SECOND SECTION
CASE OF Z AND OTHERS v. FINLAND
(Application no. 42758/23)
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 8 • Family life • Order for return of two children from Finland to Russia under the Hague Convention following removal by their father • Domestic courts’ examination in compliance with procedural requirements inherent in Art 8 • Relevant and sufficient reasons • Domestic courts genuinely took into account the factors capable of constituting an exception to their immediate return in application of the Hague Convention • No grave risk • Children’s asylum status derived automatically from that of their father • Younger child, unlike older one, not of an appropriate age and degree of maturity to take account of his views • Children’s return to Russia deemed to be in their best interests, notwithstanding older child’s objections and difficulties to maintain contact with their father after their return • Interference “necessary in a democratic society”
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
16 December 2025
 
Referral to the Grand Chamber
 
11/05/2026
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Z and Others v. Finland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,
 Saadet Yüksel,
 Jovan Ilievski,
 Péter Paczolay,
 Gediminas Sagatys,
 Juha Lavapuro,
 Hugh Mercer, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 42758/23) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Russian nationals, Mr Z and his two minor sons, X and Y (“the applicants”), on 15 December 2023;
the decision to give notice to the Finnish Government (“the Government”) of the application;
the decision not to have the applicants’ names disclosed;
the decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court);
the decision to indicate an interim measure to the respondent Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and the fact that this interim measure has been complied with;
the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants;
the comments submitted by the AIRE Centre and Ms G., the mother of the second and third applicants, who were granted leave to intervene as third parties by the President of the Section;
Having deliberated in private on 18 November 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns the domestic courts’ decision to order the return of the applicant children, who were granted asylum in Finland, to Russia pursuant to the Hague Child Abduction Convention. THE FACTS
2. The applicants are Russian nationals. The first applicant, who was born in 1983, is the father of the second and third applicants, who were born in 2011 and 2013 respectively and are also Russian nationals. The applicants were represented before the Court by Mr H. Nevala, a lawyer practising in Kemi. 3. The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Krista Oinonen, from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicants used to live in Russia. The first applicant and the mother of the second and third applicant have been separated since the children were five and three years old, respectively. The children lived with their mother but the first applicant had regular contact with them and they occasionally stayed overnight at his home. In addition to the second and third applicants, the family also includes an older sister who lives with the mother. 6. In September 2022 the first applicant took the second and third applicants from Russia to Finland without their mother’s consent. 7. After arriving in Finland, on 14 September 2022, the first applicant applied for asylum on his own behalf and on behalf of the children. His claim was based on his opposition to the current regime in Russia and the war in Ukraine, which meant that he risked political persecution in Russia. 8. On 23 January 2023 the children’s mother instituted proceedings in the Helsinki Court of Appeal for their return under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereafter “the Hague Convention”). 9. The first applicant, relying on Article 13 § 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 25 below), opposed the mother’s application, arguing that there was a grave risk that the return of the children to Russia would expose them to psychological harm or place them in an intolerable situation. He submitted, in particular, that the children had been forced to attend a military school in Russia where they had been “brainwashed” by being taught how to use guns and exposed to war propaganda. Relying on Article 13 § 2 of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 25 below), he also argued that the children objected to being returned. 10. On 8 March 2023 the Helsinki Court of Appeal dismissed the mother’s application. On the basis of the evidence provided by the parties, it held that there was a grave risk that, if returned to Russia, the children would continue to attend the same military school they had previously attended, which would expose them to psychological harm. It stated that a situation in which minor children handled weapons, even if they were not real weapons, dressed as soldiers and otherwise engaged in activities that could be seen as military could not be considered appropriate for their development and well‑being. Furthermore, based on interviews that child welfare officers had conducted with the children, the court also found that both children objected to being returned to Russia but that only the older child had reached an age and degree of maturity at which it was appropriate to take account of his views. As both parents had sought to influence the children’s views in a way favourable to themselves, the children could not be considered able to form independent opinions. Given the age of the children, their opposition to being returned to Russia was not enough to refuse their return, although the children thought it should be. What was important was the grave risk that returning the children to Russia would expose them to psychological harm. 11. The mother appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court. She argued that the Court of Appeal had wrongly assessed the evidence about the school and that it had placed excessive weight on the evidence presented by the first applicant. Furthermore, she pointed out that at the hearing in the Court of Appeal she had acknowledged that the children’s opinion of the school had changed and that she had therefore expressed her readiness to provide them with a different type of education. 12. In his reply, the applicant reiterated the arguments he had put forward in the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 9 above). In addition, he submitted:
“If returned, [the children] would hardly ever be able to see their father again. The mother and the children’s sister would be able to visit the children in Finland, unlike the position of the father, who would not be able to go to Russia.”
13. On 16 May 2023 the Supreme Court, with the assistance of child welfare officers and in the absence of the parents, interviewed the older child in order to hear his views on the matter and establish whether they were genuine. On 19 June 2023 an oral hearing was held which both parents attended. 14. On 27 September 2023 the Supreme Court ordered the return of both children to Russia. The court held that it had not been shown that, if the children were to be returned, they would be treated in a manner contrary to human dignity, exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation, whether because of the school they would attend or for any other reason. According to the case-law developed under the Hague Convention, the return of a child was most likely to be refused on the grounds related to the behaviour or personal circumstances of the parent applying for the child’s return or because for some reason the child was considered to be exceptionally dependent on the parent who had wrongfully removed him from the State of his habitual residence. In the present case, the Supreme Court observed that it had not even been alleged that the children’s basic needs would not be met if they were returned to live with their mother. Nor was it alleged that the children were at risk of being caught up in a war or living in a war zone. It observed that the Russian school system, unlike the Finnish one, did include elements of military training, at least in some schools. It also observed that it was possible that on their return the children would be treated negatively at school because they had gone to Finland with their father. However, there was no sufficient evidence of grave risk that the return of the children would expose them to physical or psychological harm or to otherwise put them in an intolerable situation. It furthermore observed that the mother had stated that the children would not continue in the same type of education and that there was no reason to doubt her statement (see paragraph 11 above). 15. The Supreme Court further found that the older child, who was twelve years old at the time, strongly and genuinely objected to being returned, and that he had attained an age and degree of maturity at which it was appropriate to take account of his views. The younger child, who was ten years old at the time, had also objected to being returned. However, on the basis of the interviews the child welfare officers had conducted with the children (see paragraph 10 above), the Supreme Court found that he had not reached an age and degree of maturity at which it was appropriate to take account of his views. 16. In making an overall assessment, the Supreme Court gave weight to the fact that the children had lived all their lives in Russia, where they had a sister and other relatives, and that they had not had any ties with Finland before their wrongful removal. The Supreme Court also considered it possible that the older child was not able to assess the long-term effects of his separation from his mother, which might make contact between them more difficult. It observed that the evidence suggested that during the stay in Finland the younger child had had more contact with his mother, which supported the conclusion that his return was in his best interests. 17. The Supreme Court also held that the children had lived together all their lives and that it was in their best interests not to be separated. While it was true that returning the children to Russia would probably make it more difficult for them to maintain contact with their father, the court concluded that it was in the children’s best interests to be returned to Russia, where they would continue to live with their mother, with whom they had lived prior to their wrongful removal (see paragraph 5 above). Taking into account the purpose of the Hague Convention, the narrow application of the grounds of objections and their discretionary nature, the older child’s objections could not be accorded such weight as to prevent the children’s return to Russia. 18. Having regard to the above considerations, the Supreme Court concluded that the children’s return to Russia would not disproportionately restrict the first applicant’s right to respect for his family life. 19. The first applicant then made an application for the quashing of the Supreme Court’s decision of 27 September 2023 (see paragraph 14 above), by the use of an extraordinary remedy under domestic law which permitted the re‑examination of a case resolved by a final judgment or decision in the event of the emergence of relevant new facts or circumstances capable of calling into question that judgment or decision. The applicant submitted that the mother would hand the children over to a religious sect, which the Supreme Court understood from its name to be the local church. 20. In her reply, the mother stated that the children would return home and that the first applicant’s allegations were not true. 21. On 27 October 2023 the Supreme Court dismissed the application for the extraordinary quashing of its decision of 27 September 2023. It stated that the threshold for quashing a final judgment or decision was high, and that the mere reliance on a new fact was not by itself sufficient to justify it. Instead, the new fact and its probable impact on the outcome of the disputed decision must be credible enough to justify a more detailed assessment and investigation of the matter. The Supreme Court held that the applicant had not established that this threshold was met. 22. On 12 December 2023 the Immigration Service granted asylum to all three applicants (see paragraph 7 above). The first applicant was granted asylum because there were grounds to believe that he would be persecuted for his political opinions in Russia. The children were granted asylum automatically as they are the minor children of a father who had been granted asylum. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:
“In view of the explanations provided in your case and the general and up-to-date information on the situation in your home country, the Immigration Service considers that you have well-founded reasons to fear that you will be persecuted in your home country because of your political opinions within the meaning of section 87 (1) of the Aliens Act.
... As to your children, you have also referred to domestic violence committed by the mother and sister, military schooling, and brainwashing [by the leader of a religious sect]. Since it has been held above that the conditions for asylum are met in your case and your children are granted asylum as the minors in your family, it is not necessary to assess those elements in this decision.”
23. The first applicant then lodged a second extraordinary application, seeking the quashing of the Supreme Court’s decision of 27 September 2023 (see paragraph 14 above) on the grounds of new facts. He argued, inter alia, that in the meantime
(i)  the children had been granted asylum, and
(ii)  their mother had accepted that the second applicant would stay in Finland, which meant that the children would be separated if the third applicant were returned to Russia. 24. On 18 January 2024 the Supreme Court dismissed the second extraordinary application to quash its decision of 27 September 2023. It stated that the mother had denied accepting that the older child would stay in Finland. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the granting of asylum to the children did not in itself exempt the State from its obligations under the Hague Convention. It also found that the asylum decision in the applicants’ case was not a new fact which would have led to a different outcome in the proceedings for the return of the children. This is because the children’s asylum status was derived from that of their father, rather than being based on a risk of harm to the children themselves were they to return to Russia (see paragraph 22 above). In its earlier decision, the Supreme Court had already assessed the grounds for refusal based on a grave risk, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and, as to grounds for refusal relating to the children’s objection, had taken into account that returning them to Russia would probably make it more difficult to maintain contact between them and their father, who had moved to Finland. The Supreme Court further noted that the asylum decision did not reveal any new circumstances capable of leading to a different result in the return matter. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE        INTERNATIONAL LAW

25. The relevant provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which entered into force in respect of Finland on 1 August 1994 and in respect of Russia on 1 October 2011, read as follows:
“The States signatory to the present Convention,
Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody,
Desiring to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have agreed upon the following provisions –
...”
Article 1
“The objects of the present Convention are –
a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and
b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”
... Article 3
“The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.”
Article 4
“The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.”
Article 5
“For the purposes of this Convention –
a) ‘rights of custody’ shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence;
b) ‘rights of access’ shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.
...”
Article 11
“The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children. If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. ...”
Article 12
“Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and at the date of commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child.”
Article 13
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that –
a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.”
Article 20
“The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
26. In addition, Article 3, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in New York on 20 November 1989, reads as follows:
“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
      DOMESTIC LAW
27. The relevant provisions of the Act on Child Custody and Right of Access (laki lapsen huollosta ja tapaamisoikeudesta, lagen angående vårdnad om barn och umgängesrätt, Act no. 361/1983) read as follows:
Chapter 5
Return of a child under the Hague Convention
 
Section 30
Return order
“A child present in Finland and wrongfully removed from the State where he or she is habitually resident, or wrongfully not returned to this State, shall be ordered to be returned at once, if immediately before the wrongful removal or retention the child was habitually resident in a State which is a Contracting State to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ...”
Section 31
Jurisdiction
“A return order shall be made, upon application, by the Helsinki Court of Appeal.”
Section 32
Wrongful removal and retention
“The removal or retention of a child is wrongful if:
1) it is in breach of rights of custody held by a person, an institution or another body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
2) at the time of removal or retention those rights were being exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The removal or retention of a child shall not be wrongful, if the holder of the rights referred to in subparagraph 1 ... has consented to it or acquiesced in it either explicitly or implicitly.”
Section 33
Rights of custody
“In this chapter, rights of custody mean the right and obligation to take care of matters relating to the person of a child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence.”
Section 34
Grounds for the refusal of a return order
“An application for the return of a child may be rejected if:
1) the application is made after one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention of the child and the return of the child would be contrary to his or her best interests;
2) there is a grave risk that the return of the child would expose him or her to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation; or
3) the court finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take his or her views into account. A child who has attained the age of 16 years cannot be ordered to be returned. If the child’s habitual residence immediately before the wrongful removal or retention was in a Member State referred to in Article 2(3) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, the provisions of Article 11(4) of the Regulation also apply to the rejection of an application for return under subparagraph 1 of paragraph 2.”
    DOMESTIC PRACTICE
28. In a precedent case, KKO 2016:65, the Supreme Court had assessed whether a child should be returned who had been wrongfully brought to Finland and where one of the persons who had custody of the child had later been granted asylum and refugee status in Finland. The Supreme Court held the following:
“[... ] Finland is bound by both the Hague Convention and the Refugee Convention. The Hague Convention was concluded later than the Refugee Convention. The Hague Convention does not provide that it is dependent on the Refugee Convention and does not take a stand on the status of the Refugee Convention or on the mutual priority of the two Conventions. The purpose of the Refugee Convention is to protect the right of a person with refugee status to reside in the Contracting State which grants them asylum, whereas the purpose of the Hague Convention is, as stated above, to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State. The Conventions therefore have different objectives, and this may lead to a conflict between them in some individual situations where they both apply. Case-law collected from various Contracting Parties to the Hague Conference on Private International Law also shows that the relation between the two Conventions has room for interpretation.
[...]
In assessing the grounds for refusal of return under the Hague Convention, the possible reasons for granting asylum must be taken into account. Asylum granted to a child does not in itself constitute grounds for not applying the obligation to return the child under the Hague Convention. Instead, the return must be assessed from the standpoint of the above-mentioned grounds for refusal under the Hague Convention, taking into account the best interests of the child.”
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
29. The applicants complained that the Supreme Court’s order for the return of the children was in breach of their right to respect for their family life. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... family life .... 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
   Admissibility
30. The Government considered that the decision of the Supreme Court was not arbitrary in any respect and did not amount to a disproportionate interference of the applicants’ rights under Article 8 in the circumstances of the case.

Outcome for Article 8: no_violation