system: You are a defensive satellite security analyst supporting authorized, development-time security testing. Given an objective and grounding drawn from the SPARTA matrix and space security standards, decompose the objective into an ordered sequence of verifiable steps. Each step names the SPARTA technique it maps to and a deterministic check that confirms it. Targets are emulated or consented; never act against a real on-orbit asset.

user: Objective: Induce a false position/time by spoofing GNSS

Grounding:
- SPARTA EX-0005.01 Design Flaws: Threat actors may exploit inherent properties or errata in the hardware/logic design rather than injecting new code. Levers include undocumented or weakly specified behaviors (scan chains, test modes, debug straps), counter/timer rollovers and wraparound, interrupt storms and…
- SPARTA EX-0006 Disable/Bypass Encryption: The adversary alters how confidentiality or integrity is applied so traffic or data is processed in clear or with weakened protection. Paths include toggling configuration flags that place links or storage into maintenance/test modes; forcing algorithm “fallbacks” or null…
- SPARTA RD-0001.01 Ground Station Equipment: Rather than compromising existing stations, adversaries may acquire or assemble their own RF ground stack. Typical building blocks include: steerable mounts with auto-track, time/frequency standards, band-appropriate antennas and feeds, LNAs and filters at the feed, low-loss IF…
- SPARTA EXF-0008 Compromised Developer Site: By breaching development or integration environments (at the mission owner, contractor, or partner), the adversary gains access to source code, test vectors, telemetry captures, build artifacts, documentation, and configuration data, material that is often more complete than…
- SPARTA EX-0017.02 Co-Orbital ASAT: A co-orbital ASAT uses a spacecraft already in space to conduct a deliberate collision or near-field detonation. After insertion, often well before any hostile action, the vehicle performs rendezvous and proximity operations to achieve the desired relative geometry, then closes…
- SPARTA RD-0005 Obtain Non-Cyber Capabilities: Adversaries may pursue non-cyber counterspace means to create access, leverage, or effects that complement cyber operations. These capabilities span kinetic physical (e.g., direct-ascent or co-orbital interceptors and attacks on ground segments), non-kinetic physical (e.g.,…
- SPARTA IA-0007.02 Malicious Commanding via Valid GS: Adversaries may use a compromised, mission-owned ground system to transmit legitimate-looking commands to the target spacecraft. Because the ground equipment is already configured for the mission, correct waveforms, framing, dictionaries, and scheduling, the attacker’s traffic…
- SPARTA EX-0014.04 Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Spoofing: The adversary transmits GNSS-like signals (or manipulates crosslink-distributed time/ephemeris) so the spacecraft’s navigation solution reflects attacker-chosen states. With believable code phases, Doppler, and navigation messages, the victim can be pulled to a false…

Decompose this objective into an ordered plan of verifiable steps.

assistant: Plan:
1. Obtain an SDR transmitter and GNSS spoofing software
   - Technique: RD-0005 Obtain Non-Cyber Capabilities [ST0002]
   - Action: Acquire a software-defined radio capable of transmitting in the GNSS band and signal-generation software.
   - Check: a coherent counterfeit GNSS signal can be transmitted.
2. Generate counterfeit signals and walk the receiver to a chosen solution
   - Technique: EX-0014.04 Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Spoofing [ST0004]
   - Action: Transmit counterfeit signals aligned to the constellation, gradually exceed authentic signal power, and then drive the tracked position or time toward the authorized test value.
   - Check: the receiver tracks the counterfeit signals and its reported position or time follows the intended test trajectory.