FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF KOZAK AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE(Applications nos. 54738/13 and 2 others–see appended list)      JUDGMENT STRASBOURG27 November 2025   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Kozak and Others v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Andreas Zünd, President, Mykola Gnatovskyy, Vahe Grigoryan, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the applications (nos. 54738/13, 33635/14 and 13080/17) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;the decision to give notice of part of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 and of the complaints under Article 8 of the Convention to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, from the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of applications nos. 54738/13 and 13080/17 inadmissible;the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 6 November 2025,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:Subject matter of the case1.  The present case mainly concerns the applicants’ complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention alleging (i) non‑compliance with the principle of an independent and impartial tribunal and (ii) insufficiency of the subsequent judicial review. According to the applicants, their dismissal from their posts as local court judges for “breach of oath” had been unlawful.Application nO. 54738/132.  On 16 October 2012 the High Council of Justice (Вища рада юстиції ‑ “the HCJ”) established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant, as a member of a panel of judges, had participated in the examination of a criminal case and in the delivery of a judgment finding the defendant in that case guilty. Subsequently, that judgment had been quashed in part by a higher court on the grounds that it had been unsubstantiated and the sentence had been too lenient. The HCJ considered that the first‑instance court’s judgment had had negative consequences: in particular, it had caused discontent in society, since the criminal case had been widely discussed in the media. The HCJ concluded that the applicant had disregarded the requirements of procedural law, and had not acted diligently and impartially when considering the criminal case; he therefore had to be dismissed.3.  The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision before the High Administrative Court (“the HAC”) which, on 28 February 2013, dismissed the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. It found that the HCJ’s conclusions had been well‑founded and that its decision proposing the applicant’s dismissal had been lawful.4.  On 23 May 2013 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.5.  The applicant challenged the parliamentary resolution ordering his dismissal before the HAC which, on 28 August 2013, dismissed the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. It held that Parliament had complied with the prescribed procedure governing the dismissal of judges when examining the applicant’s case.Application nO. 33635/146.  On 11 June 2013 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It thus decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from his post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ pointed out that the applicant had grossly violated the law when administering justice – namely, that he had opened civil proceedings and examined a case that had fallen within the jurisdiction of the commercial courts and that he had also issued an interim relief order for the seizure of the defendants’ funds, securities and property in the amount of a sum of money several times higher than the amount of the claim. All those decisions had been subsequently quashed as unlawful by an appellate court.7.  On 5 September 2013 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.8.  The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision and the parliamentary resolution ordering his dismissal before the HAC.9.  On 24 October 2013 the HAC dismissed the applicant’s claim against the HCJ as unsubstantiated. It found that the HCJ’s conclusions had been well‑reasoned and that its decision proposing the applicant’s dismissal had been lawful.10.  On 13 November 2013 the HAC dismissed the applicant’s claim against Parliament as unsubstantiated. It held that Parliament had complied with the prescribed procedure governing the dismissal of judges when examining the applicant’s case.Application nO. 13080/1711.  On 24 March 2015 the Temporary Special Commission (“the TSC”), which had been established under the 2014 Restoration of Trust in the Judiciary in Ukraine Act to vet judges (see Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, no. 15367/14 and 13 others, §§ 220-29, 21 January 2021), found that the applicant had breached his judicial oath by sentencing two individuals to fifteen days of administrative detention (the most severe administrative‑offence sentence) for their participation in mass protests in Kharkiv on 19 February 2014 (see Vorontsov and Others v. Ukraine, no. 58925/14 and 4 others, § 26, 21 January 2021). The TSC submitted its conclusion to the HCJ for further examination.12.  On 5 November 2015 the HCJ upheld the TSC’s conclusion and made a submission to the President of Ukraine to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ stated that the court decisions adopted by the applicant had not been properly reasoned and that the case files had contained no evidence whatsoever that the individuals concerned had committed the administrative offences with which they had been charged. The HCJ also established that the applicant had committed numerous serious violations (ibid., §§ 27‑29).13.  On 30 January 2016 the President of Ukraine issued a decree dismissing the applicant from the post of judge.14.  The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision and the presidential decree ordering his dismissal before the HAC.15.  On 8 August 2016 the HAC granted the applicant’s claim against the HCJ. On 29 November 2016 the Supreme Court, upon the HCJ’s appeal, quashed the HAC’s decision, finding that the HCJ’s conclusions had been well‑founded and that its decision proposing the applicant’s dismissal had been lawful.16.  On 6 April 2017 the HAC dismissed the applicant’s claim against the presidential decree as unsubstantiated. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 23 October 2018. Both courts held that the decree ordering the applicant’s dismissal fell within the discretionary powers of the President of Ukraine on the basis of and in accordance with the procedure provided in domestic legislation.Relevant legal framework and practice17.  The domestic law governing the procedure for the dismissal of judges for “breach of oath”, and the relevant international and comparative-law material can be found in Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (no. 21722/11, §§ 56‑82, ECHR 2013) and Kulykov and Others v. Ukraine (no. 5114/09 and 17 others, §§ 107-16, 19 January 2017).THE COURT’S ASSESSMENTJOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS18.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION19.  Referring to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicants complained that the dismissal procedure had been incompatible with the principles of an independent and impartial tribunal and that the subsequent judicial review (see paragraphs 3, 5, 8-10 and 14-16 above) had been insufficient to remedy those shortcomings.20.  The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention given that, at the material time, the national legislation had offered sufficient guarantees of the HCJ’s independence and impartiality, and the domestic courts considering the applicants’ dismissal cases had exercised full jurisdiction over the HCJ’s decisions and had thus complied with the fair-trial guarantees.21.  The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.22.  The Court further observes that it has previously found in Oleksandr Volkov (cited above, §§ 109-31) and Kulykov and Others (cited above, §§ 135‑36) that, at the material time, the procedure for the dismissal of judges for “breach of oath” had disclosed a number of structural and general shortcomings which had compromised the principles of independence and impartiality, and that the subsequent judicial review had not remedied those shortcomings. The Court considers that those findings are equally pertinent to the present applications.23.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards (i) non-compliance with the principle of an independent and impartial tribunal and (ii) the insufficiency of the subsequent judicial review.ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION24.  Relying expressly (applications nos. 33635/14 and 13080/17) or in substance (application no. 54738/13) on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants complained that their private lives had been substantially affected by their dismissals for “breach of oath”.Application no. 33635/1425.  After the Government were given notice of the application, the applicant submitted that he had not complained of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant may not be regarded as wishing to pursue that complaint, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights which would require the continued consideration of the complaint. The Court therefore concludes that this complaint should be struck out of its list of cases.Applications nos. 54738/13 and 13080/1726.  The Government asserted that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention because the applicants’ dismissal had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in a democratic society.27.  The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.28.  The Court further observes that it has previously found in Oleksandr Volkov (cited above, §§ 166‑67 and 173‑85) and Kulykov and Others (cited above, § 138) that the applicants’ dismissals from their posts of judge for “breach of oath” had constituted an interference with their private lives and that “such interference did not comply with the requirements of ‘quality of law’ and had not therefore been lawful for the purpose of Article 8 of the Convention”. The Court holds that those findings are fully relevant to the applications in question given that, at the material time, no guidelines or practice existed establishing a consistent and restrictive interpretation of the notion of “breach of oath” (see Oleksandr Volkov, cited above, § 180).29.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in applications nos. 54738/13 and 13080/17.OTHER COMPLAINTS30.  The applicants also raised other complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention that their cases had not been examined by a “tribunal established by law” and that they had had no effective domestic remedies for their Articles 6 and 8 complaints.31.  Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION32.  The applicant in application no. 54738/13 claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 2,000 in legal fees for his representation before the Court. The applicant in application no. 13080/17 claimed EUR 20,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 141,792 in respect of pecuniary damage (lost earnings and annual healthcare benefits for the period from 2016 to 2024). No claims were submitted in application no. 33635/14.33.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ claims for non‑pecuniary damage were wholly unsubstantiated and exorbitant. As to the claim of the applicant in application no. 13080/17 in respect of pecuniary damage, they contended that the applicant had provided no evidence to corroborate that the amount claimed would have actually been paid to him if he had remained in the post of judge and that he had failed to inform them of the fact that, from 11 February 2020 (that is, after his dismissal) he had continued to be registered as a lawyer with the Bar Council of Kharkiv Region. As regards the claim for legal fees, the Government argued that the amount claimed had not been actually incurred and was not reasonable as to quantum.34.  As to the claim for pecuniary damage in application no. 13080/17, having examined the submissions by the parties, the Court finds that the amount claimed is not corroborated by any evidence (see, for a similar approach, Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, nos. 27276/15 and 33692/15, § 140, 12 January 2023). The Court therefore rejects that claim in its entirety.35.  The Court further considers that the applicants in applications nos. 54738/13 and 13080/17 have suffered non‑pecuniary damage which is not sufficiently compensated for by the mere finding of violations of the Convention. Regard being had to the circumstances of the present case and to the approach taken by the Court in Kulykov and Others (cited above, § 156), it awards each of the applicants EUR 5,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.36.  As to the claim for legal fees in application no. 54738/13, according to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to the above‑mentioned criteria, the Court finds it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 2,000 for legal fees in the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him. At the request of the applicant, EUR 1,000 of the sum awarded under that head is to be paid directly into the bank account of Mr Y. Boychenko (see, for example, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 288, 15 December 2016).37.  Lastly, the Court sees no reason to make an award in application no. 33635/14, in the absence of any claim by the applicant.FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Decides to join the applications;Declares the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (as regards non‑compliance with the principle of an independent and impartial tribunal, and the insufficiency of the subsequent judicial review) and the complaints raised in applications nos. 54738/13 and 13080/17 under Article 8 of the Convention admissible;Decides to strike out the complaint raised in application no. 33635/14 under Article 8 of the Convention;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards non‑compliance with the principle of an independent and impartial tribunal, and the insufficiency of the subsequent judicial review;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in applications nos. 54738/13 and 13080/17;Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints raised by the applicants;Holds(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:(i)  EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) to each of the applicants in applications nos. 54738/13 and 13080/17, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage;(ii)  EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) to the applicant in application no. 54738/13, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him, in respect of costs and expenses (EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) awarded under that head to be paid into the bank account of Mr Y. Boychenko in France);(b)  that from the expiry of the above‑mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the claims for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 November 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.  Martina Keller Andreas Zünd Deputy Registrar President  APPENDIXList of cases:No.Application no.Case nameLodged onApplicant’sYear of BirthPlace of ResidenceNationalityRepresented by1.54738/13Andriy Volodymyrovych KOZAK15/08/20131977Kryvyy RigUkrainianMr Y. BOYCHENKO2.33635/14Volodymyr Mykhaylovych GRYSHCHENKO17/04/20141975DniproUkrainianMs T. SAMOYLENKO3.13080/17Denys Olegovych CHUDOVSKYY10/02/20171980KharkivUkrainianMs O. CHERNOMAZ