FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF FARMANYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA
(Applications nos. 15998/11 and 8 others –
see appended list)
 
JUDGMENT
Art 2 (substantive) • Life • Deaths of the applicants’ relatives as a result of injuries sustained during the mass protests after the 2008 presidential elections • Use of lethal force attributable to the respondent State resulting in the deaths of seven of the nine victims not “absolutely necessary” • Deaths resulted from a badly planned and executed operation involving the improper use of crowd-control weapons and the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of lethal force • Court unable to establish that one of the victims was killed as a result of the use of that force • Lack of sufficient evidence for finding a violation in relation to the remaining victim
Art 2 (procedural) • Failure to carry out an effective investigation into all the deaths
Art 38 • Non-compliance with State obligation to furnish all necessary facilities
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
18 September 2025
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Farmanyan and Others v. Armenia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Kateřina Šimáčková, President,
 María Elósegui,
 Georgios A. Serghides,
 Tim Eicke,
 Diana Sârcu,
 Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
 Anna Margaryan, ad hoc judge,
and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 15998/11, 15964/11, 16015/11, 16024/11, 16030/11, 16035/11, 16046/11, 16055/11 and 16060/11) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by seventeen Armenian nationals, Mr Vachagan Farmanyan, Ms Lyudmila Farmanyan, Ms Vardanush Farmanyan, Ms Varduhi Baghdasaryan, Mr Vahan Antonyan, Ms Mariam Hovhannisyan, Ms Ruzanna Harutyunyan, Ms Jemma Vardumyan, Mr Hovsep Khachatryan, Ms Alla Hovhannisyan, Mr Aram Khachatryan, Ms Lilya Minasyan, Ms Gayane Hovhannisyan, Mr Edik Harutyunyan, Mr Sargis Kloyan, Ms Azatuhi Manukyan and Ms Ruzanna Hunanyan (“the applicants”), on 28 February 2011;
the decision to give notice to the Armenian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention concerning the deaths of the applicants’ relatives and the alleged failure of the authorities to conduct an effective investigation into the circumstances of their deaths, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 9 September 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns the deaths of the applicants’ relatives as a result of injuries received during the mass protests which took place in Yerevan on 1 and 2 March 2008. It raises issues under Article 2 of the Convention. The applicants also relied on Article 38 of the Convention. THE FACTS
2. The applicants, whose details are set out in the appendix, are the relatives of nine people who died as a result of injuries received during the above-mentioned protests. More specifically:
(a)  The applicants Vachagan, Lyudmila and Vardanush Farmanyan (application no. 15998/11) are the father, mother and sister of Mr Armen Farmanyan, who died on 1 March 2008, aged 33;
(b)  The applicants Hovsep Khachatryan, Alla Hovhannisyan and Aram Khachatryan (application no. 16035/11) are the father, mother and brother of Mr Tigran Khachatryan, who died on 1 March 2008, aged 23. After notice of the application was given to the respondent Government, Aram Khachatryan informed the Court that he had acquired Belgian nationality;
(c)  The applicants Sargis Kloyan, Azatuhi Manukyan and Ruzanna Hunanyan (application no. 16060/11) are the father, mother and wife of Mr Gor Kloyan, who died on 2 March 2008, aged 28;
(d)  The applicants Lilya Minasyan and Gayane Hovhannisyan (application no. 16046/11) are the wife and daughter of Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, who died on 1 March 2008, aged 47;
(e)  The applicant Jemma Vardumyan (application no. 16030/11) is the mother of Mr Davit Petrosyan, who died on 2 March 2008, aged 32;
(f)  The applicants Varduhi Baghdasaryan and Vahan Antonyan (application no. 15964/11) are the wife and uncle of Mr Grigor Gevorgyan, who died on 1 March 2008, aged 27;
(g)  The applicant Edik Harutyunyan (application no. 16055/11) is the father of Mr Samvel Harutyunyan, who died on 11 April 2008 from injuries sustained on 1 March 2008, aged 28;
(h)  The applicant Mariam Hovhannisyan (application no. 16015/11) is the sister of Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan, who died on 2 March 2008, aged 30;
(i)  The applicant Ruzanna Harutyunyan (application no. 16024/11) is the mother of Mr Tigran Abgaryan, who died on 11 April 2008 from injuries sustained on 1 March 2008, aged 19. 3. All of the deceased were civilians, with the exception of Tigran Abgaryan, who at the material time was a conscript performing his compulsory military service with the Police Troops of Armenia (ՀՀ ոստիկանության զորքեր). 4. The applicants were represented by Ms J. Evans, Ms J. Gavron, Mr V. Grigoryan, Mr P. Leach, Ms K. Levine and Ms J. Sawyer, lawyers from the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC) based in London, and by Mr T. Yegoryan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan. 5. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan, and subsequently by Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters. 6. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.
19 February 2008 presidential election and post‑election eventsPresidential election and post-election demonstrations

7. On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The main candidates were the then Prime Minister, Mr Serzh Sargsyan, who represented the ruling party, and the main opposition candidate, Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan. 8. Immediately after the preliminary results of the election were announced, Mr Ter-Petrosyan called on his supporters to gather at Freedom Square in central Yerevan to protest against alleged irregularities in the election process, announcing that it had not been free and fair. From 20 February 2008 onwards, daily protest rallies were held across the country by Mr Ter-Petrosyan’s supporters, their main meeting place being Freedom Square and the surrounding park in Yerevan. It appears that the rallies at Freedom Square at times attracted tens of thousands of people, while several hundred demonstrators stayed in that area around the clock, having set up a camp. According to the Government, the authorities addressed the demonstrators gathered at Freedom Square on numerous occasions, informing them of the unlawful nature of their ongoing demonstrations. 9. The Government alleged that on 28 February 2008 the National Security Service (“NSS”) had obtained intelligence information, which it had passed on to the police the same day, that large quantities of weapons, including metal bars, wooden bats, firearms, grenades and explosives, were to be distributed to the protestors at Freedom Square in order to incite provocative actions and instigate mass disorder in Yerevan. The Chief of the Armenian police (hereinafter “the Chief of Police”) ordered his two Deputies to examine that information. On 29 February 2008 the head of the Main Department of Criminal Intelligence of the Armenian police reported to the Chief of Police that intelligence information had been gathered during the preceding few days that the demonstrators were planning to destabilise the situation and that they had been seen to be in possession of firearms, explosives, metal bars, Molotov cocktails, wooden bats and other dangerous objects, including specially assembled metal devices with a spiked shape called “hedgehogs”. He then ordered that a “site inspection” be conducted at Freedom Square at 7 a.m. on 1 March 2008 for the purpose of verifying that information. An operational meeting was held, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Police, to discuss and approve the plan for that operation, including an estimate of the number of main and backup forces to be deployed. The “site inspection” was assigned to a group of 133 police officers, led by the Deputy Chief of Police and including members of the police operational service. The backup police forces consisted of 602 police officers, including the patrol service regiment, and were deployed in the areas adjacent to Freedom Square to ensure security in case the situation deteriorated. Members of the Public Order Unit of the Police Troops of Armenia (see paragraphs 152-156 below) were not involved in the “site inspection” and were kept as a reserve at a nearby location. 10. The applicants stated that none of the above allegations made by the Government were supported by any evidence. Events of 1 and 2 March 2008 and the deaths of the applicants’ relativesThe early morning police operation and subsequent developments

(a)   Dispersal of the assembly at Freedom Square and gathering of the demonstrators near the Myasnikyan monument
11. On 1 March 2008, apparently at some point between 6 and 7 a.m., the police forces arrived at Freedom Square. 12. The applicants alleged that at least a 300 strong police force, without prior warnings or orders to disperse, had brutally attacked the several hundred demonstrators camped at the square and started beating them with rubber batons, causing them bodily injuries and destroying their tents. Within minutes the square was cleared of all the demonstrators and sealed off, while Mr Ter-Petrosyan was escorted by the police to his home, where he was effectively placed under house arrest. 13. The Government contested the above allegations and claimed that the purpose of the police operation had been to conduct the “site inspection” ordered the previous day (see paragraph 9 above). Both the main and backup police forces that participated in the police operation were all unarmed and without any means of personal protection, with the exception of 250 officers of the patrol service regiment who were equipped with shields, rubber batons and helmets. The main police forces entered the square and requested the protestors to allow them to inspect the location, but around 800 to 900 angry demonstrators, who were already aware of the arrival of the police, attacked the police officers with wooden bats, metal bars, stones and other random objects. An operational decision was made to immediately quell the resistance and to call in the backup police forces, including the patrol service. The police operation lasted for about half an hour and a corridor was created for the demonstrators to leave the square. After the square had been cleared of all the demonstrators, the police conducted the site inspection, during which they found numerous weapons stashed. These included three pistols, ammunition, grenades, metal bars, wooden and rubber bats, “hedgehogs” (see paragraph 9 above), Molotov cocktails, gas masks and knives. 14. The applicants contested the allegation that the demonstrators had been carrying any weapons or that weapons would be distributed among them. The alleged site inspection was not supported by any photographic or other convincing evidence and there was no evidence linking any of the weapons allegedly found at Freedom Square to the demonstrators. The sole purpose of the police operation at Freedom Square was to disperse the demonstrators camping there and prevent the continuation of the rallies. 15. The applicants further alleged that for two hours following the dispersal of the assembly at Freedom Square the demonstrators who had fled from there had been chased through the streets of Yerevan by the police. Some of them relocated to the area of the Myasnikyan monument, about 1.7‑2 km from Freedom Square, where a number of foreign embassies were located, including the French, Italian and Russian embassies, as well as the Yerevan mayor’s office, in the belief that they would be safe there. As news of the early morning violent police intervention and the house arrest of the main opposition candidate spread, thousands of people poured into the streets of Yerevan to voice their discontent, many of whom headed to the area of the Myasnikyan monument. From around 10 a.m. a large crowd started to form there, soon reaching several thousand people. 16. It appears that the epicentre of the gathering was the square in front of the Myasnikyan monument (“Myasnikyan Square”) and the surrounding area. It further appears that at some point the demonstrators started building barricades using a derailed trolleybus and gradually adding other vehicles, including cars and possibly a refuse truck. The applicants alleged that the protestors had done so to protect themselves from another possible police attack. 17. According to the Government, following the police operation at Freedom Square the patrol service regiment was divided into smaller groups, which were ordered to secure order in Yerevan and not to allow any new gatherings of protestors in the city centre. At 11 a.m. information was received from one of the groups that around 300 aggressively behaving demonstrators had assembled near the French embassy, where they had been guided by the leaders of the opposition. Fifty officers of the patrol service were immediately dispatched to that area, where a decision was made to thwart the unlawful actions of the uncontrollable crowd. The demonstrators attacked the police, throwing stones and various other objects in their direction. A number of streets leading to Myasnikyan Square were closed by the police. 18. The applicants disputed the Government’s account and submitted that no violence had been committed by the demonstrators during the whole period of the demonstration near the French embassy. It was the police that committed numerous acts of violence towards the demonstrators, who remained peaceful even in the face of police brutality. 19. It appears that around 12 noon several opposition leaders and activists, including members of parliament, arrived at the scene and were able to address the crowd by loudhailer. The police forces, led by two Deputy Chiefs of Police and the head of the Main Department for the Fight Against Organised Crime, entered into negotiations with those opposition leaders about the possibility of moving the demonstration to an area outside the centre, but these ended unsuccessfully at around 2.20 p.m. since the demonstrators refused to move to the location proposed by the police. It further appears that at around this time an incident happened involving a police car which – allegedly accidentally – drove into the crowd of demonstrators, injuring at least two of them. This infuriated some of the demonstrators, who attacked and set fire to the police car after the officers driving it had fled. 20. The Government alleged that the demonstrators had refused to move to another location because they had been told by some of the opposition leaders and activists to stay put. At around the same time the demonstrators derailed another trolleybus and used it to block one of the entrances to the square. One of the active members of the opposition allegedly gave a speech over loudspeakers urging the demonstrators to arm themselves “whichever way possible” and prepare for resistance. (b)   Subsequent developments as alleged by the Government
21. The Government made the following allegations regarding the subsequent course of events. 22. At 3 p.m. a new order was given to reinforce the police units in the vicinity of the President’s residence, the government building and the Public Television building, which involved 200 police officers of the Department of State Protection of the Armenian police and 300 servicemen of the Police Troops. The other police forces were ordered to go to Freedom Square. Another 150 police officers of the Department of State Protection were ordered to block the northern part of the demonstration in order to prevent access to Republic Square, where the government building was situated. 23. At around 3.40 p.m. a group of protestors stole shields and batons from a police car and at around 5.30 p.m. a group of young protestors tore off pieces of iron pipe from pavement railings and a nearby construction site. 24. At 6 p.m. the aggressive part of the crowd closed off the sections of the road leading to the Yerevan mayor’s office and Mashtots Avenue, bringing traffic to a standstill, while cars that happened to be approaching those sections were hijacked, looted and used to build barricades. There was a gradual movement of the aggressive part of the crowd towards Mashtots Avenue and Republic Square. 25. From around 7.45 p.m. the protestors, armed with stones, metal bars, wooden bats and Molotov cocktails and launching repeated attacks on the police, tried to advance down Grigor Lusavorich Street towards its intersection with Mashtots Avenue and Paronyan Street. According to the Government, their intention was to continue up Paronyan Street and eventually reach the President’s residence and the National Assembly building, which were situated a few kilometres in that direction. In order to stop them moving forward, the Police Troops formed a chain and started advancing, equipped with shields, rubber batons and helmets. Non‑commissioned officers of the Police Troops were positioned at the rear, equipped with “special means” (such as non-lethal equipment for crowd control), including tear-gas launchers. The demonstrators threw stones, Molotov cocktails and other objects at them. 26. At around 8.15 p.m. the first shots were fired and the first grenades thrown from the crowd, as a result of which some police officers received their first injuries, one of which, caused by shrapnel, proved fatal. To protect his officers, the Commander of the Police Troops decided to withdraw them, use special means, including tear gas, and fire blank cartridges for psychological impact. The protestors hid behind cars and responded by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. 27. The Commander of the Police Troops decided to send forward a barbed wire installing vehicle to try to install barbed wire. However, the onslaught of the crowd forced the driver and others in the vehicle to abandon it. Five minutes later a similar action was carried out at the intersection of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street, which also failed since the crowd charged and the barbed wire remained half open. Part of the aggressive crowd managed to capture some police vehicles, including the two barbed wire installing vehicles, a bus and other vehicles, some of which were set fire to on the spot. The rest were used to attack the police lines and were later burnt at the intersection of Leo Street and Paronyan Street. 28. At around 10 p.m. three water cannons were put to use. They temporarily repelled the crowd and prevented it from advancing, but were forced to retreat once the water ran out. The crowd again advanced down Grigor Lusavorich Street towards Paronyan Street, attacking the water cannons and throwing metal bars, stones and Molotov cocktails at police officers and servicemen of the Police Troops. In view of the possible loss of officers as a result of clashes with the crowd, the police decided to form a battle array and to retreat towards Leo Street. In order to stop the attacks, seven officers of the Police Troops armed with assault rifles fired tracer bullets in the air to exert psychological pressure on the protestors. Approximately 200 officers of different police units formed a chain blocking Paronyan Street. 29. At 11 p.m. the President of Armenia declared a state of emergency in the city of Yerevan. Despite that, the mass disorder continued and included the breaking into and looting of shops in the area. 30. As a result of the mass disorder ten people died, including eight civilians and two servicemen of the Police Troops. Thirty-five civilians and 186 police officers and servicemen were injured, ninety-two public and private vehicles were damaged and twelve commercial premises were looted. (c)   Subsequent developments as alleged by the applicants
31. The applicants contested the Government’s account of events and alleged that until 5 p.m. the police had not called on the protestors to disperse. The leaders of the opposition present called on the protestors to stay calm and not provoke the police. The protestors built barricades to prevent the police from attacking them and called for Levon Ter-Petrosyan to make an appearance. 32. From 7.30 to 8 p.m. the police forces, armed with firearms, launched their first aggressive attack on the protestors gathered at Myasnikyan Square but then retreated, provoking the protestors to break through the barricades in the direction of Mashtots Avenue, Paronyan Street and Leo Street. 33. Shortly after 9 p.m., without prior warning, the police forces started firing tracer bullets intensively into the air, apparently intending to intimidate the demonstrators and make them disperse. The first firing of tracer bullets lasted about ten to fifteen minutes. After the first protestor was shot, the resistance of the protestors intensified. Half an hour later, police in riot gear began approaching from the direction of Paronyan Street and Leo Street. Organised in four to five rows, they advanced towards the demonstrators, accompanied by the second firing of tracer bullets. 34. Facing resistance from the demonstrators, the police retreated, leaving the large crowd gathered at Myasnikyan Square alone, and regrouped at the intersection of Paronyan Street and Leo Street, several metres from an arch that led to the central district police station. There they were confronted by several dozen demonstrators, most of them young, who were chanting “Levon, Levon!” and throwing stones at the police from a distance of 15 to 20 metres. Some demonstrators were also armed with iron bars and wooden sticks. It appears that the police used tear gas in response and clashes ensued. 35. Eyewitnesses described several instances of police targeting protestors with either sub-machine guns or using tear gas, as well as instances of random firing of Makarov pistols and opening indiscriminate fire at protestors. The police also attacked and beat civilians and ill-treated protestors indiscriminately. 36. It appears that the situation started to deescalate after the declaration of a state of emergency and the clashes in the Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street, Paronyan Street and Leo Street slowly subsided, although it appears that some public buildings were damaged and some shops were broken into and looted before the disorder finally stopped. The main rally at the Myasnikyan monument involving several thousand people (see paragraph 16 above) apparently continued until around 3 a.m. on 2 March 2008. The deaths of the applicants’ relatives
(a)   The death of Armen Farmanyan (application no. 15998/11)
37. Armen Farmanyan was fatally wounded on Paronyan Street at around 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008, according to a parliamentary inquiry into the events (see paragraphs 125-131 below). It appears that at 9.50 p.m. his body, with firearm wounds to the head, was taken to the morgue for a forensic medical examination, which was performed the next day. 38. According to the results of the forensic medical examination (see paragraph 67 below), the cause of death was an injury to the left side of his head. There were foreign bodies inside the skull and multiple bruises to the tissue and muscles of the head, the soft membrane and dura mater, the brain tissue and brain cavities. The dura mater was torn and the brain was partially crushed, accompanied by a secretion. Two foreign bodies were removed from Armen Farmanyan’s right cerebral hemisphere: a cylindrical metal object measuring 3.9 x 1.85 cm and a cylindrical whitish plastic object measuring 2.35 x 1.9 cm. 39. According to the results of the forensic ballistic examination (see paragraph 72 below), the metal and plastic objects removed from Armen Farmanyan’s body were parts of a fired Cheremukha-7 type cartridge canister, namely a tear-gas grenade and its detached plastic cap, intended to be fired from a KS-23 (23 mm carbine). The shot marks on the canister were characteristic of a KS-23. There was a deformation and a crack in the front part of the cap, which could have been caused by collision with a hard object or having passed through an obstacle. 40. The Government alleged, and the applicants disputed, that the investigation had established that Armen Farmanyan had recruited participants in the mass disorder, distributed metal bars and Molotov cocktails to them and directed their actions (see paragraphs 97 and 100 below). (b)   The death of Tigran Khachatryan (application no. 16035/11)
41. Tigran Khachatryan was fatally wounded at the intersection of Leo Street and Paronyan Street at some point after 8 p.m. on 1 March 2008, according to the parliamentary inquiry (see paragraphs 125-131 below). At 10 p.m. his body was taken by ambulance to the morgue for a forensic medical examination, which was performed the next day. 42. According to the results of the forensic medical examination (see paragraph 67 below), Tigran Khachatryan received an open and blunt head injury. He died as a result of a serious malfunction of the vital functions of the brain resulting from the head injury. During the post-mortem examination, a metal object was removed from his skull. 43. According to the results of the forensic ballistic examination (see paragraph 72 below), the metal object removed from Tigran Khachatryan’s body was a tear-gas grenade of a fired Cheremukha-7 type cartridge without its plastic cap, intended to be fired from a KS-23 (23 mm carbine). Since the plastic caps of the gas canisters rubbed against the walls of the carbine bores during firing, it was impossible to determine the type of weapon from which the gas grenade in question had been fired. The plastic caps had most likely become detached due to collision with a hard object or having passed through an obstacle. (c)   The death of Gor Kloyan (application no. 16060/11)
44. Gor Kloyan was wounded at the intersection of Grigor Lusavorich Street and Mashtots Avenue at around 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008, according to the parliamentary inquiry (see paragraphs 125-131 below). It appears that at around 9.30 p.m. he was transported by a group of unidentified people to Yerevan Clinic no. 3 with a wound in the area of the left side of his groin. It appears that he underwent surgery and that a metal object was removed from that area. It further appears that six 1 mm black particles were also removed from his body. Gor Kloyan died at 4.30 a.m. on 2 March 2008. On the same day a forensic medical examination was carried out. 45. According to the results of the forensic medical examination (see paragraph 67 below), Gor Kloyan had a crushed fragmented injury in the area of the left side of the groin involving an avulsion of the femoral artery, damage to the femoral veins and a fracture of the pubic bone. The injury was accompanied by acute blood loss and resulted in his death. 46. According to the results of the forensic ballistic examination (see paragraph 72 below), the metal object removed from Gor Kloyan’s body was a fired Cheremukha-7 cartridge canister, namely a tear-gas grenade together with its plastic cap, intended to be fired from a KS-23 (23 mm carbine). The shot marks on the plastic cap were characteristic of a KS-23. There was a deformation and a crack on the plastic cap which could have been caused by collision with a hard object or having passed through an obstacle. There were also six 1 mm black particles removed from his body but, given their small size and lack of necessary features, it was impossible to determine what they were. (d)   The death of Hovhannes Hovhannisyan (application no. 16046/11)
47. Hovhannes Hovhannisyan was shot dead on Mashtots Avenue at around 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008, according to the parliamentary inquiry (see paragraphs 125-131 below). The applicants stated that it was alleged in an investigative documentary concerning the events of 1 and 2 March 2008 that the incident had happened at 10.05 p.m. It appears that his body, with a gunshot wound to the chest, was transported by a group of unidentified people to Yerevan Medical Centre no. 2 at around 9.40 p.m. on 1 March 2008. At 12.20 a.m. on 2 March 2008 his body was taken by ambulance to the morgue for a forensic medical examination, which was performed the same day. A 5.45 mm bullet was removed. 48. According to the results of the forensic medical examination (see paragraph 67 below), the cause of death was a blunt gunshot wound to the chest and internal bleeding. 49. According to the results of the forensic ballistic examination (see paragraph 72 below), the bullet removed from Hovhannes Hovhannisyan’s body was part of a 5.45 mm ball cartridge. Such cartridges were intended to be used with AK-74 assault rifles, RPK-74 machine guns or their modified models. The shot marks on the bullet were characteristic of bullets fired from 5.45 mm AK-74 assault rifles, RPK-74 machine guns or their modified models. (e)   The death of Davit Petrosyan (application no. 16030/11)
50. Davit Petrosyan was shot on Paronyan Street shortly after 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008, according to the parliamentary inquiry (see paragraphs 125‑131 below). The applicants stated that it was alleged in the above-mentioned investigative documentary (see paragraph 47 above) that the incident had happened at 10.10 p.m. It appears that at around 10.30 p.m. Davit Petrosyan was taken by a group of unidentified people to Yerevan Hospital no. 2 with a gunshot wound to his back, after which he was transported to Margaryan Hospital where it appears that surgery was performed and a 9 mm bullet was removed from his body. Davit Petrosyan died in hospital at 12.30 a.m. on 2 March 2008 from his injuries. His body was then taken for a forensic medical examination, which was performed the same day. 51. According to the results of the forensic medical examination (see paragraph 67 below), there was a gunshot entrance wound on the right rear side of Davit Petrosyan’s chest and penetrating injuries to the right kidney, liver, diaphragm and right lung which had been caused while he was alive and which were the result of a gunshot. The cause of death was acute blood loss. 52. According to the results of the forensic ballistic examination (see paragraph 72 below), the bullet removed from his body during surgery was part of a 9 mm cartridge. Such cartridges were intended for PM (Makarov pistol) and APS type guns. The shot marks on the bullet were characteristic of a PM pistol. There were scratches on the bullet primarily on the front part, caused by collision with a hard object, possibly a ricochet, or having passed through an obstacle. (f)     The death of Grigor Gevorgyan (application no. 15964/11)
53. Grigor Gevorgyan went to the area of the mass protests with his brother‑in-law, R.B., at around 8 p.m. on 1 March 2008. It appears that they lost each other at the intersection of Grigor Lusavorich Street and Zakyan Street at around 9 p.m. because of the chaotic situation. According to the parliamentary inquiry (see paragraphs 125-131 below), at around 9.15 p.m. he went with a group of other protestors to the intersection of Paronyan Street and Leo Street, where he was shot in front of a shoe repair shop and died instantly. On 2 March 2008 a forensic medical examination was performed. 54. According to the results of the forensic medical examination (see paragraph 67 below), Grigor Gevorgyan died from a penetrating gunshot wound to the head, which entered in the nasal area and exited the left part of the forehead, damaging the brain. The entrance wound measured 0.5 x 0.4 cm. There were no additional gunshot elements in the area of the entrance wound, such as traces of ash, burns and burnt or half-burnt gunpowder particles, which meant that the shot had been fired beyond the limits of such additional elements typical of the firearm in question. 55. The bullet that killed Grigor Gevorgyan was never found. (g)   The death of Samvel Harutyunyan (application no. 16055/11)
56. Samvel Harutyunyan received a head injury at the junction of Grigor Lusavorich Street and Mashtots Avenue at around 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008, according to the parliamentary inquiry (see paragraphs 125-131 below). It appears that at around 10 p.m. he was taken by a group of unidentified people to Yerevan Clinic no. 3 unconscious and with an open wound to his skull. He was then transported to the Armenia Medical Centre, where he died on 11 April 2008 from his injuries without regaining consciousness. A forensic medical examination was carried out on 13 April 2008. 57. According to the results of the forensic medical examination (see paragraph 67 below), Samvel Harutyunyan received an open, blunt and penetrating injury to the skull, involving a contusion in the left parietotemporal area with an avulsed defect of the dura mater, crushing and secretion of the brain, and multi-fragmented fractures of the left parietal and temporal bones. The injuries had been caused by a blunt object while he was alive. (h)   The death of Zakar Hovhannisyan (application no. 16015/11)
58. Zakar Hovhannisyan was shot by the market on Mashtots Avenue, about 100-150 metres from the intersection of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street at around 1.30 a.m. on 2 March 2008, according to the parliamentary inquiry (see paragraphs 125-131 below). It appears that at 2 a.m. a group of unidentified people took him to Yerevan Clinic no. 3 unconscious and with a gunshot wound to the abdomen. It appears that a 9 mm bullet was removed from his body. He died during surgery from his injuries and at 2.55 a.m. his body was taken by ambulance to the morgue for a forensic medical examination, which was performed the same day. 59. According to the results of the forensic medical examination (see paragraph 67 below), there was a gunshot entrance wound on the front surface of Zakar Hovhannisyan’s abdomen, as well as penetrating injuries to the liver, diaphragm, lower part of the left lung and waist muscle. A haemorrhage in the left part of the waist was also recorded. The cause of death was acute blood loss. 60. According to the results of the forensic ballistic examination (see paragraph 72 below), the bullet removed from Zakar Hovhannisyan’s body was part of a 9 mm cartridge. Such cartridges were intended for PM (Makarov pistol) and APS type guns. The shot marks on the bullet were characteristic of a PM pistol. (i)     The death of Tigran Abgaryan (application no. 16024/11)
61. Tigran Abgaryan was on duty at around 7 p.m. on 1 March 2008 at Grigor Lusavorich Street as a serviceman of military unit no. 1033 of the Police Troops of Armenia. According to the parliamentary inquiry, he received a penetrating gunshot wound to his neck at around 11 p.m. on Leo Street in front of a shop called Svin, (see paragraphs 125-131 below). The applicants stated that it was alleged in the above-mentioned investigative documentary (see paragraph 47 above) that the incident had happened at 10.25 p.m. He was then transported to a hospital, where surgery was performed. He remained paralysed and on a ventilator, but in the following weeks his condition deteriorated and he died on 11 April 2008. A forensic medical examination was carried out the next day. 62. According to the results of the two forensic medical examinations (see paragraph 67 below), Tigran Abgaryan died of a failure of the vital functions of the spinal cord as a result of his injury. The wound was caused by a bullet which had passed from front to back on the right side of his neck, accompanied with explosion-type complications. The entrance wound on the front of his neck measured 3 x 3 cm. The forensic medical expert noted that there were no traces of additional effects of being shot at close range, but that that question could be answered definitively after conducting a trace evidence examination of the clothing. He also added that, as regards determining the type of firearm and the calibre of the bullet, these questions were outside his competence. 63. The bullet that killed Tigran Abgaryan was never found.
criminal proceedingsThe opening of the criminal cases and the forensic examinations

64. On 1 March 2008 criminal case no. 62202508 was instituted by the Special Investigative Service (“the SIS”) under Article 225.1 §§ 1 and 2, Article 235 §§ 1 and 2 and Article 316 § 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 138, 140 and 141 below) in connection with the events at Freedom Square. That decision instituting the case stated:
“After the announcement of the preliminary results of the presidential election of 19 February 2008, the presidential candidate Levon Ter-Petrosyan, members of parliament [K.S. and S.M.], the editor-in-chief of the Haykakan Zhamanak daily newspaper [N.P.] and others organised and held mass public events at Yerevan’s Freedom Square in violation of the procedure prescribed by law and incited disobedience of the decisions ordering an end to the events held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, while a number of participants in the mass events were in illegal possession of and carrying illegally obtained weapons and ammunition. On 1 March 2008, at around 6 a.m., when the police took measures aimed at forcibly ending the public events held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, in compliance with the requirements of section 14 of the Assemblies, Rallies, Marches and Demonstrations Act, the organisers and participants in the events, disobeying the lawful orders of the [police officers], who were carrying out their official duties, committed a life-threatening and health-threatening assault on them with bats, metal bars and other adapted objects which they had in their possession for that purpose, causing the police officers injuries of varying severity.”
65. On 2 March 2008 another criminal case, no. 62202608, was instituted under Article 225 § 3 and Article 235 § 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 139 and 140 below). That decision stated:
“[Ter-Petrosyan], the candidate running for President at the presidential election of 19 February 2008 and his followers and supporters, [namely] members of parliament [K.S. and S.M.], the editor-in-chief of the Haykakan Zhamanak daily newspaper [N.P.] and others, unwilling to admit defeat in the election, with the aim of casting doubt on the election, instilling mistrust in the results among large sections of the population, creating illusions of public discontent and revolt and discrediting the election and the authorities, from 1 March 2008 in the area of the Yerevan mayor’s office and central streets organised mass disorder involving murder, violence, massacres, arson, destruction of property and armed resistance to public officials, using firearms, explosives and other adapted objects.”
66. On the same date the SIS investigator decided to join criminal cases no. 62202508 and no. 62202608 under the latter number on the grounds that the events and the offences in question had involved the same individuals. It appears that at least 140 people, including four opposition MPs and numerous other opposition leaders and supporters, were charged within the scope of the joint criminal case (some of these cases were later brought before the Court, see Mushegh Saghatelyan v. Armenia, no. 23086/08, 20 September 2018; Myasnik Malkhasyan v. Armenia, no. 49020/08, 15 October 2020; Jhangiryan v. Armenia, nos. 44841/08 and 63701/09, 8 October 2020; Smbat Ayvazyan v. Armenia, no. 49021/08, 8 October 2020; Mikayelyan v. Armenia [CTE], no. 1879/10, 31 August 2021; Arzumanyan v. Armenia [CTE], no. 63845/09, 31 August 2021; and Pashinyan v. Armenia, [CTE], nos. 22665/10 and 2305/11, 18 January 2022). It further appears that dozens of injured police officers were recognised as victims for the purposes of that criminal case. 67. On the same date the SIS investigator ordered forensic medical examinations of the deceased, namely Armen Farmanyan, Tigran Khachatryan, Gor Kloyan, Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, Davit Petrosyan, Grigor Gevorgyan, and Zakar Hovhannisyan which were conducted the same day by experts of a forensic medicine centre under the authority of the Ministry of Health. The relevant expert conclusions were produced in late March to early April 2008 (see paragraphs 38, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54 and 59 above). Similar examinations were ordered in respect of Tigran Abgaryan on 11 March and 12 April 2008 and Samvel Harutyunyan on 13 April 2008, with the relevant expert conclusions being produced on 14 March and 22 and 23 May 2008 respectively (see paragraphs 57 and 62 above). 68. On 4 March 2008 the Prosecutor General gave a press conference in which he stated that “it [was] obvious that the actions of the law enforcement bodies [had been] proportionate to the purpose of preventing the mass disorder”. He further referred to the concepts of “self-defence” and “absolute necessity” in criminal law, in which case a person was absolved from criminal prosecution, and stated that the investigation had obtained numerous video‑recordings and photographs of the events. Lastly, the Prosecutor General stated that there was sufficient evidence to believe that the mass disorder had been organised and aimed at usurping power at any cost, the cost in this case being eight human lives. 69. On the same date the SIS investigator ordered a forensic ballistic examination of the metal and plastic objects removed from the bodies of Armen Farmanyan, Tigran Khachatryan and Gor Kloyan, as well as the bullets removed from the bodies of Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, Davit Petrosyan and Zakar Hovhannisyan (see paragraphs 39, 43, 46, 49, 52 and 60 above). He further ordered a joint forensic ballistic and chemical examination of the clothing of Gor Kloyan, Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, Davit Petrosyan and Zakar Hovhannisyan. 70. By a letter of 7 March 2008 the Prosecutor General gave the following instructions to a senior investigator at the SIS:
“Taking into account the need for full disclosure of the circumstances of all the cases of death and physical injuries ... I instruct:
1. Within the scope of the investigation of this criminal case, to clarify in a comprehensive, complete and objective manner:
1.1  All the circumstances of the use of physical force, special means and firearms by the police officers, including the reasons and grounds for their use or non-use in each particular case;
1.2  The [identity of] the individuals subjected to physical coercion or the use of force;
1.3  If special means were used, their type, manner of use, the consequences and the actions of the people subjected to coercion at the time when physical force or another type of coercion was applied;
1.4  In each case of the use of firearms, the type, calibre, serial number and place of registration of the firearm, the place and time of receipt and return of the firearm and ammunition, the place and time of use of the firearm, the mode, target and direction of the shots, the number of cartridges allocated and fired, the consequences of the use of the firearm, if known to the shooter. 2. During the interviews concerning the above issues and the questions arising from them, as well as [during] the interviews of police officers and military conscripts who did not use physical force, special means or firearms, or [who did not] carry such special means or firearms, it is necessary to clarify what kind of physical or psychological violence they were subjected to during the group attacks and mass disorder, what kind of weapons or ammunition were used against them or, in their presence, against other police officers or servicemen, what information they have regarding the use of weapons, ammunition or other devices designed to cause destruction or arson by the participants in the mass disorder and the consequences of such use. 3. When interviewing people suspected or accused of participating in mass disorder, it is also necessary to invite them to testify about the circumstances known to them of use of firearms, ammunition or other means mentioned above by police officers and servicemen, as well as by people in civilian clothing. 4. It is necessary to carry out an investigation among the eyewitnesses to the events, especially those living in the area where the events related to the disturbances took place, in connection with the same circumstances, issuing a prior order to the Armenian police to identify eyewitnesses and summon them for questioning pursuant to the procedure prescribed by law. 5. To clarify as soon as possible, by comparing the results of the investigation into the above circumstances and the conclusions of the relevant forensic examinations (or the experts’ preliminary official conclusions), whether the injuries which are similar were inflicted in the same location or locations. To clarify by all means, in the case of [wounds caused by] firearms or extraordinary bodily injuries, whether the police officers or servicemen used firearms of the calibre and type corresponding to the injuries in question or ammunition causing such injuries. 6. To make, within a short period of time, official inquiries with the Armenian police, the Ministry of Defence and [the NSS] with the aim of checking the completeness of their ammunition and the possibility of missing special means and means of personal security, especially firearms; to make the fact of each unit of special means, means of personal security or missing firearm the subject of a special investigation.”
71. In March 2008 the SIS Chief gave instructions to regional prosecutors to identify those who had participated in the demonstrations and mass disorder, and to investigate the heads of the regional headquarters of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s election campaign. 72. On 21 March 2008 A.H., the deputy head of the criminological research unit of the Expert Criminological Department of the Armenian police (ՀՀ ոստիկանության փորձաքրեագիտական վարչության քրեագիտական հետազոտությունների բաժին), to whom the forensic ballistic examination had been assigned (see paragraph 69 above), produced the results of his examination of the objects and bullets removed from the bodies of Armen Farmanyan, Tigran Khachatryan, Gor Kloyan, Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, Davit Petrosyan and Zakar Hovhannisyan (Conclusion no. 389). In addition to the findings mentioned in paragraphs 39, 43, 46, 49, 52 and 60 above, the expert concluded that the shot marks on the plastic caps of the Cheremukha-7 cartridges were not suitable for matching with a specific weapon because they did not clearly show the characteristics of the bore, while the gas grenades showed no traces of contact with the bore and were not therefore suitable for matching with the weapons that had fired them. As regards the bullets, they were suitable for comparative examination, which made it possible to determine that they had been fired from different weapons. The bullets had been compared with the bullets found at the scenes of unsolved crimes committed on the territory of Armenia and those registered in the National Bullet and Cartridge Case Inventory, but no matches had been identified. 73. On 17 April 2008 two experts of the National Bureau of Examinations and one Ministry of Defence expert examined a video‑recording lasting about five minutes, concluding that the five uniformed individuals appearing on the video were firing blank cartridges from AK-74 assault rifles. 74. On 28 April 2008 a senior expert and the head of the criminological research unit of the Expert Criminological Department of the Armenian police, to whom the joint forensic ballistic and chemical examination had been assigned (see paragraph 69 in fine above), produced the results of their examination (Conclusion no. 385). The experts concluded, inter alia, that all the damage to the clothing of Gor Kloyan, Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, Davit Petrosyan and Zakar Hovhannisyan had been caused by gunshots, without any evidence of close-range discharge. It was impossible to determine the angle of the shots from the damage to the clothing. No ricochet marks were identified on the areas around the damage, but given the findings in Conclusion no. 389 regarding Davit Petrosyan about a possible ricochet (see paragraph 52 above), it could be concluded that the damage to his clothing could also have been caused by a ricochet. 75. On 23 June 2008 an expert of the National Centre of Forensic Examinations conducted a joint forensic trace evidence, ballistic and explosive technical examination of Tigran Abgaryan’s military winter coat, as ordered by the SIS investigator. It concluded, inter alia, that the tear on the back of the collar measuring 19 x 9 mm had resulted from at least one gunshot with a bullet containing copper, which had passed from front to back and constituted an exit wound. There were no traces of gunpowder soot or half‑burnt gunpowder particles around the tear in question (Conclusion no. 09330802). 76. On 13 May, 16 June, 19 June, 23 June, 24 June, 25 June and 26 June 2008 the investigator decided to recognise the applicants Vachagan Farmanyan, Alla Hovhannisyan, Sargis Kloyan, Lilya Minasyan, Jemma Vardumyan, Varduhi Baghdasaryan, Edik Harutyunyan, Mariam Hovhannisyan and Ruzanna Harutyunyan (see paragraph 2 above) as the victims’ legal heirs for the purposes of criminal case no. 62202608. 77. In June and July 2008 the applicants were presented with the conclusions of the forensic medical examinations (see paragraph 67 above). Seven of the applicants were also presented with Conclusion no. 389 (see paragraph 72 above) and six with Conclusion no. 385 (see paragraph 74 above). 78. It appears from a conclusion by two Russian experts (see paragraph 82 below) that on 8 November 2008 another ballistic examination of the Cheremukha-7 gas grenades was conducted by the head of the criminological research unit of the Expert Criminological Department of the Armenian police (Conclusion no. 1466). The results of this examination appear to have included the following findings. (a)  As a result of the gas discharge from Cheremukha-7 type tear‑gas grenade cartridges, their plastic caps had been exposed to heat, melted and were unsuitable for matching. As a result of collision or contact with an obstacle, foreign mechanical traces had been generated on them, which also made matching difficult;
(b)  There were foreign traces on the plastic caps of the Cheremukha‑7 tear‑gas grenades submitted for examination, such as deformations, cracks and traces of rubbing and contact, caused by collision with a hard object or having passed through an obstacle;
(c)  The shot marks on the plastic caps of the Cheremukha-7 tear‑gas grenades submitted for examination were unsuitable for matching with a specific weapon because they did not clearly show the characteristics of the bore, while the gas grenades (metal parts) showed no traces of contact with the bore and were therefore unsuitable for matching with the weapons that had fired them. 79. On an unspecified date the SIS submitted a request to the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation for a technical examination of the Cheremukha-7 gas grenades. 80. On 30 December 2008 an official of the relevant department of the Russian Ministry of the Interior conducted the technical examination, stating that, in accordance with the technical conditions adopted in 1976, the maximum shelf life of Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenade cartridges was five years. The suitability for use of Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenade cartridges produced in 1986 and 1989 could only be established after their testing. After the expiry of the shelf life of Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenade cartridges, their technical characteristics might alter and their combat effectiveness might be reduced. In particular, the duration of tear-gas emission and the maximum range of the gas grenade might be reduced or the cartridge might malfunction because of capsule failure. The use of Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenade cartridges with an expired shelf life against people would not cause harm to their life or limb. It was not prohibited to use Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenade cartridges in open spaces, but it was prohibited to fire them directly at people. They could be fired towards terrain or objects located near offenders, taking into account the direction of the wind to ensure that the gas fumes moved towards the offenders. 81. On 20 January 2009 the SIS asked the Russian authorities to carry out an additional forensic ballistic examination of the Cheremukha‑7 gas grenades and their plastic caps removed from the bodies of Armen Farmanyan, Tigran Khachatryan and Gor Kloyan. 82. On 4 February 2009 two ballistic experts of the Expert Criminological Centre of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation (Экспертно‑криминалистический центр министерства внутренних дел Российской Федерации) issued their conclusion after examining the Cheremukha-7 gas grenades and their plastic caps (Conclusion no. 913). They began by recapitulating the findings of the ballistic examination conducted on 8 November 2008 (see paragraph 78 above). The experts then concluded that there were no bore marks of the weapons from which the gas grenades had been fired on the surface of their metal casing. This was because there had been no direct contact between the surface of the casings and the bore because there were plastic caps on both sides of the casings, the purpose of which was to lead the grenade through the bore and “lock in” the gunpowder gas at the time of firing. The bore marks on the surface of the plastic caps were unsuitable for matching with the weapons from which they had been fired. 83. On 23 March 2009 amendments were made to the Criminal Code. Article 225 § 3 (see paragraph 139 below) was repealed and a new sub‑paragraph 10.1 added under paragraph 2 of Article 104, which prescribed a penalty for murder committed during mass disorder by one of its participants (see paragraph 137 below). 84. It appears that on 24 March 2009 a new criminal case was instituted under Article 104 of the Criminal Code, which was joined to case no. 62202608. 85. It further appears that on 13 July 2009 another criminal case was instituted under, inter alia, Article 373 § 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 142 below) for a violation of the rules for the use of KS‑23 type special means when quelling the mass disorder and the resulting involuntary manslaughter of three people and the injury of three others. The case was joined to criminal case no. 62202608 and appears to have established that KS‑23s, which were special-purpose firearms, had been used in the area of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street, Leo Street and Paronyan Street by four non-commissioned officers of the Police Troops: L.H. and A.A. of the Special Operations Detachment and M.G. and V.S. of military unit no. 1033. It was also established that out of a total of fifty-six Cheremukha‑7 tear-gas cartridges fired, twenty, nineteen, eight and nine had been fired by L.H., A.A., M.G. and V.S. respectively. On unspecified dates all four officers were charged under, inter alia, Article 373 § 3 of the Criminal Code with the involuntary manslaughter of Armen Farmanyan, Tigran Khachatryan and Gor Kloyan. 86. The Government alleged, and the applicants disputed, that the investigation in that case had also established that weapons of various types and calibres, including KS-23s, had been used by both the participants in the disorder and the Police Troops, and that various explosive devices, including military grenades, had been used against the police officers and the servicemen of the Police Troops. It had been further established that Cheremukha-7 type tear-gas grenades, after ricocheting off a wall or other obstacle or after passing through an obstacle, were capable of causing injuries, including fatal ones, depending on the angle of collision and the type of obstacle. The complaints lodged by the applicants
87. On 3 February 2010 the applicants lodged complaints with the Prosecutor General alleging, on the basis of Article 2 of the Convention, that the SIS had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the deaths of their relatives. They argued that no criminal proceedings had been instituted in respect of the murder of their relatives, that they had been recognised as victims (see paragraph 76 above) with delays of about two to four months and that the crime scene had not been examined and photographed. They also raised arguments specific to their individual cases. 88. On 8 February 2010 the Prosecutor General dismissed all the complaints, finding that the SIS had carried out and was continuing to carry out a comprehensive and objective investigation. It appears that the Prosecutor General informed the applicants in writing of his decision, but that no copies were provided. The applicants’ requests to receive such copies were rejected by the Prosecutor General on the grounds that he was not obliged to provide any. 89. On 2 April 2010 the applicants lodged complaints with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”) alleging that the SIS had failed to carry out an effective investigation and to show due diligence in examining the circumstances of the deaths and seeking damages in this regard. They also complained that they had had no access to the case file, which had prevented them from lodging requests and complaints and effectively defending their rights, and that the Prosecutor General had failed to adopt a decision on their complaints of 3 February 2010 (see paragraph 87 above). 90. By decisions of 24 May, 2 June, 4 June and 8 June 2010 the District Court dismissed the complaints. As regards the allegations of an ineffective investigation, it found that:
“... the Code of Criminal Procedure does not prescribe such investigative or procedural measures, while Article 290 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that complaints can be lodged with a court against the unlawfulness and unfoundedness of the decisions and actions of the body of inquiry, the investigator, the prosecutor and the bodies carrying out operational and intelligence measures which are provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, this complaint falls outside the scope of the judicial review of the investigation.”
91. As regards the alleged lack of access to the case file (see paragraph 89 above), the District Court found no violation of the applicants’ rights, since the rules of criminal procedure only allowed full access to the case file after the completion of the investigation. Lastly, the court found that there had been no inaction on the part of the Prosecutor General since he had adopted decisions on the applicants’ complaints on 8 February 2010 and they had been informed of this in writing (see paragraph 88 above). 92. On 2, 12, 14 and 18 June 2010 the applicants lodged appeals. 93. By decisions of 2, 13, 17 and 19 July 2010 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeals and upheld the respective decisions of the District Court. 94. The applicants lodged appeals on points of law, which were declared inadmissible by the Court of Cassation on 14 September and 22 October 2010. 95. On 28 February 2011 the applicants lodged their applications with the Court. The “SIS document”
96. On 26 December 2011 the SIS published a document entitled “Communiqué on the results of the investigation conducted within the scope of the criminal case examined by the SIS into the circumstances of the mass disorder which took place in the capital on 1 and 2 March 2008” (hereinafter “the SIS document”). 97. The SIS document began by setting out the circumstances of the events which took place in Yerevan from 20 February onwards, describing how the leaders of the opposition had allegedly planned, organised and provoked the mass disorder of 1 and 2 March, including by forming groups of people ready to commit violence and distributing weapons among them, with the aim of destabilising the internal political situation in the country (see paragraphs 9, 13, 17, and 21 above). As a consequence, armed resistance and riots took place in the area of the Myasnikyan monument, as well as on Grigor Lusavorich Street, Leo Street, Paronyan Street and Mashtots Avenue, resulting in 187 injured servicemen of the Police Troops and police officers, thirty-two injured civilians, ten deaths and more than 500,000,000 Armenian drams (AMD) worth of damage to public and private property. 98. In the description of the events of 1 March 2008, it was stated that from 6 p.m. onwards the command of both the regular police forces and the Police Troops deployed at the intersection of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street had been assigned to the Deputy Chief of Police, A.Y., and the Commander of the Police Troops, G.G. They were stationed there to prevent the crowd from advancing towards the National Assembly building and the President’s residence. It was further stated that between 8 p.m. and 11 p.m. the protestors had launched regular armed attacks on the police forces. After the attempts to install barbed wire had failed and before the water cannons were put to use, in order to calm the crowd and prevent attacks, in addition to tear-gas launchers and blank cartridges, it was decided to authorise the commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Police Troops equipped with assault rifles to open fire in the air with tracer bullets in order to exert psychological pressure. Furthermore, after the Police Troops had retreated to Leo Street, Tigran Abgaryan was shot with a rifle by a participant in the mass disorder from behind the corner of a building (see paragraphs 61-63 above). The Police Troops sniper shot him, wounding him in the leg. It was stated that the identity of that person was still being investigated. 99. For the purpose of preventing the mass disorder, the Police Troops had been equipped with the following weapons and ammunition:
(a)  16 units of AK-74 assault rifles with 1,920 units of 5.45 mm tracer bullets, of which 1,405 units were used and 515 units were returned to the arsenal;
(b)  eight units of AK-74 assault rifles with 480 units 5.45 mm blank cartridges, of which 280 units were used;
(c)  ten units of Kornet type guns with 130 rubber bullets, of which 62 were used;
(d)  four units of KS-23 rifles intended for firing Cheremukha‑7 and Siren‑7 tear-gas cartridges and Volna-R rubber bullets;
(e)  89 units of Cheremukha-7 and five units of Siren-7 tear-gas cartridges and 180 units of Volna-R rubber bullets, of which 56 units of Cheremukha‑7 tear-gas cartridges and 129 units of Volna-R rubber bullets were used;
(f)  seven units of SPSh guns intended for firing Cheremukha-4 tear‑gas cartridges;
(g)  154 units of Cheremukha-4 tear-gas cartridges, of which 79 units were used;
(h)  15 units of Cheremukha-1, 15 units of Cheremukha-5, 80 units of Siren-6 and 16 units of Dreif tear-gas grenades, of which 29 units of Siren‑6 and four units of Dreif tear-gas grenades were used;
(i)  seven units of Zarya and five units of Kasset stun grenades, of which four units of Zarya and five units of Kasset stun grenades were used; and
(j)  one SVD type sniper rifle with 20 units of 7.62 mm bullets, of which 1 was used and 19 were returned to the arsenal. 100. The SIS document also described the investigative and other measures taken in each case to establish the circumstances of the deaths. In this connection, it referred to the various forensic examinations conducted, including medical, ballistic and other examinations. It further stated that the investigation had established as follows:
(a)  Armen Farmanyan (paragraphs 37-40 above), who had been engaged and financed by an opposition member of parliament, had recruited participants for the mass disorder. At around 2 p.m. on 1 March 2008 he had led a group of young people to the area of the Myasnikyan monument where, at around 4 p.m., he had distributed metal bars, wooden bats and Molotov cocktails among them and instructed them to be ready to attack the police officers, which had later been carried out under his leadership. At around 9 p.m., in front of School no. 24 on Paronyan Street, Armen Farmanyan had been shot and had died on the spot. His friend A.V. and a group of unidentified people had put his body on the roof of a car belonging to a nearby person, B.U., demanding that he be transported to hospital. They had driven to 7 Leo Street, where the body had been handed over to an ambulance. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about fifteen people, including A.V., B.U., the driver of the ambulance L.K., the doctor M.A., the nurse A.M., the records of photographic identification by nurse A.M. and the results of the examination of the scene where the body had been placed in the ambulance, in which L.K. had participated;
(b)  Tigran Khachatryan (paragraphs 41-43 above) had gone to the area of the mass disorder with his friend, Ar.Ab. at around 7 p.m. At around 8 p.m. they had become separated because of the chaos, after which Tigran Khachatryan had gone with a group of participants in the mass disorder to the arch near the intersection of Paronyan Street and Leo Street, where he had been wounded and had died. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about twenty people, including Ar.Ab., S.K., the driver of the ambulance N.S., the doctor L.N., the nurse A.M., the records of photographic identification, the results of the examination of the scene where the body had been placed in the ambulance, in which L.N. had participated, and other material in the criminal case file;
(c)  Gor Kloyan (paragraphs 44-46 above) had gone to the area of the mass disorder at around 8 p.m. At around 9.30 p.m. he had gone with a group of participants to the intersection of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street, where he had been wounded. After that he had been transported by taxi by a group of unidentified people. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about fifteen people, including V.A. and K.A., the records of photographic identification by them and other material in the criminal case file. According to operational information, Gor Kloyan had been engaged in the mass disorder by Armen Farmanyan (see this same paragraph, under letter (a));
(d)  Hovhannes Hovhannisyan (paragraphs 47-49 above) had been standing at around 8 p.m. next to the Myasnikyan monument with a beer bottle in his hand. At around 9 p.m. he had gone with other participants in the mass disorder, waving a stick in his hand, towards the intersection of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street, where he had been shot and died. A nearby person, H.H., and an unidentified woman had transported his body to Yerevan Medical Centre no. 2. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about twenty people, including H.H. and eyewitnesses G.P. and K.H., and the results of the examination of the scene;
(e)  Davit Petrosyan (paragraphs 50-52 above) had gone to the area of the mass disorder, Grigor Lusavorich Street, with his brothers-in-law, V.D. and K.D., and his cousin, N.V., at around 8 p.m. At around 9 p.m. he had been taking photographs with his mobile telephone at 2 Paronyan Street and had temporarily become separated from the others. Sometime later, they had found him wounded and transported him in an unidentified car to hospital, where he had died. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about fifteen people, including his mother and the victim’s legal heir, the applicant Jemma Vardumyan, Davit Petrosyan’s wife, L.D., as well as V.D., K.D. and N.V., the conclusions of the computer technical examination, the results of the examination of the scene and other material in the criminal case file;
(f)  Grigor Gevorgyan (paragraphs 53-54 above) had been wounded at around 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008 in front of a shoe repair shop at the intersection of Paronyan Street and Leo Street. His body had then been transported by a group of unidentified people to Zakyan Street, where it had been picked up by an ambulance and transported to the morgue. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about twenty people, including the driver of the ambulance M.M., the nurse D.Z. and Grigor Gevorgyan’s acquaintance living in the same neighbourhood, R.S., the records of photographic identification and the results of the examination of the scene where the body had been placed in the ambulance. According to the statements of Grigor Gevorgyan’s wife and legal heir, the applicant Varduhi Baghdasaryan and those of her brother R.B., Grigor Gevorgyan had gone to the area of the mass disorder with R.B., but they had lost each other at around 9 p.m.;
(g)  Samvel Harutyunyan (paragraphs 56-57 above) had gone to the area of the mass disorder at around 6.30 p.m. with his friend, A.B., and his cousin, G.G. At around 9.30 p.m. Samvel Harutyunyan, after becoming separated from A.B. and G.G., had gone with a group of participants in the mass disorder to the intersection of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street, where he had advanced, throwing stones, and had been injured. He had then been transported by a group of unidentified people to hospital. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about twenty people, including A.B., G.G., eyewitnesses K.A. and V.A. and Samvel Harutyunyan’s father and legal heir, the applicant Edik Harutyunyan, the records of photographic identification by K.A. and V.A., the results of an investigative experiment with their participation and other material in the criminal case file;
(h)  Zakar Hovhannisyan (paragraphs 58-60 above) and his friend, Ar.Av., had gone to the area of the mass disorder at around 11 p.m. on 1 March 2008. Between midnight and 1 a.m. Zakar Hovhannisyan and other participants in the mass disorder had been in the vicinity of Mashtots Avenue, where he had been shot. Ar.Av. had fled the scene, while Zakar Hovhannisyan had been transported to hospital by a group of unidentified people. Even though Ar.Av., who had avoided appearing before the investigating authority for a year and a half, had denied having been in the area of the mass disorder and having witnessed the incident, this fact had been confirmed by interviews with about fifteen people, including Zakar Hovhannisyan’s brother-in-law V.S., his friends N.M. and V.Y., the latter’s father A.Y., Ar.Av.’s friend G.M. and other material in the criminal case file. According to operational information, Zakar Hovhannisyan had been engaged in the mass disorder by Armen Farmanyan (see this same paragraph, under letter (a));
(i)  Tigran Abgaryan (paragraphs 61-63 above) had been shot by one of the participants in the mass disorder at around 11 p.m. on 1 March 2008, while stationed on Leo Street. The shot had been fired from the corner of Grigor Lusavorich Street. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews conducted with around thirty people, including his fellow servicemen. In conclusion, it was stated in each case that the police and the NSS had been instructed to carry out operational measures to identify witnesses to the above-mentioned incidents and identify and find those responsible. 101. The SIS document then described the criminal investigation, stating that, since criminal case no. 62202608 had also been instituted on the grounds of mass disorder involving murder (see paragraph 65 above and paragraph 139 below), the deaths had been investigated within the scope of those proceedings. Later, after amendments had been made to Articles 104 and 225 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 83 above), a new criminal case had been instituted under Article 104 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 84 above). Dozens of people had been questioned, including the police officers and the servicemen of the Police Troops who had taken part in the quelling of the mass disorder. All records of the booking in and out of weapons had been seized from the relevant military units of the Police Troops, the records had been studied and all weapons removed from the arsenal had been identified. All firearms and special means assigned to the police officers and the servicemen of the Police Troops performing service in the area of the mass disorder, as well as those which had been removed from the arsenal for the purposes of internal service, had been seized and subjected to ballistic examinations. The bullets removed from the bodies of Davit Petrosyan, Hovhannes Hovhannisyan and Zakar Hovhannisyan had been compared with the cartridge cases found at the scene of the incident, as well as with the bullets registered in the National Bullet and Cartridge Case Inventory and the bullets fired from the weapons assigned to the police officers and the servicemen of the Police Troops who had taken part in the quelling of the mass disorder. No matches had been made and the weapons from which the shots had been fired had not been identified. Taking into account the fact that the shot marks on the particles of the Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenades removed from the bodies of Gor Kloyan, Tigran Khachatryan and Armen Farmanyan were unsuitable for matching with a specific weapon, it had not been established from which weapon the fatal shots had been fired. The fact that a match could not be made between the Cheremukha-7 gas grenade particles removed from the bodies and the weapons from which they had been fired had also been confirmed by the relevant agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia (see paragraph 82 above). The movements of those who had fired special means, the number of shots fired by them, the locations from which those shots had been fired and the trajectories of those shots had been established (as far as possible) through interviews. 102. The SIS document also referred to the fact that a criminal case had been instituted on 13 July 2009 under Article 373 § 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 85 above) and stated that the relevant investigation had identified the four officers who had fired the KS-23s. Charges had been brought against them for the involuntary manslaughter of Armen Farmanyan, Tigran Khachatryan and Gor Kloyan. It further referred to the findings of the experts of the Russian Ministry of the Interior (see paragraphs 80 and 82 above), adding that they had also established that, after ricocheting off a wall or other obstacle or after passing through an obstacle, Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges were capable of causing injuries to people, including fatal ones, depending on the angle of collision and the type of obstacle. Furthermore, during his visit to Yerevan from 19 to 24 November 2008 the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights had recommended to the Prosecutor General an Irish expert, C.B., who had specialist knowledge of the use of special means. The expert had been invited to Yerevan to take part in the examination aimed at matching the gas grenades removed from the victims’ bodies with the specific firearms from which the Cheremukha‑7 special means had been fired by the police servicemen. Having received all the information and material by email, C.B. had stated that such matching was impossible. 103. The SIS document further stated that the investigation had established that, during the mass disorder and in the process of quelling it, weapons of various types and calibres, including KS-23s, had been used by both the participants in the disorder, and the police officers and the servicemen of the Police Troops, and that various explosive devices, including military grenades, had been used against the police officers and the servicemen of the Police Troops. 104. Lastly, it was stated in the SIS document that, following instructions from the President of Armenia, fresh impetus had been given to the investigation. New experienced investigators had joined the investigative team, who had then studied the case material consisting of several hundred volumes and more than one hundred thousand pages, conclusions of hundreds of forensic examinations, dozens of hours of video footage and other evidence. More than 500 witnesses had also been questioned. Following the examination of the video and photographic material, instructions had been given to identify a number of people who might have witnessed the use of force. The split of the proceedings
105. The Government stated that on 5 November 2014 the Prosecutor General had met with some of the applicants to discuss further investigative measures. According to the applicant Vachagan Farmanyan, he had been invited to that meeting, where he had been informed that the death cases would be separated into individual sets of proceedings without any explanation being given for that decision. 106. On 9, 10, 11 and 13 December 2014 and 29 January 2015 the SIS decided, on the instructions of the Prosecutor General, to split the proceedings concerning the deaths of the applicants’ relatives from criminal case no. 62202608 into individual sets of criminal proceedings. The three cases which concerned involuntary manslaughter as a result of a violation of the rules for the use of KS-23 type special means were examined under Article 373 § 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 85 above), while the remaining six cases were examined under Article 104 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 84 above). 107. On 8 April 2015 the applicants applied to the SIS for copies of material in the criminal case file or, alternatively, information on the investigative measures taken within the scope of the investigation, in order to submit that information to the Court at the latter’s request. 108. By letter of 9 April 2015 the Deputy Head of the SIS informed the applicants that the investigation was still pending and that therefore no copies of the material or information on the investigative measures taken could be provided.
alleged failure of the Government to cooperate
109. On 8 September 2015 notice of the applications was given to the Government who were specifically asked to submit copies of “all the relevant documents, including the results of all the ballistic and other examinations conducted in the course of the investigation” and “all the documents prepared by the parliamentary fact-finding group” (hereinafter “the FFG”) set up to assist the parliamentary ad hoc committee in its investigation of the events in Yerevan (see paragraph 125 below). 110. On 12 May 2016, after the Government had submitted their observations, the applicants wrote to the Court complaining that they had been unable to have access to certain documents and that the Government had failed to provide copies of all the material requested by the Court which was necessary for an effective examination of the case. They pointed specifically to the Government’s failure to provide the results of the forensic examinations and the documents produced by the FFG, as requested by the Court. Furthermore, the Government had made numerous submissions but had failed to disclose any evidence in support of them. The applicants asked the Court to invite the Government to submit the missing documents, including all the documents which they had relied on in their observations, as well as numerous other documents which the applicants considered relevant for the case. They also insisted that the Government submit all the video footage in the criminal case file. 111. On 18 May 2016 the Court forwarded the applicants’ letter to the Government, drawing their attention to the fact that their observations had not included the documents requested in its communication letter of 8 September 2015 (see paragraph 109 above) and inviting the Government to submit those documents. 112. On 1 June 2016 the Government submitted a number of documents, including the results of the post-mortem examinations (see paragraph 67 above), ballistic examinations (see paragraph 72 above), joint ballistic and chemical examinations (see paragraph 74 above) and joint trace evidence, ballistic and explosive technical examinations (see paragraph 75 above), as well as a number of other forensic examinations conducted during the investigation. As regards the FFG’s material, the Government replied that the FFG had not produced any final reports save that concerning the police officer H.T., who had been the tenth victim of the events in question. However, that document was irrelevant for the present case since no application had been lodged by H.T.’s relatives. The Government added that if the applicants or the Court pointed to any document prepared by the FFG, it would be provided immediately if available. 113. On 9 June 2016 the Court wrote to the Government, indicating that it appeared from the material in the case file that the FFG and/or its individual members had produced at least two documents (see paragraphs 126 and 127 below) and inviting them to submit copies of those documents. 114. On 23 June 2016 the Government replied that the FFG had not received from its individual members the two above-mentioned documents or any other document related to the issues raised in the case produced by its individual members. 115. On 7 July 2016 the applicants wrote to the Court, pointing to the fact that the Government had provided a “strange” explanation for refusing to provide the FFG’s documents. They further complained about the quality of some of the documents provided and the fact that the Government had only provided copies of the results of four ballistic examinations when they had been asked to provide all of them. According to the SIS document (paragraphs 96-104 above), more than 800 forensic examinations had been ordered and more than 5,000 witnesses had been questioned within the scope of the criminal proceedings, but the Government had provided only a handful of those documents. The applicants again requested the Court to invite the Government to provide all the material necessary for a meaningful examination of the case. Further developments
116. On 3 July 2018 a new criminal case was instituted under Article 300.1 of the Criminal Code (overthrowing the constitutional order), which was joined to criminal case no. 62202608 (see paragraph 65 above). Former President Kocharyan and a number of other high-ranking military officials were arrested and charged with overthrowing the constitutional order of Armenia during the period 23 February to 3 March 2008. It was alleged that they had unlawfully involved the armed forces in political processes in breach of the constitutional requirement that the military be politically neutral. The applicants were recognised as the victims’ legal heirs for the purposes of that case. 117. On 14 February 2019 the investigation into that case was completed and the applicants’ representative was granted access to the case file. 118. On 29 April 2019 the case was sent to trial. 119. On 20 May 2019 the trial court suspended the proceedings and applied to the Constitutional Court with a request to determine the compatibility of Article 300.1 of the Criminal Code with the Constitution. 120. On 21 June 2019 the Constitutional Court admitted the application for examination. 121. On 6 July 2020 the applicants requested the Constitutional Court to involve them as a party in the proceedings, arguing that their rights were directly affected by them. It appears that this request was either dismissed or left unanswered. 122. On 26 March 2021 the Constitutional Court adopted its decision, finding Article 300.1 of the Criminal Code incompatible with the Constitution and declaring that provision invalid. 123. On 6 April 2021 the charges against Mr Kocharyan and several other high-ranking officials were dropped and the criminal case was discontinued in view of the outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court (for further details regarding the criminal case against former President Kocharyan and the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, see Advisory opinion concerning the use of the “blanket reference” or “legislation by reference” technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law [GC], request no. P16‑2019‑001, Armenian Constitutional Court, §§ 16-21, 29 May 2020). 124. The Government asserted, without providing further details, that as of December 2021 there were several criminal cases pending against the former Minister of Defence and other individuals for overthrowing the constitutional order, while several high-ranking police officers and investigators were being prosecuted for falsifying documents.
parliamentary inquiry
125. On 16 June 2008 the National Assembly set up a parliamentary ad hoc committee (hereinafter “the Ad Hoc Committee”) to investigate the events which had taken place in Yerevan on 1 and 2 March 2008 and the circumstances which had led to them. Its task was to submit a conclusion to the National Assembly on the violence which had occurred, including the lawfulness and proportionality of the police’s actions, the circumstances of the deaths and recommendations on how to prevent similar events in the future. A fact-finding group (“the FFG”, see paragraph 109 above) was established in October 2008 on the recommendation of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights to assist the Ad Hoc Committee in its work. It appears that the FFG was dissolved in May 2009 because of tensions between its members. The FFG and its individual members nevertheless produced several documents related to certain aspects of the death cases, which were provided to the Ad Hoc Committee and on which the latter relied in preparing its final conclusions. Reports produced by the members of the FFGIssues related to the use of Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenades

126. One of the reports produced by the members of the FFG was entitled “Findings of the Study of Facts Related to the Use of Special Means”. It was based on interviews conducted with: (a) the four officers who had fired the Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenades, L.H., A.A., M.G. and V.S. (see paragraph 85 above); (b) the four senior officers who had given the orders to fire the tear-gas grenades, including the former Deputy Commander of the Police Troops, G.P., the Commander and the Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Detachment of the Police Troops, B.K. and M.D., and the Chief of Staff of military unit no. 1033, Ar.An.; and (c) the police official who had conducted the ballistic examination of 21 March 2008, A.H. (see paragraph 72 above). The members of the FFG also studied the relevant USSR legal instruments, such as Order no. 127 of 6 July 1989 establishing the procedure for the use of special means and an instruction manual, issued in 1990, on the use of Cheremukha-7 type special means, both of which were still in force in the Russian Federation. The report included the following passages:
“The [FFG] established that as a result of the use of Cheremukha-7 type special means, civilians Gor Kloyan, Armen Farmanyan and Tigran Khachatryan were killed, and [three other civilians] received bodily injuries. The [FFG] also discovered that [fifteen] military servicemen ... were placed in different hospitals in Yerevan with a diagnosis of poisoning ... B. Training on the Use of Special Means
[B.K.] admitted that Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades are designed to be used in enclosed spaces ... Nonetheless, in order to justify the use by the Police Troops of Cheremukha-7 in an open space, [B.K.] stated that he remembered very clearly that Cheremukha-7 was also permitted to be used during mass disorder. However, he was unable to present the sources of that information to the [FFG].
[M.D.] ... [initially] stated that special means training had been organised and conducted by [B.K.] and that due to a busy schedule he had been unable to attend the relevant course. At the end [M.D.], in contradiction to his previous statement, told the [FFG] that he had participated in both training courses and used the special means in accordance with the knowledge [he had] acquired ... [M.D.] informed the [FFG] that he knew the rules for the use of special means from personal experience and not from professional literature. At the same time, he stated that he was not aware of the existence of any such literature in the unit.
[Ar.An.] ... stated that he had conducted training on the rules of use and tactical technical parameters of special means in the detachment and that all personnel had passed the required tests. When asked by the [FFG] about the difference between Cheremukha-7 and Cheremukha-4, [Ar.An.] responded that they had different shapes and different methods of use, [but] avoided responding in what circumstances each should be used, stating only that both types were tear-generating. It became known to the [FFG] that [Ar.An.] had overseen the use of special means by the officers of military unit no. 1033.
[L.H.] and [A.A.] ... confirmed that they had attended the above-mentioned training. In addition, the [FFG] was provided with documents proving that the training had taken place and that all the above-mentioned individuals had successfully passed the tests. C. Order to Use Special Means
[G.P.] ... first stated that nobody had given an order to use KS-23 carbines to fire Cheremukha-7 special means in the direction of the crowd, killing three and injuring three protestors. According to [G.P.], they had received an order to shoot at the car moving toward them and ... the servicemen equipped with special means had shot in the direction of the protestors on their own initiative. In response to the [FFG]’s question as to whether the Police Troops had had the authority to shoot at the driver of the vehicle with Cheremukha-7 special means, [G.P.] answered that ‘they’ had had the power to shoot at the driver of the vehicle and that they were not accountable to anybody for giving such an order. In response to the [FFG]’s question as to whether ‘they’ had been authorised by the law to shoot in the direction of the crowd with Cheremukha-7, [G.P.] stated that he did not want to answer that question and that their actions had been in accordance with the law.
... [G.P.] also stated that the special means they had used had been outdated and that after shooting, the smoke, instead of being exhaled, had started to spread over the area, causing the poisoning of several soldiers. He had raised the issue with the Armenian authorities, but no money had been allocated to obtain special means.
... [B.K.] ... confirmed that Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenades were designed to be used in enclosed spaces and Cheremukha-4 in open spaces during mass disorder, and that both could not be used against groups of people. Initially, [B.K.] stated that the officers equipped with special means ... had not received any special instructions to fire Cheremukha-7. Nevertheless, after we presented him with his statement given in the preliminary investigation in which he had testified that he had given the order to fire Cheremukha-7, [B.K.] told us that he had received that order from ... [G.P.] and passed it on to the members of his team (Special Operations Detachment) [officers A.A. and L.H.], who had been armed with KS-23 carbines and Cheremukha-7 tear‑gas grenades. According to [B.K.], several people came out from the left archway next to the fish shop and started throwing stones in their direction, after which he gave the order to fire Cheremukha-7, thereby violating the requirements of Order no. 127. In addition, [B.K.] told the [FFG] that at the intersection of Leo Street and Paronyan Street a truck had been heading in their direction, so he had ordered [A.A.] to fire Cheremukha-7 toward the windscreen of the truck, in the direction of the [passenger seat]. However, he could not give any reasonable explanation as to how it was that Tigran Khachatryan, who had been found next to a similar truck ... had died from injuries (blow to the head from behind) inflicted by the Cheremukha-7. In that regard, the officer of the Special Operations Detachment ... [A.A.] told the [FFG] that ... he had used the special means at a distance of 30 metres from those gathered in front of the Russian embassy and fired in the direction of Leo Street. He stated that he had fired in the direction of [the] truck slowly coming towards the soldiers at a distance of 20 metres.
[Another officer of the Special Operations Detachment, L.H.,] told the [FFG] that ... they had initially fired rubber bullets at the legs of the demonstrators in order to stop them advancing. After they had failed to stop the movement, [B.K.] had given the order to fire Cheremukha-7. According to him, he had fired first across the walls and then across the kerb of the pavement near the fish shop. In response to the [FFG]’s question as to why they had not obeyed the law and warned the people by loudspeaker that they were going to use special means against them and given them sufficient time to act appropriately, [B.K.] replied that this should have been done by the Commander of the Police Troops and that he had not received any order to warn the demonstrators by loudspeaker of the use of special means and to give them time to disperse.
... [M.D.] who was in charge of the officers equipped with special means ... stated that Cheremukha-4 and Cheremukha-7 were designed for use during mass disorder. [M.D.] told the [FFG] that they had had Cheremukha-4 and Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenades at their disposal and that ‘they’ had fired the Cheremukha-4 and Cheremukha-7 in the direction of the crowd, without effect. They had fired in the direction of the archway near the fish shop with Cheremukha‑4 but to no avail, [and had] therefore at the same time fired with Cheremukha-7. ... [M.D.] contradicted himself by saying that during the firing with Cheremukha-7 the people had been quite far from them, which cast doubt on the need for and objective of using Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenades.
... Although in his evidence to the preliminary investigation body [Ar.An.] had stated that [G.G.], the Commander of the Police Troops, had given the order to fire with Cheremukha-7, he nevertheless explained to the FFG that [G.G.] had ordered that only the vehicle be fired at ...
... E. Study of the ballistic examinations of the gas grenades
The ballistic expert [A.H.], while testifying before the FFG with regard to the examination of the Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenades, stated that he had used Soviet‑era Order no. 127 and the internet while conducting the examination. [A.H.] told the FFG that he knew nothing about the tectonic and technical data of Cheremukha-7 because of a lack of relevant material, which made the FFG have doubts, given that Order no. 127 provides complete information on the tectonic and technical data of Cheremukha-7. In response to the FFG’s question about the cases in which Cheremukha-7 can be used, [A.H.] answered that he had no idea. In response to the next question: [why] he had mentioned in Conclusion no. 389 that Cheremukha‑7 were special means designed to preserve public order, expert [A.H.] answered that he had read about it on the internet, even though Order no. 127 explicitly defines the cases in which Cheremukha-7 can be used (see Chapter A) ...”
The death of Tigran Abgaryan
127. Another report produced by two members of the FFG, entitled “Circumstances of the death of Tigran Abgaryan, serviceman of the 2nd battalion of unit no. 1033 of the Police Troops of Armenia”, pointed out what they believed to be a number of shortcomings in the investigation into the circumstances of his death, including in the conduct of the forensic examinations (see paragraphs 62 and 75 above). In preparing this report, the FFG members interviewed several officers of the Police Troops of various ranks. One of them, the Chief of Staff, alleged that he had witnessed one of the participants in the mass disorder shoot at Tigran Abgaryan from behind the corner of a building. He was then shot himself by a sniper, but still managed to flee. Conclusion of the Ad Hoc Committee
128. On 17 September 2009 the Ad Hoc Committee issued its report (hereinafter “the Conclusion”) examining the events leading up to the clashes of 1 March 2008, the police operation at Freedom Square and the developments which followed that operation until the declaration of a state of emergency. As regards, in particular, the events which unfolded in Yerevan after the dispersal of the assembly at Freedom Square, the Conclusion contained, in so far as relevant, the following findings:
“1. Despite separate instances noted in this Report, the Committee has drawn the conclusion that the actions of the police, aimed at thwarting the ... events [that took] place in Yerevan on 1-2 March 2008 [after the police operation at Freedom Square] and later the mass disorder, were generally lawful and in line with the requirements of [domestic law].
... 3. In the opinion of the Committee, the actions carried out by the police [were] not arranged and organised sufficiently operationally, while the actions of separate police officers [were] of low professional competence; otherwise it might have been possible to reduce the occurrence of serious consequences. 4. The studies of the Committee [have] revealed that the Cheremukha-7, as a special means, was applied by the Police Troops of Armenia, particularly by the non‑commissioned officers of ... unit no. 1033 and the Special Operations Detachment, who, in using the means, did not always follow the required safety rules, according to which Cheremukha-7, as a special means, is prohibited [for] use in the direction of gatherings of people; this has been affirmed by the technical expert examination conclusion of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia. (As a result, six civilians ... received bodily injuries from the cartridges of Cheremukha-7 special means, three of whom died. The instance that those tear-gas cartridges were used in breach of the required safety rules is supported by the fact that [eleven] servicemen of the Police Troops were also poisoned and received bodily injuries of varying degrees due to the gas emitted during the use of the cartridges). As a result, the use of Cheremukha-7 special means, while probably compelled by the situation, [was] nevertheless unlawful. 5. The Committee finds it necessary to note that, in terms of effectiveness, the cartridges of Cheremukha-7 special means are intended for enclosed areas. (In response to the Committee’s inquiry, the [Armenian] police have stated that the Cheremukha-7 type gas cartridges, considered [to be] special means, which were used against the participants [in] the event, were last acquired in 1990, meaning that they [were] 18 years old, whereas their shelf life is five years. It is probably because of being expired that part of those cartridges [did not maintain the intended qualities]. Conclusion no. 1466 of the forensic ballistic expert examination, carried out by the [Expert] Criminological Department of the [Armenian] police, states that the experimental shots of Cheremukha-7 cartridges provided for examination have revealed that in 40% of the fired cartridges, there [was] no discernible gas leakage from the gas grenades; meanwhile, low flying speed of gas grenades [was] also observed.)
6. The Committee concludes that in technical, organisational and moral‑psychological terms the police [were] not adequately prepared to prevent the mass disorder and similar difficult situations. Several facts attest to this, including the two futile attempts of installing the barbed wire, the ineffective use of water cannons, and in general the other actions aimed at preventing the mass disorder. 7. The Committee finds that the police [were] unprepared and [were] unable to foresee such developments of events in advance, which would have allowed them to control and manage the overall course of events, whereas they ... resisted the actions of the participants in the mass disorder with great difficulty. 8. Moreover, the Committee admits the fact that the 1 March events were unprecedented in their nature and scale; in fact, not only the police, but also our whole society were taken aback by this, and evidently the police could objectively be unprepared for such developments. 9. In this respect, the Committee considers it important that the police troop forces engaged in ensuring public order and public safety should gradually be remanned with professional staff. 10. The police officers and Police Troops servicemen engaged in ensuring public order and public safety should regularly undergo professional requalification.
... 11. The Committee states that the actions of various subdivisions of the [Armenian] police were not coordinated and organised, and certain personnel members [fell into] panic ... 12. The Committee considers as requisite the technical-material re-equipping of the police with technical and special means which will be more effective and safe when applied. 13. The Committee also considers ... important the establishment of a legal framework for carrying out actions aimed at ensuring public order and safety, particularly as to the use of physical force, special means and weapons. 14. The Committee finds that officers of all power structures engaged in ensuring public order, defending safety, and involved in states of emergency are obliged to wear appropriate uniforms with distinctive emblems; an aspect which was not adhered to in certain cases. (Video-recording no. 2 shows a young person in civilian clothing armed with a sub-machine gun in the presence of police officers. Yet it turned out that this person [was] a serviceman driver of the Ministry of Defence who reported to duty in civilian clothing due to the urgent call).”
129. The Conclusion further included a chapter dedicated to examining the circumstances of the deaths. The death cases were studied individually, with the case of Tigran Abgaryan receiving a more detailed examination. In doing so, the Ad Hoc Committee examined the document concerning the circumstances of Tigran Abgaryan’s death prepared by the members of the FFG (see paragraph 127 above) and the comments made in reply by the SIS, reaching, in so far as relevant, the following findings:
“Since the bullet causing the gunshot wound to Tigran Abgaryan was not found, a joint forensic trace evidence, forensic ballistic and explosive technical examination of his uniform was therefore ordered. The conclusion of the examination states: ‘Damage present on the military winter jacket is that of a firearm, of a bullet nature, caused by a bullet containing copper and as a result of at least one shot in the front‑to‑back direction. The described firearm damage to the military winter jacket is exit damage’. According to the hypothesis of the police and [preliminary investigation body], Tigran Abgaryan died of a gunshot fired from a firearm by a participant in the mass [disorder]. However, since the preliminary investigation has not yet revealed the identity of the person whose firearm gunshot caused the death of Tigran Abgaryan, the Committee may not refute the hypothesis put forward by the police and the preliminary investigation body, or put forward another hypothesis.
... The Committee ... states that the position of the [members of the FFG] is inconclusive ... [and that] the hypothesis put forward by [them] is inadmissible. However, the Committee is not satisfied with the actions of the preliminary investigation body, since so far the circumstances of Tigran Abgaryan’s death, and particularly the perpetrator, as well as the instrument of crime ... have not been fully established. As regards the conclusions of the forensic medical examinations, the Committee finds that a number of conclusions provided by the Republic Scientific-Practical Centre of Forensic Medicine of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Armenia are sometimes incomprehensible even for professionals and, of course, [have] resulted in various interpretations, assumptions and ambiguities. The same applies to forensic chemical ... ballistic ... explosive technical and other examinations.”
130. The Ad Hoc Committee further examined the question of the need for and lawfulness of the use of special means, including the above‑mentioned document prepared in this regard by the FFG (see paragraph 126 above) and the comments made in reply by the SIS, reaching, in so far as relevant, the following findings:
“Issues related to the lawfulness of [the use of] special means by the Police Troops of the Republic of Armenia and to the adherence to safety rules during their use became a subject of special examination and consideration by the Committee, taking into account in particular the fact that the use of these means led to the death of three people and bodily injuries of varying degrees to another three, as well as intoxication by tear gas which caused bodily injuries to eleven servicemen of the Police Troops. The examination revealed:
On 1 March 2008, at about [7.30 p.m., G.G.], Commander of the Police Troops of the Republic of Armenia, together with about 800 servicemen of the Police Troops, was at the crossroads of G. Lusavorich Street and Mashtots Avenue. According to his instruction, 350 servicemen were taken to Shahumyan Square, and about 450 servicemen of the Police Troops remained in place, standing in three lines. The servicemen of the Police Troops who stood in the [first] and [second] lines carried only rubber batons and protective shields, whereas the non-commissioned officers positioned in the [third] line were also armed with special means. According to the clarifications provided by [G.G.] during the sitting of the Committee, only the non-commissioned officers of unit no. 1033 of the Police Troops and those of the Special Operations Detachment were armed with special means. At about [7.45 p.m.], a large group of participants in the mass [disorder], coming out from behind the barricade constructed next to the Russian embassy, moved towards the intersection of G. Lusavorich Street and Mashtots Avenue. With a view to blocking their movement towards Mashtots Avenue, the troops moved forward, while the barbed wire installing vehicle tried to block G. Lusavorich Street, across the width, with barbed wire. However, the servicemen of the Police Troops encountered active resistance from the participants in the mass [disorder], who threw stones, metal bars and bottles filled with flammable substances, that is, so-called ‘Molotov cocktails’, at them. During the clash, various servicemen of the Police Troops received bodily injuries of varying degrees and of different [kinds], while the barbed wire installing vehicle was hijacked by the participants in the mass [disorder]. In order not to increase the number of wounded among the personnel and to provide them with medical assistance, [G.G.] decided to withdraw the personnel and move them towards Leo Street and Paronyan Street, creating a turtle formation called ‘testudo’, and to apply special means, rubber and blank cartridges, with the purpose of preventing the attacks. The second big clash among the participants in the mass [disorder] and the servicemen of the Police Troops took place in the area of Leo Street and Paronyan Street, at about [9 p.m.], where Police Troops officer [H.T.] received fragmentation injuries from the explosion of a grenade fuse, and the Police Troops were again compelled to use special means to halt the advancing of the participants in the mass [disorder] and prevent attacks on them. During the operations, the Police Troops had the following special means: 10 units of Kornet type pistols intended for firing rubber cartridges, 4 units of KS-23 rifles intended for firing Cheremukha-7 and Siren-7 tear-gas cartridges and Volna-R type rubber cartridges, 7 units of SPSh type pistols intended for firing Cheremukha-4 type tear-gas cartridges, 15 units of Cheremukha-1, 15 units of Cheremukha-5, 80 units of Siren-6 and 16 units of Dreif type tear-gas grenades, 7 units of Zarya and 5 units of Kasset type stun grenades, 154 units of Cheremukha-4, 89 units of Cheremukha‑7 and 5 units of Siren-7 tear-gas cartridges, 180 units of Volna-R type rubber cartridges and 130 rubber cartridges for Kornet pistols. Of the aforementioned means, 79 units of Cheremukha-4, 56 units of Cheremukha-7 tear-gas cartridges, 29 units of Siren‑6, 4 units of Dreif tear-gas grenades, 4 units of Zarya, 2 units of Kasset stun grenades, 129 units of Volna-R rubber cartridges and 62 units of rubber cartridges for Kornet pistols were used. Of the 56 units of Cheremukha-7 tear-gas cartridges used, 39 were used by two non-commissioned officers of the special operations detachment of the Police Troops of the Republic of Armenia (20 units and 19 units), while 17 units were used by two non‑commissioned officers of unit no. 1033 (8 units and 9 units).”
131. Lastly, the Conclusion contained the following general findings of the Ad Hoc Committee:
“Considering the fact that during the mass [disorder] in the above-mentioned locations three citizens – Armen Farmanyan, Gor Kloyan and Tigran Khachatryan – died by special means cartridges, in particular ‘Cheremukha-7’ type gas grenade cartridges, the Committee made a finding that they were probably used either in the direction of congregations of people or [that] it happened as a result of shots rebounding off concrete walls, other barricades or barriers. During the sitting of the Committee of 30 April 2009, in response to the question of [N.Z.], a member of the Committee, on how it was possible to explain the fact that people had died as a result of the use of Cheremukha-7 special means, [H.H.], former [Chief of Police], answered that injuries [could] be caused if it [was] fired in the direction of people at close range. He continued: ‘Maybe it was not fired at the right angle; maybe there were clashes, since at that time the situation was chaotic’. The circumstance of using those tear-gas cartridges in contravention of the prescribed safety rules is also supported by the fact that [eleven] servicemen of the Police Troops were also poisoned and received bodily injuries of varying severity. This is also supported by [a number of expert examinations]. Page 55 of the Conclusion describes in detail that the gas grenades of 40% of the fired cartridges did not have noticeable gas leaks; low flying speed of gas grenades was recorded, the gas cartridges had been received in 1990, and their prescribed storage life is five years. The Committee expresses its reservations with regard to the attitude of the [Armenian] police since, despite the fact that the Committee applied to the police requesting them to provide the relevant instruction on safety rules for the application and use of special means, the latter was not provided. Only in connection with the termination of the activities of the [FFG] was the instruction that the police had provided to the [FFG] transferred to us, together with the other documentation. The Instruction on the Procedure for the Use of Special Means by the Bodies of Internal Affairs and Internal Troops was approved by Order no. 127 of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR of 6 July 1989, which, however, was repealed in the Republic of Armenia in 2006, together with other legal acts. It means that up to the present moment the Police Troops of the Republic of Armenia do not have a procedure which prescribes the rules for keeping and using special means or the safety rules thereof. Point 1.3 of the ... Instruction defines the cases for the use of special means; in particular, point 1.3.1 provides that special means shall also be used to prevent mass [disorder], as well as group violations of public order accompanied by violence. According to the ‘General Directions’ chapter of the Instruction, KS-23 carbines are designed for opening aimed fire with Cheremukha-7 gas grenade cartridges (page 14); however, it is prohibited to open fire in the direction of congregations of people, as well as to fire at offenders at point-blank range. Point 2.6 of the Instruction explicitly states: ‘A Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade is designed for opening aimed fire inside buildings, creating a gas cloud therein’. Although the same Instruction does not contain any direct ban on the use of Cheremukha-7 special means in open spaces, nevertheless, we think that its use was inappropriate and inexpedient, since it could not lead to desirable results. The Committee also notes that, although the above-mentioned Instruction was repealed in 2006, the [Armenian] police have not yet adopted a new instruction replacing it. In spite of detailed investigations carried out by the preliminary investigation body and ourselves, the Committee states that, unfortunately, it was technically impossible to identify the KS-23 carbines and, consequently, the person armed with them whose shots caused the deaths of three citizens ... For this purpose, forensic ballistic examinations were arranged both in the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation. In particular, the KS-23 carbines that fired Cheremukha-7 cartridges and the Cheremukha-7 cartridges removed from the bodies of the dead ... people, were sent to the Expert Criminological Department of the [Armenian] police to find out the following:
1.  whether it is possible to identify Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades with the weapons which fired them;
2.  whether there are traces – useful for identification – on [the] Cheremukha-7 type cartridges removed from the [bodies] of the victims. According to Conclusion no. 1466 of the Expert Criminological Department of the [Armenian] police, the experts arrived at the following conclusions:
1.  ’In [the event] of ricochet after colliding with a wall or any other obstacle, as well as after passing through any obstacle, Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades may, depending on the collision angle and characteristics of the material of the obstacle, cause bodily – including fatal – injuries to a human being’. 2. As a result of gas leaking from Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges, the plastic floating caps undergo a thermal reaction, melt and are no longer useful for identification purposes. As a result of collision or contact with an obstacle, side mechanical traces – damage, scratches – appear and these also impede identification. 3. Traces of shooting on the plastic floating caps of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades submitted for expert examination are unsuitable for identification of a specific unit of weapon, since the specifics of the bore are not clearly marked on them and metallic corpuses of gas grenades do not bear traces of contact with the bore and are therefore unsuitable for identification of the shooting unit of the weapon. The [SIS] also applied to the Special Equipment and Communication Research and Production Association State Institution of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation, providing [the] KS-23 carbines that fired [the] Cheremukha-7 gas grenade cartridges, as well as [the] Cheremukha-7 gas grenades removed from the [bodies] ... of the victims, and asked for answers to the following questions:
a. What is the maximum storage life of Cheremukha-7 type cartridges? Are cartridges produced in 1986 and 1989 suitable for intended use?
b. When the storage life of cartridges has expired, is their use for intended purpose possible, taking into account the risk of causing injury to people’s health and life?
c. Is the use of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges prohibited in open spaces? If not, [in what] manner [may they be used]?
d.  [Has] any methodology [been] developed, and is identification of Cheremukha‑7 type gas grenades with the rifles from which they were fired possible? The following answers were received:
a. The maximum storage life of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges is no more than five years.
b.  [After the] expiry of the shelf life, the performance characteristics of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges may undergo changes, that is, reduced combat characteristics, reduced duration of tear [gas] emission, reduced maximum [range] of the gas grenade, failure of cartridges due to malfunction of percussion caps. The use of expired Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges against people will not cause injury to their health and life.
c. The use of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges in open spaces is not prohibited. While using Cheremukha-7 and Cheremukha-7 M type gas grenade cartridges, firing directly at a human being is prohibited. Fire may be opened against sites or objects around the offenders; moreover, the direction of the wind that provides the spread of the fume cloud over the offenders should be taken into account.
d. Our organisation is not entitled to conduct ballistic examinations and does not have any information on the methods of identification of the given type of cartridges and units of weapon. It is expedient to address this question to the Expert Criminological Centre of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation. To obtain an answer to the last question, both the Committee and the [SIS] applied to the Expert Criminological Centre of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation, which provided Conclusion no. 913, stating that:
‘Traces of bore of a firing weapon on the surface of metal shells of gas grenades were not detected. This is explained by the fact that there is no direct contact between the surface of the shell and internal surface of the bore of gas grenades, since polymeric obturators – designed for sliding the grenade through the pilot segment of the barrel of the carbine and blocking the powder gases – cover the shell from both sides. Traces of bore on the polymeric caps are unsuitable for the purpose of identifying the unit of weapon originating those traces.’
With a request to identify Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges with the units of weapon from which they were fired, the Committee also asked the group of experts who arrived from the USA and who had investigated the events of 11 September 2001, as well as the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, to conduct a relevant examination by international experts, [but] the answer was that it [was] technically impossible. This is also supported by the answer of the Irish expert [C.B.] addressed to the [SIS], [who said] ‘I do not think it is possible to establish which particular weapon it was fired from as grenades, unlike bullets, do not have a forensic signature’. However, the Committee gave a positive assessment [of] the efforts of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Armenia and the [SIS] of the Republic of Armenia aimed at revealing the circumstances of the deaths of three individuals ... by Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades; specifically, a criminal case was instituted against four servicemen of the Police Troops who had applied special means during the prevention of the mass riots; they were charged with breaching the rules for handling KS-23 carbines – a special means firearm.
...
4.  [At the request] of the President of the Republic of Armenia, the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Armenia transferred to the Committee all material at the disposal of the preliminary investigation body with regard to the death of ten individuals; on the basis of the examination of this material, the Committee finds that the preliminary investigation body has undertaken all possible measures [to clarify] the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, the Committee assigns high priority to the issue of regular provision of information to the public by the preliminary investigation body on the circumstances of the death of [the] ten individuals and, particularly, on further actions aimed at identifying and bringing the perpetrators to justice.
... One of the most important tasks of the Committee is to clarify the circumstances of the deaths of the deceased. In this regard, one fact should be stated first: the Committee, within the scope of the powers vested in it, as well as [on the basis of] the comparison of [the] material and facts at its disposal, should and may only make findings concerning circumstances such as the type of weapon which caused the death, as well as the time, place, and conditions of death ... Meanwhile, the Committee has not provided an answer to one of the most problematic issues, constituting a matter of public concern, that is, whose actions caused the death, since, even if the Committee so desired, it would not be able to and is not entitled to become a preliminary investigation body and exercise powers vested exclusively in the preliminary investigation body under the criminal procedure legislation. However, the Committee is hopeful that the ongoing preliminary investigation will be able to achieve the task it was assigned. In [this] connection, it is recommended that the [SIS] undertakes all necessary measures to establish the causes of death, violence, bodily injuries and other causes. The Committee states that the operational investigative activities have so far not been effective, particularly:
(a)  ownership of the units of weapons, ammunition and other objects intended [to cause] bodily injury found on 1 March 2008 in Freedom Square and adjacent areas, and the circumstances of their presence in the area have not been fully established;
(b)  all the circumstances of the deaths of the ten individuals during the mass [disorder], the perpetrators thereof and the people who caused bodily injuries to different people have not been identified;
... (d)  all the units of weapons used during the mass [disorder] and the people who used these units of weapons, except for the case of [F.G.], have not been identified;
(e)  the people actively participating in the mass [disorder] and clearly pictured in the video-recordings circulated have not been found;
(f)  the identity of the person who fired at Tigran Abgaryan, a serviceman of the Police Troops, and made an attempt to fire at other servicemen, has not been revealed, even though the sniper of the Police Troops noticed and neutralised him by wounding (the sniper clearly described the person concerned, the precise location of injuries received);
... (l)  all the policemen who used physical force and violence against the participants in the mass [disorder] have not been identified ...”
evidence provided by the applicants
132. The applicants submitted several expert reports to the Court produced at the request of EHRAC (see paragraph 4 above), including a report on the medical aspects of the post-election deaths by J.C., a forensic pathologist, dated 21 September 2016 (see paragraph 133 below) and a report dated 26 September 2016 by D.D., a forensic practitioner in the field of firearms, ballistics and explosives (see paragraphs 134-136 below). Both experts were based in the UK. Report on the medical aspects of the post-election deaths
133. The forensic pathologist J.C. carried out an assessment of the forensic medical and ballistic examinations conducted at domestic level. The relevant parts of his report provide as follows. Gor Kloyan (see paragraphs 44-46 above) – the blackening of the surface of the pelvic bone and surrounding tissue, recorded by the forensic medical expert, could point to a fairly close-range shot in which soot had entered the wound. Furthermore, given Gor Kloyan’s moribund state on arrival at the hospital, he had obviously lost a great deal of blood by that stage and therefore early initial resuscitation might have increased his chances of survival, particularly if he had been given fluids and blood to restore his blood volume. Davit Petrosyan (see paragraphs 50-52 above) – with only kidney and liver damage, in theory, Davit Petrosyan’s injury was a survivable gunshot wound. Therefore, had he received immediate medical aid at the scene, with fluid and blood replacement, his chances of survival would have increased and the outcome might have been different. Grigor Gevorgyan (see paragraphs 53-54 above) – the gunshot wound to the head caused extensive destruction to the skull and brain, which was suggestive of an injury from a high-energy weapon (high-velocity rifle). With an entrance wound of 0.5 x 0.4 cm, the injury was consistent with the use of 5.45 mm ammunition, such as what had reportedly been available. Samvel Harutyunyan (see paragraphs 56-57 above) – the shape of the wound was not described in the forensic medical examination conclusion, that is to say whether it was linear, stellate (star-shaped) or something else. Nor was the conclusion accompanied by clinical photographs. It was difficult to speculate on what object could have caused the open injury, although interestingly the provisional diagnosis on admission had been a gunshot wound. Given what was found in some of the other deceased, it could well have been the impact of a Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenade which had no longer had the force to fully penetrate. However, it could also have been any variety of heavy non-firearm object used as a weapon. Tigran Abgaryan (see paragraphs 61-63 above) – the entrance wound measuring 3 cm was very large in size, while the hole in the coat collar interestingly measured only 19 x 9 mm. Wounds caused by, for example, 5.45 mm or 9 mm bullets would be around 6 mm and 9 mm in diameter respectively. A shotgun fired at close range would produce a large round wound around 3 cm diameter, but there was nothing at all to suggest that Tigran Abgaryan’s injury had been caused by such a weapon. A wound caused by a Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenade would also be large, but again there was little from the description of the injury, particularly the internal findings, to suggest that a tear-gas grenade had been the cause of that injury. The forensic medical expert had not, however, made any comment on these matters. As a general comment, J.C. noted that the general feature of the autopsy reports was that the forensic medical experts had recorded their findings but had failed to comment on what those findings might mean. For example, there was nothing about the nature of Grigor Gevorgyan’s gunshot wound (potentially caused by a high-energy firearm), the possible causes of Samvel Harutyunyan’s head injury (potentially a heavy weapon or impact from a tear‑gas grenade) or even a simple comment on the unusual occurrence of deaths caused by tear-gas grenades generally. J.C. further noted that it had made no sense to describe the cause of death of Armen Farmanyan (see paragraphs 37-40 above) and Tigran Khachatryan (see paragraphs 41‑43 above) as an “injury to the head” and to state that “no firearm injuries had been detected” because a tear-gas grenade fired into the skull from a firearm was still considered a firearm injury. As regards the ballistic properties of tear-gas grenades, namely the speed at which they leave the grenade launchers, their effective range and their power to penetrate the body, those were questions more for a firearms expert. However, it would seem unlikely that a tear-gas grenade which had struck something else first, that is to say ricocheted, would then have the power to penetrate someone’s skull, unless very close by. Report by the forensic practitioner in the field of firearms, ballistics and explosives
134. The forensic practitioner D.D. examined the circumstances of the deaths from a ballistics perspective. The relevant parts of his report provide as follows. Deaths resulting from tear-gas grenades
135. The injuries sustained by Armen Farmanyan (see paragraphs 37‑40 above), Tigran Khachatryan (see paragraphs 41-43 above) and Gor Kloyan, (see paragraphs 44-46 above) who had died after being struck by Cheremukha-7 tear-gas grenades, had been severe and the energy of the projectiles at the point of impact had been sufficient to cause them to penetrate to a significant depth, passing through bone and body tissue. Because the projectiles had retained such high energy this suggested a close range, however, it was not possible to provide the specific distance without carrying out comparative testing. It was feasible that sufficient energy could be retained to break human bones, including the skull, after a ricochet in certain circumstances, for instance if the overall range was close and if relatively little energy was absorbed by impact of the ricochet. As regards Armen Farmanyan (see paragraphs 37-40 above), given the energy with which the projectile had struck the victim, it was quite probable that the damage to the projectile had been caused by impact with his skull. There was no evidence of a very close-range discharge, but as the projectile had clearly retained great energy when it had struck, the range could not have been such that the initial discharge energy had been greatly depleted. As the plastic cap had been recovered from inside the skull, it seemed that the cap had become detached either as a result of the impact with the skull or due to friction caused as it had travelled into the skull. As regards Tigran Khachatryan (see paragraphs 41-43 above), some form of impact had probably caused the separation of the plastic caps from the body of the projectile and it could be that it had resulted from the victim being struck. However, the possibility that the caps had detached prior to this could not be completely excluded. The catastrophic damage to the victim’s skull indicated that the projectile had retained a great degree of energy, so if it had struck any object prior to contact with the victim, it had not been sufficient to deplete its energy significantly. There was nothing to refute the proposition that the damage had been caused by the victim’s skull being struck and that there had been no prior impact or ricochet. As regards Gor Kloyan (see paragraphs 44-46 above), the projectile recovered from his body did not appear to be significantly disrupted and, given that it had caused a fracture to the upper part of the left pubic bone, the impact to the bone must have been significant. Consequently, it seemed quite possible that the tear in the grenade cap could have been caused by the bone being struck. The somewhat dismissive view in the ballistic report failed to offer any possibilities as to the nature of the six tiny particles removed from the victim’s body. It seemed that the particles had either resulted from the discharge of the weapon itself or had been carried into the wound cavity by the projectile. It could not be ruled out that the particles had been ejecta which, if correct, indicated very close-range discharge. The reference in the forensic medical conclusion to the “slightly blackened surface” of the pubic bone might be thought to be another close-range effect. However, it would be expected that any such effect would appear on clothing and skin and that the intervening tissue would prevent the bone being affected. Consequently, the cause of the blackening was not apparent. It would have therefore been prudent to allow experts specialising in examining clothing – because they applied microscopic and chemical analysis – to examine the six particles in question in order to determine whether they were gunshot particles. D.D. further noted that, if only one fatality had been caused by the impact of a Cheremukha-7 projectile, the possibility that there had been no intention to strike the victim might be considered. However, it would seem unlikely that three individuals had been struck by gas canisters travelling with such high velocity as to cause fatal injury, unless they had been targeted. While it was not possible to assess the range, the fact that the projectiles had retained a very high kinetic energy suggested a relatively close range, although comparative testing could assist in this regard. Such testing could have been carried out by those investigating the deaths. Deaths resulting from live ammunition
136. D.D. then turned to the cases involving death by firearms, noting that no analysis appeared to have been carried out to identify the particular weapons used to discharge the fatal 5.45 mm and 9 mm bullets. If test‑fired bullets from the weapons deployed had been compared to the bullets recovered, it would have been possible that the specific weapon used to discharge the bullets could have been identified by microscopic comparison. In the absence of short-range effects, such as scorching, stellate tearing of the skin and tattooing, there was nothing to indicate contact or a very close-range discharge in respect of the injuries caused by the 5.45 mm and 9 mm bullets. The shots therefore could have been fired from any distance greater than around 1 metre. It was not known how many weapons had been deployed or discharged during the repression of the protest, but in principle it might well have been possible to link the 5.45 mm and 9 mm bullets with individual weapons by comparing the bullets to test bullets fired from the weapons potentially used. As regards the bullet recovered from Davit Petrosyan’s body specifically (see paragraph 52 above), D.D. noted that the relevant photograph showed some marks. The nature of the damage indicated a glancing blow with a solid surface, although the precise nature of the item struck by the bullet before hitting the victim could not be assessed. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Relevant domestic law and other materialCriminal Code (2003-2022, as in force at the material time)

137. Article 104 § 1 of the Criminal Code defined murder as the unlawful and premeditated killing of another person. Article 104 § 2 (10.1), which was added on 23 March 2009 (see paragraph 83 above), prescribed a penalty for murder committed during mass disorder by one of its participants. 138. Article 225.1 §§ 1 and 2 prescribed a penalty for organising and holding a public event in violation of the procedure prescribed by law and for inciting disobedience to an order to terminate a public event held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law. 139. Article 225 § 3 prescribed a penalty for organising mass disorder accompanied, inter alia, by murder. This provision was repealed on 23 March 2009 (see paragraph 83 above). 140. Article 235 §§ 1 and 2 prescribed a penalty for the illegal acquisition, sale, possession, trafficking or carrying of arms and ammunition by a group of people acting in collusion. 141. Article 316 § 2 prescribed a penalty for assault endangering the life or health of a public official or his or her next of kin in the exercise of his or her official duties. 142. Article 373 § 3 prescribed a penalty for violation of the rules governing the use of arms, ammunition, radioactive material, or explosive or other particularly dangerous devices, objects or material, resulting in manslaughter. Code of Criminal Procedure (1999-2022, as in force at the material time)The victim and the victim’s legal heir

143. Article 58 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that the decision to recognise a person who had suffered non-pecuniary, physical or pecuniary damage as a result of a criminal offence as the victim was taken by the body of inquiry, the investigator, the prosecutor or the court. 144. Article 59 § 1 (9) provided that, after the completion of the investigation, the victim was entitled to familiarise him or herself with all the material in the case file, make photocopies of any such material and copy any amount of information contained in the case file. 145. Article 80 provided that one of the victim’s next of kin who had expressed the desire to implement the rights and obligations of a deceased or incapacitated victim in the criminal proceedings was recognised as the victim’s legal heir. The decision to recognise the next of kin as the victim’s legal heir was taken by the body of inquiry, the investigator, the prosecutor or the judge, at his or her request. If several next of kin applied with such a request, the choice of the victim’s legal heir was made by the prosecutor or the judge. The victim’s legal heir participated in the proceedings instead of the victim and enjoyed the latter’s rights. Complaints against decisions and actions of the investigating authorities
146. Article 103 § 1 provided that a complaint could be brought by participants in the criminal proceedings against the actions and decisions of the authority conducting them, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code. A complaint against the actions and decisions of an investigator or an officer of a body of inquiry could be brought before the relevant prosecutor, a complaint against the actions and decisions of a prosecutor could be brought before a higher prosecutor, and a complaint against the actions and decisions of a court could be lodged with a higher court. In the cases specified by the Code, a complaint against the actions and decisions of the prosecuting authority could be lodged with a court. 147. Article 278 § 2, entitled “Scope of judicial control”, provided that a court, in the cases and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code, examined complaints concerning the lawfulness of decisions and actions of the body of inquiry, the investigator, the prosecutor and the bodies carrying out operational and intelligence measures. 148. Article 290 §§ 1 and 5, entitled “Contesting before a court unlawful and unfounded decisions and actions of a body of inquiry, an investigator, a prosecutor or bodies carrying out operational and intelligence measures”, provided that such decisions and actions could be contested before a court by the suspect, the accused, the defence lawyer, the victim, participants in the criminal proceedings and other people whose rights and lawful interests had been violated by those decisions and actions, if their complaints had not been satisfied by a prosecutor. If the complaint was found to be substantiated, the court adopted a decision obliging the body conducting the criminal proceedings to put an end to the violation of the person’s rights and freedoms. Police Act (2001, as in force at the material time)
149. Section 29 of the Police Act, entitled “Grounds, conditions and limits of the use of physical force, special means and firearms”, provides that a police officer may use physical force, special means and firearms in the cases and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act. Police officers are obliged to undergo special training and regular tests to determine their ability to act in situations requiring the use of physical force, special means and firearms. After undergoing the relevant training, a police officer is entitled to keep and carry firearms and special means. When deciding whether to use physical force, special means or firearms a police officer must be guided by the situation, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. Prior to the use of physical force, special means or firearms a police officer must give a warning about their use, providing the offender with sufficient time to comply with the lawful orders and discontinue the offence, except in cases where the delay in their use may pose an immediate threat to the life and limb of citizens or police officers, or may lead to other severe consequences, or where such a warning is impossible in the circumstances. A police officer must also: (i) try to minimise the harm caused to the offender, taking into consideration the nature of the offence, the degree of danger posed by the act or the offender to the public and the extent of resistance and disobedience shown; (ii) ensure that first aid be provided to persons who have sustained bodily injuries; and (iii) immediately report all cases of injury or death caused by the use of physical force, special means or firearms to a higher police authority. The police authority must inform promptly the victim’s next of kin and the prosecutor of the incident. The use of physical force, special means or firearms by a police officer in the cases not provided for by law or exceeding the limits of their use entails liability in accordance with the law. 150. Section 31, entitled “Use of special means”, defines special means as technical means (devices, equipment, objects or material) or police dogs included in the police’s armament, the main purpose of which is to have a direct physical or psychological impact on people or physical impact on objects. It lists the types of special means that may be used by police officers, which include, inter alia, batons, rubber bullets, handcuffs, stun grenades, water cannons, electroshock devices, police dogs and tear gas. It further lists the situations in which the special means may be used. As regards tear gas, it may be used: (a) where it is necessary (i) to disrupt an attack on citizens and a police officer; (ii) to overcome disobedience or disrupt resistance shown to a police officer or other law enforcement officers; (iii) to liberate people who have been kidnapped, unlawfully deprived of their liberty or held against their will, or housing, buildings, territories and means of transportation which have been seized; or (iv) to disrupt mass disorder and other group activities impeding the functioning of public transport, communications and other institutions; or (b) where there are sufficient grounds to believe that a person or a group of people intend to show armed resistance. All types of special means may also be used in the cases provided for in section 32(1) of the Act (see paragraph 151 below). It is prohibited to use special means against women with noticeable signs of pregnancy, obviously disabled people and minors (except in cases where they are engaging in armed attacks, armed resistance or group attacks endangering people’s life and limb), as well as when disrupting peaceful and unarmed unauthorised gatherings if they do not violate the functioning of public transport, communications and institutions. 151. Section 32(1), entitled “Application and use of firearms” lists the situations in which firearms may be used by police officers, including where it is necessary to (i) protect citizens from attacks posing a threat to their life or limb; (ii) repel an attack on a police officer posing a threat to his or her life or limb and prevent an attempt to seize his or her weapon; (iii) liberate hostages; (iv) arrest people caught committing serious or particularly serious offences against life, limb or property and attempting to flee, as well as those showing armed resistance; (v) repel group or armed attacks on citizens’ flats or territories occupied by public authorities or institutions, as well as the accompanying police force; (vi) catch people who have fled from police custody, detention or a prison facility or prevent them from fleeing, as well as repel attempts to forcibly liberate them; or (vii) prevent a person wanted for a serious or particularly serious offence from fleeing. Police Troops Act (1998)
152. Section 1 of the Police Troops Act provides that the Police Troops of Armenia are part of the police system of Armenia and are called upon to protect human rights and freedoms from unlawful encroachments and to ensure the safety of society and security of the State. 153. Section 2 provides that the tasks of the Police Troops include, inter alia, maintaining public order and ensuring public safety. 154. Section 9 provides that the Police Troops are composed of military conscripts and civilian personnel. 155. Section 10 provides that conscription into the Police Troops is carried out in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Military Service Act. 156. Section 14 provides that the duties of military units of the Police Troops, when upholding public order and ensuring public safety, include, inter alia, involvement in the prevention and disruption of mass disorder. It is prohibited to engage the Police Troops in the prevention of peaceful and unarmed assemblies, rallies, marches and demonstrations. Ad Hoc Public Report of Armenia’s Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman): On the 2008 February 19 Presidential Election and the Post-Electoral Developments
157. The Armenian Ombudsman carried out a comprehensive and in‑depth analysis of the post-election events in Armenia, some relevant parts of which were cited in the case of Mushegh Saghatelyan v. Armenia (no. 23086/08, § 124, 20 September 2018). The relevant parts not cited in that judgment provide as follows:
“3.2.2. The French Embassy (starting from 11.30 a.m. on 1 March)
At around 11 a.m. on 1 March, people started gathering on the square adjacent to the French embassy. People had gathered to express their protest and indignation about the events that had taken place earlier that morning. There is a clear correlation between the events of the morning of 1 March and what happened during the second half of the day. The events that took place during the second half of 1 March cannot be investigated without a focus on their causal link with the violence done to the demonstration participants earlier in the morning; hence, these two events should be investigated in a common framework. At 11.15 a.m. on 1 March, the police and the Police Troops detachments that were near the Opera started moving towards the French embassy. Servicemen of the Police Troops and other special detachments were standing in several directions and lines. The faces of some ‘police officers’ were covered with masks. Employees of [the Main Department for the Fight against Organised Crime of the Armenian police] were taking part in the attempt to disperse the demonstrators. Numerous provocateurs, planted among the demonstrators, were doing their best to incite clashes with the police. All of these allegations, including eyewitness accounts, must be thoroughly investigated. Unlike the Freedom Square operation earlier that morning, which was subject to the criminal procedure legislation (given the ‘build-up of arms’ hypothesis), the use of force near the French embassy is subject exclusively to the [Assemblies, Rallies, Marches and Demonstrations Act], especially its provisions regarding the termination of demonstrations and the use of special means. The police have the right to compulsorily terminate a gathering, if the gathering poses a real threat to the lives of people, health, State and public security, the public order, or may inflict considerable property damage on the State, the community, or on natural and legal persons. Therefore, the physical force applied by the police at around [12] noon on 1 March should be considered unlawful, because there was no official presentation and explanation that the gathering of citizens in the vicinity of the French embassy posed a real threat to any of the aforementioned. Moreover, up to 2 p.m. the demonstration was peaceful ... The engagement of the Police Troops of the Republic of Armenia in the attempt to disperse the citizens in the vicinity of the French embassy at [12] noon on 1 March should be considered unlawful as well because section 20 [(sic) (see paragraph 156 above)] of the Police Troops Act directly provides that ‘it shall be prohibited to engage the Police Troops in the prevention of peaceful and unarmed assemblies, rallies, marches and demonstrations’ ... It needs to be determined who issued the unlawful order to engage the Police Troops, and whether an internal investigation was instigated. The situation was different in the second half of the day, when the demonstrators became, in a sense, uncontrollable, which was accompanied with disorder. The events near the French embassy in the second half of 1 March took place in two places: (i) in the vicinity of the Myasnikyan [monument], where demonstrators had assembled and were waiting for their leader, and (ii) in the area between Mashtots Avenue and Paronyan Street and Leo Street, where discrete clashes took place between police officers and groups of people. Moreover, during the night of 1 March, the looting of shops on Mashtots Avenue and the burning of vehicles took place under questionable and controversial circumstances. It is worth noting that the participants in the demonstration in the vicinity of the French embassy did not attack any of the nearby shops ... The investigation needs to reveal whether the peaceful demonstrators gathered in the vicinity of the French embassy are actually linked to those perpetrating disorder in the nearby streets. This question is of particular legal importance from the standpoint of charging the de facto leaders of the demonstration with organising disorder in the nearby streets. The investigation should also address the infliction of firearm wounds upon the police officers, given the fact that the police have still not published any evidence of the demonstrators firing in the direction of the police officers. During the clashes in the area between Mashtots Avenue and Paronyan Street and Leo Street, eight people died, according to official information, of which seven were civilians. Four of the civilians died of firearm wounds, while the other three died because of special means (tear gas). To determine whether firearm use in the demonstrations was legitimate, the following tests should be applied:
Firearm use is lawful in any of the situations specified in [section 32 of the Police Act], including, in particular, ‘while repelling an attack made upon a police officer when his or her life or health are endangered, as well as while preventing an attempt to seize his or her weapon’. It remains to be determined whether each case of firearm use was preceded by a demonstrator’s attack on the police officers, which posed a real threat to the police officers’ life or health, or whether the police officers were the first to attack and to use firearms. If it turns out that the police could realistically achieve their objective by using special means, but instead, preferred to use firearms, then the principle of proportionality has been breached. It is worth noting that, as a result of using special means, three civilians died. In this regard, the President [of Armenia] Robert Kocharyan declared: ‘The events illustrated that what we have is rather outdated and not always safe. Had the special means truly been safer, three of the seven civilian lives could have been spared’. Here, a question arises: how did it happen that hazardous special means were used, causing three additional deaths, especially if we consider, as the President said, that we inherited those means from the Soviet period[?] The authorities responsible for the investigation should ask the following question: who ordered [the] use [of] those special means? Moreover, [section 29 of the Police Act] provides: ‘Police employees shall undergo special training and regular tests to determine their ability to act in situations requiring the use physical force, special means and firearms’. Which official is responsible for administering those tests? When were they last administered?
... [W]hen assessing [the proportionality of the use of force], it must be taken into account that the brains of the dead demonstrators were smashed. Reportedly, the police officers were shooting in the direction of the demonstrators for over an hour. Finally, there is video footage in Armenia, which shows masked individuals firing at people. The [Prosecutor General] has expressed readiness to engage UN experts in verifying the authenticity of those videos. It must be determined, in the event of using firearms when there is a considerable accumulation of people, whether it has the potential of inflicting damage upon other individuals. [Section 32 of the Police Act] explicitly prohibits firearm use when there is a considerable accumulation of people if such use has the potential of inflicting damage upon others. It should be noted that, in the provision that prohibits firearm use, the legislature has used the term ‘considerable accumulation of people’, which includes all forms of assembly. If it turns out that, in the instant case, firearms were used in a situation in which there was a real threat of inflicting damage upon other individuals, then such interference will be considered unlawful.”relevant international material

158. For the relevant Council of Europe and other international material concerning the presidential election of 19 February 2008 and the events of 1 March 2008, see Mushegh Saghatelyan (cited above, §§ 125-33) and Myasnik Malkhasyan v. Armenia (no. 49020/08, §§ 50-56, 15 October 2020). Extracts of that material not quoted in those judgments are provided below. Council of Europe bodiesParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)

(a)   Information Note on the Conclusion of the Ad Hoc Committee of the National Assembly of Armenia on the events of 1 and 2 March 2008 and “the reasons thereof” (AS/Mon(2009)38 rev2, 6 January 2010)
159. On 6 January 2010 the PACE Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) produced the Information Note on the Conclusion of the Ad Hoc Committee (see paragraphs 128-131 above). The relevant parts provide as follows:
“1.  ...the National Assembly of Armenia set up a parliamentary [Ad Hoc] Committee to conduct an inquiry into these events and ‘the reasons thereof’. However, as a result of its composition – which was dominated by representatives of the ruling coalition – and the fact that it was boycotted by the forces supporting Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan, it was concluded that this committee would not have the required credibility in the eyes of the Armenian public. 2. Therefore, on recommendation of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, an independent expert group was established by Presidential decree, which was tasked with establishing the facts with regard to the events of 1 and 2 March, as well as the circumstances that lead [sic] to them, on which basis the parliamentary [Ad Hoc] Committee could base its conclusions and recommendations. 3. Regrettably, as a result of the insurmountable tensions between the members of this fact-finding group, as well as of the continuous attempts by all sides to politicise its work, the group broke down and was disbanded by the authorities in May 2009.
... 8. When the rapporteurs of the Assembly met with the Chairman of the [Ad Hoc] Committee, the latter mentioned the difficulties the [Ad Hoc] Committee had encountered in getting materials from the authorities, especially the law enforcement and secret services. However, the report makes no mention of this.
... 10. While agreeing with the Human Rights Defender on [the underlying factors for the events of 1 and 2 March 2008], and also highlighting the effects of a lack of pluralism in the media, the [Ad Hoc] Committee, however, concludes that it is the cynical exploitation of these factors by the forces supporting Levon Ter-Petrosyan as ‘propaganda against the authorities’ that created an atmosphere of intolerance and public discontent which, in turn, was manipulated by the opposition to instigate mass disorder. 11. This rather one-sided view of the underlying causes for the political crisis, the surprising lack of criticism of the authorities and placing the blame for the polarised political climate solely on the opposition forces, especially on those supporting Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan, is regrettable as it undermines the credibility of the report by the Committee. That said, from the recommendations contained in the report (see below) it is clear that, in reality, the Committee made a far more comprehensive, and arguably more balanced, analysis of the factors that caused the crisis, than it was willing to publicise in its report.
... 17. Based on news and witness accounts, the Committee paints a picture of the protests emerging in central Yerevan, following the police actions on Freedom Square, which, fuelled by rumours that the police killed innocent protesters, quickly degenerated into practically uncontrollable riots. While the report clearly notes that opposition leaders were calling upon people to go to the area near the French Embassy, it also recognises that the overall nature of these protests was spontaneous and not premeditated. In that respect, the report confirms the position of the rapporteurs of the Assembly that the events on 1 March 2008 did not constitute a premediated attempt at a coup d’état. 18. The Committee notes that police snipers were used (despite initial claims of the authorities to the contrary) and that the police decided to have police officers, ‘armed with [AK-47] sub-machine guns’ fire tracer bullets in the air to exert psychological pressure on the protestors. 19. On the basis of their analysis of the quickly deteriorating situation, the Committee concluded that the police in general had acted lawfully, but raised serious questions with regard to the use of ‘special means’ by the police. In addition, the Committee condemned the instances of police brutality that it recognised took place in the afternoon of 1 March 2008. 20. In general, the Committee considered that the police had been inadequately prepared – in technical, organisational and ‘moral-psychological’ terms – to prevent and resolve civil disorder of the scale that took place in the afternoon of 1 March 2008.
... 27. In two of the five deaths from bullet wounds, the bullet could not be recovered, which makes it impossible to establish the type of weapon from which they were fired. Of the other three deaths as a result of bullet injuries, two were the result of a bullet fired by Makarov PM pistol, and one from a bullet fired by a Kalashnikov 47 sub‑machine gun. Given the fact that the police was firing tracer bullets with Kalashnikov sub-machine guns over the heads of the protesters (and what goes up has to come down!), as well as the fact that the Makarov PM is the standard issue sidearm of the Armenian police, it could be expected that there would be a very high statistical chance of tracing some of these bullets to the weapons that fired them. However, surprisingly, the Committee reports that the investigation services were unable to trace any of the bullets. The fact that this conclusion is not questioned by the Committee is regrettable, as the claim that the bullets cannot be traced raises a number of serious questions and could easily be construed as a possible cover-up by the police. 28. One person died as the result of a violent impact of a blunt object on the head, which fractured the skull and penetrated the brain. The report does not elaborate further on the nature of the blunt object or the circumstances of the death of this person nor reaches any conclusions in this respect. 29. The death of three persons by tear-gas grenades that were fired by the police has been a matter of great controversy. The Committee established that these tear-gas grenades were acquired still in the time of the Soviet Union and had long since expired. However, on the basis of expert testimony, the Committee concluded this fact had not contributed to their fatal use. Instead, it concluded that the fatalities were the result of grenades being fired directly at, or in the close vicinity of, the protesters at point blank range, which is expressly forbidden in the regulations governing their use. Regrettably, international experts from Russia, the USA and Ireland confirmed to the Committee that it is impossible to match the grenade to the weapon that fired them due to the fact that the bore does not leave a suitable ballistic signature on the plastic casing of the grenade. It is, therefore, doubtful that the policemen that fired these fatal grenades will ever be found. 30. In its investigations, the Committee established that there are currently no valid legal regulations covering the use of ‘special means’ by law enforcement forces.
... 41. The comprehensive set of recommendations indicate that the Committee has made a far more in-depth analysis of the events of 1 and 2 March 2008 than is reflected in the rest of the report. This contradiction, as well as the manner in which certain issues are either stressed or avoided, give the impression that the Committee wanted, at all costs, to avoid too overtly discrediting the official version of the events or too harshly criticising the authorities on their handling of them. This ‘self-censorship’ is regrettable as it undermines the overall credibility of the inquiry.
... 43. The two most obvious weaknesses of the report are its rather one-sided, bordering on biased description of the events leading up to crisis of 1 and 2 March 2008 and the practically total lack of discussion and analysis of developments that followed the events of 1 and 2 March 2008, such as the arrest and prosecution of a large number of opposition supporters.
... 46. The lack of any concrete results from the inquiry into the 10 fatalities that occurred during the events of 1 and 2 March 2008 is unsatisfactory. There should be further efforts to trace any of the bullets that killed five of the 10 persons as a result of the events of 1 and 2 March 2008, to find the weapons that fired them, especially as there are indications that at least three of these bullets could have been fired by weapons that were used by the police during the events. Failure to properly answer these concerns could easily lead to allegations of foul play or cover up by the police.”
(b)   Resolution 1837 (2011): The functioning of democratic institutions in Armenia
160. The relevant parts of Resolution 1837, adopted by PACE on 5 October 2011, provide as follows:
“3. The Assembly reiterates its concern about the lack of results of the inquiry into the 10 deaths that occurred during the March 2008 events. It therefore welcomes the renewed impetus given by the President of Armenia in recent months. In relation to this inquiry, the Assembly considers that:
3.1.  it should also focus on the issue of responsibility in the chain of command and the context in which the 10 deaths occurred, in order to avoid similar situations from recurring in the future;
3.2.  in the event that individual responsibility for the 10 deaths cannot be established, the reasons for this should be fully explained in the report of the investigation.”
161. The relevant parts of the Explanatory Memorandum to this Resolution, produced by the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee, provide as follows:
“5. On 20 April 2011, President Sargsyan ordered the law enforcement agencies to give a renewed impetus to the stalled investigations into the March 2008 events and especially into the responsibility for the ten casualties. ...
... 20. The report of the [Ad Hoc] Committee paints a picture of the actual events on 1 March as a badly planned and mismanaged police operation – ostensibly to act upon reports that protestors were amassing arms on [Freedom] Square – that degenerated into practically uncontrollable riots. In this respect, the report [recognises] that the overall nature of these protests was spontaneous and not premeditated. This conclusion confirms the position of the Assembly, expressed in all its resolutions on the matter, that the March 2008 events cannot be considered as a premeditated attempt at a coup d’état. 21. In its report, while considering the police action on the morning of 1 March 2008 ‘on the whole lawful and appropriate’, the [Ad Hoc] Committee strongly criticised the manner in which the police handled the situation during those events and, particularly, for not implementing measures to establish a dialogue with the protestors or deploying other non-violent mechanisms of crowd control. In addition, it considered that a significant number of individual police actions, including the confiscation and subsequent destruction of video materials of journalists and instances of police brutality, violated legal procedures and were overall unacceptable.
... 31. Until now, the Office of the Prosecutor General and the [SIS] have not been able to identify any person or persons responsible for the ten casualties. The authorities therefore concluded that the opening of an inquiry was not possible as long as clear evidence that would identify the individuals directly responsible for the ten casualties was missing. 32. In our view, this was a restricted view of what such an inquiry should entail. We [emphasised] to the authorities that the aim of the inquiry called for by the Assembly was not only to identify, if possible, the individuals responsible for the ten casualties but also to establish how these casualties could occur during a public demonstration, to investigate possible command responsibility and to recommend that measures be taken to avoid a similar situation during future demonstrations. Furthermore, in the event that no individual responsibility can be established, such an inquiry should explain why this is the case ...
... 35. During our visit in July 2011, we met the Head of the [SIS], which has been tasked by the President of Armenia with re-evaluating all evidence and findings in the investigation into the ten deaths. While he was hopeful and confident that the investigation would lead to results, he confided that, until now, no new evidence has been unearthed that could help identify the persons responsible. In his view, the politicisation of the whole affair was influencing witness statements and their willingness to testify. We stressed the need to investigate command responsibility fully and to provide absolute transparency with regard to the progress, or lack thereof, of the investigation ...
... 37. The fact that, in the end, the police are responsible for investigating their own decisions and actions with regard to the ten deaths is a weak point in the investigation and leads to questions about their impartiality and credibility in the eyes of the Armenian public.”
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
(a)   Report by the Commissioner on his Special Mission to Armenia on 12‑15 March 2008, CommDH(2008)11REV, 20 March 2008
162. The relevant extracts of the report provide as follows:
“... The Prosecutor General stated that the ammunitions had penetrated the bodies, which appears to indicate that they must have been fired at a very close range ... A review seems necessary of the current riot control measures used by the police as serious mistakes were made ... The Prosecutor General mentioned specifically the need for international forensic expertise to determine the cause of death of the eight persons. Furthermore, the authorities have requested technical assistance to analyse existing video footages of the events to determine whether they have been manipulated ...”
(b)   Report by the Commissioner following his visit to Armenia from 18 to 21 January 2011, CommDH(2011)12, 9 May 2011
163. The relevant extracts of the report provide as follows:
“38. The Commissioner devoted particular attention to the issue of the ten deaths that occurred during the March 2008 events. The lack of results of the investigation into these cases has been a source of grave concern. None of the perpetrators have been identified to date. Furthermore, it appears that command responsibility of senior officials within the police and the security services, who were in charge at the time of the events, was not seriously considered.
... 40. It should be noted that during the March 2008 events, the police was firing tracer bullets with Kalashnikov sub-machine guns over the heads of [protestors]. Taken together with the fact that the Makarov PM is the standard issue sidearm of the Armenian police, it would seem that there is a high likelihood that some of the bullets found in the bodies of the victims can be traced to the weapons that fired them. Nevertheless, the investigation services have indicated that they were unable to trace any of the bullets, despite performing checks with all available weapons used by the police. It has also been impossible to match the tear-gas grenades that killed three persons to the weapon that fired them due to the fact that the bore does not leave a suitable ballistic signature on the plastic casing of the grenade (a fact which had also been confirmed by a foreign expert). 41. During his meeting with the Commissioner, the Prosecutor General of Armenia [A.H.] acknowledged that it has been impossible to resolve the death cases thus far. 42. Out of the four policemen who had been identified as using ‘Cheremukha‑7’ gas grenades during the March 2008 clashes, the investigation could not establish who fired the deadly shots which claimed the lives of three persons. Furthermore, the investigation could not identify witnesses present on the scene who could have helped in clarifying this question. The prosecutorial authorities have maintained that the ‘Cheremukha-7’ gas grenades were used lawfully. In contrast, the report [from] the [Ad Hoc Committee] concluded that the tear-gas grenades were used in contravention of safety rules considering the injuries that the police servicemen themselves sustained. 43. The Prosecutor General informed the Commissioner that the investigation for intentional murder would continue. He was of the opinion that the use of force by law enforcement officials and security forces during the March 2008 events has been lawful and necessary to prevent further casualties and attack of State institutions. At the same time, he indicated the willingness of his Office to consider new expertise, facts and elements for this investigation. 44. Several of the Commissioner’s interlocutors expressed the view that the investigation has not been conducted professionally. Moreover, as noted in the report by the parliamentary [Ad Hoc Committee] ... important video footage materials from journalists and citizens had been erased by the police.
... 48. The question of police violence and abuse has been a recurrent issue in Armenia. The ten deaths which occurred during the March 2008 events, some of which most probably resulted from excessive use of force by a public authority, have turned a stark spotlight on underlying problems.
... 50. The Commissioner finds that the use of force on 1-2 March 2008 was excessive and that it resulted in serious human rights violations.
... 57. In June 2008 the National Assembly established an ad hoc parliamentary committee to conduct an inquiry into the events of 1 March 2008 and ‘the reasons thereof’. The [Ad Hoc Committee’s] composition was dominated by representatives of the ruling coalition, as the opposition did not respond to the committee’s invitation to participate. The non-participation of opposition representatives was seen by many as affecting the impartiality and credibility of the [Ad Hoc Committee]. 58. During his July 2008 visit, the Commissioner proposed the creation of a separate, smaller group of independent experts who would be tasked [with] establishing a factual account of the events of 1 and 2 March 2008, on the basis of which the inquiry committee could base its conclusions and recommendations. The fact-finding group was established by Presidential decree on 23 October 2008 after agreement of all parties and on the basis of parity between nominees proposed by the governing coalition and the opposition. However, political and internal tensions developed between members of the fact-finding group, eventually preventing the achievement of its intended objectives. Although the group was disbanded by the authorities in May 2009, it nevertheless managed to submit some materials and reports for the use of the parliamentary [Ad Hoc Committee]. 59. On 16 and 17 September 2009 [S.N.], Chair of the parliamentary [Ad Hoc Committee], presented the committee’s final report. While acknowledging the authorities’ responsibility in some of the aspects of the ‘root causes’ of the March 2008 events, the report expressed the position that the exploitation by the opposition – in particular the forces supporting Levon Ter-Petrosyan – of these factors and of the resulting public discontent, directly instigated the mass disorder. The impression conveyed by the report of the inquiry committee is that the opposition and the demonstrators bear the bulk of the responsibility for the tragic succession of events. This rather categorical denouncement of the opposition’s role and the relative absence of criticism of the authorities were seen by many as affecting the credibility of the report. 60. The report further concluded that police actions on 1 and 2 March 2008 were on the whole lawful and proportionate, albeit acknowledging that the police was ill‑prepared and that there were instances of misconduct, disproportionate use of force and violence by the police, which should be duly investigated. More generally, in the [Ad Hoc Committee’s] report examination of police actions, the emphasis was placed on a lack of professionalism rather than on a thorough review of concrete allegations of ill-treatment and other human rights violations. 61. The circumstances of the ten deaths were extensively discussed in the report, including on the basis of the questions raised by members of the fact-finding group. However, the [Ad Hoc Committee] was not able to bring new elements that would clarify the circumstances of the deaths and help in identifying those responsible. The report expressed hope that the on-going investigation would contribute to resolving these cases. It criticised the police for mistakes during the investigation process and when using special means, while making a generally positive assessment of the action of the Prosecutor General’s Office.
... 66. The Commissioner met with [S.N.], who reflected on his experience as [Ad Hoc Committee] chair and upon the lessons learned from the exercise. [S.N.] indicated that the two most significant setbacks in the work of the inquiry committee were the inability to bring the opposition in and the unresolved question of the ten deaths.
67.  [S.N.] also expressed dissatisfaction about the uncooperative attitude of the police towards the inquiries made by the committee, which had not been reflected fully in the [Ad Hoc Committee’s] written report. He recalled that the police had confiscated and erased several video materials from journalists and citizens, which could have been crucial in clarifying the circumstances of the events.”
United Nations
164. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (“UN Force and Firearms Principles”) were adopted on 7 September 1990 by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Principle 2 states that governments and law enforcement agencies should undertake to develop a range of means as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms. These should include the development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate situations, with a view to increasingly restraining the use of means capable of causing death or injury. For the same purpose, it should also be possible for law enforcement officials to be equipped with self‑defence equipment such as shields, helmets, bulletproof vests and bulletproof means of transport, in order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind. Principle 9 provides that “law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury ... and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life”. Principle 14 provides that “[i]n the dispersal of violent assemblies, law enforcement officials may use firearms only when less dangerous means are not practicable and only to the minimum extent necessary. Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms in such cases, except under the conditions stipulated in principle 9”. Human Rights Watch
165. Human Rights Watch published a report entitled “Democracy on Rocky Ground, Armenia’s Disputed 2008 Presidential Election, Post‑Election Violence, and the One-Sided Pursuit of Accountability, February 2009”. For a description of the police operation at Freedom Square in the early morning of 1 March 2008, see Mushegh Saghatelyan (cited above, § 134). For a description of the events that took place later that day near the Myasnikyan monument and the French embassy, see Myasnik Malkhasyan (cited above, § 57). The relevant extracts from the Human Rights Watch Report, describing the events of the evening of 1 March 2008, provide as follows:
“Police build-up, evening of [1 March]
Towards the end of the day journalists and demonstrators saw police and other security personnel regrouping in parts of the city cent[re] close to where the demonstrators were gathered, notably in the vicinity of Republic Square and Mashtots Avenue, and on Leo [Street] and Paronyan [Street] ... Violent clashes and police use of force
At the Myasnikyan monument, a rally continued until around 3 a.m. on [2 March]. An aggressive police action to disperse the crowd began at around 9.30 p.m. on [1 March], and was met with stone throwing and even petrol bombs from the side of the demonstrators. After that, the police retreated and left the large crowd alone. A smaller group of demonstrators, however, engaged in a violent confrontation with police and security forces. It was in this context that most of the fatalities occurred. Tracer bullets and police attack
Multiple witnesses told Human Rights Watch that shortly after 9 p.m., without prior warning, police started shooting tracer bullets in the air, apparently intending to intimidate the demonstrators and make them disperse. A first episode of tracer fire lasted about 10-15 minutes. Half an hour later, police in riot gear began approaching from the direction of Leo [Street] and Paronyan [Street]. Organised in four to five rows, they advanced toward the demonstrators, accompanied by the second episode of tracer fire. One witness who was on Shahumyan Square, just behind the Myasnikyan monument, told Human Rights Watch, ‘I could see the sky full of tracer bullets, shining in red lights. The intense fire lasted at least 10 minutes and I saw the police advancing in several lines, beating truncheons on the shields and making loud noises.’
... According to [witness G.G.], when the police fired tear gas ‘that’s when we started to fight back. We hid behind cars and buses and threw stones in return. Some also threw Molotov cocktails made of petrol.’
Another protestor who was in a part of the crowd standing near the Russian embassy told Human Rights Watch:
 ‘Internal troops came and without any warning attacked the demonstrators. I stood in the middle of the protestors. ... When the police were approaching, demonstrators first retreated toward the trolley buses which were used to barricade off the main demonstration site. But then we realised that we could not retreat any further as behind stood our mothers, sisters and brothers ... I did not see who threw the first stone, but stones were thrown from both sides. We collected stones from the sidewalks, broke them into pieces and used them to throw at police.’
A journalist observing the events described to Human Rights Watch what she saw:
‘I had a feeling that [the security forces] were going to kill us all. I was terrified and ran back through Proshyan Street. People were throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. They intended to slow down the approaching police.’
Although Human Rights Watch was not able to determine under what exact circumstances the first casualties took place, the resistance from demonstrators intensified when at least one of the protestors was shot. ...
...
[G.G.] described to Human Rights Watch how a group of 10-15 young men took the fight to the police, chanting ‘Struggle, struggle, struggle to the end!’
Faced with this level of resistance, police retreated, but a small part of the crowd – one witness said around 100 people – pursued them, continuing to attack them. According to [G.G.], police attempted to block the street with razor wire, ‘but [the barrier] did not prevent the people. It was simply pushed aside.’ A lorry carrying razor wire was set on fire. [Another witness, also G.G.,] described to Human Rights Watch seeing five police vehicles burning and a civilian car turned upside down as a result of the first clashes.
... Clash between police and demonstrators near Kentron police station
Police regrouped north of the demonstration site at the junction of [Paronyan Street and Leo Street], several met[res] away from an arch that leads to the Kentron (central district) police station. According to [witness S.S.], high-ranking police (as evident from their uniforms and epaulettes) were at the arch from the time of the police advance on the crowd, which suggests that operations were being directed, or at least officially observed, from there.
... About 15 to 20 met[res] away from the police line stood several dozen mostly young demonstrators, chanting ‘Levon, Levon!’ and throwing stones at police. The protestors were not armed, but collected stones form the sidewalks and broke them into pieces. Some also had iron and wooden sticks. Both witnesses described to Human Rights Watch that without any advance warning, police used tear gas against the protestors ... [and] that tracer bullets were shot by military standing behind the three to four rows of riot police. Some protestors attempted to ram an unmanned car into the police line. [S.S.] told Human Rights Watch:
‘I saw [a] Ural type car driving towards the police line, but there was no driver inside. The car stopped in the middle. Security forces immediately opened intense fire from sub-machine guns at the car. I saw a young man was trying to get into the car, but then police used tear gas and I had to run inside the yard to get fresh air. ... When I came back the shooting was over and I saw a dead body next to the car. Another young man, apparently his friend, was crying for help.’
[S.S.] ran to help. The man on the ground was about 40, slightly bald, and wearing a black coat; his head and neck were covered in blood. [S.S.] helped to carry the body to the sidewalk, where somebody checked for a pulse and said the man was already dead.
[A.A.] saw a minivan with about 15 young protestors drive toward the police lines. Police opened fire on it, bringing it to a stop, and those inside the minivan fled (the witness did not report seeing whether any of them had been injured).
[S.S.] also described to Human Rights Watch how, around 10 p.m., a police officer stepped from beneath the arch, pointed his Makarov pistol in the direction of protestors a few met[res] away who were throwing stones, and fired six shots, apparently randomly. [S.S.] did not see whether anyone was hit.
[A.A.] saw one man shot dead, and another shot in the leg, as they walked toward police lines:
‘I saw two young men together coming from Mashtots Avenue and when they approached the crossroads, I heard a shot and one of them fell on the ground. The other of the two started crying that he was killed. Then a policeman who stood under the arch came and kicked the body, but he was told by others not to do that as he was already dead. Four-five minutes later the other guy was shot in the leg as well and he fell down. He was picked up by others and put into a [car] and taken away.’
[S.S.] described to Human Rights Watch how four policemen dragged a wounded protestor into the arch and beat him with truncheons until he was unconscious. [A.A.] also saw how about six officers attacked three young men who approached the lines from the direction of the main demonstration:
‘Policemen hit one boy with truncheons on his legs. He buckled over with pain and then police made him lie down on the ground and started kicking him and beating him with truncheons. He was then picked up and put into a police car and taken away.’
The clashes were over by midnight. As one witness told Human Rights Watch, ‘The crossroad and nearby streets resembled a battlefield. On the other hand, the main demonstration in front of the Myasnikyan monument with about four or five thousand protestors continued and stayed peaceful. It appears that the majority had no idea about the series of clashes that had taken place a block north at the crossroads. When a witness of the events went to the leaders asking if they knew what was happening ... on the other side of the barricades, the opposition leaders told her that police was shooting, but just to scare them. The protestors at the main demonstration dispersed around 2-3 a.m. after [Levon Ter-Petrosyan] addressed them by phone, asking them to do so in order to avert greater casualties.
... Shop looting and other criminal damage
Some demonstrators broke into shops on Mashtots Avenue and looted them. Most protestors to whom Human Rights Watch spoke alleged that those shops were broken into by so-called provocateurs intending to smear the peaceful demonstrators. However, at least two witnesses who had been participants in the demonstrations told Human Rights Watch that three shops belonging to prominent supporters of then President-elect Sargsyan were broken into, and thus tried to justify the crowd’s [behaviour] as targeting certain oligarchs only. ... The Office of the Public Prosecutor reported that altogether seven shops were looted and 63 vehicles were set on fire.
... Investigation of Excessive Use of Force
... Regarding the many episodes of apparent excessive force, the fact that violence against demonstrators was widespread and the methods used strongly suggest that the force was condoned or at least tolerated by senior officers responsible for commanding the operations. These individuals, in addition to individual officers engaged in assault and other crimes, should be investigated and held accountable. ... The official investigation into the [1 March] events has so far failed to identify the people responsible for the 10 deaths, and whether any of the deaths were caused by excessive use of force. Even with regards to the three deaths caused by direct impact of tear-gas canisters, weapons only used by the police, the investigation has failed to establish the exact circumstances in which these deaths occurred even though only four police officers were in possession of tear-gas launchers.”
THE LAW
JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
166. Having regard to the common factual and legal background of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment (Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Courts). ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
167. The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention that their relatives had been killed as a result of use of force which had not been “absolutely necessary”. They further complained under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of their relatives’ deaths. The Court reiterates that, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case, it is not bound by the characterisation given by the parties (see, among other authorities, Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 59180/15, § 35, 7 January 2025). In the present case, having regard to the particular circumstances of this case and the approach taken by the Court in similar cases (see, mutatis mutandis, Shumkova v. Russia, no. 9296/06, § 123, 14 February 2012), it considers that the applicants’ complaint concerning the procedural aspect of Article 2 also absorbs the complaint under Article 13. The applicants’ complaints will therefore be examined solely under Article 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
AdmissibilityThe parties’ submissions

(a)   The Government
168. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Referring to Articles 103, 278 and 290 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 146, 147 and 148 above), they argued that the applicants had had the right to lodge complaints with a court against particular decisions or actions of the investigating authority, but that they had instead lodged complaints on 3 February 2010 with the Prosecutor General, asserting in a vague and abstract manner that the ongoing investigation had been ineffective and unlawful (see paragraph 87 above). Such complaints, however, fell outside the scope of judicial control over the investigation since domestic law did not provide that the overall lawfulness of a criminal investigation could be assessed by the courts. Furthermore, having been familiarised with the results of a number of forensic examinations, the applicants had not expressed any objections or lodged any requests for additional examinations or investigative measures. Lodging such requests would have resulted in certain actions or possible inaction by the investigator, which the applicants could have then contested before the courts under Article 290 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Referring to the case of Sahakyan and Mkrtchyan v. Armenia ((dec.), nos. 57687/09, 63452/09 and 63455/09, § 92, 1 October 2013), the Government argued that that specific provision had been recognised by the Court as constituting an effective remedy. 169. The Government further submitted that the applicants had also failed to comply with the six-month rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, they had lodged their applications with the Court while the investigation had still been pending and no final decision had yet been adopted. The applicants had been wrong in claiming that the Court of Cassation’s decision of 14 September 2010 (see paragraph 94 above) was the “final decision” within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and their applications were therefore premature. Referring to the cases of Emin and Others v. Cyprus ((dec.), no. 59623/08, § 36, 3 April 2012) and Harrison and Others v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), 44301/13, 25 March 2014), the Government argued that at the time the applications had been lodged, namely on 28 February 2011, the applicants could not be regarded as no longer having any realistic hope of a positive outcome to the investigation or of any effective domestic remedies being available to them. There had been a number of investigative measures taken in the course of the investigation, including after their applications had been lodged. Moreover, in 2014, three years after the applications had been lodged, the applicants had met with the Prosecutor General to discuss further investigative measures (see paragraph 105 above). Later, a new course had been given to the proceedings and the applicants’ cases had been split into separate individual criminal cases in order to ensure efficiency in the investigation (see paragraph 106 above). That could be considered a new factor that had revived the authorities’ positive obligation to carry out an adequate investigation. It followed that since the ongoing investigation could not be considered a “continuing situation”, the applications had been lodged prematurely. (b)   The applicants
170. The applicants submitted that they had exhausted all the available and effective domestic remedies. In particular, they had lodged complaints first with the Prosecutor General and then with the courts under Articles 103, 278 and 290 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with the final decision being taken by the Court of Cassation on 14 September 2010 (see paragraphs 87‑94 above). Those complaints had been lodged specifically against the inaction, actions and decisions of the investigating authority and had not been dismissed by the domestic courts on the grounds of their vagueness, as the Government claimed, but for lack of jurisdiction of the courts to examine them. The refusal to examine their complaint showed that they had had no effective remedies against the ineffectiveness of the investigation, and the Government accepted this by acknowledging that domestic law did not provide that the overall effectiveness of the investigation could be assessed by the domestic courts (see paragraph 168 above). Furthermore, the Government’s reference to the case of Sahakyan and Mkrtchyan was irrelevant because the applicants in that case had never applied to the courts. As regards the Government’s argument that they had failed to lodge any specific requests with the investigating authority, the applicants had been unable to lodge any meaningful requests because they had been denied access to the case file throughout the entire investigation and had consequently lacked basic information regarding its progress. 171. As regards the Government’s objection regarding their alleged failure to comply with the six-month rule (see paragraph 169 above), the applicants referred to the case of Türkoğlu v. Turkey (no. 34506/97, 17 March 2005), in which the Court had decided that the application was admissible under Article 2 of the Convention even though the investigation had not yet been completed. The applicants submitted that they had lost all realistic hope of an effective investigation and had had no further remedies to exhaust after they had complained at all three levels of jurisdiction, with the Court of Cassation’s decision of 14 September 2010 being the final decision (see paragraph 94 above). The Government’s reference to the case of Emin and Others was irrelevant because, unlike in that case, the investigation into their relatives’ deaths had been a sham, had lacked good faith and had produced no tangible results after almost nine years. Nor could the decision to split their criminal cases be regarded as similar to the new evidence that had come into light and revived the investigation in the Harrison and Others case. Moreover, the positive obligation to carry out an effective investigation had persisted throughout the entire investigation and could not be revived by such a procedural decision, so the Government’s submissions in that regard were contradictory. Lastly, the applicants submitted that, in any event, they had complied with the six-month rule because the violation of their rights had been a continuing situation and, even if it had not been, they had lodged their applications within six months of the date on which copies of the final decision of 14 September 2010 had been received.

Outcome for Article 38: violation