FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF PANOVA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE(Applications nos. 28519/10 and 3 others – see appended table)    JUDGMENT STRASBOURG8 July 2021 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Panova and Others v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Lətif Hüseynov, President, Lado Chanturia, Mattias Guyomar, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the applications (nos. 28519/10, 52630/10, 52697/10 and 57473/10) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Ukrainian nationals, whose details are set out in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in that table;the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the lawfulness and fairness of the court judgments ordering the applicants’ eviction and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;the decision to grant legal aid;the parties’ observations;Having deliberated in private on 17 June 2021,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:INTRODUCTION1. The applicants alleged that they had been unlawfully and unfairly evicted from their flats in a building formerly belonging to a State-owned company after it had been transferred to a private owner. They raised complaints under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.THE FACTS2. The applicants were born in 1950, 1951, 1957 and 1974 respectively. The first, second and third applicants live in Yasnogorodka.3. The fourth applicant, Mr I.V. Biryuchkov, was the son of the second applicant, Mrs V.I. Pavlinova. He died in 2014, while his application was pending before the Court. The second applicant expressed her wish to pursue her late son’s application.4. The applicants had been granted legal aid and were represented by Mr Y.L. Boychenko, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg.5. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna.6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.Background of the case7. On 1 July 1980 the Makariv District Council (in the Kyiv region, Ukraine) permitted the use of several newly constructed buildings in the L.K. resort complex located near the village of Yasnogorodka. One of these buildings was referred to as “a hotel with an accommodation hall and garage”. The resort complex had been constructed by V. company, a Russian-based Soviet State‑owned enterprise, and was intended for hosting the children of its employees during the holidays.8. On various dates before 1987 the first three applicants, who were employed at L.K., along with several dozen other L.K. employees, were provided with accommodation in the above-mentioned building for themselves and their dependents. The fourth applicant, a minor at the material time, was accommodated together with the second applicant, his mother.9. In 1987 the V. company closed down the resort complex, laid off its employees, including the first three applicants, and transferred the L.K. property to S.M.T., a State-owned construction enterprise located in Ukraine. On several occasions S.M.T. considered various projects with a view to rehousing the former L.K. employees accommodated in the former resort; however, those projects were not completed.10. In 1992 the L.K. property complex was acquired by the private company I., who sold it to E., another private company, in the same year.11. On numerous occasions the former L.K. employees who were residing on the L.K. premises lodged complaints with different authorities and took various other actions alleging that the transfer of L.K. to private owners had been illegal and had encroached upon their rights as tenants.12. On 1 March 1993 the Kyiv Regional Administration addressed a letter to a group of former L.K. employees indicating as follows:“...The [E.] company has undertaken ... to provide the occupants [of the former L.K. resort] with heating, electricity and water. The vacation of the resort shall take place only on condition of the construction of houses for all resident families. The [E.] company has agreed to arrange for the construction of housing. At present, fifteen hectares of land have been allocated for [the project]. Planning work is in progress ...”13. In 1996 the E. company allowed a request by the second applicant to occupy an additional flat in the same building, which had become vacant, in view of the fact that she and her son (the fourth applicant), who had come of age, had been sharing a one-bedroom flat at the material time.14. According to the Government, in 2004 E. resettled some of the former L.K. employees, having provided them with other housing.15. According to the applicants, between 1992 and 2004 E. did not take any care of the L.K. property and it became dilapidated. The former L.K. employees residing on the site did their best to maintain the buildings and the infrastructure in a functioning state. In 2004, as land prices increased, E. decided to sell L.K. As the presence of tenants was detrimental to the intended sale, E. started undertaking various unlawful measures with a view to expelling the tenants without discharging its promise to rehouse them. It cut off the supply of water, gas, and electricity, forcing the residents to install their own energy and water supply systems.Eviction proceedings16. On 13 March 2006, after several rounds of the inquiry into the complaints raised by the L.K. residents, the Makariv district prosecutor instituted civil proceedings on their behalf, seeking to oblige the E. company to regularise their occupancy by way of issuing occupancy vouchers (ордер) in their names in accordance with the Housing Code of Ukraine (1983).17. E. lodged a counterclaim, alleging that all the L.K. residents had arbitrarily occupied its property. Referring to the general provisions of civil law protecting private property, it therefore sought their eviction.18. The applicants contested E.’s claims, as well as the prosecutor’s submissions. They maintained that they had been provided with their current dwellings as protected corporate tenants and had occupied them lawfully, in a regular manner, and in good faith for substantial periods of time. There had therefore not been any need for the prosecutor to seek regularisation of their occupancy. As regards E.’s counterclaim seeking their eviction, the applicants argued that under the Housing Code, they could not be evicted unless they were rehoused. The applicants provided copies of documents certifying their long-standing permanent residence registration with local authorities, and house fee payment books (розрахункова книжка) issued in their names in accordance with the rules applicable to protected tenancies in the 1980s. The applicants also provided copies of occupancy vouchers (ордер) issued in their names in the 1980s by the Makariv District Council.19. On 27 June 2006 the District Court discontinued its examination of the prosecutor’s claim lodged on the applicants’ behalf, since the applicants did not support it. It proceeded, however, with the examination of that same claim in respect of some other L.K. residents, who supported the prosecutor’s position. It also proceeded with the examination of the eviction counterclaim lodged by the E. company against all L.K. residents, including the applicants.20. On 20 October 2006 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court in Kyiv ruled in E.’s favour. It found, in particular, that there were no documents indicating that any of the L.K. buildings had been intended for permanent residential occupancy; that the applicants’ dwellings had never been registered as belonging to the public housing stock and that the issuance of their occupancy vouchers and their residence registration with the local authorities had therefore been in breach of the applicable procedural rules. In view of the above, the protected tenancy rules established by the Housing Code did not apply to their case. In the absence of any contractual relationship with E., there was no legal basis for the applicants and the other L.K. residents to occupy the premises of the former resort, and E., a private owner, could not be obliged to accommodate them. In accordance with Articles 319 and 321 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 33 below), all L.K. residents, including the applicants, therefore had to be evicted.21. A number of defendants, supported by the applicants, appealed, challenging the judgment on various procedural grounds. They also essentially maintained that private company E. had unlawfully acquired the former State property, which was accommodating them as protected corporate tenants for the purposes of the Housing Code. The premises in question were their long-standing family homes; they had maintained them at their own expense; and the lawfulness of their occupancy had never before been disputed. In accordance with Article 125 of the Housing Code, they could therefore not be evicted unless rehoused.22. The prosecutor also challenged the eviction order on behalf of all the L.K. residents, including the applicants. Contrary to the defendants’ position, he considered that their occupancy had not been duly documented. However, he argued that that irregularity could not have been held against the defendants, as it had not been their fault. He further submitted that the defendants had occupied the disputed premises in good faith for long periods of time and had dutifully contributed to their maintenance. In the prosecutor’s opinion, the indiscriminate eviction of all the defendants, with a view to protecting the current owner’s property interests, without investigating each occupant’s individual circumstances, would be an extreme and disproportionate measure.23. On 8 September 2009 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed the eviction order. It found that some documents in the case file indicated that the building occupied by the defendants had been intended to serve as a corporate accommodation hall for L.K. employees, for the purposes of the Housing Code. E.’s eviction claim, which had been formulated on the basis of the general provisions of civil law protecting private property, without a detailed assessment of each occupant’s individual situation and without taking into account the provisions of the Housing Code, could therefore not be allowed.24. On 17 March 2010 the Supreme Court of Ukraine allowed an appeal lodged by E. on points of law and upheld the eviction order made by the District Court. It found that as the building in question had never been duly registered as belonging to the public housing stock intended for permanent occupancy, there had been no grounds to treat the defendants’ occupancy as a protected tenancy for the purposes of the Housing Code. Based on the Civil Code rules protecting private property from arbitrary intrusions, the defendants, including the applicants, therefore had to be evicted.25. On 31 March 2010 the decision of the Supreme Court was sent to the applicants by post.26. On various dates in May and June 2010 all the applicants were evicted.27. Subsequently E. demolished the building in which the applicants had lived.28. In September 2010 E. sold the former L.K. resort to P., another private company.Other relevant facts29. In June 2006 the third applicant bought an unfinished house in the village of Yasnogorodka. Following her eviction from the former L.K. resort, she moved into that house.30. On 30 November 2011 the first, second and fourth applicants were placed on the local municipal priority waiting list for social housing.31. On 23 April 2013 the first, second and fourth applicants were provided with occupancy vouchers for socially owned flats in the village of Yasnogorodka. According to the first and second applicants, those flats were located in a refurbished workshop; they lacked basic amenities and needed substantial repair work to make them habitable.RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORKHousing Code of Ukraine32. The relevant provisions of the Housing Code of Ukraine, as in force at the material time, read as follows:Article 125. Persons who cannot be evicted from corporate accommodation without the provision of alternative housing“The following shall be exempt from eviction [from corporate accommodation] unless they have been allocated alternative housing ......- persons laid off in connection with the liquidation of the enterprise, institution [or] organisation or [those] dismissed in connection with [the employer] reducing the number of employees; ...”Civil Code of Ukraine33. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code of Ukraine, as in force at the material time, read as follows:Article 319. Realisation of property rights“1. Owners shall possess, use and dispose of their property at their own discretion. ...”Article 321. Inviolability of property rights“1. Property rights are inviolable. Nobody may be wrongfully deprived of these rights or restricted in exercising them....”THE LAWJOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS34. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.locus standi of the second applicant in respect of the fourth applicant’s complaints35. Mr I.V. Biryuchkov – the fourth applicant – having died in 2014, his mother, Mrs V.I. Pavlinova – the second applicant – expressed her wish to pursue his application.36. The Government argued that the second applicant had no standing to pursue her late son’s application, as the contested rights were not transferable.37. The Court notes that in a number of cases where the applicants have died during the proceedings, it has taken account of the wish expressed by their heirs or close relatives to continue them (see, in particular, Ergezen v. Turkey, no. 73359/10, §§ 29-31, 8 April 2014, and, as a recent authority, López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 1874/13 and 8567/13, §§ 72‑73, 17 October 2019, with further references). However, in the present case, regard being had to the nature of the fourth applicant’s complaints, which are identical to those brought by the three other applicants, including his mother – the second applicant – on her own behalf, the Court considers that the second applicant has no sufficient interest in pursuing the same complaints on behalf of her son. In view of the above, the Court also considers that there exists no general interest which necessitates proceeding with the examination of the fourth applicant’s complaints, and finds that the conditions in which those complaints may be struck out of its list, as provided in Article 37 § 1 of the Convention, are satisfied (compare I.G. and Others v. Slovakia, no. 15966/04, §§ 92-93, 13 November 2012).38.

Outcome for Article 8: violation