MISE EN GARDE

Le président du comité qui
    entend cet appel ordonne que lordonnance suivante soit jointe au dossier :

Lordonnance limitant la
    publication dans cette instance, en vertu des paragraphes 486.4 (1), (2),
    (2.1), (2.2), (3) ou (4) ou en vertu des paragraphes 486.6 (1) ou (2) du
Code criminel
, est maintenue. Ces
    dispositions du
Code criminel
prévoient ce qui suit :

486.4(1) Sous réserve du
    paragraphe (2), le juge ou le juge de paix qui préside peut rendre une
    ordonnance interdisant de publier ou de diffuser de quelque façon que ce soit
    tout renseignement qui permettrait détablir lidentité de la victime ou dun témoin
    dans les procédures relatives à :

a) lune des infractions
    suivantes;

(i) une infraction
    prévue aux articles 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171,
    171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011,
    279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 ou 347,

(ii)
une infraction prévue par la présente loi, dans toute version
    antérieure à la date dentrée en vigueur du présent sous-alinéa, dans le cas où
    lacte reproché constituerait une infraction visée au sous-alinéa (i) sil
    était commis à cette date ou par la suite
,

(iii) [Abrogé, 2014, ch.
    25, art. 22(2).]

b)
deux
    infractions ou plus dans le cadre de la même procédure, dont lune est une
    infraction visée à lalinéa
a
).

(2)
Dans les procédures relatives à des infractions visées aux alinéas (1)
a
) ou
b
), le juge ou le juge de paix qui préside est tenu :

a
) daviser dès que possible les témoins âgés de moins de dix-huit
    ans et la victime de leur droit de demander lordonnance ;

b
) de rendre lordonnance, si le poursuivant, la victime ou lun de
    ces témoins lui en fait la demande.

(2.1) Sous réserve du
    paragraphe (2.2), le juge ou le juge de paix qui préside peut rendre une
    ordonnance interdisant de publier ou de diffuser de quelque façon que ce soit
    tout renseignement qui permettrait détablir lidentité de la victime âgée de
    moins de dix-huit ans dans les procédures relatives à toute infraction autre
    que celles visées au paragraphe (1).

(2.2) Dans les
    procédures relatives à toute infraction autre que celles visées au paragraphe
    (1), le juge ou le juge de paix qui préside est tenu, si la victime est âgée de
    moins de dix-huit ans :

a
) daviser dans les meilleurs délais la victime de son droit de
    demander lordonnance ;

b
) de rendre lordonnance, si le poursuivant ou la victime lui en
    fait la demande.

(3) Dans les
    procédures relatives à une infraction visée à larticle 163.1, le juge ou le
    juge de paix rend une ordonnance interdisant de publier ou de diffuser de
    quelque façon que ce soit tout renseignement qui permettrait détablir
    lidentité dun témoin âgé de moins de dix-huit ans ou dune personne faisant
    lobjet dune représentation, dun écrit ou dun enregistrement qui constitue
    de la pornographie juvénile au sens de cet article.

(4) Les ordonnances
    rendues en vertu du présent article ne sappliquent pas à la communication de
    renseignements dans le cours de ladministration de la justice si la
    communication ne vise pas à renseigner la collectivité.

486.6(1)
Quiconque transgresse une ordonnance rendue conformément aux
    paragraphes 486.4(1), (2) ou (3) ou 486.5(1) ou (2) est coupable dune
    infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire.

(2) Il est entendu que
    les ordonnances mentionnées au paragraphe (1) visent également linterdiction,
    dans les procédures pour transgression de ces ordonnances, de diffuser ou de
    publier de quelque façon que ce soit tout renseignement qui permettrait détablir
    lidentité de la victime, du témoin ou de la personne associée au système
    judiciaire que lordonnance vise à protéger.
2005, ch.
    32, art. 15.

COUR DAPPEL DE LONTARIO

RÉFÉRENCE : R. c. F.J., 2021 ONCA 268

DATE : 20210430

DOSSIER : C66173

Les juges van Rensburg, Benotto
    et Thorburn

ENTRE

Sa Majesté la Reine

Intimée

et

F.J.

Appelant

David Parry, pour lappelant

Vallery Bayly, pour lintimée

Date de laudience : le 3
    décembre 2020 par visioconférence

En appel de la condamnation prononcée le
    27 juillet 2018 et de la peine imposée le 19 décembre 2018 par la juge Michelle
    OBonsawin de la Cour supérieure de justice, dont les motifs figurent à 2018
    ONSC 4587.

La juge Thorburn :

A.

SURVOL

[1]

Lappelant a été reconnu coupable des infractions
    de contacts sexuels, incitation à des contacts sexuels et agression sexuelle
    par rapport à la plaignante, N.J., contrairement aux arts. 151, 152 et 271 du
Code
    criminel
, L.R.C. 1985, c. C‑46. Le 19 décembre 2018, la juge de
    procès a prononcé un arrêt des procédures pour les chefs daccusation en vertu
    des arts. 152 et 271 du
Code criminel
. Lappelant a reçu une peine
    demprisonnement de deux ans moins un jour pour les contacts sexuels.

[2]

Il interjette appel de sa condamnation et il fait
    demande dautorisation dappel de sa peine.

[3]

La plaignante a décrit plusieurs incidents qui
    ont eu lieu quand elle avait lâge de 12 ans.

[4]

La plaignante a dit que le premier incident
    sest déroulé chez ses grands-parents maternels. Elle est allée acheter des
    bonbons à un magasin. Au retour, elle regardait des bandes dessinées avec ses cousines.
    Lappelant (son oncle) était assis à côté delle sur le divan. Il a chuchoté de
    prendre un bonbon « Strap », daller dans la salle de toilette et de mettre
    le bonbon sur son vagin. La plaignante a obéi et a par la suite donné le bonbon
    à lappelant.

[5]

La plaignante a décrit un deuxième incident qui
    a eu lieu quand lappelant la conduisait chez elle pour chercher ses vêtements
    afin quelle puisse coucher chez ses cousines. Rendu chez elle, lappelant lui
    a demandé de baisser ses pantalons et de se mettre à quatre pattes. Ensuite,
    lappelant a frappé ses fesses nues. Il lui a demandé de lever son chandail et
    de lui montrer ses seins. Il na pas touché les seins de la plaignante. Par la
    suite, il lui a ordonné de remettre ses vêtements. Avant de sortir de chez
    elle, lappelant la embrassée.

[6]

La plaignante a aussi témoigné que lappelant la
    embrassée : près de la salle de lavage dans limmeuble des grands-parents ;
    dans lascenseur de limmeuble des grands-parents ; dans le salon de lappelant
    ; et à lentrée à larrière de limmeuble des grands-parents. De plus, la
    plaignante a témoigné que lappelant lui a demandé de sucer son pouce dans le
    sous-sol de lappelant.

[7]

La question principale en litige que la juge de
    procès devait résoudre concernait la crédibilité et la fiabilité des témoins,
    notamment la plaignante et lappelant.

[8]

Lappelant interjette appel de sa condamnation
    et fait demande dautorisation dappel de sa peine demprisonnement pour les
    raisons suivantes :

1.

En trouvant quil y avait preuve dune absence de
    motif pour fabriquer, la juge de procès a renversé le fardeau de la preuve ;

2.

La juge de procès a utilisé les déclarations
    antérieures compatibles de la plaignante pour renforcer sa crédibilité ;

3.

La juge de procès a accepté le témoignage de la
    plaignante sur des questions fondamentales, malgré les incohérences, parce que
    la plaignante était enfant ;

4.

La juge de procès a accordé trop dimportance au
    comportement de la plaignante quand elle témoignait ; et

5.

La juge de procès na pas accordé assez
    dimportance aux circonstances atténuantes de lappelant lors de la
    détermination de la peine et elle a erré en imposant une peine manifestement non
    indiquée.

[9]

Lintimée demande que lappel soit rejeté pour
    les raisons suivantes :

1.

La juge de procès a répondu aux représentations
    de la défense que la plaignante avait un motif pour fabriquer en lien avec les
    allégations de sa cousine. Elle na pas renversé le fardeau de la preuve en
    concluant que la plaignante navait pas fabriqué les allégations ;

2.

La juge de procès na pas utilisé les
    déclarations antérieures compatibles de la plaignante pour renforcer sa
    crédibilité. Elle sest servie de ces déclarations pour répondre aux
    représentations de la défense quil y avait des incohérences importantes au
    sein de sa preuve ;

3.

La juge de procès a évalué la preuve de la
    plaignante à la lumière de son jeune âge selon les principes de droit
    applicables ;

4.

La juge de procès na pas accordé trop
    dimportance au comportement de la plaignante. Le comportement nétait quun
    facteur parmi plusieurs qui ont mené la juge de procès à retenir la preuve de
    la plaignante ; et

5.

La juge de procès na pas exercé son pouvoir
    discrétionnaire de façon déraisonnable en soupesant les circonstances
    aggravantes et atténuantes.
De plus, la peine est
    raisonnable.

[10]

Pour les motifs qui suivent, lappel est rejeté.

B.

ANALYSE

(1)

La norme de contrôle

[11]

Lévaluation de la crédibilité des témoins par la
    juge de procès commande la retenue judiciaire en appel. Cependant, lévaluation
    des erreurs de droit permet une intervention en appel :
R. v. Luceno
,
    2015 ONCA 759, 331 C.C.C. (3
e
) 51, au para. 34 ;
R. v. Lacombe
,
    2019 ONCA 938, 383 C.C.C. (3
e
) 114, au para. 32.

(2)

Le traitement du motif pour fabriquer

[12]

Lappelant maintient que la juge de procès a
    erré en traitant une absence de preuve de motif pour fabriquer comme preuve dune
    absence de motif pour fabriquer et, par conséquent, la juge de procès a
    renversé le fardeau de la preuve. Lappelant prétend que la preuve entendue
    lors du procès nétait pas capable de prouver une absence définitive de motif
    pour fabriquer. Selon lappelant, la juge de procès a conclu quil y avait
    preuve dune absence de motif pour fabriquer quand elle a dit que la plaignante
    « na pas de raison pour mentir » et quand la juge de procès a
    souligné, « je ne crois pas que D.J. et [la plaignante] ont créé un
    complot tel quallégué par la [d]éfense » et « je ne crois pas que
    [la plaignante] a inventé ses allégations contre [lappelant] ».

(a)

Le droit concernant le motif pour fabriquer

[13]

Labsence dun motif pour fabriquer est un
    facteur pertinent dans lanalyse de la crédibilité des témoins, mais « [w]hat
    must be avoided  is any suggestion that  the absence of a demonstrated motive
    to fabricate necessarily means that there was no motive [to fabricate] » :
R. v. Batte
(2000), 145 C.C.C. (3
e
) 449, au para. 121.

[14]

Dans larrêt
R. v. Bartholomew
, 2019 ONCA
    377, 375 C.C.C. (3
e
) 534, aux paras. 21-23, 25 et 28, le juge
    Trotter a fait une analyse détaillée de lutilisation du motif pour
    fabriquer :

An ulterior motive, or a motive to fabricate,
    on the part of a complainant may be  important.

However, problems occur when  there is no
    apparent motive to fabricate, but the evidence falls short of actually proving
    absence of motive. In these circumstances,
it is dangerous and impermissible
    to move from an apparent lack of motive to the conclusion that the complainant
    must be telling the truth
. People may accuse others of committing a crime
    for reasons that may never be known, or for no reason at all[.]

Therefore,
there is a significant
    difference between absence of proved motive and proved absence of motive
[.]
    The reasons are clear. In
R. v. B.
    (R.W.)
(1993), 24 B.C.A.C. 1 (C.A.), Rowles
    J.A. explained, at para. 28: it does not logically follow that because there
    is no apparent reason for a motive to lie, the witness must be telling the
    truth. This point was made in
[
R. v. L.L.
, 2009 ONCA 413, 244 C.C.C. (3d) 149]
, in which Simmons J.A. said, at para. 44: the fact that a
    complainant has no
apparent
motive to fabricate does not mean that the
    complainant has no motive to fabricate[.]

More
    importantly, evidence of a good relationship between the
complainant
and the
    appellant was not capable of proving that the complainant had no motive to
    fabricate; it could do no more than support the conclusion of an absence of
    evidence of a proved motive[.] This state of affairs was not capable of
    enhancing the complainants credibility, as the trial judge did. At best, it
    was a neutral factor.

[T]he trial judges findings on the issue of
    motive formed an important part of her credibility assessment of the
    complainant. She used her finding of a proved absence of motive to enhance the
    credibility of the complainant, which was a central issue at trial. This
    amounted to a miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial.
[Citations omises ; soulignements ajoutés.]

[15]

Dans larrêt
R. v. L.L.
, 2009 ONCA 413,
    244 C.C.C. (3
e
) 149, au para. 45, la juge Simmons a prononcé le
    suivant :

[E]vidence of a good relationship does no
    more than reinforce the absence of evidence of proved motive.

The same reasoning applies to evidence of
    negative consequences that may ensue from making serious allegations. Although
    they highlight the significance of absence of evidence of motive, they do not
    prove the absence of a hidden motive. [Notes omises.]

[16]

Dans larrêt
R. v. Ignacio
, 2021 ONCA
    69, au para. 22, autorisation de pourvoi à la C.S.C. demandée, 39552, la juge
    Pepall cite la prononciation suivante du juge de procès : « I note as well
    that [the complainant] had no motive to falsely accuse Mr. Ignacio of a serious
    crime ». Dans
Ignacio
,

aux paras. 25-26, lappelant a soumis quen
    trouvant quil y avait preuve dune absence de motif pour fabriquer, le juge de
    procès a renversé le fardeau de la preuve.

[17]

Dans son analyse, aux paras. 34-36 de
Ignacio
,

la juge Pepall a prononcé le suivant :

[I] am not persuaded that the trial judge
    found that the Crown had proven no motive to fabricate. If that had been the
    case  the Crown would have had a powerful platform to assert that the
    complainant was telling the truth. One would expect such a finding to play a
    much more prominent role in the trial judges analysis of credibility than it
    did. Instead, it simply amounted to an observation and a factor to
    consider, to use the trial judges words.

Moreover, the trial judge was required to
    consider motive to fabricate due to the defence allegation that the complainant
    had a motive to fabricate. In the context of the defence submissions, he was
    entitled to look to the evidence for any suggestion of motive and conclude that
    there was no such evidence. The trial judges reference to the state of the
    relationship between the complainant and the appellant does not reflect a
    finding that the complainant had
no
motive to fabricate. It is equally
    consistent with a finding that there was
no evidence
of any motive to fabricate.

In my view, the language the trial judge used
    and the context are much more reflective of a finding that there was an absence
    of
evidence
of any motive to fabricate. The trial judge did not find that the
    Crown had proven that the complainant had
no
motive to
    fabricate. He effectively found that there was an
absence of evidence
of any motive to fabricate, and he treated this finding as one
    factor in the credibility analysis. [Soulignements dans loriginal.]

(b)

Lapplication du droit aux faits

[18]

Lappelant a soutenu que la plaignante aurait pu
    être motivée par sa cousine D.J. pour fabriquer ses allégations.

[19]

D.J., une des filles de lappelant, a accusé
    lappelant davoir commis des infractions sexuelles contre elle. Entre le 21
    novembre 2013 et le 3 novembre 2015, lappelant était assujetti à un engagement
    de mise en liberté. À la suite dun procès, lappelant a été acquitté de toutes
    les infractions le 3 novembre 2015.

[20]

Pendant son interrogatoire principal, la
    plaignante a soutenu quelle avait connaissance de ce qui sest passé avec D.J.,
    mais pas en grand détail. La famille en parlait, mais personne ne croyait les
    allégations de D.J. La plaignante avait peur que sa famille ne la croie pas non
    plus. D.J. était à lécole secondaire et la plaignante était à lécole intermédiaire.
    Ces écoles étaient dans le même édifice. Daprès la plaignante, elles se
    voyaient rarement, elles se parlaient seulement quand elles se croisaient dans
    les couloirs de lécole et elles nont jamais discuté de leurs allégations
    contre lappelant.

[21]

En contre-interrogatoire, la plaignante a
    témoigné quelle ne savait pas où D.J. est allée habiter après avoir quitté la
    maison de lappelant. Par la suite, elle a dit que D.J. est venue habiter chez elle
    et sa mère pour une période, mais elle a maintenu quelle navait pas discuté
    des allégations avec D.J. Elle a dit quelle avait oublié et a expliqué que sa
    mémoire nest « pas très bonne ». La mère de la plaignante a confirmé la preuve
    de la plaignante que D.J. avait passé moins dun mois chez eux en 2013 et que
    la plaignante et D.J. ne passaient pas beaucoup de temps ensemble pendant cette
    période.

[22]

D.J. a aussi témoigné pendant le procès de
    lappelant. Notamment, elle a témoigné quelle a fréquenté la même école que la
    plaignante pendant deux ans et quelles ont vécu ensemble durant la période en
    question, mais pas pour longtemps. Elle a témoigné quen 2016, elle avait
    envoyé un message à ses surs, indiquant que « tout va changer, on va pouvoir
    se revoir ». Lexplication donnée est quelle voulait faire une application à
    la cour pour obtenir la garde de ses surs. De plus, elle a nié avoir discuté ses
    allégations contre lappelant avec la plaignante.

[23]

A.J., la sur de D.J., a confirmé quelle a reçu
    le message de D.J. avant quelle ait appris les allégations de la plaignante. Aussi,
    la plaignante lui a parfois donné des nouvelles à propos de D.J. après lavoir
    vue à lécole.

[24]

La juge de procès a trouvé que largument de la défense
    que la plaignante aurait pu être motivée par les allégations de D.J. contre
    lappelant « nest pas supporté par la preuve » et « [i]l [ny a] pas de preuve
    qui démontre que [la plaignante] voulait se venger contre [lappelant] ».

[25]

Selon la juge de procès, en « évaluant la
    totalité de la preuve, je suis daccord [que la plaignante] na pas créé de la preuve
    ou menti ». Mis en contexte, cette citation démontre que la juge de procès na
    tout simplement pas accepté largument de la défense que la plaignante aurait
    pu être motivée par les allégations de D.J. De plus, pour soutenir sa
    conclusion que « [la plaignante] est un témoin crédible », la juge de procès a
    cité les facteurs suivants :

a)

La plaignante aimait ses cousines, et daprès la
    juge de procès, elle naurait pas inventé de telles accusations pour détruire
    sa relation avec ses cousines quelle considérait comme ses meilleures amies ;

b)

La réaction familiale aux allégations de D.J.
    était très négative ;

c)

La divulgation de la plaignante à son amie en
    octobre 2015 soutient largument de lintimée quil ny a pas eu de fabrication
    récente de la plaignante ;

d)

Cette divulgation à lamie de la plaignante a eu
    lieu avant lacquittement de lappelant des accusations de D.J. ;

e)

La plaignante et D.J. ont témoigné quelles navaient
    jamais discuté des allégations ;

f)

La mère de la plaignante a témoigné que la
    plaignante et D.J. ne passaient pas beaucoup de temps ensemble et quelle ne
    les a jamais entendues discuter des allégations ;

g)

Il y avait une absence de motif pour fabriquer,
    selon la juge de procès ; et

h)

Le comportement de la plaignante lors de son
    entrevue avec la police et lors de son témoignage au procès et la corroboration
    de la preuve de la plaignante par dautres témoins pointent à la crédibilité de
    la plaignante.

[26]

Cette considération de plusieurs facteurs pour
    évaluer la crédibilité de la plaignante est semblable à la conclusion de la
    cour dans larrêt
Ignacio
, au para.
3,
    que « [p]laced in context, the trial judge rejected the motive to fabricate
    argument advanced by the appellant. He was entitled to consider the absence of
    evidence of a motive to fabricate as one of many factors in his credibility
    analysis ».
En gardant ce contexte à lesprit, il
    est possible de conclure que la juge de procès a déterminé quil y avait une
    absence de preuve de motif pour fabriquer et non une preuve dabsence de motif
    pour fabriquer. Si la juge de procès a conclu quil y avait une preuve dabsence
    de motif pour fabriquer, « [o]ne would expect such a finding to play a
    much more prominent role in the trial judges analysis of credibility than it
    did » :
Ignacio
, au para.
34. Comme dans
Ignacio
,
    au para. 59, la juge de procès en lespèce « considered the complainants
    credibility independent from [the] conclusion that there was an absence of
    evidence of a motive to fabricate. [T]he issue of motive to fabricate had been
    raised by the defence and the trial judge felt obliged to address it ».
Pour la juge de procès en lespèce, labsence de preuve de motif
    pour fabriquer était tout simplement un facteur parmi plusieurs à considérer
    dans lévaluation de la crédibilité de la plaignante : voir
Ignacio
,
    au para. 59.

[27]

De plus, la juge de procès navait aucun doute
    raisonnable de la culpabilité de lappelant pour ces raisons et les raisons additionnelles
    suivantes :

a)

La description de la plaignante de lincident où
    lappelant a demandé à la plaignante de frotter un bonbon contre son vagin était
    un « fait bizarre qui ne vient pas à lesprit facilement » et qui semblait réel ;

b)

Il était logique que lappelant ait dirigé la
    plaignante à des endroits où les caméras dans limmeuble des grands-parents
ne lenregistreraient pas en train dembrasser la plaignante
, contrairement aux représentations de la défense que lappelant
    naurait pas pris le risque de lembrasser dans les lieux publics de limmeuble
    ;

c)

A.J. avait corroboré la preuve de la plaignante que
    les cousines mangeaient les bonbons « Strap » et regardaient des bandes
    dessinées chez les grands-parents à lépoque des incidents, contrairement à
    lappelant qui avait nié que les filles regardaient des bandes dessinées à
    cette époque ;

d)

A.J. avait corroboré la preuve de la plaignante que
    lappelant sasseyait parfois sur le divan chez les grands-parents ; et

e)

Le noyau des allégations restait cohérent.

[28]

En somme, la juge de procès a rejeté la théorie
    de la défense que la plaignante avait un motif pour fabriquer les allégations
    et, après avoir rejeté cet argument, elle sest fondée sur lensemble des facteurs
    cité au para. 25 de cette décision pour accepter la preuve de la plaignante.

[29]

De plus, bien quelle ait cité labsence de
    motif pour fabriquer parmi les facteurs quelle avait considérés en acceptant
    la preuve de la plaignante, la juge de procès sest fondée sur un ensemble de
    facteurs cité au para. 27 de cette décision pour trouver lappelant coupable
    hors de tout doute raisonnable. Alors, le fardeau de la preuve na pas été
    renversé.

[30]

La retenue judiciaire simpose à la conclusion
    factuelle de la juge de procès :
Luceno
, au para. 34 ;
Housen
    c. Nikolaisen
, 2002 CSC 33, [2002] 2 R.C.S. 235, aux paras. 10, 25.

[31]

Ce moyen dappel est donc rejeté.

(3)

Lutilisation des déclarations antérieures
    compatibles de la plaignante

[32]

Lappelant maintient que la juge de procès a
    utilisé les déclarations antérieures compatibles de la plaignante pour
    renforcer sa crédibilité.

(a)

Le droit concernant lutilisation des
    déclarations antérieures compatibles

[33]

Lorsque la défense soulève des incohérences
    entre le témoignage au procès et les déclarations antérieures, la juge de procès
    peut considérer les cohérences afin de déterminer limpact des incohérences
    soulevées sur la crédibilité et la fiabilité de la preuve du témoin : voir
R. v. L.O.
, 2015 ONCA 394, 324 C.C.C. (3
e
) 562, aux paras.
    34-36 ;
R. v. Perkins
, 2015 ONCA 521, au para. 9 ;
R. v.
    Murray
, 2017 ONCA 393, 347 C.C.C. (3
e
) 529, au para. 152.

[34]

Dans larrêt
L.O.
, aux paras. 35-36, le
    juge Doherty a décrit la façon daborder les allégations dincohérences :

An isolated, minor inconsistency in a sea of
    otherwise consistent descriptions of the relevant events would have far less
    impact on [the complainants] credibility and reliability than would several material
    inconsistencies going to the heart of her allegations.

The jury had to consider the entirety of the
    evidence relating to [the complainants] various statements, including the
    consistencies in those statements, in deciding the impact of any inconsistencies
    in those statements on her credibility and reliability. To the extent that [the
    complainants] statements were consistent, especially on the central features
    of the allegations, that consistency could counter, or at least mitigate, the
    defence claim that [the complainant] was not credible or reliable because of
    her many prior inconsistent statements[.] [Citations omises.]

(b)

Lapplication du droit aux faits

[35]

Comme dans larrêt
L.O.
, au para. 39,
    lintimée au procès ne sest pas fiée aux déclarations antérieures compatibles
    de la plaignante pour la véracité de leur contenu, autre que la déclaration de
    la plaignante à la police admise en tant que preuve en vertu de lart. 715.1 du
Code criminel
.

[36]

Lavocat de la défense a présenté lors du contre-interrogatoire
    de la plaignante le témoignage de la plaignante de lenquête préliminaire afin
    dessayer de démontrer que sa preuve était incohérente.

[37]

La juge de procès pouvait alors évaluer les
    incohérences soulevées compte tenu de lensemble de la preuve, y compris les
    cohérences sur les points essentiels. Elle a rejeté largument de la défense
    quil existait des incohérences importantes au sein de la preuve de la
    plaignante pour les raisons suivantes :

Je ne suis pas daccord avec la [d]éfense que
    la question des détails nuise à la crédibilité de [la plaignante]. Je ne peux
    conclure que cette incohérence est importante pour ma décision. La divulgation
    de [la plaignante] était cohérente avec ce quelle a dit lors de son entrevue
    avec la police, à lenquête préliminaire et à ce procès. Le noyau de ses
    allégations na jamais changé. Il est vrai que la mémoire de [la plaignante] était
    parfois moins éclairée lors de son contre-interrogatoire. Cependant, je conclu[s]
    que cétait plus une fonction de son âge et de sa routine. Il est très
    important pour moi que son témoignage, relativement aux questions importantes, soit
    cohérent. En ligne avec les décisions de la Cour suprême au sujet du témoignage
    des enfants, il est important de prendre en considération lâge de la plaignante
    au moment des incidents allégués.

[38]

La juge de procès na pas utilisé les déclarations
    antérieures compatibles pour renforcer la crédibilité de la plaignante, mais pour
    adresser le point soulevé par la défense. Elle a conclu quil nexistait pas
    des incohérences matérielles et que le noyau des allégations restait cohérent.

[39]

De plus, comme affirme lappelant, lorsquune
    déclaration est admise en vertu de lart. 715.1 du
Code criminel
, cette
    déclaration devient partie du témoignage de la plaignante. Cependant, la juge de
    procès peut toujours tenir en compte les cohérences et les incohérences
    internes de la preuve du témoin, ce qui inclut la déclaration admise en vertu
    de lart. 715.1 du
Code criminel
, pour évaluer la fiabilité de la
    preuve et limpact des incohérences soulevées :
L.O.
, aux paras.
    43-44.

[40]

Les conclusions de la juge de procès concernant la
    crédibilité des témoins doivent être respectées, « sauf erreur manifeste et
    dominante » :
R. c. Gagnon
, 2006 CSC 17, [2006] 1 R.C.S. 621, au para. 20. Ce moyen dappel
    est donc rejeté.

(4)

Lévaluation des
incohérences
dans le témoignage de la plaignante

[41]

Lappelant maintient quil y a trois aspects du
    témoignage de la plaignante que la juge de procès na pas résolus dune mesure
    suffisante : (i) le fait que la plaignante ne pouvait pas se souvenir des
    dates des incidents lors de son témoignage, alors quelle se souvenait des
    dates dans sa déclaration à la police à peu près deux ans avant le procès ;
    (ii) lajout dans le témoignage de la plaignante dun endroit additionnel où
    lappelant lavait embrassée à limmeuble des grands-parents ; et (iii) le
    témoignage de A.J. que la plaignante partageait parfois des nouvelles de sa
    cousine D.J. après lavoir vue à lécole. Lappelant prétend que la juge de
    procès a accordé trop dimportance au jeune âge de la plaignante comme facteur
    déterminant pour résoudre les incohérences.

(a)

Le droit concernant le témoignage des jeunes
    enfants

[42]

En traitant le témoignage des jeunes enfants, les
    juges doivent « éviter de leur imposer les mêmes normes exigeantes qui sont
    applicables aux adultes » :
R. c. B. (G.)
, [1990] 2 R.C.S. 30,
    aux pp. 54-55. Alors, une « faille, comme une contradiction, dans le
    témoignage dun enfant ne devrait pas avoir le même effet quune faille
    semblable dans le témoignage dun adulte » :
B. (G.)
, à la
    p. 55. Sil y a des incohérences dans le témoignage, « surtout en ce qui concerne
    des questions connexes comme le moment ou le lieu », les juges doivent considérer
    « lâge du témoin au moment des événements en question » :
R.
    c. W. (R.)
, [1992] 2 R.C.S. 122, à la p. 134. Cependant, « cela ne
    veut pas dire que les tribunaux ne devraient pas apprécier soigneusement la crédibilité
    des témoins enfants et  que la norme de preuve doive être réduite à légard des
    enfants » :
B. (G.)
, à la p. 55
.

(b)

Lapplication du droit aux faits

[43]

La plaignante avait 12 ans lors des incidents et
    15 ans lors de son témoignage au procès.

[44]

La juge de procès a reconnu et a énoncé les
    principes applicables à lévaluation de la preuve des enfants. Elle a conclu
    que les failles dans la mémoire de la plaignante au sujet des dates lors de son
    témoignage étaient explicables par son âge et sa routine. La plaignante
    témoignait au sujet des événements qui ont eu lieu de manière routinière
    quelques années avant le procès, lorsquelle avait 12 ans. Le fait que sa
    mémoire était « parfois moins éclairée lors de son contre-interrogatoire »
    nétait pas une incohérence matérielle.

[45]

Quant à lendroit additionnel où lappelant
    avait embrassé la plaignante, la juge de procès a conclu raisonnablement quil « nest
    pas surprenant » quun enfant nait pas mentionné auparavant un incident
    davoir été embrassée parmi plusieurs autres incidents semblables. Ce nétait
    pas une incohérence matérielle. Encore une fois, le « noyau de ses allégations
    na jamais changé ».

[46]

Quant au témoignage dA.J. que la plaignante
    partageait des nouvelles de D.J., la juge de procès nétait pas obligée de
    répondre à chaque argument soulevé par la défense :
R. c. Dinardo
,
    2008 CSC 24, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 788, au para. 30. Elle a mentionné cet aspect de
    la preuve dA.J. De plus, bien que la plaignante ait nié quelle partageait des
    nouvelles de D.J. avec ses surs, elle avait confirmé quelle a eu des
    conversations avec ses cousines au sujet de leur sur. Limportant cest que la
    juge de procès a accepté que D.J. na
jamais discuté de ses allégations avec la plaignante.

[47]

Ces conclusions de fait doivent être respectées
    sauf erreur manifeste et dominante, dont lappelant na pas démontré :
Housen
,
    au para. 10. La retenue judiciaire simpose. Ce moyen dappel est donc rejeté.

(5)

Limportance accordée au comportement de la
    plaignante

[48]

Selon lappelant, la juge de procès a accordé
    trop dimportance au comportement de la plaignante quand elle témoignait.

[49]

Toutefois, la juge de procès a reconnu quelle
    ne devrait pas accorder trop dimportance au comportement des témoins et que «
    bien que le comportement soit un facteur pertinent dans une évaluation de la
    crédibilité, le comportement seul est un prédicteur notoirement non fiable de
    lexactitude de la preuve fournie par un témoin ». La juge de procès a aussi
    cité de la jurisprudence pour confirmer ce principe : voir notamment
Law
    Society of Upper Canada v. Neinstein
, 2010 ONCA 193, 99 O.R. (3
e
)
    1, au para. 66 ;
R. v. O.M.
,

2014 ONCA 503, 313 C.C.C. (3
e
) 5, au para. 34.

[50]

La juge de procès a considéré que la plaignante
    avait « démontré une réaction émotive forte » lorsquelle décrivait les
    attouchements sexuels : elle crachait, pleurait et tremblait lorsquelle
    parlait des incidents ; et elle a « commencé à crier » après que la défense
    avait suggéré que la plaignante mentait.

[51]

Pourtant, comme souligné au para. 25 de cette
    décision, le comportement de la plaignante nétait quun des facteurs que la
    juge de procès a considérés en évaluant la crédibilité de la plaignante. Ce
    moyen dappel est donc rejeté.

(6)

Lappel de la peine devrait être rejeté

[52]

Lappelant fait demande dautorisation dappel
    de sa peine. Il indique que la juge de procès na pas accordé assez dimportance
    aux circonstances atténuantes de lappelant lors de la détermination de la
    peine et elle a erré en imposant une peine manifestement non indiquée.

[53]

La juge de procès na commis aucune erreur de
    principe ayant une incidence sur la détermination de la peine et la peine nest
    pas manifestement non indiquée :
R. c. Lacasse
, 2015 CSC 64,
    [2015] 3 R.C.S. 1089, au para. 11 ;
R. c. Friesen
, 2020 CSC 9, 391
    C.C.C. (3
e
) 309, au para. 26.

[54]

Dans ses motifs pour la peine, la juge de procès
    était « daccord avec lénumération des facteurs atténuants offerte par la
    défense », incluant le fait que lappelant est responsable du
    « soutien de son épouse et de deux de ses filles »
et le fait quil était en libération provisoire sous
    caution selon des conditions strictes pendant plus de deux ans.

[55]

De plus, la peine demprisonnement de deux ans
    moins un jour nest pas manifestement non indiquée. Lappelant a été déclaré
    coupable davoir commis des actes sexuels à lendroit de sa nièce de 12 ans pendant
    une période prolongée. Il se situait en position de confiance envers la
    plaignante. Les incidents ont eu un grand impact sur la plaignante. Dans des
    circonstances semblables, des peines similaires ont été approuvées :
R. v.
    Manjra
, 2009 ONCA 485, 250
    O.A.C. 257, aux paras. 2-3, 28-32, autorisation de pourvoi refusée, [2009]
    C.S.C.R. no 393 ;
R. v. D.J.B.
, 2018 ONCA 566, aux paras. 1-3, 21 et 30. Ce
    moyen dappel est donc rejeté.

C.

CONCLUSION

[56]

Pour les motifs énoncés plus haut, lappel de la
    condamnation de lappelant est rejeté. La demande dautorisation dappel de la peine
    est accordée, mais lappel de la peine de lappelant est rejeté.

Rendu le : 30 avril 2021 « K.M.v.R. »

« J.A.
    Thorburn j.c.a. »

« Je
    souscris. K. van Rensburg j.c.a. »

« Je
    souscris, M.L. Benotto j.c.a. »


WARNING

An order restricting publication in this proceeding
    was made under s. 517 of the
Criminal Code
and continues to be in
    effect.  This section of the
Criminal Code
provides:

517(1)         If the prosecutor or the accused
    intends to show cause under section 515, he or she shall so state to the
    justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the accused, before or
    at any time during the course of the proceedings under that section, make an
    order directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the
    representations made and the reasons, if any, given or to be given by the
    justice shall not be published in any document, or broadcast or transmitted in
    any way before such time as

(a)     if a preliminary inquiry is held, the
    accused in respect of whom the proceedings are held is discharged; or

(b)     if the accused in respect
    of whom the proceedings are held is tried or ordered to stand trial, the trial
    is ended.

Failure to comply

(2)     Everyone who fails without lawful excuse, the
    proof of which lies on him, to comply with an order made under subsection (1)
    is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(3)     [Repealed, 2005, c. 32, s. 17]

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 517; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st
    Supp.), s. 101(E); 2005, c. 32, s. 17.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Al Zarzour, 2021 ONCA 347

DATE: 20210520

DOCKET: M52451

Fairburn A.C.J.O.
    (Motion Judge)

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Mohamad
    Al Zarzour

Applicant

Megan Stuckey, for the applicant

Grace Choi, for the respondent

Heard: May 19, 2021
by video
    conference

[1]

A non-publication order under ss. 517 and 522(5) of the
Criminal
    Code
, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46,
was imposed in this matter at the bail hearing in the court below. That order
    precludes the publication, broadcast, or transmission of any evidence taken,
    information given, representations made, and reasons given.

[2]

The decision in
R. v. Al Zarzour
, 2021 ONCA 347, contains
    information covered by that order.

[3]

Accordingly, the decision will be available on the Court of Appeal for
    Ontarios website once the non-publication order ceases to be in effect.

[4]

In the interim, a copy of the full decision is available at the Registry
    of the Court of Appeal for Ontario at 130 Queen Street West, Toronto.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
    R. v. Alas, 2021 ONCA 224

DATE: 20210409

DOCKET:
    C66058

MacPherson,
    Tulloch, and Lauwers JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her
    Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Anthony
    Raul Alas

Appellant

John M. Rosen, for the appellant

Karen Papadopoulos, for the respondent

Heard: December 14, 2020 by video conference

On appeal from the conviction entered on
    May 26, 2016 and the sentence imposed on August 3, 2016 by Justice Gary T.
    Trotter of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.

Tulloch J.A.:

A.

INTRODUCTION

[1]

In the early morning hours of March 15, 2014,
    the appellant, Anthony Alas, fatally stabbed Masud Khalif outside a bar in
    Scarborough. After a three-week trial, a jury convicted the appellant of second
    degree murder. He was sentenced to life with no parole ineligibility for eleven
    years.

[2]

The appellant appeals his conviction alone,
    raising three grounds. First, he argues that the trial judge erred by failing
    to leave the defence of provocation with the jury. Second, he contends that the
    trial judge erred in admitting the appellants statement to police. Third, he
    submits that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately relate the evidence
    of the case to the questions at issue in his charge to the jury.

[3]

For the reasons that follow, I would allow the
    appeal on the first ground. Contrary to the submissions of both counsel at
    trial, there was an air of reality to the defence of provocation in this case. With
    respect, the defence should have been left with the jury for their consideration.
    On this basis, I would order a new trial.

[4]

In light of my conclusion on the first ground, I
    need not address the second or third grounds in detail. Suffice to say, I am
    not persuaded that there is any merit to the appellants submissions on either
    ground.

B.

FACTUAL OVERVIEW

[5]

Just before midnight on March 14, 2014, the
    appellant and his fiancée, Catherine Déscoteaux, went to a bar to socialize and
    play billiards. Ms. Déscoteaux was drinking alcohol, but the appellant was
    not.

[6]

They met Patricia Isaacs and her mother at the
    bar. Ms. Isaacs was a close friend of the appellant. She was a regular patron
    at the bar and was familiar with the staff, including the bartender, Samantha
    Blackmore. By the time the appellant and his fiancée joined Ms. Isaacs at the
    bar, Ms. Isaacs indicated that she had consumed about three shots of tequila
    and smoked some marijuana.

[7]

The deceased arrived at the same bar sometime between
    11:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m., accompanied by his friend, Kelly Bonnell. In his
    testimony, Mr. Bonnell estimated that the deceased was about a seven on a
    ten-point scale in terms of intoxication that evening. He had a blood alcohol level
    over twice the legal limit for driving.

[8]

The appellant did not know the deceased or Mr.
    Bonnell. Ms. Isaacs, on the other hand, had encountered the deceased before, on
    two or three brief occasions at the bar. Ms. Blackwell, the bartender, had also
    encountered the deceased before.

[9]

The events that form the subject of this appeal arose
    from a series of interactions between the deceased and Ms. Isaacs.

[10]

Ms. Isaacs testified that she first interacted
    with the deceased when he arrived at the bar that night. As the deceased passed
    Ms. Isaacs, he tapped her on the head with his hand. Ms. Isaacs testified that
    the deceased said she should be wearing a Toronto hat, not a Chicago Bulls hat.
    According to Ms. Isaacs, the deceased then took the hat off Ms. Isaacs head
    and held it high, out of her reach, for about five to ten minutes. She
    eventually got her hat back and walked away.

[11]

When describing this incident during her
    examination-in-chief, Ms. Isaacs said that the deceased was a bully, like mean
    a bit but like, not, like too aggressive. Observers described this interaction
    as playful; they were just joking around.

[12]

Afterwards, Ms. Isaacs went outside for a
    cigarette. The deceased was also outside. According to Ms. Isaacs, as she tried
    to re-enter the bar, the deceased grabbed the hood of her sweatshirt and pulled
    her backwards, towards him. At the same time, he used his foot to push the door
    shut. According to Ms. Isaacs, when she tried to enter the bar for a second
    time, the deceased closed the door again, this time catching her head between
    the door and the frame.

[13]

When Ms. Isaacs finally got back into the bar,
    she was upset and crying. She complained to her mother and the bartender about
    the deceaseds actions. She also informed the manager of the bar.

[14]

Ms. Isaacs also told Ms. Déscoteaux what happened.
    The appellant overheard. Both Ms. Isaacs and Ms. Déscoteaux testified that the
    appellant became angry when he heard about the deceaseds behaviour towards Ms. Isaacs.
    In his police statement, the appellant said that he was shaking and really
    wanted to do something to him badly. He further explained to police:

Yeah. Because like me,
    like I have grown up with my dad beating up my mom my whole lifeSo I'm not the
    person that's like that and I don't like girls getting mistreated in front of
    me either, right So I, I always got to stick up for them. I always got to say
    something, because like I said, I don't - I don't like girls getting mistreated
    in front of me, because of my dad like my whole life, right.

[15]

Ms. Isaacs and Ms. Déscoteaux recalled the
    appellant saying that he wanted to hit the deceased in the head with a pool
    cue. The appellant explained to police that he wanted to use a pool cue because
    he felt like [he] couldnt take on a guy like that, noting:

Like the guy was big.
    That's why I told the mom, like just let me whack him with the pool stick
    because that was - because honestly I have been sick for ten years. I'm not
    like at my full strength. I couldn't take on a guy like that

[16]

At the time, the appellant was about 56. He
    suffered from longstanding health issues relating to his diagnoses of Type 1
    diabetes and gastroparesis. The deceased was a large man, standing at
    approximately 62 and weighing 230 pounds. He was described as stocky and
    muscular.

[17]

Ms. Isaacs testified that she told the appellant
    not to do anything, and to leave it alone. The appellant appeared to calm down
    and went back to playing pool.

[18]

Shortly after this interaction, Ms. Isaacs again
    went outside for a cigarette, this time with Ms. Déscoteaux in tow. Ms.
    Déscoteaux testified that she hoped that the deceased would not come outside
    because she had a bad feeling about him. The appellant told police that he
    assured the women that he would come outside if he saw the deceased follow
    them. In the meantime, the appellant returned to his pool game.

[19]

While the women were outside, the appellant saw
    the deceased and Mr. Bonnell preparing to leave. The appellant quickly
    retrieved his jacket and went outside. On his way out of the bar, the deceased
    stopped to talk to someone; his friend, Mr. Bonnell, left and headed towards
    his parked car.

[20]

The deceased exited the bar shortly after the
    appellant. The appellant told police that the deceased stopped right beside the
    appellant and started staring at Ms. Isaacs all hard core.

[21]

A verbal confrontation ensued between the
    deceased and the women. Ms. Déscoteaux testified that the deceased started
    yelling at them. According to Ms. Isaacs, Ms. Déscoteaux was angry and told him
    to leave us alone and to shut the hell up. She recalled him refusing to leave
    and swearing at them, calling Ms. Isaacs and Ms. Déscoteaux fucking bitches. Ms.
    Déscoteaux called the deceased a rude, ignorant prick. By all accounts, the
    appellant stood there silently at this point.

[22]

Ms. Blackwell, the bartender, tried to join the
    group outside, but the deceased held the door closed and prevented her from
    coming out. The appellant and Ms. Isaacs forced the door open so Ms. Blackwell
    could join them outside. The appellant told police that he then confronted the
    deceased for the first time, saying: What the fuck is wrong with you? Do you
    have a problem?

[23]

Ms. Déscoteaux and the deceased continued to
    argue and swear at one another. Ms. Déscoteaux testified that she confronted
    the deceased about his behaviour towards Ms. Isaacs. She recalled saying: Did
    your mom not teach you manners, youre not supposed to hit a woman. According
    to Ms. Déscoteaux, the deceased responded by saying: I didnt hit her, I
    tripped her.

[24]

Ms. Déscoteaux also testified that the deceased
    kept putting his middle finger about half an inch from her face. She responded
    by threatening to break his finger and unsuccessfully attempting to grab his
    hand. She also said that she pushed the deceased back with a closed fist when
    he was in her face.

[25]

As the verbal confrontation between the deceased
    and the women continued, the appellant transferred a knife from his pants
    pocket to his jacket pocket. It was the appellants common practice to carry a
    knife for his protection. He told police that he did so because he had been
    sick for ten years. He explained that he made the knife more accessible in this
    moment because the deceased was much bigger and stronger than him.

[26]

There are conflicting accounts regarding what
    precipitated the physical confrontation that happened next. From his vantage
    point across the parking lot, Mr. Bonnell saw the appellant, Ms. Déscoteaux,
    and Ms. Isaacs approach the deceased and surround him. The appellant told the
    police that he saw the deceased form a fist, as if he was about to strike one
    of the women who stood in front of him. Ms. Déscoteaux said that the deceased
    lunged at her. Ms. Isaacs said that the deceased was swinging his right arm in
    a punching motion.

[27]

The appellant told police that he reacted by
    jumping in and quickly stabbing the deceased. He said that he did not intend to
    stab the deceaseds throat; he was aiming for his chest.

[28]

Ms. Déscoteaux jumped on the deceaseds back and
    began choking him. She testified that she was concerned about the appellant,
    given his small stature and health conditions. She agreed with defence counsel that
    she and the appellant were working together to defend [themselves] and that
    it was one of the scariest moments in her life.

[29]

Ms. Déscoteaux testified that she pulled her arm
    back when she saw blood. She initially thought the deceased had broken his nose
    until she saw him clutching his neck.

[30]

When the appellant realized what he had done, he
    fled the scene. Ms. Déscoteaux and Ms. Isaacs followed suit.

[31]

The deceased died from a stab wound to the neck.
    He also had wounds on his right thigh, head, left forearm, right hand, and
    chest. The Crown alleged that the appellant stabbed him six times.

[32]

Police arrested the appellant less than 48 hours
    later, on March 16, 2014. Both the appellant and Ms. Déscoteaux gave video
    statements to the police on the night of the arrest.

C.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

[33]

On May 16, 2016, defence counsel confirmed that
    he would seek a jury charge that addressed self-defence, defence of a third
    person, and possibly provocation. However, the next day, on May 17, 2016,
    defence counsel reversed course. He indicated that provocation was
    problematic and expressed doubt that the transactional nexus between what
    happened in the bar and outside was enough to require a charge on provocation:

THE COURT: Well we're
    going to have to discuss air of reality for provocation at least.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I think
    that's problematic for me. Obviously just on the outside I look at it as
    particularly the evidence inside where he has a raised concern and then there's
    the allowance of going outside so the question would be whether or not it's on
    the (indiscernible) provocation. I think that's the problem for our side on
    that element of it. There might still be a transactional nexus through it that
    allows it to carry outside the bar given that it's such a short period of time
    but I think that's the problem.

THE COURT: That's what
    we'll be discussing on...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Exactly.

THE COURT: ...whenever we
    have the pre-charge conference...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Exactly.

[34]

Later in his discussions with counsel that day,
    the trial judge asked defence counsel again whether he would be arguing that
    there is an air of reality to the defence of provocation. Defence counsel
    wanted more time to research the issue, but indicated that it hinged on
    whether or not I think you can separate when he first becomes aware of the
    possibility of a dispute versus an actual attack against his partner.

[35]

At the pre-charge conference, defence counsel
    took the position that provocation wasnt available, highlighting the cooling
    off period between when the appellant learned of the first attack on Ms.
    Isaacs and the time when the stabbing occurred:

Its my position that
    provocation isnt availableIs not, is not because theres no air of reality
    and justthere appears to be a cooling down period [after the incident in the
    bar]. On that alone, I think it's insufficient to proceed because he's aware of
    a potential assault or a violent altercation and has a cooling off period such
    that it doesn't reach the on the (indiscernible) component which is necessary
    to establish provocation such that it shocks the mind allowing the
mens rea
to be vitiated.

[36]

I would pause here to note that this is an
    incorrect articulation of the law of provocation. The provocation defence does
    not vitiate the
mens rea
for murder:
R. v. Humaid,
(2006) 208
    C.C.C. (3d) 43 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 63, leave to appeal refused [2006]
    S.C.C.A. No. 232. Instead, the defence partially excuses an offenders conduct
    out of a compassion to human frailty:
R. v. Tran,
2010 SCC 58,
    [2010] 3 SCR 350 at paras. 21-22.

[37]

Defence counsel then went on to concede that
    there was no air of reality to the defence of provocation. Counsel argued that the
    appellant was not acting on the sudden in the sense that he armed himself in
    anticipation that something might happen when he stood outside with the women:

Additionally and even more
    in support of removing provocation would be Mr. Alas' own statement in it he
    declares Im standing outside and something to the effect of, I move the knife
    from my pocket of my pyjamas up to the pocket in my hood in preparation or as a
    prepared measure in case something were to happen. To me, again, that
    demonstrates a mind consciously aware of something that may occur such that
    it's not such a shock. Again, it doesn't really put him on the sudden  under
    the necessary legal test.

[38]

Crown counsel agreed with this submission,
    noting that: [I]ts the position of the Crown that provocation is not
    available for reasons similar to [defence counsel]. The Crown also focussed on
    the cooling off period inside. It was the Crowns position that the sequence of
    events could be separated into distinct actions on the part of the appellant
    and therefore, he did not have an unprepared mind when he was outside with
    the woman and the deceased:

CROWN COUNSEL: What takes
    provocation away on those distinct actions, because I think Mr. McGregor is
    quite correct, the very actions of Mr. Alas show a cooling off period such that
    it's not one continuous transaction.

If you're looking at the
    three distinct actions, obviously all different, that may have ultimately led
    to the stabbing, a sudden provocation and a sudden response, looking at the
    case law we're talking about firing at an unprepared mind. And when that
    happens, Mr. Alas does not have an unprepared mind because he already has his
    hand on that knife...

THE COURT: Well, you're
    talking about suddenness, when he gave his statement it sounds like he's still
    angry with, with the whole situation...

CROWN COUNSEL: He's
    certainly saying he's still...

THE COURT: ...a few days
    later.

CROWN COUNSEL: ...he's
    still angry at the whole situation but there is that cooling off period in his
    actions of playing pool.

THE COURT: I say that in
    not in opposition to what you're saying but I'm agreeing with you. I'm talking
    about suddenness.

CROWN COUNSEL: Thank you,
    Your Honour. The main point being when Mr. Alas uses a weapon to stab Mr.
    Khalif, it's not  what happens is not to an unprepared mind as it's dictated
    by the case law. What it ultimately means is there's no air of reality to the,
    the defence.

[39]

Based on the submissions of counsel, the trial
    judge ruled that he would not leave the defence of provocation with the jury.

D.

ANALYSIS

[40]

As noted above, I am of the view that this court
    need only address the first issue raised in this appeal. The appellant argues
    that the defence of provocation had an air of reality and therefore it should
    have been left with the jury. For the reasons that follow, I agree.

(1)

The Air of Reality Test

[41]

At the outset, I will briefly summarize the test
    that applies at this stage of the trial proceedings. All defences that arise on
    the facts must be left to the jury, regardless of whether they have been raised
    by an accused:
R. v. Cinous
, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para.
51;
R. v. Parnell,
(1983) 9 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont. C.A.), at
    para.
33, leave to appeal refused [1984] S.C.C.A. No.
    333. Likewise, trial judges have a duty to keep defences that do not meet the
    air of reality threshold from the jury, even if the defence in question is the
    only path to the accuseds acquittal:
R. v. Pappas,
2013 SCC 56, [2013]
    3 S.C.R. 452, at paras. 21-27.

[42]

The air of reality test asks whether there is
    evidence on the record upon which a properly instructed jury acting reasonably
    could acquit:
Cinous,
at para. 49. Stated otherwise, the trial
    judge may engage in a limited weighing of the evidence to determine if a jury
    acting reasonably could draw the inferences necessary to have a reasonable
    doubt as to whether the accused is guilty of murder, on the basis of the
    defence of provocation:
R. v. Cairney,
2013 SCC 55, [2013] 3
    S.C.R. 420,

at para. 21.

[43]

The burden on the accused is evidential, not
    persuasive:
Cinous,
at para. 52. The question before the trial
    judge is not whether the defence is likely, unlikely, somewhat likely, or very
    likely to succeed at the end of the day:
Cinous
, at para. 54. That
    question is reserved for the jury. The air of reality test is only concerned
    with whether a given defence is put in play by the totality of the evidence, accepting
    the case of the accused at its highest and assuming the evidence relied upon is
    true:
Cinous
, at para. 53.

[44]

Whether there is an air of reality to a defence
    is a question of law, assessed on a standard of correctness:
Cinous,
at
    para. 55;
Tran
,

at para. 40.

(2)

The Defence of Provocation

[45]

The defence of provocation recognizes that, as
    a result of human frailties, the accused reacted inappropriately and
    disproportionately, but understandably to a sufficiently serious wrongful act
    or insult:
Tran,
at para. 22. At the time of the offence, ss. 232(1)
    and (2) of the
Criminal Code,
R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 governed the
    defence of provocation and read as follows:
[1]

Murder reduced to Manslaughter

232 (1) Culpable homicide that
    otherwise would be murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who
    committed it did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation.

What is provocation

(2) A wrongful act or an insult that
    is of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the
    power of self-control is provocation for the purposes of this section if the
    accused acted on it on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to
    cool.

[46]

The defence will not always be available to
    excuse a loss of self control; the law has evolved to recognize that people ought
    not to yield to certain types of provocation, and that if they did the law
    should offer no concession to them: A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of
    Provocation (1976), 35
Cambridge L.J.
292, at p. 295 (emphasis in
    original), as cited in
Cairney,
at para. 28

[47]

The Supreme Court outlined the four components
    of the provocation defence in
Tran,
at paras. 25 and 36: (1) there
    must be a wrongful act or insult; (2) the wrongful act or insult must be
    sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control; (3) the
    accused must have acted in response to the provocation; and (4) the accused
    must have acted on the sudden before there was time for their passion to cool.
    The first two components constitute the two-fold objective element of the
    defence:
Tran
, at para. 25. The latter two components comprise the
    two-fold subjective element of the defence:
Tran
, at para. 36.

(a)

The Objective Components

[48]

The ordinary person standard with respect to the
    first two elements serves a restraining function, ensuring that only losses of
    self-control that comport with contemporary societys norms and values will
    attract the laws compassion:
Tran
, at para. 30.

[49]

The court takes a flexible and contextual
    approach to the ordinary person in the context of provocation. As the Supreme
    Court held in
R. v. Thibert
, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 37, at para. 14:

the ordinary person must
    be taken to be of the same age, and sex, and must share with the accused such
    other factors as would give the act or insult in question a special
    significance. In other words, all the relevant background circumstances should
    be considered.

All contextual factors that would
    give the act or insult special significance to an ordinary person must be taken
    into account:
Thibert
, at para. 18.

[50]

For example, in
R. v. Land,
2019 ONCA
    39, 145 O.R. (3d) 29, at paras. 95-97, Paciocco J.A. held that the accuseds
    experiences as a sexual abuse survivor had a bearing on the ordinary person
    test. The confrontation in that case arose out of the deceaseds alleged
    sexually abusive conduct towards a young girl.  Paciocco J.A. wrote at para. 96:

In this case, the ordinary
    person used to test whether, objectively, a loss of control could occur, must
    be conceptualized as someone who themselves had been raised in a sexually
    abused family and in a sexually abusive environment. Not doing so would be
    unfair to Mr. Land, for whom sexual abuse takes on particular significance.
    [Emphasis added].

[51]

Paciocco J.A. went on to clarify that this
    contextual approach does not mean that the ordinary person is someone who,
    like Mr. Land, habitually reacts violently to sexual abusers as the ordinary
    person is not someone who is exceptionally excitable or pugnacious:
Land,
at
    para. 97, citing
R. v. Hill
, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313, at p. 331. The court
    must bear in mind the distinction between contextualizing the objective
    standard, which is necessary and proper, and individualizing it, which defeats
    the purpose of this prong of the test:
Tran,
at para. 35. As
    Paciocco J.A. explained in
Land,
at para. 97
:
The question
    is how an ordinary person with Mr. Lands life experiences with sexual abuse
    would be apt to respond.

[52]

With respect to the first inquiry under the
    objective component  whether there was a wrongful act or insult  there was
    evidence upon which a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could conclude
    that the deceased was about to strike one of the women outside the bar. Again,
    the appellant said the deceased formed a fist and brought his arm up like he
    was going to strike one of the women; Ms. Déscoteaux indicated that the
    deceased lunged at her; and Ms. Isaacs recalled the deceased raising his arm in
    a punching motion.

[53]

As for the second inquiry under the objective
    component, the court must consider whether the wrongful act or insult was
    sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control. The
    suddenness of the provocative act is germane to this question:
Land,
at
    para. 57. As Paciocco J.A. reasoned in
Land,
at para. 57: [I]f a
    wrongful act or insult is not sudden and unexpected, it is unlikely to satisfy
    the objective requirement that the wrongful act or insult must be sufficient
    to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control.

[54]

The question is how an ordinary person with the
    appellants life experiences would be apt to respond:
Land,
at para.
    97. The appellant is someone with a relatively small stature, health
    conditions, and a history of bearing witness to violence against women. The
    ordinary person in this context would be apprised of the deceaseds previous assault
    on Ms. Isaacs, and the precipitous conduct of the deceased, a large man who
    towered over the appellant, Ms. Isaacs, and Ms. Déscoteaux.

[55]

Understood in that context, there is an air of
    reality to the prospect that an ordinary person in the appellants shoes could
    lose self-control when faced with a credible threat that the deceased would
    again assault one of his female companions. Moreover, in this moment of
    apparent escalation, an ordinary person may resort to a disproportionate
    response, particularly in light of the size differential between himself and
    the person acting in a threatening manner.

(b)

Subjective Components

[56]

Turning to the subjective components of the test,
    the court must ask: (1) whether the accused acted in response to the
    provocation; and (2) whether the accuseds actions were on the sudden before
    there was time for [their] passion to cool:
Tran
, at para. 36.

[57]

I am persuaded that there was an air of reality
    to the notion that the appellant acted in response to the provocation. The
    stabbing followed immediately on the heels of the deceased making a threatening
    gesture towards the women. It was at this juncture that the appellant reacted. Before
    this point, he demonstrated restraint.

[58]

The more contentious question on this appeal is
    the second inquiry under the subjective component: whether the appellant acted
    on the sudden before there was time for his passion to cool:
Tran,
at
    para. 36. Again, all parties at the proceedings below, including the trial
    judge, were of the view that no properly instructed jury could reasonably
    conclude that: (a) the unlawful act was sudden and unexpected; and (b) the
    appellants actions occurred on the sudden before he had time to regain
    self-control.

[59]

On appeal, the respondent argues that the
    evidence does not satisfy the suddenness requirement. The respondent first points
    to the cooling off period between the initial assault on Ms. Isaacs and the
    later interaction outside. However, I am not persuaded that the cooling off
    period forecloses the reliance on the defence of provocation in this case. In
    my view, there were two incidents that constituted potential provocative acts.
    The first was the assault on Ms. Isaacs; the second was the deceaseds
    threatening gesture outside. There was no cooling off period between the
    threatening gesture outside and the stabbing. Indeed, taking the evidence at
    its highest, the stabbing was an immediate response to the deceased lunging,
    swinging, or forming a fist in the direction of his female companions. Put
    another way, he acted on the sudden to the physical threat in front of him before
    there was time for his passion to cool.

[60]

The respondent also argues that the appellant
    did not have an unprepared mind because he engaged in a deliberate thought
    process in preparation for an altercation outside, and the nature of this
    altercation was entirely predictable. In support of this second argument, the
    respondent points to the fact that the appellant joined his female companions
    outside when he knew the deceased was on his way out; he did so while armed
    with a knife; he did not shy away from the confrontation; during said
    confrontation, he braced his knife just in case; and he admitted that he
    meant to stab the deceased in the chest, not his throat. The respondent also
    seems to imply that these acts of planning or preparation show that the
    appellant played an instigating role in the confrontation, and therefore subjectively
    expected the deceaseds response.

[61]

With respect, it remained open for the jury to
    conclude otherwise on this record. Another plausible read of the facts is that
    the appellant feared a confrontation with the deceased and went outside to
    stand with his female companions as a safety precaution. It seems to me that a
    violent altercation was not a foregone conclusion, and neither was his own
    participation in what ultimately unfolded. The deceased and his friend were
    leaving the bar; they could have left without incident but for the verbal
    confrontation that ensued between the deceased and Ms. Déscoteaux. And again,
    by all accounts, the appellant did not start the verbal confrontation, nor did
    he resort to violence until the deceased made a threatening gesture. It is
    difficult to see how he acted as an instigator, and I am not convinced that the
    appellant was wholly prepared for the threatening act of the deceased. In any
    event, the fact that a violent altercation may have been predictable is
    certainly relevant, but not necessarily determinative:
Cairney,
at
    paras. 44-46;
Land,
at para. 62.

[62]

Nor do I see the appellants anticipation of a conflict and possession
    of a knife as fatal to this stage of the air of reality test. The defence of
    provocation is not necessarily defeated in situations where the accused arms
    himself with a knife in preparation for an encounter he could anticipate. In
R.
    v. Gill
, 2009 ONCA 124, 246 O.A.C. 390, a decision cited with approval in
R.
    v. Buzizi
, 2013 SCC 27, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 248, this court found that there
    was an air of reality to the defence of provocation notwithstanding the fact
    that the accused retreated from a confrontation, retrieved a knife, and then
    returned to the confrontation.

[63]

The

majority of the Supreme Court in
Cairney
emphasized that where there are doubts about the
    evidential foundation for the defence, judges should resolve any doubts as to
    whether the air of reality threshold is met in favour of leaving the defence to
    the jury:
Cairney,
at paras. 22, 46. On this
    aspect of the test, there may be some doubt, but that doubt must be resolved in
    the favour of the accused.

(c)

Conclusion on the Defence of Provocation

[64]

In my view,
the defence
    of provocation had an air of reality. I
t
was for the
    jury to decide whether the deceased's wrongful act was sufficient to deprive an
    ordinary person of the power of self-control and whether the appellant was, in
    fact, so deprived and acted suddenly, in the heat of passion.

[65]

I would allow this ground of appeal.

E.

CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITion

[66]

I would allow the appeal on the first ground
    alone and order a new trial.

M.
    Tulloch J.A.

I
    agree. P. Lauwers J.A.

MacPherson
    J.A. (dissenting):

[67]

I have had the opportunity to review the draft
    reasons prepared by my colleague in this appeal. He would allow the appeal and
    order a new trial on the basis that the trial judge erred by not putting the
    defence of provocation to the jury. My colleague states his conclusion in this
    fashion:

In my view,
the defence of provocation had an air of reality. I
t
was for the
    jury to decide whether the deceased's wrongful act was sufficient to deprive an
    ordinary person of the power of self-control and whether the appellant was, in
    fact, so deprived and acted suddenly, in the heat of passion.

[68]

With respect, I do not agree with this
    conclusion. At trial, defence counsel and Crown counsel took the position in
    pre-jury charge discussions that the defence of provocation should not be put
    to the jury. The trial judge agreed - indeed, strongly agreed - with both
    counsel. He concluded a lengthy discussion with two active counsel on this
    issue by saying:

I could go away and think
    about this and come back later today but I have given it a lot of thought. With
    some counsel, I would go away and think about it and make up my own mind but
    given the competence of defence counsel in this case

and Crown counsel as well
    for that matter  I haven't heard anything that I disagree with and I don't
    think there is an air of reality to provocation.
In fact,
    I'm sure there is no air of reality to provocation and so I, I will not leave
    it to the jury
. [Emphasis added.]

[69]

I agree with my colleague that whether there is
    an air of reality to a potential defence is a question of law assessed on a
    standard of correctness:
R. v. Cinous
, 2002 SCC 29, at para. 55;
R.
    v. Tran
, 2010 SCC 58, at para. 40.

[70]

In my view, the trial judges ultimate decision
    on this issue, set out above, was correct. Indeed, all three of the trial
    participants - defence counsel, Crown counsel and the trial judge, who saw and
    heard all the witnesses and their evidence - got it right.

[71]

As my colleague states, there are four
    components - two objective and two subjective - to the provocation defence: (1)
    there must be a wrongful act or insult; (2) the wrongful act or insult must be
    sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control; (3) the
    accused must have acted in response to the provocation; and (4) the accused
    must have acted on the sudden before their was time for their passion to cool:
Tran
,
    at paras. 25, 36.

[72]

My colleague identifies the central issue on the
    appeal in this fashion:

The more contentious
    question on this appeal is the second inquiry under the subjective component:
    whether the appellant acted on the sudden before there was time for his
    passion to cool:
Tran
, at para. 36. Again, all parties at the
    proceedings below, including the trial judge, were of the view that no properly
    instructed jury could
reasonably conclude that: (a) the
    unlawful act was sudden and unexpected; and (b) the appellants actions
    occurred on the sudden before he had time to regain self-control.

On appeal, the respondent
    argues that the evidence does not satisfy the suddenness requirement. The
    respondent first points to the cooling off period between the initial assault
    on Ms. Isaacs and the later interaction outside. However, I am not persuaded
    that the cooling off period forecloses the reliance on the defence of
    provocation in this case. In my view, there were two incidents that constituted
    potential provocative acts. The first was the assault on Ms. Isaacs; the
    second was the deceaseds threatening gesture outside. There was no cooling off
    period between the threatening gesture outside and the stabbing. Indeed, taking
    the evidence at its highest, the stabbing was an immediate response to the
    deceased lunging, swinging, or forming a fist in the direction of his female
    companions. Put another way, he acted on the sudden to the physical threat in
    front of him before there was time for his passion to cool.

[73]

With respect, this rewrites the evidentiary
    record that was agreed to by all three of defence counsel, Crown counsel and
    trial judge.

[74]

First, there was a clear and fairly lengthy
    period between the deceased's interaction with Ms. Isaacs both inside and
    outside the bar and the subsequent interaction outside after everyone left the
    bar. After the first set of incidents, the appellant appeared to be very angry.
    However, Ms. Isaacs told him to leave it alone and the appellant appeared to
    calm down and resume playing pool inside the bar.

[75]

Second, a bit later Ms. Isaacs and a friend went
    outside the bar again to smoke. Then the deceased and the appellant left the
    bar at about the same time and joined them. The deceased was rude towards the
    two women but did not verbally threaten them.

[76]

Third, the deceased did not have physical
    contact with the women, although he may have raised a finger or a fist close to
    one of the womens face while he was haranguing them.

[77]

Fourth, as the verbal confrontation between the
    deceased and the women continued, the appellant, who was watching but said
    nothing, transferred a knife from his pants pocket to his jacket pocket. He did
    so even though the confrontation between the deceased and the women was verbal
    and the deceased was not displaying a weapon (he did not have one).

[78]

Fifth, the appellant admitted to police that at
    this juncture, he saw the deceased form a fist. He jumped in and tried to stab
    the deceased in the chest (obviously, a very vulnerable location). He missed
    and stabbed the deceased in the throat.

[79]

Sixth, the appellant continued to stab the
    deceased. The deceased suffered six, not one, stab wounds - to the throat,
    right thigh, left forearm, right hand, and two to the head. The attack, against
    an unarmed man engaged in a verbal confrontation with two other people (not the
    appellant), was sustained and deadly.

[80]

Against this backdrop, I turn to how the three
    relevant trial participants approached and resolved the legal issue of
    provocation. This issue was discussed on two days, briefly on the first day and
    extensively at the formal pre-charge conference several days later.

[81]

At the pre-charge conference, defence counsel
    explicitly and in some detail opposed a provocation instruction in the jury
    charge. He said, in part:

I think that there are two
    key components that were eliminated as a possible defence for Mr. Alas. First
    of all, it appears on the facts that he's notified inside the bar prior to going
    outside by Ms. Isaacs that there may be an altercation and he says from her
    evidence, that he wants to go hit him with a pool cue.

He gets convinced not to
    and there appears to be a cooling down period. On that alone, I think it's
    insufficient to proceed because he's aware of a potential assault or a violent
    altercation and has a cooling off period such that it doesn't reach the
    component which is necessary to establish provocation such that it shocks the
    mind allowing the
mens rea
to be vitiated.

Additionally and even more
    in support of removing provocation would be Mr. Alas own statement in it he
    declares I'm standing outside and something to the effect of, I move the knife
    from my pocket of my pajamas up to the pocket of my hood in preparation or as a
    prepared measure in case something were to happen.

To me, again, that
    demonstrates a mind consciously aware of something that may occur such that
    it's not a shock. Again, it doesn't really put him on the sudden - under the
    necessary legal test. So  I don't think it would be appropriate to go ahead
    with it. Unless Your Honour sees something differently from the facts as they
    came out, I just don't see it.

[82]

Similarly, Crown counsel, explicitly and in
    considerable detail, opposed a provocation instruction in the jury charge.
    After a lengthy review of the evidence, Crown counsel concluded:

What takes provocation
    away  the very actions of Mr. Alas show a cooling off period such that
    it's not one continuous transaction.

If you're looking at the
    three distinct actions, obviously all different, that may have led to the
    stabbing, a sudden provocation and a sudden response, looking at the case law were
    talking about firing at an unprepared mind. And when that happens, Mr. Alas
    does not have an unprepared mind because he already has his hand on that knife.

[H]es still angry at the
    whole situation but there is that cooling off period in the actions of playing
    pool.

The main point being that
    when Mr. Alas uses a weapon to stab Mr. Khalif  what happens is not to an
    unprepared mind as its dictated by the case law. What it ultimately means is
    theres no air of reality to  the defence.

[83]

After hearing counsels submission, the trial
    judge made his ruling. His language was unequivocal:

I haven't heard anything I
    disagree with and I don't think there is an air of reality to provocation. In
    fact, I'm sure there is no air of reality to provocation and so I, I will not
    leave it to the jury.

[84]

A trial judge must instruct the jury on all
    defences which arise on the evidence, even if they are not raised by the
    defence. A failure to object to a jury charge is not fatal to an appeal:
R.
    v. L.K.
, 2020 ONCA 262, at para. 15. However, the position taken by
    counsel at trial will assist an appellate court in determining whether the
    defence does properly arise on the evidence:
R. v. Jackson
(1991), 68
    C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 409. In addition, an accused has a limited
    right to control his defence and, sometimes, counsel may not want to leave a
    defence with the jury, a decision which is often laced with tactical and
    practical considerations:
R. v. Luciano
, 2011 ONCA 89, at para. 76.

[85]

In this case, the appellants defence at trial,
    as reflected in a lengthy and forceful closing address by his trial counsel,
    was, explicitly, self defence of another person, namely the two women the
    deceased interacted with outside the bar. He did not say a word about the
    deceased provoking the appellant. To insist, as does my colleague, that the
    trial judge was required to put both of the very different defences of self
    defence of another person and provocation to the jury second guesses defence
    counsels explicit choice about how to defend his client and injects a
    dangerous element of confusion and even conflict into the appellants defence.

[86]

As I said earlier, whether there is an air of
    reality to a potential defence, including provocation, is a question of law
    addressed on a standard of correctness:
Cinous
, at para. 55, and
Tran
,
    at para 40. For the above reasons, I conclude that the trial judges decision not
    to put the defence of provocation to the jury was correct.

[87]

I agree with my colleague that there is no merit
    in the appellants other two grounds of appeal.

[88]

For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.

Released: April 9, 2021 J.C.M.

J.C. MacPherson
    J.A.

[1]
The offence took place on March 15, 2014. Amendments to s. 232(2)
    of the
Criminal Code
under the
Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural
    Practices Act
, S.C. 2015, c. 29, (Bill S-7). Bill S-7 came into effect on
    July 17, 2015 restricting the application of the defence of provocation to
    instances where the wrongful act or insult constituted an indictable offence
    punishable by five or more years of imprisonment.