FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF PANOVA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE(Applications nos. 28519/10 and 3 others – see appended table)    JUDGMENT STRASBOURG8 July 2021 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Panova and Others v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Lətif Hüseynov, President, Lado Chanturia, Mattias Guyomar, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the applications (nos. 28519/10, 52630/10, 52697/10 and 57473/10) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Ukrainian nationals, whose details are set out in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in that table;the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the lawfulness and fairness of the court judgments ordering the applicants’ eviction and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;the decision to grant legal aid;the parties’ observations;Having deliberated in private on 17 June 2021,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:INTRODUCTION1.  The applicants alleged that they had been unlawfully and unfairly evicted from their flats in a building formerly belonging to a State-owned company after it had been transferred to a private owner. They raised complaints under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.THE FACTS2.  The applicants were born in 1950, 1951, 1957 and 1974 respectively. The first, second and third applicants live in Yasnogorodka.3.  The fourth applicant, Mr I.V. Biryuchkov, was the son of the second applicant, Mrs V.I. Pavlinova. He died in 2014, while his application was pending before the Court. The second applicant expressed her wish to pursue her late son’s application.4.  The applicants had been granted legal aid and were represented by Mr Y.L. Boychenko, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg.5.  The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna.6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.Background of the case7.  On 1 July 1980 the Makariv District Council (in the Kyiv region, Ukraine) permitted the use of several newly constructed buildings in the L.K. resort complex located near the village of Yasnogorodka. One of these buildings was referred to as “a hotel with an accommodation hall and garage”. The resort complex had been constructed by V. company, a Russian-based Soviet State‑owned enterprise, and was intended for hosting the children of its employees during the holidays.8.  On various dates before 1987 the first three applicants, who were employed at L.K., along with several dozen other L.K. employees, were provided with accommodation in the above-mentioned building for themselves and their dependents. The fourth applicant, a minor at the material time, was accommodated together with the second applicant, his mother.9.  In 1987 the V. company closed down the resort complex, laid off its employees, including the first three applicants, and transferred the L.K. property to S.M.T., a State-owned construction enterprise located in Ukraine. On several occasions S.M.T. considered various projects with a view to rehousing the former L.K. employees accommodated in the former resort; however, those projects were not completed.10.  In 1992 the L.K. property complex was acquired by the private company I., who sold it to E., another private company, in the same year.11.  On numerous occasions the former L.K. employees who were residing on the L.K. premises lodged complaints with different authorities and took various other actions alleging that the transfer of L.K. to private owners had been illegal and had encroached upon their rights as tenants.12.  On 1 March 1993 the Kyiv Regional Administration addressed a letter to a group of former L.K. employees indicating as follows:“...The [E.] company has undertaken ... to provide the occupants [of the former L.K. resort] with heating, electricity and water. The vacation of the resort shall take place only on condition of the construction of houses for all resident families. The [E.] company has agreed to arrange for the construction of housing. At present, fifteen hectares of land have been allocated for [the project]. Planning work is in progress ...”13.  In 1996 the E. company allowed a request by the second applicant to occupy an additional flat in the same building, which had become vacant, in view of the fact that she and her son (the fourth applicant), who had come of age, had been sharing a one-bedroom flat at the material time.14.  According to the Government, in 2004 E. resettled some of the former L.K. employees, having provided them with other housing.15.  According to the applicants, between 1992 and 2004 E. did not take any care of the L.K. property and it became dilapidated. The former L.K. employees residing on the site did their best to maintain the buildings and the infrastructure in a functioning state. In 2004, as land prices increased, E. decided to sell L.K. As the presence of tenants was detrimental to the intended sale, E. started undertaking various unlawful measures with a view to expelling the tenants without discharging its promise to rehouse them. It cut off the supply of water, gas, and electricity, forcing the residents to install their own energy and water supply systems.Eviction proceedings16.  On 13 March 2006, after several rounds of the inquiry into the complaints raised by the L.K. residents, the Makariv district prosecutor instituted civil proceedings on their behalf, seeking to oblige the E. company to regularise their occupancy by way of issuing occupancy vouchers (ордер) in their names in accordance with the Housing Code of Ukraine (1983).17.  E. lodged a counterclaim, alleging that all the L.K. residents had arbitrarily occupied its property. Referring to the general provisions of civil law protecting private property, it therefore sought their eviction.18.  The applicants contested E.’s claims, as well as the prosecutor’s submissions. They maintained that they had been provided with their current dwellings as protected corporate tenants and had occupied them lawfully, in a regular manner, and in good faith for substantial periods of time. There had therefore not been any need for the prosecutor to seek regularisation of their occupancy. As regards E.’s counterclaim seeking their eviction, the applicants argued that under the Housing Code, they could not be evicted unless they were rehoused. The applicants provided copies of documents certifying their long-standing permanent residence registration with local authorities, and house fee payment books (розрахункова книжка) issued in their names in accordance with the rules applicable to protected tenancies in the 1980s. The applicants also provided copies of occupancy vouchers (ордер) issued in their names in the 1980s by the Makariv District Council.19.  On 27 June 2006 the District Court discontinued its examination of the prosecutor’s claim lodged on the applicants’ behalf, since the applicants did not support it. It proceeded, however, with the examination of that same claim in respect of some other L.K. residents, who supported the prosecutor’s position. It also proceeded with the examination of the eviction counterclaim lodged by the E. company against all L.K. residents, including the applicants.20.  On 20 October 2006 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court in Kyiv ruled in E.’s favour. It found, in particular, that there were no documents indicating that any of the L.K. buildings had been intended for permanent residential occupancy; that the applicants’ dwellings had never been registered as belonging to the public housing stock and that the issuance of their occupancy vouchers and their residence registration with the local authorities had therefore been in breach of the applicable procedural rules. In view of the above, the protected tenancy rules established by the Housing Code did not apply to their case. In the absence of any contractual relationship with E., there was no legal basis for the applicants and the other L.K. residents to occupy the premises of the former resort, and E., a private owner, could not be obliged to accommodate them. In accordance with Articles 319 and 321 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 33 below), all L.K. residents, including the applicants, therefore had to be evicted.21.  A number of defendants, supported by the applicants, appealed, challenging the judgment on various procedural grounds. They also essentially maintained that private company E. had unlawfully acquired the former State property, which was accommodating them as protected corporate tenants for the purposes of the Housing Code. The premises in question were their long-standing family homes; they had maintained them at their own expense; and the lawfulness of their occupancy had never before been disputed. In accordance with Article 125 of the Housing Code, they could therefore not be evicted unless rehoused.22.  The prosecutor also challenged the eviction order on behalf of all the L.K. residents, including the applicants. Contrary to the defendants’ position, he considered that their occupancy had not been duly documented. However, he argued that that irregularity could not have been held against the defendants, as it had not been their fault. He further submitted that the defendants had occupied the disputed premises in good faith for long periods of time and had dutifully contributed to their maintenance. In the prosecutor’s opinion, the indiscriminate eviction of all the defendants, with a view to protecting the current owner’s property interests, without investigating each occupant’s individual circumstances, would be an extreme and disproportionate measure.23.  On 8 September 2009 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed the eviction order. It found that some documents in the case file indicated that the building occupied by the defendants had been intended to serve as a corporate accommodation hall for L.K. employees, for the purposes of the Housing Code. E.’s eviction claim, which had been formulated on the basis of the general provisions of civil law protecting private property, without a detailed assessment of each occupant’s individual situation and without taking into account the provisions of the Housing Code, could therefore not be allowed.24.  On 17 March 2010 the Supreme Court of Ukraine allowed an appeal lodged by E. on points of law and upheld the eviction order made by the District Court. It found that as the building in question had never been duly registered as belonging to the public housing stock intended for permanent occupancy, there had been no grounds to treat the defendants’ occupancy as a protected tenancy for the purposes of the Housing Code. Based on the Civil Code rules protecting private property from arbitrary intrusions, the defendants, including the applicants, therefore had to be evicted.25.  On 31 March 2010 the decision of the Supreme Court was sent to the applicants by post.26.  On various dates in May and June 2010 all the applicants were evicted.27.  Subsequently E. demolished the building in which the applicants had lived.28.  In September 2010 E. sold the former L.K. resort to P., another private company.Other relevant facts29.  In June 2006 the third applicant bought an unfinished house in the village of Yasnogorodka. Following her eviction from the former L.K. resort, she moved into that house.30.  On 30 November 2011 the first, second and fourth applicants were placed on the local municipal priority waiting list for social housing.31.  On 23 April 2013 the first, second and fourth applicants were provided with occupancy vouchers for socially owned flats in the village of Yasnogorodka. According to the first and second applicants, those flats were located in a refurbished workshop; they lacked basic amenities and needed substantial repair work to make them habitable.RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORKHousing Code of Ukraine32.  The relevant provisions of the Housing Code of Ukraine, as in force at the material time, read as follows:Article 125.  Persons who cannot be evicted from corporate accommodation without the provision of alternative housing“The following shall be exempt from eviction [from corporate accommodation] unless they have been allocated alternative housing ......- persons laid off in connection with the liquidation of the enterprise, institution [or] organisation or [those] dismissed in connection with [the employer] reducing the number of employees; ...”Civil Code of Ukraine33.  The relevant provisions of the Civil Code of Ukraine, as in force at the material time, read as follows:Article 319.  Realisation of property rights“1.  Owners shall possess, use and dispose of their property at their own discretion. ...”Article 321.  Inviolability of property rights“1.  Property rights are inviolable. Nobody may be wrongfully deprived of these rights or restricted in exercising them....”THE LAWJOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS34.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.locus standi of the second applicant in respect of the fourth applicant’s complaints35.  Mr I.V. Biryuchkov – the fourth applicant – having died in 2014, his mother, Mrs V.I. Pavlinova – the second applicant – expressed her wish to pursue his application.36.  The Government argued that the second applicant had no standing to pursue her late son’s application, as the contested rights were not transferable.37.  The Court notes that in a number of cases where the applicants have died during the proceedings, it has taken account of the wish expressed by their heirs or close relatives to continue them (see, in particular, Ergezen v. Turkey, no. 73359/10, §§ 29-31, 8 April 2014, and, as a recent authority, López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 1874/13 and 8567/13, §§ 72‑73, 17 October 2019, with further references). However, in the present case, regard being had to the nature of the fourth applicant’s complaints, which are identical to those brought by the three other applicants, including his mother – the second applicant – on her own behalf, the Court considers that the second applicant has no sufficient interest in pursuing the same complaints on behalf of her son. In view of the above, the Court also considers that there exists no general interest which necessitates proceeding with the examination of the fourth applicant’s complaints, and finds that the conditions in which those complaints may be struck out of its list, as provided in Article 37 § 1 of the Convention, are satisfied (compare I.G. and Others v. Slovakia, no. 15966/04, §§ 92-93, 13 November 2012).38.  Accordingly, the Court decides to strike the application brought by the fourth applicant, Mr I.V. Biryuchkov, out of its list of cases pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention. In the following parts of the present judgment, the expression “the applicants” should be taken to refer to the first, second and third applicants only.ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD APPLICANTS39.  The first, second and third applicants complained that the court order for their eviction had amounted to an unlawful and unfair interference with their right to respect for their home. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”AdmissibilityAlleged non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the first, second, and third applicants40.  The Government argued that the first, second, and third applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of the above-mentioned complaint. In particular, having initially obtained the accommodation in question in connection with their employment, they should have anticipated that their occupancy had become precarious once they had been laid off. Furthermore, the building they occupied had not been registered as belonging to public housing stock or as intended for permanent occupancy. The applicants should therefore have instituted proceedings against the new landlords requesting regularisation of their continued occupancy or asking to be rehoused. Alternatively, they could have applied to the relevant authorities to be placed on the waiting list for social housing. In the meantime, not only had the applicants failed to take any of the above-mentioned actions, but they had also objected when the district prosecutor had brought proceedings in their stead seeking regularisation of their occupancy.41.  The applicants disagreed. They argued that having obtained the accommodation in question from their State-owned employer, they had occupied it as protected corporate tenants according to the rules of the Housing Code. In accordance with Article 125 of the Housing Code, following the winding-up of their employer’s activity, they had been entitled to keep their accommodation unless and until other social housing had been made available to them. Their housing situation had therefore not been precarious and there had been no reason for them to either seek its regularisation or to apply for other social housing. For the very same reason the applicants had objected to the action taken by the district prosecutor: he had sought regularisation of their occupancy, which, in their view, was already lawful and regular. As the E. company had, however, lodged a counterclaim for their eviction within the framework of the same proceedings, they had actively participated in those proceedings as defendants, including by lodging an appeal against the District Court’s judgment. The applicants had therefore properly exhausted the available domestic remedies.42.  Having examined the parties’ arguments in the light of the general principles developed in its case-law (see, for example, Brežec v. Croatia, no. 7177/10, §§ 26-27, 18 July 2013), the Court observes that the applicants, in substance, contested before the national courts the eviction claim brought against them, as being neither lawful nor fair. In these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the applicants have exhausted domestic remedies in respect of the complaints raised by them under Article 8 of the Convention.43.  Accordingly, the Government’s objection must be dismissed.Alleged abuse of the right of application by the third applicant44.  The Government further alleged that the application by the third applicant (Mrs N.L. Glushchenko) had amounted to an abuse of the right of individual application as she had not informed the Court that in 2006 she had acquired a house and that she also owned three plots of land.45.  The third applicant disagreed. She argued that the purchase of a house in 2006 was not a material consideration in the determination of her Convention complaint, which concerned the unlawful and unfair deprivation of her right to occupy other premises, which had served as her home for over two decades. In fact, that house purchase had been a desperate attempt to secure some kind of accommodation in the face of the threat of homelessness and had constituted a considerable financial outlay for her. The house had been under construction and uninhabitable. She had had to borrow substantial funds from her relatives and to invest several years into repair work to make it possible to live in it. As regards the plots of land to which the Government referred, she had been granted them for free by the municipality under the national land privatisation scheme, but she could not possibly finance the erection of any construction on them.46.  The Court observes that a finding of abuse of the right of individual application may be made in extraordinary circumstances – in particular when an application is clearly unsupported by evidence, or is deliberately based on false or misleading submissions, or presents a description of facts that omits events of central importance (see, in particular, Vinniychuk v. Ukraine, no. 34000/07, § 42, 20 October 2016, with further references).47.  In the present case, the Court is unable to find any such extraordinary circumstances. The question of whether or not the third applicant owned any other housing or land was neither examined by the domestic courts within the framework of the relevant eviction proceedings, nor even raised by the claimant in its statement of claim. The ground on which the order was made to evict all the defendants including the third applicant, that is, the irregularity of their initial occupancy (see paragraph 20 above), was unrelated to the circumstances indicated by the Government. Within the context of examining the complaints lodged by the third applicant, the Court does not therefore consider that the facts referred to by the Government were of core importance.48.  It therefore dismisses the Government’s objection.Conclusion as to admissibility49.  The Court further notes that the present complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.Merits50.  The first, second and third applicants argued, in essence, that the court judgments ordering their eviction had been arbitrary, unlawful, and devoid of any meaningful analysis of their personal circumstances.51.  The Government contested that view. They agreed that the judgments at issue had amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their home under Article 8 of the Convention. However, they submitted that the measure in question was justified under paragraph 2 of that provision. In particular, it had a basis in domestic law, namely the provisions of the Civil Code protecting private property from unwarranted intrusions. The interference had also pursued a legitimate aim: the protection of the private owner’s property rights. It had also been necessary, in a democratic society, to avoid imposing on that owner a disproportionate obligation to house unwanted tenants. The eviction had not imposed a disproportionate burden on the applicants. The first two applicants had obtained social housing within three years of their eviction. The third applicant had already owned another house and had therefore been able to set up a new home there.52.  The Court reiterates from its established case-law that loss of one’s home is the most extreme form of interference with the right to respect for one’s home (see, among other authorities, McCann v. the United Kingdom, no. 19009/04, § 50, ECHR 2008). It further notes that State interference in this regard constitutes a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, unless it pursues one of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 § 2, is “in accordance with the law”, and can be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” (see, among other authorities, Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 30856/03, § 42, 2 December 2010). Any person at risk of being subject to eviction should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure in question determined (see, among other authorities, Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy, cited above, § 44, and Winterstein and Others v. France, no. 27013/07, §§ 148 (δ) and 155, 17 October 2013).53.  In the present case, the Court notes that the existence of an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their home is not in dispute between the parties. It considers that, notwithstanding that the eviction order in the present case was made in favour of a privately incorporated entity, its issuance constituted State action amounting to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their home (see, for instance, Brežec, cited above, §§ 37-40, and Vrzić v. Croatia, no. 43777/13, § 59, 12 July 2016).54.  The applicants’ eviction was ordered by the Shevchenkivskyy District Court in Kyiv, which found that their occupancy of the premises did not qualify as a “protected tenancy” under the Housing Code. The claimant, a private landlord, could therefore not be obliged to accommodate them. The Court accepts that the above-mentioned eviction order had a basis in domestic law (in particular, Articles 319 and 321 of the Civil Code – see paragraph 33 above).55.  The Court is also satisfied that the eviction order pursued a legitimate aim: namely, the protection of the rights of others, that is, the property interests of a private landlord.56.  At the same time, the Court considers that it was not based on adequate reasons and was therefore not necessary in a democratic society.57.  The Court notes in this connection that the accommodation in question was allocated to the applicants under the specific circumstances which existed in the former Soviet Union, where employees paid obligatory monthly contributions to housing funds and where a large proportion of employed persons occupied socially owned flats. When the applicants were allocated the accommodation at issue, it belonged to a State-owned company. While the respondent State certainly enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in drawing up its social and housing policies, the Court notes that the proceedings for the applicants’ eviction did not start until 2006, some fourteen years after the private company E. had purchased the formerly State‑owned resort complex where the accommodation was situated (compare Brežec, cited above, § 48 and contrast to (see F.J.M. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 76202/16, 6 November 2018).58.  The applicants in the present case presented arguments linked to the proportionality of their eviction, both in person and through representation by a district prosecutor (see paragraphs 21-22 above). They submitted, in particular, that, as noted above, the premises in question had initially been allocated to them in connection with their employment at a State-owned company for the duration of that employment and that any possible irregularity in documenting their occupancy in the 1980s had not been their fault. Furthermore, notwithstanding the termination of their employment in 1987, until 2006 the local authorities, as well as the new owners of the building, including the claimant, had consistently treated them as de facto protected tenants, who could not be evicted unless rehoused. It was also apparent from the applicants’ submissions that they had lived in the premises for over two decades and had raised their families in them and contributed to their maintenance, and that the case concerned an issue of crucial importance for them.59.  The findings of the District Court (which were quashed on the appeal of the applicants and the prosecutor but eventually upheld by the Supreme Court on further appeal by the claimant) were, however, restricted to the conclusion that the building in which all the defendants, including the applicants, had resided, had not been properly registered in the 1980s as belonging to the public housing stock and intended for permanent occupancy; the applicants’ de facto permanent tenancy had therefore not been properly regularised ab initio. The judicial authorities gave that aspect paramount importance. They did not weigh up that element in any way against the applicants’ arguments to the effect that, given how they had been allocated and had occupied the premises, their eviction would place an excessive individual burden on them.60.  Devoid of any analysis of each applicant’s individual situation, the decision-making process leading to the measure of interference was therefore not fair. It did not afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the applicants by Article 8 (see, by way of comparison, Brežec, cited above, § 50, with further references).61.  The Court has already found violations of Article 8 of the Convention in other cases where the applicants did not have the benefit, in the context of eviction proceedings, of an examination of the proportionality of the interference in question (see, among other authorities, Winterstein and Others, cited above, §§ 158 and 167; Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy, cited above, §§ 50-52; and Sadovyak v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 17365/14, §§ 32-35, 17 May 2018). It finds no reason to arrive at a different conclusion in the present case.62.  This finding obviates the need to examine any other arguments raised by the parties.63.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of the complaints raised by the first, second and third applicants.ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLEs 6 and 13 OF THE CONVENTION in respect of the first, second, and third applicants64.  Relying on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, the applicants also complained that the judgments of the District Court and the Supreme Court in their case had not provided an adequate response to their essential arguments and that in view of the manner in which the domestic courts had interpreted and applied domestic law in their case, they had had no effective remedy for their grievances under Article 8 of the Convention.65.  Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that it has already examined the main legal question raised by the applicants, and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the above-mentioned complaints (see, for example, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION66.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”Damage67.  Each applicant claimed 50,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.68.  The Government argued that these claims were exorbitant and unsubstantiated.69.  The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the first, second, and third applicants 4,500 euros (EUR) each, in respect of non-pecuniary damage.Costs and expenses70.  Each applicant also claimed EUR 600 in legal fees, to be paid directly to the account of their representative. They submitted copies of contracts for legal representation and outstanding invoices for the respective amounts, from which it appears that Mr Y.L. Boychenko spent five hours on the case of each applicant at the rate of EUR 120 per hour.71.  The Government submitted that the amounts claimed were excessive.72.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession, its case-law, and the fact that the applicants have already jointly received EUR 850 in legal aid to cover the legal fees payable, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants jointly EUR 950 in legal fees, to be transferred to the account of their representative, Mr Y.L. Boychenko.Default interest73.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Decides to join the applications;Decides to strike the application brought by the fourth applicant, Mr I.V. Biryuchkov, out of its list of cases under Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention;Declares the complaints under Article 8 admissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of the first, second and third applicants;Holds that there is no need to examine the complaints raised under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention;Holds(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:(i)  EUR 4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to each of the first, second and third applicants;(ii)  EUR 950 (nine hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of legal fees, to the first, second and third applicants jointly, to be transferred directly to the account of their legal representative;(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 July 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.Martina Keller  Lətif HüseynovDeputy Registrar President  APPENDIXList of cases:No.Application no.Case nameLodged onApplicantYear of BirthPlace of ResidenceNationality1.  28519/10Panova v. Ukraine30/04/2010Galyna Viktorivna PANOVA1950YasnogorodkaUkrainian2.  52630/10Pavlinova v. Ukraine06/09/2010Vira Ivanivna PAVLINOVA1951YasnogorodkaUkrainian3.  52697/10Glushchenko v. Ukraine06/09/2010Nataliya Leonidivna GLUSHCHENKO1957YasnogorodkaUkrainian4.  57473/10Biryuchkov v. Ukraine25/09/2010Igor Volodymyrovych BIRYUCHKOV1974YasnogorodkaUkrainian