FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF ANŽELIKA ŠIMAITIENĖ v. LITHUANIA
(Application no. 36093/13)
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Independent and impartial tribunal • Proceedings challenging the decree of the President of the Republic for a judge’s dismissal
Art 1 P1 • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Refusal to compensate a judge for unpaid salary for the period of suspension from judicial office • Lack of foreseeability

 
STRASBOURG
21 April 2020
 
FINAL
 
12/10/2020
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Anželika Šimaitienė v. Lithuania,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, President,
 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
 Faris Vehabović,
 Iulia Antoanella Motoc,
 Carlo Ranzoni,
 Marko Bošnjak,
 Péter Paczolay, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 26 March 2019 and 3 March 2020,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 36093/13) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Ms Anželika Šimaitienė (“the applicant”), on 27 May 2013. 2. The applicant was represented by Ms A. Pūkienė, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė-Širmenė. 3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that she had not had a right to an independent and impartial tribunal, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. She also complained that although the criminal proceedings against her had been discontinued, she had not been paid a salary for the period while she had been suspended from her judicial office, in breach of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 4. On 27 January 2017 notice of the complaints concerning the right to an independent and impartial tribunal, the right to the presumption of innocence and the right to the protection of property was given to the Government, and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. 5. Mr Egidijus Kūris, the judge elected in respect of Lithuania, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3 of the Rules of Court). Accordingly, on 5 March 2019 the President of the Section selected Mr Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque as an ad hoc judge from the list of three persons designated by the Republic of Lithuania as eligible to serve as such a judge (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1 (a) of the Rules of Court). THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
6. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in the village of Pašilaičiai, in the Vilnius region. 7. On 11 May 1995 the President of the Republic, President A.B., appointed the applicant as a judge of the Vilnius City Third District Court (hereinafter also referred to as “the District Court”). Criminal proceedings against the applicant
8. By a decree of 21 February 2006, and on the basis of Article 114 § 2 of the Constitution and Articles 47 § 3 and 89 § 1 of the Law on Courts (see paragraphs 57, 58 and 60 below), and on the basis of a proposal by the Prosecutor General, the President of the Republic, President V.A., suspended the applicant from her judicial duties and allowed a prosecution against her in connection with criminal charges of abuse of office (Article 228 § 1 of the Criminal Code) and forgery of documents (Article 300 § 2 of the Criminal Code) to proceed. It was suspected that the applicant had committed those crimes whilst performing her judicial duties in a civil case she had examined in June 2002 and which concerned the privatisation of an apartment. 9. By a judgment of 15 March 2010 the Kaunas Regional Court acquitted the applicant of both criminal charges. 10. On 1 July 2011 the Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court’s judgment as unlawful and unfounded on the grounds that that court had erred in examining and evaluating the facts. The Court of Appeal considered that, by her actions when dealing with the apartment privatisation case, the applicant “had discredited the title of judge and the authority of the judiciary, [and] adopted an unlawful and unfounded court decision”, and thus “[had] caused serious damage to the State”, and that such actions by her “corresponded to Article 228 § 1 and Article 300 § 2 of the Criminal Code”. Even so, the Court of Appeal discontinued the criminal proceedings because the prosecution had become time-barred. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence. 12. By a ruling of 8 May 2012, the Supreme Court, sitting in a plenary session of sixteen judges (plenarinė sesija), concurred with the appellate court’s finding that the applicant’s prosecution was time-barred due to the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court nevertheless stressed that certain phrases in the Court of Appeal’s ruling (see paragraph 10 above) had been in breach of the applicant’s right to the presumption of innocence, for they could be understood as establishing that the applicant was guilty of a crime. This had been an essential breach of criminal procedure. For that reason, the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal ruling in its entirety. 13. As to the question of the presumption of innocence, the Supreme Court also pointed out that when criminal proceedings were discontinued because of the statute of limitations, the question of a person’s guilt was not decided. The Criminal Code prohibited passing a judgment of conviction after the statute of limitations rendered a prosecution time-barred. Should the court, when discontinuing the criminal proceedings, also declare the person guilty of a certain crime, this would be in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, established in Article 31 of the Constitution. It was also paramount that the principle of the presumption of innocence be upheld by State institutions and officials. The fact that a person may not be declared guilty of a crime in the absence of a final court decision had also been underlined by the European Court of Human Rights. For the Supreme Court, it followed that when a judgment of acquittal was quashed whilst at the same time criminal proceedings were discontinued because of the statute of limitations, an appellate court’s decision could not be based on statements which essentially meant that a person was guilty of a crime. That being so, the Supreme Court nevertheless considered that discontinuing a criminal case because of the statute of limitations did not in itself mean that a person had been rehabilitated, and could not be equated to an acquittal. Disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, her removal from office, and civil proceedings for her reinstatement and unpaid salaryDisciplinary proceedings against the applicant

14. On 15 July 2010, whilst the criminal case against the applicant was still ongoing, the Prosecutor General wrote to the President of the Republic, President D.G., stating that it would be appropriate to consider whether the applicant had in fact discredited the title of judge through the negligent performance of her duties. 15. On 16 July 2010 the applicant asked the President of the Republic to reinstate her as a judge. 16. On 14 March 2011 the President of the Vilnius City Third District Court informed the Judicial Council (Teismų taryba), a body for self-government of judges, that he had received certain information from the Special Investigation Service regarding the applicant having mishandled civil cases in 2001. The Judicial Council then ordered the President of that court to investigate the matter. 17. On 29 March 2011 the President of the Vilnius City Third District Court appointed an internal investigation commission. The commission examined how the applicant had performed her duties when handling civil cases at that court between 1 January 2000 and 10 November 2003 (when she had gone on maternity leave). 18. The commission presented its conclusions on 26 April 2011, finding that the applicant had negligently performed her duties within the relevant period. The conclusions were then presented to the Judicial Council, which forwarded them to the President of the Republic. 19. By decree no. 1K-699 of 24 May 2011, the President of the Republic asked the Judicial Council for advice as to whether the applicant should be removed from office for having discredited the title of judge, in the light of the commission’s conclusions of 26 April 2011. 20. On 24 May 2011 the applicant challenged the internal investigation conclusions before the Judicial Council. In response to her plea that the conclusions had not been objective, the Vilnius City Third District Court explained to the Judicial Council why it was only at that time, that is in 2011, that it had examined how the applicant had been performing her job when handling civil cases at that court in 2003. The District Court noted that as of autumn 2003 the applicant had not been handling civil cases, and when she had returned from maternity leave on 21 January 2005 she had been handling only administrative cases, until she had been suspended by the decree of the President of the Republic of 21 February 2006 (see paragraph 8 above). Afterwards the Vilnius Regional Court found that the commission’s conclusions were valid and that the facts mentioned in those conclusions corresponded to reality. 21. The Judicial Council then held hearings on 6 June and 15 July 2011 at which the applicant was present. She denied any fault regarding performance of her duties. 22. On 15 July 2011 the Judicial Council unanimously recommended to the President of the Republic that the applicant be removed from office for having discredited the title of judge, on the basis of Article 90 § 1 (5) of the Law on Courts (see paragraph 59 below). The recommendation by the Judicial Council was based on the internal investigation conclusions (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). The Judicial Council also noted that it took into consideration “the legal evaluation of how the Court of Appeal [had] evaluated the applicant’s behaviour under Articles 228 and 300 of the Criminal Code in its ruling of 1 July 2011” (see paragraph 10 above). 23. On 18 July 2011 the President of the Republic passed decree no. 1K-764, removing the applicant from office for having discredited the title of judge, on the basis of Article 112 § 1 (4) and (5) and Article 115 § 1 (5) of the Constitution, and Article 90 §§ 1 (5) and (6) of the Law on Courts, having obtained the proposal of the Judicial Council (see paragraphs 57 and 59 below). 24. On the same day the office of the President of the Republic issued the following press release:
“President D.G. has signed a decree whereby, on the basis of the Constitution and the Law on Courts, and having taken into account the unanimous advice of the Judicial Council, [the applicant] has been removed from judicial office as a judge of the Vilnius City Third District Court for having discredited that office.
[The applicant] delayed cases concerning the recovery of debts. She was also negligent and acted hastily when hearing cases about the privatisation of apartments on terms beneficial to a private party, land restitution and other real-estate-related cases, [and] relied on non-existent documents and the false testimony of witnesses. The fact that [the applicant] forged documents and adopted an unlawful and ungrounded decision which permitted the privatisation of an apartment on terms beneficial to a private party was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal on 1 July; however, because of the statute of limitations, [that court] could not adopt a judgment of conviction. Aiming to prevent such situations in the future, on the initiative of the President of the Republic, amendments to the Criminal Code were passed, prolonging the time-limits for the statute of limitations so that persons who had committed crimes could not escape criminal liability. The President has removed eight judges for having discredited the title of judge.”
Civil proceedings for the applicant’s reinstatement and unpaid salary
25. The applicant asked her former employer, the District Court, to pay her her unpaid salary for the period from 21 February 2006 to 18 July 2011 (see, respectively, paragraphs 8 and 23 above), but that court refused her request. 26. The applicant then started civil proceedings, challenging her removal from office by the decree of the President of the Republic of 18 July 2011 and claiming her unpaid salary for the aforementioned period. She also challenged all the procedural decisions relating to the courts’ administration which had led to the President’s decree (see paragraph 22 above). The applicant pointed to the amended Article 47 § 3 of the Law on Courts (see paragraph 58 below) and also relied on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, observing that no accusatory judgment had been adopted in respect of her, and that therefore she should have been paid her salary for the entire period when she had been suspended from her duties. In that connection, it appears that on 18 October 2011 the Vilnius City Third District Court issued a document, signed by its President and chief accountant, indicating that the applicant’s “salary” between 21 February 2006 and 18 July 2011 was 322,874 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 94,370 euros (EUR)), and the “social insurance [tax]” was an additional LTL 100,674 (EUR 29,155). 27. The Court of Appeal decided that the Panevėžys Regional Court should hear the applicant’s case as the court of first instance, because her civil claim concerned matters which had already been examined by the Vilnius Regional Court and therefore an impartial tribunal was required. 28. By a decision of 7 June 2012, the Panevėžys Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s civil claim. The court found no flaws in the courts’ internal administration proceedings which had led to the adoption of the decree of the President of the Republic for the applicant’s dismissal. As to the applicant’s claim for her unpaid salary, the court noted that she had been suspended from office on 21 February 2006, but the judgment of conviction had not been adopted because the criminal proceedings had been terminated owing to the statute of limitations. Article 47 § 3 of the Law on Courts, as in force at the time of the applicant’s dismissal on 18 July 2011 (see paragraph 58 below), provided that a judge’s salary had to be repaid if criminal proceedings became impossible. In the Panevėžys Regional Court’s view, that rule meant that a judge should be compensated if his or her suspension was unreasonable. In this context, the court also referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling of 8 May 2012 wherein it had held that terminating criminal proceedings because of the statute of limitations did not mean that a person had been rehabilitated; such a judgment did not equate to an acquittal (see paragraph 13 in fine above). The Regional Court therefore considered that, in such a situation, the absence of a judgment of conviction did not mean that the applicant had been suspended from office without reason. Given that the applicant had not performed her judicial duties between 21 February 2006 and 18 July 2011, and that her suspension had not been declared unfounded, it would not be just and fair to award her unpaid salary for that period of time. The Regional Court also considered that “whilst she [had been] suspended from her judicial duties, the applicant [had] not [been] prevented from working in another job; she could also have received other income”. Lastly, the Panevėžys Regional Court also referred to the Article 47 § 3 of the Law on Courts, as in force at the time of the applicant’s suspension on 21 February 2006 (see paragraph 58 below), and considered that the applicant could have legitimately expected to be repaid her salary only in case of judgment of acquittal. 29. The applicant lodged an appeal, challenging various aspects of her dismissal by the President’s decree of 18 July 2011, and claiming her unpaid salary. The applicant also requested that questions regarding the procedure for her dismissal be referred to the Constitutional Court. She further asked the Court of Appeal to refer certain questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. Firstly, she submitted that this concerned the question of whether Article 48 of the European Charter of Fundamental rights, which enshrines the principle of the presumption of innocence, could be interpreted in such a way that discontinuing criminal proceedings because of the statute of limitations meant that a person was still considered guilty of a crime. Secondly, the applicant wished to know whether Article 17 of the European Charter on Fundamental Rights, which enshrines the right to property, could be interpreted in such a way that Article 47 § 3 of the Law on Courts could be the basis for refusing to pay a judge’s salary if a criminal case was discontinued because of the statute of limitations, but not if proceedings were terminated by an acquittal. 30. On 13 August 2012 the president of the civil cases division of the Court of Appeal appointed three judges of that court – Judges R.G., D.V. and A.B. – to hear the applicant’s appeal. After two of those judges had recused themselves from the composition – because one of them had previously worked at the Vilnius Regional Court, which was one of the defendants in those proceedings, and another knew the applicant personally – a new chamber was appointed by the President of the Court of Appeal, consisting of Judge D.V. (the reporting judge), Judge R.N. and Judge A.J. The case file was then given to Judge D.V. 31. On 12 November 2012 the applicant attempted to challenge the composition of the Court of Appeal on the basis that it was not impartial. She submitted that she had lodged certain procedural requests with that court, for example as regards holding an oral hearing and suspending the civil court proceedings and referring certain questions to the Constitutional Court, but those requests had not been put in the case file. 32. On 13 November 2012 the President of the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint. On the basis of the case-file material, he noted that her requests regarding the oral hearing and the referral to the Constitutional Court had been put in the file, but had not been sewn into it, because when those requests had been submitted, the case file had already been given to Judge D.V., the reporting judge, and it was a court clerk’s job to sew the documents into a case file when he or she received them and the case file. In this case, the court assistant had not received the file until the day of the court hearing. The President of the Court of Appeal also noted that in the event that parties’ requests for an oral hearing and for a referral to the Constitutional Court were denied, those requests could be dealt with when the decision on the merits of a case was adopted. 33. By a ruling of 28 November 2012, the Court of Appeal, in a chamber composed of three judges (Judges D.V., R.N. and A.J. – see paragraph 30 above), examined the Panevėžys Regional Court’s decision (see paragraph 28 above) and held that that court had properly examined the legal and factual circumstances of the case. It therefore left the first-instance court’s decision unchanged. The Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s request for a hearing. In the court’s view, the case concerned questions of law as opposed to questions of fact, and could therefore be decided in written proceedings. It also rejected her request that certain questions be referred to the Constitutional Court, considering that those questions had been answered by the Court of Appeal when it had examined the merits of her appeal (see the paragraph below). 34. With regard to the merits of the case, the Court of Appeal found that there had been no procedural errors by the courts’ administration when adopting procedural acts that had led to the decree of the President of the Republic of 18 July 2011 dismissing the applicant. Nor was there any reason to refer a question regarding those decisions to the Constitutional Court, because its position as to the procedures and the President’s powers to dismiss judges was settled and clear. The Court of Appeal also rejected the applicant’s request for the questions regarding the presumption of innocence and the right to property to be referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling (see paragraph 29 above), holding that such a referral was not necessary. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the applicant had been dismissed not because of criminal liability, but for other reasons – a retrospective internal investigation into how she had performed her duties from 1 January 2000 until 10 November 2003. On the one hand, the Court of Appeal also considered that the fact that a criminal case against the applicant had been discontinued because of the statute of limitations did not in itself mean that a judgment of acquittal had been adopted, where it had been held that there had been no reason to bring criminal proceedings against the applicant. On the other hand, discontinuing the criminal proceedings on the above-mentioned basis could not be seen as an accusatory judgment either. 35. The Court of Appeal did not explicitly elaborate on the Panevėžys Regional Court’s conclusion that the applicant could have worked in another job whilst she had been suspended from office (see paragraph 28 in fine above), even though it noted that Article 113 § 1 of the Constitution prohibited judges from taking up other jobs (see paragraph 57 below). The Court of Appeal nevertheless noted that before the criminal proceedings had been terminated by the Court of Appeal on 1 July 2011, disciplinary proceedings had been opened in respect of the applicant. During those disciplinary proceedings, it had been established that the applicant had performed her judicial duties negligently long before her suspension in 2006. Therefore, there was no reason to compensate the applicant for the salary which she had not received during her suspension and until her removal from office by the President’s decree no. 1K-764 of 18 July 2011 (see paragraph 23 above). Without specifying which version of the provision it relied on, the Court of Appeal also considered that Article 47 § 3 of the Law on Courts established the presumption of innocence in respect of judges, and such a presumption in respect of the applicant had been upheld when the criminal case had been discontinued because of the statute of limitations. However, discontinuing the criminal proceedings because of the statute of limitations had not, as such, restored the applicant’s irreproachable reputation, which was a compulsory requirement for a judge. The President of the Republic had therefore been correct in passing decree no. 1K-764 for the applicant’s removal. Moreover, since the applicant’s powers as a judge could not be restored due to her loss of reputation, there were also no grounds to award her compensation for loss of salary. 36. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing, among other things, that when handling her case the Court of Appeal had not been impartial and independent, which was also proven by the fact that only a month after passing a decision in her case judge D.V. had been proposed to the Supreme Court. The other judge from that composition, R.N., at that time also was being proposed for such a promotion. The applicant also challenged how the Court of Appeal resolved the questions of her dismissal by the President’s decree of 18 July 2011 and her unpaid salary. The applicant considered that those were questions of law that merited the Supreme Court’s examination. By a final ruling of 4 March 2013 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s appeal on points of law. Promotion of two Court of Appeal judges to the Supreme CourtPromotion of Judge D.V. 37. On 4 December 2012 the Seimas passed a resolution approving the voluntary resignation of Judge E.B., a judge at the Supreme Court. Subsequently, there was a vacancy at the Supreme Court. 38. On 13 December 2011, on the basis of Article 73 § 2 of the Law on Courts (see paragraph 58 below), the President of the Supreme Court G.K. put forward the Court of Appeal judge, Judge D.V., as a candidate for appointment to the Supreme Court, by making a proposal in this regard to the President of the Republic. The President of the Supreme Court acknowledged the candidate’s experience in the academic field, her numerous publications in the field of law, her former experience as a lawyer (advocate), her excellent results while working at the Court of Appeal, and her irreproachable reputation. He also underlined the need to ensure a balance between practitioners and academics, and emphasised that the big priority at that particular point in time was having more scholars on the Supreme Court bench. 39. On 13 December 2012 the President of the Republic passed another decree asking the Judicial Council for advice on whether Judge D.V. could be appointed to the Supreme Court. 40. According to the Government, having evaluated the personal and professional characteristics of Judge D.V. and her academic and pedagogical activities, as well as the absence of any complaints about her work as a judge, on 14 December 2012 the Judicial Council unanimously approved her nomination as a candidate, advising the President of the Republic to nominate her to the Supreme Court. 41. On 18 December 2012 the President of the Republic passed another decree, asking the Seimas to appoint Judge D.V. to the Supreme Court. The Seimas appointed Judge D.V. to the Supreme Court on 17 January 2013. Promotion of Judge R.N. 42. On 15 January 2013 the Seimas passed a resolution to remove Judge P.Ž. from the Supreme Court on the grounds that he had reached pensionable age. Subsequently, there was a vacancy at the Supreme Court. 43. On 6 February 2013, on the basis of Article 73 § 2 of the Law on Courts (see paragraph 58 below), the President of the Supreme Court G.K. put forward the Court of Appeal judge, Judge R.N., as a candidate for appointment to the Supreme Court, and made a proposal to the President of the Republic in this regard. The President of the Supreme Court acknowledged the candidate’s successful experience in the academic field – he was a doctor of law and a professor and had numerous publications in the field of law. The President of the Supreme Court also underlined Judge R.N.’s exceptional professional and personal characteristics and long professional career within the court system as of 1999, when he had started as a consultant and adviser in various administrative and civil courts. Besides that, the President of the Supreme Court noted Judge R.N.’s active participation in teaching judges and taking part in the legislative process, in addition to his international experience, irreproachable reputation and great results while working as a judge at the Court of Appeal. The President of the Supreme Court highlighted that employing more judges at the Supreme Court who had academic achievements in the science of law was a priority. 44. By a decree of 26 February 2012, the President of the Republic asked the Judicial Council for advice on whether Judge R.N. could be appointed to the Supreme Court. 45. According to the Government, having evaluated the personal and professional characteristics of Judge R.N. and his academic and pedagogical activities, as well as the absence of complaints about his work as a judge, on 1 March 2013 the Judicial Council unanimously approved his nomination as a candidate, advising the President of the Republic to nominate him to the Supreme Court. 46. By a decree of 6 March 2013, the President of the Republic then asked the Seimas to appoint Judge R.N. to the Supreme Court. The Seimas appointed Judge R.N. to the Supreme Court on 28 March 2013. 47. In October 2014 the Seimas removed Judge G.K. from his office as President of the Supreme Court after his term of appointment had expired. The place thus became vacant. 48. According to the Government – who in turn quoted information received from the Chancellery of the President of the Republic – having considered several nominations for the vacant post and having received Judge R.N.’s consent, by a decree of 12 December 2014, the President of the Republic asked the Judicial Council for advice on his appointment. According to the Government, such a decision by the President was determined by Judge R.N.’s extensive experience of working in the court system, perfect administration and management skills, knowledge of the work of general and specialist courts, and work at courts of different levels of jurisdiction. His international experience and knowledge of languages were also positively noted, given the representative role of the President of the Supreme Court. 49. Having received the Judicial Council’s approval of Judge R.N.’s nomination, on 15 December 2014 the President of the Republic proposed his nomination to the Seimas, which approved it on 18 December 2014. Civil proceedings for damages
50. In 2014 the applicant started civil proceedings in respect of the damage which she claimed to have suffered because of the loss of her salary during the period of her suspension from judicial office. She stated, among other things, that whilst she had been suspended her salary had not been paid, nor had her social security contributions or contributions to the old-age pension scheme. As a result, she could not use public healthcare services. 51. By a decision of 9 June 2015, the Vilnius Regional Court rejected the applicant’s civil claim. The court noted that under Article 47 of the Law on Courts (see paragraph 58 below), the President of the Republic had the right to suspend a judge from office. In the circumstances of the applicant’s case, her powers had been suspended when the question of her criminal liability had arisen. The court also noted that the plenary session of the Supreme Court had reached the final decision in the criminal proceedings on 8 May 2012, when the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been terminated because of the statute of limitations (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above). The Vilnius Regional Court held that, under Article 47 § 3 of the law on Courts “as valid at relevant time”, the decision in a criminal case determined the consequences of a suspension of judicial powers: “if a judge was declared innocent, his or her powers were restored and he or she was paid the salary for the suspension period”. Accordingly, in the Vilnius Regional Court’s view, the law clearly and unambiguously established when a judge might be compensated for the period when his or her powers had been suspended. The court also underlined that the matter of how long a judge’s powers might be suspended was not regulated by law, therefore that depended directly on how a criminal case had been handled and when the decision in a criminal case could be reached. For the Vilnius Regional Court, “even if suspending [the] judge’s powers for more than five years had not been justified”, those were not grounds to declare unlawful the decision of the President of the Republic to suspend the applicant’s powers and allow criminal proceedings to be brought against her. It followed that there was no causal link between the adoption of the President’s decree of 21 February 2006 (see paragraph 8 above) and the consequences which the applicant had had to bear. The applicant had been dismissed from her office before the criminal proceedings had been terminated, and as a result of disciplinary liability. 52. The Vilnius Regional Court also considered that the applicant had had a choice – to wait for the outcome of the criminal case and “legitimately expect” that her salary for the period of suspension would be paid if a judgment of acquittal was adopted in her case, or to get another job and thus receive an income. 53. The applicant appealed, arguing that the first-instance court had erred in reaching the conclusion that the fact that the President of the Republic had been competent to pass the decree of 21 February 2006 meant that she had not proved that there had been unlawful actions by the State which would be grounds for civil liability. She pointed out that the State’s unlawful actions had manifested themselves not in the above-mentioned decree as such, but in the fact that once the decree had been adopted and her judicial powers had been suspended, she had had no opportunity to appeal against that decree. As a result, she could not actively defend her civil and work-related rights and had been destined to sustain serious financial damage, also as a result of the lack of time-limits concerning how long a judge’s powers could be suspended during criminal proceedings, which in her case had been for a protracted period. 54. The applicant also pleaded that by failing to pay her salary for the period from 21 February 2006 to 18 July 2011, the State had breached the principles of the presumption of innocence and the protection of property. She found the first-instance court’s finding that she could have worked during the time of her suspension (see paragraph 52 above) devoid of substance and not supported by evidence. In fact, between 21 February 2006 and 18 July 2011 she had not been dismissed from her post, which meant that during all that time her status had been that of a judge who could not take up another job, except a teaching post. Lastly, the applicant pointed out that in those civil proceedings for damages she had not been challenging the President’s decree of 18 July 2011 regarding her dismissal, because that issue had already been examined during the first set of civil proceedings (see paragraphs 25-36 above). She underlined that her dismissal had not been linked to the outcome of the criminal case. This was plain from the fact that her criminal prosecution had lasted from 21 February 2006 to 8 May 2012, whereas she had been dismissed from office on 18 July 2011. In other words, the dismissal, which had taken place in 2011, could not be based on the criminal court’s judgment, which had been adopted a year later, in 2012. 55. By a judgment of 20 April 2016, the Court of Appeal left the lower court’s decision unchanged. The Court of Appeal relied on the first-instance and appellate courts’ reasoning in the applicant’s first civil case (see paragraphs 25-35 above), which, in its view, was based on Article 47 § 3 of the Law on Courts, as in force on the day of the applicant’s dismissal (18 July 2011). That provision provided that a judge should be compensated for his or her loss of salary when criminal proceedings became impossible (see paragraph 58 below). Those courts held that the aim of that provision was to compensate a judge for a period when his or her duties had been unreasonably restricted. As noted by the courts in the first set of civil proceedings, and as stated by the Supreme Court during the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 13 in fine), discontinuing criminal proceedings because of the statute of limitations was not tantamount to a person’s rehabilitation, and also could not be equated to a person’s acquittal. The Court of Appeal thus reasoned that the absence of a judgment of conviction due to the statute of limitations did not permit a conclusion that a judge’s duties had been suspended unlawfully. The court considered that the loss (the unpaid salary) had been caused by the applicant herself, namely by the fact that she had been negligent in performing her judicial duties. Lastly, and as regards the applicant’s argument that she could not have worked in another job while her judicial powers had been suspended, the Court of Appeal reiterated the findings of the first instance court (see paragraph 52 above) that the applicant had had a choice: to wait for the outcome of the criminal case and, under the version of the Law on Courts in force at that time, legitimately expect to be paid her unpaid salary if a judgment of acquittal was adopted, or to work in another job and receive an income. Accordingly, the applicant had been incorrect in stating that such reasoning by the court of first instance had been devoid of substance and not based on any evidence. 56. According to the Government, by a ruling of 26 July 2016, the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s appeal on points of law. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
57. The Constitution, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
Article 30
“A person whose constitutional rights or freedoms are violated shall have the right to apply to a court. Compensation for material and moral damage inflicted upon a person shall be established by law.”
Article 31
“A person shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty in accordance with the procedure established by law and declared guilty by an effective court judgment. A person charged with committing a crime shall have the right to a public and fair hearing of his case by an independent and impartial court...”
Article 112
“... The justices of the Supreme Court, and its President chosen from among them, shall be appointed and released by the Seimas upon submission by the President of the Republic. Judges of the Court of Appeal, and its President chosen from among them, shall be appointed by the President of the Republic with the assent of the Seimas. The judges and presidents of district, regional, and specialised courts shall be appointed, and their places of work shall be changed, by the President of the Republic. A special institution of judges, as provided for by law, shall advise the President of the Republic on the appointment, promotion, and transfer of judges, or their release from their duties ...”
Article 113
“Judges may not hold any other office to which he or she has been elected or appointed, or work in any business, commercial, or other private establishments or enterprises. Nor may they receive any remuneration other than the remuneration established for judges and payment for educational or creative activities ...”
Article 114
“Interference with the activities of a judge or court by any institutions of State power and governance, members of the Seimas or other officials, political parties, political or public organisations or citizens shall be prohibited and lead to liability provided for by law. Judges may not be held criminally liable or be detained, or have their liberty otherwise restricted without the consent of the Seimas, or, in the period between sessions of the Seimas, without the consent of the President of the Republic of Lithuania.”
Article 115
“Judges of the courts of the Republic of Lithuania shall be removed from office according to the procedure established by law in the following cases:
1)  of their own will;
2)  on the expiry of their term of office, or upon reaching the pensionable age established by law;
3)  owing to their state of health;
4)  on election to another office, or upon transfer, with their consent, to another place of work;
5)  when their conduct discredits the title of a judge;
6)  on the entry into effect of court judgments convicting them.”
58. The Law on Courts (Teismų įstatymas), in so far as relevant, reads:
Article 36. Composition of a court (wording on 28 November 2012)
“9. In all instances, cases shall be allocated to judges and judicial panels so as to ensure the right of the parties to the proceedings and participants in the hearing to an independent and impartial court. 10. The cases shall be allocated to judges and the judicial panel shall be constituted via the computer programme created pursuant to the rules on the allocation of cases to judges and the formation of judicial panels of judges approved by the Judicial Council.”
Article 47. Immunity of a judge (wording at the time when the applicant’s duties were suspended on 21 February 2006)
“3. If a judge is suspected of or charged with a crime, he or she may be suspended from judicial duties by the Seimas or – in the period between the Seimas’ sessions – by the President of the Republic. A judge is suspended from his or her duties until the court decision in a criminal case comes into force. If a judge is declared innocent, his or her duties are restored and he or she is repaid the salary for the period when he or she was suspended from office [jei teisėjas pripažįstamas nekaltu, jo įgaliojimai atnaujinami ir jam sumokamas atlyginimas už įgaliojimų sustabdymo laiką].”
Article 47. Immunity of a judge (wording after 1 September 2008, currently valid and currently Article 47 § 4 of the Law on Courts)
“3. ... If a judge is suspected of or charged with a crime, he or she may be suspended from his or her judicial duties by the Seimas or – in the period between the Seimas’ sessions – by the President of the Republic. A judge is suspended from his or her duties until the final decision in a pre-trial investigation is adopted or until the judgment in a criminal case comes into force. If, during the pre-trial investigation, circumstances are established which prove that criminal proceedings are impossible or that not enough evidence has been collected to prove the judge’s guilt in respect of the crime, or if the judge is not found guilty by a court judgment in a criminal case, the powers of the judge shall be restored and he or she shall be repaid the salary for the period when he or she was suspended from office.”
Article 48. A judge’s work and activity outside the court
“1. A judge may not take up other duties to which he or she may have been elected or appointed, or work in business or other private enterprises or companies, except for pedagogical or creative activities [išskyrus pedagoginę ar kūrybinę veiklą] ...”
Article 73. Appointment of a judge to the Supreme Court
“1. A judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Seimas upon being nominated by the President of the Republic. 2. Candidates for judicial office at the Supreme Court shall be elected and nominated by the President of the Supreme Court. This nomination shall not be binding on the President of the Republic.”
Article 79. Appointment of the President of the Supreme Court and the President of a Division of the Supreme Court
“1. The President of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Seimas upon being nominated by the President of the Republic out of the judges of the Supreme Court.
... 4. Candidates for the office of President of the Supreme Court ... shall be considered by the Judicial Council ...”
59. The Law on Courts (Teismų įstatymas) also reads that a judge may be removed from office if the title of judge has been discredited through his or her conduct (Article 90 § 1 (5)). A judge may also be removed from office if a court judgment convicting him or her comes into force (Article 90 § 1 (6)). In such cases, the Judicial Council, a body assuring the independence and self-governance of judges, advises the President of the Republic. The hearings of the Judicial Council are public, and a judge whose removal from office is to be considered at such a hearing has a right to take part in that hearing and to be heard. Should the Judicial Council recommend that the President of the Republic remove a judge from office, and should the President of the Republic pass such a decree, the removal may be appealed against to civil courts at three levels of jurisdiction. Historically, the Judicial Council has recommended that the President of the Republic remove judges from office for discrediting the title of judge through behaviour such as being drunk at work, drink-driving, swearing in a public place, negligently performing work duties, exerting undue influence on other judges in order to affect the outcome of court proceedings, and accepting objects of material value. 60. The Law on Courts further reads that criminal proceedings against a judge may be started and his or her liberty restricted only with the agreement of the Seimas, or with the agreement of the President of the Republic when the Seimas is not in session (Article 89 § 1). Criminal proceedings against a judge can only be initiated by the Prosecutor General (Article 89 § 2). 61. As regards the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court in the event of there being a vacancy, the Statute of the Seimas at the relevant time read that the candidate had to be approved by the Seimas within one month of the vacancy coming up or within one month of the Seimas’ session beginning (Article 204). The Seimas had competence to appoint the Supreme Court’s judges and its President (Article 199). 62. At the relevant time, the Code of Criminal Procedure read:
Article 3. Circumstances when criminal proceedings are not possible
“1. Criminal proceedings may not be started, and ongoing criminal proceedings must be terminated:
1) if no criminal act has been committed;
2) if criminal responsibility is barred due to the statute of limitations;
... 2. If the circumstance mentioned in point 1 (1) of this Article becomes known during the examination of the case in court, the court shall terminate criminal proceedings and adopt a judgment of acquittal.”
63. In the ruling of 16 January 2006, the Constitutional Court held:
 “13. When regulating the relations of criminal procedure, one must also pay heed to the imperative of the presumption of innocence entrenched in the Constitution. One must follow this constitutional imperative not only in the course of consideration of a criminal case in court, but also during the pre-trial investigation. ... [T]he Constitutional Court [has already] emphasised that it was especially important that State institutions and officials follow the principle of the presumption of innocence, [and] that public figures should in general restrain themselves from referring to a person as a criminal until the person’s guilt in respect of the crime had been proved in accordance with the procedure established by law and [the person had been] recognised as guilty by a court judgment which had entered into force, otherwise human honour and dignity could be violated and human rights and freedoms could be undermined.”
64. In a ruling of 9 May 2006, on the constitutional system of the judiciary and its self-governance, on the appointment, promotion and transfer of judges and their dismissal from office, and on the prolongation of the powers of judges, the Constitutional Court held:
“It has been mentioned that the special institution of judges provided for by law specified in paragraph 5 of Article 112 of the Constitution also participates (thus also has certain constitutional powers) when forming the judiciary. In the area of the formation of the judiciary, this special institution of judges (which ... is an important element of the judiciary’s self-governance [and] an independent State power), is a balance to the President of the Republic, who is part of the executive ... The ... status, autonomy, [and] independence of the judiciary, and the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, does not allow the constitutional purpose and functions of that special institution of judges to be construed in such a way that [the institution’s] role as a balance to the President of the Republic in the area of the formation of the judiciary would be denied or ignored. On the other hand, as already said, the checks and balances which the judiciary (and institutions thereof) and other State powers (and institutions thereof) have with respect to each other may not be treated as opposing mechanisms of corresponding powers. Accordingly, it would be unfair to construe the constitutional purpose of that special institution of judges as only a balance to the President of the Republic in the area of the formation of the judiciary, because partnership and cooperation between the President of the Republic and this special institution of judges is also necessary while forming it (in particular, paying heed to the interests of society – based on and defended by the Constitution – that the judiciary be formed fairly and transparently [and] that [candidates] for judicial office be chosen only on the basis of their professional qualifications and personal features, and [on the basis of] other circumstances which determine their suitability or unsuitability for this activity (judicial office in a particular court)).
... 14. In this context, it should be noted that, as the Constitutional Court held ..., the advice of the special institution of judges established in paragraph 5 of Article 112 of the Constitution gives rise to legal effects: if there is no advice from this institution, the President of the Republic may not adopt decisions on the appointment, promotion, or transfer of judges, or [decisions] on their being released from office.
... 21. It should also be emphasised that even though the dominant principle of forming the judiciary of courts of higher level is the principle of the professional careers of judges (when judges are promoted after they are released from their previous office and are appointed as judges of higher courts), under the Constitution, it is not permitted to establish any such legal regulation whereby only judges are able to become judges of higher courts. Establishing such a legal regulation and treating the principle of the professional careers of judges clearly would make the court system become too closed, subject to a routine, and so on.”
65. In a ruling of 27 November 2006, on the right of judges to apply to court, the Constitutional Court held:
“8.4. Under Article 115 of the Constitution, judges of courts shall be released from office in accordance with the procedure established by law, inter alia, when their conduct discredits the title of judge (Item 5)... The Constitution does not establish expressis verbis any type of conduct by judges which discredits the title of judges; the formula ‘conduct discrediting the title of judges’ is wide, and includes not only conduct which discredited the title of a judge while implementing his powers as a judge, but also conduct which discredited the title of a judge which has no relation to the implementation of the powers of the judge; under the Constitution, the legislature, as well as the self-governing institutions of the judiciary, have the discretion to establish what conduct should be regarded as that which discredits the title of a judge, however, neither laws nor the decisions of self-governing institutions of the judiciary may establish any final list of actions by which a judge discredits the title of a judge. ... [I]t was also held that when deciding whether the conduct of a judge is such that the title of a judge has been discredited, all the circumstances related to the said conduct and its significance to the case must be assessed each time.
...
14. ... It has been mentioned that, under the Constitution, a judge, as any other person who thinks that he has been released from office unlawfully and without grounds, has the right to apply to court regarding the defence of his violated right. This right of his is absolute, and it is not permitted to restrict or deny it. It has also been mentioned that, under the Constitution, the legislature has a discretion, in accordance with the constitutional principle of a State under the rule of law, to establish to which court – inter alia, a court of general jurisdiction – and under what procedure a person who thinks that he has been released from office unlawfully and without grounds may apply regarding the defence of his violated rights. It has also been held in this ruling of the Constitutional Court that the Constitution provides for significant powers for the President of the Republic, as the Head of State, as regards the formation of courts. The President of the Republic participates, in one way or another, when appointing or releasing judges of courts of all levels. The special institution of judges provided for by law [and] specified in paragraph 5 of Article 112 of the Constitution, which advises the President of the Republic, inter alia, on the release of judges from office, is a counterbalance to these constitutional powers of the President of the Republic.”
As to the powers of the President of the Republic when forming the judiciary, and the alleged inability of the courts to impartially and independently decide any case against the President of the Republic, the Constitutional Court highlighted the following:
“It needs to be emphasised that the mere fact that the President of the Republic decides questions related to the careers of judges or participates in those decisions ... is not grounds to doubt the independence [of judges] ... when they consider cases for the release of judges from office ... If one agreed with the reasoning ... – that the fact that the President of the Republic appoints and releases judges ... and decides questions concerning their professional careers is grounds to doubt the independence and impartiality of the court [which hears such a case] – if a party in a case considered by that court was the President of the Republic, it would have to be held that no court existed in Lithuania which was independent and could investigate in an utterly impartial manner a case in which the President of the Republic was a party. It is obvious that such a statement ... would be absolutely groundless, constitutionally speaking.”
66. The Constitutional Court has also underlined the fact that the Law on Courts provides for two separate grounds for removing a judge from office: where a court judgment which had entered into force had established that a judge had committed a crime (Article 90 § 1 (6)), and where a judge had discredited the title of judge (Article 90 § 1 (5)), and also underlined that such regulation was not in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence (see Linkevičienė and Others ((dec.), nos. 33556/07, 34734/07, 34740/07, §§ 52 and 53). 67. As to the principle of presumption of innocence, in a recent ruling of 27 June 2016, on discontinuing criminal proceedings after the expiry of a statutory limitation period for criminal liability, the Constitutional Court held:
“8.2. [T]he [existing] legal regulation ... creates conditions for a court to dismiss a case without assessing the charges brought against the accused, and without ascertaining whether the accused has been reasonably charged with having committed a crime or whether the acquitted person has been reasonably acquitted of a crime with which he or she was charged. Consequently, this legal regulation precludes a court from acting in such a way that the truth in a criminal case could be established and the question of the guilt of the person accused of a crime could be fairly resolved. This legal regulation disregards a person’s right to due court process, which stems from paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a State under the rule of law. It should also be noted that, under the [existing] legal regulation ..., if a court fails to assess whether the charges brought against the accused person are reasonable and the case is dismissed for the reason that the statutory limitation period for criminal liability has expired, the impression created is that the expiry of the prescribed limitation period prevented the conviction of the accused. Such a legal regulation creates conditions for continued doubts as to whether the accused has been reasonably charged with a criminal act, as well as continued doubts as to the accused’s good repute.
...
10. [I]t is worth noting that justice is not administered during a pre-trial investigation; ... a pre-trial investigation involves collecting and assessing information that is necessary for deciding whether charges on behalf of the State must be brought against a person and whether a criminal case must be referred to a court. Consequently, the termination of a pre-trial investigation upon the expiry of the statutory limitation period for criminal liability means that, within the prescribed period, no necessary data has been collected to bring charges against a certain person, and there are no grounds to believe that the accused has committed a crime. It should also be noted that ... paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 31 of the Constitution, inter alia, and the constitutional principle of a State under the rule of law, imply the duty of the legislature, when regulating criminal procedure regarding cases where the time-limits during which criminal liability may be applied to persons who have committed criminal acts have expired, to lay down such legal regulation as would create conditions for ensuring that a charge is dropped in a case where such a charge is not confirmed. Consequently, in cases where, after the expiry of statutory limitation periods, it is ascertained that the charges brought against the accused for having committed a crime are unfounded, a court must deliver an acquittal judgment.”
INTERNATIONAL AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE MATERIALS ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE IRREMOVABILITY OF JUDGES
68. See Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, §§ 72-86, 23 June 2016, and, more recently, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, §§ 33-36, 25 September 2018. 69. Specifically, the European Charter on the Statute for Judges of 8-10 July 1998 read as follows:
4. CAREER DEVELOPMENT
“4.2. Judges freely carry out activities outside their judicial mandate including those which are the embodiment of their rights as citizens. This freedom may not be limited except in so far as such outside activities are incompatible with confidence in, or the impartiality or the independence of a judge, or his or her required availability to deal attentively and within a reasonable period with the matters put before him or her. The exercise of an outside activity, other than literary or artistic, giving rise to remuneration, must be the object of a prior authorization on conditions laid down by the statute.”
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
70. The applicant claimed that at the stage of the Court of Appeal her civil case challenging the decree of the President of the Republic for her dismissal had not been examined fairly by an independent and impartial tribunal. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... , everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
AdmissibilityThe parties’ arguments

(a)   The applicant
71. The applicant submitted that she had not had a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal when her civil claim for unlawful dismissal and unpaid salary had been examined by the Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 33-35 above). The applicant argued in particular that two of the three judges had been partial, and in return for giving a court decision favouring the President of the Republic, had soon afterwards been promoted to the Supreme Court. 72. In support of her argument, the applicant wanted the Court to take note of the fact that, after Judge R.N.’s and Judge D.V.’s appointment, it had taken other judges with much more judicial experience much longer to be appointed to the Supreme Court. For instance, Judge A.B., who had withdrawn from the applicant’s civil case, had become a judge at the Supreme Court only in January 2015, even though she had been working at the Court of Appeal for eighteen years. Another judge, Judge A.M., had become a judge at the Supreme Court after working in the district and regional courts for twelve years. Similarly, Judge D.Š. had worked in the district and regional courts for six years and at the Court of Appeal for more than five years before being appointed to the Supreme Court. In contrast, Judge D.V. – the reporting judge who had sat on the Court of Appeal bench only as of February 2012 and had heard the applicant’s civil claim on 28 November 2012 – had been put forward for a promotion to the Supreme Court on 13 December 2012, within less than a month of that hearing. For the applicant, suggesting that a person who had not worked at the Court of Appeal for even one full year – and who had never worked in a lower court – should be put forward as a candidate had to be regarded as gratitude for the decision in her case that had been favourable to the President of the Republic. The fact that another judge of the Court of Appeal chamber which had heard the applicant’s case, Judge R.N., had also been proposed as a candidate for the Supreme Court by the President of the Republic, despite not having worked one full year as a judge, only reinforced the applicant’s suspicions. (b)   The Government
73. The Government stated at the outset that the sole fact that the President of the Republic was involved in the appointment of judges and decided issues concerning their careers could not be construed as meaning that no court could independently and impartially hear a case against the President of the Republic (the Government relied on the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 27 November 2006, see paragraph 65 above). Moreover, the procedure for judges’ appointment and removal from office was well counterbalanced, especially in the light of the Judicial Council’s special role as a self-governing body for judges. In the circumstances of this case, one also had to bear in mind that three Presidents of the Republic had been involved during the applicant’s career and her removal from office. 74. Regarding the specific circumstances of the applicant’s civil case for reinstatement, the Government firstly submitted that, under the domestic law, cases were allocated to judicial chambers randomly, in order to ensure impartiality and transparency (they relied on Article 36 of the Law on Courts, see paragraph 58 above). Initially, the applicant’s civil case had been assigned to a chamber of a different composition. It was only after two judges had withdrawn from the case that Judges R.N. and D.V. had been appointed (see paragraph 30 above). Even so, despite the applicant’s contentions, the President of the Court of Appeal had dismissed any arguments as to their partiality (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above). 75. Turning to the question of Judge R.N.’s and Judge D.V.’s promotion to the Supreme Court, the Government pointed out that any such promotion was firstly contingent on there being a judicial vacancy, and in this case the vacancies had opened up after the Court of Appeal ruling of 28 November 2012. Accordingly, when giving that ruling, Judges R.N. and D.V. could not have predicted that there would be the possibility of a promotion. Similarly, the need to ensure the normal functioning of the Supreme Court had demanded that replacements for the two judges who had left that court be found without undue delay (see paragraph 61 above). It was also pertinent that the nominations had come from the President of the Supreme Court. In this connection, the Government also submitted that although the President of the Republic was not bound by those nominations, the current President of the Republic, President D.G., had always relied on the Supreme Court President’s recommendation, and there had been no cases when the President of the Republic had submitted a nomination for a different candidate to the Seimas. The objectivity and transparency of the appointment procedure was also guaranteed by the involvement of the Judicial Council, from which Judges R.N. and D.V. had both received unanimous approval. 76. The Government also pointed out that Judge G.K., who had been the President of the Supreme Court at the relevant time, when forming the composition of that court, had paid particular attention to the enhancement of that court’s professionalism by including academics in the judiciary. The positive impact of professional scholars was undeniably beneficial, in order to ensure and develop the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in accordance with the domestic, European Union and international legal regulation, as well as the relevant case-law of the Court, and at the same time in order to seek to ensure and maintain the highest professional qualifications. The Government thus submitted that before Judge G.K.’s presidency, only 20% of the Supreme Court’s judges had had a doctor of sciences degree. For that reason, special account had been taken of the opportunity to strengthen the Supreme Court’s capacity by including legal scholars. According to the Government, currently, one third of the judges on the Supreme Court bench have a doctoral degree in law. They submitted that it therefore followed that there were objective reasons – their experience and high qualifications in both academic and professional fields, including at the Court of Appeal and in examining the most complex cases – for choosing Judges R.N. and D.V. to be promoted to the Supreme Court. 77. In the light of the foregoing, the Government concluded that the applicant had had an opportunity to exercise her right to a hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.

Outcome for Article P1-1: violation