COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Hope, 2016 ONCA 623

DATE: 20160812

DOCKET: C57835

Watt, Epstein and Tulloch JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Robert Hope

Appellant

Melanie Webb, for the appellant

Lucy Cecchetto, for the respondent

Heard: March 21, 2016

On appeal from the convictions entered on March 8, 2013
    and the sentence imposed on October 4, 2013 by Justice C.A. Tucker of the Superior
    Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.

Epstein J.A.:

[1]

On October 4, 2009, the appellant attended the
    birthday party of a three-year-old girl. The appellant carried a loaded concealed
    handgun  for protection. Tyrone Johnston, another guest at the party,
    confronted the appellant in the garage of the home where the celebration was
    taking place. The men indicated to each other that each was carrying a gun.
    Johnston left the party briefly and upon his return threatened to kill the
    appellant (the garage incident).

[2]

Another guest at the party, D
o
r
i
v
a
ldo

D
e
c
a
stro, intervened and took Johnston out
    onto the street.

[3]

After a short interval, the appellant followed
    Johnston to the street. He testified that he left the garage and went out to
    the street in order to calm things down with Johnston. However, the clash
    between the two men continued. Johnston screamed at the appellant that he would
    kill him and his sister. According to the appellant, Johnston moved his hand
    toward his waist  an action that the appellant interpreted as Johnstons
    reaching for his gun  and charged at him. The appellant pulled out his gun,
    closed his eyes and fired six shots. Three hit Johnston in the back (the
    street incident).

[4]

Johnston ran to a nearby home and collapsed. He was
    pronounced dead at the scene.

[5]

The appellant was charged with first degree murder,
    using a firearm while committing an indictable offence, and possessing a
    prohibited weapon without a lawful excuse. He pleaded guilty to the latter
    charge.

[6]

At trial, the Crowns theory was that when the
    appellant was in the garage he made up his mind to kill Johnston. The appellant
    went out to the street and followed through with this plan by shooting Johnston
    in the back.

[7]

The appellant admitted that he killed Johnston. His
    primary defence was that he shot Johnston in self-defence.

[8]

The jury convicted the appellant of second degree
    murder and of using a firearm while committing an indictable offence.

[9]

The appellant appeals those two convictions and the length
    of his sentence. He argues that the trial judge made a number of mistakes,
    primarily in his instructions to the jury on the issue of self-defence. He also
    says that the sentence is excessive.

[10]

For the reasons that follow, I
    would allow the appeal from the convictions under appeal, set them aside and
    order a new trial. In the circumstances, I do not reach the sentence appeal.

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

[11]

It is useful to review various
    aspects of the evidence to give context to the issue on which this appeal turns
     the adequacy of the jury instructions concerning self-defence. Much of this
    evidence came through the testimony of the appellant.

The Previous Dealings between
    the Appellant and Johnston

[12]

The
birthday party took place in a residential complex. The
app
e
l
l
a
n
t
s

si
s
te
r
,

S
ie
r
ra

Montu
r
e,

o
cc
upied

Unit

14

of

t
h
e

c
omp
l
e
x with

h
e
r

b
o
y
f
ri
e
nd,

D
e
c
a
stro. Out of

c
on
c
e
rn
a
bout
what he perceived to be
his si
s
te
r
s uns
a
f
e l
i
f
e
s
t
y
le
    with Decastro
, the app
e
l
l
a
nt

p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d

a
n

i
l
leg
a
l

g
un

several
    mon
t
hs

b
e
fo
r
e

the
p
a
r
t
y.

[13]

J
ohnston

l
i
v
e
d

in

Unit

12 of the complex.

The

app
e
l
l
a
nt

h
a
d

p
r
e
vious
l
y

met

J
ohnston

t
hrou
g
h Cor
re
ll

S
la
w
te
r
.
    Slawter told the appellant that Johnston was a gang member. If anyone wanted to
    mess with Johnston, they had better have a gun. The

app
e
l
l
a
nt

wo
r
ri
e
d

a
b
o
ut

his si
s
ters

l
i
ving

two

doors
d
own

f
r
om

Johnston

e
sp
e
c
i
a
l
l
y sin
c
e

D
e
ca
stro

h
a
d

s
a
i
d

that

J
ohnston
    w
a
s known to play
a
rou
n
d
    with

g
uns.

[14]

The appellant and Johnston had a
    couple of minor disputes prior to the day of the party.

The Party

[15]

The appellant learned about the
    birthday party that Ike Ume, who lived in Unit 19, was hosting for his young
    daughter. The appellant knew that the guests would include Decastro and
    Johnston. The appellant decided to attend the party because his sister and Decastro
    would be going and he wanted to maintain good relations. Given the type of
    people who would be at the party, the appellant decided to take his gun with
    him.

[16]

The men who attended the event
    congregated in the garage of the home where the party was taking place. The appellant
    observed Johnston yelling at another guest, Shilton Barros. Barros told people
    that Johnston had threatened to shoot him in the head. Eventually Barros was
    forced to leave the party.

The Two Assaults

1.

The Garage Incident

[17]

The appellant testified that after
    Barros left, Johnston confronted him and challenged him by asking, You good?
    The appellant said yes, and Johnston replied, Well, Im always good. The
    appellant explained that through this exchange each man made it clear he was
    carrying a gun. In fact, Johnstons response meant that he always had a gun
    with him.

[18]

According to the appellant Johnstons
    aggression against him continued to escalate. Johnston told the appellant he
    was going to kill him. He made gun signs with his hand. The appellant asked
    Johnston what his problem was and told Johnston that he did not have a problem
    with him. The appellant, referring to an earlier dispute, indicated to Johnston
    that [w]e squashed that beef. Johnston replied that he did not care, and said
    Ill kill you, and It is what it is.

[19]

At one point, Johnston moved
    towards the appellant. Other men had to intervene to pull him away. The
    appellant testified that he was frightened and believed that Johnston intended
    to cause him serious harm.

[20]

Decastro took Johnston to the
    street. Several minutes later, the appellant left the party and joined the two
    men.

2.

The Street Incident

[21]

The appellant testified that he
    decided to go out onto the street and try to diffuse the situation with
    Johnston in order to protect his sister from the consequences of future
    problems with Johnston. The appellant felt that leaving the garage, either
    through the front door or by entering Unit 19 and locking the door, and then calling
    the police might solve the immediate issue but would make things worse in the
    long-run since Johnston and his associates would likely retaliate against him
    and his sister. The appellant felt that waiting in the garage was not a
    solution, because Johnston would still be waiting for the appellant, whenever
    he left.

[22]

As a precaution, before leaving
    the garage the appellant cocked his gun and placed it back in his waistband.

[23]

When the appellant came outside,
    Johnston was standing with Decastro in the roadway of the complex in the area
    of Unit 13. The appellant walked toward the two men. Johnston screamed things
    such as Ill kill you and your sister. The appellant responded with Whats
    your problem? The appellant again attempted to assure Johnston that he had no
    problem with him.

[24]

The appellant and Johnston stood
    face to face. Johnston suddenly put his hand toward his waistband and charged
    the appellant. The appellant testified that he believed Johnston was taking out
    his gun. Fearing for his life, the appellant shoved Johnston, went for his gun,
    closed his eyes and pulled the trigger. He closed his eyes again, took a couple
    steps forward and shot again.

[25]

The appellant denied pointing his
    gun at Johnston. He said I didnt aim it at him. [It was] the fear of the
    moment. The appellant explained Johnstons having been shot in the back as
    being the result of the shove. The appellant denied chasing Johnston before
    firing the first shot.

[26]

According to the appellant, after
    the sixth shot he opened his eyes and saw Johnston running towards Unit 12. The
    appellant turned and fled. In shock, he discarded the gun, went into a bush in
    a nearby field and cried. He later found out that Johnston had died.

[27]

Decastros testimony from the
    preliminary inquiry was read in at trial. He could not remember everything that
    the appellant and Johnston had said on the road, but recalled that the
    appellant had said We already squashed the beef we had before. Johnston had
    responded So what. Johnston then aggressively moved towards the appellant
    with his hands in his pockets. Decastro heard gunshots and ran.

[28]

Chris Herriott lived in the
    complex close to Umes unit. He was working in his garage and heard the man
    living in Unit 12 (Johnston) cursing and swearing at someone at the party.
    The man from Unit 14 (Decastro) was trying to lead him away. Sometime later, he
    heard the same man from Unit 12 challenging someone from the party to [c]ome
    out and fight like a man. Decastro came back over and the two men went into
    Unit 14.

[29]

Herriott testified that he then
    heard Johnston yelling and screaming at someone from the party, for a third
    time. He knew things were getting bad, then heard a gunshot. He looked out
    his garage window and saw a person running in front of Unit 10 with a gun in
    his hand and saw the muzzle flash. The man was heading in the direction of Unit
    12. Herriott immediately called the police.

[30]

Police and expert evidence given
    at trial established that six shots had been fired, three of which had struck
    Johnston in his back. It was possible that Johnston could have been running,
    turning away, taking something out of his pocket or raising his arm when he was
    shot. Bullet holes and ejected casings were found in the vicinity and in the
    entrance area of Unit 12. No gun, other than the appellants, was discovered at
    the scene. A butterfly knife was found in Johnstons pocket.

The Parties
    Positions at Trial

[31]

At its core, the Crowns position
    at trial was that the appellant was guilty of first degree murder. Following
    the garage incident, the appellant decided to put an end to his dispute with
    Johnston by following Johnston into the street and putting an end to Johnston
    himself. With this specific intent in mind, the appellant cocked his loaded gun,
    put it in his waistband and went out to the street. There, he confronted
    Johnston, pulled out his gun and, as Johnston turned and fled, the appellant
    shot Johnston in the back.

[32]

The Crown argued that the
    appellants evidence that he went for his gun when Johnston went for his, was
    not to be believed. Johnston had no gun on him. He was found to be armed only
    with a butterfly knife.

[33]

The appellants primary position was
    that he had shot Johnston in self-defence.

[34]

In the garage Johnston had
    threatened to kill the appellant. The appellant was unsuccessful in his
    attempts to diffuse the situation between him and Johnston and so Decastro took
    Johnston out of the garage and onto the street. The appellant conceded that
    while he was in the garage he had a number of available options to escape
    Johnstons aggression. However, he rejected them as he had reason to continue
    to try to de-escalate the dispute with Johnston  mainly to protect his sister.
    To this end he went out to the street.

[35]

Once the two men were facing each
    other in the street, Johnston approached the appellant and threatened him. Johnston
    then charged at the appellant and moved in a manner that caused the appellant
    to believe Johnston was pulling out his gun. It was in response to those
    actions that the appellant drew his gun from his waistband, closed his eyes and
    fired.

THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

[36]

On the conviction appeal the
    appellant alleges a number of errors including various deficiencies in the
    trial judges final instructions to the jury. I would summarize the alleged
    errors as concerning:

i.

whether the trial judge erred in
    instructing the jury on self-defence;

ii.

whether the trial judge erred in
    leaving inadmissible opinion evidence with the jury;

iii.

whether the trial judge erred in
    instructing the jury on the intent required for murder; and,

iv.

whether the trial judge erred by
    failing to leave the defence of provocation with the jury.

ISSUE ONE: Did the Trial
    Judge Err in Instructing the Jury on Self-defence?

[37]

The appellant put forward three
    arguments concerning self-defence:

1.
The jury
    instructions failed to assist the jury as to the relevance of the garage
    incident, particularly in relation to the issue of retreat and in light of the
    Crowns closing address.

2.
The trial
    judge reversed the burden of proof.

3.
The trial judge
    failed to provide a
Baxter
[1]
instruction.

[38]

As to the availability of the
    proviso, the appellant argues that self-defence was the key defence at trial. The
    appellant gave evidence which, if believed, was capable of establishing that he
    acted in self-defence when he shot Johnston. It therefore cannot be assumed
    that the jury would have decided the same way had the jury received proper instructions
    relating to the defence of self-defence.

Analysis

1.

Did the Jury Instructions Fail
    to Sufficiently Assist the Jury as to the Relevance of the Garage Incident,
    Particularly in Relation to the Issue of Retreat?

(a)
Background

[39]

Recall that aside from some
    preliminary jostling, there were two main altercations between the appellant
    and Johnston.

[40]

The first  the garage incident  took
    place in the following circumstances. The appellant knew Johnston to be a gang
    member and a hot-head. Johnstons aggression had forced Barros to leave the
    party. Johnston approached the appellant, indicated he had a gun and threatened
    to kill him. Decastro was forced to diffuse the situation by getting Johnston
    out of the garage.

[41]

The second  the street incident
    took place a short time later. According to the appellant, Johnston threatened
    to kill him and his sister, and then charged him as he put his hand to his
    waist  an action that the appellant interpreted as Johnstons going for his
    gun.

i.

The Crowns Submissions

[42]

In his closing address to the
    jury, Crown counsel referred to the interval between the garage incident and
    the street incident as the sequence of events. The Crown reiterated a number
    of times that it was important for the jury, when assessing self-defence, to
    consider the entirety of the sequence of events:

I expect Your Honour
    will tell you that you must consider these three elements that Ive just gone
    through for self-defence and you must consider those three elements throughout
    the entire sequence of events. You dont consider the three elements just at
    the end of the sequence of events, much as you dont consider the three
    elements just at the start of the sequence of events. You have to consider the
    three elements throughout the sequence of events. And why is that important?
    Its important, I respectfully submit to you, because you always have to bear
    in mind that self-defence is a defence of last resort.
So that if you, the
    jury, determine when considering the entire sequence of events, that reasonably
    an alternative other than shooting [Johnston] existed for [the appellant], then
    [the appellant] cant rely on self-defence
. [Emphasis added.]

[43]

Later in his address, Crown
    counsel reminded the jury of suggestions he had put to the appellant in
    cross-examination as to options available to him while he was still in the
    garage:

I suggested other
    alternatives that I said were available to him
while he remained in the
    garage
. I suggested he could have used his cell phone to call the police. I
    suggested he could have stayed in the garage. I suggested he could have had [Ume]
    close the garage door. I suggested that he could have gone into Unit 19 and
    called the police. He could have gone into Unit 19 and out the back door. And I
    suggested that he could have gone out of the garage, the big garage door,
    turned right, and left the complex.

You have to ask
    yourself,
when in the garage
did the appellant have another reasonable
    alternative.
When in the garage
, was there a reasonable alternative
    other than the one chosen by [the appellant]? [Emphasis added.]

[44]

Crown counsel then made reference
    to options potentially available to the appellant after he had left the garage
    but prior to Johnstons coming at him:

[Decastro] testified
    that he turned to [the appellant] and said: Yo Rob, just go away. Go away.
    Im going to pause for a moment and ask you  remember, you are to consider the
    whole sequence of events. And ask yourself, reasonably, did [the appellant]
    have another alternative at that point in the sequence. Could he have, acting
    reasonably, turned and left? Could he have acted reasonably, gone over to Unit
    14, gone inside and locked the door?

[45]

Crown counsel made the following
    point as to alternatives potentially available to the appellant during the
    street incident:

If you find as a fact
    that [the appellant] pulled out his gun and [Johnston] turned and fled into
    Unit 12, you have to ask yourself, did [the appellant] have a reasonable
    alternative other than shooting [Johnston]? If [Johnston] turned and fled into
    Unit 12, would it be reasonable to turn around, go into Unit 14 and lock the
    door? Thats for you to consider. Would it be reasonable if [Johnston] turned
    and fled into Unit 12, to simply turn around and leave the complex? Thats for you
    to consider.

[46]

At the conclusion of the Crowns
    submissions, defence counsel strongly objected to the Crowns closing address relating
    to the relevance of the garage incident and the appellants opportunity to
    retreat after Johnston assaulted him in the garage. In her lengthy submissions
    defence counsel argued that in the portions of the Crowns argument noted
    above, Crown counsel effectively told the jury that the appellant could not
    avail himself of the defence of self-defence if, after the garage incident
    occurred, the jury found that the appellant had other alternatives available to
    him.

[47]

The trial judge did not accept the
    defence submissions. She interpreted the Crowns closing as properly telling
    the jury to look at the circumstances of that day in assessing whether the
    appellants conduct was reasonable. She refused to provide a correcting
    instruction.

ii.

The Trial Judges Instructions

[48]

The trial judge did not
    specifically tell the jury that the appellant was not required to retreat
    earlier in the sequence of events; namely, after the garage incident. She did,
    however, make several statements that suggested the point in time at which the
    appellant acted in self-defence was during the street incident. In referring to
    the first prong of self-defence, the trial judge stated:

[The appellant]
    testified that [Johnston], in addition to the threats, moved forward towards
    him and then made a motion with his left hand while pulling a gun. [Decastro]
    again, in his evidence, stated that [Johnston] had moved towards [the
    appellant]. I would suggest to you that
[Johnstons] actions at that point
    could be considered as an unlawful assault upon [the appellant]
, but it is
    your decision to make based on the facts that you find. [Emphasis added.]

[49]

When referring to the second prong
    of self-defence, she stated:

Did [the appellant]
    reasonably fear that [Johnston] would kill or seriously injure him? The
    question requires you to consider not only [the appellants] state of mind
when
    he used force against [Johnston]
, but also what a reasonable person would
    fear in the same circumstances.

[The appellant]
    testified that [Johnston] not only was threatening his life but that of his
    sister, as he approached him where he stood with [Decastro]. His evidence is
    that [Johnston] moved toward him and with his left hand pulled a gun. He said
    he tried to push [Johnston] away from this action as he pulled his own gun and
    shot him. [Decastro] said in his evidence that [Johnston] had moved towards [the
    appellant]. [The appellant] said he thought he was going to die.
It is at
    this point in time
that you need to determine the reasonableness of [the
    appellants] belief, both subjectively from [the appellants] perspective and
    objectively from the perspective of the reasonable man, based upon your
    assessment of the entire sequence of events between the men and your assessment
    of the evidence as a whole. [Emphasis added.]

[50]

In referring to the third prong of
    self-defence, the trial judge explained:

Did [the appellant] reasonably
    believe that he could not otherwise save himself from being killed or seriously
    injured by [Johnston]? This question requires you to consider not only [the
    appellants] state of mind
when he used force against [Johnston]
, but
    also what a reasonable person would believe in the circumstances.

iii.

The Questions and the Recharge

[51]

During their deliberations, the
    jury submitted a number of questions. One question contained two requests
    pertaining to the issue of self-defence. The first was for the appellants testimony
    from the time Johnston threatened him in the garage until he left the
    residential complex. The second request was worded as follows: In reference to
    the third element of self-defence, no other option to preserve his life, we
    would like to know when these options would start. What is the timeline  prior
    to the assault or after the assault.

[52]

The second question became the
    subject of considerable debate.

[53]

The trial judge expressed
    confusion as to what was meant by the assault. Defence counsel indicated she
    assumed it was the street incident; Crown counsel expressed the view that it
    was the garage incident. The trial judges initial opinion was that it would be
    at the point in time when the assault in the street took place.

[54]

Defence counsel submitted that in
    response to the second request, the trial judge should make it clear to the
    jury that the time to consider was when Johnston moved towards the appellant on
    the street. Crown counsel noted the prosecutions position that an assault
    occurred in the garage. It was the trial judges view that she had told the
    jury that the reasonableness of the appellants belief that there was no other
    option to preserve his life was to be determined at the time of the assault in
    the street. Defence counsel again raised the point that the law did not require
    the appellant to retreat when he was in the garage, and argued that the
    question made it clear that the jury did not understand this.

[55]

The trial judge ultimately determined
    that her initial instructions had accurately directed the jury on the issue of
    retreat and particularly the focus on the street incident. Accordingly, in
    response to the jurys request for assistance on this point, the trial judge reread
    the portion of her charge on the third element of self-defence and the portion
    of the charge concerning the issue of mistaken belief. That recharge included
    the following statements:

Did [the appellant]
    reasonably believe that he could not otherwise save himself from being killed
    or seriously injured by [Johnston]? This question also requires you to consider
    not only [the appellants] state of mind
when he used force against
    [Johnston]
, but also what a reasonable person would believe in the same
    circumstances.

If you are not satisfied
    beyond a reasonable doubt that [the appellant] did not honestly and reasonably
    believe that he could only save himself from death or serious injury by killing
    or seriously injuring [Johnston]
at the time he reasonably believed
    [Johnston] pulled his gun on him
, [the appellant] was not acting in lawful
    self-defence. [Emphasis added.]

[56]

The jury was provided with no particularized
    assistance on the issue of the relevance of the appellants failure to take
    advantage of possible avenues of retreat, prior to the street incident.

(b)
The
    Parties Positions

[57]

The appellant submits that the
    Crowns closing address suggested that the appellant was legally required to
    retreat following the garage incident. Otherwise, he could not rely on
    self-defence. Despite defence counsels request, the trial judge did not
    provide a correcting instruction. Compounding this error was the trial judges
    failure to adequately answer the jurys question as to the relevance of the
    garage incident.

[58]

The respondent does not agree that
    Crown counsels closing address contained such a suggestion. Rather, Crown
    counsel submitted, as he was entitled to, that the appellant decided to kill
    Johnston before leaving the garage, and he invited the jury to review the entire
    sequence of events in determining whether the appellant acted reasonably. Further,
    defence counsel was ultimately content with how the trial judge intended to
    instruct the jury.

(c)
The
    Governing Principles

i.

General Self-defence Provisions

[59]

The self-defence provision
    applicable at the appellants trial was the former s. 34(2) of the
Criminal
    Code
, which stated:

34
    (2) Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous
    bodily harm in repelling the assault is justified if

(a) he
    causes it under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm from
    the violence with which the assault was originally made or with which the
    assailant pursues his purposes; and

(b) he
    believes, on reasonable grounds, that he cannot otherwise preserve himself from
    death or grievous bodily harm.

[60]

In
R. v. Craig
, 2011 ONCA
    142, 269 C.C.C. (3d) 61, at para. 33,

Doherty J.A. described the three
    elements of the s. 34(2) defence as follows (referencing
R. v. Pétel
,
    [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3):

1.

An unlawful assault, or at least a reasonable belief by the accused that
    he or she was being assaulted;

2.

A reasonable apprehension of risk of death or grievous bodily harm; and

3.

A reasonable belief that it is not possible to preserve ones self from
    harm except by killing the perpetrator of the assault.

[61]

The elements of self-defence have
    both a subjective and an objective component:
Craig
, at para. 36.

ii.

Retreat

[62]

The concept of retreat is relevant
    to the second and third of the three elements of the s. 34(2) defence set out
    above. In
R. v. Cain
, 2011 ONCA 298, 278 C.C.C. (3d) 228, at para. 9,
    this court explained the relevance of the issue of retreat to a self-defence
    claim made under s. 34(2):

Unlike s. 35 of the
Criminal
    Code
, s. 34(2) does not require defendants to retreat in the face of an
    assault, but rather permits defendants to stand their ground during the early
    stages of a confrontation. However, as the appellant properly concedes, the
    possibility of retreat is relevant to the second and third elements of the s.
    34(2) defence, namely, the issues of whether the appellant did have a
    reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm, and whether the appellant
    had a reasonable belief that it was not otherwise possible to save himself from
    harm except by killing [the deceased]. [Citations omitted.]

[63]

The issue of retreat is also
    relevant when the Crown takes the position that the individual claiming
    self-defence had, from the start of the interaction, intended to harm the
    deceased: see e.g.
Cain
, at paras. 10, 15.

[64]

Where Crown counsel makes
    submissions to the effect that an individual is precluded from raising the
    defence of self-defence because he or she had failed to retreat at the start of
    a confrontation, or where there is a sufficient risk that the jury could have
    understood Crown counsel to be making that submission, a correcting instruction
    from the trial judge is required:
Cain
, at para. 11.

[65]

However, the claim of self-defence
    will be fairly put to the jury where the jury instructions, read as a whole,
    make it clear that the jurys task is to determine whether, at the time the
    accused used force against the victim, the accused reasonably believed he could
    not otherwise preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm:
R. v.
    Stewart
, 2014 ONCA 70, 306 C.C.C. (3d) 269, at para 48.

iii.

Jury Questions

[66]

As I will explain, I have
    concluded that the trial judges instructions concerning self-defence left the
    jury confused specifically with respect to the issue of retreat. I come to this
    conclusion in large part due to the question the jury asked concerning this
    issue during deliberations. Therefore, a summary of the governing legal
    principles should include those that pertain to the significance of jury
    questions.

[67]

In
R. v. W. (D.)
, [1991] 1
    S.C.R. 742, at pp. 759-60, the Supreme Court explained that When a jury
    submits a question, it gives a clear indication of the problem the jury is
    having with a case. Those questions merit a full, careful and correct response.
    As well, the answer should remind the jury of its instructions given in the
    course of the main charge.

[68]

Similarly, in
Pétel
, at p.
    15, the Supreme Court stated:

The importance of
    adequately answering questions put by the jury should be borne in mind. The
    question will generally relate to an important point in the jurys reasoning,
    so that any error the judge may make in answering it becomes all the more
    damaging. It is often necessary to repeat certain aspects of the main charge in
    order to place the specific question in a more general context. [Citation
    omitted.]

[69]

In
R. v. T. (M.)
, 2012 ONCA
    511, 289 C.C.C. (3d) 115, at paras. 114-116, Watt J.A. summarized the law on
    responses to jury questions as follows:

Jury questions
    indicate that at least some jurors are having a problem with an issue in the
    case. Jury questions merit a full, careful and correct response.

Recharges on issues
    presented by jury questions must be correct and comprehensive no matter how
    exemplary the original charge may have been. As a general rule, the correctness
    of the original charge cannot be summoned in forgiveness of a later error in a
    recharge on the very point on which the jury reports confusion and seeks
    clarification. Further, the more time that has elapsed between the main charge
    and the jury question, the more imperative it is that the recharge contain a
    correct and comprehensive response.

In some instances, for
    example where a written version of the original charge has not been provided to
    jurors and a jury question indicates a failure to recall the substance of the
    original charge, a repetition of the original instructions may be sufficient.
    On the other hand, where the judge has provided jurors with a written version
    of the charge, a juror question about a subject like the standard of proof may
    require something more than oral repetition of the charge already given. [Emphasis
    in original. Citations omitted.]

(d)
Application
    of the Governing Principles

[70]

Recall the theories advanced at trial.
    The theory of the Crown was that the appellant, just after the garage incident,
    formed the intent to kill Johnston. The theory of the defence was that the
    appellant shot Johnston on the street in self-defence.

[71]

The events in the garage were
    potentially relevant to each of these theories.

[72]

What took place in the context of
    the garage incident was relevant to the Crowns theory that the appellant
    intended to kill Johnston when he (the appellant) joined Decastro and Johnston
    in the street. It provided the background against which the appellant formed
    the intent to murder Johnston. That the appellant failed to avail himself of
    available exits and instead confronted Johnston on the street, it could be
    argued, was evidence that the appellant, while in the garage, made up his mind
    to kill Johnston.

[73]

The events in the garage were also
    relevant to the theory of the defence of self-defence. In the circumstances of
    this sequence of events the jury had to consider whether the appellants
    decision to shoot Johnston was his only reasonable option in response to
    Johnstons actions when Johnston confronted him on the street. In answering
    this question, the jury was entitled to consider the surrounding events,
    including what happened in the garage, as it informed the appellants state of
    mind and actions during the street incident. It informed the alternatives
    reasonably available to the appellant at the moment he was on the street facing
    Johnston as Johnston (according to the appellant) moved toward him, threatened
    him and brought his hand to his waistband.

[74]

Unfortunately, the trial judges
    instructions did not adequately equip the jury was not well-equipped to
    understand the relevance of the circumstances surrounding the garage incident and
    to properly apply them to the defence of self-defence.

[75]

First, the Crowns submissions on
    the issue were capable of misleading the jury on this point. I refer to the
    Crowns submissions that if the jury determined, considering the entire
    sequence of events, that reasonably an alternative other than shooting
    [Johnston] existed for [the appellant], then [the appellant] [couldnt] rely on
    self-defence. And, as set out above, Crown counsel suggested a number of
    alternatives available to the appellant prior to Johnstons moving toward him,
    including retreat options open to the appellant while he was in the garage. I
    agree with the objection taken by defence counsel that these submissions could
    have left the jury with the impression that the appellant was precluded from
    raising the defence of self-defence because, immediately after the garage
    incident, he had not taken advantage of opportunities to save himself from
    harm.

[76]

Notwithstanding these erroneous
    submissions, the trial judge did not give the corrective instruction she was
    asked to provide and, in my view, should have provided. See
Cain
, at
    para. 11.

[77]

To make matters worse, the trial
    judge, in her instructions to the jury, did not clearly explain the potential
    ways in which the circumstances involving the garage incident might be relevant
    to their deliberations.

[78]

This lack of clarity was made
    evident by the jurys question set out above. The jury expressed uncertainty about
    how to consider the third branch of self-defence, particularly in relation to the
    period in time at which the appellant had to reasonably believe he could not
    otherwise save himself from death or grievous bodily harm. Although the meaning
    of the assault was never clarified,
[2]
I conclude that the question demonstrates the jurys confusion about the
    relevance of the garage incident  significantly of the appellants decision to
    follow Johnston to the street rather than leave the party or call the police
    to the issue of whether the appellant reasonably believed that he could not
    otherwise save himself from death or grievous bodily harm when he was assaulted
    in the street.

[79]

As noted above, the trial judges
    response to the jurys question was to repeat the part of her charge on the
    third branch of self-defence, a charge that had left the jury confused the
    first time it was given. Although the recharge twice refers to the street
    incident, the majority of the recharge speaks generally about self-defence
    without reference to any particular point in time. Most importantly, it did not
    clarify the relevance of the garage incident to the jurys analysis of
    self-defence.

[80]

In my opinion, leaving the Crowns
    uncorrected erroneous closing to one side, once the jury expressed its
    confusion as to the significance of the garage incident in assessing
    self-defence, it was incumbent on the trial judge to explain that significance.
    Her reiteration of a portion of her charge failed to do so. The jury was left
    inadequately instructed with respect to this aspect of the case  an aspect
    that was both complex and critical to the defence of self-defence.

2.

Did the Trial Judge Err in
    her Instructions by Reversing the Burden of Proof in Relation to the Third Test
    for Self-Defence?

(a)
The Jury
    Instructions

[81]

In her charge to the jury on
    self-defence, the trial judge began by stating Crown counsel must satisfy you
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in lawful
    self-defence.

[82]

The trial judge then said the
    following about the burden of proof with respect to the third aspect of
    self-defence:

To decide this
    question, you should consider all of the circumstances of [the appellants]
    conduct. Take into account not only the nature of the act alleged but anything
    said about it at the time.
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable
    doubt that [the appellant] honestly and reasonably believed that he could only
    save himself from death or serious injury by killing or seriously injuring [Johnston],
    [the appellant] was not acting in lawful self-defence.
You must then return
    to the analysis [of] the essential elements of first degree murder which I will
    discuss below.
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [the
    appellant] did honestly and reasonably believe that he could only save himself
    from death or serious injury by killing or seriously injuring [Johnston], [the
    appellant] was acting in lawful self-defence and you must find [the appellant]
    not guilty and your deliberation on both counts of the indictment would be
    over.
[Emphasis added.]

[83]

In the recharge, the trial judge
    again reviewed the issue of the burden of proof in relation to the third part
    of the test for self-defence:

To decide this
    question, you should consider all the circumstances of [the appellants]
    conduct. Take into account not only the nature of the act alleged but the
    things said at that time.
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
    that [the appellant] did not honestly and reasonably believe that he could only
    save himself from death or serious injury by killing or seriously injuring [Johnston]
    at the time he reasonably believed [Johnston] pulled his gun on him, [the
    appellant] was not acting in lawful self-defence.
You must then return to
    your analysis as to the essential elements of first degree murder, which I will
    discuss below.

If you are
    satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [the appellant] did honestly and
    reasonably believe that he could only save himself from death or serious injury
    by killing or seriously injuring [the appellant] [sic]  was acting in lawful
    self-defence and you must find [the appellant] not guilty
and your
    deliberations on both counts of the indictment would be over. [Emphasis added.]

[84]

The trial judges made additional
    references to the burden of proof in her initial instructions. At the beginning
    of the charge, she stated that The person charged, being [the appellant], does
    not have to present evidence or prove anything in this case; in particular,
    that he is innocent of the crimes. From start to finish, it is Crown counsel
    who must prove [the appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is Crown
    counsel who must prove [the appellants] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not [the
    appellant] who must prove his innocence. You must find [the appellant] not
    guilty unless Crown counsel satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is
    guilty. Second, the trial judge provided a
W. (D.)
instruction on two
    occasions. Finally, at the conclusion of the charge, the trial judge stated
    that Every person charged with an offence is presumed to be innocent unless
    and until Crown counsel has proven that persons guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt. She then reiterated the same paragraph on reasonable doubt from the
    beginning of the charge.

[85]

No additional references were made
    to the burden of proof in the recharge.

(b)
The
    Parties Positions

[86]

The appellant submits that in these passages the trial judge clearly
    misstated the onus in relation to the appellants honest and reasonable belief
    that he could only save himself by killing or seriously injuring Johnston. Crown
    counsel fairly acknowledges these errors but submits that given that the trial judge
    correctly articulated the burden of proof in other parts of the charge, the
    jury would not have been misled that the burden rested on the Crown to satisfy
    the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defence of self-defence did not
    apply.

(c)
The
    Governing Principles

[87]

Once self-defence is left with the
    jury, the accused bears no burden to establish that he or she acted in
    self-defence. Rather, as the Supreme Court noted in
R. v. Cinous
, 2002
    SCC 29, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 39, the jury must be told that the burden
    of proof in relation to this defence is on the Crown, who must prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the defence does not apply.

[88]

Where the trial judge errs in
    instructing the jury on the burden of proof, the fact that the trial judge
    correctly instructed on that issue elsewhere in the charge is a strong
    indication that the jury were not left in doubt as to the burden resting on the
    Crown:
W. (D.)
, at p. 758. However, as noted above, errors made in answering
    a question from the jury become all the more damaging given that questions tend
    to relate to important parts in the jurys reasoning:
Pétel
, at p. 15.
    Indeed, in
W. (D.)
, the Supreme Court noted that, had the reversal of
    the burden of proof occurred in the course of a response to a question from the
    jury, a new trial would have had to have been ordered: p. 760.

(d)
Application
    of Governing Principles

[89]

Had the reversal of the burden of
    proof occurred only in the main charge, where the errors were cushioned on
    either side by several proper statements of the burden of proof, I may have
    been comfortable saying that the jury would have understood the Crowns onus. Here,
    however, the error was repeated in response to a question from the jury. While
    the question itself did not directly touch on the burden of proof, the trial
    judges response to that question was capable of confusing the jury as to the
    party that bore the burden of proof.

3. Did the Trial
    Judge Err by Failing to Give a
Baxter
Instruction?

(a)
The
    Jury Instructions

[90]

The charge to the jury did not
    contain a specific
Baxter
instruction.

(b)
The
    Parties Positions

[91]

The appellant argues that in this
    case it was an error for the trial judge to have failed to include a
Baxter
instruction in her charge to the jury. A
Baxter
instruction
    was necessary because it was critical for the jury to understand that the
    appellant was not required to engage in detached reflection, as the Crown
    suggested he should have done in the garage, when he was faced with a
    reasonably apprehended attack involving a gun.

[92]

The Crown submits that a nicety or
Baxter
instruction is not a prescribed incantation. The real question is
    whether the charge conveyed the requirement of an honest and reasonable belief
    by the accused that his use of force was necessary. The Crown argues that the
    trial judge, in her instructions, captured the essence of the
Baxter
instruction
    by telling the jury that the appellant was not required to exactly measure his
    necessary defensive action. The Crown relies on the case of
R. v. Krasniqi
,
    2012 ONCA 561, 291 C.C.C. (3d) 236, in which this court dismissed an appeal
    involving a jury charge with exactly the same wording as the trial judges
    charge. The Crown contends that the jury would have understood from the charge
    as a whole that the appellant only needed to honestly believe that his actions
    were necessary in the circumstances. Alternatively, says the Crown, no
    substantial wrong occurred and the absence of a
Baxter
instruction was
    mitigated by the rest of the charge.

(c)
The
    Governing Principles

[93]

A
Baxter
instruction is required to convey that a person
    responding to a reasonably apprehended attack cannot be expected to weigh to a
    nicety, the exact measure of defensive action:
Baxter
, at p. 111;
Krasniqi
,
    at para. 95. As this court explained in
Krasniqi
, at para. 96, it is
    the message in the
Baxter
instruction which must be brought home to
    the jury rather than a specific incantation.
Jurisprudence
    has made it clear that, standing on its own, a failure to give a
Baxter
instruction is not fatal to a charge on self-defence: see e.g.
Krasniqi
, at paras. 96-99
:
R. v. Scotney
, 2011
    ONCA 251, 277 C.C.C. (3d) 186, at paras. 34-38.

(d)
Application
    of the Governing Principles

[94]

In this case, while I would not
    find that the trial judges instructions were irreparably flawed due to the
    lack of this aspect of the charge, its absence does contribute to my assessment
    of the overall adequacy of the charge as it pertained to self-defence.

Summary of the
    Adequacy of the Instructions Regarding Self-Defence

[95]

In my view, the trial judge erred
    by not properly instructing the jury on the issue of self-defence, in three
    respects:

1. She failed to provide a correcting instruction
    following Crown counsels argument that if the jury found that after the garage
    incident the appellant did not avail himself of reasonable opportunities to
    retreat, self-defence was not available to him. The trial judge also failed to
    assist the jury in its obvious confusion about the relevance of the garage
    incident to the defence of self-defence.

2. On a number of occasions, including in answer to a
    question, the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

3. Finally, the trial judge should have provided but did
    not provide the jury with a
Baxter
instruction.

[96]

In the light of these errors in
    the trial judges instructions on the central issue in this case  self-defence
     I am not satisfied that the jury was provided the assistance necessary to
    assess the appellants defence of self-defence.

[97]

The respondent submits that, given the strength of the Crowns case, the
    proviso ought to apply. I disagree. Self-defence was the key defence at trial. There
    was evidence given which, if believed, was capable of establishing that the
    appellant acted in self-defence when he shot Johnston. It therefore cannot be said
    that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had they received proper
    instructions on the issue of self-defence.

[98]

I would therefore allow the
    appeal on this issue.

THE OTHER GROUNDS OF APPEAL

[99]

Given I would allow the appeal on
    the ground that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence,
    I do not intend to deal with the other grounds of appeal, expect by way of
    brief comment.

[100]

The appellant contends that the expert
    evidence of two witnesses relating to the relevance of where the gunshot
    casings were found at the scene of the killing was inadmissible and the trial
    judge ought to have instructed the jury to give no weight to it. Even if the
    evidence was admissible, it ought to have been subject to a clear and forceful
    caution about its limitations.

[101]

The authorities have made it clear
    that experts should be properly qualified in relation to all areas in which the
    expert proposes to testify. A trial judges obligation to properly control the
    reception of expert evidence does not end at the qualification stage. The trial
    judges role is to limit the evidence to areas properly admitted  objection or
    no objection. The evidence of experts must be confined to the witnesss field
    of expertise.

[102]

With respect to the trial judges
    instructions concerning the intent for murder as opposed to manslaughter, the
    appellant submits that the trial judge erred by failing to tell the jury that
    the appellants post-offence conduct could not assist them in determining
    intent and failed to provide a rolled-up charge. In relation to this ground
    of appeal I say only that I would not wish to be taken as approving the
    instructions the appellant challenged in this ground of appeal.

[103]

Finally, concerning the defence of
    provocation, the appellant argues that Johnston provoked the appellant when he
    threatened to kill him and his sister. The sudden reaction was the appellants
    pulling the gun and shooting before having an opportunity to cool down. The
    appellant submits that there was an air of reality to provocation and the trial
    judge erred by not leaving it with the jury. Self-defence and provocation are
    not necessarily incompatible. The fact that the appellant denied acting out of
    anger and testified that he was concerned about his safety and therefore went
    for his weapon does not deprive provocation of an air of reality.

[104]

In my view it would not be
    appropriate to comment on the issue of provocation as whether that issue goes
    to the jury in the next trial and what instructions are appropriate to give
    depends on the evidence adduced at that trial.

DISPOSITION

[105]

Based on this analysis, I would allow
    the appeal, set aside the convictions for second-degree murder and using a
    firearm while committing an indictable offence, and order a new trial.

Released: August 12, 2016 (DW)

Gloria
    Epstein J.A.

I
    agree David Watt J.A.

I
    agree M. Tulloch J.A.

[1]

R. v. Baxter
(1975), 27 C.C.C.
    (2d) 96 (Ont. C.A.).

[2]
Unfortunately, the trial judge did not ask the jury to clarify which assault
    they meant when they asked whether they had to consider the appellants
    opportunity to retreat prior to the assault or after the assault - an option
    that was discussed.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Merelles, 2016 ONCA 647

DATE: 20160829

DOCKET: C59948

Pepall, Tulloch and Benotto JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Alberto Merelles

Appellant

Richard A. Fedorowicz, for the appellant

Ghazala Zaman, for the respondent

Heard: May 27, 2016

On appeal from the convictions entered on October 3,
    2014, by Justice W. Low of the Superior Court of Justice.

Pepall J.A.:

Overview

[1]

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of
    trafficking, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and
    possession of the proceeds of crime.

[2]

The appellant challenged the validity of search warrants executed on
    three Toronto properties: his residence on Delaware Avenue, a home under renovation
    on Brunswick Avenue, and the garage of the home of his girlfriends mother on
    Columbine Avenue.

[3]

The trial judge concluded that the appellant did not have standing to
    challenge the search warrants for the Brunswick and Columbine properties, as he
    did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although the trial judge
    found that the appellant had standing to challenge the warrant for the
    appellants Delaware residence, she concluded that the search warrant was valid
    as there were reasonable grounds to believe that drugs would be located there. Accordingly,
    the trial judge dismissed the application to quash the search warrant for the Delaware
    residence.

[4]

At trial, the appellant called no evidence. He was convicted and
    sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, less six months credit on account of pre-trial
    custody.

[5]

On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in: (1)
    concluding that the appellant did not have standing to challenge the search of the
    Columbine property; and (2) finding that the search warrant for the Delaware
    residence was valid.

[6]

For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.

Facts

[7]

In August 2010, the Ontario Provincial Police received information from
    a confidential informant that the appellant was dealing in large amounts of
    heroin. The confidential informant provided information about the appellant,
    including his personal attributes, the location of properties frequented by him,
    a description of his truck and licence plate, and the kind of heroin in the
    appellants possession.

[8]

The police conducted three days of surveillance on the appellant. They noted
    four apparent hand-to-hand drug transactions between the appellant and unknown
    individuals, one of which occurred at the Brunswick property and another at the
    Delaware residence. The appellant also appeared to engage in
    counter-surveillance driving techniques.

[9]

The police obtained search warrants for the three properties.

[10]

Police seized 189.19 grams of cocaine from the Columbine property. Police
    also seized 983.51 grams of heroin, 29.36 grams of cocaine, $19,850 in Canadian
    currency and $150 in United States currency from the appellants Delaware residence.

[11]

Finally, police found 6.41 grams of heroin, including 20 decks of 0.15
    grams each, and 1.88 grams of cocaine, on the appellants person.

Trial Judges Decision

[12]

The appellant brought an application to quash the search warrants and to
    exclude the drugs found on execution of those warrants. The appellant filed no
    affidavit nor did he give any
viva voce
evidence.

[13]

In finding that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search
    warrant for the Columbine property, the trial judge relied on
R. v. Edwards
,
    [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, to determine whether the appellant had a reasonable
    expectation of privacy.

[14]

There was no evidence of the appellant having an ownership, leasehold or
    possessory interest in the Columbine property. The appellant only had a key to
    the garage. The agreed statement of facts stated that he had the key in
    September 2010 (the month the search was executed) and stored machinery and
    tools there with consent. There was no evidence of historical use or other connection
    with the property before September 2010. The trial judge was not prepared to
    draw an inference of a subjective expectation of privacy.

[15]

The trial judge accepted that the appellant had a reasonable expectation
    of privacy in the Delaware residence, as it was his home. However, she concluded
    that the information obtained from the confidential informant and police surveillance
    created reasonable grounds to believe that drugs and related property would be
    located there. The confidential informants information was highly detailed and
    compelling. Further, the apparent hand-to-hand transactions were consistent
    with the confidential informants information that the appellant was trading in
    illicit drugs.

Issues on Appeal

[16]

First, the appellant submits the trial judge erred in finding that the appellant
    did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the garage at
    the Columbine property.

[17]

Second, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in finding that
    the search warrant of his Delaware residence was valid.

Issue #1: Standing to Challenge the Search of the Columbine
    Property

[18]

The right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8
    of the
Charter
protects a reasonable expectation of privacy: see
Edwards
,
    at para. 30. A reasonable expectation of privacy is to be determined on the
    basis of the totality of the circumstances. A non-exhaustive list of factors to
    be considered includes (
Edwards
, at para. 45):

1.     presence at the time of the
    search;

2.     possession
    or control of the property or place searched;

3.     ownership of the property or
    place searched;

4.     historical
    use of the property or item;

5.     the
    ability to regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude others from
    the place;

6.     the
    existence of a subjective expectation of privacy; and

7.     the
    objective reasonableness of the expectation.

[19]

The burden is on the appellant to establish a reasonable expectation of
    privacy:
R. v. Simpson
, 2015 SCC 40, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 827, at para. 47.

[20]

The appellant did not testify. The agreed statement of facts only addressed
    the Columbine property, stating that: (1) the appellants girlfriend lived at the
    residence with her mother; (2) in September 2010, the appellant had a key to
    the garage and was permitted to store tools and machinery there; and (3) the
    appellant only had a key to the garage, not the rest of the house. The
    appellant admitted that the drugs found in the garage were his.

[21]

In my view, the trial judge did not err in concluding that the appellant
    had no standing with respect to the Columbine property. While the appellant had
    a key, there was no evidence that the appellant regulated access to the garage.
    Nor was there any evidence of historical use of the property  only that he
    used it in September 2010. The appellant was not present at the time of the
    search and he did not possess, control or own the garage. Although one could
    infer that he could admit people to the garage, there was no evidence to
    suggest that he could exclude entry.  There was no evidence about others in
    possession of a key. There was also no evidence of any subjective expectation
    of privacy or evidence supporting an inference of a subjective expectation of
    privacy. As in
Edwards
, the appellant was no more than a privileged
    guest.

[22]

I also reject the appellants argument that a garage in these circumstances
    is akin to a rental locker. There was no evidence that the appellant rented the
    garage space or that he had exclusive access to it. From the evidence before
    the trial judge, the appellant was simply permitted to use the garage to store
    tools. The totality of the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable
    expectation of privacy.

[23]

The trial judge was correct in concluding that the appellant did not
    have standing to challenge the search warrant for the Columbine property.

Issue #2: Validity of the Search of the Delaware Residence

[24]

Second, as mentioned, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred
    in concluding that the search warrant for the appellants home was valid. The
    appellant submits that the trial judge erred in: (1) treating the confidential
    informant as a proven source; (2) treating the confidential informants
    expectation of monetary compensation as an enhancement of his credibility; and
    (3) concluding that the police investigation confirmed the appellants
    connection with the Delaware residence.

[25]

A warrant is presumed to be valid: see
R. v. Campbell
, 2010
    ONCA 588, 261 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 45, affd 2011 SCC 32, [2011] 2 S.C.R.
    549, at para. 14. In reviewing the sufficiency of a search warrant, the test is
    whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the
    basis of which the authorization could have issued: see
R. v. Araujo
,
    2010 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at para. 54; and
R. v. Morelli
, 2010
    SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 40.

[26]

Evidence of a tip from an informant by itself is insufficient. When
    assessing the reliability of a tip from a confidential informant, the court is
    to consider the totality of the circumstances. The court must look to a variety
    of factors including: (1) the degree of detail of the tip (including the time,
    place, participants involved, and nature of the alleged activity); (2) the
    informants source of knowledge (whether it is first-hand or obtained from
    others); and (3) indicia of the informants reliability such as past performance
    or confirmation from other investigative sources:
R. v. Garofoli
,
    [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, at para. 68.

[27]

Turning to the appellants submissions, I accept that the confidential
    informant had only provided information on one previous occasion that resulted
    in charges as opposed to a conviction, and that the trial judges comments on
    monetary compensation were misplaced. That said, the information provided by
    the informant was detailed and first-hand and there was no information given in
    the past to the police that turned out to be unreliable.

[28]

Furthermore, the police investigation and surveillance established a
    strong link between the appellant and the Delaware residence and included the observation
    of an apparent hand-to-hand transaction in the residences well-lit garage. The
    appellant then was observed to have left the premises and to have participated
    in another apparent hand-to-hand transaction. The police surveillance
    observations amplified, and were consistent with, the rest of the information
    provided by the informant.

[29]

In my view, there was ample evidence for the trial judge to conclude
    that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the issuance of the search
    warrant for the Delaware residence.

[30]

Given my conclusions, there is no need for a s. 24(2)
Charter
analysis.

Disposition

[31]

For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.

Released:

SEP                                                  S.E.
    Pepall J.A.

AUG 29 2016                          I agree M. Tulloch
    J.A.

I agree
    M.L. Benotto J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v.
Nielsen, 2016 ONCA 635

DATE: 20160819

DOCKET: M46765 (C62394)

Doherty, van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Beverley Nielsen

Appellant
(Moving Party)

Glenn Bogue, for the appellant (moving party)

Nick Devlin, for the respondent

Wendy Wright, for the Attorney General for Canada

Heard and released orally:  August 15, 2016

On review of the order of the Honourable Justice H.
LaForme, dated July 21, 2016.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

Justice LaForme dismissed a motion for an order releasing the applicant
on bail and he refused a request to expedite the appeal in what was then an
ongoing
habeas corpus
proceeding.  The applicant seeks a review of
that order.  The applicant has been released on bail rendering any question of
the lawfulness of her continued detention and the related
habeas corpus
proceeding moot.

[2]

The applicants submissions, in our view, have no connection to the
merits of the order made by LaForme J.A. and give no cause to review the terms
of that order.  It seems that the applicant wants this court to dismiss the
outstanding criminal charges because, in her view, she was improperly detained in
solitary confinement for a period of time pending trial.  The propriety of the
charges and the propriety of the continued criminal proceedings are not
properly before this court at this time.  Those are matters for the trial court
and we understand they have been scheduled in the trial court.

[3]

The motion to review the order of LaForme J.A. is dismissed.

[4]

We agree with the Crowns submission that the underlying appeal is moot.
The appeal is dismissed.

Doherty J.A.

K. van Rensburg J.A.

L.B. Roberts J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Ontario Corporation 1796926, 2016 ONCA 612

DATE: 20160804

DOCKET: M46522 (M46479)

Gillese J.A. (In Chambers)

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Responding Party

and

Ontario Corporation 1796926 c.o.b. Ontario
    Outdoor Recreational Alliance

Moving Party

Jonathan M. Poitras, for the moving party (by
    teleconference)

Sunny Zhai, for the responding party

Heard: July 29, 2016

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

Ontario Corporation 1796926 c.o.b. as Ontario Outdoor Recreational
    Alliance (OntORA) was convicted, by a justice of the peace, of offences under
    s. 28 of the
Public Lands Act
, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.43

(the
PLA
)
    and s. 10(1)(a) of the
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, 1997,
S.O.
    1997, c. 41 (the
FWCA
) .

[2]

OntORA unsuccessfully appealed the convictions.

[3]

OntORA wishes to now appeal to this court but cannot do so without
    leave.  Accordingly, it brings this motion for leave to appeal.

OVERVIEW

[4]

The following facts are drawn from the agreed statement of facts
    entered at trial, on the consent of the parties.

[5]

OntORA is an organization of concerned outdoors people from across
    Ontario who joined together because they believed the Ministry of Natural
    Resources and Forestry (the Ministry) has established abusive policies that
    set aside vast areas of Crown land and lakes for the exclusive use of paying
    tourists.

[6]

During the summer of 2011, OntORA organized a public protest to be held
    on August 20, 2011, in Foleyet.  The focus of the protest was to be the
    re-opening of the road/trail to Oswald Lake (the Lake), a designated tourism
    lake.  A tourist camp operates on the Lake, catering to fly-in tourists who
    seek a remote fishing experience.

[7]

In the 1970s and 1980s, roads were built west of the Lake to facilitate
    forestry operations.  Over the following thirty years, there were occasional
    problems with unauthorized roads built to the Lake.  When these roads came to
    the attention of the Ministry, signs were installed barring their use for
    motorized access to the Lake.  A berm was installed on one part of the
    road/trail in question to try and restrict traffic.  It naturally grew in over
    the years such that by 2010, the road/trail was used only by those travelling
    on foot or by ATVs.

[8]

Further, in 2010, Ministry staff decommissioned the last 400 meters of
    the road/trail by cutting trees and laying them across it.

[9]

The road/trail is located on Crown land under the
PLA
.

[10]

As mentioned, the focus of the public protest organised by OntORA for
    August 2011 was the re-opening of the road/trail.  The intention was to meet in
    Foleyet and then drive to the road/trail and clear it.

[11]

On August 20, 2011  the date of the protest  there were four Ministry signs
    prohibiting the use of vehicles to gain access to the Lake, two of which were located
    on the road/trail.

[12]

Following the public protest in Foleyet, a group of 20-25 men arrived at
    the road/trail as part of the protest.  For the most part, these men travelled
    on ATVs.  Using chainsaws, they removed the trees the Ministry had laid across
    the road/trail.  Some of the men then proceeded to the Lake where they
    symbolically cast fishing lines in the water.

[13]

As a result of these actions, OntORA was charged with occupying or using
    public lands or a road in contravention of a notice given under the
PLA
thereby
    committing an offence pursuant to s. 28(3) of the
PLA
.  It was also
    charged with trespass to property for the purpose of fishing, contrary to s. 10(1)(a)
    of the
FWCA
.

[14]

At the relevant times, ss. 28(1) and (3) of the
PLA
read as
    follows:

28.
(1)
The Ministry may give notice
    prohibiting, controlling or governing,

(a) the possession, occupation or any use or uses
    of public lands or roads under the jurisdiction of the Minister; or

(b) the parking of vehicles on public lands or the
    roads described in clause (a).
[1]

(3)  A person is guilty of an offence if the person
    possesses, occupies or uses any public lands or a road in contravention of a
    notice given under subsection (1) or parks a vehicle on public lands or a road
    in contravention of any such notice.

[15]

On September 10, 2014, Justice of the Peace T.A. Hodgins convicted OntORA
    of the offences.  Among other things, he found that the portion of the road/trail
    btween the berm and the Lake (which OntORA had used to access the Lake) was no
    longer a road but, in fact, a trail.  He made this finding based on the agreed
    statement of facts, the testimony of witnesses, and the videos of the trail.
    He found, given the berm preventing vehicular access and the growth of natural
    vegetation, that the trail/road could no longer be considered a road at the
    time of the offences.

[16]

OntORA appealed the convictions.

[17]

On August 4, 2015, Justice Boucher (the Appeal Court Judge) dismissed the
    appeal and upheld the convictions.

[18]

If granted leave to appeal, OntORA will argue that the lower court erred
    in finding that:

1.

the road/trail
    which OntORA used to access the Lake was not a road; and

2.

the Ministry
    could close the road or limit the publics right to access the road under s. 28
    of the
PLA
.

[19]

For the reasons that follow, leave is refused and the motion dismissed.

THE TEST FOR LEAVE

[20]

To obtain leave to appeal, OntORA must meet the requirements set out in
    ss. 131(1) and (2) of the
Provincial Offences Act
, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33.
Sections 131(1) and (2) read as follows:

131. (1) A defendant or the prosecutor or the
    Attorney General by way of intervention may appeal from the judgment of the
    court to the Court of Appeal, with leave of a judge of the Court of Appeal on
    special grounds, upon any question of law alone or as to sentence.

(2) No leave to appeal shall be granted under
    subsection (1) unless the judge of the Court of Appeal considers that in the
    particular circumstances of the case it is essential in the public interest or
    for the due administration of justice that leave be granted.

[21]

On a plain reading of ss. 131(1) and (2), the test for granting leave is
    stringent.  Thus, leave should be granted only sparingly.  Section 131(1)
    restricts leave to questions of law alone or as to sentence.  (Sentence is not
    in play in this matter so will not be referred to again.)  Further, s. 131(2)
    dictates that leave shall not be granted unless the court considers that it is
    essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

ANALYSIS

The First Proposed Ground
    of Appeal

[22]

The first proposed ground of appeal challenges the finding of the lower
    court that a part of the road/trail which OntORA had used to access the Lake
    was no longer a road but, instead, was a trail.  Arguably, this finding is a
    question of fact alone but, at its highest, it is a question of mixed fact and
    law.

[23]

As noted above, s. 131(1) limits leave to being granted on questions of
    law alone.  The first proposed ground of appeal is not a question of law alone.
    Consequently, leave must be refused on the first proposed ground of appeal.

[24]

In any event, this ground of appeal is of no moment.  Whether the signs
    were posted on a road or a trail does not matter because s. 28(1) applies to
    public lands as well as roads.  There can be no question that the
    road/trail is located on public lands.  The agreed statement of facts
    stipulates that the road/trail is located on Crown land under the
PLA
.

The Second Proposed Ground
    of Appeal

[25]

The second proposed ground of appeal challenges the lower courts
    determination that the Ministry had the right to close the road or limit the
    publics right to access it under s. 28 of the
PLA
.  If leave is
    granted, OntORA would argue that the Ministry did not have that power.  It
    would contend that the public was granted a right to public passage over the road
    and that those rights remain unless the road is closed under s. 52 of the
PLA
.
    OntORA says that the evidence is clear that the proper process was not
    followed.

[26]

Again, the second proposed ground of appeal does not appear to raise a
    question of law alone.  However, and in any event, to the extent that it raises
    a question of statutory interpretation, in my view, it is not a question whose
    resolution is essential in the public interest or for the due administration of
    justice.

[27]

In
Ontario (Labour) v. Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc.
, 2011 ONCA
    13, 328 D.L.R. (4th) 343, Watt J.A. explained, at para. 36:

Grounds of appeal that raise issues of statutory interpretation
    often have application beyond the factual idiosyncrasies of individual cases.
    But simply phrasing the proposed ground of appeal as a question of statutory
    interpretation is not an open sesame to leave to appeal. The subject-matter of
    the statute, as well as the nature and extent of its influence on our daily
    activities, is of importance. The influence of the statute must be such that
    its interpretation rises to the threshold of essential in the public interest
    or essentialfor the due administration of justice. [Citation omitted.]

[28]

This reasoning applies in the present case.

[29]

OntORAs conviction under s. 28 of the
PLA
was the result of a straightforward
    application of s. 28 that was not dependent on s. 52.  Section 28(1) empowered
    the Ministry to give notice prohibiting, controlling or governing the
    occupation or use of public lands or roads.  That notice was given in the form
    of posted signs on the road/trail.  The road/trail was public lands.  OntORA
    occupied and/or used the road/trail in contravention of the notice.  Therefore,
    it was guilty of an offence under s. 28(3).

[30]

On the record before me, the proposed appeal does not raise any issue
    significant enough that granting leave is essential in the public interest or
    for the due administration of justice, as required by s. 131.

DISPOSITION

[31]

For these reasons, the motion for leave to appeal is dismissed.

E.E.
    Gillese J.A.

[1]
The Appeal Court Judge erroneously quoted a prior version of s. 28(1) in his
    reasons.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Prosser, 2016 ONCA 617

DATE: 20160805

DOCKET: M46781 (C59645)

Weiler J.A. (In Chambers)

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Calvin Prosser

Applicant

David Butt, for the applicant

John Neander, for the respondent

Heard: August 4, 2016

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The applicant, a young man, seeks his release from custody pending the
    determination of his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
    Canada pursuant to s. 679(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code
.

[2]

On June 14, 2016, this court dismissed the applicants appeal against
    conviction for trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the
Controlled Drugs and
    Substances Act
and the following offences under the
Criminal Code
:
    possession of a loaded prohibited firearm (s. 95(1)), possession of a firearm
    without a licence (s. 92(2)), possession of proceeds of crime (s. 354(1)).
    While leave to appeal sentence was granted, the court also dismissed the appeal
    from sentence of two years and six months in the penitentiary. See
R. v.
    Prosser,
2016 ONCA 467.

[3]

The applicant submits that he meets the criteria for granting judicial
    interim release, namely, that the application for leave to appeal is not
    frivolous, that he will surrender himself into custody in accordance with the
    terms of the order granting his release and that his detention is not necessary
    in the public interest. In addition, the applicant points out that if his
    release is not granted, his application for leave to appeal will essentially be
    rendered moot because he will be eligible for parole on October 15, 2016, before
    the Supreme Court is likely to decide whether or not to grant leave. The Crown
    acknowledges that this is a factor to consider.

[4]

The Crown opposes the application primarily on the public interest
    ground. The Crown points out that during the eighteen month period the
    applicant was on bail pending his appeal to the Court of Appeal, he was charged
    with another offence not long before the hearing of his appeal. More
    importantly, where the conviction has already been affirmed on appeal and the
    first two grounds for granting release have been met, the court has factored
    into the public interest requirement the likelihood of leave being granted and
    the fact that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted sparingly. See
R.
    v. Drabinsky,
[2011] O.J. No. 4491 (C.A.) at para. 11, Doherty J.A. in
    chambers;
R. v. Fundi
[2012] O.J. No. 1556 (C.A.) at para. 14, Hoy
    J.A. in chambers.

[5]

In his application for leave to appeal, the applicant raises two grounds
    of appeal. They are: (1) whether police anecdotal opinion evidence provides
    reasonable and probable grounds necessary to issue a search warrant to enter a
    dwelling home, and 2) whether special advocates should be allowed to
    participate in a challenge to a redacted search warrant (step 6 of
R. v.
    Garofoli
, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421).

[6]

The applicant acknowledges that the second ground of appeal, which was
    not raised at trial, would not be sufficient to warrant granting judicial
    interim release. Having regard to
R. v. Reid,
[2016] O.J. No. 3554,
    2016 ONCA 524, and the similar factual background to this case, I agree.

[7]

In respect of the first ground of appeal, the applicant submits that the
    decision of this court conflicts with the decision of the Court of Appeal in
R.
    v. Le,
2014 B.C.C.A. 166.

[8]

The Crown acknowledges that there is a factual similarity between the
    two cases but submits this Court appropriately distinguished
Le
on the
    facts and that no conflict exists that would give rise to an issue of national
    importance. He submits that in all the circumstances the appellants prospect
    of obtaining leave is so remote that the public interest favours enforceability
    of this Courts decision and the application should be dismissed.

[9]

Both
Le
and
Prosser
involve a review of the
    sufficiency of a warrant to search a residence where the live issue is whether
    the information to obtain (ITO) has set out sufficient grounds that the items
    sought are at the residence. In
Le,
the court effectively agreed that
    the police cannot obtain a search warrant for a residence based on the
    proposition that, because the accused is trafficking in drugs, there must be
    drugs at his home. The
Prosser
court distinguished
Le
on the
    facts, one of which was that the confidential informants provided information
    that the appellant was in possession of a firearm and illicit substances at his
    apartment building, 45 Wynford Drive, in Toronto but did not give the exact
    apartment in which he resided. The police established that he resided in
    apartment 1409 based on information obtained from the superintendent of the
    building and located his car in the parking area. The court held at para. 17 of
    its reasons that, considering the ITO as a whole, the information was
    sufficient to establish a reasonably grounded belief that the evidence sought
    would be found in the place of the proposed search. It commented:

This information distinguishes this case from
Le
where
    the ITO contained no information that linked the drug dealing to the address of
    the accused, the premises police sought to search under the warrant.

[10]

However, the fourth and last reason the
Prosser
court gave for
    dismissing the appeal was that the issuing justice and reviewing judge were
    entitled to rely upon the opinion of the affiant as to the practices of drug
    dealers in connection with the storage of drugs and firearms.

[11]

Having regard to all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the
    appellant has shown that his continued detention pending the determination of
    his application for leave to appeal is not necessary in the public interest and
    I hereby grant the application on the terms submitted in the draft order.

[12]

I am indebted to counsel for their well-prepared and well-argued motion.

Karen M. Weiler J.A.


WARNING

The
President of the panel hearing this appeal directs that the following should be
attached to the file:

An
order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2),
(2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the
Criminal Code
shall continue.  These sections of
the Criminal Code
provide:

486.4(1)        Subject
to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing
that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be
published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in
proceedings in respect of

(a)      any of the
following offences;

(i)       an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160,
162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272,
273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or
347, or

(ii)      any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the
day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged
involves a violation of the complainants sexual integrity and that conduct
would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after
that day; or

(iii)      REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6,
2014 (Act, s. 49).

(b)      two
or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which
is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2)      In
proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b),
the presiding judge or justice shall

(a)      at the
first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen
years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b)      on
application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the
order.

(2.1) Subject to
subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence
referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the
presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information
that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or
broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other
than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age
of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to
make an application for the order; and

(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the
order.

(3)      In
proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice
shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a
witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the
subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes
child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in
any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(4)      An order made
under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information
in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of
the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s.
15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25,
ss. 22,48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18..

486.6(1)        Every
person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or
(3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary
conviction.

(2)      For greater certainty, an order referred to
in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against
any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document
or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could
identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is
protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v.
Shahbaz, 2016 ONCA 636

DATE: 20160819

DOCKET: C59065

Doherty, van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Muhammad Shahbaz

Appellant

Gregory Lafontaine, for the appellant

Brock Jones, for the respondent

Heard and released orally:  August 16, 2016

On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice E.R.
Tzimas of the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 14, 2013.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.  He had sexual
intercourse with the complainant when on any view the evidence she was very
drunk.  The appellant testified that the complainant consented to sexual
intercourse.  The complainant had no recollection of having had sex with the
appellant.

[2]

The trial proceeded before a judge sitting without a jury.  The outcome
turned entirely on the trial judges credibility assessments made in the
context of the Crowns burden to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

[3]

The trial judges reasons reveal a detailed and careful consideration of
the totality of the evidence and the various arguments advanced by the
defence.  The trial judge was clearly alive to the burden of proof on the Crown
and the arguments made by counsel.

[4]

The appellant testified through an interpreter.  There is no issue as to
the competence of the interpreter.  However, counsel submits that the trial
judge failed to take the fact that the appellant was testifying through an
interpreter into account in assessing the appellants credibility.  Counsel
focuses on two aspects of the trial judges reasons.

[5]

First, counsel submits that the trial judge should not have given
significant weight to an admission made by the appellant during his
cross-examination.  Counsel argues that the question eliciting the admission
was confusing and unclear.  He also argues that the appellants response was
entirely inconsistent with the rest of the appellants evidence demonstrating
that the appellant must have been confused by the question.

[6]

We disagree.  The question was not confusing on its face.  No issue was
raised at trial about the adequacy of the interpretation as it related to the
exchange in issue.  We cannot assume that the appellant was confused simply
because he gave a significantly incriminating response through an interpreter.  We
also note that this exchange was not the only incriminatory aspect of the appellants
evidence.

[7]

The appellants admission referred to above was far from the only
reason the trial judge gave for rejecting the appellants evidence.  His
evidence was replete with inconsistencies and the trial judge highlighted many
of these.

[8]

In addition to thoroughly addressing the appellants evidence, the trial
judge also explained at length her reasons for accepting the complainants
evidence.  Her evidence was confirmed in material respects.

[9]

Counsel also argues that the trial judge improperly found that the
appellant was feigning confusion when he attempted to resile from the
admission referred to above.  First of all, we understand the trial judges
reference to the appellant feigning confusion to be a reference to the
entirety of the appellants evidence and not a single answer (see para. 133 of
the trial judges reasons).  As trial counsel expressly acknowledged to the
trial judge in his submissions, it was for the trial judge to determine whether
the appellants apparent confusion at times during his cross-examination was
feigned or otherwise.  There is no basis upon which we can interfere with the
trial judges assessment.

[10]

The appeal is dismissed.

Doherty J.A.

K. van Rensburg J.A.

L.B. Roberts J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Tran, 2016 ONCA 638

DATE: 20160819

DOCKET: M46654 (C60204)

Watt, van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Jenny Tran

Applicant (Appellant)

Jenny Tran, acting in person

Holly Loubert, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: August 18, 2016

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

We are not persuaded that the material filed warrants an adjournment of
    the applicants motion to review the order of the chambers judge. The record
    reveals a robust history of last minute requests for adjournments on grounds
    not dissimilar to those advanced now. Ms. Tran is well familiar with the
    courts practice in connection with inmate and in person appeals. The
    application for an adjournment is dismissed.

[2]

The applicant, who is self-represented, seeks to set aside an order of
    the chambers judge made on June 16, 2016. By that order, the chambers judge:

i.

rejected the applicants request to direct the Crown to produce
    transcripts of further portions of the trial proceedings for use on the
    applicants in person appeal;

ii.

extended the applicants release pending appeal until the date scheduled
    for hearing, September 6, 2016; and

iii.

rejected the applicants request to adjourn the appeal from the date
    scheduled for hearing.

[3]

We see no reason to interfere with any aspect of the order made by the
    chambers judge.

[4]

First, the transcripts. As an inmate/in person appeal, the materials
    provided to the parties and the court do not include a complete transcript of
    trial proceedings. Indeed, the record in this case significantly exceeds the
    requirements of the applicable rule and includes the entirety of the
    applicants own evidence, the closing submissions of the applicant and the
    trial Crown and proceedings relating to several motions the applicant made at
    this lengthy trial.

[5]

The applicants submissions seem grounded on her assumption of two
    entitlements:

i.

that she is entitled to a trial transcript of the trial proceedings in
    their entirety, extending over some 70 days; and

ii.

that
    such entitlement is to be funded out of the public purse.

In both respects, she is wrong. Duty counsel and the
    Crown have collaborated in putting together a record that they deem adequate
    for appellate purposes. The Crown did not undertake, nor did any judge or panel
    of this court order a complete transcript of the proceedings for appellate
    purposes. We see no reason to accede to yet another of the applicants
    unremitting requests for more transcript.

[6]

Second, release pending appeal. The applicants current release terms
    were extended to the scheduled hearing date. Rather than surrender into custody
    at a jail, she is to surrender into custody by appearing before the panel who
    will hear her appeal. This is as it should be. As the chambers judge advised
    her, if her appeal is dismissed she will be required to surrender into custody
    to serve any unserved portion of any custodial sentence imposed upon her at
    trial.

[7]

Third, adjournment of the hearing date. As the chambers judge pointed
    out, the appeal record is complete. On a prior appearance before a panel of this
    court sitting in the inmate/in person stream, the hearing date of September 6,
    2016 was fixed. Failing an order for further transcript, an issue that has now
    been decided against the applicant, the hearing was to be marked peremptory to
    the applicant. That, too, is as it should be. Nothing she has added in her
    submissions today, whether considered individually or cumulatively with grounds
    previously advanced, persuades us to the contrary.

[8]

The application to review the order of the chambers judge is dismissed.

David Watt J.A.

K.M. van Rensburg J.A.

L.B. Roberts J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Wardle,
    2016 ONCA 640

DATE: 20160822

DOCKET: C61230

Doherty, van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Joshua Wardle

Appellant

Rodney Sellar, for the appellant

Rochelle Direnfeld, for the respondent

Heard:  August 19, 2016

On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice B. MacPhee
    of the Ontario Court of Justice, dated December 9, 2013.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellant concedes, correctly in our view, that leave to appeal can
    be granted in this case only if we are satisfied that the proposed grounds of
    appeal have substantial merit.  We allowed counsel to argue the merits in full.

[2]

However, we are not satisfied that there are strong arguments that the
    Summary Conviction Appeal Court fell into legal error.  In effect, counsel, in
    his oral submissions, invited this court to repeat the analysis performed by
    the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.  That is not our function.

[3]

Counsel did identify three alleged errors in the Summary Conviction
    Appeal Court judges reasons in his factum, but did not press these in oral
    argument.  In our view, those alleged errors would not justify leave to appeal.

[4]

Leave to appeal is refused.