HOME BROWSE SEARCH FAQS ABOUT LOGIN Political Budget Cycles: Conditioning Factors and New Evidence Veiga, Linda, Efthyvoulou, Georgios and Morozumi, Atsuyoshi, "Political Budget Cycles: Conditioning Factors and New Evidence" in The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics ed. Klaus H. Goetz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), n/a-n/a. Tweet Share Document type: Book Chapter Collection: UNU-EGOV Book Chapters Browse Collection: Prev: Medidas de cidades sustentáveis e inteligentes: partindo do âmbito global para o local Next: Portugal: políticas de transparencia y reforma de los medios públicos METADATA LINKS VERSIONS STATISTICS Author Veiga, Linda Efthyvoulou, Georgios Morozumi, Atsuyoshi Book Editor Klaus H. Goetz Chapter Title Political Budget Cycles: Conditioning Factors and New Evidence Book Title The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics Publication Date 2019-05 Place of Publication Oxford Publisher Oxford University Press Start page n/a End page n/a Language eng Abstract This chapter reviews the literature on political budget cycles (PBCs), focusing on studies that analyze the conditionality of opportunistic effects. First, factors that affect incentives of politicians to embark on pre-electoral policy manipulations are highlighted, and then factors that influence the capability of those manipulations to generate additional votes are discussed. Finally, the effects of personal characteristics of leaders on PBCs are explored. To complement the review, an empirical investigation of electoral effects on central governments’ deficit, expenditure, and revenue series, under various political arrangements, is implemented on a large panel covering seventy-eight countries and forty-two years of data (1975–2016). Empirical results confirm that PBCs are more likely to occur under certain politico-institutional circumstances, including predetermined elections, disputed elections, majoritarian electoral rules, larger private benefits from holding office, weak constraints on executives, a high proportion of uninformed voters, and new democracies. Keyword Political budget cycles Political business cycles Fiscal policy Conditionality Rhythm Copyright Holder Oxford University Press Copyright Year 2019 Copyright type All rights reserved DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190862084.013.8 HOME BROWSE SEARCH FAQS ABOUT CONTACT Page generated in 2.78043 seconds on 2021-11-27 03:53:11 • Powered by Fez Software 5–53–70 Jingumae, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-8925 Japan Tel: +81 3 5467 1212 Fax: +81 3 3499 2828 Designed and Developed by the UNU Office of Communications CONTACT US PRIVACY STATEMENT TERMS OF USE COPYRIGHT

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