FOURTH SECTION
 
 
 
 
 
CASE OF JANKAUSKAS v. LITHUANIA (No. 2)
 
(Application no. 50446/09)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
 
 
 
STRASBOURG
 
27 June 2017
 
 
FINAL
 
13/11/2017
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Jankauskas v. Lithuania (No. 2),
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Ganna Yudkivska, President,
 Vincent A. De Gaetano,
 Egidijus Kūris,
 Iulia Motoc,
 Carlo Ranzoni,
 Marko Bošnjak,
 Péter Paczolay, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 June 2017,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 50446/09) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Mr Ramūnas Jankauskas (“the applicant”), on 9 September 2009. 2. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their then Agent, Ms E. Baltutytė. 3. The applicant complained about the Lithuanian authorities’ decision to strike his name off the list of trainee advocates. 4. On 25 November 2010 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Pakruojis. A. The applicant’s conviction
6. In 1996 the applicant graduated from the Lithuanian Police Academy with a degree in law. He worked as an investigator at Šiauliai city police headquarters. 7. On 3 October 2000 the Šiauliai Regional Court established that from 1995 to 1996, when he had been working as an investigator, the applicant had several times solicited and sometimes succeeded in getting bribes for discontinuing criminal proceedings. The victims of the applicant’s crimes, who were suspects in criminal proceedings or their relatives, had been threatened and sometimes harassed sexually by the applicant. He would tell them that “the case would end badly (blogai baigsis)” if they did not meet his demands. The Šiauliai Regional Court found that such actions amounted to the intentional crimes of abuse of office (Article 285 of the Criminal Code) and bribery (Article 282 of the Criminal Code). The court also noted that the applicant had not acknowledged his guilt, but had instead tried to justify his criminal acts and avoid taking responsibility for them in any way possible. The trial court sentenced him to eight years’ deprivation of liberty in a correctional labour colony under a strict regime, ordered the confiscation of all his property, and prohibited him from working in law enforcement or the justice system for five years. 8. The applicant’s conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 29 June 2001 and by the Supreme Court on 18 December 2001. 9. In 2003, upon entry into force of the new Criminal Code, the Šiauliai Regional Court requalified the applicant’s sentence to four years and seven months’ deprivation of liberty. The applicant was released from prison on 8 September 2003 after serving his sentence. 10. By a ruling of 17 June 2005 the Šiauliai Regional Court expunged the applicant’s conviction from his criminal record. The court noted that the applicant had served his sentence. He had been convicted of crimes of medium severity. The court also took account of the fact that the applicant had not committed any violations of administrative law, had been bringing up a child alone, had been described in positive terms by people at his place of residence and at his workplace, had drawn the right conclusions from the crimes he had committed, and had promised not to commit any crimes in the future. The ruling was not appealed against and became enforceable. 11. According to the applicant’s curriculum vitae, which he later submitted to the Bar Association, from May 2004 he worked as in-house lawyer and loan administrator in various private companies. B. The applicant’s admission to the position of trainee advocate and the disciplinary proceedings before the Advocates’ Court of Honour
12. On 12 January 2007 the applicant wrote to the Lithuanian Bar Association, which regulates advocates (lawyers admitted to the Bar, advokatas), requesting to be admitted as a trainee advocate. He asked that an advocate V.S.B. be appointed as his supervisor in his work practice. The applicant also confirmed in writing that “none of the grounds listed in the Law on the Bar prevented him from being put on the list of trainee advocates”. The applicant also submitted a written application (advokato įskaitos lapas) where he listed his former places of employment, stating that from 22 July 1991 until 15 March 1999 he had worked in the police and from 19 March 2004 in the private sector. There was no explanation about the period between 1999 and 2004. 13. The Bar Association placed the applicant’s name on the list of trainee advocates on 25 January 2007 and advocate V.S.B. was appointed as his supervisor. 14. On 13 June 2007 the Bar Association received a letter from a private person, L.G., informing it that the applicant had withheld information from the Bar Association that he had been previously convicted. 15. On 20 June 2007 the Bar Association held that by failing to inform it of the conviction, the applicant had withheld information relevant to assessing his reputation, and that therefore he had shown that his attitude towards the standing of the Lithuanian Bar and towards becoming a trainee advocate was not honest and respectful. The Bar Association considered that the applicant had breached points 1.3, 12.1 and 13.2 of the Lithuanian Code of Professional Ethics for Advocates (see paragraph 37 below – hereinafter, “the Code of Ethics”), and disciplinary proceedings against him were therefore justified. The Bar Association also considered that the applicant’s supervisor, V.S.B., had likewise breached the Code of Ethics but that he would not face disciplinary proceedings owing to his long and positive professional record. 16. On 10 July 2007 the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Association held that the applicant had committed a disciplinary violation by withholding information about his conviction by Šiauliai Regional Court on 3 October 2000 (see paragraph 7 above). The committee emphasised the fact that the applicant had not mentioned the conviction or his “long prison sentence” in his application to be admitted as a trainee advocate, his curriculum vitae or in the other documents submitted in support. Information about the conviction had been relevant for assessing his reputation. By withholding such information the applicant had acted dishonestly and disrespectfully, and had not protected the prestige of the Lithuanian Bar. The applicant had thus breached points 1.3, 12.1 and 13.2 of the Code of Ethics, which set out the necessary requirements for candidates to become trainee advocates (see paragraph 37 below). The case therefore had to be decided by the Court of Honour of Advocates (hereinafter – “the Court of Honour”). 17. In a letter of 4 September 2007 to the Bar Association the chief prosecutor of Šiauliai Region wrote that the applicant lived in the city of Šiauliai and that in the course of his work as a trainee advocate he had interaction with the same investigators, prosecutors and judges with whom he had worked before committing his crimes and with those who had later investigated his crimes or examined his case in court. Even though the applicant had served his sentence, communication with those investigators, prosecutors and judges caused some strains at work in Šiauliai. The chief prosecutor stated that it would be better if the applicant could be prevented from practising law in the city or region of Šiauliai, even though the Law on the Bar did not provide for the possibility to restrict an advocate’s activity within or outside a certain area. 18. By a letter of 4 September 2007 the Court of Honour informed the applicant about the forthcoming hearing in his case, and invited him to participate in person or have an advocate represent his interests in those disciplinary proceedings. The applicant was present at the hearing, and explained that he had not hidden his conviction. The only reason he had not informed the Bar Association about it was because in his view there had been no requirement to do so. He also asked for the removal of the president of the Court of Honour, J.K., stating that the manner in which the latter had put certain questions to him showed he was biased. The request was refused as unfounded. 19. The Court of Honour, composed of the presiding advocate, J.K., and two other advocates, A.P. and G.P., met on 25 September and 25 October 2007. They postponed the hearing to a later date on each occasion. 20. On 23 November 2007 the Court of Honour rejected a request by the applicant to remove J.K. as unsubstantiated, while A.P. was replaced by another advocate, J.M. 21. The Court of Honour also held on the same day that the applicant had breached the Code of Ethics and imposed the disciplinary measure of ordering his removal from the list of trainee advocates, on the basis of Articles 13 § 1 and 54 § 2 of the Law on the Bar (see paragraph 34 below). In setting out its reasons the Court of Honour had regard to the crimes committed by the applicant and noted that during the criminal court proceedings he had expressed no remorse (see paragraph 7 above). For the Court of Honour, even though the law did not directly require that a person disclose a prior conviction when submitting a request to become a trainee advocate, such an obligation stemmed from Article 8 (4) of the Law of the Bar, which required candidates to be of high moral character (nepriekaištinga reputacija). Similarly, point 13.2 of the Code of Ethics set out that an advocate had to act honestly and ethically, even if certain acts or behaviour that did not meet the requirements of the Law on the Bar or the Code of Ethics were not described specifically in that Code (see paragraph 37 below). The Court of Honour considered that the crimes which the applicant had committed whilst working in law enforcement had been cynical and had shown great disrespect towards society. Moreover, he had committed those crimes while working in the legal field. In the light of such considerations, the Court of Honour was convinced that the applicant, who had a university degree and had previously had a law-related job, had deliberately withheld information about his prior conviction, because he had been aware that, if information not only about his crimes but also about the manner in which he had committed them had come to light, then the Bar Association would have rejected his application to become a trainee advocate. Lastly, the Court of Honour noted that the profession of advocate was defined not only by legal acts, but also by certain ethical rules, historic practices and society’s legitimate expectations as to the assistance an advocate was to provide as part of his or her role. An advocate should therefore always adhere to the moral and legal standards and obligations, protect the professional honour and dignity of advocates and do nothing that would discredit the good name of the profession, the advocate’s oath, or the notion of justice. C. The Vilnius Regional Court’s decision
22. The applicant challenged the above decision before the Vilnius Regional Court. He argued, inter alia, that there had been procedural beaches and that the Court of Honour had not been impartial. He also maintained that the concept of high moral character applied to advocates was too strict when compared with the requirements for bailiffs or civil servants. 23. On 24 October 2008 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded. It dealt with the applicant’s allegations about procedural violations by the Court of Honour by noting that that court had merely postponed the case on 25 September and 25 October 2007, without examining it on the merits (see paragraph 19 above). The applicant’s suggestion that the Court of Honour had issued a ruling on either of those dates that the applicant had not committed a disciplinary violation was therefore unfounded. Furthermore, J.K., the advocate who had been the president of the Court of Honour, had been questioned as a witness by the Vilnius Regional Court and had testified that he had not been biased against the applicant; he had only had an opinion about the particular actions performed by the applicant. Moreover, the applicant’s allegation about a lack of impartiality on the part of J.K. had also been dismissed as unfounded by the Court of Honour. Lastly, the change in the composition of that court when the case had been decided on 23 November 2007, removing A.P., a member said by the applicant to have been favourable to him (see paragraph 20 above), had not been a decisive factor because the court had been unanimous in its finding against the applicant. The Vilnius Regional Court thus dismissed the applicant’s request to summon for questioning advocate A.P., who, according to the applicant, had participated in the hearing when his case had gone before the Court of Honour. On the basis of the written evidence, the first-instance court established that A.P. had not taken part in the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 24. As to the question of the applicant’s reputation, the Vilnius Regional Court had particular regard to the crimes of which he had been convicted (see paragraph 7 above). While observing that the conviction had expired, the court noted that the crimes had been committed when the applicant had been working in law enforcement. The manner in which those crimes had been committed and their scale did not allow for the assertion that the applicant had automatically regained the status of being of high moral character immediately after the conviction had been expunged. Were it otherwise, society’s expectations as to the morals and ethics of representatives of the advocate’s profession would not be met. Only people of high moral character could be trusted to work in the process of the implementation of justice. In other words, the applicant’s actions had to be looked at to see not only if they had been in accordance with applicable laws, but also whether they had adhered to the requirements of professional ethics. That stemmed, inter alia, from Article 8 (4) and other provisions of the Law on the Bar, which provided that an advocate was liable to disciplinary sanctions, including disbarment, for breaches of professional ethics (see paragraph 34 below), and was something that had also been confirmed by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 43 below). 25. The Vilnius Regional Court concurred with the Court of Honour that the applicant had had a moral obligation to disclose important information such as a prior conviction to the Bar Association when submitting an application to become a trainee advocate, even though that requirement had not been explicitly stated on the application form (see paragraph 12 above, advokato įskaitos lapas). The fact that, according to the applicant, his supervising advocate, several other advocates in Šiauliai and some members of the Bar Association Council had known about his prior conviction, did not absolve him from the obligation to provide information that was as comprehensive as possible when applying to the Bar, so that it would be possible to assess his reputation objectively and comprehensively. The Court of Honour had also been correct in holding that the applicant had consciously withheld that information because he had understood that the nature of his criminal acts would not have permitted him to be considered as a person of high moral character. In any case, if the applicant had had any doubts about whether the information about his prior conviction was relevant, he could have asked the Bar Association. Consequently, it had been legitimate for the Court of Honour to impose a disciplinary measure on the applicant by removing him from the list of trainee advocates. D. The Court of Appeal
26. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the rules of the Code of Ethics had not applied to him at the time when he had requested to become a trainee advocate, given that they applied only to people who were already advocates and trainee advocates. According to the applicant, the president of the Court of Honour had clearly acknowledged to the Vilnius Regional Court that anyone who had disclosed a prior conviction had been admitted to the Bar and that the applicant would also have been admitted if he had done the same. The applicant also relied on Article 5 § 1 (2) of the Law on Bailiffs and Article 9 § 3 (1) of the Law on Civil Service (see paragraphs 41 and 42 below), implying that the definition of high moral character had been interpreted too broadly by the Court of Honour. The Bar Association asked that the applicant’s appeal be dismissed. 27. By a ruling of 7 April 2009 the Court of Appeal upheld the Vilnius Regional Court’s arguments and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It found that no violations had been committed under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention as regards the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings. The rules regulating disciplinary proceedings did not prohibit postponing examination of a case. Moreover, the applicant had not challenged J.M.’s participation in the disciplinary proceedings. It would also have been irrelevant to summon A.P. as she had not sat in the Court of Honour when it had decided on the applicant’s case on 23 November 2007.
28.

Outcome for Article 8: no_violation