FIFTH SECTION      CASE OF SAVIN v. UKRAINE (Application no. 34725/08)      JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 16 February 2012 FINAL 16/05/2012 This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Savin v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Dean Spielmann, President, Elisabet Fura, Boštjan M. Zupančič, Ann Power-Forde, Ganna Yudkivska, Angelika Nußberger, André Potocki, judges,and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,Having deliberated in private on 24 January 2012,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:PROCEDURE1. The case originated in an application (no. 34725/08) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Vyacheslav Yuryevich Savin (“the applicant”), on 15 June 2008.2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr A. Kristenko, a lawyer practising in Kharkiv. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev, succeeded by Ms V. Lutkovska.3. The applicant alleged that he had been ill-treated while in unlawful detention and that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the matter within a reasonable time, thus allowing the perpetrators to escape all responsibility.4. On 10 March 2010 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).5. The Russian Government, having been informed of their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 of the Rules of Court), indicated that they did not wish to exercise that right.THE FACTSI. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE6. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Kharkiv, Ukraine.A. Events of 18 and 19 October 19997. As submitted by the applicant and established by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 22 and 28 below), in the afternoon of 18 October 1999 the applicant attended at the Dzerzhynskyy District Police Station, at the investigator’s summons, as a witness in a fraud-related criminal investigation. At about 7 p.m., officer K. questioned him. Not being satisfied by the applicant’s explanations and seeking to obtain his confession to the fraud, K. tied the applicant’s hands behind his back with a belt, made him sit on a chair and punched him at least eight or ten times in the head. Thereafter K. took the applicant into the corridor, threw him face down against the floor and raised his tied arms behind his back seven or eight times. K. also kicked the applicant several times in the ribs.8. According to K.’s report to the police unit on duty, later found to be knowingly false (see paragraph 22 below), he had apprehended the applicant in the street for swearing in public. As a result, an administrative offence report was drawn up and the applicant was arrested. According to the police records, he was released at 8.40 p.m. on 18 October 1999. As it was later established, the applicant was in fact held in the room for detainees until 9 a.m. on 19 October 1999.9. In addition to the aforementioned account established by the court, the applicant alleged that two other police officers, under the leadership of K., had also beaten him.B. The applicant’s health10. According to the medical documentation, the applicant had been in good health before the aforementioned events of October 1999.11. On 21 October 1999 he was examined by a doctor who documented the following injuries: multiple bruises on the face, scalp, left ear, neck and chest, as well as a closed head injury with concussion of the left frontal lobe and an intracerebral haematoma. The doctor concluded that these injuries had been caused by blunt objects and could have dated from 18 or 19 October 1999.12. On the same date, 21 October 1999, the applicant was admitted to a neurological hospital, where he underwent treatment until 23 November 1999.13. The head injury sustained by the applicant in October 1999 had negative consequences for his health. As a result, he was hospitalised many times during the years to follow. In particular, he underwent in-patient treatment on that account during the following periods: from 17 January to 7 February 2000, from 9 to 30 January 2001, from 18 April to 6 May 2002, from 12 to 22 November 2002, from 11 to 25 April 2003, and during subsequent unspecified periods.14. In 2002 the applicant was recognised as falling into the third category of disability (the mildest) on account of the residual effects of the head injury and post-traumatic encephalopathy.15. From 2004 onwards his condition was classified as a disability of the second category (more serious), as the post-traumatic encephalopathy had worsened.16. From October 1999 eight forensic medical expert examinations were carried out with a view to verifying the applicant’s ill-treatment allegation (see paragraph 17 below). According to the examination reports the applicant had sustained a craniocerebral injury with subarachnoid haemorrhage, brain concussion, and numerous haematomas on various parts of the head, neck, back and chest. All the examinations found the applicant’s account as to the time and origin of his injuries to be plausible. While originally the injuries were classified as grievous, the experts later reclassified them as being of medium severity. Their consequences were described as follows: lasting health deterioration, namely, a cerebral cicatrix, liquor hypertension syndrome, right-side sensory and motor impairment, and a convulsive disorder, which all together had led to the loss by the applicant of thirty per cent of his general working capacity and fifty per cent of his professional working capacity. The last forensic medical examination, which was conducted between 5 May and 14 June 2007, established that the applicant’s disability was a direct result of the injuries sustained by him in October 1999.C. Investigation of the applicant’s allegations of unlawful detention and ill-treatment17. From 19 October 1999 the applicant lodged numerous complaints with prosecution authorities concerning unlawful detention and torture by the police.18. During the period from 1999 to 2008 the prosecutors refused on six occasions to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers, having discerned no indication of a crime in their actions. All these decisions were subsequently quashed by higher-level prosecution authorities as premature, unlawful and based on a perfunctory investigation not aimed at establishing the truth.19. Meanwhile, on 20 December 1999, the Dzerzhynskyy District Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal investigation in respect of infliction of grievous bodily injuries on the applicant by unknown persons. Subsequently, on 2 December 2002, the charge was re-classified as “infliction of injuries of medium severity”. The investigation was stayed several times for failure to identify the offenders.20. On 27 March 2006 the Ordzhonikidze District Prosecutor’s Office (hereafter – “the Ordzhonikidze Prosecutor”) applied to the Dzerzhynskyy District Court (“the Dzerzhynskyy Court”) for discontinuation of the proceedings regarding the infliction of bodily injuries of medium severity on the applicant by unknown persons as being time-barred.21. On 6 July 2006 the Dzerzhynskyy Court rejected that application as unfounded and premature. It noted that the investigation had failed to comply on many occasions with the instructions of the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office and the General Prosecutor’s Office.22. On 30 July 2008 the Ordzhonikidzhe Prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against K. under Article 365 § 2 of the Criminal Code on suspicion of abuse of power, associated with violence and degrading treatment. That investigation established the facts as they are summarised in paragraphs 7 and 8 above.23. On 23 January 2009 K. was formally charged, and the applicant was assigned victim status.24. On 27 January 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim within the criminal proceedings seeking compensation for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage.25. On 29 January 2009 the Ordzhonikidzhe Prosecutor refused to open a criminal case against the other two police officers in respect of the applicant’s ill-treatment, having discerned nothing criminal in their actions.26. On 19 February 2009 the case was referred to the Ordzhonikidzhe District Court (“the Ordzhonikidzhe Court”) for trial.27. The court adjourned its hearings several times because K. was receiving medical treatment for excessive hypertension, proctologic problems, and an accidental fall.28. On 2 March 2010 the Ordzhonikidzhe Court upheld the investigation’s findings and found K. guilty as charged. It held that K. had breached the applicant’s rights under Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution, as well as Article 365 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The court, however, released K. from criminal liability as the statutory limitation period of ten years had expired.29. On 9 March 2010 the Ordzhonikidzhe Court modified the above‑mentioned ruling in order to specify that K. was released from both criminal liability and punishment. It also decided to leave the applicant’s civil claim without examination.30. Both K. and the public prosecutor appealed. K. submitted that the criminal proceedings against him should be terminated for lack of evidence of his guilt. The public prosecutor emphasised that K. had committed a serious premeditated crime in the course of his professional activities, thus undermining the authority of the law-enforcement bodies and the State. He noted that K. had never admitted his guilt, had not drawn any conclusions, had not compensated the applicant for any pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage, and showed no remorse about what he had done. The public prosecutor therefore considered that a guilty verdict would be the right outcome to this case.31. On 1 July 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal rejected both appeals.D. K.’s career within the law-enforcement authorities32. At the time of the events of October 1999 K. held the post of detective officer («оперуповноважений») in the Dzerzhynskyy District Police Department.33. On 15 June 2000 he was promoted to the post of senior detective officer («старший оперуповноважений»).34. At a later unspecified date K. was promoted to the post of Deputy Chief of the Zolochevskyy District Police Department.35. On 23 January 2009, after the formal charges were brought against K., the Ordzhonikidze Prosecutor suspended him from his duties.36. On 2 March 2010 the Ordzhonikidzhe Court issued, in addition to the aforementioned judgment (see paragraph 28 above), a special ruling by which it informed the Kharkiv Regional Police Department of the termination of the proceedings against K. as being time-barred and indicated that he should be restored to his post within the law-enforcement authorities.37. K. apparently continues to work in the police force.II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE38. Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution of Ukraine are cited in Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310/04, § 121, 21 April 2011.39. Article 166 of the Criminal Code (1960) provided for three to eight years’ imprisonment with a prohibition on holding certain office or carrying out certain activities for a period of up to five years as punishment for abuse of power, associated with violence or degrading treatment of the victim.40. Following the entry into force of the new Criminal Code in 2001, its Article 365 § 2 provided for the same punishment for this offence, except that the bar from office was limited to three years.41. Articles 1 and 2 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Procedure for the Compensation of Damage caused to Citizens by the Unlawful Actions of Bodies in charge of Operational Enquiries, Pre-trial Investigation Authorities, Prosecutors or Courts” (“the Compensation Act”)” (as worded before the amendments of 1 December 2005) can be found in the following judgments respectively: Kobtsev v. Ukraine, no. 7324/02, § 35, 4 April 2006, and Afanasyev v. Ukraine, no. 38722/02, § 52, 5 April 2005).42. Following the amendments to the Compensation Act of 1 December 2005, the list of cases where the right to compensation would arise was expanded by inclusion of the following point:“(1-1) where ... unlawfulness of remand and holding in custody ... has been established by a conviction or other judgment of a court (save for rulings on remittal of cases for additional investigation)”.III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS43. The relevant extracts from the Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the CPT from 9 to 21 September 2009 [CPT/Inf (2011) 29] read as follows:“14.  ... the frequency and consistency of the allegations received by the CPT’s delegation during the 2009 visit suggest that methods of severe ill-treatment/torture continue to be used with impunity by Internal Affairs officers. It is clear that continued determined action, bringing together in a joint effort all relevant State agencies, is needed to combat this phenomenon. ...16.  ... The CPT recommends that a firm message of “zero tolerance” of ill-treatment continue to be delivered at regular intervals to all Internal Affairs staff. It should be made clear that the perpetrators of ill-treatment and those condoning or encouraging such acts will be subject to severe sanctions.”44. Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations, which were adopted on 30 March 2011, provide for the following among the general measures for the prevention of impunity:“... 7. States should ... establish mechanisms to ensure the integrity and accountability of their agents. States should remove from office individuals who have been found, by a competent authority, to be responsible for serious human rights violations or for furthering or tolerating impunity, or adopt other appropriate disciplinary measures. ...”THE LAWI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION45. The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated in police custody, which he considered to amount to torture, and about the subsequent investigation. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”A. Admissibility46. Referring to the ongoing domestic proceedings regarding the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment, the Government submitted that he had not exhausted the remedies available to him under domestic law, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They noted that courts at two levels of jurisdiction had established the fact of the applicant’s ill-treatment, although they had discontinued the proceedings against the police officer concerned as being time-barred. The Government underlined that that decision could still be appealed against on points of law.47. The Government considered the circumstances of the present case to be similar to those in the case of Misiak v. Poland (no. 43837/06, 3 June 2008), in which the Court had dismissed the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment as premature because the domestic investigation into the matter was still pending (§ 32).48. Lastly, the Government noted that the applicant had not availed himself of the domestic civil procedure for seeking compensation for damages in respect of his ill-treatment.49. The applicant disagreed. He contended that the domestic investigation in his case had lasted for over ten years and had been ineffective, thus allowing the police officer in question to escape criminal liability. The applicant noted that no further appeals would be able to remedy that.50. As to the civil proceedings, the applicant maintained that, in the absence of the criminal prosecution of his offender, compensation alone could not offer sufficient redress for his sufferings.51. The Court observes, from the outset, that the only remedies Article 35 of the Convention requires to be exhausted are those that are available and sufficient and relate to the breaches alleged (see Derman v. Turkey, no. 21789/02, § 22, 31 May 2011).52. The Court further reiterates that the obligations of the State under Article 3 cannot be satisfied merely by an award of damages (see Okkalı v. Turkey, no. 52067/99, § 58, ECHR 2006‑XII (extracts)). This is so because if the authorities could confine their reaction to incidents of wilful ill-treatment by State agents to the mere payment of compensation, while not doing enough to prosecute and punish those responsible (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461/02, §§ 78 and 79, 24 July 2008).53. It follows from the above that an effective investigation is required, in addition to adequate compensation, to provide sufficient redress to an applicant complaining of ill-treatment by State agents (Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933/04, § 130, 29 July 2010).54. At the same time, the Court notes that an applicant cannot be reproached for not pursuing a domestic investigation, which is found to be ineffective (see Lotarev v. Ukraine, no. 29447/04, § 93, 8 April 2010).55. The Court observes that, unlike in the present case, the applicant in the case of Misiak v. Poland, cited by the Government, did not allege that the domestic investigation into his allegation of ill-treatment had proved ineffective.

Outcome for Article 5: violation