Title: Differentially Private Equilibrium Finding in Polymatrix Games
Primary area: learning theory
Keywords: Polymatrix Game, Differential Privacy

Abstract: We study equilibrium finding in polymatrix games under differential privacy constraints. Prior work in this area fails to achieve both high-accuracy equilibria and a low privacy budget. To better understand the fundamental limitations of differential privacy in games, we show hardness results establishing that no algorithm can simultaneously obtain high accuracy and a vanishing privacy budget as the number of players tends to infinity. This impossibility holds in two regimes: (i) We seek to establish equilibrium approximation guarantees in terms of Euclidean \emph{distance} to the equilibrium set, and (ii) The adversary has access to all communication channels. We then consider the more realistic setting in which the adversary can access only a bounded number of channels and propose a new distributed algorithm that: recovers strategies with simultaneously vanishing \emph{Nash gap} (in expected utility, also referred to as \emph{exploitability}) and \emph{privacy budget} as the number of players increases. Our approach leverages structural properties of polymatrix games. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that can achieve this in equilibrium computation. Finally, we also provide numerical results to justify our algorithm.

TL;DR: Simultaneously achieves high accuracy and low differential privacy budget in computing the equilibria of polymatrix games