    21, 2018 and November 22, 2018 were lost as the result of exceptional
    circumstances, the trial judge erred in finding that the net delay in Francois
    Perreaults trial exceeded the presumptive 18-month
Jordan
deadline in
    the provincial court, requiring a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of
    the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
. If those dates were not
    lost as the result of exceptional circumstances, the trial judge was correct,
    and this appeal must be dismissed.

[2]

We find no error in the trial judges characterization of this delay as systemic
    or institutional delay, or in his decision to allow Mr. Perreaults s. 11(b)
    application. Those trial dates, the first dates to be set, were scheduled to
    occur less than a week before the presumptive
Jordan
deadline. There was
    no margin for error. Yet, Mr. Perreaults case was set to be heard in an
    overbooked court. For example, twenty-five matters were set to be heard on
    November 21, 2018, in what turned out to be six provincial courtrooms open for
    trials in the notoriously busy Ottawa jurisdiction. Eighteen of those matters
    were expected to proceed. Things were not materially better on November 22, 2018.
    Mr. Perreault attended for his trial on both dates, but there was no judge
    available to hear his case on either day, and so it was adjourned outside of
    the presumptive 18-month
Jordan
deadline. In announcing, on November 22,
    2018, that the case would not be reached yet again, the assigned trial Crown
    commented that Mr. Perreaults case was one of the matters that was stacked on
    top of other matters and there has been very little movement.

[3]

The Crown urges that, notwithstanding this course of events the trial
    judge erred in staying Mr. Perreaults prosecution because exceptional
    circumstances caused the loss of the two trial dates, namely: (1) two judges
    were attending a compulsory education program, and (2) a third judge was unexpectedly
    ill.

[4]

We do not agree that the assignment of judges to education programs
    qualifies as an exceptional circumstance. To qualify as an exceptional
    circumstance the Crown must show that the delay is reasonably unforeseen
or
reasonably unavoidable:
R. v. Jordan
, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1
    S.C.R. 631, at para. 69. Judges are expected, indeed required, to attend
    judicial education programs. This is part of their judicial assignment and
    therefore it is reasonably foreseeable that when they are engaged in judicial
    education, they will not be available in courtrooms. If courts are left
    understaffed because judges are required to attend judicial education programs,
    this is a systemic or institutional problem, not an exceptional circumstance. It
    is also a problem that is avoidable if adequate judicial resources are made
    available to conduct trials within a reasonable time within a system that
    appropriately requires judicial education.

[5]

Nor does it matter that the prosecuting Crown can do nothing about the
    staffing of courts. The Crown at large is responsible for preventing systemic
    delay. The fact that one out-of-town judge was brought in to sit two half days while
    two judges were away was insufficient to mitigate the shortfall.

[6]

The Crown argues, in the alternative, that the unexpected illness of another
    assigned judge on November 21 and 22, 2018 is an exceptional circumstance that
    caused Mr. Perreaults delay. The Crowns theory is that even though several
    cases were not reached on November 21 and 22, 2018, Mr. Perreaults was the
    priority case for the provincial Attorney General and would have been heard but
    for this judges unexpected illness.

[7]

We agree that the illness of a judge is a quintessential example of an
    exceptional circumstance, however the Crown has not met its burden of showing
    that this judges illness explains the loss of Mr. Perreaults trial dates. Two
    federal criminal matters scheduled for the same days were not reached, and, as
    the Crown concedes, matters prosecuted by the federal Crown are given priority
    over provincially prosecuted matters. We cannot find, in the circumstances,
    that Mr. Perreaults matter would have been heard had a trial judge not
    been ill. That trial judge may well have dealt instead with one or both federal
    matters. What we do know is that Mr. Perreaults matter would have been heard
    had sufficient judges been scheduled to preside on Mr. Perreaults set trial
    dates.

[8]

The Crowns appeal is therefore dismissed.

David M. Paciocco
    J.A.

I.V.B. Nordheimer
    J.A.

J.A. Thorburn J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Petre, 2020 ONCA 577

DATE: 20200911

DOCKET: M50973

Fairburn A.C.J.O., MacPherson
    and Coroza JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Stefan Petre

Appellant

Stefan Petre, appearing in person

Nicole Rivers, for the respondent

Heard and released orally:
    September 8, 2020

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

The appellant was convicted of criminal
    harassment. He appealed to the Superior Court of Justice. This is an
    application for leave to appeal from a decision of Roberts J., dismissing the
    summary conviction appeal.

[2]

The appellant appears to wish to re-argue the
    case that has already been determined. The threshold test for leave to appeal
    is high:
R. v. R.R.
, 2008 ONCA
    497.
We see no issue significant to the administration of justice
    beyond this case and there is no merit to the proposed appeal.

[3]

There is a fresh evidence application before the
    court involving the translation of certain documents. The fresh evidence merely
    assists the court in understanding some of the documents, but does not have any
    bearing on the leave application.

[4]

For these reasons, the fresh evidence
    application is dismissed and leave to appeal is denied.

Fairburn
    A.C.J.O.

J.C.
    MacPherson J.A.

S.
    Coroza J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Place, 2020 ONCA 546

DATE: 20200901

DOCKET: C66760

Roberts, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Nicholas Place

Appellant

Nicholas Place, acting in person

Richard Litkowski, appearing as duty counsel

Hannah Freeman, for the respondent

Heard: August 12, 2020 by videoconference

On
    appeal from the convictions entered on December 7, 2018 and the sentence imposed
    on March 4, 2019 by Justice Diane M. Lahaie of the Ontario Court of Justice.

REASONS FOR
    DECISION

[1]

The appellant was convicted of the offences of break and enter into a
    dwelling house, wearing a disguise with the intent to commit an indictable
    offence, mischief, assault, uttering threats to cause death, and breach of a
    probation order. He was given a global custodial sentence of 3 years and 45
    days, which reflected credit for 4.5 months for pre-sentence custody. Among the
    ancillary orders, the trial judge made a restitution order requiring the
    appellant to immediately pay the amount of $810.93 to the complainant, Daniel
    McLaughlin. The appellant appeals his convictions and sentence.

Brief Factual Background

[2]

Following the end of his romantic relationship with Jada
[1]
,
    with whom he parents a daughter, the appellant began to send numerous Facebook
    messages to Daniel McLaughlin, the domestic partner of Jadas best friend,
    Brooklyn Saunders. The appellant sent the messages under the alias, Nicholas
    Redd. In these messages, the appellant expressed his frustration, anger and
    jealousy concerning Jada. He accused Daniel McLaughlin, or other men known to
    Daniel, of being in a romantic relationship with her. The messages were
    threatening. As the trial judge found, [The appellant] was obsessively
    pursuing [Daniel] McLaughlin, communicating as time progressed that he was
    closer to finding him and that there would be a confrontation. Daniel
    McLaughlin attempted to placate the appellant, but he ultimately blocked him
    from sending further messages on Facebook the day before the appellants
    offences.

[3]

Learning of the appellants messages to his brother, Alex McLaughlin
    wrote to the appellant through the appellants other alias, Nick Laushway,
    threatening to smash [the appellants] teeth down [his] throat. The appellant
    and Alex McLaughlin engaged in a series of mutually aggressive Facebook messages
    ending with the appellant writing to Daniel McLaughlin that he could come to
    Alex McLaughlins home for a confrontation. Alex McLaughlin blocked the
    appellant on Facebook two days before the appellants offences.

[4]

On September 22, 2017, while Daniel McLaughlin, his brothers, Alex and
    Jeffrey, and Ms. Saunders were in the kitchen at Daniel McLaughlins house,
    they noticed a car twice drive slowly by the house. Within approximately two
    minutes, the appellant kicked in the front door and entered the house. His face
    was covered with a bandana. He threw kitchen chairs and yelled at Daniel
    McLaughlin. Immediately, Daniel McLaughlin yelled out the appellants name. The
    two tussled and the appellant was brought to the ground by the McLaughlins. In
    the struggle, the appellants bandana slipped off. While on the telephone with
    the 911 operator, Ms. Saunders saw and recognized the appellants face. She
    testified that she also recognized his voice when he first entered the house
    and yelled at Daniel McLaughlin. The appellant threatened to have his friends
    come in with guns and shoot up the house if they did not release him.
    Frightened, they did, and he ran out of the house. They watched him enter the
    same car that had driven twice by the house, which then drove away.

[5]

The main issue at trial was identity. The trial judge was satisfied that
    it was the appellant who sent the Facebook messages under the two aliases to
    the McLaughlin brothers, broke into Daniel McLaughlins house, and committed
    the other offences.

Issues

[6]

The appellant puts forward the following arguments on appeal.

[7]

He submits the trial judge made the following errors resulting in an
    unfair trial and unreasonable verdicts:

i.

The trial judge erred in her treatment of Ms. Saunders recognition
    evidence.

ii.

The trial judge erred in disregarding Ms. Saunders cross-examination to
    the extent it contradicted her evidence-in-chief.

[8]

The appellant raises the following issues with respect to his
    sentence:

i.

The trial judge erred in failing to give any enhanced credit for his
    restrictive bail conditions.

ii.

The trial judge erred in failing to give him any time to pay the
    restitution order.

Analysis

Conviction Appeal

[9]

We see no basis to overturn the appellants convictions.

[10]

Starting with the identification and recognition evidence issue, the
    trial judge was aware of the inherent frailties and dangers of eyewitness
    identification evidence. She reviewed the evidence of all the eyewitnesses with
    caution and rejected as unreliable the in-dock identification of the appellant
    made by Jeffrey McLaughlin and Alex McLaughlin. She did not accept all the
    evidence given by the McLaughlin brothers. She subjected Ms. Saunders evidence
    to careful scrutiny and did not accept her identification of the appellant
    simply because she recognized him. Rather, the trial judge was satisfied of
    the reliability of Ms. Saunders identification of the appellant on the
    basis of all her evidence, including that she had an excellent and clear
    opportunity to see the appellant while he was on the ground without his bandana
    and she provided a very detailed description of what she saw.

[11]

Most importantly, the trial judges conclusion that the appellant was the
    person who committed the offences did not depend solely on Ms. Saunders
    identification or recognition evidence but on the whole of the evidence,
    including: the appellants authorship and the threatening content of the
    Facebook messages that he sent to the McLaughlin brothers; and the timing of his
    appearance at Daniel McLaughlins house and the end of the Facebook Messenger
    exchange caused by the McLaughlin brothers blocking the appellants messages a
    day or so before the incident.

[12]

We next turn to consider the trial judges treatment of Ms. Saunders
    cross‑examination. The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in summarily
    dismissing the inconsistencies between Ms. Saunders direct examination and
    cross-examination. He argues that this dismissal materially undermined the
    reliability of the trial judges identification of the appellant.

[13]

We are not persuaded by this submission.

[14]

The trial judge stated in her reasons that she placed no weight on any of
    Ms. Saunders evidence in cross-examination where it differed from her
    examination-in-chief. She determined that it was unreliable because
    Ms. Saunders was very upset during her cross-examination as the result of
    the recent death of her sister and was simply agreeing with any suggestion put
    to her by a very skilled and assertive defence counsel in order to be able to
    leave.

[15]

While it would have been preferable if the trial judge had specifically
    reviewed all the inconsistencies in issue and explained why they did not affect
    her assessment of the credibility and reliability of Ms. Saunders
    evidence-in-chief, it is clear from her reasons that she did not make this
    determination on the basis of Ms. Saunders demeanour alone. When read as a
    whole, the trial judges reasons, as supported by the record, set out a cogent
    basis for her acceptance of Ms. Saunders identification of the appellant.

[16]

Moreover, we do not see the alleged inconsistencies as material. For
    example, the fact that Ms. Saunders was ultimately prepared to concede that the
    appellants hair as it appeared in the courtroom was more brown than reddish
    is of no moment given her otherwise detailed description of the appellant at the
    time of the offences over a year earlier and the little weight that the trial
    judge correctly, in our view, gave to in-dock identification. Again, the trial
    judges conclusion that the appellant committed the offences was not solely
    based on Ms. Saunders description but on all the trial evidence, including the
    evidence of the other witnesses and, more significantly, on the Facebook
    messages that preceded and foreshadowed the appellants arrival and actions at
    Daniel McLaughlins house.

[17]

Accordingly, the appeal from the convictions is dismissed.

Sentence Appeal

[18]

The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in failing to give
    enhanced credit on sentencing for what she determined were restrictive house
    arrest conditions for some time from the beginning of October 2017 to December
    2018.

[19]

The trial judge determined that the appellants restrictive house arrest
    conditions were the result of [the appellants] criminal history and that it
    was not appropriate to grant any credit for the time spent on restrictive bail
    conditions given his criminal history. She concluded that the restrictive bail
    conditions were appropriate in all of the circumstances and that [the
    appellant] should not be given credit for the time [he] spent out of custody
    and subject to those conditions.

[20]

As this Court stated in
R. v. Downes

(2006), 79
    O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), at para. 33, it is an error in principle for a trial
    judge to fail to take into account as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing
    time spent under stringent bail conditions, especially house arrest. See also:
R. v. Ijam
, 2007 ONCA 597, 87 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 67.
The
    determination of enhanced credit is not the product of a formula but is within
    the discretion of the trial judge. In para. 37 of
Downes
, the Court
    set out a non-exhaustive list of criteria to be considered in determining this
    issue, including: the amount of time spent on pre-sentence bail conditions; the
    stringency of the conditions;
the impact on the offenders
    liberty; and the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships,
    employment and activity
. The onus is on the offender to establish the
    facts supporting the impact of the conditions on a balance of probabilities
in accordance with s. 724(3) of the
Criminal
    Code
, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

[21]

We see no error that would warrant appellate intervention. The trial
    judge did take into account the appellants stringent bail conditions and
    determined that no enhanced credit should be given for those conditions in all
    of the circumstances. While the appropriateness of the appellants bail
    conditions was not a relevant consideration, it is clear that the trial judge
    did not limit her determination to that criterion but reviewed all of the
    circumstances. The question of how much enhanced credit for strict bail
    conditions, if any, should be granted was firmly within the exercise of the
    trial judges discretion. There is no error in the exercise of her
    discretion.

[22]

Finally, we turn to the trial judges decision not to grant the appellant
    any time to pay the restitution order to Daniel McLaughlin. While we see no
    error in the exercise of the trial judges discretion, the Crown has consented
    to an extension of time for the payment of the restitution order. Accordingly,
    the appellant shall have one year from his release from custody to pay the
    amount of $810.93 in restitution to Daniel McLaughlin.

[23]

The sentence appeal is otherwise dismissed.

Disposition

[24]

The appeal from conviction is dismissed.

[25]

The appeal from sentence is allowed with the consent of the Crown, to
    permit the appellant one year from his release from custody to pay the
    restitution order in the amount of $810.93 to Daniel McLaughlin.

[26]

The appeal from sentence is otherwise dismissed.

L.B. Roberts
    J.A.

B.W. Miller
    J.A.

Gary Trotter
    J.A.

[1]

The trial judge does not refer to her
last
name.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Regan, 2020 ONCA 567

DATE: 20200909

DOCKET: C67590 & M51435 (C67590)

MacPherson, Miller and Coroza
    JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

James Regan

Appellant

James Regan, acting in person

Andrew Hotke, for the respondent

Heard: September 8, 2020 by video conference

On appeal from the convictions entered
    on June 24, 2019 and the sentence imposed on October 9, 2019 by Justice Rebecca
    Rutherford of the Ontario Court of Justice.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellant appeared in court in person and
    sought an adjournment to enable him to retain a lawyer. In light of the
    previous endorsements in this matter and the communications the appellant has
    received throughout the summer from this court, the request for an adjournment
    is denied.

[2]

The appellant then declined to make any
    submissions on his appeal. The appeal and all related motions (e.g. a s. 684
    motion) is dismissed.


WARNING

The President of the panel hearing this
    appeal directs that the following should be attached to the file:

An order restricting publication in this
    proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2)
    of the
Criminal Code
shall continue.  These sections of
the Criminal
    Code
provide:

486.4(1)       Subject to subsection
    (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any
    information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published
    in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in
    respect of

(a)     any of the following offences;

(i)      an offence under section 151,
    152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2,
    173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281,
    286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii)      any offence under this Act,
    as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into
    force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainants sexual
    integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i)
    if it occurred on or after that day; or

(iii)     REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25,
    s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).

(b)     two or more
    offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an
    offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2)     In proceedings in respect of the
    offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice
    shall

(a)     at the first reasonable
    opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim
    of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b)     on application made by the
    victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in
    proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in
    subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge
    or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify
    the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted
    in any way.

6.

(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence
    referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the
    presiding judge or justice shall

7.

(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an
    application for the order; and

8.

(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.

(3)     In proceedings in respect of an
    offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing
    that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of
    eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written
    material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning
    of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or
    transmitted in any way.

(4)     An order made under this section
    does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the
    administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make
    the information known in the community.
2005, c.
    32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014,
    c. 25, ss. 22,48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18..

486.6(1)       Every person who fails to
    comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or
    (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2)     For greater certainty, an order
    referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings
    taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in
    any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that
    could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity
    is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Rojas, 2020 ONCA 593

DATE: 20200918

DOCKET: C67252

Roberts, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Ariel Rojas

Appellant

Amy Ohler, for the appellant

Hannah Freeman, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: August 13, 2020 by videoconference

On appeal from the sentence imposed on July 10, 2019 by
    Justice P.H. Marjoh Agro of the Ontario Court of Justice.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

The appellant appeals his sentence from his adult convictions. He was
    convicted of criminal harassment, uttering threats, and breach of two probation
    orders. He received a three-year global sentence. The appellant submits that
    the sentence was excessive and demonstrably unfit.

[2]

We disagree.

[3]

While towards the high end, the sentence is within the range for like
    offences and reflects the serious and aggravating features of the appellants
    crimes. Although he was warned by the police to stop, the appellant sent
    hundreds of threatening messages of a sexually violent nature to his former
    domestic partner for over two years. The experienced trial judge characterized
    these messages as perverse and stated that The threats he made to her and the
    graphic description of the sexual activities he intended to inflict were
    depraved. There is no basis to intervene with the sentence which was fit in
    all the circumstances.

[4]

The appeal from sentence is dismissed.

L.B.
    Roberts J.A.

B.W.
    Miller J.A.

Gary
    Trotter J.A.