Title: Steering the Herd: A Framework for LLM-based Control of Social Learning
Primary area: alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords: Social learning, LLMs, optimal control, information design, dynamic programming

Abstract: Algorithms increasingly serve as information mediators -- from social media feeds and targeted advertising to the increasing ubiquity of LLMs. This engenders a joint process where agents combine private, algorithmically-mediated signals with observational learning from peers to arrive at decisions. To study such settings, we introduce a model of controlled sequential social learning in which an information-mediating planner (e.g., an LLM) controls the information structure of agents while they also learn from the decisions of earlier agents. The planner may seek to improve social welfare (an altruistic planner) or to induce a specific action the planner prefers (a biased planner). Our framework presents a new optimization problem for social learning that combines dynamic programming with decentralized action choices and Bayesian belief updates.

In this setting, we prove the convexity of the value function and characterize the optimal policies of altruistic and biased planners, which attain desired tradeoffs between the costs they incur and the payoffs they earn from induced agent choices. The characterization reveals that the optimal planner operates in different modes depending on the range of belief values. The modes include investing the maximum allowed resource, not investing any resource, or the investment increasing or decreasing with increase in the belief. Notably, for some ranges of belief the biased planner even intentionally obfuscates the agents' signals. Even under stringent transparency constraints—information parity with individuals, no lying or cherry‑picking, and full observability—we show that information mediation can substantially shift social welfare in either direction. We complement our theory with simulations in which LLMs act as both planner and agents. Notably, the LLM-based planner in our simulations exhibits emergent strategic behavior in steering public opinion that broadly mirrors the trends predicted, though key deviations suggest the influence of non-Bayesian reasoning—consistent with the cognitive patterns of both human users and LLMs trained on human-like data. Together, we establish our framework as a tractable basis for studying the impact and regulation of LLM information mediators that corresponds to real behavior.

TL;DR: We introduce, analyze, and simulate (via LLMs) a model of controlled social learning to study how algorithms can influence social beliefs, decisions, and welfare via information design.