SECOND SECTION
CASE OF TRADE UNION OF SOCIAL SECTOR WORKERS
AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 33144/21)
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 11 • Freedom of association • Protracted compulsory arbitration proceedings held to set the minimum level of services to be provided during strike action by social sector workers • Excessive delays precluded the possibility of using strike action in a timely manner to support the trade unions’ efforts to improve the working conditions of social sector employees, stripping the applicants proposed strike action of its relevance • Disproportionate restriction on the applicants’ rights • Interference not necessary in a democratic society
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
12 May 2026
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Trade Union of Social Sector Workers and Others v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,
 Saadet Yüksel,
 Péter Paczolay,
 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
 Gediminas Sagatys,
 Stéphane Pisani,
 Hugh Mercer, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 33144/21) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the Trade Union of Social Sector Workers (Szociális Ágazatban Dolgozók Szakszervezete – “the applicant trade union”) and three Hungarian nationals (“the second, third and fourth applicants”) listed in the appended table, on 28 June 2021;
the decision to give notice to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”) of the application;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 31 March 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The applicants complain under Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention of the protracted nature of arbitration proceedings held to set the minimum level of services to be provided during strike action by social sector workers. THE FACTS
2. The applicants’ details are set out in the appended table. The applicant trade union represents social sector workers providing essential services. The second, third and fourth applicants (respectively, Mr Norbert Ferencz, Ms Mónika Julia Koloszi and Mr Bulcsú Mihály) are members of it. They were represented by Ms B. Ivány, a lawyer practising in Budapest. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, from the Ministry of Justice. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5. On 17 December 2019 the applicant trade union, joined by the Trade Union of Hungarian Civil Servants and Public Employees (Magyar Köztisztviselők, Közalkalmazottak és Közszolgálati Dolgozók Szakszervezete – “the MKKSZ”), decided to organise a strike of certain social sector workers seeking a number of measures to improve the working conditions and pay and pension rights of their members and the establishment of a national labour roundtable. They announced strikes for 12 February, 13 March, 1 April, 13 May, 10 June, 15 July, 19 August, 16 September, 21 October, 18 November and 9 December 2020. 6. The trade unions submitted their offer of minimum services, as required by section 4(3) of Act no. VII of 1989 on strikes (“the Strike Act” - see paragraph 17 below), to the Ministry of Human Resources, representing the Government, on 17 December 2019. They were informed on 15 January 2020 that their offer had not been accepted by the Government and they were instructed to submit a new offer. 7. On 6 February 2020 the trade unions lodged an application with the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court requesting that it define the scope of minimum services. The court rejected their application as incomplete on 11 February and the trade unions’ legal representative submitted a new application on 12 February. 8. The relevant proceedings were discontinued on 19 February 2020 with the court reasoning that it could not be established that the negotiations between the parties to set the minimum level of services had failed, which, according to section 4(3) of the Strike Act (see paragraph 17 below), was a precondition to access the courts. The trade unions appealed against that decision and on 6 March 2020 the Budapest High Court quashed it and remitted the case to the Administrative and Labour Court, finding that the negotiations had ended without success. 9. On 18 March the first-instance court informed the parties that, owing the special legal order and extraordinary court recess declared because of the COVID-19 pandemic, procedural deadlines were suspended. The trade unions’ legal representative made submissions in that connection on the same day, and on 19 March 2020 the court quashed its own decision concerning the suspension. 10. The Administrative and Labour Court considered that the rules on the extraordinary court recess were not applicable to non-contentious proceedings. It also ruled that the trade unions had met their statutory obligation to propose a level of minimum services to be maintained during strike days and that the Ministry had failed to submit its own proposal as required by law. The court established a level of minimum services to be maintained by amending the proposal of the trade unions, taking into account the Government’s submissions on the need to maintain essential services during the pandemic. The Government appealed against that decision to the Budapest High Court on 25 March 2020. The case file was transmitted to the second-instance court on 26 March 2020. 11. On 14 April 2020 the Budapest High Court referred the case file back to the Administrative and Labour Court, apparently for the correction of errors in the Government’s notice of appeal. On 20 April 2020 the Administrative and Labour Court gave a rectification decision and transmitted the case file to the second-instance court. The case file was again referred back to the Administrative and Labour Court on 7 May 2020 for further corrections, and the rectified case file was registered at the Budapest High Court on 14 May 2020. 12. On 25 May 2020 the Budapest High Court overturned the first instance decision (see paragraph 10 above) and dismissed the trade unions’ application. It agreed with the Administrative and Labour Court that the extraordinary court recess and the special legal order did not prevent a decision from being given on the merits of the trade unions’ claim. However, given that it was not possible to predict when the pandemic would end, the court held that it was also impossible to establish when a strike could lawfully be held and, thus, to decide on the minimum level of services that had to be offered on the proposed strike days. 13. On 9 July 2020, the trade unions lodged petitions for review with the Kúria. They also lodged a constitutional complaint, which was rejected on 29 July 2020. The lower instance courts were informed of that decision on 14 August 2020. 14. On 16 September 2020 the Kúria set a fifteen-day deadline for the Government to submit observations. On 30 October 2020 the Government requested an extension of the deadline and eventually filed their counter-observations on 13 November 2020. 15. On 25 November 2020 the Kúria quashed the second-instance decision (see paragraph 12 above) and upheld the decision of the Administrative and Labour Court (see paragraph 10 above). It held that the second-instance court had erred in finding that holding strikes on the days proposed by the trade unions would have been unlawful given the pandemic. It emphasised the protraction of the short time-limits applicable to strike-related non-contentious proceedings and explained that the second-instance court should have decided on the case based on the legal provisions as in force at the time when the application was lodged. It also pointed out that the Government had not fulfilled its statutory obligation to submit a meaningful proposal as to minimum services. 16. The decision was transmitted to the first-instance court on 23 December 2020 and notified to the trade unions on 31 January 2021. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK and practice
17. The relevant provisions of the Strike Act read as follows:
Section 4
“... (2) In the case of an employer that carries out activities that fundamentally affect the population – in particular in the field of public transport and telecommunications, as well as bodies providing electricity, water, gas and other energy services – a strike may only be carried out if it does not prevent the provision of a sufficient service. (3) The extent and conditions of a sufficient service may be established by law. In the absence of legal regulation, the extent and conditions of a sufficient service must be agreed upon during the consultation prior to the strike; in this case, the strike may be held if the parties have concluded the agreement or, failing that, if the extent and conditions of a sufficient service have been established by a final decision of a court [in a case brought by] either of the parties. (4) The rules on competence and on jurisdiction set out in section 5(1) and the rules set out in section 5(2) shall apply to proceedings before a court adjudicating in a labour dispute pursuant to section (3).
...”
Section 5
“... (2) The court hearing the labour case shall decide within five working days, in a non‑contentious procedure, if necessary after hearing the parties. An appeal may be filed against the decision of the court hearing the labour case within five days of its notification. The appeal, together with all the documents of the case, shall be submitted to the second instance court on the day of its receipt. The second instance court shall decide within five working days.
...”
18. Opinion no. 1/2013 (IV.8) of the Kúria’s Administrative and Labour Law Chamber provides the following:
“... If the applicant’s application is aimed at determining the extent and conditions of minimum services [that have to be provided] to be able to hold a strike, it is not necessary to examine the legality or illegality of the planned strike in the absence of a request for this as a preliminary issue ...
... In view of the short deadline provided for non-contentious proceedings, the parties are particularly expected to make a serious, professionally substantiated statement in the proceedings before the court, in accordance with the basic principles of labour law (such as good faith, fairness, mutual cooperation and proper exercise of rights) on the extent and conditions of minimum services, knowing that the court may make its decision according to the final proposal of the other party or may decide to reject the application if the final proposal does not comply with the basic principles of labour law or with the prohibition under section 3(3)[of the Strike Act, namely] that a strike cannot be held if it would directly and seriously endanger life, health, physical integrity, or the environment, or would prevent the prevention of natural damage.
...”
THE LAW
         ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLEs 11 and 13 OF THE CONVENTION
19. The applicants complained under Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention that the failure of the domestic authorities to reach a decision in a timely manner on the minimum services to be provided during their proposed strike had violated their right to freedom of assembly and association and the right to an effective remedy. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), considers that the present complaint falls to be examined only from the standpoint of Article 11 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”
   Admissibility
20. The Government requested the Court to declare the application inadmissible in respect of the second, third and fourth applicants on the ground that those applicants had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, since they had not been parties to the domestic proceedings brought by the applicant trade union against the State. 21. The applicants submitted that, although it was true that only the applicant trade union had been a party to the domestic proceedings, the second, third and fourth applicants had been directly concerned by those proceedings. The interests of the trade union and the interests of its members were inextricably interlinked and, in such instances, the remedial actions taken by the trade union had to be attributed to its members as well, who therefore should be exempted from pursuing remedies separately. They invited the Court to find that the application lodged by the applicant trade union to the domestic courts and the non-contentious proceedings had concerned both the interest of the relevant trade union and those of its members. 22. The general principles concerning exhaustion of domestic remedies are summarised in Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC] (no. 21881/20, §§ 138-146, 27 November 2023). The Court observes that the second, third and fourth applicants are members of the applicant trade union. The interests sought to be protected by them before the Court are identical to those pursued by the applicant trade union collectively on behalf of all the union members, initially before the national courts and subsequently before the Court. It has not been suggested by the Government that the second, third and fourth applicants might have obtained a different outcome had they brought proceedings before the domestic courts, either together with the applicant trade union or in a separate action. Against this background, the Court does not find that their omission to do so can be viewed as a failure to exhaust the domestic remedies (see, mutatis mutandis, Federation of Offshore Workers’ Trade Unions and Others v. Norway (dec.), no. 38190/97, ECHR 2002-VI). The Government’s objection must therefore be rejected. 23. The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits     The parties’ arguments   The applicants

24. The applicants argued that the strikes had been time-sensitive as they had been linked to certain events and could have lost their relevance with the passing of time. Therefore, in their view, judicial protection of the right to strike could only have been regarded as real and effective if it had been sufficiently speedy. The applicants submitted that the last strike day foreseen in their application had been 9 December 2020 (see paragraph 5 above). The applicant trade union received the final decision on the application seeking the determination of minimum services only on 31 January 2021 (see paragraph 16 above), almost a year after it had been lodged, effectively excluding any possibility of holding a strike on the anticipated dates. They disputed the Government’s argument that such a delay was minor (see paragraph 27 below) and maintained that it had deprived their right to strike of its essence. 25. The applicants contended that there had been three reasons for the delay in the domestic proceedings. First, several mistakes and omissions by the domestic courts. In particular, the Administrative and Labour Court had erred in discontinuing the proceedings on 11 February 2020 (see paragraph 7 above), and it had also made several errors that had required rectification before the case could be examined by the second-instance court. Furthermore, neither the first- nor the second-instance courts had respected the statutory deadlines (see Section 5(2) of the Strike Act, quoted in paragraph 17 above), and the Kúria had granted the Government’s request for an extension of the relevant time-limit (see paragraph 14 above), even though it had been submitted belatedly. Second, the legal framework had been inadequate to guarantee the timely processing of strike‑related cases, in particular because the Kúria was not bound by the time-limits. Third, the Government had failed to put forward a proposal for minimum services to be maintained during strike days, even though it had been obliged to do so under section 4 of the Strike Act (see paragraph 17 above). 26. For the same reasons the applicants took issue with the lawfulness of the restriction of their right to strike, arguing that it had been brought about because neither the Government nor the lower-level courts had fulfilled their statutory obligations: the Government had not submitted a proposal for minimum services and the courts had not acted within the deadlines prescribed by the Strike Act. The Government
27. The Government submitted that there had been a five-day delay notifying the applicant trade union of the Kúria’s decision because of the court recess between 24 December 2020 and 1 January 2021, which had unlawfully restricted the applicant trade union’s right to strike. However, that infringement had been of a minor nature as it had not permanently deprived the applicant trade union of its right to strike: a strike could have been announced for a new date at any time. Furthermore, the applicant trade union had contributed to the protraction of the proceedings as its original application lodged with the Administrative and Labour Court on 6 February 2020 had been incomplete and had had to be resubmitted (see paragraph 7 above). The Court’s assessment
28. The Court observes that the applicants’ complaint does not relate to a denial of their right to strike in general, but to the delays in the labour court proceedings relating to the definition of minimum services to be provided in the social sector during strike days, which was a precondition of strike action (see section 4(2) and (3) of the Strike Act, quoted in paragraph 17 above). They argued that those delays had affected their rights under Article 11 of the Convention, especially their ability to hold strikes in a timely manner. The Court has previously accepted that compulsory arbitration constituted an interference with the right to freedom of association (see Association of Academics v. Iceland (dec.), no. 2451/16, § 28, 15 May 2018). It accepts in the present case that delays in the arbitration restricted the possibility of strike action and thereby interfered with the applicants’ freedom of association, of which trade-union freedom is a specific aspect. 29. The Court’s approach to trade-union freedom has been set out in, amongst others, the case of Association of Civil Servants and Union for Collective Bargaining v. Germany (nos. 815/18 and 4 others, § 54-56, 5 July 2022). In particular, the Court has held that the substance of the right to freedom of association under Article 11 is marked by two guiding principles: firstly, the Court takes into consideration the totality of the measures taken by the State concerned in order to secure trade union freedom, subject to its margin of appreciation; secondly, the Court does not accept restrictions that affect the essential elements of trade union freedom, without which that freedom would become devoid of substance (ibid. § 56, and Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 144, ECHR 2008). The general principles concerning the right to strike are summarised in, inter alia, the cases of Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC] (nos. 59433/18 and 3 others, §§ 100-112, 14 December 2023), and Association of Academics (cited above, §§ 24-27). 30. The applicants argued that the interference with their right to strike was not “prescribed by law” as the lower-level courts and the Government had been in breach of the relevant provisions of the Strike Act (see paragraph 26 above). The Government acknowledged that there had been an “unlawful” restriction of the applicants’ Article 11 rights because of the protracted domestic proceedings and attributed the delay to the court recess between 24 December 2020 and 1 January 2021 (see paragraph 27 above). 31. The Court notes that section 4(3) of the Strike Act (see paragraph 17 above) foresees mandatory arbitration as a precondition for holding a strike if agreement on minimum services cannot be reached, and accepts that the impugned interference was thus “prescribed by law” for the purposes of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. As regards the applicants’ arguments concerning the alleged failure to comply with procedural deadlines, the Court considers that that issue rather falls to be examined in terms of the necessity of the impugned interference. 32. The Court is also ready to accept that the restrictions pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others. 33. It remains to be determined whether the protraction of the compulsory arbitration can be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” in the circumstances of the present case. The Court must therefore ascertain whether the effect that the conduct of the domestic authorities had on the applicants in the present case was proportionate and whether or not it rendered their trade-union freedom devoid of substance, thereby affecting an essential element of that freedom. The Court has previously indicated, in the context of a ban on civil servants going on strike, that the answer to this question is context‑specific in a number of ways and requires an assessment which takes into account all the circumstances of the case (see Humpert and Others, cited above, §§ 109-12). The Court considers that the same approach should be applicable to the circumstances of the present case. 34. In accordance with section 4(3) of the Strike Act (see paragraph  17 above), the level of service deemed sufficient may be defined by an act of parliament or, if it is not, it must be agreed upon by the parties during pre-strike negotiations. In the absence of agreement between the parties, minimum services in a sector providing essential services to the population must be settled by arbitration prior to a strike, with the labour court acting at the request of either of the parties. 35. In default of an act of parliament defining the content of minimum services, in the present case the applicant trade union did in fact start negotiations with the Government, represented by the Ministry of Human Resources, but the parties did not reach an agreement as to the minimum level of services that had to be provided during strike days (see paragraph 6 above). The Court sees no reason to call into question the finding made by the Budapest High Court that attempts to resolve the issue of minimum services by negotiations were to be regarded as exhausted (see paragraph 8 above). Although the applicant trade union enjoyed the “right to seek to persuade the employer to hear what it has to say on behalf of its members” (see Humpert and Others, cited above, § 100), an element of freedom of association that has been identified as essential, its efforts at persuasion remained futile because of the Government’s failure to genuinely engage in the negotiations by making a proposal for minimum services (see paragraph 15 above). 36. The Court further observes that, in line with section 4(3) of the Strike Act, the applicant trade union, together with MKKSZ, initiated the procedure before the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court for setting the minimum level of services during strike days planned on 12 February, 13 March, 1 April, 13 May, 10 June, 15 July, 19 August, 16 September, 21 October, 18 November and 9 December 2020 and presented its proposals on that subject (see paragraphs 5 and 7 above). 37. The Court notes that both the first- and the second-instance court found that the rules on the special legal order and on the extraordinary court recess introduced because of the pandemic were not applicable to those non‑contentious proceedings (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above). Thus, the lower-level courts were bound by the strict deadlines set out in section 5 of the Strike Act (see paragraph 17 above). 38. Nonetheless, it took the domestic courts about a year to issue a final decision on minimum services. The Court cannot agree with the Government that the only delay in the proceedings had been caused by a court recess of about a week (see paragraph 27 above). It observes that the Administrative and Labour Court discontinued and suspended the proceedings in decisions which were subsequently overturned (see paragraphs 8 and 9-10 above) and that further delays occurred before the lower-level courts because of apparent administrative errors (see paragraph 11 above). Furthermore, it took the Kúria about another four and half months to issue a final decision on the applicant trade union’s application (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). The Court also has regard to the applicants’ argument (see paragraph 25 in fine above), which is supported by the finding of the Kúria (see paragraph 15 above), that throughout the proceedings the Government failed to submit their own proposal for minimum services, despite their statutory obligation to do so, which necessarily contributed to the protraction of those proceedings. 39. The effect of the conduct of the domestic authorities was that the applicants were not able to hold a strike on the intended dates (in the period between 12 February and 9 December 2020 – see paragraph 5 above), and in fact were not able to do so until 31 January 2021, the date on which the trade unions received notice of the Kúria’s judgment upholding the Administrative and Labour Court’s decision on the minimum level of service (see paragraph 16 above). The Court accepts the applicants’ argument (see paragraph 24 above) that holding a strike a year after the occurrence of an employment issue would have rendered that action devoid of any relevance. Thus, the excessive delays in the arbitration precluded the possibility of using strike action in a timely manner to support the trade unions’ effort to improve the working conditions of social sector employees. 40. The Court notes that the Government have not adduced relevant and sufficient reasons to justify those delays and have not referred to any exceptional circumstance that could justify restricting a trade union in the use of the most powerful instrument available to it to protect the occupational interests of its members. Furthermore, besides suggesting that the applicants were free to organise a strike at any time in the future (see paragraph 27 above), the Government have not pointed to any other means available to the applicant trade union and its members to protect the relevant occupational interests in the circumstances of the present case. 41. Having regard to the foregoing and to the fact that the applicant trade union’s effort to set minimum services through negotiations bore no fruit because of the Government’s stance (see paragraph 35 above), the Court considers that the protraction of the arbitration proceedings stripped the applicants’ proposed strike action of its relevance and entailed a disproportionate restriction on the applicants’ rights under Article 11. 42. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
43.

Outcome for Article 11: violation