Title: Bi-Criteria Metric Distortion
Primary area: other topics in machine learning (i.e., none of the above)
Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Metric Distortion

Abstract: Selecting representatives based on voters' preferences is a fundamental problem in social choice theory. While cardinal utility functions offer a detailed representation of preferences, voters often cannot precisely quantify their affinity towards a given candidate. As a result, modern voting systems rely on ordinal rankings to simplistically represent preference profiles. In quantifying the suboptimality of solutions due to the loss of information when using ordinal preferences, the metric distortion framework models voters and candidates as points in a metric space, with distortion bounding the efficiency loss. Prior works within this framework use the distance between a voter and a candidate in the underlying metric as the cost of selecting the candidate for the given voter, with a goal of minimizing the sum (utilitarian) or maximum (egalitarian) of costs across voters. For deterministic election mechanisms selecting a single winning candidate, the best possible distortion is known to be 3 for any metric, as established by Gkatzelis, Halpern, and Shah (FOCS'20). In contrast, for randomized mechanisms, distortions cannot be lower than $2.112$, as shown by Charikar and Ramakrishnan (SODA'22), and there exists a mechanism with a distortion guarantee of $2.753$, according to Charikar, Ramakrishnan, Wang, and Wu (SODA'24 Best Paper Award). Our work asks: can one obtain a better approximation compared to an optimal candidate by selecting a committee of $k$ candidates ($k \ge 1$), where the cost of a voter is defined to be its distance to the closest candidate in the committee? We affirmatively answer this question by introducing the concept of bi-criteria approximation within the metric distortion framework. In the line metric, it is possible to achieve optimal cost with only $O(1)$ candidates. In contrast, we also prove that in both the two-dimensional and tree metrics -- which naturally generalize the line metric -- achieving optimal cost is impossible unless all candidates are selected. These results apply to both utilitarian and egalitarian objectives. Our results establish a stark separation between the line metric and the 2-D or tree metric in the context of the metric distortion problem.

TL;DR: We show that selecting a small committee improves approximation guarantees over single-winner selection in metric distortion, achieving optimal cost in line metrics but not in tree or 2-D metrics.