Who Will Blink First When Iran Is on the Brink?
Obama has also emphasized Tehran's own actions as the determining factor in a U.S. response. "We offered the Iranian government a clear choice " he said on July 1  when he signed the Iran Sanctions Act. "It could fulfill its international obligations and realize greater security  deeper economic and political integration with the world ... or it could continue to flout its responsibilities and face even more pressure and isolation."
 And a few days later  the president stressed in an interview with Israeli television that although his administration will "continue to keep the door open for a diplomatic resolution ... I assure you that I have not taken options off the table."
 As a practical matter  however  Obama's decision on the use of force would hinge on factors well beyond Iran's timetable for obtaining a bomb. In fact  the political  military and policy constraints Obama would face could compel his administration to forgo the military option no matter how close Iran gets to joining the nuclear club.
 First  there is the United Nations to consider. Both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have centered their responses to Iran's nuclear ambitions on the Security Council  implying that Iran's conduct violates not just U.S. national security interests but also Tehran's international legal obligations. For Obama  the United Nations has doctrinal centrality  as well. According to the president's recently released National Security Strategy  "When force is necessary ... we will seek broad international support  working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council."
 Obama came into office pledging a new politics of accountability and responsibility  suggesting a predisposition to engage the public on the possibility that the United States may find itself in a prolonged war with a damaged but dangerous adversary. From town halls to college campuses  the president and his advisers would need to connect with civil society  clergy and university students _ not to mention Congress _ on this critical issue.
 Obama would have to decide whether the legitimacy conferred by a last-ditch warning of an attack was worth the sacrifice of tactical advantage. In the end  the balance would probably tip in favor of the moral (rather than operational) considerations  because the spiraling tension and flow of military assets to the gulf would give Tehran all the warning it needed.
 Simon served on the National Security Council during the Clinton administration and is a co-author of the forthcoming "The Sixth Crisis: Iran  Israel  America  and the Rumors of War." Takeyh is a former adviser to the Obama administration on Iran and the author of "Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs." They are senior fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations.
[TGT] has also emphasized Tehran's own actions as the determining factor in a U.S. response. "We offered the Iranian government a clear choice " he said on July 1  when he signed the Iran Sanctions Act. "[TGT] could fulfill [TGT] international obligations and realize greater security  deeper economic and political integration with the world ... or [TGT] could continue to flout [TGT] responsibilities and face even more pressure and isolation."
 And a few days later  [TGT] stressed in an interview with Israeli television that although [TGT] administration will "continue to keep the door open for a diplomatic resolution ... I assure you that I have not taken options off the table."
 As a practical matter  however  [TGT]'s decision on the use of force would hinge on factors well beyond Iran's timetable for obtaining a bomb. In fact  the political  military and policy constraints [TGT] would face could compel [TGT] administration to forgo the military option no matter how close Iran gets to joining the nuclear club.
 First  there is the United Nations to consider. Both the George W. Bush and [TGT] administrations have centered their responses to Iran's nuclear ambitions on the Security Council  implying that Iran's conduct violates not just U.S. national security interests but also Tehran's international legal obligations. For [TGT]the United Nations has doctrinal centrality  as well. According to the president's recently released National Security Strategy  "When force is necessary ... we will seek broad international support  working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council."
 Obama came into office pledging a new politics of accountability and responsibility  suggesting a predisposition to engage the public on the possibility that the United States may find itself in a prolonged war with a damaged but dangerous adversary. From town halls to college campuses  the president and his advisers would need to connect with civil society  clergy and university students _ not to mention Congress _ on this critical issue.
 [TGT] would have to decide whether the legitimacy conferred by a last-ditch warning of an attack was worth the sacrifice of tactical advantage. In the end  the balance would probably tip in favor of the moral (rather than operational) considerations  because the spiraling tension and flow of military assets to the gulf would give Tehran all the warning it needed.
 Simon served on the National Security Council during the Clinton administration and is a co-author of the forthcoming "The Sixth Crisis: Iran  Israel  America  and the Rumors of War." Takeyh is a former adviser to the [TGT] administration on Iran and the author of "Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs." They are senior fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations.