Barack Obama Was a Foreign-Policy Failure . 
Back at home , Obama seemed to think that he could win over Republicans by reaching out to them -- as he did when he nominated a highly qualified and decidedly moderate candidate for the Supreme Court -- never quite realizing that John Boehner , Paul Ryan , Mitch McConnell , Ted Cruz , and the entire tea party cared more about Obama failing than they did about America succeeding . 
WASHINGTON , DC - MAY 11 : U.S. President Barack Obama pauses as he speaks during an event to recognize emerging global entrepreneurs May 11 , 2015 at the South Court Auditorium of Eisenhower Executive Office Building in Washington , DC . 
WASHINGTON , DC - MAY 11 : U.S. President Barack Obama pauses as he speaks during an event to recognize emerging global entrepreneurs May 11 , 2015 at the South Court Auditorium of Eisenhower Executive Office Building in Washington , DC . 
But in foreign policy Obama 's record was mostly one of failure . 
I began writing this column -LRB- originally in the form of a blog -RRB- in 2009 , at the very beginning of Barack Obama 's presidency . 
And if they do , Obama 's presidency , despite the missteps and missed opportunities , will seem like an era of honor and decency that Americans willfully cast aside and may never fully regain . 
Here one must begin by recalling the dire circumstances when Obama took office . 
Moreover , Obama managed these important economic and social achievements in the face of extraordinary opposition from the Republican Party , which seemed more interested in thwarting Obama than in doing anything to help the American people . 
Barack Obama is an intelligent , disciplined , eloquent , upright , patriotic , and wholly admirable man , and in many ways he was an inspirational presidentBarack Obama is an intelligent , disciplined , eloquent , upright , patriotic , and wholly admirable man , and in many ways he was an inspirational president . 
In foreign policy , the Obama administration successfully negotiated a deal that halted Iran 's progress toward a nuclear weapon . 
And throughout his presidency , Obama conducted himself with the same dignity , humor , grace , intelligence , forbearance , respect for American values and traditions , and above all class that were on display in his farewell speech . 
Contrast that with the tone of Donald Trump 's first post-election press conference , held the day after Obama 's speech , which was bombastic , deceptive , abusive , defiant , contemptuous of traditional norms -- and entirely consistent with Trump 's campaign and business career . 
No matter how petty or two-faced his opponents were , Obama rarely paid them back in kind . 
Yet Obama 's presidency is in other respects a tragedy -- and especially when it comes to foreign policy.Yet Obama 's presidency is in other respects a tragedy -- and especially when it comes to foreign policy . 
It is a tragedy because Obama had the opportunity to refashion America 's role in the world , and at times he seemed to want to do just that . 
The crisis of 2008-2009 was the ideal moment to abandon the failed strategy of liberal hegemony that the United States had been pursuing since the end of the Cold War , but in the end Obama never broke with that familiar but failed approach . 
For starters , Obama was persuaded to escalate the war in Afghanistan in 2009 , in a pointless "surge" that was doomed to fail and did . 
Second , Obama and his team misread and mishandled the Arab Spring . 
In particular , Obama and his team mistakenly viewed the Arab Spring as a large-scale , grass-roots uprising clamoring for liberal democracy and embraced it too quickly . 
These misunderstandings led to Obama 's disastrous intervention in Libya , his inept diplomatic interference in Yemen , and the premature demand that "Assad must go" in Syria . 
As regular readers know , I think Obama made the right call when he decided not to wade deeper into the Syrian quagmire , but his handling of this admittedly turbulent and difficult-to-read process can hardly be considered a success . 
Regarding Israel-Palestine , Obama took office vowing to achieve a two-state solution by the end of his first term , and he and his second-term secretary of state , John Kerry , devoted endless hours to this quixotic quest . 
A two-state solution is further away than ever and probably impossible , in part because Obama never seemed to grasp that relying on pro-Israel advisors with a long track record of not producing an agreement was a pretty good way to guarantee failure again . 
Nor did Obama and Kerry ever realize that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not interested in a genuine two-state solution and that Israel was never going to cut a deal unless the United States made it clear that failing to do so would lead to dramatic reductions in U.S. military aid and diplomatic protection . 
Obama 's offer of ever larger bribes of U.S. military aid proved inadequate to the task , as Netanyahu quite sensibly pocketed the offer and dug in his heels , even flying to Washington to dis the president in public . 
I understand why Obama felt he had to tolerate this sort of abuse from a dependent client state -LRB- after all , I wrote a book about it -RRB- , but if he was unwilling to play hardball , he should n't have promised to deliver a solution and should n't have wasted any time or energy on it . 
Obama 's handling of Russia deserves no plaudits either . 
The early attempt at a "reset" made sense , but Obama and his advisors never understood that what they regarded as innocent and legitimate efforts to strengthen democracy in Eastern Europe or in Russia itself were not going to be viewed as benign by Moscow . 
Moscow 's actions are regrettable on many levels , but Obama and the people in charge of U.S. policy in Eastern Europe should not have been surprised . 
Obama 's desire to "rebalance" U.S. attention toward Asia was sound , and his administration did make important progress toward that goal . 
To a large extent , Obama never made that choice . 
First , although Obama took office intending to re-engineer America 's relationship with the world , he was quickly co-opted by the existing national security establishment and bought into its mantra that the United States as the "indispensable power" must take the lead in promoting a rules-based world order centered on free markets , democracy , and human rights . 
Here Obama did face a real dilemma : The Democratic Party 's foreign-policy apparatus was dominated by dedicated liberal crusaders , which meant there was hardly anyone Obama could appoint who agreed wholeheartedly with his foreign-policy instincts . 
Like Bill Clinton , Obama tried to address a vast array of global problems as cheaply as possible -LRB- and without "boots on the ground" -RRB- , but he never told the American people what their vital interests actually were . 
"He who defends everything defends nothing ," warned Frederick the Great , and Obama 's inability to develop a clear set of strategic priorities hurt him throughout his presidency . 
Second , in both domestic and foreign policy , Obama failed to appreciate that his opponents were not as reasonable , rational , cool , or unselfish as he was . 
If a central theme runs through Obama 's approach to politics , it is his conviction that people with differing views can come together , discuss , debate , share information , and gradually come to a mutual understanding that satisfies both sides and that will advance the public interest . 
When dealing with Netanyahu , for example , Obama -LRB- and Kerry -RRB- thought it obvious that "two states for two peoples" was in Israel 's interest and that Netanyahu could be persuaded to see this once he was assured of continued U.S. support . 
In Putin , Obama saw the leader of a declining power whose best course was to liberalize further and reform the lagging Russian economy .
Back at home , [TGT] seemed to think that [TGT] could win over Republicans by reaching out to them -- as [TGT] did when [TGT] nominated a highly qualified and decidedly moderate candidate for the Supreme Court -- never quite realizing that John Boehner , Paul Ryan , Mitch McConnell , Ted Cruz , and the entire tea party cared more about [TGT] failing than they did about America succeeding . 
WASHINGTON , DC - MAY 11 : [TGT] pauses as [TGT] speaks during an event to recognize emerging global entrepreneurs May 11 , 2015 at the South Court Auditorium of Eisenhower Executive Office Building in Washington , DC . 
WASHINGTON , DC - MAY 11 : [TGT] pauses as [TGT] speaks during an event to recognize emerging global entrepreneurs May 11 , 2015 at the South Court Auditorium of Eisenhower Executive Office Building in Washington , DC . 
But in foreign policy [TGT] 's record was mostly one of failure . 
I began writing this column -LRB- originally in the form of a blog -RRB- in 2009 , at the very beginning of [TGT] 's presidency . 
And if they do , [TGT] 's presidency , despite the missteps and missed opportunities , will seem like an era of honor and decency that Americans willfully cast aside and may never fully regain . 
Here one must begin by recalling the dire circumstances when [TGT] took office . 
Moreover , [TGT] managed these important economic and social achievements in the face of extraordinary opposition from the Republican Party , which seemed more interested in thwarting [TGT] than in doing anything to help the American people . 
[TGT] is an intelligent , disciplined , eloquent , upright , patriotic , and wholly admirable man , and in many ways [TGT] was [TGT] is an intelligent , disciplined , eloquent , upright , patriotic , and wholly admirable man , and in many ways [TGT] was an inspirational president . 
In foreign policy , the [TGT] administration successfully negotiated a deal that halted Iran 's progress toward a nuclear weapon . 
And throughout [TGT] presidency , [TGT] conducted [TGT] with the same dignity , humor , grace , intelligence , forbearance , respect for American values and traditions , and above all class that were on display in [TGT] farewell speech . 
Contrast that with the tone of Donald Trump 's first post-election press conference , held the day after [TGT] 's speech , which was bombastic , deceptive , abusive , defiant , contemptuous of traditional norms -- and entirely consistent with Trump 's campaign and business career . 
No matter how petty or two-faced his opponents were , [TGT] rarely paid them back in kind . 
Yet [TGT] 's presidency is in other respects a tragedy -- and especially when it comes to foreign policy.Yet [TGT] 's presidency is in other respects a tragedy -- and especially when it comes to foreign policy . 
It is a tragedy because [TGT] had the opportunity to refashion America 's role in the world , and at times he seemed to want to do just that . 
The crisis of 2008-2009 was the ideal moment to abandon the failed strategy of liberal hegemony that the United States had been pursuing since the end of the Cold War , but in the end [TGT] never broke with that familiar but failed approach . 
For starters , [TGT] was persuaded to escalate the war in Afghanistan in 2009 , in a pointless "surge" that was doomed to fail and did . 
Second , [TGT] and [TGT] team misread and mishandled the Arab Spring . 
In particular , [TGT] and [TGT] team mistakenly viewed the Arab Spring as a large-scale , grass-roots uprising clamoring for liberal democracy and embraced it too quickly . 
These misunderstandings led to [TGT] 's disastrous intervention in Libya , [TGT] inept diplomatic interference in Yemen , and the premature demand that "Assad must go" in Syria . 
As regular readers know , I think [TGT] made the right call when [TGT] decided not to wade deeper into the Syrian quagmire , but [TGT] handling of this admittedly turbulent and difficult-to-read process can hardly be considered a success . 
Regarding Israel-Palestine , [TGT] took office vowing to achieve a two-state solution by the end of [TGT] first term , and [TGT] and [TGT] second-term secretary of state , John Kerry , devoted endless hours to this quixotic quest . 
A two-state solution is further away than ever and probably impossible , in part because [TGT] never seemed to grasp that relying on pro-Israel advisors with a long track record of not producing an agreement was a pretty good way to guarantee failure again . 
Nor did [TGT] and Kerry ever realize that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not interested in a genuine two-state solution and that Israel was never going to cut a deal unless the United States made it clear that failing to do so would lead to dramatic reductions in U.S. military aid and diplomatic protection . 
[TGT] 's offer of ever larger bribes of U.S. military aid proved inadequate to the task , as Netanyahu quite sensibly pocketed the offer and dug in his heels , even flying to Washington to dis the president in public . 
I understand why [TGT] felt [TGT] had to tolerate this sort of abuse from a dependent client state -LRB- after all , I wrote a book about it -RRB- , but if [TGT] was unwilling to play hardball , [TGT] should n't have promised to deliver a solution and should n't have wasted any time or energy on it . 
[TGT] 's handling of Russia deserves no plaudits either . 
The early attempt at a "reset" made sense , but [TGT] and [TGT] advisors never understood that what they regarded as innocent and legitimate efforts to strengthen democracy in Eastern Europe or in Russia itself were not going to be viewed as benign by Moscow . 
Moscow 's actions are regrettable on many levels , but [TGT] and the people in charge of U.S. policy in Eastern Europe should not have been surprised . 
[TGT] 's desire to "rebalance" U.S. attention toward Asia was sound , and [TGT] administration did make important progress toward that goal . 
To a large extent , [TGT] never made that choice . 
First , although [TGT] took office intending to re-engineer America 's relationship with the world , [TGT] was quickly co-opted by the existing national security establishment and bought into its mantra that the United States as the "indispensable power" must take the lead in promoting a rules-based world order centered on free markets , democracy , and human rights . 
Here [TGT] did face a real dilemma : The Democratic Party 's foreign-policy apparatus was dominated by dedicated liberal crusaders , which meant there was hardly anyone [TGT] could appoint who agreed wholeheartedly with [TGT] foreign-policy instincts . 
Like Bill Clinton , [TGT] tried to address a vast array of global problems as cheaply as possible -LRB- and without "boots on the ground" -RRB- , but he never told the American people what their vital interests actually were . 
"He who defends everything defends nothing ," warned Frederick the Great , and [TGT] 's inability to develop a clear set of strategic priorities hurt him throughout his presidency . 
Second , in both domestic and foreign policy , [TGT] failed to appreciate that his opponents were not as reasonable , rational , cool , or unselfish as he was . 
If a central theme runs through [TGT] 's approach to politics , it is his conviction that people with differing views can come together , discuss , debate , share information , and gradually come to a mutual understanding that satisfies both sides and that will advance the public interest . 
When dealing with Netanyahu , for example , [TGT] -LRB- and Kerry -RRB- thought it obvious that "two states for two peoples" was in Israel 's interest and that Netanyahu could be persuaded to see this once he was assured of continued U.S. support . 
In Putin , [TGT] saw the leader of a declining power whose best course was to liberalize further and reform the lagging Russian economy .