FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF PETRYK v. UKRAINE(Application no. 11103/18)      JUDGMENT STRASBOURG12 March 2026    This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Petryk v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Andreas Zünd, President, Mykola Gnatovskyy, Vahe Grigoryan, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the application (no. 11103/18) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 19 February 2018 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Viktor Mykolayovych Petryk (“the applicant”), who was born in 1961 and lives in Chystyi Kolodiaz, and, having been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr M. Tarakhkalo and Ms A. Kozmenko, lawyers practising in Kyiv;the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;the parties’ observations;Having deliberated in private on 12 February 2026,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE1.  The case concerns the death of the applicant’s son during his military service and raises issues under Article 2 of the Convention.        Background2.  In March 2014 the applicant’s son, P.S., then 26 years old, was called up for military service following the announcement of a special military mobilisation by Ukrainian authorities. He was married and had two minor children. His task in the army was repairing vehicles.3.  On 18 February 2015 P.S. had a brief home leave. He told his family that he would finish his service in about two weeks and would return home. The applicant submitted that his son had had plans for the future and had not shown any signs of depression. The applicant had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between P.S. and the latter’s superiors, V.K. and K.S., during which his son had apparently been threatened by K.S. The applicant did not submit any further details in this regard.4.  On the evening of 22 February 2015 the applicant talked with his son by telephone for the last time. P.S. had just returned to his military unit from the active fighting zone and told his father that he was very tired. He promised to call back later, but never did so.      Death OF p.s. and related criminal investigations5.  P.S. died on the evening of 22 February 2015. According to the witness evidence of several servicemen, including P.S.’s superiors V.K. and K.S. and two soldiers (namely S.K. and S.S.), with whom, according to the applicant, P.S. had had friendly relations, the circumstances surrounding his death were as follows. After playing a game of dominos with S.K. and another soldier (S.T.), P.S. had left the dugout. Most servicemen, including V.K. and K.S., were in the dugout. Some, including S.S., were outside. Several minutes later a gunshot was heard from the direction of the lorry assigned to P.S. His fellow servicemen found him in the cabin with his face heavily bleeding and there was a rifle posed between his legs. Since the cabin was locked from inside, one of the soldiers broke the window. P.S. had a perforating gunshot wound in the head. He was unconscious but still alive. A paramedic bandaged the wound and P.S. was taken to hospital, accompanied by V.K. and K.S. However, he died before arriving there. The applicant submitted that, for unknown reasons, it had been decided to take P.S. to a hospital located 64 km from the military unit, whereas there was one only 14 km away.6.  The servicemen who were in the military unit at the time of the incident were questioned as witnesses many times. According to the forensic psychological expert examination reports (issued in 2021 and 2022) on the video-recordings of their interviews in April 2019, those witnesses spoke freely and with no indication of pressure. Most of them submitted that they had not noticed anything unusual in P.S.’s behaviour. S.K. noted, however, that P.S. had spoken with somebody by mobile telephone “in raised tones”. He also submitted that P.S. had told him: “You will not drive the lorry after me.” S.K. noted that P.S. had been sad that day when they had conversed. K.S. and V.K. also referred to P.S.’s mobile telephone conversation with somebody shortly before the incident, during which he had sounded upset and irritated.7.  On 23 February 2015 the Kuybysheve police, to which the hospital staff had reported the incident, launched a criminal investigation into P.S.’s death as possibly resulting from a breach of firearm handling rules (case no. 0111). On the same day the Volnovakha police, to which a similar report had been sent by the military unit, also started a criminal investigation into the matter, but in respect of a charge of murder by unidentified persons (case no. 0223). The two investigating authorities did not coordinate their efforts.8.  The investigation in case no. 0111 was discontinued on 16 April 2015 for absence of any indication of a criminal offence.9.  While the investigation in case no. 0223 was also discontinued on similar grounds three times (on 19 May and 27 June 2015, and on 19 July 2016), all those rulings were set aside as unlawful and unfounded (on 28 May and 13 July 2015 and on 28 July 2016 respectively), and the investigation remains pending.10.  As confirmed by documents in the case file before the Court, the investigation was undermined by numerous delays and deficiencies, which include (but are not limited to) the following.-          The bone fragment and the bullet shell withheld by the investigator during an inspection of the scene on 23 February 2015 were lost shortly thereafter, without their seizure being documented.-          The blood sample and the histological material extracted from the body during the initial forensic medical expert examination on 24 February 2015, in the context of case no. 0111, had been destroyed before the investigator dealing with the parallel investigation, in the context of case no. 0223, made enquiries to that effect (in 2018 and 2021).-          The swabs from P.S.’s hands, also initially kept with the investigating authority dealing with case no. 0111, were retrieved for the purposes of the ongoing investigation in case no. 0223 only in 2019 or 2020. An expert report of 22 October 2020 concluded that there were no traces of gunpowder and explosive substances on those swabs.-          The lorry, in the cabin of which P.S. had been found fatally injured, and the gun found next to him were returned to the military unit shortly after the incident, without thorough forensic examinations. Their additional forensic expert examinations were carried only on 31 October 2019 (in respect of the gun) and 30 June 2021 (in respect of the lorry).-          The mobile telephone which had belonged to P.S. was inspected for the first time on 17 May 2016, after being stored unsealed for more than a year. Although no sent SMS messages were recorded, in June 2020 the mobile operator informed the police, in reply to their enquiry, that on 22 February 2015 (that is, on the day of his death) P.S. had sent seven SMS messages to the same number registered in his contacts under a nickname. The investigator, however, waited until February 2024 before requesting the restoration of the contents of those SMS messages. The mobile operator rejected his request, since there was no judicial authorisation for the information disclosure and, in any event, it had been destroyed after the three-year civil-liability limitation period. On 11 April 2024 a digital technical examination of the mobile telephone was carried out. The only information available in the case file before the Court in that regard is that “no information of relevance to P.S.’s death had been discovered”.-          While there were audio records (dating from 2013 and 2014) in P.S.’s telephone of a male and a female voice discussing the man’s debt to the woman in question and his difficulties repaying it, that woman was preliminarily identified and questioned for the first time only in March 2024. She admitted to speaking to P.S. shortly before his death. She also admitted being the owner of the telephone number to which the seven SMS messages had been sent from P.S.’s telephone on the day of his death but which had subsequently been deleted. The witness in question, however, submitted that she did not remember the contents of any SMS messages or any other details. She also denied that P.S. had owed any debts to her or, according to her knowledge, to anybody else.-          Although several forensic medical examinations and investigative experiments were conducted, it was found to be impossible to give a clear answer to the question whether it had been technically possible for P.S. to have shot himself, regard being had to his height, the characteristics of his wound (its location (the entry wound in the left temple and the exit wound in the right part of the forehead) and its direction (from the back towards the front, from the left towards the right and from below upwards); the fact that the possible distance of the shot was established as measuring from 1-3 cm to 23-25 cm, with no indication of a direct-contact shot); the reported position of his body and the gun; the witness statements; and all the available evidence. The investigator posed that question before a commission of experts several times, but the experts’ consistent finding was that it was beyond their competence and that it was for the investigator to reach a conclusion on the basis of all the material in the case file.-          A posthumous forensic psychiatric expert examination of P.S. was carried out only on 27 November 2024 and the questions posed to the experts referred to P.S.’s suicide as an established fact. It was concluded in the report that P.S. had not been mentally disturbed and had been capable of controlling his actions when committing suicide.    Other relevant facts11.  In June 2016 the family of the deceased (the applicant and his wife, along with P.S.’s widow and two minor children) applied for a lump-sum State allowance under legislation related to the social protection of military servicemen and their families. Although their application was initially rejected, it was eventually granted in June 2019, after the courts had found that the internal investigation report, on the basis of which it had been concluded that P.S.’s death had not been related to his military unit, had been issued without any related investigative measures being conducted. As a result, each of P.S.’s relatives mentioned above received 182,700 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – equivalent to approximately 6,500 euros (EUR)). In addition, on 17 December 2020 the Chernihiv City Court awarded each of them UAH 10,000 (equivalent to approximately EUR 300) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, regard being had to the military authorities’ unlawful actions and omissions, which had prevented the family of the deceased from obtaining the financial assistance to which they were entitled by law. That decision was upheld by the upper-level courts.The Court’s assessmentalleged violation of Article 2 of the convention12.  The applicant complained that the State had failed to discharge its obligations under the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the Convention.   Admissibility13.  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.   Merits     The parties’ submissions14.  The applicant argued that P.S. had been murdered and that the State had failed to protect him. The applicant submitted, in particular, that, over the past ten years there had been significant non-combat losses in the Ukrainian army and that the authorities had not disclosed any statistics in that regard. Accordingly, he maintained that, even though there were some legally established mechanisms for prevention of suicides and violence in the army, their efficacy was not proved in practice. The applicant emphasised that it had been the authorities’ obligation to provide a plausible explanation for the death of his son, which had occurred while he had been under the exclusive control of the State during his military service. In the applicant’s view, that obligation had not been complied with.15.  The applicant further submitted that the investigation, which had been pending for more than nine years, had been undermined by various deficiencies and lack of diligence. As a result, the exact circumstances of his son’s death remained unelucidated and nobody had been brought to liability.16.  The Government submitted that the State had discharged its positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention, since it had put in place effective suicide prevention mechanisms in the army and had done everything possible to give a plausible explanation for P.S.’s death. They further submitted that there had been no indication of any hazing or ill-treatment of P.S. in the military unit.17.  The Government argued that all the necessary investigative measures had been carried out to establish the truth concerning the death of the applicant’s son. They pointed out that the investigation was still ongoing and that the authorities were examining several possible explanations for P.S.’s death (namely suicide, death resulting from a breach of firearm handling rules and murder).18.  The Government noted that, even though there had indeed been some deficiencies in the investigation, they had been acknowledged and compensated for in respect of the applicant and his family. In reply to this argument, the applicant emphasised that his family had only received a lump-sum social allowance and some insignificant compensation for the difficulties encountered in that regard.     The Court’s assessment19.  The Court considers it appropriate to begin its examination on the merits by first addressing the procedural limb of the applicant’s complaint under Article 2 of the Convention, namely whether or not the criminal investigation into the circumstances of P.S.’s death was effective, and then turning to the substantive limb, namely the question of whether the State can be held responsible for the death (see A.P. v. Austria, no. 1718/21, § 136, 26 November 2024, and Petrosyan v. Armenia, no. 51448/15, § 120, 9 January 2025).   Procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention20.  The relevant general principles have been set out in, in particular, Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey ([GC], no. 24014/05, §§ 169‑82, 14 April 2015).21.  The Court notes that in the present case the investigation into the violent death of the applicant’s son has lasted for more than nine and a half years and, according to the material in the Court’s possession, is still pending before the investigating authorities. The Court reiterates that the excessive length of proceedings is a strong indication that the proceedings are defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State’s positive obligations under the Convention, unless the State has provided highly convincing and plausible reasons to justify the length of the proceedings (see Mazepa and Others v. Russia, no. 15086/07, § 80, 17 July 2018, and Vyacheslavova and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 39553/16 and 6 others, § 400, 13 March 2025). No such justification has been provided by the Government in the present case. At the same time, the case-file material clearly indicates that the major reason for the lengthy investigation consisted in the prohibitive delays caused by the domestic authorities and their manifest lack of competence or diligence. By way of illustration of the most striking examples, the Court notes that the earliest meaningful attempts to carry out some essential investigative measures, such as extracting and assessing the digital evidence from the deceased’s mobile telephone and the posthumous forensic psychiatric expert examination of him, took place nine years after his death (see paragraph 10 above).22.  The Court has held in its case-law that the mere passage of time, inevitably eroding the amount and quality of the evidence available, can work to the detriment of the investigation, and even fatally jeopardise its chances of success (see Nicolaou v. Cyprus, no. 29068/10, § 150, 28 January 2020). In the present case, the challenges in the investigation, which is still ongoing almost ten years after the events, are not limited to the negative effects of the mere passage of time, but also include numerous past omissions and deficiencies, which may be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome.23.  The Court deems the foregoing considerations sufficient for concluding that the authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into P.S.’s death. In view of this conclusion, the Court considers it unnecessary to examine whether the other aspects of the investigation met the requirements of the Convention (see Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, no. 69517/11, § 153, 5 April 2022).24.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb.   Substantive limb of Article 2 of the Convention25.  The Court notes that, although the domestic investigation has not yet reached a final conclusion as to the explanation for P.S.’s death, the wording of the questions in the posthumous forensic psychiatric expert examination of him suggest the investigating authorities’ preference for the suicide version (see paragraph 10 above). This has no bearing on the Court’s assessment of the applicant’s complaint under the substantive limb of Article 2, since, in any event, having concluded that the investigation carried out by the authorities was seriously deficient (see paragraph 24 above), the Court cannot consider the conclusions of that investigation to be reliable or the explanation for P.S.’s death to be convincing and satisfactory.26.  It follows that the authorities cannot be regarded as having discharged their obligation to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation for the death of the applicant’s son, which occurred while he was in their care (see Ohanjanyan v. Armenia, no. 70665/11, § 160, 25 April 2023).27.  This consideration is sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its substantive limb (ibid., § 161).APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION28.  The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, 36,100 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts (to be paid into the applicant’s bank account) and EUR 4,950 for those incurred before the Court (to be paid into Mr Tarakhkalo’s bank account).29.  The Government contested the above claims.30.  The Court considers it appropriate to award the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.31.  Furthermore, having regard to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 650, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him, for costs and expenses incurred at the domestic level. Also, the Court awards the applicant, in addition to the legal aid received, EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. At the applicant’s request, the above-mentioned amount of EUR 2,000 should be paid directly into the bank account of Mr M. Tarakhkalo (see, for example, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 288, 15 December 2016).32.  The Court further considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Declares the application admissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its substantive limb;Holds  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:  EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;  EUR 650 (six hundred fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of legal costs incurred in the domestic proceedings;  EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of legal costs incurred in the proceedings before the Court, to be paid directly into the bank account indicated by Mr M. Tarakhkalo;  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 March 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Martina Keller Andreas Zünd Deputy Registrar President