FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF KOZAK AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE(Applications nos. 54738/13 and 2 others–see appended list)      JUDGMENT STRASBOURG27 November 2025   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Kozak and Others v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Andreas Zünd, President, Mykola Gnatovskyy, Vahe Grigoryan, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the applications (nos. 54738/13, 33635/14 and 13080/17) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;the decision to give notice of part of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 and of the complaints under Article 8 of the Convention to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, from the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of applications nos. 54738/13 and 13080/17 inadmissible;the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 6 November 2025,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:Subject matter of the case1. The present case mainly concerns the applicants’ complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention alleging (i) non‑compliance with the principle of an independent and impartial tribunal and (ii) insufficiency of the subsequent judicial review. According to the applicants, their dismissal from their posts as local court judges for “breach of oath” had been unlawful.Application nO. 54738/132. On 16 October 2012 the High Council of Justice (Вища рада юстиції ‑ “the HCJ”) established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant, as a member of a panel of judges, had participated in the examination of a criminal case and in the delivery of a judgment finding the defendant in that case guilty. Subsequently, that judgment had been quashed in part by a higher court on the grounds that it had been unsubstantiated and the sentence had been too lenient. The HCJ considered that the first‑instance court’s judgment had had negative consequences: in particular, it had caused discontent in society, since the criminal case had been widely discussed in the media. The HCJ concluded that the applicant had disregarded the requirements of procedural law, and had not acted diligently and impartially when considering the criminal case; he therefore had to be dismissed.3. The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision before the High Administrative Court (“the HAC”) which, on 28 February 2013, dismissed the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. It found that the HCJ’s conclusions had been well‑founded and that its decision proposing the applicant’s dismissal had been lawful.4. On 23 May 2013 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.5. The applicant challenged the parliamentary resolution ordering his dismissal before the HAC which, on 28 August 2013, dismissed the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. It held that Parliament had complied with the prescribed procedure governing the dismissal of judges when examining the applicant’s case.Application nO. 33635/146. On 11 June 2013 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It thus decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from his post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ pointed out that the applicant had grossly violated the law when administering justice – namely, that he had opened civil proceedings and examined a case that had fallen within the jurisdiction of the commercial courts and that he had also issued an interim relief order for the seizure of the defendants’ funds, securities and property in the amount of a sum of money several times higher than the amount of the claim. All those decisions had been subsequently quashed as unlawful by an appellate court.7. On 5 September 2013 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.8. The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision and the parliamentary resolution ordering his dismissal before the HAC.9. On 24 October 2013 the HAC dismissed the applicant’s claim against the HCJ as unsubstantiated. It found that the HCJ’s conclusions had been well‑reasoned and that its decision proposing the applicant’s dismissal had been lawful.10. On 13 November 2013 the HAC dismissed the applicant’s claim against Parliament as unsubstantiated. It held that Parliament had complied with the prescribed procedure governing the dismissal of judges when examining the applicant’s case.Application nO. 13080/1711. On 24 March 2015 the Temporary Special Commission (“the TSC”), which had been established under the 2014 Restoration of Trust in the Judiciary in Ukraine Act to vet judges (see Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, no. 15367/14 and 13 others, §§ 220-29, 21 January 2021), found that the applicant had breached his judicial oath by sentencing two individuals to fifteen days of administrative detention (the most severe administrative‑offence sentence) for their participation in mass protests in Kharkiv on 19 February 2014 (see Vorontsov and Others v. Ukraine, no. 58925/14 and 4 others, § 26, 21 January 2021). The TSC submitted its conclusion to the HCJ for further examination.12. On 5 November 2015 the HCJ upheld the TSC’s conclusion and made a submission to the President of Ukraine to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ stated that the court decisions adopted by the applicant had not been properly reasoned and that the case files had contained no evidence whatsoever that the individuals concerned had committed the administrative offences with which they had been charged. The HCJ also established that the applicant had committed numerous serious violations (ibid., §§ 27‑29).13. On 30 January 2016 the President of Ukraine issued a decree dismissing the applicant from the post of judge.14. The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision and the presidential decree ordering his dismissal before the HAC.15. On 8 August 2016 the HAC granted the applicant’s claim against the HCJ. On 29 November 2016 the Supreme Court, upon the HCJ’s appeal, quashed the HAC’s decision, finding that the HCJ’s conclusions had been well‑founded and that its decision proposing the applicant’s dismissal had been lawful.16. On 6 April 2017 the HAC dismissed the applicant’s claim against the presidential decree as unsubstantiated. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 23 October 2018. Both courts held that the decree ordering the applicant’s dismissal fell within the discretionary powers of the President of Ukraine on the basis of and in accordance with the procedure provided in domestic legislation.Relevant legal framework and practice17. The domestic law governing the procedure for the dismissal of judges for “breach of oath”, and the relevant international and comparative-law material can be found in Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (no. 21722/11, §§ 56‑82, ECHR 2013) and Kulykov and Others v. Ukraine (no. 5114/09 and 17 others, §§ 107-16, 19 January 2017).THE COURT’S ASSESSMENTJOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS18. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION19. Referring to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicants complained that the dismissal procedure had been incompatible with the principles of an independent and impartial tribunal and that the subsequent judicial review (see paragraphs 3, 5, 8-10 and 14-16 above) had been insufficient to remedy those shortcomings.20.

Outcome for Article 6: violation