FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF PETEDZHYYEV AND BONDAR v. UKRAINE(Applications nos. 60318/21 and 52156/22)     JUDGMENT STRASBOURG23 October 2025    This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Petedzhyyev and Bondar v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Andreas Zünd, President, Diana Sârcu, Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,Having deliberated in private on 2 October 2025,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:PROCEDURE1. The case originated in applications against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table.2. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the applications.THE FACTS3. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.4. The applicants complained of the life sentence with no prospect of release.THE LAWJOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS5. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 of the Convention6. The applicants complained of the life sentence with no prospect of release. They relied, expressly or in substance, on Article 3 of the Convention.7. The Court reiterates that the Convention does not prohibit the imposition of a life sentence on those convicted of especially serious crimes, such as murder. Yet to be compatible with Article 3 such a sentence must be reducible de jure and de facto, meaning that there must be both a prospect of release for the prisoner and a possibility of review. The basis of such review must extend to assessing whether there are legitimate penological grounds for the continuing incarceration of the prisoner. These grounds include punishment, deterrence, public protection and rehabilitation. The balance between them is not necessarily static and may shift in the course of a sentence, so that the primary justification for detention at the outset may not be so after a lengthy period of service of sentence. The importance of the ground of rehabilitation is underlined, since it is here that the emphasis of European penal policy now lies, as reflected in the practice of the Contracting States, in the relevant standards adopted by the Council of Europe, and in the relevant international materials (see Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 66069/09 and 2 others, §§ 59-81, ECHR 2013 (extracts)).8. In the leading case of Petukhov v. Ukraine (no. 2), (no. 41216/13, 12 March 2019), the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case. In the leading case of Medvid v. Ukraine (no. 7453/23, 10 October 2024), it further established that such a situation of uncertainty with a lack of any clear and realistic prospects of early release persisted until 3 March 2023 – the date on which the new release on parole mechanism became fully operational and offered the applicants the realistic opportunity to have their life sentences reviewed within the well‑defined timeframe and under clear conditions.9. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of the complaints raised by the applicants in the case at hand. The Court observes that after 3 March 2023 the newly established release on parole mechanism offered the applicants the realistic opportunity to have their life sentence reviewed within the well‑defined timeframe and under clear conditions. Thus, this part of the applicants’ complaints is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention (see for similar reason, Medvid, cited above, § 61). In application no. 60318/21, after the communication of his case, the applicant further submitted that the new release on parole mechanism violated Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 as it does not provide for direct release of life prisoners like in majority of the Member States but only through prior commutation of life sentence to fixed-term sentence. Even assuming that this complaint is an elaboration of the applicant’s original complaint under Article 3 of the Convention as to the new release on parole mechanism, the Court notes that similar contentions were examined in the leading case of Medvid (cited above) under Article 3 and found unsubstantiated. In that case the Court in particular noted that in view of the fact that the States are in principle free to choose their own criminal-justice systems and while the introduced release on parole mechanism does not foresee the possibility of direct release from life imprisonment apart from through the commutation thereof by means of a court decision, such an approach to the possibility of reducing life sentences has been examined by the Court before and was found to be satisfactory (ibid., § 53). Therefore, this complaint must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION11. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law (see, in particular, Petukhov (no. 2), cited above, § 201), the Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage that may have been sustained by the applicants.

Outcome for Article 3: violation