WARNING

The judge hearing this motion directs that
    the following should be attached to the file:

An order restricting publication in this
    proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2)
    of the
Criminal Code
shall continue.  These sections of
the Criminal
    Code
provide:

486.4(1)       Subject to subsection
    (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any
    information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published
    in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in
    respect of

(a)     any of the following offences;

(i)      an offence under section 151,
    152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2,
    173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281,
    286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii)      any offence under this Act, as
    it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force,
    if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainants sexual
    integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i)
    if it occurred on or after that day; or

(iii)     REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25,
    s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).

(b)     two or more
    offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an
    offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2)     In proceedings in respect of the
    offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice
    shall

(a)     at the first reasonable
    opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim
    of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b)     on application made by the
    victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in
    proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in
    subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge
    or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify
    the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted
    in any way.

(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an
    offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is
    under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) as soon as feasible, inform the
    victim of their right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application of the victim or the
    prosecutor, make the order.

(3)     In proceedings in respect of an
    offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing
    that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of
    eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written
    material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning
    of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or
    transmitted in any way.

(4)     An order made under this section
    does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the
    administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make
    the information known in the community.
2005, c.
    32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014,
    c. 25, ss. 22,48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18.

486.6(1)       Every person who fails to
    comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or
    (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2)     For greater certainty, an order
    referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings
    taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in
    any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that
    could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity
    is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

WARNING

An order restricting publication in this proceeding
    was made under s. 517 of the
Criminal Code
and continues to be in
    effect.  This section of the
Criminal Code
provides:

517(1)         If the prosecutor or the accused
    intends to show cause under section 515, he or she shall so state to the justice
    and the justice may, and shall on application by the accused, before or at any
    time during the course of the proceedings under that section, make an order
    directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the representations
    made and the reasons, if any, given or to be given by the justice shall not be
    published in any document, or broadcast or transmitted in any way before such
    time as

(a)     if a preliminary inquiry is held, the
    accused in respect of whom the proceedings are held is discharged; or

(b)     if the accused in respect
    of whom the proceedings are held is tried or ordered to stand trial, the trial
    is ended.

Failure to comply

(2)     Everyone who fails without lawful excuse, the
    proof of which lies on him, to comply with an order made under subsection (1)
    is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(3)     [Repealed, 2005, c. 32, s. 17]

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 517; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st
    Supp.), s. 101(E); 2005, c. 32, s. 17.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. N.S., 2021 ONCA 605

DATE: 20210907

DOCKET: M52683 & M52732 (C69437)

Fairburn A.C.J.O. (Motion Judge)

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Appellant

and

N.S.

Respondent

and

Criminal Lawyers
    Association (Ontario), Canadian Alliance for Sex Work Law Reform, Monica
    Forrester, Valerie Scott, Jane X, Alessa Mason, Lanna Moon Perrin, and Tiffany
    Anwar

Proposed Interveners

Deborah Krick, Michael Dunn,
    and Jeremy Tatum, for the appellant

Jeffery Couse, for the respondent

Gerald Chan and Dragana Rakic,
    for the proposed intervener the Criminal Lawyers Association (Ontario)

Michael Rosenberg and Alana
    Robert, for the proposed interveners the Canadian Alliance for Sex Work Law
    Reform, Monica Forrester, Valerie Scott, Jane X, Alessa Mason, and Lanna Moon
    Perrin

Tara Santini, for the
    proposed intervener the Canadian Alliance for Sex Work Law Reform

James Lockyer, for the
    proposed intervener Tiffany Anwar

Michael H. Morris and Joseph
    Cheng, for the Attorney General of Canada

Heard: August 19, 2021 via videoconference

REASONS FOR DECISION

A.

Overview

[1]

The respondent (N.S.) was charged with numerous offences under the

Criminal Code
, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46,
    including s. 286.2(1) (receiving material benefit from sexual services), s.
    286.3(1) (procuring sexual services), and s. 286.4 (advertising sexual
    services). At trial, N.S. asserted that all three of those provisions infringed
    ss. 2(b), 2(d), and 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and were not justifiable limits under s. 1. The trial judge found that the
    provisions infringed s. 7 of the
Charter
, declared them of no force
    and effect, and declined to suspend the declaration of invalidity:
R. v.
    N.S.
, 2021 ONSC 1628;
R. v. N.S.
, 2021 ONSC 2920.

[2]

On June 15, 2021, the Crown filed an application to stay the effect of
    the declaration pending the resolution of the appeal in this matter. The Crown
    has already filed its motion record on the application for a stay, including
    seven affidavits in support of its position. That application is scheduled to
    be heard by a panel of this court on October 1, 2021. I have been informed that
    the Crown expects to perfect the appeal prior to the date that the stay
    application will be heard.

[3]

These reasons pertain to the relief sought by a number of proposed
    interveners. With the exception of the Criminal Lawyers Association (Ontario)
    (CLA), I will refer to all other proposed interveners collectively as the Group
    Interveners. This is appropriate because, both in written and oral
    submissions, they presented a united front at the motion forming the subject of
    these reasons.

[4]

At this time, the CLA only requests leave to intervene in the Crowns
    motion for a stay. The Crown consents to the CLAs motion. I would grant the
    requested relief, subject to the conditions set out at the end of these
    reasons.

[5]

The Group Interveners ask that they be permitted leave to intervene in
    the appeal of this matter. The Group Interveners also seek a number of other forms
    of cascading relief, relief that far exceeds what the CLA requests. In
    particular, the Group Interveners ask for the following:

(i)    as their primary position, the Group Interveners
    ask for an order suspending the hearing of the appeal in this matter until such
    time that an application that the Group Interveners have lodged in the Superior
    Court of Justice has been adjudicated upon;

(ii)    if the hearing of the appeal is not suspended, then
    the Group Interveners ask for an order granting them leave to intervene in the
    Crowns motion for a stay pending appeal of the declaration of invalidity of
    ss. 286.2, 286.3(1), and 286.4 of the
Criminal Code
, including an
    order that the Group Interveners be permitted to introduce fresh evidence on
    the stay application and participate fully in cross-examinations on that
    application;

(iii)   if the hearing of the appeal is not suspended
    until after the Superior Court application is adjudicated upon, the Group
    Interveners also request an order that they be permitted to file a fresh
    evidence application on the appeal proper, an application that would largely
    duplicate the materials they wish to file on the stay application (should the
    relief in (ii) above be granted), as well as the materials filed in support of
    their application in the Superior Court of Justice.

[6]

The Crown consents to the Group Interveners being granted leave to
    intervene in both the motion to stay and the appeal, subject to limitations
    being placed upon the length of their factums and submissions. However, the Crown
    opposes the Group Interveners being permitted to delay the hearing of the
    appeal and expand the evidentiary record in both the stay application and the
    appeal.

[7]

For the reasons that follow, the Group Interveners are granted leave to
    intervene in both the motion to stay and the appeal. They will be permitted to
    file written submissions and make oral argument in accordance with the terms
    set out at the end of these reasons. All other forms of relief are denied.

B.

The Requests of the Group Interveners

[8]

The Group Interveners consist of sex workers rights organizations,
    individual sex workers, and a third party. They include the Canadian Alliance
    for Sex Work Law Reform, a coalition of 25 leading sex workers rights
    organizations predominantly led by and for sex workers across Canada. This coalition
    is joined by current and former sex workers and a former escort agency
    operator.

[9]

The Crown acknowledges that the Group Interveners meet the criteria for
    leave to intervene as set out in this courts prior jurisprudence:
Peel
    (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd.
(1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 164 (C.A.), at p. 167;
Bedford v. Canada (Attorney
    General)
, 2009 ONCA 669, 98 O.R. (3d) 792, at para. 2 [
Bedford
(2009)].
    Accordingly, the Crown consents to the Group Interveners being granted leave to
    intervene in both the stay motion and the appeal proper.

[10]

I
    do not question the Crown concession on this point. The Group Interveners
    include well-recognized entities with a special expertise in the issues to be
    decided on appeal; all have a real, substantial, and identifiable interest in
    the subject matter of the proceedings; and each has an important perspective to
    bring to the appeal, which perspectives I am satisfied will differ in some
    respects from the immediate parties to the appeal:
Bedford
(2009), at
    para. 2.

[11]

Where
    the Group Interveners and the Crown part company is on the role that the Group
    Interveners should play in relation to this appeal. The Crown maintains that
    the Group Interveners should be held to the traditional intervener status of
    friends of the court and, therefore, not be permitted to act as if they are a
    party to this criminal appeal, weighing in on scheduling issues and expanding
    the issues to be decided and factual record upon which to decide them.

[12]

The
    group interveners want more.

(1)

Should the Appeal be Delayed Pending Adjudication of the Civil
    Application in the Superior Court of Justice?

[13]

The
    Group Interveners have brought a civil application in the Superior Court of
    Justice, in which they challenge the constitutionality of many (if not all) of
    the
Criminal Code
provisions pertaining to commercial sex work. As
    their primary form of relief in the criminal appeal before this court, the one
    focused most heavily upon in both written and oral submissions, the Group
    Interveners ask that the appeal be placed on pause until their civil
    application has been adjudicated. They say that this relief should be granted
    because their application is the best means of determining the
    constitutionality of the provisions at issue in this criminal matter. The Group
    Interveners emphasize that this appeal only involves three of the
Criminal
    Code
provisions relating to sexual services and that the record is, in
    their view, woefully inadequate. As well, the Group Interveners argue that the
    constitutionality of the provisions were only considered through a ss. 2(b),
    2(d), and 7
Charter
lens at trial, when in fact they should have also
    been considered, at a minimum, under s. 15 of the
Charter
.

[14]

The
    Group Interveners therefore argue that this appeal should be delayed so that
    their civil application can be adjudicated, thereby offering this court the
    benefit of robust guidance when considering the appeal in this matter.
    Alternatively, the Group Interveners say, if there is an appeal taken from the
    decision arising out of their civil application, then that appeal could be grouped
    with this one, a grouping that would provide this court with the benefit of a
    significantly expanded factual record, and with an expanded constitutional lens
    through which to consider the impugned
Criminal Code
provisions. It is
    said that this would promote judicial economy in this court, defend against
    inconsistent decisions, and ensure that this court has the best available
    information before it when deciding these important issues.

[15]

Notwithstanding
    the importance of these issues, I would not grant this relief.

[16]

The
    Group Interveners civil application before the Superior Court of Justice
    challenges the same
Criminal Code
provisions struck down in this case:
    ss. 286.2(1), 286.3(1), and 286.4. In addition, that application challenges
    three other sections of the
Criminal Code
, all of which also relate to
    commercial sex work: s. 213(1) (stopping or impeding traffic for the purpose of
    offering, providing, or obtaining sexual services), s. 213(1.1) (communicating to
    provide sexual services for consideration next to a school, playground or daycare
    centre), and s. 286.1 (obtaining sexual services for consideration). In short,
    as I understand it from the materials filed on this application, the Group
    Interveners are essentially challenging all of the sexual service provisions in
    the
Criminal Code
.

[17]

Not
    only is the constitutional approach to those provisions much broader in scope
    than what was before the trial judge in this appeal (including a s. 15
Charter
argument that was not argued in this case), but the Group Interveners have
    filed a factual record on their civil application that can only be described as
    considerable in scope. A condensed version of that record was filed on this
    motion and is over 600 pages in length. As I understand it, the full extent of
    the record as it currently stands is over 2,000 pages deep. It was only filed in
    the Superior Court on July 14, 2021 and contains 16 affidavits, with five of
    them being expert affidavits.

[18]

The
    Attorney General of Canada (AGC) is the respondent on the civil application
    in the Superior Court of Justice. While the AGC does not take a position on the
    Group Interveners application in this court, the AGC appeared as a courtesy to
    answer any questions about the outstanding civil application. The AGC says that
    it has not yet filed its record on the civil application. If all goes according
    to plan, the AGC will aim to have its materials filed by December 15, 2021.
    While understandably reluctant to provide exact numbers, counsel to the AGC
    allowed that they will likely be filing between 10 to 20 affidavits on the
    civil application. Then a reply record will have to be filed.

[19]

While
    there is no timetable set as yet for cross-examinations on the civil
    application, I am informed that it is reasonable to expect that around eight
    weeks will be needed for those cross-examinations. Of course,
    cross-examinations will not commence until after all materials have been filed.

[20]

While
    counsel are optimistic that this matter could be ready to be heard in the
    Superior Court by June of 2022, respectfully, I would place emphasis on the
    word optimistic. The simple reality is that, based upon the information
    available to this court on this application, the Group Interveners application
    in the Superior Court is at a very preliminary stage.

[21]

I
    have come to this conclusion based in part upon the helpful April 27, 2021
    civil endorsement form of Myers J. In his endorsement, Myers J. notes that the
    applicants (the Group Interveners in this matter) were at that time asking for a
    February 2022 date for the hearing of the civil matter, which he described as
    not realistic. He also described what was being proposed as a huge trial in
    a box, questioning the appropriateness of only a four-day hearing for an application
    that would likely involve 20 or more affidavits, in addition to all of the
    transcript arising from cross-examinations.

[22]

Justice
    Myers declined the request to schedule the matter for four days in February
    2022. As he put it, if the matter did not go ahead on those days, it would
    essentially mean the loss of a judge-week from a schedule already beset with
    backlog from the pandemic.

[23]

I
    was informed at the hearing of this application that a case management judge
    has recently been assigned in the Superior Court, but that the first case
    management meeting will not happen until September 14, 2021. Whatever comes
    from that case management process, one thing seems clear today, even based upon
    the parties own schedules, this matter cannot be heard in the Superior Court
    until at least June of next year.

[24]

Even
    if the parties to the civil application have completed the record by June of
    2022, an ambitious schedule to be sure, it is not for this court to weigh in on
    whether the Superior Court will have time to hear the matter at that time. It
    will be for the Superior Court to determine the form that the application will
    take, the number of days that will be assigned to the matter, and when the
    Superior Courts schedule will accommodate the matter. In other words, it is
    not at all clear that this matter will be heard by June of next year. And, even
    if it is heard then, one cannot forget that the matter has to be decided. On a
    record of this size, it is a simple reality that whatever judge hears the civil
    application, it will take some time to produce the reasons.

[25]

It
    seems somewhat clear today that the civil application will not be concluded for
    a long time.

[26]

At
    the same time, I am informed by Crown counsel that the Crown appeal in this
    matter will be perfected before October 1, 2021, the date scheduled for the
    hearing of the stay application. The Crown also says that it will be ready to
    argue the appeal by the early new year. I was informed by counsel for the
    respondent on the criminal appeal that he may not be in a position to file
    responding submissions and argue the appeal until a few months later, likely
    into April of 2022.

[27]

I
    would add the following. While the respondent supports the Group Interveners in
    this case  provided it creates only what he describes as a modest delay,
    which he defines as the appeal being argued in 2022  he is not prepared to say
    that he is without s. 11(b)
Charter
concerns. While he does not rest
    charged right now and, accordingly, his s. 11(b)
Charter
entitlement
    is not active, I keep the respondents s. 11(b) concern in mind in arriving at
    my conclusion in this case. The fact is that, should the Crown succeed on
    appeal, the respondent will again face jeopardy on these charges. In my view,
    his concern reflects the fact that this is a criminal matter with significant
    implications, not only for the respondent as an individual, but for the
    community at large.

[28]

In
    any event, even if the civil application could be heard in June of 2022, and
    even if the reasons on this potentially 30-plus affidavit case, involving what
    Myers J. referred to as a trial in a box, could be delivered within a couple
    of months, respectfully, it seems unrealistic that an appeal from those reasons
    could get before this court and heard by the end of 2022. Therefore, stepping
    back and looking at this matter realistically, the respondents position that
    he will agree to a modest delay of up to the end of 2022 likely cannot be
    accommodated.

[29]

I
    am not familiar with the hearing of a criminal appeal ever having been delayed
    pending the outcome of a civil application. While the Group Interveners rely on
    a couple of civil appeals that were delayed in the interests of justice, they
    are not apposite to the request being made here.

[30]

In
    one of the cases, the delay was predicated on the need for the trial judge to
    determine some outstanding issues which would reduce the number of appeals
    brought before this court as a result. A short stay was granted for that
    purpose:
Korea Data Systems (USA), Inc. v. Aamazing Technologies Inc.
,
    2012 ONCA 756, 29 C.P.C. (7th) 51, at paras. 23-24.

[31]

The
    other authority relied upon by the Group Interveners is one where this court
    delayed a civil appeal on the basis that it involved essentially the same
    litigation. Like
Korea Data Systems
, the same parties were embroiled
    in different pieces of litigation arising out of one main set of allegations:
Canadian
    Planning and Design Consultants Inc. v. Libya (State)
, 2015 ONCA 661, 340
    O.A.C. 98, at para. 53.

[32]

These
    decisions have no application to the Group Interveners request in this case.

[33]

In
    my view, the Group Interveners request to delay this appeal will result in a
    very long delay. The purpose of the request is really predicated on a desire to
    turn the appeal into something very different than what is being appealed. The
    objective of this delay is to ensure that this appeal is heard against the
    backdrop of: (a) a significantly expanded record, including another potentially
    30-plus affidavits and cross-examinations; (b) additional impugned statutory
    provisions; and (c) additional constitutional arguments. Respectfully, this is
    a request to turn this appeal into more of a reference, akin to the case that
    is currently lodged in the Superior Court.

[34]

It
    is critical to keep in mind the context surrounding this appeal. This is a
    criminal appeal predicated on an indictment. The respondent brought a constitutional
    challenge to the statutory provisions under which he was charged. He chose how
    to litigate those issues and the record unfolded accordingly. As with all
    constitutional litigation, the trial judge decided the matter based upon the factual
    record and arguments put before him. The Crown appeals from that decision.

[35]

Appeals
    must proceed in an expeditious fashion. This is particularly true where there
    is conflicting jurisprudence on the very subject of the appeal, as is the case
    here. Contrary to the disposition in this case, the trial judge in
R. v.
    MacDonald
, 2021 ONSC 4423, found that
R. v. N.S.
, 2021 ONSC 1628,
    was plainly wrong and upheld the constitutionality of the same impugned
    provisions: at para. 16. Two further trial judges agreed with the findings of
    the trial judge in
MacDonald
, similarly asserting that the decision in
N.S.
is plainly wrong:
R. v. Williams
(2 July 2021),
    Brampton (Ont. S.C.);
R. v. Maldonado Vallejos
, 2021 ONSC 5809, at
    para. 19. Additionally, there is one other matter pending at the Superior
    Court, where the accused has been found guilty and has been given time to
    consider whether to bring a constitutional challenge to s. 286.2(1) of the
Criminal
    Code
:
R. v. Y.S.
, 2021 ONSC 4010, at paras. 52, 202-204.

[36]

In
    addition, there are at least two appeals pending before this court in which I
    am informed by the Crown that each appellant appears to be raising the
    constitutionality of the same or similar
Criminal Code
provisions for
    the first time on appeal:
R. v. J.K.
(3 August 2016), Brampton (Ont.
    C.J.), appeal as of right to Ont. C.A., C63449;
R. v. S.M.
(11 October
    2019), Newmarket, 18/05543 (Ont. C.J.), appeal as of right to Ont. C.A., C67806.
    There is also an appeal in the matter of
R. v. B.
, 2018 ONSC 7205
    (C69136 & C69138), where the constitutional challenge to the same
    provisions as this case was dismissed. That case involves persons under the age
    of 18 years.
[1]

[37]

Of
    further concern are four cases cited by the Crown that were scheduled to be
    heard by the Superior Court between August 2021 and September 2021.
[2]
Depending upon the results of those decisions, this court could be faced with
    even more appeals of a similar nature.

[38]

Quite
    simply, the trial courts need some help with respect to this matter. In my
    view, this court would be abdicating its responsibility to provide guidance on
    matters of constitutional importance, especially where there is uncertainty on
    such matters, if it were to suspend the hearing of a criminal appeal  one that
    would bring those constitutional matters into focus  pending a civil matter
    being adjudicated in the Superior Court, which may or may not even resolve
    within the next calendar year. This is particularly true when there are other
    constitutional challenges to the legislation being litigated in trial courts
    across Ontario right now, as is the case here.

[39]

Finally,
    as part of the materials filed on this application, the Crown also filed its
    record for the stay application. I do not intend to address that record in any
    detail, a matter that should be left to the panel hearing the stay application.
    I would simply note the fact that, as of May 21, 2021, there were hundreds of
    active cases in the Province of Ontario involving the impugned
Criminal
    Code
provisions.

[40]

Whether
    the record in this case is as complete as it could be or not, and whether N.S.
    challenged the provisions as completely as he could have or not, this matter is
    one of importance to N.S., to other accused whose jeopardy hangs in the
    balance, to the public, and to the administration of justice. It cannot be put
    on hold for an indefinite period of time.

[41]

Therefore,
    I dismiss the request to delay the hearing of the appeal.

(2)

Should the Group Interveners be Permitted to Introduce New Evidence on the
    Stay Application?

[42]

If
    the Group Interveners had succeeded in their application to have the appeal
    delayed, then they would not have taken a position on the Crowns stay
    application. However, in the event that the request to delay the appeal were to
    be dismissed, the Group Interveners asked to be permitted to make written and
    oral submissions on that application and to file a factual record. It was made
    clear during oral submissions  for reasons that I need not get into, but which
    reasons I accept  that the Group Interveners are not prepared to share their
    factual record with the respondent to the stay application.

[43]

While
    I would grant the Group Interveners request to be permitted to intervene,
    subject to the terms set out below, they may not augment the factual record.

[44]

I
    start with the proposition that interveners are not typically granted the
    ability to supplement the record:
R. v. M.C.
, 2018 ONCA 634, at para.
    10;
R. v. Morris
, 2019 ONCA 509, at para. 7;
R. v. Chapman
(2005), 203 O.A.C. 233 (C.A.), at para. 6. Nor are they permitted to raise issues
    beyond those raised by the parties to the litigation. For instance, this court has
    denied an interveners request to raise a new constitutional argument for the
    first time on appeal: see e.g.,
Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General)
,
    2011 ONCA 209, at paras. 4-20 [
Bedford
(2011)]. Notably, as pointed
    out by the Crown, the Supreme Court also recently commented that interveners
    play a vital role in our justice system by providing unique perspectives and
    specialized forms of expertise that assist the court in deciding complex issues
    that have effects transcending the interests of the particular parties before
    it but, even so, interveners should not be permitted to widen or add to the
    points in issue:
R. v. Barton
, 2019 SCC 33, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 579, at
    paras. 52-53.

[45]

In
    my view, the same can be said of requests to intervene relative to a stay
    application. This stay application is a criminal matter between the parties,
    one that can be decided on the facts as marshalled by the parties. I am
    confident that those facts will be sufficient to give proper life to the
    application for a stay. I am also confident that the Group Interveners
    presence on the application, and the submissions they will offer, will provide
    the court with the assistance necessary to properly decide the issues before it.

[46]

Therefore,
    while the Group Interveners may provide written and oral submissions at the
    stay application, they may not augment the factual record.

(3)

Should the Group Interveners be Permitted to Augment the Appeal Record?

[47]

This
    brings me to the next form of relief requested by the Group Interveners.

[48]

If
    they are denied a stay of the appeal pending their civil application playing
    through in the Superior Court, then they wish to augment the appeal record with
    the record they have filed in the Superior Court. As mentioned before, the
    record from the civil application is already a record of substantial heft and
    will only get larger with the affidavits to be filed by the AGC and the eight weeks
    of cross-examinations yet to come.

[49]

Permitting
    the Group Interveners to augment the appeal record in this fashion would turn
    this appeal into an entirely different case. As previously noted, and for the
    reasons already discussed, it would essentially turn this court into a court of
    first instance on this issue of constitutionality and render the trial judges
    reasons entirely nugatory to the result. I say this because the case in this
    court would be litigated on an entirely different basis. This would be unfair
    to the trial judge, it would be unfair to the Crown, it would be unfair to the
    respondent, and it would be unfair to the administration of justice. It is not
    how constitutional litigation should evolve.

[50]

In
    essence, it would turn this criminal appeal into a reference involving a
    broad-ranging civil application. If there is to be additional evidence led on
    appeal, it is the parties who will have to follow the usual course and bring a
    fresh evidence application, leaving it to the panel hearing the appeal to
    decide whether that evidence should be admitted:
R. v. M. (A.)
, 2005
    CanLII 33773 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 1, 4.

C.

Conclusion

[51]

The
    CLA and the Group Interveners are granted leave to intervene in the Crowns
    motion to stay the effect of the declaration of invalidity pending the
    resolution of the appeal, subject to the following terms:

(i)
    The CLA and the Group Interveners may each file a factum not exceeding 15 pages
    in length;

(ii)
    The factums will be filed no later than September 16, 2021;

(iii)
    Oral argument of no more than 10 minutes each will be permitted;

(iv)
    The record will not be supplemented in any way;

(v)
    The interveners shall not seek costs; and

(vi)
    No costs will be ordered against the interveners or the parties.

[52]

The
    Group Interveners are granted leave to intervene in the appeal subject to the
    following terms:

(i)
    They may file a factum not exceeding 15 pages in length;

(ii)
    The factum will be filed in accordance with a direction given by the case
    management judge;

(iii)
    Oral argument of no more than 15 minutes will be permitted;

(iv)
    The record will not be supplemented in any way;

(v) The interveners shall not seek costs; and

(vi) No costs will be ordered against the interveners or
    the parties.

Fairburn A.C.J.O.

[1]
The Crown has suggested that it may seek to have the appeal of
R. v. N.S.
heard with the appeal in
R. v. B.

[2]

R. v. Beeransingh
, in Newmarket;
R. v. Bernard
,
R. v. Deidun
, in Peel;
R. v. MacMillian
, in St. Catharines; and
R. v. Saab
, in Peel.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R.
    v. Bristol, 2021 ONCA 599

DATE: 20210908

DOCKET: C64759

Pardu, Paciocco and Nordheimer JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Roger Bristol

Appellant

Andrew Menchynski, for the appellant

Manasvin Goswami, for the respondent

Heard: September 1, 2021 by
    videoconference

On appeal from the sentences imposed on September
    19, 2016 by Justice Marvin Zuker of the Ontario Court of Justice.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

Mr. Bristol seeks leave to appeal the total sentence
    of ten years imposed on him following on his convictions on 32 counts of break
    and enter; 34 counts of failure to comply with probation, and two counts of
    attempted break and enter. For the following reasons, we grant leave to appeal
    and reduce the sentences to a total of seven years.

[2]

The appellant pleaded guilty to committing a
    series of break and enters at residential homes in the City of Toronto over a two-month
    period in 2015. The appellant would generally gain access to the homes through
    unlocked doors or open windows. He would find valuables such as electronics and
    jewellery which he would then take and flee. The appellant said that he engaged
    in these activities in order to pay back drug dealers to whom he was indebted.
    There was no violence used in any of these break and enters and on the odd
    occasion when the appellant found that someone was in the home, he fled
    immediately.

[3]

The appellant has an extensive criminal record
    reflecting similar offences dating back over 30 years. Prior to these offences,
    the longest sentence that the appellant had received was a period of
    incarceration of just over two years.

[4]

The appellant was 44 years old at the time of
    his sentencing. He has a serious addiction to drugs. The appellant also suffers
    from schizophrenia and has severely limited intellectual abilities.

[5]

In our view, the sentencing judge made a number
    of errors which impacted directly on the sentence that he imposed:
R. v.
    Lacasse
, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 44, of which three
    are particularly serious. First, the sentencing judge referred, more than once,
    to the break and enters as home invasion robberies. They were not. In doing
    so, it is apparent that the sentencing judge placed the offences in a more
    serious category than they properly represented.

[6]

Second, the sentencing judge erred in his
    treatment of the appellants mental health challenges and whether they impacted
    on the moral blameworthiness of his actions. The sentencing judge not only had
    a pre-sentence report, he also had a forensic report authored by two
    psychiatrists that detailed the appellants mental health issues. These issues
    date back to when the appellant was 12 years old. The psychiatrists gave
    evidence that the appellant was in the retarded range of intellectual
    functioning. The appellants challenges were exacerbated by his use of drugs.

[7]

The sentencing judge failed to give proper
    weight to this evidence in evaluating the appellants moral blameworthiness.
    Indeed, at one point, the sentencing judge said that he was not sure that
    there is any diminished moral responsibility with respect to the appellants
    actions.

[8]

Third, the sentencing judge failed to give
    proper effect to the jump principle in deciding on the appropriate sentence.
    While the sentencing judge referred to the principle in his reasons, he never
    actually addressed it. As earlier noted, prior to these offences, the longest
    sentence that had been imposed on the appellant was a period of incarceration
    of slightly more than two years. That sentence was imposed in 2006. An increase
    from two years to ten years, even given the number of offences involved, was
    excessive.

[9]

Given these errors, it falls to this court to
    determine the appropriate sentence. In our view, a sentence of seven years, as
    suggested by the appellant, is an appropriate sentence given the factors we
    have mentioned and his guilty plea.

[10]

In deciding on that sentence, we have taken into
    account one other factor. At the sentencing, the appellants trial counsel (not
    counsel on the appeal) had sought an adjournment to obtain records from the
    Toronto South Detention Centre regarding the number of lockdowns that had occurred
    while the appellant was incarcerated. The sentencing judge refused the
    adjournment of the basis that the appellant had had months to obtain the
    records and had failed to do so. That refusal was within the discretion of the
    sentencing judge. However, we now have those records which show that the
    appellant was in lockdowns for 257 days of his pre-sentence incarceration.

[11]

We are entitled to look at these records since
    we are now charged with determining an appropriate sentence and, in doing so,
    we must consider whether a
Duncan
credit is appropriate.
[1]
While the respondent argues
    that the appellant did not lead any evidence of direct impact on him arising
    from the lockdowns, we are of the view that some impact is self-evident.
    Lockdowns involve lack of showers and loss of physical activity. They also mean
    that prisoners are restricted to their cells for long periods of time. Individual
    evidence is not required to establish those basic effects which go beyond the difficult
    and restrictive circumstances offenders often encounter during pretrial custody
    and which are accounted for by the
Summers
credit.
[2]

[12]

In deciding on seven years as the appropriate
    sentence we have included a
Duncan
credit for these periods of
    lockdown. As noted in
R. v. Marshall
, 2021 ONCA 344, at para. 52, the
Duncan
credit is not a deduction from the otherwise appropriate sentence, but is one
    of the factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence.

[13]

In the end result, we grant leave to appeal and
    reduce the global sentence from ten years to seven years.

G.
    Pardu J.A.
David M. Paciocco J.A.
I.V.B. Nordheimer J.A.

[1]

R. v. Duncan
, 2016 ONCA
    754.

[2]

R. v. Summers
, 2014 SCC
    26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
Dunn Aggregates Limited v. Coco Paving Inc., 2021 ONCA 604

DATE: 20210909

DOCKET: C68961

Juriansz, Lauwers and Sossin JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Dunn Aggregates Limited

Plaintiff (Appellant)

and

Coco Paving Inc.

Defendant (Respondent)

James K. Ball, for the appellant

John D. Leslie and Ted Kalnins, for the
    respondent

Heard: August 30, 2021 by video conference

On
    appeal from the order of Justice Scott K. Campbell of the Superior Court of
    Justice, dated December 4, 2020, with reasons at 2020 ONSC 7095.

REASONS
    FOR DECISION

[1]

The appellant Dunn Aggregates previously
    operated as a stone merchant, whose assets were acquired by the respondent,
    Coco Paving. The agreement closed on March 11, 2011. A number of post-closing
    disagreements arose. On September 6, 2011, Coco Paving moved for an interlocutory
    injunction in the context of an anticipated action and the injunction was
    granted. It restrained Dunn Aggregates from breaching the non-competition and
    restrictive covenant agreements entered into pursuant to the asset purchase
    agreement. Coco Paving gave the customary undertaking as to damages.

[2]

The action started by Dunn Aggregates and the
    action started by Coco Paving proceeded to trial together. The trial judge
    concluded that Coco Pavings contractual breaches did not justify Dunn
    Aggregates non-performance of the non-competition agreement. He concluded that
    it would not be appropriate to make the interlocutory injunction permanent, in
    part because the non-competition agreement had expired by its own terms prior
    to trial.

[3]

The assessment of damages remains outstanding.

[4]

The trial judge made an order barring Dunn
    Aggregates from claiming damages under r. 40.03 arising from the interlocutory
    injunction.

[5]

The purpose of the customary undertaking as to
    damages is to protect the party against whom the injunction is granted, in this
    case Dunn Aggregates, if the injunction were found to have been wrongly granted.
    The trial judge cited several authorities for this proposition and pointed to
    the decision in
United States of America v. Yemec
, 2013 ONSC 50, 35 C.P.C. (7th) 57, affd 2014
    ONCA 274, 58 C.P.C. (7th) 223 as being especially persuasive. In
Yemec
, Belobaba
    J. considered the undertaking to pay damages and noted, at para. 14, that its
    purpose is to cover damage caused by a wrongly granted injunction.

[6]

The trial judge
    concluded that because Coco Paving was the successful party at trial the
    injunction had not been wrongfully granted. He pointed out that Dunn Aggregates
    had not made efforts to appeal the granting of the injunction or to alter it
    in the course of over five years of litigation. He found there to be no special
circumstances that would warrant
    the awarding of damages [to Dunn Aggregates] based on the undertaking. There
    was, in his view, no basis on which Dunn Aggregates should be able to advance a
    claim for damages as a result of the injunction having been granted. We agree with
    the trial judge and do not disturb his order.

[7]

The appeal is dismissed
    with costs to Coco Paving fixed in the amount of $3,500, all inclusive.

R.G.
    Juriansz J.A.

P.
    Lauwers J.A.

L.
    Sossin J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Tanti v. Tanti, 2021 ONCA 607

DATE: 20210909

DOCKET: M52665 (C69521)

Strathy C.J.O., Lauwers and
    Sossin JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Raymond Tanti

Applicant (Respondent/Responding Party)

and

Paul Tanti
and the Public Guardian and Trustee

Respondents (Respondents/
Responding Party
)

and

Sharon
    Joseph

Respondent (Appellant/Moving Party)

Joy Nwawe, for the moving party, Sharon
    Joseph

William R. Gilmour, for the responding
    party, Raymond Tanti

Kathleen Kinch, for the responding
    party, Paul Tanti

Heard: September 3, 2021 by video conference

REASONS
    FOR DECISION

[1]

After hearing submissions on behalf of the
    moving party, we advised counsel that the motion would be dismissed, with
    reasons to follow. These are our reasons.

[2]

Paul Tanti and Sharon Joseph were married on
    July 27, 2019.

[3]

On September 12, 2019, Paul Tantis son, Raymond
    Tanti, sought a guardianship order with respect to his fathers property and
    person. Harris J. of the Superior Court of Justice granted that order.

[4]

Sharon Joseph subsequently brought a motion to
    set aside the guardianship order. On July 31, 2020, Shaw J. ordered that Sharon
    Joseph be added as a party to the guardianship proceedings. Shaw J. also
    ordered that the issue of the validity of the marriage of Paul Tanti and Sharon
    Joseph would be determined as a threshold issue in the application.

[5]

By judgment dated December 22, 2020, Mandhane J.
    determined that the marriage was valid. That judgment is the subject of an
    appeal pending before this court (C69056), which is scheduled to be heard on
    October 1, 2021.

[6]

On May 27, 2021, Trimble J. of the Superior
    Court granted a stay of the guardianship proceedings pending disposition of the
    appeal of the order of Mandhane J.

[7]

Sharon Joseph purported to appeal the order of
    Trimble J. to this court (C69521). She brought a motion to expedite that
    appeal. That motion was heard by Benotto J.A. on July 13, 2021. Benotto J.A.
    dismissed the motion, holding that the order of Trimble J. was procedural and
    interlocutory and that no appeal lies to this court.

[8]

Although not styled as such, this is a motion
    pursuant to s. 7(5) of the
Courts of Justice Act
to set aside or vary
    the order of Benotto J.A.

[9]

The moving party has demonstrated no error in
    the reasons of Benotto J.A. As Benotto J.A. observed, the order of Trimble J.
    did not determine the substantive rights of the parties and the guardianship
    application remains to be determined. The order the moving party purports to appeal
    is clearly interlocutory.

[10]

Moreover, as a matter of efficiency and economy,
    the validity of the marriage should be determined before the guardianship
    proceedings are continued.

[11]

The motion to vary is dismissed and the appeal
    is quashed, with costs to the responding party, Raymond Tanti, fixed in the
    amount of $1,000 and to the responding party, Paul Tanti, fixed in the amount
    of $350, both amounts inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

G.R.
    Strathy C.J.O.

P.
    Lauwers J.A.
L. Sossin J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: 2161907 Alberta Ltd. v. 11180673
    Canada Inc., 2021 ONCA 590

DATE: 20210830

DOCKET: C68698

Rouleau, Hoy and van Rensburg
    JJ.A.

BETWEEN

2161907 Alberta Ltd.

Applicant (Appellant)

and

11180673 Canada Inc.

Respondent
    (Respondent)

J. Thomas Curry, Brian Kolenda and
    Aoife Quinn, for the appellant

Jeffrey Hoffman, for the respondent

Heard: June 3, 2021 by video conference

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Cory
    A. Gilmore of the Superior Court of Justice, dated September 11, 2020, with
    reasons reported at 2020 ONSC 5409.

Rouleau J.A.:

OVERVIEW

[1]

2161907 Alberta Ltd. (
216
) holds the Ontario rights to
    the Tokyo Smoke cannabis brand, which it licenses to various retail
    operators. 11180673 Canada Inc. (
111
)
    and its principal, Mr. Robert Heydon, won a cannabis retail operator license in
    the allocation lottery held by the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (
AGCO
) in August 2019.

[2]

In November 2019, the parties entered into a series
    of agreements for the operation of a Tokyo Smoke-branded cannabis store in
    Toronto. These agreements included a License Agreement for the use of the Tokyo
    Smoke brand and a Sublease whereby 111 rented the retail premises from 216. 216
    offered 111 funding for start-up costs, including rent, and an inducement of
    approximately $2 million to open under the Tokyo Smoke banner (the Branding
    Fee). The Branding Fee would come due once 111 obtained its Retail Store
    Authorization from the AGCO.

[3]

Two days before the store was supposed to open,
    a dispute arose as to 216s obligation to fund the payment of 111s rent for the
    month of opening. Faced with 216s refusal to pay, 111 advised 216 that it
    would not be opening the store as planned. 216 took the position that this was
    a threat to cease carrying on business and accordingly constituted a breach of
    their agreement. 216 terminated its relationship with 111, refusing to pay the Branding
    Fee.

[4]

216 brought an application seeking a declaration
    that 111 had breached the various agreements in effect between the parties,
    that the Branding Fee was not payable to 111, and that 111 must therefore
    vacate the retail premises. 111 brought a counter-application seeking, among
    other things, payment of the Branding Fee and a declaration that 216 had wrongfully
    terminated the License Agreement and breached its duty of good faith in the
    performance and enforcement of contractual relations. The application judge
    dismissed 216s application and granted 111s application. She declared that
    216 had no valid reason to terminate the agreements, that it had acted in bad
    faith, and ordered 216 to pay the Branding Fee.

Issues

[5]

216 raises three issues on appeal:

a.

Did
    the application judge err in finding that 216s termination of the License
    Agreement was invalid?

b.

Did
    the application judge err in finding that 216 had breached the duty of good
    faith?

c.

Did the application
    judge err in failing to issue a declaration that the Sublease between the
    parties was validly terminated on August 5, 2020?

[6]

For the reasons that follow, I would set aside
    the finding of bad faith, but would dismiss the balance of the appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[7]

In August 2019, 111 won the right to apply for a
    Retail Operator Licence and Retail Store Authorization in the AGCO allocation
    lottery, permitting 111 to open a retail cannabis store.

[8]

216 approached Mr. Heydon with a proposal that
    he open his retail location under the Tokyo Smoke banner for which 216 held
    the Ontario rights under licence from a subsidiary of Canopy Growth Corporation
    (Canopy).

[9]

Between November 1 and November 7, 2019, the
    parties entered into the three agreements at issue in this case:

a.

Under the Sublease, 111 rented the retail
    premises, as Subtenant, from 216, as Sublandlord, at a monthly rent of
    $105,409.03. 216 in turn rented the premises from First Capital Holdings
    (Ontario) Corporation.

b.

Under the License Agreement, 216 granted 111 the
    right to use Tokyo Smoke brand marks in the retail storefront and in its
    marketing materials subject to 216s rights of supervision. The License
    Agreement stipulated that 216 would pay 111 an up-front Branding Fee of approximately
    $2 million upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, including the issuance
    of a Retail Store Authorization by the AGCO.

c.

Under the Loan Agreement, 216 agreed to advance
    roughly $1.5 million in start-up costs to 111.

i.

Loan A
    provided for a maximum loan of up to $750,000, plus the aggregate amount of
    rent due under the Sublease up to the opening of the store. Loan A was intended
    to finance construction improvements to the premises, decorations, security,
    point of sale systems, and other equipment.

ii.

Loan B provided for a
    maximum loan of up to $750,000 to finance the purchase of inventory, insurance,
    and human resources.

[10]

The parties anticipated that the store would
    open in early June 2020.

[11]

On May 31, 2020 Mr. Heydon wrote to 216 to
    confirm that he could draw on Loan A to pay June rent. 216s representative,
    Mr. Graydon Calvert, advised Mr. Heydon that the draw was limited to the
    prorated amount of $10,540 for the first three days of June before the store
    opened. This left 111 with a shortfall of $95,000 in rent for the month.

[12]

The next day, June 1, Mr. Heydon sought the
    additional $95,000 in rent for June. Mr. Justin Farbstein, the president of
    216, responded that Mr. Heydon was at the max of the facility and that he was
    not able to grant more. As it turned out, Mr. Farbstein was mistaken. He would
    later admit on cross-examination that Loan A should have covered the amounts
    sought by Mr. Heydon.

[13]

Faced with 216s refusal to fund the balance of
    the June rent, Mr. Heydon responded: Please inform Canopy that we will NOT be
    opening. I will lay off the staff tomorrow. Mr. Farbstein called Mr. Heydon
    that same evening to calm him down, indicating that he could likely arrange
    to have the rent payment deferred and that, in any event, the Branding Fee
    would soon be paid. It was more than sufficient to cover rent for June.

[14]

On the morning of June 2, the AGCO gave 111
    final approval to open for business. 111 forwarded the approval notice to 216 as
    proof that the final condition for the payment of the Branding Fee had been
    satisfied. Mr. Farbstein again confirmed, on behalf of 216, that the Branding
    Fee would be paid later in the week in accordance with the License Agreement
    now that all conditions for the payment of the Branding Fee had been met.

[15]

In the late morning of June 2, Mr. Farbstein reviewed
    the License Agreement and concluded that Mr. Heydons statements  the previous
    day that 111 would not be opening the store constituted a threat to cease to
    carry on business contrary to the License Agreement. Mr. Farbstein indicated
    in cross-examination that he sought instructions from 216s parent company and
    communicated with both external and internal counsel. Then, at around noon on
    June 2, Mr. Farbstein instructed external counsel to begin drafting a notice
    terminating the License Agreement. 216 pulled its staff from the retail
    premises and, at 4:26 p.m., sent 111 a Notice of Defaults indicating that the
    License Agreement had been terminated.

[16]

Mr. Heydon did not follow through on his threat.
    111 responded to 216s Notice of Defaults through counsel and carried on with
    the planned opening. The store opened to the public on June 3, 2020.

[17]

216 did not pay the Branding Fee. On July 2,
    2020, it commenced this application seeking, among other things, a declaration
    that the License Agreement was validly terminated.

[18]

111 did not make its June and July rent
    payments. On August 5, 2020, 216 gave notice of termination of the Sublease,
    citing the missed rent payments. 216 subsequently amended its notice of
    application to seek a further declaration that the Sublease was validly
    terminated on August 5 as a result of unpaid rent.

Decision
    below

[19]

The application judge found that Mr. Heydons
    communication to the effect that he would not be opening the store and would be
    laying off staff was not an event of default under the License Agreement. It
    was an emotional response to being given incorrect information at a critical
    time. As a result, she concluded that 216s termination of the License
    Agreement was invalid. The application judge went on to find, based on Mr.
    Farbsteins admission in cross-examination that on the morning of June 2, 2020,
    216 was looking for a way to end the relationship with 111, that 216 had
    pounced on the statement made by Mr. Heydon as a way to terminate the
    relationship and avoid paying the Branding Fee, and therefore that 216s
    termination of the agreements was not done in good faith.

[20]

The application judge also found that the Branding
    Fee was due and owing, subject to certain deductions, including set-off for
    111s unpaid rent between June and September 2020. The issue of damages was
    left to be determined at trial or by agreement between the parties.

DID THE APPLICATION JUDGE ERR IN FINDING THAT 216S
    TERMINATION OF THE LICENSE AGREEMENT WAS INVALID?

[21]

216 submits that it validly terminated the
    License Agreement in response to a genuine threat to cease carrying on business
    by Mr. Heydon. 216 relies on the following paragraph of the License Agreement:

26.
    The Licensor has the right, without liability, cost or penalty, to terminate
    this agreement with immediate effect on written notice to the Licensee if one
    or more of the following occurs.

(c) the Licensee ceases or
threatens to cease to
    carry on business
, or takes
    or threatens to take any action to liquidate its assets, or stops making
    payments in the usual course of business; [Emphasis added.]

[22]

216 argues that the application judge erred in
    finding that Mr. Heydons statement that he intended to cease operations did
    not constitute grounds for termination under the License Agreement because it
    was an emotional response. 216 submits that there were in fact several
    statements made to different representatives of 216 and Canopy. 216 further
    submits that it was an error of law for the application judge to have expected 216
    to discern Mr. Heydons subjective intention for the statements, and for the
    application judge to have relied on Mr. Heydons subjective intention to
    determine whether those statements were indeed threats to cease to carry on
    business.

[23]

According to 216, the application judge had to
    determine what a reasonable person, circumstanced as the actual parties were,
    would have had in mind when Mr. Heydons statements were made. See
Goodyear
    Canada Inc. v. Burnhamthorpe Square Inc.
(1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.),
    at para. 88. 216 cites three communications:

a)

Mr. Heydons June 1 email to 216 stating:
    Please inform Canopy we will NOT be opening. I will lay off the staff tomorrow;

b)

Mr. Heydons June 1 email to a representative of
    Canopy with the subject line Still no rent on the table stating I also have
    to pay payroll this week. So if we cannot sort by tomorrow, I will be forced to
    lay off the staff;

c)

Mr. Heydons oral communications with 216s on-site
    staff, whom he advised that the store would not be opening due to issues
    regarding rent with 216.

[24]

216 argues that, viewed objectively, these three
    communications from Mr. Heydon to 216, Canopy and 216s on-site representatives
    clearly constituted a threat to cease to carry on business entitling 216 to
    terminate the agreement.

[25]

I disagree.

[26]

The interpretation of commercial agreements
    involves questions of mixed fact and law. A trial judges interpretation and
    application of contractual terms is owed deference on appeal:
Sattva
    Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp.
, 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633.

[27]

In this case, the application judge was called
    upon to determine whether the statements made by Mr. Heydon on June 1
    constituted a threat to cease to carry on business for the purposes of paragraph
    26(c) of the License Agreement. As the Supreme Court stated in
Sattva
,
    at para. 47, [t]he overriding concern is to determine the intent of the
    parties and the scope of their understanding by reading the contract as a
    whole and giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning
    consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of
    formation of the contract.

[28]

Unfortunately, the application judge did not
    expressly grapple with the scope or purpose of paragraph 26(c), nor did she explore
    the parties intentions in including it in their agreement. On appeal, neither
    party sought to explain the rationale for paragraph 26(c). Without this crucial
    framing, it is difficult to determine whether Mr. Heydons statements were, as
    a matter of contractual interpretation, threats for the purposes of paragraph
    26(c). In other words, while, on their face, Mr. Heydons statements were a
    threat not to open, were these threats that would trigger default under the
    License Agreement?

[29]

In my view, there are at least two possible
    interpretations of paragraph 26(c), one of which the application judge
    implicitly adopted and the other she implicitly rejected.

[30]

Under the first interpretation, paragraph 26(c)
    seeks to prevent the licensee from making what are, on their face, threats to
    cease carrying on business or threats to take any action to liquidate its
    assets. In other words, the clause is directed at preventing the licensee from
    making these kinds of statements whether or not the licensee intends to carry
    out the threatened action or the licensor expects that the threat will be
    carried out. The logic behind such an interpretation would be that the License
    Agreement was set to last for a 10-year initial term. Threats and brinkmanship
    exhibited by the licensee would be corrosive to such a long-term relationship,
    especially if such threats were used as a negotiating or pressure tactic.
    Moreover, as Mr. Farbstein repeatedly stressed in his evidence, 216 was
    concerned about preserving its relationship with Canopy, the master licensor of
    the Tokyo Smoke brand. Threats of closure by a branded store, whether acted
    upon or not, might be viewed as injuring the brand.

[31]

The second interpretation would require the
    threat to be objectively credible in order to trigger default under the
    agreement. This second interpretation recognizes that the language of paragraph
    26(c) contemplates more than threats to cease to carry on business: it is also
    an event of default under paragraph 26(c) for 111 to take action or threaten to
    take action to liquidate its assets, or to stop making payments in the usual
    course of business. Taken as a whole, paragraph 26(c) can be viewed as seeking
    to preserve the licensors rights in the event of a looming insolvency. Indeed,
    paragraph 26(d), addresses formal insolvency proceedings, and paragraph 26(e)
    makes it an event of default for 111 to cease to operate the Business at the
    Store for a period of more than thirty (30) consecutive days. It is reasonable
    that 216 would seek to preserve its right to terminate the License Agreement in
    such circumstances, both to pre-empt the uncertainty associated with insolvency
    and to avoid its brand materials becoming associated with a defunct or
    inoperative storefront in a fashionable neighbourhood. Viewed through this
    lens, paragraph 26(c) is directed toward credible threats to cease to carry on
    business which would require 216 to take action to preserve its intellectual
    property rights. From the application judges reasons, it is apparent that she
    interpreted paragraph 26(c) in this way. Such an interpretation is reasonable
    in the circumstances and I see no basis to interfere.

[32]

The application judge correctly noted that 111s
    communications during the evening of June 1 had to be viewed in context. Mr. Heydon
    had just been told that 216 would not be advancing the money needed to pay the
    June rent. He believed that this was a breach of 216s obligation pursuant to
    the agreements between the parties. It turned out that he was in fact correct
    in that regard and 216 ought to have financed the payment of the June rent.

[33]

On June 1, 2020, as a consequence of 216s
    mistake, Mr. Heydon was faced with an unexpected shortfall of $95,000. There
    was therefore uncertainty as to whether 111 could be ready to open on June 3.

[34]

The application judge had before her the email
    chain between Canopy and Mr. Heydon and between 216 (represented by Mr. Calvert
    and Mr. Farbstein) and Mr. Heydon from June 1. These emails show that Mr. Heydon
    was reacting to the fact that he had been denied the June rent advance:

Canopy - 4:00 pm: Can we confirm that we will
    be opening the doors as per your regular store hours?

Heydon - 4:26 pm: No, we are not. Just need to
    sort out rent.

Calvert - 6:48 pm: Can you clarify your
    comments? As discussed in last nights email we fund the prorated portion of
    June rent ($10k) in Loan A. Is there something outside of this that would
    prevent you from opening?

Heydon - 7:38 pm: The other 95k

Farbstein - 7:41 pm: Rob  you are at the max
    of the facility. I am not able to grant more.

Heydon - 7:48 pm:
    Ok, thank you. Please inform Canopy we will NOT be opening. I will lay off the
    staff tomorrow.

[35]

In a separate email to Canopy at 8:16 p.m. with
    the subject line Still no rent on the table Mr. Heydon wrote: I also have
    to pay payroll this week. So if we cannot sort by tomorrow I will be forced to
    lay off the staff.

[36]

Significantly, during the evening of June 1,
    with these exchanges ongoing, Mr. Farbstein called Mr. Heydon to calm him
    down and reassure him that everything was going to be ok. He reiterated that
    216 would pay 111 the Branding Fee as agreed. In other words, Mr. Farbstein responded
    to the threat in a manner suggesting that he could address Mr. Heydons
    concerns and that a closure could and would be avoided. In fact, by the time
    the Notice of Defaults was sent, it would have been apparent that Mr. Heydon
    was moving forward with the planned opening.

[37]

Given the context, I see nothing unreasonable in
    the application judges conclusion that Mr. Heydons communication did not
    constitute a threat entitling 216 to terminate the License Agreement. An
    objective observer would understand that Mr. Heydon was facing a problem: how
    was he to cover the June rent and open on June 3 given the last-minute wrongful
    withholding of needed funds? Indeed, despite Mr. Heydons threat not to open
    and to lay off staff, his frustration provided an objective manifestation of
    his strong desire to open as planned, not an intent to shutter the store.

[38]

Contrary to 216s submission, the application
    judges finding that Mr. Heydons behaviour was an emotional response to being
    given incorrect information at a critical time was not simply based on Mr. Heydons
    subjective frustration. It was based on the application judges objective
    assessment of the parties exchanges in light of the language of the agreement
    and the factual context.

[39]

In my view, on this record, the application
    judges finding that Mr. Heydons emotional frustration, viewed in context, did
    not meet the requirements of the parties termination clause was clearly reasonable.
    For the threats to be treated as an event of default under the License
    Agreement, a degree of objective credibility  or objective intent  or a real
    risk that Mr. Heydons threats would be carried out was required. As a finding
    of mixed fact and law, the application judges conclusion is owed deference on
    appeal and I see no basis to interfere.

Did the application JUDGE err
    in finding that 216 had breached its duty of good faith?

[40]

216 acknowledges that the License Agreement
    contained an express contractual duty of good faith that bound both parties.
    However, 216 argues that the application judge erred in law in finding that 216
    had breached that duty or the common law duty of good faith in contractual
    performance. In 216s submission, the application judge equated what she held
    was an invalid termination of the License Agreement with bad faith because 216 was
    looking for a way to get out of the relationship. 216 takes the position that a
    party does not act in bad faith merely because its error concerning its
    contractual termination rights achieved an additional objective, fulfilling its
    desire to end the relationship.

[41]

111 for its part argues that 216 acted in bad
    faith by misleading 111 about the funds available to it under Loan A and by
    leading 111 to believe that the Branding Fee would be paid and the rent
    deferred. Shortly after giving these assurances, 216 terminated the License
    Agreement. In its factum, 111 submits that this conduct revealed 216s true
    intention, namely, to seek to end its relationship with 111 and seize 111s
    business without paying the Branding Fee and without compensating 111. 111
    submits that all of these findings were open to the application judge on this
    record and constitute a breach of 216s duty of honest performance.

The Law

[42]

The Supreme Court in
Bhasin v. Hrynew
, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494,
explained that good faith contractual performance is a general organizing
    principle of the common law of contract. The court also recognized a more
    specific manifestation of the organizing principle in the duty to act
    honestly in the performance of contractual obligations: at para. 33. In this
    case, there is no issue as to the existence of a duty of good faith since the
    parties expressly stipulated such a duty in the License Agreement. The issue is
    therefore to determine the content of that duty in the circumstances and
    whether it was breached.

[43]

Good faith requires simply that parties
    generally must perform their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not
    capriciously or arbitrarily:
Bhasin
, at para. 63. The duty requires
    that in carrying out his or her own performance of the contract, a contracting
    party should have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of
    the contracting partner:
Bhasin
, at para. 65. It does not require
    that contracting parties serve each others interests. However, they may not
    seek to undermine those interests in bad faith.

[44]

In
Bhasin
, the
    court identified four distinct legal doctrines operating as manifestations of
    the general organizing principle: 1) the duty of cooperation between the
    parties to achieve the objects of the contract; 2) the duty to exercise
    contractual discretion in good faith; 3) the duty not to evade contractual
    obligations in bad faith; and 4) the duty of honest performance. These
    doctrines generally reflect the situations and relationships in which the law
    requires contracts to be performed honestly, and reasonably, and not capriciously
    or arbitrarily. Accordingly, the list of recognized duties is not closed:
Bhasin
,
    at para. 66
.

[45]

The application judge did not specify which of
    these doctrines was at play in this case, nor did she have the benefit of the
    Supreme Courts decisions in
C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger
, 2020 SCC 45, 452 D.L.R. (4th) 44, or
Wastech
    Services Ltd. v. Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District,
2021 SCC 7, 454 D.L.R. (4th) 1, both of which were
    released after her decision
. In its notice of counter-application
    and its factum, 111 focusses on the duty of honest performance. 111 alleges
    that 216 knowingly misled 111 about the amounts available to it under the Loan
    Agreement, that the Branding Fee would be paid and that rent would be deferred.
    After knowingly misleading 111 in this way, it simply terminated the agreement.
    111 further alleges that 216 terminated the agreement to avoid payment of the Branding
    Fee. All of this conduct, in 111s submission, amounts to a breach of the duty
    of honest performance.

Analysis

[46]

The application judge set out her finding of bad
    faith in five paragraphs at the end of her reasons. She concluded as follows:

While I do not
    find that 216 lied to 111, it pounced on a single statement made by Mr. Heydon
    as a basis to trigger default, thereby achieving its goal of ending the relationship
    with Mr. Heydon and attempting to discharge its obligation to pay the Branding
    Fee.

[47]

While the application judges conclusion clearly
    rested on her finding that 216 pounced on Mr. Heydons threat, 111 argues
    that the record discloses, and it is implicit from her reasons, that other
    sources of bad faith informed the application judges analysis.

[48]

In what follows, I address four potential
    sources or instantiations of bad faith: first, that 216 knowingly misled 111;
    second, that 216 pounced on a default that it did not believe had occurred;
    third, that 216 sought to evade payment of the Branding Fee in bad faith; and
    fourth, that 216 seized upon a breach of its own making as in
Mason v. Freedman
,
    [1958] S.C.R. 483.

(1)

216 did not knowingly mislead 111

[49]

I turn first to the question of whether 216
    knowingly misled 111 at any point. In my view, the application judges finding
    that 216 did not lie to 111 and that Mr. Farbstein did not act dishonestly is
    critical in this respect. As I will explain, it is apparent from the
    application judges finding on this point that, when Mr. Farbstein informed 111
    about the amounts available to it under the Loan Agreement and that he intended
    to pay the Branding Fee and seek to have the June rent deferred, he was not, as
    111 alleges, knowingly misleading Mr. Heydon.

[50]

I accept that it is possible to mislead in many
    ways: lies, half-truths, omissions, and even silence. In this case, it is
    acknowledged that at various points, 216 misled or misinformed 111, or changed its
    position. The critical issue, however, is whether Mr. Farbstein or 216
    knowingly misled 111:
Bhasin
at para. 73. In this respect, it is
    significant that the application judge found that Mr. Farbstein did not lie to
    111 at any point. Further, nothing in the application judges reasons suggest
    that she rejected any element of Mr. Farbsteins testimony or made an adverse
    credibility finding against him. Mr. Farbsteins evidence on at least three key
    points indicates that he never intended to mislead 111 or Mr. Heydon.

[51]

First, Mr. Farbstein admitted on
    cross-examination that he was mistaken when he told Mr. Heydon that 216 was not
    required to fund the June rent. He did not lie or knowingly withhold
    information. Thus, while 111 received false information, there is no basis for
    saying that 216 knowingly misled 111.

[52]

Second, Mr. Farbstein gave evidence that when he
    called Mr. Heydon during the evening of June 1 to calm him down, he did not
    say that 111 was in default because he did not believe 111 was in default at
    that time. He told Mr. Heydon that 216 would pay the Branding Fee later in the
    week and that it would work with the landlord to defer rent until 111 was able
    to pay, as appears from the following excerpt from Mr. Farbsteins cross-examination:

Q: Say, at the time you made this statement
    that you would pay the Branding Fee later that week and you would go speak to
    the landlord about deferring rent, those statements were true at the time you
    made them, right?

A: Correct.
Those are
    true
.

Q: And you didnt tell him in that phone call
    that his agreements with 216 were at risk of being terminated, did you?

A: I didnt tell
    him because at that point, I had  it wasnt in my head at risk of being
I hadnt thought about terminating at that point
. I was
    thinking to try and just  so I do tell him that.

[53]

Third, Mr. Farbstein admitted that his email of
    June 2 at 9:24 a.m., in which he reiterated that the Branding Fee would be paid
    and a rent deferral sought, was honest and reflected his true intention at the
    time, despite the fact that 216 was considering ways to terminate the
    relationship. He stated:

Q: Did you say at that point in time, 9:24 a.m. on June 2nd,
    you didnt think he was in default or you wouldnt have written that, right?

A: Thats what I said.

A:
At that point at
    9:24, I did not think he was in default because at that point, I had not
    re-reviewed the License Agreements
. So I thought at that point he
    wasnt in default and that I owed him the Branding Fee at that point in time,
    9:24, when I sent that email. Youre correct.

Q: Was [216] looking for a way to get out of the relationship
    with 111?

A: On the morning of June 2nd, it
    was looking for a way to end the relationship with 111, correct.

[54]

Taken together, the uncontradicted evidence is
    that 216 did not, at any point, knowingly mislead 111 about its intention with
    respect to the Branding Fee or the deferral of rent. In fact, because the
    application judge made a finding that Mr. Farbstein did not lie to 111, it is
    apparent that the assurance given to Mr. Heydon reflected Mr. Farbsteins
    honest belief at the time they were made. He had not reviewed the agreements or
    spoken with counsel. Mr. Farbstein explained that he did not form a concrete
    intention to terminate the agreement until after 9:24 a.m. on June 2, at which
    point he had reviewed the License Agreement and determined that Mr. Heydons
    threat gave 216 cause to terminate and that the Branding Fee was no longer due.
    He then contacted internal and external counsel to validate his thoughts on
    the termination before instructing external counsel to draft a notice.

[55]

216 did not, as 111 suggests, actively mislead 111.
    It simply changed positions in light of new information. The application judge
    made no finding that the change in position was taken dishonestly or
    unreasonably nor is there any suggestion that it was taken capriciously or arbitrarily.

(2)

Pouncing by 216 did not constitute bad faith

[56]

The application judges conclusion that 216
    acted in bad faith is more plausibly anchored to her finding that 216 pounced on
    a single statement made by Mr. Heydon as a basis to trigger default, thereby
    achieving its goal of ending the relationship  and attempting to discharge its
    obligation to pay the Branding Fee. In my view, however, 216s act of pouncing
    did not constitute bad faith in this case.

[57]

Setting aside the factual question of whether Mr.
    Heydon made a single statement or several statements, the more fundamental difficulty
    I have with this as a basis for finding that there was a breach of the duty of honest
    performance and bad faith on the part of the appellant is that the application
    judge made no finding of dishonesty and such a finding cannot be inferred from
    her reasons. A party is not prevented from exercising a right of termination
    simply because it wishes to bring its relationship with the other party to an
    end. Nor should a party be prevented from ending a relationship because it will
    deprive the defaulting party of a payment that it would have received had the
    relationship continued. Where a party is anxious to end a relationship, and a valid
    reason to do so presents itself, that party is not, in the absence of some
    other relevant fact, prevented from pouncing on it.

[58]

While 216s basis for terminating the License
    Agreement ultimately proved invalid, as discussed above, its position on
    termination was not unreasonable, malicious, or so inconsiderate of 111s
    legitimate contractual interests as to constitute bad faith. It was neither
    manufactured nor concocted. Mr. Farbstein believed Mr. Heydons threat
    constituted a breach.

[59]

I also see no basis for concluding that 216s
    change in position was capricious or arbitrary. Mr. Farbstein reviewed the
    License Agreement and spoke with counsel before taking the position that Mr.
    Heydons threat constituted an event of default.

[60]

Mr. Farbsteins conduct following Mr. Heydons
    threatening statements is consistent with Mr. Farbstein having viewed Mr.
    Heydons communication as a genuine and credible threat, even if he did not
    immediately recognize that such a threat could constitute an event of default
    under the License Agreement. Mr. Farbstein called Mr. Heydon because at ten
    months trying to get the store opened and I was threatened two nights before
    the store was opened that it wasnt going to be open, and so, my reaction was
    to try to calm him down  If I wasnt concerned, I wouldnt call him. I was
    concerned. He then promised and ultimately did speak with the landlord about a
    possible rent deferral, and reported on the situation to 216s parent company
    at least twice between 8:30 p.m. on June 1 and 10:00 a.m. on June 2. Mr.
    Farbsteins actions suggest that he saw Mr. Heydons communications as more than
    empty threats or posturing.

[61]

While Mr. Farbstein may well have understood by
    sometime on June 2 that, despite his threat, Mr. Heydon would in fact open the
    store on June 3, 216 had an  interest in ending such threats, especially those
    sent directly to Canopy, 216s master licensor. As I have noted, it is possible
    to read paragraph 26(c) of the License Agreement as permitting termination when
    a party makes what, on its face, is a significant threat, even if such threat is
    later withdrawn or may be considered unlikely to be carried out. Such an
    interpretation acknowledges 216s legitimate contractual interest in preserving
    its own relationship with Canopy and enjoying a commercial relationship with
    111 free of brinkmanship. As Mr. Farbstein deposed: That type of [threatening]
    behaviour by 216s sublicensees may cause Canopy to lose confidence in 216, and
    undermine its business relationship.

[62]

The evidence is that the relationship between
    216 and 111 was difficult because Mr. Heydon bristled at any intervention by
    216. The threat was, from 216s perspective, serious. As the application judge
    observed:

a)

216 saw 111s threat as a shakedown for
    additional funds;

b)

216 was concerned that Mr. Heydons behaviour
    reflected negatively on his capacity to act honestly; and

c)

the fact that Mr. Heydons threat was sent
    directly to Canopy worried 216 that this could cause Canopy to lose confidence
    in it.

[63]

Mr. Farbstein confirmed in his evidence that, by
    June 2, 216 had serious reservations about being in business with 111 for the
    next 10 years. As he admitted on cross-examination, Mr. Farbstein returned to
    the License Agreement early on June 2 with a view to determining whether the
    threat constituted a breach that justified terminating the relationship with
    111: I, you know, took some time and re-looked at the License Agreement and
    believed that the email that happened the night before may be cause for
    termination of License Agreement because I perceived that as a threat. The
    breach he ultimately invoked was based on 216s understanding that the threat
    was the type of threat contemplated by paragraph 26(c). That interpretation was
    wrong but, absent a finding that it was a position manufactured to achieve 216s
    objective of ending the relationship, an unreasonable position, or a position
    taken capriciously or arbitrarily, it constitutes an error and no more. This
    was a fluid situation at a crucial point in the commercial relationship with
    both parties evaluating and re-evaluating their legal rights in real time.

[64]

In my view, the finding that  216 had a desire
    to end its relationship with 111 and chose to pounce on what, incorrectly, it
    saw as providing the opportunity to do so was not sufficient to justify a
    finding of bad faith. I would therefore set aside the application judges
    finding of bad faith.

(3)

The Branding Fee

[65]

111 argues that 216s true intention in
    terminating the agreements was to seize 111s business without paying the
    Branding Fee. Although the application judges reasons do not set out an
    express finding on this point, 111 submits that such a finding is implied in
    her conclusion that 216 pounced on 111s statement to trigger default, thereby
    achieving its goal of ending the relationship with Mr. Heydon and attempting to
    discharge its obligation to pay the Branding Fee.

[66]

I disagree. I acknowledge that, in
Bhasin
,
    the Supreme Court explained that a party has a duty not to evade its
    contractual obligations in bad faith. As a result, a party that manufactures an
    artificial reason to terminate a contract in order to avoid future payment
    obligations would likely be found to have acted in bad faith. However, as
    explained above, 216 believed the termination was justified. The fact that
    termination releases a party from making a significant payment does not amount
    to bad faith, even where a court later finds that the termination was invalid.

[67]

The issue of the Branding Fee was put directly
    to Mr. Farbstein in cross-examination:

Q. All right. Did 216 start to regret the fact
    that it obligated itself to pay a Branding Fee, a $2 million Branding Fee, to
    Mr. Heydon once the market opened up in 2020?

A. It did not.

Q. Was it looking for a way to avoid the
    payment of that fee?

A. Nope.

[68]

The application judge did not reject this evidence.
    Without an adverse credibility finding against Mr. Farbstein or some other reason
    to reject his testimony, there is no basis for 111s suggestion that the
    termination of the License Agreement was an excuse manufactured by 216 to avoid
    payment of the Branding Fee. If 216s goal of ending the relationship with Mr.
    Heydon was achieved legitimately by the exercise of an express termination
    right, it would, as far as Mr. Farbstein understood at the time, result in the
    discharge of 216s obligation to pay the Branding Fee. This alone does not support
    a finding of bad faith.

(4)

Does the doctrine in
Mason
    v. Freedman
apply?

[69]

While it was
    not explicitly argued in this way, 111 effectively takes the position that 216
    should not be permitted to evade its contractual obligation to pay the Branding
    Fee by invoking a breach of its own making. It was Mr. Farbsteins erroneous
    interpretation of the License Agreement that caused Mr. Heydons emotional
    response, which 216 then claimed was a threat in violation of the License Agreement.
    216s attempt to seize upon the consequences of its own mistake is arguably
    another way that 216 sought to evade its contractual obligations in bad faith,
    contrary to the duty described above.

[70]

Again, I
    disagree. In
Bhasin
, the Supreme Court illustrated the duty not to evade
    contractual obligations in bad faith with reference to the case of
Mason
.
    In
Mason
, a vendor of real property attempted to repudiate an agreement
    of sale on the basis that he was unable or unwilling to remove a defect on
    title because his wife would not provide a bar of dower. The evidence, however,
    revealed that the vendor had made no effort to remove the defect on title in a
    deliberate attempt to sabotage the sale and escape his bargain.

[71]

In this case,
    the evidence is that Mr. Farbstein simply misinterpreted the Loan Agreement
    when he made the statements that triggered Mr. Heydons emotional response,
    which Mr. Farbstein in turn perceived as an event of default. Unlike
Mason
,
    there was no deliberate attempt to create the conditions giving rise to 216s
    right of termination. While Mr. Heydons reaction was, in the sequence of
    events, a default of 216s own making, it is not analogous to the vendors
    actions in
Mason
. In my view, it would not be appropriate to
    characterize 216s error as bad faith simply because that error set in motion
    the events that would culminate with 216s invalid termination of the License
    Agreement. This is quite simply a case of breach of contract.

Conclusion on Good Faith

[72]

Put simply, in terminating the License
    Agreement, 216 did not seek to undermine 111s interests in bad faith. While 216s
    notice of termination was, by definition, an attempt to put an end to the agreement,
    the termination right in question formed part of the parties bargain and
    reflected, among other things, the licensors legitimate interest in protecting
    its brand in circumstances that the parties expressly stipulated would give
    rise to a right of termination. The fact that Mr. Farbstein erroneously
    believed those circumstances were present does not amount to bad faith.

[73]

As I have explained, the application judges
    findings do not, in law, make out the necessary requirements for bad faith. That
    finding must be set aside.

DID THE APPLICATION JUDGE ERR IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT
    THE SUBLEASE WAS TERMINATED IN AUGUST 2020?

[74]

216 argues that the application judge was
    obliged to declare that the Sublease was validly terminated on August 5, 2020
    and that, consequently, the License Agreement was frustrated and at an end.

[75]

As noted, 111 failed to pay June and July rent
    after the purported termination of the License Agreement on June 2. 216 gave
    111 notice that it intended to terminate the Sublease for failure to pay, and
    it gave 111 an opportunity to cure the breach. 111 was unable to cure the
    breach and 216 terminated the Sublease for failure to pay June and July rent
    and sought a declaration that the Sublease was at an end. 216 argues that the
    application judge simply failed to address these issues.

[76]

216 maintains that once the Sublease was
    terminated the License Agreement was frustrated. The License Agreement
    permitted 111 to use the Tokyo Smoke brand only at the Store, defined as the
    Licensees retail cannabis store to be located at Unit A01131A, 21 Bloor
    Street, Toronto, Ontario. 216 suggests that this is a classic case of
    contractual frustration because the August 5 termination of the Sublease makes
    it both legally and physically impossible to operate the Store in accordance
    with the License Agreement.

[77]

For its part, 111 argues that June and July rent
    would have been paid if 216 had not wrongfully terminated the License Agreement
    and withheld payment of the Branding Fee. The purpose of the agreements between
    the parties was to ensure that 111 was funded in the early stages of the
    opening of the store. If 216 had paid the Branding Fee as agreed, 111 would
    have had no difficulty in paying June and July rent.

[78]

111 objects to 216 raising the question of
    frustration on appeal since it was not argued before the application judge.
    Nevertheless, 111 argues that there was no frustration of the License Agreement
    because there was no supervening event that made the License Agreement
    incapable of being performed. It was 216s wrongful termination of the License
    Agreement in June that brought the parties relationship to an end.

[79]

In any event, 111 notes that the parties entered
    into a consent order in connection with the judgment below. In the judgment, the
    outstanding rent obligations between June and September 2020, totalling
    $344,336.18, were set off against the unpaid Branding Fee. The consent order
    granted 216 possession of the premises as of September 2020. Accordingly, an
    order that the Sublease was terminated in August was not warranted.

Analysis

[80]

The application judges reasons only address the
    termination of the Sublease in general terms. However, her resolution of the
    issue is apparent in her judgment and in the consent order. The application
    judge awarded 216 its rent payments under the Sublease for the period June 1 to
    September 8, and the consent order granted 216 possession of the retail
    premises as of September 8. From a practical perspective, the Sublease is at an
    end and all of the outstanding issues under the Sublease are resolved.

[81]

The impact that terminating the Sublease may
    have had on the License Agreement and on the damages that flowed from 216s
    wrongful termination of the License Agreement in June 2020, were not addressed
    in the court below. Nor is that issue dealt with in the settled judgment. In my
    view, therefore, the issue as to whether the License Agreement was brought to
    an end in August by virtue of the doctrine of frustration ought not to be
    addressed for the first time on appeal. It is best left to the trial or other
    resolution of the outstanding damages issues pursuant to the application
    judges decision.

CONCLUSION

[82]

In conclusion, therefore, I would set aside the finding
    of bad faith, but would otherwise dismiss the appeal. As I consider that 111
    was largely successful on appeal, I would award it costs on a partial indemnity
    basis in the all-inclusive amount of $27,000.

Released: August 30, 2021
P.R.

Paul
    Rouleau J.A.

I
    agree
Alexandra Hoy J.A.

I agree K. van Rensburg J.A.