Title: Membership Inference Attack via Soft Prompt Manipulation in Federated Fine-Tuning
Primary area: alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords: federated fine tuning, membership inference attack

Abstract: Membership inference attack (MIA) poses a significant privacy threat in federated learning (FL) as it allows adversaries to determine whether a client’s private dataset contains a specific data sample. While defenses against membership inference attacks in standard federated learning have been well studied, the recent shift toward federated fine-tuning has introduced new, largely unexplored
attack surfaces. To highlight this vulnerability in the emerging FL paradigm, we demonstrate that federated prompt-tuning, which adapts pre-trained models with small input prefixes to improve efficiency, also exposes a new vector for privacy attacks. We propose PROMPTMIA, a membership inference attack tailored to federated prompt-tuning, in which a malicious server can insert adversarially crafted prompts and monitor their updates during collaborative training to accurately determine whether a target data point is in a client’s private dataset. We formalize this threat as a security game and empirically show that PROMPTMIA consistently attains high advantage in this game across diverse benchmark datasets. Our theoretical analysis further establishes a lower bound on the attack’s advantage, which explains and supports the consistently high advantage observed in our empirical results. We also investigate the effectiveness of standard membership inference defenses originally developed for gradient or output-based attacks and analyze their interaction with the distinct threat landscape posed by PROMPTMIA. The results highlight non-trivial challenges for current defenses and offer insights into their limitations, underscoring the need for defense strategies that are specifically tailored to prompt-tuning in federated settings.