FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF GORANIN v. UKRAINE(Application no. 15981/17)      JUDGMENT STRASBOURG16 October 2025 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Goranin v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: María Elósegui, President, Andreas Zünd, Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the application (no. 15981/17) lodged with the Court against Ukraine under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17 February 2017 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Vladyslav Yuriyovych Goranin (“the applicant”), who was born in 1989 and lives in Kyiv, and was represented by Mr V. Melnychuk, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg;the decision to give notice of the application to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko;the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 18 September 2025,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE1.  The application concerns the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention that he was ill-treated and injured, mainly in the face and head, by the police during his arrest on 21 March 2014 and during his subsequent detention and transportation on 22 March 2014. Allegedly, no effective official investigation was conducted into those incidents, even though his injuries were duly recorded by doctors on 21 March and 4 April 2014, when the applicant was discharged from the hospital.2.  The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated in connection with his participation in a series of protests in Ukraine between 21 November 2013 and 21 February 2014, commonly referred to as “Euromaidan” and/or “Maidan” (see Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 15367/14 and 13 others, §§ 9-17, 21 January 2021) and in order to extract a confession from him to the effect that he had murdered several police officers on 2 March 2014, shortly after the violent clashes between the police and protesters had ended on 21 February 2014.3.  On 9 April 2015 a criminal investigation was initiated into the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment. On 24 April 2015 the applicant was refused victim status in those proceedings, the reason for which remains unknown. On different dates the proceedings were terminated for lack of evidence of a crime. Following appeals by the applicant, the investigation was resumed and, according to the most recent information provided by the Government, was ongoing as of 26 March 2024. The applicant disagreed and contended that the investigation had been discontinued on 30 March 2018.THE COURT’S ASSESSMENTALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTIONAdmissibility4.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by the police and that no effective investigation had been conducted into the matter.5.  The Government argued that the applicant’s complaints were premature because the relevant proceedings were ongoing and that the applicant had not lodged a compensation claim and had not complained to the domestic authorities of specific actions by the investigators or of any inaction on their part.6.  The Court has already examined and dismissed similar objections by the Government in comparable cases (see, for instance, Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 15367/14 and 13 others, §§ 283-86, 300-03, 405 and 416, 21 January 2021). Nothing in the Government’s submissions persuades the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present case.7.  The Government also contended that the applicant and his lawyer had failed to appear before the investigators. However, the case material contains no evidence that the applicant and his lawyer received the relevant summons and the applicant denied receiving any of them. The Court further notes that although the applicant was refused victim status on 24 April 2015, he continued pursuing his complaints of ill-treatment by, inter alia, challenging the decisions terminating the investigation (see paragraph 3 above). Overall, the Government did not demonstrate that the applicant or his lawyer were responsible for any delays in the investigation or hindered the investigators’ ability to establish and examine the relevant circumstances (compare Shmorgunov and Others, cited above, §§ 304-07).8.  In the light of the foregoing, the Government’s objections to the admissibility of the applicant’s present complaints under Article 3 must be dismissed.9.  The Court further notes that the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.MeritsProcedural limb10.  Reviewing the facts of the present case in the light of the general principles established in its case-law (see, among other authorities, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, §§ 81-90 and 114-23, ECHR 2015), the Court observes that the applicant raised credible allegations at domestic level of his alleged ill-treatment by the police (see paragraph 1 above). However, the domestic investigation did not reflect a serious effort to determine the relevant facts and, in particular, to establish the origin of the applicant’s injuries.11.  In Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no. 23893/03, §§ 173-80, 15 May 2012), the Court found that the reluctance of the authorities to ensure the prompt and thorough investigation of ill-treatment complaints lodged against police authorities constituted a systemic problem in Ukraine for the purposes of Article 46 of the Convention. In view of the circumstances of the present case and its previous case-law, the Court considers that this case concerns another such example of a failure to ensure a prompt and thorough investigation.12.  It is noteworthy that the decisions to terminate the investigation were quashed multiple times (compare Kaverzin, cited above, § 97) and that the applicant was denied victim rights in the criminal proceedings. Consequently, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.Substantive limb13.  The applicable general principles were summarised in, among other authorities, Bouyid (cited above, § 83).14.  The Court observes that the applicant’s account of the circumstances of his alleged ill-treatment is detailed and largely coherent. It is true that some of his allegations, notably those regarding the purported link between his ill‑treatment and his participation in the Maidan protest and charges of murder, are not corroborated by sufficiently strong evidence. However, neither the Government nor the official investigation disproved the applicant’s key allegation that the injuries noted in the relevant medical documents had been caused while he had been in the hands of the police on 21-22 March 2014 (see paragraph 1 above). In these circumstances, and given the onus on the State to provide a plausible explanation for injuries sustained by persons under the control of the police (see, by way of example, Adnaralov v. Ukraine, no. 10493/12, § 45, 27 November 2014; Kulik v. Ukraine, no. 10397/10, § 59, 19 March 2015; and Yaroshovets and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 74820/10 and 4 others, § 85, 3 December 2015), the Court concludes that the State’s responsibility for the applicant’s ill-treatment is engaged.15.  The above findings are sufficient for the Court to establish that the applicant was subjected to ill-treatment which must be classified as inhuman and degrading.16.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION17.  The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.18.  The Government contested this claim.19.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Declares the application admissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs;Holds(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 October 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.  Martina Keller María Elósegui Deputy Registrar President