FIFTH SECTION      CASE OF ZORINA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE (Applications nos. 20295/07 and 3 other applications -see appended list)        JUDGMENT This version was rectified on 26 March 2019under Rule 81 of the Rules of Court   STRASBOURG 14 February 2019    This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Zorina and Others v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Síofra O’Leary, President, Lәtif Hüseynov, Lado Chanturia, judges,and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,Having deliberated in private on 22 January 2019,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:PROCEDURE1. The case originated in applications against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table.2. Notice of the applications was given to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”).3. With regard to applications nos. 24328/08 and 65898/11, the Government objected to the examination of the applications by a Committee. Having considered the Government’s objection, the Court rejects it.THE FACTS4. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.5. The applicants complained of the failure to effectively investigate the deaths of their relatives, who appear to have died under suspicious circumstances.THE LAWI. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS6. In accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications and consider them in a single judgment, given that they raise similar issues under the Convention.II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION7. The applicants complained that the investigations into the deaths of their relatives, who died in a road traffic accident or in circumstances which could have been regarded as suspicious, without there being evidence that State agents were involved, had been ineffective (the relevant facts of the applications are outlined in § 16 below and in the appended table). They relied on Article 2, Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention.8. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, finds that the complaints at issue fall to be examined under Article 2 of the Convention (see Igor Shevchenko v. Ukraine, no. 22737/04, § 38, 12 January 2012). This provision, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. (...)”A. Admissibility9. In application no. 20295/07 the accident in question happened on 30 August 1996, nearly one year before the Convention entered into force in respect of Ukraine on 11 September 1997.However, the investigation continued for another fifteen years and seven months after that date. In view of this, the Court finds that the alleged interference with Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect, which took place after 11 September 1997, falls within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction (see Igor Shevchenko v. Ukraine, cited above, §§ 47-48).10. The Court notes that the complaints in the present cases are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B. Merits1. The parties’ submissions11. The Government submitted that there had been no violation of the Convention. They noted in particular that the investigating authorities had either immediately instituted criminal investigations into the applicants’ relatives’ deaths (nos. 20295/07 and 24328/08) or had taken all investigative steps in order to conclude that an investigation was not necessary (nos. 65898/11 and 52601/12). The competent investigating authorities had acted diligently and promptly; they had done everything possible to investigate the circumstances of the cases; and the length of the investigations had been justified by the necessity to carry out a significant number of investigative actions.12. The applicants did not accept the Government’s assertions that effective investigations had been carried out. They contended that the investigating authorities had not acted promptly and had not secured evidence of the incidents. The applicants also argued that the investigations had not been structured and had been marked by tactical shortcomings, which had undermined any possibility of identifying those responsible or establishing their relatives’ cause of the death.2. The Court’s assessment13. The Court reiterates that Article 2 § 1 of the Convention enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III). This implies the putting in place of effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, § 115, Reports 1998‑VIII).14. More specifically, the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation when individuals have died in suspicious circumstances. This obligation is not confined to cases where it has been established that the killing was caused by an agent of the State. The mere fact that the authorities have been informed of the death will give rise ipso facto to an obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances in which it occurred (see, for example, Railean v. Moldova, no. 23401/04, § 28, 5 January 2010; Basyuk v. Ukraine, no. 51151/10, §§ 56-57, 5 November 2015; and Igor Shevchenko v. Ukraine, cited above, § 56). This is not an obligation of results to be achieved but of means to be employed. The Court accepts that not every investigation is necessarily successful or comes to a conclusion coinciding with the claimant’s account of events. However, it should, in principle, be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 71, ECHR 2002‑II).15. Once the investigative obligation is triggered, compliance with the procedural requirement of Article 2 is assessed on the basis of several essential parameters: the adequacy of the investigative measures, the promptness of the investigation, the involvement of the deceased person’s family, and the independence of the investigation. These elements are inter‑related and each of them, taken separately, does not amount to an end in itself (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 225, 14 April 2015).16. Turning to the circumstances of the present cases, the Court notes that the applicants’ relatives either died in a road traffic accident (no. 20295/07), or were found dead with signs of serious physical injuries (nos. 24328/08, 52601/12), or died under the unknown circumstances, which could have been regarded as suspicious (no. 24328/08). There was no evidence that State agents were involved in possible murder of the applicants’ relatives (the relevant facts of the applications are outlined in the appended table).17. The Court has firstly had regard to the substantial delay in commencing the inquiries into the applicants’ relatives’ deaths. Namely, in applications nos. 65898/11 and 52601/12, more than one year elapsed between the date of the applicants’ relatives’ deaths and the date the criminal proceedings were instituted. Moreover, in these cases, the decisions to refuse to institute proceedings were taken without the circumstances of the cases having been properly examined.18. In this connection, the Court reiterates that the effectiveness of an investigation implies a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition. Even where there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities is vital in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see, for example, Sergiyenko v. Ukraine, no. 47690/07, §§ 52-53, 19 April 2012; Chumak v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 60790/12, §§ 27-28, 19 May 2016; and Yuriy Slyusar v. Ukraine, no. 39797/05, § 82, 17 January 2013).19. The Court further notes that, in the present cases, the investigations were characterised by repeated discontinuations and reopenings as a result of the insufficiency of the measures taken by the inquiring officers, and were marked by the progressive deterioration of evidence. Moreover, from the information available, it does not appear that structured investigations took place after criminal proceedings were instituted. In the following ways, the investigations were marked by substantial shortcomings in their preliminary stages which undermined any possibility of establishing causes of death or punishing those responsible.(i)  In application no. 20295/07, for more than ten years, there were substantial divergences between the conclusions of technical expert examinations of the vehicle in question, which were not reconciled and which precluded the examination of the case on the merits. During this time the suspect left Ukraine and as a consequence the criminal proceedings against him were terminated because the limitation period for criminal liability expired.(ii)  In application no. 24328/08 there is no evidence that the investigating authorities explored other possible avenues apart from pursuing an investigation against B., whose confession could not serve as a basis for establishing his guilt, since he was suffering from schizophrenia. Moreover, the investigating authorities failed to secure any possible evidence to corroborate B.’s guilt. Namely, they did not examine the suspect’s clothes, which, in view of the circumstances of the incident, could have had bloodstains on them. Lastly, the investigating authorities acknowledged that it was not possible to establish the circumstances of the incident, because of the significant lapse of time since the event in issue.(iii)  In application no. 65898/11 the investigating authorities did not provide any explanations as to the lack of medical evidence regarding the applicant’s brother’s alleged ischaemic illness. Nor did they examine the traces of injuries on the applicant’s brother’s body. The Court also notes that the police officers were disciplined because of their inactivity: there was no medical evidence regarding the applicant’s brother’s ischaemic illness before the day of his death, swelling on his brain documented in the post-mortem examination had not been explained, and other evidence indicating a possible murder had not been properly assessed.(iv)  In application no. 52601/12, despite the fact that a number of forensic medical examinations were carried out, none of them provided convincing evidence regarding the cause of the applicants’ daughter’s death. More specifically, the exhumation conducted on 29 March 2012 fell short of the procedural requirements, and thus the court declared the results of the subsequent forensic medical examination inadmissible. Furthermore, since another exhumation was conducted on 6 May 2014, nearly three years after the incident, the subsequent forensic medical examination was unable to determine the cause of death, because the body was in an advanced state of decomposition. There is no indication that the substantive discrepancies between the expert forensic medical examinations – regarding the fact that the scene of the incident was covered with the blood of the applicants’ daughter – were resolved.20. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the effectiveness of an investigation also implies a requirement of thoroughness, in that the authorities must have taken all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see, for example Ryzhenkov and Zaytsev v. Ukraine, nos. 1805/03 and 6717/03, § 19, 13 December 2005, and Yuriy Slyusar v. Ukraine, cited above, § 82). Moreover, any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the circumstances of the case or the person responsible is liable to fall foul of the required measure of effectiveness (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 113, ECHR 2005 VII).21. The Court observes that, in the present cases, the failure of the investigating authorities to complete the necessary steps in a timely manner undermined their ability to establish the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the applicants’ relatives, and who, if anyone, was responsible.22. Having regard to its well-established case-law on the subject (see Basyuk v. Ukraine, cited above, and Svystoruk v. Ukraine (dec.) [Committee], no. 50067/13, 24 November 2016), the Court considers that, in the instant cases, the investigations failed to meet the criteria of effectiveness. These complaints therefore disclose a breach of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention.III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION23.

Outcome for Article 2: violation