AVIS

Il s'agit d'un cas en vertu de
    la
Loi de 2017 sur les services à l'enfance, à la jeunesse et à la famille
et
    sous réserve des paragraphes 87(8) et 87(9) de la
Loi
. Ces paragraphes
    et le paragraphe 142(3) de la
Loi de 2017 sur l'enfance, la jeunesse et les
    services
, qui traitent des conséquences de la non-conformité, se lisent
    comme suit:

87
(8)
Interdiction : identification dun enfant
 Nul ne doit publier, ni
    rendre publics des renseignements ayant pour effet didentifier un enfant qui
    témoigne, qui participe à une audience ou qui fait lobjet dune instance, ou
    un parent ou un parent de famille daccueil de cet enfant ou un membre de la
    famille de cet enfant.

(9)
Interdiction : identification dune personne
    accusée
 Le tribunal peut rendre une ordonnance interdisant la
    publication de renseignements ayant pour effet didentifier une personne
    accusée dune infraction à la présente partie.

142
(3)
Infraction
    : publication

Quiconque
    contrevient au paragraphe 87(8) ou 134(11) (publication de renseignements
    identificatoires) ou à une ordonnance de non-publication rendue en vertu de
    lalinéa 87(7) c) ou du paragraphe 87(9) et ladministrateur, le dirigeant ou
    lemployé dune personne morale qui autorise ou permet cette contravention ou y
    participe sont coupables dune infraction et passibles, sur déclaration de
    culpabilité, dune amende dau plus 10 000 $ et dun emprisonnement dau plus
    trois ans, ou dune seule de ces peines.

COUR DAPPEL DE LONTARIO

RÉFÉRENCE: Valoris pour enfants et adultes
    de Prescott-Russell c.
K.R., 2021 ONCA 366

DATE: 20210602

DOSSIER: C68862

Les juges Rouleau, Benotto et
    Roberts

ENTRE

Valoris pour enfants et adultes
    de Prescott-Russell

Requérante (Intimée)

et

K.R.

Intimée (Appelante)

et

A.C.

Intimé (Intimé)

Gabrielle Beaulieu
, pour lappelante K.R.

Sophie Langlois, pour lintimée
Valoris pour enfants et adultes de Prescott-Russell

Emma Dupuis, pour lintimé A.C.

Date
    de laudience : le 1 avril 2021 par visioconférence

En appel de
    lordonnance de la juge Michelle
OBonsawin
de la cour
    Supérieure de justice, en date du
14 octobre 2020
,
    dont les motifs figurent au 2020 ONSC 6181.

Le juge Rouleau :

[1]

Lappelante, K.R., fait appel dune ordonnance du
    14 octobre 2020 la d
é
clarant en
    outrage au tribunal. K.R. demande que lordonnance soit infirmée.

[2]

K.R. et A.C. sont les parents de M.C.R., né en 2016. Ils ont divorcé en 2019. La garde de M.C.R. a été accordée à K.R. avec des droits de visite accordés à A.C
.

[3]

Suite à des plaintes port
é
es contre A.C., Valoris pour enfants et
    adultes de Prescott-Russell (Valoris) a appréhendé M.C.R. afin de le placer
    sous les soins de sa mère. La police de Gatineau a lancé une enquête criminelle
    sur A.C.

[4]

Le 19 décembre 2019, le juge Pelletier a rendu
    une ordonnance temporaire en vertu de laquelle M.C.R. demeurerait aux soins et à
    la garde de K.R. sous réserve dune surveillance exercée par Valoris. Le para.
    2 de lordonnance prévoit :

Une ordonnance
    temporaire, sous toutes réserves, accordant des visites surveillées au père
    avec lenfant à titre dune fois par semaine pendant la période denquête, à
    moins que les conditions criminelles linterdisent. Suite à lenquête
    criminelle, la Société aura la discrétion de retirer la surveillance si elle ne
    la juge plus nécessaire.

[5]

Les visites surveillées étaient tenues dans les
    bureaux de Valoris. Selon laffidavit de K.R., au début de janvier 2020, M.C.R.
    aurait informé son
é
ducatrice
    de certains faits problématiques au sujet de A.C. L
é
ducatrice a rapporté ceci
à
Valoris.

[6]

Le 22 janvier 2020, Valoris a avisé lavocate de
    A.C. que Valoris allait pr
é
sent
er une motion pour suspendre les visites

puisque M.C.R.
avait de fortes réactions
    avant et après les visites avec A.C.

[7]

Le 13 février 2020, avec le consentement de
    tous, une ordonnance temporaire a été émise selon laquelle les visites de A.C. ont
    été suspendues pour trois semaines, soit les 13, 20 et 27 f
é
vrier 2020. Lordonnance en question ne
    semble pas avoir été reproduite dans le cahier dappel.

[8]

Le 5 mars 2020, une autre ordonnance temporaire
    a suspendu les visites de A.C. pour quatre semaines additionnelles, soit les
    semaines du 5, 12, 19 et 26 mars 2020. De nouveau, lordonnance ne semble pas
    avoir été incluse dans le cahier dappel.

[9]

D
û
à la pandémie de Covid-19, les visites ont été suspendues au-delà
    de la date prévue dans lordonnance du 5 mars 2020. Durant la période de la
    suspension, K.R. a noté, et Valoris semble reconnaitre que le comportement de
    M.C.R. sest amélioré.

[10]

Le 1 avril 2020, la police de Gatineau a
    confirmé que les dossiers daccusations concernant A.C. seront clos sans accusations.

[11]

Le 15 avril 2020, Valoris a avisé K.R. que les
    visites surveillées pouvaient reprendre. Elles ont repris le 2 juin 2020 dans
    les bureaux de Valoris.

[12]

K.R. a par la suite envoyé un courriel
à
Valoris le 4 juin 2020 posant différentes
    questions sur le plan proposé par Valoris et sur les mesures relatives à la Covid-19.
    K.R. a soulevé des inquiétudes quant au comportement de M.C.R. avant et après
    les visites avec A.C. Il y a eu certains échanges entre K.R. et Valoris. La visite
    du 9 juin a été manquée parce que K.R. na pas amené M.C.R. au rendez-vous. Le
    16 juin, Valoris a signifié une motion pour que K.R. soit déclarée en outrage
    au tribunal. Les visites supervisées reprennent le 16, 23 et 30 juin, et le 7
    juillet 2020. La motion est abandonnée.

[13]

Le 8 juillet 2020, Valoris a expliqué
à
K.R. que la société voulait retirer la
    supervision de façon graduelle et que les visites surveillées soient tenues au
    domicile du père d
è
s la semaine
    suivante. Valoris a expliqué que les prochaines visites seraient surveillées,
    et cela pour quatre semaines après lesquelles la société revisiterait la
    situation. K.R. nétait pas daccord avec le plan propos
é
et en particulier, elle ne voulait pas que
    les visites se déroulent chez le père. K.R. signalait à Valoris que M.C.R. vivait
    des régressions au niveau de son comportement agressif et de sa propreté. Elle indiquait
    qu
à
moins que les visites
    continuent à se dérouler au bureau de Valoris, elle nenverrait pas M.C.R.

[14]

La visite du 14 juillet a donc été annulée. Par
    contre, les visites ont repris lorsquelles se tiennent aux bureaux de Valoris à
    compter du 21 juillet. La visite du 21 juillet ainsi que celles du 28 juillet
    et du 4 août se sont bien déroulées. Malgré la reprise des visites, Valoris a entamé
    de nouveau des procédures pour déclarer K.R. coupable doutrage au tribunal.

[15]

Le 12 août 2020, les parties ont participé à une
    conférence de règlement devant le juge Pelletier. Suite à cette comparution, le
    juge Pelletier a inscrit que
«
le tribunal favorise les mesures de règlement que les parties
    pourront utiliser y compris la concertation familiale
»
. La motion en outrage au tribunal a été fixée pour le 2 octobre
    2020.

[16]

Par la suite, lavis de motion et laffidavit à
    lappui de la motion en outrage au tribunal datés du 25 août 2020 ont été signifiés
    à K.R. Lallégation dans lavis de motion se lit comme suit :

Vous ne respectez
    pas lOrdonnance de lHonorable Juge R. Pelletier datée du 19 décembre 2019.
    Cette Ordonnance octroie une (1) visite par semaine à [A.C.] avec son fils. Alors
    que Valoris tente dorganiser des visites surveillées pour [A.C.] à son
    domicile, vous avez clairement dit que vous namèneriez pas lenfant à ces
    visites car vous vous opposez à ce que la surveillance soit retirée. La Société
    ne peut donc pas exercer sa discrétion quant aux modalités des visites tel que
    stipulé dans lOrdonnance.

[17]

Dans laffidavit de Claudelle Marcheterre,
    déposé à lappui de la motion, Valoris fait état dun plan pour cheminer vers
    des visites non surveillées. Selon la société, il est important de faire
    avancer ce plan graduellement puisque K.R. continue de rapporter certains
    comportements agressifs chez M.C.R., dont morsures, violence et défiance. Valoris
    note que M.C.R. est un jeune garçon anxieux qui peut avoir de la difficulté
    avec les transitions ou les changements. Ainsi, un plan progressif selon lequel
    la réaction de M.C.R. peut être évaluée avant de passer à une prochaine étape est
    préférable.

[18]

Le plan présenté dans laffidavit de Valoris est
    comme suit :

a)

La société va allonger les visites surveillées et les faire au
    domicile du père. Ceci se fera au cours de quatre semaines et, si tout va bien,
    la société passera à une prochaine étape;

b)

À létape 2 il y aura des visites semi-surveillées. Si celles-ci se déroulent
    bien, la société passerait à la prochaine étape;

c)

À l

étape 3, la surveillance sera faite
    par voie de « spot checks » pour assurer que les visites sont positives pour M.C.R.

[19]

Ce nest que si cette troisième étape se passe
    bien que la société propose de passer
à
des visites hebdomadaires sans surveillance.

[20]

Au para. 18 de laffidavit de Mme Marcheterre,
    la société demande
à
la cour quelle
«
précise dans une Ordonnance que la société
    a la discrétion quant au lieu des visites, qui peut inclure le domicile du père
»
. La motion est entendue le 2
    octobre 2020.

[21]

Dans ses motifs, la juge de motion explique que,
    dans son ordonnance, le juge Pelletier
«
a stipulé de façon claire et sans équivoque quà la suite de lenquête
    criminelle, Valoris aurait la discrétion de retirer la surveillance, si elle ne
    la juge plus nécessaire
»
. La
    juge de motion a ensuite déterminé que K.R. a agi de façon délibérée et
    volontaire en maintenant que A.C. ne pouvait pas avoir des visites non surveillées
    avec M.C.R. et en refusant de supporter le plan de Valoris de passer de façon
    graduelle à des visites non surveillées. Ainsi, la juge de motion a conclu que
    K.R. a commis un outrage au tribunal en refusant de suivre le para. 2 de
    lordonnance du juge Pelletier cité ci-haut. Cest-à-dire, elle a refusé de
    permettre des visites non surveillées malgré la décision de Valoris de passer graduellement
    à des visites non surveillées.

[22]

La juge de motion a aussi accédé à la demande de
    Valoris de remplacer le deuxième paragraphe de lordonnance du juge Pelletier
    par un paragraphe rendant plus clair ce que Valoris proposait. Une nouvelle
    ordonnance a été donc émise le 14 octobre 2020 dans laquelle la cour a fixé le
    lieu et le déroulement des visites jusquau 23 novembre 2020. Ensuite, le 3
    novembre 2020, une deuxième nouvelle ordonnance a été émise dans laquelle la
    cour a confirmé que les visites commençant la semaine du 23 novembre 2020
    auraient lieu au domicile de A.C. avec des « spot checks » et que
    « Le but est que les visites seront éventuellement non surveillées ».
    Finalement, la cour a accordé à Valoris la discrétion de modifier lhoraire des
    visites.

[23]

K.R. a interjeté appel. Après la mise en état de
    lappel, les parties ont avis
é
la
    cour quelles avaient conclu une entente en vertu de laquelle lordonnance d
é
clarant K.R. en outrage au tribunal serait
    infirm
ée
et le tribunal donnerait
    un avertissement formel
à
la
    mère à leffet quelle doit respecter les ordonnances émises par le tribunal.

[24]

Suite
à
la réception de lentente conclue entre les parties, la cour a avisé
    les parties quelle nétait pas en mesure daccorder l

appel
    sur consentement. Lappel devait soit être retiré ou entendu, et jugement rendu
    sur le fond. Les parties ont ensuite indiqué
à
la cour quelles acceptaient que lappel soit entendu et d
écidé
sur la documentation qui avait déjà été
    déposée.

[25]

Pour les motifs qui suivent, jai conclu que
    lappel doit être accordé.

Analyse

[26]

Trois critères doivent être réunis pour
    conclure à un outrage au tribunal.
Premièrement,
    lordonnance qui na pas été respectée doit énoncer clairement et sans
    équivoque ce qui doit être fait ou ne doit pas être fait. Deuxièmement, la
    partie à qui on reproche davoir violé lordonnance doit être réellement au
    courant de son existence. Troisièmement, la partie qui désobéit à lordonnance doit
    le faire de façon délibérée et volontaire. Ces trois éléments doivent être
    établis hors de tout doute raisonnable :
Carey c. Laiken
,
    2015 CSC 17, [2015] 2 R.C.S. 79, au para. 32 :
Services aux enfants et
    adultes de Prescott-Russell c. N.G.
(2006), 271 D.L.R. (4
e
) 750
, au para. 27.

[27]

Dans larrêt
Carey
, la
    Cour suprême a réitéré que le pouvoir du tribunal en matière doutrage est
    discrétionnaire et quil doit être exercé « avec prudence et avec une
    grande réserve » : au para.
36, citant
TG Industries v. Williams,
2001 NSCA 105, 196 N.S.R. (2
e
) 35.
Voir aussi
Hefkey v. Hefkey
, 2013 ONCA 44, au para. 3. Dans le contexte dun différend familial,
    le tribunal doit aussi tenir compte et exercer sa discrétion en fonction des
    meilleurs intérêts de lenfant :
Ruffolo v.
    David
, 2019 ONCA 385, au para. 19.

[28]

Selon moi, lordonnance du juge Pelletier nest
    pas suffisamment claire pour étayer une conclusion doutrage au tribunal, et la
    preuve nétablit pas hors de tout doute raisonnable que K.R. a agi de façon
    délibérée et volontaire en violation de lordonnance. De plus, rien dans les
    motifs de la juge de motion ne laisse entendre quelle a considéré les
    meilleurs intérêts de lenfant en rendant lordonnance.

(1)

Lordonnance du juge Pelletier nest pas claire
    et sans équivoque

[29]

Pour quil y ait outrage au tribunal, lordonnance en question doit clairement
    prévoir le comportement de l

individu qui doit ou
    qui ne doit pas être fait:
Carey
, au para. 33:
Prescott-Russell
, au para. 27. Dans laffaire
Carey
, se fiant sur la décision de la Cour dappel de
    Saskatchewan en
Culligan Canada Ltd. v. Fettes
, 2010 SKCA 151, 326 D.L.R. (4
e
) 463, la
    Cour suprême a précisé au para. 33 qu« [i]l peut être établi quune
    ordonnance nest pas claire si, par exemple, il manque un détail essentiel sur
    lendroit, le moment ou lindividu visé par lordonnance, si elle est formulée
    en des termes trop larges ou si des circonstances extérieures ont obscurci son
    sens ».
Toute ambiguïté dans le texte de lordonnance doit
    être résolue en faveur de la personne accusée doutrage :
Telus
    Communications Inc. v. Cherubin
, [2005] O.J. No. 5534 (C.S.), au para.
53 ;
884772 Ontario Ltd. (c.o.b. Team Consultants) v. SHL Systemhouse Inc.
(1993),
[1993] O.J. No. 1488, au para. 18.

[30]

Lordonnance en lespèce comprend deux éléments
    distincts : elle prévoit des visites surveillées dune fois par semaine,
    et elle accorde une discrétion
à
Valoris de retirer la surveillance si elle ne la juge plus
    nécessaire. La juge de motion a déterminé que K.R. « a commis un outrage
    au tribunal en refusant de suivre le paragraphe 2 de lordonnance du juge
    Pelletier ». Son analyse qui a mené à cette conclusion est comme
    suit :

a)

Les faits énoncent que la surveillance nétait
    plus nécessaire;

b)

K.R. maintenait que A.C. ne pouvait pas avoir de
    visites non surveillées;

c)

K.R. refuse de supporter le plan de passer de
    façon graduelle à des visites non surveillées.

[31]

Les problèmes avec cette analyse sont que
    lordonnance nimpose pas à K.R. lobligation de supporter « un plan de
    passer de façon graduelle à des visites non surveillées », et le dossier
    ne permet pas de conclure que « la surveillance nétait plus
    nécessaire ».

(a)

Ce qui est prévu par lordonnance

[32]

Lordonnance du juge Pelletier prévoit en
    premier lieu des visites hebdomadaires surveillées. Il sagit de lobligation de
    permettre ou de ne pas empêcher les visites. Elle prévoit ensuite que Valoris a
    « la discrétion de retirer la surveillance ». Lordonnance nexige
    pas, tel que le suggère la juge de motion, que K.R. doive supporter un
    « plan de passer de façon graduelle à des visites non-surveillées ».

[33]

De plus, lallégation faite par Valoris dans
    lavis de motion nétait pas que K.R. avait refusé damener M.C.R. à une visite
    après que Valoris a exercé sa discrétion pour retirer la surveillance tel que
    prévu dans lordonnance. Plutôt, lallégation faite par Valoris dans lavis de
    motion est quelle « ne peut  pas exercer sa discrétion quant aux
    modalités des visites tel que stipulé dans l'Ordonnance ». Rien dans
    lordonnance naccorde clairement à Valoris
«
la discrétion quant aux modalités des visites
» et rien ne stipule où ces visites doivent avoir lieu
. De fait, tel que je lai noté, Mme Marcheterre, dans son affidavit
    à lappui de la motion, a demandé  et la juge de motion a accepté  de
    modifier lordonnance afin de mettre en uvre les différentes étapes que
    Valoris proposait, y compris que les visites surveillées soient tenues
«
au domicile de A.C.
»
. Si lordonnance du juge Pelletier avait
    été si claire, aucune modification naurait été nécessaire.

[34]

Tel quexpliqué par le juge Cullity dans
    l'affaire
Jaskhs Enterprises Inc. v. Indus Corp.
, [2004] O.J. No.
    4062, au para.
40, citée avec approbation dans
Bell ExpressVu
    Limited Partnership v. Torroni
, 2009 ONCA 85, 304 D.L.R. (4
e
)
    431, au para. 28: « a failure to comply with an order of the court will
    not be contempt if there are genuine, unresolved issues between the parties
    with respect to the manner in which it is to be carried into operation ».
Il est clair que K.R. nétait pas prête à passer à des visites non surveillées
    lorsque Valoris le proposait. Par contre, le refus par K.R. denvoyer M.C.R.
    pour sa visite avec A.C. a suivi la décision de Valoris de changer le lieu o
ù
les visites surveillées auraient lieu.
    Jusquau mois de juillet 2020, les visites surveillées se déroulaient aux
    bureaux de Valoris à Plantagenet et, selon la proposition de Valoris, celles-ci
    seraient dorénavant tenues à la résidence de A.C. à Gatineau.

[35]

En l'absence d'un langage clair permettant à
    Valoris d'effectuer un tel changement, je ne vois pas que K.R. aurait clairement
    compris qu'elle était dans l'obligation de sy conformer sans discussion. K.R.
    demeurait prête à ce que la visite ait lieu aux bureaux de Valoris, comme dans
    le passé. De fait, les visites ont repris la semaine suivante aux bureaux de
    Valoris en attente que la motion pour outrage soit entendue et que la cour se
    prononce sur la demande de Valoris de modifier les modalités de lordonnance. La
    décision de retirer la surveillance na pas été prise

[36]

La juge de motion ne semble pas reprocher à K.R.
    quelle nait pas amené M.C.R. à la visite du 14 juillet, mais plutôt quelle
    refusait daccepter que les visites surveillées nétaient plus nécessaires. Par
    contre, et contrairement à ce que la juge a énoncé, Valoris navait pas encore déterminé
    que la surveillance nétait plus nécessaire. Valoris proposait un plan à
    plusieurs étapes qui pourrait mener à une telle décision. Selon laffidavit de
    Mme Marcheterre, Valoris aurait expliqué
à
K.R. que
«
les
    visites seraient complètement surveillées pour quatre semaines » et que « [Valoris
    revisiterait] la situation par la suite
»
.

[37]

Le fait quaucune décision nait été prise de
    retirer la surveillance est confirmé par le plan que Valoris a étalé dans
    laffidavit de Mme Marcheterre. Le plan prévoyait quatre étapes successives
    avant que Valoris arrive à des visites non surveillées. Valoris passerait dune
    étape
à
une autre seulement si
    Valoris était de lavis que tout se passait bien. Ainsi, puisque la décision de
    retirer la surveillance na pas été prise par Valoris, il est difficile de
    conclure que la deuxième partie de lordonnance du juge Pelletier accordant à
    Valoris « la discrétion de retirer la surveillance si elle ne la juge plus
    nécessaire » na pas été respectée.

(2)

Le comportement de K.R. nétait pas délibéré et
    volontaire

[38]

Le troisième critère applicable à une déclaration
    doutrage au tribunal exige une preuve que lindividu a violé lordonnance de
    façon délibérée et volontaire:
Prescott-Russell
, au para. 27. La
    preuve dune intention de désobéir nest pas requise :
Carey,
au
    para. 38. Une personne aura l'intention requise lorsquelle refuse de suivre
    les prescriptions dune ordonnance dont elle a connaissance.

[39]

Comme cette cour l'a reconnu dans l'affaire
Bell
    ExpressVu
, au para. 24, il existe une relation inverse entre la clarté de
    l'ordonnance et le seuil requis pour conclure à une désobéissance délibérée. Plus
    l'ordonnance est claire, plus le tribunal pourra identifier avec précision la
    conduite reprochée et le degré dintentionnalité.

[40]

Tel que discuté, lordonnance en lespèce nest
    pas claire. La seule directive donnée aux parties est l'obligation de maintenir
    un rythme d'une visite par semaine. Bien que K.R. ait intentionnellement refusé
    d'amener M.C.R. à la visite du 14 juillet, son refus était lié au lieu de la
    visite, qui, comme je l'ai expliqué, ne relève pas clairement du champ
    d'application de l'ordonnance. Une fois que les bureaux de Valoris ont été
    rétablis comme le lieu des visites, les visites ont repris.

(3)

Les meilleurs intérêts de lenfant

[41]

En dernier lieu, il est important de souligner
    que, dans chaque cas de demande de déclaration doutrage au tribunal impliquant
    un enfant, le tribunal doit considérer les meilleurs intérêts de lenfant. Dans
    de telles circonstances, lorsquune partie cherche à trouver un parent en
    outrage, des options moins sévères devraient être considérées. Loutrage au
    tribunal est un remède qui ne devrait être utilisé quen dernier recours. Tel
    que cette cour la indiqu
é
dans
Chong v. Donnelly
, 2019 ONCA 799, aux paras. 10-12, le juge doit considérer
    dautres options, telles que déclarer quil y a eu non-respect de lordonnance ou
    dencourager les parties
à
utiliser la médiation plutôt que de passer directement à une ordonnance
    doutrage. Voir aussi
Ruffolo
, aux paras. 18-19.

[42]

Bien qu'il soit inacceptable qu'une partie
    contrevienne à une ordonnance claire du tribunal en croyant que ce sera mieux
    pour l'enfant, il n'est pas non plus souhaitable que la cour émette une
    ordonnance d'outrage en réponse à toute dérogation ou manifestation de
    réticence de la part dun parent. Il doit y avoir une place pour le dialogue,
    comme la indiqué le juge Pelletier dans son inscription du 12 août 2020 :
    « le tribunal favorise les mesures de règlement que les parties pourront
    utiliser y compris la concertation familiale ».

[43]

Lorsque Valoris a introduit sa requête pour
    déclarer K.R. coupable d'outrage au tribunal, K.R. avait refusé d'amener M.C.R.
    à sa visite hebdomadaire quune seule fois, le 14 juillet 2020, et les visites
    ont repris une semaine plus tard. De plus,

nous notons que suite aux précisions
à
lordonnance que Valoris a demandées et que la cour a accordées,
    K.R. a coopéré avec Valoris. De fait, tel que je lai indiqué, les parties se
    sont entendues à leffet que lappel devait être accord
é
.

[44]

Rien dans la décision de la juge de motion ne laisse
    entendre que la cour a considéré si des options autres quune déclaration
    doutrage au tribunal seraient dans les meilleurs intérêts de lenfant.

Conclusion

[45]

Pour ces motifs, jaccorderais lappel,
    jinfirmerais lordonnance de la juge de motion et je rejetterais la motion
    pour outrage au tribunal.

Rendu le : 2 juin 2021 « P.R. »

« Paul
    Rouleau j.c.a. »

« je
    souscris M.L. Benotto j.c.a. »

« je
    souscris L.B. Roberts j.c.a. »


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION:
Walcott v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2021 ONCA 358

DATE: 20210528

DOCKET: C68252

Strathy C.J.O., Feldman and van
    Rensburg JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Anderson T. Walcott

Plaintiff (Appellant)

and

Toronto Transit Commission
, Bell Canada,

Schwedt Map Art and
    CMA/CPA

Defendants (
Respondent
)

Anderson T. Walcott, acting in person

Justin Lim, for the respondent

Heard: May 21, 2021 by videoconference

On
    appeal from the judgment of Justice Benjamin T. Glustein of the Superior Court
    of Justice, dated February 25, 2020.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

The appellant appeals from the judgment that
    dismissed his motion for summary judgment against the respondent, and granted
    the respondents motion for summary judgment dismissing his action against it
    for copyright infringement.

[2]

As a preliminary matter, the respondent
    submitted in its factum that this appeal should have been brought to the
    Divisional Court. We reject that submission. The appellants claim was for
    $2,000,000 for copyright infringement. The motion judge found no liability and
    dismissed the action. However, he did not find that the value of the claim was
    under $50,000. A final order that dismisses an action on the basis of no liability
    does not have the effect of quantifying the damages at zero dollars. If it did,
    then every appeal from the dismissal of an action would be to the Divisional
    Court, rather than only those where the value of the damages claimed or
    quantified is under $50,000, contrary to s. 6(1)(b) of the
Courts of
    Justice Act
, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43: see
Harte-Eichmanis v. Fernandes
,
    2012 ONCA 266, 15 R.F.L. (7th) 1, at paras. 13-14.

[3]

The appellant approached the Toronto Transit Commission
    (TTC) in 1994 offering to create a bus and subway route map guide. The TTC
    responded that such a guide was already available to its passengers. In 1996,
    the appellant raised concerns with the TTC that its route maps appeared in the
    Yellow Pages Directory, to which the TTC responded that those route maps had
    been internally generated and were not based on the appellants proposed guide.
    On August 5, 1996, the appellant obtained a Certificate of Registration for a
    Guide from the United States Copyright Office. However, that Guide was
    unpublished and was not provided to the motion judge. The appellant provided
    only route maps that he proposed to include in the Guide. Those route maps
    were not in the form of maps, but were lists of transit stops along bus routes.
    There was also one document that was in the form of a map with businesses on
    the street identified in handwriting.

[4]

The evidence of the TTC was that it has been
    publishing route maps of its transit lines for many years in a number of
    formats. The motion judge found that evidence to be uncontested. These maps do
    not include information about businesses along the routes, like those prepared and
    submitted by the appellant. In his action, the appellant claims copyright in
    the publication of all transit routes and schedules in Canada and the U.S.,
    based on his U.S. Certificate of Registration.

[5]

The motion judge determined that he could decide
    both motions on summary judgment as there was no genuine issue requiring a
    trial. He made the following findings:

1)

Because the appellant did not produce a Guide,
    there was no evidentiary basis to support a claim for copyright in a Guide.

2)

As there is no copyright in ideas but only in
    their form of expression, there was no originality in the route maps the appellant
    produced which were taken from public information about TTC transit routes.

3)

Even if there was any original form of
    expression in the appellants TTC route maps, there was no evidence that the
    TTC used or adopted the appellants maps.

4)

If the appellant had copyright in the expression
    of the appellants maps, the scope of any such copyright would not extend to
    prevent the TTC from producing its own route maps.

[6]

Based on those findings, the motion judge
    dismissed the appellants action for copyright infringement.

[7]

In oral argument, the appellant asserted that
    the affidavit evidence filed by the TTC was untrue regarding the history of its
    publication of transit route maps. There is no basis on the record for making
    such an assertion. The deponent of the TTCs affidavit was not cross-examined,
    and his evidence was supported by documentary exhibits.

[8]

We see no error in the findings of the motion
    judge with respect to the record and the law of copyright, and in finding no
    genuine issue requiring a trial.

[9]

The appellant also sought to keep the respondent
    in the action as a conspirator with the federal government in respect of his
    claim for assault, slander, defraud and deny rights, benefits and privileges
    of freedom of [the appellant]. The motion judge found that there was no
    evidence to support the alleged claims against the respondent and therefore
    granted summary judgment dismissing the action against it with costs of
    $25,000. We see no error in this finding, and no genuine issue requiring a
    trial.

[10]

The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs
    fixed in the amount of $8,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

G.R. Strathy C.J.O.

K. Feldman J.A.

K. van Rensburg J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Wen v. Gu, 2021 ONCA 259

DATE: 20210426

DOCKET: C67743

Benotto, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Hao Wen

Plaintiff (Appellant)

and

Shi Gu
, Robert Choi and Robins Appleby LLP

Defendants (
Respondent
)

Yixin Wang and J. Gardner Hodder, for
    the appellant

Jerome H. Stanleigh, for the respondent

Heard: April 20, 2021 by video conference

On
    appeal from the judgment of Justice William S. Chalmers of the Superior Court
    of Justice, dated November 4, 2019, with reasons reported at 2019 ONSC 7456.

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background

[1]

In August 2016 the appellant, Hao Wen, purchased
    a restaurant from the respondent. The purchase price of $425,000 included a
    transfer of the lease, licences, and equipment. The closing was supposed to be
    October 25. However, the appellant alleged that the respondent had made
    misrepresentations entitling her to terminate the agreement. She alleged that
    during the negotiations, the respondent represented that the weekday sales
    revenues in the busiest month were $3,000 and the weekend revenues were $8,000.
    In fact, the revenues averaged to $1,000 and $4,000 respectively.

[2]

The appellant commenced an action alleging
    fraudulent misrepresentation and frustration. The respondent counterclaimed for
    breach of contract.

[3]

The appellant sought to establish that the
    representations as to revenue had been admitted. She filed a Request to Admit
    the following fact:

8.       During the
    meeting of August 29, 2016 [the respondent] told [the appellant] that in the
    best month, the daily revenue for the Restaurant business was on average
    $3,000.00 on weekdays and approximately $8,000.00 on weekends.

9.       In
    the context of paragraph 9 [sic] herein, the best month means the months of
    either May, June or July.

[4]

In his Reply to Request to Admit, the respondent
    neither admitted nor denied paragraph 8 but admitted paragraph 9.

[5]

During the respondents examination in chief at
    trial, his counsel referred to the Request to Admit:

Q.      During the
    meeting of August 29, you told the [appellant] that the best month of daily
    revenue for the restaurant business was on average $3,000 on weekdays and
    approximately $8,000 on weekends.

A.      Yes.

Decision below

[6]

The trial judge found that the respondent did
    not make any misrepresentations which induced the appellant into signing the
    contract. His statements about the revenue and profits of the restaurant were
    accurate. She had been shown sales receipts for May 7 to July 31, 2016 which
    showed approximately $1,000 of revenue for weekdays and $4,000 for weekends.
    The trial judge added that even if the estimate of revenue had been inaccurate,
    [the respondent] provided the actual sales receipts to the appellant who had
    them before the agreement and she asked no questions. He added that, if the
    appellant relied on the respondents totals when the actual sales records had
    been provided, it was not reasonable for her to do so.

[7]

The trial judge found that the appellant breached
    the contract and awarded the respondent the difference between the purchase
    price of $425,000 and the amount he eventually sold the restaurant for, rent
    for the two-month period after the closing date, and the sales commission he
    was required to pay for the new sale.

Issues

[8]

The appellant submits that the trial judge erred
    by ignoring the factual admissions when he found there were no
    misrepresentations. She also argues that he erred in assigning responsibility
    to the appellant for not verifying the sales receipts given to her.

[9]

The respondent submits that this is a case of
    buyers remorse. The appellant was not misled, and the trial judge made no
    palpable and overriding error in concluding that the sales receipts given to
    her were accurate.

Analysis

[10]

We have concluded that the trial judge erred in
    two ways.

[11]

First, the trial judge failed to refer to the
    admitted facts when he concluded that there was no misrepresentation. The
    estimates given by the respondent  that the average daily revenue in the
    restaurants best month was $3,000 on weekdays and $8,000 on weekends  could
    not be reconciled with the actual sales. These facts were admitted pursuant to
    r. 51.03 (Effect of Request to Admit) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure
,
    R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, and the testimony of the respondent. The trial judge did
    not consider the effect of these admissions. Consequently, it is not possible
    to reconcile his finding that there was no misrepresentation with the admitted
    facts.

[12]

Second, the trial judge erred by assigning
    responsibility to the appellant. He should not have relied upon the appellants
    lack of due diligence to find that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation:
Performance
    Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd.
, 2002 SCC 19,
    [2002] 1 S.C.R. 678, at paras. 67-69;
Man Financial Canada Co. v.
    Keuroghlian
, 2008 ONCA 592, at para. 45.

[13]

The combined effect of these errors requires a
    new trial.

[14]

The appeal is allowed, and a new trial is
    ordered.

[15]

The costs ordered by the trial judge are set
    aside. In accordance with the parties agreement, costs of the trial below and
    the new trial will be determined by the next trial judge.

[16]

Cost of the appeal are to be paid to the
    appellant fixed in the agreed upon amount of $20,000.00 all inclusive.

M.L.
    Benotto J.A.

B.W.
    Miller J.A.

Gary
    Trotter J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Wilton v. Northern Bruce Peninsula
    (Municipality), 2021 ONCA 12

DATE:  20210107

DOCKET: C66314

Doherty, Paciocco and Coroza
    JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Shirley Wilton as an Estate
    Trustee of Anneliese Weiss

Appellant

and

Municipality of Northern Bruce
    Peninsula

Respondent

Shirley Wilton, acting in person

Nicholas Lovell, for the respondent

Heard: in writing

On appeal from the order of Justice Kofi
    N. Barnes of the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 2, 2018.

COSTS ENDORSEMENT

[1]

We have received the respondents costs
    submissions. The appellant chose to make no costs submissions.

[2]

Costs to the respondent in the amount of
    $7,500, inclusive of disbursements and all relevant taxes.

Doherty J.A.

David M. Paciocco J.A.

S. Coroza J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Wiseau Studio, LLC v. Harper, 2021
    ONCA 31

DATE: 20210115

DOCKET: M51953 (C68580)

Thorburn
    J.A. (Motions Judge)

BETWEEN

Wiseau
    Studio, LLC and Tommy Wiseau d.b.a. Wiseau-Films

Plaintiffs/ Defendants by
    Counterclaim

(Appellants/ Responding Parties)

and

Richard Harper, Fernando Forero Mcgrath, Martin

Racicot d.b.a. Rockhaven Pictures, Room Full of Spoons

Inc., Parktown
    Studios Inc. and Richard Stewart Towns

Defendants/ Plaintiffs by Counterclaim

(Respondents/ Moving Parties)

Matthew Diskin and Meredith Bacal, for
    the moving parties

Daniel Brinza, for the responding
    parties

Heard: January 7, 2021 by videoconference

REASONS
    FOR DECISION

RELIEF SOUGHT

[1]

This is a motion by the moving parties Ri
chard
    Harper, Fernando Forero McGrath, Martin Racicot d.b.a. Rockhaven Pictures, Room
    Full of Spoons Inc., Parktown Studios Inc. and Richard Stewart Towns (together
    Room Full of Spoons)
for security for the trial judgment, costs of the
    judgment and appeal and in the alternative, an order to lift the stay pending
    appeal.

[2]

The security amounts are as follows:

1.

Security for the trial judgment in the amount of
    $200,000 CDN and Canadian currency sufficient to purchase $575,488.36 at a bank
    in Ontario listed in Schedule I to the
Bank Act
(Canada) at the close
    of business on the first day on which the bank quotes a Canadian dollar rate
    for purchase of the foreign currency before the day payment of the obligation
    is received;

2.

Security for costs of trial judgment in the
    amount of $481,521.80 CDN; and

3.

Security for costs of the appeal in the amount
    of $30,000.

[3]

Room Full of Spoons claims that although
    security for judgment has not been awarded by an Ontario court, the unique
    circumstances of this case warrant security for the judgment awarded and has
    been awarded by courts in other Canadian jurisdictions. Room Full of Spoons
    also notes that the British Columbia and Alberta courts have granted security
    for judgment in similar circumstances.

BACKGROUND EVIDENCE

[4]

In 2003, Wiseau Studio LLC and Tommy Wiseau,
    doing business as Wiseau Films released a feature film called The Room. The
    Room and its creator, Tommy Wiseau, acquired cult-like status. Wiseau Studio
    and Tommy Wiseau are residents of California.

[5]

Richard Harper, Fernando Forero McGrath, Martin
    Racicot and Richard Stewart Towns are Ontario documentary filmmakers. In 2016,
    after years of work, they completed a documentary film called
Room Full of
    Spoons
about the cult phenomenon surrounding The Room and Mr. Wiseau (the
    Documentary). Room Full of Spoons only material asset is the Documentary.

[6]

Room Full of Spoons have not been able to
    exploit the Documentary since Wiseau Films brought a claim against them in
    2017.

[7]

On June 14, 2017, Wiseau Films obtained an
ex
    parte
injunction restraining the release of the Documentary while,
    unbeknownst to the court, it was in negotiations with Room Full of Spoons about
    the Documentarys release.

[8]

On November 1, 2017, the injunction was
    dissolved as the motion judge held that Wiseau Films had failed to make full
    and frank disclosure and engaged in litigation misconduct. Room Full of Spoons
    was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $97,034.68.

[9]

The cost award was not paid for 11 months and
    was paid only after the court advised that Wiseau Films claim would be
    dismissed if the cost award was not satisfied.

[10]

Thereafter, the case management judge found that
    Wiseau Films engaged in roadblocks to scheduling at almost every attendance
    and other improper acts. These include:

(a)     The injunction was issued at a
    commercially critical time when the parties were on the verge of finalizing a
    distribution deal which was prevented by the injunction such that the lawsuit
    had the effect of blocking the release of the documentary;

(b)     Wiseau stated falsehoods about the
    defendants on social media and made misrepresentation to third parties about
    the legality of screening the documentary;

(c)     Both sides agreed to file affidavits
    from their witnesses regarding their anticipated testimony in chief.
    Thereafter, Wiseau Films sought an order from the case management judge to
    direct the Crown to prosecute the defendants for perjury based on their
    affidavits, although he never identified what was allegedly false. The request
    was refused;

(d)     Seeking to adjourn the trial on the
    eve of trial on the grounds that Wiseau Films no longer had counsel. The case
    management judge held this was a situation entirely of their own making and
    one about which [he had] warned Mr. Wiseau on many occasions. Since February
    2019, the case management judge had dealt with three different motions by three
    sets of counsel for Wiseau Films asking to be removed from the record; and

(e)     On the eve of trial, sending the judge
    and opposing counsel a document entitled Total Withdraw purporting to
    discontinue his claims. In the document, Wiseau Films attacked the Ontario
    justice system and stated that a new action would be brought in another
    jurisdiction for the same relief. (The request was refused.)

[11]

Following an eight-day trial in January 2020,
    Wiseau Films claim was dismissed and judgment granted in favour of Room Full
    of Spoons on the counterclaim. The judgment was thorough and comprehensive.

[12]

Room Full of Spoons was awarded $200,000 in
    punitive damages (in large part for litigation misconduct), $550,000 USD in
    damages arising from the improper
ex parte

injunction,
    $25,488.36 USD in pre-judgment interest, and $481,521.80 CDN in costs.

[13]

Thereafter, Wiseau Films request to vary the
    judgment was dismissed with costs to Room Full of Spoons in the amount of
    $20,000 CDN. In his reasons, the trial judge refused to allow evidence from
    witnesses that testified at trial and that could and should have been adduced
    at trial. He also noted that,

Nothing presented on this motion suggests that
    my Reasons for Judgment were based on misleading evidence or that there is any
    other reason to reconsider my decision or reopen the trial. Rather, this motion
    raises the same concerns referred to by Koehnen J. prior to trial, that the
    plaintiffs seek to delay justice for the defendants at every turn.

Once again, Wiseau also complains of the
    Ontario justice system being unfair to him as an American citizen doing
    litigation in a foreign and unfamiliar jurisdiction. This claim, and other
    criticisms of the Ontario courts was made by Wiseau in advance of trial and
    also at the outset of the trial. However, Wiseau chose to bring this action in
    Ontario, and no doubt was quite content with our system of justice when he
    obtained his
ex parte
injunction. I am not aware of any way in which
    he has been treated differently than if he were a resident of Ontario or a
    citizen of Canada.

In my view, this motion has no merit and is
    yet another tactical attempt by Wiseau to delay and obstruct the release of
Room
    Full of Spoons
.

[14]

Thereafter, Mr. Wiseau failed to attend
    examinations in aid of execution, or court Orders compelling his attendance to
    provide information about his assets. Counsel for Wiseau Films advised that,

As for the location of the assets which could
    be used to satisfy any judgment  the bulk of my clients assets may be located
    outside Ontario, namely in the USA. As you are aware, should you wish to
    proceed with execution against any US-based assets, the proper procedure for
    your side would be to convince a US court of proper jurisdiction to endorse the
    judgments and orders issued by the Ontario courts.

[15]

Mr. Wiseau refused to say whether a sizeable
    real estate asset called the Pico Property, which was the only known address
    for Mr. Wiseau, was still his address and said it was laughable to ask. No
    information has been provided about any Wiseau Films assets or their
    whereabouts save for the bald assertion that Wiseau Films can satisfy any
    judgment award.

[16]

Wiseau Films has now brought a Notice of Appeal
    of the trial judgment. Wiseau Films counsel does not dispute that the Amended
    Amended Notice of Appeal, which grounds provide only that the court below erred
    in dismissing his various claims, is frivolous on its face. He suggested
    however that there was still time to further amend the Appeal.

THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

[17]

Room Full of Spoons
claims costs of the judgment and security
    for costs of the trial and appeal on the grounds that there is no evidence that
    Wiseau Films or any of its assets is in the jurisdiction or that Wiseau Films
    would agree to pay any order of this court. Room Full of Spoons also submits
    that Wiseau Films improper behaviour in making numerous tactical attempts to
    obstruct and delay these proceedings, and its frivolous appeal, justify the
    relief sought.

[18]

Room Full of Spoons claims these actions are
    clear evidence that, having chosen to commence legal proceedings in Ontario,
    Wiseau Films does not intend to comply with an Ontario court order and that
    security for judgment and costs is therefore required.

[19]

Wiseau Films disputes the motion for security
    for judgment and/or costs as they claim justice does not demand that security
    be granted and the losing party should be entitled to avail itself of due
    process and any and all protections afforded to a judgment debtor.

[20]

Counsel for Wiseau Films conceded on this motion
    that the grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal are frivolous as
    they are entirely conclusory. He stated however, that they are not vexatious as
    there is no stated intention to refuse to pay any amounts deemed owing nor is
    there evidence Wiseau Films cannot satisfy a judgment and or costs award.

[21]

Lastly, Wiseau Films submits that to enable Room
    Full of Spoons to obtain information about its assets would constitute
    execution before final judgment. Such an order for security for judgment has
    never been granted in Ontario, which suggests it is not appropriate to do so
    absent exceptional circumstances which are not present in this case.

ANALYSIS

(1)

The First Issue: Security for Trial Judgment

[22]

Section 134(2) of the
Courts of Justice Act
,
    R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (CJA) provides that, On motion, a court to which a
    motion for leave to appeal is made or to which an appeal is taken may make any
    interim order that is considered just to prevent prejudice to a party pending
    the appeal.

[23]

Rule 1.05 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, provides that, When making an order under these rules
    the court may impose such terms and give such directions as are just.

[24]

Security for judgment is an extraordinary remedy
    that should only be granted in exceptional circumstances:
Vaillancourt v.
    Cater
,
2017 ABCA 282, at para. 20;
Aetna Financial Services
    Ltd. v. Feigelman
, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 2 at p. 10;
C.H. v. M.H.
, 1997
    ABCA 263, 53 Alta. L.R. (3d) 80 (
sub nom Hamza v. Hamza
), at para. 24.

[25]

Such an order requires an appellant to post
    security for judgment before continuing with the appeal. In this way, security
    for judgment functions much like a
Mareva

injunction and
    restrains the appellant from disposing of or dissipating assets in order that
    they be available to satisfy the judgment should it be upheld and if security
    for judgment is ordered and not posted, the appeal is dismissed:
Vaillancourt
,
    at. para. 20;
Vaccaro v. Twin Cities Power-Canada U.L.C.
, 2013 ABCA
    252, 97 Alta. L.R. (5th) 193, at para. 14.

[26]

Security for judgment has been granted in other
    jurisdictions in the following circumstances:

1.

Where there are no assets in the jurisdiction against which to
    enforce a judgment and the appeal has little merit (
Vaccaro

at
    para. 11;
Creative Salmon Company Ltd. v. Staniford
,
2007 BCCA
    285,

at paras. 12 and 14;
Richland Construction Inc. v. Manningwa
    Developments Inc.
, 1996 CanLII 3188 (B.C. C.A.) at paras. 12-13);

2.

To preserve assets that would otherwise be
    destroyed, disposed of, or dissipated prior to the resolution of the dispute:
Aetna
    Financial

at p. 12); and

3.

To encourage respect for the judicial process
    and avoid abuse of process (
C.H.
, at para. 23, citing
Mooney v.
    Orr

(1994), 100 BCLR (2d) 335 at p. 348 (B.C. S.C.);
Vaccaro

at paras. 12-14; and in respect of Mareva injunctions,
Aetna Financial

at pp. 13-14).

[27]

In
First Majestic Silver Corp. et al. v.
    Davila
,
2013 BCCA 312, the court invoked s. 10(2)(b) of the British
    Columbia
Court of Appeal Act
,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 77,

a
    provision with similar wording to that in s. 134 of the
CJA

which
    provides that In an appeal or other matter before the court, a justice may
    (b) make an interim order to prevent prejudice to any person. The court
    ordered that appellants who resided out of the jurisdiction without assets in
    the jurisdiction post security for the trial judgment, failing which the
    respondents were granted leave to apply to have the appeal dismissed as
    abandoned. In so doing, the court set out the principles governing the exercise
    of discretion in ordering security for a trial judgment:

1.

The onus is on the applicant to show that it is in the interest of
    justice to order posting for security of a trial judgment and/or of trial costs.

2.

The applicant must show prejudice if the order
    is not made.

3.

In determining the interests of justice the
    chambers judge should consider the merits of the appeal and the effect of such
    an order on the ability of the appellant to continue the appeal. (See also
Vaillancourt
,
    at para. 24).

[28]

The interests of justice may include a
    consideration of the
ex juris

residence of an appellant and
    therefore the effective immunity of an appellant from enforcement of the
    judgment:
First Majestic Silver Corp. et al.
,

at para.
16;
Paz v. Hardouin
, 1995 CanLII 1808 (B.C. C.A.), at paras.
22. They may also include a consideration of the ability to enforce
    the judgment in the appellants
ex juris

jurisdiction
    and/or the absence of assets in the jurisdiction in which the judgment was
    rendered:
First Majestic Silver Corp. et al.
,

at para. 16;
Cadinha
    v. Chemar Corp. Inc.
, 1995 CanLII 1017 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 5-7.

[29]

The interests of justice may not be relied upon
    by a successful plaintiff where the effect of requiring the posting of security
    for a trial judgment would be to preclude a party from pursuing the appeal:
Kedia
    v. Shandro Dixon Edgson
,
2007 BCCA 316, 243 B.C.A.C. 80, at para.
    39, relying on
Chan v. Vancouver Trade Mart Ltd.
, 1997 CanLII 4108
    (B.C. C.A.), at para. 10.

[30]

However, in
Creative Salmon
,
Lowry
    J.A. held at para. 12 that:

[A]dverse financial circumstances will
    generally not defeat an application for security where an appeal is virtually
    without any merit. A successful plaintiff should not be required to respond to
    an unmeritorious appeal when there is no real prospect of recovery.

[31]

A finding that an appeal has no reasonable
    prospect of success may be a factor: see
Richland Construction Inc.
, at
    para. 8.

[32]

For the reasons set out below, I find that this
    is one of those rare and exceptional circumstances where an order for security
    for judgment is warranted.

[33]

First, Wiseau Films is out of the jurisdiction.
    Wiseau Films refused to advise if it has any assets in the jurisdiction and the
    only reasonable inference therefore is that there is no evidence that Wiseau
    Films have any assets in the jurisdiction. Moreover, Wiseau Films concedes
    there is no issue that paying security for judgment and or costs would prevent
    Wiseau Films from pursuing its appeal. As such, the interest of justice onus is
    met.

[34]

Second, there is evidence that Room Full of
    Spoons will suffer prejudice if the order is not granted:

1.

On several occasions, both the case management and trial judges have
    noted that there were numerous tactical attempt(s) by Wiseau to delay and
    obstruct the release of Room Full of Spoons. Those actions are set out at
    paragraph 10 above;

2.

Room Full of Spoons spent years producing their
    documentary film and it has now been over four years since the completion of
    the film during which there has been a cloud on title such that they have been
    prevented from airing the documentary;

3.

A significant judgment award may never be
    recovered if the order is not granted.

[35]

Although Wiseau decided to commence legal
    proceedings in Ontario (and is therefore required to abide by the rules of the
    Ontario courts), Wiseau Films has demonstrated no intention to pay an award
    ordered by this court. Mr. Wiseau said it was laughable to ask if the
    sizeable Pico Property, which was the only known address for Mr. Wiseau, was
    still his address and suggests that if his appeal is not successful, Room Full
    of Spoons should commence proceedings in the United States to recover the
    judgment. It is also telling that, although Wiseau Films did pay the costs
    ordered against him for bringing an improper
ex parte
order, he did so
    only after the court ordered that if he failed to pay the award, his action
    would be dismissed.

[36]

Third, it is agreed that as presently drafted,
    the Amended Amended Notice of Appeal is frivolous and does not articulate what
    errors were made in the comprehensive reasons provided by the trial judge.

[37]

I am therefore satisfied that although this is a
    remedy that should be invoked sparingly, the interests of justice weigh in
    favour of granting the order for security for judgment.

[38]

Accordingly, the appellants are ordered to post
    security for the trial judgment within 90 days of this order, with liberty to
    apply for further directions on the form of the security, if necessary. If the
    appellants fail to comply with this order, Room Full of Spoons are granted
    leave to apply for an order dismissing the appeal as abandoned.

(2)

The Second Issue: Security for Costs

[39]

This court may order security for costs pursuant
    to Rule 56.01 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure

where,

(a)     the plaintiff or applicant is
    ordinarily resident outside Ontario;

(c)      the defendant or respondent has
    an order against the plaintiff or applicant for costs in the same or another
    proceeding that remain unpaid in whole or in part;

(d)     the plaintiff or applicant is a
    corporation or a nominal plaintiff or applicant, and there is good reason to
    believe that the plaintiff or applicant has insufficient assets in Ontario to
    pay the costs of the defendant or respondent; or

(e)     there is good reason to believe
    that the action or application is frivolous and vexatious and that the
    plaintiff or applicant has insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of
    the defendant or respondent.

[40]

As noted above, the Wiseau Films parties are
    ordinarily resident outside of Ontario and there is good reason to believe
    Wiseau Films has insufficient assets in Ontario to satisfy the awards. Wiseau
    Films has refused to adduce evidence of any assets in Ontario or any evidence
    that, having elected to proceed in Ontario, it would pay any amounts ordered by
    Ontario courts unless and until ordered by a United States court. Moreover,
    there is evidence that the proceeding is vexatious given the circumstances
    surrounding the
ex parte
order, the conduct prior to trial set out
    above, and Wiseau Films concession that the appeal is frivolous.

[41]

Taken together, there are ample grounds to
    support an order for security for costs of the trial and appeal pursuant to
    section 56 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure
.

[42]

Given the above and extension of the delay for
    release of the Documentary, Wiseau Films should post funds into court:
Health
    Genetic Center Corp. (Health Genetic Center) v. New Scientist Magazine
,
    2019 ONCA 576 at paras. 8-11. This Court has the jurisdiction to do so pursuant
    to s. 134(2) of the
Courts of Justice Act
and Rule 1.05 of the
Rules
    of Civil Procedure
.

CONCLUSION

[43]

For the above reasons, the motion is granted.

[44]

In accordance with the agreement between the
    parties, costs are awarded to the moving parties Room Full of Spoons in the
    amount of $3,500.

J.A.
    Thorburn J.A.


COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Wiseau Studio, LLC v. Harper, 2021 ONCA 396

DATE: 20210607

DOCKET: M52157 & M52464 (C68580)

Doherty, Pepall and Trotter JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Wiseau Studio, LLC and Tommy Wiseau d.b.a.
    Wiseau-Films

Plaintiffs/Defendants by Counterclaim (Appellants)

and

Richard Harper, Fernando Forero McGrath, Martin
    Racicot d.b.a. Rockhaven Pictures, Room Full of Spoons Inc., Parktown Studios
    Inc. and Richard Stewart Towns

Defendants/Plaintiffs by Counterclaim (Respondents)

Daniel Brinza, for the appellants

Matthew Diskin and Meredith Bacal, for the respondents

Heard: June 2, 2021 by video conference

A motion by the appellants to set aside the order of
    Thorburn J.A., dated January 15, 2021, and a motion by the respondents to
    dismiss the appeal for non-compliance with the order of Thorburn J.A.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]

At the end of oral argument, the court advised the parties the appellants
    motion to set aside the order of Thorburn J.A. (the motion judge) was granted
    in part and the respondents motion to dismiss the appeal was dismissed as
    moot. These are our reasons for those dispositions.

[2]

The appellants did not file any material in response to the respondents
    motion for security. Before the motion judge, counsel for the appellants
    conceded the appeal as framed in the Notice of Appeal was frivolous. The motion
    judge relied on that concession in making her order.

[3]

The appellants have fleshed out their grounds of appeal since the
    motion. They have also perfected the appeal and filed a factum.

[4]

We are prepared, in the circumstances, to permit the appellants to
    resile from the concession made before the motion judge as to the merits of the
    appeal. Absent the concession the appeal was frivolous, we are satisfied the part
    of the order requiring the appellants to post security for the amount of the
    judgment should be set aside.

[5]

We would not, however, interfere with the order for security for costs,
    both with respect to the trial costs and the costs of appeal. In challenging
    that part of the motion judges order, the appellants relied on material placed
    before this court, which was not before the motion judge. The appellants did
    not seek leave to adduce fresh evidence, nor did the appellants offer any justification
    for receiving fresh evidence.

[6]

A motion to review proceeds on the record that was before the motion
    judge unless the moving party can justify the court receiving fresh evidence.
    There is no such justification here and we will not admit any of the new material
    filed on this motion for review.

[7]

Based on the record as it was before the motion judge, it was reasonably
    open to her in the exercise of her discretion to make an order for the security
    of the costs of both the trial and the appeal pursuant to r. 61.06(1).

[8]

At the end of oral argument, the court made the following order.

[9]

The motion to review the order of the motion judge is allowed in part.
    The order for security on the amount of the judgment is set aside. The order
    for security for costs, both with respect to trial costs and the costs of the appeal,
    is affirmed.

[10]

The
    appellant shall post the required security by no later than July 7, 2021 at
    4:00 p.m., failing which the respondent may move
ex parte
in writing
    before this panel for an order dismissing the appeal. Any further application
    by any party in relation to the security for costs order shall be made to this
    panel and in writing.

[11]

The
    motion judge ordered costs against the appellants in the amount of $3,500. In
    our view, that order should stand, even though we have varied the terms of the
    motion judges order. The motion judge proceeded on the basis of the
    appellants concession as to the absence of any apparent merit to the appeal.
    In light of the position taken by the appellants before the motion judge, the
    appellants should remain obliged to pay the costs of the motion, even though we
    have varied the result.

[12]

As
    success is divided before this court, we order no costs with respect to the
    proceedings before us.

[13]

Given
    the result of the appellants motion, the respondents motion to dismiss the
    appeal for non-compliance with the order of the motion judge is dismissed as
    moot.

Doherty J.A.

S.E. Pepall J.A.

G.T. Trotter J.A.