Title: Persuasive Prediction via Decision Calibration
Primary area: learning theory
Keywords: Calibration, Decision Calibration, Persuasion, Information Design

Abstract: Bayesian persuasion, a central model in information design, studies how a sender, who privately observes a state drawn from a prior distribution, strategically sends a signal to influence a receiver's action. A key assumption is that both sender and receiver share the precise knowledge of the prior. Although this prior can be estimated from past data, such assumptions break down in high-dimensional or infinite state spaces, where learning an accurate prior may require a prohibitive amount of data.
In this paper, we study a learning-based variant of persuasion, which we term *persuasive prediction*. This setting mirrors Bayesian persuasion with large state spaces, but crucially does not assume a common prior: the sender observes covariates $X$, learns to predict a payoff-relevant outcome $Y$ from past data, and releases a prediction to influence a population of receivers. To model rational receiver behavior without a common prior, we adopt a learnable proxy: *decision calibration*, which requires the prediction to be unbiased conditioned on the receiver's best response to the prediction. This condition guarantees that myopically responding to the prediction yields no swap regret.  Assuming the receivers best respond to decision-calibrated predictors, we design a provably efficient algorithm that learns a decision-calibrated predictor within a randomized predictor class that optimizes the sender's utility. In the commonly studied single-receiver case, our method matches the utility of a Bayesian sender who has full knowledge of the underlying prior distribution. Finally, we extend our algorithmic result to a setting where receivers respond stochastically to predictions and the sender may randomize over an infinite predictor class.