FIFTH SECTION   CASE OF NUZHDYAK v. UKRAINE (Application no. 16982/05)    JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 28 May 2009 FINAL 28/08/2009 This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Nuzhdyak v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Peer Lorenzen, President, Rait Maruste, Karel Jungwiert, Renate Jaeger, Mark Villiger, Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, judges, Stanislav Shevchuk, ad hoc judge,and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,Having deliberated in private on 5 May 2009,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:PROCEDURE1. The case originated in an application (no. 16982/05) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Ms Stanislava Tadeushivna Nuzhdyak (“the applicant”), on 22 April 2005.2. The applicant was represented by Mr I. Melnyk, a lawyer practising in Kamyanets-Podilsky. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.3. On 13 December 2005 the Court decided to communicate the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as their admissibility.THE FACTSI. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kamyanets-Podilsky, Khmelnytsky region, Ukraine.5. On 20 August 2002 the local city council decided to put the applicant’s employer, Pharmacy No. 130 (комунальне підприємство Аптека № 130), a municipal enterprise owned and controlled by this council, into liquidation, and the liquidation proceedings were initiated.6. On 1 June 2004 the Kamyanets-Podilsky City Court awarded the applicant 1,355.41 Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH)[1] in salary arrears and other payments due to her from Pharmacy No. 130.7. This judgment became final and on 2 September 2004 the State Bailiffs’ Service instituted enforcement proceedings.8. According to the Government, on 22 September 2004 the State Bailiffs’ Service, having terminated the enforcement proceedings, returned the writ of enforcement to the applicant on 22 September 2004. According to the Government, the applicant had been instructed to transfer the writ to the liquidation commission for further processing but had failed to do so.9. On 16 December 2004 the debtor enterprise was removed from the relevant companies’ register.10. The judgment of 1 June 2004 remains unenforced.II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW11. The general provisions of domestic legislation on enforcement of judicial decisions are set out in the judgment of 27 July 2004 in the case of Romashov v. Ukraine (no. 67534/01, §§ 16-18).THE LAWI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 112. The applicant complained that the State authorities had failed to enforce the judgment taken in her favour in timely fashion. In this regard she relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provide, in so far as relevant, as follows:Article 6 § 1“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...”Article 1 of Protocol No. 1“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest ....”A. Admissibility13. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaints were outside the six-month time-limit, as, in their opinion, that time-limit had started to run on 22 September 2004 when the Bailiffs’ Service had returned the writ of enforcement to the applicant (see paragraph 8 above). On the other hand, they deemed her application incompatible ratione personae, as, according to them, the applicant had herself made enforcement of the judgment impossible by having had recourse to the court when the liquidation proceedings were already pending against the debtor enterprise and by her failure to introduce her writ of enforcement to the liquidation proceedings after 22 September 2004.14. The applicant has failed to submit her observations on the admissibility in time.15. The Court notes that shifting to an applicant the burden to seek further means of enforcement of a judgment against an entity for which a State is accountable does not relieve that State from its obligation to enforce the judgment. Having regard to the fact that the judgment in favour of the applicant has still not been enforced, the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged violation of her rights is ongoing and accordingly the applicant may still claim to be a victim of the violation. As a consequence, the Government’s objections must be dismissed.16. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B. Merits17.

Outcome for Article P1-1: violation