THIRD SECTION
CASE OF BARA AND KOLA v. ALBANIA
(Applications nos. 43391/18 and 17766/19)
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 6 § 1 (civil and criminal) • Unreasonable length of proceedings • Significant delays before the Supreme Court unacceptable despite the context of the far-reaching reform of the justice system
Art 13 (+Art 6 § 1) • Effective remedy • New acceleratory/preventive and compensatory remedy in length-of-proceedings cases albeit effective in principle and to be used, ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case

 
STRASBOURG
12 October 2021
 
FINAL
 
28/02/2022
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Bara and Kola v. Albania,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Paul Lemmens, President,
 Georgios A. Serghides,
 Dmitry Dedov,
 Georges Ravarani,
 Darian Pavli,
 Anja Seibert-Fohr,
 Peeter Roosma, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 43391/18 and 17766/19) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Albanian nationals, Mr Petrit Bara (“the first applicant”) and Mr Eduard Kola (“the second applicant”), on 4 September 2018 and 27 March 2019, respectively;
the decision to give notice to the Albanian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints of the excessive length of the proceedings, the unfairness of the proceedings in respect of the second applicant and the lack of an effective remedy in respect of the length-of-proceedings complaints;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 7 September 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The applications concern the allegedly excessive length of administrative and criminal proceedings and the effectiveness of a new remedy introduced in 2017 in respect of the excessive length of proceedings. THE FACTS
The circumstances of the cases
2. The first applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Tirana. He was represented before the Court by Ms B. Bara and subsequently by Mr J. Bara, a lawyer practising in Tirana. 3. The second applicant was born in 1986 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Albania. He was represented before the Court by Mr A. Doda, a lawyer practising in Tirana. 4. The Government were represented by their then Agent, Mr A. Metani, and subsequently by Ms E. Muçaj of the State Attorney’s Office. 5. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Application no. 43391/18: Bara v. Albania
6. The first applicant is a doctor and professor of medicine at the publicly funded Tirana University of Medicine (Universiteti i Mjekësisë, Tiranë – “the UMT”). 7. Following an election for the position of the UMT rector, in which the first applicant was one of three candidates who ran for the position (see paragraphs 47 and 48 below), on 23 April 2016 the Institutional Electoral Committee (“the Electoral Committee” – see paragraph 48 below) announced the preliminary election results, according to which the first applicant had received 36.3% of the votes cast, and the other two candidates 38.3% and 25.4%. On the same date, maintaining that there had been several irregularities in the election process, the first applicant lodged an administrative complaint, which was dismissed by the Electoral Committee on 24 April 2016. 8. On 29 April 2016 the Appellate Committee, another administrative body of the UMT, dismissed the administrative appeal by the first applicant. On the same date the Electoral Committee confirmed that the winner of the election was the candidate who had received 38.3% of the votes cast. 9. Having exhausted the available administrative remedies, on 3 May 2016 the first applicant lodged an action with the Tirana Administrative Court of First Instance (“the Tirana Administrative Court”), requesting that the election be invalidated. 10. On 3 July 2016 the Tirana Administrative Court dismissed the action. On 29 September 2016 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld that judgment, concluding that the first applicant’s challenge as to the accuracy of the list of voters was inadmissible, because the list had been published before the election and no challenge had been lodged at the time. As regards a discrepancy between the security codes of a ballot box and the codes appearing on the official records, the court held that this had been the result of human error. Lastly, the court found that since the eight invalid votes of which the first applicant had complained had been cast in favour of his opponent, he had no legal interest in requesting their invalidation by the Committee. 11. On 27 October 2016 the first applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower courts had erred in their application of the relevant statutory provisions. 12. On 11 September 2017, 26 February and 5 July 2018 the first applicant asked the Supreme Court to expedite the proceedings concerning the examination of his appeal. 13. On 4 May 2018 the first applicant lodged a request with the Supreme Court under Articles 399/1 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”), asking the court to find a breach of his right to be heard within a reasonable time. 14. On 24 February 2021 the Supreme Court examined the first applicant’s cassation appeal and, having identified several shortcomings in the proceedings before the Administrative Court of Appeal, remitted the case for a fresh hearing by another bench of that court. Accordingly, the case is currently pending before the Administrative Court of Appeal. 15. It transpires from the Supreme Court’s website that on 13 July 2021 the Supreme Court decided to discontinue the review of the first applicant’s request under Articles 399/1 et seq. of the CCP, finding that the case was not exceptionally complex and that there had been a delay of one year and six months, running from the date when the case file had been registered with the court until the date when the first applicant had lodged his request under Articles 399/1 et seq. of the CCP. The Supreme Court attributed the delay to the justice system reform (see paragraph 24 below) and stated that any short delays caused by it were not disproportionate to its benefits. The court further held that, pursuant to Article 399/2 of the CCP, delays caused by a situation where it was objectively impossible to proceed with the case were not to be taken into account in the determination of the length of proceedings. Since the Supreme Court had examined the first applicant’s cassation appeal and remitted the case to the administrative appellate court for a fresh hearing, it decided to discontinue the proceedings. Application no. 17766/19: Kola v. Albania
16. On 24 September 2011 a night watchman of a stone quarry was found dead in the container cabin that served as his workplace. 17. Following a police investigation, on 24 November 2011 the second applicant and a co-defendant were charged with premeditated murder and illegal possession of hunting or sporting firearms, under Article 78 § 2 and Article 280 of the Criminal Code. 18. On 15 November 2012 the Shkodra District Court sentenced the second applicant to life imprisonment for premeditated murder. The co-defendant’s charge was reclassified and he was convicted of obstruction of justice for engaging in acts aimed at obstructing the discovery of the truth. 19. While the decision was upheld on appeal, on 1 March 2016 the Supreme Court quashed the decision on the grounds that it lacked sufficient reasoning. It remitted the case for re-examination and directed, amongst other things, that an expert report be carried out on a weapon that the co-defendant had removed from the crime scene in order to verify the existence of any fingerprints. 20. On 23 March 2017 the Shkodra Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the applicant’s conviction and discontinued the examination of the charge of illegal possession of firearms in application of an amnesty law. 21. On 27 March 2017 the second applicant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 22. On 5 March 2021 the Supreme Court, sitting in a three-judge formation, declared the second applicant’s cassation appeal admissible. It does not appear that the Supreme Court has fixed the date for examination of the appeal on the merits. Statistical and other information about the Supreme CourtInformation regarding the Supreme Court’s composition

23. Until March 2016 the Supreme Court was composed of seventeen of a total of nineteen judges. Between April 2016 and October 2017 seven judges resigned, and one judge was found guilty of a criminal offence and dismissed. 24. In 2016 Albania embarked on far-reaching justice system reforms, which led to amendments to the Constitution and the enactment of a number of essential statutes relating to, amongst other things, the re-evaluation of all serving judges and prosecutors (otherwise referred to as the vetting process of judges and prosecutors), the organisation of the judiciary, including that of the Supreme Court, and the establishment of new governing bodies of the justice system (see Xhoxhaj v. Albania, no. 15227/19, §§ 4-7, 9 February 2021). 25. Between July 2018 and May 2019, following the outcome of the vetting process instituted in relation to Supreme Court judges, seven of the nine remaining judges were dismissed from office. Thus, from 31 July to 11 December 2018 the Supreme Court was composed of four judges who could examine certain types of cassation appeals, from 12 December 2018 to 21 May 2019 it was composed of three judges and from 22 May 2019 to 18 March 2020 it lacked the statutory quorum of three judges to examine any cassation appeals. 26. Only two judges were confirmed in their positions following the successful outcome of the vetting process. Of the two confirmed judges, in December 2018 one judge was elected as representative to the High Judicial Council (Këshilli i Lartë Gjyqësor – “the KLGJ”), a new governing body responsible for the management of the judiciary, and his term of office at the Supreme Court was suspended ex lege. 27. Since 30 July 2021 nine of a supposed total of nineteen judges have been serving at the Supreme Court. Information regarding the Supreme Court’s backlog
28. By the end of 2012 the Supreme Court’s backlog consisted of 9,961 cases[1], by the end of 2014 its backlog had reached 11,357 cases[2] and by the end of 2015 it had a backlog of 16,777 cases[3]. 29. On 12 February 2021, in response to a request from the Court, the Government stated that the Supreme Court’s backlog was 36,609 cases. A number of backlog reduction measures had been taken as follows: the Supreme Court had decided to examine the most urgent and oldest cases; the KLGJ had seconded other judges and legal advisors to alleviate the Supreme Court’s backlog; and additional human resources had been allocated, which contributed to the preliminary review of 22,623 cases. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICEDomestic law and practiceOrganisation and functioning of the Supreme Court

30. Article 135 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is the highest court of law in the country. Under Article 136, its members serve a non-renewable nine-year term. 31. Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Law no. 98/2016 “On the Organisation of the Judiciary”) provides that the Supreme Court examines cassation appeals in civil, administrative and criminal benches (kolegje). 32. As regards criminal cassation appeals, Article 14/a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force until 29 May 2021, provided for three different formations of the Supreme Court: it examined the admissibility of cassation appeals sitting in private in a three-judge formation, harmonised and developed case-law in a five-judge formation, and departed from established case-law sitting in a joint bench composed of at least two third of the judges of the Supreme Court. 33. In leading decision no. 00-2020-473 (4) of 22 December 2020 the Supreme Court decided that, save for cases which warranted a harmonisation and development of the case-law, a three-judge formation would also examine the merits of admissible criminal cassation appeals. It thus discontinued the practice according to which a five-judge formation examined all criminal cassation appeals on the merits. 34. As regards administrative cassation appeals, section 58 of the Administrative Courts Act (Law no. 49/2012 “On Administrative Courts and Adjudication of Administrative Disputes”, as amended), as in force at the relevant time, listed the grounds under which such an appeal could be lodged, namely: (a) where the substantive law was disregarded, misinterpreted or misapplied or the decision was contrary to a prior decision of the Supreme Court’s administrative bench or joint bench; (b) where there was a serious breach of procedural rules resulting in the invalidity of the decision or court proceedings; or (c) where there was a serious procedural breach which had significantly affected the delivery of the decision. Under section 60 the Supreme Court must examine administrative cassation appeals within ninety days of receipt. Constitutional Court’s case-law regarding the interpretation of section 60 of the Administrative Courts Act
35. In decision no. 26 of 27 March 2017 (26/2017), the Constitutional Court found a breach of the complainant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time on account of the proceedings before the Supreme Court having lasted almost three years (between 2013 and 2016), that is, beyond the ninety-day time-limit provided for in section 60 of the Administrative Courts Act. Without making an award in respect of the breach found, the court stated, amongst other things, that:
 “... in so far as the legislature has laid down time-limits for the adjudication of administrative proceedings, this meant that [it] has considered them reasonable time-limits to be applied by the administrative courts. In this connection, strict observance of the law constitutes an obligation for the Supreme Court, owing to its role and position as a court of law examining the application of substantive and procedural law by the lower courts ... [T]he backlog does not constitute a [valid reason] justifying non-compliance with the time-limits laid down by the legislature.”
36. In decision no. 3 of 6 February 2018, the Constitutional Court examined a constitutional complaint in which it was argued, among other things, that there had been a breach of the complainant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time on account of the proceedings before the Supreme Court having lasted three years (between 2014 and 2017). The Constitutional Court held that the constitutional appeal, which had been lodged prior to the entry into force of a new remedy in respect of the length of proceedings (see paragraph 37 below), concerned the length of finished administrative proceedings for which the complainant had no effective remedy except for the constitutional appeal. The Constitutional Court made the same findings with regard to the length of administrative proceedings before the Supreme Court as in its decision no. 26/2017. As regards the issue of damages, the Constitutional Court directed the complainant to lodge a separate claim with the courts of general jurisdiction. Length of proceedings
(a)   Domestic law regarding the new remedy in respect of the length of proceedings
37. In implementation of the Court’s leading judgment in the case of Luli and Others v. Albania (nos. 64480/09 and 5 others, 1 April 2014), on 30 March 2017 Albania introduced a new remedy in the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the unreasonable length of proceedings, which entered into force on 5 November 2017. The relevant provisions read as follows:
Chapter X - Examination of requests for finding a breach of the reasonable time requirement, acceleration of the proceedings and just satisfaction
 
Article 399/1 - Scope
“1. The courts, depending on the level of jurisdiction of [domestic] proceedings as specified in this Chapter, shall be competent to examine requests for just satisfaction from a person who has suffered pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage on account of the unreasonable length of proceedings, as defined in Article 6 § 1 of the [Convention].
...”
Article 399/2 - Reasonable time
“1. For the purposes of Article 399/1, in so far as the investigation, trial or enforcement of a final decision is concerned, reasonable time shall mean:
a) in administrative proceedings in the first-instance and appellate courts, termination of the proceedings within one year of commencement at each level of jurisdiction;
b) in civil proceedings in the first-instance court, termination of the proceedings within two years, in the appellate court [termination of the proceedings within] two years, and in the Supreme Court [termination of the proceedings within] two years;
c) as regards enforcement proceedings in respect of a civil or administrative decision, the period of one year shall start on the date of submission of the enforcement request, save for [the enforcement of] periodic or time-dependent obligations;
ç) in the investigation of criminal offences, the maximum duration of an investigation as specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure;
d) in a criminal trial in the first-instance court, a trial for offences [of a duration of] two years and misdemeanours one year, in the appellate court [conclusion of] a trial for offences within one year and misdemeanours six months, and in the Supreme Court [conclusion of] a trial for offences within one year and misdemeanours six months.
... 3. Periods of time during which the proceedings have been suspended for lawful reasons or postponed at the request of the party complaining under this Chapter, or during which there were circumstances that made it objectively impossible [for the court] to proceed [with the examination of the request], shall not be taken into account in the determination of the length of proceedings.
...”
Article 399/6 - Competent court to examine requests
“1. A request for finding a breach [of the reasonable time requirement] and acceleration of the proceedings shall be lodged with the competent court ... as follows:
...
b)  where the case in which a breach [of the reasonable time requirement] is alleged is pending before the appellate courts, the request shall be examined by the competent bench of the Supreme Court.
c)  where the case in which a breach [of the reasonable time requirement] is alleged is pending before the Supreme Court, the request shall be examined by a different bench of the Supreme Court.
... 2. Where there is a final decision finding a breach [of the reasonable time requirement] and ordering acceleration of the proceedings, the requesting party may file a claim for compensation under paragraph 3 of this Article. 3. The claim for compensation shall be filed with the first-instance court of general jurisdiction where the institution in respect of which a breach has been found is based. The claim shall become time-barred within six months of the final decision finding a breach.
...”
Article 399/7
“1. The examination of a claim lodged under Article 399/6 § 3 shall be carried out in accordance with the usual procedural rules within a period of three months of the claim being filed. 2. The examination of a request lodged under Article 399/6 § 1 shall take place in private and the court shall take a decision within forty-five days of the request being lodged ... 3. Should the authority examining [the main] proceedings take the action requested by the complaining party within thirty days of the request [under Article 399/6 § 1] being lodged, the examination of the request shall be discontinued.
...”
Article 399/8 - Decision
“1. After reviewing the request, the court shall:
a)  accept the request, find a breach [of the reasonable time requirement] and order that within a time-limit certain procedural action be taken in the trial or enforcement proceedings [which is the subject of the complaint];
b)  dismiss the request. 2. The decision of the court is final and binding.”
Article 399/9 - Acceptance of a request
“1. The court shall accept a request when it observes a breach of the reasonable time requirement under Article 6 § 1 [of the Convention]. 2. In determining whether there has been a breach, the court shall assess the complexity of the case, the subject matter of the dispute, proceedings or trial, the conduct of the parties and the trial bench during the proceedings, or the conduct of the bailiffs and anyone else involved in the case.”
Article 399/10 – Decision on just satisfaction
“1. After examining the claim, the court shall make an award of between 50,000 [EUR 400] and 100,000 [Albanian] leks [EUR 800] for each year or month of the year exceeding the reasonable time period [laid down in Article 399/2]. 2. The award shall take account of:
a)  the complexity of the proceedings which led to the finding of a breach;
b)  the conduct of the bench or the bailiffs and the parties;
c)  the nature of the interests at issue;
ç) the value and importance of the case in relation to ... enforcement, regard also being had to the parties’ personal circumstances.”
(b)   Domestic case-law regarding the new remedy in respect of the length of proceedings
(i)      Constitutional Court’s decisions
38. In its admissibility decisions nos. 269 and 270 of 7 December 2017 and no. 49 of 22 February 2018, the Constitutional Court, having regard to the new remedy introduced by virtue of Articles 399/1 et seq. of the CCP, which the complainants had failed to exhaust in respect of the length of non-enforcement and finished proceedings, declined to examine the complainants’ constitutional appeals in that regard. (ii)    Supreme Court’s decisions
39. As regards a request filed under Article 399/6 § 1 (b) of the CCP concerning the length of proceedings before the appellate courts, the Government provided a printout of the Supreme Court’s online case list showing that that court had received such requests from certain complainants. In this connection, they also provided examples of a number of Supreme Court decisions. In decision no. 1 of 24 January 2018, which was taken a month and two days after the request was lodged, the Supreme Court’s administrative bench accepted the claimant’s request and found a breach of the “reasonable time” requirement by the appellate court. It ordered the Administrative Court of Appeal to continue the proceedings in accordance with the procedural rules provided for in the CCP. 40. In decision no. 5 of 17 April 2018, which was taken a month and twelve days after the request was lodged, the Supreme Court’s administrative bench discontinued the proceedings before it (pushimin e shqyrtimit) in accordance with Article 399/7 § 3 of the CCP on the grounds that the Administrative Court of Appeal before which the proceedings were pending had decided to examine the claimant’s appeal at a public hearing on 12 April 2018. 41. In decision no. 4/8 of 31 January 2019, which was taken six months and fourteen days after the request was lodged, the Supreme Court’s administrative bench accepted the claimant’s request and found a breach of the “reasonable time” requirement by the appellate court. It ordered the Administrative Court of Appeal to schedule the examination of the claimant’s case as soon as practicable. 42. In decision no. 9 of 28 February 2019, which was taken twenty-one days after the request was lodged, the Supreme Court’s administrative bench discontinued the proceedings before it in accordance with Article 399/7 § 3 of the CCP on the grounds that the appellate court before which the proceedings were pending had already taken a decision in the claimant’s case. 43. As regards a request filed under 399/6 § 1 (c) of the CCP concerning the length of proceedings before the Supreme Court, the Government provided a copy of only one Supreme Court decision. In decision no. 7/13 of 15 February 2019, which was taken a month and nineteen days after the request was lodged, the Supreme Court’s criminal bench discontinued the examination of the request in accordance with Article 399/7 § 3 of the CCP because the complainant’s cassation appeal had been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 13 February 2019. 44. As regards a claim for compensation filed under Article 399/6 § 3 of the CCP, the Government submitted copies of three domestic decisions. In decision no. 6853 of 27 July 2018 the Tirana District Court, recognising that a Constitutional Court decision had acknowledged a fourteen-year delay in the enforcement proceedings, partly allowed the claim for compensation and awarded the claimant ALL 700,000 (approximately EUR 5,700) for the delay. In examining the claim, the court held that, even though it had been lodged prior to the entry into force of the new remedy, it would refer, by analogy, to the statutory provisions relating to the new remedy in determining the amount of compensation. The court dismissed the claim for late payment interest on the outstanding debt and stated that the decision was amenable to appeal. 45. In decision no. 11-2019-4385 of 25 July 2019 the Durrës District Court, recognising that a prior court decision had acknowledged a delay in the proceedings at one level of jurisdiction (the district prosecutor’s office), allowed the claim for compensation and awarded the claimant ALL 100,000 (approximately EUR 800) for the delay. 46. In decision no. 8016 of 25 November 2019 the Tirana District Court, recognising that a Supreme Court decision had acknowledged a fifteen-month delay in the proceedings at one level of jurisdiction (the Administrative Court of Appeal), allowed the claim for compensation and awarded the claimant ALL 180,000 (approximately EUR 1,400) for the delay. The decision stated that it was amenable to appeal. Other relevant domestic law
47. Higher education institutions, including the election of their rectors, are governed by the Higher Education Act (Law No. 80/2015 of 22 July 2015 “On Higher Education and Scientific Research in Higher Education Institutions”). Section 39(1) provides that the rector is the highest academic authority of a higher education institution. Under section 39(2), the rector is elected by members of the assemblies of academic staff of the main constituent units (faculties) and by students. Under section 39(3), the rector holds the academic title of “professor” and may come from within or outside of the ranks of the academic staff. Other eligibility criteria for candidates wishing to apply for the position of university rector may be laid down in the statute of a particular higher education institution. Under section 39(7), the rector serves a four-year term, renewable once. 48. In accordance with section 131 of the Higher Education Act, the Ministry of Education adopted a regulation on the organisation of the first elections of the governing bodies of higher education institutions. Rule 4 § 8 stated that the successful candidate for a position was the person who had received the majority of the valid votes cast. Rule 6 established the Electoral Committee, which was responsible for, amongst other things, organising and managing the elections, declaring the successful candidate for the position of university rector and examining complaints filed by candidates. Under Rule 39, the Electoral Committee’s decisions could be appealed against to the Appellate Committee, the decision of which was amenable to appeal before the national courts. Rule 20 laid down the eligibility criteria for candidates wishing to apply for the position of rector. Council of Europe material
49. Following the introduction of the new remedy concerning the excessive length of proceedings (see paragraph 37 above), at its 1377th meeting of 4 June 2020 the Committee of Ministers (CM/Notes/1377/H46‑1, Notes on the Agenda) stated the following regarding the status of execution of the Luli and Others v. Albania judgment:
“Status of execution
... General measures
...
3)  Developments in respect of excessive length of judicial proceedings:
-  Increase of the average length of proceedings as a result of the vetting of judges: ... the authorities report an increase of the average length of judicial proceedings and growth of the backlog of cases for the period 2017-2019. This negative trend is due to the vetting process launched in 2017 and still ongoing whereby the credentials of judges at all levels have been verified [reference omitted]. As a result, 60% of the vetted magistrates were either dismissed or they resigned [reference omitted], including judges at the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court (these two courts had until recently only one judge each). The Supreme Court currently has a backlog of nearly 35,000 cases, with part of it accumulated from May 2019 to March 2020, when it was unable to form a judicial formation to adjudicate cases. The authorities underline the extraordinary nature of this situation; that it will have only short-term effects and consider that it cannot be attributed to inadequate actions or inactions on their part ... The newly composed Supreme Court is now able to adjudicate cases in judicial formations of three judges (required in the majority of cases before it) as a result of three new judicial appointments in March 2020 ...
...
-  Action plan on reducing the backlog of the Supreme Court: In December 2019 an ad hoc committee was set up upon the High Judicial Council’s initiative to propose an action plan to reduce the backlog and increase the efficiency of the Supreme Court. It has already proposed concrete actions in a memorandum.
 ...
4)  Developments in respect of the acceleratory and compensatory remedy:
-  Functioning and efficiency of the remedy: Since November 2017, a new acceleratory and compensatory remedy for excessive length of judicial proceedings has been functioning in Albania. It applies to proceedings before all criminal, civil and administrative courts, criminal investigations and enforcement proceedings. It does not apply to proceedings before administrative bodies, in respect of which the authorities consider there are sufficient legislative and judicial review guarantees. The requests for compensation or acceleration are filed with the ordinary courts or the Constitutional Court, depending on the jurisdiction. The authorities report an increase in the past two years of the use of the remedy but acknowledge that the number of filed requests continues to be low. The statistics show that only a small number of the filed requests have been accepted by the courts (for example, for 2019, out of 40 requests filed with the Supreme Court, 1 was accepted, 13 were dismissed and 26 are still pending; out of 93 requests filed with the district and appellate courts, 19 were accepted).”
50. The relevant part of the Committee of Ministers’ decision of the same date (CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377/H46-1) stated as follows:
“The Deputies:
... As regards general measures
5.  noted with concern the increase of the average length of judicial proceedings and case backlog in the past three years as a result of judicial posts becoming vacant following the vetting of judges, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court having been particularly affected by these developments; urged, therefore, the authorities to employ all possible means to ensure that progress is made with the judicial appointments, especially at the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, and in reducing of the backlog of cases at the Supreme Court;
...
7.  noted with interest the increase in the use of the acceleratory and compensatory remedy for excessively lengthy judicial proceedings, while observing that the number of requests lodged remains low and only a small number are accepted by the domestic courts; invited the authorities to provide additional information on the grounds for dismissal of such requests and on awareness-raising measures for the general public about the existence and modalities of the remedy;
8.  invited the authorities to inform the Committee whether the legal provision which does not allow the awarded compensation to exceed the value of the object of the lawsuit needs to be further amended to be fully operational and Convention-compliant or, alternatively, to provide examples of domestic case-law showing that it is applied in conformity with the Convention; invited them further to demonstrate that the domestic judicial practice providing redress in pending judicial proceedings also for the delays that predate the introduction of the remedy is consolidating.”
THE LAW
        JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
51. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of the Court. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
52. The applicants complained that the length of the proceedings, especially those pending before the Supreme Court, had been in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The second applicant further complained that the court proceedings had been unfair and that the domestic decisions had not been adequately reasoned. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time.”
As regards application no. 43391/18: Bara v. AlbaniaAdmissibility

53. The Government did not challenge the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention to the impugned administrative proceedings. The Court considers that, while the Government did not object to the applicability of the Convention, it should consider the issue of its own motion (see Blečić v. Croatia, no. 59532/00, § 67, 29 July 2004; Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08, § 131, ECHR 2010; and Studio Monitori and Others v. Georgia, nos. 44920/09 and 8942/10, § 32, 30 January 2020). 54. The Court reiterates that the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention apply only to “civil rights and obligations” which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. Therefore, in order to establish whether the civil head of Article 6 is applicable in the present case, and, consequently, whether the first applicant could rely on the guarantees of that Article, the Court should first examine whether he had a “right” which could arguably be said to be recognised under domestic law, and secondly whether that right was a “civil” one. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, lastly, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play (see, among other authorities, Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 100, 23 June 2016). 55. The Court also observes that neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the Convention or its Protocols guarantees, as such, a right to appointment or promotion in the civil service. The Court has, however, accepted that the right to a lawful and fair promotion procedure or to equal participation in a competition for public office could be regarded as rights recognised in domestic law, at least arguably where the domestic courts have recognised their existence and examined the relevant complaints of the applicants (see, for example, Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, § 105, 19 September 2017, and Frezadou v. Greece, no. 2683/12, § 28, 8 November 2018, and the references cited therein). 56. As regards the existence of a right in the present case, the Court notes that domestic law gave candidates who fulfilled the statutory requirements specified in the relevant provisions the right to apply for the publicly funded position of university rector. Furthermore, domestic law provided for judicial remedies against any procedural irregularities in the election for the position of university rector (see paragraphs 47 and 48 above). As a result, the first applicant was one of three candidates who met the statutory eligibility requirements and possessed the necessary qualifications to run for the publicly funded position of university rector. In the academic election, the first applicant was ranked second. He subsequently challenged its lawfulness and the results before the administrative bodies and national courts. The Court notes that the courts did not dismiss his complaints against the administrative decisions on the grounds of the non-existence of a right, but because there had been no irregularities in the conduct of the election. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the first applicant could arguably claim to have a right to participate in a lawful and fair academic election process for the publicly funded position of university rector. 57. As regards the civil nature of the right, the Court considers that the election and subsequent appointment to the publicly funded position of university rector undoubtedly concerns the exercise of an individual’s professional career and, consequently, his or her pecuniary interests. Furthermore, the applicant had access to the domestic courts to challenge the outcome of the election (see, for example, Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007‑II). 58. Lastly, the Court accepts that the proceedings at issue were directly decisive for the applicant’s rights in so far as the proceedings could have ended in the annulment and rerunning of the academic election, which in turn could have led to him being elected to the esteemed publicly funded position of university rector. In this connection, in Tsanova‑Gecheva v. Bulgaria (no. 43800/12, § 84, 15 September 2015) the Court held that the proceedings were decisive for the applicant’s right to a lawful and fair promotion procedure in so far as they could have ended in the annulment of the contested procedure and the organisation of a new competition for the post, if the domestic courts had allowed the applicant’s appeal (see also Dzhidzheva-Trendafilova v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 12628/09, § 43, 9 October 2012). 59. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Article 6 of the Convention under its civil head is applicable to the present case. 60. Furthermore, the Court, noting that the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention, declares it admissible.

Outcome for Article 6: violation