FIFTH SECTION      CASE OF KUTSENKO v. UKRAINE (Application no. 41936/05)       JUDGMENT  STRASBOURG 10 December 2009 FINAL 10/03/2010 This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Kutsenko v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Peer Lorenzen, President, Renate Jaeger, Karel Jungwiert, Rait Maruste, Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges, Mykhaylo Buromenskiy, ad hoc judge,and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,Having deliberated in private on 17 November 2009,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:PROCEDURE1. The case originated in an application (no. 41936/05) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mrs Tamara Ananyevna Kutsenko (“the applicant”), on 10 January 2005. The applicant having died in June 2008, Mr Oleg Mykolayovych Kutsenko, her widower, expressed the wish to pursue the application.2. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that her Convention rights were infringed on account of the lengthy non-enforcement of a judgment given in her favour.4. On 19 January 2009 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3).THE FACTSI. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lived in Dnіprodzerzhynsk.6. On 14 May 2004 the Dniprovsky District Court of Dniprodzerzhynsk awarded the applicant 2,000 hryvnias (UAH) against the Dniprodzerzhynskteplomerezha municipal company and UAH 1,000 against the Dnipropdzerzhynska Teploelectrotsentral State-controlled OJSC.7. On 12 August 2004 this judgment became binding for enforcement.8. In September 2004 enforcement proceedings were instituted to collect the debts. By 7 July 2005 the first debtor had paid its debt. As regards the second debtor, on several occasions enforcement proceedings were suspended on various grounds (such as insolvency proceedings against the debtor and introduction of a moratorium according to the 2005 Law of Ukraine “On Measures to Ensure the Stable Operation of Fuel and Energy Sector Enterprises”). Currently the proceedings are suspended and the debt remains outstanding.9. On 17 June 2008 the applicant died. By a letter of 28 November 2008 the applicant's widower informed the Court of his wish to pursue the application.II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW10. The relevant domestic law is summarised in the judgments of Sokur v. Ukraine (no. 29439/02, § 17-22, 26 April 2005, and Kryshchuk v. Ukraine, no. 1811/06, § 10, 19 February 2009).THE LAWI. AS TO THE LOCUS STANDI OF MR KUTSENKO11. The respondent Government submitted that as the applicant had died the application should be struck out of the Court's list. They did not advance any specific objections as to Mr Kutsenko's standing to pursue the application.12. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the information in its possession, the Court considers that the applicant's widower has standing to continue the present proceedings in her stead (see Sharenok v. Ukraine, no. 35087/02, §§ 10-12, 22 February 2005). However, reference will still be made to the applicant throughout the ensuing text.II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 113. The applicant complained about the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment given in her favour and that there were no effective remedies in that respect. She invoked Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provide, in so far as relevant, as follows:Article 6 § 1“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”Article 13“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”Article 1 of Protocol No. 1“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest ....”A. Admissibility14. The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of her complaints, as she had never instituted any proceedings against the State bailiffs.15. The applicant disagreed.16. The Court reiterates that it has already dismissed similar objections in other cases concerning the non-enforcement of judgments against the State-controlled companies (see, for example, Kozachek v. Ukraine, no. 29508/04, §§ 19-25, 7 December 2006). The Court considers that these objections must be rejected for the same reasons.17. The Court finds that the above complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B. Merits18. In their observations on the merits the Government advanced the arguments they have frequently put forward in cases like the present one (see, for example, the Sokur judgment, cited above, § 28).19. The applicant asked the Court to find violations of the invoked Articles.20. The Court reiterates that it has already found violations of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in cases like the present application (see, for example, Kryshchuk, cited above, § 19).21. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.22.

Outcome for Article P1-1: violation