COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:  R. v. Munro, 2017 ONCA 498

DATE: 20170614

DOCKET: C57660

Doherty, Rouleau and Hourigan JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Harold Munro

Appellant

Diana Lumba, for the appellant

Andrew Cappell, for the respondent

Heard:  June 13, 2017

On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Quinlan
    of the Superior Court of Justice on September 23, 2011.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The appellant argues that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof by
    assuming that the assault occurred as a basis for rejecting an argument
    advanced by defence:  see
R. v. V.Y
., 2010, ONCA 544.

[2]

We have examined the impugned passage (p. 917).  As we read it, the
    trial judge was considering a defence argument that the complainants post-act
    conduct was inconsistent with her allegations.  The trial judge rejected that
    argument.  She did not reverse the burden.

[3]

The appellant argues that the trial judge erred in failing to explain
    how she could convict in light of her comment that the defence theory of how
    some of the injuries were caused was equally plausible.  First, that comment
    referred to some of the injuries and not to the facial injuries.  Second, the
    reference is only an indication that the defence theory was consistent with
    some of the injuries.  There was, however, no evidence capable of supporting
    that theory.

[4]

The appeal is dismissed.


WARNING

The
    President of the panel hearing this appeal directs that the following should be
    attached to the file:

An order
    restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1),
    (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the
Criminal Code
shall
    continue.  These sections of
the Criminal Code
provide:

486.4(1)         Subject
    to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing
    that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be
    published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in
    proceedings in respect of

(a)       any
    of the following offences;

(i)         an
    offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170,
    171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01,
    279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii)        any
    offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this
    subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of
    the complainants sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence
    referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(iii)       REPEALED:
    S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).

(b)       two
    or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which
    is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2)       In
    proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b),
    the presiding judge or justice shall

(a)       at
    the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen
    years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b)       on
    application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the
    order.

(2.1)
    Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than
    an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18
    years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any
    information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any
    document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(2.2) In
    proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in
    subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge
    or justice shall

(a) as
    soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for
    the order; and

(b) on
    application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.

(3)       In
    proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice
    shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a
    witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the
    subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes
    child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in
    any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(4)       An
    order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of
    information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the
    purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005,
    c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29;
    2014, c. 25, ss. 22,48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18.

486.6(1)         Every
    person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or
    (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary
    conviction.

(2)        For greater
    certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in
    relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the
    order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in
    any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system
    participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:  R. v. Ngoddy, 2017 ONCA 499

DATE: 20170614

DOCKET: C62828

Doherty, Rouleau and Hourigan JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Appellant

and

Valentine Ngoddy

Respondent

Karen Papadopoulos, for the appellant

Marianne Salih, for the respondent

Heard:  June 13, 2017

On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice B.L.
    Croll of the Superior Court of Justice on September 12, 2016.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1]

We are satisfied that leave to appeal should be granted, but the appeal
    should be dismissed.

[2]

We do not agree that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge failed to
    appreciate that threshold reliability had to be determined by reference to the
    very specific features of the complainants developmental and psychological
    circumstances.

[3]

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge recognized that she was
    required to defer to the trial judges findings.  The real issue for us is
    whether she did so.

[4]

After anxious consideration, counsel for the respondent has satisfied us
    that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge stayed within the proper ambit
    of her review.  She was entitled to look at the entirety of the evidence,
    including the totality of Dr. Linders evidence and the many other inconsistent
    statements made by the complainant when assessing threshold reliability.  We
    see no error in the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judges assessment.

[5]

The appeal is dismissed.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Norville, 2017 ONCA 501

DATE: 20170614

DOCKET: C61802

Laskin, Simmons and Pardu JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Carlo Norville

Appellant

Michael Peterson, for the appellant

Jason Morische, for the respondent

Heard: June 14, 2017

On appeal from the conviction entered on September 25,
    2015 and the sentence imposed on February 3, 2016 by Justice Terry Vyse of the Ontario
    Court of Justice, sitting without a jury.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1]

The Crown agrees that the trial judge erred in law by improperly using
    the confidential informant information in the ITO to support her trafficking
    finding. The appeal is allowed, the convictions are set aside and a new trial
    is ordered.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Pasian, 2017 ONCA 451

DATE: 20170602

DOCKET: C62378

Cronk, Blair and van Rensburg JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Scott Charles Pasian

Appellant

Jonathan Dawe, for the appellant

Anya Weiler and Carolyn Otter, for the respondent

Heard: May 29, 2017

On appeal from the conviction entered on February 26,
    2016 and the sentence imposed on May 26, 2016 by Justice A. Mitchell of the
    Superior Court of Justice, sitting without a jury.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

The appellant appeals his conviction for various
    drug trafficking offences and offences in connection with the storage and
    possession of a firearm. He also seeks leave to appeal his sentence.

Conviction Appeal

[2]

The conviction appeal
    challenges the application judges
Charter
ruling.
[1]
After finding that the information to obtain (ITO) was insufficient to
    support the warrant for the search of the house located on Prosperity Court,
    the application judge refused to exclude the drugs and other evidence seized in
    the search, under s. 24(2).

[3]

The appellant says the application judge made
    two reversible errors that affected the conclusion in his s. 24(2) analysis,
    that the first branch of the
Grant
inquiry (
R.
    v. Grant,
2009 SCC 32, 2 S.C.R. 353
) favoured admission of the evidence.

[4]

First, the appellant argues that the application
    judge failed to take into consideration in the s. 24(2) analysis, his earlier
    findings that the ITO had omitted material facts (specifically observations of
    the appellants attendances at other addresses during the two days of
    surveillance recounted in the ITO), and included unsubstantiated claims about
    the appellants background from police databases, which the application judge
    characterized as prejudicial and of marginal relevance.

[5]

We disagree. The application judges conclusion
    that the omission of observations suggesting the potential for an alternate
    stash house, and the inclusion of the police database material, were not false
    or deliberately misleading or evidence of bad faith, is entitled to deference.

[6]

Although characterized by the application judge
    as prejudicial and of marginal relevance, the information from the police
    databases situated the appellant in the drug subculture, and could assist in
    understanding the short transactional meetings with people in parking lots that
    were observed in the police  surveillance. Earlier in his reasons, in dealing
    with the s. 8 breach, the application judge observed that this information may
    have provided the affiant with the subjective grounds for belief the appellant
    was involved in drug-related activity and were included for the sake of
    completeness.

[7]

On a fair reading of the application judges
    reasons as a whole, he did not overlook the deficiencies in the ITO in dealing
    with the
Grant

test, but considered
    them when he concluded there was no bad faith, use of false or deliberately
    misleading information or disregard by the police of the
Charter
rights
    of the appellant.

[8]

Second, the appellant contends that the
    application judge erroneously characterized the evidence seized from the house
    as discoverable, which affected his conclusions under both the first and the
    second branches of
Grant.
The appellant says the application judge
    engaged in speculation when he noted that the police might have been able to
    acquire sufficient grounds to justify the search if they had continued their
    investigation further.

[9]

Evidence is discoverable for the purpose of s.
    24(2) when it could have been obtained through lawful means had the police
    chosen to adopt them. Discoverability will have no impact on the inquiry where
    it cannot be determined with any confidence whether evidence would have been
    discovered in the absence of the
Charter
breach:
R. v. Cô
té
, [2011] 3 S.C.R.
    215, at para. 70. It is an error to engage in impermissible speculation in
    assigning weight to discoverability as a factor:
R. v. MacMillan
, 2013 ONCA 109, at para. 63.

[10]

The application judges characterization of the
    evidence as discoverable was based on the fact that, before the warrant was
    issued, and just preceding his arrest, the appellant was observed leaving the
    Prosperity address and without making any stops, engaging in an apparent
    hand-to-hand drug transaction. This observation provided the nexus between the
    Prosperity residence and the appellants drug trafficking the application judge
    considered to be missing from the ITO. The application judges conclusion
    respecting discoverability of the evidence was based on fact, not speculation.

[11]

For these reasons, the conviction appeal is dismissed.

Sentence Appeal

[12]

The appellant seeks leave to appeal his net sentence of imprisonment
    of five years (four years and nine months after credit for restrictive bail
    conditions).

[13]

First, the appellant says that the trial judge erred by imposing a
    concurrent sentence for careless storage of a firearm that exceeded the
    statutory maximum sentence for a s. 86(1) offence (two years imprisonment for
    a first offender). This is conceded by the Crown. The sentence for the s. 86(1)
    offence accordingly is reduced on consent of the Crown to one year imprisonment,
    concurrent to the other sentences.

[14]

Second, the appellant contends that the trial judge erred by
    inferring solely on the basis of the quantity of seized cocaine, that he was a
    mid-level dealer.

[15]

We see no such error. The evidence supported the trial judges
    conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was a mid-level drug
    dealer.  The cocaine in the Prosperity residence consisted of almost a quarter
    kilogram of cocaine divided between several bags and included a large block of
    powder cocaine. It was conceded that the value of the cocaine was approximately
    $23,000. Further, the appellant had quantities of three different controlled
    substances in his room, as well as a loaded semi-automatic firearm. The
    evidence supported the trial judges inference that the appellant was operating
    as a mid-level dealer.

Disposition

[16]

For these reasons, the conviction appeal is
    dismissed, leave to appeal sentence is granted and the sentence appeal is
    allowed in part, in accordance with paragraph 13 of these reasons. In all other
    respects, the appellants sentence remains the same.

E.A. Cronk J.A.

R.A. Blair J.A.

K. van Rensburg J.A.

[1]
The issues on the conviction appeal arise from a ruling made on a
    pre-trial
Charter
application heard by Justice Andrew Goodman, reported
    at 2015 ONSC 1557.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Pastore, 2017 ONCA 487

DATE: 20170612

DOCKET: C61620

Juriansz, Pepall and Trotter JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Luigi Antonio Pastore

Appellant

Alfred S. Schorr, for the appellant

Robert Morin, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: May 30, 2017

On appeal from the sentence imposed on January 20, 2016 by
    Justice George S. Gage of the Ontario Court of Justice.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

Luigi Pastore appeals from a 15-month jail sentence imposed on two
    counts of making a false statement contrary to s. 16(1)(a) of the
Canada
    Small Business Financing Act
, S.C.
    1998, c. 36,
and three counts of fraud contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of
    the
Criminal Code
, R.S.C. 1985, c. 46. He entered pleas of guilty to
    these offences, which were committed between 2005 and 2008.

[2]

In a nutshell, Mr. Pastore exploited the Canada Small Business Financing
    Program (CSBFP) sponsored by Industry Canada. Using false documents, he
    secured loans for his own false business. By creating misleading financial
    pictures, he secured loans for 7 other business entities. His efforts were
    extensive. He created false and misleading invoices, false bank statements, a
    fraudulent S.I.N. card, along with fraudulent Notices of Assessment.

[3]

On the strength of Mr. Pastores fraudulent representations and
    activities, over $1 million in loans was advanced through the CSBFP. The loss
    to Industry Canada was $409,000. Mr. Pastore extracted fees to the tune of
    $192,000 for helping others defraud the Government of Canada. He also obtained
    $100,000 through his own company. At the time of sentencing, no restitution had
    been made. Restitution has still not been made.

[4]

In careful and detailed written reasons, the sentencing judge reviewed
    the circumstances of the offences, the circumstances of Mr. Pastore, the
    relevant principles of sentencing, and the applicable case law. After reviewing
    the relevant mitigating and aggravating facts present in the case, the
    sentencing judge concluded that a conditional sentence order would not
    sufficiently advance the goals of general deterrence and denunciation. He
    imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

[5]

Mr. Pastore appeals his sentence, contending that the sentencing judge
    erred in failing to impose a conditional sentence order.

[6]

We disagree.

[7]

The trial judge committed no error in principle, nor was the sentence he
    imposed manifestly unfit: see
R. v. Lacasse
, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3
    S.C.R. 1089. The sentencing judge was correct to approach this case as a large-scale
    fraud in which the sentencing principles of general deterrence and denunciation
    are paramount. He recognized the mitigating value of Mr. Pastores guilty plea
    and his lack of a criminal record. However, these mitigating factors were
    overwhelmed by the aggravating factors in this case, which included: (a) the level
    of sophistication involved; (b) the offences were committed over a 3-year
    period; (c) there were 8 discreet fraudulent plans; and (d) the main victim was
    the Government of Canada.

[8]

While leave to appeal is granted, the appeal is dismissed.

R.G. Juriansz J.A.

S.E. Pepall J.A.

G.T. Trotter
    J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Punia, 2017 ONCA 489

DATE: 20170612

DOCKET: M47572 (C63403)

Juriansz J.A. (In Chambers)

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Mandeep Punia

Applicant

Russell Silverstein, for the applicant

Joan Barrett, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: March 13, 2017

REASONS FOR
    DECISION

[1]

This is an application under s. 684 of the
Criminal Code
for an
    order appointing counsel.

[2]

The Crown consents to the extension of time for the late filing of the
    Notice of Appeal but opposes the s. 684 application. The Crown accepts the
    applicant does not have sufficient financial means, but takes the position the
    appeal is not arguable.

[3]

The principal attack  and the only attack  of the applicant is on the
    trial judges ruling on the
KGB
application. At that stage, the trial
    judge was concerned only with threshold reliability. I am not persuaded that
    the arguments that he erred in deciding that the statements were admissible as
    substantive evidence have any merit. In particular, I do not accept that
    counsel was denied the opportunity to effectively cross-examine the recanting
    witness.

[4]

I see no merit in the other grounds advanced, as well. The trial judges
    reasons for imposing sentence are careful and well explained and the sentence
    imposed is entitled to deference.

[5]

I have not been persuaded it is in the interests of justice that counsel
    be appointed.

R.G. Juriansz J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL
    FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Pyrek, 2017 ONCA 476

DATE: 20170612

DOCKET: C61137

Laskin, Watt and Hourigan JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Michael Pyrek

Appellant

Margaux Peck, for the appellant

Kevin Rawluk, for the respondent

Heard: April 13, 2017

On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Paul F.
    Monahan of the Ontario Court of Justice on June 15, 2015, with reasons reported
    at 2015 ONCJ 333, 84 M.V.R. (6th) 297.

Laskin J.A.:

A.

OVERVIEW

[1]

One Saturday night in September 2012, the appellant
    Michael Pyrek, then 24 years old, went to a party at a friends house in
    Mississauga. While there he played a drinking game called Beer Pong. He
    played his last game just after three oclock in the morning, and then left to
    get some food at a nearby McDonalds restaurant. He drove to the restaurant
    with his friend, eighteen year old Carlee Kather, who was in the front
    passenger seat.

[2]

Pyrek drove at a high rate of speed down a residential
    street he had driven many times before. When he came to a slight curve in the
    road, he lost control of his car and crashed it into a tree with such force
    that his car was wrapped around the tree. Both Pyrek and Kather were injured
    in the crash.

[3]

Pyrek was charged with dangerous driving causing
    bodily harm, impaired driving causing bodily harm and driving with excess
    alcohol in his blood (over 80) causing bodily harm. In May 2015  31 months
    after the charges were laid  after a 4 day trial in the Ontario Court of
    Justice, Pyrek was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and
    acquitted of the other two charges.

[4]

Shortly before the trial began, Pyrek had brought an
    application under s. 11(b) of the
Charter
on the ground he had been
    deprived of his constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time. The
    trial judge dismissed his application. He gave lengthy reasons in which he
    applied the then governing framework for s. 11(b) applications established by
    the Supreme Court of Canada in
R. v. Morin
,

[1992] 1 S.C.R. 771
.
    In July 2016, over a year after Pyreks trial, in
R. v. Jordan
,

2016

SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631,
the Supreme Court of Canada overruled
Morin
and established a new
    framework for s. 11(b) applications.

[5]

On appeal, Pyrek submits that under the
Jordan
framework, which applies to his case because he is still in the system, the
    31 month delay was unreasonable and contrary to s. 11(b).

[6]

Pyrek also submits that, in his reasons for conviction,
    the trial judge erred in finding that the
actus reus
or prohibited act
    of dangerous driving causing bodily harm had been made out. The trial judge
    convicted Pyrek because he drove too fast. Yet in finding his speed was
    excessive, the trial judge drew two related and improper inferences: he relied
    on the consequences of Pyreks driving  his crash into the tree  instead of
    the manner of his driving, and he relied on speculation instead of firm
    evidence.

[7]

Thus the two issues on appeal are:

1.

Under
Jordan
, was Pyrek
    denied his constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time?

2.

In finding that the
actus
    reus
of dangerous driving causing bodily harm had been made out, did the
    trial judge impermissibly infer that Pyrek was driving too fast?

B.

The issues

(1)

Under
Jordan
, was
    Pyrek denied his constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time?

(a)

Introduction

[8]

For cases tried in the
    Ontario Court of Justice, as were the charges against Pyrek,
Jordan
establishes a presumptive ceiling of 18 months delay.
    Any delay beyond the presumptive ceiling is presumed to be unreasonable and
    calls for a stay of proceedings unless the Crown can show exceptional
    circumstances justifying the delay above the ceiling. For the purpose of
    measuring the delay in a particular case, the court must take the total delay
    from charges to trial (or anticipated trial) and deduct delay waived or caused
    by the defence to arrive at the net delay.

[9]

This case is a transitional
    case  a case that was already in the system when
Jordan
was released. Although the new
Jordan
framework applies to transitional cases, it should be
    applied flexibly because the conduct of the proceedings is now being judged
    against a framework the parties had no notice of when the proceedings began.

[10]

In
    some transitional cases, the proceedings began in the trial court but were not
    completed when
Jordan
was released. In these
    cases the parties and the court itself had an opportunity to change their
    behaviour, to alter how they were proceeding, to try to comply with
Jordan
s dictates. In other transitional cases, the
    proceedings were entirely completed in the trial court when
Jordan
was released. In these latter kinds of cases, neither
    the parties nor the court had an opportunity to change their behaviour to
    comply with
Jordan
. This case falls within
    this latter category. And as the Supreme Court recognized in
Jordan
,
at para. 102 [u]ltimately, for most cases that are
    already in the system, the release of this decision should not automatically
    transform what would previously have been considered a reasonable delay into an
    unreasonable one.

(b)

The
    presumptive ceiling and the delay in this case

[11]

In
    the present case, the trial judge properly applied the
Morin
framework and thoroughly analyzed each of its
    components. He concluded that the overall delay was reasonable. Pyrek does not
    argue that the trial judges conclusion was wrong under the
Morin
framework. Instead, he contends that the
Jordan
framework compels a different result.

[12]

Pyrek
    submits that the net delay in this case is 24 ½ months, six and half months
    above the presumptive ceiling, and cannot be justified by any exceptional
    circumstances. He therefore asks that we overturn the trial judges decision
    and enter a stay. I do not agree that we should do so. Even under
Jordan
the delay is reasonable for this transitional case.

[13]

In
    the present case, in summary form, the timeline was as follows:

·

October
    2012: information sworn

·

December
    2013: 4 day trial scheduled for November 2014

·

November
    2014: trial adjourned to April 2015 because of the Crowns late disclosure of
    an expert report

·

April
    2015: s. 11(b) application argued

·

May
    2015: trial completed

[14]

The
    total delay from charge to the end of the trial was 31 months. The trial judge effectively
    found a total of approximately 8 months of defence delay: he expressly found
    7.1 months of defence delay, and the parties agree he inadvertently overlooked
    a further 28 day period or .9 months expressly waived by the defence. The Crown
    accepts the trial judges finding of 8 months of defence delay.

[15]

Of
    the 8 months of defence delay found by the trial judge, Pyrek accepts 6 ½
    months. Thus the net delay is either 23 months (5 months above the presumptive
    ceiling), or 24 ½ months (6 ½ months above the presumptive ceiling). The 1 ½
    months in dispute arises out of the adjournment of the first trial date in
    November 2014, to which I now turn.

(c)

Adjourned
    trial date in November 2014

[16]

If
    the trial had proceeded in November 2014 as originally scheduled, then either
    under
Morin
or
Jordan
the delay almost certainly would have been
    reasonable. The total delay would have been 25 months, less 6 ½ months of defence
    delay, for a net delay of 18 ½ months, just slightly above the presumptive
    ceiling.

[17]

But
    the November 2014 trial date had to be adjourned because the Crown did not
    disclose to the defence until shortly before the scheduled trial an expert
    report that the police had in its possession for two years. The Crown relied on
    three expert reports to prove the charges against Pyrek: a blood alcohol report
    disclosed to the defence in November 2012, soon after the charges were laid; a
    breath sample read-back report disclosed in November 2013, a year before the
    scheduled trial date; and a blood sample read-back report, which the Crown
    intended to use to prove the over 80 charge. It is this last report that the
    Crown failed to disclose on time.

[18]

The
    late disclosure of this blood sample read-back report caused the trial to be
    adjourned. The report itself was dated November 2012, but the police did not
    give it to the Crown and the Crown in turn did not give it to the defence until
    late October 2014, less than one week before the trial was set to start.

[19]

The
    late disclosure of the report was not deliberate; it was negligent, and the
    negligence must be attributed to the Crown even though the Crown itself did not
    get the report for two years either. Once the report was disclosed the defence
    justifiably asked for, and was entitled to, an adjournment. Without the report,
    the Crown had no admissible evidence to prove the over 80 charge. The defence
    wanted to have its own expert review the Crowns report and perhaps prepare its
    own rebuttal report.

[20]

The
    late disclosure caused a six month delay, from November 2014 to April 2015. I
    accept that jointly the defence and the court could not find an earlier
    available date. And I agree with Pyrek that the root cause of the delay was the
    Crowns negligence. Nonetheless, the trial judge allocated the six month delay
    as follows: 2.5 months to the Crown; 1.5 months to the defence; and 2 months to
    inherent delay, the latter a factor under the
Morin
framework. The trial judge made this allocation
    because the defence and the Crown, and even the original trial judge who
    granted the adjournment, mistakenly believed that once an adjournment is
    granted the entire trial had to be adjourned, instead of preserving some of the
    days already scheduled to call non-expert witnesses.
[1]
They all arrived at this
    mistaken belief because of a misreading of s. 657.3(4) of
the
Criminal Code
.
[2]
See
R. v. Ratneswaran
,
2013 ONSC
    6627.

[21]

Pyrek
    submits that even if the trial judges allocation can be justified under the
Morin
framework, it cannot be justified under the
Jordan
framework. Under
Jordan
,
only delay waived or caused solely by the conduct of
    the defence should be deducted from the total delay. This six month delay was
    not waived by the defence, and it was certainly not caused
solely
by the conduct of the defence.
    Also, the parties mistaken reading of the
Code
provision was irrelevant because even if the trial
    had started in November 2014, it could not have been completed before late
    April 2015.

[22]

For
    the purpose of my analysis, I am prepared to accept Pyreks submission and
    allocate no part of the six month delay to the defence. Under
Jordan
then, the net delay is 24 ½ months, not the 23 months
    argued for by the Crown. But I also accept the Crowns submission that nothing
    turns on whether the net delay is 23 months or 24 ½ months. The critical
    question is whether the 24 ½ month net delay warrants a stay of proceedings for
    this transitional case.

(d)

Does
    the 24 ½ month net delay warrant a stay of proceedings?

[23]

24
    ½ months net delay is 6 ½ months above the presumptive ceiling of 18 months. It
    is presumed to be unreasonable. Under
Jordan
the Crown has the burden to show exceptional circumstances to justify
    the excess delay. Exceptional circumstances are circumstances that lie outside
    the Crowns control and generally fall into two categories: discrete events and
    particularly complex cases. See
Jordan
,
    at
paras.
    69-71. The Crown acknowledges that it cannot justify the 6 ½ month excess delay
    under either category.

[24]

The
    Crowns inability to do so, however, does not end the analysis of whether the
    delay is unreasonable. For transitional cases that exceed the presumptive
    ceiling after subtracting defence delay and delay caused by exceptional
    circumstances, other considerations may show that the delay is reasonable.
    These considerations are rooted in the parties reasonable reliance on the law
    as it previously existed. See
Jordan
,
at paras. 92-98, 101-103
    and its companion case
R. v.
    Williamson
,
2016 SCC 28, [2016] 1
    S.C.R. 74, at para. 24.

[25]

Five
    considerations, taken together, justified the reasonableness of the 24 ½ month
    delay.

[26]

First,
    the defence showed no interest in moving the case along. The trial judge found
    that the defence was content with the pace of the litigation. In the 18 court
    appearances that took place in these proceedings, not once did the defence
    express a concern about getting a trial date as soon as possible. The defence
    did not even elect to be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice until nearly 15
    months after the charges were laid.

[27]

In
    contrast to the defences attitude to the pace of the proceedings, the Crown
    showed no complacence. For example, when the trial had to be adjourned in
    November 2014, the Crown and the court gave the case priority. A six month
    adjournment for a four day trial in the Ontario Court of Justice was a
    relatively short adjournment.

[28]

Second,
    the delay caused little prejudice to Pyrek. And as the trial judge found, any
    prejudice it did cause was significantly undermined by the defendants own
    conduct. Under the
Jordan
framework prejudice
    underpins the presumptive ceiling, but it is not an express factor. Under the
Morin
framework, however, prejudice was an express factor. For
    transitional cases it remains a factor to be considered in assessing the
    reasonableness of the delay. See
Jordan,
at para. 96.

[29]

Under
    the
Morin
framework, prejudice from
    delay could be actual or inferred. It addresses the question whether an accuseds
    liberty, security of the person and fair trial interests were prejudiced by the
    delay. The trial judge found that any prejudice Pyrek suffered was caused almost
    entirely by the charges themselves, not the delay in prosecuting them. He
    refused to infer any prejudice from the delay. He did find a small amount of
    actual prejudice from the delay: Pyreks seemingly increased anxiety. But as I
    have already said, he also found this prejudice was undermined by Pyreks
    conduct. The trial judges finding on prejudice weighs against Pyreks
    submission that the delay was unreasonable.

[30]

Third,
    although this case was not sufficiently complex to meet the requirement of
    exceptional circumstances under
Jordan
, for transitional cases moderate complexity bears on the reasonableness
    of the delay. See
Jordan
,
at para. 97 and
Williamson
,
at para. 26. This case was of at least moderate
    complexity. The trial judge found: on the spectrum of drinking and driving
    cases, this case is towards the more complicated end. That finding was
    reasonable. Pyrek was charged with three indictable offences, each involving
    bodily harm; the trial was expected to last four days; the Crown intended to
    call between 10 and 12 witnesses; the defence intended to bring a
Charter
application; and conflicting expert evidence was a
    real possibility.

[31]

Fourth,
    also relevant for transitional cases is whether the delay exceeded
Morin
s guidelines for institutional delay. See
Jordan
,
at para. 100. Under the
Morin
framework, institutional (and Crown) delay was a relevant
    factor. The guideline for that kind of delay in the Ontario Court of Justice
    was eight to ten months. On the trial judges finding, institutional and Crown
    delay was 11 ½ months, only slightly above the guideline.

[32]

Finally,
    in
Jordan
itself, at para. 98, the
    court categorized the kind of transitional case in which the delay would warrant
    a stay, and the present case is far removed from that categorization. The court
    said: if the delay in a simple case vastly exceeds the ceiling because of
    repeated mistakes or missteps by the Crown, the delay might be unreasonable
    even though the parties were operating under the previous framework. The
    present case was not simple. The delay did not vastly exceed the ceiling.
    And the delay was caused by an isolated act of Crown negligence, not by
    repeated mistakes or missteps.

[33]

For
    these reasons, under the
Jordan
framework for transitional
    cases the 24 ½ month delay did not deny Pyrek his constitutional right to be
    tried within a reasonable time. I would therefore not give effect to Pyreks
    submission on this first issue.

(2)

In
    finding the
actus reus
of dangerous driving
    causing bodily harm was made out, did the trial judge impermissibly infer Pyrek
    was driving too fast?

[34]

The
actus reus
and
mens rea
of dangerous driving are well established. The
actus reus
or the prohibited conduct is driving a car in a manner
    dangerous to the public that results in bodily harm. The
mens rea
,
or the required degree of fault, is exercising a standard
    of care that is a marked departure from the standard of care a reasonable
    person would observe in the accuseds circumstances. See
R. v. Hundal
, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867;
R. v. Beatty
,
2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49; and
R. v. Roy
,
2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60. In
Beatty
, Charron J., writing for the majority at para. 46,
    stressed that to establish the
actus
    reus
of
    dangerous driving, it is the
manner
in which the motor vehicle
    was operated that is at issue, not the consequences of the driving (emphasis
    in original).

[35]

In
    the present case the trial judge found that the
actus reus
was made out solely because of the speed at which
    Pyrek was driving. According to the trial judge, Pyrek was driving too fast,
    much faster than the posted speed limit of 50 km/hr. But the trial judge had no
    evidence of Pyreks actual speed. Pyrek argues that contrary to
Beatty
the trial judge inferred excessive speed from the
    amount of damage to Pyreks car. And Pyrek argues the trial judge compounded
    this error by a second error; he relied on speculation instead of evidence to
    infer that Pyrek was driving too fast. In support of his argument Pyrek points
    to para. 216 of the trial judges reasons:

I cannot say with certainty precisely what speed Mr. Pyrek was
    driving but that does not prevent the Court from making a finding of dangerous
    driving in the circumstances. He was driving well over the speed limit in my
    view. I believe that Ms. Kathers original evidence that he was driving 80 to
    100 km/h was correct. I believe Ms. Kather was wrong when she said in cross
    that perhaps he was only going 60 km/h. I consider that he would have had much
    better control of his vehicle at only 60 km/h. The damage to [the] vehicle was
    consistent with a high rate of speed although the Court recognizes that there
    was no expert evidence on this point and the most that can be said is that
    common sense suggests that the greater the speed, the greater the damage.
    Standing alone, the damage to the vehicle, is of limited value. As I have said,
    it does not matter that his precise speed cannot be precisely determined.

[36]

I
    do not accept Pyreks argument. In his careful and thorough reasons, the trial
    judge accurately set out the
actus
    reus
of
    dangerous driving at para. 200:

The Supreme Court of Canada has given guidance to trial courts
    on what is required to make out the offence of dangerous driving. The
actus
    reus
will be made out where the trier of fact [is] satisfied beyond a
    reasonable doubt that, viewed objectively, the accused was, in the words of the
    section, driving in a manner that was dangerous to the public, having regard to
    all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at
    which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the
    time is what might reasonably be expected to be at the place: see
R. v.
    Beatty
,
[2008] 1
    S.C.R. 49
at para. 43
. When determining
    whether the
actus reus
is made out the Court must examine the manner
    in which the motor vehicle was operating not the consequences of the driving.
    Accordingly, where death or injury occurs for example, that has no bearing on
    the question of whether dangerous driving has occurred. The consequences of the
    driving may inform an assessment of the risk involved but it does not answer
    the question of whether or not the vehicle was operated in a manner dangerous
    to the public (see
Beatty

at para. 46).

[37]

And
    at para. 211 the trial judge found that the
actus reus
had been proved because Pyrek was significantly
    exceeding the speed limit:

[It is] my view that the
actus reus
of the offence of
    dangerous driving is made out. This follows from the fact that in my view Mr.
    Pyrek was most certainly exceeding the speed limit [of] 50 km/h by a
    significant amount. He was driving on a residential Street that he knew well.
    He lost control of his vehicle and could not keep it on the roadway. Finally,
    when he lost control of the vehicle and it left the roadway, his inability to
    control the vehicle continued such that his vehicle collided with a tree. It
    took the presence of the tree to cause an abrupt stop to the vehicle. While it
    was the middle of the night and there could not have been many people around,
    it was a residential area and it is reasonable to infer that there would be
    others out in their vehicles or walking in the neighbourhood. In the
    circumstances, the
actus reus
for dangerous driving is made out.

[38]

At
    para. 216, on which Pyrek relies, the trial judge was observing that although
    he could not determine Pyreks precise speed, on the evidence he accepted, his
    speed was well over the speed limit. The trial judge cautioned himself that the
    evidence of the damage to the car was of limited weight. The trial judges
    reasons as a whole, especially the paragraphs to which I have referred, show he
    correctly focused on Pyreks manner of driving.

[39]

Also,
    the trial judge was not speculating about Pyreks rate of speed. He had
    Kathers evidence which he was entitled to accept. In addition to Kathers
    evidence in chief about Pyreks rate of speed, which the trial judge referred
    to at para. 216, he had her evidence that during the drive she freaked out
    and twice yelled at Pyrek to slow down. Finally as she and Pyrek lay injured in
    the wreckage of the car, he turned to her and confessed he had fucked up.

[40]

The
    trial judge did not err in finding the
actus reus
of dangerous driving causing bodily harm
had been made out. I would
    not give effect to Pyreks arguments on this second issue.

C.

conclusion

[41]

On
    the two issues Pyrek argues on his appeal I would hold first that he was tried
    within a reasonable time, and second that the trial judge correctly found the
actus reus
of driving causing bodily harm had been established.
    I would dismiss the appeal.

Released: D.W. June 12, 2017

John Laskin
    J.A.

I agree. David
    Watt J.A.

I agree. C. W.
    Hourigan J.A.

[1]

Monahan J, who
    tried the case in 2015, was not the judge who mistakenly adjourned the entire
    trial in November 2014.

[2]

This section reads:

If notices not given

(4) If a party calls a person as an expert
    witness without complying with subsection (3), the court shall, at the request
    of any other party,

(a) grant an
    adjournment of the proceedings to the party who requests it to allow him or her
    to prepare for cross-examination of the expert witness;

(b) order
    the party who called the expert witness to provide that other party and any
    other party with the material referred to in paragraph (3)(b); and

(c) order
    the calling or recalling of any witness for the purpose of giving testimony on
    matters related to those raised in the expert witnesss testimony, unless the
    court considers it inappropriate to do so.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:  R. v. Romain, 2017 ONCA 519

DATE: 20170621

DOCKET: C54627, C54738, C55325, C55370

Doherty, LaForme and Trotter JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

C54627

Abena Romain

Appellant

and

C54738

Tasha Spruyt

Appellant

and

C55325

Fitzroy Osbourne

Appellant

and

C55370

Akido Jack

Appellant

R. Craig Bottomley and Sherif M. Foda, for the appellant
    Romain

Nicholas A. Xynnis, for the appellant Spruyt

Mark Halfyard and Breana Vandebeek, for the appellant
    Osbourne

James C. Fleming, for the appellant Jack

John Corelli and John A. Neander, for the respondent

Heard:  June 5 and 6, 2017

On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Myrna
    L. Lack of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury, on November 18,
    2011.

By the Court:

Introduction

[1]

The four appellants and others were tried by a jury on a 31-count
    indictment.  The indictment included 14 counts of fraud over $5,000 and 14
    corresponding conspiracy charges.  Each appellant was charged with some, but
    not all, of the
fraud/conspiracy allegations.  In addition,
    all of the appellants were charged with, and convicted of, a single count of
    knowingly contributing to an activity of a criminal organization by
    facilitating the making of fraudulent loans (count 1).  The appellants were not
    charged in two of the fraud counts in the indictment (counts 2 and 25).

[2]

The appellants convictions and acquittals on the various fraud/conspiracy
    charges can be summarized as follows:

The
    appellant Jack

·

Convicted
on 10 charges (5 fraud and 5 related conspiracy charges); and

·

Acquitted on 4 charges (2 frauds and 2 related conspiracy charges).

The appellant Osbourne

·

Convicted on 4 charges (2 frauds and 2 related conspiracy charges);
    and

·

Acquitted on 4 charges (2 frauds and 2 related conspiracy charges).

The appellant Romain

·

Convicted on 4 charges (2 frauds and 2 related conspiracy charges);
    and

·

Acquitted on 2 charges (1 fraud and related conspiracy charge).

The
    appellant Spruyt

·

Convicted
    on 10 charges (5 frauds and 5 related conspiracy charges); and

·

No
    acquittals.

[3]

The appellants appealed their convictions.  The appellant, Mr. Jack,
    also appealed his sentence, however, counsel abandoned that appeal at the
    outset of his oral argument.

[4]

After oral argument, the court advised counsel that the appeals would be
    dismissed with reasons to follow.  These are our reasons.

The Scheme

[5]

The fraud and
related conspiracy charges involved what
    was referred to as an advance fee scheme.  Telemarketers, working from
    various boiler room
[1]
locations in the Toronto area, spoke with American residents who had responded
    to advertisements.  The telemarketers told the callers that they could borrow
    money on a short-term basis from various private lenders.  The companies
    represented as lenders did not exist and no loans were ever advanced.

[6]

The victims, who had poor credit ratings, were told by
    the telemarketers that certain advanced payments had to be made before the
    victims could receive the loans.  Some victims made a single advanced payment
    and some made more than one payment.  The amounts of these payments varied.  The
    victims never received any loans.

[7]

The Crown alleged that the appellants worked the
    phones in one or more of the boiler rooms.  They called the potential
    victims, and working from prepared scripts, made the relevant misrepresentations.
    If they were successful in convincing the victim to make the payments, they
    made arrangements for those payments.  The victims lost over $1 million in the
    course of the scheme.

[8]

The police investigation began in February 2008, when
    the police searched a residence after the fire department had responded to a
    flooded house call.  The search revealed many documents apparently connected to
    an ongoing telemarketing advance fee scheme.  The investigation continued to July
    24, 2008, when the police conducted simultaneous raids at several boiler rooms
    in the Toronto area.  They found many documents connected to the fraudulent scheme
    in those locations.

[9]

The investigation revealed that numerous fictitious companies were used
    as the supposed lenders in the scheme.  The
28
    fraud/conspiracy charges involving one or more of the appellants related to 14
    of those companies.  A single charge of fraud over $5,000 and conspiracy to
    commit fraud was laid in relation to each.

[10]

By the end of the trial, it was common ground that the fraudulent scheme
    alleged by the Crown existed and that many people had been victimized.  The
    appellants claimed that they were not involved in the fraudulent scheme in any
    way.

[11]

The Crowns case rested on surveillance evidence in
    respect of two of the appellants, and fingerprint evidence placing the
    appellants fingerprints on various documents directly related to the
    fraudulent scheme.  Those documents were found in different boiler rooms.
    Ms. Romain was arrested in one of the boiler rooms.

[12]

The appellants who were said to have been identified in
    the surveillance evidence, argued that the identification evidence was
    unreliable.  All of the appellants argued that although their fingerprints were
    found on the documents as claimed by the Crown, those fingerprints in and of
    themselves could not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants
    were involved in the fraudulent scheme.  Ms. Romain testified.  The other
    appellants did not.  Ms. Romain explained that she happened to be in one of the
    boiler rooms when the police arrived, having gone there earlier to purchase marihuana.
    She smoked the marihuana in the basement and was upstairs making a call on her
    cell phone when the police arrived.  She was unaware of the fraudulent activity
    going on around her in the boiler room.

The Appellant mr. Osbournes Appeal

Was the appellant, Mr. Osbourne, denied his right
    to counsel of choice?

[13]

Mr. Osbourne was represented by Ms. Abraham throughout
    the proceedings before trial.  Very shortly before the trial was to commence, Ms.
    Abraham told Mr. Osbourne that she could no longer act for him as she had taken
    a contract position with the Crown Attorneys office.  On the first day of
    trial, with jury selection about to begin, the trial judge was told that Ms.
    Abraham was withdrawing as Mr. Osbournes counsel because of the supposed
    conflict of interest.  The trial judge was told that Ms. Abraham had made
    alternate arrangements for Mr. Osbournes representation.  Ms. Abraham was not
    present.

[14]

The trial judge was concerned that Mr. Osbourne be
    properly represented, that the trial proceed as scheduled, and that the very
    large jury panel assembled for jury selection not be inconvenienced any more
    than was necessary.  She ordered Ms. Abraham to appear and briefly adjourned
    the proceeding.

[15]

Discussions occurred over the next day or so.  We need
    not detail those discussions.  The arrangements for Mr. Osbournes
    representation seemed to be in a state of flux.  The trial judge made it clear that
    she would require Ms. Abraham to continue to represent Mr. Osbourne if he so
    wished.  Mr. Osbourne initially indicated he wanted Ms. Abraham to continue as
    counsel, but in a subsequent dialogue with the trial judge, he indicated that he
    was no longer content to have her as counsel.

[16]

Ultimately, the following exchange occurred.  As it is central to this
    ground of appeal, we set it out in full:

MS. ABRAHAM:  I apologize for keeping the court waiting.  Mr.
    Osbourne, perhaps he should come forward.  I have made

THE COURT:  Yes.

MS. ABRAHAM: arrangements for somebody that I know Mr.
    Osbourne wanted as counsel and that counsel, Mr. Hy Rosenberg.  Mr. Rosenberg
    is willing and able to appear here tomorrow and for his trial.  Now Mr.
    Osbourne, I believe Your Honour would like to hear directly from him how he
    feels about that.

THE COURT:  Yes, Mr. Osbourne, do you  is that satisfactory
    with you.

MR. OSBOURNE:  Yes because Im familiar with this lawyer.

THE COURT:  I just want to make this perfectly clear to you.
    Im prepared to make an order today.  Well I dont have to make an order
    today.  The fact is that Ms. Abraham is on the record and Im just prepared to
    say to her I understand you have difficulties, but youre on the record and you
    must see this trial through, okay.  So thats an option for you Mr. Osbourne.
    You can carry on with  in this trial with Ms. Abraham as your lawyer.
    Alternatively, if that doesnt suit you, you can say, well in light of the
    circumstances here I want an opportunity to get another lawyer and I want an
    adjournment and so I would then, in all likelihood, grant you that adjournment
    to do that, or thirdly, if you  if what is being suggested here that Mr.  is
    it Rosenberg.

MS. ABRAHAM:  Yes.

THE COURT:  Mr. Rosenberg represent you and come tomorrow and
    hes able to do that, thats fine too.  So those are your options.  Do you need
    some time to think about it?

MR. OSBOURNE:  Im okay with Mr. Rosenberg.

THE COURT:  Okay, youre completely satisfied.

MR. OSBOURNE:  Yes.

THE COURT:  All right, thats good enough for me then.  Okay,
    thats fine, thank you sir.  You can sit down.

[17]

The trial judge put Mr. Osbournes options to
    him fairly and fully.  Mr. Osbourne made a clear and unequivocal decision to
    proceed with Mr. Rosenberg as his counsel.  There is no suggestion that Mr. Osbourne
    was acting under any disability or did not fully understand the situation or
    the options available to him.  The trial judge did not pressure Mr. Osbourne to
    make a choice.  She expressly told him that he did not have to make a decision
    then and there, but could have some time to think about it.  Mr. Osbourne
    declined that invitation.  Nor does it advance the appellants argument to
    point to things the trial judge could have done, but did not do.  It is almost
    inevitable when a trial judge is faced with a situation like this that one can
    think of something the trial judge could have done that he or she did not do.
    That is not the standard of review.  The issue is whether the trial judge did
    what had to be done to ensure that Mr. Osbourne could meaningfully exercise his
    right to counsel of choice.  She did.

[18]

As the above-quoted passage demonstrates, Mr. Osbourne
    had his counsel of choice.  In his affidavit, filed in this court five years
    after his conviction, and on the eve of the appeal, Mr. Osbourne declares that
    he did not have counsel of choice.  However, to the extent that the affidavit
    sheds any light on the matter, it demonstrates that Mr. Osbourne was fully aware
    of his options at trial, appreciated the pros and cons of each, and made a
    choice to proceed with Mr. Rosenberg.  The choice was a fully informed one,
    although no doubt, like many choices people make, somewhat dictated by the
    circumstances.  The affidavit offers no support for the claim that Mr. Osbourne
    was denied his counsel of choice.

[19]

There is no allegation that Mr. Osbourne was not properly
    represented by Mr. Rosenberg, and no suggestion that there were any problems
    with the client-solicitor relationship during trial.  Indeed, Mr. Osbourne was
    acquitted on four of the nine charges he faced.

[20]

In rejecting the claim that Mr. Osbourne was denied his
    counsel of choice, we have considered his affidavit.  For the reasons set out
    above, it does not advance the appellants argument on this ground of appeal.  In
    considering Mr. Osbournes affidavit on this ground of appeal, we should not be
    taken as rejecting the Crowns argument that the court should not receive the
    affidavit in light of its very late filing.

[21]

The Court of Appeal can admit fresh evidence where it
    is in the interests of justice to do so:
Criminal Code
s. 683(1).  There is a strong argument to be made that the interests
    of justice would not be served by receiving the appellants affidavit on the
    eve of the appeal, when no explanation is offered for the total failure to
    comply with the rules and conventions of this court governing fresh evidence
    applications in criminal appeals.  The negative impact on the proper
    administration of justice flowing from receiving an affidavit at this stage of
    the proceeding is properly considered in determining what the interests of
    justice require in a given case.  The timing of the filing of the appellants
    affidavit, had there been any merit to this argument, may well have forced the court
    to bifurcate the appeal and further delay the resolution of what is already a
    five-year old appeal.  We would think the court would be reluctant to go down
    that path without some good explanation for the late filing of the material and
    some demonstration of real potential merit in the fresh evidence application.

Did the trial judge err in
    refusing to allow counsel for Mr. Osbourne to file CPIC entries for one Yuri
    Lionel?

[22]

Yuri Lionel was alleged by the Crown to be a
    central figure in the fraudulent scheme.  He was charged, but absconded.  There
    was an outstanding warrant for his arrest at the time of the trial.

[23]

At trial, counsel for Mr. Osbourne indicated
    that Mr. Osbourne intended to testify on his own behalf.  Mr. Osbourne intended
    to testify that he had gone to Mr. Lionels residence, one of the boiler rooms,
    to purchase marihuana from Mr. Lionel and not because he was working in the boiler
    room as part of the fraudulent scheme.  Counsel submitted that Mr. Lionels
    record as reflected in the CPIC entries was evidence that Mr. Lionel was a drug
    dealer and would therefore support to Mr. Osbournes proposed evidence.

[24]

The submission focused on two entries in the
    CPIC record.  Mr. Lionel was convicted of possession of a narcotic in 1999,
    some nine years before the relevant events.  He was also charged with
    trafficking in a narcotic, about the same time. That charge was withdrawn.

[25]

The CPIC record was hearsay.  The Crown argued
    that there were various ways the defence could have tendered the criminal
    record of Mr. Lionel as admissible hearsay, but having chosen not to do so, the
    evidence was not admissible.  The defence submitted that the trial judge had
    the authority to relax the rules of evidence to assist the defence in proving
    Mr. Lionels criminal antecedents.

[26]

The Crowns submissions are persuasive, but in
    our view, this ground of appeal can be disposed of without deciding the merits
    of those arguments.

[27]

The admissibility of the CPIC entries fails for
    want of relevance.  The fact that Mr. Lionel was in possession of marihuana
    nine years earlier says nothing about whether he was a trafficker in the drug
    nine years later.  The fact that Mr. Lionel was charged with possession of a
    narcotic for the purpose of trafficking and that the charge was withdrawn, has
    no evidentiary value.  A charge that has been withdrawn permits no inference
    about Mr. Lionels involvement in drug dealing at the time of the charge, much
    less nine years later.

[28]

The evidence had no relevance and was properly
    rejected by the trial judge.

Did the trial judge adequately
    instruct the jury on the eyewitness evidence as it related to the appellant, Mr.
    Osbourne?

[29]

During their investigation, the police had a boiler
    room located on Whites Road under observation.  One of the surveillance officers
    testified that on July 18, 2008, he saw an individual he identified as Mr. Osbourne
    leaving that location.  The Crown relied on this evidence to connect Mr.
    Osbourne to a boiler room other than the boiler rooms in which documents
    with his fingerprints on them had been found.

[30]

The defence vigorously challenged the officers
    identification evidence.  There were many reasons for the jury to be cautious
    about the reliability of that evidence.

[31]

The trial judge charged the jury in general
    terms on the dangers inherent in identification evidence.  She emphasized the
    need to be very cautious about relying on that evidence.  The trial judge
    reviewed the identification evidence in detail.  When outlining the position of
    Mr. Osbourne, she summarized the various defence arguments supporting the claim
    that the jury should not rely on the eyewitness identification.  Considered in
    its entirety, the charge was thorough, balanced and legally correct.

[32]

There was no objection to the trial judges
    instructions.  Those instructions were fully vetted with counsel before the
    trial judge delivered her charge.

[33]

On appeal, counsel submits that the jury should
    have been told that they could consider the eyewitness evidence as capable of
    supporting the Crowns case only if the jury was certain that the officer was
    identifying the person as Mr. Osbourne and not simply testifying that the
    person looked like Mr. Osbourne.

[34]

The first part of this submission is incorrect
    in law.  The jury did not have to be certain about the identification
    evidence before making findings based on it.  Second, the distinction between
    identifying Mr. Osbourne and testifying that the person resembled Mr. Osbourne arose
    out of the cross-examination of the officer on notes he made shortly after his observations.
    In those notes, the officer used the word resembles when comparing the
    appellants photograph to the person he saw leaving the boiler room on Whites
    Road.  The defence relied on this reference to argue that the officer could not
    really identify the person as Mr. Osbourne, but could only say that he looked
    like Mr. Osbourne.  The trial judge reviewed this part of the evidence in her
    jury charge.

[35]

Whether the officer could actually identify Mr.
    Osbourne or could only say that the person resembled Mr. Osbourne was one of many
    evidentiary issues arising from the identification evidence.  The officer
    testified that he identified Mr. Osbourne.  The trial judges thorough review
    of the evidence would no doubt remind the jury of the relevant parts of the
    officers evidence, including his use of the word resembles in his notes.

[36]

There was an evidentiary basis supporting the
    argument that the officer could only say that the person resembled Mr.
    Osbourne.  The defence made that argument.  The trial judge in her instructions
    on the relevant law and her review of the relevant evidence was not required to
    argue the case for the defence.  We see no error in her instructions.

Did the trial judge fail to relate
    the elements of party liability to the evidence implicating Mr. Osbourne?

[37]

The trial judge instructed the jury at length on
    the elements of the relevant offences, the evidence relevant to the various
    offences, and the positions of the parties.  She reviewed a draft of her
    instructions with counsel and counsel had no objections to the manner in which she
    put the case to the jury.  Arguments made on appeal that effectively resile
    from a considered position taken at trial on the manner in which an accuseds
    case should be put to the jury should be viewed with skepticism.

[38]

The trial judges instructions must be read as a
    whole.  This charge made it clear to the jury what the Crown had to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt before Mr. Osbourne could be convicted on any of the
    charges.  The Crowns case came down to the assertion that Mr. Osbourne was
    working in one or more of the boiler rooms in furtherance of the advance loan
    scheme with knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the scheme.  The defence
    position came down to the claim that the Crown had failed to prove that he was
    one of the telemarketers.

[39]

Despite the length of the trial, and the bulk of
    the documentary evidence, this was a simple case.  The Crowns theory and the
    defence position were equally straightforward and easy to understand.  We have
    no doubt that the jury fully understood what the Crown had to prove and the
    respective positions of the parties.  The different verdicts arrived at by the
    jury on the various fraud/conspiracy counts demonstrate that the jury carefully
    considered the evidence as it related to the various allegations.

Were Mr. Osbournes convictions
    unreasonable?

[40]

The law applicable to a claim that convictions
    are unreasonable is well settled:  see
R. v. Villaroman
, [2016] 1 S.C.R.
    1000.  An appellate court must decide whether a reasonable jury, properly
    instructed, could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Osbourne was
    complicit in the offences for which he was convicted.

[41]

The reasonable verdict analysis has two
    counterbalancing components.  An appellate court must engage in a limited
    re-weighing of the evidence.  In doing so, the court looks at the evidence
    through the lens of judicial experience.  However, the court must also recognize
    the paramount and advantaged position of the jury as fact finder.  The
    appellate court acknowledges that advantage by deferring to the jurys
    assessment of the evidence if the jurys assessment, that is its verdict, is
    within the reasonableness range having regard to the totality of the evidence.

[42]

The appeal court does not scour the record in
    search of explanations for, or gaps in, the evidence that are arguably
    inconsistent with the jurys verdicts.  Instead, the appellate court accepts
    that the jury has performed its function and asks whether the jurys ultimate assessment
    is a reasonable one.  The mere fact that the appeal court, or another reasonable
    jury, might have reached different verdicts is not determinative of the
    reasonableness of the verdicts actually reached by the jury.

[43]

Bearing in mind both the requirement that the
    court re-weigh the evidence to a limited extent, and the requirement that the
    court defer to the jurys assessment, we are satisfied that the convictions
    clear the reasonableness bar.

[44]

The evidence considered as a whole supports the
    following reasonable inferences:

·

Mr. Osbourne was at some time in possession of four documents that
    were closely tied to the fraudulent scheme.  The contents of at least some of
    those documents made the fraudulent nature of the scheme crystal clear;

·

The documents were of a sort that one could not reasonably be
    expected to have access to if one was not a participant in the fraud;

·

Mr. Osbourne was in possession of the documents at two different boiler
    rooms;

·

Mr. Osbournes possession of the documents at two different
    locations occurred many months apart from each other;  and

·

Mr. Osbourne was seen exiting a third boiler room several months
    after he was in possession of fraud-related documents at one of the other boiler
    rooms.

[45]

These inferences could reasonably support the convictions
    entered against Mr. Osbourne.  It is also relevant to the reasonableness
    assessment in this court that Mr. Osbourne did not testify.

[46]

Mr. Osbourne was acquitted on two of the fraud
    charges and the two related conspiracy charges.  It is not argued that those
    acquittals are in any way inconsistent with the convictions such as to cast any
    doubt on the reasonableness of those convictions.

The Appellant ms. Spruyts Appeal

[47]

Counsel for Ms. Spruyt advanced five grounds of
    appeal in his factum.  He argued three of them in his oral submissions.  We
    will address those three arguments.

Did the trial judge err in holding
    that the Crown could cross-examine Ms. Spruyt on her prior convictions for
    fraud and unlawful use of a credit card?

[48]

Trial counsel for Ms. Spruyt brought a
Corbett
 application prior to deciding
    whether Ms. Spruyt would testify.  Counsel asked the court to prohibit Crown
    counsel from cross-examining Ms. Spruyt on her prior convictions.  She had been
    convicted in 2007 of two counts of fraud under $5,000 and one count of
    unlawfully using a credit card.    The charges were laid in 2006.  The evidence
    in this case suggested that the advance fee loan scheme was ongoing no later
    than the fall of 2007 and continued until the summer of 2008.

[49]

The trial judge dismissed the
Corbett
 application.  Ms. Spruyt did not testify.

[50]

In dismissing the application, the trial judge
    acknowledged the potential prejudice flowing from cross-examination on
    fraud-related convictions when the accused was facing fraud-related charges.
    At the same time, she described those prior convictions as highly probative of
    her [Ms. Spruyts] honesty and important to the jury in assessing Ms. Spruyts
    credibility.  The trial judge ultimately concluded that the probative value as
    it related to Ms. Spruyts credibility significantly outweighs the danger of
    prejudice, particularly in light of the fact that the jury will receive a clear
    direction as to the limited use it can make of the information.

[51]

In the usual course, a witness, including an
    accused, may be cross-examined on a prior criminal record.  That
    cross-examination goes to credibility.  The trial judge can prohibit cross-examination
    on a prior criminal record if the potential prejudice from the
    cross-examination outweighs any potential probative value.

[52]

The trial judges ruling involves an exercise of
    her discretion.  This court will not interfere with that exercise absent
    demonstrable misapprehension of material facts, an error in principle, or what
    can be characterized as an unreasonable exercise of the discretion in all of the
    circumstances.  We see no reversible error in the trial judges exercise of her
    discretion.  Recent convictions for multiple crimes of dishonesty can be an
    important consideration in assessing the truthfulness of a witnesss
    testimony.  The trial judge did not err in holding that this potentially important
    evidence should not be kept from the jury should Ms. Spruyt elect to testify.

[53]

There is no basis upon which we can interfere
    with the trial judges exercise of her discretion.

Did the trial judge fail to relate
    the elements of party liability to the evidence against Ms. Spruyt?

[54]

The same ground of appeal was advanced on behalf
    of Mr. Osbourne (see
supra
, at paras. 37-39).
    We would reject the submission made on behalf of Ms. Spruyt for the same
    reasons that we rejected Mr. Osbournes submissions.

Were Ms. Spruyts convictions
    unreasonable?

[55]

The Crowns case against Ms. Spruyt rested
    entirely on fingerprint evidence.  Thirteen fingerprints belonging to Ms.
    Spruyt were found on eight documents connected to five of the fictitious
    companies put forward to the victims as lenders.  The documents were seized
    from two boiler rooms.  Some of the documents were seized by the police in
    February 2008 at one boiler room, and others dated after February 2008 were
    seized in July 2008 at a different boiler room.

[56]

Taking the approach outlined above (at paras.
    43-45), and considering the evidence in its totality, we are satisfied that the
    evidence could support the inferences necessary to find that Ms. Spruyt was
    involved in the fraudulent scheme over an extended period of time.  Her fingerprints
    permit the inference that she was in possession of documents directly connected
    to the fraud at different places and at different times.  A jury could also reasonably
    conclude that some, if not all, of these documents were not the kind of
    documents that a person unconnected to the fraud would have in his or her
    possession.  The verdicts cannot be said to be unreasonable.

the appellant ms. romains appeal

Did the trial judge fail to
    protect Ms. Romains right to a fair trial?

[57]

At trial, after the Crown had completed its
    examination-in-chief of Detective Lamothe, the lead investigator, counsel for
    Ms. Romain brought a motion to stay the proceedings on the basis that the Crown
    had failed to produce to the defence potentially exculpatory evidence in the
    possession of the police.

[58]

As we understand the position at trial, the
    defence argued that Ms. Romain was speaking on her cell phone when the police
    entered the boiler room at 1990 Whites Road and arrested her.  She claimed
    that the police seized her phone.  Ms. Romain maintained that her cell phone
    records would show that she was speaking to a friend at the time of her
    arrest.  According to the defence, this evidence would contradict the Crowns
    claim that she was involved in the activities of the boiler room when the
    police arrived.

[59]

Defence counsel told the trial judge that he had
    been led to believe that the cell phone had been seized by the police and that
    the phone and/or relevant records would be produced by the police.  According
    to trial counsel, it became apparent to him during the trial that the Crown had
    no intention of producing the cell phone and had in fact lost the phone.  This
    realization precipitated the motion for a stay.

[60]

In response, the Crown made three points to the
    trial judge.  First, it had no cell phone records.  Second, it had never
    undertaken to produce any cell phone records.  Third, the defence knew, at
    least since the preliminary inquiry, that it was the evidence of the police
    that many cell phones had been seized from the Whites Road address and that the
    police could not say whether Ms. Romains phone had been seized.

[61]

The next day, the police brought 13 cell phones
    to court.  The Crown indicated that all of them had been seized from the 1990
    Whites Road address.  The phones were available immediately outside of the
    courtroom.  Crown counsel told the trial judge that the police suspected that
    one of them could belong to Ms. Romain because it was different than the other
    phones.  Crown counsel invited Ms. Romain and her counsel to examine the cell
    phones and identify Ms. Romains phone, if it was among those seized.

[62]

The trial judge also invited counsel for Ms.
    Romain to examine the phones, identify his clients phone, and should the
    police for some reason refuse to produce it, return to court for the
    appropriate order.

[63]

For some reason, defence counsel never responded
    directly to this simple straightforward suggestion.  Instead, he went on at
    some length about his proposed cross-examination of one of the police officers.

[64]

The trial judge ultimately dismissed the stay motion
    on the basis that the defence had failed to comply with the applicable criminal
    rules and offered no acceptable explanation for that failure.  The trial judge
    reviewed the history of the matter, stressing that the defence was aware of the
    Crown position in respect of Ms. Romains cell phone at least 18 months before
    trial, but had not brought a motion for production.  The trial judge also
    mentioned that the defence could have brought an application for production of
    the records from the cell phone service provider, but had not done so.

[65]

On appeal, the argument surrounding the
    missing cell phone has shifted shape.  There is no longer any suggestion that
    the police had lost exculpatory evidence.  Now, the fundamental error, according
    to appellate counsel, is the trial judges failure to either order production
    of the cell phone or production of the relevant records from the cell phone.

[66]

This argument fails.  The police brought all of
    the seized cell phones to court.  Counsel for Ms. Romain had ample opportunity
    to examine those cell phones, identify Ms. Romains phone, if it was among
    them, and seek the appropriate order.  It made no sense for the trial judge to
    make any kind of production order, unless and until it was clear that one of
    the 13 seized cell phones belonged to Ms. Romain.  The easiest and most obvious
    way to achieve that end was to have counsel and Ms. Romain examine the cell
    phones.  The trial judge invited counsel to do that.  There is no evidence that
    counsel ever looked at the phones, or if he did that any of them belonged to
    Ms. Romain.

[67]

Absent any indication by counsel to the trial
    judge that one of the phones had some connection to Ms. Romain, we are at a
    loss to understand how or why the trial judge would make an order directing the
    production of a cell phone or the cell phone records.  In the absence of any
    indication that one of the cell phones belonged to Ms. Romain, the trial
    judges failure to order one or more of the phones produced, or her failure to
    order the records in relation to one or more of the phones produced, could not
    possibly have had any negative impact on the fairness of the trial.

[68]

The trial judge made no error in dismissing the
    motion on procedural grounds.  The motion as now framed on appeal is also
    devoid of merit.

Did the trial judge err in failing
    to instruct the jury on bad character evidence?

[69]

Ms. Romain testified that she went to the Whites
    Road address to purchase marihuana.  She smoked marihuana in the basement
    shortly before the police arrived.  Before the police arrived, she had gone upstairs
    and was sitting on a couch talking on her cell phone.  As it turns out, she was
    surrounded by documents relating to the fraud.  She testified that she may have
    inadvertently touched some of those documents.  She claimed to have no idea of
    the ongoing boiler room operation in the upstairs area.

[70]

In cross-examination, Ms. Romain was asked about
    a statement she gave to the police.  Crown counsel suggested to her that, in
    the statement, she acknowledged to the officer that she became aware of what
    was going on upstairs when she went back up after smoking marihuana.  Crown
    counsel suggested that Ms. Romain indicated to the officer that she was not
    particularly concerned about it as she had gone to the residence for an illegal
    purpose in any event.  The Crown suggested to her that her attitude in the
    interview was captured by the phrase in for a penny in for a pound.  Ms.
    Romain was adamant throughout the cross-examination that she told the officer
    that she only realized what was going on at Whites Road after he told her.

[71]

Counsel were provided with a draft of the trial
    judges charge and given a full opportunity to make submissions on its
    contents.  There was no suggestion by anyone that the evidence about marihuana
    consumption should precipitate an instruction against bad conduct propensity
    reasoning.

[72]

The suggestion that the jury might infer that
    because Ms. Romain used marihuana, she had a propensity to commit all crimes,
    including telemarketing fraud, is to say the least farfetched.  The argument
    becomes even less tenable in light of the nature of the cross-examination.
    Crown counsels questions did not target Ms. Romains marihuana use as
    demonstrating a propensity to commit crimes, but rather the cross-examination
    sought to highlight what the Crown argued was a patently unbelievable
    explanation offered by Ms. Romain for her conduct at Whites Road.

[73]

Like counsel at trial and the trial judge, we see
    no risk that the jury improperly used propensity reasoning to infer that because
    Ms. Romain used marihuana, she was a telemarketing fraudster.

Did the trial judge misdirect the
    jury that some of the evidence against Ms. Romain was direct evidence?

[74]

In her instructions, the trial judge gave the
    usual explanation to the jury about the difference between direct evidence and
    circumstantial evidence.  She also told the jury:

In a case such as this, where the evidence for
    the prosecution is substantially circumstantial, an accused person should only
    be found guilty where you are satisfied that the guilt of an accused person is
    the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the whole of the evidence
    pertaining to that accused person.

[75]

Later, when instructing the jury on the elements
    of the offence of fraud as it related to Ms. Romain, the trial judge said:

The case against Ms. Romain is not a wholly circumstantial
    case.  There is evidence from which you may find direct participation in the
    frauds alleged.  I am referring to the evidence about where she was and what
    she was doing when police entered the residence at Whites Road.
Crown counsel also relies on circumstantial evidence to prove her
    knowledge of the existence of a criminal organization and her participation in
    the conspiracies to commit fraud and the frauds alleged against her.

You should consider all of the evidence about
    how the advance fee loan operation was conducted, the methods in general and
    the specifics of the transactions that Ms. Romain is alleged to have been
    involved in.  You should consider the evidence of Detective Lamothe and others
    about where Ms. Romain was sitting and what she was doing at 1990 Whites Road,
    Unit 11 on July 24th, 2008 when police entered.  Consider the evidence of where
    the various documents were found in relation to her. Consider all of the evidence
    of who and what police found.  There is an audio/video tape recording of the
    premises after they entered, Exhibit 35.  Consider what is seen and heard on
    it.  [Emphasis added.]

[76]

The trial judge went on to refer to other
    evidence relevant to the case against Ms. Romain, including her fingerprints
    and her own testimony.  After referring to that evidence, she reminded the jury
    of the ultimate burden on the Crown to prove the essential elements of each
    offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

[77]

Counsel for Ms. Romain focuses on the trial
    judges use of the phrase you may find direct participation in the frauds
    alleged.  He submits that the trial judge wrongly instructed the jury that Ms.
    Romains presence in the boiler room when it was operating was direct evidence
    of her participation in the frauds.

[78]

It is unclear whether the trial judges
    reference to evidence of direct participation in the frauds was meant to be a
    reference to direct evidence as contrasted with circumstantial evidence.
    Clearly, Ms. Romains presence in the boiler room, armed with a phone and
    surrounded by fraud-related documents, was not direct evidence of her
    involvement in the fraud.  Evidence of her involvement in the fraud could come
    only from inferences drawn from her presence.

[79]

Looking at the charge as a whole, we are
    satisfied that the jury would understand the phrase direct participation to refer
    to participation in the criminal activity at the time of the police raid and
    Ms. Romains arrest.  Unlike the other appellants, there was evidence that Ms.
    Romain was engaged in the fraud at the moment of her arrest.  In our view, that
    is the distinction the trial judge was drawing in the above-quoted passage.
    The use of the phrase direct participation, while perhaps unfortunate, would
    not have misled the jury.

[80]

Once again, we note that the trial judge fully
    vetted this charge with counsel.  No objection was taken to the phrase now said
    to have resulted in reversible error.

[81]

It is also significant that the jury acquitted
    Ms. Romain on some counts.  Had they understood that her presence in the boiler
    room on the phone was direct evidence of her participation in the fraud, it is
    difficult to understand how they would have distinguished among the counts as
    they did.

Did the trial judge misstate the
    evidence?

[82]

Detective Lamothe testified that when he
    approached Ms. Romain, she was on the phone.  He testified that he did not know
    what happened to the cell phone she was using.  He did not recall reviewing the
    contents of that cell phone at any time.

[83]

Ms. Romain testified that she dropped her phone
    when the police took her into custody.  She thought she dropped it into her
    purse.  She also testified that later that day, the police provided her with
    her mothers telephone number.  According to Ms. Romain, they could only have
    gotten that number from her cell phone.

[84]

The cell phone was said to be significant to the
    defence because Ms. Romain claimed to be on the phone with a person who could
    confirm that she was at the Whites Road residence to purchase marihuana.

[85]

In the course of reviewing the evidence
    concerning the cell phone, the trial judge twice told the jury the evidence
    from police officers was that the cell phone was not seized.

[86]

The trial judges summary of the police evidence
    is not quite accurate.  They did not testify that the cell phone was not
    seized, but as summarized above, Detective Lamothe testified that he did not
    know what happened to the phone.  In other words, he did not know whether it
    was seized or not.

[87]

Appellate counsel for Ms. Romain describes the
    trial judges misstatement as an egregious and false jury instruction.  Counsels
    language is extravagant and unsupported by the record.  There was extensive
    discussion about this part of the jury instruction in the pre-charge conference.
    Counsel for Ms. Romain was content with the trial judges language probably
    because it assisted in his attack on the credibility of the police.  On the trial
    judges version of the police officers evidence, counsel could argue that it
    was simply incredible for the police to suggest that they had not seized Ms.
    Romains phone, given the circumstances in which she was arrested.  Counsel
    could argue that the police were lying about not seizing the phone because they
    did not want to produce the phone and the exculpatory phone records.

[88]

Even if trial counsels acceptance of the trial
    judges proposed language was not a calculated tactical decision, we reject
    this ground of appeal on another basis.  The jury was told that the facts were for
    them and it was their recollection of the evidence that counted.  A single
    factual error in a lengthy jury instruction will seldom, if ever, justify quashing
    the verdicts returned by a jury.  Certainly the relatively minimal difference
    between a completely accurate instruction  there is no evidence from the
    police that they seized Ms. Romains cell phone  and the instruction actually
    given  the cell phone was not seized by the police  would not warrant
    interference with the verdicts.

Are Ms. Romains convictions
    unreasonable?

[89]

The case for the Crown against Ms. Romain
    consisted of:

·

her arrest in the middle of an ongoing boiler room operation
    connected to the fraudulent scheme; and

·

her fingerprints on eight of the documents relating to the fraudulent
    scheme found in that boiler room.  All of the documents were related to the
    frauds.  One was the actual script used to induce victims to make the
    investments.

[90]

In our view, the evidence provided an ample
    basis upon which a reasonable jury could convict Ms. Romain on the charges on
    which she was convicted.

[91]

Ms. Romain did testify.  The trial judge gave a
    careful and accurate explanation to the jury as to how they should approach her
    testimony.  Clearly, the jury were satisfied that Ms. Romains testimony,
    considered in the context of the rest of the evidence, did not leave any doubt
    as to her involvement in the scheme.  We observe that even if the jury believed
    that Ms. Romain was at the Whites Road boiler room to purchase and smoke
    marihuana, that is not necessarily inconsistent with the Crowns claim that she
    also worked in the boiler room located at the location.  The jury could
    accept, or at least not reject, significant parts of Ms. Romains evidence and
    still be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that she was a participant in the
    scheme.

[92]

In our view, it cannot be said that Ms. Romains
    convictions are unreasonable.

the appellant mr. jacks appeal

Did the nature of the charges
    unfairly prejudice the appellant, Mr. Jack?

[93]

Counsel for Mr. Jack submits that, in reality,
    this was a case about many discrete fraudulent transactions involving
    individual victims, most of whom were defrauded of less than $5,000.  He
    submits that the Crown artificially and deceptively charged a number of
    frauds over $5,000 by grouping the charges according to the identity of the fictitious
    lender, an irrelevant factor, and identifying the victim, not as the individual
    borrowers, but as the public.  Counsel submits that all of this deception was
    in aid of creating an offence that would fall within the definition of serious
    offence for the purposes of the criminal organization charge in count 1.

[94]

Trial counsel raised no objections to the
    indictment or the form of the charges at any stage of the trial.  Nor did he
    raise any of the complaints now made by counsel on appeal.  At trial, Mr. Jack
    advanced one defence and one defence only  he was not involved in what he readily
    acknowledged was a large-scale telemarketing fraud operation.

[95]

We do not accept counsels submissions.  The
    frauds alleged and proved by the Crown fell squarely within the kind of fraudulent
    scheme that has always been charged as a fraud on the public.  The scheme
    targeted a segment of the public at large, as opposed to specific individuals
    identified as targets before the scheme was implemented. The schemes goal was
    to cheat anyone who answered the ads and called the boiler rooms.  There is
    nothing deceptive or prejudicial in describing the victims of this fraud as the
    public.  Indeed, to describe the frauds alleged and proved by the Crown as a number
    of individual frauds against individual victims would mis-describe the nature
    of the fraudulent scheme and significantly understate its seriousness.

[96]

We also see no difficulty with the Crown
    particularizing the charges by reference to the various fictitious companies
    identified as the lenders.  It may be that the Crown could have laid a single
    overarching fraud and conspiracy charge, or that it may have organized the
    charges in other ways.  The approach taken by the Crown, however, potentially made
    the case more manageable for the jury.  We see no basis upon which it could be
    said that, by laying a separate charge in respect of each fictitious company, the
    Crown somehow put Mr. Jack in a worse position than he would have been had the
    Crown laid a single global fraud and conspiracy charge.  Mr. Jack had no
    difficulty pleading to and defending the charges as particularized.

[97]

Finally, there is no merit to the submission
    that it is somehow unfair to convict Mr. Jack of frauds over $5,000 when many
    individual victims were defrauded of less than $5,000.  This argument assumes
    there was some merit to the submission that the fraud was mis-described as a
    fraud on the public.  There was not.  As we are satisfied that Mr. Jack was
    properly charged with frauds over $5,000 and conspiracies to commit fraud over
    $5,000, it follows that the submission that the charge in count 1 is somehow
    contrived must fail.

Did the trial judge err in
    admitting the Agreed Statement of Facts tendered by all counsel?

[98]

At the request of all counsel, including counsel
    for Mr. Jack, the trial judge admitted a document setting out the outcome of
    the charges against other persons referred to in the evidence.  Five of those
    individuals had pled guilty to fraud or conspiracy to commit fraud and the
    charges had been withdrawn against two.

[99]

All counsel, including counsel for Mr. Jack,
    worked to produce the Agreed Statement of Facts.  Obviously, counsel did not
    want the jury wondering about what might have happened to some of the other
    named conspirators.  Each counsel no doubt had specific tactical reasons for
    the admissions.  There is no suggestion that Mr. Jack did not receive effective
    and competent legal assistance.

[100]

The trial judge cautioned the jury against using the convictions of
    others in determining the guilt of individual appellants.  She gave that
    caution both when the Agreed Statement of Facts was admitted and during her
    charge.  In her charge, she added the caution, a person who pleads guilty may
    have had any number of reasons for pleading guilty.   The trial judges
    instructions adequately cautioned the jury against any misuse of the
    information provided in the Agreed Statement of Facts.

[101]

We do not see how we can hold that the trial judge erred in
    admitting into evidence an Agreed Statement of Facts, absent some suggestion
    that by agreeing to those facts counsel did not provide competent
    representation.  For this court to go behind the Agreed Statement of Facts and
    counsels tactical decisions, absent a claim of ineffective assistance, would
    be to severely undermine counsels independence and the overall credibility of
    the trial process.

The instruction on potential
    liability under section 21(2)

[102]

The trial judge instructed the jury on the operation of s. 21(2) of
    the
Criminal Code
.  She told the jury that if
    an accused had agreed with another or others to commit a fraud under $5,000,
    and one or more of the people in the agreement committed a fraud over $5,000 in
    the course of carrying out the agreement, the accused would be guilty of fraud
    over $5,000 if that accused knew or should have known that one of the other
    parties to the agreement would commit fraud over $5,000 in the course of pursuing
    the common objective.

[103]

There was no objection to the charge.  The instruction assumes that
    fraud over $5,000 and fraud under $5,000 are discrete offences.  The language
    of s. 380 of the
Criminal Code
and this
    courts judgment in
R. v. Bernard
, [2013] ONCA
    371 suggest otherwise.  The language used in s. 380 suggests there is one crime
     fraud.  The amount of the fraud is relevant to jurisdiction (the amount
    alleged in the charge) and penalty (the amount proved by the Crown).

[104]

We need not decide whether fraud over $5,000 and fraud under $5,000
    are two distinct crimes.  On the evidence, there was no realistic basis upon
    which a jury could conclude that Mr. Jack had entered into an agreement to
    defraud the public, but only of an amount less than $5,000.  The fraudulent
    scheme alleged and proved by the Crown was to defraud any member of the public
    who could be induced through various misrepresentations to pay one or more advance
    fees.  The amount of the fraud contemplated by the agreement was the total amount
    the fraudsters could eventually induce members of the public to advance to them.

[105]

The instruction on s. 21(2) was unnecessary, but not prejudicial.

The trial judges review of the
    evidence against Mr. Jack

[106]

Counsel for Mr. Jack accepts that the fingerprint evidence
    incriminating Mr. Jack could reasonably justify his conviction on the counts on
    which he was found guilty.  Counsel also accepts that the trial judge
    accurately reviewed the fingerprint evidence.  Counsel contends, however, that
    the trial judge erred in leaving other evidence with the jury as potentially
    confirmatory of the Crowns case against Mr. Jack.

[107]

The trial judge left three pieces of evidence with the jury as
    relevant to their determination of whether the Crown had proved Mr. Jacks
    guilt.  First, the trial judge referred to the evidence that Mr. Jack was seen
    at the Whites Road boiler room on the day the search was executed.  Second,
    she referred to the name Jack which appeared on a document relating to the
    fraud.  Mr. Jacks fingerprints were found on other documents relating to the
    same fictitious lender.  Third, the trial judge referred to the evidence that
    Mr. Jack listed his address on his drivers licence as the same address as Tawnya
    Neil, one of the alleged co-conspirators.

[108]

There was no objection to the trial judges treatment of the
    evidence.  In her charge, she had given a detailed summary of the purported identification
    evidence.  That summary no doubt brought home to the jury the weakness of the
    supposed identification evidence.  It amounted to little more than evidence
    that someone looked like Mr. Jack.

[109]

The other evidence, the name Jack on the document and the residence
    shown on his drivers licence, had relatively little probative value, although
    the nickname was connected in the evidence to documentation relating to a
    victim named Marianne Shipley.  Mr. Jacks fingerprints were also found on a
    document relating to that same victim.

[110]

We are not convinced that the trial judge should have withdrawn the
    impugned evidence from the jury, especially in the absence of any request that she
    do so.  The Crown made only brief reference to the evidence in its
    submissions.  The trial judges instructions to the jury also made little reference
    to this evidence.  The case for the Crown and the case for the defence were put
    to the jury, as they should have been, largely on the basis of the fingerprints
    and the inferences, if any, the jury should draw from those fingerprints.  The
    trial judges brief reference to other bits of evidence relevant to the case
    against Mr. Jack gave that evidence the minor role it deserved.

conclusion

[111]

The conviction appeals are dismissed.  Mr. Jacks sentence appeal is
    dismissed as abandoned.

Released: DD  JUN 21 2016

Doherty J.A.

H.S. LaForme J.A.

G.T. Trotter J.A.

[1]

The term boiler room refers to a location used by a group of
    telemarketers to sell various products over the telephone using dishonest and
    high pressure tactics.