Inside the Failed Yemen Peace Talks a Hard
Matthew Tueller
Despite the fact that the United States had paid for the cranes  one senior U.S. diplomat opposed their delivery. Matthew Tueller  the U.S. ambassador to Yemen  argued that it was pointless to deliver the equipment because it would only be destroyed  either by coalition bombs  the opposition Houthis  or a future military offensive by the United Arab Emirates.
 Tueller  was and remains a central figure in peace negotiations  which have not resulted in a peace deal or a lasting cessation of hostilities. As talks have faltered  a cholera epidemic is spiraling out of control  the nation’s infrastructure has been reduced to rubble  and some 50 000 children are expected to die of disease and starvation by the end of this year.
This portrait of  Tueller  and his role in the failed peace negotiations is based on interviews with six current and former senior State Department and national security officials who worked closely with  Tueller . All of them asked to remain anonymous in order to share diplomatically sensitive details.
Yemen’s President Abdu-Rabbu Mansour Hadi  right  talks with U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller  left  during a meeting in Aden on March 2  2015. Photo: Reuters
 Tueller  is a career foreign service officer who has held posts throughout the Middle East  serving in Egypt  Iraq  and Kuwait. A graduate of Brigham Young University and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and a father of five  he rose steadily through the State Department ranks  gaining a reputation as a well-respected and deeply knowledgeable diplomat. He became ambassador to Kuwait in 2011  and attracted little public attention  aside from a happenstance run in with Kim Kardashian.
Multiple sources in Washington briefed on the negotiations said Abdul Salam’s version was indeed consistent with  Tueller ’s position that the Houthis had to accept the agreement as is  or else the Yemeni people would face worsening humanitarian conditions  though the sources were not in the room for the conversation.
Whether  Tueller  made that specific threat or not   it ’s notable that the Houthi negotiator would make such a charge publicly. At the very least  Abdul Salam’s statement suggests a deep distrust between  Tueller  and a key party to the conflict.
By the spring of 2016 — more than a year into the war – both the Obama White House and State Department began to question why  Tueller  was pushing such a one-sided plan.
In May 2016  Jon Finer  Kerry’s chief of staff  sent an email to  Tueller  asking why he didn’t support the formation of a national unity government. A unity government would include members of the various factions  giving the Houthis a seat at the table in the form of ministerial positions or other roles.
The email was one of several exchanges with  Tueller  that were widely circulated around the State Department. Its contents  and those of other exchanges with  Tueller  on the topic  were described to The Intercept and confirmed by multiple former officials.
Finer’s concerns were seconded by Eric Pelofsky  senior director for Yemen on Obama’s National Security Council  who also wrote directly to  Tueller . Finer and Pelofsky  in their emails  urged  Tueller  to move past the framework provided by U.N. Resolution 2216 and offer something the Houthis might actually accept.
 Tueller  responded by saying that the Houthis were negotiating in bad faith. Saleh had already violated the internationally brokered agreement that put Hadi in power  he argued  so why wouldn’t they violate a future agreement that prescribed them a limited role in government?
As the negotiations stretched on  State Department officials in D.C. began to feel like they were in the dark about exactly what  Tueller  was doing. Kerry’s staff pushed to receive more frequent updates. When press reports emerged about the negotiations being deadlocked  Finer pressed  Tueller  again on why he wasn’t pushing negotiations toward the idea of a unity government.
But the secretary of state didn’t trust Tueller to carry out his instructions. Kerry thought he had to be involved in the talks to push the new approach  and he spent much of the remainder of 2016 participating in Yemen’s peace negotiations. Kerry even met personally with Houthi representatives  who were growing frustrated with  Tueller .  Tueller   meanwhile  argued that Kerry personally intervening in the talks was premature and would not get the outcome Kerry wanted.
In a statement to The Intercept  State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert described  Tueller  as a “devoted career diplomat” and said he has the “full confidence” in the new administration.
“The U.S. policy in Yemen remains unchanged: to work with our international partners to bring peace  prosperity  and security to Yemen ” said Nauert. “We have consistently supported the work of the U.N. Special Envoy and comprehensive peace negotiations under the auspices of the U.N.”
Despite the fact that the United States had paid for the cranes  one senior U.S. diplomat opposed their delivery. [TGT]argued that it was pointless to deliver the equipment because it would only be destroyed  either by coalition bombs  the opposition Houthis  or a future military offensive by the United Arab Emirates.
 [TGT]was and remains a central figure in peace negotiations  which have not resulted in a peace deal or a lasting cessation of hostilities. As talks have faltered  a cholera epidemic is spiraling out of control  the nation’s infrastructure has been reduced to rubble  and some 50 000 children are expected to die of disease and starvation by the end of this year.
This portrait of  Tueller  and his role in the failed peace negotiations is based on interviews with six current and former senior State Department and national security officials who worked closely with  Tueller . All of them asked to remain anonymous in order to share diplomatically sensitive details.
Yemen’s President Abdu-Rabbu Mansour Hadi  right  talks with [TGT]left  during a meeting in Aden on March 2  2015. Photo: Reuters
 [TGT]is a career foreign service officer who has held posts throughout the Middle East  serving in Egypt  Iraq  and Kuwait. A graduate of Brigham Young University and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and a father of five  he rose steadily through the State Department ranks  gaining a reputation as a well-respected and deeply knowledgeable diplomat. He became ambassador to Kuwait in 2011  and attracted little public attention  aside from a happenstance run in with Kim Kardashian.
Multiple sources in Washington briefed on the negotiations said Abdul Salam’s version was indeed consistent with  [TGT] ’s position that the Houthis had to accept the agreement as is  or else the Yemeni people would face worsening humanitarian conditions  though the sources were not in the room for the conversation.
Whether  [TGT]made that specific threat or not   [TGT] ’s notable that the Houthi negotiator would make such a charge publicly. At the very least  Abdul Salam’s statement suggests a deep distrust between  Tueller  and a key party to the conflict.
By the spring of 2016 — more than a year into the war – both the Obama White House and State Department began to question why  [TGT]was pushing such a one-sided plan.
In May 2016  Jon Finer  Kerry’s chief of staff  sent an email to  [TGT]  asking why [TGT] didn’t support the formation of a national unity government. A unity government would include members of the various factions  giving the Houthis a seat at the table in the form of ministerial positions or other roles.
The email was one of several exchanges with  Tueller  that were widely circulated around the State Department. Its contents  and those of other exchanges with  Tueller  on the topic  were described to The Intercept and confirmed by multiple former officials.
Finer’s concerns were seconded by Eric Pelofsky  senior director for Yemen on Obama’s National Security Council  who also wrote directly to [TGT] . Finer and Pelofsky  in their emails  urged  Tueller  to move past the framework provided by U.N. Resolution 2216 and offer something the Houthis might actually accept.
 [TGT]responded by saying that the Houthis were negotiating in bad faith. Saleh had already violated the internationally brokered agreement that put Hadi in power  he argued  so why wouldn’t they violate a future agreement that prescribed them a limited role in government?
As the negotiations stretched on  State Department officials in D.C. began to feel like they were in the dark about exactly what  [TGT]was doing. Kerry’s staff pushed to receive more frequent updates. When press reports emerged about the negotiations being deadlocked  Finer pressed  [TGT]again on why he wasn’t pushing negotiations toward the idea of a unity government.
But the secretary of state didn’t trust Tueller to carry out his instructions. Kerry thought he had to be involved in the talks to push the new approach  and he spent much of the remainder of 2016 participating in Yemen’s peace negotiations. Kerry even met personally with Houthi representatives  who were growing frustrated with [TGT] .  [TGT]   meanwhile  argued that Kerry personally intervening in the talks was premature and would not get the outcome Kerry wanted.
In a statement to The Intercept  State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert described  [TGT]as a “devoted career diplomat” and said he has the “full confidence” in the new administration.
“The U.S. policy in Yemen remains unchanged: to work with our international partners to bring peace  prosperity  and security to Yemen ” said Nauert. “We have consistently supported the work of the U.N. Special Envoy and comprehensive peace negotiations under the auspices of the U.N.”