Shinzo Abe won big on Sunday. This is what it means for Japanâs national security policy.
Shinzo Abe
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe  head of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party  leaves a news conference at the partyâs headquarters in Tokyo on Oct. 23. (Kiyoshi Ota/Bloomberg News)
On Sunday  Japanâs Liberal Democratic Party won a landslide victory  winning 284 of the 465 seats in the lower house of the Diet. Prime Minister Shinzo Abeâs junior coalition partner  Komeito  added 29 seats  giving the ruling coalition a two-thirds supermajority.
In addition to freeing the LDP from a mandatory ballot challenge before 2021  Abeâs election victory provides new support for  his  efforts to amend Japanâs pacifist constitution.
 Abe  went into the election arguing that  his  track record on the economy and national security should be the decisive factor  and voters appear to have agreed. Japan faces new security challenges from two of its neighbors. North Korean missiles have passed over Japan twice in recent months  leaving Japanese citizens rattled by early-morning text alerts. And at the recent Communist Party Congress in Beijing  President Xi Jinping promised that China would be âmoving closer to center stage â raising additional concerns in Japan.
The ruling coalitionâs supermajority ensures not only that  Abe  will remain in power  but also that  he  can now push for a revision of Japanâs constitution   his  personal pledge and an unfulfilled element of the LDP platform since 1955. Although many in the public remain skeptical of the constitutional revision plan  the LDPâs success in this election represents an endorsement of the ruling coalitionâs governing ability  particularly on security issues.
[Did Trump and  Abe  just launch a new chapter in U.S.-Japan relations?]
There may also be debates within the ruling coalition on the need for Japan to deploy its own surface-to-surface missiles to enhance deterrence vis-a-vis North Korea.  Abe  has not taken a public stand on these âcounterstrike capabilities â which would to give Japan the ability to neutralize North Korean ballistic missiles on their launchpads. This would be an abrupt change from a postwar defense policy that has remained strictly defensive  with few offensive capabilities.
 Abe  will also continue moderate spending increases on Japanâs air and naval capabilities in an attempt to counter Chinaâs much higher spending on the Peopleâs Liberation Army. The numerical balance of fighter aircraft and surface combatants has been steadily shifting in Chinaâs favor for decades.
More recently  however  Xi has begun streamlining the PLA to strengthen its war-fighting effectiveness in preparation for a potential conflict in the Western Pacific.  Abe  knows that maintaining deterrence will require closer cooperation with the United States and continued reforms to break down the postwar barriers to the effectiveness of Japanâs own forces.
Will  Abe  revise Japanâs constitution?
Two years ago   Abe  pushed through a reinterpretation of the constitution to allow new defense guidelines and operations with the United States and other like-minded states. Many in  his  party support revising the second half of Article 9 to declare that Japanâs military is constitutional  though intended only for self-defense.
Support from pacifist-leaning coalition partner Komeito will probably be forthcoming  and friendly governments such as the United States and Australia are likely to be supportive as well. China will protest  as might South Korea  but polls elsewhere in the region suggest that Japan has moved beyond its wartime image. Nevertheless  Article 9 is highly political and ideological;  Abe  will have to carry out  his  promise to build domestic consensus before proceeding.
Despite President Trumpâs harsh rhetoric about Japan during  his  election campaign   Abe  has deftly engaged with the new administration in Washington and managed to build significant trust with Trump.  Abe  was the first foreign leader to visit Trump  and Trump will start  his  first Asia tour by spending several days in Japan in November.
Trumpâs tough line on North Korea is likely to be well received in Japan  but  his  hostile view toward trade (particularly the rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership) continues to perplex Tokyo. Japanese leaders argue that allies should be leading on rulemaking to manage the mercantilist challenge from China.
[TGT] leaves a news conference at the partyâs headquarters in Tokyo on Oct. 23. (Kiyoshi Ota/Bloomberg News)
On Sunday  Japanâs Liberal Democratic Party won a landslide victory  winning 284 of the 465 seats in the lower house of the Diet. Prime Minister Shinzo Abeâs junior coalition partner  Komeito  added 29 seats  giving the ruling coalition a two-thirds supermajority.
In addition to freeing the LDP from a mandatory ballot challenge before 2021  Abeâs election victory provides new support for  his  efforts to amend Japanâs pacifist constitution.
  [TGT] went into the election arguing that   [TGT]   track record on the economy and national security should be the decisive factor  and voters appear to have agreed. Japan faces new security challenges from two of its neighbors. North Korean missiles have passed over Japan twice in recent months  leaving Japanese citizens rattled by early-morning text alerts. And at the recent Communist Party Congress in Beijing  President Xi Jinping promised that China would be âmoving closer to center stage â raising additional concerns in Japan.
The ruling coalitionâs supermajority ensures not only that   [TGT] will remain in power  but also that   [TGT]   can now push for a revision of Japanâs constitution    [TGT]   personal pledge and an unfulfilled element of the LDP platform since 1955. Although many in the public remain skeptical of the constitutional revision plan  the LDPâs success in this election represents an endorsement of the ruling coalitionâs governing ability  particularly on security issues.
[Did Trump and   [TGT] just launch a new chapter in U.S.-Japan relations?]
There may also be debates within the ruling coalition on the need for Japan to deploy its own surface-to-surface missiles to enhance deterrence vis-a-vis North Korea.   [TGT] has not taken a public stand on these âcounterstrike capabilities â which would to give Japan the ability to neutralize North Korean ballistic missiles on their launchpads. This would be an abrupt change from a postwar defense policy that has remained strictly defensive  with few offensive capabilities.
  [TGT] will also continue moderate spending increases on Japanâs air and naval capabilities in an attempt to counter Chinaâs much higher spending on the Peopleâs Liberation Army. The numerical balance of fighter aircraft and surface combatants has been steadily shifting in Chinaâs favor for decades.
More recently  however  Xi has begun streamlining the PLA to strengthen its war-fighting effectiveness in preparation for a potential conflict in the Western Pacific.   [TGT] knows that maintaining deterrence will require closer cooperation with the United States and continued reforms to break down the postwar barriers to the effectiveness of Japanâs own forces.
Will   [TGT] revise Japanâs constitution?
Two years ago    [TGT] pushed through a reinterpretation of the constitution to allow new defense guidelines and operations with the United States and other like-minded states. Many in   [TGT]   party support revising the second half of Article 9 to declare that Japanâs military is constitutional  though intended only for self-defense.
Support from pacifist-leaning coalition partner Komeito will probably be forthcoming  and friendly governments such as the United States and Australia are likely to be supportive as well. China will protest  as might South Korea  but polls elsewhere in the region suggest that Japan has moved beyond its wartime image. Nevertheless  Article 9 is highly political and ideological;   [TGT] will have to carry out   [TGT]   promise to build domestic consensus before proceeding.
Despite President Trumpâs harsh rhetoric about Japan during  his  election campaign    [TGT] has deftly engaged with the new administration in Washington and managed to build significant trust with Trump.   [TGT] was the first foreign leader to visit Trump  and Trump will start   [TGT]   first Asia tour by spending several days in Japan in November.
Trumpâs tough line on North Korea is likely to be well received in Japan  but   [TGT]   hostile view toward trade (particularly the rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership) continues to perplex Tokyo. Japanese leaders argue that allies should be leading on rulemaking to manage the mercantilist challenge from China.