FIRST SECTION
CASE OF CONSTANTINOU AND OTHERS v. CYPRUS
(Applications nos. 77396/14 and 4 others –
see appended list)
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Fair hearing • No divergence in the Supreme Court’s case-law concerning State interference with the pensions and salaries of officials and employees in the civil service at a time of financial crisis • Reasonable explanation given for the approaches taken in the relevant decisions
Art 1 P1 • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Reasonable and justified temporary de facto reduction of public officials and civil servants’ salaries and/or pensions in response to an excessive budget deficit and financial crisis • Fair balance struck between competing interests at stake • Wide margin of appreciation not overstepped
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
13 November 2025
 
FINAL
 
23/03/2026
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Constantinou and Others v. Cyprus,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Ivana Jelić, President,
 Erik Wennerström,
 Georgios A. Serghides,
 Frédéric Krenc,
 Alain Chablais,
 Artūrs Kučs,
 Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 77396/14, 45039/20, 45089/20, 45101/20 and 45899/20) against the Republic of Cyprus lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four hundred and fifty Cypriot nationals, on the various dates indicated in the appended table;
the decision to give notice to the Cypriot Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning Article 6 § 1 in respect of applications nos. 45039/20, 45089/20, 45101/20 and 45899/20, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of all applications, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 in respect of application no. 77396/14, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 13 May and 7 October 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The applications concern interferences by the State with the pensions and salaries of officials and employees in the civil service at a time of economic crisis. They mainly raise issues under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASES
2. A list of the applicants is set out in the Appendix. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr G. L. Savvides, Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus. 4. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. A. Application no. 77396/14
1. Events leading up to the deductions of salaries and pensions
5. On 31 August 2011 the Cypriot Parliament passed the Law on Extraordinary Contribution of Officials, Employees and Pensioners of the Civil Service and the Wider Public Sector of 2011 (“Law no. 112 (I)/2011”) (Ο περί Έκτακτης Εισφοράς Αξιωματούχων, Εργοδοτουμένων και Συνταξιούχων της Κρατικής Υπηρεσίας και του Ευρύτερου Δημόσιου Τομέα Νόμος του 2011). Under this law, a tiered effective percentage would be deducted from the pensions and gross income of officials and employees in the civil service (except for employees on an hourly wage) and the wider public sector each month, as a special contribution to the budget of the Republic. The Law initially provided for deductions from salaries over 1,500 euros (EUR) per month. It provided as follows: a 1.5 % deduction from a salary on the scale of EUR 1,501-2,500, 2.5 % from a salary on the scale of EUR 2,501-3,500, 3% from a salary on the scale of EUR 3,501-4,500 and 3.5% from a salary of EUR 4,501 and above. No deduction was made from salaries below EUR 1,500. 6. Law no. 112(I)/2011 entered into force on 1 September 2011 for an initial period of twenty-four months. The law was subsequently amended by amending Laws nos. 193(I)/2011 and 184(I)/2012, extending its validity to 31 December 2016. While there were small amendments to the percentage of extraordinary contribution taken from each of the abovementioned salary scales, the figure never exceeded 3.5%. 7. With the entry of into force of Law no. 112 (I)/2011, the Government began deducting the relevant percentage of special contribution from the applicants’ gross salaries. 8. The extraordinary contribution for the salary scales can be summarised as follows:
 
Monthly gross salary / pension amount in EUR

% extraordinary contribution
from 1.9.2011
Law 112(I)/2011

% extraordinary contribution
from 1.1.2012
Law 193(I)/2011

% extraordinary contribution
from 1.1.2013
(Law 184(I)/2012)

% extraordinary contribution
from 1.1.2014
(Law 184(I)/2012)

1,000 - 1,500

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

1,501 – 2,500

1.5%

0.0%

0.0%

2.5%

2,501 – 3,500

2.5%

2.5%

2.5%

3%

3,501 – 4,500

3.0%

3%

3%

3.5%

Over 4,500

3.5%

3.5%

3.5%

3.5%

2. Domestic proceedings
(a)   The applicants’ claim before the domestic courts
9. The applicants asked the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of Law no. 112(I)/2011 (the case numbers are given in the appendix). They argued that the deductions under the Law from their monthly salaries as an extraordinary contribution to the State budget were unlawful and void because they were contrary to, inter alia, Articles 23 (protection of property), 24 (equality in taxation) and 28 (principle of equality) of the Constitution as well as in violation of Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Specifically, the applicants argued that their salary constituted a proprietary right which was protected by Article 23 of the Constitution. In this connection they argued that none of the conditions provided for in Article 23 § 3 had been satisfied so as to allow an interference with their constitutionally protected right. (b)   The Supreme Court judgment: Charalambous and Others v. the Republic of Cyprus, nos. 1480/2011 and others, 11 June 2014
10. The cases were heard together by the plenary of the Supreme Court comprising twelve judges (Judges D.H, M.N., G.E., S.N., C.P., A.P., P.P, L.P., D.M., M.C., A.L., and K.S.). 11. The Supreme Court gave judgment on 11 June 2014, dismissing the applications by a majority of nine to three (one judge, M.N., gave a separate concurring opinion and three judges, S.N., L.P., A.L. dissented). It held that the applicants had failed to convince the court that the provisions of Law no. 112(I)/2011 were unconstitutional. (i)      The majority judgment
(α)     Circumstances leading to the adoption of Law no. 112(I)/2011
12. In its judgment the Supreme Court set out the background to the enactment of Law no. 112(I)/2011, referring to documents showing, inter alia, the excessive public budget deficit; the continual downgrading of Cyprus’ credit rating by the international credit rating agencies, rendering it impossible for Cyprus to borrow money on the international markets; the need to reorganise public expenditure and to exit from the deficit; the need to redistribute resources; and the need to secure micro-economic stability, taking into account the adverse consequences of the worldwide crisis. The Supreme Court also referred to, inter alia, the preamble of Law no. 112(I)/2011 (see paragraph 60 below). (β)      The right to equality
13. The Supreme Court then reviewed the applicants’ discrimination complaint under Articles 24 and 28 of the Constitution. It recognised, inter alia, that public sector personnel costs, which exceeded two billion euros annually, were the largest expense in the public sector. The court observed that in a severe financial crisis the State had discretion to implement extraordinary measures, provided they were constitutional, in order to stabilise public finances, especially in relation to people employed in the public sector who were paid from public accounts that had an excessive shortfall. The court stressed that the State had gradually adopted other measures and within a period of four months an extraordinary contribution was also being deducted from the pay of private sector workers (see paragraph 64 below). Beyond that, certain provisions of Law no. 112(I)/2011 which were considered as prone to create inequality between public and private sector workers were amended by amending Law no. 193(I)/2011, which led to equalisation between the sectors. The court also ruled that the measures did not treat low-wage earners or pensioners unfairly, as the contributions were based on a person’s financial means. The measures were reasonable and proportionate, balancing the public interest with individual rights in the face of the adverse economic situation at the time. (γ)      The right to property
14. The court then examined the applicants’ complaint that their right to property had been violated. The court held at the outset that Law no. 112(I)/2011 was not a tax law. 15. It then stressed that the right protected under Article 23 § 1 of the Constitution was not absolute but was subject to limitations which were set out in the remaining passages of the Article, and which had to be lawful. Under domestic case-law, the provisions of Article 23 did not affect the power of the State to enact laws necessary to secure payment of taxes or other contributions to public expenditure. 16. The court referred to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Demetriades and others v. Council of Ministers and others (1996) 3 C.L.R. 85 and reiterated that terms restricting the use of property that left the core of the right to own property intact did not constitute a deprivation of the right but a limitation on it. Restrictions could result in a deprivation only when they rendered the property unusable. 17. The respondent government claimed that the deduction from the applicants’ salaries did not fall within Article 23 § 3, as that referred solely to interference with land rights. The court disagreed. It held that, on the contrary, Article 23 covered both movable and immovable property. 18. The respondent government further argued that the deduction of an extraordinary contribution from the applicants’ salaries and pensions could be justified based on Article 23 § 3 and for reasons of public benefit. The court again disagreed. It clarified that the deduction could not be linked to the public benefit because Article 23 § 3 connected the promotion of the public benefit to the imposition of terms, conditions, or limitations to property for reasons of town and country planning or the development and use of property, none of which applied in the present case. 19. The court noted that, as regards the right to one’s salary, Article 23 aimed to protect that right from arbitrary executive regulation of the core of the right, or arbitrary and substantial reductions from salaries. 20. The court accepted that the applicants’ salaries constituted a proprietary right and held that any interference with them therefore fell within the scope of Article 23 of the Constitution. 21. The court then observed - with reference to this Court’s case-law - that the right to one’s salary did not extend to a right to receive a salary of a particular amount. In the light of this, the court considered that the question it had to answer was whether or not a small deduction imposed in the form of a special contribution ranging between 1.5% and 3.5% of the applicants’ gross monthly salary constituted an arbitrary interference with the right which led either to rendering the right devoid of any effectiveness (αδρανοποίηση δικαιώματος) or to a substantial limitation of the right, requiring the payment of compensation. 22. The court replied to the above question in the negative. It considered that the relatively small deduction from the applicants’ salaries had not affected the core of their right to receive their salary. The court found that the core of the right remained intact and that it was not negated, and therefore there was no deprivation contrary to Article 23 of the Constitution. According to the court, a person was only entitled to compensation under Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution when the economic value of the property was ‘substantially’ limited. The court did not consider the reduction ranging between 1.5% to 3.5% such a substantial reduction in salary as to constitute a sufficient limitation of the right. 23. The court then observed that the same applied with regard to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It noted that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was not as limiting as Article 23 of the Constitution, as it provided for the right of a State to enforce such laws as it found necessary to control the use of property in “the general interest” or “to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties”. The court subsequently observed that in the case before it the State was in a precarious position because of the worldwide financial crisis and needed to take measures to reduce the budgetary deficit, rescue its economy and consequently the social structure, and thus to serve the public interest. The court therefore concluded that the imposition of a relatively small special contribution had been justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 24 of the Constitution (requiring citizens to pay taxes) and that it did not violate the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution. 24. The court lastly rejected the applicants’ arguments that, inter alia, there had been no attempt to justify the deductions on the grounds of the public interest and that there had been a lack of proper enquiry. (ii)    Concurring opinion of judge M.N. 25. In his concurring opinion, Judge M.N. observed that as regards the right to property there was a substantial difference between Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention and Article 23 of the Constitution, in that under the provisions of the Convention property rights might be restricted for public benefit or the public interest, while Article 23 of the Constitution contained no such provision. The third paragraph of Article 23 provided that the exercise of the constitutional right to property could be subject, by law, to restrictions or limitations which were absolutely necessary in the interests of public safety or public health or public morals, or town and country planning or the development and use of any property for the promotion of the public benefit or for the protection of the rights of others. Judge M.N. held that the “promotion of public benefit” in the third paragraph concerned only the development and use of property and did not concern “restrictions or limitations” which might be applied when exercising that right. Consequently, he considered that the case had to be examined under Article 23 of the Constitution rather than Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, given that the former provided more protection. 26. Judge M.N. considered that Law no. 112(I)/2011 was not unconstitutional because the applicants had not shown that they had a property right. He considered that a civil servant’s gross salary was a contractual right. However, there was no case-law to the effect that the current or future salary of a civil servant, unlike salary owing for past service, was protected under the Constitution. He therefore held that there had been no breach of Article 23 of the Constitution. (iii)   Dissenting opinion of judges S.N., L.P. and A.L. 27. In his dissenting opinion, with which Judges L.P. and A.L. concurred, Judge S.N. found the interference with the applicants’ property rights unconstitutional. 28. The dissenting judges agreed with the majority that the right to one’s salary was a proprietary right protected under Article 23 of the Constitution. 29. They went on to find that the deduction of the special contribution was not merely a restriction of the applicants’ property rights – which would in any event have been prohibited - but was a deprivation of that part of their property for as long as the law remained in force. 30. Specifically, they observed that while Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 allowed for an interference with property on public interest grounds, no such provision or exception existed in Article 23 of the Constitution. That provision gave more protection to property rights since restrictions on or interference with those rights was only possible for the express and specific reasons in the Article. The provisions of Law no. 112(I)/2011 restricting the applicants’ property and depriving them of it was contrary to Article 23 of the Constitution since deductions from salaries did not fall under any of the exceptions provided in that article. That Law was therefore unconstitutional. 31. The government had supported their argument by reference to various documents discussing the dire economic situation in Cyprus. They asserted that the State had interfered with the applicants’ property rights for reasons of public benefit/interest, but the minority judges observed that that argument had not been included or referred to in Law no. 112(I)/2011. Nowhere in the law or its preamble had it appeared that the law had been passed to bring the state into line with recommendations from the European Union. Nor did the law refer to the public interest or benefit. The government could not invoke the public interest or benefit in any event as it was not referred to in Article 23 of the Constitution. 32. The minority also found that the monthly deductions had been made without proper inquiry as to each person’s earning capacity (εισοδηματική ικανότητα) and there was no proper reasoning in support of the deductions. 33. On the issue of equality, the minority considered, inter alia, that the Law targeted a specific class of persons in society, namely public officials, for the imposition of financial burdens, and their treatment had therefore been unequal. B. Applications nos. 45039/20, 45089/20, 45101/20 and 45899/20
1. The adoption of Law no. 168(I)/2012
34. On 6 December 2012, the Parliament passed the Law on the Reduction in Emoluments and Pensions of Officials, Employees and Pensioners of the Public Sector and of the broader Public Sector of 2012. Pursuant to this law, an effective percentage would be deducted monthly from the income or pensions of officials, employees, and pensioners in the public sector and the broader public sector. The amounts deducted from each employee were deposited in the fixed fund of the State (Πάγειο Ταμείο της Δημοκρατίας). Initially, an effective percentage to be deducted monthly ranged from 0% (for those on a low salary or pension) to 12.5% (for those on a high salary or pension). The reduction in salaries and pensions would be deducted from income tax and would not be taken into account for the calculation of pension benefits. 35. The relevant reductions of Law no. 168(I)/2012 applied as of 1 December 2012 and the law had no expiry date. It was subsequently amended on three occasions and the reductions were eventually discontinued for everyone as of 1 January 2023. With the entry into force of Law no. 168(I)/2012 the Government began to deduct the relevant percentage from the applicants’ gross income and pension. The percentage deducted from the income or pension of officials, employees and pensioners of the public sector and the broader public sector, as adjusted over time, was as follows:
 
Monthly gross salary / pension amount in EUR

%[1]
from
1.12.12
 

%[2] from
1.6.13
 

%[3]
from 1.12.14
 
 

%[4]
from 1.7.18
to 31.12.18
 

%[5]
from
1.1.19
to
31.12.20
 

%[6]
from
1.1.20
to
31.12.20

%[7]
from
1.1.21
to
31.12.21

%[8]
from
1.1.22
to
31.12.22

0 – 1,000

0.0

0.8

3.8

1.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1,000 – 1,500

6.5

7.3

10.3

8.3

5.8

3.3

0.8

0.0

1,500 – 2,000

8.5

9.3

12.3

10.3

7.8

5.3

2.8

0.0

2,000 – 3,000

9.5

10.5

13.5

13.5

13.5

11.0

8.5

5.0

3,000 – 4,000

11.5

13.0

16.0

16.0

16.0

13.5

11.0

7.5

Over 4,000

12.5

14.5

17.5

17.5

17.5

15.0

12.5

9.0

 
2. Domestic proceedings
(a)   First instance judicial review proceedings
36. In the years between 2012-2016, the applicants – and many others who have not come to this Court – challenged the reduction of their salaries or pensions arguing that Law no. 168(I)/2012 had been unconstitutional as it contravened Article 23 of the Constitution (the recourse number of each case is set out in the appendix). They further argued that the reduction of their salaries or pensions breached Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 37. The Administrative Court hearing the applicants’ complaints at first instance delivered two separate judgments. 38. The first (Avgousti and others v. The Republic of Cyprus, recourse no. 898/2013 and others, 27 November 2018) concerned challenges to the reduction of the applicants’ pensions and was delivered by the president of the Administrative Court alone. The court found that the reduction of pensions constituted a restriction to the right to property. With reference to the findings of the majority in Charalambous and Others (see paragraph 18 above), the court reiterated that reasons of the public benefit, such as the consolidation of public finances, did not fall under the exceptions provided for in Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution. The court further found that the right to receive a pension was a proprietary right and that restrictions to a property right were only permitted for the purposes set out in Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution. When a permissible interference resulted in a material curtailment of the right, then compensation was payable. The court therefore reasoned that what should have been decided first had not been whether the restriction materially curtailed the right, but whether the restriction was permissible under Article 23 § 3, and only if that was the case should the court have examined the extent of the restriction. The court subsequently considered that neither the Attorney General’s Explanatory Report accompanying the proposal for the Bill nor the preamble to the law relied on any of the permissible grounds for interference as set out in Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution. The consolidation of the State economy constituted a public interest ground which was one of the exceptions provided for in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 but not in Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution, as was also found in Maria Koutselini-Ioanidou and others v. The Republic of Cyprus, cases nos. 740/2011 and others ((2014) 3 A.A.D. 361) (see paragraph 68 below). As such, the court held that section 3 of Law no. 168(I)/2012 was unconstitutional and in breach of Article 23 of the Constitution. 39. The second judgment (Nicolaide and others v. The Republic of Cyprus, nos. 98/2013 and others, 29 March 2019) of the plenary of the Administrative Court concerned challenges to the reduction of salaries. The court gave reasons similar to those of the first judgment. It held that the right to a salary fell within the scope of Article 23 and therefore interferences could only be legitimate if they fell within the provisions of its paragraph 3. Since the reductions in salaries had been justified by reasons of the public interest which were not among the exceptions in Article 23 § 3, the provision in Law no. 168(I)/2012 for the deduction of a monthly percentage from those salaries had been unconstitutional. (b)   Appeal proceedings: The Republic of Cyprus v. Avgousti and others, nos. 177/2018 and others, 10 April 2020
40. The State appealed against the judgments issued by the Administrative Court on 27 November 2018 and 29 March 2019 respectively (see paragraphs 38 and 39 above). 41. The Supreme Court joined the appeals, which were examined by the plenary under the case name Avgousti and others v. The Republic of Cyprus, nos. 177/2018 and others. On 10 April 2020 the Supreme Court by a majority of nine (M.N., T.E., C.P., P.P., M.C., K.S., T.P.M., C.M. and Y.Y.) to four judges (S.N., A.S.P., L.P., A.L.), accepted the appeals lodged by the State and declared that the reduction of salaries and pensions under Law no. 168(I)/2012 had been constitutional. (i)      The judgment of the majority
42. At the outset, the majority referred to the difficult economic conditions and extreme financial crisis Cyprus had faced, and because of which it had passed legislation to curb public expenditure, including Law no. 168(I)/2012. 43. The court observed that the crux of the case lays in the Government’s argument that the first-instance court had erroneously considered that it had first to examine whether the restriction had been permissible under Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution and only subsequently to examine the extent of the restriction. The Government suggested that the first-instance court had first to have examined whether Article 23 § 1 guaranteed a salary of a particular amount and could only then go on to examine whether the restriction had been made on one of the permissible grounds in Article 23 § 3. 44. The court agreed with the Government that it first had to decide on the scope of the right protected by Article 23 § 1 because the first-instance court had failed to address that issue. It found the first paragraph of Article 23 to be the same as the first rule of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as both provisions acknowledged the right to the peaceful enjoyment of property. The court then considered, with reference to Charalambous (cited above), that while a salary constituted a property right and therefore any interference with that right needed to fall under the provisions of Article 23, nonetheless the right to one’s salary did not extend to that salary being of a particular amount and as a result under certain conditions, in times of economic crisis, changing that amount was not prohibited as long as it did not result in the loss of a person’s means of subsistence. The court observed that the plenary in Charalambous had not examined how the facts of the case were affected by Article 23 § 3 – since the right to property did not safeguard the right to a particular amount of income – but had rather examined the case as whole, and particularly whether a fair balance had been struck between competing interests. Since the core of the right remained intact, the court in Charalambous had held that the reduction of salaries fell within the accepted ambit of, and did not violate, Article 23. 45. The court subsequently found that no distinction could be made between salaries and pensions as both constituted property rights protected under the constitution. As with salaries, Article 23 § 1 did not guarantee a pension of a certain amount. The court considered that in the more recent case of Koutselini-Ioannidou (cited above) (see paragraph 68 below) the Supreme Court plenary had decided that the “suspension” of the pension essentially meant that the applicants in that case lost their right to a pension for as long as they continued to occupy a public post. Moreover, the court in Koutselini‑Ioannidou had held that there was no difference between those applicants who had not received any pension while they still occupied a public post and those who had lost part of their pension, the reason being that in both cases there had been an impermissible restriction or deprivation of the applicants’ property rights without an adequate justification based on reasons of public interest. The court further considered that the crux of Koutselini‑Ioannidou was the impermissible permanent restriction or deprivation of the right to property, which could not be justified under Article 23 § 3 (επρόκειτο περί επιβολής στέρησης ή περιορισμού, του δικαιώματος ιδιοκτησίας στο διηνεκές, που δεν εδικαιολογείτο από το Άρθρο 23.3). The court therefore held that unlike Koutselini-Ioannidou, which concerned the permanent partial or full deprivation of pensions, the case under consideration was different as it concerned the reduction of pensions or salaries in a restricted, effective, and rational manner for a limited period. 46. However, the court found the case at hand to be similar to Charalambous (cited above) and considered itself bound by the precedent set by that case instead of Koutselini-Ioannidou (cited above). As with Charalambous, the court reiterated that the state had been under extreme financial strain. The court concluded as follows:
“...[we] take into consideration the fact that the reduction in salaries and pensions was made in an effective and proportionately equal manner so that the reduction was related to income and was zero or very low in a low income bracket. [We also take] seriously into account the emergency background to the measure. It is also important in our opinion that the reductions diminished from 2019 onwards, and came to an end in 2023.
... In light of the above, we consider that the reductions made under Law no. 168(I)/2012 [and subsequent amending laws] do not affect the core of the right to a salary and pension, nor do they endanger the [applicants’] living standards, and they too ... have not argued that they have. As a result, under the circumstances, [the reductions] do not constitute a deprivation of property or a breach of property rights within the meaning of Article 23 of the Constitution.”
(ii)    Concurring opinion of judge Y.Y. 47. Judge Y.Y. agreed with the majority as to the outcome, but on the basis of different reasoning. His view was that Article 23 § 1 protected the right to movable and immovable property. Reading Article 23 § 2, it was evident that the right to property was not an absolute right. Article 23 § 3 set out the permissible grounds for interfering with the said right. He reiterated that the term “development and use of any property to the promotion of public benefit” had been broad enough to cover movable and immovable property and he therefore disagreed with the Charalambous judgment (cited above) which limited the term to town-planning purposes. 48. As regards the core of the right, he saw the same concept in existing domestic case-law (Demetriades and others v. Council of Ministers and others (1996) 3 C.L.R. 85) where the Supreme Court had clarified that terms which restricted the use of property but left the core of the right intact constituted a restriction but not a deprivation. According to Judge Y.Y. this highlighted the difference between a restriction - which did not affect the essence of the right – and a deprivation. The judge was further of the view that the facts in Charalambous did not give rise to an issue of deprivation of property but rather to an issue of the restriction of property rights under terms provided for by law. However, the court in Demetriades and others had not explained how the right to a salary was safeguarded as it ought to have been through the application of Article 23 § 3 or how the reservations of that paragraph had applied. 49. The judge further observed that the majority in the appeal had attempted to formulate a more direct approach to the application of constitutional provisions to the circumstances of the cases before the court. However, the case-law showed that the same principles applied to the recognition of the right to movable and to immovable property. He also observed that there was no case-law differentiating between the two or deciding that only the core of immovable property was protected, and that the right to immovable property was also fully protected under paragraph 3 of Article 23 of the Constitution. If necessary, immovable property could be made subject to terms or conditions or restrictions for one or more of the reasons provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 23. Judge Y.Y. therefore found no reason why the right to salaries and pensions, would not enjoy the same protection as any other immovable property under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Article 23 of the Constitution. 50. Turning to the reduction of salaries and pensions under Law no. 168(I)/2012, the judge considered that the reductions had undoubtedly been necessary for the promotion of the public interest, which was one of the reasons for which the right to property could be restricted under Article 23 § 3. The majority of the court reached the same conclusion, albeit by reference to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They found the reductions were in accordance with the principle of proportionality, because of, inter alia, the effective nature of the reductions and the fact that they had not put the dignity of the applicants at risk of their being unable to afford reasonable living standards, something which would have been more probable in the event of the sovereign bankruptcy of Cyprus. (iii)   Dissenting opinions
(α)     Judges S.N. and A.S.P. 51. Judge S.N. delivered the minority judgment, with which judge A.S.P. agreed. He noted that Law no. 168(I)/2012 made no reference to Article 23 of the Constitution or to any of the lawful restrictions on the right to property in it. The preamble merely made a general comment on the dire economic crisis faced by the State at the time. There was therefore no justification for reductions from salaries and pensions. 52. They repeated, as per Charalambous (cited above), that Article 23 of the Constitution provided greater protection for the right to property than Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as the Constitution did not allow restrictions on the right to property in the public interest. The State was therefore not allowed to restrict the right to a property on the grounds of the public interest given that there was no such exception in Article 23 of the Constitution. 53. The minority of judges disagreed with the majority’s view that Article 23 protected solely the core of the right to property. According to them Article 23 should be read in its entirety so as to understand the hierarchy of its provisions. The right to, inter alia, acquire, own, and enjoy property came first and was coupled with a demand that it be respected under the first paragraph (Article 23 § 1). This was followed by the proviso that it was prohibited, in an absolute manner - “no deprivation or restriction shall be made” – to deprive, restrict or limit the right except as provided by Article 23 (Article 23 § 2). Then followed the permissible restrictions which could be made only when “absolutely necessary” (Article 23 § 3, first sentence). Next, when a term or restriction materially decreased the economic value of property, that loss of value should be compensated for (Article 23 § 3, second sentence). The minority considered that the idea of the core of the right under the circumstances created a paradox as it meant that the whole of the right to a salary was not at all protected, or had been inadequately protected. At the same time, if one were to accept that the reduction of one’s salary was permitted under Article 23 of the Constitution, then the person affected should receive compensation, but this would be an issue to be decided by the civil courts. However, the legislator had not intended to provide compensation as the aim had been to take part of the salary for as long as required by the law, without offering compensation. 54. They further considered, inter alia, that the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights to which the majority made reference (for example Koufaki and ADEDY v. Greece (dec.), nos. 57665/12 et 57657/12, 7 May 2013) had not been relevant as the Court in those cases had relied on the principle of “public benefit” under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which did not form part of Article 23 of the Constitution. 55. They lastly considered that safer guidance could be drawn from Koutselini-Ioannidou (cited above), where the court had made a detailed analysis of Article 23 of the Constitution. This judgment was delivered after that in Charalambous (cited above). The minority also disagreed that Koutselini-Ioannidou could be distinguished from Charalambous because it did not concern pensions. The judges took the view that both cases concerned a proprietary right, whether that was a salary or pension, part of which had been taken from the applicants without the intention of returning it. (β)      Judge L.P. 56. Judge L.P. commented as follows on the interpretation and application of Article 23:
“There are a number of cases dealing with the interpretation of Article 23 of the Constitution. The following is derived from binding case-law:
1. Article 23 safeguards the right to property, whether movable or immovable. 2. Limitations, terms, or restrictions can only be imposed in accordance with and for the reasons provided for in paragraph 3 [of Article 23]. 3. A deprivation of property may only take place by expropriation as provided for in paragraph 4 [of Article 23]. 4. Restrictions will result in a deprivation only when they render property unusable. 5. Conditions which restrict the use of property but leave the core of the right to property untouched constitute a restriction, not a deprivation. (see Holy See of Kitium and Municipal Council, Limassol, 1 R.S.C.C. 15, Thymopoulos and others v. Municipal Committee of Nicosia (1967) 3 C.L.R. 588, Kirizis and 2 others v. The Republic of Cyprus (1965) 3 C.L.R. 46, Demetriades and others v. Council of Ministers (1996) 3 C.L.R. 85, Antoniou and others v. The Republic (1990) 3 C.L.R. 3251, Strovolos Municipality v. Yasemidou and others (1996) 3 C.L.R. 223, Lanitis E.C. Estates Ltd and others v. The Republic (1989) 3 C.L.R. 3252, Iera Metropoli Pafou v. Aristo Developers Ltd (2011) 1 C.L.R. 1377, Psaltis and others v. The Republic of Cyprus (2008) 3 C.L.R. 452, Kyprianou v. The Republic (2003) 3 C.L.R. 8, Konstantinou v. Strovolos Municipality (2012) 1 C.L.R. 1990, Sofroniou and others v. The Municipality of Nicosia and others (1976) 3 C.L.R. 124, Orphanides v. The Improvement Board of Ayios Dometios (1979) 3 C.L.R. 466, Theodoulou v. The Republic of Cyprus (1990) 3 C.L.R. 2806, Stavride and others v. The Republic of Cyprus (1992) 3 C.L.R. 303, Ioannides v. E.A.C. (2007) 3 C.L.R. 233, Simeonidou v. The Republic of Cyprus (1991) 3 C.L.R. 137).”
57. He further noted his disagreement with the approach followed in Charalambous (cited above) as follows:
“1. Even taking into account the originality of the legal issue that it had to resolve, the [court in Charalambous] still departed from the long-standing binding jurisprudence, which had interpreted the provisions of Article 23 §§ 1,2,3, and 4 in a clear manner, without being asked to do so by the parties and without justifying that deviation from the previous case-law. 2. It should have first decided whether the salary and pension cuts were a “restriction or limitation” as provided by paragraph 3 of Article 23 and, in particular, whether the deductions were “absolutely necessary in the interests of public safety or public health or public morals, or town and country planning or the development and use of any property for the promotion of the public benefit or for the protection of the rights of others”. The [court in Charalambous] did not do this, nor did it find that the deductions fell within any of the above [permissible] limitations. On the contrary [the court in Charalambous] proceeded under the erroneous, in my opinion, assumption that the limitation was permissible, and analysed the limits/extent of the right on that basis, and then concluded that the definition of property rights in Article 23 “does not extend to a salary of a particular amount”. ... 3. They used Greek jurisprudence and ECtHR case-law to justify the deductions, missing the facts that (a) Article 17 of the Greek constitution, expressly provides that property rights “may not be exercised contrary to the public interest” ...; and (b) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 also provides for the imposition of restrictions on public interest grounds. Article 23 of the Constitution does not allow restrictions in a similar manner to [the above articles]. Restrictions and deprivations are foreseen in an express and limited manner in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 23. 4. The [court in Charalambous] used Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which allows States to enact laws to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. This would be similar to using Article 24 of the Constitution to justify the relatively small contribution “without breaching the stricter provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution.” With all due respect, any reference to law under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is made with the proviso that the law being dealt with is not unconstitutional. In addition, in the same judgment the [court] decided that [Law no. 112(I)/2012] is not a tax law ... it is not then clear how [the court] could rely on Article 24 of the Constitution, which requires citizens to pay taxes or to make contributions. 5. The case of Maria Koutselini-Ioannidou followed ... Having in mind the above, I am of the humble opinion that Charalambous is incorrect to the extent that it finds that the salary and pension cuts did not breach the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution for the reasons I have already stated and because it clashes with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, both prior to and subsequent to this decision, to the extent that it weakens its jurisprudential gravity. As a result, it would be justified not to apply that case and rather to apply Koutselini-Ioannidou and the case-law prior to that setting out the same principles.”
(γ)      Judge A.L. 58. Judge A.L. fully agreed with the reasoning of Judge S.N. (see paragraph 51 above) and reiterated the precedence of Article 23 of the Constitution over Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention because it provided greater protection of the right to property. He was therefore of the view that Article 23 should apply instead. He further reiterated that:
(a) salaries and pensions constituted property rights which fell under Article 23 § 1 of the Constitution;
(b) following the literal reading of the Constitution, a restriction or limitation of proprietary rights was only allowed on the grounds provided for under Article 23 § 3; and
(c) while the need to consolidate public finances had been understandable, there was at the same time an obligation on the state to remain in line with the Constitution as it was in such periods of crisis that the Constitution protected citizens. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
59. The relevant Constitutional provisions read, in so far as relevant, as follows:
Article 23
“(1) Every person, alone or jointly with others, has the right to acquire, own, possess, enjoy or dispose of any movable or immovable property and has the right to respect for such a right. The rights of the Republic to underground water, minerals and antiquities are reserved. (2) No deprivation or restriction or limitation of any such right shall be made except as provided in this Article. (3) Restrictions or limitations which are absolutely necessary in the interests of public safety or public health or public morals, or town and country planning or the development and use of any property for the promotion of the public benefit or for the protection of the rights of others, may be imposed by law on the exercise of such a right. Just compensation shall be promptly paid for any such restrictions or limitations which materially decrease the economic value of such property; such compensation is to be determined in case of disagreement by a civil court. (4) Any movable or immovable property or any right over or interest in any such property may be compulsorily acquired by the Republic or by a municipal corporation or by a Communal Chamber for educational, religious, charitable or sporting institutions, bodies or establishments within its competence and only from persons belonging to its respective Community, or by a public corporation or a public utility body on which such a right has been conferred by law, and only:
(a) for a purpose which is to the public benefit and shall be specially provided for by a general law of compulsory acquisition which shall be enacted within a year from the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution; and
(b) when that purpose is established by a decision of the acquiring authority and made under the provisions of such law stating clearly the reasons for such acquisition; and
(c) upon the payment in cash and in advance of just and equitable compensation, to be determined in case of disagreement by a civil court.
...”
Article 28
“1. All persons are equal before the law, the administration and justice and are entitled to equal protection and equal treatment. 2. Every person shall enjoy all the rights and liberties provided for in this Constitution without any direct or indirect discrimination against any person on the ground of his community, race, religion, language, sex, political 
or other convictions, national or social descent, birth, color, wealth, social class, or on any ground whatsoever, unless there is express provision to the contrary in this Constitution. ...”
 
II. OTHER RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAWS
A. The Law on Extraordinary Contribution of Officials, Employees, and Pensioners of the Public Sector and of the broader Public Sector of 2011 (Law no. 112(I)/2011) and relevant amendments
60. The preamble of Law no. 112(I)/2011 reads as follows:
“Because the Republic has recently being going through an adverse financial period and in order to avoid further exacerbating the budget situation as a consequence of the events of July 11th, 2011, it is necessary to limit expenditure for the public sector, the wider public sector, the local governments and the local school authorities and;
Because it has become necessary, pursuant to the above purpose, to, among other things, deduct as a special contribution to the Republic a part of the gross income and pensions paid to officials, employees and pensioners in the civil service, the wider public sector, local government and the local school authorities”. 61. The comment about the “events of July 11th 2011” referred to an explosion that occurred on that date at the Evangelos Florakis naval base near the village of Mari (see Herakleous and others v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 57596/12, § 4, 20 June 2017). 62. Law no. 112(I)/2011 was amended by Amending Law no. 193 (I)/2011 which entered into force on 1 January 2012 for a period of two years (section 6 of the Amending Law). This Law lowered the specific scale percentages to make them the same as those in the private sector. It provided that the deduction of the extraordinary contribution would start at incomes or pensions over EUR 2,500 at the following percentages: 2.5 % for a salary scale of EUR 2,501-3,500, 3% for a salary scale of EUR 3,501-4,500 and 3.5% for a salary scale of EUR 4,501 and above (section 3 of the Amending Law). It also added a reservation deducting a high percentage corresponding to 3%, 3.5% and 4.5% on the above salary scales when at the time of the entry into force of the law an officer was at the top of the salary scale for his position (this reservation was subsequently amended by Amending Law no. 74(I)/2012 applying these percentages to, inter alia, officers at the top of the scale in positions with “combined scales”, and officers on a fixed salary, paid under a contract for services, sponsored externally or on a grant (χορηγία) or who received other remuneration (αντιμισθία). Amending Law no. 193(I)/2011 also made the special contribution tax-deductible, unlike the original provision (section 5 of the Amending Law and section 6 of Law no. 112(I)/2011). 63. Amending Law no. 184(I)/2012, which was in force between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2016, provided that the scale percentages set by Law no. 193(I)/2011 would remain until 31 December 2016 (section 3(a) of Law no. 112(I)/2011 as amended). However, it amended the percentages to be deducted after 1 January 2014 so that they would start at incomes or pensions over EUR 1,500, as had initially been the case under Law no. 112(I)/2011, at the following percentages: 2.5 % for EUR 1,501‑2,500, 3% EUR 2,501-3,500, 3.5% for over EUR 3,501 (section 3(b) of Law no. 112(I)/2011 as amended). B. The Law on Extraordinary Contribution of Employees, Pensioners and the Self-Employed of the Private Sector of 2011 and subsequent amending laws
64. On 1 January 2012, four months after Law no. 112(I)/2011 came into force, Law 202(I)/2011 on the Extraordinary Contribution of Employees, Pensioners and the Self-Employed of the Private Sector came into force at the same time as Amending Law no. 193(I)/2011. Law 202 (I)/2011 provided for the deduction of an extraordinary contribution from salaries or pensions from employees, pensioners and the self-employed in the private sector, using the same percentages and on the same salary scales as Amending Law no. 193(I)/2011(see paragraph 62 above). 65. Amending Law no. 183(I) of 2012, which entered into force on 1 January 2014, made the same amendments to the percentages to be deducted from 1 January 2014 until 31 December 2016 as Amending Law no. 184(I)/2012 (see paragraph 63 above). C. The Law on the Reduction in Emoluments and Pensions of Officials, Employees and Pensioners of the Public Sector and of the broader Public Sector of 2012 (Law no. 168(I)/2012) and relevant amendments
66. The preamble to Law no. 168(I)/2012 reads as follows:
“Because the State has recently fallen into an adverse financial period and, to avoid further exacerbating the fiscal situation, it becomes necessary to limit expenditure in the public sector, the wider public sector, local government and local school authorities; and
Because, pursuant to the above purpose, it becomes necessary, inter alia, to reduce the salaries and pensions paid to officials, employees and pensioners in the civil service, the wider public sector, the local governments and school authorities.”
67. This law was amended three times. First, by Law no. 31(I)/13, which increased the effective percentage of deductions initially to 0.8% of the gross salary or pension and subsequently to 3.8% (for low income and low pensions) and to 14.5% and subsequently to 17.5% (for high income and high pensions). Law no. 94(I)/2018 reduced the effective percentage of deductions to 1.8% (for low income and low pensions) to 17.5% (for high income and high pensions) for the period between 1 July 2018 until 31 December 2018. Law no. 94(I)/2018 further reduced the effective percentage of deductions to 0% (for low income and low pensions) to 17.5% (for high income and high pensions) for the period between 1 January 2019 and until 31 December 2019. The same law further reduced the effective percentage of reductions to 3.3% for those who previously had reductions of 5.8% to 15% for those who previously had reductions of 17.5% for the period between 1 January 2020 and until 31 December 2020. The same law further reduced the effective percentage of reductions gradually and as of 1 January 2023 the reductions of salaries and pensions on the basis of the Reduction of Salaries and Pensions Law was discontinued (see table in paragraph 35 above). III. RELEVANT DOMESTIC CASE-LAW
A. Maria Koutselini-Ioannidou v. The Republic of Cyprus, cases nos. 740/2011 and others ((2014) 3 A.A.D. 361)
68. On 7 October 2014 the plenary of the Supreme Court comprising ten judges delivered its judgment Maria Koutselini-Ioannidou v. The Republic of Cyprus (cited above). The case concerned whether the provisions of Law 88(I)/2011, which suspended the applicants’ pension for as long as they held another public position or office from which they gained a salary, had been in breach of Article 23 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, by a majority of seven (M.N., T.E., S.N., L.P., D.M., A.L., K.S.) to three (C.P., A.P., M.C.) found Law 88(I)/2011 had breached Article 23 of the Constitution. 69. The majority stated that the right to property could not be restricted, and a person could not be deprived of their property except as provided under Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution. The majority noted that Article 23 of the Constitution provided greater protection than Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as the third paragraph of Article 23 did not allow the restriction of the right to property for the public benefit. With reference to Charalambous (cited above), the majority reiterated that the reference to the “development and use of any property to the promotion of the public benefit” under Article 23 § 3 did not coincide with the general limitation of property for the public benefit. 70. With reference to domestic case-law the majority noted that a pension constituted a property right. At the same time, the “suspension” of pensions as provided for by Law 88(I)/2011 did not mean that once the applicants retired from their other public post they would receive the pension that was suspended retroactively. The “suspension” essentially meant that the applicants either (a) lost their right to a pension for as long as they held public office or a position in the civil service or (b) if their salary while in office was less than their pension, they would only receive part of their pension so as to equate their salary to the amount of their monthly pension. 71. Against this background, the majority noted that there was no difference between those who (a) lost their pension in its entirety, and (b) those who lost part of their pension, because in both cases there was an impermissible deprivation or restriction of their property rights. Nor was there a possibility of balancing the general interest of the society on the one hand with the applicants’ individual interest to their property on the other hand, since Article 23 § 3 did not allow the deprivation or restriction of that right for reasons of public benefit. As such, the majority considered that the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which provided for a proportionality assessment had not been applicable to the circumstances of that case. 72. In any event, according to the majority, Law 88(I)/2011 did not contain a public interest justification, but rather referred to the “modernisation of pension schemes” without sufficiently elaborating on this point. With the above in mind, the majority found the relevant sections of Law 88(I)/2011 which effected the suspension of pensions, unconstitutional. 73. The minority considered that the suspension of pensions was the result of the applicants’ own actions as they had accepted appointment to another public position or office knowing that their pension would be suspended. As for those who had already been holding a public position, it had been open to them to resign in order to receive a full pension. Hence, according to the minority there had been no deprivation or limitation to the right to property. B. Case-law concerning the interpretation of Article 23 of the Constitution
74. In Holy See of Kitium v. Municipal Council of Limassol (1 RSCC 15, 2 March 1961) the Supreme Constitutional Court as it existed at the time examined, inter alia, the authorities’ refusal to grant the Holy See of Kitium a building permit. In interpreting the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution, the court stated that the right to property safeguarded by Article 23 § 1 included the right to possess and enjoy property. The court considered that whether an interference (and in that case, the decision to refuse a building permit) amounted to a “deprivation” which could be achieved only under paragraph 4 of Article 23, or whether it amounted to a “restriction or limitation” which could only be imposed under paragraph 3 of Article 23 was “a question of fact or degree”. 75. The reasoning used in Holy See of Kitium (cited above) was subsequently cited in many other cases that followed concerning the interpretation of Article 23 of the Constitution such as Kirizis and others v. The Republic of Cyprus ((1965) 3 C.L.R. 85), Thymopoulos and others v. Municipal Committee of Nicosia ((1967) 3 C.L.R. 588) and Demetriades and Others v. Council of Ministers ((1996) 3 C.L.R. 85) among many other authorities. In the latter case, also referred to by the Supreme Court majority in Charalambous (cited above) as well as in the dissenting opinion of Judge L.P. in Avgoustis (cited above)(see paragraphs 16 and 56 above), concerning the imposition of restrictions on the use of the applicant’s immovable property, the Supreme Court plenary stated in relation to Article 23, among other things, the following:
“1. The right to property, movable and immovable, is enshrined in the Constitution - (Article 23 § 1). The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Additional Protocol, which form part of domestic law as a result of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Ratification) Law of 1962 (Law 39/62), do not extend the right to property as enshrined in the Constitution, nor do they enhance its content. The relevant provisions of the Protocol are, in essence, identical to those of Article 23 § 1 of the Constitution. (See Article 1 of the Additional Protocol, Ratifying Law 39/62.)
2. The right to property is subject to both restrictions and deprivations, in accordance with and for the reasons provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 23 of the Constitution. Urban planning, as well as the development and use of any property, are explicitly defined as reasons on the basis of which restrictions on the use of property may be imposed by law.
... 3. Deprivation of property can only take place with the expropriation of land, a procedure which presupposes, as defined in Article 23 § 4 of the Constitution, compensation of the owner before the alienation of his property - (see, inter alia, Holy See of Kitium and Municipal Council of Limassol, 1 R.S.C.C. 15). Restrictions on the use of property do not require the owner to be compensated in advance for damage that he may suffer as a result of their imposition. Compensation for a substantial reduction in the economic value of the property, due to restrictions on its use, is determined, in the event of a dispute, by a competent civil court, (Article 23 § 3) - (see, inter alia, Nikos Kirzis and Others v. The Republic of Cyprus (1965) 3 C.L.R. 46, Demetrios Thymopoulos and Others v. Municipal Committee of Nicosia (1967) 3 C.L.R. 588).
...
4. ... 5. The classification of the conditions imposed for the use of property as "restrictions" is not decisive for determining their character. If the conditions imposed, restricting the use of property, result in a substantial neutralization of the right to property, the act is annulled for abuse of power. When restrictions lead to deprivation of property is the issue that we will consider below. Conditions restricting the use of property, which leave intact the core of the right to property, constitute a limitation and not a deprivation. Restrictions on the use of property result in its deprivation only when they render property inactive - (see Kyriakopoulou - "Administrative Greek Law", Volume III, pp. 366 and 368; P.D. Dagtoglou - "Constitutional Law - Individual Rights B’", pp. 907, 936, 937, 938; Lanitis E.C. Estates Ltd. and Others v. Republic and Others (case no. 108/88, et al., 21 December 1989)). ...”
C. Leave to apply to the Supreme Constitutional Court for the resolution of conflicts of case-law
76. A Supreme Constitutional Court with third instance jurisdiction was created in Cyprus. It began dealing with cases on 1 July 2023. 77. Several public servants had unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of other austerity measures, including a law reducing the extra lump sum they would receive following retirement, in the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. Following the establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court they applied to that court (see application no. 10/23) for leave to apply for a resolution of a conflict which had arisen in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court prior to the creation of the Constitutional Court, namely that among Charalambous, Koutselini‑Ioannidou and Avgousti. On 19 March 2024 the Supreme Constitutional Court held that it had no jurisdiction to examine conflicts in the jurisprudence of the former Supreme Court. It held that it could only examine conflicts arising in the new Court of Appeal (‘Εφετείο’). It noted, obiter, that there was in any event no conflict in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and it restated the findings of that court in Avgousti (cited above). THE LAW
MATTERS OF PROCEDURE
A. Joinder of the applications
78. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. B. Standing of deceased applicants’ successors
79. In their last observations the Government informed the Court about the death of three applicants, namely Ms Pantelitsa Constantinou Loizia, Ms Georgia Vyra Dionysiou and Mr Stylianos Christofi. 80. On 27 August 2024 the applicants’ representative was asked to provide comments in reply to the information provided by the Government. 81. On 20 September 2024 the applicants’ representative confirmed the death of the said applicants and informed the Court of the names of persons wishing to pursue the application in their stead. He had provided documents proving the relationship of Ms Pantelitsa Constantinou Loizia to the person wishing to pursue the application in her stead, which was her father. There was no other information identifying the relationship between the remaining deceased applicants and the persons wishing to pursue their applications. No authority forms were provided for either of the persons intending to pursue the applications. 82. On 24 September 2024 the Court invited the applicants’ representative to provide information in respect of the persons who wished to pursue the proceedings before the Court in respect of each of the deceased applicants, provide the Registry with a written statement explaining their legitimate interest in having the proceedings pursued, and return to the Court the official authority form duly completed and signed by each person wishing to pursue the proceedings. 83. On 14 October 2024 the applicants’ representative had informed the Court that the father, husband, and son of the deceased applicants, respectively, expressed the wish to pursue the application the applicants had initially filed. The authority forms provided had not however been duly completed by the persons wishing to pursue the application, as the data concerning the personal information of the said persons had been absent. Instead, the personal information of the deceased applicants was replicated. No information was provided to the Court about the failure to provide duly completed authority forms. 84. The Court notes first, as regards the father of Ms Pantelitsa Constantinou Loizia, that while he has provided sufficient documents proving his relationship with the deceased applicant, he has not provided the court with a duly completed authority form. The Court considers it essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention on whose behalf they purport to act (see, mutatis mutandis, Çetin v. Turkey (dec.), no. 10449/08, 13 September 2011 and Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 21727/08, 20 January 2009). It is equally important that a representative claiming to act on behalf of a late applicant’s relative submits a duly filled and signed power of attorney. The Court notes second that as regards Ms Georgia Vyra Dionysiou and Mr Stylianos Christofi, the persons wishing to pursue the application in their stead have neither provided the Court with duly completed authority forms, nor have they provided proof of their relationship with the deceased. 85. Accordingly, the Court finds that the persons wishing to pursue the applications in the name of Ms Pantelitsa Constantinou Loizia, Ms Georgia Vyra Dionysiou and Mr Stylianos Christofi, respectively, do not have standing to pursue the proceedings. As far as these applicants are concerned their application can be struck out of the Court’s list pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. The Court sees no particular circumstance relating to respect for the rights guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols (Article 37 in fine) requiring it to continue the examination of the application in respect of these three applicants (see Burlya and Others v. Ukraine, no. 3289/10, §§ 73-75, 6 November 2018). The Court accordingly decides to strike the application, in so far as it concerns these three applicants, out of its list. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
86. The applicants in applications nos. 45039/20, 45089/20, 45101/20 and 45899/20 complained that their right to a fair trial had been violated by the Supreme Court’s failure to follow established case-law in Avgousti (see paragraph 41 above), contrary to Article 6 of the Convention, which provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
87. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
(a)   The applicants
88. The applicants argued that the principle of legal certainty had not been complied with. They argued that the domestic courts should have examined their complaints using the established methods of analysis and interpretation of Article 23 of the Constitution. It was established that no deprivation or restriction of the right to property could be made except as provided in either Article 23 § 3 (if a restriction) or § 4 (if a deprivation), and that property rights could not be restricted for the “public interest”. That interpretation had been confirmed by the plenary of the Supreme Court in Koutselini-Ioannidou, following Charalambous, which had a similar legal framework. 89. The applicants further contended that the majority in Avgousti had disregarded the precedent set by Koutselini-Ioannidou without giving adequate reasons; that they had introduced extraneous words and ideas (such as the core of the right) into the text of Article 23 without sufficient explanation, which had led to inconsistency and contradiction in the judgment; and that they had found the measures in Avgousti, contrary to those in Koutselini-Ioannidou, to have been limited in duration - despite the fact that all measures had had permanent effect. (b)   The Government
90. The Government contended that the Supreme Court in Avgousti had followed the precedent set by Charalambous and that that had been more appropriate in the circumstances. The Supreme Court had approached the issue in those two cases under the first paragraph of Article 23 of the Constitution. Unlike Koutselini-Ioannidou, neither Charalambous nor Avgousti had been decided under the third paragraph of Article 23, which did not apply to the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court was the highest court in the country with jurisdiction to interpret the constitution. It had not added a new element to the Constitution, nor had it distorted the language of the constitutional provisions. It had rather interpreted the existing provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution and ruled that the disputed measures had been constitutional because the relatively small reductions had left the core of the right to receive a salary or pension intact. 91. The Government also asserted that the judgments in Charalambous and Koutselini-Ioannidou (both cited above) had not been in conflict given the different facts of the two cases, which justified their different outcomes. Specifically, the Supreme Court had found that, unlike the applicants in Koutselini-Ioannidou, the applicants in Avgousti (cited above) had not lost their property forever as their salaries and pensions had merely been reduced by an amount which depended on the original level of the salary or pension, and for a limited period of time. In addition, the reduction of salaries and pensions in both Charalambous and Avgousti was based on laws which had been enacted to avert the dire economic crisis facing Cyprus, whereas the total withdrawal of the applicants’ pensions in Koutselini-Ioannidou had been merely for the purpose of modernising the pension schemes. Charalambous and Avgousti affected the same group of people, namely employees and pensioners in the public and wider public sectors, whereas Koutselini‑Ioannidou affected only those who held another paid official position while receiving a pension. Therefore, according to the Government, the Supreme Court in Avgousti had given reasons for following the precedent of the judgment in Charalambous – in essence examining the case under the first paragraph of Article 23 as a whole - and not Koutselini-Ioannidou, in which the court had applied the third paragraph of Article 23. 92. The Government further stressed that the Supreme Court in Avgousti (cited above) had not departed from the reasoning or method of assessment that it had used in previous similar cases with the same subject matter. The court had applied Charalambous as being closer on its facts to the case, whereas Koutselini-Ioannidou had been decided on its own specific circumstances, which were different from those in Avgousti. The court did not overrule Koutselini-Ioannidou but merely distinguished it on the facts. The judgments in Charalambous and Avgousti were relevant precedents for the Supreme Court’s approach to Article 23 of the Constitution and the reduction of salaries and pensions in a tiered and logical manner and for a limited period. 93. In any event, according to the Government there had been only three judgments of the Supreme Court relating to the constitutionality of the reduction of salaries and pensions and whether that reduction was compatible with three specific laws, and they had not revealed any profound or protracted differences in the case-law. The divergences of approach and in the application of Article 23 had led to the evolution of domestic case-law in different circumstances. Charalambous and Avgousti had dealt with the reduction of salaries and pensions under Article 23 § 1 of the Constitution (looking at the scope of the rights involved) and Koutselini-Ioannidou had dealt with the total extinction of pension rights under Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution. 2. The Court’s assessment
(a)   General principles
94. The Court reiterates at the outset that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation (see Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 13279/05, § 49, 20 October 2011). Save in the event of evident arbitrariness, it is not the Court’s role to question the interpretation of the domestic law by the national courts (ibid, § 50). 95. In examining complaints of allegedly discordant case-law under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the Court will apply the principles which have been summarised in Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 116, 29 November 2016 and Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin, cited above, §§ 49-58. Accordingly, the Court will need to establish:
firstly, whether there are profound and long-standing differences in the case-law of those courts;
secondly, whether there is a mechanism in domestic law for resolving such inconsistencies; and
thirdly, whether that mechanism has been used and, if appropriate, to what effect (see, among many authorities, Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others, § 116 and Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin §§ 53-55, both cited above). (b)   Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present case
96. The present case involves an alleged inconsistency in the case-law of a court of last resort (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others, cited above, § 117; Tudor Tudor v. Romania, no. 21911/03, § 29, 24 March 2009; Beian v. Romania (no. 1), no. 30658/05, § 38, ECHR 2007-V). 97. The issue in question arose in June 2014, with the Supreme Court’s judgment in Charalambous (see paragraph 11 above). It should first be noted that at that time, the domestic courts were faced with an entirely novel factual situation, namely, the excessive budget deficit and financial crisis (see paragraph 12 above). The facts of the present case must therefore be analysed against this background. The Court further notes that case-law development is not, in itself, contrary to the proper administration of justice since a failure to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk hindering reform or improvement (see, among many authorities, Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin, cited above, § 58). 98. With the above in mind, the Court observes that with its judgment in Charalambous, the Supreme Court departed for the first time from the previously established case-law, under which interferences which left the core of the right to property intact constituted a restriction of that right to be examined under Article 23 § 3 as the only other provision of the Constitution which regulated the imposition of restrictions on the right to property (see paragraphs 56, 74 and 75 above for an outline of the principles which applied prior to Charalambous). The Supreme Court in Charalambous held that since the core of the right to property (and in that case specifically the right to a salary) remained intact, there was no need to apply Article 23 § 3 (see paragraph 22 above). The Supreme Court found the interference in that case to be minimal, proportionate, and justified on account of the State’s dire financial position. 99. Subsequently in October 2014, in Koutselini-Ioannidou (see paragraph 68 above), concerning legislation suspending the public service retirement pension of beneficiaries for as long as they held public office or employment, the Supreme Court plenary took the approach that had been applied prior to Charalambous. The court therefore held that the interference with the complainants’ right to a pension constituted a restriction and therefore had to be examined under Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution, which sets out the terms for permissible restrictions on the right to property (and specifically the right to a pension in that case). The Supreme Court held that since the “public benefit” was not included in the list of justifications in Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution, the contested interference with the applicants’ pension rights for reasons of the public benefit was unconstitutional. 100. Some time later, in the judgments issued in 2018 and 2019, the Administrative Court (first instance jurisdiction) followed Koutsellini‑Ioannidou and the previously established approach (see paragraphs 38 and 39 above), while the Supreme Court in Avgousti (judgment of April 2020) followed Charalambous (see paragraph 42 above). The Supreme Court in Avgousti declined to follow Koutselini-Ioannidou, distinguishing the interference in Koutselini-Ioannidou as permanent, the complainants in that case having partially or fully lost their pensions. The majority reasoned that the applicants in Avgousti had only suffered a restricted reduction to their salaries or pensions which had lasted for a limited period (see paragraph 45 above). The court further referred to the extreme financial strain under which Cyprus was at the time. For the above reasons, it found Charalambous a more appropriate precedent on account of the similarities of the two cases on their facts. 101. The Court reiterates that the existence of conflicting court decisions, especially when those decisions involve large numbers of applicants, can in certain circumstances create a state of legal uncertainty likely to reduce public confidence in the judicial system, which is clearly one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of law. Divergences of approach may arise between courts as part of the process of interpreting legal provisions while adapting them to the particular situation (see Albu and Others v. Romania, nos. 34796/09 and 63 others, cited above, § 38). 102. Turning to the present cases, the Court finds that the domestic courts gave a reasonable explanation for the varied approaches in their decisions, explaining the differences between Charalambous, Koutselini-Ioannidou and Avgousti. In Avgousti the Supreme Court explained that the difference in approach was justified by the differences in the facts of the cases (see paragraph 91 above). Specifically, the Supreme Court in Avgousti distinguished Koutselini-Ioannidou because the interference in that case was permanent and the complainants in that case had partly or totally lost their pensions. On the contrary, the majority found that the applicants in Avgousti had only suffered a restricted reduction to their salaries or pensions, particularly related to the dire economic situation of the state, which only lasted for a limited period (see paragraph 45 above). The Court reiterates that is not in principle its function to compare different decisions of national courts even if given in apparently similar proceedings and that it must respect the independence of those courts (see, among other authorities, Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin, cited above, § 50 and Ferreira Santos Pardal v. Portugal, no. 30123/10, § 42, 30 July 2015). In the light of the factual differences between the cases as expressed by the Supreme Court and the reasons for the different approaches advanced by it, the Court is not convinced by the applicants’ argument that there was a divergence of case-law, let alone a profound and longstanding one. 103. The Court further notes in this connection that the newly established Supreme Constitutional Court, albeit in an obiter comment, found that there had been no conflict in the Supreme Court’s case-law (see paragraph 77 above).
104.

Outcome for Article P1-1: no_violation