FIFTH SECTION
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE OF RAMDA v. FRANCE
 
(Application no. 78477/11)
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
(Extracts)
 
 
 
 
 
STRASBOURG
 
19 December 2017
 
FINAL
 
09/04/2018
 
 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ramda v. France,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Angelika Nußberger, President,
 Erik Møse,
 Nona Tsotsoria,
 André Potocki,
 Síofra O’Leary,
 Mārtiņš Mits,
 Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 28 November 2017,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 78477/11) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Algerian national, Mr Rachid Ramda (“the applicant”), on 8 December 2011. 2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr E. Piwnica of the Conseil d’État and Court of Cassation Bar. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr F. Alabrune, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs. 3. The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 4. On 30 September 2014 the Government were given notice of the application. THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1969 and is currently detained in Lannemezan Prison. A. Background to the case
6. The applicant was a member of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut – “the FIS”) and left Algeria prior to the dissolution of that political group by a judgment of the Algiers Administrative Court dated 19 March 1992. After spending some time in Pakistan he entered the United Kingdom in January 1993 using the false name of Elias Serbis. On 26 February 1993 he applied for political asylum in that country, claiming to have been forced to leave Algeria because of his membership of the FIS. His application was refused on 10 August 1994. 7. On 25 July, 17 and 26 August, 3, 4 and 7 September and 6 and 17 October 1995 eight terrorist attacks were carried out in France. 8. Although no organisation explicitly claimed responsibility, certain factors, such as the existence of virulent press statements against France and the mode of operation of the attacks, pointed to the involvement of the Armed Islamic Group (Groupement Islamique Armé – “the GIA”). 9. In the course of the judicial investigation aimed at identifying the perpetrators, telephone tapping operations carried out on public payphones used by a certain B.B. led to a number of persons being arrested and to the search being focused on the United Kingdom and an individual named Elyes (also known as Elyesse or Eliass). The sources of these names or pseudonyms were a telephone conversation of 1 November concerning Elyes and the Western Union bank, a search of B.B.’s home during which a document was found showing that a sum of money had been transferred to B.B. from that bank on 16 October 1995, and the decoding of a list of telephone numbers found on B.B.’s person and at his home and featuring three numbers in England preceded by the name “Elyesse” or “Eliass”. B.B., who was arrested on 1 November 1995, also directly implicated “Ylies”, claiming that he had funded the campaign of attacks from London and had been kept informed of their progress. 10. On 3 November 1995 the French National Surveillance Directorate informed the investigators that the individual known as “Elyes, Ilyes, Lyes, Iliesse, Eliass or Elyasse”, whom B.B. had identified as having funded the attacks, might be the applicant. The latter, who was living in London, was suspected of being one of the leaders of the GIA in the United Kingdom, in particular because of his involvement with the publication Al Ansar (or Al Ansaar) which the GIA used as a mouthpiece abroad. 11. The investigations carried out in London established that the applicant had a home there and had a set of keys to a second London address, which served as the offices of the magazine Al Ansar and as a meeting place for all the persons involved in publishing and distributing it. On the premises the investigators found, among other items, the following: contracts for three mobile phones in the names of three of the applicants’ acquaintances and corresponding to the numbers identified at the home of B.B., who had rung the numbers before and after each attack; a receipt for the rental of a post-office box in the name of Fares ELIASS with the applicant’s fingerprints on it; letters and statements from the FIS; a statement saying that only the GIA was entitled to conduct the jihad; a letter from the GIA to the French President calling on him to convert to Islam; a letter commenting on the attacks carried out in France; copies of press articles on anti-terrorism mentioning the names of judges and members of the intelligence service; a piece of paper on which “Notre Dame 33‑1‑43‑54-46-12” was written, corresponding to the telephone number of the Western Union branch at 4 rue du Cloître Notre Dame in Paris; and a receipt dated 21 July 1995 issued by a branch of Thomas Cook in London for a sum of 5,000 pounds sterling (GBP). 12. The applicant was arrested and placed in police custody from 4 to 7 November 1995 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 13. On 7 November 1995 the applicant was detained pending extradition under the terms of an international arrest warrant issued on the same day in connection with the investigation into the attack carried out on 6 October 1995 close to the Maison Blanche metro station. 14. Three further international arrest warrants were issued concerning the applicant: on 24 November 1995 in relation to the attack of 17 October at the Gare d’Orsay station; on 29 January 1996 in the case concerning a conspiracy to prepare terrorist attacks; and on 16 January 2001 in relation to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995 at the Saint-Michel suburban rail station. 15. The applicant lodged habeas corpus applications which were dismissed in June 1997 and in 2001. On 8 October 2001 the British Home Secretary ordered his removal to France, but that order was quashed by the High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, on 27 June 2002. 16. On 6 April 2005 the Home Secretary signed a fresh order for the applicant’s extradition in the light of the assurances provided by the French authorities concerning the safeguards of a fair and impartial trial in France. On 14 October 2005 the High Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant. 17. On 1 December 2005 the applicant was handed over to the French authorities and was remanded in custody the following day. B. The proceedings before the criminal courts (procédure correctionnelle)
18. By an order of 5 February 1999 the applicant was committed for trial in the Paris Criminal Court for involvement – in France and in England, from an unspecified date until 4 November 1995 – in an association or conspiracy formed with a view to the preparation, in the form of one or more material acts, of one of the terrorist acts in question. The investigating judge stated, in particular, as follows:
 “- [the applicant] was responsible for distributing the journal Al Ansar, a propaganda outlet of the Armed Islamic Group;
- ... was involved on this account in disseminating propaganda for that organisation, which is banned in France;
- ... was the main contact person in Europe for [D.Z.], alias Abou Abderhamane Amine, in organising and carrying out the GIA’s activities in Europe;
- ... was tasked with sending money to GIA members still in France to enable them to fund and carry out attacks;
- ... was in contact with numerous persons involved in and convicted of criminal conspiracy with a view to a terrorist enterprise.”
19. In a judgment of 29 March 2006 accompanied by over thirty pages of reasoning, the Criminal Court first of all set out the facts with regard to the “political/religious background”, the emergence of the FIS and then the GIA, the “background to the attacks” in 1995 – which it listed and described as attributable in all likelihood to the GIA – and the “context surrounding Rachid Ramda”. 20. Ruling on the criminal charges, the court began by examining the case against the applicant. It found that it could be established with certainty, on the basis of precise and concurring physical evidence, that the applicant had indeed used various false names and aliases which had come up in the course of the investigations, a fact the court described as “beyond doubt and indisputable”. With regard to the GIA’s funding the court, having noted the prosecution’s claims that the applicant had funded the GIA groups which carried out the attacks in France during the second half of 1995, examined the factual evidence in the case file at length and in detail. It observed in particular that, according to one witness who was a GIA member, the organisation’s groups had different specialisations depending on their location, with the London group being responsible for sending funds. The court further noted that the applicant had transferred GBP 5,000 on 16 October 1995, two days before the attack of 17 October 1995. This was established by the statements of the British police officers tasked with keeping the applicant under surveillance and of the staff of the Western Union branch where the transfer had been made, and also by the discovery of the applicant’s fingerprints on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union branch. The court also observed that one of the perpetrators of the attacks, B.B., had stated that the money used in preparing the various attacks had always been supplied by the applicant from London. The court inferred that the facts as a whole “demonstrate[d] that Rachid Ramda was indeed responsible for funding terrorist groups on French soil”. Furthermore, in response to the public prosecutor’s submissions concerning the applicant’s role in disseminating GIA propaganda, the first-instance court also considered the various items of factual evidence before it, and in particular the wealth of correspondence and propaganda documents relating to the GIA’s views and actions that had been found during the searches of the various premises used by the applicant, as well as the statements by a GIA member confirming the applicant’s role as a member of the team publishing the magazine Al Ansar, which was the GIA outlet used in particular to claim responsibility for attacks. It also noted the presence at the applicant’s home of pamphlets promoting terrorism and killing with specific reference to France. The court concluded that the applicant had played a part in disseminating GIA propaganda and ideas. 21. Turning next to the applicant’s involvement in a criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise, the court found this offence to have been made out, as the investigation had shown that several groups located in the Lyons area, in Paris and in Lille had been behind the 1995 attacks. All the members had either been directly involved or had played an indirect role by aiding and abetting and providing resources, and all of them were either known activists or claimed to be activists within the GIA. The court found that the applicant’s contacts with the various members of these networks, who had the shared goal of carrying out attacks, were sufficient to establish his conscious and deliberate participation in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts on French soil. In its judgment the court set out, among other findings, the facts showing the existence of links to eight members of three groups forming a support network for the GIA. 22. Accordingly, the Criminal Court found the applicant guilty of criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise, on the basis of Articles 450-1 and 421-1 of the Criminal Code. It sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. The court cited as reasons for imposing the prison sentence the fact that “by providing funding and issuing propaganda on behalf of the GIA, Rachid RAMDA not only enabled the attacks to be carried out but acted as a propagandist, potentially attracting new members to strengthen the networks spread over several European countries”. It further cited the fact that “his double talk reveal[ed] both his bad faith and his complete lack of regret or remorse”. The court awarded one euro (EUR) in damages to the association SOS Attentats, which had joined the proceedings as a civil party. 23. In a final judgment of 18 December 2006 the Paris Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. While referring expressly to the statement of facts as established in the judgment, it devoted some thirty pages to analysing the charges against the applicant, giving reasons. First of all, the Court of Appeal gave further details concerning the evolution and operation of the GIA. It also specified that the case before it concerned “the series of attacks carried out in France in the summer and autumn of 1995”, and that “the facts of the case at hand concern[ed] the preparation of the attacks and the actions enabling the attacks, which started in France in July 1995, to be carried out”. The Court of Appeal went on to list the eight attacks carried out between 25 July and 17 October 1995. With particular reference to the evidence of the existence of an information hub based in London which the applicant had allegedly managed, it found this to be established on the basis of the telephone calls made on the day after the killing of the imam S. in Paris; two days before the attack on the Saint-Michel suburban rail station; on the day of that attack and the day after the attempted attack on the Paris‑Lyon high-speed railway line at Cailloux-sur-Fontaines; on 12 September 1995, a few days after the attack of 3 September on Boulevard Richard Lenoir in Paris, the attempted attack of 4 September on Place Charles Vallin in Paris and the attack of 7 September in rue Jean-Claude Vivand in Villeurbanne; the day after the shooting at the Col de Maleval and the arrest of three people; five days before the attack of 6 October and two days after it; on 16 October 1995, in other words just before the attack of 17 October; and, finally, on 1 November 1995, immediately after a telephone conversation between B.B. and S.A.B. concerning preparations for an attack on the Wazemmes market in Lille, with B.B. stating that the purpose of the call was to report to the applicant on the “final preparations” for the Lille attack. 24. The Court of Appeal also emphasised the existence of several items of factual evidence pointing to the applicant’s involvement as the supervisor of a structure set up to fund the GIA’s activities. These included the fact that the applicant had sent funds from England on 16 October 1995 under the false name of Philippe Hervier, which had been received by B.B. at the Rivoli branch of the Rivaud bank under the false name of A. Benabbas, and which matched an entry in A.T.’s accounts book marked “36,800 francs, Lyseo” and B.B.’s statements; the payment by the applicant of GBP 5,000 and 50,000 French francs (FRF), as shown by an entry in A.T.’s accounts book which mentioned funds sent by “Walid”, a false name used by the applicant or the first name of one of his acquaintances who could be contacted in order to reach him; statements from several individuals concerning services offered in return for payment, fundraising, the sending of substantial sums of money, a transfer of EUR 4,000 to M. and the existence of a receipt for GBP 100. 25. Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted a series of facts demonstrating, firstly, that the applicant had been “the main contact person ... in organising and carrying out the GIA’s activities in Europe”, as was clear in particular from a telephone conversation of 2 December 1995, from the statements of a witness who was a GIA member, and from the detailed content of several documents seized in London (press statements, authorisations to conduct the jihad, documents on the management of funds, articles and handwritten notes on the activities of Islamist groups in Europe and anti-terrorist activities, notes on military weapons and the handling of explosives, and so on); secondly, that he had been “the GIA’s main propaganda agent outside Algeria”, with “his role on the magazine Al Ansaar” (particularly in the light of documents seized at the applicant’s London address, namely a note on how to make the magazine more dynamic, a letter explaining the means of distributing it, a piece of computer equipment which the applicant would have been unable to afford, letters from readers and GIA sympathisers, a large number of magazines detailing the GIA’s ideas and violent actions, a substantial amount of correspondence relating to Algerian and Islamic issues, some testimonies, and a list of post-office boxes in numerous countries, used by the magazine’s subscribers); thirdly, that he had been at the centre of “the London cell which revolved around [him and which] also served as a rallying point for young recruits passing through”, as demonstrated by the personal histories of four of them; and fourthly, that he had been a leader with “a strategic role in the GIA’s external organisation”, as demonstrated by his links to members and correspondents of other Islamist terrorist groups worldwide. 26. The Court of Appeal echoed the reasons given by the Criminal Court and added that there was sufficient evidence in the case to demonstrate that the applicant had been contacted regularly in order to be kept informed of events, that he had been responsible for funding GIA operations in Europe, that he had acted as a conduit for the GIA’s military command and as a propaganda agent for that organisation, especially through the magazine Al Ansar, that he had given shelter to fugitives passing through London and had sometimes been called upon to coordinate the GIA’s external activities. The Court of Appeal therefore concluded as follows:
 “The Court of Appeal, like the first-instance court, therefore finds it established that the GIA created ‘an external structure’ in Europe designed to enable it to pursue its goal of overthrowing the Algerian regime, including by attacking institutions and people in countries that supported or were deemed to support that regime, by setting up networks in Belgium and France in particular which provided support to the Algerian guerrillas by supplying weapons, munitions and various items of equipment, supplying jihadists and providing safe havens (accommodation and false identity papers) to fighters who were fleeing the maquis or had arrived to carry out attacks, organised and coordinated by a cell in London in charge of fundraising and using funds acquired lawfully or unlawfully.
... [the applicant] knowingly played a decisive role, by means of the material acts referred to by the Criminal Court and by this court above, in the achievement of the GIA’s goal, participating from London in the implementation of the group’s external structure, and played a vital role within the organisation whose aim was to prepare, assist in and carry out the attacks which took place.”
27. In a judgment of 14 March 2007 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. C. The proceedings before the assize courts (procédure criminelle)
28. In a judgment of 13 February 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal indicted B.B., S.A.B. and the applicant for the attack of 17 October 1995 and committed them for trial before the Paris special Assize Court. The applicant was charged with aiding and abetting the crimes of attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing mutilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection principally or incidentally with a terrorist enterprise, and with the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise. 29. On 3 August and 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the orders issued by the Paris investigating judge on 27 April (concerning the attack of 25 July 1995) and 13 July 2001 (concerning the attack of 6 October 1995) for the indictment of the applicant and B.B. and their committal for trial before the special Assize Court. The applicant faced trial for aiding and abetting the crimes of murder, attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing death, mutilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection with a terrorist enterprise, and for the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise. 30. These three judgments of the Investigation Division specified that the applicant had aided and abetted by: transmitting instructions from the GIA ordering attacks with explosives and providing B.B. with instructions on manufacturing; relaying to the GIA leadership operational information provided by the perpetrators of the attacks; providing the perpetrators with the funds needed not just to manufacture the explosive devices but also to make all the logistical arrangements for preparing and carrying out the attacks. The judgments of 13 February and 3 August 2001 added the fact that the funds had also been intended, if necessary, to enable the perpetrators based in France to flee. 31. In these judgments the judges noted in particular the following facts in relation to the applicant. The three mobile phones used by the applicant had received calls from B.B. on 16 and 22 October and 1 November 1995; a receipt for an exchange transaction performed on 16 October 1885 at 3.50 p.m. (Paris time) for an amount of FRF 36,800 had been discovered at B.B.’s home, together with a notice of transfer of FRF 38,000 from an English branch of Western Union, and the checks carried out established that the applicant had gone into a Londis shop in Wembley containing a Western Union office at 2.34 p.m. on 16 October 1995 and had re-emerged at 3.26 p.m. (London time); the applicant’s fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union office in the Londis shop; the words “LYESO – FF 36,600” had been found in the credit column of B.B.’s accounts and the words “West Union” and “West-Union Bank” had also been entered by B.B. in a document logging the details of the 17 October attack; the applicant had possessed the details of the Western Union branch in rue du Cloître in the Notre-Dame district of Paris; an exchange receipt dated 21 July 1995, for an amount of GBP 5,000 exchanged at a rate of 7.5%, had been found at the applicant’s home, with the number of a public payphone in Corbeil-Essonnes used by A.T. written on the back, and an entry had been made in the credit column of B.B.’s accounts for the sum of “5,000 pounds sterling from [W.], converted at a rate of 7.5%”; a sum of GBP 6,945 had been sent on 20 July 1995; between 20 and 25 July 1995 the sum of FRF 300 had been entered as expenditure for the purchase of a “GB ticket”, demonstrating that the funds, after being exchanged in England, had been transported to Paris in the days leading up to the attack at the Saint‑Michel suburban rail station; and a letter from British Telecom had been found, addressed to “Walid” at 122 Hamlet Gardens, the applicant’s address. The judges also noted, as evidence against the applicant, the content of a hard disk found in a London flat to which the applicant had keys, containing two financial reports, one relating to the activities of the GIA in Belgium and the other to a set of accounts for the period from September 1994 to 1 November 1995, the date of B.B.’s arrest. 32. In its judgment of 13 February 2001 concerning the attack of 17 October 1995 the Investigation Division observed in particular that the applicant’s three telephone numbers had been called repeatedly from payphones used by B.B., around the time of the different attacks and in particular on the day before the attack of 17 October 1995. It compared these calls with the statements made by B.B. and a further accomplice, who had been planning an attack on Lille city market, according to which they had reported to the applicant on preparations for the operations, and in particular for the attack of 17 October 1995. The Investigation Division also noted that the applicant had made a transfer of FRF 36,800 from London the day before that attack – as shown by the fact that his fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip in the Western Union office in London – which had been received by B.B. in Paris on the same day. The link between that transfer and the attack of 17 October 1995 had also been established by B.B.’s statements and by a call made to the applicant’s mobile phone the same day, after the money had been received. 33. In its judgment of 3 August 2001 relating more specifically to the attack of 25 July 1995, the Investigation Division stressed that the applicant’s English mobile phone had been called two days before that attack from a public payphone in Paris close to B.B.’s home from which other calls had been made, including a call to a mobile phone belonging to a member of the French GIA network, made one minute before the applicant was called. Furthermore, the day before the attack and then on the day itself, the applicant had received calls from France on his various numbers, including from a payphone close to the previous one, concerning his role as an intermediary between the perpetrators of the attacks and the person masterminding them in Algeria. Above all, the Investigation Division noted that the applicant had on 2 and 20 July 1995 sent sums of GBP 5,000 and GBP 6,945 respectively which were directly linked to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995. 34. Lastly, in its judgment of 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division also noted that it was clear from these different elements that the applicant had sent funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, not just in relation to the campaign of attacks as a whole but also for use directly in carrying out the attack of 6 October 1995. With regard to the latter, it noted that the instructions issued by the GIA concerning the campaigns, which had been accompanied by advice on the manufacture of explosives, had been transmitted via the applicant, who had also funded all the operational arrangements put in place in France in order to ensure the success of the attacks, and that the recipients had been required to report to him on how the money had been used. A number of telephone calls had established that the applicant had been kept informed of the progress of the attacks, and in particular of the attack of 6 October 1995, which had been followed by a telephone call on 8 October 1995 telling the applicant that everything had gone well on 6 October. 35. On 26 October 2007 the Paris special Assize Court, composed of seven professional judges, found the applicant guilty as charged in connection with the three attacks. It sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years. The applicant appealed on 29 October 2007. 36. The appeal proceedings before the Paris special Assize Court, this time composed of nine professional judges, took place from 16 September to 13 October 2009. One hundred and ninety-six individuals joined the proceedings as civil parties, as did the RATP (the Paris public-transport operator), the SNCF (the French national rail company), the Guarantee Fund for victims of terrorist acts and other crimes, the Government Law Officer and the association SOS Attentats. 37. At the hearing of 16 September 2009 counsel for the applicant made submissions requesting the termination of the proceedings and a finding that the prosecution was null and void, on the basis of the ne bis in idem principle. Citing Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 and the judgment in Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, delivered by the Grand Chamber of the Court on 10 February 2009, they argued that the material acts which the Assize Court was called on to examine were the same as those of which the applicant had previously been convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal in its final judgment of 18 December 2006. In counsel’s view, the material acts alleged in the Assize Court proceedings, namely the transfer of funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, the transmission of instructions to the same perpetrators, and the monitoring of the preparation and carrying-out of the attacks, had also been alleged in the Criminal Court proceedings. 38. In an interlocutory judgment of 17 September 2009 the special Assize Court dismissed the objection regarding a breach of the ne bis in idem principle, finding as follows:
 “Although Rachid RAMDA’s defence counsel correctly points out that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second ‘offence’ in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same, the following factors need to be taken into consideration in the present case:
- The facts on which the criminal courts based their finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty, while they related to criminal acts dealt with in the current set of proceedings, were by no means confined to them. In finding the offence of criminal conspiracy to be made out – a separate offence that is provided for and punishable under Article 450-1 of the Criminal Code – the courts considered all the elements apt to substantiate the accused’s involvement in the conspiracy, which was aimed at organising, developing and ensuring the continuation of a movement that was bent on imposing its cause, in particular by using clandestine methods and material and intellectual resources (recruitment of and regular contact with activists, dissemination of information on the GIA’s activities and views, fundraising, seeking donations of weapons and various items of equipment, etc.), without necessarily pursuing the sole objective of carrying out the attacks that are the subject of the proceedings.
 - The facts to be considered by this court differ substantially from the earlier ones in that they relate to criminal conduct aimed at the achievement of one-off objectives which were determined with precision and were not inextricably linked, and which were driven by a specific motivation consisting in particular in providing others, in full knowledge of the situation, with the means of deliberately harming human life or individuals’ physical or mental integrity by the use of explosives.
 - In these circumstances the finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty and his conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal cannot lead the Assize Court to find that his prosecution has lapsed and to declare the criminal proceedings against him null and void.
 - It is thus the task of the Assize Court, on conclusion of the proceedings and in the light thereof, to rule, by answering the questions raised before it, as to whether or not Rachid RAMDA is guilty of aiding and abetting as charged ...”
39. In an interlocutory judgment of 24 September 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal deferred its decision on a request for further information and eventually rejected the request in a further interlocutory judgment of 8 October 2009. 40. Sixty-three questions concerning the applicant alone were put to the special Assize Court of Appeal. Twenty-six related to the circumstances surrounding the attack of 25 July 1995, eighteen to the events surrounding the attack of 6 October 1995 and nineteen to the attack of 17 October 1995. The questions gave precise details of the various alleged acts and where and when they had been committed, and listed the names of dozens of victims of killings and attempted killings, mutilation or permanent disability, injuries resulting in unfitness for work of up to eight days or more, and victims of damage to their property. The answer to sixty-one of the questions was “yes”, by a majority (some questions, followed by a list of victims and requiring an individual reply in each case, were also found partly “devoid of purpose”), and two questions were found to be “devoid of purpose”. Besides details regarding the places and dates concerned in each instance, as well as the indication of the victims according to the damage suffered (death, mutilation or permanent disability, temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days and of a maximum of eight days, destruction of or damage to property), the questions related in particular to whether or not the applicant’s actions had been premeditated (questions nos. 2, 8, 28 and 46), and to incitement of others to commit certain acts (questions nos. 5, 11, 20, 25, 31, 36, 43, 49, 57 and 62), the assistance lent by the applicant to the perpetrators of the attacks (questions nos. 10, 19, 24, 30, 35, 42, 48, 56 and 61) and whether the applicant had issued instructions to others to commit certain crimes (questions nos. 6, 12, 21, 26, 32, 37, 44, 50, 58 and 63). The parties did not comment on these questions. 41. An affirmative answer was given to the questions whether the applicant had knowingly assisted in the manufacture or possession of explosive devices and in issuing instructions to that effect, in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995, and whether he had knowingly incited others to manufacture or possess such devices in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 17 October 1995. 42. In a judgment of 13 October 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years, and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. It adjourned the civil hearing for a later date. The applicant appealed on points of law. 43. On 15 June 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. Regarding his ground of appeal to the effect that no reasons had been given for the finding of guilt, based in particular on Article 6 of the Convention, it found as follows:
 “Firstly, the impugned questions, which were put in accordance with the law, established in all aspects the acts of aiding and abetting of which Mr Ramda was found guilty.

Outcome for Article 6: no_violation