An Act To Make Part 1 of the Maine Criminal Code Gender-neutral
Maine Legislature, Session 123, LD 0966
Committee: Criminal Justice and Public Safety
Amends: 17-A MRSA §2, 17-A MRSA §4-B, 17-A MRSA §7, 17-A MRSA §8, 17-A MRSA §10-A, 17-A MRSA §16, 17-A MRSA §35, 17-A MRSA §36, 17-A MRSA §37, 17-A MRSA §60, 17-A MRSA §61, 17-A MRSA §101, 17-A MRSA §102, 17-A MRSA §103, 17-A MRSA §105, 17-A MRSA §107, 17-A MRSA §108

Legislative Document 
No. 966 
H.P.726 
House of Representatives, March 2, 2007 
An Act To Make Part 1 of the Maine Criminal Code Gender-neutral 
Reported by Representative GERZOFSKY of Brunswick for the Criminal Law Advisory 
Commission pursuant to the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17-A, section 1354, subsection 2. 
Reference to the Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety suggested and ordered 
printed under Joint Rule 218. 
Printed on recycled paper 
77J~ 
/J7.1J7ac~ 
MILLICENT M. MacFARLAND 
Clerk 
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine as follows: 
Sec. 1. 17-A MRSA §2, sub-§8, as enacted by PL 1975, c. 499, §1, is amended to 
read: 
8. 
"Deadly force" means physical force wlHeh that a person uses with the intent of 
causing, or \vhich he that a person knows to create a substantial risk of causing, death or 
serious bodily injury. Intentionally or recklessly discharging a firearm in the direction of 
another p~rson or at a moving vehicle constitutes deadly force. 
Sec. 2. 17-A MRS A §2, sub-§21, as enacted by PL 1975, c. 499, § 1, is amended 
to read: 
21. 
"Public servant" means any official officer or employee of any branch of 
government and any person participating as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in 
performing a governmental function. A person is considered a public servant upon his the 
person's election, appointment or other designation as such, although he the person may 
not yet officially occupy that position. 
Sec. 3. 17-A MRSA §4-B, sub-§l, as enacted by PL 1985, c. 282, §3, is amended 
to read: 
1. 
All civil violations are expressly declared not to be criminal offenses. They are 
enforceable by the Attorney General, his the Attorney General's representative or any 
other appropriate public official in a civil action to recover what may be designated a 
fine, penalty or other sanction, or to secure the forfeiture that may be decreed by the law. 
Sec. 4. 17-A MRSA §7, sub-§l, as amended by PL 1979, c. 512, §§15, 16 and 
17, is further amended to read: 
1. 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person may be convicted under 
the laws of this State for any crime committed by his the person's own conduct or by the 
conduct of another for which he the person is legally accountable only if: 
A. Either the conduct wlHeh that is an element of the crime or the result wlHeh that is 
such an element occurs within this State or has a territorial relationship to this State; 
ef 
B. Conduct occurring outside this State constitutes an attempt to commit a crime 
under the laws of this State and the intent is that the crime take place within this 
State; 
C. Conduct occurring outside this State would constitute a criminal conspiracy under 
the laws of this State, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within this 
State or has a territorial relationship to this State, and the object of the conspiracy is 
that a crime take place within this State; 
D. Conduct occurring within this State or having a territorial relationship to this State 
would constitute complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, solicitation or 
Page I - 123LR1481(Ol)-1 
conspiracy to commit an offense in another jurisdiction wffieb that is also a crime 
under the law of this State; 
E. The crime consists of the omission to perform a duty imposed on a person by the 
law of this State, regardless of where that person is when the omission occurs; ef 
F. The crime is based on a statute of this State wffieb that expressly prohibits conduct 
outside the State, when the astef person knows or should know that ffi.s the person's 
conduct affects an interest of the State protected by that statute; or 
G. Jurisdiction is otherwise provided by law. 
Sec. 5. 17-A MRSA §8, sub-§5, ~A, as enacted by PL 1975, c. 499, §1, is 
amended to read: 
A. 
Any crime based upon breach of fiduciary obligation, within one year after 
discovery of the crime by an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to 
represent an aggrieved party, and who is himself not a party to the crime, whichever 
occurs first; ef 
Sec. 6. 17-A MRSA §10-A, sub-§l, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 324, §12, is 
amended to read: 
1. 
Ne A criminal proceeding may not be commenced against any person who had 
not attained his 18th birthday 18 years of age at the time of the alleged crime, except as 
the result ofa finding of probable cause authorized by Title 15, section 3101, subsection 
4, or in regard to the offenses over which juvenile courts have no jurisdiction, as provided 
in Title 15, section 3101, subsection 2. 
Sec. 7. 
17-A MRSA §16, as amended by PL 1979, c. 127, §125, IS further 
amended to read: 
§16. Warrantless arrests by a private person 
Except as otherwise specifically provided, a private person shall ha,'e has the 
authority to arrest without a warrant: 
1. 
Any person who He the private person has probable cause to believe has 
committed or is committing: 
A. Murder; or 
B. Any Class A, Class B or Class C crime. 
2. Any person who, in fact, is committing in ffi.s the private person's presence and in 
a public place.; any of the Class D or Class E crimes described in section 207; 209; 211; 
254; 255; 501, subsection 2; 503; 751; 806 or 1002. 
A. 
Any of the Class D or Class E orimes desoribed in seotions 207; 209; 211; 254; 
255; 501, subseotion 2; 503; 751; 806 or 1002. 
3. For the purposes of subsection 2, in the presence has the same meaning given in 
section 15, subsection 2. 
Sec.8. 17-A MRSA §35, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 324, §14, is amended to read: 
§35. Definitions of culpable states of mind 
1. "Intentionally." 
A. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of ffis the person's conduct 
when it is ffis the person's conscious object to cause such a result. 
B. A person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances when he the 
person is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes that they exist. 
2. "Knowingly." 
A. 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of ffis the person's conduct 
when he the person is aware that it is practically certain that ffis the person's conduct 
will cause such a result. 
B. A person acts knowingly with respect to attendant circumstances when he the 
person is aware that such circumstances exist. 
3. "Recklessly." 
A. A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of ffis the person's conduct when 
he the person consciously disregards a risk that ffis the person's conduct will cause 
such a result. 
B. A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant circumstances when he the 
person consciously disregards a risk that such circumstances exist. 
C. For purposes of this subsection, the disregard of the risk, when viewed in light of 
the nature and purpose of the person's conduct and the circumstances known to him 
the person, must involve a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation. 
4. "Criminal negligence." 
A. A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result of ffis the person's 
conduct when he the person fails to be aware of a risk that ffis the person's conduct 
will cause such a result. 
B. A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to attendant circumstances 
when he the person fails to be aware of a risk that such circumstances exist. 
C. For purposes of this subsection, the failure to be aware of the risk, when viewed 
in light of the nature and purpose of the person's conduct and the circumstances 
known to him the person, must involve a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation. 
5. "Culpable." A person acts culpably when he the person acts with the intention, 
knowledge, recklessness or criminal negligence as is required. 
Sec. 9. 17 .. ;A MRS A §36, sub-§3, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 324, §14, is amended 
to read: 
3. 
Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the crime 
charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another crime 
had the situation been as he the defendant supposed. 
Sec. 10. 17-A MRSA §36, sub-§4, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 324, §14, is 
amended to read: 
4. It is an affirmative defense if the defendant engages in conduct whieh he that the 
defendant believes does not legally constitute a crime if: 
A. The statute violated is not known to the defendant and has not been published or 
otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or 
lOB. The defendant acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement, afterward 
determined to 'be invalid or erroneous, contained in: 
(1) A statute, ordinance or other enactment; 
(2) A final judicial decision, opinion or judgment; 
(3) An administrative order or grant of permission; or 
(4) An official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with 
responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the statute 
defining the crime. This subsection does not impose any duty to make any such 
official interpretation. 
Sec. 11. 17-A MRSA §37, sub-§2, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 324, §14, IS 
amended to read: 
2. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the aetof a person, due 
to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he the person would have been 
aware had he the person not been intoxicated, such unawareness is immaterial. 
Sec. 12. 17-A MRSA §37, sub-§3, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 324, §14, IS 
amended to read: 
3. As used in this section: 
A. 
"Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental capacIties resulting from the 
introduction of alcohol, drugs or similar substances into the body; and 
B. "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused when the aetof a person 
intentionally or knowingly introduces into hls the person's body substances whish 
that the aeter person knows or ought to know tend to cause intoxication, unless he the 
person introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such duress as would 
afford a defense to a charge of crime. 
Sec. 13. 17-A MRS A §S7, as amended by PL 1977, c. 510, §25-A, is further 
amended to read: 
§57. Criminailiability for conduct of another; accomplices 
1. A person may be guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another 
person for which he the person is legally accountable as provided in this section. 
2. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: 
A. Acting with the intention, knowledge, recklessness or criminal negligence that is 
sufficient for the commission of the crime, he the person causes an innocent person, 
or a person not criminally responsible, to engage in such conduct; or 
B. 
He The person is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the 
law defining the crime; or 
C. He The person is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the 
crime, as provided in subsection 3. 
3. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: 
A. With the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime, he the 
person solicits such other person to commit the crime, or aids or agrees to aid or 
attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the crime. A person is an 
accomplice under this subsection to any crime the commission of which was a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of his the person's conduct; or 
B. His The person's conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his the person's 
complicity. 
4. 
A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular crime himself may 
be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he the 
person is legally accountable. 
5. 
Unless otherwise expressly provided, a person is not an accomplice in a crime 
committed by another person if: 
A. He The person is the victim of that crime; ef 
B. The crime is so defined that it cannot be committed without his the person's 
cooperation; or 
C. He The person terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the crime by~ 
(1) informing his Informing the person's accomplice that he the person has 
abandoned the criminal activity~ and 
(2) leaYing Leaving the scene of the prospective crime, if he the person is present 
thereat. 
6. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the crime and of 
his the accomplice's complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the 
crime has not been prosecuted or convicted, or has been convicted of a different crime or 
degree of crime, or is not subject to criminal prosecution as a result of immaturity 
pursuant to section 1O-A, subsection 1, or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction, 
or has been acquitted. 
Sec. 14. 17-A MRSA §60, sub-§I, ~, as enacted by PL 1975, c. 499, §1, is 
amended to read: 
B. The conduct or result specified in the definition of the crime is engaged in or 
caused by an agent of the organization while acting within the scope ofhis the agent's 
office or employment. 
Sec. 15. 17-A MRSA §61, as enacted by PL 1975, c. 499, §1, is amended to read: 
§61. Individual liability for conduct on behalf of organization 
1. 
An individual is criminally liable for any conduct he the individual performs in 
the name of an organization or in its behalf to the same extent as if it were performed in 
his the individual's own name or behalf. Such an individual shall must be sentenced as if 
the conduct had been performed in his the individual's own name or behalf. 
2. 
If a criminal statute imposes a duty to act on an organization, any agent of the 
organization having primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is criminally 
liable if he the agent recklessly omits to perform the required act, and he shall the agent 
must be sentenced as if the duty were imposed by law directly upon hiffi the agent. 
Sec. 16. 17-A MRS A §101, sub-§I, as amended by PL 1997, c. 185, §l, is 
7 
further amended to read: 
1. The State is not required to negate any facts expressly designated as a "defense," 
or any exception, exclusion or authorization that is set out in the statute defining the 
crime by proof at trial, unless the existence of the defense, exception, exclusion or 
authorization is in issue as a result of evidence admitted at the trial that is sufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt on the issue, in which case the State must disprove its existence 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This subsection does not require a trial judge to instruct on 
an issue that has been waived by the defeadant a person. The subject of waiver is 
addressed by the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Sec. 17. 17-A MRSA §101, sub-§2, as repealed and replaced by PL 1981, c. 324, 
§24, is amended to read: 
2. 
Where the statute explicitly designates a matter as an "affirmative defense," the 
matter so designated must be proved by the defeadant person by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Sec. 18. 17-A MRSA §102, sub-§2,~, as enacted by PL 1975, c. 499, §l, is 
amended to read: 
B. As to persons assisting public servants, by the fact that the public servant to 
whom assistance was rendered exceeded his the public servant's legal authority or 
that there was a defect of jurisdiction in the legal process or decree of the court or 
tribunal, provided the aetef person believed the public servant to be engaged in the 
performance of his the public servant's duties or that the legal process or court decree 
was competent. 
Sec. 19. 17-A MRSA§,l02-A, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 324, §25, is amended to 
read: 
§102-A. Military orders. 
1. 
It is a defense if the aefeaaaBt person engaged in the conduct charged to 
constitute a crime in obedienc.e to an order of his the person's superior in the armed 
services whish he that the pernon did not know to be unlawful. 
2. 
If the aefeaaaBt person was reckless in failing to know the unlawful nature of 
such an order, the defense is unavailable in a prosecution for a crime for which 
recklessness suffices to establish liability. 
Sec. 20. 17-A MRSA §103, as enacted by PL 1975, c. 499, §1, is amended to 
read: 
§ 1 03. Competing harms 
1. Conduct wffieh that the aetef person believes to be necessary to avoid imminent 
physical harm to himself that person or another is justifiable if the desirability and 
urgency of avoiding such harm outweigh, according to ordinary standards of 
reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the statute defining the crime 
charged. The desirability and urgency of such conduct may not rest upon considerations 
pertaining to the morality and advisability of such statute. 
2. When the aetef person was reckless or criminally negligent in bringing about the 
circumstances requiring a choice of harms or in appraising the necessity of his the 
person's conduct, the justification provided in subsection 1 does not apply in a 
prosecution for any crime for which recklessness or criminal negligence, as the case may 
be, suffices to establish criminal liability. 
Sec. 21. 17-A MRS A §103-A, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 324, §26, is amended to 
read: 
§103-A. Duress 
1. It is a defense that, when a aefenaarn person engages in conduct wffieh that would 
otherwise constitute a crime, he the person is compelled to do so by threat of imminent 
death or serious bodily injury to himself that person or another person or because he that 
person was compelled to do so by force. 
2. 
For purposes of this section, compulsion exists only if the force, threat or 
circumstances are such as would have prevented a reasonable person in the defendant's 
situation from resisting the pressure. 
3. The defense set forth in this section is not available: 
A. 
To a person who intentionally or knowingly committed the homicide for which 
he the person is being tried; 
B. To a person who recklessly placed himself that person in a situation in which it 
was reasonably probable that he the person would be subjected to duress; or 
C. 
To a person who with criminal negligence placed himself that person in a 
situation in which it was reasonably probable that he the person would be subjected 
to duress, whenever criminal negligence suffices to establish culpability for the 
offense charged. 
Sec. 22. 17-A MRS A §104, as repealed and replaced by PL 1975, c. 740, §26, is 
amended to read: 
§I04. Use offorce in defense of premises 
I. 
A person in possession or control of premises or a person who is licensed or 
privileged to be thereon is justified in using nondeadly force upon another person when 
and to the extent that he the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or 
terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such 
premises. 
2. 
A person in possession or control of premises or a person who is licensed or 
privileged to be thereon is justified in using deadly force upon another person when and 
to the extent that he the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent an attempt by 
the other person to commit arson. 
3. A person in possession or control of a dwelling place or a person who is licensed 
or privileged to be therein is justified in using deadly force upon another person: 
A. Under the circumstances enumerated in section 108; or 
B. When he the person reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent 
or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such other person, who he the 
person reasonably believes: 
(1) Has entered or is attempting to enter the dwelling place or has surreptitiously 
remained within the dwelling place without a license or privilege to do so; and 
(2) Is committing or is likely to commit some other crime within the dwelling 
place. 
4. 
A person may use deadly force under subsection 3, paragraph B, only if he the 
person first demands the person against whom such deadly force is to be used to 
terminate the criminal trespass and the other person trespasser fails to immediately 
comply with the demand, unless he the person reasonably believes that it would be 
dangerous to himself the person or another a 3rd person to make the demand. 
5. As used in this section: 
A. Dwelling place has the same meaning provided in section 2, subsection 10; and 
B. Premises includes, but is not limited to, lands, private ways and any buildings or 
structures thereon. 
Sec. 23. 17-A MRSA §105, as amended by PL 1975, c. 740, §27, is further 
amended to read: 
§I05. Use offorce in property offenses 
A person is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon another 
person when and to the extent that he the person reasonably believes it necessary to 
prevent what is or reasonably appears to be an unlawful taking of hls the person's 
property, or criminal mischief, or to retake hls the person's property immediately 
following its taking; but he the person may use deadly force only under such 
circumstances as are prescribed in sections 104, 107, and 108. 
Sec. 24. 17-A MRS A §106, as amended by PL 2003, c. 143, §§1 and 2, is further 
amended to read: 
§I06. Physical force by persons with special responsibilities 
1. A parent, foster parent, guardian or other similar person responsible for the long 
term general care and welfare of -a- another person is justified in using a reasonable 
degree of force against such other person when and to the extent that he the person 
reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or punish such other person's misconduct. A 
person to whom such parent, foster parent, guardian or other responsible person has 
expressly delegated permission to so prevent or punish misconduct is similarly justified in 
using a reasonable degree of force. 
I-A. 
For purposes of subsection 1, "reasonable degree of force" is an objective 
standard. To constitute a reasonable degree of force, the physical force applied to the 
person may result in no more than transient discomfort or minor temporary marks on that 
person. 
2. 
A teacher or other person entrusted with the care or supervision of a person for 
special and limited purposes is justified in using a reasonable degree of force against any 
such person who creates a disturbance when and to the extent that he the teacher or other 
entrusted person reasonably believes it necessary to control the disturbing behavior or to 
remove a person from the scene of such disturbance. 
3. 
A person responsible for the general care and supervlSlon of a mentally 
incompetent person is justified in using a reasonable degree of force against such person 
who creates a disturbance when and to the extent that he the responsible person 
reasonably believes it necessary to control the disturbing behavior or to remove such 
person from the scene of such disturbance. 
4. The justification extended in subsections 2 and 3 does not apply to the intentional 
or reckless use of force that creates a substantial risk of death, serious bodily injury or 
extraordinary pain. 
5. A person required by law to enforce rules and regulations, or to maintain decorum 
or safety, in a vessel, aircraft, vehicle, train or other carrier, or in a place where others are 
., 
~ 
assembled, may use nondeadly force when and to the extent that he the person reasonably 
believes it necessary for such purposes. 
6. 
A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit 
suicide or to ~ 
self-inflict serious bodily injury upon himself may use a degree of 
force on such other person as he the person reasonably believes to be necessary to thwart 
such a result. 
7. A licensed physician, or a person acting under his a licensed physician's direction, 
may use force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment whieh he 
that the physician reasonably believes will tend to safeguard the physical or mental health 
of the patient, provided such treatment is administered: 
A. With consent of the patient or, if the patient is a minor or incompetent person, 
with the consent of the person entrusted with his the patient's care and supervision; or 
B. In an emergency relating to health when the physician reasonably believes that no 
one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person concerned 
for the welfare of the patient would consent. 
8. 
A person identified in this section for purposes of specifying the rule of 
justification herein provided, is not precluded from using force declared to be justifiable 
by another section of this chapter. 
Sec. 25. 
17-A MRSA §107, as amended by PL 2003, c. 143, §3, 1S further 
amended to read: 
§107. Physical force in law enforcement 
1. A law enforcement officer is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly 
force upon another person: 
A. When and to the extent that the officer reasonably believes it necessary to effect 
an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person, unless the 
officer knows that the arrest or detention is illegal; or 
B. To defend himself or herself In self-defense or to defend a 3rd person from what 
the officer reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful nondeadly force 
encountered while attempting to effect such an arrest or while seeking to prevent such 
an escape. 
2. A law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force only when the officer 
reasonably believes such force is necessary: 
A. To defend himself or herself For self-defense or to defend a 3rd person from what 
the officer reasonably believes is the imminent use of unlawful deadly force; or 
B. To effect an arrest or prevent the escape from arrest of a person when the law 
enforcement officer reasonably believes that the person has committed a crime 
involving the use or threatened use of deadly force, is using a dangerous weapon in 
attempting to escape or otherwise indicates that the person is likely to endanger 
seriously human life or to inflict serious bodily injury unless apprehended without 
delay; and 
(l) The law enforcement officer has made reasonable efforts to advise the person 
that the officer is a law enforcement officer attempting to effect an arrest or 
prevent the escape from arrest and the officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person is aware of this advice; or 
(2) 
The law enforcement officer reasonably believes that the person to be 
arrested otherwise knows that the officer is a law enforcement officer attempting 
to effect an arrest or prevent the escape from arrest. 
For purposes of this paragraph, Ita reasonable belief that another has committed a 
crime involving use or threatened use of deadly force" means such reasonable belief 
in facts, circumstances and the law wffieh that, if true, would constitute such an 
offense by that person. If the facts and circumstances reasonably believed would not 
constitute such an offense, an erroneous but reasonable belief that the law IS 
otherwise justifies the use of deadly force to make an arrest or prevent an escape. 
3. A private person who has been directed by a law enforcement officer to assist the 
officer in effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody is justified in using: 
A. A reasonable degree of nondeadly force when and to the extent that the private 
person reasonably believes such to be necessary to carry out the officer's direction, 
unless the private person believes the arrest is illegal; or 
B. 
Deadly force only when the private person reasonably believes such to be 
necessary to defend himself or herself for self-defense or to defend a 3rd person from 
what the private person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful 
deadly force, or when the law enforcement officer directs the private person to use 
deadly force and the private person believes the officer is authorized to use deadly 
force under the circumstances. 
4. 
A private person acting on his or her that private person's own is justified in 
usmg: 
A. A reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon another person when and to the 
extent that the private person reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest or 
detention that is lawful for the private person to make or prevent the escape from 
such an arrest or detention; or 
B. Deadly force only when the private person reasonably believes such force IS 
necessary: 
(1) 
To defend the person or a 3rd person from what the private citizen 
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful deadly force; or 
(2) To effect a lawful arrest or prevent the escape from such arrest of a person 
who in fact: 
(a) Has committed a crime involving the use or threatened use of deadly 
force, or is using a dangerous weapon in attempting to escape; and 
Page II - 123LR1481(Ol)-1 
(b) The private citizen has made reasonable efforts to advise the person that 
the citizen is a private citizen attempting to effect an arrest or prevent the 
escape from arrest and has reasonable grounds to believe the person is aware 
of this advice or the citizen reasonably believes that the person to be arrested 
otherwise knows that the citizen is a private citizen attempting to effect an 
arrest or prevent the escape from arrest. 
5. 
Except where otherwise expressly provided, a corrections officer, corrections 
supervisor or law enforcement officer in a facility where persons are confined, pursuant 
to an order of a court or as a result of an arrest, is justified in using deadly force against 
such persons under the circumstances described in subsection 2. The officer or another 
individual responsible for the custody, care or treatment of those persons is justified in 
using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force when and to the extent the officer or the 
individual reasonably believes it necessary to prevent any escape from custody or to 
enforce the rules of the facility. 
5-A. 
A corrections officer, corrections supervisor or law enforcement officer is 
justified in using deadly force against a person confined in the Maine State Prison when 
the officer or supervisor reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent an 
escape from custody. The officer or supervisor shall make reasonable efforts to advise 
the person that if the attempt to escape does not stop immediately, deadly force will be 
used. This subsection does not authorize any corrections officer, corrections supervisor 
or law enforcement officer who is not employed by a state agency to use deadly force. 
7. Use of force that is not justifiable under this section in effecting an arrest does not 
render illegal an arrest that is otherwise legal and the use of such unjustifiable force does 
not render inadmissible anything seized incident to a legal arrest. 
S. Nothing in this section constitutes justification for conduct by a law enforcement 
officer or a private person amounting to an offense against innocent persons whom the 
officer or private person is not seeking to arrest or retain in custody. 
Sec. 26. 17-A MRSA §108, as amended PL 1997, c. 351, §1, is further amended 
to read: 
§10S. Physical force in defense of a person 
1. 
A person is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon 
another person in order to defend himself the person or a 3rd person from what he the 
person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such 
other person, and he the person may use a degree of such force ",,chioh he that the person 
reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose. However, such force is not 
justifiable if: 
7 
A. With a purpose to cause physical harm to another person, he the person provoked 
the use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person; or 
B. He The person was the initial aggressor, unless after such aggression he the 
person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other 
person ffis the intent to do so, but the lattef other person notwithstanding continues 
the use or threat of unlawful, nondeadly force; or 
C. The force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not authorized by 
law. 
I-A. A person is not justified in using nondeadly force against another person who 
that person knows or reasonably should know is a law enforcement officer attempting to 
effect an arrest or detention, regardless of whether the arrest or detention is legal. A 
person is justified in using the degree of nondeadly force the person reasonably believes 
is necessary to defend the person or a 3rd person against a law enforcement officer who, 
lOin effecting an arrest or detention, uses nondeadly force not justified under section 107, 
subsection 1. 
2. A person is justified in using deadly force upon another person: 
A. When the person reasonably believes it necessary and reasonably believes such 
other person is: 
(1) About to use unlawful, deadly force against the person or a 3rd person; or 
(2) Committing or about to commit a kidnapping, robbery or a violation of 
section 253, subsection 1, paragraph A, against the person or a 3rd person; or 
B. When he the person reasonably believes: 
(1) That such other person has entered or is attempting to enter a dwelling place 
or has surreptitiously remained within a dwelling place without a license or 
privilege to do so; and 
(2) That deadly force is necessary to prevent the infliction of bodily injury by 
such other person upon himself the person or a 3rd person present in the dwelling 
place; 
C. However, a person is not justified in using deadly force as provided in paragraph 
A, if: 
(1) With the intent to cause physical harm to another, he the person provokes 
such other person to use unlawful deadly force against anyone; er 
(2) He The person knows that the person against whom the unlawful deadly 
force is directed intentionally and unlawfully provoked the use of such force; or 
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(3) He The person knows that he the person or a 3rd person can, with complete 
safety~ 
(a) fetfeat Retreat from the encounter, except that he the person or the 3rd 
person is not required to retreat if he the person or the 3rd person is in ffis the 
person's dwelling place and was not the initial aggressor; er 
(b) surrender Surrender property to a person asserting a colorable claim of 
right thereto; or 
(c) 
comply Comply with a demand that he the person abstain from 
performing an act which he that the person is not obliged to perform. 
SUMMARY 
This bill is submitted by the Criminal Law Advisory Committee. 
The bill amends Part 1 of the Maine Criminal Code to make it gender-neutral.