FIFTH SECTION   CASE OF LAVRIK AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE(Applications nos. 63542/13 and 4 others)    JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG25 June 2020 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Lavrik and others v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, President, Lado Chanturia, Anja Seibert-Fohr, judges,and Anne-Marie Dougin, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the applications (nos. 63542/13, 11237/14, 20415/14, 24962/15 and 43478/16) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Yuriy Viktorovich Lavrik (“the first applicant”) and four Ukrainian nationals, Mr Dmytro Fedorovych Abgash (“the second applicant”), Mr Artur Petrovych Paseka (“the third applicant”), Mr Ivan Bogdanovych Krutiy (“the fourth applicant”) and Mr Kuzma Yuriyovych Ivanov (“the fifth applicant”), on the dates indicated in the appended table;the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;the Russian Government’s indication that they did not wish to exercise their right to intervene in the present case in so far as it concerns application no. 63542/13;the decision to grant legal aid to the first applicant;the parties’ observations;Having deliberated in private on 2 June 2020,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:INTRODUCTIONThe case concerns the alleged lack of reasoning of the judicial decisions ordering the applicants’ arrest and continued detention, and the allegedly unreasonable duration of their pre-trial detention.THE FACTS1. The applicants’ personal details are set out in the appended table.2. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna, of the Ministry of Justice.3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.4. On various dates the applicants were arrested in the context of criminal investigations against them. Shortly afterwards the courts ordered their pre-trial detention. The relevant judicial decisions stated that the applicants were accused of serious crimes and could abscond and hinder the investigation or continue with their criminal activities. The courts did not provide specific details explaining why the above-mentioned reasons persisted.5. In addition to the above-mentioned reasons, in application no. 63542/13 the domestic court noted, without providing specific details, that the crime imputed to the applicant had been committed while he had been on probation for a similar crime.6. In the course of the proceedings, the courts extended the applicants’ detention a number of times, referring to the reasons indicated in the initial decisions to detain them. The courts furthermore noted that there were no reasons for the applicants to be released, since no new circumstances warranting release had been identified or the circumstances that had led to the decision to place the applicants in pre-trial detention persisted, without providing specific details.7. On 8 November 2012 the trial court convicted the first applicant and sentenced him to fourteen years and eight months’ imprisonment. On 10 February 2015 that sentence was quashed on points of law and the case was remitted for retrial. On 20 July 2016 the trial court again convicted the first applicant and sentenced him to the same term of imprisonment as before.8. On 11 February 2014 the trial court convicted the second applicant and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment with probation.9. On 26 May 2014 the trial court convicted the third applicant and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment.10. On 21 December 2015, in the course of the proceedings, the fourth applicant was released on bail.11. On 15 December 2017 the trial court convicted the fifth applicant and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment.THE LAWJOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS12. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.SCOPE OF THE CASE13. In his response to the Government’s observations, the fifth applicant complained, under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention, that one of the court hearings in his case had been held in the absence of his lawyer.14. In the Court’s view, this is a new complaint that was not included in the original complaints on which the parties have commented. It is therefore inappropriate to take this matter up in the context of the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, Piryanik v. Ukraine, no. 75788/01, § 20, 19 April 2005).ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION15. The applicants complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that their pre-trial detention had been unjustified and unreasonable.The relevant part of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention reads as follows:“3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”Admissibility16. The Court notes that the applications are neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.Merits17. The applicants submitted that their pre-trial detention had not been based on sufficient grounds and had been unreasonable and too lengthy.18. The Government contested the applicants’ arguments, stating that their detention had been justified and reasonable.19. The applicable general principles are set out in Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 84-91 and 102, 5 July 2016.20. Information about the dates and length of the applicants’ detention is indicated in the appended table.21. The Court observes that the seriousness of the charges against the applicants and the risk of their absconding or interfering with the respective investigations were mentioned in the initial orders for their detention (see paragraph 4 above). Those reasons remained the main grounds for the applicants’ detention until their conviction or release. The Court furthermore notes that the decisions on the applicants’ detention were couched in general terms and contained repetitive phrases. They did not suggest that the courts had made an appropriate assessment of the facts relevant to the question of whether such a preventive measure was necessary in the circumstances at the respective stages of proceedings.22. Moreover, with the passage of time, the applicants’ continued detention required further justification, but the courts did not provide any further reasoning. It appears that the domestic courts did not attempt to demonstrate the existence of specific facts proving that the declared risks outweighing the rule of respect for individual liberty existed. In fact, the burden of proof was wrongly shifted onto the applicants (compare Khayredinov v. Ukraine, no. 38717/04, §§ 40-41, 14 October 2010, and Makarenko v. Ukraine, no. 622/11, § 91, 30 January 2018).23. The Court notes in particular that the domestic courts repeatedly justified the applicants’ further detention by the absence of reasons to release them (see paragraph 6 above), whereas Article 5 § 3 of the Convention implies the opposite approach and requires the national authorities to provide grounds for the person’s continuing detention (see Komarova v. Ukraine, no. 13371/06, § 79, 16 May 2013).24. The Court has often found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in cases against Ukraine on the basis that even in respect of lengthy periods of detention, the domestic courts referred to the same set of grounds (if indeed any were given) throughout the period of the applicant’s detention (see, for example, Kharchenko v. Ukraine, no. 40107/02, §§ 80-81 and 99, 10 February 2011, and Ignatov v. Ukraine, no. 40583/15, §§ 41-42, 15 December 2016).25. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that by failing to address specific facts or consider other measures as an alternative to pre-trial detention and by relying essentially and routinely on the seriousness of the charges, the authorities extended the applicants’ pre-trial detention on grounds that cannot be regarded as “sufficient” and “relevant” to justify its duration.26. There have accordingly been violations of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION27.

Outcome for Article 5: violation