FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF NIKOLAYENKO v. UKRAINE(Application no. 59342/19)      JUDGMENT STRASBOURG9 January 2025 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Nikolayenko v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: María Elósegui, President, Gilberto Felici, Kateřina Šimáčková, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the application (no. 59342/19) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 1 November 2019 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Nikolayenko (“the applicant”), who was born in 1982, is detained in Novgorod-Siverskyy and was represented by Mr A.L. Yakovlev, a lawyer practising in Chernihiv;the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the applicant’s confinement in a metal cage during court hearings to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, from the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;the parties’ observations;Having deliberated in private on 5 December 2024,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE1.  The application concerns the applicant’s confinement in a metal cage during court hearings, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.2.  The applicant has been serving a life sentence for murder since 2001. Alleging that the criminal case against him had been falsified, he lodged a complaint against the investigating authorities, seeking to have a criminal investigation opened into the matter. The investigation was discontinued and resumed several times following legal challenges brought by the applicant against the investigator’s decisions.3.  The applicant’s complaints were examined by the Desnyanskyi District Court of Chernihiv (“the District Court”), which held open hearings on 4 and 14 March 2019 and on 21 and 30 May 2019 and rejected the applicant’s complaints. During those hearings the applicant was held in a metal cage.4.  The Government submitted that some of the hearing rooms in the District Court were equipped with glass cabins, but that those rooms had been occupied by other hearings on the above-mentioned dates, and therefore the applicant’s case had been heard in a room with a cage.THE COURT’S ASSESSMENTALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION5.  The applicant complained that placing him in a metal cage during court hearings had been degrading and unjustified, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.Admissibility6.  The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not complained to the court during the hearings about being held in a cage.7.  The Court notes, with reference to the relevant principles of its case-law concerning the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies as set out in Mocanu and Others v. Romania ([GC], nos. 10865/09 and 2 others, §§ 220-26, ECHR 2014 (extracts)) and to the Government’s submissions as outlined in paragraph 4 above, that the Government did not explain how the suggested remedy could have been effective in practice given the fact that there were no hearing rooms equipped with glass cabins available in the District Court on the dates under examination.8.  The Court therefore concludes that the Government’s preliminary objection must be dismissed and considers that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.Merits9.  The Government stressed that the applicant had been convicted of a serious crime and that his confinement in a cage had been a compulsory measure to avoid security risks for the participants in the proceedings. The applicant disagreed.10.  As the Court has previously found, holding a person in a metal cage during a trial – having regard to its objectively degrading nature, which is incompatible with the standards of civilised behaviour that are the hallmark of a democratic society – constitutes in itself an affront to human dignity in breach of Article 3 of the Convention (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 138, 17 July 2014).11.  The Court has already found violations of Article 3 of the Convention in a number of similar cases and has held that holding defendants in metal cages during court hearings was a standard procedure in Ukraine which did not include an assessment of whether there were any actual and specific security risks in the courtroom requiring that the defendant be held in a metal cage during the hearings (see Korban v. Ukraine, no. 26744/16, § 132, 4 July 2019, and Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, nos. 62209/17 and 50933/18, § 79, 16 September 2022).12.  The Court considers that the present case is another example of that practice. While it is true that the applicant was serving a prison sentence for murder at the time under examination, the Government did not provide any evidence that there had been any actual and specific security risk in the courtroom which required the applicant to be held in a metal cage during the hearings or that the District Court had in fact assessed the existence of any such risk.13.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION14.  The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.15.  The Government argued that that claim was unsubstantiated.16.  The Court awards the applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Declares the application admissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s confinement in a metal cage during court hearings;Holds(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 January 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Martina Keller María Elósegui Deputy Registrar President