THIRD SECTION
CASE OF METALLA v. ALBANIA
(Application no. 19646/20)
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
STRASBOURG
5 May 2026
 
 
 
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Metalla v. Albania,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
 Úna Ní Raifeartaigh, President,
 Darian Pavli,
 Mateja Đurović, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 19646/20) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 7 May 2020 by an Albanian national, Mr Ervin Metalla (“the applicant”), who was born in 1976, lives in Tirana and was represented by Ms T. Eatwell and, from 2021, by Mr S. Powles, lawyers practising in London;
the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning the applicant’s right to respect for private life to the Albanian Government (“the Government”), represented by Mr O. Moçka, General State Advocate, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
the decision to reject the applicant’s request for a hearing (Rule 59 § 3 of the Rules of Court);
Having deliberated in private on 31 March 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the applicant’s dismissal from office by the Independent Qualification Commission (“the IQC”) and the Special Appeal Chamber (“the SAC”) under the Vetting Act (“the VA”) (see Xhoxhaj v. Albania, no. 15227/19, 9 February 2021). 2. The applicant served as a judge at the Durrës District Court from 2001, as its President from 2005, and as a judge at the Tirana Court of Appeal from 2013. He also acted as Chair of the Union of Judges from 2011. 3. The institutions assisting the IQC identified no concerns relating to links to organised crime or his professional skills and general ethical compliance (see Xhoxhaj, cited above, §§ 138-43). The IQC refused to pursue the investigation in respect of these criteria, contrary to the applicant’s request. 4. On 23 July 2018 the IQC dismissed the applicant under section 61(3) of the VA, owing to irregularities relating to his brother E.M.’s assets and the applicant’s declaration of assets. It noted that ethical standards required judges to act with integrity in extrajudicial activities and in a manner befitting their duties. The applicant’s conduct had been unethical, as he had engaged in fictitious transactions. 5. The applicant appealed and repeated his request for an assessment in respect of the remaining criteria, which would, he said, have demonstrated his contribution to the justice system through his teaching, manuals for legal professionals, and chairmanship of the Union of Judges. 6. On 30 October 2019 the SAC upheld, by a three-to-two majority, the IQC’s findings and applied an additional ground under section 61(5) of the VA, which provided for dismissal where, following a global assessment of all the vetting criteria or an “overall assessment of the procedures”, the vetting subject was found to have undermined public trust in the justice system. The SAC held as follows. (a)  The applicant had lived in a rented flat in Tirana while commuting to Durrës. He had signed a preliminary sale contract and a commercial-loan contract in 2007 and had bought that flat, with ownership to pass once it had been legalised and registered in the seller’s name, which had occurred in 2013. (b)  From 2008 onwards, under Council of Ministers’ Decision (CMD) no. 600/2007, judges had been authorised to receive a soft loan – State‑covered interest above 4% – if they or their close relatives did not own a dwelling in their judicial district. The loan had been limited to housing in that district. (c)  In 2011, annexes to the 2007 contracts had replaced the applicant with E.M. as buyer and loan debtor. The applicant had admitted agreeing to this in order to become eligible for the soft loan. The SAC held that this had created the appearance that he no longer owned the property, though he had continued living in the flat. The sale-contract annex had been neither notarised nor declared in his 2011 asset declaration. (d)  The applicant had signed a declaration of compliance with the CMD, a contract to purchase a flat in Durrës and a soft-loan agreement for 5,000,000 Albanian leks (ALL), with E.M. acting as guarantor. Under the mortgage contract, E.M. had offered a flat (bought in 2008) as collateral. Through a series of transactions, the soft loan had been transferred to his father N.M.’s account as “debt repayment”. Although the funds had remained available to the applicant, he had not declared them as disposable liquidity in his 2011 asset declaration. (e)  In 2012, the applicant, N.M. and others had signed debt-exchange agreements so that the ALL 5,000,000 would be used for a new flat in Tirana. The applicant had declared his intention to buy it, and N.M. had declared that the funds belonged to the applicant. The applicant had then withdrawn from the Durrës contract, allegedly due to construction delays. The SAC considered that the sole purpose of the Durrës contract had been to meet the soft-loan conditions. He had signed a preliminary contract for that new Tirana flat but had not declared it in his 2012 asset declaration. In 2013 the applicant, E.M. and a real-estate company had agreed that the new flat would pass to E.M., while the 2007 flat would remain with the applicant, each paying “his respective loan”. 7. The SAC considered, in particular, that the applicant had taken steps (i) to hide or misrepresent his use of the 2007 Tirana flat while benefiting from the soft loan; and (ii) to allow inaccuracies as to his liquidity to appear in his 2011 declaration. 8. The SAC found that the applicant, showing disregard for the law, had obtained the soft loan in breach of the legal criteria, and appeared to have used it for the 2007 Tirana flat where he continued living, and not for the housing in Durrës. Extrajudicial conduct was guided by the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, and under the 2006 Albanian Code of Judicial Ethics judges had to ensure that their extrajudicial activities did not undermine the authority of the judiciary. The fictitious transactions for personal gain had been unethical and had undermined public trust in the justice system. 9. Lastly, the applicant had failed to prove that E.M. had had sufficient legal sources of income. (a)  Section 3(14) of the VA defined “other related persons” as those having a “relationship of interest” with vetting subjects arising from a patrimonial interest or a business relationship. Under section 32(4), vetting subjects, their related persons or “other related persons” declared as donors, lenders, or borrowers were required to prove the lawful origin of their assets. (b)  The IQC had shifted the burden of proof to the applicant because E.M. (i) had replaced him as debtor and buyer of the 2007 Tirana flat; (ii) had paid him ALL 1,000,000 in 2011, part of what the applicant had already repaid the bank between 2008-11; and because of a 2014 vehicle sale. In its decision of 23 July 2018, the IQC had cited (i) and (ii), noted that the applicant had continued living in the flat in 2011-13 and thus had a lender‑borrower relationship, and referred to E.M.’s collateral. (c)  The SAC held that E.M. had maintained a continuous legal relationship for the applicant’s unilateral benefit, assuming less favourable financial conditions in 2007-13. E.M. had become the guarantor of the soft loan; under the Civil Code suretyship rules, the surety ensured the fulfilment of the debtor’s obligation and was liable to the same extent. A relationship of interest therefore existed. The applicant had also received a small loan from E.M. in 2004 and ALL 1,000,000 in 2011 and had continued using the Tirana flat after transferring his rights. Thus, read together, sections 3(14) and 32(4) meant that E.M. qualified as “another related person”. (d)  The applicant had therefore had to prove that E.M. had received lawful income during his stay in Italy from the late 1990s to 2008 (used for the 2008 flat later offered as collateral, and for the 2004 loan), and in Albania for the sum of ALL 1,000,000. The evidence showed, in particular, that E.M.’s foreign income had been very modest. 10. Two SAC judges dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s ethics‑related findings, interpretation of domestic law in relation to E.M. and the applicant’s dealings with him, including the finding that the transactions had been “fictitious”.

Outcome for Article 8: violation