COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Figliola, 2018 ONCA 578

DATE: 20180625

DOCKET: C58139

Doherty, Epstein and Pepall JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Maria Figliola

Appellant

Michael Lacy and Deepa Negandhi, for the appellant

Rosella Cornaviera and Susan L. Reid, for the respondent

Heard: May 7 and 8, 2018

On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Alan
    C.R. Whitten of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury, on September
    28, 2013 for first degree murder.

Doherty J.A.:

overview

[1]

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in May 2006. On
    appeal, this court ordered a new trial:
R. v. Figliola
, 2011 ONCA 457
    (
Figliola

#1
). At her re-trial, the appellant was again
    convicted of first degree murder. She appeals.

[2]

The Crown alleged that the appellant murdered her husband. The Crown
    contended that the appellant had a new love interest in her life, and her marriage
    was a very unhappy one. She had also come to the conclusion that her husband
    was worth much more financially to her dead than alive. On the Crowns theory,
    the appellant arranged for someone, likely Daniel Di Trapani, to murder her
    husband.

[3]

The appellant and Mr. Di Trapani were tried together at the first trial.
    On appeal, this court ordered a new trial for both. Mr. Di Trapani was not
    retried, but pled guilty to being an accessory after-the-fact to murder. He did
    not testify at the appellants retrial.

[4]

The evidence heard at the first trial was substantially the same as the
    evidence heard on the retrial, although the appellant did not testify on the
    retrial. That evidence is summarized in
Figliola

#1
and I need
    not repeat that exercise here.

[5]

While the evidence was lengthy, the issues the jury needed to resolve
    were few and straightforward. Mr. Figliola was murdered. No one suggested
    otherwise. There were only two possible verdicts. Either the appellant was
    guilty of first degree murder or she was not guilty. The appellant was guilty
    of first degree murder only if the Crown could prove, beyond a reasonable
    doubt, both that she arranged for the murder of her husband and that her
    husband was murdered pursuant to that arrangement. If the Crown failed to prove
    either, the appellant was entitled to an acquittal.

[6]

On appeal, the appellant submits that the trial judge made various
    errors in his instructions to the jury. She also argues that a series of
    rulings made in the course of the trial relating to the evidence of Teresa
    Mascia rendered the trial unfair and effectively recreated the same problem
    that had led to the order for a new trial at the first appeal.

[7]

I would dismiss the appeal.

The Grounds of Appeal

A.

Did the trial judge adequately relate the evidence to the issues in his
    instructions to the jury?

[8]

The appellant submits that the trial judges lengthy summary of the
    testimony of the witnesses provided to the jury in the course of his instructions
    failed to adequately connect that evidence to the legal issues and positions of
    the parties. The appellant stresses the distinction between simply reviewing
    the evidence to assist the jury in recalling the substance of the evidence and
    relating the important evidence to the issues and the positions of the parties,
    an essential step in the jurys reasoning process: see
R. v. Daley
, 2007
    SCC 53, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 523, at paras. 54-58;
R. v. Newton
, 2017 ONCA
    496, 349 C.C.C. (3d) 508, at paras. 15-18;
R. v. Jack
(1993), 88 Man.
    R. (2d) 93, at 102 (C.A.), affd [1994] 2 S.C.R. 310.

[9]

The appellant further argues that by simply reviewing the mass of
    evidence without relating the evidence to the issues, the trial judge unfairly
    tilted the instruction in favour of the Crown, since, as almost always happens,
    the bulk of the evidence being reviewed was Crown evidence led in support of
    the Crowns position. The appellant argues that a detailed review of the
    testimony without connecting the evidence to the issues or the positions of the
    parties created a misleading impression of the respective strengths of the
    Crown and defence cases.

[10]

To
    demonstrate her point, the appellant focused on the evidence relating to Mr.
    Figliolas gambling habits. The defence claimed that Mr. Figliola was a
    gambling addict who spent thousands of dollars, including money he did not
    have, on both legal and illegal gambling. The defence alleged, and there was
    evidence to support this claim, that Mr. Figliolas death may have been the
    result of unpaid gambling debts owed to violent persons who did not tolerate the
    non-payment of gambling debts. The appellant submits that the evidence
    supporting this theory came from the testimony of many witnesses heard over the
    course of the several months of evidence. She argues that the force of this
    evidence could only have been properly appreciated by the jury if the trial
    judge had assembled at least a summary of that evidence and related it directly
    to the defence position that Mr. Figliolas murder was related to his many
    gambling debts. The appellant submits that the trial judge failed to do so.

[11]

Courts
    have repeatedly emphasized that an assessment of the adequacy of jury
    instructions relating the evidence to the issues requires a functional and
    contextual analysis:
e.g.
see
R. v. P.J.B.
, 2012 ONCA 730, 97
    C.R. (6th) 195, at paras. 46-50. There are essentially two questions:

·

Would the jury appreciate the potential significance of the
    evidence to the issues from both the Crown and defence perspective?

·

Was the instruction fair, in the sense that it represented an
    even-handed treatment of the evidence as it related to the issues the jury had
    to decide?

[12]

The
    nature of the trial is an important feature of the contextual analysis required
    in assessing the adequacy of a jury instruction. This was a lengthy trial. The
    evidence occupied five months and there was a six-week delay between the end of
    the evidence and the jury instruction. It was open to the trial judge, given
    the length of the trial and the long delay between the evidence and the jury
    instruction, to conclude that a thorough review of the evidence would assist the
    jury in discharging its duties. Other trial judges might have approached the
    evidence in a different way. In this court, however, the question is not
    whether the trial judge chose the most effective method of instruction, but
    whether his instructions, as given, adequately related the evidence to the
    issues.

[13]

While
    the appellant is undoubtedly correct in drawing a distinction between the reviewing
    of evidence and the relating of that evidence to the issues and the positions
    of the parties, the former can play an important role in the latter. The entire
    charge must be examined. For example, in relating evidence to an issue, the trial
    judge may refer to certain evidence in a general way. However, when the trial judge
    summarizes the evidence for the jury, he may refer to that evidence in considerably
    more detail. When deciding whether the trial judge adequately related the
    evidence to the issues, the appellate court is entitled, as no doubt the jury
    would, to draw a connection between the reference to a part of the evidence in
    one part of the jury instruction, and the detailed summary of that same evidence
    in another part of the jury instruction. Indeed, this is what occurred in this
    case.

[14]

This
    trial judges instructions can be broken down into three parts. The first part
    included instructions on the applicable legal principles and various
    evidentiary topics. In the second part, the trial judge reviewed the evidence
    of the witnesses at great length. In the third part, the trial judge read to
    the jury the positions of the Crown and defence as provided to him by counsel. Those
    positions included references to parts of the evidence.

[15]

Ms.
    Cornaviera, for the Crown, in her able submissions, stressed that the adequacy
    of the trial judges relating of the evidence to the issues does not depend exclusively
    on what the trial judge said in the part of his instructions in which he
    reviewed the evidence. The merit of her submission is demonstrated by
    considering the jury instruction as it related to the defence position that Mr.
    Figliola was killed because of outstanding gambling debts.

[16]

The
    trial judge addressed this issue in the first part of his instructions under
    the heading Frank Figliolas Gambling. The trial judge reviewed, in some
    detail and in a balanced fashion, the evidence about Mr. Figliolas gambling activities
    and the evidence about possible implications of owing significant gambling
    debts to the wrong people. In this part of his instruction, the trial judge did
    not specifically tell the jury that he was reviewing this evidence in relation
    to the defence claim that Mr. Figliola was murdered because of those gambling
    debts. However, that connection could not have been lost on the jury,
    particularly as they had heard lengthy submissions from defence counsel stressing
    Mr. Figliolas gambling debts and their possible connection to his murder.

[17]

In
    any event, when the trial judge came to the defence position in the third part
    of his charge, he expressly told the jury that it was the defence position that
    Mr. Figliola was murdered because of his gambling debts. He discussed the same
    evidence he had highlighted in the first part of his instruction. He also
    referred to much of that evidence in the course of his witness-by-witness
    review of the testimony in the second part of the instruction.

[18]

Considering
    the charge as a whole, the trial judge drew a clear connection between the
    evidence of Mr. Figliolas gambling and the defence position that his death was
    connected to the gambling debts. The review of the evidence in the second part
    of the trial judges instructions did not detract from what the trial judge
    said in other parts of his instructions. To the contrary, the detailed review
    of the evidence would have assisted the jury in recalling the substance of the
    evidence when assessing the merits of the defence position.

[19]

The
    trial judge dealt with other parts of the evidence in a similar fashion. One
    more example will suffice. The jury heard a great deal of evidence about things
    the appellant did and said after the murder. The Crown relied on much of that
    evidence as circumstantial evidence of the appellants guilt.

[20]

In
    the first part of his instructions, the trial judge explained to the jury how
    they could use evidence of the appellants acts and statements after the murder
    as evidence that she had arranged the murder. He properly instructed the jury
    that before they could use the evidence to draw the inferences urged by the Crown,
    they had to consider and reject the innocent explanations for the statements
    and conduct put forward by the defence. He told the jury that unless those
    explanations were rejected, the acts and conduct of the appellant could not
    further the Crowns case.

[21]

In
    the course of the first part of his instructions, the trial judge referred to parts
    of this testimony by reference to the subject matter,
e.g.
Ms.
    Figliolas lies to the police. He briefly summarized the relevant evidence,
    including the explanations proffered by the defence. In the second part of his
    instructions, when reviewing the evidence of each witness, the trial judge referred
    to the substance of much of the evidence concerning the appellants statements
    and conduct after the murder.

[22]

I
    am satisfied that the charge as a whole left the jury fully informed of the
    substance of the evidence concerning the appellants conduct and statements
    after her husbands murder, the potential relevance of that evidence to the
    Crowns case, and the defence position that the appellants conduct and
    statements were explained by things that had no connection to the death of her
    husband. The jury was properly equipped to consider the impact of this evidence
    on the relevant issues in the case.

[23]

I
    would also reject the argument that the instructions presented the evidence in
    an unbalanced fashion and led to an unfair trial. This was a strong Crown case.
    A large body of circumstantial evidence pointed toward the appellants
    involvement in her husbands murder. An accurate and full treatment of the evidence
    in the charge to the jury inevitably revealed the strength of the Crowns case.
    While this was unfortunate from the appellants perspective, it was not unfair.

B.

Did the trial judge err in instructing the jury that it could convict on
    the basis that the appellant arranged for someone other than Mr. Di Trapani to
    murder her husband?

[24]

At
    trial, it was the Crowns primary position that the appellant arranged with Mr.
    Di Trapani, a friend of the appellants best friend, Teresa Mascia, to murder
    her husband. Mr. Di Trapani had connections with individuals suspected to be
    involved in organized crime.

[25]

There
    was a significant body of evidence to support the Crowns contention that the
    appellant hired Mr. Di Trapani. She provided him with a cellphone they used to
    communicate with each other up until the time of the murder. They did not use
    that phone after the murder. One Crown witness testified that on the night of
    the murder, he drove Mr. Di Trapani to the location of the murder and then to a
    house in the appellants neighbourhood. There was also evidence of payments made
    to Mr. Di Trapani by the appellant in the weeks after the murder.

[26]

At
    trial, the Crown submitted that the jury could convict the appellant of first
    degree murder, even if it was not satisfied that she had hired Mr. Di Trapani
    to commit the murder. The Crown argued that the jury could conclude, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that the appellant had hired somebody, although perhaps not
    Mr. Di Trapani, to commit the murder and that her husband had been murdered
    pursuant to that arrangement.

[27]

The
    defence argued that on any reasonable view of the evidence, the Crowns case
    depended on establishing that Mr. Di Trapani had been hired by the appellant to
    actually kill her husband, or to arrange for the killing of her husband. The
    defence maintained that there was no air of reality to the Crowns unknown killer
    theory and that leaving that theory with the jury would invite improper
    speculation: see
R. v. Morales
(2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 161, at paras. 21-22.

[28]

The
    Crown can advance alternative theories of liability. However, like defences
    advanced by an accused, a theory of liability can be left with the jury only if
    there is an air of reality in the evidence to that theory. Subject to
    fairness concerns peculiar to individual cases, a theory of liability should be
    left with a jury if a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could
    convict based on that theory:
R. v. Largie
, 2010 ONCA 548, 101 O.R.
    (3d) 561, at para. 141.

[29]

The
    reasonableness component of the air of reality test incorporates a limited
    weighing of the evidence by the trial judge. The trial judge must determine
    whether there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a properly instructed jury,
    acting reasonably, to render a conviction based on that theory of liability:
R.
    v. Cairney
, 2013 SCC 55, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 420, at paras. 19-23;
R. v.
    Pappas
, 2013 SCC 56, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 452, at paras. 21-26.

[30]

I
    am satisfied that there was an air of reality to the Crowns alternative
    theory of liability. Some of the evidence implicating the appellant in the
    murder plot also implicated Mr. Di Trapani in the murder. There was, however, a
    body of evidence implicating the appellant in the murder that did not connect
    Mr. Di Trapani to the murder. The evidence of the appellants motive to murder
    her husband, incriminating statements she made before the murder, statements
    she made after the murder, including what could be construed as a written
    confession provided to her boyfriend, and various lies she told the police, all
    implicated the appellant in her husbands murder without necessarily pointing
    to Mr. Di Trapani as the person with whom she arranged the murder.

[31]

While
    it was not likely, there was a realistic possibility on this evidence that the
    jury could be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant had
    arranged for the murder of her husband, but not necessarily be satisfied that
    she made the arrangement with Mr. Di Trapani. The Crowns alternate theory was
    directed at this specific possibility. If the jury were satisfied that the
    appellant arranged for her husbands murder, and that he was killed pursuant to
    that arrangement, she was guilty of first degree murder, regardless of whether
    the jury could identify her partner or partners in crime. The unknown person
    alternative theory provided for that possibility.

C:      Were there errors in the treatment of the evidence of Teresa Mascia
    that rendered the trial unfair and the verdict a miscarriage of justice?

[32]

Teresa
    Mascia was a close friend of the appellant.  She was also a friend of Mr. Di
    Trapani.  He often did various chores at her request. Mr. Di Trapani also knew
    the appellant, although not as well as he knew Ms. Mascia. There was also
    evidence that the appellant had paid Ms. Mascia $23,000 several months after
    the murder.

[33]

Ms.
    Mascia testified as a Crown witness at the first trial. She was declared an adverse
    witness and cross-examined by the Crown. In
Figliola

#1
, the court
    held that her cross-examination went beyond the proper limits of cross-examination
    of adverse witnesses under s. 9(1) of the
Evidence Act
, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 (the Evidence Act)
.
    The court further held that the failure to tell the jury that it could not use
    any finding it made with respect to Ms. Mascias credibility as evidence
    against the accused constituted reversible error:
Figliola

#1
, at paras. 61-63.

[34]

The
    Crown decided to call Ms. Mascia on the retrial. Counsel argued that the Crown
    should not be permitted to call her and, alternatively, that the Crown should
    not be permitted to cross-examine Ms. Mascia under s. 9(1) of the
Evidence
    Act
. The reasons of this court in
Figliola

#1
, and
R.
    v. Soobrian
(1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 603, 96 C.C.C. (3d) 208 figured
    prominently in the arguments put to the trial judge. The trial judge allowed
    Ms. Mascia to testify for the Crown, and allowed the Crown to cross-examine her
    on prior inconsistent statements relating to certain specific topics. The
    appellant argues that the trial judges rulings are inconsistent with the
ratio
of both
Figliola

#1
and
Soobrian
.

(i)

The Alleged Errors

[35]

The
    appellant submits that the trial judge made four errors relating to the
    evidence of Ms. Mascia. She contends that these four errors, taken together,
    rendered the trial unfair and resulted in a miscarriage of justice,
    necessitating the quashing of the conviction.
[1]

[36]

First,
    the appellant contends that the trial judge should not have allowed the Crown
    to call Ms. Mascia as a witness. The appellant argues that the Crown called her
    in bad faith with a view to cross-examining her to demonstrate that she was
    lying to protect the appellant, hoping that the jury would use that finding as
    evidence of the appellants guilt.

[37]

Next,
    the appellant submits that the trial judge should not have allowed the Crown to
    cross-examine Ms. Mascia under s. 9(1) of the
Evidence Act
. The appellant argues that
even though
    the Crown satisfied the technical requirements for a finding that Ms. Mascia was
    an adverse witness, there was no probative value in her cross-examination and
    that her cross-examination created a real risk that the jury would improperly use
    the Crowns attack on Ms. Mascias credibility as evidence of the appellants
    guilt. The appellant submits that balancing the very real potential prejudice
    of the evidence against the minimal probative value, the trial judge should
    have exercised his discretion and refused to allow the Crown to cross-examine
    Ms. Mascia.

[38]

Third,
    the appellant submits that the Crown was improperly allowed to re-examine Ms.
    Mascia about an alleged attempt to intimidate a Crown witness. Once again, the
    appellant submits that this re-examination could only have been intended to
    blacken Ms. Mascias character in the hope that the jury would paint the
    defence with the same brush.

[39]

Fourth,
    the appellant contends that Crown counsel, in his closing address made an
    improper use of the evidence that had been wrongly admitted on re-examination
    of Ms. Mascia. The appellant submits that Crown counsels comment also
    increased the likelihood that the jury would misuse Ms. Mascias evidence to
    discredit the defence.

(ii)

Soobrian
and
Figliola

#1

[40]

Much
    of the argument on this ground of appeal centers around the reasons in
Figliola

#1
and
Soobrian
. I begin with an examination of those cases.

[41]

In
Soobrian
, the Crown called a witness named Williams. Williams had
    given a statement to the police that contained an account of the relevant
    events that assisted the Crown. At the preliminary inquiry, Williams testified
    as a defence witness and gave a different account of events, helpful to the
    defence.

[42]

At
    trial, the Crown called Williams knowing he would maintain the position he took
    at the preliminary inquiry. During his examination-in-chief, Crown counsel
    questioned Williams on the contents of his written statement without first
    obtaining a ruling permitting cross-examination under either s. 9(1) or s. 9(2)
    of the
Evidence Act
. The Crown next sought a declaration that Williams
    was adverse under s. 9(1) of the
Evidence Act
, and therefore subject to cross-examination on any
    prior inconsistent statements
. The trial judge declined to make that
    finding but permitted the Crown to pursue further cross-examination on
    statements that fell within s. 9(2) of the
Evidence Act
.

[43]

The
    Crown at trial made its strategy very clear. It had called Williams intending
    to cross-examine him on his prior statement to lay the groundwork for an
    argument to the jury that Mr. Williams obvious dishonesty provided evidence that
    the accused was not telling the truth and the complainant was being truthful:
Soobrian
at, p. 610.

[44]

This
    court emphatically rejected the argument that Williams dishonesty as a witness
    could constitute evidence against the accused. The court indicated that without
    evidence showing collusion between Williams and the accused, Williams lies on
    the witness stand were not evidence against the accused, and had no connection
    to the complainants credibility: see also
R. v. Walker
(1994), 18
    O.R. (3d) 184, at p. 197. The cross-examination of Williams might cause the
    jury to reject his evidence as incredible, but it could not advance the Crowns
    case against the accused:
Soobrian
, at p. 611. The court said, at p.
    612:

It is plain that the witness Williams did not adopt his prior
    statement as true and the only use the jury could properly make of his evidence
    that he saw the things he testified to was either to accept it, reject it or
    give it little weight having regard to the view they took of his initial
    statement to police and his explanation for having made it. But, on the facts
    of this case, the thing for which the jury could not use a finding of
    credibility against Williams, if based on his statement to the police, was to
    support a finding that either or both of the appellants were not credible. Nor
    could it support the truth of the complainants evidence that either of the
    appellants had sexually assaulted her. A finding against the credibility of
    Williams on these grounds would simply neutralize his evidence under oath.

[45]

The
    court next considered s. 9(1) of the
Evidence Act
. The court confirmed that a
trial judge has
    a discretion to refuse to permit cross-examination even though the witness was
    adverse: see also
R. v. Dooley
, 2009 ONCA 910, 249 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at
    para. 158, leave to appeal refused, [2010] 258 C.C.C. (3d) vi (note); D.
    Paciocco,
Confronting Disappointing,
    Hostile and Adverse Witnesses in Criminal Cases
, (2012) 59 Crim.
    L.Q. 301, at 347-51. The court ruled that the trial judge had properly refused
    to allow cross-examination, as the Crown had proffered no purpose for the
    cross-examination other than to discredit the defence by discrediting the
    witness:
Soobrian
, at p. 611.

[46]

Lastly,
    the court held that in the face of the very real risk that the jury would
    misuse their rejection of Williams evidence in the manner urged by the Crown,
    the trial judge should have given a limiting instruction. The court described
    the required instruction, at p. 613:

The true purport of Williams evidence, including his
    cross-examination by the Crown, was to show that the appellants were not
    credible because Williams was not. The trial judge should have made clear to
    the jury that there was no basis upon which they [could]

use Williams
    evidence to support that conclusion.

[47]

In
Figliola

#1
, the Crown called Ms. Mascia as a witness.
[2]
She had given several statements to the police that were inconsistent with
    parts of her testimony. The Crown sought a ruling that Ms. Mascia was adverse under
    s. 9(1) of the
Evidence Act
. The trial judge declared her adverse, and
    the Crown cross-examined her. However, the Crowns cross-examination went well beyond
    inconsistencies in Ms. Mascias prior statements and grew into a
    cross-examination at large. The Crown suggested to Ms. Mascia that she was
    lying to cover up for her good friend, the appellant, and that she was prepared
    to say anything to protect the appellant. On the appeal in
Figliola

#1
, counsel argued that the cross-examination led
to exactly
    the error identified in
Soobrian
:
Figliola

#1
, at para. 37. The Crown had invited
    the jury to convict the appellant, in part, because her friend, Ms. Mascia, was
    lying for her.

[48]

This
    court accepted the appellants argument in part. The court began by holding that
    the Crown had properly called Ms. Mascia, noting that the Crown had little
    choice but to call Ms. Mascia. She had potentially important evidence to give:
R. v. Figliola
, at para. 45. The court next determined that the trial
    judge had not erred in declaring Ms. Mascia adverse and permitting
    cross-examination on her prior statements under s. 9(1) of the
Evidence Act
:
Figliola

#1
,
    at paras. 47-48.

[49]

The
    court, however, found two errors. The Crowns cross-examination of Ms. Mascia went
    far beyond the cross-examination on prior inconsistent statements permitted
    under s. 9(1). The Crown had, without bringing any application to do so,
    treated Ms. Mascia as a hostile witness and cross-examined her at large. During
    that cross-examination, the Crown set out its cover up theory, contending
    that Ms. Mascia was lying to protect the accused. There was no evidence to
    support that allegation.

[50]

The
    court concluded, at para. 61:

In our view, by taking the tack it did, the Crown --
    inadvertently or otherwise -- strayed into impermissible Soobrian territory.
    Even without any initial intent to do so, the ultimate effect of the
    cross-examination was to create the very scenario that Soobrian envisages:
the

effect of the cross-examination was to shred the credibility of the Crowns
    own witness and to create a factual matrix in which the jury might well
    conclude that Ms. Pignatelli [Mascia] was not only a liar, but was a witness
    lying for the very purpose of covering up for the appellants wrongful deeds and
    that the appellants were therefore liars themselves, and guilty too.
[Emphasis added.]

[51]

The
    court held that in light of the improper cross-examination of Ms. Mascia, the jury
    should have been strongly and immediately instructed that any finding it made
    concerning Ms. Mascias credibility could not be used, either in assessing the
    credibility of the accused, or as evidence of guilt:
Figliola

#1
, at paras. 62-63.

[52]

Three
    propositions emerge from
Soobrian
and
Figliola

#1
:

·

If a witness has relevant evidence to give, the Crown may call
    that witness, even if the Crown expects that the witness will give evidence
    that is inconsistent with a prior statement made by the witness and the Crown
    anticipates bringing an application to cross-examine the witness under s. 9 of
    the
Evidence Act
.

·

A trial judge may refuse to permit cross-examination under s. 9(1),
    even if the technical requirements for a finding of adversity are met. The
    trial judge should not permit cross-examination if that cross-examination would
    undermine the fairness of the trial. Trial fairness will be undermined if there
    is a real risk
that the jury, despite an
    appropriate limiting instruction, could misuse the
cross-examination
    of the Crown witness in the manner described in
Soobrian
.

·

If the Crown is allowed to cross-examine its own witness under s.
    9, the trial judge should caution the jury that the cross-examination may be
    used in assessing that witnesss credibility, but that it cannot assist in
    assessing the credibility of the accused, or in proving the Crowns case
    against the accused unless the witness adopts the prior statements as true or
    there is evidence of collusion between the witness and the accused.

(iii)

The Appellants Arguments

(a)

Should the Crown have been allowed to call Ms. Mascia?

[53]

The
    appellant argues that the Crown called Ms. Mascia in bad faith, intending to
    demonstrate by cross-examining her that she was a liar in the hope that the
    jury would paint the defence with the same brush and reject the defence
    position at trial. The appellant goes so far as to argue that the Crown cannot
    call a witness with a view to attacking the credibility of that witness.

[54]

There
    is no merit to this submission. As pointed out in
Figliola #1
, at
    para. 45, Ms. Mascia had relevant evidence to give in several areas. Indeed, I
    think it is fair to describe her as a central character in the narrative, as it
    relates to events after the murder. The Crown had to call Ms. Mascia or risk
    leaving gaps in the evidence that could have been exploited by the defence.

[55]

The
    appellant was concerned that the Crown called Ms. Mascia with a view to making
    the argument foreclosed in
Soobrian
.
    That concern is properly addressed by carefully controlling the questioning of
    the witness, not by keeping relevant evidence from the jury:
see D.
    Paciocco, at pp. 350, footnote 173;
R. v. Mariani
, 2007 ONCA 329, 220
    C.C.C. (3d) 74, at para. 41.

[56]

When
    the Crown seeks to cross-examine its own witness, the Crown must clearly set
    out the justification for that claim and the nature of the cross-examination
    sought. A trial judge may allow cross-examination on a statement in writing or
    reduced to writing under s. 9(2) of the
Evidence Act
. The trial judge
    may allow cross-examination on all prior statements of a witness if the witness
    is found to be adverse under s. 9(1). The trial judge may also allow
    cross-examination at large if the witness is found to be hostile. No matter the
    level of cross-examination, the Crown must demonstrate that the proposed
    cross-examination has some probative value. This exercise ensures that the
    Crown will identify the specific lines of questioning it seeks to pursue with
    the witness.

[57]

The
    importance of the trial judge properly limiting cross-examination of the Crowns
    own witnesses under s. 9 of the
Evidence Act
is apparent from
Figliola

#1
. The failure to limit cross-examination generated the reversible error.

[58]

If
    the Crown applies to cross-examine its own witness and the trial judge is satisfied
    that the cross-examination will create a real risk that the jury will fall into
    the
Soobrian
error
,
    the trial judge may prohibit cross-examination, even though the witness is
    adverse. In the same vein, if the trial judge is satisfied that the
    cross-examination would do no more than put a version of events before the
    jury, in the form of a prior statement, which the witness will deny and with
    respect to which there will be no other evidence, the trial judge may decline
    to allow cross-examination:
R. v. Fraser
(1990), 55 C.C.C. (3d) 551,
    at 558-59 (BCCA).

[59]

Even
    when the Crown is allowed to cross-examine its own witness on prior
    inconsistent statements, the trial judge should carefully limit
    cross-examination to specific inconsistencies that have some potential probative
    value. In some instances, it will be necessary to fully vet the proposed
    cross-examination on a
voir dire
before determining what part of the
    cross-examination the jury should be allowed to hear.

[60]

The
    appellants argument that the Crown should be prohibited from calling a witness
    who has relevant evidence to give because the Crown anticipates the witness
    will give evidence inconsistent with a prior statement and the Crown will seek
    to cross-examine the witness and challenge the witnesss credibility, has significant
    negative policy implications for the criminal trial process. It is not uncommon
    in certain kinds of prosecutions that persons who have relevant evidence to
    give do not want to testify for the Crown, perhaps because they are friends
    with the accused, or because they are afraid of the accused. If the appellants
    argument were to be accepted, a witness could effectively secure immunity from
    testifying for the Crown by advising the Crown and the defence that he or she
    would give testimony at trial favourable to the defence and inconsistent with prior
    statements made by the witness. A blanket rule against requiring a witness in
    those circumstances to testify would not further the search for the truth and
    would lead some to believe that witness intimidation works.

[61]

In
    my view, if the Crown has a good faith basis for believing that a witness has
    relevant evidence to give, the Crown may call that witness even though the
    Crown expects that the witness will give evidence inconsistent with the Crowns
    position and evidence that contradicts the witnesss prior statements. The
    Crown may call that witness even though it anticipates applying for leave to
    cross-examine that witness and challenging the credibility of that witness in
    certain respects: see D. Paciocco, at pp. 358-59. In choosing to call that
    witness, however, the Crown must realize that the trial judge has a discretion
    to both prohibit and limit cross-examination of the witness. In some
    circumstances, the Crown may call the witness only to find itself stuck with
    the answers given in-chief by that witness.

(b)

Did the trial judge err in declaring Ms. Mascia an adverse witness?

[62]

The
    trial judge declared Ms. Mascia adverse pursuant to s. 9(1) of the
Evidence
    Act
. However, he limited her cross-examination to questions about inconsistencies
    in various statements Ms. Mascia had given concerning when and where she had
    seen a man named Louis Latorre in a car with Mr. Di Trapani on the night of the
    murder. Mr. Latorre had been called by the Crown and had testified that he was
    with Mr. Di Trapani on that evening. According to Mr. Latorres evidence, he had
    driven Mr. Di Trapani to the scene of the murder at approximately 10:30 p.m.,
    and later to a house in the appellants neighbourhood. Ms. Mascia had testified
    that she had seen the two drive by earlier, at approximately 9:30 p.m.

[63]

In
    allowing cross-examination in that area, the trial judge reasoned that nothing
    in the record before him warranted a departure from this courts decision in
Figliola

#1
, that Ms. Mascia was properly ruled an adverse witness. By strictly
    limiting the scope of the cross-examination, the trial judge indicated he hoped
    to avoid any potential morphing of the cross-examination into a cross-examination
    at large: see
R. v. Figliola
, 2013 ONSC 4825, at para. 81.

[64]

The
    trial judge specifically turned his mind to both the potential probative value
    of the cross-examination and any potential prejudice flowing from it. He
    concluded there was some probative value to the cross-examination on the
    inconsistencies, and that any potential prejudice flowing from a limited
    cross-examination could be neutralized by a mid-trial limiting instruction as
    set out in
Soobrian
and
Figliola
    #1
.

[65]

As
    it turned out, the trial judge did not give a limiting instruction after Ms.
    Mascias cross-examination, but only because defence counsel strongly objected
    to any limiting instruction. Defence counsel also resisted any limiting
    instruction in the final jury instructions. The trial judge did, however, give
    a limiting instruction like that described in
Soobrian
and
Figliola

#1
. In the first part of the charge, in the context of referring to
    prior inconsistent statements, he told the jury:

I must also instruct you that if you do find Ms. Mascia not to
    be credible, you cannot use that finding to draw an inference adverse to Maria
    Figliola. In other words, if you conclude that Ms. Mascia is not credible, you
    cannot use that finding to conclude that Maria Figliola is guilty.

[66]

The
    appellant does not take issue with the determination that Ms. Mascia was an
    adverse witness. She contends, however, that the trial judge improperly
    exercised his discretion in allowing the Crown to cross-examine Ms. Mascia. The
    appellant maintains that the probative value/prejudicial effect analysis strongly
    favoured prohibiting cross-examination.

[67]

In
    support of this position, the appellant argues that the Crown was not taken by
    surprise by Ms. Mascias testimony. The Crown knew that Ms. Mascia would give
    evidence inconsistent with prior statements and in conflict with evidence given
    by Latorre. The Crown also had no reason to think that Ms. Mascia would adopt
    any of her prior statements as true, thereby making them substantive evidence
    in the case.

[68]

As
    I understand the thrust of this submission, the appellant contends that
    cross-examination under s. 9(1) of Crown witnesses is limited to situations in which
    the inconsistent evidence is unexpected and/or there is some real likelihood
    that cross-examination will cause the witness to adopt the earlier inconsistent
    statement.

[69]

The
    law is firmly against this submission: see
Dooley
, at para. 161. The
    Crown on the retrial was in no different position than the Crown in
Figliola

#1
. At the first trial, the Crown knew full well that Ms. Mascia would
    give evidence inconsistent with prior statements and that she was unlikely to
    provide helpful evidence for the Crown in respect of some issues. In
Figliola
    #1
, the court did not suggest that the Crown should not have been allowed
    to cross-examine Ms. Mascia because it knew she would give evidence
    inconsistent with her statements, or because there was no real prospect that
    she would adopt her earlier statements. To the contrary, the court implicitly
    accepted that she was properly cross-examined on those statements. The courts
    concern was that the cross-examination went well beyond the limits of s. 9(1).
    The appellants submission would unduly limit the scope of cross-examination permitted
    under s. 9(1) of the
Evidence Act
and is contrary to the holding in
Figliola

#1
.

[70]

The
    appellant next submits that Ms. Mascias evidence, was, by the time the Crown
    called her, of little importance to the Crowns case. The appellant also contends
    that defence counsels offer at trial to present Ms. Mascias evidence by way
    of an Agreed Statement of Facts further diminished the evidentiary value of her
    testimony for the Crown. In effect, the appellant contends that Ms. Mascias testimony
    had so little probative value to the Crowns case that any cross-examination on
    statements inconsistent with her testimony must have been outweighed by the
    potential prejudice it presented.

[71]

I
    do not accept the appellants evaluation of Ms. Mascias evidence. It was for
    the jury to determine the importance of her evidence to the Crowns case. A
    jury could reasonably find some of her evidence, particularly as it related to
    her interactions with the appellant after the murder, significantly probative. More
    importantly, I see no connection between the jurys assessment of the ultimate
    importance of Ms. Mascias evidence to the Crowns case and the trial judges
    decision, made in the course of her evidence, to permit cross-examination on
    certain specific prior inconsistent statements. The trial judges decision was
    aimed at ensuring the jury was fully equipped to assess Ms. Mascias
    credibility, regardless of the ultimate significance they chose to give to all
    or part of her evidence.

[72]

The
    suggestion that the defence offer to present Ms. Mascias evidence by way of an
    Agreed Statement of Facts was relevant to the trial judges exercise of his
    discretion under s. 9(1) is without substance on this record. First, defence
    counsel did not offer any proposed Agreed Statement of Facts and specifically
    did not indicate that it was prepared to agree to anything acceptable to the
    Crown in terms of Ms. Mascias evidence as to when she saw Mr. Latorre and Mr.
    Di Trapani in the vehicle. The defence counsel at trial merely stated he would
    consider an Agreed Statement of Facts. There was nothing before the trial
    judge by way of a proposed Agreed Statement of Facts that was sufficiently
    concrete to potentially have any influence on the exercise of his discretion
    under s. 9(1) of the
Evidence Act
.

[73]

Ms.
    Mascias evidence about when she saw Mr. Latorre and Mr. Di Trapani together on
    the evening of August 6 was directly relevant to the Crowns case. The Crown
    had a good faith basis to believe that she had relevant evidence to give on
    that issue. The evidence she chose to give was inconsistent with prior
    statements she had made and inconsistent with Mr. Latorres evidence. A jury
    could reasonably have been assisted in its assessment of the credibility of
    those answers and her overall credibility by cross-examination on her prior inconsistent
    statements.

[74]

The
    appellants argument that the trial judge undervalued the prejudice component
    of the analysis comes down to the assertion that the trial judge should have
    recognized that the cross-examination would inevitably slide into
Soobrian
territory. The appellant submits that the inevitability flowed from the
    Crowns realization, both that its witness would give inconsistent evidence and
    that no amount of cross-examination would yield any evidence of substantive
    value to the Crown.

[75]

This
    submission is best answered by examining what happened at trial. The limited
    cross-examination of Ms. Mascia by the Crown was viewed by defence counsel as
    so ineffective that he urged the trial judge to refrain from a mid-trial or
    final instruction cautioning the jury against the improper use of that
    cross-examination. According to defence counsels submissions, the Crowns
    cross-examination had fallen flat and did not give rise to the risk that the
    jury would engage in the improper reasoning prohibited by
Soobria
n. Defence
    counsel believed that an instruction cautioning against the misuse of the
    evidence might well lead the jury down a reasoning path that otherwise would
    not have occurred to the jury.

[76]

I
    agree with trial counsels description of the effect of the cross-examination
    of Ms. Mascia. That cross-examination did not give rise to any
Soobrian
concerns. I view the result of the cross-examination as a strong indication
    that the trial judge correctly weighed the probative value and prejudicial
    effect of the potential cross-examination. He further minimized any possible
    prejudice by telling the jury that Ms. Mascias prior inconsistent statements
    were relevant only to her credibility and could not be used to draw an
    inference adverse to Maria Figliola. The appellant has not demonstrated that
    the trial judge erred in his probative value/prejudicial effect analysis.

(c)

Did the trial judge err in allowing the Crown to re-examine Ms. Mascia?

[77]

At
    trial, the Crown sought to lead evidence of an interaction between Mr. Latorre,
    Ms. Mascia and her husband at a club in 2004. The incident occurred after the
    appellant had been charged, but before the first trial.

[78]

According
    to the Crown, Ms. Mascia and her husband confronted Mr. Latorre about
    testifying for the Crown. A tense incident ended with Ms. Mascias husband
    offering to shake Mr. Latorres hand. When Mr. Latorre refused, Ms. Mascias
    husband spat in his face. Mr. Latorre walked away. Ms. Mascia and her husband
    were charged with intimidating a witness. The charge was later withdrawn
    against Ms. Mascia.

[79]

The
    trial judge initially refused to allow the Crown to lead this evidence through Mr.
    Latorre. After the cross-examination of Ms. Mascia, the Crown sought leave to
    re-examine her about the encounter. The Crown maintained that Ms. Mascias
    cross-examination had created a potentially misleading impression that Ms.
    Mascia had attempted to co-operate with the police throughout their
    investigation, and had made it appear as though Ms. Mascia had been badly
    treated by the authorities.

[80]

The
    trial judge accepted the Crowns argument and allowed re-examination. After
    having her memory refreshed, Ms. Mascia gave a relatively benign account of the
    event. She testified that she had been charged and that the charge had been
    withdrawn.

[81]

The
    trial judge gave the jury an instruction on this evidence immediately after Ms.
    Mascia testified. He told them that the evidence of the incident involving Mr. Latorre
    was admissible only for the purpose of assessing Ms. Mascias credibility and
    that the jury should bear in mind the charge was withdrawn. The trial judge
    gave that direction again in his final instructions, adding that the evidence
    relevant to the incident in the club should not be considered by the jury as
    part of the totality of the evidence to be considered in determining the guilt
    or innocence of Ms. Figliola.

[82]

The
    Crown should not have been allowed to re-examine Ms. Mascia about the incident
    at the club involving Mr. Latorre. I agree with the appellant that defence counsels
    cross-examination of her did not create a misleading picture. Ms. Mascia was
    cross-examined at length about various inconsistent statements. Defence counsel
    was entitled to bring out in his cross-examination of Ms. Mascia that whatever
    problems there may have been with her prior statements and her veracity, they
    never reached the point where the police saw fit to charge her with anything in
    relation to those statements. That line of questioning did not open the door to
    questions about other conduct totally unrelated to anything she said to the
    police.

[83]

I
    also do not see how Ms. Mascias evidence about her encounter with Mr. Latorre
    could have any positive or negative impact on her credibility. On the evidence
    the jury heard, Ms. Mascia did not do anything that could reasonably have had any
    negative impact on her credibility as a witness. Clearly, the fact that she was
    charged, when those charges were later withdrawn, cannot support the inference
    that she intimidated or threatened Mr. Latorre. I do not see how this line of
    re-examination could have assisted the jury in evaluating Ms. Mascias
    credibility.

[84]

Although
    I am satisfied that the questions should not have been asked, I am equally
    satisfied they worked no unfairness on the appellant. I see virtually no possibility
    that the jury used this evidence for anything. Further, the trial judges
    twice-given, strong admonition that the evidence could not assist in proving
    the case against the appellant was a strong and effective prophylactic.

D: The Crowns closing

[85]

Mr.
    Latorre testified that initially he did not voluntarily come forward to tell
    the police what he knew because he was afraid. Crown counsel, in his closing,
    referred to evidence that the Crown alleged gave credence to Mr. Latorres
    assertion that he was afraid. The evidence identified by the Crown included Ms.
    Mascias evidence about the incident at the club involving her, her husband and
    Mr. Latorre. The Crown argued that Ms. Mascia and her husband had intended to
    frighten and intimidate Mr. Latorre and that this gave some validity to his
    assertion about being afraid.

[86]

Defence
    counsel at trial argued that the Crown had improperly suggested to the jury
    that it could use Ms. Mascias evidence about her encounter with Mr. Latorre to
    buttress Mr. Latorres credibility. Counsel submitted that the trial judge had
    made it clear that the evidence of the encounter was relevant only to Ms.
    Mascias credibility and that the Crowns argument directly contravened that
    ruling. Defence counsel asked for a mistrial, or alternatively an immediate and
    strong instruction to the jury telling them that Crown counsels comment was
    improper and should be ignored.

[87]

The
    trial judge described the Crowns submission tying Mr. Latorres fear of
    testifying to Ms. Mascias evidence about the encounter in the club as
    problematic since Mr. Latorre had not testified about the incident or
    suggested that he was in any way intimidated by Ms. Mascia. The trial judge
    declined to order a mistrial or provide an immediate curative instruction. He
    indicated he would deal with the issue in his final instructions.

[88]

In
    his final instructions, the trial judge pointed out to the jury that the
    evidence of the encounter between Mr. Latorre and Ms. Mascia was relevant only
    to her credibility. He told the jury that there was no evidence that the
    incident frightened Mr. Latorre or had any impact on him. Finally, the trial
    judge repeated his instruction that the evidence had nothing to do with the
    guilt or innocence of Ms. Figliola.

[89]

I
    agree with the appellant that Ms. Mascias evidence about her interaction in
    the club with Mr. Latorre could not support Mr. Latorres evidence that he did
    not initially come forward because he was afraid. As pointed out by the trial
    judge, there was simply no evidence of Mr. Latorres reaction, if any, to the
    events described by Ms. Mascia.

[90]

I
    am also satisfied that the Crowns single misstep in a lengthy closing argument
    had no impact on the fairness of the trial. A declaration of a mistrial would
    have been a gross overreaction. The trial judges comments in his closing
    instructions to the jury effectively neutered any possible harm the Crowns
    comment may have caused.

conclusion

[91]

The
    appellants trial was not perfect. No trial is. The minor errors described above
    had no impact on the fairness of the trial and give no cause to doubt the
    verdict.

[92]

I
    would dismiss the appeal.

Released: DD  JUN 25 2018

Doherty J.A.

I agree Gloria Epstein J.A.

I agree S.E. Pepall J.A.

[1]

During oral argument, counsel for the appellant suggested that
    if any of the alleged errors amounted to an error in law, the appellant was also
    entitled to a new trial. Counsel contended that the Crown could not rely on the
    curative proviso and the court could not invoke the proviso, as it had not been
    raised by the Crown in its factum.

Without in any way accepting the
    merits of this submission, I think the appeal should be decided on the basis of
    the arguments presented in the appellants factum  were there errors in the
    treatment of Ms. Mascias evidence that rendered the trial unfair and the
    verdict a miscarriage of justice?

[2]
At the time of the first trial, Ms. Mascia was married and using her husbands surname
    Pignatelli. By the time of the second trial, she was divorced and was using her
    own surname.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Gardner, 2018 ONCA 584

DATE: 20180626

DOCKET: C64995

Hourigan, Pardu and Nordheimer JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Appellant

and

Jordan Gardner

Respondent

Jennifer Epstein, for the appellant

Karen Seeley, for the respondent

Heard: June 22, 2018

On appeal from the decision dated August 30, 2017 by
    Justice F. Bruce Fitzpatrick of the Superior Court of Justice sitting as a
    Summary Convictions Appeal Court, with reasons reported at 2017 ONSC 5175, dismissing
    an appeal from the acquittal entered on October 17, 2016 by Justice Jennifer R.
    Hoshizaki of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Nordheimer J.A.:

[1]

The Crown appeals, with leave,
[1]
from the decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge (SCAJ) that dismissed
    the Crowns appeal from an acquittal on a charge of driving with more than 80
    mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the
Criminal
    Code
, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. At the conclusion of the hearing before this
    court, we allowed the appeal with reasons to follow. I now provide those
    reasons.

[2]

In summary, both the SCAJ and the trial judge erred in finding that the
    respondents
Charter
rights had been breached, and thus further erred
    in excluding both the breathalyser readings and the respondents statements
    made at the time of the police stop from the evidence.

Background Facts

[3]

On December 12, 2015, at approximately 11:25 p.m., Constable Lieverse of
    the Treaty Three Police
[2]
received a call that a specific individual was suspected to be impaired and
    driving a green pickup truck in the Wabigoon Lake First Nation community. Constable
    Lieverse arrived in the Wabigoon Lake community approximately 20 minutes after
    receiving the call. Constable Lieverse first attended the residence of this
    individual but the individual was not home.

[4]

Constable Lieverse left the residence and drove along Main Road.
    Constable Lieverse observed an oncoming motor vehicle. Because it was dark, and
    the road had no street lighting, Constable Lieverse could only see the
    headlights as the vehicle approached. It appeared to Constable Lieverse to be a
    pickup truck. Constable Lieverses activated his emergency lights and stopped
    his cruiser. Constable Lieverse stepped out onto the roadway and flagged the
    vehicle to stop. The vehicle stopped. Constable Lieverse gave evidence that he
    could not tell what colour the truck was as it approached. In
    cross-examination, Constable Lieverse said he would not have been able to tell
    what colour the motor vehicle was until it passed him.

[5]

The motor vehicle that Constable Lieverse stopped was a pickup truck but
    it was a red pickup truck, not a green one. The red pickup was being driven by the
    respondent.

[6]

Constable Lieverse approached the drivers side of the vehicle and asked
    the respondent to roll down his window and identify himself. Constable Lieverse
    advised the respondent that he was looking for an impaired driver. Constable
    Lieverse could smell the odour of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. He asked the
    respondent if he had been drinking. The respondent responded that he had. Constable
    Lieverse asked the respondent to step out of the motor vehicle because there
    were other persons in the vehicle and he wanted to isolate the respondent from
    the others in order to determine the source of the alcohol smell. Once outside
    the vehicle, Constable Lieverse could smell alcohol on the respondents breath.
    As a result of that fact, and an admission by the respondent that he had been
    drinking, Constable Lieverse made a demand for a roadside breath sample from
    the respondent.

[7]

Constable Lieverse asked the respondent when he consumed his last drink.
    The respondent advised that his last drink had been only several minutes
    earlier. As a consequence, Constable Lieverse elected to wait 15 minutes before
    administering the breath test in order to eliminate the effects of any residual
    mouth alcohol. Thereafter, the respondent provided the breath sample. The
    Approved Screening Device registered a Fail. Constable Lieverse said that he then
    formed reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent was driving over 80.

[8]

Constable Lieverse arrested the respondent. He then, and for the first
    time, gave the respondent his rights to counsel. He also gave the respondent
    the standard caution about his right to remain silent and he read the standard
    breath demand. Constable Lieverse took the respondent to a police station to administer
    a breathalyser test. Prior to administering the test, Constable Lieverse asked
    the respondent if he wished to speak to counsel. The respondent declined. Constable
    Lieverse reiterated the rights to counsel and the respondent again waived his
    rights. Two breathalyser tests were then administered. The readings from those tests
    at 1:31 a.m. and 1:54 a.m. were 110 and 107 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood,
    respectively.

The Trial

[9]

At trial, the respondent alleged that his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a),
    and 10(b) of the
Charter
had been violated. The respondent asserted
    that his rights under s. 9 were breached because the police did not have any
    right to stop his vehicle. This assertion arose from the respondents companion
    assertion that the police were engaged in a criminal investigation relating to
    a specific individual and, since the respondent was not that individual, the
    police could not rely on authority, under the
Highway Traffic Act
,
    R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, to stop him.

[10]

From
    these assertions, the respondent said that it followed that, when the police
    did stop him, they were engaged in an investigative detention and that the
    respondent ought to have been given his rights to counsel from the moment of
    the stop. The respondent also argued that his s. 8 rights were breached, as
    Constable Lieverse did not have reasonable and probable grounds to make the
    breath demand, and his s. 10(a) rights were breached as the Constable Lieverse failed
    to promptly inform him of the proper reason for his detention.

[11]

The
    trial judge accepted the respondents position. She found that the respondents
    ss. 8, 9, and 10
Charter
rights were breached. The trial judge then determined
    that the breathalyser and contemporaneous statements evidence should be
    excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the
Charter
. As such, the respondent
    was acquitted.

[12]

In
    reaching her decision, the trial judge concluded that the respondent was
    detained for a purpose under the
Criminal Code
, and not pursuant to
    the
Highway Traffic Act
. She therefore found that Mr. Gardner was
    arbitrarily detained. The trial judge found that the respondent should have
    been informed of his rights to counsel immediately upon his detention. The trial
    judge did not provide specific reasons for her conclusion that there had been a
    breach of s. 10(a). Rather, she only addressed the s. 10(b) issue. The trial judge
    also found that Constable Lieverse breached the respondents s. 8
Charter
rights because he did not have grounds to stop the respondents vehicle.

The Summary Conviction Appeal

[13]

The
    Crown appealed to the Superior Court of Justice. The Crown asserted that the
    trial judge had made two errors of law by:

i.

finding that the police were not permitted to detain the respondent
    either under the
Highway Traffic Act
or at common law; and

ii.

finding that there had been a breach of the respondents rights under s.
    10(a) of the
Charter
.

[14]

The
    SCAJ dismissed the appeal. He concluded that the trial judge had made a
    finding of fact that the stop resulted in an investigative detention and that
    this finding was open to the trial judge on the evidence. The SCAJ concluded
    that the polices powers to stop a vehicle under the
Highway Traffic Act
did not apply to the instant case.

[15]

In
    reaching his conclusion, the SCAJ said, at para. 49:

In my view, the findings of the trial judge are ones that could
    have been reasonably reached. The decision was supported by the evidence. The
    decision is not clearly wrong in law. Further, I find the decision to be
    reasonable in light of the findings of fact. In my view, the acquittal in this
    case did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.

Issues on Appeal

[16]

The
    Crown identified three issues in its motion for leave to appeal. They are:

(i)

whether the SCAJ erred by applying the wrong standard of review;

(ii)

whether the SCAJ erred in law by failing to find that the trial judges conclusion,
    that the respondent was detained, was an error of law; and

(iii)

whether the SCAJ erred in law by failing to find that the trial judges conclusions
    regarding the
Charter
breaches were errors of law?

Analysis

[17]

I
    agree with the Crown that the SCAJ applied the wrong standard of review because
    he mischaracterized the trial judges conclusions as findings of fact when they
    were actually conclusions of law. The appropriate standard of review was
    therefore correctness:
Housen v. Nikolaisen
, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2
    S.C.R. 235, at paras. 8 and 36.

[18]

The
    central issue in this appeal is the proper characterization of the nature of
    the stop. The trial judge concluded that Constable Lieverse was engaged in a
    criminal investigation and thus could not rely on the authority given to him by
    the
Highway Traffic Act
to stop the respondents vehicle to check on
    the sobriety of the driver. Section 48(1) of the
Highway Traffic Act
reads:

A police officer, readily identifiable as such, may require the
    driver of a motor vehicle to stop for the purpose of determining whether or not
    there is evidence to justify making a demand under section 254 of the
Criminal
    Code
(Canada).

[19]

The
    purpose for which Constable Lieverse stopped the respondents vehicle was to
    determine if the driver of the vehicle was impaired. The fact that Constable
    Lieverse stopped a vehicle, that was not the same vehicle for which he had a
    report of possible impaired driving, does not change the reason for the stop. The
    fact that Constable Lieverse fortuitously discovered another impaired driver is
    irrelevant to the legal analysis. Constable Lieverse had reason to believe that
    a person was operating a pickup truck while impaired. This informed Constable
    Lieverses decision to stop the respondents pickup truck to determine if the
    driver of the pickup truck was impaired. He had the authority to do so under s.
    48(1) of the
Highway Traffic Act
.

[20]

The
    trial judge erred in law in finding that the actions of Constable Lieverse constituted
    only an investigative detention that did not include a traffic stop for highway
    safety purposes under the
Highway Traffic Act
. This error led, in
    turn, to the trial judges erroneous conclusion that stopping the respondents
    vehicle constituted a breach of the respondents s. 9
Charter
rights.

[21]

Police
    officers have the right to stop a vehicle for the purpose of checking on the
    sobriety of the driver. This is a power that the police have both at common law
    and through statutes such as the
Highway Traffic Act
:
R. v.
    Orbanski
;
R. v. Elias
, 2005 SCC 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at
    para. 41.

[22]

The
    actions of the police in stopping a vehicle under their authority at common law
    or by statute only constitutes an unconstitutional stop if the reason for the
    stop is unconnected to a highway safety purpose. That is what distinguishes
    this case from cases such as
R. v. Simpson
(1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 182
    (C.A.), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482. In that case, Doherty J.A. made this very point, at
    p. 491:

In
Dedman
,
supra
, at pp. 119-22, the court held
    that the common law ancillary police power justified random stops of vehicles
    in the course of the enforcement of laws relating to the operation of those
    vehicles. This power to stop was, however, closely tied to the particular
    purpose of the stops, the dangers presented by the activity targeted by the
    stops, the qualified nature of the liberty interfered with by the stops, and
    the absence of other less intrusive means of effective enforcement of the
    relevant laws. The authority to stop described in
Dedman
was clearly not
    a general power to stop for all police purposes, but was limited to stops made
    in furtherance of the police duty to protect those who use the public roadways
    from those who use those roadways in a dangerous manner.

[23]

If
    the police stop a motorist for a criminal investigation unrelated to highway
    safety, then they must have an articulable cause for the stop. In
Simpson
,
    the police were investigating drug activity, not highway safety. That is the
    reason that this court found a
Charter
breach, excluded the evidence,
    quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal in that case.

[24]

This
    same distinction applies to one of the cases relied upon by the trial judge,
    namely,
R. v. Lacoste
, 2014 ONSC 7481. In
Lacoste
, para. 31,
    the trial judge found that the police stop was not made pursuant to their
    authority under the
Highway Traffic Act
. Indeed, the police did not
    suggest it was. Rather, the police were searching for someone who had stolen
    gas and stopped the vehicle in furtherance of that investigation. It again had
    nothing to do with highway safety.

[25]

Had
    the trial judge correctly characterized the reason underlying the stop of the
    respondents vehicle, she would have concluded that it was not an investigative
    detention that would invoke s. 9 of the
Charter
and there was no
    breach of the respondents rights under ss. 10(a) or 10(b). I note, in passing,
    that this court, unfortunately, did not have the benefit of any reasons from
    the trial judge respecting the alleged s. 10(a) breach. The SCAJ acknowledged
    the lack of reasons underlying the trial judges conclusion on this issue but
    said, at para. 45, that the basis for the conclusion is otherwise apparent
    from the record. Unfortunately, the SCAJ did not go on to identify what portions
    of the record made those conclusions apparent.

[26]

What
    I see as apparent from the record is that almost immediately upon stopping the
    respondents vehicle, Constable Lieverse advised the respondent that he was
    looking for an impaired driver. He then proceeded to ask questions of the
    respondent that were directly related to that purpose. There cannot have been any
    doubt in the respondents mind as to why his vehicle was stopped. Consequently,
    there is no basis for a finding that either the temporal or informational
    elements of the respondents s. 10(a) rights were breached:
R. v. Roberts
,
    2018 ONCA 411, at para. 63.

[27]

There
    was a delay in advising the respondent of his rights to counsel under s. 10(b),
    but that delay was in order to determine whether there was a reasonable grounds
    to believe that the respondent was impaired, such as to warrant a roadside
    breath demand through an Approved Screening Device. The Supreme Court of Canada
    confirmed in
R
. v. Orbanski
;
R. v. Elias
, at para. 52
    that giving rights to counsel can be delayed during the time required to
    implement a roadside breath demand. In this case, once the respondent failed
    the roadside test, he was immediately advised of his rights to counsel. The
    SCAJ erred in upholding the trial judges conclusion that the respondents s.
    10(b) rights had been violated again, apparently, on the basis that is was a
    finding of fact entitled to deference. It was not.

[28]

Finally,
    the trial judges finding that there was a breach of the respondents s. 8
Charter

rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure flowed from her erroneous
    conclusion that there had been a breach of the respondents s. 9 rights
    resulting from an arbitrary detention. I have already said that there was no
    arbitrary detention. Both the roadside demand and the subsequent breathalyser
    test are expressly authorized by the
Criminal Code
and were properly
    implemented in this case. Once Constable Lieverse smelled alcohol on the
    respondents breath, he was entitled to administer a roadside test. When the
    respondent failed that roadside test, Constable Lieverse was entitled to arrest
    the respondent and conduct a breathalyser test: see,
e.g
.
, this
    courts most recent review of these principles in
R. v. Notaro
, 2018
    ONCA 449, at paras. 34-44. Neither of these tests involved any breach of the
    respondents s. 8
Charter
rights.

[29]

The
    SCAJ compounded the errors below by simply deferring to the trial judges
    finding that there had been an arbitrary detention instead of reviewing her
    conclusions for correctness in law.

[30]

In
    the end result, each of the trial judges findings of
Charter
breaches
    was erroneous because of her legally incorrect conclusion regarding Constable Lieverses
    reason for stopping the respondents vehicle. The trial judge therefore erred
    in excluding the breathalyser evidence and the respondents statements.

[31]

As
    a result, this court must determine the appropriate remedy. Section
    686(4)(b)(ii) of the
Criminal Code
authorizes a court of appeal in
    indictable appeals to enter a verdict of guilty on an appeal from an acquittal.
[3]
This court is entitled to enter a finding of guilt in respect of the index offence
    where this court concludes that the respondent should have been found guilty,
    but for the error of law committed by the trial judge:
R. v. Labadie
, 2011
    ONCA 227, 105 O.R. (3d) 98, at para. 61. In this case, the respondent fairly
    conceded that, if the breathalyser results and the statements were not excluded
    under s. 24(2) of the
Charter
, there was sufficient evidence to
    convict the respondent of driving over 80.

Conclusion

[32]

It
    is for these reasons that the appeal was allowed. The decision of the SCAJ, and
    the acquittal entered by the trial judge, are both set aside. In its place, I
    would enter a conviction. I would remit the matter back to the Ontario Court of
    Justice for sentencing.

Released: GP JUN 26 2018

I.V.B. Nordheimer J.A.

I agree. C.W. Hourigan J.A.

I agree. G. Pardu J.A.

[1]

Leave to appeal was granted by endorsement dated February
    16, 2018 (Docket M48393).

[2]

The Treaty Three Police Service is a First Nation
    self-administered police service. Members of the Treaty Three Police Service are
    appointed as First Nations Constables by the Commissioner of the OPP pursuant
    to s. 54 of the
Police Services Act
, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15.

[3]

By virtue of s. 839(2), the powers of the court of
    appeal under s. 686(4)(b)(ii) apply to summary conviction appeal matters.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. George-Nurse, 2018 ONCA 515

DATE: 20180606

DOCKET: C64222

MacPherson, Hourigan and Miller JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Devante George-Nurse

Appellant

Devante George-Nurse, appearing in person

Brian Snell, appearing as duty counsel

Deborah Calderwood, for the respondent

Heard: May 9, 2018

On appeal from the conviction entered on May 31, 2017 by
    Justice Sean Dunphy of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.

Hourigan J.A. (Dissenting):

Introduction

[1]

The appellant was convicted by a jury of one count of intentionally discharging
    a firearm while reckless as to the life or safety of another person (
Criminal
    Code
, s. 244.2(1)(b)) and one count of occupying a motor vehicle while
    knowing there was a firearm in the vehicle (s. 94(1)). He appeals his
    convictions on the ground that they are unreasonable. I agree, and would
    therefore allow his appeal on both offences.

Facts

[2]

On the evening of August 12, 2015, the appellant borrowed his mothers
    Nissan Maxima and drove to 237 Roywood Drive to visit his god sister and
    Rikisha Reddon Barrow, an ex-girlfriend.

[3]

At some point overnight, the Maximas tires were slashed and the windshield
    was damaged. Ms. Reddon Barrow advised the appellant that Shakur Foster, her
    former boyfriend, had slashed the tires. Witnesses testified that the appellant
    was angry when he learned that the Maximas tires had been slashed, although
    the Crown and defence drew different inferences about how angry the appellant
    had become.

[4]

There were security cameras at the Roywood complex and they captured the
    following events on August 13.

[5]

At 2:10 p.m., the appellant exited 237 Roywood while Connie Reddon, Ms. Reddon
    Barrows mother, tried to restrain him. Ms. Reddon testified that she was
    trying to prevent the appellant from going to 239 Roywood to confront Mr.
    Foster. The appellant returned to 237 Roywood after the confrontation.

[6]

At around 2:40 p.m., a black SUV arrived at the Roywood complex parking
    lot. Within seconds, the appellant emerged from 237 Roywood with his backpack.
    The appellant boarded the SUV through the front passenger side door. The SUV then
    left the parking lot and returned to the lot in reverse. The video surveillance
    shows the appellant then exit the SUV and retrieve something in a bag from the
    Maxima. There was no evidence to suggest that either that bag or the
    appellants backpack contained a gun.

[7]

The appellant got back into the SUV and it exited the parking lot. The SUV
    stopped in the street in front of a pathway leading to a playground between 235
    and 239 Roywood. Mr. Foster was standing in the backyard of 239 Roywood. The
    driver of the SUV fired several shots and then sped off. Mr. Foster testified
    that he heard a ricochet off the fence in the backyard where he was standing.

[8]

There was no evidence regarding the identity of the SUV driver. A search
    of the appellants cell phone did not provide any evidence that he contacted
    someone to pick him up before the SUV arrived at 237 Roywood. Despite Mr.
    Fosters testimony, no bullet was located in the backyard. A shell casing was
    found in the street.

Trial

[9]

The Crown did not allege that the appellant had fired the gun. Its
    theory was that the appellant counselled the SUV driver to shoot at or near Mr.
    Foster as retaliation for the damage done to his mothers car. The Crown
    conceded that there was no direct evidence of counselling and instead invited
    the jury to infer counselling from a number of facts, including: the appellant
    was one of only two people in the SUV, the shooting was directed at Mr. Foster
    who the appellant had been told slashed his mothers tires, and the appellant
    knew where Mr. Foster was located.

[10]

The
    defence suggested that the circumstantial evidence was consistent with a number
    of possibilities other than the appellant having counselled the driver to shoot.
    One possibility the defence put forward was that the appellant told the driver
    about the damage to his mothers car and the driver took it upon himself to
    avenge the appellant without any counselling.

[11]

The
    jury convicted the appellant of the two counts appealed from and acquitted him of
    intentionally discharging a firearm with the intent to endanger Mr. Fosters
    life.

Analysis

(i)

Counselling Discharge of a Firearm

[12]

When
    assessing whether a verdict was reasonable, an appellate court asks whether, on
    the whole of the evidence, the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury,
    acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered. The court does not ask
    whether it would have convicted the appellant, but whether the verdict is
    supportable on any reasonable view of the evidence:
R. v. McCracken
,
    2016 ONCA 228, 348 O.A.C. 267, at paras. 23-24.

[13]

The
    case against the appellant on this count was based entirely on circumstantial
    evidence. The Crown provided a plausible narrative to support its contention
    that the appellant counselled the SUV driver to shoot at Mr. Foster. However,
    in cases where the proof of one or more of the elements of the offence depends
    exclusively or largely on circumstantial evidence, an inference of guilt must
    be the only reasonable available inference. This ensures that the trier of fact
    will not fill in the blanks in the evidence by overlooking reasonable
    alternative inferences:
R. v. Villaroman
, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R.
    1000, at para. 30.

[14]

In
    the case at bar, there was no evidence that the appellant summoned the SUV
    driver. There was also no evidence regarding what was said, if anything,
    between the appellant and the SUV driver. Did the appellant counsel the driver
    to shoot at Mr. Foster? It is possible that that was exactly what he did. But
    it is also possible that it was the drivers intention to shoot at Mr. Foster
    without any counselling from the appellant.

[15]

In
    oral submissions, the Crown says that any alternative inference is entirely speculative
    because it lacks evidential support. In
Villaroman,
at para. 36, Justice
    Cromwell, writing for the court, rejected a similar argument:

I agree with the respondents position that a
    reasonable doubt, or theory alternative to guilt, is not rendered speculative
    by the mere fact that it arises from a lack of evidence. As stated by this
    Court in
Lifchus
,

a reasonable doubt is a
    doubt based on reason and common sense which must be logically based upon the
    evidence
or lack of evidence
: para. 30 (emphasis added). A certain gap
    in the evidence may result in inferences other than guilt. But those inferences
    must be reasonable given the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed
    logically, and in light of human experience and common sense.

[16]

As
    the court noted in
Villaroman,
at para. 38, the distinction between a
    plausible theory and speculation may sometimes be fine. The trier of fact is
    required to look logically at the evidence or absence of evidence, in light of
    human experience, to determine whether an inference other than guilt may reasonably
    be drawn.

[17]

The
    fact that the appellant did not testify to offer a plausible alternative
    version of events is of no assistance to the Crown in this case. Appellate courts
    may refer to an accuseds silence as indicative of an absence of an exculpatory
    explanation when considering an unreasonable verdict argument on appeal.
    However, the accuseds failure to testify is generally relevant only in cases
    where the Crown has adduced a compelling body of evidence:
R. v. Noble
, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874, at para. 103.

[18]

In
R. v. LePage
,

[1995] 1 S.C.R. 654
, at paras. 29-30, a majority of the Supreme
    Court of Canada endorsed the following statement from
R. v.
    Johnson
(1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 340 (C.A.): No adverse
    inference can be drawn if there is no case to answer. A weak prosecution's case
    cannot be strengthened by the failure of the accused to testify. See also
R.
    v. Hay
, 2009 ONCA 398, 249 O.A.C. 24, at para. 37
[1]
; and
R. v. Tremble
,
2017 ONCA 671,
    354 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 98.

[19]

Thus, while the jurisprudence makes clear that the accuseds failure to
    testify may be taken into account in assessing whether there is an innocent
    inference available, it would make little sense to factor in that failure when reasonable
    innocent explanations are already apparent by looking at the gaps in the
    Crowns case. In
the case at bar, the evidence against the appellant
    that he had counselled the SUV driver to shoot at Mr. Foster was weak. It would
    have been foolhardy for any competent defence lawyer to advise a client to
    testify in these circumstances. There was simply no need to call evidence to
    support an alternative version of events.

[20]

In
    my view, there was a lacuna in the evidence such that no trier of fact acting
    reasonably could have concluded that there was no reasonable inference other
    than guilt.

(ii)

Occupying
    a Motor Vehicle

[21]

The foregoing analysis is equally applicable to the conviction on
    occupying the vehicle with knowledge of the gun, which was also based entirely
    on circumstantial evidence. There were innocent explanations available to the
    jury on the evidence and lack of evidence adduced at trial.

[22]

There was no evidence to support any suggestion that the appellant
    brought the gun into the SUV himself. It is impossible to say with any degree
    of certainty when the appellant became aware of the presence of the gun in the SUV.
    There was also no evidence whether, knowing that the gun was present, he had
    any feasible opportunity to exit the SUV. At the time of the shooting, the
    appellant was obviously aware of the presence of the gun, but the video
    surveillance showed that the vehicle left the area at high speed, which would
    make it impossible for him to safely exit the SUV. There was no evidence of
    what happened thereafter.

[23]

In my view, no properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably
    have convicted the appellant on this count.

Disposition

[24]

For
    the foregoing reasons, I would allow the appeal, quash the convictions, and
    enter acquittals in their place.

C.W. Hourigan J.A.

MacPherson J.A.:

[25]

I
    have had the opportunity to read my colleagues reasons in this appeal. With
    respect, I do not agree with his analysis or his proposed disposition. I would
    dismiss the appeal and affirm the convictions on both counts.

Analysis

[26]

I
    agree with the starting point my colleague identifies in his reasons. When
    assessing whether a verdict is unreasonable, the crucial question is whether
    the verdict is supportable on
any
reasonable view of the evidence:
R.
    v. McCracken
, 2016 ONCA 228, at paras. 24.

[27]

The
    evidence at trial established the following:

·

The appellant spent a night at his ex-girlfriends home at unit
    237 of a housing complex;

·

During the night, the car he brought (his mothers) had its tires
    slashed. The cars windshield was later damaged as well;

·

The ex-girlfriend informed the appellant that another
    ex-boyfriend, Shakur Foster, had slashed the tires. Foster lived at unit 239 of
    the same housing complex;

·

Witnesses testified that the appellant was angry;

·

Security cameras recorded the appellant leaving unit 237 at about
    2:10 p.m. His ex-girlfriends mother tried to restrain him. She failed. She
    testified that she was trying to prevent him from going to unit 239;

·

The appellant went to unit 239 and confronted Foster. The
    confrontation was not captured by security cameras;

·

The appellant returned to unit 237 after the confrontation. He
    was still angry;

·

At about 2:40 p.m., a black SUV arrived at the housing complex
    parking lot. The appellant came out of unit 237 with a backpack and immediately
    entered the vehicle;

·

The SUV left the parking lot, but immediately returned. The
    appellant got out, went to his mothers car, retrieved a bag, and returned to
    the SUV;

·

The SUV left the parking lot a second time and stopped almost
    immediately near unit 239. The driver of the SUV fired four shots and then sped
    off; and

·

Foster, who was standing in the backyard of unit 239, testified
    that he heard a ricochet off the fence. A shell casing was found in the street.

[28]

The
    jury convicted the appellant of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless
    as to the life or safety of another person
[2]
and occupying a motor vehicle while knowing there was a firearm in the vehicle.
    The jury acquitted the appellant of intentionally discharging a firearm with
    the intent to endanger Fosters life.

[29]

Given
    the time frame in which the events captured by security cameras unfolded
    (2:10-2:40 p.m.), the appellants condition (demonstrably angry), his conduct
    (confronting Foster at his home), and the final constellation of criminal
    activity (a car arrives, the appellant immediately enters it, and the driver
    almost immediately fires four shots in the vicinity of Foster), I think the
    jurys verdicts on the three counts are reasonable.

[30]

Presumably,
    the jury determined that the appellant counselled the unknown driver to fire
    shots in the vicinity of Foster and was in the car when the driver did so.
    However, the jury was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the shooter
    intended to endanger Fosters life, possibly because of the lack of ballistic
    evidence about where the four shots struck. In my view, this is an entirely
    reasonable set of verdicts for the jury to have rendered.

[31]

My
    colleague emphasizes that since the case against the appellant was based
    entirely on circumstantial evidence, an inference of guilt must have been the
    only reasonable available inference: see
R. v. Villaroman
, 2016 SCC
    33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 30. He determines that there was another
    reasonable inference available in this case: that the driver intended to shoot
    at Foster without any counselling from the appellant.

[32]

However,
    I note that the appellant did not testify at trial. In my view, his failure to
    testify negates the alternative inference my colleague identifies.

[33]

As
    recognized by my colleague, appellate courts may refer to an accuseds silence
    as indicative of an absence of an exculpatory explanation when considering an
    unreasonable verdict argument on appeal:
R. v. Noble
,
    [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874, at para. 103
. However, relying on
R. v. Lepage
,
    [1995] 1 S.C.R. 654, at paras. 29-30, my colleague concludes that no adverse
    inference can be drawn from the appellant not testifying in this case because
    there was no case to answer.

[34]

With
    respect, I disagree. The facts I set out above established a strong case to
    answer, namely, that the appellant: was angry; had already overcome persuasion
    and resistance (his ex-girlfriends mother); had gone to Fosters home and
    confronted him; very soon thereafter (several minutes at most) joined a man he
    knew in a car who had a firearm; and participated in an enterprise in which
    four shots were fired near Foster and his backyard. In my view, this is a
    paradigm of a case to meet, far removed from no case to answer.

[35]

This
    court is therefore entitled to consider the appellants failure to testify in
    assessing whether an innocent inference was available:
Noble
, at para. 103.

[36]

The
    appellant was in the car during the events in question. He obviously knows who
    the driver/shooter was. He also obviously knows what happened leading up the
    shooting. Yet, he did not provide an innocent explanation at trial. It was not
    unreasonable for the jury to consider this and conclude there was no
exculpatory explanation or innocent inference available.

[37]

I
    make a final point. Appellate courts should be very cautious about declaring a
    jury verdict unreasonable. By definition, this issue is only considered if a
    criminal trial has been a fair trial from start to finish and if the trial
    judges jury charge is unimpeachable. In this context, it is no light thing to
    conclude that a unanimous verdict of 12 jurors is unreasonable, that is, not
    supportable on
any
reasonable view of the evidence:
McCracken
, at para. 24 (emphasis in original)
. In
    my view, the jurys verdicts in this case are far removed from deserving this
    label.

[38]

I
    would dismiss the appeal.

Released: J.C.M. June 6, 2018

J.C. MacPherson J.A.

I agree. B.W. Miller J.A.

[1]

Reversed on unrelated grounds: 2013 SCC 61, [2013] 3 S.C.R.
    694.

[2]

I agree with my colleagues explanation of this count  the
    Crown theory was that the appellant counselled the SUV driver to shoot at or
    near Foster as retaliation for the damage done to the appellants mothers car.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Hewitt, 2018 ONCA 561

DATE: 20180619

DOCKET: C64079

Sharpe, Roberts and Trotter JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Amanda Hewitt

Appellant

Robert J. Reynolds, for the appellant

Avene Derwa, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: June 18, 2018

On appeal from the sentence imposed on June 21, 2017 by
    Justice S. Hunter of the Ontario Court of Justice.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

The appellant appeals from her three-year
    sentence (less six months for pre-sentence custody) following her guilty plea
    for trafficking in firearms. She was granted leave to appeal sentence on
    February 16, 2018. She has now served 12 months of her sentence and is eligible
    for parole.

[2]

Pursuant to a joint submission, the appellant
    received the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2)(a) of the
Criminal
    Code
, less 6 months credit for pre-sentence custody.

[3]

The appellant submits that the mandatory minimum
    sentence under s. 99(2)(a) is contrary to s. 12 of the
Charter
because
    it is overly broad. It captures reasonable hypotheticals for which the 3-year
    mandatory minimum would be a grossly disproportionate sentence. The appellant
    seeks to file fresh evidence, without objection from the Crown, that her
    counsel was unaware of various lower court decisions in which the courts held
    that s. 99(2)(a) is contrary to s. 12 of the
Charter
, and outlining
    her personal circumstances.

[4]

The appellant submits that without the mandatory
    minimum, the appropriate sentence in her circumstances would be 24 months, less
    6 months for pre-sentence custody credit, plus a term of probation.

[5]

It is not necessary for us to consider the
    appellants constitutional argument because it would not affect the sentence:
R.
    v. Chambers
, 2013 ONCA 680. Even if the mandatory minimum did not apply,
    the three-year sentence imposed in the circumstances of this case was fit and
    appropriate.

[6]

The most significant mitigating factors here
    include the appellants guilty plea, her very troubled and personal history,
    and the fact that she was a first-time offender when she committed the index
    offence. These factors have to be balanced against the seriously aggravating features
    of this case. These include that the appellant transferred 9 non-restricted
    long guns, some without serial numbers, and at least one of which was stolen;
    she admitted that she asked for payment and admitted that she suspected the
    guns were stolen; and that, at the time of transfer, she was subject to a
    prohibition order against possessing any weapons.

[7]

The sentence imposed was within the range of
    sentences for similar offences and similar offenders. It follows that even if
    the mandatory minimum did not apply, the sentence was fit.

[8]

Accordingly, the appeal from sentence is
    dismissed.

Robert
    J. Sharpe J.A.

L.B.
    Roberts J.A.

G.T.
    Trotter J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Hoad, 2018 ONCA 528

DATE: 20180608

DOCKET: C64735

Lauwers, Pardu and Miller JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Brother James R. Hoad

Appellant

Brother James R. Hoad, in person

Kevin Wilson, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: June 5, 2018

On appeal from the decision of Justice D. Nadeau of the Superior
    Court of Justice dated, November 24, 2017.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

The appellant challenges the decision made on his application in
certiorari
refusing to quash the decision of the Ontario Court of Justice, which in turn
    refused to return marijuana seized from the appellant to him after charges of
    possession and possession for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana were
    withdrawn.

[2]

Justice Rogers of the Ontario Court of Justice was not satisfied on the
    evidence before him that the appellant was lawfully entitled to the seized
    cannabis.

[3]

The appellant did not establish before Rogers J. that he obtained the
    marijuana from a licenced producer or that he was lawfully entitled to
    possession of the substance.

[4]

On appeal, the appellant acknowledges that he did not have a licence
    authorizing the possession of the marijuana at the time it was seized. The
certiorari
judge did not err in concluding that Rogers J. did not commit any error or
    excess of jurisdiction permitting review by way of certiorari.

[5]

The appeal is dismissed.

P. Lauwers J.A.

G. Pardu J.A.

B.W. Miller J.A.