Trump has an Iran strategy but it's going to be difficult to pull off
The Trump administration  is sending mixed signals to supporters and opponents of the Iran nuclear deal.
 The Trump administration 's game plan for Iran has a certain logic to  it   but executing  it  will be the most difficult diplomatic gambit his team has attempted thus far.
 The administration  is attempting to signal to supporters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)  the nuclear agreement US President Barack Obama negotiated with Iran  that  President Donald Trump  is willing to blow up that deal because  he  sees it as disadvantageous to the United States  while also signaling that  the president  is willing to not blow up the deal  provided that  he  gets  his  way on other elements of a counter-Iran strategy.
At the same time   the administration  is attempting to signal to opponents of the JCPOA that there is a way to address the weaknesses in the deal without blowing it up  provided that those opponents give  the president  some relief by revising the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) to remove the 90-day certification requirement.
In its most basic form  this is a boat-rocking strategy.  Trump  is threatening to do something that most people do not want  him  to do â including  apparently  most people on  the president 's own team â in order to get others to do things that they have hitherto been unwilling to do. (By the way  this strategy is not unlike the strategy that the  Trump  team is currently pursuing on North Korea â only there  the primary target of the boat-rocking is the Chinese government  and here the primary target is European allies and Democrats on Capitol Hill.)
And in practice  Obama was hesitant to challenge Iran on those other activities lest doing so would disrupt the diplomatic gains of the JCPOA  whereas  Trump  has received little support from our allies when he showed greater willingness to confront Iran.
When combined with the unwillingness of our allies to do more to push Iran on non-nuclear issues  the 90-day requirement that the president publicly certify that Iran is abiding by the JCPOA agreement was a pill too bitter for  Trump  to swallow more than twice.
The  Trump  administration is betting that Congress will not do so because  in the interval  the White House is hoping to persuade our allies to get tougher on Iran on the non-nuclear issues. In exchange for that greater allied cooperation  the administration hopes it will be able to persuade Congress to amend the INARA and remove the 90-day certification  thus buying more time for other lines of pressure to come to bear on Iran.
The foregoing is based on the advanced reporting on what the Trump administration is planning to do  along with a heavy dose of rational actor rationalization ("What is the best way to make sense of the confusing signals coming out of the administration?"). If I have read the tea leaves correctly  the Trump team has a strategy  albeit a strategy that is very difficult to pull off successfully.
It will also require deft and sustained diplomatic pressure on our allies  simultaneously cajoling them out of their post-JCPOA complacency and reassuring them that going along with the Trump administration is not a one-way ticket to what they would consider to be the worst of all possible outcomes: a violent confrontation with an Iran that can put the collapse of the JCPOA on us.
[TGT] is sending mixed signals to supporters and opponents of the Iran nuclear deal.
  [TGT]  's game plan for Iran has a certain logic to   [TGT]    but executing   [TGT]   will be the most difficult diplomatic gambit his team has attempted thus far.
  [TGT] is attempting to signal to supporters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)  the nuclear agreement US President Barack Obama negotiated with Iran  that   [TGT] is willing to blow up that deal because  he  sees it as disadvantageous to the United States  while also signaling that  the president  is willing to not blow up the deal  provided that  he  gets  his  way on other elements of a counter-Iran strategy.
At the same time    [TGT] is attempting to signal to opponents of the JCPOA that there is a way to address the weaknesses in the deal without blowing  [TGT]  up  provided that those opponents give  the president  some relief by revising the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) to remove the 90-day certification requirement.
In its most basic form  this is a boat-rocking strategy.   [TGT] is threatening to do something that most people do not want   [TGT]   to do â including  apparently  most people on  the president 's own team â in order to get others to do things that they have hitherto been unwilling to do. (By the way  this strategy is not unlike the strategy that the   [TGT] team is currently pursuing on North Korea â only there  the primary target of the boat-rocking is the Chinese government  and here the primary target is European allies and Democrats on Capitol Hill.)
And in practice  Obama was hesitant to challenge Iran on those other activities lest doing so would disrupt the diplomatic gains of the JCPOA  whereas   [TGT] has received little support from our allies when  [TGT]  showed greater willingness to confront Iran.
When combined with the unwillingness of our allies to do more to push Iran on non-nuclear issues  the 90-day requirement that the president publicly certify that Iran is abiding by the JCPOA agreement was a pill too bitter for   [TGT]   to swallow more than twice.
 [TGT]  is betting that Congress will not do so because  in the interval  the White House is hoping to persuade our allies to get tougher on Iran on the non-nuclear issues. In exchange for that greater allied cooperation   [TGT]  hopes it will be able to persuade Congress to amend the INARA and remove the 90-day certification  thus buying more time for other lines of pressure to come to bear on Iran.
The foregoing is based on the advanced reporting on what  [TGT]  is planning to do  along with a heavy dose of rational actor rationalization ("What is the best way to make sense of the confusing signals coming out of  [TGT] ?"). If I have read the tea leaves correctly   [TGT]  has a strategy  albeit a strategy that is very difficult to pull off successfully.
 [TGT]  will also require deft and sustained diplomatic pressure on our allies  simultaneously cajoling them out of their post-JCPOA complacency and reassuring them that going along with  [TGT]  is not a one-way ticket to what they would consider to be the worst of all possible outcomes: a violent confrontation with an Iran that can put the collapse of the JCPOA on us.