Documents shed light on North Koreaâs startling gains in sea
Makeyev
The documents from the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau include marketing brochures for an array of top-of-the-line Soviet missiles that were able to deliver nuclear warheads to U.S. cities. Initially designed for the Soviet navyâs nuclear submarines  some of the models offered for sale could be launched from a large boat  a submerged barge  or a capsule dropped into the ocean  negating the need for a modern submarine fleet.
âThe missile could be floated and ignited without any need for a launch platform â recalled Kyle Gillman  the former executive vice president of the U.S.-Russian joint venture known as Sea Launch Investors. Gillman  who negotiated the business agreement with Russiaâs Makeyev scientists  reviewed and authenticated the documents obtained by The Washington Post.
The evidence that the designs eventually ended up in North Korea is partly circumstantial. In late 1992  with  the U.S.-Russian project flagging  more than 60 Russian missile scientists and family members from the Makeyev facility  were arrested at Moscowâs Sheremetyevo International Airport as  they  prepared to travel to Pyongyang to work as consultants. U.S.  Russian and South Korean intelligence officials later concluded that some of the scientists eventually succeeded in traveling to North Korea to offer blueprints and technical advice for the countryâs missiles program.
But U.S. analysts see more Â­persuasive evidence in the actual missiles that North Korea has put on display over the past two years. In the most striking case  the Â­Hwasong-10  or Musudan  a Â­single-stage missile successfully tested by North Korea in June 2016  appears to use the same engine and many design features as the Soviet Unionâs R-27 Zyb  a submarine-launched ballistic missile designed by Makeyev scientists and advertised in one of the brochures obtained by The Post.
The Americans who founded Sea Launch Investors in 1992 believed that their project could help prevent the poaching of Russian weapons experts by terrorists and rogue states  at least from the community of rocket scientists at  the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau   the premier Soviet manufacturer of submarine-launched ballistic missiles headquartered in Miass  a small city in Russiaâs southern Ural mountains.
In May of that year  a Protocol of Intent agreement was signed by retired Adm. Thomas Moorer  a former Joint Chiefs chairman and head of the American team  and retired Russian Adm. Fyodor Novoselov  a former deputy fleet commander for shipbuilding and armaments. The joint venture Â­acquired exclusive rights to  Makeyev âs inventory of submarine-launched ballistic missiles  and then developed marketing materials that showcased a line of products that could be converted for use in commercial ventures. These included a missile known as the R-27 Zyb â or âRippleâ â the squat  blunt-nosed workhorse of the Soviet Unionâs Yankee-1 Class submarine fleet  along with larger  more powerful missiles such as the 50-foot-tall R-29 Shtil â or âCalmâ â and the newer  solid-fueled R-39 Rif. The latter two were true intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of more than 5 000 miles.
As the months passed   Makeyevâs managers  became increasingly frustrated as  their  American partners ran into a series of obstacles  including reservations about whether the joint venture was permissible under U.S.-Russian arms-control agreements. In April 1993  Gen. Colin L. Powell  then the Joint Chiefs chairman  informed Sea Launch Investors that the project could not proceed without a government review and a formal waiver of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. No waiver was granted  and by the spring of 1995  it was clear that the company was at a dead end.
By then  some of the Makeyev drawings and blueprints had apparently gone out the door. The Russian scientists arrested at the Moscow airport acknowledged to investigators that they had been recruited as a group to assist North Korea in building rockets  ostensibly as space boosters for satellites. In âThe Dead Hand â David E. Hoffmanâs Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the last years of the Cold War  a Russian security official describes how the North Koreans systematically chose experts from across  Makeyev âs entire production line  from fuels specialists to engineers who designed the nose cone and payload chamber. The salary offer  $1 200 a month  was 200 times as much as some of the scientists were earning at home.
Other attempts would follow. U.S. and South Korean intelligence officials have confirmed that  Makeyev  scientists eventually did land jobs as consultants for the North Koreans  and technical drawings were passed to Pyongyang  either directly or through intermediaries.
Some of  Makeyev âs missile secrets appear to have left Russia before the joint-venture effort officially disbanded. Still  years later  the companyâs former executive vice president remains convinced that most  if not all  could have been kept locked away if Western governments had acted quickly.
The missile was dubbed the Hwasong-10  or Musudan. But experts noted striking similarities to the R-27 Zyb  or Ripple  manufactured by  the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau . Two months later  on Aug. 24  2016  North Korea successfully tested the Pukguksong-1  a submarine-launched missile that also incorporates some features from the Zyb. Both models are âgenerally regarded as derived from the designs of the Makeyev Bureauâs R-27 â said Joshua Pollack  an analyst at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey  Calif.
âI have to assume that Makeyev pitched part  if not all  of these concepts and proposals to other interested investors  including the North Koreans â said Michael Elleman  a former missiles scientist and a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies  a British think tank.
The documents from the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau include marketing brochures for an array of top-of-the-line Soviet missiles that were able to deliver nuclear warheads to U.S. cities. Initially designed for the Soviet navyâs nuclear submarines  some of the models offered for sale could be launched from a large boat  a submerged barge  or a capsule dropped into the ocean  negating the need for a modern submarine fleet.
âThe missile could be floated and ignited without any need for a launch platform â recalled Kyle Gillman  the former executive vice president of the U.S.-Russian joint venture known as Sea Launch Investors. Gillman  who negotiated the business agreement with Russiaâs Makeyev scientists  reviewed and authenticated the documents obtained by The Washington Post.
The evidence that the designs eventually ended up in North Korea is partly circumstantial. In late 1992  with  the U.S.-Russian project flagging  more than 60 Russian missile scientists and family members from the Makeyev facility  were arrested at Moscowâs Sheremetyevo International Airport as  they  prepared to travel to Pyongyang to work as consultants. U.S.  Russian and South Korean intelligence officials later concluded that some of the scientists eventually succeeded in traveling to North Korea to offer blueprints and technical advice for the countryâs missiles program.
But U.S. analysts see more Â­persuasive evidence in the actual missiles that North Korea has put on display over the past two years. In the most striking case  the Â­Hwasong-10  or Musudan  a Â­single-stage missile successfully tested by North Korea in June 2016  appears to use the same engine and many design features as the Soviet Unionâs R-27 Zyb  a submarine-launched ballistic missile designed by Makeyev scientists and advertised in one of the brochures obtained by The Post.
The Americans who founded Sea Launch Investors in 1992 believed that their project could help prevent the poaching of Russian weapons experts by terrorists and rogue states  at least from the community of rocket scientists at  the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau   the premier Soviet manufacturer of submarine-launched ballistic missiles headquartered in Miass  a small city in Russiaâs southern Ural mountains.
In May of that year  a Protocol of Intent agreement was signed by retired Adm. Thomas Moorer  a former Joint Chiefs chairman and head of the American team  and retired Russian Adm. Fyodor Novoselov  a former deputy fleet commander for shipbuilding and armaments. The joint venture Â­acquired exclusive rights to  Makeyev âs inventory of submarine-launched ballistic missiles  and then developed marketing materials that showcased a line of products that could be converted for use in commercial ventures. These included a missile known as the R-27 Zyb â or âRippleâ â the squat  blunt-nosed workhorse of the Soviet Unionâs Yankee-1 Class submarine fleet  along with larger  more powerful missiles such as the 50-foot-tall R-29 Shtil â or âCalmâ â and the newer  solid-fueled R-39 Rif. The latter two were true intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of more than 5 000 miles.
As the months passed    [TGT] became increasingly frustrated as   [TGT]   American partners ran into a series of obstacles  including reservations about whether the joint venture was permissible under U.S.-Russian arms-control agreements. In April 1993  Gen. Colin L. Powell  then the Joint Chiefs chairman  informed Sea Launch Investors that the project could not proceed without a government review and a formal waiver of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. No waiver was granted  and by the spring of 1995  it was clear that the company was at a dead end.
By then  some of the Makeyev drawings and blueprints had apparently gone out the door. The Russian scientists arrested at the Moscow airport acknowledged to investigators that they had been recruited as a group to assist North Korea in building rockets  ostensibly as space boosters for satellites. In âThe Dead Hand â David E. Hoffmanâs Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the last years of the Cold War  a Russian security official describes how the North Koreans systematically chose experts from across  Makeyev âs entire production line  from fuels specialists to engineers who designed the nose cone and payload chamber. The salary offer  $1 200 a month  was 200 times as much as some of the scientists were earning at home.
Other attempts would follow. U.S. and South Korean intelligence officials have confirmed that   [TGT] scientists eventually did land jobs as consultants for the North Koreans  and technical drawings were passed to Pyongyang  either directly or through intermediaries.
Some of   [TGT]  âs missile secrets appear to have left Russia before the joint-venture effort officially disbanded. Still  years later  the companyâs former executive vice president remains convinced that most  if not all  could have been kept locked away if Western governments had acted quickly.
The missile was dubbed the Hwasong-10  or Musudan. But experts noted striking similarities to the R-27 Zyb  or Ripple  manufactured by  the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau . Two months later  on Aug. 24  2016  North Korea successfully tested the Pukguksong-1  a submarine-launched missile that also incorporates some features from the Zyb. Both models are âgenerally regarded as derived from the designs of the Makeyev Bureauâs R-27 â said Joshua Pollack  an analyst at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey  Calif.
âI have to assume that Makeyev pitched part  if not all  of these concepts and proposals to other interested investors  including the North Koreans â said Michael Elleman  a former missiles scientist and a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies  a British think tank.