Title: Look-ahead Reasoning with a Learned Model in Imperfect Information Games
Primary area: reinforcement learning
Keywords: Imperfect Information Games, Two-player Zero-sum Games, Reinforcement Learning, Learned Game Models, Game Abstraction, Look-ahead Search, Value Function, Continual Resolving, MuZero

Abstract: Test-time reasoning significantly enhances pre-trained AI agents’ performance. However, it requires an explicit environment model, often unavailable or overly complex in real-world scenarios. While MuZero enables effective model learning for search in perfect information games, extending this paradigm to imperfect information games presents substantial challenges due to more nuanced look-ahead reasoning techniques and large number of states relevant for individual decisions. This paper introduces an algorithm LAMIR that learns an abstracted model of an imperfect information game directly from the agent-environment interaction. During test time, this trained model is used to perform look-ahead reasoning. The learned abstraction limits the size of each subgame to a manageable size, making theoretically principled look-ahead reasoning tractable even in games where previous methods could not scale. We empirically demonstrate that with sufficient
capacity, LAMIR learns the exact underlying game structure, and with limited capacity, it still learns a valuable abstraction, which improves game playing performance of the pre-trained agents even in large games.