COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Bennett Law Chambers Professional Corporation v. Zareh, 2013 ONCA 686

DATE: 20131108

DOCKET: M43035

Sharpe J.A. (In Chambers)

BETWEEN

In the
    matter of the
Solicitors Act
and

in the
    matter of section 47 of the

Legal
    Aid Regulation, 106-99

Bennett Law Chambers Professional Corporation

Solicitors (Respondents in Appeal)

and

Akbar Zareh, Kingsway Real Estate Brokerage and
    Maxcom Realty Inc.

Clients (Appellants)

Alexandrina  Valvova, for the appellants

J. Sebastian Winny, for the respondent

Heard: November 5, 2013

Motion for an extension of time to file a Notice of
    Appeal.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The moving parties seek an order extending the time to serve a Notice of
    Appeal from an order dismissing their motion to set aside an order for the
    assessment of the respondents bills under the
Solicitors Act
. The
    moving parties sought leave to appeal in the Divisional Court in a timely
    manner but the parties agree that the appeal lies to this court without leave
    as the order is final in nature.

[2]

It is common ground that the following factors are to be considered:

1)

whether the appellant formed an intention to appeal within the relevant
    period;

2)

the length of and explanation for the delay;

3)

any prejudice to the respondent;

4)

the merits of the appeal; and

5)

whether the justice of the case requires it.

[3]

See
Kefeli v. Centennial College of Applied Arts and Technology
(2002),
    23 C.P.C. (5th) 35 (Ont. C.A.);
Kirby v. Hope Place Centres,
[2013]
    ONCA 90, affd 2013 ONCA 459.

[4]

I am satisfied that consideration of the first three factors favours
    granting an extension. The appellants formed an intention to appeal within the
    relevant period and a reasonable explanation for the delay is offered. While
    the appeal would delay the respondent in its effort to collect legal fees,
    there would be no other prejudice.

[5]

With respect to the fourth and fifth factors, the respondent submits
    that the appeal lacks merit, and as RZCD are in a conflict of interest, the
    justice of the case weighs against granting the extension.

[6]

These two issues are intertwined. The legal issue raised is whether the
    respondent lacked authority to seek an assessment of legal fees for work done
    by Mr. Bennett. Mr. Bennett did most of the work for which fees are sought
    while a member of the RZCD Law Firm. That same law firm appears as counsel for
    the appellants and contends that the billings form part of RZCDs assets and
    that the respondents only recourse is against the firm, not the clients. Thus,
    while RZCD represents the appellants who resist payment of the fees, RZCD
    advances its own claim to the fees to defeat the claim of the respondent.

[7]

When RZCD moved on behalf of the appellant clients to set aside the
    notice for assessment, the respondent moved to have RZCD removed as solicitors
    of record on grounds of conflict of interest. RZCD requested an adjournment to
    consider obtaining outside counsel. The motion judge chose to deal with RZCDs
    motion on the merits. The motion judge observed that she found it somewhat
    disturbing to have the clients interests argued by Mr. Callahan, a partner in
    the RZCD law firm, whose invoices may be the subject of the assessment, but
    she refused the adjournment request and deferred any consideration of the
    respondents conflict motion.

[8]

The only relevant evidence as to the respondents authority was an
    Associate Agreement dated June 1, 2002. Although Mr. Bennett subsequently
    became a partner in the firm, no other agreement was produced. Article 5 of the
    agreement provides that in the event of termination, fees earned to the date of
    termination remain payable to the partnership and will be paid to the associate
    upon collection less any debts owing by the associate to the partnership. On
    the other hand, provisions in Article 7 provide that the associate shall
    receive 100% of fees billed, and that the associate assumes all responsibility
    for collection of unpaid accounts while the partnership shall take all
    reasonable steps to facilitate the said collection of unpaid accounts.

[9]

The motion judge concluded that the agreement was ambiguous and applied
    the
contra proferentem
principle against the law firm.

[10]

I
    turn first to the merits of the appeal. The Notice of Appeal is deficient. It
    repeats grounds formulated for the purposes of leave to appeal to the
    Divisional Court that have no application in this court. The remaining grounds
    are purely generic and fail to identify specific alleged errors in the order
    appealed from.

[11]

That
    said, it is my view that the interpretation of the Associate Agreement does
    raise an arguable legal issue. On the other hand, it would appear from the
    Associate Agreement that whether it is for the respondent or RZCD to claim the
    fees from the appellants, the respondent is ultimately entitled to 100% of the
    fees billed.

[12]

I
    turn finally to the justice of the case. My concern is that the appeal
    appears to be presented as if it raised an issue between the respondent and Mr.
    Bennetts former law partners who claim that the fees at issue belong to them. The
    appellants seem to serve as a proxy for RZCD in this dispute. There was no
    affidavit from the clients to support the motion to set aside the assessment
    and no evidence, apart from the Associate Agreement, as to the financial
    arrangements between Mr. Bennett and his former law firm. The position taken by
    RZCD in this matter is, as the motion judge put it, disturbing.

[13]

On
    the other hand, as I have noted, the appellant clients may have an arguable
    ground of appeal.

[14]

In
    these circumstances, I grant the motion for an extension of time to file the Notice
    of Appeal for fifteen days from the date of this endorsement, but add this: it
    is my view that it would greatly assist the proper and orderly presentation of
    this appeal if RZCD were to remove themselves as solicitors of record. That
    would ensure that if the appeal does proceed, any right of the appellant
    clients will not be confounded or confused by the participation of RZCD as
    counsel in a matter in which they appear to have, and to be advancing, their
    own personal interest.

[15]

I
    note that as this appeal falls into the hold-up category in relation to the
    assessment, it should be expedited in the usual way for such appeals.

[16]

In
    my view, this is not a case for costs.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Best v. Cox, 2013 ONCA 695

DATE: 20131114

DOCKET: M42922 & M42935 (C57123)

Feldman J.A. (In Chambers)

BETWEEN

Donald Best

Applicant (Appellant)

and

Richard Ivan Cox, Gerard Cox, Alan Cox, Philip
    Vernon Nicholls, Eric Ashby Bentham Deane, Owen Basil Keith Deane, Marjorie Ilma
    Knox, David Simmons, Elneth Kentish, Glyne Bannister, Glyne B. Bannister,
    Philip Greaves a.k.a. Philip Greaves, Gittens Clyde Turney, R.G. Mandeville
    & Co., Cottle, Catford & Co., Keble Worrell Ltd.,
Eric Iain Stewart Deane, Estate of Colin Deane
, Lee
    Deane, Errie Deane, Keith Deane, Malcolm Deane, Lionel Nurse, Leonard Nurse,
    Edward Bayley, Francis Deher, David Shorey, Owen Seymour Arthur, Mark Cummins,
    Graham Brown, Brian Edward Turner, G.S. Brown Associates Limited, Golf Barbados
    Inc.,
Kingsland Estates Limited
, Classic Investments Limited, Thornbrook
    International Consultants Inc., Thornbrook International Inc., S.B.G. Development
    Corporation, The Barbados Agricultural Credit Trust, Phoenix Artists Management
    Limited, David C. Shorey and Company, C. Shorey and Company Ltd.,
First Caribbean International Bank (Barbados) Ltd.
,
    Price Waterhouse Coopers (Barbados), Attorney General of Barbados, the Country
    of Barbados, and John Does 1-25, Philip Greaves, Estate of Vivian Gordon Lee
    Deane, David Thompson, Edmund Bayley, Peter Simmons, G.S. Brown and Associates
    Ltd., GBI Golf (Barbados) Inc., Owen Gordon Finlay Deane, Classic Investments
    Limited and Life of Barbados Limited c.o.b. as Life of Barbados Holdings, Life
    of Barbados Limited, David Carmichael Shorey,
PricewaterhouseCoopers East
    Caribbean Firm
, Veco Corporation, Commonwealth Construction Canada Ltd.,
    and Commonwealth Construction Inc.

Respondents (
Respondents
)

Paul Slansky, for the appellant

Robert Harrison and Gerald Ranking, for the respondent,
    PricewaterhouseCoopers East Caribbean Firm

William Burden and Lorne Silver, for the respondent, Kingsland
    Estates Limited

Heard: October 29, 2013

On appeal from the orders of Justice J. Bryan Shaughnessy
    of the Superior Court of Justice, dated January 15, 2009, and May 3, 2013.

Feldman J.A.:

[1]

Two motions were heard in the context of an appeal by Mr. Best from: a)
    a finding of civil contempt made against him by Shaughnessy J. on January 15,
    2009, the imposition of a fine of $7,500, and an order that he be incarcerated
    for three months unless he purges the contempt; and b) an order of May 3, 2013,
    where Shaughnessy J. dismissed an application to set aside the finding of
    contempt.

[2]

One motion was brought by Mr. Best for an order that counsel for each of
    the two respondents, PricewaterhouseCoopers East Caribbean Firm and Kingsland
    Estates Limited, be removed and prevented from arguing the appeal based on allegations
    of misconduct in the proceedings appealed from. Mr. Harrison and Mr. Burden
    argued this motion as the conduct of the other two counsel was being impugned. The
    second motion was brought by the two respondents for security for the costs of
    the appeal.

(1)

The Removal Motion

[3]

The appellant seeks to have the court remove counsel and their law firms
    from the record for alleged misconduct in the contempt proceedings and in the
    proceeding to set aside the contempt order. The allegations against the lawyers
    that are raised on this motion were raised and rejected by Shaughnessy J. in
    his May 3, 2013 ruling where he refused to withdraw the contempt order. All of
    the allegations and submissions made on this motion are also grounds of appeal
    on the main appeal.

[4]

The allegations relate primarily to the events surrounding the
    appellants failure to attend for examination as ordered and what he knew about
    the order requiring him to attend and when he knew about it. He alleges that
    counsel for the respondents deliberately misled the motion judge on what
    occurred. This was not only rejected by the motion judge, but he made it clear
    that his findings were based on the appellants own letters, recorded words and
    actions. The appellant also argues that the lawyers now have a conflict of
    interest as they now have an interest in protecting their own reputations which
    conflicts with their clients interest on the appeal. He also says that he
    intends to bring a fresh evidence motion where the respondents lawyers will be
    witnesses.

[5]

The appellant is effectively asking the court on the motion to make a
    preliminary determination that Shaughnessy J. erred in rejecting the
    allegations of misconduct, or that he may have erred or that it is arguable
    that he erred, and on that basis, to remove counsel at this stage.

[6]

Clearly that cannot be done. The record as it stands is that there was
    no misconduct. Shaughnessy J. stated repeatedly that the allegations were
    spurious and baseless. He was the case management judge over a period of
    several years. Considerable deference is owed to his findings. To the extent
    that the misconduct issue is relevant to the finding of contempt, it will be
    determined on the appeal. The conflict of interest allegation arises directly
    from and depends on the misconduct allegations.

[7]

No motion to introduce fresh evidence or to examine the respondents
    lawyers has been brought. I will therefore not comment on the likely outcome of
    such a motion.

[8]

This court has recently re-iterated the principle that a court will only
    in the rarest of cases grant a removal motion: see
Kaiser (Re)
, 2011
    ONCA 713, 205 O.A.C. 275 (Cronk J.A. in Chambers);
Manftoun v. Banitaba
,
    2012 ONCA 786, [2012] O.J. No.5376 (Weiler J.A. in Chambers). As Cronk J.A.
    stated in
Kaiser (Re)
, at para. 21:

As the motion judge properly noted, A litigant should not be
    deprived of counsel of its choice without good cause For this reason,
    Canadian courts exercise the highest level of restraint before interfering with
    a partys choice of counsel.  Where such discretionary, equitable relief is
    invoked, there must be a possibility of real mischief should a removal order be
    refused.  The test is whether a fair-minded and reasonably informed member of
    the public would conclude that counsels removal is necessary for the proper
    administration of justice  [Citations omitted.]

[9]

I am satisfied that a fair-minded and reasonably informed member of the
    public would not conclude that removal of respondents counsel is necessary for
    the proper administration of justice. The motion is therefore dismissed.

[10]

The
    appellant, through his counsel, has made serious allegations of deliberate
    misconduct against the two counsel for the respondents both in writing and in
    open court in the face of a finding to the contrary. In my view, that tactic
    requires the court to express its condemnation by awarding costs on the full
    indemnity scale. Costs are fixed in the amount of $24,000 for
    PricewaterhouseCoopers and $48,000 for Kingsland, all inclusive.

(2)

The Security for Costs Motion

[11]

The
    respondents move for security for costs of the appeal. In light of what they
    and the motion judge say is the egregious conduct of the appellant during this
    proceeding, all of which is discussed in detail by the motion judge, the
    respondents seek security for costs at the substantial indemnity level.

[12]

They
    rely on rules 61.06(1)(a) and (c), which provide:

In an appeal where it appears that,

(a) there is good reason to believe that the
    appeal is frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant has insufficient
    assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the appeal;  [or]

(c) for other good reason, security for costs
    should be ordered,

a judge of the appellate court, on motion by the
    respondent, may make such order for security for costs of the proceeding and of
    the appeal as is just.

[13]

Under
    subrule (a), the respondents say that the appeal is frivolous and vexatious.
    They point to the record and the careful findings of the motion judge that the
    appellant knew of the order requiring him to appear and did not do so, either
    on the ordered day or on a number of days thereafter when he was given further
    opportunities to do so. They also point to the detailed findings of the motion
    judge on the motion to set aside the contempt finding, that the appellant did
    not purge his contempt as he said he did, but lied to the court, and to the
    motion judges failure to accept the appellants apology because he found that
    it was not genuine.

[14]

The
    appellant says he is impecunious. That is sufficient for the second part of subrule
    (a). However, the respondents counsel submit that the appellant has been able
    to fund this litigation, indicating that he has access to funds and will be
    able to pay if costs are ordered as a condition of proceeding with the appeal.

[15]

In
    my view, there is a legal issue that arises on the facts of this case which is
    not frivolous. The issue relates to the penalty imposed for the contempt and
    the appellants ability at this stage to purge his contempt.

[16]

The
    appellant is the principal of the plaintiff in the action, Nelson Barbados Group
    Ltd. The action was dismissed in 2009 for lack of jurisdiction in Ontario.
    Prior to the dismissal, the plaintiff withdrew against several defendants
    including PricewaterhouseCoopers. The order of November 2, 2009, ordered the
    appellant to appear on November 17, 2009, at Victory Verbatim to answer
    questions the answers to which would be used by the court to determine and
    award the costs of the action. Some defendants were seeking costs against the
    appellant personally. The appellant did not appear and was found in contempt of
    the November 2, 2009 order.

[17]

Following
    the contempt finding against the appellant, the entire action and costs were
    settled with all defendants and the agreed costs were paid. Apparently it is
    not known who provided the funds to pay the costs, but the Minutes of
    Settlement provide that the costs agreed to are for the entire action. As a
    result, the action is over and the costs of the action have been paid.

[18]

In
    those circumstances, it is unclear to me on what basis the appellant could be
    required to now appear and answer questions in accordance with the original
    order. Counsel for the respondents advised this court, as they did Shaughnessy
    J., that they still need to find out information about the relationship between
    the appellant and the Barbados assets that were the subject of the action. They
    need the information for other litigation that was or is still being pursued
    against the defendants in other jurisdictions. It is not clear on what basis
    they can now obtain that information in the context of this contempt
    proceeding.

[19]

If
    there is an issue with the ability of the appellant to now purge his contempt,
    this may also raise an issue with respect to the enforceability of the penalty
    of incarceration at this stage.

[20]

As
    I have concluded that the appeal raises a legal issue that is not frivolous,
    and in addition involves the liberty of the subject, this is not a case where
    security would be ordered under either subrule (a) or (c). There should be no
    order for security for costs. The motion is therefore dismissed with costs of $25,000
    inclusive, payable in the cause.

K. Feldman J.A.


WARNING

THIS IS AN
    APPEAL UNDER THE

CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT

AND IS SUBJECT
    TO S. 45 OF THE ACT WHICH PROVIDES:

45.
    (7)
The court may make an order,

(a)     excluding
    a particular media representative from all or part of a hearing;

(b)     excluding
    all media representatives from all or a part of a hearing; or

(c)     prohibiting
    the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,

where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the
    media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as
    the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a
    participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

45.
    (8)
No person shall publish or make public
    information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a
    participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the childs parent
    or foster parent or a member of the childs family.

45.
    (9)
The court may make an order prohibiting
    the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person
    charged with an offence under this Part.

COURT OF APPEAL
    FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Children's Aid Society of Oxford
    County v. W.T.C, 2013 ONCA 637

DATE: 20131101

DOCKET: C55909

Hoy A.C.J.O., Feldman and Simmons JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Childrens Aid Society of Oxford County

Applicant
    (Respondent in Appeal)

and

W.T.C.

Respondent (Appellant in Appeal)

John
    Schuman and Rachel Healey, for the appellant

Lorne
    Glass, for the respondent

Katherine
    Kavassalis, for the Office of the Childrens Lawyer

Heard:
    July 4, 2013

On appeal from the order of Justice Johanne N. Morissette
    of the Superior Court of Justice, dated July 20, 2012 dismissing an appeal from
    the order of Justice Peter R. W. Isaacs of the Ontario Court of Justice, dated
    September 2, 2010.

By the Court:

[1]

In our decision of July 23, 2013, the court made two orders: an order
    for an additional assessment and an order requesting written submissions from
    the Attorney General in response to the Constitutional question raised by the
    appellant.

[2]

This court ordered that the Society provide a current assessment of the
    proposed adoptive parents, of the child, and of the birth mother for the
    purpose of determining what is in the childs current best interests. This was
    necessary at this stage of the process because of fresh evidence tendered by
    the Childrens Aid Society indicating that the proposed adoptive parents had
    separated since the time of the last adoption home study. Since the status
    review judges reasons made it clear that the stable, two-parent home provided
    by the proposed adoptive parents was a key factor in her decision to uphold the
    order for Crown wardship with no access, this court viewed the separation as a
    change in circumstances requiring further investigation.

[3]

On appeal to this court, the appellant mother indicated that if she were
    not awarded custody, she would request access to the child for both herself and
    for the appellants two siblings who are in her custody.

[4]

Further to the courts order, the parties agreed to name as the assessor
    Dr. N. Perlman, a well-qualified psychologist, and a further order was made
    appointing her to provide the assessment, initially within 30 days, then with a
    requested extension to October 9, 2013.

[5]

The court has now received the detailed report from Dr. N. Perlman. The
    report makes it clear that the child is thriving in the proposed adoptive
    family, and that she would continue to do so, despite the separation of the
    parents. Furthermore, the child suffered great emotional distress when she was
    transferred from her foster family to the proposed adoptive family. If she were
    to be moved again, the fear is that she would have great difficulty handling
    the change.

[6]

Following receipt of the report, the parties were allowed an opportunity
    to make written submissions based on the report.

[7]

In our view, it is clear from all the evidence, including the report of
    Dr. Perlman, that it is in the best interests of the child, L.H., for the court
    to dismiss the appeal of the mother and to allow the child to be adopted by the
    proposed adoptive parents. There is no basis on the record to find any error in
    the decision of the Superior Court appeal judge.

[8]

On the issue whether the appellant mother, sister and brother of L.H.
    could have access now to L.H., the proposed adoptive parents advised Dr.
    Perlman that they do not wish L.H. to have that relationship at this time (she
    is now six years old). Their reservation appears to relate to L.H.s past
    challenges in adapting to change. However, they also stated that when L.H. asks
    about her birth mother, they will then be prepared to allow contact. Dr.
    Perlman recommended that approach as the most appropriate for L.H. at this
    time, given that she does not know her birth mother. Although the mother
    challenges the basis for Dr. Perlmans conclusion on this issue, we accept her
    neutral assessment as in the present best interests of the child.

[9]

We observe that Dr. Perlmans report is positive about the birth mother.
    Based on the materials before us at this time, we see no reason that when L.H.
    is ready, she should not have contact with the appellant and with her two
    siblings.

[10]

In the
    result, the appeal from the decision making L.H. a Crown ward with no access is
    dismissed.

[11]

The second
    order of the court was a request for written submissions from the Attorney
    General of Ontario in response to the Constitutional question raised by the
    appellant alleging a breach of her
Charter
rights based on delay.
    Those submissions were received within 30 days, as requested. The court will
    reconvene on a date to be arranged, to hear any further submissions from all
    parties on the constitutional question.

[12]

Costs of
    the appeal will be determined at that time.

Released: AH November 1, 2013

A. Hoy A.C.J.O.

K. Feldman J.A.

J. Simmons J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Cumming v. Peterborough Police
    Association, 2013 ONCA 670

DATE: 20131104

DOCKET: C56906

Cronk, Rouleau and Tulloch JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Matthew Cumming

Plaintiff (Appellant)

and

Peterborough Police Association

Defendant (Respondent)

Richard Taylor, for the
    appellant

Caroline Jones and Debra
    Newell, for the respondent

Heard and released
    orally: October 18, 2013

On appeal from the order of
    Justice D.S. Gunsolus of the Superior Court of Justice, dated March 12, 2013.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellant police officer issued a claim against the respondent
    police association asserting that the association had breached its duty of fair
    representation.

[2]

The respondent brought a motion pursuant to rule 21.01(3)(a) of the
Rules
    of Civil Procedure
, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, for an order dismissing the
    claim on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction. Relying on this courts
    decision in
Renaud v. LaSalle (Town of) Police Assn.
(2006), 216
    O.A.C. 1 (C.A.), the motion judge concluded that because the claim was for
    breach of the duty of fair representation by a police association it fell
    within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator. As a result, the
    motion judge struck the claim for want of jurisdiction.

[3]

On appeal, the appellant argues in effect that we should overturn
Renaud
.
    As we indicated to counsel, this court is bound by
Renaud
. In order to
    reconsider it, the appellant needs to request that the Chief Justice strike a
    five-judge panel to consider whether
Renaud
remains good law. That was
    not done. As found by the motion judge,
Renaud
stands for the
    proposition that an alleged breach of a police associations duty of fair
    representation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator
    appointed pursuant to ss. 123 and 124 of the
Police Services Act
, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15
.
Renaud
,
    therefore, is a complete answer to the appellants appeal.

[4]

We would add that this collective agreement gives the respondent the
    exclusive power to bargain on behalf of the members, of which the appellant is
    one. The Supreme Court of Canada in
Canadian Merchant Service Guild v. Gagnon
,
    [1984] 1 S.C.R. 509, held that this type of exclusive power includes a
    corresponding obligation on the union of fair representation of all employees
    in the bargaining unit. We therefore reject the appellants submission that the
    duty of fair representation is not encompassed in this bargaining relationship.

[5]

For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

[6]

Costs are awarded to the respondent fixed in the amount of $5,000 plus
    H.S.T.

E.A.
    Cronk J.A.

Paul
    Rouleau J.A.

M.H. Tulloch J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Denomme v. McArthur, 2013 ONCA 694

DATE: 20131114

DOCKET: M43002 & M43003

Feldman J.A. (In Chambers)

BETWEEN

M43002

Kelly Jane Denomme

Applicant (Respondent)

and

Corey Wilson McArthur

Defendant (Appellant)

AND BETWEEN

M43003

Paul Denomme

Plaintiff (Respondent)

and

Kelly Jane Denomme

Defendant (Respondent)

and

Corey Wilson McArthur

Defendant (Appellant)

Anna Towlson, for the appellant, Corey Wilson McArthur

Robert K. Bickle, for the respondent, Kelly Jane Denomme

Clarke L. Melville, for the respondent, Paul Denomme

Heard: October 28, 2013

On appeal from the judgments of Justice Dale Parayeski of
    the Superior Court of Justice, dated May 21, 2013, with reasons reported at
    2013 ONSC 2834 and 2013 ONSC 2895.

Feldman J.A.:

[1]

This is a motion by the husband, Corey Wilson McArthur, for an extension
    of time to serve and file the notice of appeal in two actions: a matrimonial
    action involving issues of custody, access and financial matters; and an action
    by the wifes father, Paul Denomme, to assert and collect a debt from the
    husband and the wife, Kelly Jane Denomme.

[2]

The reasons in both actions were released on May 21, 2013. The husband
    instructed his lawyer to appeal both decisions and she advised the wifes
    lawyer of this intention during a chance meeting on June 3, 2013. At that time,
    the wifes lawyer advised that the husbands lawyer should be sure to comply
    with timelines as it would be difficult for her to obtain instructions for an
    extension. The notice of appeal was served one day late on June 21, 2013, as
    the husbands lawyer erred by not counting Victoria Day as part of the 30-day
    appeal period.

[3]

The husbands lawyer asked the wifes lawyer and the wifes fathers
    lawyer for an extension of time to file the notices of appeal. They asked for a
    letter explaining the delay and outlining the merits of the appeal. They then refused
    to consent to the extension.

[4]

The husband did not move immediately in this court for the extension.
    Instead, he sought a stay pending appeal from a Superior Court judge, which was
    first adjourned and ultimately adjourned
sine die
because there was
    not yet any appeal. He also applied to the trial judge to settle the terms of
    the order on the issue of access to the children, claiming that the reasons for
    judgment were internally inconsistent on the issue. The trial judge ultimately
    reaffirmed his finding that he was implementing the recommendation of the
    Office of the Childrens Lawyer that has the effect of somewhat reducing the
    fathers access time with the children.

[5]

The order was settled on August 9, 2013, and since that time, the three
    young children have been following the new access schedule, which was the one
    suggested by the report to the court from the Office of the Childrens lawyer.
    They have also started school. In an affidavit filed on the motion, the mother
    deposes that the children are thriving under the new schedule and the stability
    it provides.

[6]

The rest of the delay in bringing this motion was attributed to accommodating
    the holidays of all counsel.

[7]

The factors that a court considers in deciding whether to grant an
    extension of time to appeal are: 1) whether the appellant formed an intention
    to appeal within the relevant period; 2) the length of the delay and the
    explanation for it; 3) any prejudice to the respondent; 4) the merits of the
    appeal, and 5) whether the justice of the case requires that time be extended:
Rizzi
    v. Mavros
(2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 401 (C.A.), at para. 16. In a case
    involving children, the justice of the case is reflected in the best interests
    of the children:
Lombardi v. Mehnert
, [2009] O.J. No. 1715, 67 R.F.L.
    (6th) 167 (Ont. S.C.).

[8]

The husband did intend to appeal within the time limit. The delay was initially
    only one day, and the explanation was a counting error by the husbands lawyer.
    A one-day delay would not have caused any prejudice to the wife or to her
    father in his action. I also note that rules of professional conduct and
    civility generally require that counsel agree to reasonable requests from
    opposing counsel, including for extensions of time, so long as doing so would
    not prejudice the legitimate interests of the client: see Law Society of Upper
    Canada,
Rules of Professional Conduct
, rule 6.03(2) and related
    commentary; The Advocates Society,
Principles of Civility for Advocates
,
    principle 13.

[9]

The respondents on this motion submit that there is no merit to the
    appeals. The appeals appear to challenge the trial judges appreciation of the
    evidence and his factual conclusions.

[10]

As
    this court is required to accord a high degree of deference to a trial judges
    findings of fact, it is difficult to see the merit in the appeals. However, a
    party is entitled to appeal and should not be deprived of that entitlement
    where there is no real prejudice to the other side. That is the case with
    respect to the financial issues in the matrimonial action and the debt action.

[11]

However,
    the same cannot be said about the custody and access ruling by the trial judge.
    There has been a four-month delay altogether, and, since August 9, the children
    have been on an effective access schedule. They are thriving under the
    stability of that arrangement, which is the one that was recommended by the
    social worker from the Office of the Childrens Lawyer.

[12]

The
    husband disputes this. He says that the social worker intended her use of the
    October schedule as an example only and that in other months where the father
    has more off-work time, it was intended that he have more access time. This
    argument was made to the trial judge when they attended to settle the order. The
    trial judge disagreed. He understood the argument and the evidence of the
    social worker and he made his decision and his ruling. I see no basis for this
    court to intervene. And if circumstances change, the husband may apply for a
    variation.

[13]

In
    my view, the justice of the case does not call for an extension to be granted
    for the portion of the judgment that deals with custody and access.

[14]

An
    extension of time to November 20, 2013, is granted to the husband to file the
    notice of appeal in the debt action and to serve and file an amended notice of
    appeal in the matrimonial action to appeal only the financial orders.

[15]

Costs
    in the debt action are payable to the applicant husband in the amount of $5000
    inclusive of disbursements and HST. As success on the motion in the matrimonial
    action was divided, there shall be no order as to costs of that motion.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Detlor v. Brantford (City), 2013
    ONCA 688

DATE: 20131112

DOCKET: C53084

Doherty, Laskin and Simmons JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Aaron Detlor and The Haudenosaunee Development
    Institute

Applicants (Appellants)

and

Corporation of the City of Brantford

Respondent (Respondent)

BETWEEN

Hazel Hill

Applicant (Appellant)

and

Corporation of the City of Brantford

Respondent (Respondent)

BETWEEN

Ruby Montour and Floyd Montour

Applicants

and

Corporation of the City of Brantford

Respondent (Respondent)

Louis C. Sokolov and Jessica Orkin, for the appellants, Aaron
    Detlor, The Haudenosaunee Development Institute and Hazel Hill

Neal Smitheman, W. Thomas Barlow and Tracy A. Pratt, for
    the respondent, The Corporation of the City of Brantford

Michael Beggs, for the intervener the Attorney General
    of Canada

Heard: January 17, 2013

On appeal from the order of Justice Harrison S. Arrell of
    the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 19, 2010.

COSTS ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellants submit that success on the appeal was divided.
    Therefore, they submit that:

(a)

We should order no costs of the
    appeal; and

(b)

We should reduce the costs
    ordered by Arrell J. by $117,000.00  from $350,000.00 to $233,000.00. The
    appellants attribute the $117,000.00 to the by-laws application and the
    remaining $233,000.00 to the injunction motion.  Consistent with their position
    that there should be no costs of the appeal because success was divided, they
    say that no costs should be ordered for the by-laws application.

[2]

The City of Brantford contends that as we dismissed the appeal with
    minor modifications, it was the successful party on the appeal.  Therefore,
    Brantford submits that:

(a)

It is entitled to costs of the
    appeal on a partially indemnity basis.  It asks for $68,000.00; and

(b)

The costs ordered by Arrell J.
    should not be reduced.

Costs of the Appeal

[3]

We agree that Brantford was substantially successful on the appeal and
    is therefore entitled to costs of the appeal.  However, although we upheld
    almost all of the impugned provisions of the two by-laws, the appellants did
    obtain some limited relief.  We struck the ban on signs on the ground it
    infringed s. 2(b) of the
Charter
and could not be justified under s.
    1.  Further, Brantford conceded in oral argument that the prohibitions on the
    words request and invite in by-law 64-2008 could not be justified, and we
    struck those offending words from the by-laws.

[4]

Because the appellants did achieve modest success on the appeal, we
    think it appropriate to reduce the costs Brantford would otherwise be entitled
    to.  A fair and reasonable figure for the costs of the appeal is $25,000.00 all
    inclusive.

Costs before Arrell J.

[5]

Brantford was successful on the injunction motion, which was the main
    proceeding before Arrell J., and, in the light of our decision, almost, though
    not entirely successful, in resisting the appellants challenge to the two
    by-laws.  In these circumstances, we are not persuaded that we should reduce
    the costs ordered by Arrell J. in the exercise of his discretion.  His award
    seems fair and reasonable to us, even taking account of this Courts decision.
    Accordingly, we decline to disturb his award.

Doherty J.A.

John Laskin J.A.

Janet M.
    Simmsons J.A.


COUR DAPPEL DE LONTARIO

RÉFÉRENCE : Dezzou-Koulombo
    (Re) , 2013 ONCA 687

DATE : 20131113

DOSSIER : C56747

Les juges Weiler, Sharpe et
    Rouleau

DANS LAPPEL DE SIMON
    DEZZOU-KOULOMBO

UN APPEL EN VERTU DE LA
    PARTIE XX.1 DU CODE

Jean Richer,
amicus curiae,
pour
    lappelant

Robert Gattrell et Davin Garg, pour
    lintimé le Procureur général de lOntario

Michelle OBonsawin, pour lintimé le Centre
    de santé mentale dOttawa

Date de laudience: le 17 octobre 2013

En appel de la décision
    imposée par la Commission ontarienne dexamen en date du 7 décembre 2012.

Rouleau
    J.A. :

[1]

Lappelant fait appel de la revue annuelle datée
    du 7 décembre 2012. La Commission a conclu que la détention de lappelant dans
    un hôpital, sous réserve de modalités, continuait dêtre nécessaire.

[2]

Je note quil y a eu une décision subséquente de
    la Commission datée du 25 février 2013, suivie de motifs émis le 26 mars 2013.
    Bien que cette décision et ces motifs aient été inclus dans le dossier dappel
    soumis par la Couronne, aucune demande na été faite pour la réception de
    nouvelle preuve. Ainsi, la présente décision ne traite aucunement de cette décision
    subséquente de la Commission ou des incidents qui y sont rapportés. Je me limite
    à la revue annuelle du 7 décembre 2012 portée en appel et la situation
    factuelle telle quelle existait au moment où cette revue annuelle a été complétée.

[3]

Lappelant a fait lobjet dun verdict de
    non-responsabilité criminelle pour cause de troubles mentaux à la suite dune
    accusation dagression sexuelle. Cette accusation découle dun incident ayant
    eu lieu en 2007 où lappelant a frotté les fesses et saisi le vagin dune
    employée dans un magasin.

[4]

À la revue annuelle de lappelant en 2012, la
    Commission a conclu que si lappelant « ne faisait pas lobjet dune décision
    de la Commission, il arrêterait de prendre ses médicaments et représenterait
    alors un risque très important pour la collectivité. » Lexplication donnée par
    la Commission pour cette conclusion est que lappelant souffre dune « grave
    maladie mentale, dont il na absolument aucune conscience, et   quil a
    souffert dune importante décompensation durant la dernière année. Il a déclaré
    clairement ne pas souffrir de trouble mental et ne pas avoir besoin de prendre
    des médicaments. »

[5]

La Commission a donc ordonné la détention de
    lappelant, cette disposition étant nécessaire, « afin de permettre à lhôpital
    de choisir son lieu de résidence et de pouvoir lhospitaliser rapidement si
    cela savère nécessaire. »

[6]

Lappelant fait appel de la décision. Il prétend
    quil ne souffre pas de maladie mentale et quil devrait être libéré de la
    supervision de la Commission. Je rejette ce moyen dappel. À mon avis la
    conclusion de la Commission que lappelant souffre dune grave maladie mentale
    est conforme à la preuve présentée à laudience et aux avis des experts.

[7]

L
amicus
, par contre, présente un
    différent moyen dappel. L
amicus
prétend que les motifs de la
    Commission sont insuffisants. Il accepte, aux fins de lappel, que lappelant
    souffre de trouble mental et quil est fort possible que sil est libéré, il ne
    prendra pas ses médicaments et, par conséquent, il décompensera. Seul, le
    risque de décompensation néquivaut pas à un risque important pour la sécurité
    du public au sens de larticle 672.54 du
Code criminel
, L.R.C. 1985,
    c. C-46. La Commission doit expliquer comment le comportement de lappelant,
    lorsquil décompense, pourrait représenter un risque important pour la sécurité
    du public. L
amicus
prétend aussi quune étude détaillée du dossier ne
    mène pas à une telle conclusion.

[8]

Il incombe, dans tous les cas, aux intimés de
    prouver que lappelant représente un risque important, ce qui «signifie un
    risque véritable quun préjudice physique ou psychologique soit infligé aux
    membres de la collectivité, risque qui est grave dans le sens où le préjudice
    potentiel est plus quennuyeux ou insignifiant. La conduite préjudiciable doit
    être de nature criminelle.»
Winko c. Colombie-Britannique (Forensic
    Psychiatric Institute)
, [1999] 2 R.C.S. 625 au para. 62. De plus, le
    risque doit être étayé par la preuve, et les décisions de la Commission doivent
    être appuyées de motifs :
R. c. Owen
, 2003 CSC 33, [2003] R.C.S.
    779 au para. 46;
Centre de santé mentale de Penetanguishene c. Ontario
    (Procureur général)
, 2004 CSC 20, [2004] 1 R.C.S. 498 au para. 73.

[9]

Je suis davis que les motifs de la Commission sont
    entachés derreurs.

[10]

Notamment, le ouï-dire semble jouer un rôle
    important dans ce cas. Dans
Starson c. Swayze
, 2003 CSC 32, [2003] 1
    R.C.S. 722, au paragraphe 115, la Cour suprême du Canada a reconnu quune
    commission, dans ce cas la Commission du consentement et de la capacité,
    pourrait recevoir du ouï-dire et que « [l]e poids quil convient daccorder à
    une telle preuve est normalement une question qui est laissée à lappréciation
    de la Commission. » Par contre, la cour a ajouté la mise en garde que la
    Commission « doit éviter daccorder une importance trop grande à des éléments
    de preuve non corroborés et ne comportant pas suffisamment dindices de
    fiabilité  »
Ibid.

[11]

La Commission avait devant elle des rapports
    contenant du ouï-dire. Ces rapports indiquent que lappelant aurait été vu par
    quelquun dans le couloir de son appartement avec un couteau. Il aurait aussi
    été vu à parler seul à voix haute dans les corridors au point de rendre certaines
    personnes mal à laise et se serait comporté de façon inappropriée avec des
    résidents de lédifice où il demeurait. Les psychiatres semblent sappuyer sur
    ce ouï-dire  de sources non identifiées  pour conclure que lappelant, en
    état de décompensation, peut présenter «une désorganisation de son comportement,
    des comportements sexuels inadéquats ainsi quune altération de son jugement et
    de son autocritique.»

[12]

Par contre, les divers incidents dont les
    rapports font état ont été niés ou expliqués par lappelant dans son témoignage
    devant la Commission. De plus, il y avait de lappui pour les propos de
    lappelant. Les rapports de lhôpital indiquent que les voisins de lappelant,
    qui étaient la source du ouï-dire concernant certains incidents, sont quelque
    peu intolérants à son égard et « le taquinent et le provoquent. » La Commission
    na pas tranché les questions de crédibilité soulevées par lappelant dans son
    témoignage et les motifs de la Commission ne contiennent aucun commentaire
    concernant la fiabilité du ouï‑dire que les psychiatres citent à lappui
    de leur avis.

[13]

Il y avait certainement de la preuve au dossier
    qui démontrait que le comportement de lappelant, quand il décompense, peut
    être perçu comme troublant, agressif et alarmant. Ceci ne constitue pas
    nécessairement une conduite de nature criminelle qui comporte un risque
    important pour la sécurité du public.

[14]

La Commission doit évaluer le comportement
    parfois dérangeant de lappelant dans le contexte entier que présente le
    dossier. Lappelant na commis quune seule infraction, linfraction initiale
    dagression sexuelle en 2007 où la poursuite a élu de procéder par voie
    sommaire. Lappelant na aucun casier judiciaire et aucune accusation na été
    portée contre lui depuis 2007 malgré le fait quil a vécu dans la communauté
    pour une bonne portion de cette période. Les résultats du test de dangerosité
    HCR-20 démontrent quil était à faible risque lorsquil a été admis en 2007.
    Depuis ses résultats sont passés de 11 à 7 indiquant un risque encore plus bas.

[15]

De plus, le «risque pour la société» que
    présentait M. Dezzou-Koulombo est passé, dans lévaluation des psychiatres, d«
    un risque important » dans leur rapport du 10 janvier 2012 à « un risque » tout
    court dans le rapport qui était devant la Commission lors de la revue annuelle
    du 7 décembre 2012. Ce changement est remarquable parce que le paragraphe qui
    le contient, et qui constitue l« Évaluation des risques dans la communauté »,
    est autrement quasi-identique entre les deux rapports des psychiatres.  La
    conclusion des psychiatres que M. Dezzou-Koulombo demeure «
un risque pour la société
»
    ne répond pas aux exigences de larticle 672.54 du
Code criminel
, qui
    prévoit «
un risque
    important pour la sécurité du public
», comme je lavais indiqué
    ci-haut et tel quexpliqué dans les arrêts
Penetanguishene
et
Winko
.

[16]

Dans ses motifs, la Commission indique que: « En
    se fondant sur la preuve présentée, la Commission na eu aucune difficulté à en
    arriver à la conclusion unanime que [lappelant] représentait toujours
un risque important pour la
    collectivité
». Ces motifs nexpliquent toutefois pas comment la
    Commission a conclu que le risque était « important », étant donné que le
    rapport des psychiatres devant la Commission en décembre 2012 ne le qualifiait
    plus ainsi.

[17]

En lespèce, les motifs sont insuffisants pour démontrer
    que la Commission a tenu compte de toute la preuve et pour expliquer pourquoi
    la Commission a rejeté le témoignage de lappelant et a accepté le ouï-dire de
    sources non identifiées. Lappelant et cette cour sont laissés dans le doute
    quant à la raison pour laquelle la Commission a conclu quil posait un tel
    risque :
R. c. Sheppard
, 2002 CSC 26,

[2002] 1
    R.C.S. 869 au para. 55.

[18]

Ceci dit, et malgré lexcellente présentation faite
    par l
amicus
, je ne suis pas en mesure de conclure quil ny avait pas
    suffisamment de preuve devant la Commission pour conclure que lappelant pourrait
    représenter un risque important pour la sécurité du public. Lincident original
    en 2007 était sérieux et le témoignage des psychiatres démontre que ceux-ci
    considèrent que lappelant demeure un risque pour la collectivité. Cest à la
    Commission dévaluer cette preuve ainsi que les autres éléments de preuve pour
    déterminer le niveau de risque. Cependant, lévaluation doit aussi tenir compte
    de preuves contraires. Les motifs doivent expliquer le raisonnement de la
    Commission.

[19]

Pour ces motifs, jordonnerais que la Commission
    soit convoquée pour décider de nouveau la cause en suivant les dires des arrêts
Penetanguishene
et
Winko
, et pour expliquer ses résultats en
    respectant larrêt
Sheppard.

Je note
    que le prochain examen annuel est prévu pour le 28 novembre 2013. La Commission
    pourrait rendre la décision requise par la présente ordonnance en conjonction
    avec cet examen annuel déjà prévu.

« Paul
    Rouleau j.c.a. »

« Je
    souscris K.M. Weiler j.c.a »

« Je
    souscris Robert J. Sharpe j.c.a. »

Rendu : le 13 novembre 2013