FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF NAYDYONOV AND VEDUTENKO v. UKRAINE(Application no. 10479/16)      JUDGMENT This version was rectified on 18 March 2026under Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. STRASBOURG12 March 2026This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Naydyonov and Vedutenko v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Andreas Zünd, President, Mykola Gnatovskyy, Vahe Grigoryan, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the application (no. 10479/16) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 5 February 2016 by two Ukrainian nationals, Mr Oleksiy Valeriyovych Naydyonov and Ms Olga Igorivna Vedutenko (“the applicants”), who were born in 1980 and 1977 respectively, live in Kyiv and were represented by Mr M.O. Tarakhkalo and Ms A. Kozmenko, lawyers practising in Kyiv;the decision to give notice of the application to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Marharyta Sokorenko;the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 12 February 2026,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE1.  The case concerns a prohibition to hold a demonstration near the Presidential Administration and judicial proceedings stemming from it (Articles 6 and 11 of the Convention).2.  The Presidential Administration building is located at 11 Bankova Street in Kyiv. That street has three points of entry: at the intersection of Bankova Street and Instytutska Street, at the intersection of Bankova Street and Lyuteranska Street and from Ivana Franka Square.3.  In early 2014 fences and checkpoints were installed at the entry points.4.  On an unspecified date a criminal investigation into the theft of five vehicles belonging to the applicants’ company was opened by prosecutors. Considering that investigation to be lengthy and ineffective, the applicants lodged numerous complaints with various State bodies and officials, including the President. According to the applicants, they did not receive any reply from the President.5.  On 2 June 2015 the applicants informed the Kyiv State Administration that they intended to hold a protest outside 11 Bankova Street from that date until 1 August 2015. From the materials in the case file, it transpires that the aim of the demonstration was to inform the President about alleged inefficiency of the investigation and to request him to intervene personally.6.  On 2, 3 and 4 June 2015 the applicants were allowed to enter Bankova Street and hold a demonstration at 2 Bankova Street. Officers of the Department of State Protection (“the Department”) placed themselves between the applicants and the Presidential Administration building and did not allow them to approach it.7.  On 5 and 6 June 2015 an officer did not allow the applicants to enter Bankova Street.8.  On 8 June 2015 the applicants instituted proceedings in the Kyiv District Administrative Court, asking it to stop the police, the Department and the Presidential Administration from preventing their exercise of the right to freedom of assembly.9.  On 17 June 2015 the court delivered a judgment in the applicants’ case, ordering the Department “to remove restrictions on the exercise of the applicants’ right to hold a peaceful assembly near the Presidential Administration building (11 Bankova Street, Kyiv), taking into account sections 1 and 9 of the Law on State Protection”. In the text of the decision the court also cited other provisions of that Law.10.  The court noted that it could be seen from a video recording submitted by the applicants that they had been holding a demonstration “at a certain distance” from the Presidential Administration building and that “there [had been] a chain of [officers between them and the building]”[1]. The court thus concluded that the applicants’ right to hold their demonstration near the administration building had been restricted. Before the court the Department stated that the applicants had not been allowed to approach the Presidential Administration building because foreign delegations had been visiting it on the dates in question. However, the court noted that no documentary evidence of those visits had been provided.11.  On 18 June 2015 the applicant informed the Kyiv State Administration that they intended to extend their protest until 31 December 2015.12.  According to the applicants, despite the judgment of 17 June 2015, officers of the Department continued to prevent their attempts to enter Bankova Street and hold a demonstration in front of the Presidential Administration building. On 19 June 2015 the applicants lodged a complaint with prosecutors, complaining about the Department’s failure to comply with the court judgment of 17 June 2015. Proceedings were instituted but closed on 27 July 2017 for lack of corpus delicti. That decision was not appealed against.13.  On two occasions the Department asked the court to clarify its judgment of 17 June 2015. However, the court refused to do so on 25 and 26 June 2015, respectively, stating that the judgment was sufficiently clear.14.  On 26 June 2015, by a separate decision, the court, of its own motion, gave a decision setting out a procedure for the execution of the judgment of 17 June 2015. It stated that its decision had been given “in an open hearing” held on that date. However, the introductory part of the decision contains no mention of the persons present at the hearing. The applicants submitted to the Court that they had not been informed of the hearing in advance and had not attended it.15.  The court noted that “at the hearing on 26 June 2015 the court observed that there were no substantive disagreements between the parties concerning the exact location of the [applicants’ intended] demonstration” and that, in particular, the applicants had pointed out that they intended to carry out the demonstration outside 11 Bankova Street “near the fence”.16.  The court pointed out that the Department had submitted to it that fences were located at the intersection of Bankova Street and Lyuteranska Street, at the point of entry to Bankova Street from Ivana Franka Square and at the intersection of Bankova Street and Instytutska Street. The court therefore interpreted the judgment of 17 June 2015 as allowing the applicants to hold their demonstration near the fences located at those points of entry.17.  Before the Court the applicants stated that they had consistently communicated to the authorities their intention to hold a demonstration outside 11 Bankova Street and had not mentioned that they intended to hold it “near the fence”. The documents submitted to the Court by the parties, including the applicants’ notifications to the Kyiv State Administration (see paragraph 5 above), mentioned that they intended to hold the demonstration at 11 Bankova Street. The fences in question were not mentioned. According to the applicants, said fences were located between 122 and 327 meters from the main entrance to the Presidential Administration at 11 Bankova Street.18.  Appeals lodged by the applicants against the decision of 26 June 2015 were rejected, with a final decision delivered by the Higher Administrative Court on 5 August 2015.19.  In November and December 2015, the applicants tried to hold a demonstration at 11 Bankova Street, but officers of the Department did not allow them beyond the checkpoints.20.  Section 1 of the Law on State protection of the authorities and officials of Ukraine (“the Law on State Protection”) provides that State protection of the authorities and officials of Ukraine is a system of organisational, legal and other measures carried out by State bodies in order to ensure the normal functioning of those authorities.21.  Section 5 of the Law on State Protection provides that the Department of State Protection ensures the security of the President of Ukraine at his permanent and temporary places of residence. Section 9 requires that State protection be provided in respect of the buildings where the President works, the vehicles which he uses, important State facilities and adjacent areas determined by the President.22.  Pursuant to section 18 of the Law on State Protection, to ensure such security, officers of the Department have a right to demand that individuals comply with the security measures in effect at locations subject to State protection. Together with designated police units, they also have a right to restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on streets and roads as part of security measures in respect of the President’s travel arrangements and during visits from foreign heads of State, parliaments or governments and other foreign delegations. They also have the right to prevent individuals from entering certain areas and to ask them to leave those areas.23.  In accordance with Article 263 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, a court may, on its own initiative, establish as an exceptional measure the procedure for the execution of a court decision “where circumstances arise that complicate enforcement of [that] decision”.THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT        ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION   Legal certainty24.  The applicants complained, invoking Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the decision of 26 June 2015 changed the substance of the judgment of 17 June 2015 and that the requirement of legal certainty had been violated.25.  The Government stated that this complaint was of a fourth‑instance nature and that the court decision had been based on law. They further submitted that the phrase “to remove restrictions on the exercise of the applicants’ right to hold a peaceful assembly near the Presidential Administration building (11 Bankova Street, Kyiv), taking into account sections 1 and 9 of the Law on State Protection” used in the judgment of 17 June 2015 did not mean that the applicants had been entitled to unrestricted access to the Presidential Administration building. Accordingly, the decision of 26 June 2015 had not altered the substance of the judgment of 17 June 2015, but had simply established a procedure for its execution in line with Article 263 of the Code of Administrative Procedure.26.  The applicants maintained their complaints.27.  The Court notes that the applicants’ complaints relate to the principle of legal certainty as safeguarded by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, rather than whether the domestic courts’ assessment of evidence was arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. They cannot therefore be regarded as complaints of a fourth-instance nature. On that basis, the Government’s objection must be dismissed. The applicants’ complaints are neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. They must, therefore, be declared admissible.28.  The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing must be interpreted in the light of the rule of law. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty (see Okyay and Others v. Turkey, no. 36220/97, § 73, ECHR 2005-VII), which requires, inter alia, that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII, and Agrokompleks v. Ukraine, no. 23465/03, § 148, 6 October 2011).29.  The Court observes that the Department was not precluded from appealing against the judgment of 17 June 2015. However, it did not avail itself of that opportunity.30.  The Court observes that in the decision setting out a procedure for the execution of the judgment of 17 June 2015, the Kyiv District Administrative Court found that the applicants had intended to hold their demonstration “near the fence” (see paragraph 15 above). The grounds on which the court based that conclusion remain unclear as the fence in question is not mentioned in the documents submitted to the Court by the parties (see paragraph 17 above). The Court observes in this connection that the introductory part of the decision of 26 June 2015 does not mention that the applicants were present at the hearing, which supports the applicants’ statement that it was held in their absence and they could not thus make any oral statements concerning holding a demonstration near the fence.31.  The Court accepts that under Article 263 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, a domestic court has a right to establish, of its own motion, the procedure for the execution of a judgment. It also accepts that in the judgment of 17 June 2015 the court ruled that the applicants’ right to hold a demonstration at 11 Bankova Street was subject to restrictions set out by the Law on State Protection.32.  In the Court’s view, there is a difference between holding a demonstration outside 11 Bankova Street and holding it near a fence located more than 100 metres from that address. From the text of the judgment of 17 June 2015 it cannot be inferred that the applicants were only allowed to hold their demonstration near the fence. That restriction was subsequently introduced by the decision of 26 June 2015.33.  In view of the above, the Court considers that by its decision of 26 June 2015 the Kyiv District Administrative Court, of its own motion, changed the substance of the judgment of 17 June 2015. It thus infringed the principle of legal certainty. The higher courts failed to rectify this following the applicants’ appeals. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.   Other complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention34.  The applicants complained that the proceedings before the Kyiv District Administrative Court had not been adversarial, as they had not been present at the hearing of 26 June 2015 and had not been able to present their arguments. They also complained that the court had violated the requirement of impartiality of Article 6 § 1 because it had not had the right to establish the procedure for execution of the judgment on its own initiative and that there had been no valid reasons for it to do so. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the remaining complaints under that provision (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).      ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION35.  The applicants complained that by its decision of 26 June 2015 the Kyiv District Administrative Court had imposed an unlawful and unjustified restriction on their right to freedom of assembly. They submitted that in its decision of 26 June 2015 the court had not referred to any of the legitimate aims listed in Article 11, that their demonstration had been peaceful and that there had been no pressing social need to justify the restriction. The applicants further complained that their right under Article 11 had also been restricted during their protest on Bankova Street on 2, 3 and 4 June 2015 as they had not been allowed to approach 11 Bankova Street (see paragraph 6 above) because several officers had placed themselves between the applicants and the Presidential Administration building.36.  The Government submitted that the restrictions imposed on the applicants’ right had not been incompatible with Article 11 and that no punitive measures had been applied to them. Initially the applicants had been allowed to demonstrate on Bankova Street and that only later had their right to do so been restricted, as the officials of the Department had asked them to move to a certain distance from the Presidential Administration building. The Government submitted that that restriction had been based on the law and had been justified on account of the socio-political situation in Ukraine following the events of 2014. They further stated that the Law on State Protection empowered the Department to impose restrictions on the movement of vehicles and pedestrians near the Presidential Administration building.37.  The applicants maintained their complaints.38.  The Court reiterates that the right to freedom of assembly is not absolute; it can be subject to restrictions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 11. An interference with the exercise of that right does not need to amount to an outright ban, legal or de facto, but can consist in various other measures taken by the authorities (see Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], no. 37553/05, § 100, ECHR 2015). Acts constitutive of interference must be taken to encompass any restrictive measures taken against an applicant in connection with his or her expressive conduct (see Pivkina and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 2134/23 and 6 others, § 76, 6 June 2023).39.  The Court accepts that the events complained of by the applicants constituted a restriction on their right to freedom of peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention. It also accepts that the interference was prescribed by law, notably the Law on State Protection, and pursued a legitimate aim of prevention of disorder or crime. The Court considers, however, that the restriction in question was not disproportionate to that aim having regard to the fact that on several occasions, the applicants were able to make their views publicly known, holding the demonstrations on 2, 3 and 4 June 2015 at 2 Bankova Street, near the Presidential Administration (see paragraph 6 above). The Court notes in this connection that the applicants’ demonstrations were aiming to make the President personally intervene in the criminal investigation into their stolen vehicles, the progress of which they considered too slow. The Court observes that although the public undeniably has an interest in the proper conduct of criminal investigations, the specific topic of the applicants’ demonstration was of limited public interest.40.  It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION41.  The first applicant claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) and the second applicant claimed EUR 35,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. They jointly claimed EUR 5,100 for legal assistance before the Court. The applicants asked this amount is to be transferred directly into the account of their lawyer, Mr Tarakhkalo.[2]42.  The Government contested these claims.43.  The Court awards each applicant EUR 900 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.44.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award each applicant EUR 500 covering costs for legal assistance before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, to be transferred directly to the account of the applicants’ lawyer Mr Tarakhkalo.[3]FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,     Declares the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the principle of legal certainty admissible and the complaints under Article 11 of the Convention inadmissible;     Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the principle of legal certainty;     Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remainder of the applicants’ complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;     Holds  that the respondent State is to pay each applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:  EUR 900 (nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;  EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses, to be transferred directly to the account of the applicants’ lawyer Mr Tarakhkalo[4];  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;     Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 March 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.  Martina Keller Andreas Zünd Deputy Registrar President[1] The video recording has not been made available to the Court.[2] Rectified on 18 March 2026: “The applicants asked this amount is to be transferred directly into the account of their lawyer, Mr Tarakhkalo” has been added.[3] Rectified on 18 March 2026: “(…), to be transferred directly to the account of the applicants’ lawyer Mr Tarakhkalo” has been added.[4] Rectified on 18 March 2026: “(…), to be transferred directly to the account of the applicants’ lawyer Mr Tarakhkalo has been added.