COURT
    OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
Way v.
    Schembri, 2020 ONCA 691

DATE: 20201102

DOCKET: C68037

Huscroft, Nordheimer and Harvison
    Young JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Al Way,
    Kingsley Financial Inc. and Triumph Financial Holdings Inc.

Plaintiffs (Appellants)

and

Gordon
    Schembri, Schembri Financial Limited, 1765998 Ontario Inc., 41 Columbia Inc.,
    King & Columbia Inc., 69 Columbia Inc., 5 Rittenhouse Inc., The Block Inc.,
    The Block 1 Inc. and The Block II Inc.

Defendants (Respondents)

Jonathan C. Lisus, Andrew J. Winton and
    Niklas Holmberg, for the appellants

James M. Wortzman and Spencer Malthouse,
    for the respondents

Heard: October 21, 2020 by
    video conference

On appeal from the judgment of Justice James
    W. Sloan of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 1, 2019, with reasons
    reported at 2019 ONSC 819 and the costs award dated March 14, 2019, with
    reasons reported at 2019 ONSC 1668.

Nordheimer J.A.:

[1]

The plaintiffs appeal from the summary judgment
    granted by the motion judge that dismissed their action.
[1]
They also seek leave
    to appeal the motion judges award of costs. For the following reasons, I would
    allow the appeal, set aside the judgment below, and reinstate the appellants
    action. Given my conclusion that the matter should proceed to trial, I will
    limit any observations I may have on the enforceability of the clause in
    question.

Background

[2]

Al Way and Gordon Schembri are real estate
    developers. In 2007, the two men entered into a joint venture agreement
    (through their respective numbered companies) to develop a project in Waterloo,
    Ontario. Shortly after entering into the joint venture agreement, Way and
    Schembri formed a corporation, Triumph Financial Holdings Inc.
    ("Triumph"), to pursue other development opportunities in Waterloo,
    London and Oshawa (the "Triumph Lands").

[3]

Under a shareholders' agreement dated April 2,
    2008 (the "Shareholders Agreement"), Way and Schembri are shareholders
    of Triumph through their respective corporations, Kingsley Financial Inc. (55%
    of common shares) ("KFI") and Schembri Financial Limited (45% of
    common shares) ("Schembri Financial"). Way and Schembri are Triumph's
    only directors.

[4]

Clause 13 of the Shareholders Agreement reads:

13. NON-COMPETITION

During the period which SCHEMBRI FINANCIAL is
    a shareholder of the Corporation, it shall have the ongoing obligation to
    present KINGSLEY FINANCIAL and the Corporation all real estate development
    opportunities (the "Project") which it may have acquired within the
    Regional Municipality of Waterloo. This obligation to KINGSLEY FINANCIAL and
    the Corporation shall also extend to GORDON SCHEMBRI personally, and any other
    legal entity in which he has an interest, either directly or indirectly,
    financially or otherwise. KINGSLEY FINANCIAL and the Corporation shall have
    FIFTEEN (15) days following the presentation of the Project to them to
    determine if it is economically feasible using the typical budget model
    consistently utilized by them in such circumstances and, if at the expiry of
    the FIFTEEN (15) day period neither of them have indicated to SCHEMBRI
    FINANCIAL in writing that it is taking on the Project, then SCHEMBRI FINANCIAL
    (or its designate) shall be free to pursue the Project without the involvement
    of KINGSLEY FINANCIAL or the Corporation.

[5]

Shortly after the Shareholders Agreement was
    executed and development on the Triumph Lands commenced, Way and Schembri's
    business relationship deteriorated. The men have been engaged in sustained and hard-fought
    litigation since 2010.

[6]

The appellants action was commenced on May 25,
    2012. It is based on a claim for damages arising out of an alleged breach of
    clause 13. The appellants action is a companion action to a broader action
    commenced by Schembri in 2010. In that action, Schembri claims over $30 million
    in connection with the joint venture project and the Triumph Lands.

[7]

In 2014, the parties consented to an order that
    the two actions be tried together. In 2018, the parties consented to an order
    that the two actions share common discoveries, which the respondents say are
    not yet complete.

[8]

It is unnecessary for the purposes of this
    appeal to recite all of the machinations that have taken place between the
    parties to these two actions. It is sufficient to say that each side makes a
    wide variety of allegations against the other side, all alleging improper
    conduct of one type or another.

[9]

The respondents say that they have completed
    their examinations for discovery. They also say that the Schembri action has
    been set down for trial, although there is apparently no trial date set. The
    appellants have not completed their examinations for discovery.

[10]

In May 2017, the respondents brought a motion
    for summary judgment to dismiss the appellants action on the ground that clause
    13 is an unenforceable restrictive covenant. The motion was heard over two days
    in October 2018 and another two days in January 2019. The motion judge agreed
    with this submission, held that clause 13 was unenforceable, and granted judgment
    dismissing the action.

Analysis

[11]

There is no analysis undertaken by the motion
    judge as to whether this was a proper situation in which to consider summary
    judgment, although that preliminary question was argued before him. Indeed, the
    motion judge alludes to the issue at para. 138 of his reasons. I would note on
    this point that the litigation between the parties has been going on for more
    than 10 years. The motion judge also happens to be the judge who is case
    managing these actions. The summary judgment motion itself was launched more
    than three years ago.

[12]

It would seem, at first blush, to be unusual to
    consider summary judgment in one action that has already been ordered to be
    tried together with another action, along with an order for common examinations
    for discovery. Indeed, the order directing that the actions be tried together
    refers to the fact that the actions are related. It is even more unusual
    given that it appears that the facts underlying the two actions are
    inextricably intertwined.

[13]

The respondents contend that summary judgment is
    appropriate because the only issue before motion judge was the enforceability
    of clause 13. That argument might have gained some traction if there had been
    agreement that the only issue to be decided was the meaning of clause 13 based
    on its wording alone, without the need for any factual context. That was not the
    case, however. The factual matrix was a necessary consideration of any decision
    regarding the application and enforceability of clause 13 because [c]onsideration
    of the surrounding circumstances recognizes that ascertaining contractual
    intention can be difficult when looking at words on their own, because words
    alone do not have an immutable or absolute meaning:
Sattva Capital Corp.
    v. Creston Moly Corp.
,
2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633, at para.47.

[14]

In any event, it is difficult to see what saving
    of time and expense was accomplished by dealing with this issue separately,
    when the main parties are locked in other litigation that is still ongoing and
    has been for some time. The issue of the enforceability of clause 13, by
    itself, could have been easily dealt with at the trial, if the issue was as
    narrow as the respondents contend. Purporting to deal with it through a summary
    judgment motion has only caused further delay, distraction, and expense, all in
    the context of litigation that has been going on for far too long as it is.

[15]

On this point, the appellants say that the
    motion judge effectively granted partial summary judgment because of the
    existence of the other action and the factual linkage between the two. The
    respondents reply that the motion judge granted full summary judgment because
    it disposed of the appellants action.

[16]

The respondents are correct, but only in the
    most technical sense. More importantly, the principles surrounding partial
    summary judgment are not to be so narrowly construed nor applied. Partial
    summary judgment is a rare procedure that should be sparingly invoked:
Butera
    v. Chown, Cairns LLP
, 2017 ONCA 783, 137 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 34. The
    reasons for that approach are enunciated by Paciocco J.A. in
Service Mold +
    Aerospace Inc. v. Khalaf
, 2019 ONCA 369, 146 O.R. (3d) 135, at para. 14:

There is also the risk that partial summary
    judgment can frustrate the
Hryniak
objective of using summary judgment
    to achieve proportionate, timely and affordable justice. If used imprudently,
    partial summary judgment can cause delay, increase expense, and increase the
    danger of inconsistent findings at trial made on a more complete record. [Citation
    omitted.]

[17]

Those concerns regarding partial summary
    judgment are fully engaged in this case because, as the appellants correctly
    point out, the two actions are factually intertwined. Indeed, the motion judge
    acknowledged the overlap in the facts of the two cases numerous times in the
    course of his reasons. He also relied on that overlap in reaching the costs
    decision that he did.

[18]

As a result, there is the very real possibility
    that conclusions reached by the trial judge could conflict with the result
    reached by the motion judge. There is also the possibility that the trial judge
    will reach a better understanding of the relationships between the parties that
    would give a more informed view of the meaning and purpose behind clause 13. This
    was the very concern that Lauwers J.A. expressed in
Baywood Homes
    Partnership v. Haditaghi
, 2014 ONCA 450, 120 O.R. (3d) 438, when he said,
    at para. 37:

In the complex situation in this case, it is
    therefore entirely possible that the trial judge who hears the trial of the
    issue on the validity of the promissory notes will develop a fuller
    appreciation of the relationships and the transactional context than the motion
    judge. That could force a trial decision on the promissory notes that would be
    implicitly inconsistent with the motion judge's finding that the third release
    is fully valid and effective, even though the parties would be bound by that
    finding. The process, in this context, risks inconsistent findings and
    substantive injustice.

[19]

That, however, is not the only problem with
    employing summary judgment in this case. The motion judge made a number of
    findings about clause 13 that demonstrate that summary judgment was not, in
    fact, an appropriate route to take in this action. First, he found that clause
    13 is a restrictive covenant, although it is not clear what the motion judge
    meant in making that finding. Clause 13 is, in fact, a right of first refusal. Second,
    the motion judge found that clause 13 was ambiguous in several respects. He
    found its spatial parameters were ambiguous; he found at least four phrases to
    be ambiguous; and he found the requirement for Schembri to present all real
    estate development opportunities to be ambiguous. Third, the motion judge
    found clause 13 to be commercially absurd and not necessary to protect
    Triumphs or Kingsleys legitimate interests. Fourth, the motion judge found
    that no typical budget model had been presented to the court and thus
    concluded that this phrase was also ambiguous. Fifth, the motion judge found
    that the arbitration provision in the Shareholders Agreement, by which any
    disputes were to be resolved by arbitration, was commercially unreasonable and
    something that no businessperson would agree to.

[20]

In addition to these findings, the motion judge
    also found that it is difficult to see how Ways interests have been damaged
    by the breaches of Clause 13 that he alleges. The motion judge based this
    finding on the fact that Way and his companies had generated millions of
    dollars in revenues during the same period of time.

[21]

All of these findings require a factual
    foundation. Yet, the motion judge failed to refer to any factual foundation for
    any of these findings. Indeed, given that contracts are to be interpreted in a
    manner consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at
    the time of formation of the contract (
Sattva Capital
,
at
    para. 47), evidence regarding those circumstances would appear to have been a
    necessary interpretive step.

[22]

It is also unclear what factual foundation the
    motion judge relied upon for his conclusion that the arbitration provision was
    one that was commercially unreasonable. That finding would require
    consideration of the application of the clause in the particular commercial
    context that existed, none of which is examined by the motion judge. Given the
    presence of arbitration provisions in countless business agreements, it cannot
    be that their existence alone is commercially unreasonable. Further, the motion
    judges view that no businessperson would agree to such a clause appears to be
    contradicted by the very facts of this case, as both Ways and Schembris
    companies signed the Shareholders Agreement as did Way and Schembri personally.

[23]

The motion judge also rejected the legitimacy of
    clause 13 on the basis that it was a mere agreement to agree. As I have said, clause
    13 is, on its face, a right of first refusal, notwithstanding the title the
    clause was given by the drafters of the Shareholders Agreement. Rights of
    first refusal are a common feature of many commercial arrangements: see, for
    example,
Downtown King West Development Corp. v. Massey Ferguson Industries
    Ltd.
(1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 327 (C.A.), at p. 339, leave to appeal refused,
    [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 258. In some instances, they contemplate that when certain
    opportunities are presented to one party, that party will offer the other party
    the right to participate. In other instances, they contemplate that, before a
    party enters into a sale with a third party, the party will offer the other
    party the first chance to buy. Rights of first refusal always contemplate that
    there will be the need for a further agreement between the parties. However, the
    need for a further agreement does not invalidate a contractual right of first
    refusal. This suggests that the motion judge misunderstood the proper
    application of the agreement to agree principle.

[24]

Finally, there is no legal foundation for the
    motion judges conclusion that, in some fashion, the appellants are not
    entitled to advance a claim for damages arising from a breach of a contractual
    term just because they have otherwise been financially successful in their
    business affairs.

Conclusion

[25]

This is not a matter that ought to have been
    dealt with by way of summary judgment. The summary judgment cannot stand. I
    would allow the appeal, set aside the summary judgment along with the award of
    costs, and reinstate the action. Accordingly, I do not reach the motion for
    leave to appeal the costs award.

[26]

The appellants are entitled to their costs of
    the appeal which are fixed at the agreed upon amount of $50,000, inclusive of
    disbursements and HST. I leave the disposition and fixing of the costs of the
    original summary judgment motion to the trial judge.

Released: GH  November 2, 2020

I.V.B.
    Nordheimer J.A.

I
    agree. Grant Huscroft J.A.

I
    agree. Harvison Young J.A.

[1]
I note that 1765998 Ontario Inc. is not included in the title of
    proceeding in the formal judgment below but it is included as a party in the
    title of proceeding in the originating process. Thus, it is properly included
    in the title of proceeding here.


COUR DAPPEL DE LONTARIO

RÉFÉRENCE : 1750738 Ontario Inc. c. 1750714
    Ontario Inc., 2020 ONCA 836

DATE : 20201223

DOSSIER : C67079

Les juges van Rensburg, Benotto
    et Thorburn

ENTRE

1750738 Ontario Inc.

Demanderesse (Intimée)

et

1750714 Ontario Inc.,
    1751917 Ontario Inc., 6888631 Canada Inc.

et 1750739 Ontario Inc.

Défenderesses (Appelantes)

Jeff G. Saikaley, Gabriel Poliquin et
    Marie-Pier Dupont, pour les Appelantes

Sophie C. Reitano, pour lIntimée

Date de laudience : par
    écrit

En appel du jugement du juge Michel Z.
    Charbonneau de la
Cour supérieure de justice
, en date du 14 mai 2019, dont les motifs figurent
à
2019 ONSC 2879.

La juge Thorburn :

A.

SURVOL

[1]

Christian Leclair (« M. Leclair »)
    souhaitait développer un lotissement denviron 100 lots résidentiels. Il avait
    besoin dinvestisseurs. Son beau-père, Hervé Lacroix (« M. Lacroix »)
    a investi dans le projet de lotissement avec M. Leclair, dans le projet que
    M. Leclair se préparait
à
mettre
    en place.

[2]

Il y a désaccord sur la question si un contrat
    verbal a été conclu et si oui, les termes du contrat.

[3]

Par la suite, deux autres personnes ont décidé
    dinvestir dans le projet de M. Leclair. 1750739 Ontario Inc.
    (« 739 ») a été incorpor
é
e et
    une convention parmi actionnaires est effectuée parmi les compagnies des quatre
    investisseurs : 1750714 Ontario Inc. (« 714 »), 1751917 Ontario Inc.
    (« 917 »), 6888631 Canada Inc. (« 631 ») et la compagnie de
    M. Lacroix, 1750738 Ontario Inc. (« 738 »).

[4]

Leffet de la convention parmi actionnaires sur le pr
é
sum
é
contrat
    oral entre M. Lacroix et M. Leclair est aussi en dispute. Les parties sont
    en désaccord sur leffet de la clause de résiliation des ententes antérieures
    sur le contrat verbal, lordonnance de lexécution en nature du contrat, et
    lapplication de lordonnance à 714, 917 et 631.

[5]

Au procès, lintimé 738 a soumis que les appelants
    ont commis une violation du contrat oral lorsque 714, 917 et 631 ont décidé,
    malgré lopposition de 738, de cesser de transférer 25% des lots à la compagnie
    du beau-fils de M. Lacroix, Maisons Lacroix Homes Inc. (« Maisons
    Lacroix »).

[6]

Le Tribunal a décidé quun contrat verbal a été
    conclu entre M. Lacroix et M. Leclair, que la condition de linvestissement de
    M. Lacroix est quun nombre de lots égaux à la participation de M. Lacroix dans
    le projet serait construit par Maisons Lacroix, que 738 pouvait poursuivre
    laction de sa part, et que le deuxième contrat ne nie pas leffet du premier. Le
    Tribunal a ordonné lexécution en nature du contrat liant 714, 917 et 631 aux
    ordonnances.

[7]

Les appelantes, 714, 917, 631 et 739 soumettent que
    le juge de première instance a fait plusieurs erreurs en droit y compris :

a.

Le Tribunal na pas accepté que les termes matériaux
    du présumé contrat oral entre Christian Leclair et son beau-père, Hervé Lacroix
    étaient trop incertains pour la formation dun contrat;

b.

Le Tribunal a ajouté des conditions implicites au
    contrat oral;

c.

Le Tribunal na pas pris en considération la
    clause de résiliation des ententes antérieures dans la convention entre
    actionnaires;

d.

Le Tribunal a ordonné lexécution en nature du
    contrat oral; et

e.

Le Tribunal a ordonné les dépens dindemnisation
    substantielle.

[8]

Pour les raisons qui suivent, lappel est rejeté.

B.

EXPOSÉ
DES FAITS

[9]

M. Leclair est constructeur de maisons sous le nom
    Les Habitations Leclair Inc. Il apprend quil y a deux terrains à vendre
    totalisant environ 85 acres qui pourraient être divisés en environ 100 lots
    résidentiels. Il a besoin dargent pour acheter les terrains.

[10]

Au mois de mai, 2007, M. Leclair cherchait de largent de son
    beau-père, M. Lacroix, pour investir dans le projet de subdivision, M.
    Lacroix a accepté dinvestir et une entente est conclue.

[11]

M. Lacroix a une connaissance limitée de langlais, particulièrement
    langlais écrit. Il a complété sa 12
e
année décole.

(1)

Les termes du contrat verbal

[12]

Selon M. Lacroix, il a dit quil serait intéressé à investir dans le
    projet
seulement
si sa
    part des lots qui seraient construits était transférée à Maisons Lacroix pour
    construction, car il voulait aider lentreprise de son fils Marc Lacroix.
    Quelques jours plus tard, M. Leclair a accepté son offre.

[13]

Selon M. Leclair, il a refusé, ne voulant pas inclure dautres
    constructeurs que lui dans le projet. Quelques jours plus tard, il a dit
    « si tu veux avoir 2 à 3 lots par année jvais le considérer » et M.
    Lacroix a accepté les termes.

(2)

Lincorporation de 739

[14]

Ayant une entente avec M. Lacroix, M. Leclair réussit à trouver deux
    autres investisseurs qui ont accepté de procéder au projet dinvestissement.
    Les quatre investisseurs sont : Christian Leclair par lentremise de 714,
    Pierre Major par lentremise de 631, Alain Lamarche par lentremise de 917, et
    Hervé et sa femme Huguette Lacroix par lentremise de 738 opérée par M. Lacroix.

[15]

Les investisseurs ont procédé à lincorporation de leurs sociétés et de
    739, pour entamer le projet de subdivision pour la vente de lots résidentiels
    sous le Projet Oasis. 739 est une société de portefeuille détenant des
    biens-fonds qui font lobjet du Projet de promotion immobilière Oasis.

[16]

Le 14 décembre 2007, lavocate est venue avec les documents déjà
    préparés et prêts à signer pour lincorporation des sociétés des investisseurs.
    Les documents sont en anglais.

[17]

Lavocate na jamais reçu dinstructions de M. Lacroix et elle confirme
    que « Jai quelques messages dans mes dossiers qui portent soit le nom de
    Christian Leclair, Jocelyn Lamarche ou dAlain Lamarche, mais je nai aucun
    message qui porte le nom dHervé Lacroix [J]e navais aucune connaissance du
    fait que [M. Lacroix] cultivait des légumes, quil avait peu déducation et
    quil ne maitrisait pas langlais ».

(3)

LAchat des Terrains

[18]

Le premier terrain est acheté le 19 décembre 2007 et le deuxième est
    acheté le 18 novembre 2008. Chacun des quatre investisseurs a investi un quart
    de linvestissement.

[19]

M. Major a signé le contrat pour lachat du premier terrain denviron
    40 acres, et M. Major et M. Lacroix ont signé le contrat pour lachat du
    deuxième terrain. Le Projet Oasis correspond au lieu de lensemble des deux
    terrains.

(4)

La Convention

[20]

Une hypothèque de 4 000 000 $ était nécessaire pour procéder avec le
    projet. Avant de compléter le prêt hypothécaire, la Caisse demandait que les
    investisseurs signent un accord en forme de Convention.

[21]

Une convention parmi actionnaires fut préparée par un avocat. Lavocat
    na reçu des instructions que de M. Lamarche et M. Leclair pour sa préparation.

[22]

Une clause dexclusion des ententes antérieures portant sur «
the
    organization and affairs of the Corporation and/or the sale of any
    Shareholders shares of the Corporation
» sy trouvait.
Selon lavocat, il sagissait dune clause standard au précédent de
    lavocat.

[23]

La Convention fut signée le 8 août 2011 au Home Hardware appartenu par
    M. Lamarche sans la présence davocat.

(5)

Répartition des Lots à Construire

[24]

Suivant lapprobation de la subdivision par la municipalité en 2011,
    jusquau mois de juin 2015, les lots ont été distribués 75% aux Habitations
    Leclair et 25% à Maisons Lacroix à chaque occasion quune distribution de lots
    sest présentée : (i) lors du transfert de 1 lot sur 4, (ii) à la Phase I
    et (iii) à la Phase II du Projet Oasis, sans aucune objection des actionnaires.

(6)

Terminaison du Contrat

[25]

Messieurs Leclair, Lamarche et Major reprochaient à Maisons Lacroix de
    vendre ses maisons moins chères, de laisser des débris sur les chantiers, de
    commencer des chantiers avant davoir un acheteur ce qui laissait des fondations
à
découvert et de construire un
    inventaire de maisons. Les investisseurs ont imposé des conditions financières.

[26]

Cependant, lofficier de la municipalité a indiqué quil na reçu
    aucune plainte des acheteurs et que les constructions de Maisons Lacroix
    étaient approuvées à chaque étape de la construction.

[27]

Pour donner suite à des désaccords, le 3 octobre 2016, les trois
    actionnaires appelantes ont mis fin à la relation daffaires avec Maisons
    Lacroix.

C.

LE JUGEMENT DU TRIBUNAL

[28]

La position de 738 au procès était que les appelants ont commis un bris
    de contrat lorsque 714, 917 et 631 ont décidé, malgré lopposition de 738, de
    cesser de transférer 25% des lots à Maisons Lacroix et que la seule réparation
    équitable était son exécution en nature.

[29]

Le Tribunal a conclu que M. Lacroix et M. Leclair avaient un contrat
    verbal selon lequel M. Leclair sengageait à permettre à Maisons Lacroix de
    bâtir des maisons sur un nombre de lots équivalent à la part de M. Lacroix et
    quil ny avait que ces deux dispositions essentielles au contrat verbal.

[30]

Le Tribunal a préféré le témoignage de M. Lacroix au témoignage de M. Leclair.
    De plus, le Tribunal a décidé que : « Dans un tel contexte, il serait
    absurde de dire que la relativité de contrat entre [M.] Lacroix et [M.] Leclair
    ne sétendra pas à [738] et [739], leur alter ego  [739] est lié par le
    contrat verbal même si sa formation précède son incorporation. »

[31]

Le Tribunal a conclu quil serait injuste que 739 puisse se soustraire
    à sa promesse à cause du manque décrit et que 739 a clairement et sans
    équivoque agit en conformité avec le contrat verbal en distribuant les lots à
    raison de 25% en faveur de Maisons Lacroix.

[32]

Le Tribunal a déterminé que la convention entre actionnaires na pas
    mis fin à lentente orale. La convention fut exigée par la Caisse, non par les
    actionnaires et il ny a aucune preuve que la clause « Termination of
    Prior Agreements » dans la convention a été sujette de directive précise de
    lavocat, et que la clause ait été discutée avant la signature ou que M.
    Lacroix aurait compris la portée de la clause.

[33]

Enfin, le Tribunal a décidé que 739 ne pouvait pas mettre fin au
    contrat, car les appelantes nont fourni aucune preuve solide que leurs
    plaintes étaient bien fondées et dautre part, la preuve de lofficier de la
    municipalité indique quà chaque étape de construction, les maisons construites
    par Maisons Lacroix étaient approuvées et la municipalité na pas reçu de
    plainte daucun des acheteurs.

[34]

Le Tribunal a ordonné :

a.

L'annulation de la décision corporative de 739
    de mettre fin à sa relation d'affaires avec Maisons Lacroix ;

b.

Une ordonnance enjoignant les appelantes de répartir
    25% de tous les lots actuels et futurs à Maisons Lacroix aux mêmes conditions
    que l'autre constructeur ;

c.

Une ordonnance de l'exécution en nature du
    contrat verbal selon lequel 739 doit répartir des lots d'un projet de promotion
    immobilière a Maisons Lacroix ;

d.

Une ordonnance permettant à 738 un délai
    raisonnable afin de pouvoir acheter le solde des 6 lots dans la phase II du
    projet Oasis qui leur avaient été attribués et qui sont protégés par un
    certificat daffaire ;

e.

Une prohibition permanente pour 739 de prendre
    des décisions allant à lencontre de lattribution de 25% des lots à Maisons
    Lacroix ; et

f.

Que des dépens de 225 000 $ soient versés par les
    appelantes en faveur de lIntimée.

D.

LES QUESTIONS EN APPEL

[35]

Les Appelantes portent en appel la décision du Tribunal et demandent
    lautorisation de faire appel de linscription relative aux dépens du 18
    juillet 2019. Les questions en litige sont :

1.

Est-ce que le Tribunal a erré en droit en concluant quil y avait un
    contrat oral alors que les termes matériaux de ce présumé contrat étaient trop
    incertains et /ou en ajoutant des conditions implicites au contrat ?

2.

Est-ce que le Tribunal a erré en droit en ninterprétant pas la
    clause de résiliation dans la convention pour conclure que la clause a pour
    effet de résilier le contrat antérieur, et ordonnant lexécution en nature du
    contrat ?

3.

Est-ce que le Tribunal a commis une erreur de droit en ordonnant
    lexécution en nature du contrat ?

4.

Est-ce que le Tribunal a commis une erreur de droit quant à
    lapplication des ordonnances à 714, 917 et 631 ? et

5.

Dans lalternative, est-ce que lautorisation de faire appel de
    lordonnance de dépens doit être accordée, et lordonnance modifiée ?

E.

ANALYSE DU JUGEMENT ET CONCLUSION

(1)

Est-ce que le Tribunal a erré en droit en concluant
    quil y avait un contrat oral alors que les termes matériaux de ce présumé
    contrat étaient trop incertains et /ou en ajoutant des conditions implicites au
    contrat ?

[36]

La détermination de lexistence dun contrat verbal et la certitude de
    ses termes ne sont pas des questions de droit, mais plutôt des questions mixtes
    de fait et de droit en considérant la matrice factuelle dans son ensemble :
Modern Paving Ltd. v. Donovan Homes Ltd.
,
2011 NLCA 39, 308 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 180,
    aux paras. 28-30.

[37]

Seuls les termes
essentiels
doivent faire partie de lentente.
« When
    they agree on all of the essential provisions to be incorporated in a formal
    document with the intention that their agreement shall thereupon become
    binding, they will have fulfilled all the requisites for the formation of a
    contract.:
Bawitko Investments Ltd. c. Kernels Popcorn Ltd.
(1991)
, 79 D.L.R. (4
e
)
    97 (Ont. C.A.).

[38]

Par contre :

[[T]here is no doubt that non-essential terms
    and details do not have to be settled in order for legal effect to be given to
    the reasonable expectation of the parties. Indeed, in the case of a contract
    meant to endure over an extended period it may be that details or other non-essential
    matters are not even able to be determined at the time the parties agree to the
    contract.

Les faits à être considérés dépendent du
    contexte du contrat:
Modern Paving
, aux paras.
37-39 ;
Credit Security
    Insurance Agency Inc. v. CIBC Mortgages Inc.
(2006)
,
268 D.L.R. (4
e
) 725 (Ont. C.S.),
    conf par 2007 ONCA 287, 279 D.L.R. (4
e
) 559.

[39]

Il est pertinent de savoir si les parties se sont comportées comme si
    elles étaient liées par une entente exécutoire :
Sattva
    Capital Corp. c. Creston Moly Corp.
,
2014 CSC 53, [2014] 2 R.C.S. 633, aux paras. 46-47,
Matic et al v. Waldner et al
,
2016 MBCA 60, 330 Man. R. (2
e
) 107, aux paras. 59-64,
    autorisation de pouvoi refusée, [2016] C.S.C.R. no 359.

[40]

Au paragraphe 53 du jugement, le Tribunal a conclu que :

Il ny a que deux dispositions qui sont
    essentielles au contrat verbal :

1) Hervé Lacroix
    sengageait à participer au financement du projet Oasis à part égal avec les
    autres investisseurs.

2) En retour le
    promoteur du projet Oasis sengageait à faire le nécessaire pour que Maisons
    Lacroix Homes puisse être le contracteur choisit par le projet pour construire
    les maisons sur un nombre de lots égaux à la part dHervé Lacroix dans le
    projet. Il y a eu contrepartie, car Hervé Lacroix a effectivement rempli ses
    obligations ce qui a permis au projet daller de lavant. Personne ne savait
    exactement le % exact que détiendrait Hervé Lacroix, à quel prix les lots
    seraient vendus, combien de lots seraient disponibles et ainsi de suite. Il
    nétait pas nécessaire pour la certitude du contrat de connaître ces différents
    points. Lessentiel était connu

Je conclus aussi que lors du temps de distribuer
    les lots aux différents contracteurs une fois le projet prêt, 1750739 Ontario
    Inc. a distribué les lots 25% à Maisons Lacroix Homes, représentant la part de
    linvestissement de M. Lacroix dans le projet de lotissement en conformité avec
    lentente verbale.

[41]

Suivant une révision objective de la preuve, le Tribunal a conclu que
    le contrat comprenait des termes essentiels suffisamment précis et certains,
    nonobstant labsence de la durée de lentente, léchéancier dexécution du
    contrat, la valeur de linvestissement de M. Lacroix, le prix, la nature, la
    localisation ou la condition des lots et la nature de limplication des autres
    investisseurs. De plus, les investisseurs se sont rencontrés avant le 14
    décembre 2007, ils ont été informés de ces termes essentiels au moment
    deffectuer la première allocation, les ont acceptés, et ont ratifié le contrat
    à maintes reprises.

[42]

Telles conclusions de crédibilité doivent être accordées un très haut
    niveau de déférence :
UBS Securities Canada Inc. v.
    Sands Brothers Canada Ltd.
,
2009 ONCA 328, 95 O.R. (3
e
) 93, au para. 71.

[43]

Le Tribunal na commis aucune erreur manifeste et dominante lorsquil a
    conclu quil y avait un contrat verbal entre M. Leclair et M. Lacroix car les
    termes essentiels étaient précis et certains : M. Lacroix investirait et
    M. Leclair sengagerait à permettre à Maisons Lacroix de bâtir des maisons sur
    un nombre de lots équivalent à la part de M. Lacroix. Par la suite, ils

se
    sont comportés comme sils étaient liés par une entente exécutoire. Je rejetterais
    ce moyen dappel.

(2)

Est-ce que le Tribunal a erré en droit en
ninterprétant
pas la clause de résiliation
    dans la convention pour
conclure
que la clause a pour effet de résilier le contrat antérieur ?

[44]

Lanalyse pour déterminer si une clause de résiliation a force de droit
    est citée dans larrêt
Singh v. Trump
,
2016 ONCA 747, 408 D.L.R. (4
e
)
    235, aux paras. 111, 116-22, citant
Tercon
    Contractors Ltd. c. Colombie-Britannique (Transports et Voirie)
,
2010 CSC 4, [2010] 1 R.C.S. 69, aux paras. 122-123 :

The first issue, of course, is whether as a matter of
    interpretation the exclusion clause even applies to the circumstances
    established in evidence. This will depend on the Courts assessment of the
    intention of the parties as expressed in the contract. If the exclusion clause
    does not apply, there is obviously no need to proceed further with this
    analysis. If the exclusion clause applies, the second issue is whether the
    exclusion clause was unconscionable at the time the contract was made, as
    might arise from situations of unequal bargaining power between the parties (
Hunter
, at p. 462). This second issue has to do with
    contract formation, not breach.

If the exclusion clause is held to be valid and applicable, the
    Court may undertake a third enquiry, namely whether the Court should
    nevertheless refuse to enforce the valid exclusion clause because of the
    existence of an overriding public policy, proof of which lies on the party
    seeking to avoid enforcement of the clause, that outweighs the very strong public
    interest in the enforcement of contracts.

[45]

Lauteur
    G.H.L. Fridman, dans son livre,
The Law of Contract in Canada
,
6
e
éd., Toronto, Thompson Reuters Canada Limited, 2011, à la p. 282
    a soutenu que:

Where the plea has been successful, it has been because the
    party signing the document was ignorant of the English language and did not
    know what was going on; or was of limited education and reading ability and was
    mistaken as to what the document was; or relied on what she was told by her
    husband to whom she was subservient in business matters, so she did not know
    what she was signing.

[46]

Linterprétation contractuelle consiste à déterminer lintention
    objective des parties suivant une analyse axée sur les faits. On peut regarder
    à tout ce qui « appartenait ou aurait dû raisonnablement appartenir aux
    connaissances communes des parties au moment de la signature du contrat
    [...] » :
Sattva,
aux paras. 27, 55 et 58. Le Tribunal doit effectuer une analyse des
    circonstances de façon objective :
Tercon
,
aux paras. 54, 122-123.

[47]

Cette cour en
D.L.G. & Associates c.
    Minto Properties Inc.
, 2015 ONCA 705, 391 D.L.R. (4
e
)
    505, au para. 37 a décrit les circonstances à regarder :

The courts have looked to a variety of
    interpretive aids in considering the potential application of an entire
    agreement clause to pre-contractual misrepresentations: see J.D. McCamus:
The
    Law of Contract
, 2
nd
ed 2012, Irwin Law Inc., at 365-66. The
    courts have considered:

the language used in the entire agreement
    clause;

the relationship of the parties when the
    contract was consummated;

the sophistication of the parties;

the nature of the negotiations;

the language of other terms of the contract and
    specifically the extent to which allowing or precluding a negligent
    misrepresentation claim would be inconsistent with the other terms of the
    agreement.

[48]

Une clause dexclusion ne peut avoir pour effet décarter lélément de
    substance dune entente contractuelle préexistante à moins quil puisse être
    démontré que cette clause fut spécifiquement apportée à lattention de la
    partie qui renonce à ses droits :
Singh,
aux paras. 53, 115-122.

[49]

Le Tribunal a noté que :

a.

La clause ne fut pas apportée à lattention de
    M. Lacroix,

b.

Le libellé de la clause ne fait aucune mention
    de lintention décarter le contrat verbal. Le libellé de la clause confirme
    simplement quelle se rapporte à «

the organization and affairs of the
    Corporation

»,

c.

Toutes les parties savaient que M. Lacroix avait
    une connaissance limitée de langlais particulièrement langlais écrit et quil
    avait une expérience limitée dans le monde corporatif,

d.

Il na pas eu davis juridique indépendant avant
    de signer la Convention, et

e.

Il na pas eu dexplication de la clause et son
    importance.

[50]

Le Tribunal a déterminé que la clause de résiliation des ententes
    antérieures contenue dans la Convention entre actionnaires ne pouvait pas
    écarter lélément de substance de lentente contractuelle préexistante car
    cette clause ne fut pas apportée à lattention de 738. Lavocat a

incorporé
    les renseignements des actionnaires (sans la participation de M. Lacroix) à un
    précédent en anglais et aucune demande expresse na été faite par lun des
    actionnaires afin dincorporer la clause et aucune discussion de la clause na
    eu lieu avant la signature de la Convention. Les parties ont continué à agir en
    fonction du contrat après avoir signé la Convention.

[51]

Il ny avait donc aucune nécessité de satisfaire aux autres éléments de
    lanalyse :
Douez c. Facebook Inc.
,
2017 CSC 33, [2017] 1 R.C.S. 751 aux paras.
    112-116.

[52]

Le Tribunal a aussi déterminé que si la clause sapplique, la seule
    explication serait que les trois autres actionnaires lauraient fait avec
    lintention de prendre avantage de M. Lacroix en le privant sans contrepartie
    du bénéfice quils savaient était la raison première de son investissement.

[53]

Le Tribunal na pas commis derreur en droit en ninterprétant pas la
    clause de résiliation dans la convention pour conclure que la clause a pour
    effet de résilier le contrat antérieur. Au contraire, le Tribunal avait raison
    de conclure que la clause dexclusion aurait pour effet décarter lélément de
    substance de lentente contractuelle préexistante, la clause ne fut pas
    spécifiquement apportée à lattention de 738 : la partie qui allait
    renoncer à ses droits, M. Lacroix avait une expérience limitée dans le monde corporatif,

et il serait injuste de mettre fin au contrat verbal à cause du caractère
    manifestement inique de la clause. Elle priverait M. Lacroix dun bénéfice
    important du premier contrat sans aucune contrepartie. Je rejetterais donc ce moyen
    dappel.

(3)

Est-ce que le Tribunal a commis une erreur de droit
    en ordonnant lexécution en nature du contrat
?

[54]

Lobjectif de la réparation dans une situation de bris de contrat est
    de remettre la partie atteinte dans la position où elle aurait été, neût été
    le bris de contrat. Lorsque les dommages-intérêts sont inadéquats pour le
    faire, lexécution en nature peut être ordonnée.

[55]

« Specific performance is a discretionary equitable remedy
    granted where damages cannot afford an adequate and just remedy in the
    circumstances. »:
Matthew Brady Self Storage Corporation v. InStorage
    Limited Partnership
, 2014 ONCA 858, 125 O.R. (3e) 121, aux paras.
29, 32 et 35-40. Lexécution en nature peut être ordonnée lorsque
    lobjet de lentente est unique ou irremplaçable.

[56]

Puisque le choix daccorder lexécution en nature est discrétionnaire,
    le Tribunal dappel ne doit pas intervenir que si la décision du juge de
    première instance révèle une erreur de principe ou est nettement erronée :
de Montigny c. Brossard (Succession)
,
2010 CSC 51,

[2010] 3 R.C.S. 64, au
    para. 27.

[57]

Lexécution en nature peut être la réparation indiquée lorsque le
    contrat est pour le bénéfice dun tiers. Bien que la partie au contrat ne
    souffre de dommages, cest précisément en raison du fait que la partie au
    contrat ne subit aucune perte financière que les dommages-intérêts sont
    manifestement inadéquats et que lexécution en nature est la réparation
    appropriée :
Beswick v. Beswick
,
[1968] A.C. 58 (H.L.), suivi dans

Gasparini et al. v. Gasparini et al.

(1978), 20 O.R. (2
e
) 113, (Ont. C.A.).

[58]

Cette cour dans larr
ê
t
Gasparini
a décidé que :

The learned trial Judge correctly relied on
Beswick
    v. Beswick
, [1968] A.C. 58, a case in which the House of Lords
    unanimously affirmed the right of a widow, as administratrix of the estate of
    her late husband who was a party to a contract, to an order for specific
    performance of the agreement providing for the payment of a personal annuity
    for her. It was held that she could not bring an action personally to enforce
    the agreement, not being a party to it; but, as her husband's personal
    representative, she could enforce the agreement, even though she was a third
    party beneficiary.

[59]

M. Lacroix représente lintérêt de Maisons Lacroix. Il a témoigné quil
    a accepté dinvestir dans le projet de subdivision seulement pour aider Maisons
    Lacroix et non pas pour largent. Il est devenu investisseur par lentremise de
    738 et 738 est préjudicié en raison de la décision de 739 de cesser de faire
    affaire avec Maisons Lacroix.

[60]

Le Projet Oasis est la seule et unique subdivision en construction à
    Limoges depuis 6 ans. Cette opportunité de permettre aux Maisons Lacroix de
    continuer à construire sur 25% des lots du Projet Oasis représente au minimum
    25% des 100 lots de la Phase III, 400 autres lots qui seront développés dans le
    futur et 4 lots commerciaux. Cest aussi la seule subdivision qui est le sujet
    dune entente selon laquelle 738 peut refiler 25% des lots aux Maisons Lacroix,
    un projet de développement immobilier complexe de longue durée.

[61]

Le Tribunal a donc accepté que 738 a droit de poursuivre ces
    procédures, que des dommages-intérêts soient inadéquats, et quil sera
    impossible de quantifier des dommages-intérêts. Lobligation de répartir 25%
    des lots aux Maisons Lacroix en appliquant les mêmes conditions que celles
    imposées aux Habitations Leclair est claire et ne crée pas dobstacles à la
    supervision judiciaire.

[62]

Le Tribunal na pas erré en concluant à lexécution en nature du
    contrat, car cest le seul remède qui permet de remettre 738 dans la position
    quelle aurait été sans le bris de contrat, des dommages-intérêts sont
    inadéquats pour lentente unique, et il serait difficile de quantifier les
    dommages-intérêts avec exactitude. Je rejetterais ce moyen dappel.

(4)

Est-ce que le Tribunal a commis une erreur de droit
    quant à lapplication des ordonnances à 714, 917 et 631
?

[63]

Lapplication des ordonnances à 714, 917 et 631 découle de la
    conclusion du Tribunal que les autres investisseurs doivent être liés par le
    jugement, car :

a.

Tous les investisseurs de 739 étaient au courant
    de la répartition 75/25 et ils ont accepté dêtre liés par le contrat verbal;

b.

739 a ensuite ratifié le contrat verbal en
    adoptant « des mesures ou comportements qui exprimaient les intentions de
    739 dêtre liée par le contrat verbal » au sens de larticle 21 (2) de la Loi
    sur les sociétés par actions » ; et

c.

Les trois autres actionnaires et 739 étaient
    représentées par les mêmes avocats.

[64]

Pour ces raisons, le Tribunal na pas erré en liant 714, 917 et 631 aux
    ordonnances rendues compte tenu de son appréciation de lensemble du contexte. Nous
    devons faire preuve de déférence car le juge de première instance a fondé sa
    décision sur les faits. Je rejetterais ce moyen dappel.

(5)

Dans lalternative, est-ce que lautorisation de
    faire appel de lordonnance de dépens doit être accordée, et lordonnance
    modifiée
?

[65]

Si une offre de transaction est présentée par un
    demandeur selon les exigences de la règle et le demandeur obtient un jugement
    aussi favorable, ou plus favorable, que les conditions de loffre, il a droit
    aux dépens dindemnisation partielle à la date de la signification de loffre
    et aux dépens dindemnisation substantielle à compter de cette date :
Règles de procédure civile
,
R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194
,
règle 49.10.

[66]

En labsence dune erreur de principe ou dune erreur manifeste dans
    loctroi des dépens, un haut niveau de déférence est accordé à un Tribunal de
    première instance :
Smith v. Inco Limited
, 2013 ONCA 724, 313 O.A.C. 156, au para. 18, autorisation de pourvoi
    refusée, [2014] C.S.C.R. no 36.

[67]

Les tribunaux reconnaissent que labandon des dépens ou certains
    postes, comme les intérêts prédéterminés, peuvent être un élément de compromis
    et un facteur important dans lévaluation de laspect favorable de loffre de
    règlement en comparaison au résultat obtenu sous la Règle 49.10 :
Seaton v. Bolton
,
2007 CanLII 46250 (Ont. C.S.), au para. 28 ; voir aussi
Niagara Structural Steel (St. Catharines) Ltd. V. W.D. Laflamme Ltd.
, 1987 CanLII 4149 (Ont. C.A.).

[68]

Le 31 janvier 2018, 738 a présenté une offre de transaction aux appelantes
    en offrant que laction soit réglée si :

a.

Les appelantes acceptent de reconnaître la
    validité de lentente verbale et de distribuer 25% des lots de 739 aux Maisons
    Lacroix ;

b.

Les conditions et le prix pour la vente de ces
    lots seront les mêmes que ceux imposés aux Habitations Leclair. Les conditions
    indiquées dans loffre étaient celles qui étaient connues par 738 et appliquées
    aux contracteurs à ce moment dans le temps lors de la répartition des lots
    avant le bris de contrat ; et

c.

Chaque partie assumera ses propres dépens.

[69]

Les appelantes ont refusé loffre et nont présenté aucune offre de
    règlement à 738. 738 navait donc aucun choix que de procéder avec le procès.
    La conduite des actionnaires majoritaires est le point central du litige.

[70]

738 a connu un jugement plus favorable que les conditions de son offre
    puisque les conditions énumérées à son offre datée le 31 janvier 2018, étaient
    les mêmes conditions qui étaient imposées tant aux Habitations Leclair quaux
    Maisons Lacroix dans la Phase II du Projet Oasis à lunanimité par les
    actionnaires de 739. De plus, lIntimée proposait dabandonner tous ses dépens
    jusquau matin du procès en échange de lacceptation de loffre.

[71]

Le Tribunal na commis aucune erreur révisible en appel en concluant
    que les dépens représentaient une « somme substantielle » et en
    appliquant la règle 49.10.

[72]

Le Tribunal a reconnu quune certaine flexibilité est nécessaire à
    limposition des conditions, lorsquil a ordonné que la répartition de 25% des
    lots aux
«
Maisons Lacroix Homes aux
    mêmes conditions financières et autres que celles exigées dHabitations
    Leclair
»,
car les
    conditions imposées aux deux constructeurs de maisons ont évolué entre la Phase
    I et la Phase III du Projet Oasis.

[73]

739 fut jointe à laction pour que les quatre parties soient actionnaires,
    et liée par les effets du jugement. Si le Tribunal avait inclus 739 à
    lOrdonnance de dépens, 738 aurait eu pour effet de payer une partie de ses
    propres dépens. Le Tribunal a correctement ordonné que les dépens soient
    acquittés par 714, 917 et 631.

(6)

Conclusion

[74]

Je rejetterais lappel avec dépens. Si les parties ne peuvent pas
    régler les dépens, ils peuvent envoyer des soumissions écrites, limitées à 7
    pages, dans les 15 jours.

Rendu le : 23 décembre 2020 (« K.M.v.R. »)

« J.A. Thorburn j.c.a. »

« Je souscris. K. van Rensburg j.c.a. »

« Je souscris, M.L. Benotto j.c.a. »


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: 7084421 Canada Ltd. v. Vinczer,
    2020 ONCA 829

DATE:  20201217

DOCKET: M51970 (C68637)

Brown J.A.
    (Motion Judge)

BETWEEN

7084421
    Canada Ltd.

Plaintiff

(Respondent/Moving
    Party)

and

Attila Vinczer, Peter Vinczer, and Katalin Vinczer

Defendants

(Appellants/Responding
    Parties)

Gerald
    Anthony, acting in person and on behalf of
the moving
    party,
7084421 Canada Ltd.

Attila Vinczer, acting in person

Heard: in writing

REASONS
    FOR DECISION

OVERVIEW

[1]

The respondent, 7084421 Canada Ltd. (the
    Plaintiff), moves for various orders designed to move this appeal along and
    allow the Plaintiff to take possession of two mortgaged properties, 330 Premier
    Place, Newmarket and 462 Lake Drive South, Keswick (the Properties), which
    are owned by the appellants, Attila Vinczer and Peter Vinczer. I shall refer to
    Attila and Peter, together with Katalin Vinczer, who guaranteed the mortgages,
    as the Defendants.

THE MORTGAGE ENFORCEMENT ACTION

[2]

The essentials of the action underlying this
    appeal were summarized by Boswell J. at paras. 2, 3, 10 and 11 of his January
    15, 2020 reasons (2020 ONSC 217):

The plaintiff loaned the sum of $1,023,448.66
    to the defendants on July 31, 2017 on the strength of a blanket first mortgage
    over two properties: 462 Lake Drive South, Keswick and 330 Premier Place,
    Newmarket.

The mortgage, as registered, was in the amount
    of $1,033,157 which was the amount originally negotiated. A slightly lower
    figure was actually advanced. The term was six months. The mortgage provided
    for interest to be paid the rate of 12% which worked out to monthly payments of
    $10,331.57. The interest was fully pre-paid, meaning six months worth of
    interest payments were deducted from the funds actually advanced to the
    defendants.

[The mortgage] was not repaid. It went into
    default in early 2018. The plaintiff sued for payment and possession of the
    mortgaged premises in August 2018. The defendants failed to serve and file a
    Statement of Defence.

Default judgment was signed by the registrar
    of the court on November 9, 2018 for payment of a little over $1.2 million as
    well as possession of the mortgaged properties.

[3]

The Defendants motion to set aside the default judgment
    was brought sometime in the first part of 2019 but not heard by Boswell J. until
    November 2019. The Plaintiff was represented by counsel. Attila Vinczer
    appeared in person and argued the motion on behalf of all the Defendants. Peter
    and Katalin, Attilas elderly parents, did not appear.

[4]

In para. 7 of his reasons, Boswell J. described
    the positions of the parties on the motion before him:

The manner in which the motions proceeded was
    not a model of clarity. Though the defendants formally sought an order setting
    aside the default judgment,
it became apparent during
    argument that what both sides really wanted was for the court to decide the
    issues between them in a summary fashion and to, if necessary, vary the default
    judgment accordingly
. [Emphasis added.]

[5]

Boswell J. found that: (i) the explanation for
    the Defendants default was weak; (ii) the Defendants did not provide a
    satisfactory explanation about why it took them three months to do anything
    about the default judgment; and (iii) for the most part, the Defendants have
    not raised an arguable defence: at paras. 40, 42 and 43. He explained his
    conclusion on whether the Defendants had demonstrated an arguable defence, at
    paras. 50 and 51:

Canadian common law respects private ordering.
    That is a fancy way of saying that our law generally respects and enforces
    agreements reached between competent parties. Parties are free to enter good
    deals and bad deals. The deal entered into between the plaintiff and the
    defendants is bad for the defendants. In fact, it is downright ugly. Mr.
    Vinczer knows that and is trying his best to find a way around some of its
    worst features. But the fact is, the defendants were desperate at the time they
    borrowed from the plaintiff. And that desperation led them to enter a mortgage
    deal that bought them some time but at immense cost.

Mr. Vinczers arguments otherwise focused on
    two elements of the balance claimed by the plaintiff: the imposition of three
    months bonus interest and a management fee in excess of $50,000. I find that
    there are arguable defences to both, grounded in the terms of the contract
    itself and in the law of unconscionability.

[6]

After weighing the appropriate factors, Boswell
    J. concluded that he should not set aside the default judgment stating, at
    para. 55:

On balance, I am not persuaded that the
    default judgment should be wholly set aside.  My conclusion is based on the
    following summary of the prevailing circumstances:

(a)     The defendants offered a weak explanation for not defending
    the plaintiffs claim;

(b)     The defendants failed to act expeditiously to set aside the
    default judgment once it came to their attention;

(c)     While the defendants have arguable defences to some of the
    fees charged after default, these fees represent only a small fraction of the
    amount outstanding;

(d)     The mortgage has been in default for almost two years. The
    parties are agreed that the court is able to determine any live issues between
    them on the current evidentiary record and the court was invited to do so.

In my view, it is in the interests of justice
    to accept the parties invitation to resolve the live issues and to otherwise
    leave the judgment, amended as appropriate, in place.

[7]

Boswell J. then proceeded to determine the live
    issues between the parties. He found, at paras. 62 and 63:

The original principal amount is conceded.
    The correct principal outstanding is $1,023,448.66.

In terms of the other two disputed issues, I
    find that the plaintiff is not entitled to the three months bonus interest,
    but is entitled to the management fees as charged.

[8]

In the result, by order dated January 15, 2020
    (the Boswell Order), Boswell J. refused to set aside the default judgment but
    varied its amount stating, at paras. 81 and 82:

In summary, for the reasons expressed, I am
    not prepared to set aside the default judgment. I am prepared to vary it, again
    for the reasons expressed. I find the following amounts outstanding on the
    mortgage:

(a)     Principal
    $1,023,448.66

(b)     Accrued
    interest to January 15,

2020 (714 days @12%)                     240,244.06

(c)     Management Fees
51,172.43

Total
                   $1,314,865.15

The plaintiff is entitled, therefore, to judgment
    in the amount of $1,314,865.15 and to possession of the mortgaged premises. The
    judgment will continue to accrue interest at 12% per annum.

THE APPEAL OF THE BOSWELL JUDGMENT TO THE
    DIVISIONAL COURT

[9]

The Defendants thereupon appealed the Boswell
    Judgment to the wrong court. On February 6, 2020 they filed a notice of appeal
    to the Divisional Court. I do not understand why the Divisional Court accepted
    the appeal. The judgment under appeal was for over $1.3 million, vastly in
    excess of the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court:
Courts of Justice Act
,
    R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 19(1.2).

[10]

In her August 14, 2020 reasons (2020 ONSC 4853),
    to which I shall come shortly, J. Speyer J. stated: The procedural irregularities
    surrounding this motion are numerous, likely because the appellants are
    self-represented, but also because it appears from the materials filed that the
    court has contributed to the state of affairs that caused the appellants to
    bring this motion. For, upon accepting the notice of appeal, the Registrar of
    the Divisional Court in Oshawa issued, on requisition by the Defendants, two
    certificates of stay: the first dated February 6, 2020, and a slightly amended
    one dated February 10, 2020 (collectively the Certificate). The Certificate
    certified that the Boswell Order had been stayed by delivery of the notice of
    appeal. The Certificate, apparently prepared by Attila Vinczer, contained a
    major omission; it did not state, as required by r. 63.03(5), whether the stay was
    under r. 63.01(1) (the automatic stay of an order for the payment of money) or
    by order under r. 63.02(1).

[11]

The automatic stay rule did not apply to the
    Boswell Order because it was, in its essence, an order that refused to set
    aside a default judgment: r. 63.01(2). Accordingly, to obtain a stay of the
    Boswell Order, the Defendants were required to obtain an order from a judge: r.
    63.01(2) and 63.02(1). They had not obtained such an order. Consequently, the
    Registrar should not have issued the Certificate; it was a mistake to do so.

[12]

Notwithstanding the Certificate, the sheriffs
    office in Newmarket sought to enforce the Boswell Order by evicting the
    Defendants from the mortgaged Premises.

THE DEFENDANTS
EX PARTE
MOTION
    BEFORE J. SPEYER J.

[13]

Attila Vinczer brought an
ex parte
motion in writing before J. Speyer J. to stay the eviction, who granted an
    order dated August 14, 2020 (the Speyer Order). I would observe,
    parenthetically, that I do not understand why the motion judge entertained an
ex
    parte
motion in the circumstances. The Plaintiff loaned the Defendants a
    significant amount of money, had taken security, was faced with a default, and
    sought possession of the secured Properties. The Plaintiff was entitled to be
    heard on Mr. Vinczers motion.

[14]

In any event, the motion judge concluded that
    the Defendants appeal of the Boswell Order was in the wrong court. Pursuant to
CJA
s. 110, the motion judge transferred the appeal to this court and
    directed the Defendants to serve and file an amended notice of appeal to this
    court by August 21, 2020. The Defendants did not do so until September.

[15]

Second, the motion judge concluded that she need
    not entertain the Defendants request for an interim stay order of the Boswell Order
    because the Certificate is an order of the Superior Court, and it is binding
    until and unless it is set aside: at para. 15. With respect, that is not the
    case. The Certificate is not an order. If a r. 63.03(4) certificate is issued
    where the stay is under r. 63.01(1), the automatic stay rule, then the
    certificate simply certifies the fact that the order under appeal is subject to
    the automatic stay rule.

[16]

However, in the present case the Boswell Order
    is, in essence, an order refusing to set aside a default judgment. For such an
    order, a stay first requires an order of a judge under r. 63.02(1) which, if
    given, would permit the Registrar to certify that such an order had been made. The
    Defendants never sought a stay order from a judge. The Certificate should not
    have been issued without such an order. Consequently, the Certificate is of no
    effect.

THE APPEAL

[17]

The Defendants appeal has been transferred to
    this court and a file opened for the appeal: C68637.

[18]

The Defendants notice of appeal contains approximately
    60 grounds of appeal. None take issue with the simple reality that the
    Defendants owe the Plaintiff at least the amount of the funds advanced,
    approximately $1 million. Most relate to the Defendants dispute about the
    precise repayment amount due under the mortgages which, of course, grows with
    every passing day. Ground 54 identifies the true magnitude of the dispute:

The court erred in law by failing to address
    and recognize the triable issues being beyond merely fees that are not
    insignificant, but over $80,000.00. A substantial amount.

[19]

I have read the affidavits filed by Gerald
    Anthony and Attila Vinczer on this motion. Based on that review, Boswell J.s
    observation that the mortgage deal was bad for the Defendants who were trying
    to find a way around some of its worst features captures the essence of the
    position laid out by Mr. Vinzcer in his affidavit. Mr. Vinczer admits that the
    Plaintiff advanced mortgage funds but takes issue with several mortgage terms
    that increased the discharge amount.

[20]

In his affidavit, Mr. Vinczer identifies some of
    the repayment charges in the mortgages with which he takes issue. He characterizes
    the mortgages as frauds. He also paints himself as a victim of fraud by the
    Plaintiff. At the same time, Mr. Vinczer offers no plan about how or when the
    Defendants will repay any part of the amounts they concede were loaned to them
    by the Plaintiff.

[21]

I will now consider the specific relief
    requested by the Plaintiff on this motion.

THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON THIS MOTION

Representation of the parties

[22]

Mr. Anthony, the president and sole shareholder
    of the Plaintiff, seeks leave under r. 15.01(2) to represent the corporation.
    He is a former paralegal. His materials are focused. I am satisfied he has the
    ability to represent the corporation on this appeal and I so order.

[23]

The Plaintiff also seeks an order that Peter and
    Katalin Vinczer be represented or be removed from the appeal. I will not make
    such an order. They are parties to the default judgment and are named
    appellants.

[24]

However, it appears that Attila Vinczer is
    preparing and filing all the Defendants materials. To ensure that Peter and
    Katalin Vinczer are aware of these proceedings,
I order
    that Attila, Peter, and Katalin Vinczer each sign the factum the Defendants
    will file on the appeal.

Review of the Speyer Order

[25]

The Plaintiff seeks an order extending the time
    for serving a motion for a panel review of the Speyer Order. As J. Speyer J.
    was sitting as a judge of the Divisional Court, any such motion would have to
    be brought before a panel of the Divisional Court, not this court:
CJA
,
    s. 21(5). I cannot grant such an order.

Security for costs

[26]

The Plaintiffs notice of motion seeks an order
    for security for costs. The Plaintiff is, in essence, self-represented, so its
    recoverable costs of the appeal would be low. In any event, the Plaintiffs
    materials do not contain a bill of costs so there is no basis on which I could
    order security for costs.

Dismissal of the appeal

[27]

The Plaintiffs seek an order dismissing the
    appeal. Quite apart from the issue of my jurisdiction as a single judge to make
    such an order, I think the more appropriate approach is to fix a date for the
    perfection of the appeal.

[28]

This is an appeal from a final order of a motion
    judge. Any required transcripts are ready. The Defendants initiated their
    appeal, albeit in the wrong court, in early February but still have not
    perfected it. That is unacceptable. Even making allowance for the suspension of
    filing deadlines enacted in response to he pandemic, the Defendants conduct
    has all the hallmarks of stall tactics. Accordingly, I order the Defendants to
    perfect this appeal on or before January 15, 2021. If they do not do so, then I
    order that the Defendants are barred from bringing any further motion in this
    court without leave of a judge, and it will be open to the Plaintiff to move in
    writing before a panel for the dismissal of the appeal.

Setting aside the Certificate

[29]

The Plaintiff seeks an order setting aside the
    Certificate. He is entitled to that order. As explained above, the Registrar
    should not have issued the Certificate because the Defendants had appealed to
    the wrong court and a stay of the Boswell Order required an order of a judge. I
    set aside the Certificate.

[30]

If the Defendants wish to seek a stay of the
    Boswell Order pending appeal, they must bring the appropriate motion under r.
    63.02(1). If the Defendants bring such a motion, no doubt the judge of this
    court will review the Defendants evidence to see whether they disclose (i) why
    they are not repaying the significant sum of money they concede the Plaintiff
    lent to them, and (ii) the details of their current financial situation so that
    the court can assess their explanation for not repaying
any
of the monies advanced.

Writ of Possession

[31]

The Plaintiff seeks writs of possession for 330
    Premier Place, Newmarket and 462 Lake Drive South, Keswick. Para. 2 of the default
    judgment ordered that vacant possession of the two properties is hereby
    granted to the Plaintiff forthwith. The Boswell Order did not set aside para.
    2 of the default judgment, which remains in operation; no order has stayed its
    operation pending the appeal.

[32]

However, a court may grant leave to issue a writ
    of possession only where it is satisfied that all persons in actual possession
    of any part of the land have received sufficient notice of the proceeding in
    which the order was obtained to have enabled them to apply to the court for
    relief: r. 60.10(2). The order is the order entitling a party to
    possession: r. 60.10(1). The order entitling the Plaintiff to possession arose
    from a proceeding in the Superior Court of Justice. There is nothing in the
    record on this motion regarding proof of service to persons in actual
    possession of the Properties in the proceeding from which the default judgment
    and Boswell Order arose. Consequently, I cannot grant a writ of possession. The
    Plaintiff must seek such writs from the Superior Court of Justice.

DISPOSITION

[33]

By way of summary, I grant the Plaintiffs
    motion in part and make the following orders:

(i)

Gerald Anthony, the president and sole
    shareholder of the Plaintiff, may represent the corporate Plaintiff on this
    appeal;

(ii)

Attila, Peter, and Katalin Vinczer must each
    sign the Defendants factum;

(iii)

The Defendants must perfect this appeal on or
    before January 15, 2021. If they do not, then I order that the Defendants are
    barred from bringing any motion in this court without leave of a judge, and it
    will be open to the Plaintiff to move in writing before a panel for the
    dismissal of the appeal; and

(iv)

The Certificate is set aside.

[34]

I decline to grant the other relief requested in
    the notice of motion.

[35]

The Plaintiff is entitled to its costs of the
    motion from the Defendants, which I fix in the amount of $500, payable by the
    Defendants by December 31, 2020.

David Brown J.A.


COURT
    OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
614128
    Ontario Ltd. (Trisan Construction) v. Toronto (City), 2020 ONCA 803

DATE: 20201211

DOCKET: C68216

Lauwers, Miller and Nordheimer
    JJ.A.

BETWEEN

614128
    Ontario Ltd. o/a Trisan Construction

Applicant (Appellant)

and

City of
    Toronto

Respondent (Respondent)

Krista J. McKenzie, for the appellant

Michele A. Wright and Georgia Tanner,
    for the respondent

Heard: December 2, 2020 by
    video conference

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Janet
    Leiper of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 12, 2020, with reasons
    reported at 2020 ONSC 902.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

Trisan Construction appeals from the dismissal
    of its application for a declaration that the City of Toronto (the
    "City") pay to it a construction holdback in the amount of
    $174,381.14 plus HST for two contracts signed in 2012 and 2013
. At the conclusion of the hearing, we
    dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow. We now provide our reasons.

[2]

The appellant was the
    general contractor on five watermain and sewer projects for the City. It
    commenced five lawsuits, one on each project, to claim additional amounts for
    extras and delay.

[3]

On or about November
    13, 2018, the parties entered into a global settlement of all five lawsuits.
    The appellant signed a release stating there were no further outstanding claims
    on the projects. Pursuant to the settlement, the City paid the appellant the
    agreed settlement amount of $1,287,500 plus HST.

[4]

At the time of the settlement,
    two of the five projects were not yet complete as deficiencies were still
    outstanding and there were completion holdbacks on both projects. The appellants
    position was that these were statutory holdbacks impressed with a trust
under the
Construction Lien Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30.

[5]

The Citys position was that the funds held back
    on the two projects were not impressed with a trust under
the

Act
at the time of the settlement because any potential lien rights
    against the holdback funds had long since expired. Consequently, nothing in the
Act
precluded the City and the appellant from incorporating any claims
    for payment of the monies into the broadly worded and final global settlement
    between them.

[6]

The City applied the holdback money to the settlement
    funds paid to the appellant when it paid the settlement funds. The appellant
    claimed that the holdback money belonged to it, separate and apart from the
    settlement, and that the failure of the City to pay these monies to the
    appellant amounted to breach of trust.

[7]

The application judge found that the terms of
    the 2018 settlement constituted a full and final agreement between the parties
    as to all amounts to be paid by the City in satisfaction of the work done with
    respect to the projects. She found that the City was not obliged to make any
    further payment to the appellant.

[8]

The core of the application judges reasoning is
    found at para. 38 of her reasons where she said:

The plain words of the settlement and release
    read together are not ambiguous. They settle all outstanding claims as between
    these parties for the contracts at issue. In this case, there is no unknown
    claim that arose after the settlement. Trisan was aware of its holdbacks and
    was tracking and accounting [for] the funds held back by the City. It did not
    raise this issue as a separate ground for payment at the time of the mediation
    and the settlement agreement did not create any exception or
    "carve-out" for a finishing holdback.

[9]

We agree with the application judge. The parties
    entered into a full and complete settlement of all claims that were outstanding
    between them. The appellant was fully aware of the monies that the City had held
    back. If the appellant had intended that the holdback funds were to be paid
    over and above the settlement amount, it could easily have so stipulated in the
    settlement agreement. It did not. The appellant can not now come forward and
    advance a claim for additional funds in light of the unambiguous terms of the
    settlement agreement and release.

[10]

The appeal is dismissed. The respondent is
    entitled to the costs of the appeal fixed in the agreed amount of $7,000
    inclusive of disbursements and HST.

P.
    Lauwers J.A.
B.W. Miller J.A.

I.V.B. Nordheimer J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: 1632093 Ontario Inc. (Turn-Key
    Projects) v. York Condominium Corporation No. 74, 2020 ONCA 843

DATE: 20201223

DOCKET: C67665

Tulloch,
    Miller and Paciocco JJ.A.

BETWEEN

1632093
    Ontario Inc. carrying on business as

Turn-Key
    Projects

Plaintiff
    (Respondent/

Appellant
    by way of cross-appeal)

and

York
    Condominium Corporation No. 74

Defendant
    (Appellant/

Respondent
    by way of cross-appeal)

Antoni Casalinuovo, for the appellant/respondent
    by way of cross-appeal

Micheal Simaan and Rahul Gandotra, for
    the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal

Heard and released orally: November 20, 2020 by
    video conference

On
    appeal from the judgment of Justice Clayton J. Conlan of the Superior Court of
    Justice, dated October 9, 2019, with reasons reported at 2019 ONSC 5789, and
    from the costs order, dated January 15, 2020.

REASONS
    FOR DECISION

[1]

In our view, the appellant is essentially
    seeking to re-litigate the factual findings of the trial judge. It is trite law
    that an appellate court should not interfere with a trial judges reasons
    unless it finds that there is a palpable and overriding error. A palpable error
    is one which is clear to the mind or plain to see, so obvious that it could be easily
    seen or known or readily or plainly seen. An overriding error is one which had
    a sufficiently decisive effect, such that it would justify intervention and
    review on appeal.

[2]

We see no palpable or overriding error here.

[3]

We agree with the submissions of the respondent
    that in order for the appellant to succeed on this appeal, it would be
    necessary for this court to in effect overturn the factual findings of the
    trial judge and substitute the opposite finding asserted by the appellant. We
    cannot do this. In our view, there was ample evidence to support the factual
    findings made by the trial judge and as such the appeal on the off-set issue is
    dismissed.

[4]

Now with respect to the cross-appeal on costs,
    the parties agree that the trial judge erred in principle, in determining success
    on a distributive-costs basis. Given this error in principle, we cannot defer
    to the costs disposition. We agree with the appellant that it succeeded in the
    litigation and that a r. 49 offer to settle was not submitted by the
    respondent. We allow the costs appeal and dismiss the cross-appeal. We remit
    the matter back to the trial judge to determine the quantum of costs.

[5]

We award costs to the condominium corporation in
    this appeal the amount of $5,000, all inclusive.

M.
    Tulloch J.A.

B.W.
    Miller J.A.

David
    M. Paciocco J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Abu-Saud v. Abu-Saud, 2020 ONCA
    824

DATE: 20201217

DOCKET: M51992 (C67699)

Strathy C.J.O., Huscroft and Roberts
    JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Amneh Tawfic Abu-Saud

Applicant

(Respondent
/Moving Party
)

and

Azam Asaad Abu-Saud

Respondent

(Appellant/Responding
    Party)

Sharon E. Hassan, for the moving party

William R. Clayton, for the responding
    party

Heard: December 11, 2020 by
    videoconference

On a
    motion to quash the appeal from the order of Justice Thomas J. Carey of the
    Superior Court of Justice, dated October 30, 2019, with reasons reported at
    2019 ONSC 6303.

REASONS FOR
    DECISION

Overview

[1]

The moving party, Amneh
    Tawfic Abu-Saud, moves to quash the appeal of her former spouse, the responding
    party, Azam Asaad Abu-Saud, based on his ongoing and wilful breach of court
    orders that he pay spousal support and arrears to Ms. Abu-Saud.

[2]

We agree that the responding
    partys breach of not only the trial judges order but this courts order dated
    May 22, 2020, with reasons reported at 2020 ONCA 314,
per
Benotto
    J.A., is, as aptly characterized by Ms. Abu-Sauds counsel,
deliberate, relentless, and indefensible.

[3]

We therefore advised the parties at the
    conclusion of submissions on the motion that the appeal was quashed with costs
    to the moving party, with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.

[4]

It is common ground that the
    court has jurisdiction to quash or dismiss an appeal in the face of
    non-compliance with a support order: see
Courts of Justice Act
, R.S.O.
    1990, c. C.43, s. 134(3);
Dickie v. Dickie
, 2007 SCC 8,
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 346,
at para. 6;
Brophy v. Brophy

(2004), 180
    O.A.C. 389 (C.A.), at para. 11;
Siddiqui v. Anwar
, 2018 ONCA 965, 22
    R.F.L. (8th) 92, at para. 19. Moreover, this court has consistently refused to
    hear from the defaulting appellant or entertain the appeal where the record
    shows continuing disobedience with court orders:

Cosentino v. Cosentino
, 2017 ONCA 593, 98 R.F.L. (7th) 53, at para. 8.

[5]

Quashing or dismissing an
    appeal for non-compliance is not automatic. Factors to be considered by the court
    in determining whether to exercise its discretion to quash an appeal include:
    the wilfulness of the breach; the amount of arrears; the excuse for the breach;
    and the efforts to correct the breach:
Brophy
, at paras. 9-15.

[6]

All these considerations
    unequivocally favour Ms. Abu-Saud and her motion to quash the appeal. A review
    of the relevant factual and procedural chronology of these proceedings, as set
    out by the trial judge and our colleague in their respective reasons, and as
    briefly supplemented here, clearly demonstrates that Mr. Abu-Saud has
    deliberately undertaken, without lawful justification, whatever step he can to
    avoid his support obligations to Ms. Abu-Saud.

Facts and Procedural History

[7]

Ms. Abu-Saud left the
    matrimonial home in 2015 after 27 years of marriage with no income or financial
    support. She was dependent on assistance from family, social assistance, and Canada
    Pension Plan Disability Benefits. Except when ordered to do so, Mr. Abu-Saud
    has never willingly or voluntarily paid any support to his former spouse.
    Rather, he ignored the trial judges order of $2,653 monthly spousal support,
    plus retroactive support, continued to pay only $1,500 per month pursuant to an
    interim order, and then in January 2020, unilaterally reduced the monthly
    spousal support payment to $1,100.

[8]

Mr. Abu-Sauds continuous
    and deliberate disobedience of the trial judgment led to the first compliance
    motion before Benotto J.A. At para. 19 of her reasons, she characterized Mr.
    Abu-Sauds breach as flagrant and clearly directed him to comply with the
    trial judgment, noting his acknowledgement that he had the funds to pay. We
    endorse and repeat her direction at para. 17 of her reasons, which is apposite
    here:

Compliance with an order for support is not
    optional
.
    Support payments are not stayed pending appeal. If the
appellant
seeks relief from this requirement, the
    procedure is to bring a motion to stay the support. The procedure is not to
    decide for yourself how much to pay. This court has repeatedly admonished
    payors who do not pay the support pending appeal. In
Murphy v.
    Murphy
,

2015 ONCA 69
, 56 R.F.L. (7th) 257, the court refused to entertain
    submissions from a party who had not paid support pending appeal. To do
    otherwise would be to reward his deliberate and willful misconduct: at para.
    6. [Emphasis added.]

[9]

Benotto J.A. granted Ms.
    Abu-Sauds request for payment of a portion of the equalization payment and
    stayed the appeal, with costs of $3,500, until Mr. Abu-Saud complied with
    the trial judgment. He did so in short order. By a further order dated June 12,
    2020, Benotto J.A. then disposed of the remaining issue, ordering that Mr.
    Abu-Saud post security for Ms. Abu-Sauds appeal costs in the amount of $20,000
    by July 15, 2020, with costs of $1,500, and that if he failed to comply, Ms.
    Abu-Saud could move to dismiss the appeal. He complied by June 30, 2020.
    However, in June 2020 and from August to November 2020, in breach of the trial
    judgment and the May 22, 2020 order of this court, he again reduced his monthly
    support payments to $1,100, less than half the court-ordered monthly support of
    $2,653. As a result of this continued non-compliance, Ms. Abu‑Saud was
    obliged to bring this motion to quash the appeal.

[10]

Rather than making any
    attempts at compliance, in response to Ms. Abu‑Sauds motion to
    quash his appeal, at the eleventh hour, Mr. Abu-Saud attempted to bring before
    this court a cross-motion to stay the trial judges order. We did not permit
    him to do so, although we allowed him to file the supporting affidavit
    materials in response to this motion to quash.

Analysis

[11]

Mr. Abu-Saud has admittedly,
    unabashedly, and, in our view, unjustifiably, breached the trial judges and
    this courts orders. He has always been represented by counsel. He has never
    expressed confusion about what the court orders mean or what is required of
    him. Other than very recently when faced with the present motion to quash his
    appeal, he has never attempted to stay the trial judgment. He has breached
    court orders with the certain knowledge that Ms. Abu‑Saud is
    disabled, unable to work, and in dire financial straits that are exacerbated by
    these proceedings and his failure to comply with court orders. According to Ms. Abu‑Saud,
    as of December 1, 2020, the spousal support and retroactive spousal support
    arrears totalled $23,901. This is an enormous sum for Ms. Abu‑Saud.
    We draw the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Abu-Saud just chooses not to pay
    the amount of court-ordered spousal support to Ms. Abu-Saud because he simply
    does not want to do so.

[12]

Mr. Abu-Sauds continued
    refrain of impecuniosity, rejected by the trial judge, Benotto J.A., and
    repeated again here, rings hollow. It stands sharply contradicted by the trial
    judges findings about his imputed income, as well as the financial
    documentation produced in these proceedings, his admissions concerning his
    assets, and his substantial withdrawal of his assets to further his lifestyle
    with his new spouse, which serves to dilute Ms. Abu-Sauds security for his
    payment of support in further breach of the trial judgment. We also note that
    instead of satisfying his court-ordered obligations to his former spouse, he
    appears to be engaged in income-splitting with his new spouse by initially
    paying her $500 per week and then $480 bi-weekly for ostensibly providing
    undocumented and unsubstantiated services to his business. He also revealed
    that he has instigated a motion to vary the court-ordered support, alleging a
    material change in his means and circumstances, which is returnable before the
    Superior Court of Justice in February 2021.

[13]

Mr. Abu-Saud is inexcusably
    in breach of court orders that he pay spousal support to his former wife. He
    has doggedly and undeniably chosen to thumb his nose at court orders. We
    condemn his behaviour in the strongest terms.

Disposition

[14]

The appeal is therefore quashed.

[15]

This is one of those very clear
    and exceptional cases where Ms. Abu‑Saud is entitled to her full
    indemnity costs of her motion to quash and the appeal. Simply put, but for Mr.
    Abu-Sauds contumelious refusal to comply with his court-ordered obligations,
    she would not have been put to this tremendous expense.

[16]

Mr. Abu-Saud is required to
    pay to Ms. Abu-Saud on or before December 23, 2020 the amount of $38,419.90,
    representing $7,852.94 for the motion to quash and $30,566.96 for the appeal,
    inclusive of all disbursements and applicable taxes. These costs are amply
    justified in the circumstances of this case.

[17]

Ms. Abu-Saud is entitled to
    the costs paid into court under the June 12, 2020 order of Benotto J.A. in
    payment of her costs incurred on her motion to quash and in response to the appeal.
    We order that those funds be paid out to her forthwith on request.

[18]

As the costs paid into court
    will be insufficient to satisfy our cost order, we also order that, as the
    costs here were incurred in relation to Ms. Abu-Sauds claims for spousal support,
    Mr. Abu-Sauds obligation to pay our cost order shall be binding and constitute
    a first charge on the estate of Mr. Abu-Saud and shall be enforceable as a
    support order under the
Family Responsibility and Support Arrears
    Enforcement Act, 1996
, S.O. 1996, c. 31. Our cost order shall also be
    secured against any of Mr. Abu-Sauds assets.

[19]

As noted above, this court
    has discretion to refuse to entertain a further proceeding in the face of a
    record showing continuing disobedience with court orders. We have determined
    that is the case here. Mr. Abu-Saud is therefore precluded from bringing any
    further proceeding before this court until he has complied with the trial
    judges order and the orders of this court, including the cost orders, and the
    ongoing support obligations.

[20]

We end with this. While Mr.
    Abu-Sauds newly launched motion to vary the trial judges order was not before
    us for determination, it was referenced as yet another example of Mr.
    Abu-Sauds persistent attempts to avoid his court-ordered obligations. Rule
    1(8)(e) of the
Family Law Rules
, O. Reg. 114
/
99,
explicitly empowers the court to order that a
    party who has not complied with prior orders is not entitled to any further
    order from the court unless the court orders otherwise. In our view, any
    attempt by Mr. Abu-Saud to vary support or take any other step in the Superior
    Court of Justice proceedings while he remains in substantial non-compliance
    with the trial judges order and the orders of this court would appropriately
    attract such an order, in keeping with the primary objective of the
Family
    Law Rules
, as stated under r. 2(2), to deal with cases justly, including
    saving expense and time, as stated under r. 2(3)(b).

[21]

To summarize:

1.

The appeal is quashed;

2.

Mr. Abu-Saud must comply with all support
    obligations listed in the trial judgment and the reasons of Benotto J.A.;

3.

The money paid into court for security of costs,
    $20,000, will be paid out to Ms. Abu-Saud forthwith on request;

4.

The remaining $18,419.90 is to be paid by Mr.
    Abu-Saud to Ms. Abu-Saud forthwith, and no later than December 23, 2020.

G.R.
    Strathy C.J.O.

Grant
    Huscroft J.A.

L.B.
    Roberts J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Ahmadzai (Re), 2020 ONCA 819

DATE: 20201216

DOCKET: C68455

Fairburn A.C.J.O., Watt and
    Zarnett JJ.A.

IN THE MATTER OF:  Meladul Ahmadzai

AN APPEAL UNDER PART XX.1 OF THE
CODE

Meaghan Shea Thomas, for the appellant

Emily Marrocco, for the respondent, Attorney
    General of Ontario

Marie-Pierre Pilon, for the respondent,
    the Person in Charge for Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre

Heard: December 8, 2020 by
    videoconference

On appeal against the disposition of the
    Ontario Review Board, dated May 22, 2020, with reasons dated June 10, 2020.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

On
April 11, 2018, the appellant was found
    NCRMD on charges of assault with a weapon, robbery, and possession of a weapon
    for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

[2]

The charges arose out of a single event.
    Sometime after 8 oclock one evening, the appellant entered a Money Mart. He
    approached the counter. A female cashier was working alone in the store. The
    appellant brandished a paring knife with a four-inch blade. He demanded cash.
    The cashier retreated to the rear of the store. There, she activated a distress
    alarm. The appellant remained at the counter.

[3]

Shortly after the alarm had been activated, the
    police arrived. The appellant remained standing at the counter, the knife in
    front of him on the surface of the counter. He had made no effort to leave the
    store during the five minutes that elapsed between the sounding of the distress
    alarm and the arrival of the police. He did not obtain any cash despite his
    demand.

[4]

The appellant was 27 years old when he was found
    NCRMD on the predicate offences. He had previous convictions, both as a youth
    and as an adult. None were offences of violence. Some were for failures to
    comply with the terms of release orders.

[5]

During his tenure under the supervision of the
    Ontario Review Board, the appellant has generally been bound by detention
    orders subject to various conditions. However, for the most part, he has
    resided with his parents at their home in accordance with the terms of those
    dispositions.

[6]

The appellants current diagnoses are
    Schizophrenia, First Episode, currently in partial remission, and probable
    Major Depressive Disorder (moderate). He is presently subject to a conditional
    discharge that, among other things, permits him to reside with his parents.

The Grounds of Appeal

[7]

In this court, the appellant seeks a new hearing
    before the Board on two grounds. He says that in reaching its conclusion that
    he should be conditionally discharged, the Board made two errors:

i.

it failed to recognize and fulfill its
    inquisitorial role; and

ii.

it shifted the burden of proof to the appellant.

[8]

In our view, whether the grounds of appeal are
    considered individually or cumulatively, they fail.

Ground  #1: The Inquisitorial Function

[9]

The inquisitorial function of the Board and its
    related powers and responsibilities are beyond dispute. The Board is tasked with
    the responsibility of gathering and reviewing all available evidence about the
    four factors listed in s. 672.54 of the
Criminal Code
. But this duty
    only arises when, in the Boards expert view, additional information is
    necessary for the Board to discharge its mandate:
Kassa (Re)
, 2020
    ONCA 543, at paras. 33-34.

[10]

As a general rule, this court defers to a Board
    decision about whether it had sufficient evidence before it to make a decision
    about significant threat, thus disposition. It is all the more so, where, as
    here, the Board applies its collective and experienced mind to that decision.
    Deference will give way where the complaining party can demonstrate a
    realistic possibility that the missing material would have affected the
    Boards decision. Provided the Board has not acted unreasonably or proceeded on
    some improper principle, we do not interfere:
Baker (Re),
2001 CanLII
    4894, at para. 5.

[11]

In our assessment of this ground of appeal, a
    relevant factor of which to take account is whether any party suggested at the
    hearing that the material before the Board was inadequate and would not permit
    an informed assessment of the significant threshold:
Baker
, at para.
    3.

[12]

In our view, it simply cannot be said that the
    Board lacked evidence essential or necessary to an informed decision about
    significant threat. None of the parties suggested otherwise. Indeed, all agreed
    to an expedited hearing in full knowledge of the state of the evidentiary
    record. Some of the factors were unknown and would only materialize in the
    fullness of time.

[13]

It is also worthy of mention that the appellant
    does not challenge as unreasonable the significant threat finding. That
    decision was firmly rooted in a substantial evidentiary predicate not seriously
    challenged here. A serious mental illness of an ongoing nature. Limited
    insight. A predicate offence of threatened violence. A prior history of
    assaultive behaviour with family members. Guarded symptom disclosure to
    treating physicians. And a deficit of information about current or future
    residential arrangements.

Ground #2: Shift in the Burden of Proof

[14]

The appellant also alleges that the Board erred
    in shifting the burden of proof to the appellant. In effect, the appellant
    says, the Board required
him
to show that he was
not
a
    significant threat, rather than requiring the parties opposite to demonstrate
    that he was such a threat. In our view, reading the reasons of the Board, as a
    whole, as we must, nothing said, left unsaid or implied from either of these
    sources can sustain the conclusion the appellant asks us to draw.

[15]

That the Board had concerns about the
    appellants stability and potential decompensation in light of his proposed
    life changes does not amount to a shift in the burden of proof. Their concerns
    were amply supported by the evidence of the appellants treating psychiatrist. There
    was a robust history of involvement with mental health professionals. The
    predicate offence was committed while the appellant was on medication and
    compliant with it. There was a history of violence against close family
    members, of suicidal thoughts, of homicidal thoughts, and of paranoia. This
    amply supported the finding of significant threat and the disposition made.

Conclusion

[16]

For these reasons the appeal was dismissed.

Fairburn A.C.J.O.

David Watt J.A.

B. Zarnett J.A.