An Act To Amend the Maine Criminal Code and Motor Vehicle Laws as Recommended by the Criminal Law Advisory Commission
Maine Legislature, Session 121, LD 1844
Committee: Criminal Justice and Public Safety
Amends: 17-A MRSA §15-A, 17-A MRSA §17, 17-A MRSA §751, 17-A MRSA §1158, 17-A MRSA §1158-A, 17-A MRSA §1202, 17-A MRSA §1205-C, 25 MRSA §3503-A, 29-A MRSA §105

12lst MAINE LEGISLATURE 
Legislative Document 
No. 1844 
H.P.1370 
House of Representatives, February 5,2004 
An Act To Amend the Maine Criminal Code and Motor Vehicle 
Laws as Recommended by the Criminal Law Advisory Commission 
Reported by Representative BLANCHETTE of Bangor for the Criminal Law Advisory 
Commission pursuant to the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17 -A, chapter 55. 
Reference to the Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety suggested and ordered 
printed under Joint Rule 218. 
Printed on recycled paper 
/YI~ 
/h.1l!oc~ 
MILLICENT M. MacFARLAND 
Clerk 
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine as follows: 
Sec. I. IS MRSA §3314, sub-§6, as corrected by RR 2001, c. 2, 
Pt. A, §24 and affected by §25, is amended to read: 
6. 
Forfeiture of firearms. 
As part of every disposition in 
every proceeding under this code, every firearm that constitutes 
the basis for an adjudication for 
a 
juvenile crime that, if 
committed by an adult, would constitute a violation of section 
393; Title l7-A, section 1105-A, subsection 1, paragraph 
C-l; 
Title l7-A, 
section 1105-B, 
subsection 1, paragraph C; 
Title 
l7-A, section 1105-C, subsection 1, paragraph C-l; or Title l7-A, 
section 1105-D, subsection 1, paragraph B-1 and every firearm 
used by the juvenile or any accomplice during the course of 
conduct for which the juvenile has been adjudicated to have 
committed 
a 
juvenile 
crime 
that 
would 
have 
been 
forfeited 
pursuant to Title l7-A, 
section llsS l158-A if the criminal 
conduct had been committed by an adult must be forfeited to the 
State and the juvenile court shall so order unless another person 
satisfies the court prior to the dispositional hearing and by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the other person had a right 
to pos$ess the firearm, to the exclusion of the juvenile, at the 
time of the conduct that constitutes the juvenile crime. 
Rules 
adopted by the Attorney General that govern the disposition of 
firearms forfeited pursuant to Title l7-A, section lUiS l158-A 
govern forfeitures under this subsection. 
Sec. 2. 17-A MRSA §15-A, sub-§§l, 2 and 3. as amended by PL 
1991, c. 459, §4, are further amended to read: 
1. 
A law enforcement officer who 
has probable cause to 
believe a crime has been or is being committed by a person may 
issue 
or 
have 
delivered 
a 
written 
summons 
to 
that 
person 
directing that person to appear in the District Court to answer 
the allegation that the person has committed the crime. 
The 
summons 
must 
include the signature of the officer, 
a 
brief 
description of the alleged crime, 
the time and place of the 
alleged crime and the time, place and date the person is to 
appear in court. 
The form used must be the Uniform Summons and 
ComplaintT-~-~ha~7--~~-~~-a~eHey-~-whBm--~~-~~~~~--is 
e~F±eyee-~-eH-~-~7--~~~~-~~~~~--&~e~&-~--~eF~s-~~--~Re 
a~eHey-~~-a~~h&~~~-~B-~r-~Re-~;Ray-~~m~~-~~-~~-~e 
I:lse-~~-fe~RI&-~-i.J.--1;Ge.&e--£~e€.lf:6--a-r~-eeFle~ee. 
A person to 
whom a summons is issued or delivered must give a written promise 
to appear. 
If the person refuses to sign the 
summons after 
having been ordered to do so by a law enforcement officer, the 
person commits a Class E crime. 
As soon as practicable after 
service of the summons, the officer shall cause a copy of the 
summons to be filed with the court. 
Page l-LR2693(1) 
2. 
Any person who a law enforcement officer has probable 
cause to believe has committed or is committing a crime other 
than one listed under section 15, subsection 1, paragraph A, and 
to whom 
a 
law enforcement officer is authorized to deliver a 
summons pursuant to subsection 1, 
who intentionally fails or 
refuses to provide to that officer reasonably credible evidence 
of that person's correct name 
a:e.eL 
address or date of birth 
commits a Class E crime, 
pFevieee-~ha~ if the person persists in 
the failure or refusal after having been informed by the officer 
of the provisions of this subsection. 
If that person furnishes 
the officer evidence of the person's correct name a:e.eL 
address 
and date 
of birth and 
the 
evidence 
does 
not 
appeaL 
to 
be 
reasonably credible, 
the officer shall attempt to verify the 
evidence as quickly as is reasonably possible. 
During the period 
the verification is being attempted, the officer may require the 
person to remain in the officer's presence for a period not to 
exceed 2 hours. 
During this period, if the officer reasonably 
believes that the officer's safety or the safety of others 
present requires, the officer may search for any dangerous weapon 
by an external patting of that person's outer clothing. 
If in 
the course of the search the officer feels an object that the 
officer reasonably believes to be a dangerous weapon, the officer 
may take such action as is necessary to examine the object, but 
may take permanent possession of the object only if it is subject 
to forfeiture. 
The requirement that the person remain in the 
presence of the officer does not constitute an arrest. 
After 
informing that person of the provisions of this subsection, the 
officer may arrest the person either if the person intentionally 
refuses to furnish any evidence of that person's correct nameL 
a:e.e address or date of birth or if, after attempting to verify 
the evidence as provided for in this subsection, the officer has 
probable 
cause 
to believe that the person has 
intentionally 
failed to provide reasonably credible evidence of the person's 
correct name a:e.eL address or date of birth. 
3. 
If, at any time subsequent to an arrest made pursuant to 
subsection 2, 
it appears 
that the 
evidence of the person's 
correct name a:e.eL 
address and date of birth was accurate, the 
person must be released from custody and any record of that 
custody must show that the person was released for that reason. 
If, upon trial for violating subsection 2, a person is acquitted 
on the ground that the evidence of the person's correct name a:e.eL 
address and date of birth was accurate, the record of acquittal 
must show that that was the ground. 
Sec. 3. 17-A MRSA §17, sub-§l, as amended by PL 1995, 
Pt. 
A, 
§56 and affected by §153 
and Pt. 
C, 
§15, is 
amended to read: 
c. 65, 
further 
1. 
A law enforcement officer who has probable cause to 
believe that a civil violation has been committed by a person 
must issue or have delivered a written summons to that person 
directing the person to appear in the District Court to answer 
the allegation that the person has committed the violation. 
The 
summons 
must 
include the signature of the officer, 
a 
brief 
description of the alleged violation, the time and place of the 
alleged violation and the time, place and date the person is to 
appear in court. 
The form used must be the Violation Summons and 
Complaint, as prescribed in Title 29-A, section 2601, for traffic 
infractions and the Uniform Summons and Complaint for other civil 
violationsT-~--EhaET-~~--Ehe-~-BY-~-Ehe-~~~~--is 
emp±9yee-~-9B-~-~7--~~~~-~~~~--S~9*S-~--~9Fms-~~-the 
a~eBey-~~-&a&&&~~&&G-~e-~r-Ehe-~~y-~~m4~-~~-~~-E9 
Qse-~~-'9Fms-~~-plaee-~--Ehe-~~~~-Samm9Bs-~-b9mplaiBt 
QBEi±-~~e£~-~~-&~-eepleEee. 
A person to whom a summons is 
issued or delivered must give a written promise to appear. 
If 
the person refuses to sign the summons after having been ordered 
to do so by a law enforcement officer, the person commits a Class 
E crime. 
The law enforcement officer may not order a person to 
sign the summons for a civil violation unless the civil violation 
is an offense defined in Title 12; Title 23, section 1980; Title 
28-A, section 2052; or Title 29-A. 
Every law enforcement officer issuing a Violation Summons 
and 
Complaint charging the commission of a traffic infraction shall 
file the original of the Violation Summons and Complaint with the 
violations bureau within 5 days of the issuance of that Violation 
Summons and Complaint. 
Every law enforcement officer issuing a 
Uniform Summons and Complaint that charges the commission of an 
offense shall file the original of 
the Uniform 
Summons 
and 
Complaint with the District Court having jurisdiction over the 
offense or in such other location as instructed by the Chief 
Judge of the District Court without undue delay and, 
in any 
event, within 5 days after the issuance of the Uniform Summons 
and Complaint. 
Sec. 4. 17·A MRSA §17, sub-§§2 and 3, as amended by PL 1991, c. 
459, §5, are further amended to read: 
2. 
Any 
person 
to 
whom 
a 
law 
enforcement 
officer 
is 
authorized to issue or deliver a summons pursuant to subsection 1 
,,'ho 
intentionally fails 
or 
refuses 
to 
provide 
the 
officer 
reasonably credible evidence of the person IS correct name aBeL 
address or date of birth commits a Class E crime, PF9Via9G-that 
if the person persists in that failure or refusal after having 
been 
informed 
by 
the 
officer 
of 
the 
provisions 
of 
this 
subsection. 
If the person furnishes the officer evidence of that 
person I s correct name aBeL address and date of birth and the 
evidence does not appear to be reasonably credible, the officer 
shall attempt to verify the evidence as quickly as is reasonably 
possible. 
During 
the 
period 
that 
verification 
is 
being 
attempted, the officer may require the person to remain in the 
officer's presence for a period not to exceed 2 hours. 
During 
this 
period, 
if 
the 
officer 
reasonably 
believes 
that 
the 
officer's safety or the safety of others present requires, the 
officer may 
search for 
any 
dangerous 
weapon 
by 
an external 
patting of the person's outer clothing. 
If in the course of the 
search the officer feels an object that the officer reasonably 
believes to be a dangerous weapon, 
the officer may take such 
action as 
is necessary to examine the object, but may take 
permanent possession of the object only if it is subject to 
forfeiture. 
The 
requirement 
that 
the 
person 
remain 
in the 
presence of the officer does not constitute an arrest. 
After informing the person of the provisions of this subsection, 
the 
officer 
may 
arrest 
the 
person 
either 
if 
the 
person 
intentionally refuses to furnish any evidence of that person's 
correct 
name 
aBeL 
address 
or 
date 
of 
birth or 
if, 
after 
attempting to verify the 
evidence 
as 
provided 
for 
in this 
subsection, the officer has probable cause to believe that the 
person has intentionally failed to provide reasonably credible 
evidence of the person's correct name aBeL address or date of 
birth. 
3. 
If, at any time subsequent to an arrest made pursuant to 
subsection 
2, 
it appears that the evidence of 
the person's 
correct name aBeL address and date of birth was accurate, the 
person must be released from custody and any record of that 
custody must show that the person was released for that reason. 
If, upon trial for violating subsection 2, a person is acquitted 
on the ground that the evidence of the person's correct name aBeL 
address and date of birth was accurate, the record of acquittal 
must show that that was the ground. 
§2, 
Sec. 5. 17-A MRSA §751, sub-§l, as amended by PL 1997, c. 351, 
is further amended to read: 
1. 
A 
person 
is 
guilty 
of 
obstructing 
government 
administration if the person Qses intentionally interferes by 
force, violence or intimidation or 
eB'iJa'iJeS--Hl--aBY--<H"-i~1--aet: 
wit:a--ti:J..e--int.-en-t:--t-G--iBt.eFfel'e by any physical act with a public 
servant performing or purporting to perform an official function. 
Sec. 6. 17-A MRSA §1158, as amended by PL 2003, c. 143, §7, 
is repealed. 
Sec.7. 17-A MRSA §1158-A is enacted to read: 
§1158-A. 
Forfeiture of firearms 
1. 
As part of every sentence imposed, except as provided in 
subsection 
2, 
a 
court 
shall 
order 
that 
a 
firearm 
must 
be 
forfeited to the State if: 
A. 
That firearm constitutes the basis for conviction under: 
(1) 
Title 15, section 393; 
( 2) 
Section ll05-A, subsection 1, paragraph C-1; 
(3) 
Section ll05-B, subsection 1, paragraph C' , 
(4) 
Section llQ5-C, subsection 1, paragraph C-1; or 
{ 5) 
Se!:;t,ion 1105-D, sy;Qsect,iQn 1. pgrggraph B-1, or 
B. 
The St,gte pleads gnd proves thgt the firearm is used by 
the defendant or an accQmplice during the commission of any 
myrder or Clgss A, Class B or Clgss C crime Qr any Class D 
!:;rime defined in chgpter 9, 11 or 13. 
2. 
A 
!:;Qyrt 
may not 
org~r the fQrfeityre of 
a 
firearm 
ot,herwi!;ie gyglifying for forfeiture under 
subs~ction 1 if another 
per!;iQn 
!:;gn 
!;igt,i:.1 f y 
the court prior 
t,Q 
the impQ!;iition of the 
ggfgnggnt'§ §gnt,gn!:;e gnd by a 12reponderance of the evidence that: 
A. 
Other 
than in 
the 
context of either subsection 1, 
paragraph A, 
subparggraph (1) or subsection 1, paragraph B 
rglative to murdgr or any other unlawful homicide crime in 
whi!:;h thg firearm usgd is a handgun, the Qthgr 12erson, at 
thg timg of the commission of the crime, had a right to 
PQs!;iess the firearm to the exclusion of the gefendantj 
B. 
In 
the 
context 
of 
subsection 
1, 
paragra12h 
A, 
su;Q12grggraph 
(1), 
the othgr person, 
at the time 
of the 
cQmmission Qf the crime, had a right to pO!;i§ess the firearm 
tQ 
thg gxclusion Qf 
the defendgnt 
and the other person 
either did nQt 
know or 
should not have 
known that the 
gefendgnt was 
g prohibited 12ersQn ynder Title 15, sgction 
Qr, even if the other 12erson did know or should have 
known, 
nonetheless 
did 
not 
intgntionally, 
knowingly 
or 
rgckle!;i!;ily gllQw the defgndant to pos!;iess or have under the 
gefgnggnt's !:;Qntrol the firearm; or 
C. 
In thg context of paragraph B relating to murder or any 
Qthgr ynlawful homicide !:;rime in which the firgarm used is a 
hgnggun, the other persQn, at the time of the commission of 
thg !:;rime, was the rightful Qwngr from whQm the hanggun had 
been stolen and the other person was not a principal or 
accomplice in the commission of the crime. 
3. 
The Attorney General shall adopt rules governing the 
disposition to state, county and municipal agencies of firearms 
forfeited under 
this section. 
A handgun 
not excepted under 
subsection 2, paragraph C must be destroyed by the State. 
4. 
As 
used in this section, 
"handgun" means 
a 
firearm, 
including a pistol or revolver, that has a short stock and is 
designed to be held and fired by the use of a single hand. 
Sec. 8. 17-A MRSA §1202. sub-§l-B. as amended by PL 2003, c. 
154, §l, is repealed and the following enacted in its place: 
B. 
Notwithstanding subsection 1, if the State pleads and 
proves that the enumerated Class D or Class E crime was committed 
by the person against a family or household member, and if the 
court 
orders 
the 
person 
to 
complete 
a 
certified batterers' 
intervention program as defined in Title 19-A, section 4014, the 
person may be placed on probation for a period not to exceed 2 
years, except that the term of probation must be terminated by 
the court when the probationer has served at least one year of 
probation, has completed the certified batterers' intervention 
program and has met all other conditions of probation. 
A. 
As used in this subsection, the following definitions 
apply. 
(1) 
"Enumerated Class D or Class E crime" means any 
Class D crime in chapter 9, 
any Class D or Class E 
crime in chapter 11, the Class D crimes described in 
section 
506-B 
and 
the 
Class D crimes 
described in 
sections 554, 555 and 758. 
(2) 
"Family or household member" has the same meaning 
as in Title 19-A, section 4002, subsection 4. 
B. 
Termination under this subsection reguires a judicial 
finding that the probationer has served at least one year of 
probation, has successfully completed a certified batterers' 
intervention program and has met all other conditions of 
probation. 
Sec. 9. 17-A MRSA §1205-C. sub-§6, as enacted by PL 1999, c. 
246, §3, is amended to read: 
6. 
Failure to comply with the time limits set forth in this 
section is not grounds for dismissal of a motion for probation 
revocation but is may be grounds for the probationer's release on 
personal recognizance pending further proceedings. 
Sec. 10. 17-A MRS A §1252, sub-§2, 1fA, as amended by PL 1995, 
c. 473, §1, is further amended to read: 
A. 
In the case of a Class A crime, the court shall set a 
definite period not to exceed 49 30 years ... --.g:-be-~A;--Hlay 
eensiee~-~-~€~~~~--eFimiaa~-~1&t~~-ef--~h&-~~--ane 
iHlpese-~-HlaHiHlQHI-~-~-ef--i&Ga~~~~a-~~-e~ee&&-~--6g 
yea~s-~-~-eiEae~-~~-~~~-ane-~~~-~--Eae 
e~iHle-~~~~-e£-~~-na~Q~e-~-&e~~~&ae&&-ef-~~-e~iHle 
eeQplee-wiEa-Eae~se~ieQs-e~iHlinal-aisEe~y-ef-~ae-eefeneanE; 
Sec. 11. 25 MRSA §3503-A, as amended by PL 1999, c. 47, § l, 
is further amended to read: 
§3503-A. Disposal of firearms and ammunition 
Notwithstanding 
any 
other 
provision of 
this 
chapter, 
a 
police 
department 
or 
other 
law 
enforcement 
agency 
retaining 
firearms 
and 
ammunition 
covered 
by 
this 
chapter, 
Title 
15, 
section 3314 or chapter 517, or Title 17-A, section 1198 1158-A 
may auction the firearms to federally licensed firearms dealers 
or the public, 
use the firearms 
and ammunition for training 
purposes or destroy the firearms and ammunition. 
Sec. 12. 29-A MRSA §105. sub-§4, as amended by PL 1997, c. 
653, §5, is further amended to read: 
4. 
Violation. 
A person is guilty of a Class E crime if a 
law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person 
violated or is violating this Title and the person intentionally 
fails or refuses upon request to give the person's correct name, 
address or date of birth to a law enforcement officer. 
SUMMARY 
This bill does the following. 
The bill adds "date of birth" to the information that must 
be provided to a 
law enforcement officer upon request by the 
person to whom a summons is issued or delivered under either the 
Maine 
Revised 
Statutes, 
Title 
-A, 
section 
15-A 
or 
17. 
Currently, the information required of the person is limited to 
name and address. 
Date of birth is an important aid in properly 
identifying the person being summonsed and is currently required 
in Title 29-A, section 105, subsection 4. 
The bill also adds the 
word "correct" relative to the information to be supplied by the 
person. 
The bill also strikes an exception relative to use of 
nonconforming forms that no longer is relevant. 
The bill addresses 
a 
defect in the statute prohibiting 
obstruction of government administration revealed by the recent 
case of State v. Matson, 2003 ME 34, 818 A.2d 213. 
In Matson, 
the defendant had been convicted under the statute for physic~lly 
interfering with the arrest of another person. 
Because 
the 
physical 
interference, 
intentionally standing in the 
way 
and 
refusing to move, 
was held to constitute something less than 
"force, violence or intimidation," the conviction was reversed. 
The focus of the crime is intentional physical interference 
with an official function, 
not "intimidation" of an officer. 
Harassing 
speech 
alone 
is 
not 
sufficient, 
but 
when 
it is 
accompanied by a physical act that actually interferes with an 
official function, the further requirement of "intimidation" is 
unnecessary. 
The bill repeals Title 17 -A, section 1158 and replaces it 
with section 1158-A, which differs in the following ways. 
1. 
It makes technical drafting changes to clarify the law. 
2. It clarifies that forfeiture of a firearm under certain 
circumstances is condi tioned on the State's both alleging 
that the firearm was used by the defendant or an accomplice 
during the commission of the crime in the indictment or 
information and proving that allegation to the fact finder 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3. 
It clarifies when a court may not order as part of the 
sentence the forfeiture of a 
firearm otherwise qualifying 
for forfeiture. 
Access to the exception is available only 
to a person other than the defendant. 
The exception must be 
established by the other person at a point in time prior to 
the actual imposition of the defendant's sentence, and the 
burden imposed on the other person is to satisfy the court 
of the exception by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The bill also addresses forfeiture of firearms other than in 
the context of a conviction under possession of a firearm by a 
prohibited person or in the context of a handgun used by the 
defendant or an accomplice during the commission of murder or any 
other unlawful homicide crime. 
The other person's burden is 
satisfied by proof by a preponderance of the evidence that at the 
time of the commission of the crime, the other person had a right 
to possess the firearm to the exclusion of the defendant. 
This 
burden is the same as under Title 17-A, section 1158. 
The bill also 
addresses 
forfeiture 
of 
firearms 
in the 
context of the conviction under Title 15, section 393. 
The other 
person's burden is satisfied by proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence that, at the time of the commission of the crime, the 
person had a right to possess the firearm to the exclusion of the 
defendant and the person either did not know or should not have 
known that the defendant was a prohibited person under Title 15, 
section 393 or, even if the other person did know or should have 
known, nonetheless did not intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
allow the defendant to possess or have under the defendant's 
control the firearm. 
This burden imposed upon the other person 
is greater than under Title l7-A, section 1158. 
The bill also addresses forfeiture of a handgun used by the 
defendant or an accomplice during the commission of murder or any 
other unlawful homicide crime. 
The other person's burden is 
satisfied by proof by a preponderance of the evidence that, at 
the time of the commission of the crime, the other person was the 
rightful owner from whom the handgun had been stolen and the 
other 
person 
was 
not 
a 
principal 
or 
an 
accomplice 
in the 
commission of the crime. 
It also defines "handgun" for purposes 
of Title l7-A, section l158-A. 
The bill replaces Title 17 -A, section 1202, subsection l-B 
in order to address the constitutional defect revealed in the 
recent case of State v. Hodgkins, 2003 ME 57, 822 A.2d 1187. 
The 
bill also eliminates the necessity of the State's pleading and 
the jury's having to find that the Class D or Class E crime 
involved 
"domestic 
violence" 
by specifically enumerating 
the 
Class D or Class E crimes that automatically qualify and by 
having the State plead and the jury find that the qualifying 
crime was committed by the person "against a family or household 
member," as defined in Title 19-A, section 4002, subsection 4. 
The bill also makes clear that imposition of the extended period 
of probation is further conditioned upon the court's ordering the 
person to complete a certified batterers' intervention program as 
defined 
in Title 
19-A, 
section 
4014. 
This 
precondition is 
necessary because only one program currently exists for female 
defendants, and a program may not be reasonably available for 
certain 
male 
defendants. 
The 
bill 
also 
clarifies 
that 
termination of the extended probation period requires a judicial 
finding that the probationer has served at least one year of 
probation, 
has 
successfully 
completed 
a 
certified batterers' 
program and has met all other conditions of probation. 
The bill is intended to make clear that in the event there 
is a failure by the State to comply with the time limits set 
forth in Title 17-A, section l205-C, 
a court may, but is not 
required to, issue an order that, pending initial appearance, the 
probationer be released on personal recognizance. 
In 1988 the Legislature doubled the maximum sentence of 
imprisonment for all Class A crimes from 20 years to 40 years. 
In 1991 the Law Court examined the legislative history of the 
relevant act and determined that the legislative intent was to 
"make available two discrete ranges of sentences for Class A 
crimes." 
See State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 151 (Me. 1991). 
Most 
Class A crime sentences were intended to remain in the original 
0- to 20-year range, while the "expanded range" of 20- to 40-year 
sentences was reserved "only for the most heinous and violent 
crimes committed against a person." 
The sentencing court was to 
apply this 
"heinousness" 
standard "in its discretion" 
as 
a 
sentencing factor, subject to appellate review. 
This 2-tier system has been placed under a constitutional 
cloud by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 
U. S. 
(2000), which held that 
sentencing 
factors 
increasing 
punishment 
beyond 
the 
maximum 
authorized must be treated as elements of crimes to be pleaded 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than as sentencing 
factors. 
Since the "heinousness" standard can be interpreted as 
increasing maximum punishment of up to 20 years to the "expanded 
range" of 
to 40 years, it is potentially unconstitutional 
absent legislative correction. 
The bill eliminates the constitutional cloud by replacing 
the 2-tier system with a single 0- to 30-year range. 
This change 
anticipates that the Law Court, through the case-by-case sentence 
review process, will develop and apply criteria that will avoid 
the imposition of excessively harsh sentences within the single 
range. 
In solving the Apprendi problem, this change will affect 
few actual sentences. 
The bill adds the culpable mental state of "intentionally" 
to 
Title 
29-A, 
section 
105, 
subsection 
4, 
regarding 
the 
enforcement of the motor vehicle laws, to conform it to Title 
17-A, sections IS-A and 17.