An Act To Enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act Amendments of 1996 and 2001
Maine Legislature, Session 121, LD 0986
Committee: Judiciary
Sponsors: LaFOUNTAIN, DOUGLASS, MAYO, PENDLETON, ROTUNDO
Amends: 19-A MRSA §2802, 19-A MRSA §2803, 19-A MRSA §3004, 19-A MRSA §3004-A, 19-A MRSA §3005, 19-A MRSA §300, 19-A MRSA §3007, 9-A MRSA §3007, 19-A MRSA §3008-A, 19-A MRSA §3010, 19-A MRSA §3011, 19-A MRSA §3012, 19-A MRSA §3016, 19-A MRSA §3017, 19-A MRSA §3051, 19-A MRSA §3101-B, 19-A MRSA §3101-F, 19-A MRSA §3102, 19-A MRSA §3201, 19-A MRSA §3203, 19-A MRSA §3252, 19-A MRSA §3253, 19-A MRSA §3254, 19-A MRSA §3301, 19-A MRSA §3352

Legislative Document 
No. 986 
S.P.327 
In Senate, February 25, 2003 
An Act To Enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
Amendments of 1996 and 2001 
Reference to the Committee on Judiciary suggested and ordered printed. 
Presented by Senator LaFOUNTAIN of York. 
JOY J. O'BRIEN 
Secretary of the Senate 
Cosponsored by Senators: DOUGLASS of Androscoggin, MAYO of Sagadahoc, 
PENDLETON of Cumberland, ROTUNDO of Androscoggin. 
Printed on recyc led paper 
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine as follows: 
UNIFORM COMMENT 
PREFATORY NOTE 
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
In 1992 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws 
[hereafter 
NCCUSL, 
the 
Conference, 
or 
Uniform 
Law 
Commissioners] promulgated the UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT 
ACT 
[hereafter UIFSA] 
as 
a 
complete replacement for the 
two 
then-existing 
uniform 
interstate 
support 
acts, 
the 
UNIFORM 
RECIPROCAL 
ENFORCEMENT 
OF 
SUPPORT ACT 
[URESA] 
and its revised 
version [RURESA]. In 1993 two States, Arkansas and Texas, enacted 
UIFSA. 
By the summer of 1996, 
States had adopted the new 
Uniform Act. That year was a very eventful one in the history of 
UIFSA. First, a Drafting Committee was convened in Spring 1996 in 
response to requests from representatives of employer groups for 
more 
specific 
statutory 
directions 
regarding 
interstate 
child-support 
withholding 
orders. 
Second, 
the 
child-support 
community 
(primarily 
the 
IV-D 
programs 
funded 
by 
federal 
subsidies) 
requested review of the substantive and procedural 
provJ.SJ.ons. 
As 
a result, significant amendments to UIFSA were 
adopted by the Conference in July, 1996. 
The Conference promulgated UIFSA in July, 1996. Less than one 
month later, the U.S. Congress assured that nationwide acceptance 
of the amended Act was virtually certain. In the "welfare reform" 
legislation passed 
in 
August 
1996, 
officially 
known 
as 
the 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
WORK 
OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT 
OF 
1996 
(PRWORA), 
the 
enactment 
of 
UIFSA, 
as 
amended, 
was 
mandated as a condition of state eligibility for the federal 
funding of child support enforcement, as follows: 
Sec. 321. ADOPTION OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS [42 U.S.C. Section 666) 
is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
"( f) Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. --In order to satisfy 
[42 U.S.C. 654(20)(A)], on and after January 1, 1998, each State 
must have in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as 
approved by the American Bar Association on February 9, 
1993, 
together with any amendments officially adopted before January 1, 
1998, 
by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform 
State Laws." P.L. 104-193, Section 321, no Stat. 2221. 
For 
a 
comprehensive history of the events leading up to the 
replacement of URESA and RURESA by UIFSA, see the Prefatory Notes 
to the 1992 and 1996 versions of the Act found in 9 UNIFORM LAWS 
ANNOTATED 253, 393 (2000), or John J. Sampson, Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act with Unofficial Annotations, 27 FAM. 
L.Q. 91 
(1993), and John J. Sampson, Uniform Interstate Family Support 
Act (1996), 
Statutory Text. Prefatory Note, 
and Commissioners 
Comments 
(with More Unofficial Annotations), 
FAM. 
L.Q. 
(1998). 
In accordance with the congressional mandate, by 1998 all U.S. 
jurisdictions had enacted UIFSA. Thus, the several states have 
had between four and eight years of experience with the various 
iterations of the Act. Moreover, there has been an extraordinary 
amount of comprehensive training about the Act by the child 
support enforcement agencies throughout the nation and associated 
agencies 
and 
organizations 
of 
those 
agencies, 
~: U. S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Child Support 
Enforcemen t 
(OCSE) ; 
National 
Child 
Support 
Enforcement 
Association 
(NCSEA)i 
Eastern Regional Interstate Child Support 
Association 
(ERICSA); 
and, 
Western 
Interstate 
Child 
Support 
Enforcement Council (WICSEC). As a consequence, the provisions of 
UIFSA are far more familiar to those who must administer it than 
ever was true of its predecessor acts, URESA and RURESA. 
In 2000 the child-support community again requested that the Act 
be reviewed and amendments suggested as appropriate. In response 
to 
this 
request, 
the 
Conference 
leadership 
appointed 
a 
new 
Drafting Committee (the earlier Committee had been disbanded). A 
single meeting in March 2001 led to significant sUbstantive and 
procedural 
amendments 
that 
ultimately 
were 
approved 
by 
the 
Conference at its Annual Meeting in August, 
2001. 
None of the 
amendments, however, make a fundamental change in the policies 
and 
procedures 
established 
1n 
UIFSA 
1996. 
The 
widespread 
acceptance 
of 
UIFSA 
is 
due 
primarily 
to 
the 
fact 
that 
representatives 
of 
the 
child 
support 
enforcement 
community 
mentioned above participated actively in the drafting of each 
version of the Act, including the amendments of 2001. 
In sum, 
al though two sets of amendments have been propounded since the 
initial 1992 version of UIFSA, its basic principles have remained 
constant. 
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF UIFSA 
A. In General 
1. RECIPROCITY NOT REQUIRED BETWEEN STATES. Reciprocal laws, the 
hallmark of 
RURESA 
and URESA, 
are not required under 
UIFSA. 
Although reciprocity became irrelevant in this country with the 
universal adoption of UIFSA, reciprocity continues to be an issue 
with regard to the recognition and enforcement of support orders 
of foreign countries and their political subdivisions, Sections 
(21), 104, 308. Respect and tolerance for the laws of other 
states 
and 
nations 
in 
order 
to 
facilitate 
child 
support 
enforcement is another prime goal of the Act. 
continue 
this 
perspective 
by 
explicitly 
tribunals may extend the principle of comity 
orders, Sections 104 and 210. 
The 2001 amendments 
recognizing 
that 
to foreign support 
2. 
LONG-ARM JURISDICTION. 
UIFSA contains a broad provision for 
asserting long-arm jurisdiction to provide 
a 
tribunal in the 
State of residence of the spouse or a child entitled to support 
wi th 
the 
maximum 
possible 
opportunity 
to 
secure 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
an 
absent 
respondent, 
Section 
201. 
This 
converts what otherwise would be a two-state proceeding into a 
one-state proceeding. 
When jurisdiction over 
a 
nonresident is 
obtained, 
the 
tribunal 
may 
obtain 
evidence, 
provide 
for 
discovery, 
and 
elicit 
testimony 
through 
use 
of 
the 
same 
"information route" provided for two-state proceedings, Sections 
210, 316-318. Amendments in 2001 to the basic long-arm provision, 
Section 201, 
clarified and strengthened the interrelationship 
between the assertion of such jurisdiction and the continuing 
nature of personal jurisdiction for enforcement and modification 
of a support order, Sections 205 and 206. 
B. Establishing a Support Order 
1. 
FAMILY 
SUPPORT. 
The Act may be used only 
involving the 
support of 
a 
child or 
spouse 
obligor; it does 
not include enforcement of 
support found in the statutes of a few states, 
support of an elderly or disabled parent by 
Sections 101(2),(18). 
for proceedings 
of 
the 
support 
other duties of 
such as requiring 
an adult child, 
2. LOCAL LAW. 
UIFSA provides that the procedures and law of the 
forum apply, with some significant additions or exceptions: 
(a) Certain procedures are prescribed for interstate cases even 
if they are not consistent with local law, i. e.: the contents of 
interstate petitions, Sections 311 and 602; the nondisclosure of 
certain sensitive information, Section 312; authority to award 
fees 
and 
costs 
including 
attorney's 
fees, 
Section 
313; 
elimination of certain testimonial immunities, Section 314; and, 
limits on the assertion of nonparentage as a defense to support 
enforcement, Section 315. 
(b) 
Visitation 
issues 
cannot 
proceedings, Section 305(d). 
be 
raised 
in 
child 
support 
(c) Special rules for the interstate transmission of evidence and 
discovery 
are 
added 
to 
help 
place 
the 
maximum 
amount 
of 
information before the deciding tribunal. These procedures are 
available in cases in which the tribunal asserts jurisdiction 
over a nonresident, 
(Sections 210, 
316-318), and may have the 
effect of amending local law in long-arm cases. 
(d) The choice-of-law rule for the interpretation of a registered 
order is that the law of the issuing State governs the underlying 
terms of the controlling support order. One important exception 
exists; if the registering and issuing State have different 
statutes of limitation for enforcement, 
the longer time limit 
applies, Section 604. 
3. 
CONTINUING 
EXCLUSIVE 
JURISDICTION 
AND 
THE 
ONE-ORDER 
SYSTEM. 
Under URESA and RURESA the majority of support proceedings were 
de 
novo. 
Even 
when 
an 
existing 
order 
of 
one 
State 
was 
"registered" in a 
second' State, 
the registering State often 
asserted the right to modify the registered order. This meant 
that multiple 
support orders 
could 
be 
in effect in several 
states. 
As 
far as is possible, 
under UIFSA the principle of 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction aims to recognize that only 
one valid support order 
may 
be effective at anyone time, 
Sections 
205-207. 
This principle is carried out in Sections 
203-211. 
4. 
PRIVATE 
ATTORNEYS. 
UIFSA explicitly authorizes parties to 
retain private legal counsel in support proceedings, Section 309, 
as well as to use the services of a state support enforcement 
agency, Section 307(a). The Act- expressly takes no position on 
whether 
the 
support 
enforcement 
agency's 
assistance 
of 
a 
supported f~nily establishes an attorney-client relationship with 
the applicant, Section 307(c). 
5. 
EFFICIENCY. 
UIFSA 
streamlines 
interstate 
proceedings 
as 
follows: 
(a) Proceedings may be initiated by or referred to administrative 
agencies rather than to courts in those states that use those 
agencies to establish support orders, Section 101(22). 
(b) Under the old system, the process began by requiring a local 
"initiating tribunal" 
to 
make 
a 
preliminary 
(and nonbinding) 
determination of 
a 
duty to support, 
and then forwarding the 
documents to a 
"responding tribunal" for 
a 
binding decision. 
Under UIFSA an individual party or support enforcement agency in 
the initiating State may file a proceeding directly in a tribunal 
in the responding State, Section 301. This innovation by UIFSA 
has 
proven 
to 
be 
a 
major 
contribution 
to 
efficient 
case 
management. 
In the unlikely event that 
some local action is 
needed, initiation of an interstate case in the initiating State 
1S 
expressly 
made 
ministerial 
rather 
than 
a 
matter 
for 
adjudication or review by a tribunal. 
(c) 
To 
facilitate 
efficient 
interstate 
establishment, 
enforcement, 
and modification of child support orders, 
forms 
sanctioned by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement are 
available. Although developed in conjunction with the federal 
IV-D program, private parties and their attorneys who are engaged 
in an interstate child support case are well advised to use the 
appropriate 
forms 
for 
transmission 
of 
information 
to 
the 
responding State, Section 311(b). The information in those forms 
is declared to be admissible evidence, Section 3l6(b). 
(d) Authority is provided for the transmission 
documents 
through 
electronic 
and 
other 
communication, Section 3l6(e). 
of information and 
modern 
means 
of 
(e) Tribunals 
witness to be 
Section 316 (f) • 
are directed 
deposed or 
to 
to 
permit 
testify 
an 
by 
out-of-state party or 
telephone conference, 
(f) Tribunals are required to cooperate in the discovery process 
for use in a tribunal in another State, Section 318. 
(g) 
A 
tribunal 
and 
a 
support 
enforcement 
agency 
providing 
services to a supported family must keep the parties informed 
about all important developments in a case, Sections 305 and 307. 
(h) 
A registered support order 
enforceable unless the respondent 
within a 
fixed period of time, 
suggested originally, Sections 603 
is 
confirmed 
and 
immediately 
files an objection in a record 
almost invariably the 20 days 
and 607. 
6. 
INTERSTATE 
PARENTAGE. 
UIFSA 
authorizes 
establishment 
of 
parentage in an interstate proceeding, even if not coupled with a 
proceeding to establish support, Section 701. 
c. Enforcing a Support Order 
1. 
DIRECT 
ENFORCEMENT. 
UIFSA 
provides 
two 
direct enforcement 
procedures that do not require assistance from a tribunal. First, 
a 
notice may 
be sent directly to the obligor's employer 
in 
another State, Section 501, which triggers income withholding by 
that employer without the necessity of 
a 
hearing unless the 
employee objects. The Act details the procedure to be followed by 
the employer in response to an interstate request for direct 
income 
withholding, 
Sections 
502-506. 
Additionally, 
the 
Act 
provides for direct administrative enforcement by the support 
enforcement agency of the obligor's State, Section 507. 
2. REGISTRATION. Enforcement of a support order of another State 
or nation involving a tribunal of the forum State begins with the 
registration of the existing support order in a tribunal of the 
responding State, Sections 601-604. However, the registered order 
continues to be the order of the issuing State, Sections 605-608. 
The role of the responding State is limited to enforcing that 
order 
except 
in 
the 
very 
limited circumstances 
under 
which 
modification is permitted, infra. 
D. Modifying a Support Order 
1. REGISTRATION. The first step for a party (whether obligor or 
obligee) requesting a tribunal of another State to modify an 
existing child support order is to follow the identical procedure 
for registration as when enforcement is sought. All modification 
requests are subject to strict rules, infra, although different 
sequences are allowable: i.e., registration for enforcement and a 
later request for modification; or, a request for contemporaneous 
modification and enforcement. 
2. 
MODIFICATION 
STATUTORILY 
RESTRICTED. 
Under UIFSA, 
the only 
tribunal 
that 
can 
modify 
a 
support 
order 
is 
one 
having 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the support issue. As an 
initial matter, this is the tribunal that first acquires personal 
and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and the support 
obligation. If modification of the order by the issuing tribunal 
is no longer appropriate, another tribunal may become vested with 
the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction necessary to modify the 
order. Primarily this occurs when neither the individual parties 
nor the child reside in the issuing State, or when the parties 
agree in a record that another tribunal may assume modification 
jurisdiction. 
Only 
then 
may 
another 
tribunal 
with 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
parties 
assume 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction and have jurisdiction to modify the order, Sections 
205,206, 603(c), 609-612. Further, except for modification by 
agreement, 
Section 205 and 207, 
or when the parties have all 
moved to the same new State, Section 613, the party petitioning 
for modification must be a nonresident of the responding State 
and must submit himself or herself to the forum State, which must 
have personal jurisdiction over the respondent, Section 611. The 
vast majority of 
the 
time 
this 
is 
the State 
in which 
respondent 
resides. 
A 
colloquial 
short-hand 
summary 
of 
principle is that ordinarily the movant for modification 
child support order "must play an away game." 
the 
the 
of a 
A 2001 amendment adds that even if the parties and child have 
moved from the issuing State they may agree that the tribunal 
that issued the controlling order will continue to exercise its 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, Section 205. This recognizes 
the fact that it may be preferable for the parties to return to a 
tr ibunal familiar with the issues rather than to be required to 
fully inform another tribunal of all the facts and issues that 
have 
been 
previously 
litigated. 
This 
exception 
may 
be 
particularly 
appropriate 
if 
both 
child-support 
and 
spousal-support are involved in the same case; under this Act, 
jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order is exclusively 
reserved to the issuing tribunal, regardless of where the parties 
reside. 
Section 
makes 
an 
obvious 
exception 
to 
the 
nonresident 
petitioner rule: if the child no longer resides in the issuing 
State and the parties have moved from the issuing State and by 
coincidence or design currently reside in the same State, that 
State has jurisdiction to modify the existing order and assume 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the child support order. 
Section 614 places the duty on the party obtaining a modification 
to provide notice of the new order to all interested tribunals, 
and grants the tribunal authority to sanction a party who fails 
to perform this duty of notice. 
To facilitate modification across international borders, another 
exception to the nonresident petitioner rule was added in 1996 
for child support orders issued by foreign jurisdictions. The 
amendments of 2001 recodified this procedure in a 
wholly new 
provision. Section 615 expands on the right of a tribunal of one 
of the several states to modify a 
child support order of 
a 
foreign country or political subdivision if that jurisdiction is 
prevented from modifying its order under its local law and the 
modification would be consistent with standards of due process. 
Sec. 1. 19-A MRSA §2802, sub-§7, as enac ted by PL 1995, 
c . 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
1. 
Initiating state. 
"Initiating state" means a state 3:B 
from which a proceeding is forwarded or in which a proceeding is 
filed for forwarding to a responding state under this chapter or 
a 
law or procedure substantially similar to this chapterr--t:-ae 
YB~€e~ffi--~~~~-~~~--~--gyppe~t--AGt:--~--~£~--Rev~see 
YBi~e~ffi--Reeip~eea±--EB~e~eeffieBt--e~--gyppe~t--Aet--i6--~i±ee--feF 
~e~wa~e~B~-te-a-~e6peBe3:B~-6tate. 
Sec. 2. 19-A MRSA §2802, sub-§§13-A and 13-B are enacted to 
read: 
I3-A. 
Person. 
"Person" means an individual; corporation; 
business trust; estate; trust; partnership; 
limited liability 
company; 
association; 
joint venture; 
government; 
governmental 
subdivision, 
agency or instrumentality; public corporation; or 
any other legal or commercial entity. 
B. 
Record. 
"Record" means information that is inscribed 
on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other 
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. 
Sec. 3. 19-A MRSA §2802, sub-§16, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
16. 
Responding state. 
"Responding state" means a state t:e 
in which 
a 
proceeding is filed or to which a 
proceeding is 
forwarded for filing from an initiating state under this chapter 
or a law or procedure substantially similar to this chapterT-~ae 
YaifeFm--~~~~~-~~~--~--SQPpeFt:-~~-~--~£€--&evi6eQ 
YaifeFm-&eeipFeeal-EafeFeemeat:-ef-SQPpeFt:-Aet:. 
Sec. 4. 19-A MRSA §2802, sub-§19, as amended by PL 1997, c. 
669, §13, is further amended to read: 
19. 
State. 
"State" means a state of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, t:ae-Gemmeawealt:a-ef Puerto Rico, the United 
States Virgin Islands or any territory or insular possession 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
The 
term 
" s tate" 
inc 1 ude s 
aa- --I-n4i.~- -t;.F-ibe-- -aaQ- - -i-n€-d.-OOe-£-- -a-- - feFei~a 
jQFi6Qiet:iea--~~-~-e£~aa~i£aea--pFeeeQQFe&-~~--i££~~€--aaa 
eafeFeemeat:-~--&~~~F~-e£Qe££-~~--aFe-£~~~~£~-i~~~y-~~~~F--t:e 
t:ae--~~~~~€£--~---~ai&--€aa~~e£7--~~-~~~~~--&eeipFeeal 
EafeFeemeat-~~-~~~~--Ae~r-~--~ae--~¥~&&G-~~~~-&eeipFeeal 
EafeFeemeat-ef-SQPpeFt:-AetT~ 
A. 
An Indian tribe; and 
B. 
A foreign country or political subdivision that: 
(1) 
Has been declared to be a foreign reciprocating 
country or political subdivision under federal law; 
(2) 
Has established a reciprocal arrangement for child 
support with this State as provided in section 3008-A; 
or 
(3) 
Has enacted a law or established procedures for 
issuance and enforcement of support orders that are 
substantially similar 
to 
the 
procedures 
under 
this 
chapter. 
Sec. 5. 19-A MRSA §2802, sub-§21, 1f1fC and D, as enacted by PL 
1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, are amended to 
read: 
C. 
Determination of parentage; eF 
D. 
The location of obligors or their assetsTL-Q£ 
Sec.6. 19-A MRSA §2802, sub-§21, ~E is enacted to read: 
E. 
Determination of the controlling child support order. 
Sec. 7. 19-A MRSA §2802, sub-§22, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
22. 
Support 
order. 
"Support 
order" 
means 
a 
judgment, 
decree 
9FL 
order 
or 
directive, 
whether 
temporary, 
final 
or 
subject to modification, issued by a 
tribunal for the benefit of 
a child, a spouse or a former spouse, that provides for monetary 
support, 
health care, 
arrearages 
or 
reimbursement. 
"Support 
order" 
may 
include 
related costs 
and 
fees, 
interest, 
income 
withholding, attorney's fees and other relief. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 102 of the Uniform Act.) 
The 
terms 
defined in 
UIFSA 
have 
undergone 
relatively little 
amendment since its original promulgation in 1992. Two new terms 
were added in 2001--"person" and "record," found in Subsections 
(14) and (15), respectively. Other definitions have been amended 
slightly over the years, but none as significantly as the 2001 
amendments to the definition of "State" in Subsection (21). 
Many crucial definitions continue to be left to local law. For 
example, 
the definitions of "child" and "child-support order" 
provided 
by 
Subsections 
(1) 
and 
(2) 
refer 
to 
"the 
age 
of 
majority" without further elaboration. The exact age at which a 
child becomes an adult for different purposes is a matter for the 
law of each State, as is the age at which a parent's duty to 
furnish child support terminates. Similarly, 
a 
wide variety of 
other terms of art are implicitly left to state law. For example, 
Subsection (23) refers inter alia to "health care, arrearages, or 
reimbursement." All of these terms are subject to individualized 
definitions on a state-by-state basis. 
Subsection 
(3) 
defines 
"duty of 
support" 
to 
mean 
the 
legal 
obligation to provide support, whether or not that duty has been 
the subject of an order by a tribunal. This broad definition 
includes both prospective and retrospective obligations to the 
extent they are imposed by the relevant state law. 
For the limited purpose of resolving certain conflicts in the 
exercise of jurisdiction, Subsection (4) borrows the concept of 
the 
"home State of 
a 
child" 
from 
the 
UNIFORM 
CHILD 
CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION ACT 
(UCCJA) 
and its successor, 
the UNIFORM 
CHILD 
CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION 
AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
ACT 
(UCCJEA), 
versions of 
which have been adopted in all 50 states, 
the federal PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION 
1738A (PKPA). 
and incorporated into 
ACT, 42 U.S.C. Section 
Subsection 
(6) 
is 
written 
broadly 
to 
include 
an 
"income 
withholding 
order" 
based 
on 
"other 
legal 
process," 
as 
distinguished from "by order of a tribunal." Some states issue 
such orders administratively, which are entitled to enforcement 
notwithstanding 
the 
fact 
that 
no 
judicial or 
quasi-judicial 
process is involved. Federal law requires that, in order to be 
eligible for federal subsidy monies, each State must provide for 
income withholding 
"without the necessity of 
any application 
therefor, or for any further action by the court or other entity 
which issued such order ." 42 U.S.C. Section 666(b)(2). States 
have complied with this requirement in a variety of ways. 
From its beginning 
UIFSA 
has 
permitted direct filing of 
an 
interstate proceeding in a 
responding State wi thout an initial 
filing in an initiating tribunal. This has become the standard 
operating procedure for child support enforcement agencies. Thus, 
a petitioner in one State may seek to establish, enforce, or 
modify a support order in a second State by either filing in the 
responding state's tribunal or by directly seeking the assistance 
of the support enforcement agency in the second State. Although 
Subsections 
(7), 
(8), 
(18) 
and 
(19) 
supply definitions 
for 
"ini tiating and responding State" and "initiating and responding 
tribunal," the procedure of "initiation and response" established 
by 
the predecessor 
acts 
of 
URESA 
and 
RURESA 
has 
become 
an 
anachronism since the universal enactment of UIFSA. 
Until the 2001 amendments, the relationship between UIFSA and the 
prior uniform acts was captured in the reference to URESA and 
RURESA 
as 
"substantially 
similar" 
acts. 
This 
phrasing 
in 
Subsections 
(7) , 
(18) 
and 
(21) , 
and 
repeated 
several 
times 
throughout the Act, has been deleted everywhere it appears to 
avoid confusion that might arise from appearing to incorporate 
statutes that have been replaced. This is not to suggest in any 
way that support orders issued under URESA or RURESA are not 
fully enforceable under UIFSA. Until valid orders issued under 
those laws expire of their own terms or are replaced by new UIFSA 
orders, 
the 
support orders 
themselves will 
continue 
to 
have 
vitality, 
see 
Sections 
201-211, 
infra. 
In 
short, 
UIFSA 
is 
specifically designed to function with the earlier acts without 
conflict. Support orders issued under one of the earlier acts 
should be honored and enforced in every State. But, despite their 
common 
roots, 
neither 
URESA 
nor 
RURESA 
can 
be 
said 
to 
be 
"substantially similar" with regard to the continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction/one-order system established in UIFSA. 
States are 
directed to accord full enforcement remedies to support orders 
issued under the prior acts, but they must apply UIFSA restraint 
regarding modification. In situations involving multiple orders 
created under the former system, UIFSA mandates the application 
of its one-order rules to determine the single order that is 
entitled to prospective enforcement, see Section 207, infra. 
The 
term "obligee" in Subsection (12) 
is defined in a 
broad 
manner, which is consistent with common usage. In instances of 
spousal support, the person owed the duty of support and the 
person receiving the payments are almost always the same. Use of 
the term is more complicated in the context of child support. The 
child is the person to whom the duty of support is owed, 
and 
therefore 
can 
be 
viewed 
as 
the 
ultimate 
obligee. 
However, 
"obligee" 
usually 
refers 
to 
the 
individual 
receiving 
the 
payments. While this is most commonly the custodial parent or 
other legal custodian, the "obligee" may be a support enforcement 
agency that has 
been 
assigned 
the 
right to 
receive 
support 
payments 
in 
order 
to 
recoup 
Temporary 
Assistance 
for 
Needy 
Families (TANF) , 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., formerly known as 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC). 
Even in the 
absence of such an assignment, 
a State may have an independent 
statutory claim for reimbursement for general assistance provided 
to a spouse, a former spouse, or a child of an obligor. The Act 
also uses "obligee" to identify an individual who is asserting a 
claim for support, not just for a person whose right to support 
is unquestioned, presumed, or has been established in a 
legal 
proceeding. 
Subsection 
(13) 
provides 
the 
correlative 
def ini tion 
of 
an 
"obligor," which includes an individual who is alleged to owe a 
duty 
of 
support 
as 
well 
as 
a 
person 
whose 
obligation 
has 
previously been determined. 
The terms "obligor" and "obligee" inherently contain the legal 
obligation 
to payor 
receive 
support, 
and 
both 
terms 
also 
implicitly refer to the individuals with a 
duty to support a 
child. The one-order system of UIFSA can succeed only if the 
respective obligations of support are adjusted as the physical 
possession of a child changes between parents or involves a third 
party caretaker. This must be accomplished in the context of 
modification, 
and 
not 
by 
the 
creation 
of 
mUltiple 
orders 
attempting to reflect each changing custody scenario. Obviously 
this issue is of concern not only to interstate child-support 
orders, but applies to intrastate orders as well. 
The definition of "record" in new Subsection (14) conforms UIFSA 
to the Conference standard for legal documentation as established 
in 
the 
UNIFORM 
ELECTRONIC 
TRANSACTIONS 
ACT 
Section 
102(13) 
[hereafter 
UETA]. 
Henceforth, 
the phrase 
"in 
a 
record" will 
replace the terminology "in writing" as the appropriate manner to 
recognize 
that 
electronic 
transmissions 
and 
signatures 
are 
increasingly 
appropriate 
substitutes 
for 
more 
traditional 
documentation. 
The definitions of "responding State" and "responding tribunal" 
in Subsections (18) and (19) accommodate the direct filing of a 
petition under UIFSA without the intervention of an initiating 
tribunal. Both definitions acknowledge the possibility that there 
may 
be 
a 
responding 
State 
and 
a 
responding 
tribunal 
in 
a 
situation where 
there 
is 
no 
initiating State 
or 
initiating 
tribunal. 
Subsection 
(21) 
no 
longer 
requires 
reciprocity 
between 
the 
several states, 
formerly 
a 
cornerstone of 
RURESA 
and 
URESA. 
Public policy favoring enforcement of child support orders is 
sufficiently 
strong 
to 
warrant 
waiving 
any 
quid 
pro 
quo 
requirement between U.S. jurisdictions. This was true even before 
the issue was mooted by the enactment of UIFSA by all states by 
1998. 
The 1996 amendment to Subsection (21) clarified the position that 
UIFSA, like RURESA before it, does not waive reciprocity in the 
international 
context. 
A 
major 
amendment 
to 
the 
text 
of 
Subsection (21) was made in 2001 to make clear that a foreign 
country or political subdivision is defined as a 
"State" under 
the Act in three situations. First, 
a declaration by the u.S. 
State Department that a foreign jurisdiction is a reciprocating 
country or political subdivision is controlling for all states. 
Second, in the absence of such a declaration, each of the several 
states 
can 
make 
an 
arrangement 
with 
a 
foreign 
country 
or 
political 
subdivision 
for 
reciprocal 
enforcement 
of 
child 
support. 
Finally, 
a 
finding 
may 
be 
made 
that 
a 
foreign 
jurisdiction has 
a 
law or procedure substantially similar to 
UIFSA. 
That is, 
a 
tribunal 
may 
consider whether 
the 
foreign 
jurisdiction also has laws and procedures that allow for a U.S. 
order to be recognized in that foreign jurisdiction independent 
of 
a 
formal 
reciprocity 
agreement. 
The 
inclusion of 
foreign 
political subdivisions is necessary because in some countries the 
central government will not or cannot bind the subdivisions. For 
example, 
reciprocal arrangements with Canada are made 
on 
the 
province level and not with the Canadian federal government. 
Although 
the 
vast 
bulk 
of 
child 
support 
establishment, 
enforcement, and modification in the United States is performed 
by the state IV-D agencies, see Part IV-D, SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, 
U.S.C. 
Section 651 et seq., 
Subsection (22) defines the term 
"support enforcement agency" to include not only those entities, 
but also any other state or local governmental entities charged 
with establishing or enforcing support. The 2001 amendment simply 
adds 
another 
key 
task 
to 
the 
list 
of 
powers, 
that 
is, 
determination 
of 
the 
controlling 
order 
in 
multiple 
order 
situations. 
In 
1992 
Subsection 
(24) 
introduced 
a 
completely 
new 
term, 
"tribunal," which replaced the term "court" used in RURESA. With 
the advent of federally-funded IV-D programs, a number of states 
have delegated various aspects of child support establishment and 
enforcement to quasi-judicial bodies and administrative agencies. 
The term "tribunal" accounts for the breadth of state variations 
in dealing with support orders. By 2001 the usage has become the 
standard in the child support enforcement community, 
although 
private practitioners who only rarely are involved in such cases 
may still find the term unfamiliar. 
Sec. 8. 19-A MRSA §2803, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is repealed and the following 
enacted in its place: 
§2803. 
Remedies cumulative 
1. 
Remedies cumulative. 
Remedies provided by this chapter 
are cumulative and do not affect the availability of remedies 
under other law, including the recognition of a support order of 
a foreign country or political subdivision on the basis of comity. 
2. 
Not exclusive method; jurisdiction. 
This chapter does 
A. 
Provide 
the 
exclusive 
method 
of 
establishing 
or 
enforcing a support order under the laws of this State; or 
B. 
Grant a tribunal of this State jurisdiction to render 
judgment or issue an order relating to parental rights and 
responsibili ties other than child support in a proceeding 
under this chapter. 
Uniform Conment 
(This is Section 104 of the Uniform Act.) 
The 
existence 
of 
procedures 
for 
interstate 
establishment, 
enforcement, or modification of support or a determination of 
parentage in UIFSA does not preclude the application of the 
general law of the forum. Even if the parents live in different 
states, for example, a petitioner may decide to file an original 
proceeding for child support (and most likely for other relief as 
well) directly in the State of residence of the respondent and 
proceed under that forum's generally applicable support law. In 
so 
doing, 
the 
petitioner 
thereby 
submits 
to 
the 
personal 
jurisdiction of the forum and foregoes reliance on UIFSA. Once a 
child support order has been issued, this option is no longer 
available to interstate parties. Under UIFSA, 
a State may not 
permit a party to proceed to obtain a 
second support order; 
rather, in further litigation the tribunal must apply the Act's 
provisions 
for 
enforcement 
of 
an 
existing 
order 
and 
limit 
modification to the strict standards of UIFSA. 
The 2001 addition to Subsection (a) specifically recognizes the 
doctrine of comity as a legitimate function of state law that on 
a 
proper 
showing provides 
for 
the 
recognition of 
a 
foreign 
support order, see Mississippi Dept. Human Svcs. v. Shelnut, 772 
So.2d 1041 (Miss. 2000). Although the determination by the U.S. 
State Department that a foreign nation is a reciprocating country 
is binding on all states, recognition of foreign support orders 
through comity is dependent on the law of each UIFSA State. The 
reference to "remedies under other law" is intended to recognize 
the principle of comity 
as 
developed in the 
forum State by 
statutory or common 
law, 
rather than to create a substantive 
right independent of that law. 
New Subsection (b) (1) gives notice that UIFSA is not the only 
means 
for establishing or enforcing a 
support order with an 
interstate aspect. Examples abound. A potential child-support 
obligee may voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of another 
State to seek the full range of desired relief under the law of 
that State using intrastate procedures, rather than resorting to 
the interstate procedure provided by UIFSA. A nonresident married 
parent may choose to file a proceeding in the forum State for 
dissolution of 
the marriage, 
including property division and 
spousal support, and in conjunction seek an order regarding child 
custody and visitation and child support. A parent may submit to 
the 
jurisdiction 
of 
another 
State 
for 
a 
determination 
of 
parentage and child support. A support order resulting from each 
of 
these 
scenarios 
implicates 
UIFSA. 
Invariably 
the 
issuing 
tribunal will have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its 
controlling child or 
spousal 
support 
orders 
as 
provided 
by 
Sections 
205, 
207, 
211, 
infra, 
with 
all 
of 
the 
attendant 
application of the Act to those orders. 
On the other hand, Subsection (b) (2) states what is clear under 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions; the bases of jurisdiction for child 
custody 
and 
visitation 
orders 
and 
the 
jurisdiction 
for 
child-support orders 
run 
on separate tracks, 
compare 
May 
v. 
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) with Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 
U.S. 
(1978). If the child-support order is sought. under the 
authority of UIFSA, 
the most. important. aspect of this rule is 
that a child-support obligee utilizing the provisions of UIFSA to 
establish 
child 
support 
across 
State 
lines 
submits 
to 
jurisdiction for child support only, and does not submit to the 
jurisdiction of the responding State with regard to child custody 
or visitation. 
Sec. 9. 19-A MRSA c. 67, sub-c. 2, as amended, is repealed. 
Sec. 10. 19-A MRS A c. 67, sub-c. 2-A is enacted to read: 
SUBCHAPTER 2-A 
JURISDICTION 
§296l. 
Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident 
1. 
Exercise of jurisdiction. 
In a proceeding to establish 
or enforce a support order or to determine parentage of a child, 
a tribunal of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
a 
nonresident 
individual 
or 
the 
individual's 
guardian 
or 
conservator if: 
A. 
The individual is personally served with notice within 
this State; 
B. 
The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this State 
by consent, by entering a general appearance or by filing a 
responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest 
to personal jurisdiction; 
C. 
The individual resided with the child in this State; 
D. 
The 
individual 
resided 
in this 
State 
and 
provided 
prenatal expenses or support for the child; 
E. 
The child resides in this State as a result of the acts 
or directives of the individual; 
F. 
The individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this 
State and the child may have been conceived by that act of 
intercourse; or 
G. 
There 
is 
any 
other 
basis 
consistent 
with 
the 
Constitution of Maine and the United States Constitution for 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
2. 
Use of bases to establish personal jurisdiction. 
The 
bases of personal jurisdiction set forth in subsection 1 or in 
any other law of this State may not be used to acquire personal 
jurisdiction for 
a 
tribunal of the State to modify 
a 
child 
support order of another state unless the requirements of section 
3253 or 3257 are met. 
Page l5-LR0467(1) 
Uniform Connent 
(This is Section 201 of the Uniform Act.) 
Sections 
and 
assert 
what 
is 
commonly 
described 
as 
long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent for purposes 
of 
establishing 
a 
support 
order 
or 
determining 
parentage. 
Inclusion of this long-arm provision in this interstate Act is 
justified because residents of two separate states are involved 
in the litigation, both of whom are subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of the forum. Thus, the case has a clear interstate 
aspect, despite the fact that only the law of the forum State is 
applicable. 
Moreover, 
this is sufficient to invoke additional 
UIFSA 
provisions 
in 
an 
otherwise 
intrastate proceeding. 
See 
Sections 202, 316, and 318, infra. The intent is to insure that 
every enacting State has a long-arm statute that is as broad as 
constitutionally permitted. In situations in which the long-arm 
statute can be satisfied, the petitioner (either the obligor or 
the obligee) has two options: (1) utilize the long-arm statute to 
obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent; or (2) initiate 
a two-state proceeding under the succeeding provisions of UIFSA 
seeking to establish a support order in the respondent's State of 
residence. Of course, a third option is available that does not 
implicate 
UIFSA; 
a 
petitioner 
may 
file 
a 
proceeding in the 
respondent's State of residence (perhaps to settle all issues 
between the parties in a single proceeding). 
This long-arm statute applies to an order for spousal support as 
well as an order for child support. However, almost all of the 
specific 
provisions 
relate 
to 
child 
support 
orders 
or 
determinations of parentage. This derives from the fact that the 
focus of UIFSA is primarily on child support. Only Subsections 
(1), (2) and (8) are applicable to an action for spousal support 
asserting long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident. The first two 
subsections are wholly noncontroversial insofar as an assertion 
of personal jurisdiction is concerned. 
Moreover, 
assertion of 
personal jurisdiction under Subsections (1), 
(2), or (8) will 
doubtless yield jurisdiction over all matters 
to 
be 
decided 
between the spouses, including division of property on divorce. 
Thus, 
the most obvious possible basis for asserting long-arm 
jurisdiction 
over 
spousal 
support, 
i.e., 
"last 
matrimonial 
domicile," is not included in Section 201 to avoid the potential 
problem of 
another 
instance of bifurcated jurisdiction. 
This 
restraint avoids 
a 
situation in which 
UIFSA grants 
long-arm 
jurisdiction for a spousal support order when the forum State has 
no correlative statute for property division in divorce. 
Under RURESA, multiple support orders affecting the same parties 
were commonplace. UIFSA creates a structure designed to provide 
for only one support order at a time. The new one-order regime is 
facilitated 
and 
combined with 
a 
broad assertion of personal 
jurisdiction under this long-arm provision. The frequency of a 
two-state procedure involving the participation of tribunals in 
both states should be substantially reduced by the introduction 
of this long-arm statute. 
Subsections 
(1) 
through 
(8) 
are 
derived 
from 
a 
variety of 
sources, including the UNIFORM PARENTAGE 
ACT 
(1973) Section 8, 
TEXAS FAMILY CODE Section 102.011, and NEW YORK FAMILY COURT ACT 
Section 154. 
Subsection (1) codifies the holding of Burnham v. Superior Court, 
U.S. 604 (1990), which reaffirms the constitutional validity 
of asserting personal 
jurisdiction based on personal service 
within a State. 
Subsection (2) expresses the principle that a nonresident party 
concedes personal jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief or 
by submitting to the jurisdiction by answering or entering an 
appearance. 
However, 
the power to assert jurisdiction over 
a 
support 
issue 
under 
the Act 
does 
not extend the 
tribunal's 
jurisdiction to other matters. 
Subsections 
(3) 
through 
(6) 
identify specific fact situations 
justifying 
the 
assertion 
of 
long-arm 
jurisdiction 
over 
a 
nonresident. Each provides an appropriate affiliating nexus for 
such an assertion, when judged on a case-by-case basis with an 
eye on procedural and substantive due process. 
Further, 
each 
subsection does contain a possibility that an overly literal 
construction of the terms 
of the statute will overreach due 
process. 
For 
example, 
Subsection 
(3) 
provides 
that 
long-arm 
jurisdiction to establish a support order may be asserted if "the 
individual resided with the child in this State." The typical 
scenario contemplated by the statute is that the parties lived as 
a 
family unit in the forum State, separated, 
and one of the 
parents 
subsequently moved 
to another State while 
the other 
parent and the child continued to reside in the forum. No time 
frame is stated for filing a proceeding; this is based on the 
fact that the absent parent has a support Obligation that extends 
for at least the minority of the child (and often longer in many 
states) . 
On the other hand, suppose that the two parents and their child 
lived in State A for many years, and then decided to move the 
family to State B to seek better employment opportunities. Those 
opportunities did not materialize and, after several weeks or a 
few months of frustration with the situation, one of the parents 
returned with the child to State A. Under these facts a tribunal 
of State A may conclude it has long-arm jurisdiction to establish 
the support obligation of the absent parent. But, suppose that 
the family's sojourn in State B lasted for many years, and then 
one parent unilaterally decides to return to State A. It is a 
reasonable expectation that all tribunals will 
conclude that 
assertion 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
absent 
parent 
immediately after the return based on Subsection (3) would offend 
due process. The interstate provisions of UIFSA are available to 
the returning parent to establish child support. Note that State 
B will have 
long-arm jurisdiction to establish support under 
Section 201. See also Section 204, infra, for the resolution of 
simultaneous proceedings provided by the Act. 
The factual situations catalogued in the first seven subsections 
are 
appropriate 
and 
constitutionally acceptable 
grounds 
upon 
which 
to 
exercise 
personal 
jurisdiction over 
an 
individual. 
Subsection 
(7) 
is bracketed because 
not all states maintain 
putative father registries. 
Finally, Subsection (8) tracks the broad, catch-all provisions 
found in many state statutes, including California, Civ. P. Code 
Section 410.10 (1973); New York, ~; and Texas, supra. Note, 
however, that the California provision, standing alone, was found 
to be inadequate to sustain a child support order under the facts 
presented in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
When read together, the 2001 amendments to Subsection(a) deleting 
the term "modify" and the addition of new Subsection (b) are 
designed to preclude a tribunal of the forum from ignoring the 
restrictions on modification of child-support orders established 
by UIFSA. Some courts broadly construed the former reference to 
"modify" to justify ignoring the requirement of Section 611 that, 
absent agreement of the parties, a petitioner for modification of 
a child-support order of an issuing State when all parties have 
left that State must be a nonresident of the forum. 
The 2001 
amendments make clear that a tribunal may not apply the long-arm 
provisions of Subsection (a), or any other law of the forum, and 
thereby assert that personal jurisdiction over both individual 
parties to a 
support order of another State is sufficient to 
modify that order. The limitations on the exercise of subject 
matter jurisdiction provided by Sections 611 
and 
must be 
observed irrespective of the existence of personal jurisdiction 
over 
the 
parties. 
Long-arm 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
respondent, standing alone, is not sufficient to grant subject 
matter jurisdiction over a proposed modification to a tribunal of 
the 
State of 
residence 
of 
the petitioner, 
see LeTellier v. 
LeTellier, 
S.W.3d 
490, 
A.L.R.5th 
(Tenn. 
2001), 
reversing 1999 WL 732487 (Tenn. App. 1999). 
Subsection 
(b) 
1S 
intended 
to 
cement 
the 
principle 
that 
modification of an existing order is not subject solely to the 
usual rules of personal jurisdiction over both parties. Even if a 
tribunal has personal 
jurisdiction over both parties, 
absent 
agreement 
of 
the 
parties it does 
not 
have 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction to modify a support order of another State if one of 
the parties or the child reside in the issuing State at the time 
the modification proceeding is filed, see Section 207, 
infra. 
Even if everyone 
has 
moved 
away 
from 
the 
issuing State, 
a 
tribunal having personal jurisdiction over both parties may not 
modify the order if the petitioner is a resident of the tribunal 
forum--unless 
both parties 
are 
residents 
of 
the 
forum, 
see 
Sections 611 and 613, infra. Absent an agreement of the parties, 
in all other cases the movant must be a nonresident, and the 
tribunal must have personal jurisdiction over the respondent. 
Almost invariably the respondent will be a resident of the forum. 
On 
rare occasion, 
however, 
the required personal jurisdiction 
over the respondent may 
be available only by virtue of the 
long-arm provisions of this section, which explains why Sections 
201, 
205, 
207, 
and 615 must read in conjunction with one 
another. 
An 
example of such 
a 
situation is as 
follows: 
the 
controlling child-support order was issued by a tribunal in State 
A, 
which of course had personal jurisdiction over the parties 
when it issued its order; the obligee and child presently reside 
in State B (a State the obligor has never even visited); the 
obligor presently is employed and resides in Nation X, although 
the obligor's "home base" in the United States can be identified 
as State C where the headquarters of the obligor's employer is 
located; and, finally, other than Nation X, the only states that 
can claim a nexus with the obligor sufficient to assert personal 
jurisdiction over him are State C and perhaps State A. Under this 
fact situation, it is necessary to invoke one of the long-arm 
bases of Section 201 to assert the personal jurisdiction over the 
obligor necessary to modify the order. Note that the long-arm 
statute may not be asserted in State B where the movant resides 
due to the restriction provided in Section 611, even if a basis 
exists for assertion of long-arm jurisdiction in that State. The 
employment connection in State C is likely to permit a tribunal 
in that State to assert jurisdiction to modify the support order 
based on the catch-all provision, Subsection (a)(8). Further, a 
tribunal 
in State 
A might 
also 
find that it has 
retained 
jurisdiction 
to 
modify 
the 
order 
under 
Subsection 
(a) (8) 
(remember both parties are nonresidents) given the absence or 
paucity of other U.S. jurisdictions with a nexus to the obligor, 
see Phillips v. Phillips, 826 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App. 1992). Note, 
however, that such an action by the original issuing State must 
be 
exercised 
with 
extreme 
restraint 
or 
the 
restriction 
on 
modification in Section 611 will become a nullity. Concern that 
long-arm 
jurisdiction 
will 
be 
asserted 
in 
less 
compelling 
circumstances than presented in this hypothetical situation is 
not substantiated by experience with Section 201 in establishment 
cases filed since the enactment of UIFSA. In fact, overreaching 
assertions 
of 
long-arm 
jurisdiction 
have 
been 
dealt 
with 
satisfactorily 
on 
a 
case-by-case 
basis 
using 
due 
process 
constitutional or forum non conveniens grounds. Rains v. Dept. of 
Social & Health Serv., 989 P.2d 558 (Wash. App. 1998); Phillips 
v. Fallen, 6 S. W. 3d 862 (Mo .1999), reversing 1999 WL 50159 (Mo. 
App. 
W.D.,1999); 
Abu-Dalbouh 
v. 
Abu-Dalbouh, 
N.W.2d 
(Minn. App.1996). 
§2962. 
Duration of personal jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction acquired by a tribunal of this State 
in a proceeding under this chapter or other law of this State 
relating to a support order continues as long as a tribunal of 
this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its 
order or continuing jurisdiction to enforce its order as provided 
by sections 2965, 2966 and 2971. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 202 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section can be said to state a legal truism, albeit a useful 
one. That is, once a tribunal issues a support order binding on 
the parties, which must be based on personal jurisdiction by 
virtue of 
Ku1ko 
v. 
Superior 
Court, 
U.S. 
(1978) 
and 
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 
U.S. 
(1957), jurisdiction in 
personam continues absent the statutorily specified reasons for 
its termination. 
The 
rule established by 
UIFSA 
is that the 
personal 
jurisdiction 
necessary 
to 
sustain 
enforcement 
or 
modification of an order of child support or spousal support 
persists as long as the order is in force and effect, even as to 
arrears, 
see 
Sections 
205-207, 
211, 
infra. 
This 
is 
true 
irrespective of the context in which the support order arose, 
~, 
divorce, 
lTIFSA 
support 
establishment, 
parentage 
establishment, 
modification 
of 
prior 
controlling order, 
etc. 
Insofar 
as 
a 
child-support order is 
concerned, 
depending 
on 
specific factual 
circumstances 
a 
distinction is 
made 
between 
continuing, 
exclusive 
continuing jurisdiction 
206, 
infra. 
Authority 
permanently reserved to 
jurisdiction 
to 
modify 
an 
order 
and 
to enforce an order, see Sections 205 and 
to 
modify 
a 
spousal 
support order is 
the issuing tribunal, Section 211, infra. 
§2963. 
Initiating and responding tribunal of this State 
Under this chapter, a tribunal of this State may serve as an 
initiating tribunal to forward proceedings to another state and 
as 
a 
responding tribunal for proceedings initiated in another 
state. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 203 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section identifies the various roles a tribunal of the forum 
may serve; as appropriate, it may act as either an initiating or 
a 
responding tribunal. Under UIFSA 
a tribunal may serve as 
a 
responding tribunal even when there is no initiating tribunal in 
another 
State. 
This 
accommodates 
the 
direct 
filing 
of 
a 
proceeding in a responding tribunal by a nonresident. 
§2964. 
Simultaneous proceedings 
1. 
Exercise of jurisdiction when filed in another state. 
A 
tribunal of this State may exercise jurisdiction to establish a 
support order when the petition or comparable pleading is filed 
after a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state 
only if: 
A. 
The petition or comparable pleading in this State 
1S 
filed before the expiration of the time allowed in the other 
state 
for 
filing 
a 
responsive 
pleading 
challenging 
the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the other state; 
B. 
The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of 
jurisdiction in the other state; and 
c. 
When relevant, this State is the home state of the child. 
2. 
Jurisdiction may not be exercised when filed in another 
state. 
A tribunal of this State may not exercise jurisdiction to 
establish 
a 
support 
order 
when 
the 
petition 
or 
comparable 
pleading 
1S filed before a petition or comparable pleading is 
filed in another state if: 
A. 
The petition or comparable pleading in the other state 
is filed before the exgiration of the time allowed in this 
State 
for 
filing 
a 
responsive 
pleading 
challenging 
the 
exercise of jurisdiction by this State; 
B. 
The contesting garty timely challenges the exercise of 
jurisdiction in this State; and 
c. 
When relevant, the other state is the home state of the 
child. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 204 of the Uniform Act.) 
Under the one-order system established by UIFSA, it is necessary 
to provide a new procedure to eliminate the multiple orders so 
common under RURESA and URESA. This requires cooperation between, 
and 
deference 
by, 
sister-state tribunals 
in order 
to 
avoid 
issuance of competing support orders. To this end, tribunals are 
expected to take an active role in seeking out information about 
support proceedings in other States concerning the same child. 
Depending on the circumstances, one or the other of two tribunals 
considering the same support obligation should decide to defer to 
the other. In 1992 UIFSA took a significant departure from the 
approach adopted by the UCCJA ("first filing"), by choosing the 
"home State of the child" as the primary method for resolving 
competing jurisdictional disputes, thereby adopting the choice of 
the federal PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT, 
U.S.C. 
1238A 
Section (C). Given the pre-emptive nature of the PKPA, 
and the 
possibility that custody and support will both be involved in 
some cases, the PKPA/UIFSA choice for resolving disputes between 
competing jurisdictional assertions was followed in 1997 by the 
decision of the Conference to replace the UCCJA with the UCCJEA. 
If the child has no home State, however, "first filing" will 
continue to control. 
§2965. 
Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify child 
support order 
1. 
Tribunal 
has 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
A 
tribunal of this State that has issued a support order consistent 
with the laws of this State has and shall exercise continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order if the 
order is the controlling order and: 
A. 
At the time of the filing of a request for modification 
this State is the residence of the obligor, the individual 
obligee or the child for whose benefit the support order is 
issued; or 
B. 
Even if this State is not the residence of the obligoh 
the individual obligee or the child for whose benefit the 
support order is issued, the parties consent in a record or 
in open court that the tribunal of this State may continue 
to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order. 
2. 
Tribunal 
may 
not 
exercise 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
A tribunal of this State that has issued a child 
support order consistent with the laws of this State may not 
exercise its continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction to modify the 
order if: 
A. 
All of the ~rties who are individuals file consent in a 
record with the tribunal of this State that a tribunal of 
another state that has jurisdiction over at least one of the 
parties who is an individual or that is located in the state 
of residence of the child may modify the order and assume 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; or 
B. 
The tribunal's order is not the controlling order. 
3. 
Recognition 
of 
jurisdiction 
of 
another 
state's 
tribunal. 
If a tribunal of another state that has issued a child 
support order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support 
Act or a law substantially similar to this chapter that modifies 
a child support order of a tribunal of this State, tribunals of 
this State shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction 
of the tribunal of the other state. 
4. 
Initiating tribunal to request modification. 
A tribunal 
of this State that lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to 
modify a child support order may serve as an initiating tribunal 
to reguest a tribunal of another state to modify a support order 
issued in that state. 
5. 
Temporary 
support order. 
A temporary support order 
issued 
ex 
parte 
or 
pending 
resolution 
of 
a 
jurisdictional 
conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in 
the issuing tribunal. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 205 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section is perhaps the most crucial provision in UIFSA. 
Drawing 
on 
the precedent of 
the 
federal 
PARENTAL 
KIDNAPPING 
PREVENTION 
ACT, 
U.S.C. 
Section l738A, 
the issuing tribunal 
retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support 
order, 
except 
in 
very 
narrowly 
defined 
circumstances. 
First 
introduced by UIFSA in 1992, this principle is understood and 
widely accepted in all jurisdictions. "CEJ," as it is known in 
the 
child-support 
enforcement 
world, 
is 
fundamental 
to 
the 
one-child-support-order-at-a-time principle of UIFSA. 
At first 
glance this section appears to have been significantly rewritten; 
certainly minor adjustments have been made to the substantive 
rules established. But, with the exception of the addition of and 
entirely new Subsection (a)(2), the sole intent and effect of the 
2001 
amendments 
is 
to 
reorganize 
the statutory language 
for 
greater clarity. The basic concept that the tribunal issuing a 
support 
order 
retains 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
to 
modify that order remains the cornerstone of the Act. 
As long as one of the individual parties or the child continues 
to reside in the issuing State, and as long as the parties do not 
agree to 
the contrary, 
the issuing tribunal has 
continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction over its child-support order--which in 
practical terms means that it may modify its order. The statute 
attempts 
to 
be 
even-handed. 
The 
identity 
of 
the 
remaining 
party--obligor or obligee--does not matter. If the individual 
parties have left the issuing State but the child remains behind, 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction [a.k.a. CEJ ] remains with the 
issuing State. Even if all parties and the child no longer reside 
in the State, the support order continues in existence and is 
fully enforceable unless and until a modification takes place in 
accordance with the 
requirements of Article 
6, 
infra. 
Note, 
however, that the CEJ of the issuing State over a spousal support 
order is permanent, see Section 211, infra. 
In 
2001 
a 
significant, 
albeit subtle 
amendment 
was 
made 
to 
Subsection (a)(l). 
The intent was 
not to make 
a 
substantive 
change, but rather to clarify the original intent of the Drafting 
Committee. 
First, 
the 
time 
to 
measure 
whether 
the 
issuing 
tribunal has continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction to modify its 
order, or whether all parties and child have left the State, is 
explicitly stated to be at the time of filing a proceeding to 
modify the child support order. Second, substitution of the term 
.. is the residence" for the term "remains the residence" makes 
clear that any interruption of residence of a party between the 
date of the issuance of the order and the date of filing the 
request for modification does not affect juriSdiction to modify. 
Thus, if there is but one order, it is the controlling order in 
effect 
and 
enforceable 
throughout 
the 
United 
States, 
notwithstanding the fact that everyone has 
left the 
issuing 
State. If the order is not modified during this time of absence, 
a return to reside in the issuing State by a party or child will 
immediately identify the proper forum at the time of filing a 
proceeding for modification. Although the statute does not speak 
explicitly to the issue, temporary absence should be treated in a 
similar fashion. Temporary employment in another State may not 
forfeit a claim of residence in the issuing State, State ex reI. 
Havlin v. Jamison, 
S.W.2d 938 
(Mo. 
App. 
1998). Of course, 
residence is a fact question for the trial court, keeping in mind 
that the question is residence, not domicile. 
A substantive change is made by the 2001 amendment that adds 
entirely new language to Subsection (a)(2). From the beginning of 
the 
implementation of the 
CEJ principle, questions 
have 
been 
raised about why a tribunal may not modify its own order if the 
parties agree that it should do so even after both parties have 
left the State. The move of the parties and the child from the 
State may have been of a very short distance and, although the 
parties reside outside the issuing State, 
they may prefer to 
continue to be governed by the same issuing tribunal because they 
continue to have a strong affiliation with the issuing tribunal. 
For example, the child-support order may have been issued by a 
tr ibunal of Washington, D. C. Subsequently the obligee and child 
have moved to Virginia, the obligor now resides in Maryland, and 
perhaps 
one 
or 
both 
parties 
continue 
to 
be 
employed 
in 
Washington. 
The possibility that under 
such circumstances the 
parties 
reasonably 
may 
prefer 
to 
continue 
to 
deal 
with 
the 
issuing tribunal convinced the Drafting Committee to add this 
exception to the basic principle of CEJ to modify. 
The other side of the coin follows logically. Just as Subsection 
(a) defines the retention of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, 
by 
clear 
implication 
the 
subsection 
also 
identifies 
how 
jurisdiction to modify may be lost. That is, if all the relevant 
persons--the obligor, the individual obligee, and the child--have 
permanently left the issuing State, the issuing State no longer 
has an appropriate nexus with the parties or child to justify the 
exercise of jurisdiction to modify its child-support order. See 
In re Marriage of Erickson, Wash. App. Div. 3 2000, 991 P.2d 123, 
(Wash. App. 
2000); Groseth v. Groseth, 600 N.W.2d 159 (Neb. 
1999). Further, the issuing tribunal has no current information 
about 
the 
factual 
circumstances 
of 
anyone 
involved, 
and 
the 
taxpayers of that State have no reason to expend public funds on 
the 
process. 
Note, 
however, 
that the original order 
of 
the 
issuing tribunal remains valid and enforceable. That order is in 
effect not only in the issuing State but also in those States in 
which the order has been registered. It also may be registered 
and enforced in additional States even after the issuing State 
has lost its power to modify its order, see Sections 601-604, 
infra. The original order remains in effect until it is properly 
modified in accordance with the narrow terms of Sections 609-612, 
infra. 
Subsection (b) (1), reworded 
~n 2001, explicitly states that the 
issuing 
State 
may 
also 
lose 
its 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction to modify if the parties consent in a 
record for 
another State to assume jurisdiction to modify (even though one 
of the parties or the child continues to reside in the issuing 
State). Filing of the record in the issuing State divests the 
issuing tribunal of its CEJ. See Peace v. Peace, 737 A.2d 1164 
(N.J. Super. 1999). The Drafting Committee anticipated that such 
an agreement would seldom occur because of the almost universal 
desire of each party to prefer his or her local tribunal; but, 
the Committee also believed that the parties should be allowed to 
agree upon an alternate forum if they choose to do so. The 2001 
rewording of this provision also makes this procedure available 
in a situation in which all the parties and the child have left 
the issuing State and are in agreement that a tribunal of the 
State in which only the movant resides shall assume modification 
jurisdiction. 
Although Subsections (a) 
and (b) identify the methods for the 
retention and the loss of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by 
the issuing tribunal, this section does not confer jurisdiction 
to modify 
on 
another tribunal. 
Modification requires that 
a 
tribunal have personal jurisdiction over the parties and meet 
other criteria as provided in Sections 609 through 615, infra. 
§2966. 
Continuing jurisdiction to enforce child support order 
1. 
Initiating tribunal to enforce or modify. 
A tribunal of 
this State that has issued a child support order consistent with 
the laws of this State may serve as an initiating tribunal to 
reguest a tribunal of another state to enforce: 
A. 
The order if the order is the controlling order and has 
not been modified by 
a 
tribunal of 
another state that 
assumed 
jurisdiction pursuant 
to 
the 
Uniform 
Interstate 
Family Support Act; or 
B. 
A money judgment for arrears of support and interest on 
the order accrued before a determination that an order of 
another state is the controlling order. 
2. 
Responding tribunal to enforce or modify. 
A tribunal of 
this State having continuing jurisdiction over a support order 
may act as a responding tribunal to enforce or modify the order. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 206 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section is the correlative of the continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction asserted 1n the preceding section. It makes 
the 
relatively subtle distinction between 
the 
CEJ 
"to 
modify 
a 
support order" established 1n Section 205 
and the "continuing 
jurisdiction to enforce" established in this section. A keystone 
of UIFSA is that the power to enforce the order of the issuing 
State is not "exclusive" with that State. Rather, on request one 
or more responding States may also exercise authority to enforce 
the 
order 
of 
the 
issuing 
State. 
Secondly, 
under 
the 
one-order-at-a-time system, 
the validity and enforceability of 
the 
controlling order 
continues 
unabated until it is 
fully 
complied with, unless it is replaced by a modified order issued 
in accordance with the standards established by Sections 609-615. 
That is, even if the individual parties and the child no longer 
reside in the issuing State, the controlling order remains in 
effect and may be enforced by the issuing State or any responding 
State without regard to the fact that the potential fOe its 
modification 
and 
replacement 
exists. 
The 
2001 
amendments 
to 
Subsection 
(a) 
authorize 
the issuing tribunal 
to initiate 
a 
request for enforcement of its order by a tribunal of another 
State if its order is controlling, see Section 207, or to request 
reconciliation of the arrears and interest due on its order if 
another order is controlling. 
Subsection (b) reiterates that the issuing State has jurisdiction 
to serve as a responding State to enforce its own order at the 
request of another State. 
The 2001 amendments moved the second sentence in Subsection (b) 
to Section 210, infra, and moved Subsection (c) to Section 21l, 
infra. 
§2967. 
Determination of controlling child support orders 
1. 
Recognition of orders; one tribunal. 
If a proceeding is 
brought under this chapter and only one tribunal has issued a 
child support order, the order of that tribunal controls and must 
be so recognized. 
2. 
Recognition of orders; 
or 
more 
tribunals. 
If 
a 
proceeding is brought under this chapter and 2 or more child 
support orders have been issued by tribunals of this State or 
another state with regard to the same obligor and same child, a 
tribunal of this State having personal jurisdiction over both the 
obligor and individual obligee shall apply the following rules 
and by order shall determine which order controls. 
A. 
If only one of the tribunals has continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of that tribunal 
controls and must be so recognized. 
B. 
If more 
than 
one 
of 
the 
tribunals has 
continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter: 
(1) 
An order issued by a tribunal in the home state of 
the child controls; or 
(2) 
If an order has not been issued in the home state 
of the child, the order most recently issued controls. 
C. 
If none of the tribunals have continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction under this chapter, the tribunal of this State 
shall issue a child support order, which controls. 
3. 
Request for order. 
If 2 or more child support orders 
have been issued for 
the 
same obligor and 
same child, 
upon 
reguest of a party who is an individual or a support enforcement 
agency, 
a tribunal of this State having personal jurisdiction 
over both the obligor and the obligee who is an individual shall 
determine which order controls under subsection 2. 
The reguest 
may be filed with a registration for enforcement or registration 
for modification pursuant to subchapter 6 or may be filed as a 
separate proceeding. 
4. 
Copy of orders required. 
A reguest to determine which 
is the controlling order must be accompanied by a copy of every 
child support order 
in effect and 
the 
applicable 
record of 
payments. The reguesting party shall give notice of the reguest 
to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination. 
5. 
Tribunal having continuing. exclusive jurisdiction. 
The 
tribunal that issued the controlling order under subsection 1, 2 
or 
has 
continuing 
jurisdiction to 
the extent provided in 
section 2965 or 2966. 
6. 
Basis 
for 
order. 
A 
tribunal 
of 
this 
State 
that 
determines 
by 
order 
which 
is 
the 
controlling 
order 
under 
subsection 2, paragraph A or B or subsection 3, or that issues a 
new controlling order under subsection 2, 
paragraph C, 
shall 
state in that order: 
A. 
The basis upon which the tribunal made its determination; 
B. 
The amount of prospective support, if any; and 
C. 
The total amount of consolidated arrears and accrued 
interest, if any, under all of the orders after all payments 
made are credited as provided by section 2969. 
7. 
Filing certified copy of order. 
Within 30 days after 
issuance of an order determining which order is the controlling 
order, the party obtaining the order shall file a certified copy 
of it in each tribunal that issued or registered an earlier order 
of child support. A party or support enforcement agency obtaining 
the order that fails to file a certified copy is subject to 
appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure 
to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the validity 
or enforceability of the controlling order. 
8. 
Controlling order or judgment must be recognized. 
An 
order that has been determined to be the controlling order, or a 
judgment for consolidated arrears of support and interest, if 
any, 
made 
pursuant 
to 
this 
section 
must 
be 
recognized 
in 
proceedings under this chapter. 
Uniform Connent 
(This is Section 207 of the Uniform Act.) 
Next to the introduction of the concept of continuing exclusive 
jurisdiction in Section 205, 
supra, the most dramatic founding 
principle of UIFSA was to establish a system whereby the multiple 
orders created by URESA 
and RURESA could be reconciled in the 
transi tion from a wor ld wi th multiple child-support orders to a 
one-order-at-a-time world. This principle introduced by Section 
was subsequently incorporated into the requirements of 28 USC 
1738B, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders, a.k.a. 
FFCCSOA. 
Sections 207 and 209-210 are designed to span the gulf between 
the one-order system created by UIFSA 
and the multiple-order 
system 
previously 
in 
place 
under 
RURESA 
and 
URESA. 
UIFSA 
necessarily must provide transitional procedures for the eventual 
elimination of existing multiple support orders in an expeditious 
and efficient manner. 
But, 
even though all U.S. 
jurisdictions 
enacted UIFSA by 1998, many years will pass before its one-order 
system will be completely in place. Multiple orders covering the 
same parties and child number in the hundreds of thousands; it 
can be reasonably anticipated that some of these orders will 
continue in effect until nearly 2020. To begin the journey toward 
a one-order system, however, this section provides a relatively 
simple procedure designed to identify a single viable order that 
will be entitled to prospective enforcement in every UIFSA State. 
Subsection (a) 
declares that if only one child support order 
exists, 
it 
is 
to 
be 
denominated 
the 
controlling 
order, 
irrespective of when and where it was issued and whether any of 
the individual parties or the child continue to reside in the 
issuing State. 
Subsection (b) establishes the priority scheme for recognition 
and prospective enforcement of 
a 
single order 
among existing 
mul tiple orders regarding the same obligor, obligee, and child. 
The 2001 amendment to Subsection (b) clarifies that a tribunal 
requested to sort out the multiple orders and determine which one 
will be prospectively controlling of future payments must have 
personal jurisdiction over the litigants in order to ensure that 
its decision is binding on all concerned. For UIFSA to function, 
one order must be denominated as the controlling order, and its 
issuing 
tribunal 
must 
be 
recognized 
as 
having 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
In 
choosing 
among 
existing 
multiple 
orders, none of which can be distinguished as being in conflict 
with 
the principles 
of 
UIFSA, 
Subsection 
(b)(l) 
gives 
first 
priority to an order issued by the only tribunal that is entitled 
to continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the terms of UIFSA, 
i. e., an individual party or the child continues to reside in 
that State and no other issuing State meets this criterion. If 
two 
or 
more 
tribunals 
would 
have 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction under the Act, Subsection (b)(2) first looks to the 
tribunal of the child's current home State. If that State has not 
issued a support order, Subsection (b)(2) looks next to the order 
most recently issued. Finally, Subsection (b)(3) provides that if 
none 
of 
the 
existing 
multiple 
orders 
are 
entitled 
to 
be 
denominated 
as 
the 
controlling 
order 
because 
none 
of 
the 
preceding priorities apply, the forum tribunal is directed to 
issue a new order, given that it has personal jurisdiction over 
the obligor and obligee. The new order becomes the controlling 
order, establishes the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the 
tribunal, and fixes the support obligation and its nonmodifiable 
aspects, 
primarily duration of support, 
see Sections 
and 
611(c), infra. The rationale for creating a new order to replace 
existing multiple orders is that there is no valid reason to 
prefer the terms of anyone of the multiple orders over another 
in the absence of 
a 
fact situation described in Subsections 
(b)(l) or (b)(2). 
As 
originally promulgated, 
UIFSA did not come 
to grips with 
whether existing multiple orders issued by different States might 
be entitled to full faith and credit without regard to the 
determination 
of 
the 
controlling 
order 
under 
the 
Act. 
The 
drafters took the position that state law, however uniform, could 
not 
interfere 
with 
the 
ultimate 
interpretation 
of 
a 
constitutional directive. Fortunately, this question has almost 
certainly been mooted by the 1996 amendment to 28 U.S.C. Section 
1738B, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders. Congress 
incorporated the multiple order recognition provisions of Section 
of UIFSA into FFCCSOA virtually word for word in the PERSONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND 
WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996. 
Pub. L. 104-193, Aug. 22, 1996, 110 Stat. 2221. 
It is not altogether clear whether the terms of UIFSA apply to a 
strictly intrastate case; that is, a situation in which multiple 
child support orders have been issued by multiple tribunals of a 
single State and all parties and the child continue to reside in 
that State. This is not an uncommon situation, often traceable to 
the intrastate applicability of RURESA. A literal reading of the 
statutory language suggests the section applies. Further, FFCCSOA 
does not make a distinction regarding the tribunals that issued 
multiple orders. If multiple orders have been issued by different 
tribunals in the home State of the child, most likely the most 
recent 
will 
be 
recognized 
as 
the 
controlling 
order, 
notwithstanding the 
fact that UIFSA 
Section 207(b)(2)(B) 
and 
FFCCSOA 42 U.S.C. Section 1738B(f)(3) literally do not apply. At 
the very least, this section, together with FFCCSOA, 
provide a 
template for resolving such conflicts. 
Subsection (c), added in 1996, clarifies that any party or a 
support enforcement agency may request a tribunal of the forum 
State to identify the controlling order. That party is directed 
to fully 
inform the tribunal of all existing child support 
orders. 
The 2001 addition of new Subsection (d) is to assure the tribunal 
is furnished with all the information needed to make a proper 
determination of the controlling order as well as the information 
needed to make a calculation of the consolidated arrears. The 
party or support enforcement agency requesting the determination 
of controlling order and determination of consolidated arrears is 
also required to notify all other parties and entities who may 
have an interest in either of those determinations. Those with 
such 
an 
interest most 
likely are 
support 
agencies 
and 
the 
obligee. 
Relettered Subsection (e) provides that the determination of the 
controlling 
order 
under 
this 
section 
has 
the 
effect 
of 
establishing 
the 
tribunal 
with 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction; only the order of that tribunal is entitled to 
prospective enforcement by a sister State. 
Relettered Subsection (f) directs the forum tribunal to identify 
the 
details 
upon 
which it makes 
its 
determination 
of 
the 
controlling order. In addition, the tribunal is also directed to 
state specifically the amount of the prospective support, and to 
reconcile and consolidate the arrears and interest due on all of 
the multiple orders to the extent possible. 
The party obtaining the determination is directed by relettered 
Subsection (g) to notify all interested tribunals of the decision 
after the fact. Although tribunals need not be given original 
notice of the proceeding, all tribunals that have contributed an 
order to the determination must be informed regarding which order 
was determined to be controlling, and should also be informed of 
the consolidated arrears 
and interest so that the extent of 
possible subsequent enforcement will be known with regard to each 
of the orders. 
The Act does not deal with the resolution of 
potential conflicting claims regarding arrears; this is left to 
case-by-case decisions or to federal regulation. 
Section 207 presumes that the parties are accorded notice and 
opportunity to be heard by the tribunal. It also presumes that 
the tribunal will be fully informed about all existing orders 
when it is requested to determine which one of the existing 
multiple child support orders is to 
be 
accorded prospective 
enforcement. If this does not occur and one or more existing 
orders is not considered by the tribunal, the finality of its 
decision is likely to 
turn 
on principles of estoppel 
on 
a 
case-by-case basis. Finally, new Subsection (h), added in 200l, 
affirms the concept that when a fully informed tribunal makes a 
determination 
of 
the 
controlling 
order 
for 
prospective 
enforcement, 
or 
renders 
a 
judgment 
for 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
consolidated arrears, the decision is entitled to full faith and 
credit. 
§2968. 
Child support orders for 2 or more obligees 
In responding to registrations or petitions for enforcement 
of 2 or more child support orders in effect at the Same time with 
regard to the same obligor and different individual obligees, at 
least one of which was issued by a tribunal of another state, a 
tribunal of this State shall enforce those orders in the same 
manner as if the orders had been issued by a tribunal of this 
State. 
Uniform Connent 
(This is Section 208 of the Uniform Act.) 
Multiple orders may involve two or more families of the same 
obligor. Although all such orders are entitled to enforcement, 
practical 
difficulties 
frequently 
exist. 
For 
example, 
full 
enforcement of each of the multiple orders may exceed the maximum 
allowed for income withholding. The federal statute, 42 U.S.C. 
Section 666 (b) (1), requires that to be eligible for the federal 
funding for enforcement, States must provide a ceiling for child 
support withholding expressed in a percentage that may not exceed 
the federal consumer credit code limitations on wage garnishment, 
U.S.C. Section l673(b). In order to allocate resources between 
competing 
families, 
UIFSA 
refers 
to 
state 
law. 
The 
basic 
principle is that one or more foreign orders for the support of 
an out-of-state family of the obligor, and one or more orders for 
an in-state family, 
are all of equal dignity. 
In allocating 
payments to different obligees, every child support order should 
be treated as if it had been issued by a tribunal of the forum 
State. 
§2969. 
Credit for payments 
A tribunal of this State shall credit amounts collected for 
a particular period pursuant to any child support order against 
the 
amounts 
owed for 
the 
same period under 
any other child 
support order for support of the same child issued by a tribunal 
of this State or another state. 
Uniform Conwnent 
(This is Section 209 of the Uniform Act.) 
Because 
of 
the 
reciprocal acts, 
multiple 
orders 
RURESA and URESA, 
possible 
under 
the predecessor 
the 
former 
section was 
nominally 
concerned 
with 
insuring 
that 
payments 
made 
on 
a 
particular order were credited toward the amounts 
due on all 
other 
orders. 
As 
a 
practical 
matter, 
however, 
very little 
attention was paid to that provision. No mechanism was available 
to reconcile payments on multiple orders other than the obligor's 
record keeping, if any. 
Quite a different situation is currently in place throughout the 
nation. The advent and development of IV-D agencies has brought 
collection of arrears 
and interest on 
those arrears to 
the 
forefront. Computerized exchange of complex information is now 
almost instantaneously available in many cases. Thus, deciphering 
the financial information available to accord credit for payment 
on one order against other orders is possible to a degree unknown 
in the days of RURESA. For example, full payment of $300 on an 
order of State C earns a 100% pro tanto discharge of the current 
support owed on a $200 order of State A, and a 75% credit against 
a $400 order of State B. Crediting payments against arrears on 
multiple orders is more complex, 
and is subject to different 
constructions in various states. 
Under the one-order system of UIFSA, an obligor ultimately will 
be 
ordered 
to 
pay 
only 
one 
sum-certain 
amount 
for 
current 
support, and a 
sum certain to reduce arrears and interest, if 
any. Nonetheless, multiple orders will exist for several years 
into the future. Moreover, even under a one-order system, more 
than 
one entity may 
be 
engaged in collecting past arrears. 
Ultimately those collections must be reported to a single entity 
with final accounting responsibility. Finally, because the nature 
of human enterprise is such that mistakes are inevitable, at 
least on occasion multiple orders will continue to be issued in 
error. 
The issuing tribunal is ultimately responsible for the overall 
control of the enforcement methods employed and for accounting 
for the payments made on its order from multiple sources. Until 
that scheme is fully in place, however, it will be necessary to 
continue to mandate pro tanto credit for actual payments made 
against all existing orders. 
The rewording of this section in 2001 reaffirms the simultaneous 
accrual and simultaneous credit approach, 
and provides further 
substance to the directive in Section 207(f) that a tribunal 
making a determination of the consolidated arrears must use this 
approach. 
§2970. 
Application of chapter to nonresident subject to personal 
jurisdiction 
A tribunal of this State exercising personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident in a proceeding under this chapter or under 
other 
laws 
of 
this 
State 
relating 
to 
a 
support 
order 
or 
recognizing a support order of a 
foreign country or political 
subdivision on the basis of comity may receive evidence from 
another 
state 
pursuant 
to 
section 
3016, 
communicate 
with 
a 
tribunal of another state pursuant to section 3017 and obtain 
discovery through a tribunal of another state pursuant to section 
3018. In all other respects, subchapters 3 to 7 do not apply and 
the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of 
this State. 
Uniform Cooment 
(This is Section 210 of the Uniform Act.) 
Al though this section is a product of the 2001 amendments, 
ln 
fact it combines provisions formerly found in Sections 202 and 
(b) into a single, comprehensive provision. Section 202 took 
account of the fact that assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over 
a nonresident results in a one-state proceeding, notwithstanding 
the fact that the parties reside in different States. Section 
(b) made a vi tal contribution to the exercise of continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction to modify and continuing jurisdiction to 
enforce support orders if one of the parties to an original 
proceeding in the forum State subsequently left the State after 
the initial support order was issued. 
Indeed, it is far more 
common for a support order to be issued in conjunction with a 
divorce or determination of parentage in which both the obligor 
and obligee are residents of the forum than to be issued as a 
result of an assertion of long-arm jurisdiction. Note that either 
the petitioner or the respondent may be the nonresident party 
(either of whom may be the obligor or the obligee). And, also 
note 
that 
absent 
this 
provision 
the 
ordinary 
intrastate 
substantive and procedural law of the forum would apply to either 
fact situation without reference to the fact that one of the 
parties is a 
nonresident. 
In sum, 
whether the matter at hand 
involves 
establishment 
of 
an 
original 
support 
order 
or 
enforcement or modification of an existing order. If one of the 
parties resides outside the 
forum State, 
the nonresident may 
avail himself or herself of the special evidentiary and discovery 
provisions provided by UIFSA. 
Except 
for 
the 
three 
sections 
specified, 
the 
provisions 
of 
UIFSA--its title labels it an interstate act--are not applicable 
to 
an intrastate proceeding. 
The first exception allows 
the 
tribunal to apply the special rules of evidence and procedure of 
Section 316 in order to facilitate decision-making when one party 
resides in another State. 
The 
improved interstate exchange of 
information enables the nonresident to participate as fully as 
possible ln the proceedings without the necessity of personally 
appearing in the forum State. The same considerations account for 
authorizing inter-tribunal 
communications 
as per Section 
317. 
Finally, the two-state discovery procedures of Section 318 are 
made applicable in a one-state proceeding when a foreign tribunal 
can assist in that process. In all other situations, the ordinary 
substantive and procedural law of the forum State applies to a 
one-state proceeding. In sum, the parties and the tribunal in a 
one-state 
case 
may 
utilize 
those 
two-state 
procedures 
that 
contribute to economy, efficiency, and fair play. 
Finally, the 2001 amendment recognizes and extends the operation 
of these evidentiary and discovery provisions to a case involving 
a foreign support order recognized on the basis of comity. 
§2971. 
Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify spousal 
support order 
1. 
Tribunal 
of 
this 
State; 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
A tribunal of this State issuing a spousal support 
order consistent with the 
law of this State has continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
to 
modify 
the 
spousal 
support 
order 
throughout the existence of the support obligation. 
2. 
Spousal support issued by another state. 
A tribunal of 
this State may not modify a spousal support order issued by a 
tribunal 
of 
another 
state 
having 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state. 
3. 
Tribunal 
of 
this 
State; 
initiating 
or 
responding 
tribunal. 
A 
tribunal 
of 
this 
State 
that 
has 
continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order may serve as: 
A. 
An initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another 
state to enforce the spousal support order issued in this 
State; or 
B. 
A responding tribunal to enforce or modify its own 
spousal support order. 
Uniform Conanent 
(This is Section 211 of the Uniform Act.) 
This is not new language: a 2001 amendment moved former Section 
205(f) to this stand-alone section. Complimentary provisions with 
regard to other aspects of CEJ over a spousal support order are 
also moved. An order for spousal support is treated differently 
than an order for child support. The issuing tribunal retains 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction over 
an 
order 
of 
spousal 
support 
throughout 
the 
entire 
existence 
of 
the 
support 
obligation. Sections 205(f) and 206(c) state that the procedures 
of UIFSA are not available to a responding tribunal to modify the 
existing spousal support order of the issuing State. This marks a 
radical departure from RURESA, 
which treated spousal and child 
support 
orders 
identically. 
Under 
UIFSA, 
"interstate" 
modification of spousal support is limited to a procedure whereby 
a proceeding may be initiated outside of the issuing State, but 
only the tribunal in the original issuing State may modify the 
order under its law. This approach was expected to have minimal 
effect on actual practice, a prediction that appears to have been 
accurate. Interstate modification of pure spousal support was 
relatively rare under RURESA, 
and plays almost no part in the 
activities of support enforcement agencies. 
The 
prohibition 
of 
modification 
of 
spousal 
support 
by 
a 
nonissuing state tribunal under 
UIFSA is consistent with the 
principle that a tribunal should apply local law to such cases to 
insure efficient handling and to minimize choice of law problems. 
Avoiding conflict of law problems is almost impossible if spousal 
support orders are subject to modification in a second State. For 
example, States take widely varying views of the effect on a 
spousal support order of the obligee's remarriage or nonmarital 
cohabitation. 
Making 
a 
distinction between spousal 
and child 
support 
is 
further 
justified 
because 
the 
standards 
for 
modification of 
child 
support 
and 
spousal 
support 
are 
very 
different. In most jurisdictions a dramatic improvement in the 
obligor's economic circumstances will have little or no relevance 
in 
a 
proceeding 
seeking 
an 
upward 
modification 
of 
spousal 
support, 
while 
a 
similar 
change 
in 
an 
obligor's 
situation 
typically is the primary basis for an increase in child support. 
This disparity is founded on a policy choice that post-divorce 
success of an obligor-parent should benefit the obligor's child, 
but not the obligor's ex-spouse. 
Finally, 
UIFSA does 
not provide for shifting the continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction over 
a 
spousal-support order by mutual 
agreement. 
That procedure is limited to child support 
under 
Section 205(b)(1). 
Note 
that 
the 
Act 
is silent rather 
than 
preclusive on the subject. If the parties wish to enter into such 
an agreement, it is up to the individual States to decide whether 
to recognize it. A waiver of continuing, exclusive juriSdiction 
and subsequent modification of spousal support by a tribunal of 
another State simply is not authorized by UIFSA, 
rather than 
prohibited. 
Sec. 11. 19·A MRSA §3001. as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is repealed and the following 
enacted in its place: 
§300l. Proceedings under this chapter 
1. 
Application of subchapter. 
Except as otherwise provided 
in this chapter, this subchapter applies to all proceedings under 
this chapter. 
I-A. 
Initiation of proceedings. 
An individual petitioner 
or 
a 
support 
enforcement 
agency 
may 
initiate 
a 
proceeding 
authorized 
under 
this 
chapter 
by 
filing 
a 
petition 
in 
an 
initiating tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by 
filing a petition or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal 
of another state that has or can obtain personal jurisdiction 
over the respondent. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 301 of the Uniform Act.) 
Subsection (a) mandates application of the general provisions of 
this article to all UIFSA proceedings. 
A 2001 amendment deletes the original Subsection (b), the once 
controversial "road map" originally thought by the 1992 Drafting 
Committee to be required in order to introduce the large number 
of 
non-lawyer 
administrators 
employed 
by 
child 
support 
enforcement agencies 
to 
the 
intricacies of 
UIFSA. 
Given 
the 
extensive training on the Act throughout the nation, the road map 
no longer can be viewed as necessary. 
Relettered Subsection (b) 
continues in a 
new 
form 
the basic 
two-state procedure long-employed by the former reciprocal acts 
to establish a support order in the interstate context. Direct 
filing of a petition in the responding State by an individual or 
a support enforcement agency without reference to an initiating 
tribunal State was introduced by UIFSA 1992. Although filing of a 
petition 
in 
an 
initiating 
tribunal 
to 
be 
forwarded 
to 
a 
responding tribunal is still recognized as a possible procedure, 
the direct filing procedure has proven to be one of the most 
significant improvements in efficient interstate case management. 
The promulgation and use of the federally mandated forms, Section 
311(b), further serves to eliminate any role for the initiating 
tribunal. 
Sec. 12. 19·A MRS A §§3002 and 3003, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, are amended to read: 
§3002. 
Proceeding by minor parent 
A minor parentT or a guardian or other legal representative 
of a minor parentT may maintain a proceeding on behalf of or for 
the benefit of the minor's child. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 302 of the Uniform Act.) 
A minor parent may maintain a proceeding under UIFSA without the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem, even if the law of the forum 
jurisdiction requires 
a 
guardian for 
an in-state case. 
If 
a 
guardian or legal representative has been appointed, he or she 
may act on behalf of the minor's child in seeking support. 
§3003. Application of law of this State 
Except 
as 
otherwise 
provided 
by 
in 
responding tribunal of this State shall: 
this 
chapter, 
a 
1. 
Procedural 
and substantive law; 
powers 
and remedies. 
Apply the procedural and substantive lawT-~££~~4i~-~~-~~~&-8R 
eR8iee--8f--~awT generally 
applicable 
to 
similar 
proceedings 
originating in this State and may exercise all powers and provide 
all remedies available in those proceedings; and 
2. 
Determine duty and amount of support. 
Determine the 
duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the law 
and support guidelines of this State. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 303 of the Uniform Act.) 
Historically States have insisted that forum law be applied to 
support 
cases 
whenever 
possible. 
This 
continues 
as 
a 
key 
principle of UIFSA. 
In general, 
a responding tribunal has the 
same powers in a proceeding involving interstate parties as it 
has in an intrastate case. This inevitably means that the Act is 
not self-contained; rather, it is supplemented by the forum's 
statutes and procedures governing support orders. To insure the 
efficient processing of the huge number of interstate support 
cases, it is vi tal that decision-makers apply familiar rules of 
local 
law 
to 
the 
maximum 
degree 
possible. 
This 
must 
be 
accomplished in a manner consistent with the overriding principle 
of UIFSA that enforcement is of the issuing tribunal's order, and 
that the responding State does not make the order its own as a 
condition of enforcing it. 
Pr ior to the 2001 amendments, choice of law rules of the forum 
State 
were 
specifically 
invoked 
in three 
places; 
henceforth 
Section 604 is the sole reference to the issue. 
Sec. 13. 19-A MRSA §3004. as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is repealed. 
Sec. 14. 19-A MRSA §3004-A is enacted to read: 
§3004-A. 
Duties of initiating tribunal 
1. 
Forward petition and accompanying documents. 
Ul?on the 
filing of a l?etition authorized by this chal?ter, an initiating 
tribunal 
of 
this 
State 
shall 
forward 
the 
l?etition 
and 
its 
accoml?anying documents: 
A. 
To 
the 
resl?onding 
tribunal 
or 
al?l?rol?riate 
sUl?l?ort 
enforcement agency in the responding state; or 
B. 
If the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, 
to the state information agency of the resl?onding state with 
a request that they be forwarded to the al?prol?riate tribunal 
and that receipt be acknowledged. 
2. 
Issue certificate or document; make findings; specify 
amount. 
If requested by the resl?onding tribunal, a tribunal of 
this State shall issue a certificate or other document and make 
findings required by the law of the resl?onding state. 
I f 
the 
responding state is a foreign country or l?olitical SUbdivision, 
ul?on request the tribunal shall sl?ecify the amount of sUl?l?ort 
sought, convert that amount into the equivalent amount in the 
foreign currency under the al?l?licable official or market exchange 
rate 
as 
l?ublicly 
rel?orted 
and 
provide 
any 
other 
documents 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of the resl?onding state. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 304 of the Uniform Act.) 
Under UIFSA the role of the initiating tribunal consists of 
ministerial 
function 
of 
forwarding 
the 
documents 
to 
appropriate entity 
1n 
the 
responding State 
for 
action. 
initiating tribunal has no substantive legal task to perform. 
the 
the 
The 
Subsection (b) 
was designed primarily to facilitate interstate 
enforcement between UIFSA States and URESA 
and RURESA States, 
with some applicability to cases involving foreign jurisdictions. 
After the nationwide enactment of UIFSA by 1998, see Prefatory 
Note, SUl?ra, the subsection retains its utility only with regard 
to support orders of foreign nations. 
Supplying documentation 
required 
by 
a 
foreign 
jurisdici io~ 
which 
_~ 
not 
otherwise 
required by UIFSA procedure will continue to be appropriate in 
the 
international 
context 
for 
the 
foreseeable 
future. 
An 
initiating 
tribunal 
is 
authorized 
to 
cooperate 
and 
provide 
whatever information or documentation is required or requested by 
a foreign jurisdiction. For example, a statement of the amount of 
support being requested is required by Canadian provinces before 
a tribunal will establish a support order. The 2001 amendment 
adds a duty for the initiating tribunal to state the amount of 
foreign 
currency 
equivalent 
to 
that 
request; 
there 
is 
a 
corresponding 
duty 
of 
a 
responding 
tribunal 
to 
convert 
the 
foreign currency into dollars if the foreign initiating tribunal 
does not, Section 305(f). 
The reference to "the applicable official or market exchange 
rate" takes into account the present practices of international 
money markets. A few countries continue to maintain an official 
exchange rate for their currency. The vast majority of countries 
recognize the fact that the value of their currency is subject to 
daily market fluctuations that are reported on the financial 
pages of many daily newspapers. Thus, in the example described 
above, 
a 
request 
for 
a 
specific 
amount 
of 
support 
in U.S. 
dollars, which is to be translated into Canadian dollars on a 
specific date, will inevitably have 
a 
variable value 
as 
the 
foreign currency rises or falls against the U.S. dollar. 
Sec. 15. 19-A MRSA §3005. sub-§2, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
2. 
Powers of responding tribunal. 
A responding tribunal of 
this State, to the extent e~HeFWi&e-aH~He~isea not prohibited by 
other law, may: 
A. 
Issue or enforce a support order, modify a child support 
order, 
determine 
the controlling child support order 
or 
render a judgment to determine parentage; 
B. 
Order 
an 
obligor 
to 
comply 
with 
a 
support 
order, 
specifying the amount and the manner of compliance; 
C. 
Order income withholding; 
D. 
Determine the amount of any arrearages and specify a 
method of payment; 
E. 
Enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both; 
F. 
Set aside property for satisfaction of the support order; 
G. 
Place 
liens 
and 
order 
execution 
on 
the 
obligor's 
property; 
H. 
Order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the 
obligor's 
current 
residential 
address, 
telephone 
number, 
employer, address of employment and telephone number at the 
place of employment; 
I. 
Issue 
a 
capias for an obligor who 
has failed after 
proper notice to appear at a hearing ordered by the tribunal 
and enter the capias in any local and state computer systems 
for criminal warrants; 
J. 
Order the obligor to 
seek appropriate employment 
by 
specified methods; 
K. 
Award 
reasonable attorney's fees 
and other fees 
and 
costs; or 
L. 
Grant any other available remedy. 
Sec. 16. 19-A MRSA §300S, sub-§6 is enacted to read: 
6. 
Convert foreign currency amount to dollar amount. 
If 
requested to enforce 
a 
support order, 
arrears or 
judgment or 
modify a support order stated in a foreign currency, a responding 
tribunal of this State shall convert the amount stated in the 
foreign currency to the equivalent amount in dollars under the 
applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 305 of the Uniform Act.) 
This 
section 
establishes 
a 
wide 
variety 
of 
duties 
for 
a 
responding 
tribunal. 
It 
contains: 
ministerial 
functions, 
Subsection 
(a); 
judicial 
functions, 
Subsection 
(b); 
and, 
substantive rules applicable 
to interstate cases, 
Subsections 
(c)-(e). Because a responding tribunal may be an administrative 
agency rather than a 
court, 
the Act explicitly states that a 
tribunal is not granted powers that it does not otherwise possess 
under state law. 
For example, 
authority to enforce 
a 
support 
order by contempt generally is limited to courts. 
Subsection 
(a) 
directs 
the filing of 
the 
documents 
received 
without regard to whether an initiating tribunal in another State 
was 
involved in forwarding the documentation. It also directs 
that the individual or entity requesting the filing be notified, 
but leaves the means 
of that notification to local law. 
The 
advent of a variety of swifter, and perhaps even more reliable, 
forms of notice in the modern era justifies the deletion of a 
particular form of notice. For example, many States now authorize 
notice by telephone facsimile (FAX), or by an express delivery 
service. 
Already 
many 
legal 
documents 
are 
transmitted 
by 
electronic mail (email). 
Subsection (b) lists duties that, if possessed under state law in 
connection with in-state cases, are allocated to the responding 
tribunal in UIFSA 
cases. 
Thus, 
each subdivision purposefully 
avoids 
mention of substantive rules. 
For 
example, 
Subsection 
(b)(7) does not identify the type, nature, or priority of liens 
that may be issued under UIFSA. As is generally true under the 
Act, 
those details will be determined by applicable state law 
concerning support enforcement remedies of local orders. 
Subsection (c) clarifies that the details of calculating the 
child support order are to be included along with the order. 
Local 
law generally 
requires 
that variation 
from 
the 
child 
support guidelines must be explained, see 42 U.S.C. Section 667; 
this requirement is extended to interstate cases. 
Subsection (d) states that an interstate support order may not be 
conditioned on compliance with a visitation order. Chaisson v. 
Ragsdale, 
S.W.2d 
(Ark. 
1996). 
While this may 
be at 
variance with state law governing intrastate cases, under a UIFSA 
proceeding the petitioner generally is not present before the 
tribunal. 
This 
distinction 
justifies 
prohibiting 
visitation 
issues 
from 
being 
litigated 
in 
the 
context 
of 
a 
support 
proceeding. All States have enacted some version of either the 
UCCJA or the UCCJEA providing for resolution of visitation issues 
in interstate cases. 
Subsection 
(e) 
petitioner, the 
shall be kept 
introduces 
the 
respondent, and 
informed about 
policy determination that 
the 
the initiating tribunal, if any, 
actions taken by the responding 
tribunal. 
Subsection (f) is designed to facilitate enforcement of foreign 
support orders. 
Sec. 17. 19-A MRSA §3007. sub-§2. 1I11D and E. as enacted by PL 
1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, are amended to 
read: 
D. 
Within 2 days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays, after receipt of a written notice in a record from 
an initiating, responding or registering tribunal, send a 
copy of the notice By-~iF6t-e±a66-mai± to the petitioner; 
E. 
Within 2 days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays, after receipt of 
a written communication in a 
record from the respondent or the respondent's attorney, 
send a copy of the communication By-~~~~-~~-mail to the 
petitioner; and 
Sec. IS. I9-A MRSA §3007~ sub-§§2-A to 2-C are enacted to read: 
2-A. 
Registration; reasonable efforts. 
If the department 
reguests registration of a child support order in this State for 
enforcement 
or 
for 
modification, 
the 
department 
shall 
make 
reasonable efforts: 
A. 
To 
ensure that the 
order to 
be 
registered is the 
controlling order; or 
B. 
If 2 or more child support orders exist and the identity 
of the controlling order has not been determined, to ensure 
that 
a 
reguest 
for 
such 
a 
determination is 
made 
in 
a 
tribunal having jurisdiction to do so. 
2-B. 
Conversion of amounts to dollars. 
If the department 
reguests registration and enforcement of a support order, arrears 
or judgment stated in a foreign currency, the department shall 
convert the amounts stated in the foreign currency into the 
eguivalent amounts in dollars under the applicable official or 
market exchange rate as publicly reported. 
2-C. 
Issuance upon request. 
The department shall issue or 
reguest a tribunal of this State to issue a child support order 
and an income-withholding order that redirect payment of current 
support, arrears and interest if reguested to do so by a support 
enforcement agency of another state pursuant to Section 319 of 
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 307 of the Uniform Act.) 
The 
focus 
of Subsection 
(a) 
is 
on providing services to 
a 
peti tioner, and not merely on "representing" the obligee. Care 
should 
be 
exercised 
in 
the 
use 
of 
terminology 
given 
this 
substantial alteration of past practice under RURESA. 
Not only 
may either the obligee or the obligor request services, but that 
request may be in the context of the establishment of an initial 
child-support order, enforcement or review and adjustment of an 
existing child-support order, or a modification of that order 
(upward or downward). 
Note that the Act does not distinguish 
between 
child 
support 
and 
spousal 
support 
for 
purposes 
of 
providing services. Note also, that the services available may 
differ 
significantly; 
for 
example, 
modification 
of 
spousal 
support is limited to the issuing State, 
see Section 205(f), 
supra. 
Subsection 
(b) 
petitioners that 
progress of their 
responds 
to 
the 
past 
complaints 
of 
many 
they were not properly kept informed about the 
requests for services. 
The 
2001 additions of Subsections (c) 
and 
(d) 
are procedural 
clarifications reflecting actual practice of the support agencies 
developed after years of experience with the Act. Subsection (c) 
imposes a duty on all support enforcement agencies to facilitate 
the UIFSA one-order world by actively searching for cases with 
multiple orders and obtaining a determination of the controlling 
order as expeditiously as possible. This agency duty correlates 
to new Subsection 602 (d) regarding the registration process and 
cases with multiple orders. 
Read in conjunction with Section 319, infra, new Subsection (e) 
requires 
the 
state 
support 
enforcement 
agency 
to 
facilitate 
redirection of the stream of child support in order that the 
payments be more efficiently received by the obligee. 
Subsection (f) explicitly states that UIFSA neither creates nor 
rejects 
the establishment of 
an attorney-client or fiduciary 
relationship 
between 
the 
support 
enforcement 
agency 
and 
a 
petitioner 
receiving 
services 
from 
that 
agency. 
This 
highly 
controversial issue is left to otherwise applicable state law. 
Sec. 19. 19-A MRSA §3008-A, as enacted by PL 1997, c. 669, 
§18, is amended by adding a new 2nd paragraph to read: 
The commissioner may determine that a 
foreign country or 
political subdivision has established a 
reciprocal arrangement 
for child support with this State and take appropriate action for 
notification of the determination. 
Uniform Connent 
(This is Section 308 of the Uniform Act.) 
In a 
carryover from RURESA, 
Subsection (a) provides 
State Attorney General, 
or an alternative designated 
law, is given oversight responsibility for the diligent 
of services by the support enforcement agency and the 
seek compliance with the Act. 
that the 
by state 
provision 
power to 
The 2001 addition of Subsection (b) makes clear that a State has 
a variety of options in determining the scope of its support 
enforcement program. In the absence of controlling federal action 
declaring a foreign jurisdiction to be a reciprocating country or 
political subdivision, 
see Section l02(21)(B)(i), 
~, each 
State 
may 
designate 
an 
official 
with 
authority 
to 
make 
a 
statewide, binding determination recognizing a foreign country or 
political subdivision as having a reciprocal arrangement with the 
that State. 
Sec. 20. 19-A MRSA §3010, sub-§l, ~B, as enacted by PL 1995, 
c. 694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
B. 
Maintain a register of the lists of names and addresses 
of tribunals and support enforcement agencies received from 
other states; 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 310 of the Uniform Act.) 
Subsection 
(a) 
identifies 
the 
central 
information 
agency. 
Subsection 
(b) 
details the duties of that agency insofar as 
interstate proceedings are concerned. Subsection (b) (4) does not 
provide independent access to the information sources or to the 
governmental 
documents 
listed. 
Because 
States 
have 
different 
requirements 
and limitations 
concerning such access 
based 
on 
differing views of the privacy interests of individual citizens, 
the agency is directed to use all lawful means under the relevant 
state law to obtain and disseminate information. 
Sec. 21. 19-A MRSA §3011. sub-§l. as enacted by PL 1995, c. 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
1. 
Petition; 
contents. --A-
In 
a 
proceeding 
under 
this 
chapter, a petitioner seeking to establish 9F-me€l.ify a support 
order 
9F L 
to determine parentage 
iH--~-~~~i~-~£4~--~Ri6 
eRapt:eF or to register and modify a 
support order of another 
state must veFi~y-tRe file a 
petition. Unless otherwise ordered 
under section 3012, the petition or accompanying documents must 
provide, so far as known, 
the names, residential addresses and 
social security numbers of the obligor and the obligee or the 
parent 
and 
alleged 
parent, 
and 
the 
name, 
sex, 
residential 
address, social security number and date of birth of each child 
for WR9ffi whose benefit support is sought or whose parentage is to 
be determined. 
~Re Unless filed at the time of registration, the 
peti tion must be accompanied by a eeFtifiea copy of any support 
order iH--e-tfeet known to have been issued by another tribunal. 
The petition may include any other information that may assist in 
locating or identifying the respondent. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 311 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section establishes the basic requirements for drafting and 
filing interstate pleadings. Subsection (a) 
should be read in 
conjunction 
with 
Section 
312, 
which 
provides 
for 
the 
confidentiality of certain information if disclosure is likely to 
result in harm to a party or a child. The 2001 amendments are 
directed at improving the efficiency of the process. Illustrative 
of that goal is the requirement that all known support orders be 
attached to the petition for relief, coupled with the elimination 
of the requirement that such copies be certified. If a dispute 
arises over the authenticity of a purported order, the tribunal 
must, of necessity, sort out conflicting claims at that time. 
AnothGr 
improvement 
is 
the 
deletion 
of 
the 
requirement 
for 
verified pleadings originated in URESA and carried forward in the 
original version of UIFSA. 
Subsection 
(b) 
provides 
authorization 
for 
the 
use 
of 
the 
federally authorized forms promulgated in connection with the 
IV-D child support enforcement program and mandates substantial 
compliance with those forms. Although the use of other forms is 
not 
prohibited, 
standardized 
documents 
have 
resulted 
in 
substantial 
improvement 
in the efficient processing of 
UIFSA 
proceedings. 
Sec. 22. 19-A MRSA §3012, 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, 
enacted in its place: 
as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
§2, is repealed and the following 
§3012. 
Nondisclosure of information in exceptional circumstances 
If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath 
that the health, safety or liberty of a party or child would be 
jeopardized by disclosure of specific identifying information, 
that information must be sealed and may not be disclosed to the 
other party or the public. After a hearing in which a tribunal 
takes into consideration the health, safety or liberty of the 
party or child, the tribunal may order disclosure of information 
that the tribunal determines to be in the interest of justice. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 312 of the Uniform Act.) 
Derived 
from 
the 
UNIFORM 
CHILD 
CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION 
AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
ACT, 
Section 209. 
Information To 
Be 
Submitted to 
Court. 
This 
section is 
the latest version of 
the statutory 
formulation originally developed in UIFSA 1992. Public awareness 
of 
and sensitivity to 
the 
dangers of domestic violence has 
significantly increased since interstate enforcement of support 
originated. This section authorizes confidentiality in instances 
where there is a 
serious risk of domestic violence or child 
abduction. Although local law generally governs the conduct of 
the forum tribunal, state law may not provide for maintaining 
secrecy about 
the exact whereabouts 
of 
a 
litigant or other 
information ordinarily required to be disclosed under state law, 
i.e., Social Security number of the parties or the child. If so, 
this 
section 
creates 
a 
confidentiality 
provision 
that 
is 
particularly appropriate in the light of the intractable problems 
associated with interstate parental kidnapping, see the PARENTAL 
KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A. 
Sec. 23. 19·A MRSA §3014, sub·§l, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
l. 
Personal 
jurisdiction 
in 
another 
proceeding. 
Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding under this chapter 
before 
a 
responding tribunal, 
whether 
in person, 
by private 
attorney or through services provided by the department, does not 
confer 
personal 
jurisdiction over 
the petitioner 
in 
another 
proceeding. 
Uniform Cormnent 
(This is Section 314 of the Uniform Act.) 
Under Subsection (a), direct or indirect participation in a UIFSA 
proceeding does not subject 
a petitioner to an assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over the petitioner by the forum State in 
other litigation between the parties. The primary Object of this 
prohibition is to preclude joining disputes over child custody 
and 
visitation 
with 
the 
establishment, 
enforcement, 
or 
modification of child support. This prohibition strengthens the 
ban on visitation litigation established in Section 305(d). 
A 
petition 
for 
affirmative 
relief 
under 
UIFSA 
limits 
the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal to the boundaries of the support 
proceeding. 
In sum, 
proceedings under 
UIFSA are not suitable 
vehicles for the relitigation of all of the issues arising out of 
a 
foreign 
divorce 
or 
custody 
cases. 
Only 
enforcement 
or 
modification of the support portion of such decrees or orders are 
relevant. 
Other 
issues, 
such 
as 
custody 
and visitation, 
or 
matters relating to other aspect of the divorce decree, 
are 
collateral and have no place in a UIFSA proceeding. Chaisson v. 
Ragsdale, 914 S.W.2d 739 (Ark. 1996). 
Subsection (b) grants a litigant a variety of limited immunity 
from service of process during the time that party is physically 
present in a State for a UIFSA proceeding. The immunity provided 
is in no way comparable to diplomatic immunity, however, which 
should be clear from reading Subsection (c) in conj unction wi th 
the other subsections. 
Subsection 
(c) 
does 
not extend 
immunity to civil litigation 
unrelated 
to 
the 
support 
proceeding 
which 
stems 
from 
contemporaneous acts committed by a party while present in the 
State 
for 
the 
support litigation. 
For 
example, 
a 
petitioner 
involved in an automobile accident or a contract dispute over the 
cost of lodging while present in the State does not have immunity 
from a civil suit on those issues. 
Sec. 24. 19-A MRSA §3016, sub-§§l, 2, 5 and 6, as enacted by PL 
1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, are amended to 
read: 
1. 
Physical presence not required. 
The physical presence 
of tse-f>€-t-i-t-ieaei' a nonresident party who is an individual in a 
i'espeBaiB~ tribunal 
of 
this 
State is 
not 
required 
for 
the 
establishment, enforcement or modification of a support order or 
the rendition of a judgment determining parentage. 
2. 
Admissible 
evidence. 
A--¥~~~~~-~~~r--aB An 
affidavit, 
a 
document 
substantially 
complying 
with 
federally 
mandated forms aBa or a document incorporated by reference in any 
of themT that would not be excluded under the hearsay rule if 
given in personT---a-re-
is admissible in evidence if given under 
eats penalty of perjury by a party or witness residing in another 
state. 
5. 
No 
objection 
based 
on 
means 
of 
transmission. 
Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a tribunal 
of this State by telephone, telecopier or other means that does 
not provide an original 
wi'itiB~ record may not be excluded from 
evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission. 
6. 
Testimony not in person. 
In a proceeding under this 
chapter, 
a tribunal of this State may shall permit a party or 
witness residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by 
telephone, 
audiovisual 
means 
or 
other electronic 
means 
at 
a 
designated tribunal or other location in that state. 
A tribunal 
of this State shall cooperate with tribunals of other states in 
designating 
an 
appropriate 
location 
for 
the 
deposition 
or 
testimony. 
Sec. 25. 19-A MRS A §3016, sub-§10 is enacted to read: 
10. 
Voluntary 
acknowledgment 
admissible. 
A 
voluntary 
acknowledgment 
of 
paternity, 
certified 
as 
a 
true 
copy, 
is 
admissible to establish parentage of the child. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 316 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section combines many time-tested procedures with additional 
innovative methods for gathering evidence in interstate cases. 
The 
amendment 
to 
Subsection 
(a) 
ensures 
that 
a 
nonresident 
petitioner or a nonresident respondent may fully participate in a 
proceeding 
under 
the 
Act 
without 
being 
required 
to 
appear 
personally. This was always the intent of the provision, but the 
text was ambiguous in this regard. 
Subsections (b) through (f) greatly expand the special rules of 
evidence originally propounded in RURESA which are designed to 
take into account the virtually unique nature of the interstate 
proceedings under this Act. These sections provide exceptions to 
the otherwise guiding principle of UIFSA, i.e., local procedural 
and substantive law should apply. Because the out-of-state party, 
and that party's witnesses, necessarily do not ordinarily appear 
in person at the hearing, deviation from the ordinary rules of 
evidence is justified in order to assure that the tribunal will 
have available to it the maximum amount of information on which 
to base its decision. The intent throughout these subsections is 
to eliminate by statute as many potential hearsay problems as 
possible in interstate litigation, with the goal of providing 
each party with the means 
to present evidence, 
even if not 
physically present. See Attorney General v. Litten, 999 S.W.2d 74 
(Tex. App. 1999); State ex reI. T.L.R. v. R.W.T., 737 So.2d 688 
(La. 1999). 
Perhaps the most dramatic of the 2001 amendments affecting these 
special rules of evidence is the change of a single word. The 
authorization in Subsection (f) 
of telephonic 
or 
audiovisual 
testimony in depositions and in hearing now substitutes the word 
"shall" for the word "may." Adoption by the States may herald the 
day when every relevant court 
room will be 
equipped with 
a 
speaker phone, at the minimum, if not cameras and audiovisual 
receivers. This amendment will also eliminate decisions such as 
Schwier v. 
Bernstein, 
So.2d 
(Fla. 
App. 
1999), 
which 
construed the use of electronic transmission of testimony to be 
wholly within the discretion of the tribunal. On a related track, 
the 
2001 
amendments 
to 
Subsection 
(b): 
(1) 
recognize 
the 
pervasive effect of the federal forms promulgated by the Office 
of Child Support Enforcement, HHS; 
(2) replace the necessity of 
swearing to a document "under oath" with the simpler requirement 
that the document be provided "under penalty of perjury," as is 
required by federal income tax form 1040. 
Subsection (d) provides a simplified means for proving health 
care expenses related to the birth of a child. Because ordinarily 
these charges are not in dispute, this is designed to obviate the 
cost of having health care providers appear in person or of 
obtaining affidavits of business records from each provider. 
Subsections (e) and (f) encourage tribunals and litigants to take 
advantage 
of 
modern 
methods 
of 
communication 
in 
interstate 
support litigation; most dramatically, the out-of-state party is 
authorized to testify by telephone and supply documents by fax. 
One of the most useful applications of these subsections has been 
the combining of (c) and (e) to provide an enforcing tribunal 
with up-to-date information concerning the amount of arrears. 
Subsection (g) codifies the rule in effect in many States that in 
civil litigation 
an 
adverse 
inference 
may 
be 
drawn 
from 
a 
litigant's silence. 
If 
a 
party refuses to submit to genetic 
testing, the refusal may be admitted into evidence and the court 
may resolve the question of paternity against that party on the 
basis of an inference that the results of the tests would have 
been unfavorable to the interests of the refusing party. 
Subsection (j), new in 2001, complies with the federally mandated 
procedure that every State must honor the 
"acknowledgment of 
paterni ty" validly made in another State. 
Sec. 26. 19-A MRSA §3017, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
§3017. Communications between tribunals 
A tribunal of this State may communicate with a tribunal of 
another state or foreign country or political subdivision in 
w~itiB~ a 
record or 
by 
telephone 
or other 
means 
to obtain 
information concerning the laws 
e{-~~--&tate; the legal effect 
of a judgment, decree or order of that tribunal; and the status 
of 
a 
proceeding 
in 
the 
other 
state or 
foreign 
country or 
political subdivision. 
A tribunal of this State may furnish 
similar information by similar means to a tribunal of another 
state or foreign country or political subdivision. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 317 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section authorizes communications between tribunals in order 
to facilitate decisions. The 2001 amendments extend the coverage 
of the section to tribunals of foreign nations. Broad cooperation 
between tribunals is permitted to expedite establishment 
and 
enforcement of a support order. 
Sec. 27. 19·A MRSA §3019, 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, 
enacted in its place: 
as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
§2, is repealed and the following 
§30l9. 
Receipt and disbursement of pa~nts 
1. 
Disburse 
promptly. 
The 
department 
shall 
disburse 
promptly any amounts received pursuant to a 
support order as 
directed 
by 
the 
order. 
The 
department 
shall 
furnish 
to 
a 
requesting 
party 
or 
tribunal 
of 
another 
state 
a 
certified 
statement by the custodian of the record of the amounts and dates 
of all payments received. 
2. 
Direct 
pa~nt; 
issue 
withholding 
order 
or 
administrative notice. 
If neither the obligor, nor the obligee 
who is an individual, nor the child resides in this State, upon 
request from the department or the support enforcement agency of 
another state, the department or a tribunal of this State shall: 
A. 
Direct that the support payment be made to the support 
enforcement agency in the state in which the obligee is 
receiving services; and 
B. 
Issue and send to the obligor' s employer a conforming 
income-withholding order 
or 
an 
administrative 
notice 
of 
change of payee, reflecting the redirected payments. 
3. 
Statement of record of payments. 
If the department 
receives redirected payments from another state pursuant to a law 
similar 
to 
subsection 
2, 
the 
department shall 
furnish to 
a 
requesting party or tribunal of the other state a 
certified 
statement by the custodian of the record of the amount and dates 
of all payments received. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 319 of the Uniform Act.) 
The first sentence of 
Subsection 
(a) 
is truly hortatory 
in 
nature, although its principle is implemented insofar as support 
enforcement 
agencies 
are 
concerned 
by 
federal 
regulations 
promulgated by the Office of 
Child Support Enforcement. 
The 
second sentence confirms the duty of the agency or tribunal to 
furnish payment information in interstate cases. 
The 2001 amendments to Subsections (b) and (c) were inspired by 
the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement 
(OCSE), 
U.S. 
Department 
of Health and 
Human 
Services. 
Support enforcement 
agencies 
are 
directed 
to 
cooperate 
in 
the 
efficient 
and 
expeditious collection and transfer of child support from obligor 
to obligee. States may choose whether only a tribunal may order 
redirection of support payments, or whether a support enforcement 
agency of the State is also authorized to render such an order. 
Under either approach, the request for such redirection that must 
be acted upon may only be made by a support enforcement agency in 
either the issuing State or another State. The basic idea is that 
redirection of payments will be facilitated, with the proviso 
that the issuing tribunal be kept informed as to the disposition 
of the payments made under its order. 
Sec. 28. 19-A MRSA §3051, sub-§2, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
2. 
Responding tribunal may issue temporary support order. 
A responding tribunal of this State may issue a temporary support 
order 
~~Fs~aB~--B&-~~--~-~--~£~£--S~a~eT if the 
tribunal 
determines that such an order is appropriate and the individual 
ordered to pay is: 
A. 
The presumed father of the child; 
B. 
Peti tioning 
to 
have 
his 
paternity 
of 
the 
child 
adjudicated; 
c. 
Identified as the father of the child through genetic 
testing; 
D. 
An 
alleged father of the child who 
has declined to 
submit to genetic testing; 
E. 
Shown by clear and convincing evidence to be the father 
of the child; 
F. 
An acknowledged father of the child as provided in Title 
19-A, section 1616; 
G. 
The mother of the child; or 
H. 
An individual who has been ordered to pay child support 
to the child 
in a previous proceeding and the order has not 
been reversed or vacated. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 401 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section authorizes a tribunal of the responding State to 
issue 
temporary 
and 
permanent 
support 
orders 
binding 
on 
an 
obligor over whom the tribunal has personal jurisdiction. UIFSA 
does not permit such orders to be issued when another support 
order 
exists, 
thereby 
prohibiting 
a 
second 
tribunal 
from 
establishing 
another 
support 
order 
and 
the 
accompanying 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, see Sections 
and 206. 
The 2001 rewording of Subsection (b) conforms the language to the 
provisions of the 
UNIFORM 
PARENTAGE 
ACT 
(2000) 
regarding the 
individual party who may be ordered to pay temporary support. 
Sec. 29. 19·A MRSA §3101, as repealed and replaced by PL 
1997, c. 669, §20, is amended to read: 
§3l0l. 
Employer's receipt of out-of-state income-withholding 
order 
An income-withholding order issued in another state may be 
sent by or on behalf of the obligee or by the department to the 
obligor's employer, described as a payor of income under chapter 
65, 
subchapter 
IV 
1, 
without 
first 
filing 
a 
petition 
or 
comparable pleading or registering the order with a tribunal of 
this State. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 501 of the Uniform Act.) 
In 1984 Congress mandated that all States adopt procedures for 
enforcing 
income-withholding 
orders 
of 
sister States. 
Direct 
recognition 
by 
the 
out-of-state 
obligor's 
employer 
of 
a 
withholding order issued by another State long was 
sought by 
support enforcement associations and other advocacy groups. 
In 
1992 
UIFSA 
recognized 
such 
a 
procedure. 
The 
article 
was 
extensively 
amended 
in 
1996, 
but 
was 
the 
subject 
only 
of 
clarifying amendments in 2001. 
Section 501 is deliberately written in the passive voice; the Act 
does not restrict those who may send an income-withholding order 
across state lines. Although the sender will orcinarily be 
a 
child support enforcement agency or the obligee, the obligor or 
any 
other 
person 
may 
supply 
an 
employer 
with 
the 
income-withholding order. "Sending a copy" of a withholding order 
to an employer is clearly distinguishable from "service" of that 
order 
on the 
same 
employer. 
Service of 
an order necessarily 
intends to invoke a tr ibunal 's authority over an employer doing 
business in the State. Thus, for there to be valid "service" of a 
wi thholding order on an employer in a State, the tribunal must 
have authority to bind the employer. In most cases, this requires 
the assertion of the authority of a local responding tribunal in 
a 
"registration 
for 
enforcement" 
proceeding. 
In 
short, 
the 
formality of "service" defeats the whole purpose of direct income 
withholding across state lines. 
In 
sum, 
the process 
contemplated 
in this article is direct 
"notification" of an employer in another State of a withholding 
order 
without 
the 
involvement 
of 
initiating 
or 
responding 
tribunals. Therefore, receipt of a copy of a withholding order by 
facsimile, 
regular first class mail, 
registered or certified 
mail, or any other type of direct notice is sufficient to provide 
the requisite notice to trigger direct income withholding in the 
absence of a contest by the employee-obligor. 
The 2001 amendments acknowledge that this process is now widely 
used by not only child support enforcement agencies, but also by 
private collection agencies or private attorneys acting on behalf 
of obligees. 
Sec. 30. 19-A MRSA §3101-B, as enacted by PL 1997, c. 669, 
§21, is amended to read: 
§3101-B. 
Employer's compliance with multiple income-withholding 
orders 
If 
an 
employer 
receives 
ffia±~ip±e 
or 
more 
income-withholding orders 
for 
the 
same 
obligor, 
the 
employer 
satisfies the 
terms 
of 
the 
ffia±~ip±e orders if the 
employer 
complies with the laws of the state of the obligor's principal 
place 
of 
employment 
when 
establishing 
the 
priorities 
for 
wi thholding and allocating income for 
ffia±~ip±e 2 or more child 
support obligees. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 503 of the Uniform Act.) 
Consistent with the Act's general problem-solving approach, the 
employer is directed to deal with multiple income orders for 
multiple families in the same manner as required by local law for 
orders of the forum State. 
Sec. 31. 19-A MRSA §3101-F, sub-§l, as enacted by PL 1997, c. 
669, §21, is amended to read: 
1. 
Contesting the validity or enforcement of an order. 
An 
obligor 
may 
contest 
the 
validity 
or 
enforcement 
of 
an 
income-withholding order issued in another state and received 
directly by an employer in this State by registering the order ln 
a tribunal of this State and filing a contest to that order as 
provided in subchapter 6, or otherwise contesting the order in 
the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of 
this State. 
Section 3153 applies to the contest. 
Sec. 32. 19·A MRSA §3101.F, sub.§2, ~C, as enacted by PL 1997, 
c. 669, §21, is amended to read: 
C. 
The person 
eF--a~eR€y designated to receive payments in 
the income-withholding order or, if a person 
eF--a~eR€y is 
not designated, to the obligee. 
Uniform Connent 
(This is Section 506 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section incorporates into the interstate context the law 
regarding defenses an employee-obligor may raise to an intrastate 
withholding 
order. 
Generally, 
States 
have 
accepted 
the 
IV-D 
requirement that the only viable defense is a "mistake of fact." 
U.S.C. Section 666(b) (4) (A). This apparently includes "errors 
in the amount of current support owed, errors in the amount of 
accrued arrearage or mistaken identity of the alleged obligor" 
while excluding "other grounds, such as the inappropriateness of 
the 
amount of support ordered to be paid, 
changed financial 
circumstances of the obligor, or lack of visitation." H.R. Rep. 
No. 
98-527, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1983). The latter claims 
must 
be pursued in a 
separate proceeding in the appropriate 
State, not in a UIFSA proceeding. 
This procedure is based on the assumption that valid defenses to 
income withholding for chi Id support are few and far between. 
Experience 
has 
shown 
that 
in 
relatively 
few 
cases 
does 
an 
employee-obligor have a 
complete defense, 
~, the child has 
died, another contingency ending the support has occurred, the 
order has 
been 
superseded, 
or 
there is 
a 
case 
of 
mistaken 
identity and the employee 
is not the obligor. 
An 
employee's 
complaint that "The child support is too high" must be ignored. 
However, 
situations 
do 
arise where 
an 
employer 
has 
received 
mul tiple withholding notices regarding the obligor-employee and 
the same obligee. The notices may even allege conflicting amounts 
due, 
especially 
for 
payments 
on 
arrears. 
Additionally, 
many 
employees claim to have only learned of default orders when the 
withholding notice Is delivered to the employer; this leads to 
claims that the order being enforced through income withholding 
was 
entered 
without 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
obligor-employee. 
The 
2001 
rewording of Subsection 
(a) 
affirms that 
a 
simple. 
efficient, 
and 
cost-effective 
method 
for 
an 
employee-alleged 
obligor to assert a defense is to register the withholding order 
with a 
local tribunal and seek protection from that tribunal 
pending resolution of 
the contest. 
This 
may 
be 
accomplished 
through the obligor's employment of private counselor by 
a 
request for services made to the child support enforcement agency 
of 
the 
responding State. 
Some 
States 
provide 
administrative 
procedures 
for 
challenging 
the 
income 
withholding 
that 
may 
provide quicker resolution of a dispute than a judicially-based 
registration and hearing process. In the absence of expeditious 
action by the employee to assert a defense and contest the direct 
filing of a notice for withholding, however, the employer must 
begin income withholding in a timely fashion. 
In contrast to the multiple-order system of RURESA, another issue 
the employee-obligor may 
raise is that the withholding order 
received by the employer is not based on the controlling child 
support order issued by the tribunal with continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction, 
see Section 207, 
supra. 
Such 
a 
claim does 
not 
constitute a defense to the obligation of child support, but does 
put at issue the identity of the order to which the employer must 
respond. Clearly the employer is in no position to make such a 
decision. When multiple orders involve the same employee-obligor 
and child, as a practical matter resort to a responding tribunal 
to 
resolve 
a 
dispute 
over 
apportionment 
almost certainly 
1S 
necessary. 
Sec. 33. 19-A MRSA §3102, sub-§l, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
1. 
Documents to state information agency. 
A party residing 
in another state or support enforcement agency seeking to enforce 
a support order or an income-withholding order, or both, issued 
by a tribunal of another state shall send the documents required 
for registering the order to the department. 
Uniform Conunent 
(This is Section 507 of the Uniform Act.) 
This 
section authorizes 
summary 
enforcement of 
an interstate 
child support order through the administrative means available 
for intrastate orders. Under Subsection (a), an interested party 
in 
another 
State, 
which 
necessarily 
may 
include 
a 
private 
attorney or a support enforcement agency, may forward a support 
order or income-withholding order to a support enforcement agency 
of the responding State. 
The 
term "responding State" in this 
context does not necessarily contemplate resort to a tribunal as 
an initial step. 
Subsection 
responding 
(b) 
directs the 
State to employ 
support enforcement 
that State's regular 
agency in the 
administrative 
procedures 
to 
process 
an 
out-of-state 
order. 
Thus, 
a 
local 
employer accustomed to dealing with the local agency need not 
change 
its procedure 
to 
comply 
with 
an out-of-state order. 
Similarly, the administrative agency is authorized to apply its 
ordinary rules equally to both intrastate and interstate orders. 
For 
example, 
if the administrative hearing procedure must be 
exhausted for an intrastate order before a contesting party may 
seek relief in a tribunal, the same rule applies to an interstate 
order received for administrative enforcement. 
Sec. 34. 19·A MRSA c. 67, sub·c. 6 is amended by repealing the 
subchapter headnote and enacting the following in its place: 
SUBCHAPTER 6 
REGISTRATION, ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION 
OF SUPPORT ORDER 
Sec. 35. 19·A MRSA §3151. as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
§3151. 
Procedure to register order for enforcement 
1. 
Required documents and information. 
The department may 
register 
a 
support 
order 
or 
an 
income-withholding 
order 
by 
forwarding the following sge~meRts records and information to the 
appropriate court in this State for registration in this State 
for enforcement: 
A. 
A letter of 
transmittal 
to 
the 
tribunal 
requesting 
registration and enforcement; 
B. 
Two copies, including one certified copy, of al-l--9£Sef'S 
the order to be registered, including any modification of an 
order; 
C. 
A sworn statement by the ~af'ty-6eekiR~ person requesting 
registration or a certified statement by the custodian of 
the records showing the amount of any arrearages; 
D. 
The name of the obligor and, if known: 
(1) 
The obligor's address and social security number; 
(2) 
The name and address of the obligor's employer and 
any other source of income of the Obligor; and 
(3) 
A description and the location of property of the 
obligor in this State not exempt from execution; and 
E. 
±Re Except as provided in section 3012, the name and 
address of the obligee and, if applicable, the agency or 
person to whom support payments are to be remitted. 
2. 
File as foreign judgment. 
Upon receipt of a request for 
registration, the registering tribunal shall file the order as a 
foreign judgment, together with one copy of the documents and 
information, regardless of their form. 
3. 
Additional petition filed at same time. 
A petition or 
comparable pleading seeking a remedy that must be affirmatively 
sought under other law of this State may be filed at the same 
time as the request for registration, or later. 
The pleading 
must specify the grounds for the remedy sought. 
4. 
Two or more orders in effect. 
If 2 or more orders are 
in effect, the person requesting registration shall: 
A. 
Furnish to the tribunal a copy of every support order 
asserted to 
be 
in effect in addition to 
the 
documents 
specified in this section; 
B. 
Specify the order alleged to be the controlling order, 
if any; and 
C. 
Specify the amount of consolidated arrears, if any. 
5. 
Request 
for 
determination of controlling order. 
A 
request for a determination of which order is the controlling 
order may be filed separately or with a request for registration 
and enforcement or for registration and modification. 
The person 
requesting registration shall give notice of the request to each 
party whose rights may be affected by the determination. 
Uniform COllDllent 
(This is Section 602 of the Uniform Act.) 
Subsection (a) outlines the mechanics for registration of an 
interstate order. Substantial compliance with the requirements lS 
expected, Twaddell v. Anderson, 523 S.E.2d 710 (N.C. App. 1999); 
In re Chapman, 973 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App. 1998). 
Subsection (b) 
converted into 
continues to be 
confirms that the order being 
an order of the 
responding 
an order of the issuing State. 
registered is not 
State, 
but rather 
Subsection (c) warns that if a particular enforcement remedy must 
be specifically sought under local law, the same rule of pleading 
is applicable as in an interstate case. For example, if license 
suspension or 
revocation is 
sought 
as 
a 
remedy 
for 
alleged 
noncompliance with the terms of the order, the substantive and 
procedural rules of the responding State apply. Whether the range 
of application of the remedy in the responding State is wider or 
narrower than that available in the issuing State is irrelevant. 
The responding tribunal will apply the familiar law of its State, 
and is neither expected nor authorized to consider the law of the 
issuing State. In short, the path in enforcing the order of a 
tribunal of another State is identical to the path followed for 
enforcing an order of the responding State. The authorization of 
a 
later filing 
to 
comply 
with 
local 
law 
contemplates 
that 
interstate pleadings may be liberally amended to conform to local 
practice. 
The 2001 amendments adding Subsections (d) and (e) amplify the 
procedures to be followed when two or more child-support orders 
exist and registration for enforcement or modification is sought. 
In such instances, 
the requester is directed to furnish the 
tribunal with sufficient information and documentation so that 
the tribunal may make determinations of the controlling order and 
of the amount of consolidated arrears and interest as provided by 
Section 207, ~. 
Sec. 36. 19-A MRS A §3153, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is repealed and the following 
enacted in its place: 
§3153. 
Choice of law 
1. 
Current payments. other obligations and arrearages under 
order. 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, the law of 
the issuing state governs: 
A. 
The 
nature, 
extent, 
amount 
and duration of current 
payments under a registered support order; 
B. 
The computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of 
interest on the arrearages under the support order; and 
c. 
The 
existence 
and satisfaction of other obligations 
under the support order. 
2. 
Proceeding for arrears. 
In a proceeding for arrears 
under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of 
this State or of the issuing state, whichever is for a longer 
period of time, applies. 
3. 
Procedures and remedies of this State. 
A responding 
tribunal of this State shall apply the procedures and remedies of 
this State to enforce current support and collect arrears and 
interest due on a support order of another state registered in 
this State. 
4. 
A;eplication of law of state issuing controlling order. 
After a tribunal of this or another state determines which order 
is 
the 
controlling order 
and 
issues 
an 
order 
consolidating 
arrears, if any, 
a tribunal of this State shall prospectively 
apply 
the 
law 
of 
the 
state issuing 
the 
controlling order, 
including its law on interest on arrears, on current and future 
support and on consolidated arrears. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 604 of the Uniform Act.) 
This 
section 
identifies 
situations 
in 
which 
local 
law 
is 
inapplicable. A basic principle of UIFSA is that throughout the 
process the controlling order remains the order of the issuing 
State, and that responding States only assist in the enforcement 
of 
that 
order. 
Absent 
a 
loss 
of 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction and 
a 
subsequent modification of the order, 
the 
order never becomes an "order of the responding State." Ultimate 
responsibility 
for 
enforcement 
and 
final 
resolution 
of 
the 
obligor's 
compliance 
with all 
aspects 
of 
the 
support 
order 
belongs to the issuing State. Thus, calculation of whether the 
obligor has fully complied with the payment of current support, 
arrears, 
and interest on arrears is the duty of the issuing 
State. For example, 
under Subsection (a) 
the responding State 
must recognize and enforce an order of the issuing State for the 
support of a child until age 21, notwithstanding the fact that 
the duty of support of a child ends at age 18 under the law of 
the responding State, see Robdau v. Commonwealth, Virginia Dept. 
Social Serv., 
S.E.2d 602 
(Va. 
App. 
2001); 
State ex reI. 
Harnes v. Lawrence, 538 S.E.2d 223 (N.C. App. 2000). Similarly, 
the law of the issuing State governs whether a payment made for 
the benefit of a child, such as a Social Security benefit for a 
child of 
a 
disabled obligor, 
should be credited against the 
obligor's child support obligation. The amendments of 2001 to 
Subsection (a) are intended to clarify the range of subjects that 
are governed by the choice of law rules established 
~n this 
section. 
Subsection (b) contains another choice of law provision that may 
diverge from local law. In situations in which the statutes of 
limitation differ from State to State, 
the statute with the 
longer term is to be applied. Attorney General v. Litten, 999 
S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App. 1999). In interstate cases, arrearages often 
will have accumulated over a considerable period of time before 
enforcement is perfected. The rationale for this exception to the 
general rule is that the obligor should not gain an undue benefit 
from the choice of residence if the forum State has a shorter 
statute of limitations for arrearages than does the controll ing 
order State. On the other side of the coin, i.e., the forum has a 
longer statute of limitations, the obligor will be treated in an 
identical manner as all other obligors in that State. 
Subsection (c) mandates that local law controls with regard to 
enforcement procedures. 
For example, if the issuing State has 
enacted 
a 
wide 
variety of 
license 
suspension 
or 
revocation 
statutes, while the responding State has a much narrower list of 
licenses subject to suspension or revocation, local law prevails. 
Subsection (d) may appear to state another truism-the law of the 
State that issued the controlling order is superior with regard 
to the terms of the support order itself. However, 
the last 
clause in the 
sentence provides 
a 
very important clarifying 
provision; that is, the law of the issuing State is to be applied 
to the consolidated arrears, even if the support orders of other 
States contributed a portion to those arrears. 
In sum, the local tribunal applies its own familiar procedures to 
enforce a support order, but it is clearly enforcing an order of 
another State and not an order of the forum. 
Sec. 37. 19-A MRSA §3201. as enac ted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
§3201. 
Notice of registration of order 
1. 
Time and method of notice. 
When 
a 
support order or 
income-wi thholding order issued in another state is registered, 
the registering tribunal shall notify the nonregistering party. 
Notice must be given by first class, certified or registered mail 
or by any means of personal service authorized by the law of this 
State. 
The 
notice 
must 
be 
accompanied 
by 
a 
copy 
of 
the 
registered order 
and 
the 
documents 
and 
relevant 
information 
accompanying the order. 
2. 
Contents of notice. 
±He 
b 
notice 
must 
inform 
the 
nonregistering party: 
A. 
That a registered order is enforceable as of the date of 
registration ln the same manner as an order issued by a 
tribunal of this State; 
B. 
That a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of 
the registered order must be requested within 20 days after 
~He-aa~e-9~-ffiai±iB~-9~-~e~s9Ba±-Se~yiee-9~-~He notice; 
c. 
That failure to contest the validity or enforcement of 
the registered order in a 
timely manner will result in 
confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order and 
the alleged arrearages and precludes further contest of that 
order with respect to 
any matter that could have 
been 
asserted; and 
D. 
Of the amount of any alleged arrearages. 
3. 
Notice if 2 or more orders. 
If the registering party 
asserts that 2 or more orders are in effect, a notice must also: 
A. 
Identify the 2 or more orders and the order alleged by 
the registering person to be the controlling order and the 
consolidated arrears, if any; 
B. 
Notify the nonregistering party of 
the 
right to 
a 
determination of which order is the controlling order; 
C. 
State that the procedures provided in subsection 2 apply 
to 
the determination of which order is the controlling 
order; and 
D. 
State 
that 
failure 
to 
contest 
the 
validity 
or 
enforcement of the order alleged to be the controlling order 
in a timely manner may result in confirmation that the order 
is the controlling order. 
4. 
Notice of income-withholding order. 
Upon registration 
of an income-withholding order for enforcement, the registering 
tribunal shall notify the obligor's employer pursuant to chapter 
65, subchapter 4. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 605 of the Uniform Act.) 
Sections 605-608 provide the procedure for the nonregistering 
party to contest registration of an order, either because the 
order is allegedly invalid, superseded, or no longer in effect, 
or because the enforcement remedy being sought is opposed by the 
nonregistering party. 
Subsections (a) and (b) direct that the nonregistering party be 
fully informed of the effect of registration. After such notice 
is given, 
absent 
a 
successful contest by 
the nonregistering 
party, the order will be confirmed and future contest will be 
precluded. 
Subsection (c), with new text in 2001, is the correlative to 
Section 602(d) and (e) regarding the notice to be given to the 
nonregistering party if a controlling order determination must be 
made 
because of the existence of 
two 
or more 
child-support 
orders. 
The petitioner requesting this affirmative relief is 
directed to identify the order alleged to be controlling under 
Section 207, supra. If the nonregistering party does not contest 
this 
allegation, 
either 
by 
default 
or 
agreement, 
the 
order 
identified as controlling will be confirmed by operation of law 
by the following section. 
Relettered 
Subsection 
(d) 
states 
the 
obvious; 
the 
obligor's 
employer must also be notified if income is to be withheld. 
Sec. 38. 19-A MRSA §3203, sub-§l, ~F and G, as enacted by PL 
1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, are amended to 
read: 
F. 
Full or partial payment has been made; 
e~ 
G. 
The statute of limitation under section 3153 precludes 
enforcement of some or all of the alleged arrearagesT~ 
Sec.39. 19-A MRSA §3203, sub-§l, ~H is enacted to read: 
H. 
The alleged controlling order is not the controlling 
order. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 607 of the Uniform Act.) 
Subsection (a) places the burden on the nonregister ing party to 
assert narrowly defined defenses to registration of a 
support 
order. 
The 
2001 
amendment 
added an obvious defense that was 
inadvertently omitted from the original list of defenses. In a 
multiple order situation, if the nonregistering party contests 
the allegation regarding the controlling order, either because it 
allegedly has not been registered or because another order has 
been misidentified as such, the nonregistering party may defend 
against enforcement of another order by asserting the existence 
of 
a 
controlling 
order. 
Presumably 
the 
defense 
must 
be 
substantiated by registration of the other alleged controlling 
order to be effective. 
If the obligor is liable for current support, in the absence of a 
valid defense under Subsection (b) the registering tribunal must 
enter an order to enforce that obligation. State Dept. of Revenue 
ex reI. 
Rochell v. Morris, 
So. 
2d 
(Fla. 
App. 
1999); 
Welsher v. 
Rager, 
S.E.2d 661 
(N.C. 
App. 
1997); 
Cowan v. 
Moreno, 
S.W.2d 
(Tex. 
App.--Austin 
1995). 
Proof 
of 
arrearages 
must 
resul t 
in 
enforcement; 
under 
the 
Bradley 
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. Section 666(a)(10), all States are required 
to treat child support payments as final judgments as they come 
due (or lose federal funding). Therefore, such arrearages are not 
subject to retroactive modification. 
Subsection (c) provides that failure to successfully contest a 
registered order requires the tribunal to confirm the validity of 
the registered order. 
Although the statute is silent on the 
subject, it seems likely that res judicata r6quires that both the 
registering and nonregistering party who fail to register the 
"true" 
controlling order will 
be 
estopped 
from 
subsequently 
collaterally attacking the confirmed order on the basis that the 
unmentioned "true order should have been confirmed instead." 
Sec. 40. 19-A MRSA §3252, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
§3252. 
Effect of registration for modification 
A tribunal of this State may enforce a child support order 
of another state registered for purposes of modification in the 
same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this 
State, but the registered order may be modified only if the 
requirements of section 3253, 3255 or 3257 have been met. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 610 of the Uniform Act.) 
An order registered for purposes of modification may be enforced 
in 
the 
same 
manner 
as 
an 
order 
registered for 
purposes 
of 
enforcement. But, the power of the forum tribunal to modify a 
child-support 
order 
of 
another 
tribunal 
is 
limited 
by 
the 
specific factual preconditions set forth in Sections 611, 
613, 
and 615. 
Sec. 41. 19-A MRSA §3253, as amended by PL 1997, c. 669, §22, 
is repealed and the following enacted in its place: 
§3253. 
Modification of child support order of another state 
1. 
Modification of order issued in another state. 
If 
section 3255 does not apply, 
except as otherwise provided in 
section 3257, a tribunal of this State upon petition may modify a 
child 
support 
order 
issued in 
another 
state that 
has 
been 
registered in this State if, 
after notice 
and hearing, 
the 
tribunal finds that: 
A. 
The following requirements are met: 
( 1) 
Neither the child, 
nor 
the obligee who 
is an 
individual, 
nor 
the obligor resides 
in the 
issuing 
state; 
(2) 
A petitioner, 
who 
is either 
a 
resident or 
a 
nonresident of this State, seeks modification; and 
(3) 
The 
respondent 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
personal 
jurisdiction of the tribunal of this State; or 
B. 
This State is the state of residence of the child or a 
party who 
is an individual, 
the child or the party is 
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal and all 
of the parties who are individuals have filed consents in a 
record in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this State 
to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
2. 
Modification; 
enforcement 
and 
satisfaction. 
Modification of a registered child support order is subject to 
the same requirements, procedures and defenses that apply to the 
modification of an order issued by a tribunal of this State and 
the order may be enforced and satisfied in the same manner. 
3. 
No modification. 
Except as provided in section 3257, 
a 
tribunal of this State may not modify any aspect of a 
child 
support order that may not be modified under the law of the 
issuing state, 
including 
the 
duration 
of 
the 
obligation 
of 
support. 
If 2 or more tribunals have issued child support orders 
for the same obligor and same child, the order that controls and 
must be recognized under section 2967 establishes the aspects of 
the child support order that are nonmodifiable. 
3-A. 
Issuing state's 
law governs. 
In 
a 
proceeding to 
modify 
a 
child support order, 
the 
law of the state that is 
determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs 
the 
duration 
of 
the 
obligation 
of 
support. 
~he obligor's 
fulfillment of the duty of support established by that order 
precludes imposition of 
a 
further obligation of support by 
a 
tribunal of this State. 
4. 
Modification order; continuing, exclusive juriSdiction. 
Upon issuance of an order by a tribunal of this State modifying a 
child support order issued in another state, the tribunal of this 
State becomes the tribunal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
Uniform Conunent 
(This is Section 611 of the Uniform Act.) 
Under the procedure established by RURESA, after a support order 
was registered for the purpose of enforcement it was treated as 
if it had originally been issued by the registering tribunal. 
Most States interpreted these registration provisions as also 
authorizing prospective "modification" of the registered order. 
However, except in circumstances in which both States had the 
same version of 
RURESA 
and the formalities were 
scrupulously 
followed, 
the 
registering 
tribunal 
did 
not 
have 
the 
legal 
authority to replace the original order with its own order. In 
short, 
most 
often 
the 
purported 
modification 
in 
essence 
established a new obligation. In sum, by its very terms RURESA 
contemplated, 
or 
even 
encouraged, 
the 
existence 
of multiple 
support orders, none of which were directly related to any of the 
others. 
Al though the issuing tribunal under 
RURESA retained a 
version of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its own 
order, that power was not exclusive. 
The typical scenario of 
those days was that an obligee would seek assistance from a local 
court, 
which would 
determine 
a 
duty of 
support existed 
and 
forward 
a certificate and order and petition to a 
responding 
court. The subsequent proceeding in the responding State would 
bring the obligor before the court. The obligor typically sought 
modification of the support obligation (which almost always was 
not being paid) in a forum which presented him with the "hometown 
advantage." Thus arose the common practice of the issuance of a 
new, lower child-support order. 
Under 
UIFSA, 
as 
long 
as 
the 
issuing State 
has 
continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction over its child-support order, see Section 
205(a), 
supra, 
a 
registering sister State is precluded 
from 
modifying that order. Without doubt, this is the most significant 
departure from the multiple-order system established by the prior 
Uniform Act. 
However, 
if the issuing State no 
longer has 
a 
sufficient interest in the modification of its order under the 
factual circumstances described in Section 205(b), 
supra, 
and 
restated in this section, after registration the responding State 
may assume the power to modify the controlling order. 
Registration is subdivided into distinct categories: registration 
for enforcement, for modification, or both. UIFSA is based on 
recognizing the truism that when an out-of-state support order is 
registered, the rights and duties of the parties affected have 
been previously litigated. Because the obligor already has had a 
day before an appropriate tribunal, an enforcement remedy may be 
summarily invoked. On the other hand, modification of an existing 
order presupposes 
a 
change 
in 
the 
rights 
or 
duties 
of 
the 
parties. 
The 
requirements for modification of a 
child-support 
order are much more explicit under UIFSA, which allows a tribunal 
to modify an existing Child-support order of another State only 
if certain quite limited conditions are met. First, the tribunal 
must have all the prerequisites for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction required for rendition of an original support order. 
Second, 
one 
of 
the 
restricted fact 
situations 
described 
in 
Subsection 
(a) 
must 
be 
present. 
This 
section, 
which 
is 
a 
counterpart to Section 205 (a), establishes the conditions under 
which 
the 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction of 
the 
issuing 
tribunal is released. 
Under Subsection (a)(l), before a tribunal in a 
new forum may 
modify the controlling order three specific criteria must be 
satisfied. 
First, 
the 
individual 
parties 
affected 
by 
the 
controlling order and the child must no longer reside in the 
issuing 
State. 
Second, 
the 
party 
seeking 
modification 
must 
register the order in a new forum, almost invariably the State of 
residence 
of 
the 
other 
party. 
A 
colloquial 
(but 
easily 
understood) 
description 
of 
this 
requirement 
is 
that 
the 
modification movant must "play an away game on the other party' s 
home field." This rule applies to either obligor or obligee, 
depending on which of those parties seeks to modify. Proof of the 
fact that neither individual party nor the child continues to 
reside 
in 
the 
issuing 
State 
may 
be 
made 
directly 
in 
the 
registering State; no purpose would be served by requiring the 
petitioner to return to the original issuing State for a document 
to confirm the fact that none of the relevant persons still lives 
there. Third, the forum must have personal jurisdiction over the 
parties. 
This 
is 
supplied 
by 
the 
movant 
submitting 
to 
the 
personal jurisdiction of the forum by seeking affirmative relief, 
almost always coupled with the fact that the respondent resides 
in the forum. 
On rare occasion, the personal jurisdiction over 
the respondent may be supplied by other factors, see Section 201 
and the comment thereto, supra. 
The policies underlying the change affected by Subsection (a)(l) 
contemplate that the issuing State no longer has an interest in 
exercising its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its 
order. 
This 
restriction attempts 
to 
achieve 
a 
rough 
justice 
between the parties in the majority of cases by preventing a 
litigant from choosing to seek modification in a local tribunal 
to the marked disadvantage of the other party. For example, 
an 
obligor visiting the children at the residence of the obligee 
cannot be validly served with citation accompanied by a motion to 
modify the support order. Even though such personal service of 
the obligor in the obligee' s home State is consistent with the 
jurisdictional requisites of Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 
(1990), the motion to modify does not fulfill the requirement 
of being brought by "a [petitioner] who is a nonresident of this 
State 
In short, 
the obligee is required to register the 
existing order and seek modification of that order in a State 
that has personal jurisdiction over the obligor other than the 
State of the obligee's residence. Again, almost invariably this 
will 
be 
the 
State 
of 
residence 
of 
the 
obligor. 
Similarly, 
fairness requires that an obligee seeking to modify or modify and 
enforce the existing order in the State of residence of the 
obligor will not be subject to a cross-motion to modify custody 
or visitation merely because the issuing State has lost its 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the support order. 
The 
same is true of the obligor, 
who also is required to make 
a 
motion to modify support in a State other than that of his or her 
residence. 
Yet 
another benefit is 
supplied by 
the 
procedure 
mandated in this section. The most typical case is a motion to 
increase child support by the obligee, the enforcement of which 
ultimately will primarily, if not exclusively, take place in the 
obligor's State of residence. Modification and enforcement in the 
same forum promotes efficiency. 
Several 
arguments 
sustain 
the 
jurisdictional 
choice 
made 
by 
UIFSA. First, "jurisdiction by ambush" will be avoided. That is, 
personal service on either the custodial or noncustodial party 
found within the state borders will not yield jurisdiction to 
modify. Thus, a parent seeking to exercise rights of visitation, 
delivering 
or 
picking-up 
the 
child 
for 
such visitation, 
or 
engaging in unrelated business activity in the State, will not be 
involuntarily 
subjected 
to 
protracted 
litigation 
in 
an 
inconvenient forum. The rule avoids the possible chilling effect 
on the exercise of parental contact with the child that the 
possibili ty of such litigation might have. 
Second, 
almost all 
disputes 
about whether 
the tribunal has 
jurisdiction will 
be 
eliminated; 
submission 
by 
the 
petitioner 
to 
the 
State 
of 
residence of the 
respondent alleviates this issue completely. 
Finally, because there is an existing order the primary focus 
will 
shift 
to 
enforcement, 
thereby 
curtailing 
to 
a 
degree 
unnecessary, 
time-consuming modification efforts. 
The array of 
enforcement 
procedures 
available 
administratively 
to 
support 
enforcement agencies may be invoked without resort to action by a 
tribunal, 
which had constituted a 
bottleneck under 
RURESA 
and 
URESA. 
There 
are 
two 
exceptions 
to 
the 
rule 
of 
Subsection 
(a)(l) 
requiring the petitioner to be 
a 
nonresident of the forum in 
which modification is sought. First, under Subsection (a) (2) the 
parties may agree that a particular forum may serve to modify the 
order. Second, Section 613, infra, applies if all parties have 
left the original issuing State and now reside in the same new 
forum State. Subsection (a) (2), which authorizes the parties to 
terminate the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the issuing 
State by agreement, 
is based on several implicit assumptions. 
First, the subsection applies even if the issuing tribunal has 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction because one of the parties or 
the child continues to reside in that State. Subsection (a) (2) 
also is applicable if the individual parties and the child no 
longer reside in the issuing State, but agree to submit the 
modification issue to a tribunal in the petitioner I s State of 
residence. 
Also implicit in a shift of jurisdiction over the 
child-support order is that the agreed-upon tribunal must have 
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over at 
least one of the parties or the child, and that the other party 
submits to the personal jurisdiction of that forum. 
In short, 
UIFSA 
does not contemplate that absent parties can agree to 
confer jurisdiction on a tribunal without a nexus to the parties 
or the child. But if the other party agrees, either the obligor 
or the obligee may seek assertion of jurisdiction to modify by a 
tribunal of the State of residence of either party. 
The 
requirements 
of 
Subsection 
(a) 
are 
demonstrated 
to 
the 
tribunal 
being 
asked 
to 
assume 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
No 
action to transfer, 
surrender, 
or otherwise 
participate 
is 
required 
or 
anticipated 
by 
the 
original 
order-issuing tribunal. 
The 
Act does not grant discretion to 
refuse to yield jurisdiction to the issuing tribunal; nor does it 
extend 
discretion 
to 
refuse 
to 
accept 
jurisdiction 
to 
the 
assuming tribunal when the statutory requisites are met. However, 
there is 
a 
distinction between the processes 
involved 
under 
Subsection (a)(l) and (a)(2). Once the requirements of (a)(l) or 
Section 613 have been met for assumption of jurisdiction, the 
assuming jurisdiction acts on the modification and then notifies 
the tribunal whose order has been replaced by the order of the 
assuming tribunal, see Section 614, infra. In contrast, for a 
tribunal of another State to assume modification jurisdiction 
under 
Subsection 
(a)(2) it is necessary that the 
individual 
parties first agree in a record to submit modification of child 
support 
to that tribunal 
and file their 
agreement with 
the 
issuing tribunal. Thereafter they may then proceed to petition 
the assuming tribunal to take jurisdiction. 
Modification of child support under Subsections (a)(l) and (a)(2) 
is distinct from custody modification under the federal Parental 
Kidnapping 
Prevention 
Act, 
U.S.C. 
Section 
l738A, 
which 
provides that the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction may 
"decline 
jurisdiction." 
Similar 
provisions 
are 
found 
in 
the 
UCCJA, 
Section 14. 
In those statutes the methodology for the 
declination of jurisdiction is not spelled out, but rather is 
left 
to 
the 
discretion 
of 
possibly 
competing 
courts 
for 
case-by-case 
determination. 
The 
privilege 
of 
declining 
jurisdiction, thereby creating the potential for a vacuum, is not 
authorized under UIFSA, see Rosen v. Lantos, 938 P.2d 729,734 
(N .M. App. 1997). Once a controlling initial child-support order 
is established under UIFSA, at all times thereafter there is an 
existing order in effect to be enforced. 
Even if the issuing 
tribunal no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, its 
order 
remains 
fully 
modification jurisdiction 
this article. 
enforceable 
until 
issues a new order 
a 
in 
tribunal 
with 
conformance with 
The 
degree to which the 
new standards of 
one tribunal with 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
has 
been 
accepted 
is 
illustrated by 
comparing 
UIFSA 
to 
the 
UNIFORM 
CHILD 
CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION 
ACT, 
Sections 
12-14, 
and 
UNIFORM 
CHILD 
CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION 
AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
ACT 
Sections 
201-202. 
The 
UCCJA 
provides general principles for the judicial determination of an 
appropriate fact situation for 
subsequent modification of 
an 
existing custody order by another court. 
In contrast, 
UIFSA 
establishes a set of "bright line" rules which must be met before 
a tribunal may modify an existing child-support order. The intent 
is to eliminate multiple support orders to the maximum extent 
possible consistent with the principle of continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction that pervades the Act. The UCCJEA borrows heavily, 
but not identically, from UIFSA. 
Both UIFSA and UCCJEA seek a 
world in which there is but one-order-at-a-time for child support 
and custody and visitation. Both have similar restrictions on the 
abili ty of a tribunal to modify the existing order. The major 
difference between the two acts results from the fact that the 
basic 
jurisdictional 
nexus 
of 
each 
is 
founded 
on different 
consideration. UIFSA has its focus on the personal jurisdiction 
necessary to bind the obligor to payment of 
a 
child-support 
order. UCCJEA places its focus on the factual circumstances of 
the child, primarily the "home State" of the child; personal 
jurisdiction over a parent in order to bind that parent to the 
custody decree is not required. 
An 
example of the disparate 
consequences of this difference is the fact that a return to the 
decree State does "not reestablish" continuing jurisdiction under 
the custody jurisdiction Act, see comment to UCCJEA Section 202. 
But, 
under 
UIFSA 
similar facts 
permit the 
issuing State to 
exercise 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
to 
modify 
its 
child-support order if at the time the proceeding is filed the 
issuing State "is the residence" of one of the individual parties 
or the child, see Section 205(a), supra. 
Subsection 
(b) 
states 
modification jurisdiction 
continuing, 
exclusive 
generally 
follow 
local 
child-support orders. 
that 
when 
the 
forum 
has 
assumed 
because 
the 
issuing State has 
lost 
jurisdiction, 
the 
proceedings 
will 
law 
with 
regard 
to 
modification 
of 
The 
2001 
amendment 
to 
Subsection 
(c) 
and 
the 
addition 
of 
Subsection (d) are designed to eliminate scattered attempts to 
subvert a significant policy decision made when UIFSA was first 
promulgated. Prior to 1993, American case law was thoroughly in 
chaos regarding modification of the duration of a child-support 
obligation when an obligor or obligee moved from one State to 
another 
with 
different 
ages 
regarding 
the 
duration 
of 
the 
child-support obligation. 
In those 
circumstances, 
whether 
the 
obligation ended, extended, or was curtailed was left almost to 
chance. 
In a 
RURESA 
proceeding, 
on the obligee's motion some 
States would increase the duration of the support obligation when 
the obligor resided in a State with a higher age for the child 
support obligation. Other States decreased the obligor's duration 
of child support when the obligor countered with a motion that 
the new RURESA support order should reflect a shorter duration of 
the obligation in accordance with local law. Multiple durations 
of the support obligation, as well as multiple support amounts, 
were both major problem areas addressed by UIFSA. 
From its original promulgation UIFSA determined that the duration 
of child-support obligation should be fixed by the controlling 
order, see Robdau v. Commonwealth, Virginia Dept. Social Serv., 
S.E.2d 
(Va. 
App. 
2001). 
If 
the 
language 
was 
insufficiently specific before the 2001, 
the amendments should 
make this decision absolutely clear. The original time frame for 
support is not modifiable unless the law of the issuing State 
provides 
for modification of its duration. 
Some 
courts 
have 
sought to subvert this policy by holding that completion of the 
obligation to support a child through age 18 established by the 
now-completed controlling order does not preclude the imposition 
of a new obligation thereafter to support the child through age 
or 
even 
to 
age 
if the 
child is enrolled in higher 
education. Subsection (d) is designed to eliminate these attempts 
to 
create 
multiple, 
albeit 
successive, 
support 
obligations. 
Consistent with this principle, if a domestic violence protective 
order has been entered with a child-support provision that has a 
duration less than the general child support law of the State 
that 
issues 
the 
controlling 
order, 
the 
law 
of 
that 
State 
determines the maximum duration. In sum, 
absent tribunal error 
the first child-support order issued under UIFSA will invariably 
be the initial controlling order. The initial controlling order 
may 
be modified 
and 
replaced by 
a 
new controlling order in 
accordance with the terms of Sections 609-615, but the duration 
of the child-support obligation remains constant, 
even though 
virtually every other 
aspect 
of 
the 
original 
order 
may 
be 
changed. 
This 
is 
also 
the 
standard 
in situations 
involving 
multiple 
valid 
child-support 
orders--a 
problem 
that 
will 
progressively decrease over time as RURESA multiple orders expire 
or a determination of the initial controlling order is made under 
Section 207, supra. Once a controlling order is identified under 
these standards, the duration of the support obligation is fixed. 
Relettered Subsection (e) provides that upon modification the new 
order becomes the one order to be recognized by all UIFSA States, 
and 
the 
issuing 
tribunal 
acquires 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
Good practice mandates that the tribunal should 
explicitly state in its order that it is assuming responsibility 
for the controlling child-support order. Neither the parties nor 
other tribunals should be required to speculate about the effect 
of the action taken by the tribunal under this section. 
Sec. 42. 19-A MRSA §3254, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
§3254. 
Recognition of order modified in another state 
A If a child support order issued by a tribunal of this 
State saall-£e€e~Ri~e-a-~~~~~~~~--it~~~~i&~-ehila-s~pp9Ft 
9FaeF is modified by a tribunal of another state that assumed 
jurisdiction pursuant to 
a--b&w-~~~~~-~~~~--~e--tais 
eaapteF-~-~-Fe~~e6tT-~~~-~-9taeFwi6e-~~~-~-tai6 
eaapteFT--saall the 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 
a 
tribunal of the State: 
1. 
Enforce amounts accruing before modification. 
ERE9Fee 
May 
enforce the order that was 
modified only as 
to 
affie~Rts 
arrears and interest accruing before the modification; 
aT----~~~---~~~~~---a6pee~6T----~~~---9Rly 
R9Rffi9aiEiaele-aspeets-9E-taat-9FaeFf 
3. 
Relief 
for 
violations before modification. 
PF9viae 
etaeF May provide appropriate relief 9Rly for violations of taat 
its 
order 
that 
occurred 
before 
the 
effective 
date 
of 
the 
modification; and 
4. 
Recognize modifying order. 
~ee9~Rise Shall recognize 
the modifying order of the other state, upon registration, for 
the purpose of enforcement. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 612 of the Uniform Act.) 
A 
key 
aspect of 
UIFSA 
is 
the deference 
to 
the controlling 
child-support order of a sister State demanded from a tribunal of 
the forum State. This applies not just to the original order, but 
also to a modified child-support order issued by a second State 
under the standards established by Section 611, 613, and 615. For 
the Act to function properly, the original issuing State must 
recognize and accept the modified order as controlling, and must 
regard its prior order as prospectively inoperative. Because the 
UIFSA system is based on an interlocking series of state laws, it 
is fundamental that a modifying tribunal of one State lacks the 
authority to direct the original issuing State to release its 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. That result is accomplished 
through the enactment of UIFSA by all States, which empowers a 
modifying tribunal to assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction 
from the original issuing State and requires an issuing State to 
recognize such an assumption of jurisdiction. This explains why 
the U. S. 
Congress took the extraordinary measure in PRWORA of 
mandating 
universal 
passage 
of 
UIFSA 
1996, 
as 
amended, 
see 
Prefatory Note. 
The original issuing tribunal retains authority post-modification 
to take remedial actions directly connected to its now-modified 
order. 
Sec. 43. 19·A MRSA §§3255 to 3257 are enacted to read: 
§3255. 
Jurisdiction to modify child support order of another 
state when individual parties reside in State 
1. 
Jurisdiction to modify. 
If all of the parties who are 
individuals reside in this State and the child does not reside in 
the issuing state, a tribunal of this State has jurisdiction to 
enforce and to modify the issuing state's child support order in 
a proceeding to register that order. 
2. 
Application 
of 
laws. 
A 
tribunal 
of 
this 
State 
exercising 
jurisdiction 
under 
this 
section 
shall 
apply 
the 
provisions of subchapters 
and 2-A, 
this subchapter and the 
procedural and substantive law of this State to the proceeding 
for enforcement or modification. Subchapters 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 do 
not apply. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 613 of the Uniform Act.) 
A 1996 amendment explicitly dealt with the possibility that the 
parties and the child subject to a child-support order no longer 
reside in the issuing State and that the individual parties have 
moved to the same new State. This section makes it clear that, 
when 
the 
issuing State 
no 
longer 
has 
continuiag, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction to modify its order, 
a tribunal of the State of 
mutual residence of the individual parties has jurisdiction to 
modify the child-support order and assume continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction. Although the individual parties must reside in the 
forum State, there is no requirement that the child must also 
reside in the forum State (although the child must have moved 
from the issuing State). 
Finally, because modification of the child-support order when all 
parties reside in the forum is essentially an intrastate matter, 
Subsection 
(b) 
withdraws 
authority 
to 
apply 
most 
of 
the 
substantive and procedural provisions of UIFSA, i.e., those found 
in the Act other than in Articles 1, 2, and 6. Note, however, 
that the provision in Section 611 (c) forbidding modification of 
nonmodifiable 
aspects 
of 
the 
controlling order 
applies. 
For 
example, the duration of the support obligation remains fixed by 
the original controlling order despite the subsequent residence 
of all parties in a new State. The fact that the State of the new 
controlling order has a different duration of for child support 
is specifically declared to be irrelevant by UIFSA, see Section 
611, 
supra. Note that the even-handed approach of the Act is 
sustained; neither an increase nor a decrease in the duration in 
the obligation of child support is permitted. 
§3256. 
Notice to issuing tribunal of modification 
V'Tithin 30 days after issuance of a modified child-support 
order, 
the 
party 
obtaining 
the 
modification 
shall 
file 
a 
certified copy of the order with the issuing tribunal that had 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier order, and in 
each tribunal in which the party knows the earlier order has been 
registered. A party who obtains the order and fails to file a 
certified copy is sUbject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal 
in which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file 
does not affect the validity or enforceability of the modified 
order 
of 
the 
new 
tribunal 
having 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 614 of the Uniform Act.) 
This 
stand-alone 
provision 
is 
designed 
to 
Clarify 
the 
organization of the Act; it states the crucial proposition that 
the prevailing party must inform the original issuing tribunal 
about its loss of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its 
child-support order. Thereafter, the original tribunal may not 
modify, or review and adjust. the amount of child support. Notice 
to the issuing tribunal and other affected tribunals that the 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction of 
the 
former 
controlling 
order has been modified is crucial to avoid the confusion and 
chaos of the multiple-order system UIFSA is designed to replace. 
Additionally, the tribunal has authority to impose sanctions on R 
party who fails to comply with the requirement to give notice of 
a modification to all interested tribunals. Note, however. that 
failure to notify a displaced tribunal of a modification of its 
order does not affect the validity of the modified order. 
§3257. 
Jurisdiction to modify child support order of foreign 
country or political subdivision 
1. 
Assumption of jurisdiction. 
If a 
foreign country or 
political subdivision that is a state will not or may not modify 
its order pursuant to its laws, 
a tribunal of this State may 
assume jurisdiction to modify the child support order and bind 
all individuals subject to 
the personal 
jurisdiction of 
the 
tribunal whether or not the consent to modification of a child 
support order otherwise required of the individual pursuant to 
section 3253 has been given or whether the individual seeking 
modification is 
a 
resident of this State or of the 
foreign 
country or political subdivision. 
2. 
Controlling order. 
An order issued pursuant to this 
section is the controlling order. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 615 of the Uniform Act.) 
The amendments of 
2001 added Section 615, 
which expands upon 
language moved from Section 611 (a)(2). A tribunal of one of the 
several States may modify a support order of a foreign country or 
political subdivision when a tribunal of the foreign jurisdiction 
would have jurisdiction to modify its order under the standards 
of 
UIFSA, 
but 
under 
the 
law 
or 
procedure 
of 
that 
foreign 
jurisdiction the tribunal will not or may 
not exercise that 
jurisdiction to modify its order. The standard example cited for 
the necessity of this special rule involves the conundrum posed 
to a tribunal of a foreign country having a requirement that the 
parties be physically present in order to sustain a modification 
of child support, and lacking the authority to compel a party 
residing outside of the borders of the country to appear. In such 
an instance, a tribunal of the forum State may modify the order 
if it has personal jurisdiction over both parties, 
including 
jurisdiction over the absent party who 
has 
submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the forum by making a request for modification of 
the support order. 
Sec. 44. 19-A MRSA §3301, as enacted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
§330l. Proceeding to determine parentage 
1. 
Responding 
court. 
A 
E~iB~aa± court 
of 
this 
State 
authorized to determine parentage of a child may serve as aa 
iai~1a~1~-e~ g responding tribunal in a proceeding to determine 
parentage brought 
under 
this 
chapter or 
a 
law substantially 
similar to this 
chapterT--t.-he--Yai-E-eFH\--R-e-£.J.¥~a.J.--&n-E-o-r-~--9€ 
S~~~e~E--A&~-~--~£€--Revisea-~~~~Fffi-~~~~-E£~B~£€me£~--9€ 
S~~~e~E-~-t.--~e-~~~~-~&a~-~£€-~~~~~~-~6-~-~a~eHE-~--a 
paFtiealaF-€aila-e£-~B-~~ma£~~~~~~-~-a-paFen~-ef 
taat-eaila. 
~y--baw-~~eQ~--~£-~-~~i~-te-~~~~~~~r-a 
Fe6penain~-~£~~£~~-~--~~-bta~e-6aall-~~-~~-¥FGeeG~Fa~-ana 
6~e6tantive-Jaw6-B~-~~£-~~~-~~1~i~~r~~~-~F-eleee-eF 
ti66ae-typin~-te6t6T-ana-tae-Fale6-ef-tai6-btate-en-eaeiee-ef-lawT 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 616 of the Uniform Act.) 
This 
article 
authorizes 
a 
"pure" 
parentage 
action 
in 
the 
interstate context, i.e., an action not joined with a claim for 
support. Either the mother or a man alleging himself to be the 
father of a child may bring such an action. Typically, an action 
to determine parentage across state lines will also seek to 
establish a 
support order under the Act, 
see Section 401. 
An 
action to establish parentage 
under 
UIFSA 
is to 
be 
treated 
identically to such an action brought in the responding State. 
Note that in a departure from the rest of this Act, the term 
"tribunal" is replaced by "court." Although in the several States 
there are various combinations of judicial and administrative 
entities that are authorized to establish, enforce, and modify 
child-support orders, the UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (2000) restricts 
parentage determinations to "a court," see UPA 
(2000) 
Section 
104. 
The 
view that only 
a 
judicial officer should determine 
parentage is based on what the Conference believes is 
sound 
public policy. 
Sec. 45. 19-A MRSA §3352. sub-§2. as enacted by PL 1995, c. 
694, Pt. B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
2. 
Criminal 
charge 
in another 
state. 
If, 
under 
this 
chapter or 
a 
law substantially similar to this chapter, 
tHe 
YnifeFm--~i~~a~-~~~--B~--S~ppeFt--AG~-~--~£€--Revi6ea 
YnifeFm - -R€-£-i·PHl .. €-a-d.- -EnE-G-F-Gern€-n-t:- - ef- -Suppo-r-t:- -AetT the gove rno r 
f 
another state makes 
a 
demand that the Governor 
surrender an 
individual charged criminally in that state with having failed to 
provide for the support of a child or other individual to whom a 
duty of support is owed, the Governor may require a prosecutor to 
investigate 
the 
demand 
and 
report 
whether 
a 
proceeding 
for 
support has been initiated or would be effective. If it appears 
that a proceeding would be effective but has not been initiated, 
the Governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable time 
to permit the initiation of a proceeding. 
Uniform Comment 
(This is Section 802 of the Uniform Act.) 
This section has not undergone significant change 
Interstate 
rendition 
remains 
the 
last 
resort 
enforcement, in part because a governor may exercise 
discretion in deciding whether to honor a demand for 
an obligor. 
since 1968. 
for 
support 
considerable 
rendition of 
Sec. 46. 19·A MRS A §3401. as enac ted by PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. 
B, §2 and affected by Pt. E, §2, is amended to read: 
§340l. 
Uniformity of application and construction 
±ai6-€Rap~e~-~£~-~~~~~~~-~-e~~ee~~a~e-i~6 
§eReFal-~-£i*'£e--t.-o--ffia-~-\iRiEeFfR In applying and construing this 
Act, 
consideration 
must 
be 
given 
to 
the 
need 
to 
promote 
uniformity of the law with respect to t::ae its subject 
eE-~R-i6 
eaapt::eF matter among states eRaet::iR§ that enact it. 
SUMMARY 
This bill incorporates into Maine 
law the 
1996 
and 
2001 
amendments to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. 
Details 
of the changes are included in the Prefatory Note and the Uniform 
Comments that are included.