COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Ly (Re), 2015 ONCA 141

DATE: 20150304

DOCKET: C58809

MacFarland, Tulloch and Pardu JJ.A.

IN THE MATTER OF Giang
    Ly

AN APPEAL UNDER PART XX.1 OF THE
CODE

Anita Szigeti, for Giang Ly

Gavin S. MacKenzie, for CAMH

Shawn Porter, for the respondent Crown

Heard:  February 23, 2015

On appeal against the disposition of the Ontario Review
    Board dated, May 9, 2014.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

On April 17, 2005 the appellant was found not criminally responsible on
    account of mental disorder (NCRMD) on charges of break and enter with intent to
    commit an indictable offence and arson.

[2]

At the time of his hearing before the Review Board, the appellant was
    subject to a Disposition dated May 28, 2013 detaining him at the General
    Forensic Unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) with
    privileges up to and including living within the community in supervised
    accommodation approved by the person in charge.

[3]

While the appellant did not concede that he remained a significant
    threat to the safety of the public, he did not seek an absolute discharge.

[4]

The only issue the Board faced was whether in the circumstances of this
    offender, the least onerous, least restrictive disposition was a conditional
    discharge or a continuation of the current detention order.

[5]

The applicant submits that the Board erred in law by failing to
    meaningfully consider if the appellant could be discharged conditionally.  As
    the Crown notes in para. 2 of its factum:

The dispute between the parties did not focus on the need for
    terms governing medication compliance, housing and street drug use. Rather, the
    dispute centered on whether those terms should be part of a conditional
    discharge or detention order

[6]

The differences between a conditional discharge and a detention order
    were thoroughly canvassed in this courts decision in
R. v. Breitwieser
2009 ONCA 784.

[7]

The appellants diagnoses at the time of the Boards disposition which
    is the subject of this appeal were:

Schizophrenia, Substance Abuse Disorder and Maladaptive Personality
    Traits/Disorder

[8]

The hospital report filed at the hearing details the appellants history
    over the years following the NCR finding.

[9]

Although discharged from the hospital setting in June 2006 to
    independent housing through the Canadian Mental Health Association (CMHA)  he
    was readmitted frequently as the result of urine samples positive for drugs.
    He remained an in-patient for the most part from January 2010 to August 2013
    with  as the Board noted  several short-lived discharges into the community.
    It was noted there were episodes of physical aggression towards co-patients and
    staff.

[10]

In
    March 2013 he was discharged to CMHA-supported housing where staff was on site
    24/7.  By early April problems began to exhibit themselves and as the Board
    noted the appellant:

-

became
    increasingly pre-occupied by his delusional belief system and had no insight
    into the fact that his symptoms arose from his mental illness.

[11]

According
    to the hospital report

The intensification and nature of his psychosis pose an acute
    elevation in his risk of violence and as such he was admitted to a General
    Schizophrenia Unit for stabilization on April 13, 2013.

[12]

It
    was at this juncture that after discussion with his then treating psychiatrist
    his anti-psychotic medication was changed to Clozapine.

[13]

He
    was in hospital until mid-May 2013 and subsequently readmitted in July because
    of substance use and discharged to CMHA supervised living again on August 19,
    2013.

[14]

In
    September 2013 the appellant insisted on reducing his level of Clozapine.  This
    was contrary to his doctors medical advice.  He continues to request that the
    dosage be further reduced.

[15]

As
    the Board noted

While his psychosis responds well to Clozapine, his decision to
    reduce the dose against his psychiatrists advice (and which he wants to
    further reduce) has resulted in a return of his auditory hallucinations. He continues
    to have a striking lack of insight.

[16]

The
    appellant through his counsel agrees to a conditional discharge where he will
    agree to the following terms:

1)       to
    consent to treatment pursuant to s. 672.55 of the
Criminal      Code
.

2)       to
    reside at his current residence

3)       and
    to be delivered to CAMH in the event he breaches a term     of his disposition.

[17]

The
    Board in its reasons dealt with the proposed terms.

[18]

Dr.
    Duff was very concerned that Mr. Ly, who is competent to treatment, would
    further reduce his dosage of Clozapine, he did so once already contrary to his
    doctors advice and is seeking further reduction.

[19]

Absent
    his medication, decompensation for the appellant can occur quickly and when he
    becomes psychotic as Dr. Duff noted, he becomes agitated and acts on his
    psychosis in a desperate and unpredictable way  putting the public at risk.

[20]

His
    treatment team was of the view that he would rapidly revert to the use of
    substances (spice in particular  a synthetic form of marijuana) and become
    non-compliant with medication absent his current support structure.

[21]

As
    for housing, although he is doing well in his current setting  it is transient
    in nature. The average stay is 18 months and the appellant was close to that at
    the time of his hearing.  Although he would agree to a term requiring his
    continued residence there  there cannot be a guarantee he would be able to
    remain there  despite his willingness to agree to such a term, he has
    expressed a desire to move from his current setting.

[22]

This
    court has said that the requirement for an appellant to reside in approved,
    supervised community housing meant that a conditional discharge is not an
    appropriate disposition.  See
R. v. Runnalls
, 2009 ONCA 504. Currently
    there are staff on site 24/7 to monitor the residents. Absent the involvement
    of the person in charge of CAMH in the event of a move there is the real
    likelihood that the current structures  which allow the appellant to do as
    well as he does  would disappear with resulting serious consequences. And
    while he would agree to be returned to CAMH in the event of a breach  there
    can be no guarantee that he would be returned there where he is subject to a
    conditional discharge  for the reasons fully set out in
R. v. Breitwieser
.

[23]

As
    it has been in the past, it is important for the appellant to get to the
    hospital quickly where the necessary steps can be taken to stabilize him.

[24]

The
    Board in its reasons noted Dr. Duffs evidence  where she stated that she was
    aware of the appellants request for a conditional discharge but did not think
    it wise.

[25]

She
    noted that while he had been better in the past year  it is still within a
    very tight safety net under his then current disposition.

[26]

While
    the appellant noted that hed had no positive tests for illicit substances
    since January 2014  the Board noted there had been six positive reports in the
    reporting year.  Further there was reluctance to rely on the urine testing in
    view of the appellants past history of tampering with urine samples.

[27]

The
    Board concluded that in all the circumstances a detention order was the least
    onerous, least restrictive disposition to manage the risk posed by the
    appellant which included:

-        He
    requires close medical supervision to insure compliance.

-        Given
    his substance abuse history close monitoring for that is   required.

-        His
    current attitude towards the drug, spice  and his lack of      insight into
    the role that drug plays in his non-compliance with       his medication is
    troubling.

-        His
    striking lack of insight into his mental illness.

-        Further
    while the appellant says he will agree to be returned to   the hospital in the
    event of a breach  there can be no         guarantee of that on a conditional
    discharge  and in the past       he has been angry when told he needed to be
    re-admitted to   hospital.

[28]

In
    all the circumstances, we are not persuaded the Board made any error in law and
    their decision in the particular circumstances of this appellant was a
    reasonable one.

[29]

We
    note that at the time of the review which is the subject of his appeal.  The
    appellant had been doing reasonably well although for a short time. We are
    hopeful that his efforts will continue.

[30]

Appeal
    is dismissed.

J.
    MacFarland J.A.

M.
    Tulloch J.A.

G.
    Pardu J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Nandlal v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2015 ONCA
    166

DATE: 20150312

DOCKET: C59285

Cronk, Gillese and Brown JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Sarojanie (Mazie) Nandlal and Haitram Nandlal

Plaintiffs (Appellants)

and

Toronto Transit Commission

Defendant (Respondent)

Alan L. Rachlin and Joel P. McCoy, for the appellants

Stephen Sargent, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: March 10, 2015

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Paul Perell of the
    Superior Court of Justice, dated August 18, 2014.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellants, Sarojanie (Mazie) Nandlal and Haitram Nandlal, appeal
    from the summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent, Toronto Transit
    Commission (the TTC), dismissing their claim for damages arising from
    personal injuries sustained by Mrs. Nandlal when she slipped and fell at the
    threshold of a flight of stairs at the TTC rapid transit station known as the
    Kennedy Station.

[2]

The appellants raise three grounds of appeal.  First, they argue that
    the motion judge erred by finding that there was no objective evidence of a
    slippery steps hazard at the location in the Kennedy Station where Mrs. Nandlal
    fell.

[3]

We reject this argument.

[4]

In their statement of claim, the appellants allege that Mrs. Nandlal
    slipped and fell on slippery and debris strewn steps at Kennedy Station.
    However, Mrs. Nandlals own evidence was that, although she was alert, walking
    with care and actually looking for hazards as she was proceeding through the
    station, she did not see any debris on the tile at the location where she
    fell.  Rather, because she had noticed garbage and debris in the station and in
    subway cars on prior occasions, and elsewhere on the station floor on the day
    in question, she believed that she had slipped on debris at the top of the
    stairwell.  This was not evidence about the condition of the top of the
    stairwell on the day that Mrs. Nandlal unfortunately fell.  Further, there was
    undisputed affirmative evidence before the motion judge that the tiles on which
    Mrs. Nandlal fell were non-slip tiles and were not defective or in need of
    repair.

[5]

In light of this evidence, the motion judge held:

[26]    In the case at bar, Mrs. Nandlal provides no direct
    evidence that there was debris on the stairs, but, rather, she provides her
    belief that the stairs were slippery and debris strewn.  The direct evidence is
    that the tiles were non-slip tiles in good repair, and, thus, Mrs. Nandlals
    case comes down just to her belief that she slipped on stairs made slippery by
    the strewn debris that she believes existed but that she did not see,
    notwithstanding her alertness and the care in which she was walking.

[27]    There is no objective evidence of the slippery steps
    hazard, but only a subjective rationalization by Mrs. Nandlal for her having
    fallen down the stairs.  That she saw other debris at other parts of the
    station that day or that she saw debris on past occasions does not lead to the
    inference that there was a debris hazard at the top of the stairs on November
    18, 2008 that the TTC could and should have removed.

[6]

We see no reversible error in this reasoning.  Indeed, we agree with it.

[7]

The appellants rely on the decision of this court in
Kamin v. Kawartha
    Dairy Ltd.
(2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 284 to argue that the motion judge erred
    by imposing too high a burden of proof on the appellants in resisting the TTCs
    summary judgment motion.

[8]

We disagree.  In our view,
Kamin
does not assist the
    appellants.  In
Kamin
, unlike this case, there was considerable
    uncontradicted evidence that the entire parking lot where the plaintiff was
    injured was in poor condition and a state of disrepair:
Kamin
at para.
    5.  This included the testimony of the plaintiffs husband that at the time and
    place his wife fell, the surface of the parking lot was unclear, unmaintained,
    unsafe and, generally, in a state of disrepair.  There was no comparable
    evidence in this case.

[9]

The appellants next argue that the motion judge erred in his application
    of the test for granting summary judgment by refusing, ostensibly without
    resorting to his enhanced fact-finding powers under rule 20.04 of the
Rules
    of Civil Procedure
, to draw an inference based on the circumstantial
    evidence before him that the top of the stairwell where Mrs. Nandlal fell was
    in a state of non-repair.

[10]

Again,
    we disagree.  The reasons reveal that the motion judge appreciated the test for
    granting summary judgment set out in
Hryniak v. Mauldin
, 2014 SCC 7 and
    applied it correctly in this case.

[11]

In
    accordance with
Hryniak
, the motion judge first considered whether
    there was a genuine issue requiring a trial based on the record before him,
    without resorting to his fact-finding powers under Rule 20.  Based principally
    on Mrs. Nandlals own uncontradicted evidence, he concluded that no genuine
    issue requiring a trial had been demonstrated.  Unlike the authorities relied
    on by the appellants, this determination did not involve the assessment of
    credibility or the resolution of conflicting evidence.  The motion judges
    conclusion on this issue attracts significant deference from this court.

[12]

Finally,
    contrary to the appellants submission, we see no error in the motion judges
    approach to or application of the summary judgment test or the substantive law
    on occupiers liability.  The motion judge found that the appellants had not
    established that the TTC failed to meet its statutory obligation to keep
    Kennedy Station reasonably safe for use by TTC patrons.  This finding was
    grounded in the evidentiary record.  In particular, there was evidence before
    the motion judge that the TTCs maintenance system at the Kennedy Station
    reflected reasonable steps to keep the premises safe in all the circumstances.
    The appellants say that the motion judge wrongly inferred from the evidence of
    the TTCs general maintenance practices that those practices were actually
    followed on the day of the accident.

[13]

We
    reject this submission.  The motion judge observed at para. 30: There is no
    evidence that would justify a conclusion that the TTC did not meet its
    statutory duty to take such care in all the circumstances as is reasonable to
    see that persons entering on the Kennedy Station are reasonably safe.  Further,
    there was uncontradicted evidence before the motion judge from the TTC
    caretaker assigned to Kennedy Station of his duties under the TTC maintenance
    system.  He swore that he believed that he had discharged those duties on the
    day in question by performing a visual scan of the entire station for any hazards.
    The appellants elected not to cross-examine the TTC caretaker on this evidence.

[14]

It
    was open to the motion judge to accept the caretakers unchallenged evidence,
    which was fatal to any suggestion of a genuine issue requiring a trial in
    respect of the TTCs alleged negligence as occupier of the premises.

[15]

For
    these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.  The TTC is entitled to its costs of
    the appeal, fixed in the amount of $5,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

E.A. Cronk
    J.A.

E.E. Gillese
    J.A.

David Brown J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Nicoletti v. Nicoletti, 2015 ONCA
    163

DATE: 20150312

DOCKET: C59276

Lauwers, Hourigan and Pardu JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Bruna Nicoletti

Respondent/Appellant

and

Giovanna Nicoletti

Applicant/Respondent

and

Vittoria Nicoletti by
    her litigation guardian,

The Public Guardian and
    Trustee and Pietro Nicoletti

Respondents/Respondents

No one present for the appellant

Tony N. Nguyen, for Giovanna Nicoletti

Donald Kim, for the Public Guardian and Vittoria
    Nicoletti

Heard:  March 5, 2015

On appeal from the order of Justice Michael A. Penny of
    the Superior Court of Justice, dated July 31, 2014.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellant did not appear for the argument of this appeal. Her appeal
    is therefore dismissed as abandoned, with costs fixed in the amount of $15,000
    all-inclusive payable to the respondents, and $1,250 payable to the Public
    Guardian and Trustee.

[2]

The appellant sought an adjournment of the argument of this appeal by
    e-mail correspondence. Her request was refused for the reasons that follow.

[3]

This appeal was originally scheduled to be heard on February 26, 2015,
    but Ms. Nicoletti did not appear.  According to Laskin J.A.s endorsement, she
    sent an email requesting an adjournment on the basis that she had a dental
    problem which was causing her pain. Counsel for the respondents, Giovanna
    Nicoletti and the Public Guardian and Trustee, opposed the adjournment.

[4]

Justice Laskin noted that this was the third time the appellant had
    requested an adjournment.  His endorsement adjourned the matter to March 5,
    2015, peremptory to the appellant, with costs payable to the respondents. A
    copy of the endorsement was sent to the appellant.

[5]

On February 27, 2015, the appellant requested another adjournment. At
    the presidents request, the appellant provided a medical note from a dentist,
    a Dr. Guido. The dental note provided no information on the appellants current
    pain levels and when she might be able to argue the appeal. The president requested
    an explanation as to the relationship between Dr. Guido and the appellant,
    whose married name is Guido, but got no answer. (At the hearing counsel advised
    that Dr. Guido was a cousin of the appellants spouse.)

[6]

The appellants request for an adjournment was sent to counsel for the
    other parties.  They opposed the adjournment on the basis that the endorsement
    of Laskin J.A. provided that the hearing date was peremptory, and that
    there was prejudice.  Counsel for Giovanna Nicoletti stated in correspondence:

My client, Giovanna Nicoletti, who has been caring for her
    elderly mother, Vittoria Nicoletti, for the past five years is carrying
    significant costs as a result of the constant delays from the adjournment
    request by the appellant. The respondent is now close to 90 years old with
    declining health and any further delay will simply put further stress and
    financial burden on my client.  This not only puts immense stress on my client
    but it also impacts her husband and family.

We note that as a result of the appeal, my client has not been
    reimbursed $54,800 for expenses which she incurred on behalf of her mother and
    approved in her passing of accounts application.

It is the appellant who has brought this appeal, which the
    respondent submits is without merit, yet she has not acted reasonably to move
    this appeal with reasonable diligence. This is now her fourth adjournment
    request.

[7]

Based on the exchange of correspondence, on March 4, 2015, court staff
    advised the appellant that the president of the panel had denied the
    adjournment request, but invited the appellant to review her adjournment
    request before the full panel.  In the morning on March 5, 2015, the appellant
    advised court staff that she would not appear at the appeal.

[8]

The panel heard submissions from counsel for the respondents and for the
    PGT, which enlarged on the submissions in the correspondence. The record
    throughout is replete with the appellants desire to delay the final disposition
    of this matter. Penny J. observed that this litigation has dragged on quite
    unnecessarily for a long time. He noted that a last minute motion was brought
    by the appellant in an effort to delay and complicate matters and to add to
    the already significant costs in controversy in this litigation. As a result
    of the stay of the order under appeal, the respondent Giovanna Nicoletti has
    been obliged to absorb the costs of caring for her mother, Vittoria Nicoletti.

[9]

The appeal itself is nothing more than an effort to re-litigate the
    issues heard by Penny J., particularly relating to credibility findings, which
    are subject to a high standard of review of palpable and overriding error. No
    such error is evident from the written material filed by the appellant.

[10]

Based
    on the conduct of the appellant and the material considered by the court,
    including the submissions received on the adjournment, which have been placed
    in the record of the court, the court exercised its discretion to refuse the
    requested adjournment.

P.
    Lauwers J.A.

C.W.
    Hourigan J.A.

G.
    Pardu J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: O'Laughlin v. Byers, 2015 ONCA 210

DATE: 20150330

DOCKET: C59475

Sharpe, Pepall and van Rensburg JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Donna OLaughlin

Plaintiff (Respondent)

and

Timothy John Byers, 1566997 Ontario Inc.

and Kelly Ann Jamieson

Defendants (
Appellants
)

Robert Isles, for the appellants

Peter C. Card, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: March 25, 2015

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Guy P. DiTomaso of
    the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 3, 2014.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

This is an appeal of a summary judgment. The appellants contend that the
    motion judge erred in granting judgment after concluding that there was no
    issue requiring a trial. We disagree.

[2]

The respondent provided evidence of a loan, an amortization schedule
    prepared by the appellants lawyer and a list account of payments received and
    demands made. The appellants admitted to the loan and the various payments made
    by cheque, but contended that additional payments were made by cash and cheque.

[3]

The motion judge carefully analyzed the payments the respondent
    acknowledged having received and the payments the appellants contended were
    made, and found the appellants evidence was inadequate. The evidence included
    substantial payments not required by the amortization schedule, and the
    additional payments were unsupported by any receipts.

[4]

The appellants assert that the motion judge erred in failing to consider
    evidence of the respondents income tax returns. We are not persuaded that this
    was overlooked or that it would have made any difference to the result. Nor do
    we agree that the motion judge failed to consider the fact that the respondent
    dealt with certain financial aspects of the appellant Byers businesses. This
    fact was evident on the record but could not have been determinative of the
    issues.

[5]

In the end the appellants failed to put their best foot forward on the
    question of the payments they assert were made on the mortgage.

[6]

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Costs to the respondent fixed at
    $12,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Robert
    J. Sharpe J.A.

S.E.
    Pepall J.A.

K.
    van Rensburg J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Ontario v. Waskowec, 2015 ONCA 203

DATE: 20150325

DOCKET: C58693

Watt, Lauwers and Hourigan JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario

Respondent

and

Peter Waskowec

Appellant

Peter Waskowec, acting in person

Mary-Ellen Hurman, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: March 9, 2015

On appeal from the order of Michael A. Code of the
    Superior Court of Justice, dated March 13, 2014.

ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellant brought a private prosecution against Hydro One, claiming
    that it improperly retained his property, assaulted him and uttered threats.
    His private prosecution arises from a dispute with Ontario Hydro regarding the
    refusal to courier bills to his home.

[2]

The appellants private prosecution was dismissed by the Justice of the
    Peace who found that the facts did not disclose a criminal offence known to
    law.

[3]

The appellant commenced an appeal from the order of the Justice of the
    Peace. Justice Code converted the appeal to an application for
mandamus
because an appeal was not available. On the application, he found that it was
    unclear whether the Justice of the Peace had declined to issue a summons or
    warrant under s. 507.1 of the
Criminal Code
,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, or whether he had refused to
    receive the information under s. 504 of the
Criminal Code
. He also
    noted that no sworn information was ever received by the Justice of the Peace.
    Despite this, the Justice of the Peace held a hearing and seemingly rejected
    the information as if under s. 507.1. In so doing, he conflated the s. 504 and
    s. 507.1 regimes and committed a jurisdictional error.

[4]

Justice Code noted however, that
mandamus
is discretionary. He
    found that because the materials filed did not establish a
prima facie
case that any of the alleged offences were actually committed, the result would
    inevitably have been the same even if the error had not been committed. In
    these circumstances, he declined to exercise his discretion to grant
mandamus
.

[5]

Before this court, the appellant: (i) appealed the refusal of Justice
    Code to grant
mandamus
; and (ii) sought
mandamus
and other
    relief from this court
de novo
. He seeks a
mandamus
order
    requiring Hydro One to courier his bills to his home. We refuse to grant that
    order. The appellant brought a civil
mandamus
application for that
    very relief. It was dismissed by Justice Backhouse and the appellant
    unsuccessfully appealed to this court and to the Supreme Court of Canada.  In
    any event, we are of the view that Hydro One has no duty to courier mail to the
    appellants home and has fulfilled its statutory duties for the delivery of
    bills.

[6]

We also see no error in the decision of Code J. dismissing the
    appellants
mandamus
application.

[7]

The appeal is dismissed. The motion brought by the appellant for
    mandamus and other relief is also dismissed.

David
    Watt J.A.

P.
    Lauwers J.A.

C.W.
    Hourigan J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Ontario (Review Board) v. Merner, 2015 ONCA 157

DATE: 20150310

DOCKET: C58964

Sharpe, Gillese and Benotto JJ.A.

IN THE MATTER OF:  Janet A. Merner

AN APPEAL UNDER PART XX.1 OF THE
CODE

Anita Szigeti, for the appellant

B. Walker-Renshaw, for the respondent, Ontario Shores
    Centre for Mental Health

Joanne Stuart, for the respondent, Her Majesty the Queen

Heard: March 6, 2015

On appeal against the disposition of the Ontario Review
    Board dated, May 2, 2014.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1]

No issue is taken with the ORBs finding of significant risk.

[2]

The appellant submits, however, that although the Board was presented
    with a joint submission that the least onerous and restrictive order was a
    detention order with expanded privileges, the Board erred in law by failing to
    explicitly consider and reject the option of a conditional discharge.

[3]

We disagree. There was evidence before the Board that the stress the
    appellant experiences from her perception of the communitys reaction to her
    transgender status could lead to decompensation. The issue of conditional
    discharge was expressly considered by the treating physician and the co-author
    of the hospitals report. Her evidence was that to push the appellant to a
    conditional discharge would run the risk of suicidal or homicidal reaction on
    the part of the appellant. The Board fully discharged its obligation to ensure that
    the least onerous and restrictive disposition was imposed.

[4]

We add that it would appear to us that the appellant is making good
    progress, and as noted by the hospital, if she continues along that path
    reintegration into the community may follow.

[5]

Appeal dismissed.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Ontario (Review Board) v. Petroniuk, 2015 ONCA 156

DATE: 20150310

DOCKET: C58995

Sharpe, Gillese and Benotto JJ.A.

IN THE MATTER OF:  Elizabeth Petroniuk

AN APPEAL UNDER PART XX.1 OF THE
CODE

Daniel Moore, for the appellant

Jason Gorda and Gavin MacKenzie, for the respondent

Heard: March 6, 2015

On appeal against the disposition of the Ontario Review
    Board dated, May 5, 2014.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1]

In our view, there was ample evidence to support the ORBs finding that
    the appellant continues to a pose a significant risk, and that the detention
    order is the least restrictive measure to deal with that risk.

[2]

It is apparent from the submissions made before us that the appellant
    lacks insight into her mental illness. The index offence involved a violent
    assault on the appellants mother, which the appellant continues to regard as
    an act directed by God. There is a long history of non-compliance with
    medication and the appellant expresses a continuous desire to stop taking it.
    In these circumstances, the ORBs conclusion that the appellant and the risk
    she poses could not be adequately managed in the community was reasonable.

[3]

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.