SECOND SECTION
CASE OF B.A. v. ICELAND
(Application no. 17006/20)
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 3 and Art 8 • Positive obligations • Effective investigation • Alleged failure to adequately protect the applicant and conduct an effective investigation into her complaints of domestic violence and sexual assault • Criminal law providing adequate mechanisms for protection • Investigation as a whole meeting the threshold of effectiveness required
Art 14 (+ Art 3 and Art 8) • Discrimination • Alleged gender-based discrimination in handling of domestic violence cases • Various legislative and policy measures adopted to combat sexual and domestic violence • Insufficient prima facie evidence of structural bias or disproportionate effect capable of shifting the burden of proof to the State
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
26 August 2025
 
FINAL
 
26/11/2025
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of B.A. v. Iceland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,
 Saadet Yüksel,
 Tim Eicke,
 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
 Gediminas Sagatys,
 Stéphane Pisani,
 Juha Lavapuro, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 17006/20) against the Republic of Iceland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Icelandic national, Ms B.A. (“the applicant”), on 23 March 2020;
the decision to give notice to the Icelandic Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the allegations of an ineffective investigation of domestic violence and gender-based discrimination, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 8 July 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns the alleged failure of the Icelandic authorities to conduct an effective investigation into the applicant’s complaints of domestic violence and sexual assault, as well as allegations of gender-based discrimination in the handling of such cases. The applicant complained under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Reykjavík. She was represented before the Court by Sigrún Ingibjörg Gísladóttir, a lawyer practising in Reykjavík. 3. The Government were initially represented by Einar Karl Hallvarðsson, Agent, and subsequently by Fanney Rós Þorsteinsdóttir. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. Alleged violence
5. In December 2017 the applicant lodged a complaint with the police against her former cohabitant, F.Þ., alleging physical, psychological and sexual violence during their relationship between 2011 and 2014. 6. According to the applicant’s complaint, she and F.Þ. began cohabiting in 2011. She stated that during their cohabitation, F.Þ. repeatedly humiliated and criticised her, isolated her from her immediate family and exercised control over various aspects of her life. She alleged that the psychological abuse intensified after she became pregnant and subsequently escalated into physical and sexual violence. 7. The applicant described four specific incidents of alleged sexual violence. These included an incident during her pregnancy when she was hospitalised, where F.Þ. allegedly coerced her into sexually stimulating him. She further alleged that he raped her during a visit to a rehabilitation clinic where she was staying, another time in the hallway of their home and again while she was sleeping, which, according to her statement, resulted in bruising. She also described physical violence on two occasions: a brief chokehold and a “headbutt”. Police investigation
8. During the police investigation, the applicant was assisted by her officially appointed legal representative. When questioned, the applicant stated she had never sought immediate medical attention following any of the incidents. 9. F.Þ. was first questioned on 19 September 2018. He denied any wrongdoing, asserting that he had never subjected the applicant to physical, psychological or sexual violence or any other form of mistreatment. He attributed the difficulties in their relationship to the applicant’s excessive alcohol consumption and related behaviour. F.Þ. acknowledged having engaged in sexual intercourse with the applicant at the rehabilitation clinic but denied that it constituted rape. While denying any psychological violence on his part, he admitted to having been controlling towards the applicant in situations where he had urged her to stop consuming alcohol or to refrain from going to work under its influence. 10. Eleven witnesses were subsequently questioned. Several stated that they had observed changes in the applicant after she began cohabiting with F.Þ., noting that she had significantly reduced contact with others or ceased communication altogether. Some witnesses also described instances in which F.Þ. had humiliated the applicant or displayed anger, although not directed at her. One witness stated that he had heard the applicant scream and found her trembling and scared after an incident involving F.Þ., which the applicant had described as involving a chokehold. There were no direct witnesses to the alleged physical or sexual violence by F.Þ.; most witness accounts were based on disclosures made by the applicant after their relationship had ended. 11. The case file included a certificate from Stígamót, the centre for victims of sexual abuse, dated 21 December 2017, stating that the applicant had attended consultations there since April 2015 and had reported experiencing severe mental, physical and sexual violence by F.Þ. It also contained documents from the psychiatric ward regarding visits in 2012 and 2017 recording her depression and anxiety, and a statement from a psychologist dated 12 February 2019 diagnosing the applicant with post‑traumatic stress disorder following an alleged sexual offence. Decisions by domestic authorities
12. On 11 June 2019 the police informed the applicant of their decision to discontinue the investigation. With respect to the alleged sexual violence, the police determined that, given F.Þ.’s denial and the available evidence, there was insufficient support for the allegations and that further investigation was unlikely to improve the evidentiary position. Regarding the alleged physical violence, the police concluded that, as Article 218b of the General Penal Code (the “GPC”) had not been enacted until 2016, the alleged conduct could be considered only under Article 217. As the statute of limitations for offences under Article 217 had expired, prosecution was no longer possible. 13. On 25 September 2019 the State Prosecutor upheld this decision. It was concluded that Article 218b could not be applied retroactively to conduct which had not been criminalised before its entry into force in 2016. While the physical violence alleged by the applicant had been, before that time, punishable under Article 217, the statute of limitations for such offences was two years and had thus expired. With regard to the allegations of sexual violence, the State Prosecutor found that the evidence, including witness testimony and expert documentation of the applicant’s distress, did not provide sufficiently strong support for the applicant’s testimony to overcome F.Þ.’s denial. It was thus not considered “sufficient or likely” to secure a conviction. Finally, the State Prosecutor concluded that further investigation measures would not change the evidentiary position of the case. 14. Subsequent to the State Prosecutor’s decision of 25 September 2019, the applicant’s legal representative raised the question of whether F.Þ.’s conduct could have been characterised as gross defamation of a closely related person under Article 233b of the GPC. In its email of 3 February 2020, the State Prosecutor replied that its review of the case had not been confined to the police’s classification of the alleged offences. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Domestic legal frameworkConstitution of the Republic of Iceland

15. Article 65 provides that everyone shall be equal before the law and enjoy human rights irrespective of, inter alia, sex. The second paragraph states that men and women shall enjoy equal rights in all respects. General Penal Code No. 19/1940 (Almenn hegningarlög)Provisions on sexual and physical violence

16. Article 194, as amended by Act No. 61/2007 and in force until its further amendment in 2018, provided:
“Any person who engages in sexual intercourse or other sexual relations with another person by means of violence, threats or other unlawful coercion shall be guilty of rape and shall be imprisoned for a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 16 years. ‘Violence’ here includes deprivation of freedom of action by means of confinement, drugs or other comparable means. It shall also be considered rape, subject to the same punishment as specified in the first paragraph, to exploit a person’s psychiatric disorder or other mental disability, or their inability, for any other reason, to resist the act or understand its significance, in order to engage in sexual intercourse or other sexual relations with them”. 17. The Explanatory Report to Act No. 61/2007 stated that the main characteristic of sexual offences is a violation of a person’s sexual autonomy and that the bill aimed to reduce emphasis on the means employed and stress that “the offences involve sexual relations without the victim’s consent”. As regards the proposed wording of Article 194, it stated that “the underlying idea is that the new provision on rape should apply to situations where sexual intercourse occurs without the victim’s consent, as the absence of consent is a fundamental condition”. Article 194(1) was subsequently amended by Act no. 16/2018 to define rape as “sexual intercourse or other sexual relations with a person without their consent”, specifying also that consent must be freely stated and that it is not considered to have been given if violence, threats or other forms of unlawful coercion are employed. 18. In its judgment of 20 June 2017 (case no. 486/2016) the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of two men for rape. Although the evidence indicated that the victim had been heavily intoxicated, unable to recall the entirety of the events and unaware of her whereabouts, the court found that her state was not such as to engage Article 194(2) of the GPC. The court emphasised that the essential element of a sexual offence is the engagement in sexual activity without the victim’s consent, thereby infringing the individual’s right to sexual self-determination. It concluded that, owing to her level of intoxication, the victim had been incapable of giving consent and that the defendants had exploited this. The court also observed a marked disparity in position and physical strength between the parties. The defendants were accordingly found guilty of rape by means of “unlawful coercion” under Article 194(1) of the GPC. 19. Article 217 provides:
“Any person convicted of assault, provided it is not as serious as is described in Article 218, shall be fined or imprisoned for up to six months, and imprisoned for up to one year if the conduct involved is particularly reprehensible”. 20. Article 218 provides:
“If by a deliberate assault someone causes another person physical injury or health damage and these consequences can be regarded as his or her fault in terms of intention or negligence, the person shall be imprisoned for up to three years, or fined if there are extenuating circumstances. Where serious physical injury or health damage results from an assault or where the offence is particularly dangerous in view of the method, including the implements, used, and also where the assault victim dies as a consequence of the attack, punishment for the offence shall take the form of up to sixteen years’ imprisonment”. Domestic violence provisions
21. Article 218b, introduced into the GPC by Amending Act no. 23/2016 and in force from 5 April 2016, provides:
“Any person who, repeatedly or seriously poses a threat to the life, health or well-being of his or her present or former spouse or cohabiting partner, to his or her descendant or the descendant of his or her present or former spouse or cohabiting partner, to an older person in his or her direct blood-line, or to other persons who live with him or her in the home or are in his or her care, by means of violence, threats, deprivation of freedom, coercion or in another manner, shall be imprisoned for up to six years. A gross violation may be punishable by up to sixteen years’ imprisonment. When the seriousness of the violation is assessed, particular consideration shall be given to whether the injured party suffered major physical injury or damage to his or her health or whether the violation was fatal. Furthermore, consideration shall be given to whether the violation was committed in a particularly painful or injurious manner, whether it lasted a long time or whether the perpetrator grossly abused his or her superior position vis-à-vis the injured party”. 22. The Explanatory Report to Act No. 23/2016 clarifies that, although Article 218b highlights that domestic violence should not be regarded as a series of isolated incidents but rather as a continuous situation creating a climate of threat and fear, a single incident, if serious enough, can also engage criminal liability under the provision. It further explains that the means by which domestic violence might be committed are not limited to physical violence, threats, deprivation of freedom or coercion, but can also include forms of social, psychological and financial violence. 23. Article 233 provides that anyone who makes a threat of committing a criminal act designed to cause another person to fear for their life, health or well-being, or that of other persons, shall be fined or imprisoned for up to two years. 24. Article 233b provides that anyone who insults or denigrates their spouse or ex-spouse, child or other closely related person, where the offence constitutes gross defamation, shall be imprisoned for up to two years. General provisions
25. Article 2 provides that where penal legislation is amended between the commission of an offence and the delivery of judgment, the case shall be adjudicated in accordance with the newer legislation with respect to both criminal liability and punishment. However, no punishment may be imposed unless authorised by law at the time the act was committed, nor may a more severe punishment be imposed than that which would have been applicable under the law in force at that time. 26. Article 70(3) stipulates that where an offence is committed against a person closely related to the perpetrator and the nature of their relationship is deemed to have aggravated the seriousness of the offence, this shall normally be considered an aggravating factor in determining the punishment. 27. Article 81 establishes statutory limitation periods: two years for offences carrying a maximum penalty of one year’s imprisonment, five years for those punishable with up to four years’ imprisonment, ten years for offences punishable with up to ten years’ imprisonment and fifteen years for offences subject to over ten years’ maximum imprisonment. Criminal Procedure Act No. 88/2008
28. The Act contains detailed provisions on criminal investigations and prosecutions. These include the requirements that investigations shall be carried out expeditiously (Article 53), that the police shall investigate when necessary based on knowledge or suspicion of crime regardless of whether a complaint has been received (Article 52), and that the burden of proof regarding guilt lies with the prosecution (Article 108). It also provides that, after receiving the case, the prosecutor may instruct the police to undertake additional investigative measures (Article 57), and that an indictment shall not be issued unless the investigative material is considered sufficient or likely to secure a conviction (Article 145). 29. Article 41 provides that the police shall appoint a legal representative for victims in sexual offence cases upon request, and in all cases where the victim is under eighteen. In cases concerning domestic violence, the police shall also appoint a legal representative when it is considered necessary. Upon the initiation of court proceedings, the legal representative shall be appointed by the court. Act on Restraining Orders and Removal from the Home No. 85/2011
30. The Act permits the imposition of restraining orders where there is reasonable suspicion of the commission, or the risk of commission, of a criminal offence, or where the perpetrator otherwise disturbs the victim’s peace (Article 4). The perpetrator may also be arrested and removed from the home if there is reasonable suspicion of the commission, or the danger of commission, of certain punishable offences, including sexual and physical violence as well as offences under Articles 233 and 233b and, since its entry into force, Article 218b of the GPC (Article 5). Council of Europe
31. The Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), in its Baseline Evaluation Report on legislative and other measures giving effect to the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) in the Republic of Iceland, GREVIO/Inf(2022)26, published on 14 November 2022, noted the persistence of gender stereotypes and the continued need to address violence against women in Iceland, while highlighting “the clear commitment” by the Icelandic Government to “combat gender-based violence, to improve the legal status of victims [and] to prioritise the striving for gender equality” (§§ 2-3). It welcomed Iceland’s ranking in 2021, for the twelfth consecutive year, at the top of the Global Gender Gap Index, and commended the Icelandic authorities for the “official anchoring of a gender equality perspective in all areas of governance and policy making” (§ 16). 32. As regards coordinated and comprehensive measures to prevent and combat violence against women, GREVIO noted that “the first action plan on domestic and sexual violence in Iceland [had been] introduced in 2006” and was followed by further action plans on gender-based violence, which focused on combating domestic violence and sexual violence against women and children and aimed to improve the legal status of and facilities for victims. Emphasis was also placed on “strengthening preventive efforts against violence” (§ 30). 33. As regards the collection of data on violence against women, GREVIO noted that, according to the authorities, statistics on such violence were “not currently compiled in a single location” and that “there [was] no overview available on the extent of the different forms of violence covered by the Istanbul Convention in Iceland”. Nevertheless, the police collected data on domestic violence “disaggregated by sex, age, nationality, type and place of the offence, and relationship of the perpetrator to the victim”. Statistics on sexual and domestic violence, including yearly trends, were published on the police website and updated quarterly. Overall, the police and police prosecutors had “a solid data system in place for recording reported offences of sexual violence and domestic violence”. However, GREVIO regretted that “no data on indictments or convictions [were] being collected or made available publicly” (§§ 53-55). 34. As regards the substantive criminal-law provisions and the initiation of proceedings, GREVIO noted with satisfaction that the Icelandic GPC provides for ex officio initiation of legal proceedings in relation to all of the offences listed in Article 55, paragraph 1, of the Istanbul Convention (§ 286). It also noted legislative developments following a 2012 report on the GPC’s conformity with the Convention and remarked that they demonstrated “Iceland’s serious commitment to tackling violence against women and stemming impunity” (§ 192). GREVIO observed that, with one exception, the aggravating circumstances contained in Article 46 of the Convention form part of the Icelandic legislation, either in Article 70 of the GPC or as a part of the provisions of the substantive criminal law (§ 234). It further welcomed the adoption of the new Article 218b and noted the judicial clarification of the threshold for its application in cases of a single violent incident. It observed, however, that acts of psychological violence occurring between partners who do not share a residence were not covered within its scope, and that its efficiency in terms of protecting against psychological violence remained to be seen (§§ 193 and 199). 35. As regards the response of law-enforcement agencies, GREVIO welcomed the issuance of protocols for police officers dealing with cases of domestic violence by the National Commissioner for Police “as early as 2005”, with subsequent updates in 2014 and 2018. It was satisfied that these protocols were “comprehensive and provided a model of good practice consistent with the requirements of the Istanbul Convention”, although it noted that their implementation “remain[ed] inconsistent and further effort [was] required in that respect” (§ 242). It also noted the State Prosecutor’s issuance, in 2017, of instructions prioritising the investigation of rape cases, cases involving violence against children and violence in close relationships and, in 2018, of instructions requiring the implementation of a standardised and timed investigation plan for such cases (§ 251). GREVIO further noted that “following a study conducted in 2013 and 2014, which found that acquittal rates for sexual offences were high in Iceland, an Action Plan on Sexual Offences was passed by the parliament in 2017” with “several measures to improve the situation, in particular aimed at increasing the rate of prosecutions and convictions of perpetrators of sexual offences”. It also provided for “15 new full-time police officer positions ... added to police departments all over the country”, and additional funding to update procedures and investigative equipment (§ 250). 36. Noting the concerns raised by NGOs and women’s organisations over the number of cases concerning sexual violence that did not proceed to prosecution, and how the deployment of more resources to their investigation created “a new bottleneck” in prosecutions (§§ 252-53), GREVIO urged the authorities “to significantly reinforce their investigative and prosecutorial capacity and to take immediate measures to ensure a prompt and appropriate response by law-enforcement agencies in all cases of violence against women” (§ 259). GREVIO further observed that, as regards domestic violence, “the lack of statistics in respect of interventions, prosecutions and convictions [made] it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the system”. It noted that “numerous concerns were raised by NGOs and women’s organisations in respect of the delays in getting to court, leading to reduced or suspended sentences, and unduly negative approaches to women victims of violence at District Court and Court of Appeal level” (§ 263). United Nations
37. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), in its Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of Iceland, adopted at its sixty-third session on 15 February - 4 March 2016 (CEDAW/C/ISL/CO/7-8), noted with concern the increasing number of cases of violence against women and welcomed “the new rules, procedures and risk assessment tool issued by the Reykjavik Metropolitan Police in March 2015 for cases of domestic violence”. It expressed particular concern about “the high number of discontinuances in criminal proceedings on charges of violence against women, in particular rape and sexual violence, by the State Prosecutor and the low number of convictions” and recommended, among other measures, that Iceland incorporate the Istanbul Convention into national legislation to strengthen legal protection for women, including by criminalising online harassment and psychological violence. It further called upon Iceland to enhance efforts to prosecute and convict perpetrators of rape and sexual violence and analyse and address the causes of the high acquittal rates (§§ 19‑20). 38. In its Concluding Observations on the Ninth Periodic Report of Iceland, adopted at its eighty-fifth session (8-26 May 2023) (CEDAW/C/ISL/CO/9), the CEDAW Committee noted with appreciation Iceland’s top ranking in the 2022 Global Gender Gap Index and welcomed the progress achieved since the last report, including the criminalisation of digital sexual violence and stalking, increased protection for victims of psychological violence and the definition of rape based on absence of consent. However, it expressed concern over “the high number of criminal proceedings concerning gender-based violence against women, in particular rape and sexual violence, discontinued by the State Prosecutor and the low number of convictions, notwithstanding the adoption and implementation of the action plan concerning sexual offences for the period 2018-2022”. It also highlighted “the lack of disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence against women and girls, including domestic violence”. Among other measures, it recommended addressing the causes of underreporting and high acquittal rates in cases of gender-based violence and ensuring the collection and analysis of data on all such forms of violence (§§ 4, 25-26). THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION
39. The applicant complained that the authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into her allegations of ill-treatment and to provide adequate protection against gender-based violence, in breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, which read as follows:
Article 3
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment ...”
Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ...”
Admissibility
40. The Government acknowledged that the applicant had exhausted effective remedies in the criminal proceedings by appealing to the State Prosecutor. They submitted, however, that her complaint was manifestly ill‑founded. The applicant contested the Government’s submission in this respect. 41. The Court takes note of the Government’s acknowledgment concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies. As regards the objection concerning the alleged manifestly ill-founded nature of the complaint, the Court considers that the arguments put forward in relation to this objection raise issues which require an examination on the merits of the complaint under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, rather than an assessment of its admissibility (see Mehmet Çiftci v. Turkey, no. 53208/19, § 26, 16 November 2021, and the authorities cited therein). 42. The Court thus considers that this complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. MeritsSubmissions by the parties

(a)   The applicant
43. The applicant submitted that the domestic legal framework had failed to afford practical and effective protection of her rights. She asserted that, prior to the entry into force of Article 218b of the General Penal Code (the “GPC”) in 2016, victims of domestic violence had not been adequately protected under Icelandic law, a deficiency identified in the observations of the CEDAW Committee. In her view, equating domestic violence with random physical assaults, particularly in relation to the two-year limitation period for offences under Article 217 of the GPC, was incompatible with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and also with the Istanbul Convention. Furthermore, at the material time psychological abuse had not been criminalised and the element of consent had not been sufficiently taken into account in the definition of rape. 44. The applicant disputed the Government’s claim that domestic violence cases were prioritised by the police, pointing to significant delays in her case before F.Þ. was questioned and witness statements were taken. While acknowledging that a period of time had elapsed between the incidents and her complaint, she maintained that this made it more crucial to commence an effective investigation immediately to secure available evidence. The various guidelines and procedures for the expedited handling of such cases were of little value if they were not effectively implemented in practice. Furthermore, the Government’s decision to increase funding to ensure effective investigations after the investigation in her case further demonstrated that the delays in her proceedings had been unacceptable. 45. The applicant further maintained that her account was credible and corroborated by additional evidence, including medical records and witness testimony. However, the police systematically discounted or dismissed victims’ evidence in domestic violence cases, while according undue weight to the denials of the accused. Witness statements describing threatening behaviour, controlling conduct, events surrounding the alleged chokehold and visible injuries after the end of her relationship with F.Þ. ought to have been considered as part of the overall body of evidence. The dismissal of witness testimony as merely “retelling” the victims’ accounts inappropriately diminished crucial evidence in domestic violence cases, where direct witnesses were rare by nature. 46. The applicant emphasised that, despite F.Þ. admitting to sexual intercourse while she was pregnant at the rehabilitation clinic, the police failed to conduct a proper investigation into the issue of consent. She maintained that her PTSD diagnosis, reports from the Stígamót support centre, medical records and witness testimony had all been improperly disregarded. She further noted that, despite contradictions in F.Þ.’s testimony, including his admission of controlling behaviour while denying abuse, his account was preferred. The police failed to follow up on his admissions or develop lines of questioning regarding his controlling conduct to assess whether it constituted an offence under the GPC. The police had also failed to consider whether his conduct could have constituted gross defamation under Article 233b. The applicant submitted that the investigation’s failure to properly examine the issue of consent in relation to the incident at the rehabilitation clinic reflected the same rigid approach to rape investigations that the Court had previously condemned (referring in particular to M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, ECHR 2003-XII, and E.M. v. Romania, no. 43994/05, 30 October 2012). She argued that witness accounts had been improperly dismissed and that the exclusive focus on F.Þ.’s denial, while disregarding corroborating evidence of abuse, demonstrated systemic shortcomings in the investigation of gender-based violence. (b)   The Government
47. The Government submitted that investigations into sexual assault and domestic violence had been prioritised by the police and prosecution for decades. Before the enactment of Article 218b of the GPC in 2016, protection had been provided through Articles 217 and 218 on physical assault and Article 70(3), which prescribed aggravated punishment for offences committed within close relationships. Although psychological violence had not been a punishable offence, Articles 233 and 233b had penalised intimidation and gross defamation in domestic violence cases. Article 194 of the GPC had further been amended several times in line with evolving standards on sexual violence and the Court’s case-law. By amending Act no. 61/2007, the emphasis on the means employed had been reduced and the rape offence had been conceptualised with reference to the lack of consent. This had subsequently been confirmed in the case-law of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 18 above). 48. The Government emphasised that investigators were required to establish the truth and give equal weight to evidence supporting both acquittal and conviction, in accordance with Article 70 of the Constitution and Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. While accepting that the burden of proof in domestic and sexual violence cases was difficult, the Government rejected the applicant’s claim that it was “almost impossible to fulfil”. The legislative framework allowed for consideration of various types of evidence, including medical certificates concerning psychological effects and accounts of events before and after the alleged incidents. 49. While acknowledging an increase in the influx cases during 2017‑18 and a lack of manpower, the Government maintained that this had been met with organisational changes and increased funding, noting in particular the addition of six full-time positions at the Reykjavík Metropolitan Police Department. This did not, therefore, indicate that sexual and domestic violence cases had not been prioritised. Urgent cases reported immediately after an incident were given priority over those reported later, such as the applicant’s case. The delays were not due to the nature of the offences, nor did they suggest a lack of police prioritisation. Instructions issued by the State Prosecutor placed clear emphasis on expediting proceedings and prioritising such cases. 50. With respect to the investigation in the applicant’s case, the Government, while acknowledging that more than nine months had elapsed between her statement and the questioning of F.Þ., maintained that this delay had not prejudiced the proceedings. As the complaint concerned events that had taken place between 2011 and 2014 but were first reported in December 2017, the case did not require immediate action to secure evidence. The Government acknowledged that witnesses had been questioned between eleven and thirteen months after the complaint was lodged but maintained that this too had not affected the outcome. The investigation had been comprehensive, a large number of witnesses were questioned, but none had been able to confirm the applicant’s accusations in the face of F.Þ.’s denial. The applicant had not obtained medical records documenting injuries, and certificates from support services had not been sufficient proof that her mental condition could be linked to the events described. Article 233b of the GPC was not deemed relevant in the circumstances of her case, as the applicant had not explained how she believed F.Þ. had been guilty of gross defamation of character against her. 51. The Government emphasised that, in cases involving sexual offences and domestic violence, direct witnesses were often absent and that investigations generally relied on witness testimony regarding events before and after the incidents, as well as victims’ disclosures. While it was common practice to take into account certificates from psychologists and other support services, such evidence was insufficient to support prosecution in the applicant’s case. They distinguished the present case from the Court’s findings in M.C. v. Bulgaria (cited above) and E.B. v. Romania (no. 49089/10, 19 March 2019), arguing that unlike in those cases, the domestic authorities had properly explored the available evidence and assessed credibility of conflicting accounts.

Outcome for Article 14: no_violation