COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Bidawi, 2018 ONCA 698

DATE: 20180827

DOCKET: C65130

Lauwers, Miller and Fairburn JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Appellant

and

Fawzi Bidawi

Respondent

Andrew Hotke, for the appellant

Kathryn Wells, for the respondent

Heard: June 8, 2018

On appeal from the order of Justice Todd Ducharme of the
    Superior Court of Justice, dated August 4, 2017, with reasons reported at 2017
    ONSC 4732, allowing the appeal from the conviction entered on April 21, 2015 by
    Justice Leslie C. Pringle of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Fairburn J.A.:

Overview

[1]

The respondent was tried in a summary conviction proceeding for firearm
    offences arising out of two separate transactions. The Crown asked the trial
    judge to amend the information to conform to the evidence elicited at trial. The
    respondent objected to the amendments, arguing that they would have the effect
    of substituting new charges, which would in turn give rise to the institution
    of new proceedings. He maintained that the six-month limitation period for instituting
    summary conviction proceedings had passed and, therefore, the amendments were
    statute barred. The trial judge rejected that argument, made the requested
    amendments and ultimately entered convictions on the amended counts.

[2]

The summary conviction appeal judge found that the trial judge erred by
    amending the counts. Section 786(2) of the
Criminal Code
governs summary
    conviction proceedings and reads: [n]o proceedings shall be instituted more
    than six months after the time when the subject-matter of the proceedings
    arose, unless the prosecutor and the defendant so agree. The summary
    conviction appeal judge reasoned that the amendments had the effect of instituting
    new proceedings and were, therefore, statute barred by virtue of s. 786(2). He
    set aside the convictions and entered acquittals.

[3]

The Crown now seeks leave to appeal to this court and, if leave is
    granted, appeals from the summary conviction appeal decision.

[4]

The resolution of this case turns on the answer to the following
    question: does the limitation period in s. 786(2) of the
Criminal Code
restrict the types of amendments that can be made to informations in summary
    conviction proceedings? I would grant leave to appeal, answer that question in
    the negative, and allow the Crowns appeal.

Background

(1)

Facts Giving Rise
    to the Charges Against the Respondent

[5]

The respondent was the owner and operator of a private security company.
    He possessed licences to carry on that business and to carry non-restricted and
    restricted firearms.

[6]

The police received information that caused them to place the respondent
    under surveillance. On June 21, 2012, officers watched as the respondent left
    his home with a shotgun in hand, entered his SUV, and mounted the shotgun in
    the front seat area of the vehicle. The respondent then drove to a bank, parked
    the vehicle, and entered the bank. He left the shotgun unattended in the
    vehicle. It was visible to people walking by. The respondent later returned to
    the vehicle, drove to his workplace, parked the vehicle, and entered the
    building. This time he left the still visible shotgun unattended in the vehicle
    for at least an hour.

[7]

Six days later, while executing a search warrant at the respondents
    home, the police found what they believed to be the same shotgun that the
    respondent had transported in his vehicle on June 21. The firearm was exposed, leaning
    against a bedroom wall. The gun had shells attached to it. Twenty-five rounds
    of ammunition were also lying on top of a dresser that was close to the gun.

[8]

These events gave rise to several charges against the respondent. A
    four-count information was sworn about a week following the search of the
    respondents home. The first two counts covered the June 21, 2012 incident (the
    SUV incident). The other two counts covered the June 27, 2012 discovery of
    the gun with accessible ammunition nearby (the bedroom discovery).

[9]

For reasons that are immaterial to the resolution of this appeal, the
    Crown eventually withdrew counts one and four on the information, leaving one
    count per incident before the court. In their original form, those remaining counts
    read:

Count Two: Fawzi Bidawi on or about the 21st day of June in
    the year 2012 in the City of Toronto  did without lawful excuse
store a firearm
, to wit a shotgun in a careless manner
    contrary to the Criminal Code

Count Three: Fawzi Bidawi on or about the 27th day of June in
    the year 2012 in the City of Toronto  did, without lawful excuse
store ammunition
in a careless manner contrary to the
    Criminal Code  [Emphasis added.]

[10]

Section
    86 of the
Criminal Code
governs the storage and transportation of,
    among other things, firearms and ammunition. That provision creates a hybrid
    offence, allowing the Crown to elect to proceed either summarily or by
    indictment. In this case, the trial Crown elected to proceed summarily.

(2)

The Need for
    Amendments and the Trial Judges Decision

[11]

Despite
    the manner in which the counts were framed, from the beginning to the end of
    the trial, the trial Crown took the position that the prosecution was based
    upon proving offences under s. 86(2) of the
Criminal Code
. I refer to
    the manner in which the counts were framed because it seems clear that the
    counts were also rooted in conduct that is prohibited under s. 86(1) of the
Criminal
    Code
.

[12]

Among
    other things, s. 86(1) makes it an offence to store a firearm and/or ammunition
    in a careless manner without lawful excuse. In their original form, counts two
    and three were worded in a way that suggested the careless storage of a firearm
    (the SUV incident) and careless storage of ammunition (the bedroom discovery). The
    evidence arguably supported those offences having been committed. Had the
    matter proceeded on that basis, there would have been no need for amendments to
    the information. Accordingly, nothing in these reasons should be understood to
    mean that the original framing of the counts, and the evidence elicited at
    trial, could not have supported a prosecution under s. 86(1) of the
Criminal
    Code.

[13]

The
    fact remains, though, that the matter was prosecuted with a unilateral focus on
    s. 86(2). The Crown approach led the trial judge and, in turn, the summary conviction
    appeal judge to focus exclusively on that provision. The appeal has also been
    argued on that basis, and so it is upon that basis that we will decide the
    case.

[14]

Because
    the trial Crown focused on culpability under s. 86(2), amendments to the counts
    were required. Section 86(2) makes it an offence to contravene a regulation
    made under the authority of s. 117(h) of the
Firearms Act
, S.C. 1995,
    c. 39, respecting, among other things, the storage and transportation of
firearms
(not ammunition).

[15]

Sections
    5 and 10 of the
Storage, Display, Transportation and Handling of Firearms
    by Individuals Regulations
, SOR/98-209 (the Regulations), are made under
    the authority of s. 117(h). Section 5 governs the storage of non-restricted
    firearms and s. 10(2)(b) governs the transportation of non-restricted
    firearms in vehicles. There is no dispute that the shotgun was a
    non-restricted firearm. The trial Crown maintained that s. 5 of the Regulations
    corresponded to the bedroom discovery (count three) and s. 10(2)(b) corresponded
    to the SUV incident (count two).

[16]

Pursuant
    to s. 5, a non-restricted firearm must be stored in a way that is not readily
    accessible to ammunition, unless that ammunition is stored in a specified manner.
    The exposed shotgun found in the bedroom, being in close proximity to exposed ammunition,
    was stored in a manner that contravened s. 5 of the Regulations, making it an
    offence under s. 86(2) of the
Criminal Code
. The difficulty was that count
    three, intended to cover the bedroom discovery, referred to the storage of
    ammunition. Having regard to the fact that s. 86(2) of the
Criminal Code
did
    not make it an offence to store ammunition, and s. 5 regulated the storage of a
    firearm (in close proximity to ammunition), the Crown asked that the count be
    amended to replace the word ammunition with firearm.

[17]

Pursuant
    to s. s. 10(2)(b) of the Regulations, where a non-restricted firearm is left in
    an unattended vehicle that is not equipped with a trunk or similar
    compartment, the firearm must not be visible from the outside of that vehicle. Leaving
    the visible and unattended shotgun between the front seats of the SUV contravened
    s. 10(2)(b) of the Regulations, making it an offence under s. 86(2) of the
Criminal
    Code
. Having regard to the fact that s. 10(2)(b) actually regulated the
    transport of firearms in a specified manner, the Crown asked that the count
    be amended to replace the word store with the word transport.

[18]

The
    trial judge concluded that, although the amendments created new offences, they
    did not have the effect of instituting new proceedings because the original
    information remains valid, albeit with a different offence reflected on its
    face. She also rejected the respondents position that he would be prejudiced
    if the amendments were to be made. To compensate for any potential prejudice,
    the trial judge permitted the respondent to recall two witnesses.

[19]

The
    respondent did not continue to advance his prejudice claim on summary
    conviction appeal or in this court, focusing instead on his claim that the
    amendments were statute barred.

(3)

The Summary
    Conviction Appeal

[20]

Placing
    heavy reliance upon
R. v. Joy Oil Co. Inc.
(1959), 123 C.C.C. 370
    (Ont. C.A.), a judgment which I will have more to say about later, the summary
    conviction appeal judge reasoned that, in summary conviction proceedings, amendments
    involving the substitution of new charges necessarily give rise to the
    institution of new proceedings. Accordingly, having regard to the timing of the
    amendments in this case, the summary conviction appeal judge concluded that
    they were statute barred by the limitation period contained in s. 786(2) of
    the
Criminal Code
.

[21]

The
    summary conviction appeal judge allowed the appeal and denied the Crowns
    request to order a new trial. He entered acquittals on the basis that, without
    an amendment to the information, the evidence at trial could not support
    convictions on the offences charged.

[22]

I
    now turn to my analysis of the threshold question  whether leave to appeal
    should be granted in this case.

Analysis

(1)

Leave to Appeal

[23]

The
    Crown submits that the robust test for a second level of appeal has been met
    because the case raises an important issue of general application to the
    administration of criminal justice. The respondent quite fairly agrees. For the
    reasons that follow, I conclude that this is an appropriate case in which to
    grant leave to appeal.

[24]

First,
    the issue that this court is asked to decide is a pure question of law. Indeed,
    s. 601(6) of the
Criminal Code
makes it so: [t]he question whether an
    order to amend an indictment or a count thereof should be granted or refused is
    a question of law.

[25]

Second,
    this court has not yet addressed the core issue raised on appeal. Although
    there is a well-established body of jurisprudence pertaining to when, how and
    in what circumstances amendments to charging documents can be made, this court
    has not squarely addressed the impact, if any, of the limitation period for
    instituting summary conviction proceedings on those otherwise broad powers of
    amendment.

[26]

Third,
    it is common for summary conviction trials to commence after the six-month
    limitation period has expired. It is also common for amendments to be made to
    informations and counts within informations. Consequently, the question raised
    on this appeal will undoubtedly arise again.

[27]

Finally,
    the central issue raised in this matter could have ramifications for the general
    administration of criminal justice. By way of example, if the six-month
    limitation period restricts the type of amendments that can be made: (a)
    acquittals could result from technicalities, without any regard to the merits
    of a case; and (b) the Crown will be required to proceed by indictment in cases
    where some types of amendments to informations are required outside of the
    six-month limitation period. Proceeding by indictment to prosecute cases that are
    otherwise deserving of a summary conviction proceeding approach is an
    inefficient prospect, one that would place an additional burden on an already
    overly taxed criminal justice system.

[28]

Accordingly,
    I would grant leave to appeal.

(2)

The Power to Amend After
    the Expiry of the s. 786(2) Limitation Period

[29]

Section
    786(2) must be read in its proper context. That context includes s. 601 of the
Criminal
    Code
, which provides the statutory basis for the power to amend.
    Accordingly, before explaining why s. 786(2) does not bar amendments that
    substitute one offence for another in summary conviction proceedings, I will review
    s. 601 and how it has been judicially interpreted.

(a)

The Power to Amend Under s. 601 of the
Criminal Code

[30]

Section
    601 of the
Criminal Code
contains the statutory power to amend an
    information or indictment. While s. 601 specifically refers to amending
    indictments, s. 2 of the
Criminal Code
defines an indictment as
    including an information or a count therein. Further, s. 601(10) says that
    where the term court is used within the provision, it is to be understood as
    including a judge acting in summary conviction proceedings. Consequently, the
    s. 601 power to amend an indictment applies with equal force to informations in
    summary conviction proceedings. As the focus of this appeal is on amendments to
    an information, I will use that terminology.

[31]

Section
    601(2) contains the power at issue in this appeal, providing a trial judge with
    the jurisdiction to amend a count on an information to conform to the evidence
    given at trial.

[32]

Section
    601(4) lists the factors that must be taken into account when considering
    whether to make an amendment, including: (a) the evidence taken; (b) the
    circumstances of the case; (c) whether the accused has been misled or
    prejudiced in his defence by any variance, error or omission; and (d) whether
    the amendment can be made without creating an injustice. Conspicuously absent
    from that list, and from s. 601 in general, is any reference to the statutory
    limitation period within s. 786(2) or, for that matter, any limitation period.

[33]

The
    power to amend an information or count within an information is a broad one:
R.
    v. Irwin
(1998)
,
107 O.A.C. 102, at para. 9;
R. v. S.(A.)
(1998), 113 O.A.C. 340, at para. 4. Provided there is no irreparable prejudice
    to the accused, and the fairness of the trial will not be adversely impacted, the
    trial judge may exercise her or his power in favour of making an amendment:
R.
    v. Morozuk,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 31, at para. 22.

[34]

As
    noted by Doherty J.A. in
Irwin,
at para. 26, provided that prejudice
    to the accused remains the litmus test against which to assess any potential
    amendment to an information, the wide power to amend includes the ability to
    substitute one charge for another. The essential inquiry should be into the
    impact of any potential amendment on the accused, not on how the amendment will
    impact the charge. Doherty J.A. summed up this point in the following question:
    If no prejudice will result from the change, why should it matter how the
    change to the charge is described? See:
Irwin,
at para. 26.

[35]

Although
Irwin
was decided in the context of a case involving an appeal courts
    power to amend under s. 683(1)(g) of the
Criminal Code
, the parties
    agree that the general principles articulated in that judgment have equal
    application to the trial setting. Where the parties part company is on the
    question of whether the
Irwin
principles apply in the context of this
    case. Like the trial judge, the Crown says
Irwin
governs. Like the
    summary conviction appeal judge, the respondent says that in a summary
    conviction proceeding, before looking to the litmus test of prejudice, the
    court must ask whether the amendment is statute barred by virtue of s. 786(2).

[36]

I
    will now explain why I conclude that s. 786(2) does not bar amendments that
    substitute one offence for another in summary conviction proceedings. In
    particular, I will focus on: (i) why
Joy Oil
, which was key to the
    summary conviction appeal judges analysis,

is not binding on this
    issue; (ii) why amendments do not institute proceedings; and (iii) why the important
    rationales that underpin the broad powers of amendment support my
    interpretation of s. 786(2).

(b)

The Power to Amend in Summary Conviction Proceedings

(i)

Joy Oil
does not support the respondents position

[37]

The
    summary conviction appeal judge leaned almost exclusively on
Joy Oil
in
    support of the view that amendments that substitute new offences result in the
    institution of new proceedings, thereby triggering the application of s. 786(2).
    Accordingly, I will commence by addressing
Joy Oil
and why I do not
    agree that it assists in resolving the issue on appeal.

[38]

Joy
    Oil was a service station in Toronto that was charged on a one count
    information under s. 45 of
The Weights and Measures Act
, S.C. 1951, c.
    36. Section 45 made it an offence for a trader (defined as a person engaged
    in trade) to use in trade a measuring machine that is false. The single count
    information alleged that Joy Oil used gasoline pumps in trade that produced
    false measures.

[39]

The
    charge was originally dismissed on the basis that the information was deficient
    because it did not refer to Joy Oils status as a trader. Being 1958 at the
    time of the first level of appeal, the Crown appealed to the then County Court for
    a trial
de novo.
At the outset of the proceedings, the County Court judge
    amended the count in two ways, one of which is relevant for these purposes. Just
    after reference to Joy Oil, the words being a trader were inserted into the
    count. Following the trial
de novo,
the dismissal of the charge was
    vacated and a conviction substituted.

[40]

On
    appeal to the Court of Appeal, Joy Oil raised three arguments for why the County
    Court judge had erred in amending the count to include the words, being a
    trader: (a) the County Court judge was without jurisdiction to amend the count
    before he had heard evidence; (b) the count omitted a vital and essential
    ingredient of the offence, which made the count defective in substance, a
    nullity and incapable of amendment; and (c) in the alternative, the effect of
    the amendment was to substitute a new charge, effectively instituting a new
    proceeding after the six-month limitation period.

[41]

Although
    it is Joy Oils third ground of appeal that pertains to the issue in this case,
    the judgment did not turn on that ground. Schroeder J.A. concluded that the
    original wording of the count did not omit to state an essential ingredient of
    the offence. To the contrary, the count had been properly drafted and the
    amendment constituted mere surplusage. Consequently, it became unnecessary to
    consider Joy Oils third ground of appeal. Indeed, as Schroeder J.A. recognized,
    [h]aving regard to the decision which I have reached on the second ground of
    appeal, it becomes unnecessary to deal with the third ground. Even so, he went
    on in one short paragraph to comment on the limitation period issue.

[42]

It
    is the following
obiter
comment from
Joy Oil,
at p. 375, that
    forms the backbone of the summary conviction appeal decision:

There are numerous authorities in which it has been held that
if the effect of an amendment would be to substitute an
    entirely new charge, it cannot be permitted since this would be in effect to
    permit the institution of a prosecution after the time limited by statute had
    expired
. If, however, an amendment has the effect merely of supplying an
    allegation necessary to a complete statement of the offence, the statutory
    period of limitation would not act as a bar to the prosecution:
Rex v. Ayer
(1908), 14 Can. C.C. 210 at p. 214, 17 O.L.R. 509 at p. 513, considered and
    applied in
Rex v. Ross,
94 Can. C.C. 150 [,] [1949] O.W.N. 442. [Emphasis
    added.]

[43]

The
    respondent contends that the summary conviction appeal court was right to
    consider
Joy Oil
as binding authority. The respondent says that the amendments
    made by the trial judge in this case were inconsistent with that authority and that
    the trial judge essentially allowed the Crown to do indirectly what it was not
    permitted to do directly. I disagree.

[44]

I
    start by noting that it is understandable why the summary conviction appeal
    judge applied
Joy Oil
to the circumstances of this case. At first
    blush, the judgment appears to apply. Despite its seeming application to the
    circumstances of this case, though, for the following reasons I find that it

is neither conclusive nor persuasive on the issue to be determined.

[45]

First,
    as set out above, the judgment actually turned on a finding that the amendment
    was unnecessary because it added nothing to the charge. In the result, as
    acknowledged by Schroeder J.A., the comment about the intersection between
    amendments and limitation periods was made in
obiter.

[46]

Second,
    the comments in
Joy Oil
were made against a factual backdrop that did
    not involve anything even close to the substitution of a new charge. Without a
    factual context against which to measure the expression entirely new charge,
    it is difficult to know exactly what was being contemplated when Schroeder J.A.
    penned the critical
obiter
sentence relied upon.

[47]

Finally,
    and most importantly,
Joy Oil
was decided almost 60 years ago, long
    before the modern approach to amending informations and indictments took root.

[48]

Joy
    Oil
and the judgments it cites in the passage set out above, one of which
    is over a hundred years old, were written at a time when decisions to amend
    were much more likely to turn on technicalities. Since that time, there has
    been a significant evolution of the law regarding the predominant factors upon
    which decisions to amend rest. As noted in
R. v. Côté
, some 20 years
    following
Joy Oil
, a golden rule governing informations and
    indictments had emerged, one where the extreme technicality of the old
    procedure had given way to a focus on prejudice: [1978] 1 S.C.R. 8, at p. 13. The
    previous focus on technicalities gave way to a practical exploration of whether
    the accused had been reasonably informed of the transaction alleged against
    him:
Côté
, at p. 13.

[49]

That
    same year, in
R. v. Sault Ste-Marie
, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, Dickson J.
    (as he then was) also addressed the historical jurisprudence, when the
    slightest defect made an indictment a nullity. He referred to the fact that [t]hat
    age ha[d] passed: at p. 1307. Although addressing the matter in the context of
    alleged duplicity, his comments about the move away from the punctilio of an
    earlier age and toward an emphasis on substance and not petty formalities
    are equally applicable to the desirability of a broad amending power: at p.
    1307. See also:
R. v. Bengert (No. 5)
(1980), 53 C.C.C. (2d) 481 (B.C.C.A.),
    at pp. 505-506, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1980] S.C.C.A. No. 1.

[50]

A
    broad amending power  one that avoids technicalities and, instead, focuses
    upon prejudice  is even further justified in the age of full disclosure. While
    there was a day when the information was the central document providing the
    accused with notice of what the state alleged, that is no longer the case.
    Today, the accused also receives full disclosure of the Crowns case, a valuable
    source of material from which the accused can obtain information about what is
    alleged.

[51]

By
    referring to the evolution of the law of criminal procedure away from
    formalities and toward substance, I should not be taken as suggesting that a
    limitation period under s. 786(2) is a mere petty formality. Plainly, barring
    the consent of the parties to proceed summarily, where the statutory criteria
    within s. 786(2) are operative, s. 786(2) governs. I simply wish to underscore
    that
Joy Oil
was decided during an earlier stage of the law
    surrounding amendments. There is a risk in relying upon a 60-year-old passing
obiter
comment, made at a time when technicalities sometimes trumped
    substance, to inform the contemporary approach to amendments.

[52]

I
    conclude that
Joy Oil
is not of assistance in resolving the central
    issue in this case.

(ii)

To
    Institute Proceedings Requires the Laying of an Information

[53]

I
    now turn to s. 786(2), the provision at the heart of this appeal. Section
    786(2) lies within Part XXVII of the
Criminal Code,
the part governing
    summary conviction proceedings. For ease of reference, I repeat s. 786(2) since
    the precise wording is important:

No proceedings shall be instituted
more than six months after the time when the subject-matter of the proceedings
    arose, unless the prosecutor and the defendant so agree. [Emphasis added.]

[54]

As
    before, s. 86(2) creates a hybrid offence. In this case, the information was
    sworn within days of the offences being committed. Accordingly, it was open to
    the Crown to elect to proceed by indictment or summary conviction. The Crown chose
    to proceed summarily. In light of that election, the matter had to be treated
    in all respects as a summary conviction offence:
R. v. Dudley,
2009
    SCC 58, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 570, at para. 2.

[55]

Given
    that it was a summary conviction proceeding from the moment that the Crown
    elected to proceed summarily, I agree with the respondent that the amendments
    were requested within the context of a summary conviction proceeding. For the
    purposes of this appeal, I also accept the parties characterization of the
    amendments as having substituted new offences. That does not mean, though, that
    the amendments had the effect of instituting new summary conviction proceedings.
    Indeed, I conclude that the amendments did not institute any proceedings. They
    were amendments.

[56]

It
    is important to remain focused on what s. 786(2) prohibits, namely the
institution
    of summary conviction proceedings
more than six months after the
    subject-matter of the proceedings arose. Accordingly, the nub of the question
    on appeal is what is meant by the term institute under s. 786(2)? Does an
    amendment that substitutes one offence for another amount to instituting
    proceedings?

[57]

Section
    788(1) provides a clear answer to that question: no. Section 788(1) says that a
    summary conviction proceeding is commenced by laying an information in Form 2.
    Both the majority and concurring judgments in
Dudley
interpreted s.
    788(1) as meaning that summary conviction proceedings are instituted by the
    laying of the information.  In the majority judgment, Fish J. pointed out, at para.
    51, that hybrid offences prosecuted summarily are
instituted
by the laying of an information (emphasis added). In her concurring judgment,
    at para. 69, Charron J. concluded that:

Proceedings relating to summary conviction offences are
instituted
pursuant to s. 788(1) of the
Criminal
    Code
; proceedings relating to indictable offences are
instituted
pursuant to s. 504 or 505 of the
Criminal
    Code.
In either case,
instituting
the
    procedure requires laying an information in Form 2.

[Emphasis added]
.

[58]

Section 788(1) is clear. In accordance with that provision, and how it was
    interpreted in
Dudley,
I conclude that summary conviction proceedings
    are
instituted
at the time that the information is laid. Although prosecutions
    involving hybrid offences will only take on their character as summary
    conviction proceedings after the Crown has elected to proceed summarily (
Dudley,
at para. 2), the proceeding is instituted with the laying of the actual information.

[59]

I
    reject the respondents position that allowing for the substitution of a new
    offence by way of amendment, after the limitation period for a summary
    conviction proceeding has expired, allows the Crown to do indirectly what it
    cannot do directly. An amendment to an information or count within an information
    cannot constitute the institution of proceedings because it does not constitute
    the laying of an information within Form 2. That is true, regardless of the
    nature of the amendment, even if it substitutes one offence for another. An
    amendment simply amends the previously laid information.

[60]

To
    conclude otherwise would conflict with the plain meaning of s. 788(1), the
    interpretation of that provision in
Dudley,
and the important reasons underpinning
    the broad power of amendment. I will now turn my attention to this latter
    point.

(iii)

The Rationales Supporting a Broad Power to Amend

[61]

The
    power to amend is widely understood to serve two important goals: (1) the
    determination of criminal cases on their merits; and (2) ensuring that a
    multiplicity of proceedings do not arise from single transactions:
Irwin
,
    at paras. 9-11. These rationales underscore the sound proposition that a fair criminal
    justice system prioritizes substance over form. The goals that underpin the power
    to amend would be undermined by an interpretation of s. 786(2) that precluded
    amendments in summary conviction matters.

[62]

As
    the Crown correctly points out, the result of the summary conviction appeal
    decision would be to enter acquittals on pure summary conviction offences when an
    amendment in the nature of substituting a charge is required after the six-month
    limitation period. Even if the Crown wanted to, in a pure summary conviction
    matter, it could not re-lay an information by virtue of having passed the
    limitation period in s. 786(2).

[63]

Accordingly,
    in pure summary conviction matters, criminal cases might be decided in a manner
    detached from an assessment of the merits of the case. Acquittals in these
    circumstances, arising from a mere technicality in the drafting of a count,
    would be unjust.

[64]

As
    for hybrid offences, they operate differently.

[65]

Even
    if amendments could institute new proceedings  a proposition that I do not
    accept  making those amendments in the context of hybrid offences (after the six-month
    limitation period), would do nothing more than render a nullity the Crowns
    original election to proceed summarily; they would not invalidate the
    information. Consistent with the reasons in
Dudley,
a case dealing
    with the need for a re-election, multiple options would be available. Barring
    the accuseds consent to continue the matter as a summary conviction
    proceeding, even if the amendments instituted proceedings, I see no reason
    why: a mistrial could not be declared and the case start over with the Crown
    electing to proceed by indictment; or why the Crown could not withdraw the
    information, relay a different Form 2 and elect to proceed by indictment:
Dudley,
at para. 43. Barring any potential abuse of process argument, there is no
    reason that the Crown could not proceed in that manner:
Dudley,
at
    paras. 31, 43-44.

[66]

If
    s. 786(2) were to operate as the respondent suggests, proceedings might have to
    be commenced again, the second time by indictment, resulting in the need to
    recall witnesses and repeat evidence.  Proceeding in that way would conflict
    with the desire to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings arising from a single
    transaction.

[67]

The
    rationales upon which the wide-ranging power to amend rest are best served by
    interpreting ss. 786(2) and 788(1) in accordance with their plain meaning.

(3)

Propriety of the
    Amendments in this Case

[68]

As
    before, the respondent is not alleging that he was prejudiced by the
    amendments, only that they were statute barred.

[69]

The
    respondent knew what the Crown alleged and the case he was required to meet. The
    proceedings were instituted by the laying of the information on July 3, 2012,
    less than two weeks after the SUV incident and about a week following the
    bedroom discovery.

[70]

At a minimum, the disclosure made the offence alleged in
    count two abundantly clear. When considering any fairness issues that may arise
    from an amendment, the court may look to the disclosure provided:
R. v.
    Robinson
(2001), 143  O.A.C. 80, at paras. 23, 28;
R. v. Munyaneza,
2014
    Q.C.C.A. 906, 309 C.R.R. (2d) 71, at para. 86. Among other things, an
    information to obtain a search warrant for the respondents home clearly set
    out the allegations involved in the SUV incident, all of which conformed with
    an offence under s. 10(2)(b) of the Regulations. The affiant clearly set out
    the facts involving the visibility of the shotgun in the SUV when the
    respondent left the vehicle unattended on two occasions.

[71]

In
    addition, on the first day of trial, the Crown explained its theory on what
    constituted the criminal conduct relating to the SUV incident. The Crown
    explained that the police had the respondent under surveillance because they
    were concerned about how he had been transporting a shotgun. He explained
    that the alleged offence involved what you have to do when youre transporting
    firearms in a vehicle or, more importantly, if you leave them in an unattended
    vehicle, namely that you cant leave them visible.

[72]

This
    theme continued throughout the trial. The affiant for the search warrant was
    clear in his evidence that the SUV incident involved a transporting offence.

[73]

As
    for the bedroom discovery, the trial Crown was also clear on the first day of
    trial that he would be asking for an amendment to count three to conform to the
    evidence. He specifically noted that the word ammunition should have read
    firearm. The defence did not object at that time. Indeed, so unobjectionable
    was the Crowns comment that when the respondent brought an application for a
    directed verdict, he was mistakenly under the impression that the amendment to
    count three had actually been made on the first day of trial.

[74]

The
    respondent had fair notice of the charges he faced. It was a simple
    prosecution, the scope of which was clear from the outset. The offences were
    also clear. This is precisely the kind of case that amendments are made for.
    They were properly made.

Conclusion

[75]

I
    would grant leave to appeal, grant the appeal, set aside the acquittals and reinstate
    the convictions.

Released: MF Aug 27 2018

Fairburn
    J.A.
I agree. P. Lauwers J.A.
I agree. B.W. Miller J.A.


COUR DAPPEL DE LONTARIO

RÉFÉRENCE: R. c. Burroughs, 2018 ONCA 704

DATE: 20180829

DOSSIER: C63066

La juge en chef adjointe Hoy et les
juges van Rensburg et Pardu

ENTRE

Sa Majesté la Reine

Intimée

et

Corey Burroughs

Appelant

Christian
Deslauriers, pour lappelant

Philippe
G. Cowle, pour lintimée

Date
de laudience : le 17 juillet 2018

En appel de la condamnation prononcée le
3 octobre 2016 et de la peine imposée le 7 décembre 2016 par le juge Michel Z.
Charbonneau de la Cour supérieure de justice.

La juge Pardu :

[1]

Lappelant interjette appel de sa condamnation
pour vol qualifié et autres infractions. Il interjette également appel de sa peine
de 8 ans demprisonnement.

Aperçu

[2]

Le matin du 31 octobre 2012, le jour de
lHalloween, deux personnes font irruption dans le Restauparc situé dans le
village de Casselman. Elles sont masquées, déguisées, et armées dun pistolet.
Lun des voleurs ordonne à lune des employées douvrir le coffre-fort. Il
place ensuite largent, environ 10 000$, dans un sac. Les voleurs attachent les
poignets des employées et les séquestrent. Après avoir fouillé les lieux, les
voleurs prennent la fuite avec largent et un ordinateur. Des caméras vidéo ont
capté les allées et venues des malfaiteurs ainsi que le mouvement de véhicules
à lextérieur du Restauparc.

[3]

La police apprend des employées que lun des
voleurs appelait lautre « Corey ». Ce dernier na jamais parlé, mais
répondait par sa conduite au nom de « Corey ». La police apprend
également quun certain Corey Burroughs avait récemment été congédié du
Restauparc au printemps 2012. Lindividu que lon appelait « Corey »
semblait très bien connaître les lieux, celui-ci étant parvenu à déverrouiller une
serrure sans activer lalarme. La police identifie Corey Burroughs comme le
suspect principal et une alerte générale est diffusée sur le réseau de la
police provinciale.

[4]

Vers 7h30, le 1er novembre 2012, Corey Burroughs
est arrêté et emmené au poste de police. Aux environs de 8h, la police tente de
rejoindre lavocat choisi par M. Burroughs. Celui-ci ne répond pas et la
police laisse un message.

[5]

Vers 10h, un second appel est fait au bureau de lavocat
choisi par M. Burroughs. On répond que cet avocat nest pas disponible,
mais quun autre avocat peut sentretenir avec M. Burroughs. Lentretien
téléphonique débute vers 10h30 et se termine à 10h51. Linterrogatoire de
M. Burroughs débute à 12h33 et se poursuit jusquà 16h34.

[6]

Malgré lexigence de larticle 503 du
Code criminel
de faire comparaître un accusé devant un juge de paix dans un délai de 24
heures après son arrestation, M. Burroughs nest emmené devant un juge de
paix quà 13h le 2 novembre 2012, soit plus de 29 heures après son arrestation
le matin du 1er novembre 2012.

Décision de première instance

[7]

Le juge du procès a conclu que la police
avait illégalement et arbitrairement détenu M. Burroughs en prenant la décision
de ne pas lamener devant un juge de paix comme lexige larticle 503 du
Code
criminel
. Les policiers savaient que sils ne faisaient pas comparaître M.
Burroughs à 13h le jour de larrestation, il ne serait pas possible de le faire
comparaître dans le maximum de 24 heures prévu par larticle 503.
M. Burroughs avait terminé sa conversation avec son avocat à 10h51. Malgré
cela, la police a attendu jusquà 12h33 pour linterroger afin que
linterrogatoire soit plus efficace. La police a donc délibérément choisi de ne
pas respecter larticle 503 du
Code criminel.

[8]

Le juge du procès a conclu quil fallait
appliquer le test de larrêt
R. c. Babos
, 2014 CSC 16, [2014] 1 R.C.S.
309, afin de déterminer si un arrêt des procédures était justifié. Selon le
juge du procès, la conduite de la police, en choisissant de faire fi de la
protection offerte par larticle 503, constituait une atteinte à lintégrité du
système judiciaire. À son avis, aucune autre réparation nétait susceptible de
corriger latteinte au système de justice.

[9]

Au troisième volet de lanalyse requise par
R.
c. Babos
,
le juge du
procès a mis en balance la décision des policiers avec lintérêt de la société à
ce que les accusations soient jugées au fond. Dun côté, le juge du procès a
reconnu que les policiers avaient agi en contravention avec larticle 503 de
manière délibérée et que leur conduite était choquante. Dun autre côté,
laccusation était grave : séquestration, violence, usage darmes à feu.
Seule lidentification de laccusé était en jeu, et les motivations de la
police étaient légitimes. De plus, le juge était davis que la marge de
manuvre des policiers était limitée : soit M. Burroughs
comparaissait à 13h le jour de son arrestation, ou larticle 503 nétait pas
respecté. Cela atténuait limpact de la conduite des policiers sur la
conscience publique. Le système de comparution sétait grandement amélioré
depuis 2012, un juge de paix étant maintenant disponible entre 14h et 16h. Le
risque que cela se reproduise était atténué. Pour ces raisons, il était préférable
selon le juge du procès que la poursuite criminelle suive son cours.

[10]

Le juge du procès a donc choisi de ne pas
prononcer darrêt des procédures. M. Burroughs fut déclaré coupable de
tous les chefs daccusation. Après lapplication des principes de larrêt
R.
c. Kienapple
,

[1975] 1 S.C.R. 729, le juge imposa
une peine
de 8 ans demprisonnement.

Arguments en
appel

(1)

Lappelant

[11]

Lappelant est davis que le juge du procès a erré
dans son application du troisième volet de lanalyse requise par
R. c.
Babos
.

[12]

Il allègue que le juge a omis de considérer que
le système de comparution à LOrignal ne permet pas la comparution devant un
juge de paix avant 13h, entrainant la violation systématique des droits de tous
les détenus arrêtés avant 13h et ne comparaissant pas le jour même. La nouvelle
preuve démontre que lhoraire du palais de justice est toujours le même
aujourdhui.

[13]

Malgré ce problème systémique et la violation
des droits de M. Burroughs, le juge a mis en balance la conduite des
policiers avec les motivations légitimes quils avaient de localiser les armes
à feu ayant servi au crime. Selon lappelant, le juge a erré dans cet exercice
de mise en balance.

[14]

Toujours selon lappelant, le juge aurait erré
en atténuant la responsabilité des policiers en raison des contraintes du
système judiciaire, tout en leur reprochant davoir délibérément retardé la
comparution de M. Burroughs.

[15]

Lappelant fait valoir que le juge aurait dû
dénoncer le problème systémique à LOrignal en prononçant larrêt des
procédures. Le juge aurait erré en notant dans son jugement que la plus grande disponibilité
des juges de paix en après-midi réglait le problème. Encore à ce jour, aucun
juge de paix nest disponible le matin. La violation des droits de
M. Burroughs reste donc sans conséquence.

(2)

Lintimée

[16]

Lintimée fait valoir que le juge de première
instance na commis aucune erreur et que cette cour devrait respecter
léquilibre déterminé par le juge de première instance et rejeter lappel de la
déclaration de culpabilité.

Analyse

[17]

Dans larrêt
R. c. Babos
,
la Cour suprême a décrit lanalyse
requise à la suite dun abus de procédure qui ne compromet pas léquité du
procès dun accusé dans les circonstances o
ù
aucune réparation autre que larrêt des procédures nest
susceptible de corriger latteinte. La cour a expliqué, au para. 41, que le
tribunal doit se livrer à une analyse comportant nécessairement une mise en
balance. Lorsquil se livre à cet exercice :

Le tribunal doit prendre en compte des
éléments comme
la nature et la gravité de la
conduite reprochée  que celle‑ci soit un cas isolé ou la manifestation
dun problème systémique et persistant , la situation de laccusé, les
accusations auxquelles il doit répondre et lintérêt de la société à ce que les
accusations soient jugées au fond. [Note de bas de page omise.]

[18]

La Cour suprême a spécifié, au para. 44 de
R.
c. Babos
, quun arrêt des procédures ne sera justifié que si latteinte au
franc-jeu et à la décence est disproportionnée à lintérêt de la société
dassurer que les infractions criminelles soient efficacement poursuivies :
R. c. Conway
, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 1659, à la p. 1667. Les cas résiduels pouvant
justifier un arrêt des procédures seront donc « exceptionnels » et
« très rares ».

[19]

Quant à la norme de contrôle applicable aux réparations
accordées en vertu du para. 24(1) de la
Charte
,
la Cour suprême a expliqué, au para. 48
de
R. c. Babos
:

Une cour dappel nest justifiée dintervenir
que si le juge du procès sest fondé sur des considérations erronées en droit,
a commis une erreur de fait susceptible de contrôle, ou a rendu une décision « erronée
au point de créer une injustice ».
[
Citations
omises.
]

[20]

En lespèce, je ne suis pas convaincue que le
juge se soit fondé sur des considérations erronées en droit ou quil ait commis
une erreur de fait. Je ne crois pas non plus que la décision du juge était
erronée au point de créer une injustice. Les arguments de lappelant ne sattardent
quau poids accordé aux facteurs pertinents par le juge de première instance.

[21]

La mise en balance faite par le juge était
raisonnable. Après un examen de tous les facteurs pertinents, il a conclu que,
malgré la faute grave de la part de la police, lintégrité du système de
justice serait mieux servie par un procès complet sur le fond plutôt que par un
arrêt des procédures. Aucune raison ne justifie lintervention de cette cour
dans cette conclusion.

Lappel de la
peine de la part de laccusé et de la Couronne

[22]

Le juge de première instance a imposé une peine
de 8 ans demprisonnement. Les parties sont daccord que le juge a erré en
appliquant larrêt
R. c. Kienapple
et en imposant une peine minimale
de 4 ans pour le vol qualifié en utilisant une arme à feu, alors que la peine
minimale était en fait de 5 ans.

[23]

La peine imposée peut être résumée comme
suit :

Chefs
  daccusation en vertu du
Code criminel

Arrêt
  des procédures

Peine

1. Article 88, port darme en vue de
  commettre une infraction

Oui, en raison du chef daccusation 9

2. Alinéa 85(1)a), usage dune arme à feu
  à autorisation restreinte alors quil portait une arme en vue de commettre
  une infraction

Oui, en raison du chef daccusation 9

3. Article 87, braquer une arme à feu

Oui, en raison du chef daccusation 4

4. Alinéa 85(1)a), usage dune arme à feu
  à autorisation restreinte alors quil braquait une arme à feu

Non

1
  an

5. Paragraphe 86(1), usage dune arme à
  feu de manière négligente ou sans prendre suffisamment de précautions pour la
  sécurité dautrui

Oui, en raison du chef daccusation 6

6. Alinéa 85(1)a), usage dune arme à feu
  à autorisation restreinte alors quil utilisait une arme à feu de manière
  négligente ou sans prendre suffisamment de précautions pour la sécurité
  dautrui

Non

1
  an

7. Paragraphe 3512), avoir le visage
  masqué dans lintention de commettre une infraction

Oui, en raison du chef daccusation 8

8. Alinéa 85(1)a), usage dune arme à feu
  à autorisation restreinte alors quil avait le visage masqué dans lintention
  de commettre une infraction

Non

1
  an

9. Alinéa 344(1)a), vol qualifié en
  utilisant une arme à autorisation restreinte

Non

4
  ans

10. Paragraphe 343b), vol en utilisant de
  la violence

Oui, en raison du chef daccusation 9

11. Paragraphe 279(2), séquestration

Oui, en raison du chef daccusation 12

12. Alinéa 85(1)a), usage dune arme à
  feu à autorisation restreinte alors quil séquestrait

Non

1
  an

[24]

Laccusé demande que cette cour impose une peine
globale de 5 ans. Le procureur de la Couronne préconise une peine de 6 ans. Dans
ses motifs au sujet de la peine, le juge de première instance a mentionné quune
peine de 5 ans ou peut-être de 6 ans aurait été appropriée compte tenu de la
gravité de linfraction, labsence dun casier judiciaire et des antécédents de
laccusé. Toutefois, il était davis que cela nétait pas possible puisque
laccusé avait été reconnu coupable de multiples infractions pour lesquelles
une peine minimale demprisonnement est requise.

[25]

Je substituerais une peine de 5 ans
demprisonnement pour le chef daccusation 9, vol qualifié en utilisant une
arme à autorisation restreinte, conformément à la peine minimale prescrite par le
sous-alinéa 344(1)a)(i).

[26]

Je prononcerais un arrêt des procédures sur le chef
daccusation 5. Le juge de première instance na identifié aucun usage négligent
de larme de la part de laccusé. Larme na pas été utilisée par lappelant de
quelque façon lors du vol qualifié, hormis davoir été braquée sur la personne
spécifiée au chef daccusation 3. Laccusé peut donc seulement être déclaré
coupable des chefs daccusation 3 et 9.

[27]

Les infractions dusage dun masque, de
séquestration et de braquer une arme à feu protègent tous des intérêts
différents. Un arrêt des procédures naurait pas dû être prononcé sur ces chefs
daccusation. Par contre, lemploi de larme à feu décrit aux chefs 4, 6,
8, et 12, en violation de lalinéa 85(1)a), était compris sous le chef
daccusation 9, vol qualifié en utilisant une arme.

[28]

Cette cour a décrit lanalyse requise dans la
décision
R. v. Rocheleau
, 2013 ONCA 679, 311 O.A.C. 295, au para. 32 :

In the circumstances of this case,
the two offences  use of a firearm in committing robbery under s. 344 and use
of a firearm in committing forcible confinement under s. 85  do not
promote different societal interests, protect different victims or prohibit
different consequences. No distinction can be drawn in this case between the
use of a firearm in committing robbery and the use of a firearm in committing
forcible confinement.

[29]

Ainsi, lapplication des principes de
Kienapple
aurait dû mener à larrêt des procédures pour chacun des chefs en vertu de
lalinéa 85(1)a) (4, 6, 8, 12), en raison de la condamnation pour usage dune
arme à feu lors de la perpétration dun vol qualifié en vertu du sous-alinéa 344(1)a)(i).

[30]

Deuxièmement, les condamnations en vertu de lalinéa
85(1)a) nauraient pas dû mener à lannulation des infractions subsidiaires
au contraire, elles dépendaient de celles-ci. Comme la expliqué la Cour suprême
dans larrêt
R. c. Pringle
, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 1645, à la p. 1653, le but
de linfraction prévue à lalinéa 85(1)a) est
dajouter
une peine supplémentaire à la peine imposée pour linfraction subsidiaire en
raison de lemploi dune arme à feu.

[31]

Troisièmement, laccusé ne pouvait être condamné
pour lusage dune arme à feu alors quil commettait une autre infraction qui devait
nécessairement être commise en utilisant une arme à feu, par exemple,
linfraction de braquer une arme à feu. Comme le procureur de la Couronne la
noté dans son mémoire, « [d]ire autrement serait dimposer de façon
automatique la peine prévue par lalinéa 85(1)(a) sur toutes les infractions
qui doivent être accomplies à laide dune arme à feu. Rien ne laisse croire
que cétait lobjet du législateur. »

[32]

Il résulte de cette analyse que les
condamnations sont maintenues pour les chefs 3, 7, 9 et 11, et quun arrêt des
procédures est prononcé pour les chefs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8,10 et 12.

[33]

Selon les observations des parties, la peine
pour les chefs 3, 7 et 11 devrait être dun an demprisonnement. Jen conviens.
Reste à déterminer si cette peine devrait être purgée de façon consécutive ou
concurrente à la peine de 5 ans demprisonnement imposée pour le chef daccusation
9.

[34]

Les infractions commises par lappelant étaient
graves et inexplicables, comme la décrit le juge de première instance :

Le rapport
présentenciel de M. Burroughs indique une personne qui, jusquau 31 octobre
2012, tout indiquait que tout allait bien dans sa vie, il travaillait, il était
aux études au Collège Algonquin aussi. Il navait aucun antécédent judiciaire
daucune sorte. Comme son procureur la dit, il faut souvent se poser la
question : Quest-ce qui pousse un jeune de 19 ans à aller de lavant puis
faire un vol à main armée lorsquon a des antécédents comme ça? En dautres
mots, lorsquon vient dun foyer qui semble avoir des valeurs, quil a eu des
valeurs quon lui a inculquées, quil semble avoir toujours été responsable. Là
maintenant, avec tout ça, ce quon retrouve cest un individu qui, malgré quil
travaille depuis toujours et quil a maintenant, et depuis ces quatre années, le
travail est très apprécié par son employeur. Là maintenant il fait face à un
long terme de pénitencier.

[35]

Toutes les infractions faisaient partie du même
événement. Je suis toutefois davis que, compte tenu du « principe de
totalité » et du jeune âge de lappelant au moment du crime, la peine dun
an demprisonnement pour les chefs 3, 7 et 11 devrait être purgée de façon
concurrente. Les autres ordonnances accessoires prononcées par le juge de
première instance sont maintenues.

« G.
Pardu j.c.a. »

« Je
souscris Alexandra Hoy j.c.a.o. »

« Je
souscris K. van Rensburg j.c.a. »

Rendu : le 29 août 2018