An Act To Implement the Recommendations of the Family Law Advisory Commission with Regard to the Uniform Parentage Act
Maine Legislature, Session 121, LD 1851
Committee: Judiciary

Legislative Document 
No.1SS1 
H.P.1377 
House of Representatives, February 11,2004 
An Act To Implement the Recommendations of the Family Law 
Advisory Commission with Regard to the Uniform Parentage Act 
Reported by Representative MILLS of Farmington for the<Family Law Advisory 
Commission pursuant to Resolve 2003, chapter 25, section 2. 
Reference to the Committee on Judiciary suggested and ordered printed under Joint Rule 
218. 
Printed on recycled paper 
17/~'frl·mc~ 
MILLICENT M. MacFARLAND 
Clerk 
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine as follows: 
PREFATORY NOTE 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws has addressed the subject of parentage throughout the 20th 
Century. 
In 
1922, 
the 
Conference 
promulgated 
the 
"Uniform 
Illegitimacy Act," 
followed 
by 
the 
"Uniform 
Blood 
Tests 
To 
Determine Paternity Act" in 1952, the "Uniform Paternity Act" in 
1960, and certain provisions in the "Uniform Probate Code" in 
1969. 
The 
"Uniform 
Illegitimacy 
Act" 
was 
withdrawn 
by 
the 
Conference and none of the other Acts were widely adopted. As of 
June 1973, the Blood Tests to Determine Paternity Act had been 
enacted in nine states, the "Uniform Paternity Act" in four, and 
the "Uniform Probate Code" in five. 
The most important uniform act addressing the status of the 
nonmarital child was the Uniform Parentage Act approved in 1973 
[hereinafter referred to as UPA (1973)]. As of December, 2000, 
UPA (1973) was in effect in 19 states stretching from Delaware to 
California; 
in 
addition, 
many 
other 
states 
have 
enacted 
significant portions of it. Among the many notable features of 
this landmark Act was the declaration that all children should be 
treated equally without regard to marital status of the parents. 
In addition, the Act established a set of rules for presumptions 
of parentage, shunned the term "illegitimate," and chose instead 
to employ the term "child with no presumed father." 
UPA (1973) had its genesis in a law review article, Harry D. 
Krause, A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 829 
(1966); see also Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 
Mich. 
L. Rev. 
(1967). Professor Krause followed with a 
pathfinding book, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy (1971), and 
then went on to serve as the reporter for UPA (1973). When work 
on the Act began, the notion of substantive legal equality of 
children regardless of the marital status of their parents seemed 
revolutionary. 
Even 
though 
the Conference 
had put itself on 
record in favor of equal rights of support and inheritance in the 
Paternity Act and the Probate Code, 
the 
law of many states 
continued 
to 
differentiate 
very 
significantly 
in 
the 
legal 
treatment of marital and nonmarital children. A series of United 
States Supreme Court decisions invalidating state inheritance, 
custody, and tort laws that disadvantaged out-of-wedlock children 
provided both the 
impetus 
and 
a 
receptive 
climate 
for 
the 
Conference to promulgate UPA (1973). 
Case 
law has 
not 
construing UPA 
(1973). 
subjects not dealt with 
California courts have 
always 
reached 
consistent 
results 
in 
Moreover, widely differing treatment on 
by the Act has been common. For example, 
held that a nonmarital father does not 
have standing to sue an intact family to assert his rights of 
fatherhood. Another UPA (1973) state, Colorado, has declared that 
under its state constitution the father may not be denied such 
rights. Texas, which has adopted many of the provisions of UPA 
(1973), reached much the same conclusion. Similarly, a judgment's 
binding effect on the child or on others seeking to claim a 
benefit of the judgment or to attack the judgment collaterally is 
confused in the case law. Adding to the confusion is the fact 
that UPA 
(1973) is entirely silent regarding the relationship 
between a divorce and a determination of parentage. Finally, the!' 
incredible scientific advances in parentage testing since 1973 
warrant a thoroughgoing revision of the Act. 
Beginning in the 1980s, states began to adopt paternity 
registries in an attempt to deal with the risk of 
a 
man's 
subsequent claim of paternity after the mother relinquishes a 
child for adoption. Although at that time the Conference rejected 
a paternity registry as a solution, it promulgated the Uniform 
Putative and Unknown Fathers Act in 1988 (UPUFA) to deal with the 
rights of such men. However, UPUFA has not been enacted by any 
state. In 1988 the Conference also adopted the Uniform Status of 
Children 
of 
Assisted 
Conception 
Act 
(USCACA). 
Assisted 
reproduction and gestational agreements became commonplace in the 
1990s, 
long after the promulgation of UPA 
(1973). 
The USCACA 
resembled a model act more than a uniform act because it provided 
two opposing options regarding "gestational agreements." To date, 
only two states have enacted USCACA, 
each choosing a different 
option. 
The promulgation of the Uniform Parentage Act in 2000, as 
amended 
in 
2002, 
is 
now 
the official recommendation of 
the 
Conference on the subject of parentage. This Act relegates to 
history all of the earlier uniform acts dealing with parentage, 
to 
wit, 
UPA 
(1973). 
UPUFA 
(1988), 
and 
USCACA 
(1988). 
The 
amendments of 2002 are the end-result of objections lodged by the 
American 
Bar 
Association 
Section 
of 
Individual 
Rights 
and 
Responsibilities and the ABA Committee on the Unmet Legal Needs 
of Children, based on the view that in certain respects the 2000 
version did not adequately treat a child of unmarried parents 
equally with a child of married parents. Because equal treatment 
of nonmarital children was 
a 
hallmark of the 
1973 
Act, 
the 
objections caused the drafters of the 2000 version to reconsider 
certain sections of the Act. Through extended discussion and a 
meeting of representatives 
of all 
the entities 
involved, 
a 
determination was made that the objections had merit. As a result 
of this process, the amendments shown in this Act were presented 
by mail ballot to the Commissioners and unanimously approved in 
November 2002. 
In brief outline, 
UPA 
(2002) 
is structured as 
follows: 
Article 1, 
General Provisions, 
adds 
many 
new definitions to 
clarify the participants in determinations of parentage and adapt 
the 
Act 
to 
recent 
scientific 
developments. 
Article 
2, 
Parent-Child Relationship, will look familiar to past users of 
UPA (1973) because it continues a number of the 1973 provisions 
with little or no change, while eliminating the ambiguous term 
"natural" to describe a 
genetic parent. Article 3, 
Voluntary 
Acknowledgment of Paternity, is entirely new and is driven by 
federal mandates that states provide simplified nonjudicial means 
to 
establish 
paternity, 
especially 
for 
newborns 
and 
young 
children. Article 4, Registry of Paternity, is entirely new and 
incorporates a tightly integrated registry law to deal with the 
rights of a man who is neither an acknowledged, 
presumed or 
adjudicated 
father. 
A primary 
goal 
of 
this 
article is 
to 
facilitate 
adoption proceedings. 
Article 
5, 
Genetic 
Testing, 
comprehensively covers that subject in ten separate sections (the 
1973 Act had one section on the subject). Article 6, Proceeding 
to Adjudicate Parentage, 
sets forth the parties to, 
and the 
procedures 
for, 
adjudicating 
parentage 
and 
challenging 
acknowledgments, presumptions, and judgments. Article 7, Child of 
Assisted Reproduction, recodifies USCACA (1988), but applies its 
provisions to nonmarital as well as marital children born as a 
result 
of 
assisted 
reproductive 
technologies. 
The 
bracketed 
Article 8, Gestational Agreement, is based upon USCACA (1988), 
but 
follows 
only 
the 
option that permits 
enforcement 
of 
a 
gestational 
agreement. 
Moreover, 
the 
Act 
makes 
a 
number 
of 
important changes in that option. 
UPA 
(1973) 
contained 
a 
number 
provisions, 
including 
those 
applicable 
custody. These subjects are omitted from 
state law adequately provides for them. 
of 
other 
substantive 
to 
child support 
and 
UPA (2002) because other 
Finally, Uniform Parentage Act (2002) is consistent with the 
prov~s~ons of 
two 
other uniform acts of great significance, 
namely the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act [UIFSA (1996) 
and UIFSA (2001)] and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act [UCCJEA (1997)]. 
Sec. 1. 19-A MRSA c. 61 is enacted to read: 
CHAPTER 61 
QBIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 
SUBCHAPTER 1 
GENERAL PROVISIQHS 
S18ll. 
Short title 
This 
chapter 
may 
be 
known 
and 
cited 
as 
"the 
Uniform 
Parentage Act. " 
S1832. 
Definitions 
As 
used 
in this 
chapter, 
unless 
the 
context otherwise 
indicates, the following terms have the following meanings. 
1.. 
Acknowledged fa~r. "Acknowledged father" means a man 
who has established a parent-child relationship under subchapter 
h 
2. 
Adjudicated parent. 
"Adjudicated parent" means a person 
who has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to 
be the parent of a child. 
3. 
Alleged father. 
"Alleged 
father" 
means 
a 
man 
who 
alleges himself to be, or is alleged to be, the genetic father or 
a possible genetic father of a child, but whose paternity has not 
been determined. "Alleged father" does not mean: 
A. 
A presumed parent: 
B. 
A man whose parental rights have been terminated or 
declared not to exist: or 
C. 
A male donor. 
4. 
Assisted reproduction. 
"Assisted reproduction" means a 
method 
of 
causing 
pregnancy 
other 
than 
sexual 
intercourse. 
"Assisted reproduction" includes: 
A. 
Intrauterine insemination: 
B. 
Donation of eggs: 
C. 
Donation of embryos: 
D. 
In vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and 
E. 
Intracytoplasmic sperm injection. 
5. 
Child. 
"Child" means an individual of any age whose 
parentage may be determined under this chapter. 
6. 
Co.-ence. 
"Commence" means to file the initial pleading 
seeking an adjudication of parentage in the District Court. 
7. 
Determination 
of 
parentage. 
"Determination 
of 
parentage" 
means 
the 
establishment 
of 
the 
parent child 
relationship 
by 
the 
signing 
of 
a 
valid 
acknowledgment 
of 
paternity under subchapter 3 or adjudication by the court. 
8. 
Donor. 
"Donor" means an individual who produces eggs or 
sperm 
used 
for 
assisted 
reproduction, 
whether 
or 
not 
for 
consideration. "Donor" does not mean: 
A. 
A husband who provides sperm, or a wife who provides 
eggs, to be used for assisted reproduction by the wife; 
B. 
A woman who gives birth to a child by means of assisted 
reproduction. except as otherwise provided in subchapter 8; 
.QI 
C. 
A parent under subchapter 7 or an intended parent under 
subchapter 8. 
9. 
Ethnic or racial group. 
"Ethnic or racial group" means. 
for purposes of genetic testing. 
a 
recognized group that an 
individual identifies as all or part of the individual's ancestry 
or that is so identified by other information. 
10. 
Genetic testing. 
"Genetic testing" means an analysis 
of genetic markers to exclude or identify a man as the father or 
a woman as the mother of a child. "Genetic testing" includes an 
analysis of one or a combination of the following: 
A. 
Deoxyribonucleic acid; and 
B. 
Blood group antigens. red cell antigens. human leukocyte 
antigens. serum enzymes. serum proteins or red cell enzymes. 
11. 
Gestational mother. 
"Gestational 
mother" 
means 
an 
adult woman 
who 
gives birth to 
a 
child under 
a 
gestational 
agreement. 
12. Man. 
"Man" means a male individual of any age. 
13. 
Parent. 
"Parent" 
means 
an 
individual 
who 
has 
established a parent-child relationship under section 1841. 
14. 
Parent-child relationship. 
"Parent-child relationship" 
means the legal relationship between a child and a parent of the 
child as established under section 1841. 
15. 
Paterni.ty 
index. 
"Paternity 
index" 
means 
the 
likelihood of paternity calculated by computing the ratio between: 
A. 
The likelihood that the tested man is the father based 
on the genetic markers of the tested man, mother and child 
and conditioned on the hypothesis that the tested man is the 
father of the child; and 
B. 
The likelihood that the tested man is not the father 
based on the genetic markers of the tested man, mother and 
child and conditioned on the hypothesis that the tested man 
is not the father of the child and that the father is of the 
Same ethnic or racial group as the tested man. 
16. 
Presumed parent. 
"Presumed parent" means a person who, 
by operation of law under section 1844, is recognized as the 
parent of a child until that status is rebutted or confirmed in a 
judicial proceeding. 
• 
Probability of paternity. 
"Probability of paternity" 
means the measure, for the ethnic or racial group to which the 
alleged father 
belongs, 
of 
the probability that the 
man 
in 
guestion is the father of the child compared with a 
random, 
unrelated man of the same ethnic or racial group and expressed as 
a 
percentage 
incorporating 
the 
paternity 
index 
and 
a 
prior 
probability. 
18. 
Record. 
"Record" means information that is inscribed 
on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other 
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. 
19. 
Signatory. 
"Signatory" 
means 
an 
individual 
who 
authenticates a record and is bound by its terms. 
20. 
State. 
"State" means a state of the United States, the 
District of 
Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, 
the United States Virgin 
Islands or any territory or insular possession subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
21. 
Support 
enforcement 
agency. 
"Support 
enforcement 
agency" means a public official or agency authorized to seek: 
A. 
Enforcement of support orders or laws relating to the 
duty of support; 
B. 
Establishment or modification of child support; 
C. 
Determination of parentage; or 
D. 
Location of child support obligors and their income and 
assets. 
Comment 
(This is section 102 of the UPA.) 
Four separate definitions of "father" are provided by the 
Act to account for the permutations of a 
man who may be so 
classified. 
Subsection 
(1), 
"acknowledged 
father," 
directly 
responds to a 1996 federal mandate encouraging states to adopt 
nonjudicial means for a man to identify himself as the father of 
a child in order to achieve an early determination of paternity. 
The 
term 
"acknowledged father" 
is given 
a 
relatively narrow 
meaning, rather than the broader definition previously accorded 
to the term. Only a man who acknowledges paternity of a child in 
accordance with the formal requirements established in Article 3 
qualifies as an "acknowledged father." Because the mother of the 
child must 
concur in the 
formal 
acknowledgment, 
the federal 
mandate declares that the states must treat the action as the 
equivalent of an adjudication of paternity. 
Subsection 
(2), 
"adjudicated 
father," 
although 
self-defining, presents a policy choice reached by the Conference 
that contested parentage matters are reserved for 
courts 
to 
resolve. The definition is limited to judicial adjudication of 
parentage, 
rather 
than 
providing 
for 
an 
alternative 
of 
administrative determination of parentage. 
Subsection (3), "alleged father," is derived from the UPUFA 
§ 1(1), although much of the terminology has been changed. A man 
who is asserted to be, or asserts himself to be or possibly to 
be, the father of a child is the primary target of the Uniform 
Parentage Act. 
Subsection (16), "presumed father," is more fully defined by 
the factual circumstances establishing a presumption of paternity 
in § 204, infra. 
Closely related to the definitions of "father," Subsection 
(12) is derived from the UPUFA § 1(1). Defining "man" to include 
all male humans eliminates the connotation of adulthood, thereby 
satisfying the obvious 
need for 
the Act 
to 
cover 
under-age 
progenitors. Although objection to calling a 14-year-old father a 
"man" was raised when UPUFA was considered by the Conference, for 
purposes of procreation such a teen-age boy is a man. 
Note 
employed 
section. 
replaced 
Webster's, 
Clearly, 
Further, 
that 
a 
wide 
variety 
of 
other 
terms 
historically 
to identify the male parent are not defined in this 
Specifically, 
the 
term 
"putative 
father" 
has 
been 
by the broader 
term 
"alleged father." 
According to 
"putative" 
means 
"commonly 
accepted 
or 
supposed." 
many 
"alleged fathers" 
do 
not fit that definition. 
UPUFA 
chose 
the term "biological father" 
over 
more 
ambiguous "natural father." Because one woman may be the genetic 
mother of a child while another woman is the gestational mother, 
for consistency the term "genetic father" was substituted for 
"biological." Definitions are not supplied for such terms as 
"unknown father, legal father, real father, and the like," either 
because the term is self-defining or because it is ambiguous. 
Subsection 
(8) 
was 
amended in 
2002 
to clarify that 
an 
individual who becomes a parent through assisted reproduction as 
provided in Article 7 is not a "donor." Similarly, if bracketed 
Article 8, Gestational Agreement, is enacted, an individual who 
is an intended parent through the procedure implemented in that 
article is not a "donor." No substantive change is intended by 
this clarification. 
Subsection (9), 
"ethnic or racial group," relates to an 
individual only for purposes of genetic testing. 
The genetic 
tests themselves do not determine the race or ethnic group of the 
individual. Rather, if a tested individual is not excluded, his 
race 
or 
ethnic 
group 
provided 
is 
used 
in 
the 
paternity 
calculations 
because 
those 
calculations 
give 
the 
most 
conservative result, that is, those most favoring non-paternity. 
Subsection 
(10) , 
"genetic 
testing," 
contemplates 
that 
paternity testing must be broadly defined to include all of the 
traditional genetic tests, such as blood types and HLA 
(Human 
Leukocyte Antigen), as well as newer DNA technologies. In the 
past the term "blood test" was 
commonly applied to paternity 
testing. 
However, 
this usage actually referred to the sample 
collected; in fact, the tests were genetic tests performed on 
blood samples. The Act uses the scientific term "deoxyribonucleic 
acid." This is to accommodate the changes in technology used to 
evaluate the DNA. 
Early DNA 
testing involved RFLP 
technology 
(Restriction 
Fragment 
Length 
Polymorphism), 
followed 
by 
PCR 
techniques (Polymerase Chain Reaction); these may be replaced by 
newer technology, such as SNP (Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms). 
The 
type of 
DNA 
technology to be employed is best left to 
scientific bodies, such as accreditation agencies, see § 503(a), 
infra. 
Subsection 
(11) , 
"gestational 
mother, " 
is 
derived 
from 
USCACA 
(1988) 
§ 1(4), 
which 
employed the now-discarded 
term 
"surrogate mother" to define the same factual circumstances dealt 
with in bracketed Article 8, Gestational Agreement, infra. For 
purposes of this Act, 
a woman giving birth to her own genetic 
child, 
a.k.a. 
"birth 
mother," 
is 
distinguished 
from 
a 
"gestational mother." 
The 
former 
is both 
a 
gestational 
and 
genetic mother, while the latter also gives birth to a child, who 
mayor may 
not be her genetic child. 
In the Act the 
term 
"gestational mother" is narrowly defined to restrict it to a 
situation in which a woman gives birth to a child pursuant to a 
gestational agreement validated under Article 8. If Article 8 is 
not enacted, this definition should be omitted from the Act. The 
2002 amendment providing that the gestational mother must be an 
adult corrects a drafting oversight. 
A 2002 amendment deleted former sUbsection (12), "intended 
parents," as adopted in UPA 
2000. 
That term is now employed 
exclusively in bracketed Article 
8, 
and 
thus 
is 
no 
longer 
appropriate as a definition for the Act. 
Subsection 
(14), 
"parent-child relationship," 
is derived 
from UPA 
(1973) § 1. A wide variety of the rights and duties 
flowing to and from parents and children are found in many other 
laws of this state. 
Subsection 
(15) , 
"paternity 
index," 
defines 
a 
complex 
scientific and mathematical concept. 
Note that the definition 
includes statistical measures of the mother and tested man. The 
tested man may be an alleged father, 
or any other potential 
biological 
father. 
In 
fact, 
under 
appropriate 
circumstances 
Article 5 provides for testing without samples from the mother or 
the alleged father. 
In these cases 
the expert statistically 
reconstructs the missing potential mother or biological father 
from genetic testing of samples from their relatives. Therefore 
the definition is correct even in cases involving a 
missing 
parent. 
Subsection 
(18) 
is 
derived 
from 
the 
Uniform 
Electronic 
Transactions Act § 102(13), 
which establishes a 
standard for 
either paper or electronic record keeping. 
Maine Coanent 
Specific gender references have been removed from several 
definitions consistent with other Maine amendments that make the 
UPA gender neutral and ensure equal treatment for every child 
regardless of the circumstances of the parent or parents. 
SIB)3. Scope of chapter: choice of law 
1. 
Scope. 
This 
chapter 
applies 
to 
determination 
of 
parentage in this State. 
• 
Appl ication. 
The court shall apply the law of this 
State to adjudicate the parent-child relationship. The applicable 
law does not depend on: 
A. 
The place of birth of the child; or 
B. 
The past or present residence of the child. 
3. 
Effect on parental rights. 
This 
chapter 
does 
not 
create, enlarge or diminish parental rights or duties under other 
law of this State. 
Connent 
(This is section 103 of the UPA.) 
The 
new UPA 
conforms to the requirement of 42 U. S. C. 
§ 
666(a)(5)(A), 
that 
a 
state 
must 
provide 
that 
parentage 
proceedings be available at any time before a child attains 18 
years of age or suffer the potential penalty of forfeiture of the 
federal funds that subsidize child support enforcement by the 
state, see Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, 
infra. 
Subsection (a) was amended in 2002 in response to objections 
that the phrase "governs every determination of parentage" was 
excessively broad and could conflict with other state laws, such 
as those governing probate issues. 
Subsection (b) is derived from the UIFSA (1996) § 303 and 
UPA 
(1973) 
§ 
8(b). 
This 
section 
simplifies 
choice 
of 
law 
principles; the local court is directed to apply local law. If in 
fact this state is an inappropriate forum, dismissal for forum 
non-conveniens may be appropriate. 
Subsection (d) is bracketed. If a state enacts Article 8, 
Gestational Agreement, this subsection should be omitted. If a 
state 
does 
not 
enact Article 
8, 
this 
subsection 
should 
be 
included to make clear that this Act does not affect other law of 
the jurisdiction on the subject, if any. 
The 
2002 
amendment 
employs 
consistent 
language 
in 
order 
to 
treat married 
and 
unmarried couples alike with regard to parentage issues, 
and 
reflects the terminology in Articles 2, 7, and bracketed Article 
8. 
Maine Connent 
Subsection (d) is deleted because Article 8 is included in 
this chapter. 
§1834. 
COurt of this State 
The District Court is authorized to adjudicate parentage 
under this chapter. 
Connent 
(This is section 104 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 8(a). 
The court having jurisdiction over parentage proceedings 
under this Act should be identified here. Al though a proceeding 
to determine parentage is most often associated with an action to 
establish a child support order, the Act departs from the choice 
made 
by 
the 
UIFSA 
(1996) 
§ 
102, 
which 
allows 
for 
the 
establishment of 
a 
child support order by 
an administrative 
agency. Insofar as establishment of parentage is concerned, the 
new 
UPA 
reflects 
the deliberate decision by 
NCCUSL 
that an 
"adjudication" 
should 
require 
a 
judicial 
proceeding. 
This 
procedure is consistent with the practice of most states. In 
fact, very few states provide for the resolution of disputed 
paternity through administrative processes, which, of course, is 
a policy judgment for the State legislature to make. 
The term "tribunal" found in UIFSA to describe both courts 
and agencies is not employed in the Act. Rather, the dispute 
resolution entity in UPA 
(2002) is limited to a "court." UPA 
(2002) conforms to the congressional determination that parentage 
may also be established by an acknowledgment of parentage under 
Article 3. Article 7 allows parentage to be established in a 
written record that presumably could then be approved by an 
administrative 
officer. 
These 
exceptions 
create 
potential 
disputes that only a jUdicial proceeding can resolve. 
Joinder 
of 
a 
parentage 
proceeding 
with 
an 
action 
for 
divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, or child support and 
custody is left to state law. 
This should be considered in 
choosing which court in a state is to be given jurisdiction over 
proceedings under this Act. 
§1835. Protection of participants 
Proceedings under this chapter are subject to other law of 
this State governing the health, safety, privacy and liberty of a 
child or other individual who could be jeopardized by disclosure 
of identifying information, including address, telephone number 
place of employment, 
social security number 
and the child's 
day-care facility and school. 
Comment 
(This is section 105 of the UPA.) 
Source: UCCJEA (1997) § 209(e). 
§1836. 
Determination of maternity 
Provisions of this chapter relating to determination of 
paternity apply to determinations of maternity. 
Comment 
(This is section 106 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 21. 
This 
section 
provides 
for 
a 
determination 
of 
the 
mother-child relationship if that issue is in dispute. Except in 
circumstances 
involving 
immigration, 
cases 
involving disputed 
maternity are extraordinarily rare. Therefore, the new UPA is 
otherwise written in terms applicable to the determination of 
paternity, while maintaining the possibility that a dispute may 
arise regarding whether a woman claiming maternity actually is 
the mother of a particular child. 
Although certain provisions found in the balance of the Act 
logically do not apply in a proceeding to establish maternity, 
the Act continues the decision made in UPA (1973) not to burden 
these already complex provisions with unnecessary references to 
the ascertainment of maternity. Except for issues arising from 
assisted reproduction technologies or gestational agreements, see 
Article 7 and bracketed Article 8, § 201(a) is the sole provision 
in 
the 
Act 
that 
specifically 
relates 
to 
the 
mother-child 
relationship. In an actual case, a judge facing a claim for the 
determination of the mother-child relationship should have little 
difficulty deciding which portions of the Act should be applied. 
SUBCHAPTER 2 
PARENT-CHILD RELATIQRSHIP 
§1841. 
Establishment of parent child relationship 
The parent-child relationship is established by: 
1. 
Woman·s giving birth. 
The woman's having given birth to 
the child, except as otherwise provided in subchapter 8; 
2. 
Unrebutted 
pre~Ym2tion of parentage. 
presumption of parentage under section 1844: 
An 
unrebutted 
3. 
Effective 
ackno1fled~nt of paternity. 
An 
effective 
acknowledgment of paternity by the man under subchapter 3, unless 
the acknowledgment has been rescinded or successfully challenged: 
4. 
Adjudjcation of parentage. 
An adjudication of parentage: 
5. 
Adoption of chjld. 
Adoption of the child; 
tiP 
Consent to assisted reproduction. 
Consent to assisted 
reproduction by a woman under subchapter 7 that resulted in the 
birth of the child; or 
7. 
Adjudication 
confirming 
parentage. 
An 
adjudication 
confirming the individual as a parent of a child born to the 
gestational 
mother 
if 
the 
agreement 
was 
validated 
under 
subchapter 8 or is enforceable under other law. 
Comment 
(This is section 201 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973), § 4; expanded to include all possible 
bases of the parent-child relationship 
Subsection 
(b)(5) 
and 
bracketed 
subsections 
(a)(4) 
and 
(b)(6) reflect the fact that Article 7 provides that both a 
married 
and 
an 
unmarried 
couple 
are 
entitled 
to 
assisted 
reproductive technologies in order to become parents and, if 
bracketed Article 8 is enacted, 
to enter into a gestational 
agreement. If a state enacts Article 8, Gestational Agreement, 
the brackets should be removed. If a state does not enact Article 
8, the bracketed subsections should be omitted. 
Maine Comment 
Section 
1841 
has 
been 
amended 
to 
delete 
reference 
to 
gender-specific terms and has been made gender neutral to include 
all parent-Child relationships. 
Recent advancements in science 
make possible the birth of children through the use of assisted 
reproduction 
and 
gestational 
agreements. 
As 
a 
result, 
new 
parent-child 
relationships 
are 
being 
created 
and 
new 
and 
unanticipated issues relating to the parentage of these children 
have arisen. Many of Maine's courts are struggling with these 
issues now. 
The UPA is made gender neutral to provide guidance 
in the resolution of these new and unanticipated issues and to 
ensure equal treatment of every child in Maine regardless of the 
circumstances of the child's parent or parents. 
Accordingly, section 1841 has been reconfigured to reflect 
that the Act has been made 
gender neutral to establish the 
parentage 
of 
every 
child 
born 
or 
living 
in 
Maine. 
The 
parent-child relationship is created between a person and the 
resulting child if the person provides sperm or egg or consents 
to assisted reproduction by a woman with the intent to be the 
parent of the child or to a gestational agreement with the intent 
to be the parent of the child born pursuant to the agreement. 
The parent-child relationship is also created if for the first 
two years of the child's life, a person resided in the same 
household with the child and that person openly held out the 
child as that person's child. 
Section 1841 clarifies who the 
child's parent or parents are and who is responsible for all 
aspects of that child's welfare, including the child's financial 
welfare. 
Section 1841 creates stability and security for every 
child in Maine. 
§1842. 
No discrimination based on marital status 
A child born to parents who are not married to each other 
has the same rights under the law as a child born to parents who 
are married to each other. 
Comment 
(This is section 202 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 2 and Massachusetts Gen. Laws ch. 209C, 
§ 1. 
From a legal and social policy perspective, this is one of 
the 
most 
significant 
substantive 
prov~s~ons 
of 
the 
Act, 
reaffirming the principle that regardless of the marital status 
of the parents, 
children and parents have equal rights with 
respect to each other. As discussed in the Prefatory Note, supra, 
U. S. Supreme Court decisions and lower federal and state court 
decisions 
require 
equal 
treatment 
of marital 
and 
nonmarital 
children without regard to the circumstances of their birth. 
Nonetheless, 
the 
equal 
treatment 
principle 
does 
not 
necessarily eliminate all distinctions in the application of 
other 
substantive 
laws 
to different 
kinds 
of 
children. 
For 
example, as amended in 1991 the Uniform Probate Code § 2-705(b), 
states: 
Y in construing a dispositive provision of a transferor who is 
not a natural parent, an individual born to the natural parent is 
not considered a child of that parent unless the individual while 
a minor lived as a regular member of the household of that parent 
or of that parent's parent, brother, sister, spouse, or surviving 
spouse. 
U.L.A. 188 (1998) 
In short, the UPC provides that an individual is presumed 
not to be included in a class gift from someone other than 'the 
child's parent unless that individual lived as a member of the 
parent's family during childhood. This presumed intent of the 
donor is rebuttable. 
Although this provision probably has 
a 
disproportionate effect on nonmarital children, the disparity is 
-not based on the circumstances of birth, but rather on post-birth 
living conditions. 
S1843. 
Consequences of establishment of Parentage 
Unless 
parental 
rights 
are 
terminated. 
a 
parent-child 
relationship established under 
this 
chapter 
applies 
for all 
purposes. except as otherwise specifically provided by other law 
of this State. 
Coament 
(This is section 203 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA (1988) § 10. 
This section may seem to state the obvious, but both the 
statement and the qualifier are necessary because without this 
explanation 
a 
literal 
reading of §§ 
201-203 
could 
lead to 
erroneous 
statutory constructions. 
The 
basic 
purpose 
of 
the 
section is to make clear that a mother, as defined in § 20l(a), 
is not a parent once her parental rights have been terminated. 
Similarly, 
a 
man 
whose 
paternity 
has 
been 
established 
by 
acknowledgment or by court adjudication may subsequently have his 
parental rights terminated. 
The qualifier, "as otherwise provided by other law of this 
State," is necessary because other statutes may restrict rights 
of a parent. For example, 
UPC 
(1993) 
§ 2-ll4(c) precludes a 
parent of a child (and the parent's family) from inheriting from 
the child by intestate succession "unless that natural parent has 
openly treated the child as his [or hers] and has not refused to 
support the child." Similarly, 
as discussed in the preceding 
Comment, UPC (1993) § 2-705(b) affects the right of a child to 
take under a class gift from a person who is not a parent of the 
child. 
SIB... 
Presumption of parentage 
1. 
Presumption established. 
A person is presumed to be the 
parent of a child if: 
A. 
The person and the mother of the child are married to 
each other and the child is born during the marriage; 
B. 
The person and the mother of the child were married to 
each other and the child is born within 300 days after the 
Page l5-LR2675(1) 
marriage 
is 
terminated 
by 
death, 
annulment, 
divorce 
or 
declaration of invalidity or after a decree of separation; 
C. 
Before the birth of the child, the person and the mother 
of the child married each other in apparent compliance with 
law, even if the attempted marriage is or could be declared 
invalid, and the child is born during the invalid marriage 
or 
within 
days 
after 
its 
termination 
by 
death, 
annulment, divorce or declaration of invalidity or after a 
decree of separation; 
D. 
After the birth of the child, the person and the mother 
of the child married each other in apparent compliance with 
law, whether or not the marriage is or could be declared 
invalid, and the person voluntarily asserted parentage of 
the child and: 
(1) 
The assertion is in a record filed with the State 
Registrar of Vital Statistics; 
(2) 
The person agreed to be and is named 
as 
the 
child's parent on the child's birth certificate; or 
(3) 
The person promised in a record to support the 
child as that person's own; or 
E. 
For the first 2 years of the child's life, the person 
resided in the same household with the child and openly held 
out the child as that person's own. 
2. 
Rebuttal of presumption. 
A presumption of parentage 
established under 
this 
section 
may 
be 
rebutted only 
by 
an 
adjudication under subchapter 6. 
COllllllent 
(This is section 204 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 4. 
A network of presumptions was established by UPA (1973) for 
application to cases in which proof of external circumstances 
indicate a particular man to be the probable father. The simplest 
of these is also the best known--birth of a child during the 
marriage between the mother and a man. When promulgated in 1973 
the contemporaneous commentary noted that: 
While perhaps no one state now includes all these presumptions in 
its law, the presumptions are based on existing presumptions of 
'legitimacy' 
in state 
laws 
and 
do 
not 
represent 
a 
serious 
departure. Novel is that they have been collected under one roof. 
All 
presumptions 
of paternity are 
circumstances. Uniform Parentage Act 
U.L.A. 379 (2001). 
rebuttable 
in appropriate 
(1973), Prefatory Note, 
9B 
After amendments adopted in 2002, the Uniform Parentage Act 
retains all but one of the original presumptions of paternity 
contained in UPA § 4 (1973). Originally the 2000 version of the 
new Act limited presumptions of paternity to those related to 
marriage. 
The objection by the 
ABA Steering Committee on the 
Unmet Legal Needs of Children and the Section of Individual 
Rights 
and 
Responsibilities 
that 
this 
could 
result 
in 
differential treatment of 
children born to 
unmarried parents 
resulted in the revision to this section. 
Subsection (1) deals with a child born during a marriage; 
subsection (2) deals with a child conceived during marriage but 
born after its termination; subsection (3) deals with a child 
conceived or born during an invalid marriage; and, subsection (4) 
deals with a 
child born before 
a valid or invalid marriage, 
accompanied by other facts indicating the husband is the father. 
Added by amendment in 2002, subsection (5), is a significant 
revision of UPA § 4 (4) 
(1973), which created a presumption of 
paternity if a man "receives the child into his home and openly 
holds out the child as his natural child." Because there was no 
time 
frame specified in the 
1973 
act, 
the 
language fostered 
uncertainty about whether the presumption could arise if the 
receipt of the child into the man's home occurred for a short 
time or took place long after the child' s birth. To more fully 
serve 
the 
goal 
of 
treating nonmarital 
and marital 
children 
equally, the "holding out" presumption is restored, subject to an 
express durational requirement that the man reside with the child 
for the first two years of the child' slife. This mirrors the 
presumption applied to a married man established by § 607, infra. 
Once this presumption arises, it is subject to attack only under 
the limited circumstances set forth in § 607 for challenging a 
marital presumption, 
and is similarly subject to the estoppel 
principles of § 608. 
One presumption found in UPA (1973) is not repeated in the 
new Act. Former UPA §4(5) created a presumption of paternity if 
the man "acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing 
filed with [named agency] [and] the mother does not dispute the 
acknowledgment within a 
reasonable time." This presumption was 
eliminated 
because 
it 
conflicts 
with 
Article 
3, 
Voluntary 
Acknowledgment of Paternity, under which a val id acknowledgment 
establishes paternity rather than a presumption of paternity. 
Finally, subsection (b) is a complete rewrite of UPA (1973) 
§ 4(b). The requirement that a presumption "may be rebutted only 
by clear and convincing evidence" was eliminated from the Act. 
The same fate was accorded the statement that: "If two or more 
presumptions 
arise 
which 
conflict 
with 
each 
other, 
the 
presumption which 
on 
the 
facts 
is 
founded 
on the weightier 
considerations 
of 
policy 
and 
logic 
controls." 
Nowadays 
the 
existence of modern genetic testing obviates this old approach to 
the problem of conflicting presumptions 
when 
a 
court is 
to 
determine paternity. Nowadays, genetic testing makes it possible 
in most cases to resolve competing claims to paternity. Moreover, 
courts may use the estoppel principles in § 608 in appropriate 
circumstances 
to 
deny 
requests 
for 
genetic 
testing 
in 
the 
interests 
of 
preserving 
a 
child's ties 
to 
the 
presumed 
or 
acknowledged father who openly held himself out as the child's 
father regardless of whether he is in fact the genetic father. 
Maine Comment 
Section 1844 is made 
gender neutral 
and preserves, 
for 
example, a child's ties to the presumed parent who for the first 
two years of the child's life openly held the child out as that 
person's own 
child regardless of whether that person is in fact 
a genetic parent. 
SUBCBAP"iER 3 
6 
VOLUNTARY ACKBOIILEDGMERT OF PATEHBITY 
Comment 
Voluntary 
acknowledgment 
of paternity has 
long 
been 
an 
alternative to a contested paternity suit. Under UPA (1973) § 4, 
the inclusion of a man's name on the child's birth certificate 
created a presumption of paternity, which could be rebutted. In 
order to improve the collection of child support, especially from 
unwed fathers, the U.S. Congress mandated a fundamental change in 
the acknowledgment procedure. 
The 
Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, also known 
as the Welfare Reform Act) conditions receipt of federal child 
support enforcement funds on state enactment of laws that greatly 
strengthen the effect of a man's vOluntary acknowledgment of 
paternity, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C). This statute is reproduced 
in Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
In brief, it provides that a valid, unrescinded, unchallenged 
acknowledgment of paternity is to be treated as equivalent to a 
judicial determination of paternity. 
Because in many respects the federal act is nonspecific, the 
new UPA contains clear and comprehensive procedures to comply 
with the federal mandate. Primary among the factual circumstances 
that Congress did not take into account was that a married woman 
may consent to an acknowledgement of paterni ty by a man who may 
indeed be her child's genetic father, but is not her husband. 
Under the new UPA, the mother's husband is the presumed father of 
the child, see § 204, supra. By ignoring the real possibility 
that the child will have both an acknowledged father 
and 
a 
presumed father, Congress left it to the states to sort out which 
of the men should be recognized as the legal father. 
Further, 
PRWORA does not require that a man acknowledging 
paternity must assert genetic paternity of the child. Section 301 
is 
designed 
to 
prevent 
circumvention 
of 
adoption 
laws 
by 
requiring a sworn assertion of genetic parentage of the child. 
Sections 302-305 clarify that, if a child has a presumed 
father, that man must file a denial of paternity in conjunction 
wi th another man's acknowledgment of paternity in order for the 
acknowledgement to be valid. If the presumed father is unwilling 
to cooperate, or his whereabouts are unknown, a court proceeding 
is necessary to resolve the issue of parentage. 
Congress 
also 
directed 
that 
the 
acknowledgment 
can 
be 
"rescinded" within a particular timeframe, and subsequently can 
be "challenged" without stating a timeframe. Those procedures are 
dealt with in §§ 307-309. 
Finally, the related issue of issuance or revision of birth 
certificates is left to other state law. 
§1851. 
Acknov1edgmAnt of paternity 
The mother of a child and a man claiming to be the genetic 
father of the child may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with 
intent to establish the man's paternity. 
Conment 
{This is section 301 of the UPA.} 
Source: 42 U. S. C. § 666 {a}( 5} (C), see preceding Comment and 
Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
PRWORA does not explicitly require that a man acknowledging 
parentage necessarily is asserting his genetic parentage of the 
child. In order to prevent circumvention of adoption laws, § 301 
corrects this omission by requiring a sworn assertion of genetic 
parentage of the child. A 2002 amendment provides that a man who 
signs an acknowledgment of paternity declares that he is the 
genetic father of the child. Thus both the man and the mother 
acknowledge his paternity, 
under penalty of perjury, 
without 
requiring the parents to spell out the details of their sexual 
relations. Further, the amended language also takes into account 
a 
situation in which 
a 
man, 
who 
is 
unable 
to 
have 
sexual 
intercourse with his partner, may still have contributed to the 
conception of the child through the 
use 
of his 
own 
sperm. 
Henceforth, a man in that situation will be able to recognize 
legally 
his 
paternity 
through 
the 
voluntary 
acknowledgment 
procedure. 
§1852. 
Execution of acknowledgment of paternity 
1. 
Acknowledgement; 
regyirements. 
An 
acknowledgment 
of 
paternity must: 
A. 
Be in a record; 
B. 
Be signed, or otherwise authenticated, under penalty of 
perjury by the mother and by the man seeking to establish 
his paternity; 
C. 
State 
that 
the 
child 
whose 
paternity 
is 
being 
acknowledged: 
(1) 
Does not have a presumed parent or has a presumed 
parent whose full name is stated; and 
(2) 
Does 
not 
have 
another 
acknowledged 
father 
or 
adjudicated parent; 
D. 
State whether there has been genetic testing and, if so, 
that 
the 
acknowledging 
man's 
claim 
of 
paternity 
is 
consistent with the results of the testing; and 
E. 
State 
that 
the 
signatories 
understand 
that 
the 
acknowledgment is the equivalent of a judicial adjudication 
of paternity of the child and that a 
challenge to the 
acknowledgment is permitted only under limited circumstances 
and is barred after 2 years. 
2. 
Acknowledgement void. 
An acknowledgment of paternity is 
void if it: 
A. 
States that another person is a presumed parent, unless 
a denial of parentage signed or otherwise authenticated by 
the preSumed parent is filed with the State Registrar of 
Vital Statistics; 
B. 
States that another person is an acknowledged father or 
adjudicated parent; or 
C. 
Falsely denies 
the existence of 
a 
presumed parent, 
acknowledged father or adjudicated parent of the child. 
3. 
Presuwtd parent. 
A man who is a presumed parent may 
sign or otherwise authenticate an acknowledgment of paternity. 
Coaaent 
(This is section 302 of the UPA.) 
Source: 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C), see Appendix: Federal IV-D 
Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
The federal statute cited above provides that receipt of the 
federal subsidy by a state for its child support enforcement 
program is contingent on state enactment of laws establishing 
specific procedures for voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. 
This deceptively simple principle proved difficult to implement. 
Problems most notably include fact situations in which the 
mother of the child is married to someone other than the man who 
intends to acknowledge his paternity. With an acknowledgment the 
child would then have both an acknowledged father and a presumed 
father. To deal with this circumstance, many states have passed 
laws allowing the presumed father to sign a denial of paternity, 
which must be filed as part of the acknowledgment. 
This Act 
adopts this common sense solution; otherwise the acknowledgment 
would have no legal consequence because it cannot affect the 
legal rights of the presumed father. 
At 
least 
two 
other provisions 
of 
this 
section warrant 
special 
emphasis. 
Subsection 
(a)(2) 
requires 
that 
the 
acknowledgment 
be 
"signed, 
or 
otherwise 
authenticated, 
under 
penalty of perjury," just as income tax returns and many other 
government documents require. Clearly, the potential punishment 
for false swearing is substantial, and the benefits from avoiding 
the 
complication 
of 
requ~r~ng witnesses 
and 
a 
notary 
are 
significant in this context. Mandating greater formality would 
greatly 
discourage 
the 
in-hospital 
signatures 
so 
earnestly 
desired in 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (C) (H), see Appendix: Federal 
IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
Similarly, in an attempt to ensure full disclosure and avoid 
false swearing, subsection (a) (4) requires that the results of 
genetic testing, if any, be reported along with confirmation that 
the 
acknowledgment 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
results 
of 
that 
testing. This provision is also designed to avoid a possible 
subversion of 
the 
requirements 
for 
an 
adoption. 
A would-be 
"father" whose parentage of a child has been excluded by genetic 
testing may not validly sign an acknowledgment once that fact has 
been established. 
Maine Comment 
Section 1852 is made gender neutral to cover all presumed 
parents, regardless of gender. 
Subsequent sections are revised 
accordingly. 
SI853. 
Denial of parentage 
A presumed parent may 
sign 
a 
denial 
of that person's 
parentage. The denial is valid only if: 
1. 
Acknowledgement. 
An acknowledgment of paternity signed, 
or otherwise authenticated, by another man is filed pursuant to 
section 1855: 
2. 
Under penalty of perjury. 
The denial is in a record and 
is signed, or otherwise authenticated, under penalty of perjury; 
and 
3. 
Presumed parent. 
The presumed parent has not previously: 
A. 
Acknowledged 
paternity, 
unless 
the 
previous 
acknowledgment has been rescinded pursuant to section 1857 
or successfully challenged pursuant to section 1858; or 
B. 
Been adjudicated to be the parent of the child. 
§1854. 
Acknowledgment of paternity and denial of parentage 
1. 
Acknowledgement 
and 
denial. 
An 
acknowledgment 
of 
paternity and a denial of parentage may be contained in a single 
document or may 
be 
signed in counterparts and may 
be filed 
separately or simultaneously. If the acknowledgement and denial 
are both necessary, neither is valid until both are filed. 
2. 
Signed before birth. 
An acknowledgment of paternity or 
a denial of parentage may be signed before the birth of the child. 
3. 
Effective 
date. 
Subject 
to 
subsection 
1, 
an 
acknowledgment of paternity or denial of parentage takes effect 
on the birth of the child or the filing of the document with the 
State Registrar of Vital Statistics, whichever occurs later. 
4. 
Signed.by minor. 
An 
acknowledgment of paternity or 
denial of parentage signed by a minor is valid if it is otherwise 
in compliance with this chapter. 
CODDent 
(This is section 304 of the UPA.) 
Source: 
U.S.C. 
§ 666(a)(5)(C)(i), 
requiring a 
"simple 
civil process" for voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, see 
Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
SI8SS. 
Effect of acknowledgment of paternity or denial of 
parentage 
1. 
Acknowledgment. 
Except 
as 
otherwise 
provided 
in 
sections 1857 and 1858, a valid acknowledgment of paternity filed 
with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics is e~uivalent to an 
adjudication of parentage 
of 
a 
child and 
confers 
upon 
the 
acknowledged father all of the rights and duties of a parent. 
2. 
Denial. 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1857 
and 1858, a valid denial of parentage by a presumed parent filed 
with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics in conjunction with 
a 
valid 
acknowledgment 
of 
paternity 
is 
e~uivalent 
to 
an 
adjudication of the nonparentage of the presumed parent and 
discharges the presumed parent from all rights and duties of a 
parent. 
Comment 
(This is section 305 of the UPA.) 
Source: 
U.S.C. 
§ 666(a)(5)(D)(ii), 
requiring that an 
acknowledgment of paternity be "a legal finding of paternity," 
and 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(M), directing that acknowledgments be 
"filed with the State registry of birth records 
"; see 
Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
S1856. 
Bo filing fee 
The State Registrar of Vital Statistics may not charge for 
filing an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of parentage. 
§18S7. 
Proceeding for rescission 
A signatory may rescind an acknowledgment of paternity or 
denial of parentage by commencing a proceeding to rescind before 
the earlier of: 
1. 
Siztr dAYs after effective date. 
Sixty days after the 
effective date of the acknowledgment or denial, as provided in 
section 1854; and 
2. 
Date of first hearing. 
The date of the first hearing, 
in a proceeding to which the signatory is a party, before a court 
to 
adjudicate 
an 
issue 
relating to 
the 
child. 
including 
a 
proceeding that establishes support. 
Comment 
(This is section 307 of the UPA.) 
This section reflects a decision by NCCUSL 
to require a 
judicial 
adjudicatory 
process 
to 
rescind 
a 
vOluntary 
acknowledgment of paternity. The federal statute, 
U.S.C. § 
666(a)(5)(c)(D)(ii), 
does 
not 
prescribe 
the 
method 
for 
the 
rescission, 
see 
Appendix: 
Federal 
IV-D 
Statute 
Relating 
to 
Parentage, infra. 
SlU58. 
Challenge after exPiration of period for rescission 
1. 
,Challenge acknowledgment or denial. 
After the period 
for rescission under section 1857 has expired, a signatory of an 
acknowledgment of paternity or denial of parentage may cOmmence a 
proceeding to challenge the acknowledgment or denial only: 
A. 
On the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of 
fact: and 
B. 
Within 2 years after the acknowledgment or denial is 
filed with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. 
2. 
Burden of proof. 
A party challenging an acknowledgment 
of paternity or denial of parentage has the burden of proof. 
Comment 
(This is section 308 of the UPA.) 
The 
federal 
statute 
also 
includes 
a 
provision 
for 
a 
"challenge" of an acknowledgment of paternity after the period 
for rescission of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity has 
elapsed. Such a collateral attack is to be limited to a challenge 
based on alleged "fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact," 
and according to 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(c)(D)(iii), must be made 
"in court," 
see 
Appendix: 
Federal 
IV-D 
Statute Relating 
to 
Parentage, infra. 
SlU59. 
Procedure for rescission or challenge 
1. 
Every 
signator.y 
party. 
Every 
signatory 
to 
an 
acknowledgment of paternity and any related denial of parentage 
must be made a party to a proceeding to rescind or challenge the 
acknowledgment or denial. 
2. 
Submission to personal jurisdiction. 
For the purpose of 
rescission of, or challenge to, an acknowledgment of paternity or 
denial of parentage, a signatory submits to personal jurisdiction 
of this State by signing the acknowledgment or denial, effective 
upon the filing of the document with the State Registrar of Vital 
Statistics. 
3. 
Suspension of legal responsibilities. 
Except for good 
cause shown, during the pendency of a proceeding to rescind or 
challenge an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of parentage, 
the 
court 
may 
not 
suspend 
the 
legal 
responsibilities 
of 
a 
signatory arising from the acknowledgment. including the duty to 
pay child support. 
4. 
Proceeding to rescind or challenge. 
A proceeding to 
rescind or to challenge an acknowledgment of paternity or denial 
of parentage must be conducted in the same manner as a proceeding 
to adjudicate parentage under subchapter 6. 
5. 
Amendment to birth record. 
At the conclusion of a 
proceeding to rescind or challenge an acknowledgment of paternity 
or denial of parentage, the court shall order the State Registrar 
of Vital Statistics to amend the birth record of the child, if 
appropriate. 
Comment 
(This is section 309 of the UPA.) 
Although the federal statute does not prescribe the method 
for 
"rescission" of 
an 
acknowledgment of paternity, it does 
require 
a 
judicial proceeding for 
a 
subsequent 
"challenge." 
Overturning an acknowledgment of paternity through either of the 
prescribed methods has significant legal consequences. Thus, both 
methods should require a formal procedure because either one may 
result 
in 
the 
setting 
aside 
of 
an 
otherwise 
valid 
legal 
determination of the child's parentage. A procedure that allows a 
signatory of an acknowledgment of paternity merely to file a 
rescission with the state bureau of vital statistics would be an 
unwise pOlicy choice. Many jurisdictions have come to the same 
conclusion. 
§1860. 
Ratification barred 
A court or administrative agency conducting a judicial or 
administrative proceeding is not required or permitted to ratify 
an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity. 
Conoent 
(This is section 310 of the UPA.) 
Source: 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(E), see Appendix: Federal IV-D 
Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
§1861. 
Full faith and credit 
A court of this State shall give full faith and credit to an 
acknowledgment of paternity or denial of parentage effective in 
another state if the acknowledgment or denial has been signed and 
is otherwise in compliance with the law of the other state. 
Conoent 
(This is section 311 of the UPA.) 
Source: 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv). 
PRWORA requires states "to give full faith and credit to 
such an affidavit [of acknowledgment of paternity] signed in any 
other 
State 
according 
to 
its 
procedures." 
Id. 
And, 
§ 
666(a)(5)(D)(ii) provides that a "signed voluntary acknowledgment 
is considered a legal finding of paternity 
In sum, 
federal law requires that an acknowledgment of paternity has the 
same status as a "judgment," 28 U. S. C. § 1738, a "child custody 
determination," 28 U.S.C. § l738A, and a "child support order," 
U.S.C. § 1738B. This section implements these mandates. 
§1862. 
Forms for acknowledgment and denial of paternity 
1. 
Form. 
To facilitate compliance with this subchapter, 
the State Registrar of Vital Statistics shall prescribe forms for 
the acknowledgment of paternity and the denial of parentage. 
• 
Later modification .",o=f,---f=o=rm=,-"._~A,-,,--,v,-,a=1=-1=-· d=----'a=c'''"'k=n=o~w..:=l'_"e'_"d""g .... m'_"e"'"'n=t____'o<_=.f 
paternity or denial of parentage is not affected by a 
later 
modification of the prescribed form. 
Conoent 
(This is section 312 of the UPA.) 
Source: 
U.S.C. 
§ 
666(a)(5)C)(i),(iv), 
see 
Appendix: 
Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
The federal Office of Child Support Enforcement has issued 
an Action Transmittal to all IV-D agencies specifying how to 
ensure that the forms comply with PRWORA, OCSE-AT-98-02, Required 
Data 
Elements 
for 
Paternity 
Acknowledgment 
Aff idavi ts, 
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/1998-at.htm 
S186). 
Release of information 
The 
State 
Registrar 
of 
Vital 
Statistics 
may 
release 
information relating to the acknowledgment of paternity or denial 
of parentage to a signatory of the acknowledgment or denial and 
to courts and appropriate state or federal agencies of this State 
or another state. 
S1864. 
Adoption of rules 
The State Registrar of Vital Statistics may adopt rules to 
implement 
this 
subchapter. 
Rules 
adopted 
pursuant 
to 
this 
section are routine technical rules for the purposes of Title 5, 
chapter 375, subchapter 2-A. 
Comment 
(This is section 314 of the UPA.) 
This section is bracketed to account for situations in which 
it may conflict with other rulemaking limitations in a particular 
state. 
States 
will 
implement 
voluntary 
acknowledgment 
of 
paterni ty procedures in a variety of ways, depending on local 
practice. This grant of rulemaking authority to carry out the 
provisions of this article may include electronic transmission of 
birth and acknowledgment data to the designated state agency. 
SUBCHAPTER 4 
REGISTRY OF PATERNITY 
Comment 
In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of 
a 
New 
York 
"putative father 
registry." A New York statute required a father of a child born 
out-of-wedlock to register if he wished to be notified of a 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
or 
adoption 
proceeding. 
Thereafter, a series of well-publicized adoption cases occurred 
in which state courts held that nonmarital fathers had not been 
given proper notice of such proceedings and voided established 
adoptions. 
A substantial 
number 
of legislatures 
responded 
to 
these decisions by enacting paternity registries similar to the 
New York statute. As of May, 2000, at least 28 states had enacted 
legislation creating paternity registries. 
Initially, in 1988 the Conference took 
a 
much different 
view, stating: 
[The Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act] does not include a 
putative fathers 
registry requirement for, 
essentially, 
three 
reasons: 
(1) while "ignorance of the law is no excuse," most 
fathers or potential fathers--even very responsible ones--are not 
likely to know about the registry as a means of protecting their 
rights, and the objective is providing some actual protection, 
not relying on a cliche more relevant to the criminal law; (2) 
individual state registries do not protect responsible fathers in 
interstate situations; 
and 
(3) 
since the registries rely on 
unsupported 
claims, 
their 
accuracy 
is 
in 
doubt 
and 
their 
potential for an invasion of privacy and for interference with 
matters of adoption, custody, and visitation is substantial. It 
has also been pointed out that such a registry could provide a 
means for blackmailing the mother. The registry can, however, 
provide a 
simple (albeit "hard-nosed" and potentially unjust) 
solution when a father fails to register, as in Lehr v. Robertson. 
The 
new 
UPA 
reverses 
that 
approach 
by 
accepting 
the 
importance and utility of 
a 
parentage registry to facilitate 
infant 
adoptions. 
Under 
circumstances 
in 
which 
the 
mother 
consents to the adoption of her infant child, time is of the 
essence 
in 
placing 
an 
infant 
with 
the 
adoptive 
parents. 
Therefore, 
resort 
to 
the 
constitutionally approved paternity 
registry system is appropriate. But, the Act limits the effect of 
the registry to cases in which a child is less than one year of 
age at the time of the court hearing, see § 405, infra. This 
recognizes the need to expedite infant adoptions, while properly 
protecting the rights of those nonmarital fathers who may not 
have registered, but instead have established some relationship 
with the child following birth. This gives the nonmarital father 
the opportunity to step forward to accept the responsibilities of 
parenthood, 
while 
not 
derailing 
infant 
adoptions. 
Requiring 
notification to the alleged father of a proceeding when the child 
has reached one year of age or more will not unduly delay the 
placement of an older child. Further, this Act excepts from the 
registration requirement a man who timely initiates a proceeding 
for paternity, notwithstanding his failure to register. 
Article 1 
General Provisions 
§1871. 
Establishment of registry 
The State Registrar of Vital Statistics shall establish a 
registry of paternity within the Office of Data Research and 
Vital Statistics. 
§1872. 
Registration for notification 
1. 
Registration required. 
Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection 2 or section 1875, a man who desires to be notified of 
a proceeding for adoption of, or termination of parental rights 
regarding, a child that he may have fathered must register in the 
registry of paternity before the birth of the child or within 30 
days after the birth. 
2. 
Exception to registration requirement. 
A man is not 
required to register if: 
A. 
A parent-child relationship between the man 
and the 
child has been established under this chapter or other law; 
or 
B. 
The 
man 
commences 
a 
proceeding 
to 
adjudicate 
his 
parentage before 
the 
court has 
terminated his 
parental 
rights. 
3. 
Notification of change in information. 
A registrant 
shall promptly notify the registry in a record of any change in 
the 
information 
registered. 
The 
State 
Registrar 
of 
Vi tal 
Statistics shall incorporate all new information received into 
its records but need not affirmatively seek to obtain current 
information for incorporation in the registry. 
Comment 
(This is section 402 of the UPA.) 
A registry of paternity protects a claim of paternity from 
summary termination, but the primary advantage of such a registry 
is to facilitate infant adoptions. By registering, a registrant 
ensures that he will receive notice of the possible adoption of a 
child that he may have fathered if the birth occurs in the state 
of registration. In this manner, a man may seek to protect his 
right to assert parentage. 
Limiting the consequence of a failure to register with a 
registry of paternity only to termination of paternal rights in 
cases of infant adoption seems appropriate. If an adoption is not 
commenced in the first year of the child' slife, the nonmar i tal 
father and the mother remain responsible for support and eligible 
for custody or visitation throughout the minority of the child in 
the absence of an adoption or termination after notice to the 
alleged father. The latter fact situation distinguishes it from 
an infant adoption in which both parents lose those rights and 
duties for the benefit of the child. 
If a state chooses to enact subsection (b) (2), one of the 
major criticisms of Lehr v. Robertson, supra, will be eliminated. 
In Lehr, although the genetic father did not avail himself of the 
New York putative fathers registry, he had filed a "visitation 
and paternity" petition in another local court. The trial judge 
in the adoption proceeding knew the identity of the biological 
father, where he could be located, and that he was seeking to 
establish his paternity in another court. Nonetheless, the court 
granted the adoption and terminated the genetic father's parental 
rights 
without 
notice 
to 
him. 
Subsection 
(b)(2) 
exempts 
an 
alleged father from the requirement of registration if the man 
"commences a proceeding to adjudicate his paternity before the 
court has terminated his parental rights." 
The act of registration submits the man to the personal 
jurisdiction of the tribunals of the state of registration, see 
UIFSA (1996) § 201(7). 
Bracketed subsection (b) (2) may be omitted by those states 
that do 
not decide 
termination and adoption separately, 
but 
rather 
combine 
the 
termination of 
parental 
rights 
with 
the 
adoption. 
Under optional subsection 
(b) 
[enacted without the 
bracketed (2)], the alleged father may establish his father-child 
relationship before an adoption can be completed. 
§l873. 
Notice of proceeding 
Notice of a proceeding for the adoption of, or termination 
of parental 
rights 
regarding, 
a 
child must 
be 
given 
to 
a 
registrant who has timely registered. Notice must be given in a 
manner prescribed for service of process in a civil action. 
Comment 
(This is section 403 of the UPA.) 
This 
section 
is 
the 
logical 
conclusion 
to 
the 
legal 
rationale for establishing a paternity registry. In an adoption 
of a child or termination of parental rights proceeding, 
the 
registry provides 
a 
clear procedure 
for 
resolving whether 
a 
nonmarital father intends to assert his rights with regard to the 
child. If he registers, termination of his rights and adoption of 
his child may not proceed without notice to him; this affords him 
the opportunity to assert his paternity and his 
claims 
for 
custOdy or visitation. 
§l874. 
Termination of parental rights: child under one year 
of age 
The parental rights of a man who may be the father of a 
child may be terminated without notice if: 
1. 
Age of child. 
The child has not attained one year of 
age at the time of the termination of parental rights; 
2. 
Timely registration. 
The man did not register timely 
with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics; and 
3. 
Rot exempt. 
The man is not exempt from registration 
under section 1872. 
COJNDent 
(This is section 404 of the UPA.) 
This section is the obverse logical conclusion to the legal 
rationale for establishing a paternity registry. 
In an infant 
adoption or termination of the genetic father's parental rights, 
the registry provides a clear procedure for determining that a 
man does not intend to assert parental rights with regard to the 
infant. Although the registry protects a man's right to notice in 
a termination or adoption proceeding, his failure to register 
waives those rights. Thus, 
the registry is both a first step 
towards claiming parental rights and a means for terminating the 
rights of those men who 
do not register. If a man fails to 
register with the paternity registry, a termination and adoption 
may proceed without fear of a belated claim, most particularly a 
claim coming after adoptive parents have received custody of the 
infant. 
This 
expedited 
procedure 
greatly 
facilitates 
infant 
adoption, 
which 
in 
truth 
explains 
the 
existence--and 
popularity--of 
the 
registries 
with 
a 
majority 
of 
state 
legislatures. 
§1875. 
Termination of parental rights: child at least one year 
of age 
1. 
Age of child. 
If a child has attained one year of age, 
notice of 
a 
proceeding 
for 
adoption of, 
or 
termination of 
parental rights regarding, 
the child must be given to every 
alleged father of the child, whether or not he has registered 
with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. 
2. 
Manner of notice. 
Notice must be given in a manner 
prescribed for service of process in a civil action. 
Comment 
(This is section 405 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 25, and UPUFA (1988) § 3. 
With the exception of infant adoptions (children under one 
year of age) as provided in the preceding section, this provision 
is solidly based on the Supreme Court's decision in Lehr v. 
Robertson, supra, while affirming the basic principle of Stanley 
v. Illinois, ~, and its progeny by requiring notice to the 
nonmarital father of an adoption of his child or a termination of 
parental 
rights 
proceeding 
against 
him. 
This 
protects 
those 
fathers who may have had some informal or de facto relationship 
with the child or mother for some time and prevents unilateral 
action to adversely affect that father's rights. 
Article 2 
Operation of Registry 
S1881. 
Required form 
The State Registrar of Vital Statistics shall prepare a form 
for 
registering with the 
agency. 
The 
form must 
reguire the 
signature of the registrant. The form must state that the form is 
signed under penalty of perjury. The form must also state that: 
1. 
Notice. 
to 
notice 
of 
a 
termination of the 
A timely registration entitles the 
proceeding 
for 
adoption 
of 
the 
registrant's parental rights; 
registrant 
child 
or 
2. 
Does not counence proceeding. 
A timely registration 
does not commence a proceeding to establish paternity; 
3. 
Use of information. 
The information disclosed on the 
form may be used against the registrant to establish paternity: 
4. 
Services available. 
Services to assist in establishing 
paternity are available to the registrant through the support 
enforcement agency; 
5. 
Register in another state. 
The registrant should also 
~ister in another state if conception or birth of the child 
occurred in the other state; 
6. 
Information 
from 
other 
states. 
Information 
on 
registries of other states is available from the State Registrar 
of Vital Statistics; and 
7. 
Rescind 
r~istration. 
Procedures exist to rescind the 
registration of a claim Qf paternity. 
S1882. 
Furnishing of information: confidentiality 
1. 
Location 
and 
notification 
of 
mother. 
The 
State 
Registrar of Vital Statistics need not seek to locate the mother 
of a child who is the subject of a registration, but the State 
Registrar of Vital Statistics shall send a copy of the notice of 
registration to a mother if she has provided an address. 
2. 
Information 
confidential: 
release. 
Information 
contained in the registry is confidential and may be released on 
reguest only to: 
A. 
A court or a person designated by the court; 
B. 
The mother of the child who is the subject of the 
registration: 
C. 
An 
agency 
authorized 
by 
other 
law 
to 
receive 
the 
information; 
D. 
A licensed child-placing agency: 
E. 
A support enforcement agency; 
F. 
A party 
or 
the 
party's 
attorney 
of 
record 
in 
a 
proceeding 
under 
this 
chapter 
or 
in 
a 
proceeding 
for 
adoption 
of, 
or 
for 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
regarding, a child who is the subject of the registration; 
G. 
The registry of paternity in another state. 
SIBB3. 
Penalty for releasing information 
An 
individual commits 
a Class 
E crime if the individual 
intentionally releases information from the registry to another 
individual or agency not authorized to receive the information 
under section 1882. 
SIBB4. 
Rescission of registration 
A registrant may rescind his registration at any time by 
sending to the registry a 
rescission in a 
record signed or 
otherwise authenticated by him and witnessed or notarized. 
SIBBS. 
Untimely registration 
If a man registers more than 30 days after the birth of the 
child, the State Registrar of Vital Statistics shall notify the 
registrant that on its face his registration was not filed timely. 
S1886. 
Fees for registry 
1. 
Filing registration or rescission. 
A fee may not be 
charged for filing a registration or a rescission of registration. 
2. 
Search: certificate. 
Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection 3, the State Registrar of Vital Statistics may charge 
a reasonable fee for making a search of the registry and for 
furnishing a certificate. 
3. 
Ho fee. 
A support enforcement agency is not required to 
pay a fee authorized by subsection 2. 
Article 3 
Search of Registries 
S1891. 
Search of appropriate registry 
1. 
Child under one year of age: certificate of search. 
If 
a parent child relationship has not been established under this 
chapter for a child under one year of age, 
a petitioner for 
adoption of, or termination of parental rights regarding, 
the 
child must obtain a certificate of search of the registry of 
paternity. 
2. 
Certificate 
of 
search 
from 
another 
state. 
If 
a 
petitioner for adoption of, or termination of parental rights 
regarding, a child has reason to believe that the conception or 
birth of the child may 
have occurred in another state, 
the 
petitioner must also obtain a certificate of search from the 
registry of paternity, if any, in that state. 
S1892. 
Certificate of search of registry 
1. 
Certificate of search. 
The State Registrar of Vi tal 
Statistics shall furnish to the requester a certificate of search 
of the registry on request of an individual, court or agency 
identified in section 1882. 
2. 
Contents. 
A certificate provided by the State Registrar 
of Vital Statistics must 
be 
signed on behalf of the State 
Registrar of Vital Statistics and state that: 
A. 
A search has been made of the registry: and 
B. 
A registration containing the information required to 
identify the registrant: 
(I) 
Has been found and is attached to the certificate 
of search: or 
(2) 
Has not been found. 
3. 
File with court. 
A petitioner must file the certificate 
of search with the court before a proceeding for adoption of, or 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
regarding, 
a 
child 
may 
be 
concluded. 
S1893. 
Admissibility of registered information 
A certificate of search of the registry of paternity in this 
State or another state is admi§9ible in a proceeding for adoption 
of, or termination of parental rights regarding, a child and, if 
relevant, in other legal proceedings. 
SUBCBAP"'.rER 5 
GENETIC TESTING 
SI90I. 
Scope of subchapter 
This subchapter governs genetic testing of an individual to 
determine parentage, whether the individual: 
1. 
Voluntary. 
Voluntarily submits to testing; or 
2. 
Pursuant to order. 
Is tested pursuant to an order of 
the court or a support enforcement agency. 
Comment 
(This is section 501 of the UPA.) 
This section is intended to avoid problems with regard to 
the admissibility of the results of voluntary genetic testing. 
Testing is often 
agreed 
upon 
to 
avoid 
the 
cost 
and 
delay 
engendered by 
requ~r~ng a 
proceeding to be filed before the 
results of genetic testing can be admitted as evidence. If the 
test excludes the man's paternity, an unnecessary step has been 
avoided. 
§1902. 
Order for testing 
1. 
Order to submit to genetic testing. 
Except as otherwise 
provided in this subchapter and subchapter 6, 
the court shall 
order the child and other designated individuals to submit to 
genetic testing if the request for testing is supported by the 
sworn statement of a party to the proceeding: 
A. 
Alleging paternity and stating facts establishing a 
reasonable 
probability of 
the 
requisite 
sexual 
contact 
between the individuals: or 
B. 
Denying 
parentage 
and 
stating facts 
establishing 
a 
possibility that sexual contact between the individuals, if 
any, did not result in the conception of the child. 
2. 
No presumed parent, acknowledged father or adjudicated 
parent. 
A support enforcement agency may order genetic testing 
only if there is no presumed parent, 
acknowledged father or 
adjudicated parent. 
3. 
In utero testing. 
If a request for genetic testing of a 
child is made before birth, the court or support enforcement 
agency may not order in utero testing. 
4. 
Concurrent or sequential testing. 
If 2 or more men are 
subject to court ordered genetic testing, 
the testing may be 
ordered concurrently or sequentially. 
Comment 
(This is section 502 of the UPA.) 
Source: 
UPA 
(1973) 
§ 
11; 
U.S.C. 
§ 
666(a)(5)(B)(i) 
requiring genetic testing in certain cases, see Appendix: Federal 
IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
The 
progress 
that 
science 
has 
made 
in 
understanding 
molecular genetics 
since 
the 
promulgation 
of 
UPA 
(1973) 
is 
phenomenal. 
Subsection (a) speaks to testing of a 
"designated 
individual" other than of the "mother, and alleged or presumed 
father" to take into account the fact that testing for paternity 
may proceed without testing the mother. Further, testing may also 
proceed without testing the 
alleged father 
by testing close 
relatives of that man. Moreover, the right of the court to order 
testing is not absolute; §§ 607-609 place limitations on genetic 
testing if the child has a presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated 
father. 
Subsection 
(c) 
is 
intended 
to 
prevent 
the 
court 
from 
ordering the mother to undergo prenatal testing, such as through 
amniocentesis 
or 
other 
in 
utero 
collection 
method. 
These 
procedures pose a measurable risk to the life and health of both 
the fetus 
and the mother. If the mother volunteers for 
such 
testing, she may undergo prenatal sample collection for parentage 
determination. 
Subsection 
(d) 
recognizes 
that 
multiple 
men 
may 
be 
participating in the 
establishment process. 
The 
laboratories 
prefer 
to 
evaluate 
all 
persons 
concurrently, 
as 
concurrent 
testing may prevent multiple sample collections from the child 
and in rare cases (such as evaluating two non-identical siblings) 
the laboratory can continue testing until one or both of the 
tested men are excluded. 
However, 
sequential testing is also 
acceptable. 
SI903. 
Regyirements for genetic testing 
1. 
Type of genetic testing. 
Genetic testing must be of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of genetic 
testing and performed in a testing laboratory accredited by: 
A. 
The American Association of Blood Banks, or a successor 
to its functions; 
B. 
A 
national 
society 
for 
histocompatibility 
and 
immunogenetics; or 
c. 
An accrediting body designated by the federal Secretary 
of Health and Human Services. 
2. 
Specimen. 
A 
specimen 
used in genetic 
testing mpy 
consist of one or more samples, or a combination of samples, of 
blood, buccal cells, bone, hair or other body tissue or fluid. 
The specimen used in the testing need not be of the same kind for 
each individual undergoing genetic testing. 
3. 
Selection of databases: objections. 
Based on the ethnic 
or racial group of an individual, the testing laboratory shall 
determine the databases from which to select frequencies for use 
in calculation of the probability of paternity. If there is 
disagreement as to the testing laboratory's choice, the following 
provisions apply. 
A. 
The 
individual 
objecting 
may 
require 
the 
testing 
laboratory, within 30 days after receipt of the report of 
the test, to recalculate the probability of l?aternity using 
an ethnic or racial group different from that used by the 
laboratory. 
B. 
The individual objecting to the testing laboratory's 
initial choice shall: 
(1) 
If 
the 
frequencies 
are 
not 
available 
to 
the 
testing laboratory 
for 
the 
ethnic or 
racial 
group 
requested, provide the requested frequencies compiled 
in a manner recognized by accrediting bodies; or 
(2) 
Engage another testing laboratory to perform the 
calculations. 
c. 
The 
testing laboratory may 
use its own statistical 
estimate if there is a question regarding which ethnic or 
racial 
group is appropriate. 
If available, 
the testing 
laboratory shall calculate the frequencies using statistics 
for any other ethnic or racial group requested. 
4. 
Additional genetic testing. 
If, after recalculation 
using a different ethnic or racial group, genetic testing does 
not rebuttably identify a man as the father of a child under 
section 1905, an individual who has been tested may be required 
to submit to additional genetic testing. 
Comment 
(This is section 503 of the UPA.) 
Source: 
U.S.C. 
§§ 
666(a)(5)(B)(i)(I)(II) 
666(a)(5)(F)(i)(I)(II), 
see 
Relating to Parentage, infra. 
Appendix: 
Federal 
IV-D 
and 
Statute 
As 
of December 
2000, 
the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services had not officially designated any accreditation bodies 
as referenced in subsection (b) (3). But, Information Memorandum 
OCSE-IM-97-03, April 10, 1997, 
from the Deputy Director of the 
Office 
of 
Child 
Support 
Enforcement 
identifies 
the 
American 
Association 
of 
Blood 
Banks 
and 
American 
Society 
for 
Histocompatibility 
and 
Immunogenetics 
as 
meeting 
this 
requirement. 
The 
accreditation 
requirement 
assures 
that 
the 
testing will "be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the field of genetic testing." 
Subsection 
(b) 
clarifies that 
a 
"specimen" suitable for 
genetic testing may be composed from one of a wide variety of 
constituent elements of "body tissue and fluids." This conforms 
the statutory language to biological terminology to assure common 
understanding between the scientific community 
and the legal 
profession. 
In states with statutes employing only the broad 
terms, bench and bar have evidenced confusion about the fact that 
blood, buccal cells, bone, hair, etc. are "body tissues." 
Subsections (c) and (d) are designed to clarify the use of 
"race or ethnic group" in the paternity calculations. Generally, 
the individual tested provides the 
information regarding 
the 
ethnic or racial group to use in the calculations. These sections 
are 
designed 
to 
avoid 
last 
minute 
changes 
in 
the 
racial 
designation, 
a scientific version of "forum shopping", 
and to 
easily correct any misunderstanding about which race should be 
used. 
51904. 
Report of genetic testing 
1. 
Report; 
self-authenticating. 
A 
report 
of 
genetic 
testing must be in a record and signed under penalty of perjury 
by a designee of the testing laboratory. A report made under the 
requirements of this subchapter is self-authenticating. 
2. 
Documentation. 
Documentation 
from 
the 
testing 
laboratory 
of 
the 
following 
information 
is 
sufficient 
to 
establish a reliable chain of custody that allows the resul ts of 
genetic testing to be admissible without testimony: 
A. 
The 
names 
and photographs 
of the individuals 
whose 
specimens have been taken; 
B. 
The names of the individuals who collected the specimens; 
c. 
The places and dates the specimens were collected; 
D. 
The names of the individuals who received the specimens 
in the testing laboratory; and 
E. 
The dates the specimens were received. 
Comment 
(This is section 504 of the UPA.) 
Source: 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(F) requlong genetic testing 
in certain cases, see Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to 
Parentage, infra. 
Subsection (b) is designed to indicate that in civil trials 
only a minimal showing of reliability of the chain of custody is 
needed. 
This 
avoids 
evidentiary problems, 
such 
as 
arguments 
modeled on criminal cases in which the chain of evidence is 
crucial. If an element of the chain is missing, such a defect may 
be 
corrected 
by 
affidavit 
or 
other 
testimony 
as 
to 
the 
reliability of the sample. For example, samples from a deceased 
individual may be obtained from a coroner's office and a picture 
of the individual need not be taken. In this case, proof of the 
chain of custody of the body maintained by the coroner may be 
provided. 
51905. 
Genetic testing results; rebuttal 
1. 
Results identify as father. 
Under this chapter, a man 
is rebuttably identified as the father of a child if the genetic 
testing complies with this subchapter and the results disclose: 
A. 
That 
the 
man 
has 
at 
least 
a 
99% 
probability 
of 
paternity, using a prior probability of O.SO, as calculated 
by 
using 
the 
combined paternity index 
obtained in the 
testing: and 
B. 
A combined paternity index of at least 100 to 1. 
2. 
Rebuttal. 
A man identified under subsection 1 as the 
father of the child may rebut the genetic testing results only by 
other 
genetic 
testing 
satisfying 
the 
requirements 
of 
this 
subchapter that: 
A. 
Excludes the man as a genetic father of the child: or 
B. 
Identifies another man as the possible father of the 
child. 
3. 
Further genetic testing. 
Except as otherwise provided 
in section 1910, if more than one man is identified by genetic 
testing as the possible father of the child, the court shall 
order them to submit to further genetic testing to identify the 
genetic father. 
Comment 
(This is section SOS of the UPA.) 
Source: 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(S)(G) 
requ~nng genetic testing 
in certain cases, see Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to 
Parentage, infra. 
The selection of a probability of paternity of 99.0°'6 and a 
combined paternity index of 100 to 1 as the rebuttably identified 
man as father of the child is consistent with the year 2000 
standard 
of 
practice 
in 
the 
genetic-testing 
community. 
Accrediting agencies 
require 
the 
reporting of both of 
these 
numbers. 
As 
of December, 
2000, 
states have established a 
presumption at less than this level. However, for several years 
the standard of practice in the scientific community has been 
99.0%. Therefore, raising the genetic presumption to the 99. 0Ol-0 
level 
should 
have 
no 
impact 
on 
those 
states. 
This 
number 
represents a reasonable level of testing, given the breadth of 
the Act and potential difficulty of working with some specimens 
in a probate case. It is not intended as a standard of practice 
for the laboratories, but as a legal presumption to satisfy the 
SO 
legal standard of proof. Given the rapid progress of science, it 
is likely that accrediting standards will rise over time. If the 
standard of practice becomes more strict, the newer standards 
will be made routine by the requirement that laboratories be 
accredited in order to perform testing under the Act. But, the 
legal significance of the genetic presumption stated in this 
section will be unaffected. 
Genetic testing results 
m1n1mum. 
During the drafting 
presumptions were considered, 
Genetic 
testing 
laboratory 
persuasive 
arguments 
for 
a 
Committee ultimately chose to 
will usually exceed the statutory 
of the new UPA several statutory 
Le., 95%, 
99°1>, 
99.9% and 99.99q,0. 
representatives 
presented 
quite 
variety of choices. 
The Drafting 
settle on the 99% standard because: 
(1) 
the 
99% 
standard reflects 
the 
current 
standard of 
the 
American Association of Blood Banks 
(Standards 
for 
Parentage 
Testing Laboratories, 4th ed. 1999), and the proposed standards 
(5th ed. 2001); 
(2) the standards promulgated by the various accrediting bodies 
(American Association of Blood Banks and the American Society for 
Histocompatibility and Immunogenetics) will, in reality, set the 
benchmark for genetic testing: 
(3) the 99% standard is consistent with the standards of the 
plurality of American jurisdictions as of December, 2000; 
(4) a standard higher than 99°<> could cause evidentiary problems 
in probate proceedings because of degraded specimens. Similarly, 
that problem may arise in cases involving one or more missing 
individuals, e.g., the mother is not available, but the child and 
alleged father are available: 
(5) 
the 
percentage 
is 
an 
evidentiary 
presumption 
that 
the 
respondent may always challenge by requesting a second test under 
§507: and 
(6) a proceeding to adjudicate paternity is a civil action based 
on a preponderance of the evidence, not a criminal action based 
on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. 
§1906. 
Costs of genetic testing 
1. 
Costs advanced. 
Subject to assessment of costs under 
subchapter 
6, 
the 
cost of initial genetic 
testing must 
be 
advanced: 
A. 
By a support enforcement agency in a proceeding in which 
the support enforcement agency is providing services; 
B. 
By the individual who made the reguest; 
C. 
As agreed by the parties; or 
D. 
As ordered by the court. 
2. 
Reimbursement. 
In cases in which the cost is advanced 
by 
the 
support 
enforcement 
agency, 
the 
agency 
may 
seek 
reimbursement from a 
man who is rebuttably identified as the 
father. 
Comment 
(This is section 506 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA 
(1973) § 11; 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B)(ii)(I), 
see Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra; 
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, (1981). 
In general, the party seeking relief from a court must bear 
the cost of the initial genetic testing. The federal law mandates 
that the support enforcement agency pay the cost of testing, 
subject 
to 
recoupment. 
Subsection 
(a) (3) 
does 
present 
the 
possibility that a court might order a respondent to pay the 
initial cost. 
§1907. 
Additional genetic testing 
The court or the support enforcement agency shall order 
additional genetic testing upon 
the 
reguest of 
a 
party who 
contests the result of the original testing. If the previous 
genetic testing identified a man as the father of the child under 
section 1905, 
the court or 
agency 
may 
not order 
additional 
testing unless the party provides advance payment for the testing. 
Conment 
(This is section 507 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 11; 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B)(ii)(II). 
Obviously the opportunity for additional testing should be 
provided if the original testing is contested in good faith, see 
Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. The 
requirement that the contestant provide advance payment if prior 
testing has 
identified 
a 
man 
as 
the father 
is 
intended 
to 
discourage spurious contests. 
This section provides 
the most 
important mechanism for determining the accuracy of a paternity 
test. While extremely rare, even after initial tests indicate a 
probability of paternity greater than 99.99% it is theoretically 
possible that additional testing can result in exclusion of the 
tested man. 
Likewise, if there is an error in the chain of 
custody or testing procedures, exclusion is the expected outcome. 
The only way to reliably determine whether an error occurred is 
to obtain a second test. 
S1908. 
Genetic testing when specimens not available 
1. 
Specimen 
not 
available; 
submission 
of 
specimens. 
Subject to subsection 2, if a genetic-testing specimen is not 
available from a man who may be the father of a child, for good 
cause and under circumstances the court considers to be just, the 
court may order the following individuals to submit specimens for 
genetic testing: 
A. 
The parents of the man; 
B. 
Brothers and sisters of the man; 
C. 
Other children of the man and their mothers; and 
D. 
Other relatives of the man necessary to complete genetic 
testing. 
2. 
Finding regyired. 
Issuance of 
an order 
under this 
section reguires 
a 
finding that 
a 
need 
for genetic testing 
outweighs the legitimate interests of the individual sought to be 
tested. 
Comment 
(This is section 508 of the UPA.) 
In some cases, the alleged father may be unavailable for 
testing. Subsection (a) accommodates those cases by providing for 
testing of the man's relatives to establish his paternity or 
nonpaternity of a child. Depending on the proceeding, some of the 
individuals listed for testing in subsection (a) will be parties 
to the paternity proceeding and others will not. If an individual 
does not volunteer to participate in the testing and is not a 
party, 
in the absence of this provision the court would be 
required to decide whether it has the authority to order the 
testing 
and 
whether 
testing 
the 
objecting 
individual 
is 
necessary. This provision resolves the issues. Given the fact 
that genetic testing in the modern age is not invasive--use of 
the buccal swab method means that the intrusion into the privacy 
of the individual is relatively slight compared to the right of 
the child to have parentage established. Moreover, the alleged 
parent also has a right to have that fact determined. 
Note that no 
prov~s~on is explicitly made for court-ordered 
testing 
of 
maternal 
relatives 
because 
the 
establishment 
of 
paternity by genetic testing is in no way dependent on testing 
the mother of the child. However, if maternity is at issue, §106, 
Determination 
of 
Maternity, 
directs 
that 
this 
section 
be 
construed to test the relatives of the mother. 
§1909. 
Deceased individual 
For good cause shown, the court may order genetic testing of 
a deceased individual. 
Cooment 
- 14 
(This is section 509 of the UPA.) 
In some states, the court with jurisdiction to adjudicate 
parentage may lack authority to order disinterment of a deceased 
individual. If so, that authority is provided by this section. 
§1910. 
Identical brothers 
1. 
Genetic testing of brother. 
The court may order genetic 
testing of a brother of a man identified as the father of a child 
if the man is commonly believed to have an identical brother and 
evidence suggests that the brother may be the genetic father of 
the child. 
2. 
Hongenetic evidence. 
If each brother satisfies the 
requirements as the identified father of the child under section 
1905 without consideration of another identical brother being 
identified as the father of the child, the court may rely on 
nongenetic evidence to adjudicate which brother is the father of 
the child. 
Comment 
(This is section 510 of the UPA.) 
This 
section refers to "identical brothers" 
rather than 
"identical twins" to account for the possibility of identical 
triplets, etc. In some cases, non-identical brothers (and even 
other related men) will not be excluded after initial genetic 
testing. This section should not be used to resolve those cases 
because 
more 
sophisticated genetic testing 
can differentiate 
between non-identical siblings. If a case occurs in which, after 
initial testing, two men are not excluded, both men should be 
ordered to submit to additional testing as provided in § 505(c) 
to determine which is the father. In the extremely rare case in 
which a competent laboratory exhausts all of its in-house testing 
and 
still 
cannot 
determine 
which 
non-identical 
sibling 
is 
excluded, the common practice is to provide the genetic material 
to another laboratory for more extensive testing to resolve the 
case. 
Contrasting identical brothers with non-identical brothers, 
identical brothers can never be differentiated by additional 
genetic testing. This creates a completely different situation 
for 
the 
court. 
This 
section 
resolves 
the 
identical-brother 
conundrum as much as possible, and is designed to prevent the 
court from simply dismissing the case. 
§19ll. 
Confidentiality of genetic testing 
1. 
Release of report. 
The report of genetic testing for 
parentage 
may 
not 
be 
released except 
as 
provided 
in 
this 
subchapter. 
2. 
Intentional 
release 
of 
identifiable 
specimen. 
An 
individual who intentionally releases an identifiable specimen of 
another individual for any purpose other than that relevant to 
the proceeding regarding parentage without a court order or the 
written permission of the individual who furnished the specimen 
commits a Class E crime. 
Comment 
(This is section 511 of the UPA.) 
This section seeks to protect the privacy rights of persons 
who 
are tested for 
a 
parentage 
determination. 
Although 
the 
Drafting Committee was not informed of an instance in which a 
paternity-testing laboratory had released samples or performed 
unauthorized testing, several states have proposed or passed laws 
regulating the "genetic privacy" of paternity tests. This section 
is intended to provide some guidance in this area. 
The term 
"identifiable specimen" is included, as there are beneficial uses 
of samples for anonymous 
research purposes. 
For example, 
the 
frequency tables used to make calculations are compiled from 
anonymous data and provide a more precise calculation for all 
persons involved in paternity testing. On occasion, a court may 
order the laboratory to release samples. For instance, a man who 
had been tested in one paternity proceeding and then dies may 
have his samples utilized in another paternity proceeding if a 
court orders testing in the second action. 
Courts have also 
ordered the release of samples when the tested man has allegedly 
engaged in criminal conduct. This has occurred when the alleged 
father has sent an imposter for sample collection. If the state 
pursues criminal charges, a court might order the laboratory to 
release the samples to a 
state crime laboratory for further 
identification and possible criminal prosecution. 
The Drafting Committee was informed that in one case, 
a 
grand jury brought indictments for multiple counts of a scheme to 
defraud, tampering with physical evidence and perjury against the 
alleged father and the imposter. The results of genetic testing 
for paternity purposes appear to have no medical or predictive 
value 
in 
any 
other 
context. 
Thus, 
regulation 
of 
the 
paternity-test results is left to the states. In some states, the 
records of paternity proceedings are open, thus allowing anyone 
to obtain the results. A more comprehensive treatment on this 
subject must necessarily be left to other laws. 
The control of the records is left to other state law. In 
some states paternity records are open to the public, 
and a 
fundamental change in handling of the records is beyond the scope 
of this Act. The accreditation agencies provide guidance on this 
subject. For example, 
the American Association of Blood Banks 
requires that accredited laboratories maintain records for at 
least five years. Because a laboratory performing testing under 
this Act should be accredited, see § 503(a), supra, protection is 
thus 
provided 
to 
the 
tested 
person's 
records 
under 
the 
accreditation standards. 
SUBCHAPTER 6 
PROCEEDING TO ADJUDICATE PARENTAGE 
Article 1 
Nature of Proceeding 
§192l. 
Proceeding authorized 
A civil proceeding may 
be maintained to adjudicate the 
parentage of a child. The proceeding is governed by the Maine 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Connent 
(This is section 601 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 14. 
A determination of paternity is governed by the ordinary 
rules 
of 
civil 
procedure. 
The 
party 
seeking 
to 
establish 
paternity is entitled to full discovery, to compel the testimony 
of all witnesses, and to have the case tried by a preponderance 
of the evidence. "The equipoise of the private interests that are 
at stake in a paternity proceeding supports the conclusion that 
the standard of proof normally applied in private litigation is 
also appropriate for these cases." Rivera v. Minnich, 483 u.s. 
574, 581 (1987). 
A corresponding amendment to UPC § 2-114 was not made until 
the major revision of 1990 (as further revised in 1993). By that 
time, it had been recognized as illogical and unjust to impose 
discriminatory burdens on children born out-of-wedlock who were 
seeking 
paternal 
inheritance. 
It 
also 
had 
been 
ruled 
unconstitutional by application of the intermediate scrutiny test 
formulated under the 14th Amendment. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 
(1986) Moreover, by 1990 the preponderance of the evidence 
standard had been widely applied to determinations of paternity 
and probate proceedings. 
Against this background, 
UPC 
(1993) 
abandoned 
the 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
standard 
for 
determining paternal relationships. 
§1922. 
Standing to maintain proceeding 
Subject to 
subchapter 
and 
sections 
1927 
and 
1929, 
a 
proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by: 
1. 
Child. 
The child; 
2. 
Mother. 
The mother of the child; 
3. 
Person whose parentage to be adjudicated. 
A person 
whose parentage of the child is to be adjudicated; 
4. 
Support enforcement agency. 
The 
support enforcement 
agency or other governmental agency authorized by other law; 
5. 
Agency. 
An 
authorized 
adoption 
agency 
or 
licensed 
Child-placing agency; 
6. 
Representative 
of 
individual. 
A 
representative 
authorized by law to act for an individual who would otherwise be 
entitled 
to 
maintain 
a 
proceeding 
but 
who 
lS 
deceased, 
incapacitated or a minor; or 
7. 
Intended parent. 
An intended parent under subchapter 7 
Comment 
(This is section 602 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 6. 
This section grants standing to a broad range of individuals 
and 
agencies 
to bring 
a 
parentage 
proceeding. 
But, 
several 
limitations on standing to sue are contained within the Act. 
Article 
details 
the 
procedures 
involved 
in 
a 
vOluntary 
acknowledgment of parentage. Sections 607 and 609 establish. the 
ground 
rules 
for 
proceedings 
involving 
children 
with, 
and 
without, 
a 
presumed 
father. 
Article 
regulates 
parentage 
determinations arising from a gestational agreement. 
Maine Comment 
The Maine enactment broadens the range of individuals who 
have standing by deleting specific gender references and making 
the language gender neutral to ensure equal treatment for every 
child regardless of the circumstances of the parent or parents. 
§1923. 
Parties to proceeding 
The following individuals must be joined as parties in a 
proceeding to adjudicate parentage: 
1. 
Mother. 
The mother of the child; and 
2. 
Person whose parentage to be adjudicated. 
A person 
whose parentage of the child is to be adjudicated. 
Comment 
(This is section 503 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 9. 
This section partially follows and partially rejects the UPA 
(1973) requirements regarding who must be named as parties in a 
parentage proceeding. First, contra to UPA (1973), the child is 
not a necessary party. Few states require children as necessary 
parties. Further, with the widespread use of DNA testing, such a 
requirement has 
outlived its usefulness. 
On 
the other 
hand, 
failure to join a child as a party may later result in a child's 
successful collateral attack on the original determination of 
paternity to be filed by the child. This subject is discussed 
more fully in the comment to § 537, Infra. 
Second, as far as can be ascertained, no state requires the 
children born to a woman during marriage to be named as parties 
in a divorce proceeding. Divorce decrees generally serve as res 
judicata in the event of a subsequent challenge to the decree's 
determination of parentage. rd. 
Maine Comment 
The Maine enactment broadens the range of individuals who 
must be 
named in a 
parentage proceeding by deleing specific 
gender 
references 
and 
making 
the 
language 
gender 
neutral 
consistent with other Maine amendments to the Uniform Act. 
§1924. 
Personal jurisdiction 
1. 
Personal 
jurisdiction. 
An 
individual 
may 
not 
be 
adjudicated 
to 
be 
a 
parent 
unless 
the 
court 
has 
personal 
jurisdiction over the individual. 
2. 
Personal jurisdiction over nonresident. 
A court of this 
State having jurisdiction to adjudicate parentage may exercise 
personal 
jurisdiction over 
a 
nonresident 
individual, 
or 
the 
guardian or conservator of the individual, if the conditions 
prescribed in section 2961 are fulfilled. 
3. 
Adjudication. 
Lack of jurisdiction over one individual 
does 
not preclude the court 
from 
making 
an adjudication of 
parentage binding on another individual over whom the court has 
personal jurisdiction. 
Comment 
(This is section 604 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 6(b). 
Although custody and visitation proceedings are considered 
to be status adjudications, and therefore do not require personal 
jurisdiction over 
both parents, 
subsection 
(a) 
confirms 
the 
long-standing view that paternity proceedings require personal 
jurisdiction. 
Subsection 
(b) 
incorporates 
the 
long-arm 
provision 
for 
establishing personal jurisdiction over an absent respondent set 
forth in UIFSA (1996), which is in effect in every state. 
Subsection (c) makes the best of a situation in which an 
adjudication will almost inevitably be incomplete because not all 
the necessary parties are subject to the personal jurisdiction of 
the 
court. 
The 
most 
likely 
scenario 
for 
this 
unfortunate 
circumstance is one in which the mother and alleged father of the 
child are subject to the court's jurisdiction, but the mother's 
absent husband is not. 
Even if the husband's whereabouts are 
known, if both the forum court and the court of his residence 
lack jurisdiction over all three parties, there still is no court 
with power to bind all of them to a parentage determination. 
Subsection (c) takes the common sense approach that a court 
should not be dissuaded from making a parentage decision, even if 
it cannot bind all appropriate parties. In the scenario described 
above, binding the mother and alleged father to a decision of the 
man's 
parentage 
may 
not 
technically 
bind 
the 
husband 
.( the 
presumed father), but more than likely it will end litigation on 
the subject. 
§1925. 
Venue 
Venue for a proceeding to adjudicate parentage is in the 
judicial division of this State in which: 
1. 
Child. 
The child resides or is found; 
2. 
Respondent. 
The respondent resides or is found if the 
child does not reside in this State; or 
3. 
Estate 
proceeding. 
A 
proceeding 
for 
probate 
or 
administration of 
the 
presumed parent's 
or 
alleged father's 
estate has been commenced. 
CODDent 
(This is section 605 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 8(c). 
The venue provision provides choices proven to be reasonable 
and convenient since its inclusion in the 1973 Act. 
§1926. 
No limitation: child having no presumed parent, 
acknowledged father or adjudicated parent 
A proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having 
no presumed parent, acknowledged father or adjudicated parent may 
be commenced at any time, even after: 
1. 
Child. 
The child becomes an adul t, but only if the 
child initiates the proceeding; or 
2. 
Earlier proceeding dismissed. 
An earlier proceeding to 
adjudicate parentage has been dismissed based on the application 
of a statute of limitation then in effect. 
CODDent 
(This is section 606 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) §§ 6, 7. 
For a state to retain the federal child support enforcement 
subsidy, 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(A)(i) mandates that the states 
must have laws to "permit the establishment of the paternity of a 
child at any time before the child attains 18 years of age." 
States have chosen a 
wide range of age options: 
age 
(20 
states), 
age 
(6 
states), 
age 
(2 
states), 
age 
(10 
states), age 22 (2 states), age 23 (2 states), and no limitation 
(9 states). Several states limit the establishment of parental 
rights to a shorter period. 
The new UPA directs that an individual whose parentage has 
not been determined has a civil right to determine his or her own 
parentage, which should not be subject to limitation except when 
an 
estate 
has 
been 
closed. 
Accordingly, 
if 
the 
action 
is 
initiated by the child this section allows 
a 
proceeding to 
adjudicate parentage after the child has 
reached the age of 
majority. 
Such a proceeding is the exclusive province of the 
child, 
however. 
This 
limitation prohibits 
the 
filing of 
an 
intrusive proceeding by an individual claiming to be a parent of 
an adult child, or by a legal stranger. There appear to be no 
reported problems encountered in states without a 
statute of 
limitations for such actions. 
Maine Conment 
The 
Maine 
enactment 
broadens 
the 
range 
of 
individuals 
against whom a child whose parentage has not been determined may 
initiate an action by making the 
language gender neutral to 
ensure 
equal 
treatment 
for 
every 
child 
regardless 
of 
the 
circumstances of the parent or parents. 
§1927. 
Limitation: child having presumed parent 
1. 
Two years after birth. 
Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection 2, 
a proceeding brought by a 
presumed parent, 
the 
mother or another individual to adjudicate the parentage of a 
child having a presumed parent must be commenced not later than 2 
years after the birth of the child. 
2. 
Anytime. 
A 
proceeding 
seeking 
to 
disprove 
the 
parent-child 
relationship 
between 
a 
child 
and 
the 
child's 
presumed parent may 
be maintained at any 
time if the court 
determines that; 
A. 
The presumed parent and the mother of the child neither 
cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other 
during the probable time of conception; and 
B. 
The presumed parent never openly held out the child as 
that person's own. 
Comment 
(This is section 607 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 6; cf. UPC (1993) § 2-114(c). 
This 
section 
deals 
with 
difficult 
issues. 
First, 
it 
establishes the right of 
a 
mother or 
a 
presumed marital or 
nonmarital father to challenge the presumption of his paternity 
established by § 
204. 
Second, 
it clarifies the right of 
a 
third-party male 
to 
claim paternity of 
a 
child who 
has 
an 
existing presumed father. 
UPA 
(1973) § 6(a) places a 
[five-year) limitation on the 
time in which a proceeding may be brought "for the purpose of 
declaring the non-existence of the father and child relationship 
presumed under [the Act)." At that time, the comment noted that: 
"Ten states have denied standing to a man claiming to be the 
father when the mother was married to another at the time of the 
child's birth. In some of these states, even though a presumed 
father may seek to rebut his presumed paternity, a third-party 
male will be denied standing to raise that same issue." 
As of the year 2000, the right of an "outsider" to claim 
paternity of a child born to a married woman varies considerably 
among 
the 
states. 
Thirty-three states 
allow 
a 
man 
alleging 
himself to be the father of a child with a presumed father to 
rebut the marital presumption. 
Some 
states have granted this 
right through legislation, while in other states case law has 
recognized the alleged father' s right to rebut the presumption 
and establish his paternity. 
In 
some 
states, 
there is both 
statutory and 
common 
law support for the standing of 
a 
man 
alleging himself to be the father to assert his paternity of a 
child born to a married woman. 
Not that long ago, 
some states 
imposed an absolute bar on a man 
commencing a proceeding to 
establish his 
paternity if state 
law 
provides 
a 
statutory 
presumption of the paternity of another man. See Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. llO, (1989). It is increasingly clear that 
those days are coming to an end. 
The new UPA attempts to establish a middle ground on these 
exceedingly complex issues. Subsection (a) establishes a two-year 
limitation for rebutting the presumption of paternity established 
under § 204 if the mother and presumed father were cohabiting at 
the time of conception. 
The presumption of paternity may 
be 
attacked by the mother, 
the presumed father, or a third-party 
male during this limited period; thereafter the presumption is 
immune from attack by any of those individuals except as provided 
in subsection (b). 
The reverse fact situation is also clear; a presumption of 
paternity may be challenged at any time if the mother and the 
presumed father were not cohabiting and did not engage in sexual 
intercourse at the probable time of conception and the presumed 
father never openly held out the child as his own. 
Under the fact circumstances described in subsection (b), 
nonpaternity of the presumed father is generally assumed by all 
the parties as a practical matter. It is inappropriate for the 
law to assume a presumption known by all those concerned to be 
untrue. 
Maine Comment 
Consistent with the Maine enactment of section 1844 <§204 of 
the UPA), this enactment broadens the range of individuals who 
have the right to challenge the presumption of parentage or to 
claim parentage of a child who has an existing presumed parent by 
deleting specific 
gender 
references 
and 
making 
the 
language 
gender 
neutral 
to 
ensure 
equal 
treatment 
for 
every 
child 
regardless of the circumstances of the parent or parents. 
§1928. 
Authority to deny motion for genetic testing 
1. 
Denial of motion for genetic testing. 
In a l?roceeding 
to adjudicate the l?arentage of a child having a l?resumed l?arent 
or to challenge the l?aterni ty of a child having an acknowledged 
father, the court may deny a motion seeking an order for genetic 
testing of the mother, 
the child and the l?resumed l?arent or 
acknowledged father if the court determines that: 
A. 
The conduct of the mother or the l?resumed l?arent or 
acknowledged 
father 
estops 
that 
l?arty 
from 
denying 
l?arentage; and 
B. 
It would be inequitable to disl?rove the l?arent-child 
re1ationshil? between the child and the presumed l?arent or 
acknowledged father. 
2. 
Best interest of child; factors. 
In determining whether 
to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing under this 
section, the court shall consider the best interest of the child, 
including the following factors: 
A. 
The length of time between the l?roceeding to adjudicate 
parentage 
and 
the 
time 
that 
the 
presumed 
parent 
or 
acknowledged father was placed on notice that the parent 
might not be the genetic parent; 
B. 
The length of time during which the presumed parent or 
acknowledged father has assumed the role of parent of- the 
child; 
C. 
The 
facts 
surrounding 
the 
presumed 
parent's 
or 
acknowledged father's discovery of that person' s 
possible 
nonparentage; 
D. 
The nature of the relationship between the child and the 
presumed parent or acknowledged father; 
E. 
The age of the child; 
F. 
The 
harm that may result to the child if presumed 
parentage 
or 
acknowledged 
paternity 
is 
successfully 
disproved; 
G. 
The nature of the relationship between the child and any 
alleged parent; 
H. 
The extent to which the passage of time reduces the 
chances of establishing the paternity of another man and a 
child-support obligation in favor of the child; and 
I. 
Other factors that may affect the equities arising from 
the disruption of the parent-child relationship between ·the 
child and the presumed parent or acknowledged father or the 
chance of other harm to the child. 
3. 
Guardian 
ad litem. 
In 
a 
proceeding 
involving 
·the 
application of this section, the court may appoint a guardian ad 
litem to represent the best interests of a minor or incapacitated 
child. 
4. 
Clear and convincing evidence. 
Denial 
of 
a 
motion 
seeking an order for genetic testing must be based on clear and 
convincing evidence. 
5. 
Order adjudicating parent. 
If the court denies a motion 
seeking an order for genetic testing, it shall issue an order 
adjudicating the presumed parent or acknowledged father to be the 
parent of the child. 
Connent 
(This is section 608 of the UPA.) 
This 
section 
incorporates 
the 
doctrine 
of paternity 
by 
estoppel, which extends equally to a child with a presumed father 
or 
an 
acknowledged father. 
In appropriate circumstances, 
the 
court 
may 
deny 
genetic 
testing 
and 
find 
the 
presumed 
or 
acknowledged father to be the father of the child. 
The most 
common situation in which estoppel should be applied arises when 
a man knows that a child is not, or may not be, his genetic 
child, but the man has affirmatively accepted his role as child's 
father and both the mother and the child have relied on that 
acceptance. Similarly, the man may have relied on the mother' s 
acceptance of him as the child's father and the mother is then 
estopped to deny the man's presumed parentage. 
Subsection (b) delineates the standards for denying genetic 
testing. Subsection (c) requires the child to be independently 
represented. 
Subsection 
(d) 
requires 
an elevated standard of 
proof before the order for genetic testing can be denied. 
Because § 607 places a two-year limitation on challenging 
the presumption of parentage, the application of this section 
should be applied in those meritorious cases in which the best 
interest of the child compels the result and the conduct of the 
mother and presumed or acknowledged father is clear. 
Maine Comment 
The Maine version deletes the specific gender references to 
make this section gender neutral consistent with the presumed 
parentage provisions recognized in Sections 1841 and 1844. 
Thus, 
the court may deny genetic testing and find the presumed parent 
to be the parent of the child when a parent knows that a child is 
not, or may not be, that parent's genetic child, but the parent 
has affirmatively accepted the role as child's parent and both 
the mother and the child have relied on that acceptance. 
§1929. 
Limitation: child having acknowledged father or 
adjudicated parent 
1. 
Sixty days or 2 years. 
If a child has an acknowledged 
father, a signatory to the acknowledgment of paternity or denial 
of parentage may commence a proceeding seeking to rescind the 
acknowledgement or denial or challenge the parentage of the child 
only within the time allowed under section 1857 or 1858. 
2. 
Two years. 
If a child has an acknowledged father or an 
adjudicated parent, an individual, other than the child, who 
H 
neither a signatory to the acknowledgment of paternity nor a 
party to 
the adjudication 
and 
who 
seeks 
an adjudication of 
parentage of the child must commence a proceeding not later than 
years 
after 
the 
effective 
date 
of 
the 
acknowledgment 
or 
adjudication. 
3. 
Estoppel. 
A proceeding under this section is subject to 
the application of the principles of estoppel established in 
section 1928. 
Comment 
(This is section 609 of the UPA.) 
A two-year period is prescribed in § 307 for a challenge in 
which the acknowledged or adjudicated father mistakenly believed 
himself 
to 
be 
the genetic 
father. 
A similar 
limitation is 
prescribed in § 607(a) for an individual who was not a signatory 
or a party to the earlier determination. 
The 
2002 
amendment 
adding subsection 
(c) 
authorizes 
the 
court to deny genetic testing in accordance with the principles 
enumerated in § 608 in a fact situation in which equity justifies 
a denial. For example, if there is an untimely challenge by a 
third party to the paternity of an acknowledged or adjudicated 
father long after an actual father-child relationship has been 
formed, 
the court has discretion to refuse to order genetic 
testing. 
Maine Comment 
To be consistent with Sections 1841 and 1844, this section 
has been amended to delete specific gender references and add 
gender-neutral 
language. 
This 
amendment 
makes 
applicable the 
time limitations to any adjudicated parent and authorizes a court 
to exercise its discretion when equity justifies a denial of 
genetic 
testing. 
For 
example, 
a 
court 
may 
exercise 
its 
discretion when there is an untimely challenge by a third party 
to the parentage of an adjudicated parent long after an actual 
parent-child relationship has been formed. 
§1930. 
Joinder of proceedings 
1. 
Joinder permitted. 
Except 
as otherwise provided in 
subsection 2, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be joined 
with a proceeding for adoption, termination of parental rights, 
child custody or visitation, child support, divorce, annulment, 
legal separation, probate or administration of an estate or other 
appropriate proceeding. 
2. 
Joinder not permitted. 
A respondent may not join a 
proceeding 
described 
in 
subsection 
with 
a 
proceeding 
to 
adjudicate parentage brought under chapter 67. 
Comment 
(This is section 610 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 8. 
Joinder of paternity proceedings with related matters is 
common, especially when a child support agency seeks to establish 
paternity and fix child support. 
Subsection (b) restricts counterclaims in those instances in 
which 
an 
initiating state 
sends 
a 
paternity 
suit 
to 
the 
responding state. Because petitioner is "appearing" in the other 
forum, to permit counterclaims would serve as a major deterrent 
to 
bringing 
such 
proceedings. 
This 
bar 
does 
not 
prevent 
a 
separate action for such matters, but there must be independent 
jurisdiction not arising from the petitioner's appearance in the 
paternity proceeding. 
§1931. 
Proceeding before birth 
A proceeding to determine parentage may be commenced before 
the birth of the child, but may not be concluded until after the 
birth of the child. The following actions may be taken before the 
birth of the child: 
1. 
Service of process. 
Service of process; 
2. 
Discovery. 
Discovery; and 
3. 
Collection of 
specimens. 
Except 
as 
prohibited 
by 
section 1902, collection of specimens for genetic testing. 
Comment 
(This is section 611 of the UPA.) 
This 
section 
recognizes 
that 
establishing 
a 
parental 
relationship as quickly as possible may be in the best interest 
of a child. To facilitate that process, some initial steps may be 
completed prior to the birth of the child. 
§1932. 
Child as party: representation 
1. 
Permissible but not necessary party. 
A minor child is a 
permissible party, but is not a necessary party to a proceeding 
under this subchapter. 
2. 
Appointment. 
The court shall appoint an attorney to 
represent a minor or incapacitated child if the child is a party 
or the court finds that the interests of the child are not 
adeguately represented. 
Comment 
(This is section 612 of the UPA.) 
This section rejects UPA (1973) § 9. Consistent with § 603, 
~, this Act rejects the view that the child necessarily has 
independent standing in a 
parentage proceeding. 
On 
the other 
hand, if the court determines that the child in fact does have a 
position at variance with all the other litigants, an attorney 
may be appointed to represent that interest. 
Article 2 
Special Rules for Proceeding 
to Adjudicate Parentage 
§l941. 
Admissibility of results of genetic testing; expenses 
1. 
Record 
admissible; 
objection. 
Except 
as 
otherwise 
pXovided in subsection 3, a record of a genetic-testing expert is 
admissible as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted in the 
report unless a party objects to its admission wi thin 14 days 
after its receipt by 
the objecting party and cites specific 
grounds for exclusion. The admissibility of the report is not 
affected by whether the testing was performed: 
A. 
Voluntarily or pursuant to an order of the court or a 
support enforcement agency; or 
B. 
Before or after the commencement of the proceeding. 
2. 
Testimony of experts. 
A party objecting to the results 
of genetic testing may call one or more genetic-testing experts 
to testify in person or by telephone, videoconference, deposition 
or another method approved by the court. Unless otherwise ordered 
by the court, the party offering the testimony bears the expense 
for the expert testifying. 
3. 
Results inadmissible; exceptions. 
If a 
child has 
a 
presumed parent, acknowledged father or adjudicated parent, the 
results 
of 
genetic 
testing 
are 
inadmissible 
to 
adjudicate 
parentage unless performed: 
A. 
With the consent of both the mother and the presumed 
parent, acknowledged father or adjudicated parent; or 
B. 
Pursuant to an order of the court under section 1902. 
4. 
Copies of bills as evidence. 
Copies 
of bills for 
genetic testing and for prenatal and postnatal health care for 
the mother and child that are furnished to the adverse party not 
less than 10 days before the date of a 
hearin~ are admissible to 
establish; 
A. 
The amount of the char~es billed; and 
B. 
That 
the 
char~es 
were 
reasonable, 
necessary 
and 
customary. 
Coanent 
(This is section 621 of the UPA.) 
Source: 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(F)(ii), see Appendix: Federal 
IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, inf£g; UPA (1973) §§ 10, 13. 
Justification 
for 
additional 
testing 
is 
provided 
by 
subsection (a). If the objecting party can state with specificity 
the grounds for rejecting a 
genetic test, 
and those grounds 
cannot be clarified under Article 5, retesting should be ordered. 
For example, if the chain of custody is seriously flawed, or the 
testing laboratory is not accredited, errors of this sort may be 
corrected by collecting new specimens and repeating the testing. 
Unlike the samples collected in a potential criminal proceeding 
which cannot be replaced, 
such as 
a blood alcohol test, 
the 
samples in a paternity proceedings remain the same 
no matter 
when, or how often, the samples are collected. Any flaw in the 
original test can be corrected by collection of new samples and 
additional testing of the individuals. 
Maine Comment 
This section has been made gender neutral. 
§1942. 
Consequences of declining genetic testing 
1. 
Contempt. 
An order for 
~enetic testin~ is enforceable 
by contempt. 
2. 
Adjudication contrar:y to position. 
If an individual 
whose paternity is being determined declines to submit to genetic 
testing ordered by the court, 
the court for that reason may 
adjudicate parentage contrary to the position of that individual. 
3. 
Testing of mother; unavailable or declines. 
Genetic 
testing of the mother of a child is not a condition precedent to 
testing the child and a man whose paternity is being determined. 
If the mother is unavailable or declines to submit to genetic 
testing, the court may order the testing of the child and every 
man whose paternity is being adjudicated. 
Comment 
(This is section 622 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 10. 
§1943. 
Admission of parentage authorized 
1. 
Admission of parentage. 
A respondent in a proceeding to 
adjudicate parentage may admit to the parentage of a child by 
filing a pleading to that effect or by admitting parentage under 
penalty of perjury when making an appearance or during a hearing. 
2. 
Order adjudicating parentage. 
If the court finds that 
the admission of parentage satisfies the reguirements of this 
section and 
finds that there is 
no 
reason to guestion the 
admission, the court shall issue an order adjudicating the child 
to be the child of the person admitting parentage. 
Comment 
(This is section 623 of the UPA.) 
Source: 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(i)(II), 
see 
Appendix: 
Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
Maine Comment 
This section is gender neutral consistent with other Maine 
amendments to the UPA. 
§1944. 
Temporax:y order 
1. 
Temporary order for support. 
In a proceeding under this 
subchapter, the court shall issue ~ temporary order for support 
of a child if the order is appropriate and the individual ordered 
to pay support is: 
A. 
A presumed parent of the child; 
B. 
Petitioning to have parentage adjudicated; 
C. 
Identified as the father through genetic testing under 
section 1905: 
D. 
An alleged father who has declined to submit to genetic 
testing; 
E. 
Shown by clear and convincing evidence to be the parent 
of the child; or 
F. 
The mother of the child. 
2. 
Custody and visitation. 
A temporary order may include 
provisions for custody and visitation as provided by other law of 
this State. 
Comment 
(This is section 624 of the UPA.) 
Source: UIFSA (1996) § 401; 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(J), see 
Appendix: Federal IV-D Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
Maine Comment 
The Maine version broadens the range of individuals against 
whom a child order may be entered by making the language gender 
neutral consistent with prior Maine amendments to the UPA. 
Article 3 
Hearings and Adjudication 
§1951. 
Adjudication of parentage 
The court shall apply the following provisions to adjudicate 
the parentage of a child. 
1. 
Parentage disproved. 
The parentage of a child having a 
presumed parent, acknowledged father or adjudicated parent may be 
disproved only by admissible results of genetic testing excluding 
that man as the father of the child or identifying another man as 
the father of the child. 
2. 
Identified father adjudicated as father. 
Unless the 
results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of 
genetic testing, a man identified as the father of a child under 
section 1905 must be adjudicated the father of the child. 
3. 
Genetic testing not conclusive. 
If the court finds that 
genetic 
testing 
under 
section 
1905 
neither 
identifies 
nor 
excludes a 
man as the father of a 
child, the court may not 
dismiss the proceeding. In that event. the results of genetic 
testing. and other evidence, are admissible to adjudicate the 
issue of parentage. 
4. 
Excluded man adjudicated as not father. 
Unless· the 
results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of 
genetic testing, 
a 
man excluded as the father of a child by 
genetic testing must be adjudicated not to be the parent of the 
child. 
Comment 
(This is section 631 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 14. 
This 
section 
establishes 
the 
controlling 
supremacy 
of 
admissible genetic test results in the adjudication of paternity. 
Other matters such as statute of limitations, equitable estoppel 
and res judicata may preclude the matter from reaching trial or 
the court denying genetic testing. However. if test results are 
admissible, 
those 
results 
control 
unless 
other test results 
create a conflict rebutting the admitted results. 
Paragraph (3) is included to ensure that the fact a genetic 
test does not reach the 99°-6 level decreed in § 505 will not be 
perceived as an indicator of an exclusion of paternity. Although 
test results that 
do 
not 
reach that level 
do 
not create 
a 
presumption of paternity, the testing should be evaluated as an 
indicator of paternity along with the other evidence of ~aternity 
presented in the proceeding. Presumably expert testimony will be 
required to provide information about the measure of the weight 
of 
a 
test 
that 
does 
not 
achieve 
"at 
least 
a 
percent 
probability of paternity, using a prior probability of 0.50, as 
calculated by using the combined paternity index obtained in the 
testing. and a combined paternity index of at least 100 to 1." 
The inclusion of the first clause in paragraph (4) indicates 
that although a genetic testing exclusion of paternity can be 
absolute, errors (and sometimes fraud) may occur in testing. Some 
courts have imposed a rule that a party must first show the test 
is 
in error 
before 
ordering 
another test. 
This 
imposes 
an 
impossible burden because the only accurate method to show that a 
test is in error is to repeat the testing. Without this clause, 
some litigants might argue that once an exclusion is obtained it 
is absolute and no other test can be ordered, even when the first 
test is shown to be wrong. 
Maine Comment 
The Maine version is gender neutral consistent with other 
Maine amendments to the UPA that recognize the adjudication of 
parentage. 
§1952. 
Jury prohibited 
The court. without a jury, shall adjudicate parentage of a 
child. 
Comment 
(This is section 632 of the UPA.) 
Source: 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(I), requiring state law to 
provide that "parties to an action to establish paternity are not 
entitled to trial by jury 
" See Appendix: Federal IV--D 
Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
UPA 
(1973) § 14[(d)] prohibited jury trials in parentage 
proceedings on the basis that "The use of a jury is not desirable 
in the emotional atmosphere of cases of this nature." Congress 
agreed when it enacted an effectively identical prohibition in 
PRWORA (1996). 
Maine Comment 
This section is gender neutral consistent with other Maine 
amendments to the UPA. 
§1953. 
Hearings; inspection of records 
1. 
Close proceeding. 
On reguest of a party and for good 
cause 
shown, 
the 
court 
may 
close 
a 
proceeding 
under 
this 
subchapter. 
2. 
Public records; consent or order. 
A final order in a 
proceeding 
under 
this 
subchapter 
is 
available 
for 
public 
inspection. Other papers and records are available only with the 
consent of the parties or on order of the court for good cause. 
Conunent 
(This is section 633 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 20. 
UPA 
(1973) 
§ 
was 
concerned with the privacy of the 
parties in a paternity proceeding and required closure of the 
proceedings. 
The high caseload and the desensitizing of such 
proceedings, 
however, 
lead 
to 
the 
conclusion that mandating 
closure of the proceedings is no longer appropriate. 
§1954. 
Order on default 
The court shall issue an order adjudicating the parentage of 
a person who: 
1. 
In default. 
After service of process, is in default; and 
2. 
Found to be parent. 
Is found by the court to be the 
parent of a child. 
CODDent 
(This is section 634 of the UPA.) 
Source: 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(H), see Appendix: Federal IV-D 
Statute Relating to Parentage, infra. 
Maine Conment 
This section is gender neutral consistent with other Maine 
amendments to the UPA. 
§1955. 
Dismissal for want of prosecution 
The 
court 
may 
issue 
an 
order 
dismissing 
a 
proceeding 
commenced under this chapter for want of prosecution only without 
prejudice. 
An 
order 
of 
dismissal 
for 
want 
of 
prosecution 
purportedly with prejudice is void and has only the effect of a 
dismissal without prejudice. 
Comment 
(This is section 635 of the UPA.) 
A major principle of the new UPA--and its predecessor--is 
that the child's right to have a determination of paternity is 
fundamental. This new section confirms this right by declaring 
that the delinquency of another person in prosecuting such a 
proceeding, e.g., the mother or a support enforcement agency, may 
not permanently preclude the ultimate resolution of a parentage 
determination. 
§1956. 
Order adjudicating parentage 
1. 
Order. 
The court shall issue an order adjudicating 
whether a person alleged or claiming to be the parent is the 
parent of the child. 
2. 
Identify child. 
An order adjudicating parentage must 
identify the child by name and date of birth. 
3. 
Fees, costs and~xpenses. 
Except as otherwise provided 
in subsection 4, the court may assess filing fees, 
reasonable 
attorney's 
fees, 
fees 
for 
genetic testing, 
other 
costs 
and 
necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred in a 
proceeding under this subchapter. 
The court may award attorney's 
fees, which may be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce 
the order in the attorney's own name. 
4. 
No assessment against agency. 
The court may not assess 
fees, costs or expenses against the support enforcement agency of 
this State or another state, except as provided by other law. 
5. 
Change of name. 
On request of a party and for good 
cause shown, the court may order that the name of the child be 
changed. 
6. 
Amended birth r~gistration. 
If the order of the court 
is at variance with the child's birth certificate, the court 
shall order the State Registrar of Vital Statistics to issue an 
amended birth registration. 
Comment 
(This is section 636 of the UPA.) 
Source: UIFSA (1996) § 313; UPA (1973) §§ IS, 16, 23. 
This Act differs from UPA (1973), which attempted to do more 
than merely establish parentage. For example, 
UPA 
(1973) § lS 
provided for a wide range of court orders to be made relating to 
the 
child's 
support, 
custody, 
guardianship, 
visitation 
privileges, 
as well as to the payment by the father of the 
mother's expenses of pregnancy and confinement. This Act leaves 
such matters to other state law. Only in instances where other 
state law is likely to be 
inadequate does this Act specify 
special treatment for litigants, For example, subsections (c) and 
(d) may be required because ordinary civil litigation probably 
does 
not 
provide 
for 
the 
court 
to 
apportion 
the 
costs 
of 
litigation among the parties. 
Maine Connent 
This section is gender neutral consistent with other Maine 
amendments to the UPA. 
SO 
§1957. 
Binding effect of determination of parentage 
1. 
Dete~ination binding; signatories. parties. 
Except as 
otherwise provided in subsection 2, a determination of parentage 
is binding on: 
A. 
All signatories to an acknowledgement of paternity or 
denial of parentage as provided in subchapter 3; and 
B. 
All parties to an adjudication by a court acting under 
circumstances that satisfy the jurisdictional reguirements 
of section 2961. 
2. 
Dete~ination binding; child. 
A child is not bound by a 
determination of parentage under this chapter unless: 
A. 
The 
determination 
was 
based 
on 
an 
unrescinded 
acknowledgment 
of 
paternity 
and 
the 
acknowledgement 
is 
consistent with the results of genetic testing; 
B. 
The adjudication of parentage was based on a finding 
consistent with the 
results of genetic testing and 
the 
consistency is declared in the determination or is otherwise 
shown; or 
C. 
The 
child 
was 
a 
party or 
was 
represented 
in 
the 
proceeding determining parentage by an attorney. 
3. 
Adjudication in proceeding to dissolve marriage. 
In a 
proceeding to dissolve a marriage, the court is deemed to have 
made an adjudication of the parentage of a child if the court 
acts 
under 
circumstances 
that 
satisfy 
the 
jurisdictional 
reguirements of section 2961 and the final order: 
A. 
Expressly 
identifies 
a 
child 
as 
a 
"child 
of 
the 
marriage" or "issue of the marriage" or by similar words 
indicates that the husband is the father of the child; or 
B. 
Provides for support of the child by the husband unless 
paternity is specifically disclaimed in the order. 
4. 
Dete~ination a defense. 
Except as otherwise provided 
in subsection 2, a determination of parentage may be a defense in 
a 
subseguent proceeding seeking to adjudicate parentage by an 
individual who was not a party to the earlier proceeding. 
5. 
Challenge to adjudication. 
A party to an adjudication 
of parentage may challenge the adjudication only under law of 
this State relating to appeal, vacation of judgments or other 
judicial review. 
Comment 
(This is section 637 of the UPA.) 
A considerable amount of litigation involves exactly who is 
bound 
and 
who 
is 
not 
bound 
by 
a 
final 
order 
determining 
parentage. This section codifies rules regarding the effect of 
such orders. Subsection (a) provides that, if the order is issued 
under standards of personal jurisdiction of the UIFSA (1996), the 
order is binding on all parties to the proceeding. This solves 
the 
problem 
of 
an 
order 
issued 
without 
the 
appropriate 
jurisdiction, as would be the case of a divorce based on status 
jurisdiction in which the court lacked the requisite personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident party. 
Subsection (b) partially resolves the question of whether a 
child is bound by the terms of the order. UPA 
(1973) required 
that the child be made a party to a parentage proceeding, and be 
bound. However, the 1973 Act did not address whether a divorce 
decree 
had 
a 
legal 
impact 
on 
paternity. 
A 
maj or i ty 
of 
jurisdictions hold that the child is not bound by the divorce 
decree because the child was not a party to the proceeding. A 
minority of states hold that the child is bound by the order and 
that the child is in privity with the parents. In its present 
formulation, this subsection adopts the majority rule, which does 
not bind the child during minority unless the parentage order is 
based on genetic testing or the child was 
represented by an 
attorney ad litem (each state supplies its own terminology). 
Subsection (c) resolves whether a divorce decree constitutes 
a finding of paternity. This subsection provides that a decree is 
a determination of paternity if the decree states that the child 
was born of the marriage or grants the husband visitation or 
custody, or orders support. This is the majority rule in American 
jurisprudence. 
Subsection (d) gives protection to third parties who 
may 
claim benefit of an earlier determination of parentage. 
Finally, 
the 
section is 
silent 
on 
whether 
state 
IV-D 
agencies are bound by prior determinations of parentage. This 
controversial issue is left to other state law. Similarly, issues 
of collateral attack on final judgments are to be resolved by 
recourse to other state law, as in civil proceedings generally. 
Maine Comment 
This section is gender neutral consistent with other Maine 
amendments to the UPA. 
SUBCHAPTER 7 
CHILD OF ASSISTED BEPRODtlCTI(If 
Comment 
During the last thirty years, medical science has developed 
a wide array of assisted reproductive technology, often referred 
to as ART, which have enabled childless individuals and couples 
to become parents. Thousands of children are born in the United 
States each year as the result of ART. If a married couple uses 
their own eggs and sperm to conceive a child born to the wife, 
the parentage of the child is straightforward. The wife is the 
mother--by gestation and genetics, the husband is the father--by 
genetics and presumption. And, insofar as the Uniform Parentage 
Act is concerned, neither parent fits the definition of a "donor." 
Current state laws and practices are not so straightforward, 
however. If a woman gives birth to a child conceived using sperm 
from a man other than her husband, she is the mother and her 
husband, if any, is the presumed father. However, the man who 
provided the sperm might assert his biological paternity, or the 
husband might seek to rebut the martial presumption of paternity 
by proving through genetic testing that he is not the genetic 
father. As was the case in UPA (1973), it is necessary for the 
new Act to clarify definitively the parentage of a child born 
under these circumstances. 
Similarly, assisted reproduction may involve the eggs from a 
woman other than the mother--perhaps using the intended father's 
sperm, perhaps not. In either event, the new Act makes a policy 
decision 
to 
clearly 
exclude 
the 
egg 
donor 
from 
claiming 
maternity. 
Theoretically, 
it is 
even 
possible 
that 
absent 
appropriate 
legislation 
the 
mother 
could 
attempt 
to 
deny 
maternity based on her lack of genetic relationship. 
Finally, many couples employ a 
common ART procedure that 
combines sperm and eggs to form a pre-zygote that is then frozen 
for future use. If the couple later divorces, or one of them 
dies, absent legislation there are no clear rules for determining 
the parentage of a child resulting from a pre-zygote implanted 
after 
divorce 
or 
after 
the 
death 
of 
the 
would-be 
father. 
Disposition 
of 
such 
pre-zygotes, 
or 
even 
issues 
of 
their 
"ownership," 
create 
not 
only 
broad pUblicity, 
but 
also 
are 
problems on which courts need guidance. 
§1961. 
Scope of subchapter 
This subchapter does not apply to the birth of 
a child 
conceived by means of sexual intercourse or as the result of a 
gestational agreement as provided in subchapter 8. 
Comment 
(This is section 701 of the UPA.) 
Article 7 applies only to children born as the result of 
assisted reproduction technologies; a child conceived by sexual 
intercourse is not covered by this article, irrespective of the 
alleged intent of the parties. The bracketed clause relates to 
gestational agreements under Article 8. If a state enacts Article 
8, the brackets should be removed. If a state does not enact 
Article 8, the bracketed subsection should be omitted. 
Maine Comment 
The 
brackets 
have 
been deleted because 
Maine 
adopts 
a 
revised version of Article 8. 
§1962. 
Parenta1 status of donor 
A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of 
assisted reproduction. 
Comment 
(This is section 702 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 5(b); USCACA (1988) § 4(a). 
child 
is 
conceived 
as 
this section clarifies 
is not a parent of the 
If 
a 
reproduction, 
sperm or egg) 
the 
result 
of 
assisted 
that a 
donor (whether of 
resulting child. The donor 
can neither sue to establish parental rights, nor be sued and 
required to support the resulting child. 
In sum, 
donors are 
eliminated from the parental equation. 
The new UPA does not deal with many of the complex and 
serious 
legal 
problems 
raised 
by 
the 
practice 
of 
assisted 
reproduction. 
Issues 
such 
as 
ownership 
and 
disposition 
of 
embryos, 
regulation 
of 
the 
medical 
procedures, 
insurance 
coverage, etc., are left to other statutes or to the common law. 
Only the issue of parentage falls within the purview of this Act. 
This was also the case in UPA 
(1973), 
which wholly deferred 
speaking on the subject except to ensure the husband' s paternal 
responsibili ty when he gave his consent to what was then called 
"artificial 
insemination" 
of 
his 
wife 
(now 
known 
in 
the 
scientific 
community 
as 
"intrauterine 
insemination"). 
The 
commentary to UPA (1973) 
to single out and cover 
occurs frequently." 
stated: "It was thought useful, however, 
at least one fact situation that 
The new UPA goes well beyond that narrow view; it go'£erns 
the parentage issues in all cases in which the birth mother is 
also the woman who intends to parent the child. It also ensures 
that if the mother is a married woman, her husband will be the 
father 
of 
the 
child if 
he 
gives 
his 
consent 
to 
assisted 
reproduction by his wife, regardless of which aspect of ART is 
utilized. UPA (1973) § 5(b) specified that a male donor would not 
be 
considered 
the 
father 
of 
a 
child 
born 
of 
artificial 
insemination if the sperm was provided to a licensed physician 
for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than 
the donor I s wife. The new Act does not continue the requirement 
that 
the 
donor 
provide 
the 
sperm 
to 
a 
licensed physician. 
Further, this section of the new UPA does not limit a donor I s 
statutory exemption 
from 
becoming 
a 
legal parent of 
a 
child 
resulting from ART to a situation in which the donor provides 
sperm 
for 
assisted 
reproduction 
by 
a 
married 
woman. 
This 
requirement is not realistic in light of present ART practices 
and the constitutional protections of the procreative rights of 
unmarried as well as married women. 
Consequently, this section 
shields all donors, whether of sperm or eggs, (§ 102 (8), supra), 
from parenthood in all situations in which either a married woman 
or a single woman conceives a child through ART with the intent 
to be the child' s parent, either by herself or with a man, 
as 
provided in sections 703 and 704. 
If a married woman bears a child of assisted reproduction 
using a donor's sperm, the donor will not be the father in any 
event. 
Her 
husband will be 
the father 
unless 
and until 
the 
husband's lack of consent to the assisted reproduction is proven 
within two years of his learning of the birth, see § 705, infra. 
This provides certainty of nonparentage for prospective donors. 
The 
comment 
to 
now-withdrawn 
USCACA 
§ 
4(a) 
states that 
"nonparenthood is also provided for 
those donors 
who 
provide 
sperm for assisted reproduction by unmarried women." Under those 
circumstances--called a "relatively rare situation" in the 1988 
comment--"the child would have 
no legally recognized father." 
This result is retained in the new UPA, although the frequency of 
unmarried women using assisted reproduction appears to have grown 
significantly since 1988. 
Maine Comment 
This section shields all donors, whether of sperm or eggs, 
from parenthood in all situations in which either a married woman 
or a single woman conceives a child through ART with the intent 
to be the child's parent, either by herself or with another 
person, as provided in sections 1983 and 1984. 
Maine has no statutes and only one appellate case regarding 
donors, whether of sperm or eggs; yet, cases are being litigated 
in 
Maine's 
trial 
courts 
with 
little 
or 
no 
guidance. 
In 
Guardianship of I.H., 
2003 
ME 
130, 
the court held that the 
probate court may waive notice to an anonymous sperm donor. 
In 
so ruling, the court cited Section 702 of the UPA 2000 in its 
analysis of the issue. 
§1963. 
Parentage of child of assisted reproduction 
A person who provides an egg or sperm for, or consents to, 
assisted reproduction by a woman as provided in section 1964 with 
the intent to be the parent of her child is a parent of the 
resulting child. 
Comment 
(This is section 703 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 5; USCACA (1988) §§ 1, 3. 
The father-child relationship is created between a man and 
the resulting child if the man provides sperm for, or consents 
to, assisted reproduction by a woman with the intent to be the 
parent of her child, see § 704, infra. This provision reflects 
the concern for the best interests of nonmarital 
as well as 
marital children of assisted reproduction demonstrated throughout 
the Act. Given the dramatic increase in the use of ART in the 
United States during the past decade, it is crucial to clarify 
the parentage of all of the children born as a result of modern 
science. 
Maine Comment 
The intent of the UPA is to clarify the parentage of all of 
the children born of modern science and without regard to the 
marital status of the parents. 
Therefore, 
the Maine version 
establishes that the parent-child relationship is created between 
a person and the resulting child if the person provides sperm or 
egg or consents to assisted reproduction by a 
woman with the 
intent to be the parent of her child. 
This provision reflects 
the concern for the best interest of all children of assisted 
reproduction. 
Given the dramatic increase in the use of ART in 
Maine 
during the past decade, 
it is crucial to clarify the 
parentage of every child born as a result of modern science and 
to provide every child in Maine with the opportunity to have as 
parents, without regard to gender. both the birth parent and the 
parent who either contributed sperm or an egg or consented to 
assisted reproduction with the intent to be the parent of the 
child. 
Further, the UPA must operate in a gender-neutral maI;lner, 
that is, it must apply equally to women and men. 
The statutory 
means available to establish paternity must also be available, 
where appropriate, to establish the existence of a mother and 
child relationship. 
The UPA mandates in section 106 that the 
provisions of the UPA 
relating to determination of paternity 
apply equally to determinations of maternity. 
Thus a woman is a 
legal parent of a child gestated by another woman where she has 
provided an egg or consented to assisted reproduction with the 
intention of parenting the resulting child. 
Section 1983 serves 
to protect the welfare and best interest of every child born of 
assisted reproductive technology by ensuring that a child will 
have the opportunity to have as parents both the person who gives 
birth to the child and the person who either donated the egg or 
sperm or the person who consented to the assisted reproduction 
with the intent to be the parent of the child. 
§1964. 
Consent to assisted reproduction 
1. 
Consent. 
Consent by a woman and a person who intends to 
be a parent of a child born to the woman by assisted reproduction 
must be in a 
record signed by the woman 
and the person who 
intends to be a parent. This requirement does not apply to a 
donor. 
2. 
Lack of consent: pater~ity. Failure of a person to sign 
a consent required by subsection 1, before or after birth of the 
child, does not preclude a finding of parentage if the woman and 
the person, during the first 2 years of the child's life, resided 
together in the same household with the child and openly held out 
the child as their own. 
Comment 
(This is section 704 of the UPA.) 
Source: UPA (1973) § 5; UPC (1993) § 2-114(c). 
Subsection 
(a) 
requires that 
a 
man, 
whether married or 
unmarried, who intends to be a parent of a child must consent in 
a record to all forms of assisted reproduction covered by this 
article. The amendment clarifies that the requirement of consent 
does not apply to a male or a female donor. 
Subsection 
(b) 
provides 
that even if a 
husband, 
unmarried man who intends to be a parent of the child, 
or 
an 
did not 
consent to assisted reproduction, he may nonetheless be found to 
be the father of a child born through that means if he and the 
mother openly hold out the child as their own. This principle is 
taken from the Uniform Probate Code § 
2C114 (c) 
(1993), 
which 
provides that neither "natural parent" nor kindred may inherit 
from or through a child "unless that natural parent has openly 
treated the child as his 
[or hers], 
and has not refused to 
support the child." The 
"holding out" requirement substitutes 
evidence of the parties' conduct after the child is born for the 
requirement of formal consent in a record to prospective assisted 
reproduction. 
The "non-support" phrase in § 2Cl14(c) 
was not 
carried forward in subsection (b) (and the term "natural parent" 
has been replaced by more accurate terminology). 
Maine Conment 
Subsection 1 is gender neutral and requires that a person, 
whether 
married 
or 
unmarried 
and 
regardless 
of 
gender, 
who 
intends to be a parent of a child must consent in a record to all 
forms 
of 
assisted 
reproduction 
covered 
by 
this 
subchapter. 
Subsection 2 provides for 
a finding not limited to paternity, 
but expanded to afford to a woman the same rights afforded to a 
man. 
§1965. 
Limitation on husband's dispute of paternity 
1. 
Challenge by husband. 
Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection 2, the husband of a wife who gives birth to a child by 
means of assisted reproduction may not challenge his paternity of 
the child unless: 
A. 
Within 2 years after learning of the birth of the child 
he commences a proceeding to adjudicate his paternity: and 
B. 
The court finds that he did not consent to the assisted 
reproduction before or after birth of the child. 
2. 
Proceeding to adjudicate parentage. 
A proceeding to 
adjudicate parentage may be maintained at any time if the court 
determines that: 
A. 
The husband did not provide sperm for, or before or 
after 
the 
birth 
of 
the 
child 
consent 
to, 
assisted 
reproduction by his wife: 
B. 
The 
husband 
and 
the 
mother 
of 
the 
child have 
not 
cohabited since the probable time of assisted reproduction; 
and 
C. 
The husband never openly held out the child as his own. 
3. 
LiDlitation period. 
The limitation provided in this 
section applies to a marriage declared invalid after assisted 
reproduction. 
Comment 
(This is section 705 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA (1988) § 3; UPC (1993) § 2-ll4(c). 
Subsection 
(a) 
provides 
for 
a 
challenge to 
a 
husband's 
presumed paternity if the conception of the child was through 
assisted reproduction not consented to by the husband before or 
after the birth of the child. 
If a 
proceeding to establish 
nonpaternity is timely filed and the husband's lack of consent is 
demonstrated, 
the child will be without 
a 
legally-recognized 
father because the sperm donor is not the father under § 702, 
supra. Because the filing of such a nonpaternity proceeding is 
permitted within two years of the husband's learning of the 
child's birth, the period of uncertainty concerning the identity 
of 
the child's father will 
be 
longer 
than 
two 
years 
in 
a 
situation in which an absent husband is not immediately made 
aware of the child's birth. 
Subsection (b) provides an exception to the two-year time 
limi t if the husband's sperm was not used, the couple has not 
cohabited 
since 
the 
probable 
time 
of 
the 
use 
of 
assisted 
reproduction, and the husband has never openly held out the child 
as his own. 
§1966. 
Effect of dissolution of marriage or withdrawal of consent 
1. 
Prior to placement. 
If a marriage is dissolved before 
placement of eggs, sperm or embryos, the former spouse is not a 
parent of the resulting child unless the former spouse consented 
in a record that, if assisted reproduction were to occur after a 
divorce, the former spouse would be a parent of the child. 
2. 
Withdrawal of consent. 
The consent of a woman or a man 
to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by that individual in a 
record and by delivery of a written notice of withdrawal of 
consent to the woman who intends to give birth to the child born 
of assisted reproduction at any time before placement of eggs, 
sperm or embryos. An individual who withdraws consent under this 
section is not a parent of the resulting child. 
Comment 
(This is section 706 of the UPA.) 
This section is entirely new to the Parentage Act. but its 
logic is derived 
from 
the 
policy stated in § 
707, 
infra. 
Subsection (a) applies only to married couples and posits that if 
there is to be no liability for a child conceived by assisted 
reproduction after death, then there should be no liability for a 
child conceived or implanted after divorce. If a 
former wife 
proceeds with assisted reproduction after a divorce, the former 
husband is not the legal parent of the resulting child unless he 
had previously consented in a 
record to post-divorce assisted 
reproduction. If such were the case, subsection (b) provides a 
mechanism for him to withdraw that consent, Le., by so stating 
in a record (presumably to be filed with the laboratory in which 
the sperm or embryos are stored). 
An amendment in 2002 extends a similar right to an unmarried 
man. Although there is no automatic cancellation of consent via 
divorce 
in the 
unmarried context, 
the 
man 
may 
withdraw his 
consent to ART before the woman conceives or is implanted, and 
thereby avoid being determined to be the legal parent of the 
resulting child. 
In either fact 
scenario, 
a 
child born through assisted 
reproduction 
accomplished 
after 
consent 
has 
been 
voided 
by 
divorce or withdrawn in a record will have a legal mother under § 
20l(a)(1). However, the child will have a genetic father, but not 
a legal father. In this instance, intention, rather than biology, 
is the controlling factor. The section is intended to encourage 
careful 
drafting 
of 
assisted 
reproduction 
agreements. 
The 
attorney and the parties themselves should discuss the issue and 
clarify their intent before a problem arises. 
This Act does not attempt to resolve issues as to control of 
frozen embryos following dissolution of marital or nonmarital 
relationships. As indicated in the prefatory note, those matters 
are left to other state laws. 
Maine Comment 
Maine' s 
revision provides a mechanism to ensure that the 
woman bearing a child of assisted reproduction has actual written 
notice of withdrawal of consent to assisted reproduction before 
placement of the sperm or embryo. 
§1967. 
Parental status of deceased individual 
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by 
assisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, 
sperm or 
embryos. the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting 
child unless the deceased individual consented in a record that, 
if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased 
individual would be a parent of the child. 
COIIIIIent 
(This is section 707 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA (1988) § 4 
Absent consent in a record, the death of an individual whose 
genetic material is subsequently used either in conceiving an 
embryo or in implanting an already existing embryo into a womb 
ends the potential legal parenthood of the deceased. This section 
is 
designed 
primarily 
to 
avoid 
the 
problems 
of 
intestate 
succession which could arise if the posthumous use of a person's 
genetic material leads to the deceased being determined to be a 
parent. Of course, an individual who wants to explicitly provide 
for such children in his or her will may do so. 
Maine Comment 
This 
section has 
replaced 
"individual" 
for 
"spouse" 
to 
correct a clerical drafting mistake. 
The intent of the UPA is to 
treat a 
child of unmarried parents equally with a 
child of 
married parents. 
SUBCHAPTER 8 
GESTATIONAL AGREEMENT 
Comment 
The 
longstanding shortage of adoptable children ln this 
country has led many would-be parents to enlist a gestational 
mother (previously referred to as a "surrogate mother") to bear a 
child for 
them. 
As 
contrasted with the assisted reproduction 
regulated by Article 7, which involves the would-be parent or 
parents and most commonly one and sometimes two anonymous donors, 
the 
gestational 
agreement 
(previously 
known 
as 
a 
surrogacy 
agreement) provided in this article is designed to involve at 
least three parties; the intended mother and father and the woman 
who agrees to bear a child for them through the use of assisted 
reproduction (the gestational mother). Additional people may be 
involved. 
For example, if the proposed gestational mother is 
married, her husband. if any, must be included in the agreement 
to dispense with his presumptive paternity of a child born to his 
wife. Further, an egg donor or a sperm donor, or both. may be 
involved, 
although neither will be joined as 
a party to the 
agreement. 
Thus, 
by definition, 
a 
child born pursuant to 
a 
gestational agreement will need to have maternity as well as 
paternity clarified. 
The subject of gestational agreements was last addressed by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
1988 with the adoption of the Uniform Status of Children of 
Assisted 
Conception 
Act 
(USCACA). 
Because 
some 
Commissioners 
believed that such agreements should be prohibited, while others 
believed that such agreements should be allowed, but regulated, 
USCACA 
offered 
two 
alternatives 
on 
the 
subject; 
either 
to 
regulate such activities through a judicial review process or to 
void such contracts. As might have been predicted, the only two 
states to enact USCACA selected opposite options; Virginia chose 
to regulate such agreements, while North Dakota opted to void 
them. 
In the years since the promulgation of USCACA (and virtual 
de facto rejection of that Act), approximately one-half of the 
states developed statutory or case law on the issue. Of those, 
about one-half recognized such agreements, 
and the other half 
rejected 
them. 
A survey in December, 
2000, 
revealed 
a 
wide 
variety of approaches: eleven states allow gestational agreements 
by statute or case law; 
six states void such agreements by 
statute; 
eight 
states 
do 
not 
ban 
agreements 
per 
se, 
but 
statutorily ban compensation to the gestational mother, which as 
a practical matter limits the likelihood of agreement to close 
relatives; and two states judicially refuse to recognize such 
agreements. In states rejecting gestational agreements, the legal 
status 
of 
children 
born 
pursuant 
to 
such 
an 
agreement 
is 
uncertain. If gestational agreements are voided or criminalized, 
individuals determined to become parents through this method will 
seek 
a 
friendlier legal forum. 
This raises 
a 
host of legal 
issues. For example, a couple may return to their home state with 
a 
child born as 
the 
consequence of 
a 
gestational 
agreement 
recognized in another state. This presents 
a 
full faith and 
credit question if their home 
state has 
a 
statute declaring 
gestational agreements to be void or criminal. 
Despi te the legal uncertainties, thousands of children are 
born each year pursuant to gestational agreements. One thing is 
clear; a child born under these circumstances is entitled to have 
its status clarified. Therefore, NCCUSL once again ventured into 
this controversial subject, withdrawing USCACA and substituting 
bracketed Article 8 of the new UPA. The article incorporates many 
of the USCACA provisions allowing validation and enforcement of 
gestational agreements, along with some important modifications. 
The 
article 
is 
bracketed 
because 
of 
a 
concern 
that 
state 
legislatures may decide that they are still not ready to address 
gestational 
agreements, 
or 
that 
they 
want 
to 
treat 
them 
differently from what Article 8 provides. States may omit this 
article without undermining the other provisions of the 
UPA 
(2002). 
Article 
8's 
replacement 
of 
the 
USCACA 
terminology, 
"surrogate mother," by "gestational mother" is important. First, 
labeling a woman who bears a child a "surrogate" does not comport 
with 
the 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
the 
term 
under 
any 
construction, to wit: "a person appointed to act in the place of 
another" or "something serving as 
a substitute." The term is 
especially misleading when "surrogate" refers to a 
woman 
who 
supplies both "egg and womb," that is, a woman who is a genetic 
as well as gestational mother. That combination is now typically 
avoided by the majority of ART practitioners in order to decrease 
the 
possibility 
that 
a 
genetic\gestational 
mother 
will 
be 
unwilling to relinquish her child to unrelated intended parents. 
Further, the term "surrogate" has acquired a negative connotation 
in American society, which confuses rather than enlightens the 
discussion. 
In contrast, term "gestational mother" is both more accurate 
and more inclusive. It applies to both a 
woman who, 
through 
assisted reproduction, performs the gestational function without 
being genetically related to a child, and a woman is both the 
gestational and genetic mother. The key is that an agreement has 
been made that the child is to be raised by the intended parents. 
The latter practice has elicited disfavor in the ART community, 
which has concluded that the gestational mother's genetic link to 
the 
child 
too 
often 
creates 
additional 
emotional 
and 
psychological problems in enforcing a gestational agreement. 
The new UPA treats entering into a gestational agreement as 
a significant legal act that should be approved by a court, just 
as an adoption is judicially approved. The procedure established 
generally follows that of USCACA, but departs from its terms in 
several 
important 
ways. 
First, 
nonvalidated 
gestational 
agreements 
are unenforceable 
(not void), 
thereby providing 
a 
strong incentive for the participants to seek judicial scrutiny. 
Second, there is no longer a requirement that at least one of the 
intended parents would be genetically related to the child born 
of the gestational agreement. Third, individuals who enter into 
nonvalidated gestational agreements and later refuse to adopt the 
resulting child may be liable for support of the child. 
Although legal recognition of gestational agreements remains 
controversial, the plain fact is that medical technologies have 
raced ahead of the law without heed to the views of the general 
public--or legislators. Courts have recently come to acknowledge 
this 
reality 
when 
forced 
to 
render 
decisions 
regarding 
collaborative reproduction, noting that artificial insemination, 
gestational carriers, cloning and gene splicing are part of the 
present, as well as of the future. One court predicted that even 
if all 
forms 
of 
assisted 
reproduction 
were 
outlawed 
in 
a 
particular state, its courts would still be called upon to decide 
on the identity of the lawful parents of a child resulting from 
those procedures undertaken in less restrictive states. 
This 
court noted: 
Again we must calIon the Legislature to sort out the parental 
rights 
and 
responsibilities 
of 
those 
involved 
in artificial 
reproduction. 
No 
matter 
what 
one 
thinks 
of 
artificial 
insemination, traditional and gestational surrogacy (in all of 
its permutations) 
and--as 
now 
appears in the not-too-distant 
future, cloning and even gene splicing--courts are still going to 
be faced with the problem of determining lawful parentage. 
A 
child cannot be ignored. 
Even if all the means of artificial 
reproduction were 
outlawed with draconian 
criminal 
penalties 
visited on the doctors and parties involved, courts would still 
be 
called 
upon 
to 
decide 
who 
the 
lawful 
parents 
are 
and 
who--other 
than 
the 
taxpayers--is 
obligated 
to 
provide 
maintenance and support for the child. These cases will not go 
away. 
Again we 
must call on the Legislature to sort out the 
parental 
rights 
and 
responsibilities 
of 
those 
involved 
in 
artificial reproduction. Courts can continue to make decisions on 
an ad hoc basis without necessarily imposing some grand scheme. 
Or, the Legislature can act to impose a broader order which, even 
though it might not be perfect on a case-by-case basis, would 
bring 
some predictability to those who 
seek to make 
use of 
artificial reproductive techniques. 
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
§1971. 
Gestational agreement authorized 
1. 
Written agreement. 
The intended parents and prospective 
gestational mother, her husband if she is married, a donor or the 
donors may enter into a written agreement that provides: 
A. 
The prospective gestational mother is at least 21 years 
of 
age 
and 
agrees 
to 
pregnancy 
by 
means 
of 
assisted 
reproduction; 
B. 
The prospective gestational mother, her husband if she 
is married and the donors relinquish all rights and duties 
as 
the 
parents 
of 
a 
child 
conceived 
through 
assisted 
reproduction; and 
C. 
The intended parent or parents become the parents of the 
child. 
2. 
Intended parents. 
The intended parent or parents must 
be parties to the gestational agreement. 
3. 
Enforceable if validated. 
A gestational agreement is 
enforceable only if validated as provided in section 1973. 
4. 
Chi1d conceived by sezua1 intercourse. 
A gestational 
agreement does not apply to the birth of a child conceived by 
means of sexual intercourse. 
5. 
Consideration. 
A gestational agreement may provide for 
payment of consideration. 
6. 
Decision of gestational mother. 
A gestational agreement 
may 
not limit the 
right of the gestational mother 
to 
make 
decisions to safeguard her health or that of the embryos or fetus. 
Comment 
(This is section 801 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA §§ 1(3), 5, 9. 
The previous uniform act on this subject, USCACA, proposed 
two alternatives, one of which was to declare that gestational 
agreements were void. Subsection (a) rejects that approach. The 
scientific state of the art and the medical facilities providing 
the technological capacity to utilize a 
woman other than the 
woman 
who 
intends to raise the child to be the gestational 
mother, 
guarantee 
that 
such 
agreements 
will 
continue 
to 
be 
written. Subsection (a) recognizes that certainty and initiates a 
procedure for its regulation by a judicial officer. This section 
permits all of the individuals directly involved in the procedure 
to enter into a written agreement; this includes the intended 
parents, 
the gestational mother, 
and her husband, if she is 
married. In addition, if known donors are involved, 
they also 
must sign the agreement. 
The agreement must provide that the 
intended parents will be the parents of any child born pursuant 
to the agreement while all of the others (gestational mother, her 
husband, if any, and the donors, as appropriate) relinquish all 
parental rights and duties. 
Under subsection (b), a valid gestational agreement requires 
that the man and woman who are the intended parents, whether 
married or unmarried, to be parties to the gestational agreement. 
This 
reflects 
the 
Act's 
comprehensive 
concern 
for 
the 
best 
interest of nonmarital as well as marital children born as the 
result of a gestational agreement. Throughout UPA the goal is to 
treat marital and nonmarital children equally. 
Subsection (c) provides that in order to be enforceable, the 
agreement must be validated by the appropriate court under § 803. 
Subsection (e) is intended to shield gestational agreements 
that include payment of the gestational mother from challenge 
under "baby-selling" statutes that prohibit payment of money to 
the birth mother for her consent to an adoption. 
Subsection 
(f) 
is 
intended 
to 
acknowledge 
that 
the 
gestational 
mother, 
as 
a 
pregnant 
woman, 
has 
a 
constitutionally-recognized right to decide issues regarding her 
prenatal care. In other words, the intended parents have no right 
to demand that the gestational mother undergo any particular 
medical regimen at their behest. 
Maine Comment 
Subsection 1, paragraph A requires that a gestational mother 
be at least twenty-one years of age to ensure that she has 
sufficient maturity to fully comprehend the consequences of what 
she is about to undertake. 
Subsections 1 and 2 are made gender neutral and establish 
that the intended parent or parents, regardless of their gender, 
must be parties to the gestational agreement. 
§1972. 
Requirements of petition 
I. 
Proceeding to validate agreement. 
The intended parent 
or parents and the prospective gestational mother may commence a 
proceeding 
in 
the District 
Court 
to 
validate 
a 
gestational 
agreement. 
2. 
Reqy.irements. 
A proceeding to validate a gestational 
agreement may not be maintained unless: 
A. 
The mother or the intended parent or parents have been 
residents of this State for at least 90 days; 
B. 
The prospective gestational mother's husband, if she is 
married, is joined in the proceeding; and 
C. 
A copy of the gestational agreement is attached to the 
petition. 
Comment 
(This is section 802 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA § 6(a). 
Sections 802 and 803, the core sections of this article, 
provide for state involvement, through judicial oversight, of the 
gestational agreement before, 
during, 
and after the assisted 
reproduction process. 
The purpose of early involvement is to 
ensure 
that 
the 
parties 
are 
appropriate 
for 
a 
gestational 
agreement, that they understand the consequences of what they are 
about to do, and that the best interests of a child born o~ the 
gestational agreement are considered before the arrangement is 
validated. 
The 
trigger 
for 
state 
involvement 
is 
a 
petition 
brought 
by all the parties to 
the 
arrangement 
requesting 
a 
judicial order authorizing the assisted reproduction contemplated 
by their agreement. The agreement itself must be submitted to the 
court. 
To 
discourage 
forum 
shopping, 
subsection (b)(l) 
that the petition may be filed only in a state in 
intended parents or the gestational mother have been 
for at least ninety days. 
Maine Comment 
requires 
which the 
residents 
Exclusive jurisdiction over gestational agreements is given 
to the District Courts. 
§1973. 
Bearing to validate gestational agreement 
1. 
Order. 
If 
the 
requirements 
of 
subsection 
are 
satisfied. a court may issue an order validating the gestational 
agreement and declaring that the intended parents will be the 
parents of a child born during the term of the agreement. 
2. 
Requirements. 
The 
court 
may 
issue 
an 
order 
under 
subsection 1 only on finding that: 
A. 
The residence requirements of section 1972 have been 
satisfied and the parties have submitted to the jurisdiction 
of the court under the jurisdictional standards of this 
chapter; 
B. 
All parties have voluntarily entered into the agreement 
and understand its terms; 
C. 
Adequate provision has been made for all reasonable 
health 
care 
expense 
associated 
with 
the 
gestational 
agreement 
until 
the 
birth 
of 
the 
child. 
including 
responsibility 
for 
those 
expenses 
if the 
agreement 
is 
terminated; and 
D. 
The 
consideration. if any. 
paid to 
the prospective 
gestational mother is stated. 
Comment 
(This is section 803 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA § 6(b). 
This pre-conception authorization process for a gestational 
agreement is roughly analogous to prevailing adoption procedures 
in place in most states. 
Just as 
adoption contemplates 
the 
transfer of parentage of a child from the birth parents to the 
adoptive parents, a gestational agreement involves the transfer 
from the gestational mother to the intended parents. The Act is 
designed to protect the interests of the child to be born under 
the gestational 
agreement 
as 
well 
as 
the 
interests 
of 
the 
gestational mother an~ the intended parents. 
In contrast to USCACA (1988) § 1(3), there is no requirement 
that at least one of the intended parents be genetically related 
to the child born of a gestational agreement. Similarly, the 
likelihood that the gestational mother will also be the genetic 
mother is not directly addressed in the new Act, while USCACA 
(1988) 
apparently assumed that such 
a 
fact pattern would be 
typical. Experience with the intractable problems caused by such 
a 
combination 
has 
dissuaded 
the 
majority 
of 
fertility 
laboratories from following that practice. See In re Matter of 
Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
This section seeks to protect the interests of the child in 
several 
ways. 
The 
major 
protection 
of 
the 
child 
is 
the 
authorization 
procedure 
itself. 
The 
Act 
requires 
closely 
supervised gestational arrangements to ensure the security and 
well 
being of 
the 
child. 
Once 
a 
petition has 
been 
filed, 
subsection 
(a) 
permits--but 
does 
not 
require--the 
court 
to 
validate a gestational agreement. If it validates, the court must 
declare that the intended parents will be the parents of any 
child born pursuant to, and during the term of, the agreement. 
Subsection (b) 
requires the court to make five separate 
findings 
before 
validating 
the 
agreement. 
Subsection 
(b)(l) 
requires 
the 
court 
to 
ensure 
that 
the 
90-day 
residency 
requirement 
of 
§ 
has 
been 
satisfied 
and 
that it has 
jurisdiction over the parties; 
Under subsection(b) (2), the court will be informed of the 
results of a home study of the intended parents who must satisfy 
the 
suitability 
standards 
required 
of 
prospective 
adoptive 
parents. 
The interests of all the parties are protected by subsection 
(b) (3), which is designed to protect the individuals involved 
from the possibility of overreaching or fraud. 
The court must 
find that all parties consented to the gestational agreement with 
full 
knowledge of what they agreed to do, 
which necessarily 
includes 
relinquishing 
the 
resulting 
child 
to 
the 
intended 
parents who are obligated to accept the child. 
The requirement of assurance of health-care expenses until 
birth of the resulting child imposed by subsection (b)(4) further 
protects the gestational mother. 
Finally, subsection (b)(5) mandates that the court find that 
compensation of the gestational mother, if any, is reasonable in 
amount. 
Section 
803, 
spells 
out 
detailed 
requirements 
for 
the 
petition and the findings that must be made before an authorizing 
order can be issued, 
but nowhere states the consequences of 
violations of the rules. 
Because of the variety of types of 
violations 
that 
could 
possibly 
occur, 
a 
bright-line 
rule 
concerning the effect of such violations is inappropriate. The 
consequences of a failure to abide by the rules of this section 
are left to 
a 
case-by-case determination. 
A court should be 
guided by the Act's intention to permit gestational agreements 
and the equities of a particular situation. Note that § 
provides a period for termination of the agreement and vacating 
of the order. The discovery of a failure to abide by the rules of 
§ 803 would certainly provide an occasion for terminating the 
agreement. On the other hand, if a failure to abide by the rules 
of § 803 is discovered by a party during a 
time when § 806 
termination is permissible, failure to seek termination might be 
an appropriate reason to estop the party from later seeking to 
overturn or ignore the § 803 order. 
Maine Conment 
Maine's revision has eliminated the requirement of a home 
study to minimize complexity, expense and delay. 
Surrogacy is 
different from adoption. 
In adoption, 
a genetic mother places 
her child into the adoptive process after the child is born. 
In 
surrogacy, 
the intended parent or parents may be the genetic 
parent or parents, but whether they are or not. 
a child is 
procreated 
because 
a 
medical 
procedure 
was 
initiated 
and 
consented to by the intended parent: or parents. 
The parent or 
parents who planned to create and raise a child, taking extensive 
and complex steps to do so, are the legal parents of the child 
whether or not there is a genetic tie. 
The child would not have 
been born but for the efforts of the intended parent or parents. 
Since the issues involved in surrogacy are so different from 
those involved in adoption, it does not make sense to superimpose 
the home study required by adoptions onto the surrogacy situation. 
The word "stated" has replaced "reasonable" to eliminate the 
discretion that would be invoked if courts were charged with 
reviewing the reasonableness of the consideration. 
It is in the 
best interest of the child that all consideration be stated, or 
set forth, in the agreement, so that the parties are not involved 
in lengthy litigation over the amount of the consideration. 
§1974. 
Inspection of records 
The proceedings, records and identities of the individual 
parties to a gestational agreement under this subchapter are 
subject to 
inspection under 
the standards of confidentiality 
applicable to adoptions as provided under other law of this State. 
Comment 
(This is section 804 of the UPA.) 
The 
personal, 
privacy. 
procedures 
thereby 
Adoption 
involved in this article are exceptionally 
warranting 
protection 
from 
invasions 
of 
records provide 
a 
suitable model for these 
records. 
§1975. 
Exclusive. continuing jurisdiction 
Subject to 
the 
jurisdictional 
standards 
of 
chapter 
58, 
subchapter 
2, 
the 
court 
conducting 
a 
proceeding 
under 
this 
subchapter has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of all matters 
arising out of the gestational agreement until a child born to 
the 
gestational 
mother 
during 
the 
period 
governed 
by 
the 
agreement attains the age of 180 days. 
Comment 
(This is section 805 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA § 6(e). 
This section is designed to minimize the possibility of 
parallel litigation in different states and the consequent risk 
of chi1dnapping for strategic purposes. The court that validated 
the gestational agreement will have authority to enforce the 
gestational agreement until the child is 180 days old. Note that 
only the parentage issues and enforcement issues are covered; 
collateral matters, 
such 
as 
custody, 
visitation, 
and 
child 
support are not covered by this Act. 
Maine Comment 
The brackets were 
removed and the Maine citation of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act was added. 
§1976. 
Termination of gestational agreement 
1. 
Tenmination of agreement; parties. 
After issuance of an 
order 
under 
this 
subchapter, 
but 
before 
the 
prospective 
gestational 
mother 
becomes 
pregnant 
by 
means 
of 
assisted 
reproduction, the prospective gestational mother or her husband 
or either of the intended parents may terminate the gestational 
agreement by giving written notice of termination to all other 
parties. 
2. 
Tenmination of agreement. 
The court for good cause 
shown may terminate the gestational agreement. 
3. 
Notice of termination. 
An individual who terminates a 
gestational agreement shall file notice of the termination with 
the court. On receipt of the notice, the court shall vacate the 
order issued under this subchapter. An individual who does not 
notify the court of the termination of the agreement is subject 
to appropriate sanctions. 
4. 
No liability. 
Neither a prospective gestational mother 
nor her husband, if any, is liable to the intended parent or 
parents for terminating a gestational agreement pursuant to this 
section. 
Conanent 
(This is section 806 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA § 7. 
Subsection (a) permits a party to terminate a gestational 
agreement 
after 
the 
authorization 
order 
by 
canceling 
the 
arrangement 
before 
the 
pregnancy 
has 
been 
established. 
This 
provides for cancellation during a time when the interests of the 
parties 
would 
not 
be 
unduly 
prejudiced 
by 
termination. 
By 
defini tion, the procreation process has not begun. The intended 
parents certainly have an expectation interest during this time, 
but the nature of this interest is little different from that 
which they would have while they were attempting to create a 
pregnancy through traditional means. 
In contrast to the next 
subsection, termination of the agreement does not require "good 
cause." 
Subsection 
(b) 
gives the court the right to cancel the 
agreement for cause, which is left undefined. 
Under subsection (c) a party who wishes to terminate the 
agreement must inform the other parties in writing, and must also 
file notice with the court. The court must then vacate the order 
validating the agreement. An individual who does not notify the 
court of his/her termination of the agreement is subject to 
sanction. 
USCACA 
§ 
7(b) 
specifically dealt with termination of 
a 
"surrogacy agreement" by a gestational mother who provided the 
egg for the assisted conception. This possibility is not repeated 
in the new UPA because there is only a remote likelihood that an 
agreement for the gestational mother to furnish the egg will be 
countenanced. Assisted reproduction, 
as generally conducted by 
medical facilities today, disapproves of that practice. 
Subsection (d) provides that before pregnancy a gestational 
mother is not liable to the intended parents for terminating the 
agreement. Although the new Act does not explicitly provide for 
termination of the agreement after pregnancy. Several sections 
deal 
with this 
issue 
under 
certain described 
circumstances. 
Section 80l(f) recognizes that the gestational mother has plenary 
power to decide issues of her health and the health of the fetus. 
Sections 803 (a) and 807 (a) direct that the intended parents are 
in fact the parents of the child with an enforceable right to the 
possession of the child. 
§1977. 
Parentage under validated gestational agreement 
1. 
Notice of birth; order. 
Upon birth of a child to a 
gestational mother, the intended parent or parents shall file 
notice with 
the 
court that 
a 
child has 
been 
born 
to 
the 
gestational mother within 300 days after assisted reproduction. 
Thereupon, the court shall issue an order: 
A. 
Confirming that the intended parent or parents are the 
parents of the child; 
B. 
If necessary, ordering that the child be surrendered to 
the intended parent or parents; and 
C. 
Directing the State Registrar of Vital Statistics to 
issue a birth certificate naming the intended parent or 
parents as parent or parents of the child. 
2. 
Genetic testing. 
If the parentage of a child born to a 
gestational mother is alleged not to be the result of assisted 
reproduction, the court shall order genetic testing to determine 
the parentage of the child. 
3. 
Failure to file notice; order. 
If the intended parent 
or parents fail to file notice required under subsection It the 
gestational mother or the appropriate state agency may file 
notice with the 
court that 
a 
child has 
been born to 
the 
gestational mother within 300 days after assisted reproduction. 
Upon proof of a 
court order issued pursuant to section 1973 
validating the gestational agreement, the court shall order that 
the intended parent or parents are the parent or parents of the 
child and are financially responsible for the child. 
Conment 
(This is section 807 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA § 8. 
Under subsection (a), the intended parents of a child born 
pursuant to an approved gestational agreement within 300 days of 
the use of assisted reproduction are deemed to be the legal 
parents if the order under § 803 is still in effect. Notice of 
the birth of the child must be filed by the intended parents. On 
receipt of the notice, the court shall issue an order confirming 
that the intended parents are the legal parents of the child and 
direct the issuance of a birth certificate to confirm the court's 
determination. 
If 
necessary, 
the 
court 
may 
also 
order 
the 
gestational mother to surrender the child to the intended parents. 
Subsection 
(c) 
clarifies 
the 
intended parents refuse to accept 
result of a gestational agreement. 
remedies 
available if 
a child who is born as 
11978. 
Gestational agreement: effect of subsequent marriage 
the 
the 
After 
the 
issuance 
of 
an 
order 
under 
this 
subchapter, 
subsequent marriage of the gestational mother does not affect the 
validity of a gestational agreement, her husband's consent to the 
agreement is not reguired and her husband is not a presumed 
parent of the resulting child. 
Comment 
(This is section 808 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA § 9. 
If, after the original court order validates the gestational 
agreement, 
the 
gestational 
mother 
marries, 
the 
gestational 
agreement continues to be valid and the consent of her 
new 
husband is not required. The new husband is neither a party to 
the original action nor the presumed father of a resulting child, 
and therefore ought not be burdened with the status of parent 
unless he is the genetic father or chooses to adopt the child. 
§1979. 
Effect of nonyalidated gestational agreement 
I. 
Hot 
enforce~ab~l~e~.~~A~g~e~s~t~a~tional agreement, whether 
record 
or 
not, 
that 
is 
not 
judicially 
validated 
is 
enforceable. 
in a 
not 
2. 
Parent-child relationship. 
If a birth results under a 
gestational 
agreement 
that 
is 
not 
judicially 
validated 
as 
provided in this subchapter, 
the parent-child relationship is 
determined as provided in subchapter 2. 
3. 
Liability for su~rt. __ IJ:ldividuals \'rho are parties to a 
nonvalidated gestational agreement as intended parents may be 
held liable for support of the resulting child, 
even if the 
agreement is otherwise unenforceable. The liability under this 
subsection includes assessing all expenses and fees as provided 
in section 1956. 
Comment 
(This is section 809 of the UPA.) 
Source: USCACA §§ 5(b),10. 
This 
section 
distinguishes 
between 
an 
unenforceable 
agreement 
and a 
prohibited one. 
Given the widespread use of 
assisted reproductive technologies in modern society, 
the Act 
attempts only to regularize the parentage aspects of the science, 
not 
to 
regulate 
the 
practice 
of 
assisted 
reproduction. 
If 
individuals choose to ignore the protections afforded gestational 
agreements by the Act, parentage questions will remain when a 
child 
is 
born 
as 
a 
result 
of 
an 
nonvalidated 
gestational 
agreement. The Act provides no legal assistance to the intended 
parents. 
The 
gestational 
mother 
is 
denominated 
the 
mother 
irrespective of the source of the eggs, and donors of either eggs 
or sperm are not parents of the child. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the intended parents in a nonvalidated agreement may not 
enforce that agreement, subsection (c) provides that a court may 
hold 
the 
intended parents 
to 
an 
obligation 
to 
support 
the 
resulting child of the unenforceable agreement. 
Under USCACA (1988), agreements that were not approved were 
declared "void." Under the new UPA, 
a nonapproved agreement is 
"unenforceable." The result may be virtually the same in some 
instances. As under the prior Act, the gestational mother is the 
mother of a child conceived through assisted reproduction if the 
gestational 
agreement 
has 
not 
been 
judicially 
approved 
as 
provided in this article. Her husband, if he is a party to such 
agreement, 
is presumed to be the father. 
If the gestational 
mother's husband is not a party to the agreement, or if she is 
unmarried, paternity of the child will be left to existing law, 
if any. If the mother decides to keep the child, the intended 
parents have no recourse. If the parties agree that the intended 
parents will raise the child, adoption is the only means through 
which they may become the legal parents of the child will be 
through adoption. 
SUBCHAPTER 9 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
S1981. 
Uniformity of application and construction 
In applying and construing this chapter, consideration must 
be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with 
respect to its subject matter among states that enact it. 
S1982. 
Effective date 
This chapter takes effect September 1, 2004. 
SUMMARY 
This bill enacts the Uniform Parentaqe Act with changes 
recommended 
by 
the 
Family 
Law 
Advisory 
Commission. 
Uniform 
comments and Maine comments are included.