FIRST SECTION
CASE OF HUBER v. CROATIA
(Application no. 39571/16)
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
STRASBOURG
7 July 2022
 
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Huber v. Croatia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
 Alena Poláčková, President,
 Raffaele Sabato,
 Davor Derenčinović, judges,
and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 16 June 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application against Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4 July 2016. 2. The applicant was represented by Ms L. Horvat, a lawyer practising in Zagreb. 3. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the application. THE FACTS
4. The applicant’s details and information relevant to the application are set out in the appended table. 5. The applicant complained of the inadequate conditions of his detention. THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
6. The applicant complained of the inadequate conditions of his detention. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
Article 3
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
7. The Court notes that the applicant was kept in detention in poor conditions. The details of the applicant’s detention are indicated in the appended table. The Court refers to the principles established in its case‑law regarding inadequate conditions of detention (see, for instance, Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 96‑101, ECHR 2016). It reiterates in particular that a serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the detention conditions described are “degrading” from the point of view of Article 3 and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (see Muršić, cited above, §§ 122-41, and Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 149‑59, 10 January 2012). 8. In the leading cases of Muršić, cited above, §§ 69-73 and 91-173, and Ulemek v. Croatia, no. 21613/16, §§ 71-120 and 126-46, 31 October 2019, the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case. 9. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of this application. 10. In particular, the Government’s argument that in respect of certain periods of his detention the applicant’s civil action for compensation had become time barred because he had brought it outside of the statutory time‑limit of three years must be dismissed. Detention should be regarded as a “continuing situation” as long as it was effected in the same type of detention facility in substantially similar conditions. Requiring detainees to bring their compensation claims against the State before the end of such situations imposes an unreasonable procedural burden on them (see Nikitin and Others v. Estonia, nos. 23226/16 and 6 others, §§ 136 and 141, 29 January 2019). Moreover, the Government’s argument seems to be contrary to the position of Croatian courts (see, for example, the judgment of the Split County Court, no. Gž-1371/2018 of 21 August 2019). In the present case the periods of the applicant’s detention in different prison facilities ended in November 2010, January 2011 and December 2014, respectively (see the Appendix), whereas he took the relevant preliminary step for bringing his civil action (which interrupted the running of the statutory time‑limit) on 4 May 2012, that is, within three years. 11. The Government also submitted that the applicant had been spending only between seven and nine hours in his cell during the night whereas the rest of the time he had either worked or been able to move freely within his ward. In addition, he was allowed to spend two hours per day outdoors. The Government also pointed out that the Court had previously found no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in similar circumstances (see Dolenec v. Croatia, no. 25282/06, §§ 133-36, 26 November 2009). 12. The Court reiterates its finding in Muršić, a Grand Chamber judgment subsequent to Dolenec, that a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 arises where the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m of floor surface. That presumption can be rebutted only if certain factors are cumulatively met, inter alia, if the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occasional and minor (see Muršić, cited above, §§ 137-38). However, the periods in which the applicant in the present case disposed of less than 3 sq. m were neither short nor occasional (see the Appendix). 13. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the applicant’s conditions of detention were inadequate. 14. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
15.

Outcome for Article 3: violation