FIRST SECTION
CASE OF NIKOLAOU AND OTHERS v. CYPRUS
(Application no. 37068/18)
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
(Merits)
 
Art 1 P1 • Deprivation of property • Domestic authorities’ refusal to return to the applicants 3,974 square metres of expropriated land which remained unused for over thirty years not based on a public-interest requirement • Fair balance between competing interests upset
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
30 April 2026
 
 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Nikolaou and Others v. Cyprus,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Ivana Jelić, President,
 Erik Wennerström,
 Georgios A. Serghides,
 Raffaele Sabato,
 Frédéric Krenc,
 Alain Chablais,
 Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 37068/18) against the Republic of Cyprus lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by ten Cypriot nationals (“the applicants”), whose names and particulars are set out in the appended table, on 31 July 2018;
the decision to give notice to the Cypriot Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 27 May 2025, 25 November 2025 and 17 March 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that later date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns the authorities’ refusal to return to the applicants 3,974 square metres of expropriated land which allegedly remained unused. THE FACTS
2. The applicants were represented by Mr A. Demetriades and Ms L. Nikolaou, lawyers practising in Nicosia and Limassol respectively. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr G. L. Savvides, Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus. 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. EXPROPRIATION, SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS AND REFUSAL TO RETURN THE PROPERTY
5. On 5 February 1976 the Council of Ministers decided to create an industrial area in the Agios Athanasios sector of Limassol. Various stretches of land needed to be expropriated to bring the plan to fruition, including the largest part of plot no. 243, which at the material time belonged to the applicants or their ancestors. Plot no. 243 measured 7,693 square metres, of which a 7,024-square-metre portion was expropriated. 6. On 6 February 1976 the Council of Ministers published Expropriation Notice no. 99 in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Cyprus. It described the purpose of the project as follows:
“[The land is needed] for a purpose in the public interest, namely the promotion and development of industry ..., and the expropriation thereof is imposed for the following reasons: the creation of an industrial area, the leasing of the said area or part thereof in parcels or otherwise to industrial tenants for the development of industry, and/or the leasing or usage of the area or part thereof for any other purpose contributing to the development of industry.”
7. On 17 December 1976 the Council of Ministers published Expropriation Order no. 1022 in the Official Gazette. The order gave full effect to the expropriation by extinguishing the property rights of the applicants and transferring ownership of the 7,024-square-metre portion of plot no. 243 and the other expropriated properties to the Republic of Cyprus. The applicants received 7,215 Cypriot pounds (12,327.56 euros (EUR)) as compensation. 8. Meanwhile, the Department of Town Planning and Housing of the Ministry of the Interior prepared a regulatory plan for the development of the industrial area, which was to include the construction of industrial buildings, car parks, green spaces and a so-called “administrative centre” with facilities to serve the local area, such as a childcare centre, a bank, a post office, a pharmacy and restaurants. From land plan no. 5789/2403 adduced by the Government it is evident that plot no. 243 fell within the perimeter of the industrial area. From references in the material submitted to the Court it is further apparent that that land was part of the parcel on which the administrative centre was to be built. 9. In 1979 it was decided that a new road network would be built in the area. A 3,050-square-metre portion of the expropriated land previously belonging to the applicants was allocated to that project. The remaining 3,974-square-metre portion of the expropriated land was left unused and forms the object of the present case (“the disputed land”). 10. The regulatory plan for the area remained in force, with the disputed land allocated for the construction of an administrative centre. 11. Between 1990 and 2021 the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (“the Ministry”) engaged in discussions and negotiations with regard to the use of the disputed land. These included talks with the local industry association and the municipality with a view to creating a childcare centre, an administrative centre, public-interest services and a car park. None of those projects ever materialised. 12. Specifically, various plans to create an administrative centre on the disputed land in the years 2001-2006 and 2017-2022 failed to materialise, either for financial or other, unknown, reasons, despite efforts to that end on behalf of the local industry association. Two requests by the industry association in 2010 and 2013 to develop an administrative centre and a car park were dismissed because of the pending appeal proceedings brought by the applicants (see paragraph 20 below). In addition, it appears from the material submitted to the Court by the Government that the construction of a childcare centre started in 2021, although not on the disputed land. 13. In 1996 the Ministry planned to lease the land to an individual for the construction of a sports centre. That project also never materialised. 14. On 26 September 2014 a company called Christmas Mystery Ltd requested permission to temporarily use the unused expropriated land between December 2014 and January 2015 for a Christmas market. On 30 September 2014 the Ministry gave its approval, and the Christmas market was carried out as planned. 15. It is apparent from the parties’ submissions that the disputed land was occasionally used as a waste-disposal site and as a car park, in the alleged absence of sufficient parking in the Agios Athanasios industrial area. 16. In a letter of 6 March 2008 addressed to the Ministry, the applicants requested the return of their land in exchange for the amount they had received as compensation. They argued, relying on Article 23 § 5 of the Constitution and section 15 of the Compulsory Acquisition Law (see paragraphs 27 and 30 below), that after thirty-two years the purpose of the expropriation of the land had not been achieved. 17. In a letter of 17 March 2008 the Ministry refused the applicants’ request, explaining that the expropriated land formed part of the “open space” at the entrance of the industrial area, which fulfilled the stated aim of the expropriation. The letter read, in so far as relevant:
“(b) Following the expropriation of the private property referred to, the Department of Town Planning and Housing prepared a regulatory plan for the creation of the Industrial Area. On the basis of this plan, industrial plots were developed, along with roads, car parks, green spaces and open space at the entrance to the site. Our Ministry has completed all the necessary infrastructure works for the creation of the Industrial Area in accordance with the town-planning blueprint, and all the industrial plots have been leased and factories have been built on them. (c)  The regulatory plan for the Agios Athanasios Industrial Area is an integral part of the current Local Development Plan for Limassol, as approved by the Cabinet. (d)  The portion of [the applicants’] property that was expropriated and used for the development of the Industrial Area forms part of the open space at the entrance to the site. The claim made by [the applicants] that it has not been used for the purpose for which it was expropriated is therefore unfounded.”
      FIRST-INSTANCE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
18. The applicants challenged the refusal of the Ministry by way of a recourse for judicial review (no. 781/2008) before the Supreme Court, which at the material time exercised first-instance jurisdiction in administrative‑law cases. They argued that since the stated aim of the expropriation had not been fulfilled, they were entitled to the restitution of their property. They pointed out that a portion of the expropriated land previously owned by them remained unused thirty-two years later (see paragraph 9 above), arguing that this was indicative of the fact that the authorities had either abandoned the purpose of the expropriation or failed to bring it to fruition. The applicants also claimed that the refusal of the domestic authorities to return the land to them constituted a violation of Article 23 §§ 4-5 of the Constitution and of section 15 of the Compulsory Acquisition Law (see paragraphs 27-32 below). The respondent – the State via the Ministry – contended that the purpose of the expropriation had been to develop a fully functional industrial area and that that purpose had been achieved in relation to the unused portion of plot no. 243, since the land in question had been intended as “open space”. Moreover, the respondent submitted that the authorities still had the intention of developing an administrative centre and that the disputed land would be used for that purpose. 19. On 21 September 2011 the Supreme Court, sitting in single‑judge formation, dismissed recourse no. 781/2008, endorsing the arguments of the respondent State as regards the purpose of the expropriation. It accepted that that purpose had been achieved by including the disputed land in the wider industrial area, as envisaged in the regulatory plan. It further found that the land formed part of the block allocated for the industrial area’s administrative centre, which naturally would only be developed after the project’s industrial facilities had been completed and the administrative needs of the area had thus been clarified. The court referred to various agreements between the Ministry and the Agios Athanasios municipality or the industry association as demonstrating that the purpose of the expropriation had not been abandoned. In sum, the Supreme Court judge considered that the purpose of the expropriation had in large part been achieved and, at the same time, that the domestic authorities had demonstrated their intention of bringing to fruition the few remaining works which fell within the ambit of the stated aim of the expropriation. APPEAL PROCEEDINGS
20. The applicants appealed against the first-instance judgment to the Supreme Court, exercising its second-instance jurisdiction (revisional appeal no. 152/2011). They alleged that the first-instance court had contradicted itself in accepting that the disputed land formed part of the industrial area’s open space while at the same time finding that the stated aim of the expropriation could and would still be fulfilled by the development of an administrative centre on that land. According to the applicants, the administrative centre and more specifically the childcare centre did not fall within the ambit of the purpose of the expropriation. The applicants contended that the industrial area had been completed twenty years earlier, whereas the disputed land remained unused. They argued that the disputed land was in excess of the real needs of the industrial project and should therefore be returned to them. 21. On 2 February 2018 the Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of five judges, dismissed revisional appeal no. 152/2011 by a majority of three votes to two. 22. The majority held that the purpose of the expropriation in Expropriation Order no. 1022 had been formulated in very broad terms, thus allowing the authorities wide discretion to determine the precise ways in which to implement the stated aim of the expropriation. They accepted that these could range from keeping the plot unused to approving the construction of any building, including a sports centre. The three judges considered that the purpose of the expropriations for the development of the industrial area had been based on a broad and general understanding of the needs of the sector and that the disputed land formed an integral part of that area. They assessed that purpose broadly and did not investigate what had been done specifically on every single expropriated plot, concluding that the stated aim of the expropriation had been fulfilled. 23. As regards the proportionality of the interference with the applicants’ proprietary rights, the Supreme Court ruled that the applicants had not proved that the domestic authorities had failed to take any reasonable action to bring to fruition the planned development on the disputed land. On the contrary, it considered that the various attempts to lease and develop the applicants’ former land demonstrated that they had fulfilled their obligations and that the proportionality requirement had been satisfied. 24. The three judges in the majority found, inter alia, as follows (original emphasis):
“It is apparent from the administrative file that the situation is as described by the respondents. The purpose for which the disputed parcel was expropriated has been achieved by its inclusion in the wider industrial area, of which it is an integral part, in accordance with the existing regulatory plan. This industrial area appears to have been developed gradually after the expropriation, with all necessary infrastructure works being completed to contribute to the construction and start-up of industrial facilities on the designated industrial plots. The creation of the industrial area’s administrative centre, including on the disputed parcel, is provided for in the approved plans, and the development of this specific area for the stated purposes should logically follow the start‑up of the industrial facilities. Deciding which needs to prioritise in the development of the administrative centre is a task that has to follow the completion of the industrial facilities, so as to allow a greater opportunity to assess and evaluate the actual needs of the area. The fact that buildings have not been erected in the administrative-centre area is clearly because the authorities are waiting for all the industrial facilities to be operational, so that they can identify the actual needs, set priorities and determine which services should be established in order to be genuinely beneficial for the promotion and development of industry, as outlined in the relevant expropriation notice. The leasing of this specific area to the local industry association and the municipality of Agios Nikolaos clearly indicates that the purpose of the expropriation has not been abandoned, and that its achievement is still feasible. In the case of Zinon Efthymiadis Ltd v. the Republic (2006) 3 A.A.D. 166, it was stated:
‘... The concept of feasibility refers not to the subjective intentions or desires of the authorities but to the objective facts relating to the actions of the authorities in the implementation of the project.’
In the present case, the objective facts of the matter lead to the sound conclusion that the purpose for which the applicants’ parcel was expropriated has largely been achieved. What remains is for some minor works to be completed, which logically could not have been done before the development of the industrial plots, as the authorities reasonably explained. The completion of these remaining works is intended to create a fully organised and functional industrial area, which clearly aligns with the purpose of the expropriation.”
25. The two dissenting judges issued a separate opinion in which they stated that the applicants’ appeal should have been successful. They argued that according to Zinon Efthymiadis Ltd and subsequent case-law of the Supreme Court, the requirement that the purpose of an expropriation should be realistically feasible within the three-year deadline set by the Constitution remained in force as a continuous obligation beyond that time-limit. The requirement in question also prohibited the authorities from remaining inactive in a way which deprived the applicants of their property for no apparent or substantial reason. 26. In relation to the facts of appeal no. 152/2011, the two dissenting judges found that the Agios Athanasios industrial area, whose creation was the reason behind all the 1976 expropriations, had in fact been fully completed and functional for years, whereas the disputed land still remained unused. They accepted the respondent’s submissions that the area needed an administrative centre, that one such centre had been envisaged and that construction could only take place after the industrial units in the area had been completed. However, they considered that the disputed land had exceeded the needs of the industrial project. Specifically, they concluded:
“As already stated, the concept of feasibility refers not to the subjective intentions or desires of the authorities, but to the objective facts of the case concerning the steps taken by the authorities towards completing the project. In the present case, the authorities, objectively, not only failed to take any steps towards utilising the contested property for the purpose for which it had been expropriated, in a way that would continually make that purpose fully achievable, but, with their stated intention to grant a long‑term, renewable right of use for part of the open space to a third party, outside the scope of the expropriation notice, they also disregarded the purpose of the expropriation and confirmed that there was no real need to continue depriving the appellants of their property. The proposed lease in no way aligned with the purpose of the expropriation, which was the development of industry or projects contributing to that development.”
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE        CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

27. Chapter Two of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus is titled “Fundamental Rights and Freedoms” and includes Articles 6 to 35 of the Constitution. 28. Article 23, in so far as relevant, provides:
“1. Every person, alone or jointly with others, has the right to acquire, own, possess, enjoy or dispose of any movable or immovable property and has the right to respect for such right. The right of the Republic to underground water, minerals and antiquities is reserved.
... 4. Any movable or immovable property or any right over or interest in any such property may be compulsorily acquired by the Republic or by a municipal corporation or by a Communal Chamber for the educational, religious, charitable or sporting institutions, bodies or establishments within its competence and only from the persons belonging to its respective Community or by a public corporation or a public utility body on which such right has been conferred by law, and only –
(a)  for a purpose which is to the public benefit and shall be specially provided by a general law for compulsory acquisition which shall be enacted within a year from the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution; and
(b)  when such purpose is established by a decision of the acquiring authority and made under the provisions of such law stating clearly the reasons for such acquisition; and
(c)  upon the payment in cash and in advance of a just and equitable compensation to be determined in case of disagreement by a civil court. 5. Any immovable property or any right over or interest in any such property compulsorily acquired shall only be used for the purpose for which it has been acquired. If within three years of the acquisition such purpose has not been attained, the acquiring authority shall, immediately after the expiration of the said period of three years, offer the property at the price it has been acquired to the person from whom it has been acquired. Such person shall be entitled within three months of the receipt of such offer to signify his acceptance or non-acceptance of the offer, and if he signifies acceptance, such property shall be returned to him immediately after his returning such price within a further period of three months from such acceptance.”
29. Article 33 of the Constitution, in so far as relevant, provides:
“1. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the state of emergency, the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by this Chapter shall not be subject to any other condition, constraint or restriction except those prescribed in this Chapter. 2. The provisions of this Chapter which refer to such conditions, constraints or restrictions shall be interpreted narrowly and shall not be applied for any purpose other than that for which they were enacted.”
      COMPULSORY ACQUISITION LAW OF 1962 (LAW No. 15/1962)
30. Section 15(1) of the Compulsory Acquisition Law of 1962 provides, in so far as relevant:
“For any property expropriated after the entry into force of the Constitution, where the purpose of the expropriation has not been achieved within three years from the date of the expropriation, or where the purpose has been abandoned by the expropriating authority, or where it has been shown that all or part of such property was in excess of the real needs of the expropriating authority, the following provisions shall apply:
(a)  the expropriating authority shall make a written offer to sell the property at the price at which it acquired it, to the person to whom such property belonged before the expropriation or, where that person is deceased, to that person’s representatives or heirs, who in reply shall indicate in writing within three months whether they accept or reject the offer; if no reply is received within the time-limit, the offer shall be considered rejected ...;
(b)  where the person mentioned in paragraph (a) accepts the offer, that person shall within a further three months from the acceptance ... pay the agreed or determined price to the expropriating authority; the authority shall thereafter transfer ownership of the property.”
31. Section 15(2) governs what happens in the event that no agreement with the former owner of a property can be reached. In such a scenario, the authorities offer the expropriated property for sale via a public auction. 32. Section 15(3) provides, in so far as relevant:
“The provisions of subsection 2 shall not apply if all or part of the immovable property becomes necessary for another purpose pursued by the expropriating authority, as long as such purpose is in the public interest as provided for in the present Law and as long as the authority issues a confiscation order (διάταγμα επισχέσεως) published in the Official Gazette of the Republic ...”
    DOMESTIC CASE-LAW
33. The full bench of the Supreme Court in the leading case of Zinon Efthymiadis Ltd v. the Republic (2006) 3 A.A.D. 166 crystallised the principle that not only should an expropriation be formally justified but its purpose should also be actively pursued in order to prevent the State from indefinitely holding expropriated property without fulfilling its stated public‑interest purpose. The case concerned a 1992 expropriation of 6,990 square metres of land for the construction of the government’s new printing office. By 1998 the construction had still not taken place. In the meantime, town-planning zones had changed, placing the plot in a residential area and raising further hurdles for the construction of the building in question. The former owner of the land had thus requested its return. That request had been refused by the government on the grounds that architectural plans had been prepared and that the project was still feasible. The former owner had unsuccessfully challenged that refusal. On appeal, the Supreme Court decided to harmonise the divergent case-law on the interpretation of Article 23 § 5 of the Constitution (concerning whether the purpose of an acquisition has been attained and, where this is not the case, the return of the property). 34. The full bench of the Supreme Court analysed the conflicting case-law on the matter and held that the authorities had an ongoing duty – extending beyond three years – to actively pursue the stated public-interest purpose for which the property had been expropriated. In deciding whether the purpose of the expropriation had been attained, the focus should be on objective feasibility, that is, on whether the project could realistically be implemented. Importantly, the burden was on the former owner to show that the authorities had not taken the necessary steps to implement the project. 35. As to the specific circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court considered that the retention of the property based on a potential future decision to pursue the stated purpose amounted to an unjustified benefit for the State. At the same time, it imposed an indefinite burden on the former owner, especially given that the value of the property had increased since the expropriation – as was usually the case. 36. Lastly, the Supreme Court reiterated that Article 23 of the Constitution provided for the extinguishment of property rights when an expropriation took place, but at the same time granted the right to reclaim the property subject to certain conditions and other statutory provisions. THE LAW        PROCEDURAL SUCCESSION

37. The application was lodged with the Court on 31 July 2018 under Article 34 of the Convention by ten applicants. They or their ancestors previously owned plot no. 243. 38. After the application had been lodged, applicant no. 9, Mr Savvas Nikolaou, passed away. In a letter of 31 May 2023 his children and heirs, Nikolaos, Chrysis and Marina Nikolaou, expressed their wish to pursue the application in his stead. The Government did not submit any objections. 39. In a number of cases in which an applicant has died in the course of the proceedings, the Court has taken into account the statements of the applicant’s heirs or of close family members expressing the wish to pursue the proceedings, or the existence of a legitimate interest claimed by a person wishing to pursue the application (see Mraović v. Croatia (striking out) [GC], no. 30373/13, § 23, 9 April 2021, and the cases cited therein). 40. In the circumstances of the present case, and in view of the absence of any objections from the Government, the Court considers it justified to permit Mr Savvas Nikolaou’s children to pursue the application in his stead. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
41. The applicants complained that the continuous deprivation of their property and the refusal of the domestic authorities to return the disputed land to them breached their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
   Admissibility
42. In the present case, the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is not in question. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits     The parties’ submissions   The applicants

43. The applicants accepted that the initial purpose of the expropriation of their plot of land had been in the public interest, namely the development of an industrial area. However, they argued that that purpose had not been achieved for the unused land in dispute and that the continuous deprivation of their property therefore violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The applicants contended that the expropriated land in question had never been used for the general interest of the community and that it had in fact been used for purposes other than those set out in Expropriation Notice no. 99. 44. Citing Article 23 § 5 of the Constitution and its interpretation in domestic case-law (see paragraph 34 above), the applicants submitted that an expropriation was considered lawful only for as long as the expropriated property was being used for the purpose for which it had been acquired by the State. The time-limit laid down in the Constitution was a safeguard for the individual’s property rights, setting a maximum period within which the interest of the community had to be served. However, should that purpose not be achieved within the set period, the authorities had an obligation to return the property to the original owner, according to both domestic case-law and the Court’s case-law. In the applicants’ view, given that the authorities had failed to return the disputed land to them within the time-limit set by the Constitution, they had remained legally obliged to do so in 2008 when the applicants had lodged a request to that effect, because thirty-two years had passed since the expropriation and no public-interest projects had materialised on the unused land. 45. The applicants argued that their land had been expropriated too early for, or in excess of, the real needs of the development of the industrial area. In view of the subsequent failure of the authorities to use the disputed land for the purpose for which it had been expropriated, their refusal to return it had upset the fair balance that they were obliged to maintain between the general interest of the community and the protection of the property rights of the applicants as individuals. According to the applicants, the property had generated an increase in value of which they had been deprived. They had therefore had to bear an unnecessary economic burden which, to date, no compelling public-interest need had been shown to counterbalance. The Government
46. The Government accepted that the expropriation of the applicants’ land constituted an interference amounting to a deprivation of their possessions. They contended, however, that both the expropriation and the subsequent refusal of the authorities to return the disputed land to the applicants had been in accordance with the procedure laid down in domestic law. 47. In relation to the purpose of the expropriation, the Government first asserted that it had been feasible to achieve within three years from the expropriation. They further submitted that the disputed land formed part of the wider industrial area. Since its conception, the industrial area had included open space for functional purposes. Moreover, the Government cited the various discussions between the national authorities and other stakeholders concerning the administrative centre, arguing that these had been indicative of the intention to use the land in the public interest. The Government submitted that the applicants had not shown that the land was not being used for the needs of the State, understood in a broad sense. 48. The Government further contended that the development of an industrial area was consistent with the public-interest purpose under the Convention. They argued that the domestic authorities enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in that regard. According to the Government, the expropriation measures had not targeted the applicants specifically but had been applied in a general manner and had affected many property owners. The Government alleged that the local community largely benefited from the development of the industrial area and other related public-interest services that were based around it. They denied any disproportionality or arbitrariness on the part of the domestic authorities, who had acted in an orderly and timely manner during the administrative and judicial proceedings concerning the disputed land. The Court’s assessment   General principles

49. The Court reiterates that the taking of property can be justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention only if it is shown, inter alia, to be “in the public interest” and “subject to the conditions provided for by law”. In this connection, because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is “in the public interest”. Here, as in other fields to which the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. Furthermore, the notion of “public interest” is necessarily extensive. In particular, the decision to enact laws expropriating property will commonly involve consideration of political, economic and social issues. The Court finds it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one and will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is “in the public interest” unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation (see Malama v. Greece, no. 43622/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II). Likewise, in an area as complex and difficult as that of land development, the Contracting States should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in order to implement their planning policy (see Terazzi S.r.l. v. Italy, no. 27265/95, § 85, 17 October 2002, and Elia S.r.l. v. Italy, no. 37710/97, § 77, ECHR 2001-IX). Nevertheless, in the exercise of its power of review the Court must determine whether the requisite balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the individual’s right of property (see Abdilla v. Malta (dec.), no. 38244/03, 3 November 2005). 50. Not only must a measure depriving a person of his or her property pursue, on the facts as well as in principle, a legitimate aim in the public interest, but there must also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. The fair balance to be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights is thus upset if the person concerned has had to bear a disproportionate burden (see Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, no. 40786/98, § 33, ECHR 2004-VIII (extracts)). 51. The Court has held that when a significant amount of time passes between the expropriation of a property and the actual implementation of the public-interest project underlying that measure, the continuous deprivation of the property may deprive the former owner of any increase in its value during that period. Where such a deprivation is not itself based on a public‑interest justification, the individual may therefore, depending on the circumstances of the case, be made to bear an additional burden that is incompatible with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Motais de Narbonne v. France, no. 48161/99, §§ 19 and 22, 2 July 2002; Beneficio Cappella Paolini, cited above, § 33; Keçecioğlu and Others v. Turkey, no. 37546/02, §§ 27‑29, 8 April 2008; Vassallo v. Malta, no. 57862/09, § 42, 11 October 2011; Frendo Randon and Others v. Malta, no. 2226/10, § 61, 22 November 2011; and B. Tagliaferro & Sons Limited and Coleiro Brothers Limited v. Malta, nos. 75225/13 and 77311/13, § 73, 11 September 2018). Application of those principles to the present case
52. The Court notes that the domestic legal order – specifically Article 23 § 5 of the Constitution, read in the light of its interpretation and application by the domestic courts – confers on the original owners of expropriated land a right to have that land returned to them if the purpose of the expropriation has not been attained (see paragraphs 34 and 36 above). The applicants relied on that right to claim back the 3,974 square metres of their former land which had remained unused. Their claim was examined in substance by the domestic courts. The Court also observes that the essence of the dispute between the parties domestically concerned whether the stated purpose underpinning the expropriation of the disputed land had been fulfilled or not. 53. It is common ground between the parties that a right of restitution exists in domestic law. There is also agreement that the expropriation constituted a deprivation of possessions, that it was in accordance with the Compulsory Acquisition Law, that it pursued a public interest and that adequate compensation was paid. What therefore remains to be decided is whether the authorities’ refusal to return the disputed land in itself had a legitimate aim in the public interest and struck a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights (see, mutatis mutandis, Motais de Narbonne, §§ 19 and 22; Beneficio Cappella Paolini, § 33; Keçecioğlu and Others, §§ 27-29; Vassallo, § 42; Frendo Randon and Others, § 61; and B. Tagliaferro & Sons Limited and Coleiro Brothers Limited, § 73, all cited above). 54. The Court reiterates that it is an accepted fact that part of the initially expropriated property – namely a 3,050-square-metre portion – was used for road development and that the remaining 3,974 square metres constitute the disputed land in issue in the present case. In the years following the expropriation, the disputed land was the subject of extensive negotiations for construction projects in line with the purpose of the expropriation (see paragraphs 11-12 above). Specifically, in 1979 it was designated in the regulatory plan for the area (see paragraph 8 above) to be used for the construction of an administrative centre, which would serve the needs of the industrial area under development. In the following thirty-one years the authorities made several plans and entered into various agreements for the development of the land to that end. However, none of those plans materialised, either for financial or other, unknown, reasons (see paragraph 12 above). As a result, the disputed land has remained unexploited. This fact is accepted and forms common ground between the parties. 55. According to the plans proposed over the years and submitted to the Court by the Government, the disputed land was not originally intended to remain “open space”. It was only in 2008, following the applicants’ request for the return of the property (prompted by the failure to implement the original – or any other – project), that the domestic authorities referred to its designation as “open space”, presenting this as the basis for its continued retention (see paragraph 17 above). Moreover, the Supreme Court did not consider, either in the first-instance or in the appellate proceedings that the disputed land was destined to remain “open space”, but found that the authorities had shown their intention to complete any remaining works needed to create a fully functional industrial area (see paragraphs 19 and 24 above). The Court acknowledges that open space serves a useful and necessary function in town planning and that it will generally respect the domestic authorities’ judgment as to what is in the general interest unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation (see paragraph 49 above and Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, § 49, ECHR 1999‑V). However, it cannot remain passive, in exercising the European supervision incumbent on it, where a domestic court’s interpretation of a legal act appears “unreasonable, arbitrary or ... inconsistent ... with the principles underlying the Convention” (see Michael Theodossiou Ltd v. Cyprus, no. 31811/04, § 78, 15 January 2009). In the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot disregard the Government’s own actions and submissions that contradict the land’s designation as “open space”, asserting that there is a maintained intention to construct a public-service building on the disputed land, and accepting that the land has been used for other-than-the-stated purposes such as for private‑profit (see paragraph 14 above), as an informal car park and as a waste‑disposal site (see paragraph 15 above). These contradictions aside, the Government have also failed to clarify before the Court the specific public interest justifying the land’s continued designation as “open space” over an extended period of time, instead suggesting – as did the domestic courts in their examination of the case – that it might still be developed into an administrative centre (see, a contrario, Özer and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 58734/16, §§ 16-17, 10 December 2024, where the absence of construction on part of the expropriated land fulfilled a specific public interest, as it served to protect against electromagnetic waves emitted by the weather station built on the rest of the expropriated land). 56. While the Court accepts that projects of a certain scale – such as the transformation of an entire area for industrial use – may need to allow scope for further expansion. However, when expropriating land, the authorities should have had some concrete plans at least for its forthcoming, if not for its imminent, development (see Frendo Randon and Others, cited above, § 61). Despite the assertion that the Expropriation Notice was worded in broad terms (see paragraph 22 above) and the Government’s submission that the applicants had not proven that the land was not being used for the State’s needs understood in a broad sense (see paragraph 47 above), the Court cannot consider that this absolved the national authorities from their obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court notes that the domestic courts accept there was a legal obligation under Article 23 § 5 of the Constitution to fulfil the stated purpose of the expropriation within three years, and that former owners retained the right to challenge an alleged non‑fulfilment of the stated purpose well beyond that deadline (see paragraphs 28, 33-36 above). Given the absence of clear arguments about the use and purpose of the land in relation to the public interest requirement, as well as the uncontested fact that it remains unexploited by the authorities, it cannot be said, in the light of the Court’s relevant case-law, that the delay in using the land is itself based on any public-interest concern. 57. Thus, the Court finds that the authorities’ refusal to return the disputed land to the applicants was not in itself based on a public-interest requirement. Since the land has indisputably generated an increase in value over the years, of which the applicants have been deprived, the Court finds that in the circumstances of the present case the fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individuals’ fundamental rights has been upset. 58. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
59.

Outcome for Article P1-1: violation