FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF R.M. v. LATVIA
(Application no. 53487/13)
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 8 • Family life • Relevant and sufficient reasons for temporary suspension of parental authority and limitation of contact rights with vulnerable child, in context of applicant’s refusal to cooperate with authorities • Measures falling within margin of appreciation, given applicant’s full opportunity to participate in the decision-making process at all stages including repeated judicial review
 
STRASBOURG
9 December 2021
 
 
FINAL
 
04/04/2022
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of R.M. v. Latvia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Síofra O’Leary, President,
 Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,
 Lətif Hüseynov,
 Lado Chanturia,
 Ivana Jelić,
 Mattias Guyomar, judges,
 Daiga Rezevska, ad hoc judge,
and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 53487/13) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Latvian national, Ms R.M. (“the applicant”), on 12 August 2013;
the decision to give notice to the Latvian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the right to respect for family life and the right to education and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;
the parties’ observations;
Considering that Mr Mārtiņš Mits, the judge elected in respect of Latvia, was unable to sit in the case (Rule 28 of the Rules of Court) and that the President of the Chamber appointed Ms Daiga Rezevska to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1),
Having deliberated in private on 2 November 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention about the suspension of the applicant’s parental authority over her son and his placement in public care, as well as the continued suspension of her parental authority while she kept her son in hiding from the authorities. The applicant also complains under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 about the alleged restriction on the applicant’s son’s right to education. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in municipality B. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Ms I. Nikuļceva, a lawyer practising in Riga. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Līce. 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Background of the case
5. The applicant’s son X was born in 2000. In 2003 the applicant and the child’s father went through an acrimonious divorce, which was finalised in 2006. Until the events described below, X was living with the applicant. In 2009 the child’s father instituted civil proceedings seeking sole parental authority (aizgādības tiesības) and limitation of the applicant’s contact rights (saskarsmes tiesības). In 2014 his claim was granted. In 2016, following an appeal by the applicant, the sole parental authority was granted to her as the child’s father had withdrawn his claim in 2015. 6. Following reports of X’s behaviour in school, on 21 November 2008 the director of the guardianship institution established by municipality C. (bāriņtiesa – a guardianship and curatorship institution established by a local municipality) (hereinafter “the C. Guardianship Institution”) removed X from the physical custody (atņēma aprūpes tiesības) of the applicant. The director of the C. Guardianship Institution noted that X’s behaviour in school had worsened. He had attempted to harm himself and he had hurt other children (references were made to incidents of poking in the eye, hurting with scissors and biting). He was placed in the psychiatric unit of a children’s hospital for inpatient treatment for the same reasons. X was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct. He was discharged on 3 December 2008. 7. On 5 December 2008 the C. Guardianship Institution upheld the decision removing X from the applicant’s physical custody. It relied, inter alia, on the following grounds. The applicant had “made serious parenting mistakes”, “allowed and encouraged the child’s unlawful behaviour”, “ignored the advice of teachers and specialists” and “insufficiently involved X’s father in the parenting”. Thus, X continued to suffer emotional abuse in different life situations. As a result of “wrong parenting” by his mother, X’s life and health was considered to be in danger. The Guardianship Institution decided that at that point in time it was impossible to grant physical custody over X to his father as they had not established a true father-child relationship. The father had not opposed to X being temporarily placed in a family support centre. X was placed in a family support centre and afterwards started living with his father. After a couple of months X returned to live with the applicant and on 30 October 2009 her physical custody was restored. 8. In January 2010 a hearing was scheduled before the guardianship institution established by municipality V. (hereinafter “the V. Guardianship Institution”) concerning the potential removal of X from the applicant’s physical custody in view of conflicts between X, now aged 9, and his schoolmates, following reports of X’s behaviour in school (references were made to schoolmates’ refusal to attend school while X was present and endangered them). The case was not examined because the applicant changed her registered address and the V. Guardianship Institution no longer had jurisdiction to examine the case. 9. In civil proceedings relating to parental authority (see paragraph 5 above), on 29 March 2011 a first-instance court ordered the applicant, X and X’s father to undergo a forensic psychological and psychiatric assessment. The Court has not been provided with this decision or the reasoning, and it appears that neither of the parties complied with it. 10. On 10 May 2012 X intentionally caused a fire in their apartment and broke a neighbour’s window. Two neighbours sought medical aid – for poisoning by combustion and for atrial fibrillation attack. In view of this incident, the V. Guardianship Institution scheduled a hearing concerning his potential removal from the applicant’s physical custody. The applicant again changed her registered address and the case was not examined, though she denied having received the summons. From 2009 to 2012 the applicant had changed her registered address twelve times. 11. Following the incident of 10 May 2012, proceedings concerning correctional measures for minors were instituted. In those proceedings, on 8 August 2012 a district court ruled that X had to undergo a forensic psychological and psychiatric assessment. On 3 December 2012 a police officer took a further decision ordering X to undertake that assessment. On 17 December 2012 the police apprehended him to carry out that assessment, but he showed resistance. He and his mother both cursed and shouted at the police officers. X spat at them. On 18 February 2013 a prosecutor concluded that the decision of 3 December 2012 had been unlawful as it had contained references to the Criminal Procedure Law (Kriminālprocesa likums), whereas X had been a minor and had not reached the age of criminal responsibility. Moreover, the Internal Security Bureau of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iekšējās drošības birojs) carried out an inquiry and, on 25 April 2013, made similar conclusions. Disciplinary penalties were imposed on the police officers concerned. 12. In February 2013 X had a fight with other children, which resulted in him being taken to hospital with a broken nose and concussion. Suspension of parental authority and hiding of XIncident of 25 February 2013

13. On the night of 25 February 2013, the applicant and X had a fight after which X ran out of the home in his pyjamas and slippers. He was picked up by the police on the street and taken to a police station in city B. He was seen by a paramedic, who referred him to a children’s hospital in another city; two police officers accompanied him there. No danger to his state of health was detected; he was found fit to be taken to a police unit dealing with minors. X requested to be taken home and on receiving a negative response attempted to throw a cup of tea in the police officer’s face. Following that, he was taken to the psychiatric unit of that hospital in another location. X’s initial account of the events to a police officer stated that the applicant had physically fought him for having refused to take some medication. In particular, she had kicked him, pinned his arms behind his back and bitten his knee. He later changed his version of events and explained to the police and guardianship institutions that he himself had become aggravated and had kicked his mother, who had been trying to calm him down. He had bitten his own knee after the fight. The applicant stated that she had tried to calm X down by holding him but denied having been physically violent. In view of these events, criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant (see paragraph 38 below). 14. On 26 February 2013 the applicant together with her mother and her brother arrived at the hospital and demanded that X be discharged; the applicant was very agitated – she shouted and threatened the staff. On 5 March 2013 X run away from the hospital. He was found by the police on the street and taken back to the hospital, where he behaved demonstratively: claimed that he would run away again, tried to break some lamps, attempted to strangle himself with a scarf and refused to change his wet clothes. Letters and text messages from the applicant were later found encouraging X to resist the staff and emphasise his somatic complaints. On 6 March 2013 X was moved to the children’s unit in a closed psychiatric hospital to prevent any contact with the applicant. He was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct. Suspension of the applicant’s parental authority and X’s placement in public care
15. On 26 February 2013 the director of the guardianship institution established by municipality B. (hereinafter “the B. Guardianship Institution”) suspended the applicant’s parental authority on the grounds that she had subjected X to emotional and physical abuse. On 12 March 2013, having heard the applicant and her lawyer, the V. Guardianship Institution decided not to restore the applicant’s parental authority. On the same day it also took a decision depriving the applicant of her contact rights and ordering that X be placed, first, in a family crisis centre for one month, and, subsequently, in a long-term social care institution (children’s home). It referred to the prolonged and complicated situation in the family and the indications of possible physical and emotional abuse against the child. It observed that the applicant’s attitude towards parenting and the childcare authorities had not changed. She had not recognised her parenting mistakes, was evading expert assessments of herself and X and was trying to prevent the guardianship institutions from taking decisions in X’s interests. 16. While X was in the hospital, on 5 March 2013, social services inspected the applicant’s place of residence and gave positive assessment. They asked the applicant to cooperate and, after several unsuccessful attempts, on 10 April 2013, together with the applicant, they prepared a social rehabilitation plan (sociālās rehabilitācijas plāns – a set of measures aimed at the renewal or improvement of the social functioning abilities). It was aimed at restoration of the applicant’s parental authority. It was agreed, among other things, that the applicant would see a psychiatrist. On 14 April 2013 that plan was marked as completed. 17. On 6 March 2013 the guardianship institution established by municipality R. (hereinafter “the R. Guardianship Institution”) suspended X’s father’s parental authority after he had indicated that he had no possibility of providing for the child. On 19 March 2013 this decision was upheld. On 10 April 2013 the V. Guardianship Institution decided to deprive the applicant’s mother and brother of their contact rights with X as they had been actively involved in preventing the child from cooperating with the specialists (reference was made to the episode of 26 February 2013, see paragraph 14 above). Following the restoration of the applicant’s parental authority, their contact rights were also restored on 11 November 2014. 18. On 12 March 2013 X was discharged from the children’s unit of the psychiatric hospital and placed in a family crisis centre. On 26 April 2013 he was moved to a children’s home. On 11 May 2013 he was placed in a psychiatric hospital for two days as he had been aggressive towards other children. The applicant and X had contact via a social network. X also called and informed her that he had been treated violently by the director of the children’s home. On 15 May 2013 the applicant visited the school, took X to the police station and subsequently, together with the police, to a hospital. X was initially diagnosed with a fractured radius of the right arm and bruising to the upper arm and chest. The fracture diagnosis was not subsequently confirmed. 19. On 22 April 2013 social services, in cooperation with the State Inspectorate for the Protection of Children’s Rights (Valsts bērnu tiesību aizsardzības inspekcija), issued another referral for the applicant to see a psychologist. The authorities explained to the applicant that she could consult either a psychologist advised by the social services (see paragraph 16 above), or the one referred to by the Inspectorate or a psychologist of her own choosing. The applicant chose the latter option. She did not further cooperate with social services and refused to take any calls from them. The applicant consulted a psychologist on two occasions (in April and May 2013), but it was insufficient for a comprehensive assessment to be made. 20. On 16 May 2013, while still in hospital, X had a conversation with his specially assigned representative in the presence of his mother. He claimed that he had suffered physical, emotional and sexual abuse from other children and the staff and that he wanted to return home to his mother. According to the applicant, he was subsequently informed that he would be taken to another children’s home about 200 km away from home (see paragraph 39 below). Hiding X from the authorities
21. On the evening of 16 May 2013, the applicant and X left the hospital. The applicant informed the authorities that X was safe but refused to disclose his whereabouts. On 23 July 2013 the applicant declined a proposal by social services to organise a meeting, stating that she wished to protect the child from emotional trauma and stress. 22. On 1 August 2013 the V. Guardianship Institution decided not to restore the applicant’s parental authority. According to that decision, the applicant had intentionally worsened her son’s living conditions and was treating him cruelly by hiding him for a prolonged period of time. Despite X’s written submissions asking to be allowed to live with his mother, he had to be heard in person in order for his opinion and living conditions to be verified. The applicant was not cooperating with social services and the other authorities, and had not eliminated the reasons for the suspension of her parental rights. 23. On 17 May 2013 the police commenced their search for X. On 24 September 2013 he was found in the applicant’s usual place of residence. As he behaved erratically upon his apprehension (he tried to injure himself – he bit his arm and tried to strangle himself with a scarf), he was placed in the psychiatric unit of the children’s hospital. On 1 October 2013 he was taken to a social rehabilitation centre. On 4 October 2013 the applicant took X some personal belongings but was not allowed to see him. On the same day he ran away from the centre. 24. On 7 October 2013 the State Inspectorate for the Protection of Children’s Rights organised a meeting with the applicant and various specialists. The applicant was asked not to hide the child and to undergo social rehabilitation together with him. She refused. 25. On 12 October 2013 X wrote letters to fourteen recipients, mostly State authorities, asking to be allowed to live with his mother. He submitted that he should not be placed in psychiatric hospitals, crisis centres or children’s homes and should be allowed to live at home. He stated that he would resist police and run away from wherever he was placed. He had a home and a mother, and it was in his best interests to live with her. 26. On 23 October 2013 the R. Guardianship Institution restored X’s father’s parental authority. On 19 March 2014 it granted him sole parental custody and restricted the applicant’s contact rights until receipt of her forensic psychological and psychiatric assessment. In April and May 2014, the police attempted to intercept X after a bus journey in order to place him in his father’s care. On both occasions X managed to run away from the police. On 21 July 2014 X was found by the police and placed with his father. The following day he ran away and returned to the applicant. 27. In October 2013 and April and May 2014 social services asked the applicant to cooperate and undergo social rehabilitation. 28. On 16 May 2014 the V. Guardianship Institution, having heard the applicant and her representative, decided not to restore the applicant’s parental authority. The applicant was intentionally worsening X’s living conditions by hiding him over a prolonged period of time and not ensuring his basic needs, which amounted to cruel treatment. To hide X was psycho-emotional abuse, as sooner or later he would be taken by the police, which would be an unnecessary and traumatising event in his life. The applicant was not cooperating with the authorities and was preventing X from leading a normal life in society. She had been informed on multiple occasions of the possibility for her and her son to receive social rehabilitation, but any attempts to cooperate had been one-sided. The applicant had not eliminated the reasons for the suspension of her parental authority. X’s education
29. In the 2012/2013 school year X attended a school in municipality R. in sixth grade. According to the Government’s submissions, which were contested by the applicant, in March and April 2013, while placed in the family crisis centre (see paragraph 18 above), he had continued these studies online. From 30 April to 15 May 2013, while placed in the children’s home, X had attended a school in municipality L. At the end of May 2013, the school in municipality R. issued a certificate confirming his completion of sixth grade and the school in municipality L. enrolled him in seventh grade. 30. During the 2013/2014 school year X was formally registered at the school in L., which he was not attending. The applicant enrolled him in a distance learning school. The contract with the school was signed by both the applicant and X. On 29 October 2013 the State Education Quality Service (Izglītības kvalitātes valsts dienests) inspected the distance learning school and concluded that X had been enrolled unlawfully. It ordered the principal of the school to annul the decision on his admission. 31. On 11 February 2014 the Ministry of Education and Science wrote to the applicant that the decision annulling X’s admission to the distance learning school had been lawful, as his admission had been based on untruthful information – she had failed to disclose that her parental authority had been suspended. X’s legal guardian at that time, the V. Guardianship Institution, on 30 April 2013 had enrolled him in a State school, thereby ensuring his right to education. On 7 February 2014 the State Education Quality Service also confirmed that X was enrolled in a school in Latvia but refused to inform the applicant which school. 32. In the meantime, X was given access to the study materials from the distance learning school and completed the assignments for seventh grade. The teachers assessed his performance and on 11 April 2014 the distance learning school issued a certificate confirming his completion of seventh grade with good marks. He was then transferred to eighth grade. However, on 30 May 2014 the distance learning school annulled this certificate on the grounds that X had not been enrolled in the school. 33. On 12 June 2014 the school in municipality L. decided that X had not completed seventh grade and should repeat it over the following school year. 34. On 4 July 2014 the Ministry of Welfare wrote to the State Education Quality Service expressing concerns about the annulment of X’s transfer to eighth grade. It noted that the child’s best interests required a solution to be found, regardless of the shortcomings in the admission procedure. On 24 July 2014 the State Education Quality Service responded that the decision certifying his completion of seventh grade had been unlawful. X had been provided with a possibility of obtaining an education and there were no grounds for considering that the annulment decisions had not served his best interests. 35. On 22 August 2014 the B., V. and R. Guardianship Institutions organised a meeting about the situation and the fact that X was not being provided with an education for the second school year. 36. On 9 October 2014 a different distance learning school informed the V. Guardianship Institution that the applicant had sought help concerning her son’s education. The school was providing consultations to X and had provided him with the necessary study materials. X was studying the curriculum intended for eighth grade, and his knowledge and skills were compatible with that grade. 37. During the 2012/2013 school year X also attended a music school. In September 2013 the music school informed the applicant that X was supposed to repeat the year, as he had not attended since February 2013. In August and September 2014, the music school informed the applicant that the possibility for X to attend would be examined once she had submitted a document showing that she was his legal guardian. Criminal proceedings
38. Following the incident of 25 February 2013 (see paragraph 13 above) criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for cruel treatment of a minor. On 1 July 2013 they were terminated on account of the absence of a criminal act (actus reus). It was concluded that X had lied in his initial account of the events. 39. After the applicant took X from the children’s home to the police station (see paragraph 18 above), criminal proceedings were instituted on suspicion of him having been ill-treated at the children’s home. On 27 November 2013 these proceedings were terminated as the suspicion proved unfounded. 40. In view of X’s removal from the children’s home, criminal proceedings were also instituted against the applicant for failure to comply with the decisions concerning her parental authority and contact rights. On 6 August 2014 these proceedings were terminated. It was found that the applicant had taken X from the children’s home based on his complaints of being physically abused. The police had contacted the V. Guardianship Institution and the children’s home as to where X should be placed, but neither had shown any interest about X being brought back to the children’s home or to a similar institution. That is why the applicant had taken X to the hospital. The following day X had learned that he would be taken to a children’s home more than 200 km away and started crying inconsolably, at which point the applicant had decided to take him away. Both the V. Guardianship Institution and the children’s home had been informed of this, but neither of them had reported the need to organise a search for X. According to the applicant, X had repeatedly contacted her and asked her to take him away from the children’s home as he was being abused. The police inspector concluded that the applicant had not acted in bad faith; while the applicant had acted contrary to the decisions of the guardianship institutions, she had acted in the interests of the child. 41. On 3 November 2014 the decision terminating these criminal proceedings was upheld. The prosecutor, after examining the hiding episodes that had followed X’s removal from the children’s home in further detail, concluded that while the applicant had violated the decisions of the guardianship institutions she had not acted in bad faith which was a compulsory element of the substance of the criminal offence involved and therefore the criminal proceedings had to be terminated. According to the prosecutor, after X had run away from the childcare institutions and his father, she had allowed him to stay with her in order to reduce his emotional suffering and stress. The prosecutor also referred to a conclusion drawn by social services on 23 September 2014 (see paragraphs 63 and 64 below) that she had provided him with proper care. Psychological assessments of X and the applicant
42. A psychological examination report of 4 March 2013 by the psychiatric unit of the children’s hospital concluded that physical, emotional and sexual abuse could not be excluded. It was recommended that psychological consultations be continued, an in-depth examination be carried out in order to exclude the possibility of abuse, and socio-psychological support be provided to the family. 43. The documentation concerning X’s stay in the psychiatric unit of the children’s hospital from 26 February to 6 March 2013 stated that X had been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct, as the result of an atypical parental situation. The indications were that he should be under the consultative supervision of a child psychiatrist and receive psychological consultations, that he could continue his schooling and that a structured day and study regime was required. 44. The medical documentation from the psychiatric hospital to which X had been moved on 6 March 2013 included a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct in a teenager with signs of psychophysical infantilism and parenting problems in the family. It was recommended that he work with a psychologist and undergo a family psychotherapy, but treatment in a psychiatric hospital was considered unnecessary. 45. On 11 April 2013 the family crisis centre where X had stayed from 12 March 2013 issued a psychological examination report. It indicated that X had suffered emotional and physical abuse at home or outside his family and parental neglect. According to X, he had suffered abuse from his father. The possibility of sexual abuse at home or outside his family could not be excluded. X had psychological peculiarities that indicated the possibility of future abuse, including poor control over his emotions, communication difficulties, a heightened desire for emotional attachment and emotional maturity below his age. The results indicated that development of a psychopathic personality with antisocial behavioural tendencies could not be excluded. The applicant had exercised excessive care, which was regarded as hidden emotional abuse against the child. At the same time, she had showed parental neglect by ignoring the indications of the need for specialist help. She lacked the ability to provide age-appropriate parenting. The report also noted that X had a symbiotic relationship with the applicant. He had asked when he would be able to return to his mother and feared that he would need to live with his father. The parental conflicts and prolonged court proceedings had emotionally traumatised the child. To prevent re‑traumatising the child, repeated questioning was impermissible. 46. A forensic psychological and psychiatric assessment of X, carried out on 26 April 2013, disclosed that he was emotionally dependent on his mother and due to his infantilism wished to remain in her care. He had adjustment disorder with disturbance of emotions and conduct connected to negative changes during puberty and an atypical family upbringing. In view of these peculiarities, X was not capable of adequately assessing his mother’s conduct. He was very easily influenced by her and could uncritically mimic her behaviour. Indicators characteristic of children who had suffered emotional and physical abuse were present. Sexual abuse could not be excluded, though it could have been indirect. There had been adverse changes in his mental state, manifesting themselves as inadequate emotional development, distorted self-image, and relationships with others. These adverse changes had a causal link to his mother’s conduct. Due to X’s psychological state, it was advised that he should not take part in the pre-trial or trial proceedings. 47. A report of 11 July 2013 by psychologist I.L. disclosed that the applicant’s relationship with her son showed confused roles. She had an insufficient ability to understand the needs of her child and take his interests into account. Due to her psychological particularities, the applicant was unable to understand and ensure the needs of her child. There was a risk of abuse against the child. 48. A report of 24 July 2013 by psychologist I.P. stated that the applicant’s alleged negative attitude towards the specialists had not been confirmed. The applicant understood the peculiarities of her son’s age group and had the necessary knowledge on questions of childcare and discipline. It was also noted that in order to assess whether the applicant’s psycho-emotional state was negatively affecting her son, they would need to be observed together. 49. A psychological assessment of 30 September 2013 carried out by the children’s psychiatric hospital where X had been placed following his apprehension by the police (see paragraph 23 above) concluded that he had the appropriate cognitive abilities for his age, that he did not have depression and that he did not require medication. X had changing and exaggerated emotions; his well-being depended on his situation and his thoughts on suicide changed rapidly. The dominant desire was to return to his mother. It was recommended that he receive long-term psychotherapy and stay in a stable, safe, calm and unchanging environment. 50. On 21 March 2014 psychologist M.Z. stated that during a consultation X had indicated that he wanted peace and wished to live with his mother at their current place of residence. He had expressed a wish to continue attending extracurricular activities – music school, singing, dancing, and painting lessons. This opinion had been expressed without the applicant being present. Administrative proceedings seeking restoration of parental authorityProceedings against the decision of 12 March 2013

51. The applicant challenged the decision of 12 March 2013 refusing to restore her parental authority before the administrative courts. She relied on Article 110 of the Constitution (Satversme), which guarantees the protection of family, as well as various domestic and international documents protecting the rights of the child. On 28 June 2013 the Administrative District Court, following a hearing in the presence of the applicant, officials of the B. and V. Guardianship Institutions and social services, and the X’s specially assigned representative, refused to restore the applicant’s parental authority, concluding that she had abused her parental authority and committed physical and emotional abuse against X. The court referred to prolonged and inadequate emotional treatment of the child and the applicant’s inability to understand his emotional needs, which had harmed his development. The applicant lodged an appeal and an application for an interim measure. 52. On 13 September 2013 the Administrative Regional Court, by means of a written procedure, dismissed her application for an interim measure. It considered that she continued to ignore the child’s interests and was hiding him in spite of his need for specialist help. On 29 October 2013 the Senate of the Supreme Court, after having examined the submissions made by the applicant, the official of the V. Guardianship Institution and X’s specially assigned representative by means of a written procedure, upheld the refusal to order an interim measure. It referred, in particular, to the psychologist’s report of 11 July 2013 (see paragraph 47 above), the meeting of 7 October 2013 (see paragraph 24 above), the forensic psychological and psychiatric assessment of 26 April 2013 (see paragraph 46 above) and X’s conduct on 24 September 2013 when apprehended by the police and taken to a psychiatric hospital (see paragraph 23 above). It also noted that the applicant continued to refuse to cooperate with the specialists and was hiding the child. In his mother’s care, from 16 May to 24 September 2013, X’s conduct had remained self-destructive and his psycho-emotional state had not improved. The child’s opinion was known to the court, though it could not be considered objective. The reasons behind the decision to suspend parental authority had not ceased to exist. With regard to the applicant’s complaint of restriction of X’s right to education, the Senate of the Supreme Court noted that it was the applicant who had prevented her child from receiving an education, as while X had lived in the children’s home he had attended school. 53. On 19 December 2013 the Administrative Regional Court, following a closed hearing that had taken place on 28 November 2013 in the presence of the applicant, the official of V. Guardianship Institution and the X’s specially assigned representative, examined the applicant’s appeal in the main proceedings and dismissed the request for parental authority to be restored. Reiterating the reasoning of the Senate of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 52 above), it found that the circumstances for the suspension had not ceased to exist. There were no grounds to question reliability of the psychologist’s report of 11 July 2013 (see paragraph 47 above) as she had drawn her conclusions on the basis of ten different assessment methods. The court also referred to the forensic psychological and psychiatric assessment of 26 April 2013 (see paragraph 46 above). The court established that the applicant continued to hide her child. There was a high risk of X being subject to abuse. The following factors were taken to confirm that the applicant did not have an adequate understanding of his needs: (i) hiding of the child, (ii) failure to cooperate with the authorities, (iii) failure to ensure that X received adequate medical care (as X had not been registered with a general practitioner), (iv) her own aggressive behaviour (such as threats and cursing), and (iv) denial of problems and failure to work on resolving them. According to the court, the applicant had acted in an abusive manner towards X and had not changed her attitude. The court examined other psychological assessments submitted by the applicant (see, amongst others, paragraph 48 above) and dismissed their significance as they had been made following simple consultations and no particular assessment methods had been applied. 54. As to the best interests of the child, it was not disputed that X wished to stay with the applicant. However, his views had been influenced by her; they were not decisive. X was not aware of his own interests. In a neutral setting, he had expressed a wish to stay with his mother or father and not to be sent to a children’s home (reference was made to a conversation with a social worker in a hospital, paragraph 23 above). The circumstances for separating the family had not ceased to exist. 55. The court added that a decision to suspend parental authority was a compulsory administrative act, which the authorities were required to adopt whenever the circumstances set out in section 203 of the Civil Law (Civillikums) were established. Parental authority could only be restored when those circumstances had ceased to exist. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 56. On 3 March 2014 the Supreme Court in a preparatory meeting by means of a written procedure refused to institute proceedings on points of law. It noted that the suspension of the applicant’s parental authority had been based on her attitude and conduct, and that it was up to her to remove these obstacles by constructively cooperating with the authorities. While the Supreme Court agreed with the applicant that the child’s placement in a child-care institution may be emotionally hard on the child, it considered that there were no less restrictive measures to protect the best interests of the child. Proceedings against the decision of 1 August 2013
57. The applicant’s appeal against the decision of 1 August 2013 (see paragraph 22 above) was not examined separately, as it concerned the same subject matter as in the proceedings against the decision of 12 March 2013 – the restoration of the applicant’s parental authority. Accordingly, the decision of 1 August 2013 and the developments following that date were assessed in the proceedings against the decision of 12 March 2013. Proceedings against the decision of 16 May 2014
58. In proceedings against the decision of 16 May 2014 (see paragraph 28 above), the applicant relied on various documents guaranteeing the rights of the child. On 4 September 2014 the Administrative District Court refused to restore her parental authority, having assessed the situation since 28 November 2013 when the previous case had been heard by the appellate court (it referred to the 19 December 2013 judgment, see paragraph 53 above). X whereabouts remained unknown, as the applicant refused to disclose them. The case file contained no conclusion of certified experts prepared since 28 November 2013 with respect to the applicant and X, but the court referred to the psychologist’s report of 11 July 2013 (see paragraph 47 above) and noted the applicant’s continued failure to cooperate with the authorities. There was no information that the applicant had received a prolonged psychotherapy treatment. There was no evidence about the applicant’s current psycho-emotional state and its effect on the child. The termination of criminal proceedings against the applicant did not mean that her parental authority should be restored. The applicant had not tried to resolve the underlying problems and her conduct remained confrontational. In her appeal the applicant relied, inter alia, on Articles 110 and 112 of the Constitution, which guarantee the protection of family and the right to education. 59. The appeal was examined after the restoration of the applicant’s parental authority (see paragraph 67 below). Accordingly, in its judgment of 17 April 2015 the Administrative Regional Court reduced the scope of the review to the legality of the decision of 16 May 2014 in view of the circumstances obtaining from 28 November 2013 to 16 May 2014. It dismissed the claim, considering that in the period concerned there had been no indications that the applicant’s parental authority should be restored. No appeal on points of law was lodged against this judgment and it took effect on 19 May 2015. Restoration of the applicant’s parental authorityViews expressed by the Ombudsperson and social services

60. On 27 February 2014 the Ombudsperson suggested that the V. Guardianship Institution should either restore the applicant’s parental authority or ensure that the decision concerning out-of-family care be enforced. 61. On 22 September 2014 social services wrote a letter to the V. Guardianship Institution suggesting it to urgently review the decision to suspend the applicant’s parental authority. It noted that the decision had been taken on the basis of alleged abuse in February 2013; however, this fact had not been confirmed. 62. On 23 September 2014 the director of the V. Guardianship Institution met up with X to obtain his opinion about the situation. She later stated that X had been in a good mood and had confirmed that he had a very good relationship with his mother. On the same day the V. Guardianship Institution wrote to the applicant and social services, stating that the decisions taken so far had been lawful and had served the interests of the child. It invited the applicant to cooperate and to submit any new material that would be relevant for the restoration of her parental authority. 63. On 23 September 2014 social services wrote another letter to the V. Guardianship Institution, the State Inspectorate for the Protection of Children’s Rights and the Ministry of Welfare. At this point in time it had become known that since May 2013 the child was together with his mother; in their opinion it was inappropriate to blame the applicant for failure to comply with the decision suspending her parental authority, as the authorities had also failed to ensure compliance with that decision for more than eighteen months. In the meantime, X, who had already turned 14, had repeatedly expressed the wish to live with his mother at their place of residence, to attend school, music school and arts lessons. There was no information that X’s placement in a family-like setting had ever been sought. Placing a child in a children’s home was a last resort and could only be used as a short-term solution. 64. Social services noted that even though the initial decision to suspend the applicant’s parental authority following the incident of 25 February 2013 had been well-intended, in their view in practice it had not served the interests of the child; the alleged abuse had not been proved in the criminal proceedings and the mother had not been convicted. The child had suffered most from this decision – he had been separated from his mother, deprived of the ability to live at his family home, and could not attend school and music school. Social services were convinced that any further separation of the child from his mother would be emotionally traumatising to both the child and the mother and would only worsen the situation. X’s family doctor had also emphasised the stress both the mother and child had been facing. Furthermore, after X’s stay at the psychiatric hospital it had been recommended that he stay in a stable, calm and unchanging environment (see paragraph 49 above), which was not possible if there were continued risks of the child being separated from his mother and being placed in various institutions. While social services acknowledged that the family had problems that required long-term cooperation, the questions of the child’s education and safety had to be resolved as a matter of priority. 65. Social services also emphasised that all the authorities involved agreed that X’s right to education was not being ensured. During this period X had attended a distance learning school, but the certificate of studies had been annulled on formal grounds. 66. On 13 October 2014 social services wrote another letter to the B., V. and R. Guardianship Institutions, pointing out that X’s right to education was still not being ensured despite the fact that various authorities had identified the problem almost two months earlier. While in practice X was following studies at a distance learning school, his education status remained legally unregulated. Decision taken by the relevant guardianship institution
67. On 4 November 2014 the B. Guardianship Institution restored the applicant’s parental authority. It concluded that the applicant was now cooperating with social services and that the child’s opinion had been established in person. All the parties involved recognised that in the current circumstances the child’s right to education was not being ensured. The guardianship institution then reiterated the reasoning of the letter from social services of 23 September 2014 (see paragraphs 63-65 above). It also referred to the psychological assessment of 30 September 2013 that X required a stable, safe, calm and unchanging environment (see paragraph 49 above) and the psychologist’s report of 24 July 2013 stating that the applicant understood the parenting issues relevant to her son’s age group (see paragraph 48 above). While X’s father had expressed the opinion that the applicant’s parental authority should not be restored, he was not prepared to take care of X and was of the opinion that he should live in a crisis centre. The B. Guardianship Institution concluded that the reasons for the suspension of the applicant’s parental authority had ceased to exist. X’s further education
68. On 10 November 2014 X was accepted into the distance learning school in seventh grade. On 19 November 2014 he was issued a certificate confirming completion of seventh grade with good marks and was moved to eighth grade. He was praised, among other things, for being actively involved in the study process, for participating in extracurricular activities (e.g. representing the school in a televised quiz show) and for his creative approach to studies. On 29 May 2015 he was issued a certificate confirming completion of eighth grade and was transferred to ninth grade. He completed ninth grade at the same school before continuing his education in a State secondary school. As of 13 January 2015, X started to take piano classes in the music school. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
Domestic law
69. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows:
Article 110
“The State shall protect and support marriage – a union between a man and a woman, the family, the rights of parents and rights of the child. The State shall provide special support to disabled children, children left without parental care or [those] who have suffered from violence.”
Article 112
“Everyone has the right to education. The State shall ensure that everyone receives primary and secondary education free of charge. Primary education shall be compulsory.”
Section 30(1) of the General Education Law (Vispārējās izglītības likums) provides that primary education is obtained in nine years. 70. At the relevant time, section 203 of the Civil Law provided:
“Parental authority shall be suspended if a guardianship institution concludes that:
(1)  there are actual obstacles preventing the parent from caring for the child;
(2)  the child’s health or life is endangered due to the fault of the parent (through intentional or negligent actions ... );
(3)  the parent abuses his or her rights or does not ensure care and supervision of the child;
... (5)  parental abuse against the child has been established or there is reasonable suspicion of parental abuse against the child. In such cases, care shall be ensured by the other parent, but if there are also obstacles [to this], the guardianship institution shall ensure out-of-family care for the child. The suspended parental authority shall be restored if the guardianship institution finds that the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 of this section no longer apply. If it is not possible to restore parental authority within one year of its suspension, the guardianship institution decides on bringing court proceedings (lemj par prasības celšanu tiesā) for removal of parental authority, except when it is not possible to restore parental authority owing to the circumstances beyond parental control. The guardianship institution shall have a right to decide on bringing court proceedings for removal of parental authority before the expiry of the above-mentioned [one-year period] if it is in the interests of the child.”
71. The relevant parts of section 27(1) of the Law on the Protection of Children’s Rights (Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likums) provide that a child may be separated from the family if his or her life, health or development are seriously endangered due to abuse or if there is reasonable suspicion of abuse, as well as due to a lack of care or other circumstances at home (social environment). Section 27(2) provides that a child should be separated from the family if it is not possible to eliminate the circumstances adverse to his or her development if he or she remains in the family. Section 27(3) stipulates that a child who is separated from the family is ensured out-of-family care with a guardian, in a foster family or in a childcare institution, as well as State-financed emergency medical care in a healthcare facility or help in a social rehabilitation centre. Ombudsperson’s assessment of children’s homes in Latvia
72. On 11 May 2015 the Ombudsperson issued a report on children’s rights in municipal childcare institutions, which was based on visits to twenty-one children’s homes. The Ombudsperson found that in practice children were placed in children’s homes because no alternatives could be found, as the number of guardians and foster families was insufficient. Children were sometimes placed in children’s homes far from their parents’ homes, hampering the exercise of contact rights and hindering family relationships. The Ombudsperson rejected the idea that moving children to different municipalities was acceptable when they had behavioural problems. He emphasised that moving children far from their families was not an effective method to improve their behaviour and frequently only exacerbated the problems. Furthermore, the change of the child’s living place could not replace the preventive work that had to be undertaken. However, the requirement to develop individual programmes to correct social behaviour was not complied with in practice. Instead, children who transgressed were administratively punished or placed in psychiatric hospitals. 73. The Ombudsperson observed that most of the children who lived in children’s homes had spent two to six years there, and 12% of them had even lived there for more than ten years. It concluded that the question of reuniting children with their biological families or changing the out-of-family care model to placement with a guardian or foster family was not being re-examined. The authorities involved were not cooperating to facilitate the return of children to their families. Furthermore, most of the children had protracted behavioural, health and addiction problems, which were not being sufficiently treated. In the light of the problems identified, the Ombudsperson concluded that the rights of children who had been removed from or left without parental care were not being ensured. THE LAW
Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention
74. The applicant complained that the suspension of her parental authority, placement of her son in public care and subsequent refusals to restore her parental authority while she was hiding her son from the authorities had breached her right to respect for family life as provided for in Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Scope of the case
75. The Court observes that even though the applicant’s parental authority was suspended following the incident of 25 February 2013, the childcare authorities had been dealing with the applicant’s family situation since at least 2008. The scope of a case before the Court is determined by the applicant’s complaint or “claim” (see, more generally, Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 123-27, 20 March 2018, and Denis and Irvine v. Belgium [GC], nos. 62819/17 and 63921/17, §§ 99-101, 1 June 2021). In the present case, having regard to the applicant’s submissions (see paragraphs 86-91 below), the Court finds it established that the factual and legal basis of her complaint related to the period when her parental authority was suspended between 26 February 2013 and 4 November 2014. The Court also reiterates that the child is not an applicant in the present case. However, this does not mean that the child’s best interests and the way in which these were addressed by the domestic courts are of no relevance (see, mutatis mutandis, Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], no. 25358/12, § 208, 24 January 2017). 76. In response to the Government’s argument about the applicant’s contact rights (see paragraph 97 below), the Court notes that the applicant expressly mentioned that issue in the application form and subsequently elaborated on it (see paragraph 88 below). Hence, the Court concludes that the applicant’s complaint also encompasses her contact rights with X. AdmissibilityThe parties’ submissions

77. The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted the available domestic remedies in two respects. Firstly, she had not raised before the domestic courts the argument that the suspension of her parental authority and refusals to restore it had interfered with her right to family life, instead challenging the reasons for those decisions. Secondly, she had not pursued all the available domestic remedies with respect to the decision of 16 May 2014, as she had not lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Administrative Regional Court of 17 April 2015 (see paragraph 59 above). 78. The applicant observed that it was not disputed that she had exhausted all domestic remedies with respect to the decisions of 12 March 2013 and 1 August 2013. As regards the decision of 16 May 2014, she pointed out that the Administrative Regional Court’s judgment had been adopted on 17 April 2015, that is, already after the restoration of her parental authority on 4 November 2014. A further appeal on points of law would have therefore been a highly formalistic step and could not have provided redress. Accordingly, she had exhausted all domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 of the Convention.

Outcome for Article 8: no_violation