COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
Carfrae Estates
    Limited v. 2108790 Ontario Inc., 2012 ONCA 489

DATE: 20120709

DOCKET: C54235

OConnor A.C.J.O., MacPherson and Rouleau JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Carfrae Estates Limited and Cornerstone
    Properties Inc.

Plaintiffs (Appellants)

and

2108790 Ontario Inc.
and 1510232 Ontario Inc.

Defendants (Respondent)

F. Scott Turton, for the appellants

David R. Rothwell, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: July 6, 2012

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Gregory M. Mulligan
    of the Superior Court of Justice, dated July 22, 2011.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellants Carfrae Estates Limited and Cornerstone Properties Inc.
    appeal from the Judgment of Mulligan J. of the Superior Court of Justice dated
    July 22, 2011. In the Judgment, the trial judge dismissed the appellants
    action in which they sought an order discharging a debenture now owned by the
    respondent 2108790 Ontario Inc. on the basis that the debenture is
    unenforceable because any enforcement action is now outside the relevant limitation
    period.

[2]

Carfrae is a successor corporation to the company that granted a
    debenture to the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce on October 9, 1979. CIBC
    demanded payment of the debenture from Carfrae on November 15, 1984. However,
    CIBC never brought an action to enforce the debenture and never took possession
    of the land. Twenty-two years later, on October 31, 2006, CIBC assigned the
    debenture to the respondent.

[3]

The appellants brought an action seeking an order discharging the
    debenture from the land registry on the basis of ss. 4 and 15 of the
Limitations
    Act
, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, which provide:

4.       No person shall make an entry or distress,
    or bring an action     to recover any land or rent, but
within ten years
next after the        time at which the right to make such entry or distress,
    or to      bring such action, first accrued....

. . .

15.
At the determination of the period
    limited by this Act
to any        person for making an entry or distress
    or bringing any action,
the right and title of such person to the
    land
or rent, for the        recovery whereof such entry, distress or
    action, respectively,          might have been made or brought with such
    period,
is

extinguished
.         [Emphasis added.]

[4]

The trial judge held that these provisions
prima facie
applied
    to this case. He said:

The debenture between Carfrae and the CIBC was a floating
    debenture which did not require any payments until demand. The demand was
    issued on November 15, 1984.

This issue was canvassed in
McVan

supra
. As
    Cronk J.A. stated at para. 19:

This court determined in
King v. Flannigan
, [1944]
    O.R. 537 (C.A.) and
Andre v. Valade
,
    [1944] O.R. 257 (C.A.), that a

mortgagees right to claim possession of mortgaged land accrues
    upon the first default in payment of interest and that the ten-year limitation
    period established by s. 4 of the
Act
runs from that time.

The debenture having been demanded on November 15, 1984 I am
    satisfied that the limitation period would have expired on November 16, 1994
    ten years after the demand subject to my ruling which follows with respect to
    Carfraes conduct.

[5]

Turning to Carfraes conduct, the trial judge discussed three factors
    Carfraes long delay in seeking the relief claimed in its action, Carfraes
    lengthy dissolution and the circumstances surrounding its revival, and
    Carfraes previous (1985) fraudulent conduct with respect to the debenture.
    Following this discussion, he concluded:

When all of these circumstances are weighed I am satisfied that
    it would be an injustice to allow the plaintiff to succeed on its argument that
    the
Limitations Act
ought to defeat the registered debenture. The
    plaintiffs claim is therefore dismissed.

[6]

The appellants contend that the trial judge erred in reaching this
    conclusion. We agree with the appellants position, essentially for two
    reasons.

[7]

First, the trial judge erred in determining the case on issues not
    pleaded or argued. The respondent defended the action on at least four
    different bases; an argument advancing equitable considerations as a ground for
    refusing to apply a statutory limitation period was not one of these grounds.
    Indeed, during closing submissions in response to a question from the trial
    judge, the respondents counsel explicitly disclaimed reliance on equitable
    arguments.

[8]

In a series of decisions in the last decade, this court has made it
    clear that a trial judge should not step outside the pleadings and the case as
    developed by the parties: see, for example,
Rodaro v. Royal Bank of Canada
(2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 74;
A-C-H International Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada
(2005), 254 D.L.R. (4
th
) 327; and
TSP-INTL Limited v. Mills
(2006) 212 OAC 66. The trial judges decision in this case did not comply with
    these authorities.

[9]

Second, we do not think that equitable considerations can trump the
    clear language of the
Limitations Act
. Section 4 of the
Act
establishes a ten-year limitation period; s. 15 states a clear effect  if,
    after ten years, an action has not been commenced, the right and title of such
    person to the land ... is extinguished.

[10]

An
    example of the application of these sections is
McVan General Contracting
    Ltd. v. Arthur
(2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 240 (C.A.). In that case, on a motion
    by the chargee under Rule 21, the motion judge held that the chargees action
    for payment and possession, and power of sale, were barred by ss. 4 and 15. The
    motion judge discharged the charge and directed that it be deleted from title.
    This court affirmed the motion judges decision. Cronk J.A. stated, at para. 29,
    that the
Limitations Act
evidences an intention to establish a
    uniform ten-year limitation period for remedies under charges or mortgages.
    The relief requested by the appellants in their action in this case is the same
    as that awarded in
McVan
, namely, an order discharging the debenture
    and deleting it from title.

[11]

The
    appeal is allowed. Judgment is granted in favour of the plaintiffs. It is ordered
    that the debenture is discharged and that it be deleted from the land registry.
    The defendants counterclaim is dismissed.

[12]

The
    appellants are entitled to their costs of the appeal and the action below,
    fixed at $15,000 and $33,000, respectively, inclusive of disbursements and
    applicable taxes.

D.
    OConnor A.C.J.O.

J.C. MacPherson J.A.

Paul Rouleau J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
Cinar v. Cinar, 2012
    ONCA 507

DATE: 20120719

DOCKET: C53772

Simmons, Juriansz and Hoy JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Omer Cinar

Appellant

and

Sebahat Cinar

Respondent

Will Hutcheson, for the appellant

Shmuel Z. Stern, for the respondent

Heard and endorsed: July 16, 2012

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Nancy L. Backhouse
    of the Superior Court of Justice, dated April 27, 2011.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1]

In oral argument on appeal, the appellant advanced two arguments.

[2]

First, that the amount of spousal support paid prior to the trial date
    far exceeds the amount that would have been appropriate under the Spousal
    Support Advisory Guidelines. (Ottawa, Department of Justice, 2008).

[3]

We do not accept this argument. The financial
    arrangement prior to trial under a temporary order was initially that the
    husband would pay $700 per month on account of spousal support and $500 per
    month on account of child support. In addition, the husband was to pay the
    mortgage, house insurance and property taxes in relation to the matrimonial
    home and receive a credit for one half of the mortgage payments to be paid from
    the equalization payment. The wife was to pay all other expenses in relation to
    the matrimonial home.

[4]

However, under a subsequent temporary order this
    arrangement was changed. Effective as of the date of the first order, the
    appellant was no longer required to pay spousal support and he was no longer to
    receive a credit for mortgage payments paid. In addition, he was to receive,
    and did receive, a credit for spousal support payments actually paid.

[5]

At trial, the only issue that appears to have
    been raised in relation to the pre-trial financial arrangements is occupation
    rent. The trial judge rejected this claim. Given that the financial
    arrangements prior to trial appear to have been crafted to permit the wife and
    child to remain in the home and that the husband did not earlier request an
    order for sale of the matrimonial home, in our view, it was well within the
    discretion of the trial judge not to revisit the arrangements that were put in
    place prior to trial. At trial, the trial judge found that neither of the
    parties was credible and imputed income to both parties. In these circumstances
    it would have been next to impossible to disentangle the financial arrangements
    made prior to trial.

[6]

The appellant's second argument is that the
    trial judge erred by failing to ensure that the respondent had a Turkish
    interpreter. We are not persuaded that the failure to have a Turkish interpreter
    gave rise to a miscarriage of justice. Both parties were represented by counsel
    at trial. Neither counsel raised the issue at trial; nor did the trial judge. Based
    on our review of the transcript, the respondent sought and obtained
    clarification when she did not understand words or concepts. We would not give
    effect to this ground of appeal.

[7]

The appeal is therefore dismissed.

[8]

Costs of the appeal will be to the respondent on
    a partial indemnity scale fixed in the amount of $6,000 inclusive of
    disbursements and applicable taxes.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
Crosbie v. Crosbie, 2012 ONCA 516

DATE:
    20120726
DOCKET: C54415

Simmons, Juriansz and Epstein JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Michelle Ernestine Crosbie

Applicant (Respondent in appeal)

and

Stephen Mark Crosbie

Respondent (Appellant)

Maurice W. Pilon, for the appellant

Jeffrey R. Robles, for the respondent

Heard: July 18, 2012

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Peter Z. Magda of
    the Superior Court of Justice, dated September 15, 2011.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellant father,
Mr. Crosbie, appeals an
    order that he pay the following: (1) child support arrears plus interest on
    those arrears in the amount of $49,650.78, (2) child support adjusted
    retroactively to start January 1, 2005  by an amount that would add $37,063.20
    to the arrears, (3) ongoing monthly child support of $611.00 commencing January
    1, 2010 based on imputed income of $66,131.00, (4) 43% of section 7 expenses,
    and (5) costs in the amount of $30,428.06 to the respondent mother, Ms.
    Crosbie.

[2]

The parties only child was born in 1990. The
    parties separated in 1993. Ms. Crosbie returned to Canada from Jamaica while
    Mr. Crosbie remained. The original child support order, made in 1995, ordered
    Mr. Crosbie to pay monthly child support of $300. He made no payments under
    this order until after his return to Canada in late 1999.  From April 2000
    until June 2008, when the child turned 18 and left school, Mr. Crosbie paid
    $300 monthly.

[3]

On October 7, 2009, Mr. Crosbie brought an
    application: (1) to change his child support obligations retroactively from
    July 2008 to May 2009 by an amount that would yield a balance owing of $1,489,
    (2) to establish his support payments from May 2009 based on an imputed annual
    income of $38,000 plus an additional $1,000 per year for extraordinary
    expenses, and (3) to fix arrears at $8,400 with all interest forgiven.

[4]

Ms. Crosbie opposed the application and brought
    a cross-application:  (1) for payment of arrears of $25,489.00 plus accrued
    interest of $24,161.78 for a total of $49,650.78, (2) for increased child
    support from January 1, 2005 of $27,892, (3) for payment of section 7 expenses
    of $1,604, and (4) for a tax gross-up on arrears to March 2000 of $3,360.

[5]

The application judge dismissed Mr. Crosbies
    application and granted the relief requested by Ms. Crosbie.  Mr. Crosbie
    appeals.

[6]

For the reasons that follow, the appeal is
    allowed, in part.

(1)

Mr. Crosbies claims for relief

[7]

The dismissal of Mr. Crosbies application to change
    his child support obligations was based on the motion judge conclusion that
    Mr. Crosbie had not established that a change in child support was warranted. This
    conclusion was available to the application judge on this record and we see no
    reason to interfere.
It is unfortunate that the application judge did
    not acknowledge the need to reconsider support in the light of the coming into
    force of the 1997
Child Support Guidelines
.
    However, there is no evidence to sustain the conclusion that consideration of
    the
Guidelines

would have
    assisted Mr. Crosbies arguments concerning child support.

[8]

In considering Mr. Crosbies request that
    arrears be rescinded, the application judge

made
    the following findings, supported by the evidence:  that Mr. Crosbie earned
    income in Jamaica, that his efforts to seek a change were delayed, that paying
    the arrears would not cause him to suffer undue hardship, and that his son was
    in need of support. The application judges conclusion not to rescind the
    support arrears involved an application of the analysis recommended in
DiFrancesco
    v. Couto
(2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 363 (C.A.)
to
    those facts.
There is no reason to interfere.

[9]

We are concerned however about the application
    judges failure to exercise his discretion to relieve Mr. Crosbie of the
    obligation to pay interest at the rate of 10% on the arrears from 1995 onwards.

[10]

The statutory post-judgment interest rate should
    apply unless there are compelling and exceptional reasons to change the
    interest rate:
Robert McAlpine Ltd. v. Byrne Glass Enterprises Ltd.
,
    116 A.C.W.S. (3d) 441 (Ont. C.A.), [2001] O.J. No. 3208.

[11]

The statutory post-judgment rate of interest when
    the order was made in 1995 was 10%. It has steadily fallen since then and is
    now 3%.

[12]

In our view, the application judge erred in
    failing to view the dramatic decline in interest rates since 1995, combined
    with the extensive passage of time during which arrears have accumulated, as
    amounting to exceptional and compelling circumstances warranting a change in
    the rate of post-judgment interest:  see

MacKinnon v. Duffy
(2000), 10 R.F.L. (5th) 336 (Ont. S.C.).  Allowing arrears to
    continue to attract an interest rate of 10% would be unfair to Mr. Crosbie and
    provide an excessive return to Ms. Crosbie but might also be perceived as an
    incentive for a party in Ms. Crosbies position to delay enforcement.

[13]

We would set aside the amount of interest on the
    arrears established by the application judge and replace it with an amount
    calculated on the basis of the average rate of post-judgment interest between
    the date of the 1995 order and the order under appeal.

(2)

Ms. Crosbies claims for relief

[14]

Mr.
    Crosbie challenges the application judges decision to grant the relief sought
    by Ms. Crosbie on the following bases:

1.    The
    application judge erred in failing to consider Ms. Crosbies delay in pursuing
    child support claims;

2.    The
    application judge erred in awarding an increase in child support that was made
    retroactive for five years from the date of notice
;
and

3.    The
    application judge erred in his analysis of Mr. Crosbies income.

[15]

While
    the payees delay is a valid consideration, it is mitigated in these
    circumstances by the fact that during the period of non-payment, Mr. Crosbie
    was in Jamaica and Ms. Crosbie was in Canada.  The challenges of pursuing
    collection of child support in these circumstances are obvious.

[16]

Retroactive
    increases in child support should be limited to three years except where there
    is a finding of disreputable conduct by the payor spouse:
D.B.S. v. S.R.G
.
, 2006 SCC 37, [2006]
    2 S.C.R. 231.
Such conduct is implicit in the finding at para. 21 that
    Mr. Crosbie threatened Ms. Crosbie to try to prevent her from re-opening the
    issue of child support. Again, we see no basis to interfere.

[17]

Central to the relief sought by both parties, was Mr. Crosbies
    income from 2005 to 2011. Unfortunately, the evidence relevant to this issue
    was unsatisfactory, as noted by the application judge when he commented that
    Mr. Crosbie provided no documentary proof whatsoever of his income or that of
    his spouse, and rejected the only evidence Mr. Crosbie did proffer  his
    testimony.

[18]

Section
    19(1) of the
Guidelines
provides that the court may impute such amount
    of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances.  These
    circumstances include where the spouse has failed to provide income information
    when under a legal obligation to do so.

[19]

The
application judge arrived at an income
    figure for Mr. Crosbie based on the information the parties provided, primarily
    being Ms. Crosbies reconstruction of Mr. Crosbies gross income. While, the
    important task of imputing income is extremely difficult, the reasons should
    demonstrate that, notwithstanding the paucity of evidence, some degree of rigor
    has been applied in arriving at the amount. Here, g
iven Mr. Crosbie was
    self-employed, the application judge should have indicated that he took other
    factors into account such as legitimate business expenses and taxable and
    non-taxable benefits.

[20]

That said, Mr. Crosbie failed to provide evidence to support the
    business expenses he now argues the application judge should have taken into
    account. The application judge used the information the parties provided him to
    arrive at an amount of imputed income. A payor such as Mr. Crosbie, who does
    not disclose income information as required runs the risk that income will be
    attributed to him  accurately or otherwise. The application judges decision
    is entitled to deference. We would not interfere.

[21]

For these reasons, Mr. Crosbies appeal of the relief granted Ms.
    Crosbie in her cross-application, is dismissed.

(3)

Motion to Adduce Fresh Evidence

[22]

Finally,
Mr. Crosbies
    motion to introduce fresh evidence relating to his income for 2008 and 2010 in
    the form of CRA reassessments, is dismissed as the proposed evidence satisfies
    none of the requirements of the test established in
R
. v. Palmer,

[1980] 1 S.C.R. 759
[1]
.
    While the reassessments were from 2012, after the hearing of this application,
    Mr. Crosbie gave no explanation for his failure to produce the income
    documentation he had at the time of the hearing. Further, given the nature of
    Mr. Crosbies business, as noted, we are not persuaded that this proposed
    evidence would have affected the result.

(4)

Consent Amendment

[23]

The parties agree that para. 24 3. of the reasons contains an
    error in the date for the commencement of increased child support.  To avoid
    double-counting, the paragraph should provide that [o]ngoing child support
    payable by [Mr. Crosbie] to [Ms. Crosbie] shall be $611 per month from
    September 1, 2011,  , and the parties have consented to a variation of the
    judgment, accordingly.

(5)

Disposition

[24]

The
    appeal is, therefore, allowed, in part.  The judgment will be varied in accordance
    with these reasons.

[25]

While
    success has been divided, Ms. Crosbie was, for the most part, successful and is
    therefore entitled to her costs.  We would fix those costs in the amount of $3,000
    inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

Janet
    Simmons J.A.

Russell Juriansz
    J.A.

Gloria
    Epstein J.A.

[1]

In civil cases, this court has used two different tests to
    determine the admissibility of fresh evidence  the
Palmer
test (used in criminal cases) and the test established in
Sengmueller
    v. Sengmueller
(1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 208 (C.A.):

Chiang
    (Re),
2009 ONCA 3, 93 O.R. (3d) 483 at paras. 72-77.   As
    the evidence in this case does not meet either test, it is unnecessary that we
    decide which is correct.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
Davydov v. Kondrasheva, 2012 ONCA 488

DATE: 20120706

DOCKET: C55040

OConnor A.C.J.O., MacPherson and Rouleau JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Igor Davydov

Appellant (Respondent)

and

Marianna Kondrasheva

Respondent (Applicant)

Igor Davydov, in person

Alexandra Abramian and Brigitta Tseitlin, for the
    respondent

Heard: July 4, 2012

On appeal from the order of Justice John P.L. McDermot of
    the Superior Court of Justice, dated January 27, 2012.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

This is an appeal from the motion judges
    order finding the appellant in contempt of a non-dissipation order issued in a
    matrimonial proceeding.  Non-dissipation orders find their origin in sections
    12 and 40 of the
Family Law Act
,
RSO 1990, c F.3.

[2]

Section 12
provides as follows:

In an application under section 7 or 10, if the court considers
    it necessary for the protection of the other spouses interests under this
    Part, the court may make an interim or final order,

(a) restraining the depletion of a
    spouses property; and

(b) for the possession, delivering up,
    safekeeping and preservation of the property.

[3]

Section 40 provides that:

The court may, on application, make an interim or final order
    restraining the depletion of a spouses property that would impair or defeat a
    claim under this part.

[4]

The appellant was born in Russia and, after
    spending two years in Israel, immigrated to Canada in 1993.  The parties were
    married in Russia in October 2005 and separated in early 2011.

[5]

An application for relief under the
Family Law Act
issued on March 16, 2011.  On March 23, 2011, the applicant and her
    counsel attended before McGee J. in order to obtain a number of orders
    including exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, spousal support of
    $5,000 per month and an order that the respondent pay all expenses on the
    home.  McGee J. dismissed the motion for lack of notice but made an order that
    neither party is to dissipate assets until further order or written
    agreement.

[6]

The respondent brought a motion for contempt of the
    non-dissipation order of Justice McGee.  The motion judge gave the Appellant 60
    days to purge his contempt by payment of $723,999.12.

[7]

In response to the motion for contempt, the
    appellant conceded that he was aware that a non-dissipation order had been made
    and that, after the order was made, he transferred $780,502.73 to an account in
    Cyprus.  The appellant explained that these funds were used to partially repay
    a legitimate debt he had incurred prior to the date of separation.  In his
    affidavit filed on the motion, he stated that his counsel had not discussed
    with him nor did he understand the nature and effect of the non-dissipation
    order.  He admitted to using the moneys to pay debts and acknowledged this
    may have breached the non-dissipation order.  He went on to state that,

At the time I did not understand the nature and effect of that
    provision of the order and I did not knowingly believe that by paying these
    debts, which I really considered to be a debit and credit transaction, meant
    that I was breaching the order.  As I have earlier indicated, I did not think
    this would make a difference in the equalization of our net family properties
    because the debts I was paying were incurred prior to the date of separation
    and would be considered in the final equalization.

[8]

As to the timing of the payment, he indicated that
    the creditor,

began to push me very hard for repayment when she learned about
    my separation and my stock market losses  she is Russian and Russians deal
    with disputes differently than do Canadians.  Knowing her and her Russian rules
    of handling business disputes, I felt I had no choice but to repay that
    legitimate debt.

[9]

In his reasons, the motion judge correctly set out
    the criteria relevant to a finding of contempt of court.  As set out by this
    court in
Prescott
    Russell Services for Children and Adults v. G.(N.)
(2006),
    82 O.R. (3d) 686 (Ont. C.A.):

A three-prong test is required.  First, the order that was
    breached must state clearly and equivocally what should and should not be
    done.  Secondly, the party who disobeys the order must do so deliberately and
    wilfully.  Thirdly, the evidence must show contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.

[10]

The trial judge, however, appears to have been of
    the view that a non-dissipation order cannot be ignored because the money was
    being used to pay down debts and then, later in his reasons, states that it
    does not matter whether he used the funds to pay debt

[11]

As to the appellants submission that the debt he
    paid was legitimate and did not represent a depletion of property or in any way
    defeat a claim that could be advanced by his spouse, the motion judge made no
    finding.  The motion judge stated:

I am not in a position to prejudge whether or not an
    equalization payment will have to be made and the respondent will have to do a
    better job at proving his debts than he has done to the present if he is to
    utilize those debts as reduction for calculating his net family property.

[12]

In order for contempt to have been made out in this case, the
    motion judge would have had to make specific findings with respect to the
    nature and consequences of the appellants decision to pay the substantial
    Russian debt.

[13]

Since no such findings were made, we would set
    aside the finding of contempt.

[14]

In setting aside the finding of contempt, we should
    not be taken as condoning the conduct of the appellant nor should we be taken to
    say that a finding of contempt is not available in this case.

[15]

Whether the payment in question was made in
    repayment of a legitimate debt incurred prior to separation is closely
    connected to an assessment of this familys net family property.  It is also an
    important factor in the allegation of contempt and the determination of an appropriate
    penalty.  We are of the view therefore that the trial of an issue is required.
    That is, the respondent is at liberty to bring a renewed motion for contempt where
    the legitimacy of the debt can be determined as well as its impact on the issue
    of the equalization of net family property.

[16]

For these reasons, the order of the motion judge is
    set aside.

[17]

There will be no costs of the appeal and the costs
    of the proceedings below are reserved to the judge hearing the contempt
    proceedings.

D. OConnor A.C.J.O.,

J.C. MacPherson J.A.

Paul Rouleau J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:

Downey v. Ecore
    International Inc., 2012 ONCA 480

DATE: 20120706

DOCKET: C54648

Feldman, Simmons and Cronk JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Paul Downey

Plaintiff (Respondent/Cross-Appellant)

and

Ecore International Inc.

Defendant (Appellant/Respondent
    to Cross-Appeal)

L. David Roebuck and Mark Hines, for the
    appellant/respondent to cross-appeal

Timothy M. Lowman and Patrick J. Cotter, for the
    respondent/cross-appellant

Heard: April 12, 2012

On appeal and cross-appeal from the order of Justice John
    S. Fregeau of the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 8, 2011, with
    reasons reported at 2011 ONSC 6617.

Cronk
    J.A.:

I.        Overview

[1]

Ecore International Inc. (Ecore) appeals from the dismissal of its
    motion for an order staying or dismissing an Ontario action commenced against
    it by the respondent, Paul Downey (Downey). Ecore requested that the action
    be dismissed for want of jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
    based on a forum selection clause (FSC) in favour of the Pennsylvania courts,
    as found in a written confidentiality agreement between the parties
    (Confidentiality Agreement).

[2]

The narrow issue on appeal is whether the motion judge erred by
    concluding that the Confidentiality Agreement fails to bind Downey for lack of
    consideration. Should Ecore succeed on its appeal, Downey cross-appeals,
    contending that the Confidentiality Agreement is unenforceable because it
    applied only during or after his employment with Ecore.  As Downey was never
    an employee of Ecore, he argues that a necessary precondition to the operation
    of the Confidentiality Agreement was not satisfied.

[3]

For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal and dismiss the
    cross-appeal.

II.       Facts

[4]

Ecore, formerly known as Dodge-Regupol Inc. (DRI),
[1]
is a Pennsylvania-based manufacturer of recycled rubber and a wide array of
    rubber-related products.  Downey is a professional engineer licensed and
    resident in Ontario.

(1)

Genesis of the
    Contracts

[5]

In the 1990s, Downey was employed by one of Ecores competitors in
    Toronto.  By 1999, he was seeking a new position in a senior business
    development or sales and marketing position, with the hope of a later
    transition to general management.

[6]

In August and September 1999, Downey had discussions with the President
    of Ecore, Art Dodge, regarding a potential role for him with Ecore.  On
    September 9, 1999, Dodge wrote to Downey, enclosing an employment proposal
    and offering him employment with Ecore in the position of Business Development
    Manager  Industrial Products.  The letter indicates that Dodge anticipated
    Downey relocating to Pennsylvania in early 2001 or sooner.  The letter states:
    given your history and industry knowledge, coincident with your joining the
    company and as a condition of your employment, we will require you to sign an
    Employee Confidentiality Agreement.

[7]

Downey responded to Dodge on September 10, 1999 with a
    counter-proposal.  He suggested various changes to the compensation
    arrangements outlined by Dodge and proposed that the parties operate, albeit
    temporarily for the next 12  18 months as a business-to-business relationship
    rather than an employer-employee one.  Downey described this arrangement as
    necessary given Canadian tax law.  He included a draft consulting agreement
    prepared by his lawyer, which contemplated that Downeys services would be
    provided to Ecore through his company, CSR Industries Inc. (CSR). The draft
    agreement provided that CSR would execute a copy of Ecores standard
    confidentiality agreement.

[8]

Dodge replied to Downey on the same day with a modified proposal that
    accepted some, but not all, of Downeys suggested compensation arrangements,
    and that accepted all other terms and conditions in Downeys counter-proposal.

(2)

Consulting Agreement

[9]

CSR and Ecore executed a consulting agreement on September 14, 1999
    (Consulting Agreement). The agreement is between Ecore as the Client and
    CSR as the Consultant. Downey is not a named party to the Consulting
    Agreement. However, as will be discussed below, he is described in the terms of
    the agreement as a Key Person of the Consultant.

[10]

The
    Consulting Agreement provides that CSR will provide defined Services, including
    acting as Ecores Manager Business Development  Industrial Products and
    sitting as a member of Ecores management team.  Additional services to be
    provided by CSR include the investigation and development of new business
    opportunities within industrial market segments.

[11]

Section
    3 requires Ecore to pay CSR an annual fee of $132,000 CDN, payable in weekly
    amounts, for the Services provided under the Agreement, as well as various
    bonuses in 2000. After 2000, CSR would be considered for participation in all
    company-wide bonus distributions.

[12]

Section
    5 of the Consulting Agreement describes the relationship between Ecore and CSR
    as follows:

The Consultants relationship with the Client as created by
    this Agreement is that of an independent contractor for the purposes of the
Income
    Tax Act
(Canada) and any similar provincial taxing legislation. It is
    intended that the Consultant shall have general control and direction over the
    manner in which its services are to be provided to the Client under this
    Agreement. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be regarded or construed
    as creating any relationship (whether by    way of employer/employee, agency,
    joint venture, association or partnership) between the parties other than as an
    independent contractor as set forth herein.

[13]

Section
    7 recognizes Downeys role as CSRs Key Person:

7.    Key
    Person

(a)   The
    parties acknowledge that Paul Downey is a Key Person of the Consultant and is
    integral to the successful performance of the Services by the Consultant under
    this Agreement. It is acknowledged by the Consultant that Paul Downey will
    perform all services of the Services, unless the Client otherwise consents in
    writing.

[14]

Section
    8 requires CSR to execute a confidentiality agreement:

8.    Confidential
    Information

The
    Consultant will execute a copy of the Clients standard confidentiality
    agreement, and said confidentiality agreement, upon execution, will form part
    of this agreement.

(3)

Confidentiality
    Agreement

[15]

On
    Downeys first day of work with Ecore on October 4, 1999, Ecore asked him to
    sign its standard form confidentiality agreement, backdated to October 1,
    1999.  Downey executed the agreement in his personal capacity on or about
    October 4, 1999.

[16]

The
    Confidentiality Agreement is between Ecore, which is referred to as Company,
    and Downey, who is referred to as Employee. CSR is not a named party to the
    agreement and is not referenced in the document.

[17]

The
    preambles to the Confidentiality Agreement include this clause :

BACKGROUND: Company is prepared to engage Employee for
    employment with Company. Employee will be granted access to confidential and
    proprietary information of the Company as part of his employment.  Employee is
    entering into this Agreement to grant to the Company protections regarding the
    Companys proprietary information. The parties of [sic] this Agreement agree
    and intend to be legally bound by the covenants as set forth in this Agreement.

[18]

Section
    1 of the Confidentiality Agreement defines Proprietary Information, while s.
    2 obliges Downey to accept and hold all Proprietary Information as secret and
    confidential and not to use it for his own benefit, but only for the benefit of
    Ecore.

[19]

Section
    3 of the Confidentiality Agreement contains the FSC at issue in this
    proceeding.  The pertinent part of the FSC states:

Employee hereby consents to the exclusive jurisdiction in the
    courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and of the United States situate in
    the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in connection with any action or suit to
    enforce this Agreement, that relates to this Agreement, that arises out of or
    in any way relates to the Companys business relations with Employee.

[20]

Section
    4 of the Confidentiality Agreement provides that [a]ll inventions or
    discoveries which relate to [Ecores] Proprietary Information shall be the
    exclusive property of the Company.  This section obliges Downey to execute any
    instruments that Ecore deems necessary to confirm its exclusive rights to any
    invention or discovery under applicable intellectual property law.

[21]

Section
    5 of the Confidentiality Agreement states:

This Agreement shall not constitute an employment agreement
    between Company and Employee, and, in the absence of written agreement to the
    contrary, Employee shall, at all times, be considered an employee at will. This
    Agreement shall apply during and after the Employees employment with Employer.

(4)

Assignment Agreement

[22]

Sometime
    in 2000, Downey invented a new form of impact sound insulation for use in the
    construction of flooring systems.  He disclosed the inventions to Ecore in
    2000. Downey believed that his inventions could lead to a new Ecore product
    line.

[23]

In
    a written agreement, dated October 10, 2001, Downey assigned all his rights,
    title and interest in the inventions to Ecore (Assignment Agreement).  Downey
    acknowledged in the Assignment Agreement that he received valuable
    consideration from Ecore.

(5)

Subsequent Events

[24]

In
    2008, Ecore asked Downey to sign an Amended and Restated Confidentiality
    Agreement that sought to create joint and several obligations on the part of
    Downey and CSR.   Downey declined to do so.

[25]

In
    February 2011, Downey commenced an action in Ontario against Ecore, alleging
    that it failed to honour an oral promise to reasonably compensate him for his
    assignment of the insulation inventions.  Downey alleges in his claim that the
    inventions were made by him alone using public source materials information and
    without the use of any Proprietary Information of Ecore.  Downey seeks damages
    or, in the alternative, rescission of his assignment of the inventions and an
    accounting of profits by Ecore.

[26]

In
    response to this action, Ecore terminated the Consulting Agreement effective
    July 2011.  Ecore also moved under Rule 21 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure
,
    R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, to stay or dismiss Downeys action on the ground that
    the Pennsylvania courts have exclusive jurisdiction over it pursuant to the FSC
    in the Confidentiality Agreement.

III.      Motion Judges Decision

[27]

The
    motion judge reviewed the circumstances leading to the execution of the
    Consulting and Confidentiality Agreements and the terms of both contracts.  He
    found that, at Downeys request, the Consulting Agreement was between CSR and
    Ecore, rather than Ecore and Downey, because this structure was advantageous
    to [Downey] from a Canadian tax perspective and was for his advantage (at
    para. 30). He also found that while it was contemplated that Downeys position
    or status might change to that of an employee of Ecore, this never happened.

[28]

As
    for the Confidentiality Agreement, the motion judge found that while CSR was
    obliged under the Consulting Agreement to execute the agreement, it did not do
    so. Instead, as requested by Ecore, Downey signed the Confidentiality Agreement
    in his personal capacity. The motion judge correctly held that Downey was bound
    by the FSC in the Confidentiality Agreement only if that agreement was a valid
    contract to which Downey was personally bound.  He concluded, at para. 34, that
    the Confidentiality Agreement fails for lack of consideration. The motion
    judge found that it is CSR, not Downey, who is the party to the Consulting
    Agreement. The confidential information is provided to CSR, and the
    compensation, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, was to flow to CSR.

[29]

The
    motion judge summarized his conclusion this way, at para. 37:

Downey never received consideration for executing the
    Confidentiality Agreement and is not personally bound by its terms, including
    the FSC contained therein. The jurisdiction of this court to hear Downeys
    action against Ecore is therefore not ousted by the FSC contained in the
    Confidentiality Agreement dated October 1, 1999.

[30]

Although
    this conclusion was dispositive of Ecores motion, the motion judge went on to
    consider the other issues raised by the parties concerning the enforceability
    of the Confidentiality Agreement against Downey.  He held that: (1) the subject
    matter of Downeys action against Ecore falls within the scope of the FSC in
    the Confidentiality Agreement since the action arises out of and relates to
    Ecores business relations with Downey (at paras. 38-41); and (2) Downey failed
    to show sufficient strong cause to avoid the enforcement of the FSC in the Confidentiality
    Agreement (at paras. 42-45). Downey did not challenge these additional findings
    before this court.

[31]

The
    motion judges reasons for dismissing Ecores motion are summarized in this
    succinct passage from his reasons, at para. 46:

The FSC in the Confidentiality Agreement should be enforced,
    and the stay of proceedings would be granted, but for the finding that the
    Confidentiality Agreement fails to bind Downey personally for lack of
    consideration.

IV.     Issues

[32]

There
    is one issue on the appeal: did the motion judge err by concluding that the
    Confidentiality Agreement, including the FSC, is unenforceable against Downey
    for lack of consideration?

[33]

If
    the motion judge so erred, the only issue on the cross-appeal is whether the
    Confidentiality Agreement is unenforceable against Downey on the alternative
    basis that a necessary precondition to its operation  Downeys employment with
    Ecore  was never satisfied.

V.      Analysis

(1)

The Appeal

[34]

Ecores
    basic position is that the motion judge erred by concluding that the
    Confidentiality Agreement is unenforceable against Downey by reason of a
    failure of consideration.

[35]

Ecore
    submits that s. 8 of the Consulting Agreement evidences the parties intentions
    that Ecore was to receive a confidentiality covenant that bound Downey
    personally as the Key Person. In addition, Ecore argues that the consideration
    for signing the Confidentiality Agreement was provided by the monies and
    benefits that flowed through CSR to Downey.  Ecore also submits that consideration
    is found in the expressed premise of the Confidentiality Agreement that Downey would
    be granted access to Ecores confidential information and that he was entering
    into the agreement to grant Ecore protection in respect of that information.

[36]

For
    the reasons that follow, I agree with Ecore that the motion judge erred by
    holding that the Confidentiality Agreement fails and is unenforceable against
    Downey due to a lack of consideration.

(i)

Principles of Contractual Interpretation

[37]

I
    begin with the well-established principles of contractual interpretation.  As
    the courts have repeatedly affirmed, the aim of contractual interpretation is
    to determine the intentions of the parties in accordance with the language used
    in the written document, having regard to the context in which the contract was
    signed: see
Dumbrell v. Regional Group of Companies
(2007), 85 O.R.
    (3d) 616 (C.A.), at paras. 47-56;
Salah v. Timothys Coffees of the World
    Inc.
, 2010 ONCA 673, 268 O.A.C. 673, at para. 16; and
SeaWorld Parks
    & Entertainment LLC v. Marineland of Canada Inc.
, 2011 ONCA 616, 282
    O.A.C. 339, at para. 16.

[38]

The
    contours of the exact bargain between the parties may sometimes require
    consideration of more than one contract. Nonetheless, the same principles of
    contractual interpretation apply.  In
Salah
, at para. 16, Winkler
    C.J.O. provided this instructive overview of the applicable principles:

When interpreting
    a contract, the court aims to determine the intentions of the parties in
    accordance with the language used in the written document and presumes that the
    parties have intended what they have said.  The court construes the contract as
    a whole, in a manner that gives meaning to all of its terms, and avoids an
    interpretation that would render one or more of its terms ineffective.  In
    interpreting the contract, the court must have regard to the objective evidence
    of the factual matrix or context underlying the negotiation of the contract,
    but not the subjective evidence of the intention of the parties.  The court
    should interpret the contract so as to accord with sound commercial principles
    and good business sense, and avoid commercial absurdity.  If the court finds
    that the contract is ambiguous, it may then resort to extrinsic evidence to clear
    up the ambiguity.
Where a transaction involves the execution of several
    documents that form parts of a larger composite whole  like a complex
    commercial transaction  and each agreement is entered into on the faith of the
    others being executed, then assistance in the interpretation of one agreement
    may be drawn from the related agreements.
[Citations omitted; Emphasis added.]

(ii)

The Wording of the
    Agreements and the Factual Matrix in this Case

[39]

The
    motion judges factual finding that CSR was the recipient of Ecores Proprietary
    Information led to his conclusion that the Confidentiality Agreement fails for
    lack of consideration.  In my view, this finding is not consistent with the wording
    of the Consulting and Confidentiality Agreements, having regard to the factual matrix
    in which these agreements were made. Nor, with respect, does the motion judges
    interpretation of the effect of these agreements accord with sound commercial
    principles or good business sense.

[40]

From
    the outset of the parties dealings, as revealed by Dodges initial letter to
    Downey dated September 9, 1999, Ecore contemplated that Downey, personally,
    would join its team and sit as a member of its management group. Consistent
    with that view, Ecores position was that Downey would be required to
    personally commit to protect Ecores Proprietary Information as a condition of
    his relationship with Ecore.

[41]

There
    was no evidence on the motion to suggest that Ecore resiled from its initial position
    after Downey and his lawyer converted the original employment proposal into a proposed
    consulting arrangement with CSR.  Indeed, both the wording of s. 5 of the
    Consulting Agreement and the motion judges findings confirm that Downey
    proposed this arrangement solely as a means of advantaging his Canadian income
    tax position.  The arrangement with CSR was simply a tax device that, in the
    motion judges words, was implemented at Downeys request and for his
    advantage (at para. 30).  This business reality is a critical component of the
    factual context in which the Consulting and Confidentiality Agreements were
    signed.

[42]

Moreover,
    the transaction between the parties was effected by the execution of both
    contracts.  The Consulting Agreement was entered on the faith of the Confidentiality
    Agreement being executed.  Consequently, these related contracts must be read
    together and, as Winkler C.J.O. explained in
Salah
, assistance in the
    interpretation of each agreement may be drawn from the other.

[43]

That
    the two agreements together constitute a composite whole is suggested by the
    language of the agreements themselves.  Section 8 of the Consulting Agreement
    provides for the execution of Ecores standard form confidentiality agreement
    by the Consultant. It further states that, upon execution, the confidentiality
    agreement would form part of the Consulting Agreement.

[44]

The
    Consulting Agreement does not specifically address the provision or protection
    of Ecores Proprietary Information, nor does it refer to the intended recipient
    of that information.  Instead, it confirms that Downey, in his personal
    capacity, is a Key Person of the Consultant and is integral to the successful
    performance of the Services by the Consultant under this Agreement. CSR
    explicitly acknowledged that Downey would perform all Services, as defined in
    the Consulting Agreement, unless Ecore otherwise consented in writing.

[45]

The
    Confidentiality Agreement fills in the gaps in the Consulting Agreement about the
    provision and protection of Ecores Proprietary Information. It specifically addresses
    the disclosure of this information, providing not only that Downey will be
    granted access to [Ecores] confidential and proprietary information but, also,
    that Downey was entering into the Confidentiality Agreement to grant to
    [Ecore] protections regarding [Ecores] proprietary information.  It confirms
    that Downey intended to be legally bound by the covenants as set forth in this
    Agreement, which include the confidentiality covenants and acknowledgements
    set out in the body of the agreement.

[46]

It
    is true, as the motion judge recognized, that CSR never signed a
    confidentiality agreement and that it was not a named party to the
    Confidentiality Agreement signed by Downey. However, when the Consulting
    Agreement and Confidentiality Agreement are read together, the terms of these
    agreements reveal the parties intentions that Ecores Proprietary Information was
    to be protected in the hands of the person who was to actually receive that
    information  Downey. It was only reasonable for the parties to intend that
    Downey  who was then employed by a known competitor of Ecore  would be
    subject to the terms of the Confidentiality Agreement. He was the person
    defined in s. 7 of the Consulting Agreement as the actual provider of all the
    consulting services to Ecore. Indeed, Downey admitted in cross-examination that
    he was the person who would get Ecores information if a contract was entered into
    with Ecore.

[47]

The
    motion judge erred in finding that Ecore accepted that CSR would receive both the
    Proprietary Information and the benefits flowing from Downeys relationship
    with Ecore. The wording of the agreements and the overall factual matrix
    reveals that the
de facto
relationship between the parties was between
    Ecore and Downey. It was Downey, not CSR, who committed to perform the
    consulting services. And it was Downey who would receive the benefits arising
    from the relationship with Ecore, whether directly or through the corporate
    vehicle of CSR.

[48]

Two
    further comments by the motion judge require mention. The motion judge observed,
    at para. 32, that the Consulting Agreement could have required that both CSR
    and Downey sign the Confidentiality Agreement. He also commented that it was [o]f
    significance that, in 2008, Ecore asked Downey to sign an amended
    Confidentiality Agreement that would have bound both CSR and Downey.

[49]

In
    my view, with respect, these observations are beside the point. The fact that
    the Consulting Agreement did not require both CSR and Downey to sign the
    Confidentiality Agreement is explained by the factual matrix in which the agreements
    were made. At least for the purposes of the Confidentiality Agreement, the
    parties understood and intended that CSR and Downey were one and the same.

[50]

In
    addition, I view the 2008 effort to restate the Confidentiality Agreement as
    nothing more than a failed attempt by Ecore to formally commit CSR to the
    contractual protections it already enjoyed with Downey under the
    Confidentiality Agreement.

[51]

An
    additional point telling against the motion judges interpretation of the interaction
    between the Consulting Agreement and the Confidentiality Agreement is that it fails
    to accord with sound commercial principles and good business sense, and [to] avoid
    commercial absurdity:
Salah
, at para. 16.  On the motion judges
    approach to the interpretation of the two agreements, the Confidentiality
    Agreement serves no meaningful purpose.  The motion judge viewed CSR as the
    recipient of Ecores Proprietary Information. If this were the case, it would
    have served no logical purpose for Ecore to ask Downey to personally commit to
    protect Proprietary Information that he never received.

[52]

Moreover,
    on the motion judges findings, neither Downey nor CSR is bound by the
    Confidentiality Agreement.  Downey is not bound because, in the motion judges
    view, there was no consideration for the agreement.  And CSR is not bound because
    it is not a party to the agreement.  On this interpretation, Ecore is deprived
    of the very protection of its intellectual property for which it bargained.

[53]

Such
    a result is inconsistent with the parties demonstrated intentions at the time
    they entered into the Consulting and Confidentiality Agreements.  It is also
    inconsistent with sound commercial principles and good business sense.    An
    interpretation of the Consulting and Confidentiality Agreements that occasions
    such a commercially absurd result is to be avoided:
Salah
, at para.
    16.

[54]

I
    therefore conclude that, properly interpreted, the intent of the parties in
    entering into their contractual arrangements was to require the execution of a
    confidentiality agreement that bound Downey personally. That s. 8 of the
    Consulting Agreement required CSR to execute such a confidentiality agreement
    does not relieve against the parties joint objective. To conclude otherwise,
    as the motion judge did, would deprive Ecore of any protection of its Proprietary
    Information from the intended and actual recipient of that information. This
    unjust result would permit form to triumph over substance.

(iii)

Confidentiality Agreement is
    Supported by Valid Consideration

[55]

It
    follows from this analysis that the motion judge erred by concluding that
    Downeys execution of the Confidentiality Agreement was unsupported by valid
    consideration. The motion judge rejected Ecores suggestion that the
    consideration received by Downey for executing the Confidentiality Agreement is
    the provision of confidential information by Ecore to the consultant, allowing
    the services of the Consulting Agreement to be provided, thereby allowing the
    compensation contemplated in that agreement to flow (at para. 34).  According
    to the motion judge, at para. 35:

[T]his submission overlooks the fact that it is CSR, not
    Downey, who is the party to the Consulting Agreement.  The confidential
    information is provided to CSR, and the compensation ... was to flow to CSR.  I
    am mindful that some of the funds owing to CSR pursuant to the Consulting
    Agreement were paid to Downey personally.  However, [Ecore] cannot unilaterally
    change the parties to the Consulting Agreement by choosing who they pay.
    Further, the record suggests that these funds were treated by Downey as revenue
    of CSR.

[56]

In
    my opinion, the motion judges conclusion that the Confidentiality Agreement
    fails for lack of consideration ignores the mutual promises contained in the
    Confidentiality Agreement. In particular, the motion judge failed to consider
    the BACKGROUND preamble to the Confidentiality Agreement, which reads:

Employee will be granted access to confidential and proprietary
    information of the Company as part of his employment.  Employee is entering
    into this Agreement to grant to the Company protections regarding the Companys
    proprietary information.  The parties of [
sic
] this Agreement agree
    and intend to be legally bound by the covenants as set forth in this Agreement.

[57]

The
    mutual promises contained in this provision constitute a
quid pro quo
that formed the basis for the Confidentiality Agreement: Downey would be
    granted access to Ecores Proprietary Information, which was necessary to allow
    him to perform the Services under the Consulting Agreement, and the information
    so disclosed would be subject to confidentiality protections in favour of
    Ecore. Contrary to the parties original expectations, Downey never became an
    Ecore employee but instead continued to use his corporate vehicle for income
    tax purposes. However, the fact remains that Downey received Ecores
    Proprietary Information.

[58]

In
    my view, the mutual promises contained in the Confidentiality Agreement afford
    good and valid consideration for Downeys execution of that agreement. This is
    sufficient to legally bind the parties in accordance with their express
    intentions as set out in the preamble to the agreement, quoted above. It was
    these promises and their fulfillment that permitted Downey, both personally and
    through CSR, to realize the benefits of the Consulting Agreement  benefits he
    would not have received without executing the Confidentiality Agreement to
    which he was personally bound.

(iv)

Conclusion

[59]

I
    therefore conclude, contrary to the motion judges ruling, that Downeys
    execution of the Confidentiality Agreement was supported by valid
    consideration.  It follows that the Confidentiality Agreement, including the
    FSC, is fully enforceable against Downey.

(2)

The Cross-Appeal

[60]

On
    his cross-appeal, Downey invokes s. 5 of the Confidentiality Agreement, which
    provides in part: This Agreement shall apply
during and after
the
    Employees employment with Employer (emphasis added). Downey submits that even
    if he did receive valid consideration for entering into the Confidentiality
    Agreement, it is nonetheless unenforceable against him since he never became an
    Ecore employee. The motion judge did not need to consider this alternative
    argument, having accepted that the Confidentiality Agreement was unenforceable
    against Downey due to a lack of consideration.

[61]

I
    do not read s. 5 of the Confidentiality Agreement in the manner urged by
    Downey. The material language of this provision  that the Confidentiality
    Agreement was to apply during and after Downeys employment with Ecore simply
    confirms that Downeys confidentiality obligations were to survive the
    termination of his relationship with Ecore. This makes commercial sense given
    the purpose of the agreed protections for Ecores Proprietary Information.  It
    was precisely when Downeys relationship with Ecore fell apart, that those
    protections would be needed by Ecore.

[62]

It
    is telling, in this regard, that the relevant language in s. 5 does not provide
    that the Confidentiality Agreement or Downeys confidentiality covenants were
    to apply
only
if Downey was an employee of Ecore or that his
    employment by Ecore was a condition precedent to the triggering of those
    covenants.  This language also accords with common and business sense. If
    Ecores Proprietary Information was disclosed to Downey  in any capacity  the
    protection of that information was of vital concern to Ecore.

VI.     Disposition

[63]

For
    the reasons given, I am persuaded that the motion judge erred in his
    interpretation of the Confidentiality Agreement. That agreement forms part of a
    single transaction between Ecore, Downey and CSR, constituted by both the
    Consulting and the Confidentiality Agreements. The interpretation of each
    agreement is informed by the other.  It is only when the two agreements are
    read together, in accordance with the principles of contractual interpretation
    referenced above, that the intentions of the parties and the true business
    reality of their relationship emerge.

[64]

Accordingly,
    I would allow the appeal, dismiss the cross-appeal, set aside the motion judges
    order and substitute in its stead an order staying Downeys Ontario action on
    the basis of the FSC in the Confidentiality Agreement.

[65]

Ecore
    is entitled to its costs of the appeal and the cross-appeal, in the agreed
    amount of $13,000, inclusive of all disbursements and taxes.

Released:

JUL -6 2012                                     E.A.
    Cronk J.A.

KF                                                   I
    agree K. Feldman J.A.

I
    agree Janet Simmons J.A.

[1]
Prior to 2008, Ecore carried on business under the name of DRI. For
    convenience, DRI is treated in these reasons as being one and the same as
    Ecore.