FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF KOLESNICHENKO v. UKRAINE(Applications nos. 34532/14 and 34511/14)      JUDGMENT STRASBOURG22 January 2026    This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Kolesnichenko v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Andreas Zünd, President, Mykola Gnatovskyy, Vahe Grigoryan, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the applications against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Ukrainian nationals whose details are listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;the decision to give notice of the complaints under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by Alisa-Tetiana Pietukhova, of the Ministry of Justice,the parties’ observations;Having deliberated in private on 11 December 2025,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE1.  The applications concern the applicants’ complaints that the police illegally entered their apartment, seized their property and did not prevent a group of private individuals from entering their apartment and removing their property. They relied on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.2.  Mr Vasyl Kolesnichenko (the applicant in application no. 34511/14 – hereinafter “the first applicant”) was the father of Mr Vadym Kolesnichenko (the applicant in application no. 34532/14 – hereinafter “the second applicant”). Mr Vasyl Kolesnichenko died on 15 September 2022 and Mr Vadym Kolesnichenko expressed his wish to pursue the application in his stead.3.  Until April 1999 both applicants lived in the same apartment, which belonged to the second applicant. The latter’s wife, D., and her mother, Sh. lived in the same apartment. It is unclear whether D. and Sh. moved out after April 1999.4.  On 20 October 1998 Sh. bought numerous furnishings of the apartment from the second applicant and gave him a promissory note for 517,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1] as payment. The furnishings remained at the apartment and were used by its inhabitants.5.  In June 1999 the second applicant and D. instituted divorce proceedings and civil proceedings concerning division of their joint property.6.  On 1 November 1999, when the first applicant was at home, D., Sh. and a group of around twenty individuals forced their way into the apartment and started removing furniture and other property.7.  The first applicant called the police, who arrived, refused to intervene and left.8.  On 2 November 1999, the same group of people continued to remove property from the apartment. The applicants lodged a written complaint with the police, followed by a complaint with the prosecutor’s office about the police’s allegedly unlawful refusal to intervene. On the evening of 2 November 1999, the police arrived, took the keys to the apartment from the group, gave them back to the applicants and left.9.  On the morning of 3 November 1999, the same group of people led by two lawyers representing D. and Sh. attempted to enter the apartment, but the first applicant refused to open the door. While the group were still near the entrance to the apartment, police officer P. arrived. He explained that he had been tasked with finding out what was happening and asked the first applicant to let him in. The first applicant again refused to open the door, fearing that the group might enter the apartment if he opened the door for P.10.  At around 12 noon on 3 November 1999, police officers O. and S., arrived. They tried to convince the first applicant to allow them to enter the apartment to “sort it out together”.11.  O. called a police squad, which consisted of approximately ten to twelve officers equipped with automatic rifles, helmets, bulletproof vests and other equipment. Fearing that the police might start shooting, the first applicant opened the door and O., S. and the group of private individuals entered the apartment. The group immediately started removing property.12.  O. ordered police officer G. to seize the gun with which the first applicant had allegedly threatened the police when he had been refusing to let them in.13.  The police did not find any weapons in the apartment, but G. seized a locked safety box which allegedly contained a gun and brought it to a police station for storage. According to the applicants’ submissions before the Court, the box contained “money, receipts, promissory notes and other documents for a total amount of about 5,000,000 Ukrainian hryvnias[2]”.14.  On an unspecified date the second applicant instituted proceedings before the Yalta Court seeking to declare the actions of O. and G. unlawful.15.  On 12 December 2001 the court ruled that O. had unlawfully ordered the seizure of the safety box and G. had unlawfully seized it. The court noted that the box contained weapons and ammunition belonging to the second applicant and “certain other property”.16.  The applicants stated that between 1999 and 2001 the police had refused to open a criminal investigation into their complaint of 2 November 1999 on ten occasions, but that the refusals had been quashed by court decisions following their appeals. The applicants submitted a copy of one of the decisions delivered on 23 August 2001.17.  The decision of 23 August 2001 refers to the statements of the second applicant that he had thought that on 1-3 November 1999 Sh. had removed from the apartment the items which she had previously bought. However, in 2001 the applicants learned that Sh. had instituted judicial proceedings before a civil court claiming that the second applicant had failed to hand over to her the items which she had bought and seeking to recover UAH 517,000 paid for the items. On an unspecified date, a court before which Sh. had instituted the proceedings found in her favour and ordered the second applicant to return Sh. this sum.18.  In July 2001 the second applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Yalta Court. He stated that the police had unlawfully entered his apartment and seized a safety box containing 1,200 United States dollars (USD) and documents, including promissory notes. The second applicant requested the court to order the police to pay him compensation for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage caused by the allegedly unlawful entry and seizure.19.  Still in July 2001, the first applicant instituted proceedings before the same court claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by allegedly unlawful entry and seizure of the contents of the safety box.20.  In 2002 and 2012, the applicants modified their claims. The nature of the modifications introduced in 2002 remain unknown. In 2012, the applicants introduced before the first instance court an account of events identical to that submitted to the Court. They now claimed compensation for the property removed by the police and the group of private persons and a compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the actions and omissions of the police on 1-3 November 1999.21.  After five reconsiderations of the case, following remittals by the higher courts, on 22 November 2012, the Yalta Court rejected the applicants’ claim concerning pecuniary damage and ordered the police to pay them compensation for non-pecuniary damage (1,995 euros (EUR) to the first applicant and EUR 1,466 to the second applicant) for “unlawful actions of the police between 1 and 3 November 1999”. The court held as follows:“[I]t has been established that from 1 to 3 November 1999 [private individuals] removed [from the apartment] property worth UAH 12,188,988 ... It is established that [the first applicant] called the police because unknown persons had tried to enter his apartment and remove the property.According to the witness statements, all safety boxes in the apartment had been opened before the police arrived on the morning of 3 November 1999. The safety box which, according to the statement [of the second applicant], contained receipts and other documents was at the disposal of the [private individuals] on 1 and 2 November 1999. The court does not doubt that on 1 November 1999, that is, before the private individuals entered the apartment, the safety box contained the documents referred to by [the applicants]... the court concludes that those documents had been seized by [the private individuals], that is, before the police arrived [on 3 November 1999] ... hence the private individuals who organised and carried out the removal of the property were responsible [for removing documents from the safety box].It follows that [the applicants’] claims concerning [compensation for pecuniary damage to be paid by the police] are unsubstantiated, as it has been established that the police unlawfully entered the apartment on 3 November 1999 and removed only the safety box ... Moreover, it has been established that the rest of the property was removed by other [private] individuals against whom [the applicants] have not lodged claims.”22.  The court stated that the removal of property from the apartment by the private individuals had no legal basis.23.  The applicants and the police appealed. On 8 April 2013 the Crimea Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court’s decision in the part concerning pecuniary damage and ordered the police to pay the second applicant USD 1,200 in respect of the pecuniary damage caused to him by the removal of the safety box and USD 1,200 which it contained. The court pointed out that the applicants had claimed that the safety box had contained money and promissory notes. It noted that the police sealed up the box only after it had been brought to the police station. It further noted, referring to a document which is not available to the Court, that when the police had opened the box in 2001 it had found currency straps which supported the second applicant’s claims that the box contained USD 1,200 before it had been removed by the police.24.  The court held:“In the course of the examination of the case by the first-instance court it was established that between 1 and 3 November 1999 [several private individuals] removed [from the apartment] property worth UAH 12,188,988. Police officers participated in the removal of the property. However, there was no court decision [authorising the removal of the property]. [The first applicant] called the police, who, in breach of the Law on the Police, did not take the appropriate measures aimed at protecting [the applicants’] rights. It was also established that the police [removed the safety box from the apartment].... the court agrees with the conclusion of the first-instance court...that the unlawful actions of the police... caused non-pecuniary damage to [the applicants], [their] right to respect for their home, privacy and their right to property [were violated].There is no evidence that the safety box, which according to [the second applicant], contained various documents and also money in the amount of USD 1,200, had been opened by [the private] individuals before the police arrived ... In addition, it has been established that the keys to the safety box were not available [before it was seized by the police].... the police ... unlawfully entered the applicants’ apartment on 3 November 1999.[According to the police record,] on 20 February 2001 the police opened the safety box in the presence of an expert and two attesting witnesses ... The court considers that the [second applicant’s] claim that the safety box contained USD 1,200 which disappeared because [of improper storage of the safety box by the police] is credible.”25.  A cassation appeal by the applicants was rejected on 2 October 2013.26.  In the course of the proceedings the applicant lodged one request to extend the time-limit for lodging an appeal (see paragraph 21 above).THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT        JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS27.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.      standing of the second applicant to pursue the first applicant’s application28.  The Government argued that the first applicant’s rights under Articles 6, 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were non‑transferable, and that therefore the second applicant could not pursue application no. 34511/14 lodged by his late father. The second applicant maintained his complaints and the complaints of the first applicant.29.  The Court reiterates that in a number of cases in which an applicant has died in the course of proceedings it has taken into account statements of the applicant’s heirs or close family members expressing their wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court. It has done so most frequently in cases which primarily involved pecuniary and, for this reason, transferable claims. However, the question of whether such claims are transferable to persons seeking to pursue an application is not the exclusive criterion. In fact, human rights cases before the Court generally also have a moral dimension, and persons close to an applicant may have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that justice is done even after the applicant’s death. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court accepts that the second applicant has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in the late first applicant’s stead (see Parinov v. Ukraine, no. 48398/17, 10 December 2020).    ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION30.  The applicants complained that their civil claim had been considered by the court from 7 August 2001 to October 2013, that is, during a period of twelve years, one month and twenty-five days at three levels of jurisdiction.31.  The Government submitted that this complaint was unsubstantiated and that the applicants themselves contributed to the proceedings by amending their claims on two occasions and making a request to extend the time-limit for lodging their appeal. They further submitted that they could not obtain a copy of the case file because it remained in Crimea and could rely only on the documents provided by the applicants to the Court. The Court considers that the Government’s objections are closely linked to the merits of the case. It therefore joins them to the merits.32.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.33.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).34.  The Court observes that the case was not particularly complex and that there is no evidence that the applicants significantly contributed to the protraction of the proceedings. As to the conduct of the domestic authorities, the Court notes that there were five remittals of the case for fresh consideration. It reiterates that, since remittal is usually ordered because of errors committed by lower courts, the repetition of such orders within one set of proceedings discloses a serious deficiency in the judicial system (see, mutatis mutandis, Wierciszewska v. Poland, no. 41431/98, § 46, 25 November 2003).35.  This is sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.   ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF article 8 of the convention and article 1 of prOtocol nO. 136.  The applicants complained that the police had unlawfully entered their apartment, seized the safety box with its contents and that because of the inaction of the police their property had been unlawfully removed by private individuals who had unlawfully entered the applicants’ apartment, and that the courts refused to award them compensation for pecuniary damage which they had claimed.37.  The Government submitted that neither the civil proceedings brought by the applicants, nor their attempts to have criminal proceedings opened, constituted effective remedies in the applicants’ case. In particular, if the police had facilitated the unlawful actions of private individuals, such actions would have constituted a criminal offence under domestic law and the civil courts would not have been able to rule on the matter in the absence of a decision by a criminal court. However, as the applicants’ attempts to have criminal proceedings opened were fruitless, they should have concluded that that was not an effective remedy and should have applied to the Court in 1999. Their applications were thus inadmissible as being lodged outside the six‑month time-limit. The Government also stated that the applicants had failed to bring proceedings against the private individuals who had removed their property. In this respect, the applications were therefore inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.38.  The Government further submitted that the Yalta Court had duly addressed the applicants’ claims concerning pecuniary damage and their findings were reasonable and well-founded. Even assuming that the police had failed to protect the applicants’ home and property, the existing legal framework permitted them to vindicate their rights, so the State had complied with its positive obligation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Moreover, the applicants had not provided any proof that the police had helped the private individuals to enter their apartment on 3 November 1999 and that, in any event, the applicants’ rights under Article 8 had been fully restored because they had been awarded compensation at the domestic level.39.  The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive him or her of his or her status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 180, ECHR 2006-V; Kurkut and Others v. Türkiye, nos. 58901/19 and 6 others, § 85, 25 June 2024). Only when these conditions are satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention preclude the examination of an application (see Rooman v. Belgium [GC], no. 18052/11, §§ 128-133, 31 January 2019).40.  The Court observes that the applicants were able to lodge their complaints concerning the interferences with their property rights and their private life before a civil court which acknowledged that the police had unlawfully entered the applicants’ apartment and had removed the safety box and so had been the police failure to intervene in removal of property by private persons. The applicants were awarded compensation for the non‑pecuniary damage caused to them by the unlawful actions of the police and also for the pecuniary damage which they had sustained as a result of the removal of the safety box by the police. It follows that, in respect of this part of the application, the applicants can no longer claim to be victims of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention. This part of the application is therefore incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a).41.  As to the remainder of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court considers that the domestic courts’ refusal to order the police to pay compensation for the pecuniary damage caused by the removal of the property by the private individuals cannot be considered arbitrary or unreasonable. Moreover, it was neither argued nor shown in the case material that the property removed by the private individuals has become unrecoverable or that the applicants instituted civil proceedings against Sh. and D. seeking to recover the property in question or obtain compensation for the property. The Court does not lose sight that, according to the applicants’ own submissions, Sh. had been the owner of at least some of the furnishings which had been removed from the apartment. Furthermore, the domestic courts addressed the applicants’ complaints regarding the content of the safety box and found that only their claim concerning disappearance of USD 1,200 was supported by evidence (see paragraph 23 above). The Court does not see a strong reason to depart from that finding.42.  It follows that the remainder of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.43.  Accordingly, this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION44.  The second applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage with regard to the application introduced by his late father and EUR 35,000 with regard to his own application. He also claimed UAH 12,188,988 in respect of pecuniary damage, referring to both applications.45.  The Government contested those claims. In particular, they asserted that there had been no violation of the applicants’ rights. They also noted that the second applicant had signed a form of authority for Mr R. Martynovskyy to represent both applicants before the Court; however, the authority had become invalid when the first applicant had died. For this reason, Mr Martynovskyy had not been empowered to submit just satisfaction claims to the Court on 2 November 2023 on behalf of the first applicant.46.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it awards the second applicant EUR 3,600 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. The Court further finds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the first applicant.FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Decides to join the applications;Declares that the second applicant has standing to pursue the proceedings before the Court in the late first applicant’s stead;Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the first applicant;Holds  that the respondent State is to pay the second applicant, within three months, EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State;  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 January 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.  Martina Keller Andreas Zünd Deputy Registrar President  APPENDIXList of applications:No.Applicant’s nameApplication numberYear of birthNationalityPlace of residence1.Vasiliy Korneyevich KOLESNICHENKO 34511/141935UkrainianSevastopol2.Vadim Vasilyevich KOLESNICHENKO34532/141958UkrainianSevastopol [1] Approximately 234,000 United States dollars (USD) at the relevant time.[2] Approximately USD 2,260,000 at the material time.