FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF ROMANYUK v. UKRAINE(Application no. 26039/18)      JUDGMENT STRASBOURG4 December 2025 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Romanyuk v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Gilberto Felici, President, Diana Sârcu, Sébastien Biancheri, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the application (no. 26039/18) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 26 May 2018 by two Ukrainian nationals, Ms Olga Anatoliyivna Romanyuk (“the first applicant”) and Mr Oleksandr Vasylyovych Romanyuk (“the second applicant”), who were born in 1970 and 1963 respectively, live in Bilohorivka (Luhansk Region, Ukraine) and were represented by Mr S. Myedvyedyev, a lawyer practising in Lysychansk (Luhansk Region, Ukraine);the decision to give notice of the applicants’ complaints under Article 2 of the Convention to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, from the Ministry of Justice, and to declare their complaint under Article 3 of the Convention inadmissible;the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 13 November 2025,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:INTRODUCTION1.  The present case concerns the applicants’ complaints that domestic investigations into the circumstances of their son’s death while performing his military service were ineffective, allegedly in breach of Article 2 of the Convention.SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE2.  From June 2015 onwards the applicants’ son was performing his military service with the fire brigade of a military unit stationed in the Kirovohrad Region. On 1 April 2016 he was found dead at a high‑voltage electrical substation on the military base.internal investigation into the death of the applicants’ son3.  A special commission and a service commission were set up by the military command on 1 and 2 April 2016 respectively to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of the applicants’ son. They were composed of commanding officers from the military unit.4.  On 4 April 2016 the special commission released the findings of its investigation. Having questioned servicemen who had arrived at the scene immediately after the incident, it established that the applicants’ son had died of electrocution (as confirmed by his death certificate) while attempting to commit a criminal offence together with two other servicemen (M. and Ya.), namely trying to steal non-ferrous metals from a transformer at the electrical substation. In particular, M. stated that he had been with the applicants’ son when the latter had broken into the substation. Having heard a loud crack, M. had returned to the scene and entered the substation, whereupon he had seen that the applicants’ son had fallen into the electrical transformer cell; M. had then tried to administer first aid, but to no avail. Ya. stated that the applicants’ son had asked him by telephone to give pliers and a wrench to M., and to send M. to meet him. Ya. had complied with the request, despite having previously overheard conversations between M. and the applicants’ son indicating that they were looking for copper to sell. Having been informed of the accident, Ya. had then arrived at the substation and unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate the applicants’ son. The special commission also pointed out that the applicants’ son was not on the list of individuals authorised to service electrical substations, and that at the relevant time he had been on duty at the fire station on the military base but had left without permission.The special commission concluded that the accident had occurred mainly on account of the following: (i) personal indiscipline and irresponsibility on the part of the deceased serviceman, who had acted outside the scope of his duties while attempting to commit theft; (ii) various breaches of the military unit’s internal regulations by its commanding officers with regard to restrictions on unauthorised access to electrical substations; and (iii) the failure of the commanding officers to take meaningful action to prevent offences, injuries and deaths among servicemen.The same day five commanding officers were disciplined: one was reprimanded; three were severely reprimanded; and one was given an official warning for failing to comply with the requirements of military service and informed that he would undergo a subsequent evaluation by a certification commission.5.  On 7 April 2016 the service commission released the findings of its investigation, which confirmed the conclusions of the special commission. The same day two more commanding officers were severely reprimanded and Ya. was dismissed from military service.CRIMINAL Investigation into the possible murder of the applicants’ son6.  On 2 April 2016 the local police in the city of Kirovohrad (now known as Kropyvnytskyi) launched a criminal investigation into the possible murder of the applicants’ son.7.  On 12 April 2016 the investigation was closed on account of the lack of constituent elements of a crime. The police investigator concluded that the applicants’ son had died of electrocution while attempting to commit theft. The applicants were notified of that decision by a letter dated 12 December 2017, which they allegedly received on 30 March 2018.8.  In April 2018 the first applicant challenged the decision to terminate the criminal investigation in the courts, stating that the applicants had not been questioned as parents of the deceased serviceman or duly informed of the course of the investigation.9.  On 24 April 2018 the Leninskyi District Court of Kirovohrad rejected the first applicant’s complaint, noting that the criminal investigation had been terminated by an investigating authority outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.10.  On 14 May 2018 the Kirovohrad Regional Court of Appeal quashed that ruling as unlawful, set aside the decision to terminate the investigation as premature and ordered that it be reopened. The appellate court held that the investigation was incomplete since the applicants had not been questioned, in spite of the fact that their son had telephoned the first applicant on the day of his death and told her that he had been carrying out maintenance at the military base. The appellate court also pointed out that the applicants had not been granted victim status, which had prevented them from being involved in the investigation.11.  On an unspecified date (presumably in August 2018) the applicants were granted victim status and questioned in that capacity at their place of residence.12.  On 17 September 2020 the police investigator once again closed the investigation, citing reasons that were almost identical to those given in the initial decision.13.  On 12 November 2020 the Kirovskyi District Court of Kirovohrad overturned the above-mentioned decision as premature and ordered that the investigation be reopened. The court noted that the investigation was incomplete because the applicants’ allegations about the possible intentional killing of their son had not been properly assessed.14.  The parties did not inform the Court of any subsequent developments in the criminal investigation.Criminal INVESTIGATION into the COMMANDING OFFICERS’ allegedly negligent attitude to military service15.  On 6 December 2016, following a complaint by the second applicant that his son had died from an electric shock while carrying out an unlawful order, the Kirovohrad Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office launched a criminal investigation into whether a negligent attitude to military service on the part of the unit’s commanding officers had led to the death of his son.16.  During the investigation, the commanding officers submitted that all the electrical substations on the base had been properly locked and kept under surveillance, and that access to them had been duly restricted; they asserted that the applicants’ son had died owing to his own negligence and imprudence. The investigating authority also examined the military unit’s records and the results of its internal investigation.17.  On 27 December 2016 the military prosecutor closed the criminal investigation for lack of constituent elements of a crime.18.  In June 2017 the first applicant challenged the decision to terminate the investigation in the courts, stating that she had been unable to participate in it because of the failure to grant her victim status.19.  On 26 July 2017 the Leninskyi District Court of Kirovohrad rejected the first applicant’s complaint, holding that she had not had victim status in the criminal investigation and could therefore not appeal against the contested decision. Rather, it was for the second applicant, who had reported the crime, to do so.20.  On 11 September 2017 the Kirovohrad Regional Court of Appeal quashed that ruling as unlawful, set aside the decision to terminate the criminal investigation as premature and ordered that it be reopened. The appellate court found that the investigation was incomplete because the applicants had not been duly notified of its course or been granted victim status. The appellate court also noted that the applicants had not been questioned, in spite of the fact that the first applicant had had a telephone conversation with her son on the day of his death.21.  Following the resumption of the investigation in December 2017, two more servicemen from the military unit were questioned; they confirmed the previously established circumstances surrounding the death of the applicants’ son by electrocution.22.  On 30 January 2018 the criminal investigation was again closed for lack of evidence of a crime on the part of the commanding officers.23.  On 22 August 2018 the second applicant challenged the decision to terminate the investigation in the courts, referring to the non‑execution of the court ruling of 11 September 2017.24.  On 7 February 2019 the Leninskyi District Court of Kirovohrad allowed the second applicant’s complaint in part, setting aside the decision to terminate the investigation as premature and ordering that it be reopened. The court emphasised that the military investigator had failed to follow the instructions given by the appellate court in its ruling of 11 September 2017.25.  On 21 October 2019 the military prosecutor recognised the applicants as victims and transmitted the case for further investigation to the State Bureau of Investigations (“the SBI”) in Mykolaiv.26.  On 6 February 2020 the applicants were questioned as victims at their place of residence. The first applicant stated that her son had telephoned her on the day of his death: he had said that he and other servicemen were cutting down thickets near an electrical substation at the airfield on the military base, and that he was fine and would call her back that evening. The second applicant stated that he had been informed of his son’s death the next day by the chief of staff of the military unit; a few days later, the chief of staff had shown him the place where his son had died from electrocution.27.  On 21 February 2020 the applicants were questioned again, but they refused to clarify their statements without their legal representative being present.28.  On 19 March 2020 the SBI again closed the criminal investigation on account of the lack of constituent elements of a crime. The investigator reached the following conclusions: (i) on 1 April 2016 three servicemen, including the applicants’ son, had reported for duty with the fire brigade; (ii) while on duty, the entire fire brigade had had to be at the fire station on the military base; (iii) at around 5 p.m. the applicants’ son had left the fire station without permission and had gone to the electrical substation; (iv) at about 6 p.m. he had broken into the substation; (v) being unaware that the substation operated at 10,000 volts, the applicants’ son had decided to steal non‑ferrous metals from high-voltage bus switches; and (vi) while dismantling the switches, he had suffered an electric shock and died on the spot. Lastly, the SBI concluded that there was no indication that the unit’s commanding officers had had a negligent attitude to military service.29.  The parties did not inform the Court of any subsequent developments in the criminal investigation.THE COURT’S ASSESSMENTALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION30.  The applicants complained under Articles 2, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention that the domestic investigations into the circumstances of their son’s death had not been sufficiently effective.31.  The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, finds that the complaints at issue fall to be examined under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention (see Igor Shevchenko v. Ukraine, no. 22737/04, § 38, 12 January 2012). The Court further notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.32.  The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect. They contended that the investigating authorities had demonstrated a willingness to carry out a prompt investigation and had acted comprehensively and with due diligence in order to establish all the circumstances surrounding the death of the applicants’ son. The Government emphasised that all the shortcomings of the investigations that had been identified by the domestic courts in their decisions had been fully remedied.33.  The applicants disagreed with the Government’s assertions. They contended that the investigating authorities had not conducted an effective investigation into the circumstances of their son’s death. In particular, they had not been involved in the investigations, and the investigating authorities had failed to comply with the court decisions finding numerous deficiencies in the investigations.34.  The Court reiterates that Article 2 of the Convention imposes a duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal‑law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. This obligation requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when there is reason to believe that an individual has sustained life-threatening injuries in suspicious circumstances (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 171, 14 April 2015, with further references). Once the investigative obligation is triggered, compliance with the procedural requirement of Article 2 of the Convention is assessed on the basis of several essential parameters: the adequacy of the investigative measures, the promptness of the investigation, the involvement of the deceased person’s family, and the independence of the investigation. These elements are interrelated and each of them, taken separately, does not amount to an end in itself (ibid., § 225).35.  Moreover, the obligation to conduct an effective investigation is not an obligation of results to be achieved but of means to be employed. The Court accepts that not every investigation is necessarily successful or comes to a conclusion coinciding with the claimant’s account of events. However, it should, in principle, be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 71, ECHR 2002-II). An investigation will not be effective unless all the evidence is properly analysed and the conclusions are consistent and reasoned (see Sergey Shevchenko v. Ukraine, no. 32478/02, § 67, 4 April 2006).36.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes at the outset that the internal investigation into the death of the applicants’ son was launched by the military unit command immediately after the accident had occurred (see paragraph 3 above). Even though that investigation cannot be considered independent, it nevertheless enabled the basic circumstances of the accident to be established, its main causes to be identified and the commanding officers who had contributed to it by their omissions to be disciplined (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above). However, the Court considers that the internal investigation taken alone was not capable of satisfying the requirements of an effective domestic investigation under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention (see Sergey Shevchenko, cited above, § 70).37.  The Court further observes that two criminal investigations followed the internal military investigation into the fatal accident. They concerned, in particular, the possible murder of the applicants’ son and whether a negligent attitude to military service on the part of the unit’s commanding officers had led to his death. Regard being had to the documents in its possession, the Court notes that the first investigation was opened by the police the day after the accident and lasted for more than four years (see paragraphs 6‑14 above); the second investigation was opened by the military prosecutor’s office upon the second applicant’s complaint (lodged eight months after the accident had taken place) and lasted for more than three years (see paragraphs 15-29 above).38.  Taken overall, the criminal investigations into the circumstances of the applicants’ son’s death were marked by the following significant shortcomings: (i) the investigations were criticised by the domestic courts for incompleteness owing to the failure to inform the applicants of their course, to involve them as victims or to question them (see Sergey Shevchenko, cited above, § 74, and Prynda v. Ukraine, no. 10904/05, § 56, 31 July 2012); (ii) the investigators were ordered to reopen the investigations on several occasions because the measures taken by them had been insufficient (see Antonov v. Ukraine, no. 28096/04, § 50, 3 November 2011); and (iii) the applicants’ allegations about the possible involvement of the commanding officers in the death of their son (owing to an unlawful order) were not properly assessed (see Yuriy Slyusar v. Ukraine, no. 39797/05, §§ 86‑87, 17 January 2013).39.  Lastly, the Court emphasises that the investigation into whether the commanding officers had exhibited a negligent attitude to military service was limited purely to an assessment of their version of events, according to which access to all the electrical substations had been duly restricted and the death of the applicants’ son had been the result of his own negligence and imprudence (see paragraph 16 above). The investigating authorities, in closing the relevant criminal investigation on several occasions (see paragraphs 17, 22 and 28 above), referred essentially to the above-mentioned testimony, despite the internal military investigation revealing that the officers had failed to properly restrict unauthorised access to the electrical substations (see paragraph 4 above). In addition, the actions and omissions of M. and Ya. – the two servicemen who had indirectly contributed to the accident by assisting the applicants’ son in the attempted theft (ibid.) – were never investigated.40.  Having regard to its well-established case-law on the subject (see, among many other authorities, Sergey Shevchenko, cited above, §§ 63-76), the Court concludes that the domestic investigations into the circumstances surrounding the death of the applicants’ son during his military service failed to meet the criteria of effectiveness.41.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION42.  The applicants claimed 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.43.  The Government submitted that the amount claimed was unsubstantiated.44.  The Court considers that the applicants must have suffered anguish and distress on account of the facts giving rise to the finding of a violation in the present case. Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court finds it reasonable to award the applicants jointly EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.45.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Declares the application admissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb;Holds(a)  that the respondent State is to pay EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros) to the applicants jointly within three months, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 December 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.  Martina Keller Gilberto Felici Deputy Registrar President