THIRD SECTION
CASE OF KOFFI v. BULGARIA
(Application no. 95/24)
 
JUDGMENT
Art 3 (substantive) • Positive obligations • Violent assault on the applicant, in which he sustained serious injuries, by several football fans walking through the city centre after a match • Legislative and regulatory framework appeared to encompass the acts complained of • Domestic authorities’ plan of operations drawn up before the football match sufficiently thorough to serve as a basis capable of providing effective protection of the general public • Adequate assessment of risk • Imminent threats emanating from particular group of fans not apparent to police before the assault was perpetrated • Special diligence obligation not triggered • Higher level of preventive operational response vis-à-vis the particular group of fans in advance of the incident not called for on the basis of the information available at the time
Art 3 (procedural) • Ineffective investigation into the assault which was not capable of leading to the establishment of the facts or a determination of the identity of persons responsible
Art 14 (+ Art 3) • Discrimination • Domestic authorities’ failure to make specific efforts to investigate any potential racist motive behind the assault
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
17 February 2026
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Koffi v. Bulgaria,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Ioannis Ktistakis, President,
 Peeter Roosma,
 Lətif Hüseynov,
 Darian Pavli,
 Diana Kovatcheva,
 Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,
 Canòlic Mingorance Cairat, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 95/24) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a British national, Mr Leon François d’Assises Koffi (“the applicant”), on 14 December 2023;
the decision to give notice to the Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the alleged non-compliance by the authorities with their obligations to effectively respond to a racially motivated act of violence against the applicant by private parties, under Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention;
the parties’ observations;
noting that the British Government did not make use of their right under Article 36 § 1 of the Convention to intervene in the proceedings;
Having deliberated in private on 25 November 2025 and 20 January 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The application concerns the authorities’ alleged failure to (i) effectively investigate the perpetrators (several unidentified individuals) of an assault on the applicant which was allegedly prompted by racist motives and which caused serious injury, and (ii) put in place adequate operational measures with a view to preventing the assault. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Sheffield. He was represented by Ms A. Kachaunova, a lawyer practising in Sofia. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Dimitrova, of the Ministry of Justice. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5. On 29 September 2018 teams from the two biggest football clubs in Bulgaria, CSKA Sofia and PFC Levski Sofia, played a match at the National Stadium in Sofia. 6. The National Stadium is located in the central part of town; its official address is 38 Evlogi and Hristo Georgievi Boulevard. That boulevard crosses (at an almost perpendicular angle) General Parensov Street, on which – at a distance of around 600 metres from the boulevard, and in immediate proximity both to 6 September Street and the headquarters building of the Ministry of the Interior – the applicant was assaulted (see paragraphs 26-33 below). 7. Events such as the football match in question are, as a matter of practice, broadly publicised in advance in order to prompt people to take measures for their own safety and to avoid the area in proximity to the stadium. 8. In order to prevent violence at and around major sporting events held in Sofia, the standard practice of the authorities is to divide the centre of the city into two areas during such events. The respective fans of opposing teams are allowed to reach the stadium and to exit and walk away from it through the different areas. This is done in order to prevent clashes between supporters of different teams. The Sofia police force assigns a significant number of police officers to the organisation of such events and engages officers from other towns as well. The authorities’ Plan of operations
9. In preparation for the football match of 29 September 2018, the police authorities drew up a plan of operations. It was dated 28 September 2018, contained 39 pages and was approved by the head of the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs. 10. The plan comprised information about the authorities’ plans and expectations regarding the football match scheduled to take place the following day. Those included an estimate that around 25,000 spectators would attend the event. The plan also stated that the stadium would be split into four distinct sectors – two of which would be assigned to fans supporting one of the teams, and two to fans supporting the other team. It listed the different streets in the city (both in the vicinity of the stadium and further away from it) designated as corridors for the movement of fans to and from the stadium on the day; it also specified that no mixing of the two groups of supporters would be allowed. The area where the events complained of subsequently unfolded (see paragraphs 26-33 below) was designated for Levski supporters. 11. The plan stated that officers involved in ensuring security for the event would gradually occupy their posts from 11 a.m. onwards. External security arrangements in respect of the stadium were to be in place by 2 p.m., and internal security arrangements were to be ready by 2.30 p.m. 12. The plan specified that the level of risk associated with the event was estimated as one that posed a “high degree of public danger”. 13. The plan provided that a Temporary Operations Headquarters Committee (временен оперативен щаб) would be set up with the overall aim of maintaining public order and preventing the commission of crimes before, during and after the football match. That committee would comprise three named high-level officers (who would be in command of operations) and a further 20 named officers. It would be the responsibility of the officers in command to ensure the operational management of onsite law-enforcement forces and police resources. 14. A total of 1,867 officers were to be engaged as security forces in respect of the event. 15. The plan listed the preparations that were to be made. Those included: a meeting with the stadium’s management to discuss the list of the specific measures that it had to undertake with a view to ensuring the smooth running of the event; issuing instructions to the commercial establishments in the vicinity of the stadium not to sell alcohol; providing information to the media about the security arrangements put in place for the event; carrying out reconnaissance of the stadium with a view to setting up barriers and entry points; and sending letters to the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior with a view to involving in the security arrangements for the football match law-enforcement forces from different police directorates, as well as officers from the fire-safety and civil-protection authorities and the Mayor’s Office. 16. For the purposes of security arrangements for the football match, the plan divided Sofia into 18 operational zones. It specified: the number of police officers to be deployed in each zone and their deployment within each zone (listing the names of the respective streets); the time at which officers were to take up their posts; and the names of the officer(s) responsible for policing each respective zone. 17. Some of the police teams deployed were to be armed with gas‑spraying devices and firearms capable of firing rubber bullets; others were to carry shields, helmets and batons. 18. It was also planned to set up mobile police units capable of reacting swiftly if incidents arose. Their tasks were to observe and monitor the areas assigned to them and “upon noticing any big groups of fans [that seemed] inclined to commit hooligan-inspired acts, to immediately report via radio the location of those groups and the direction of their movement”. 19. At the end of the match, the police were to escort the crowds leaving the stadium. Reserve contingents of officers (the number of officers comprising each contingent was indicated) were to be formed and located at specifically identified points. 20. The plan also listed a number of areas in the city that had been identified (on the basis of operational information and related analysis) as potential “conflict points”. The area where the events complained of subsequently unfolded (see paragraphs 26-33 below), including the Sveti Sedmochislenitsi Church, was indicated as a likely conflict area. 21. A specialised water-cannon machine was to be placed in front of the Turkish embassy on Vasil Levski boulevard, as would be 20 police officers. A further ten police officers were to be positioned around the Patriarch Evtimii statue. Both the Turkish embassy and the Patriarch Evtimii statue are located in the area between the National Stadium and the Ministry of the Interior building. 22. Moreover, five officers were to be deployed along each of eight different streets in the area, within sight of Vasil Levski Boulevard (which in turn lay almost parallel to and between Evlogi and Hristo Georgievi Boulevard and 6 September Street). The exact names of the streets where officers were to be located were listed, and those included General Parensov Street (where the assault on the applicant would take place). In addition, officers were to be placed at several intersections in the area, including the intersection between Vasil Levski Boulevard and General Parensov Street. 23. The plan was that groups of two to three officers would be stationed at the small park in front of Sveti Sedmochislenitsi Church and on 6 September Street with the task of keeping apart the fans of the two different teams and preventing conflict and breaches of public order. They were to be carrying shields, helmets and batons. 24. Teams of officers were to be formed and given the task of gathering operational intelligence over the whole city, prior to, during and after the football match. In particular, it was planned that four teams of two officers each would move around the area of Vasil Levski Boulevard and Graf Ignatiev Street. Three more teams (each comprised of the same number of officers) would cover the area between Vitosha Boulevard, Tsar Osvoboditel Boulevard, Rakovski Street and Graf Ignatiev Street. The teams would have to be vigilant in respect of particularly large groups of fans and, upon spotting such groups, would report their movements to their respective team leader. The teams’ tasks would also include the prevention of offences and disturbance to public order, the detection of individuals or groups likely to assault migrants, and the diffusing of potential conflict. All additional tasks that might arise were to be coordinated and resolved by the respective team leader. 25. The plan also provided that special attention was to be paid to a number of locations identified as vulnerable and key. Those included Vasil Levski Boulevard and the other main corridors for movement of fans. Officers would have to be ready to organise themselves into mobile teams and to react, upon instruction, if an incident arose – including in neighbouring zones. 26. The gathering places of fans and the routes used by them for getting to and leaving the stadium were to be accorded particular attention. After the end of the match officers were to take up positions at public transport stops, as well as at train and coach stations. Fans who gathered together to walk in groups would be escorted by officers. The assault on the applicant
27. On the evening of 29 September 2018, shortly after 7.30 p.m., the applicant and two of his acquaintances, A. and S., were walking on General Parensov Street in the immediate vicinity of the Ministry of the Interior building. They were moving from 6 September Street in the direction of Vasil Levski Boulevard (see paragraph 22 above), on the side of the small park in front of the Sveti Sedmochislenitsi Church. At that time the football match had already finished and fans were walking out of the stadium. 28. The applicant and his companions noted that a large group of men were walking towards them. The men were moving along General Parensov Street from the direction of Vasil Levski Boulevard. The police had organised corridors via which the football fans could leave the stadium and move through the area around it, and the group that the applicant came across had been directed towards this particular corridor. 29. At 7:45:11 p.m. (as subsequently established on the basis of CCTV footage collected from the area in the course the investigation) several men from the crowd started chasing after the applicant and his friends. A. and S. ran towards the church. The applicant turned around in order to run in the opposite direction. A man came out from the crowd. He had very short hair and was dressed in a dark sweatshirt, lighter trousers and black trainers. He approached the applicant and kicked him. 30. At 7:45:20 p.m. the applicant – who fell to the ground, was surrounded by a group of people who started kicking him. At 7:45:32 p.m. another man knelt next to the applicant and immediately after that a third man, dressed in a black t-shirt with an inscription in white lettering, kicked him. At 7:45:55 p.m. a few other persons approached the applicant, apparently with the intention of helping him. 31. At 7:47:00 p.m. police officers, who had been driving after the group of Levski fans in a police van, arrived at the scene. 32. The group of fans was large: according to the applicant, as well as A. and S., it comprised around 40 to 70 people in it (see paragraphs 54 and 67 below); according to the police officers who were interviewed subsequently, it comprised around 150-200 people (see paragraphs 53, 77 and 79 below). 33. Having noticed some agitation in the group, the police officers stopped the van and got off. Some of the fans pointed to the applicant, who was lying on the street, where a young man was trying to open his mouth. The applicant took a breath and regained consciousness. 34. There is no information that the police officers actually saw the applicant, his friends or the perpetrators before the assault. The whole incident lasted less than two minutes. The officers called an ambulance, which arrived at around 8.10 p.m. 35. The applicant went through several medical procedures in hospital that night. 36. A forensic medical report drawn up subsequently for the purposes of the investigation indicated that he had sustained the following traumatic injuries: concussion; a contusion on the left frontal area of the head; an abrasion and haematoma in the area of the left cheekbone; an open contusion wound on the left side of the lower lip; open contusions on the upper and lower eyelids of the left eye; a fracture of the ascending left-side branch of the lower jaw; the loss of the two front teeth; and the loosening of the left‑side incisor. The above-noted injuries had been sustained as a result of blows with blunt objects and could have been caused in the manner indicated in the witness statements. 37. On 10 October 2018 the applicant underwent reconstructive surgery to his lower jaw. He left the country in November 2018, apparently for the United Kingdom. The initial stage of the investigation: from the incident until the first suspension of the proceedings
38. An investigation was opened on the following day – 30 September 2018 – into the offence of causing moderate bodily harm (Article 129 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code) – namely “a broken jaw [and] fractured teeth, without which chewing and talking is hampered”. Interviews of the applicant and his companionsInterviews of the applicant

39. The investigation opened with the carrying out of the first investigative measure – an interview of the applicant as a witness. He stated that on the evening of 29 September 2018 at around 8 p.m. he had been walking with his friends A. and S. on a street whose name he did not know; however, he remembered that it had been undergoing roadworks. At some point he had seen a crowd of people dressed in black and wearing black hats with an inscription in white lettering. A. and S. had run away but someone from the crowd had managed to kick him in the head; he had then fallen to the ground. After that many other people had started kicking him in the head. He had heard them making monkey-like noises, signalling to him they considered him to be a monkey. He had thought that he would die. 40. The next thing the applicant remembered was how – after he had regained consciousness – he had seen police officers, as well as A. and S., around him. A. and S. had accompanied him to a hospital. 41. The person who had kicked him had been wearing a black mask, a grey jacket and a black T-shirt underneath. He had been the only person wearing grey – all the others had been in black. He had also been wearing black gloves. He had been around 170 cm tall with an athletic build. The other people who had kicked him had been between 20 and 40 years of age. Given that they had not been wearing masks, he was able to give a description of them; however, he was not certain he would be able to recognise them. 42. In a subsequent interview on 26 October 2018, the applicant stated that as he and his friends had been walking along a street that had been undergoing roadworks, they had passed by a stationary police patrol car in which two officers wearing uniforms had been sitting. He, A. and S. had continued for about 100 metres after the car and had then turned right. Then he had seen a big group of men numbering around 50 to 75 around 100 metres ahead of them. Three or four men had been walking ahead of the group and had looked like the leaders. The people behind had all been dressed in black, and had been walking in lines, as if marching. Because of that and of the police car parked nearby, he had thought the men were all police personnel involved in some kind of training exercise. He had asked A. and S. whether the men were police, but A. and S. had gone quiet and had exchanged words in Arabic with each other – a language the applicant did not understand. 43. The group had started marching directly towards the applicant. A man had stood right in front of the applicant with folded arms and hands in fists. The man had been young (around 20 years old), white, slightly taller than the applicant himself (who was 160 cm in height), and had been wearing a dark‑grey mask – through which only his eyes (light in colour) had been visible. He had been dressed all in grey and had been wearing grey mittens. He had been wearing sports shoes and he had been somewhat corpulent (since his body had shaken under his clothes with his movements). The applicant had taken up a similar stance, preparing to defend himself. 44. Although the attention of the applicant had been primarily occupied by the man described above, he had noticed another – tall – man pass behind him. He had not taken a good look at him as he had been looking at the man in the mask. He had thought of running away and had turned around in order to take the road along which he had come and where he had seen the police patrol car. All of a sudden, the tall man had jumped and kicked the applicant on the right side of his face. The applicant had lost control and had fallen to the ground. The tall man had then kicked the applicant with a military-style leather boot on which there had been some kind of metal attachment, which the applicant had felt on his face. The applicant had felt piercing pain, and had then perceived a strong light. He had had the feeling of falling asleep, and had been no longer able to see anything, but had continued hearing what seemed to him to be monkey-like noises. Before passing out he had felt himself being kicked – sometimes in the body but mostly in the head. He remembered that none of his teeth had been dislodged by the initial kick in the face. 45. When the applicant had regained consciousness, he had felt blood in his mouth and had been unable to open his left eye; his lips had been swollen and he had felt that he was missing teeth. At that point, he had been unable to remember his name or in which country he was and what had happened. When he had seen police officers around him, he had initially become frightened and had attempted to escape, thinking the assault on him was still ongoing. He had later understood that the officers were trying to help him. 46. The applicant had drifted in and out of consciousness, so his memories of that period were not clear. He had been turned away by some hospitals, and had then been taken by taxi by his friends A. and S. to the main hospital, where he had been admitted as an inpatient. He had continued to feel very strong pain. He had remained for quite a few days in the hospital, where his jaw had been operated on and an implant placed in the right side of his face, next to his ear. 47. The applicant had thought the group of men who had assaulted him looked like an army, as nothing about them had remotely reminded him of football. The man who had kicked him first had been around 180 cm tall with white skin, had been well-built, and had been about 30 years old, but as he had been unable to see him well, he could not be sure about that description. 48. At the time of his interview the applicant had not yet consulted a dentist, and did not know how much tooth implants would cost him; in any case, he did not have any money (including money to buy food that did not need to be chewed). 49. Both before the assault on him and afterwards, the applicant had seen the same man several times standing outside of his home, usually smoking and looking at him in a hostile manner. The man had had a tattoo on his right calf, in red, yellow and green colours. The tattoo had resembled the anarchist sign and had looked something like a football. The man had had tattoos on his other leg and arms, as well as on his body – as could be seen when his T‑shirt had lifted. 50. Earlier on the same day that the interview took place (26 October 2018), the applicant had seen the same man (with the tattoos described above), accompanied by another man. They had been standing looking arrogantly at him, as if they wanted to say something. The applicant and a friend had walked near to where the two men had been standing. The men had not done anything but the applicant had felt afraid for his life. The applicant estimated the height of the man with the tattoos at about 180‑190 cm; the man had had light brown, short hair, a moustache and possibly a light beard, and had had a muscular physique. The other man had been about 160 cm tall, dark-haired and “friendly-looking”. The applicant would be able to recognise both men if he ever saw them again. 51. The applicant stated that he was not leaving his home unaccompanied, was not riding on public transport, and was afraid to go out alone. 52. After giving interviews to the media, he had come across many people who had treated him badly. One person had refused to sell him cigarettes; another had thrown him out of a shop that sold spectacles. Someone had set up a Facebook group called “@LEONKOFFIMONKEY” (sic). Interview of A. 53. On 9 October 2018 A. and S. (see paragraph 27 above) were interviewed. 54. According to A., he and his friend S. had been in each other’s company on the evening of 29 September 2018, when the applicant had rung him to suggest that they all meet up. A. and S. had agreed and had met the applicant shortly after 7.30 p.m. next to a branch of McDonald’s across from the main courthouse. They had decided to go to S.’s apartment, which was not far away. They had walked along Vitosha Boulevard, continued onto a street that had been undergoing roadworks and turned left next to a small park situated in front of Sveti Sedmochislenitsi Church. When they had reached the Ministry of the Interior building, they had turned right and had started walking along General Parensov Street, where he had seen a group of men. A. stated that there had been “many of them – around 40 or 50”. All had been dressed in black clothes with an inscription in white lettering. The group had been at a distance of around 50 metres from A. and his companions. 55. The men had been walking “normally” towards A., S. and the applicant, but when they had drawn closer they had started running towards them. One of the men in the group – without saying a word – had kicked the right side of the applicant’s face. He had watched the applicant fall to the ground face down; then men had gathered around the applicant. 56. A. had run down General Parensov Street and had turned left at the end of it, around the Ministry of the Interior building. S. had run too, but had turned right, towards the church. Neither A. nor S. had suffered physically at the hands of the group of men, even though some of them had chased A. 57. About two or three minutes later A. had rung S. and had suggested that they go back to the applicant, since A. had thought that the applicant might die. That telephone call had taken place at 7.48 p.m. 58. A. and S. had returned to the scene of the assault and had seen police officers there. The applicant had been lying on his left side. He had been surrounded by blood; two of his teeth had been lying on the pavement. The applicant had been conscious but disoriented and had repeatedly asked A. what had happened and where he was. 59. About 40 minutes later an ambulance had arrived. A. and S. had accompanied the applicant in it. Staff at the first hospital to which the applicant had been taken had cleaned his swollen eye and had told him he was fine and free to leave. A. and S. had accompanied him to another hospital, where he had been admitted as an inpatient. 60. When A. had first seen the men in the group he had thought that they were police officers, since they had all been dressed in black. The man who had kicked the applicant in the face had been about 180 cm tall, had looked between 20 and 30 years old, had had a trimmed beard (chestnut brown) in colour and had been wearing a baseball cap and a black long-sleeve T‑shirt with an inscription in white lettering. A. stated that he would be able to recognise him if he saw him again. 61. A. was certain that the applicant had been assaulted because of the colour of his skin, which was black. He had felt that “something might happen as the men in the group had been looking at them threateningly”. A. had not personally heard any noises such as those indicated by the applicant, but had learned subsequently from the applicant that, while he had been on the ground and the men had been kicking him, they had been making monkey-like noises. Interview of S. 62. According to S. (see paragraph 53 above), he had been out with his friend A. on the evening of 29 September 2018 when he and A. had met the applicant at around 7.30 p.m. next to a McDonald’s branch on Vitosha Boulevard. S. had invited them to accompany him to his flat, which was right next to the Turkish embassy, so that he could cook for them. The information that S. provided in his statement about the route they had taken corresponded to that provided by A. (see paragraph 54 above). 63. S. and A. had run ahead while the applicant had tried to run in the direction from which he had been walking. When S. had looked back he had seen a man kick the applicant with his right leg on the right side of his face. The man had been around 185 cm tall, burly and white, and had looked to be aged between 20 and 30. He had had a well-trimmed beard (dark in colour) and had been dressed in a black T-shirt with long sleeves and an inscription in white lettering. S. said that he would be able to recognise the man if he saw him again. 64. S. stated that he had not seen the applicant fall. Two boys aged around 17 or 18 had tried to block his way, but had not succeeded. S. would be able to recognise one of them (who had been blond, with light, “sparkling” eyes and very white skin) if he saw him again. S. had run, turning right towards the church. He had been very frightened. He had waited behind something like a fence with a piece of scrap metal in his hands (which he had picked up off the ground, in case anyone had followed him). 65. According to S. the assault on the applicant had definitely been on racial grounds, namely he had been attacked because of the colour of his skin. 66. S. submitted that at 7.48 p.m. A. had rung him to suggest that they both return to the scene of the incident in order to check on the applicant. Upon going back, S. had found A. next to the applicant. There had been many police officers there too – at least fifteen of them. 67. The rest of the information that S. provided in his statement corresponded to that provided by A. (see paragraphs 58-60 above). Interviews of police officersOfficer P.G. 68. On 24 October 2018, P.G., a police officer, was interviewed as a witness. According to his statement, he had been on duty between 11 a.m. and 11 p.m. on 29 September 2018, taking part in the security arrangements put in place in connection with the football match between CSKA-Sofia and PFC Levski Sofia that day. At around 7.30 p.m., together with six other colleagues, he had been in a police van escorting a group of around 200 Levski fans who had been leaving the stadium after the game and moving away from it along General Parensov Street. 69. Officer P.G. stated that the group had comprised “among the more passionate” fans; almost all of them had been dressed in dark clothes, and some had been wearing baseball caps. The police van had followed the group to the corner of General Parensov Street and 6 September Street. While the van had been following behind the group on General Parensov Street, in the immediate vicinity of the Ministry of the Interior building, P.G. had seen the group of fans become agitated and some of its members begin moving in the opposite direction to that in which the group had been heading. 70. The van had stopped immediately and Officer P.G. had been the first officer to step out of it. People from the group had begun gesticulating at the officers, calling on them to come and see what had happened. The officers had walked through the group. Officer P.G. had seen a group of people gathered on the pavement across, trying to help a person who was lying on the ground on his side. That person had been unconscious. Someone had been trying to help him by attempting to open his mouth to facilitate his breathing; as a result, the injured person had managed to take a breath and had regained consciousness. 71. Officer P.G. submitted that the people who had been helping the victim had stood up while the officers had been administering first aid to the victim; they had then left the scene before the officers could establish their identities. 72. When the injured person had lifted his head from the pavement, Officer P.G. had noticed a large swelling on his left eye; he had also been missing two front teeth, which the officers had later found on the pavement. There had also been bloodstains on the asphalt. The injured person had been visibly disoriented. Officer P.G. had not spoken to him, but the injured person had been a foreigner whose identity had later been established as that of the applicant. 73. Officer P.G. stated that police officers had called for an ambulance without delay, via the Duty Office of the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs (Дежурен център на СДВР). The ambulance had arrived at about 8.10 p.m. 74. The identity of two individuals, A. and S., had been established on the spot; they had turned out to be friends of the applicant who had been accompanying him. They had left the scene in the ambulance together with the applicant. 75. P.G. noted that there was a police post near the place where the applicant had been lying – specifically, towards the entry to the parking area of the Ministry of the Interior building. Officer N.Sh. 76. On 25 October 2018, N.Sh. – the police officer who had been driving the above‑mentioned van (see paragraph 68 above) – was interviewed as a witness. The information provided in his statement (which contained slightly less detail than that provided by Officer P.G.) corresponded to the account given by Officer P.G. It included the statement indicated in paragraph 71 above. Officer N.Sh. specified that the left cheek bone of the applicant had been swollen and the skin on it torn. There had also been blood on the applicant and on the ground around him. He spoke English and French, but incoherently. Some of his teeth had been kicked out and the attending doctor had collected two teeth from the ground. 77. According to Officer N.Sh., the police van in which he had been sitting at the time of the incident in question had been moving behind the group. The group had been made up of about 150-200 individuals. 78. Officer N.Sh. noted that near to the scene of the incident there was a police post. Officers B.B., Z.D. and A.M. 79. On 1 November 2018 officers B.B., Z.D. and A.M. – all of whom had been in the van described in paragraph 68 above – were interviewed as witnesses. Their statements corresponded to the accounts provided by officers P.G. and N.Sh. 80. All three officers specified that they had reported the incident to the Duty Operations Office (ОДЦ/Оперативен дежурен център) and had called an ambulance. Officer B.A. 81. In a letter of 6 November 2018, replying to a written request for information (regarding the officers who had been on guard duty (наряд) in the area around the Ministry of the Interior building, on General Parensov Street and 6 September Street between 7.00 p.m. and 8.00 p.m. on the day of the incident) from the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs of 25 October 2018, an officer from the gendarmerie directorate in the national police provided information (namely, the names, rank and units to which they were attached). According to that information, Officers I.K., I.A. and B.A. had been on guard duty between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. in the area of the Ministry of the Interior building, on General Parensov Street and 6 September Street. 82. On 23 November 2018 Officer B.A. was interviewed as a witness. 83. According to his statement, he had been on duty between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. on 29 September 2018 (together with two of his colleagues – officers I.A. and I.K). The duty that had been assigned to him had been to stand next to the Ministry of the Interior building; between 1 p.m. and 8 p.m. that day, he had been posted at the barrier on General Parensov Street (on the side of the small park in front of Sveti Sedmochislenitsi Church). 84. He stated that there had been a football match on that day between CSKA Sofia and PFC Levski Sofia. After the game had ended many fans had left the stadium and moved along General Parensov Street. At about 7.40 p.m. or 7.45 p.m. two boys from the group of fans had been visibly concerned about something and had started shouting. They had been calling for help, shouting that a person had fallen down and that it looked as though he had hit his head on the ground. Officer B.A. had told them to calm down and that he was going to call an ambulance. 85. Officer B.A. had immediately reported to the officer on duty by telephone what had happened and had not left his post. 86. He had not personally seen where the applicant was and had not known who he was or what had happened. 87. Officer B.A. stated that two police vans had been following behind the main group of fans. Officers from the van had asked him what had happened and he had told them what he had been told by the people who had been calling for help. He did not know what had happened after that as his shift had ended at 8 p.m. and he had been replaced in his post by a colleague. 88. Officer B.A. specified that only he had been on duty outside the Ministry of the Interior building during the incident. Officers I.A. and I.K. had both been inside the Ministry of the Interior building. 89. He had learned from his colleagues that an ambulance had subsequently arrived. He had remained under the impression that the applicant was one of the fans and had only later learned from news reports that he was a British citizen. Other investigative measures
90. On 5 October 2018 the applicant’s lawyer asked that the applicant be allowed to join the pre-trial criminal proceedings as a civil party in his quality of a victim. She also requested that the CCTV footage from the nearby building be included in the case file. On 12 October 2018 the prosecutor ordered that this be done. 91. On 25 October 2018 the investigating officer requested from the authorities a copy of the plan of operations drawn up for the event (see paragraphs 9-26 above) and information regarding the police officers who had been on duty on the day of the applicant’s assault. 92. By 21 November 2018 the investigator had: interviewed the applicant; ordered a detailed expert medical report and requested medical documentation in respect of the applicant; obtained and added to the case file the CCTV footage from the cameras on the Ministry of the Interior building and on a nearby bank; ordered a report on that footage; and interviewed witnesses. 93. On 11 February 2019 a police officer who had watched the CCTV footage (see paragraph 29 above) said that he recognised one of the leaders of the group – a certain G. The police interviewed G. on 14 May 2019. He denied participating in the assault or seeing who had done it. He refused to participate in person in an identification parade. 94. On 14 February 2019 an expert submitted a report on the CCTV footage. The report concluded that owing to poor light conditions the faces of the perpetrators could not be identified. 95. On 21 May 2019 the investigating officer conducted a photo identification procedure featuring G. and three other individuals. S. was invited to identify the person, from among the ones whose pictures were shown to him, to whom S.’s earlier statements related (see paragraphs 62-67 above) and to explain the basis on which he had recognised him. S. stated that he did not recognise anyone among the photographs shown to him. S. was interviewed again on the same date. The interviewing officer enquired after A.’s whereabouts, but S. said that he did not know where A. was. 96. On 28 May 2019 the investigating officer presented the collected evidence to the applicant’s lawyer. The lawyer requested that two individuals be interviewed, namely: a certain S.A. (a former football player of Serbian origin who had played for a well-known Bulgarian football club), because he had published racist comments on Facebook regarding the applicant and had claimed involvement in the attack on him; and another individual (someone bearing the nickname “Uporit” (meaning “tenacious”), who had posted a comment in the online newspaper Dnevnik under an article about the assault. The latter had stated, in particular: “I walked down Parensov Street a few minutes after the attack. The black man was sitting on the sidewalk with [a] smashed face, and a few cops were scratching their heads next to him. I passed by again half an hour later and saw the same situation – the man was STILL sitting on the sidewalk and the cops were STILL scratching their heads. What an effective police force we have!” The lawyer indicated that enough elements showed that the violence against the applicant had been motivated by racist considerations and the assault should be investigated under the offence criminalised in Article 162 § 2 of the Criminal Code, namely inflicting violence with racist motives (see paragraph 126 below). 97. The investigating officer tried to locate S.A. It appeared that he had left the country on 21 May 2019. On 21 November 2019 he was declared wanted by the police. He was located subsequently and interviewed on 23 June 2020. He stated that the Facebook profile in question was fake, that as a former football player he had become a victim of fake profiles, that he had never been racist and that he had never made comments such as that referred in paragraph 96 above. 98. On 29 October 2019 the applicant’s lawyer lodged another request for further investigative action with the investigating authorities. She stated that soon after the events in question the applicant had become Facebook friends with a certain V.H. They had even exchanged friendly messages on Facebook’s messaging service Messenger. The applicant had later found out that V.H. had posted a photograph of himself with three other men – two of whom the applicant had recognised as his attackers. The lawyer submitted a CD containing a copy of the photograph in question and requested that those persons be interviewed. The lawyer also emphasised that V.H. had published fascist content dating back to 2015-2016, such as pictures of Adolf Hitler. 99. The four individuals referred to in paragraph 98 above were located by the authorities and interviewed on 25 November 2019. All of them denied participating in the assault. The first one stated that he was not a Levski fan; the second stated that he had never been interested in football; the third asserted that he was a Levski fan but had not attended the game in question (and most probably at that time had been in North Macedonia working in construction); and the fourth (V.H.) insisted that he was a supporter of CSKA – the club Levski had been playing on the day in question). 100. On 23 June 2020 the authorities presented the material in the case file to the applicant’s lawyer, who reiterated her request that the person who had posted a comment under the article in the online newspaper Dnevnik be identified. The authorities did not follow up on that request. First suspension of the investigation
101. On 29 July 2020 the Sofia District Prosecutor suspended the investigation on the grounds that the perpetrator had not been identified. He noted that neither the applicant nor his friends could have given a detailed description of the perpetrator because of the significant commotion surrounding the incident and the involvement of many individuals. The prosecutor also modified the offence that was being investigated to a more serious one, namely the causing of moderate bodily harm out of hooligan-inspired motives (an offence under Article 131 § 1 (12) of the Criminal Code – see paragraph 127 below). Noting that the offence had not been perpetrated for personal vengeance or another personal motive, the prosecutor found that the assault had been carried out of hooligan-inspired motives “in demonstration of impunity and full disrespect of societal rules and norms”. The prosecutor instructed the investigating authorities to report back to him every four months on the search for the perpetrator. 102. Following an appeal lodged by the applicant, on 11 September 2020 the Sofia District Court quashed the prosecutor’s decision of 29 July 2020 as having been taken prematurely. The court ruled that the investigation had been conducted with adequate speed, that a number of pieces of evidence had been collected and that the established facts had been correctly interpreted. Nevertheless, it found that the investigation was incomplete, and instructed the prosecutor to: conduct a photo identification procedure (with the participation of A. and S.) of the four potential suspects indicated by the applicant’s lawyer; establish whether the Facebook profile of S.A. was indeed fake (by requesting information from Facebook); and consider interviewing the applicant again. The court’s decision noted that the investigation had been initially opened and conducted under Article 129 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code, but that the offence under investigation had later been modified by the prosecutor to that under Article 131 § 1(12) of the Criminal Code, namely causing moderate bodily harm out of hooligan motivation. Subsequent investigative measures
103. On 6 January 2021 the police searched for S. and found that he had left the country on 8 May 2020 and had not returned. Moreover, his residence permit had expired on 20 March 2020. 104. On 11 January 2021 the investigating officer requested the Chief Directorate for Combatting Organised Crime (GDBOP) to check the Facebook profile of S.A. In a response of 29 January 2021 the GDBOP informed the officer that the Facebook profile in question had been deleted. 105. On 14 May 2021 A. was interviewed again (see paragraphs 53-61 above). The authorities also conducted a photo identification procedure involving the four potential suspects (see paragraph 98 above), but A. recognised none of them. On the same day the investigating officer instructed the border police to deliver a summons to S. in the event that he were ever to return to the country. 106. On 16 July 2021 the material in the case file was presented to the applicant’s lawyer. She raised the following concerns: the GDBOP had not diligently verified the person behind the Facebook account of S.A. and no action had been taken regarding the request for the person who had posted a comment under the article in the online newspaper Dnevnik to be interviewed. 107. On 27 July 2021 the prosecutor refused the requests lodged by the applicant’s lawyer. He stated, inter alia, that it was pointless to interview the applicant and to ask him to participate in a photo identification procedure, because the applicant had already stated that it would be difficult for him to recognise his attacker. Moreover, he had already seen a picture of the four suspects and this could compromise his ability to genuinely identify those particular individuals. Furthermore, S.A.’s deleted Facebook profile did not constitute relevant evidence. Lastly, the lawyer’s request for the person who had posted a comment in the online newspaper Dnevnik to be interviewed was not to be allowed, because he had not been an eyewitness to the events but had merely stated that he had passed by the scene of the crime after the attack had ended. 108. On 10 September 2021 the prosecutor instructed the police to search for S. On 2 November 2021 S. was declared wanted by the police. 109. On 9 November 2021 the material in the case file was presented to the applicant’s lawyer. Second suspension of the investigation
110. On 8 December 2021 the Sofia District Prosecutor again suspended the investigation in order to search for S. The decision stated that the investigation had been opened and conducted into the offence under Article 129 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code; it did not mention that the offence had been modified (see paragraph 101 above). 111. Upon the applicant’s appeal, by a decision of 30 December 2021 the Sofia District Court quashed the prosecutor’s decision of 8 December 2021. The court noted several shortcomings in the proceedings, made the following observations and gave the following instructions: firstly, the prosecutor’s decision suspending the investigation had not been reasoned, so it was impossible to understand what circumstances the prosecutor had found established and on the basis of what evidence; secondly, the prosecutor’s decision was contradictory in respect of the reason for the suspension; thirdly, the authorities had made insufficient efforts to find S.; fourthly, the authorities needed to interview the applicant anew; fifthly, the authorities needed to establish who had created the allegedly fake profile of S.A.; and lastly, the authorities needed to find the person who had commented under the above-mentioned article in the online newspaper Dnevnik. The court’s decision noted that the investigation had been opened and conducted into the offence under Article 129 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code; it did not mention that the offence had been modified (see paragraph 101 above). 112. On 16 March 2022 the prosecutor instructed the police to comply with the court’s instructions. Investigative steps taken after the second suspension of the investigation
113. On 18 May 2022 the investigating officer requested the GDBOP to conduct a more in-depth check into the deleted Facebook profile – including by contacting the company that owned the platform. In a response of 8 June 2022, the GDBOP explained that such information could only be sought on the basis of an agreement between the United States and Bulgaria and, in any event, only if the said profile had not been deleted. On 13 June and 8 September 2022 the investigating officer requested information from the online newspaper Dnevnik regarding the person who had posted the above-mentioned comment (see paragraph 96 above). 114. The applicant’s lawyer wrote to the district prosecutor and the Prosecutor General in February 2023, enquiring whether the court’s instructions to the prosecution had been complied with and also about the time-frame of their expected completion. On 30 March 2023 the Office of the Supreme Prosecution of Cassation sent a reply on half a page. The letter indicated that, while no grounds for imposing disciplinary sanctions on the supervising prosecutors had been established, it has been recommended to examine whether there were grounds for seeking disciplinary sanctions in respect of the investigating police officers since the investigation had been ineffective at times. 115. On 3 November 2022 the prosecutor again instructed the investigating officer to summon the applicant in order to clarify contradictions in his statements and to participate in the identification of individuals. He also instructed the investigating officer to find S. and to establish the identity of the person who had posted a comment under the article in the online Dnevnik newspaper. On 5 April 2023 he reiterated those instructions. 116. On 12 April 2023 the police sent a letter to the State Agency for National Security (“DANS”) to establish the identity of the person who had used the fake profile of S.A. On 26 June 2023 DANS replied that this was outside its scope of authority because it did not concern national security. On 15 September 2023 the chief editor of Dnevnik informed the police that she could not submit the requested information concerning the person who had posted the comment in question, because it constituted personal data and was therefore protected. On 19 October 2023 the prosecutor requested the Sofia District Court to allow access to the relevant communications data in order for the person to be identified. The request was refused by the court by a decision of 23 October 2023 on the grounds that the deadline for such a request (six months) had expired. In a letter of 18 March 2024 the chief editor informed the police that Dnevnik did not have the requested data. 117. The time-limit for completing the investigation was extended numerous times by decisions of the prosecutor. 118. On 26 March 2024 the file was presented to the applicant’s lawyer. 119. On 11 April 2024 the proceedings were suspended on the grounds that, despite all efforts, the perpetrator had not been established. The decision noted that the investigation had been conducted into the offence under Article 131 § 1(12) of the Criminal Code. The case material was sent to the police, who were instructed to provide information to the prosecutor regarding the continued search for the perpetrator every six months. 120. The applicant and his representative only learned of the suspension of the proceedings in April 2024 from the Government’s observations to the Court (since they had not been informed of it in any other manner). Claim for damages
121. In October 2023 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a claim for damages against the State authorities under section 2(b) of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act, seeking compensation for damage caused by the excessive length of the criminal proceedings. In a judgment of 6 June 2024 the Sofia District Court allowed the claim in part and awarded compensation in the amount of 3,000 Bulgarian levs (around 1,500 euros (EUR)). The applicant appealed, arguing that that amount was too low. In mid-October 2025 those proceedings were pending. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
122. In 2004 the Securing of Public Order at Sports Events Act was adopted (Закон за опазване на обществения ред при спортни мероприятия – hereafter “the Sports Events Act”). In the explanatory memorandum to the bill it was pointed out that levels of aggression and violence during sports events had increased. The draft law (which was based on a number of Council of Europe and European Union documents) was specifically aimed at ensuring more thorough protection of life and limb within the context of sports events. 123. The national legislation deals with the issue of football violence in a two‑fold manner: an administrative-penalty procedure (which is provided in the Sports Events Act) and the general criminal procedure (which applies when the offence is of such gravity that it merits criminal prosecution). 124. On 3 July 2016 Bulgaria signed the Convention on Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events. It was ratified on 10 December 2019 and came into force on 1 February 2020. 125. Several ordinances and specialised instructions deal with the organisation and security of sports events in order to ensure safety and to prevent violence. These are: the Ordinance on the Security of the Sports Facilities and the Measures against Violence and the Bad Behaviour of the Spectators before, during and after the Sports Events (revoked in 2019); the Ordinance on Championships and Football Tournaments within the system of the Bulgarian Football Union for the 2018/2019 season (which was issued by the Bulgarian Football Union); Instruction no. 8121з-988 of 12 December 2014 on ensuring public order in the organisation of events (issued by the Minister of the Interior); and Methodical Instructions on police security and safety measures during sports events (approved by Order no. 8121з-128 of 24 January 2017). A special directorate (a part of the National Police Chief Directorate) is responsible for coordinating the security of sports events. 126. Article 162 § 2 of the Criminal Code criminalised racially, nationally or ethnically motivated violence in the following terms at the relevant time:
“Any person who uses violence against another or damages his property on account of his nationality, race, religion or political convictions shall be punished by up to four years’ imprisonment and a fine ranging from five thousand to ten thousand levs, as well as by public reprimand.”
127. The offence of causing moderate bodily harm (Article 129 § 2 of the Criminal Code) is punishable by imprisonment of up to six years (Article 129 § 1 of the Criminal Code). Article 131 § 1 (12) of the Criminal Code has provided since 2013 that causing moderate bodily harm from hooligan-inspired, racist or xenophobic motives is punishable by between two to ten years imprisonment. 128. Section 49 of the 1951 Obligations and Contracts Act provides that a person who has entrusted another with carrying out a task is liable for the damage caused by that other person in the course of or in connection with the performance of that task. Liability under that provision – as, indeed, under all provisions governing tort – is premised upon the wrongfulness of the conduct complained of (decision no. 567 of 24 November 1997 in Case No 775/1996, Supreme Court, five-member Chamber). Under section 110 of the Obligations and Contracts Act, the limitation period for tort claims is five years. THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
129. The applicant complained that (1) the authorities had failed to put in place adequate regulations and operational measures with a view to preventing the assault on him, and (2) the authorities had not effectively investigated that assault, which had caused him serious suffering and had been prompted by racist motives. The above-noted failings had been in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Admissibility
130. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies, since he had not lodged a tort claim under section 49 of the Contracts and Obligations Act (see paragraph 128 above) with the domestic civil courts seeking compensation for the State’s failure to meet its positive and procedural obligations under Article 3 and under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3. The applicant stated that, since he had been a victim of a hate crime, the only effective remedy was the conducting of criminal proceedings capable of identifying the perpetrators, bringing them to justice and unmasking any underlying discriminatory motive. 131. As regards the possibility of lodging a claim for damages in relation to the alleged failure of the State to comply with its positive and procedural obligations under Article 3, the Court finds as follows. It has already ruled that lodging a tort claim against the very individuals who caused alleged ill‑treatment in cases of assault in circumstances comparable to those in the present case would not fulfil the State’s procedural obligations under Article 3 in case of assault (see Abdu v. Bulgaria, no. 26827/08, § 51, 11 March 2014). Consequently, since a claim for damages (as suggested by the Government) might have led to the payment of compensation but would not have led to the prosecution of those responsible, the Court finds that it was not a remedy that the applicant was required to pursue for the purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. 132. The Government, in their reply to the submission by the applicant and his claim for just satisfaction, added in passing another point which, given its nature, might be taken as an additional objection of non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies. Specifically, the Government stated that the applicant could appeal against the prosecutor’s suspension order. However, the Court reiterates that, under Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of inadmissibility must be raised by the respondent Contracting Party, in so far as the nature of the objection and the circumstances so allow, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application. Any omission by the Government to do so may lead the Court to conclude that they are estopped from raising those objections at a later stage in the proceedings (see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, §§ 51‑54, 15 December 2016). The Court notes that the Government have not explained why, in the present case, their objection concerning an additional non-exhaustion was not raised in their initial written observations on the admissibility of the application. Nor have they provided any explanation for the delay in raising their objection. Moreover, the Court discerns no exceptional circumstances which might have exempted the Government from their obligation to raise the objection in a timely manner (see Khlaifia and Others, cited above, §§ 52 and 53). It follows that the Government are estopped from raising this objection. 133. The Court further notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. MeritsThe applicant’s submissions

134. The applicant noted that a legislative and regulatory framework aimed at combatting football-related violence or sport-related hooliganism had been introduced in Bulgaria; however, he argued that that framework had been ineffective and had not served to actually prevent the occurrence of any such violence or hooliganism. 135. On the one hand, he argued, criminal-law provisions applied only once a crime had been committed; as a result their dissuasive effect was rather low. On the other hand, the Sports Events Act was not applicable to the provision of public-security measures outside the venue of a sporting event; as a result, it was the police who were responsible for ensuring public safety and applying preventive measures to that effect. 136. In the instant case, only six police officers in a van had been following (and in effect observing) a crowd of about 200 fans, who had been dressed in similar clothing (all bearing the same distinctive mark) and singing chants. Despite the fact that the incident had taken place in front of the Ministry of the Interior building, there had been no other police officers on that street at the time in question. Although the authorities had properly evaluated the level of risk, their implementation of the planned security measures had been inadequate. As a result, despite the relatively large number of police officers deployed in order to ensure security in relation to the match, the preventive measures had been insufficient to mitigate the risks surrounding that event. 137. In particular, there was no information as to whether the authorities had consulted the national register of sports hooligans before the event and whether they had sought to identify persons from that register for the purpose of effectively policing the CSKA-Levski match. It is not known whether the officers in the van were wearing special protection gear and if they were equipped to react to a violent crowd. 138. Moreover, the overall plan of the Ministry seemed to have been a ready-made plan that could well have been copied and pasted from that pertaining to any other similar event, as many parts of it had been rather general and not specific to the CSKA-Levski match. It was striking that the plan had not noted that the main street near the incident – Graf Ignatiev Street – had been closed for repairs at the time in question, and that the fans were to be escorted along a smaller street – General Parensov Street – instead. In any case, notwithstanding the provisions of the plan, the CCTV footage showed that the group of fans had been walking along without any officers next to them. 139. The above-mentioned observations indicated that the preventive measures taken by the authorities had been superficial. The implementation of the planned security measures had been such that the large group of fans had been allowed to move around unsupervised. That in turn indicated that the authorities had failed to ensure public safety and had contributed to the racially-motivated assault of which the applicant had been a victim. 140. Furthermore, the investigation had been ineffective: many steps had been taken too late – others not at all. The domestic courts had twice quashed decisions to suspend the investigation, finding that the prosecution had put itself in the position of not being able to identify the perpetrators. The police had gathered no data concerning any of the fans who had been present at the time of the assault on the applicant, and had instead identified only his acquaintances A. and S. No members of the fan club had been questioned and the person who had been recognised by one of the officers on the CCTV footage had only been asked whether he had attended the match, but not where he had been at the time of the events. The Government’s submissions
141. The Government submitted that the authorities had adopted the necessary regulatory framework, taken adequate operational measures, and conducted an effective investigation capable of identifying and prosecuting the perpetrators. 142. In particular, in terms of the legal framework, following years of recurring problems with football gangs, violence against spectators and police officers and street riots, Parliament had enacted in 2004 the Securing of Public Order at Sports Events Acts (see paragraph 122 above). Contrary to the applicant’s submission, that Act specifically provided that the authorities had to ensure safety in the broader area around stadiums, and the Act applied to hooligan-inspired actions (other than those classified as criminal offences – to which criminal legislation applied) committed on the way to or back from sport events. 143. Moreover, Bulgaria had been one of the first countries to sign the Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events (on 3 July 2016). It had come into force on 1 February 2020 (see paragraph 124 above). 144. In addition, the authorities had issued several ordinances and specialised instructions regarding the organisation of and the provision of security at sports events in order to ensure safety and to prevent violence (see paragraph 125 above). There was a special directorate (a part of the National Police Chief Directorate) that was responsible for coordinating security at sports events. 145. As regards operational measures needed to protect victims (or potential victims) of ill-treatment, the authorities had drawn up a plan of operations in respect of the CSKA v. Levski football game (see paragraphs 9 to 24 above) that had been clear, thorough and detailed. They had deployed a large number of police officers and had instructed them on their role and places of deployment before, during and after the event. They had ensured the provision of special routes for the respective supporters of both teams and had planned the deployment of police groups at various spots – especially in the most dangerous locations. 146. The group of fans that had assaulted the applicant had been directed towards Parensov Street, since the main street – Graf Ignatiev Street – had been undergoing repairs. That group had been escorted by police officers who had been carrying weapons and had been prepared to react in the event of clashes. The planning and organisation of the event had been aimed at preventing crowds from roaming the streets and at ensuring that fans would approach and leave the stadium in smaller groups and under police monitoring. 147. The appearance of the applicant and his friends at the time in question (when the most vigorous supporters had been leaving the area) had been sudden and unexpected. It did not appear that any of the police officers had noticed them marching towards the crowd; if they had, they would have ensured their protection. The incident had lasted for approximately two minutes. 148. There had indeed been a risk of the applicant – a black foreigner who had suddenly found himself in the middle of a crowd of football fans – suffering ill-treatment. 149. Unfortunately, bearing in mind that it had been late in the evening (and therefore already dark), the authorities could not have reacted more rapidly than they had. It was also noteworthy that, despite prior media coverage of the football game, the applicant and his friends had not known about it; it followed that they could not have decided to avoid the area or at least to await the departure of the football supporters. Not every risk of ill‑treatment imposed a duty on the authorities (under the Convention) to take measures to prevent such a risk from materialising. However, once the police officers had noticed the commotion in the crowd they had reacted immediately. 150. In terms of the investigation, the applicant had become a victim of a violent assault of extreme football supporters in circumstances that had objectively made the task of investigating the incident difficult. The clash between the crowd and the applicant and his two companions had happened when it had already been dark; lots of people had been present at the scene of the crime, and it had been almost impossible for the police to chase after the potential perpetrators, given that the events had unfolded in the course of a couple of minutes and the police officers had been trying to offer first aid to the applicant (and potentially to ensure his protection). 151. The authorities had acted promptly by interviewing the applicant, his two friends and the police officers who had been at the scene. They had also looked at the CCTV footage that had captured the offence and had ordered expert reports in respect of it. They had interviewed a suspect, G., who had been identified in the video recordings by a police officer. However, an eyewitness had not recognised him, and the suspect himself had not made any confession. Furthermore, the applicant had singled out four more suspects who had also been interviewed and had taken part in a photo identification procedure – to no avail. It had not appeared justified for the authorities to undertake any other measures against those four individuals. 152. The Government noted that the authorities had afforded the applicant and his lawyer access to the case file. The applicant’s lawyer had been given the opportunity to submit evidence. 153. Moreover, the authorities had interviewed S.A., who had given no indication that he had participated in the event in question. In fact, it did not appear credible that a former football player from another team (and who was, what is more, a foreigner) would have been among the ranks of the most extreme Levski fans on the night of a big football match with CSKA. The authorities had also attempted to retrieve information regarding the above-mentioned Facebook profile, but their efforts had proved futile as the profile had been deleted. Indeed, the authorities had been tardy in their efforts to establish the identity of the person who had commented under the above-mentioned Dnevnik article, and had eventually been unable to establish that person’s identity. However, as reiterated by the prosecutor, that person had not been an eyewitness to the event in question and would not in any manner have been able to contribute to the establishment of the facts of the case. Accordingly, the authorities had not been obliged to establish his identity and to interview him. 154. Lastly, the Government submitted that the authorities had been conducting an investigation under conditions in which they had not had access to both the applicant and one of the eyewitnesses, as both had been abroad. The applicant, who had been traumatised by the events, had been interviewed twice in the initial stages of the investigation, but was left in peace after he had left the country. However, the investigation had been impeded by his absence from Bulgaria and by the absence of a key witness. As for S. – the authorities had been constantly making attempts to establish his whereabouts, but to no avail.

Outcome for Article 14: violation