SECOND SECTION
 
CASE OF DOBROVITSKAYA AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA
(Applications nos. 41660/10 and 5 others)
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
 
 
 
 
STRASBOURG
3 September 2019
 
 
 
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Dobrovitskaya and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
 Julia Laffranque, President,
 Ivana Jelić,
 Arnfinn Bårdsen, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 2 July 2019,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in six applications (nos. 41660/10, 25197/11, 8064/11, 6151/12, 28972/13 and 29182/14) against the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by eleven Moldovan and Russian nationals, Ms Elena Dobrovitskaya, Mr Alexandru Ursu, Mr Serghei Boltenco, Mrs Galina Samatov, Mr Ivan Samatov, Mr Mihail Petiş, Mr Maxim Ciumacenco, Mr Mihail Doagă, Mr Igor Gherghelejiu, Mr Vitalii Beşleaga and Mr Serghei Bevziuc (“the applicants”, see details in the appended Annex), on 7 July 2010, respectively. 2. The applicants were represented by Mr A. Zubco, Mr A. Postica, Ms N. Hriplivîi and Mr P. Postica, lawyers practising in Chișinău and Varnița. The Moldovan Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent ad interim at the time, Mrs R. Revencu. The Russian Government were represented by their Agent at the time, Mr A. Fedorov, Head of the Office of the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights. 3. Between 29 September 2014 and 16 June 2016 the complaints listed in the annexed table were communicated to the respondent Governments and the remainder of the applications nos. 41660/10, 8064/11, 25197/11 and 6151/12 was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. 4. The Russian Government objected to the examination of the applications by a Committee. After having considered the Russian Government’s objection, the Court rejects it. THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The details concerning each application are set out in the annexed table. Each of the applicants (except for Mrs Galina Samatova in application no. 8064/11) was detained by the authorities of the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Transdniestrian Republic” (the “MRT” – see for more details Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012). They all (except for application no. 28972/13) complained about unlawful detention, while some also complained about inhuman conditions of detention, unfair trial and the lack of effective remedies in respect of their other complaints (see details in the annexed table). RELEVANT MATERIALS
6. The relevant materials have been summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC] (no. 11138/10, §§ 61-77, ECHR 2016). THE LAW
JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
7. Given their similar factual and legal background, the Court decides that the six applications should be joined under Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court. GENERAL ADMISSIBILITY ISSUESVictim status of one of the applicants

8. The Court notes that application no. 8064/11 was lodged by Mrs Galina Samatova in her own name, as a direct and indirect victim, as well as in the name of her son, who could not lodge it himself due to being isolated in an “MRT” prison. It considers that the complaints made in that application, namely allegedly inhuman conditions of detention, unlawful detention and lack of effective remedies, are not of a nature giving rise to an independent right for Mrs Samatova to complain in her own name of breaches of the Convention, given in particular that her son, Mr. Ivan Samatov, is alive and could pursue himself the application before the Court. In view of the above, the Court concludes that the complaints of Mrs Samatova are incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4. Death of an applicant
9. On 19 November 2014 Mr Boltenco (application no. 28972/13) died from heart attack. His wife expressed her wish to continue with the application lodged with the Court. 10. The Court sees no reason to reject that request. For practical reasons this judgment will continue to refer to Mr Boltenco as the “applicant” although his wife is today to be regarded as having that status (see Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 1, ECHR 1999‑VI, and Brosset-Triboulet and Others v. France [GC], no. 34078/02, § 58, 29 March 2010). Observance of the six-month rule
11. The Russian Government submitted that the applications lodged by Mr Samatov (application no. 8064/11), Mr Ursu (application no. 25197/11) and Mr Boltenco (application no. 28972/13), as well as the complaint lodged by the applicants in application no. 6151/12 should be rejected for failure to submit their applications within six months. They noted that Mr Samatov had complained about his conditions of detention between 3 March and 17 June 2007, while he had lodged his application on 20 January 2011. Mr Ursu had been finally convicted by the “MRT” Supreme Court on 29 June 2010, but only lodged his application on 11 April 2011. Similarly, Mr Boltenco had been convicted by the “MRT” Supreme Court on 12 May 2009, but lodged his application only on 2 May 2012. Finally, the four applicants in application no. 6151/12 were convicted by an “MRT” court on 27 May 2011, but lodged their application on 18 January 2012. 12. The Court reiterates that the six-month rule stipulated in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention is intended to promote legal certainty and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time (Jeronovičs v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898/10, § 74, ECHR 2016). As a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where no effective remedy is available to an applicant, the time-limit generally expires six months after the date of the acts or measures about which he or she complains (ibidem, § 75). In cases of a continuing situation, the period starts to run afresh each day and it is in general only when that situation ends that the six‑month period actually starts to run (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 159, ECHR 2009; Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, § 54, 29 June 2012; and Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09 and 2 others, § 261, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). The concept of a “continuing situation” refers to a state of affairs which operates by continuous activities by or on the part of the State to render the applicant a victim (Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 86, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). 13. The Court notes that the complaint made under Article 6 § 1 by Mr Ursu concerns the instantaneous act of his conviction by the final judgment of 29 June 2010. That was also the last date by which the local courts could have heard his complaints regarding his alleged ill-treatment while in detention (complaint under Article 3 of the Convention). Accordingly, these two complaints were to be lodged by 29 December 2010 in order to comply with the six-month rule referred to above. However, he lodged his application only on 11 April 2011. Therefore, these complaints under Article 3 (alleged ill-treatment) and 6 were lodged outside the time-limit set down by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and must be rejected as inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. 14. As regards the other complaints lodged by Mr Samatov, Mr Ursu and Mr Boltenco, the Court notes that they referred to their conditions of detention, the lawfulness of their detention and the lack of effective remedies (see the annexed table). It considers that, given the fact that at the time of lodging their complaints all these applicants were still in detention and in the conditions complained of, this part of their applications referred to a “continuing situation” within the meaning referred to above (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 78, 10 January 2012). 15. The same conclusion is to be reached in respect of the complaint lodged by the four applicants in application no. 6151/12 concerning their unlawful detention. As for their complaint under Article 6, the Court notes that the judgment of 27 May 2011 was appealed to the “MRT” Supreme Court, which upheld it on 19 July 2011. The Russian Government argued that, given the ineffectiveness of any remedies existing in the “MRT” as argued by the applicants, they did not have to appeal their conviction by the first-instance court and should have lodged their application within six months of that date. 16. The Court refers to its earlier findings (see, for instance, Mozer, cited above, § 212) that there were no effective remedies in the “MRT” in respect of the complaints raised under a number of Convention provisions. It considers that the judgment of the “MRT” Supreme Court resulted in the applicants’ conviction, regardless of the decisions given by the lower courts. Therefore, the applicants could complain about their conviction by the “MRT” Supreme Court, which had taken place less than six months prior to the lodging of this application. 17. Consequently, the Russian Government’s objection in respect of all the complaints except those mentioned in paragraph 13 above is to be rejected. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
18. The Moldovan Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted the remedies available to them in Moldova. In particular, they could have asked the Moldovan Supreme Court of Justice to quash any convictions by the “MRT” courts and make use of Law no. 1545 (1998) on compensation for damage caused by illegal acts undertaken by the criminal investigation bodies, the prosecution authorities or the courts, to claim compensation from the Republic of Moldova for a breach of their rights. The Moldovan Government therefore argued that the parts of the applications concerning Moldova should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies in Moldova. 19. The Court notes that the same objection was raised by the Moldovan Government and dismissed by the Court in Mozer (cited above, §§ 115‑121). It sees no grounds on which to distinguish the present case from Mozer and rejects the Moldovan Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on the same grounds as in that case. 20. The Russian Government submitted that the application should be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies before the Russian courts. 21. The Court notes that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain, not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. To be effective, a remedy must be capable of directly redressing the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Mozer, cited above, § 116). 22. By contrast, there is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 67, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑IV). However, the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to use that means of redress (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 71; and Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 70, 17 September 2009). 23. As regards the burden of proof, it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, and available in theory and in practice at the relevant time. Once this burden has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact used, or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see, inter alia, Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, § 58, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014; and Gherghina v. Romania [GC] (dec.), no. 42219/07, §§ 83-89, 9 July 2015). 24. The Court notes the Russian Government’s submission concerning the failure to exhaust domestic remedies before the Russian courts. It observes that it examined essentially the same objection in Ilaşcu and Others, finding that:
“... the Russian Government mentioned that it was possible for the applicants to bring their complaints to the knowledge of the Russian authorities but did not state what remedies Russian domestic law might have afforded for the applicants’ situation. It notes also that the Russian Government denied all allegations that the armed forces or other officials of the Russian Federation had taken part in the applicants’ arrest, imprisonment and conviction or had been involved in the conflict between Moldova and the region of Transdniestria. Given such a denial of any involvement of Russian forces in the events complained of, the Court considers that it would be contradictory to expect the applicants to have approached the Russian Federation authorities” (Ilaşcu and Others [GC] (dec.), no. 48787/99, 4 July 2001). 25. In the present case, the Russian Government did not specify which of their courts had jurisdiction over complaints against the actions of the “MRT” authorities. Moreover, no details were given as to the legal basis for examining such complaints and to the manner in which any decision taken would be enforced. In addition, the Russian Government continued to deny any involvement in the Transdniestrian conflict or participation by their agents in the alleged breaches of the applicants’ rights in the present cases. Given those circumstances the Court is not satisfied that the remedies referred to by the Russian Government were available and sufficient (see Draci v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, no. 5349/02, § 41, 17 October 2017). 26. It follows from the above that the Russian Government’s objection must be dismissed. Jurisdiction
27. The Russian Government argued that the applicants did not come within their jurisdiction. Consequently, the applications should be declared inadmissible ratione personae and ratione loci in respect of the Russian Federation. For their part, the Moldovan Government did not contest that the Republic of Moldova retained jurisdiction over the territory controlled by the “MRT”. 28. The Court notes that the parties in the present case have positions concerning the matter of jurisdiction which are similar to those expressed by the parties in Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, §§ 83-101, ECHR 2012 and in Mozer (cited above, §§ 81-95). Namely, the applicants and the Moldovan Government submitted that both respondent Governments had jurisdiction, while the Russian Government submitted that they had no jurisdiction. The Russian Government expressed the view that the approach to the issue of jurisdiction taken by the Court in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC] (no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004 VII was wrong and at variance with public international law. 29. The Court observes that the general principles concerning the issue of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention in respect of acts undertaken and facts arising in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova were set out in Ilaşcu and Others (cited above, §§ 311-19), Catan and Others (cited above, §§ 103-07) and, more recently, Mozer (cited above, §§ 97-98). 30. In so far as the Republic of Moldova is concerned, the Court notes that in Ilaşcu, Catan and Mozer it found that although Moldova had no effective control over the Transdniestrian region, it followed from the fact that Moldova was the territorial State that persons within that territory fell within its jurisdiction. However, its obligation, under Article 1 of the Convention, to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, was limited to that of taking the diplomatic, economic, judicial and other measures that were both in its power and in accordance with international law (see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 333; Catan and Others, cited above, § 109; and Mozer, cited above, § 100). Moldova’s obligations under Article 1 of the Convention were found to be positive obligations (see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, §§ 322 and 330-31; Catan and Others, cited above, §§ 109-10; and Mozer, cited above, § 99). 31. The Court sees no reason to distinguish the present case from the above-mentioned cases. Besides, it notes that the Moldovan Government do not object to applying a similar approach in the present case. Therefore, it finds that Moldova had jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, but that its responsibility for the acts complained of is to be assessed in the light of the above-mentioned positive obligations (see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 335). 32. In so far as the Russian Federation is concerned, the Court notes that in Ilașcu and Others it has already found that the Russian Federation contributed both militarily and politically to the creation of a separatist regime in the region of Transdniestria in 1991-1992 (see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 382). The Court also found in subsequent cases concerning the Transdniestrian region that up until at least July 2010, the “MRT” was only able to continue to exist, and to resist Moldovan and international efforts to resolve the conflict and bring democracy and the rule of law to the region, because of Russian military, economic and political support (see Ivanţoc and Others, cited above, §§ 116-20; Catan and Others, cited above, §§ 121-22; and Mozer, cited above, §§ 108 and 110). The Court concluded in Mozer that the “MRT”‘s high level of dependency on Russian support provided a strong indication that the Russian Federation continued to exercise effective control and a decisive influence over the Transdniestrian authorities and that, therefore, the applicants fell within that State’s jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention (Mozer, cited above, §§ 110‑11). 33. The Court sees no grounds on which to distinguish the present case from Ilașcu and Others, Ivanţoc and Others, Catan and Others, and Mozer (all cited above). 34. It follows that the applicants in the present cases fell within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation under Article 1 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court dismisses the Russian Government’s objections ratione personae and ratione loci. 35. The Court will hereafter determine whether there has been any violation of the applicants’ rights under the Convention such as to engage the responsibility of either respondent State (see Mozer, cited above, § 112). ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
36. Mr Serghei Boltenco (application no. 28972/13) complained about the authorities’ failure to provide him with the requisite medical assistance for his condition. He argued that this failure exposed him to a real risk to his life, contrary to Article 2 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally ...”
Admissibility
37. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

Outcome for Article 13: no_violation