FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF STOYANOV AND TABAKOV v. BULGARIA (No. 2)
(Application no. 64387/14)
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Art 1 P1 • Fair hearing • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Continued non-enforcement of final domestic judgments obliging council to initiate privatisation procedure for sale of property to applicants at preferential conditions, after finding of violations by the European Court in 2013 • Distinct situation containing relevant new information relating to issues undecided by that judgment and still under supervision of the Committee of Minister for its execution
 
STRASBOURG
7 December 2021
 
FINAL
 
07/03/2022
 
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Stoyanov and Tabakov v. Bulgaria (no. 2),
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Tim Eicke, President,
 Yonko Grozev,
 Faris Vehabović,
 Iulia Antoanella Motoc,
 Armen Harutyunyan,
 Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,
 Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges,
and Ilse Freiwirth, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 64387/14) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Bulgarian nationals, Mr Valeri Stoyanov Stoyanov (the first applicant”) and Valentin Stoyanov Tabakov (“the second applicant”), on 8 September 2014;
the decision to give notice to the Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) of the application;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 16 November 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The application concerns the non-enforcement of final domestic judgments in the applicants’ favour by virtue of which a municipal council was obliged to initiate a privatisation procedure for the sale of a property to the applicants at preferential conditions. It raises an issue under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with the above-mentioned provisions. In an earlier judgment (see Stoyanov and Tabakov v. Bulgaria, no. 34130/04, 26 November 2013, hereinafter referred to also as “the Court’s 2013 judgment”), the Court found violations of the above‑mentioned Convention provisions in an application brought by the same applicants, regarding the same privatisation procedure. THE FACTS
2. The applicants were born in 1962 and 1960 respectively and live in Pazardzhik. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr V. Obretenov, of the Ministry of Justice. 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
the court’s 2013 judgment
5. In 1996 the applicants submitted a proposal to the Pazardzhik Municipal Council (“the council”) to purchase an office, part of a house which was municipal property, under a preferential privatisation procedure applicable to tenants of State and municipally-owned properties provided for in section 35(1) of the Privatisation Act 1992 (Закон за преобразуване и приватизация на държавни и общински предприятия). As the council did not reply, they brought judicial review proceedings. In a final judgment of 17 February 2005 the courts quashed the council’s tacit refusal to open a privatisation procedure and found that it was obliged to do so, and to offer the applicants to buy the office in question, within a two-month period. In July 2007 the council decided to open such a procedure and in September 2007 it assigned the applicants as buyers, and set the conditions for the purchase, namely the purchase price. Following a judicial challenge to the conditions set by the council, in a final judgment of 8 January 2010 the courts quashed the September 2007 council’s decision in its part setting the conditions for privatisation. The applicants unsuccessfully pursued enforcement of the two final judgments in their favour. 6. The Court found in its 2013 judgment (see paragraph 1 above) that the municipal authorities had not only failed to undertake the necessary steps to enforce the final judgments in the applicants’ favour, but had demonstrated a particular unwillingness to do so. Specifically, the council had annulled its own decisions of 2007 which had recognised the applicants’ privatisation rights in respect of the office. Once the decisions’ annulment had been quashed in court, the council had attempted to have the courts declare those decisions null and void. Even though the domestic courts had repeatedly found for the applicants, and even awarded them compensation, the council’s actions had resulted in a fully unjustified delay of enforcement of the final judgments, in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Court furthermore found a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, in conjunction with the above‑mentioned provisions, due to the absence of an effective domestic remedy. 7. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has been supervising the execution of the Court’s 2013 judgment, since it became final in February 2014. As of 6 October 2021, the case was pending before the Committee who was awaiting information on the individual measures adopted by the authorities with a view to enforcing the domestic judgments in the applicants’ favour. Facts subsequent to the court’s 2013 judgment
8. In three decisions taken respectively on 31 October, 25 November and 19 December 2013, the council resolved to open a privatisation procedure concerning the whole house mentioned in paragraph 5 above, including the office subject to the Court’s 2013 judgment, and determined the conditions for that procedure under the Privatisation Act 2002 (Закон за приватизация и следприватизационен контрол). 9. The privatisation procedure, opened by the council at the end of 2013, apparently fixed eligibility conditions which disqualified the applicants from participating. As a result of judicial challenges by the applicants against the three council’s decisions of 2013 (see paragraph 8 above), the courts quashed those decisions as unlawful. Among other things, the Pazardzhik Administrative Court held in three separate judgments, two of 6 February 2014 and one of 18 March 2014, that, by opening an entirely new procedure under a new law, the council had disregarded the final judgments in the applicants’ favour on the basis of which the council had been obliged to proceed with a privatisation procedure under the Privatisation Act 1992 (see paragraph 5 above). The Supreme Administrative Court (“the SAC”) upheld those findings, in final judgments of 14 May 2014, 4 December 2014 and 28 March 2016. 10. In the meantime, on 24 February 2014, the applicants put the mayor on notice in writing that on 26 February 2014 the Court’s 2013 judgment (see paragraphs 5-7 above) would become final. They pointed out that, if the mayor were to enter into a contract selling the property in question to a third party, that would make it impossible to enforce several domestic judgments, as well as the Court’s 2013 judgment. They invited the mayor to inform the council accordingly. Notwithstanding the above and following a publicly‑announced bidding competition held on 17 February 2014, in a decision of 27 February 2014 the council assigned company Z. as the buyer, and tasked the mayor with entering into a contract with it. 11. A judicial challenge by the applicants to the council’s decision of 27 February 2014 (see paragraph 10 above) was dismissed in a final decision of 28 July 2014 by the SAC, which found that the applicants had no legal interest to pursue the proceedings. The SAC specified that it had been the council’s decisions of 2013 (see paragraph 8 above), which had opened the contested privatisation procedure and determined the conditions for it, that had affected the applicants’ legal interests. 12. Acting upon a challenge brought by the prosecutor, on 14 July 2014 the Pazardzhik Administrative Court quashed the council’s decision of 27 February 2014 as unlawful. The court held that the authorities had been obliged, on the basis of the final judgment of 17 February 2005 (see paragraph 5 above), to conduct a privatisation procedure under the old Privatisation Act 1992, and not a new procedure under the Privatisation Act 2002. The SAC confirmed the lower court’s findings in a final judgment of 22 April 2015. 13. Nonetheless, in the meantime the house (see paragraph 8 above) had been sold to company Z., on the basis of a contract entered into on 12 March 2014. 14. Subsequently, in November 2016 the council and company Z. reached an agreement, accepting that the contract for the sale of the house had been null and void, as a result of the judicial decisions quashing all of the related council decisions. 15. On 28 June 2017 the mayor notified the second applicant that his rental contract, entered into with the municipality in 1994, was being unilaterally terminated with a month’s notice. In a separate letter of the same date, the mayor invited the applicant to voluntarily vacate the office premises within seven days following the end of the month’s notice for the termination of the contract. 16. In judicial proceedings brought by the second applicant in 2017, in a judgment of 22 February 2018, final on 3 April 2018, the Pazardzhik Regional Court directed the council to refrain from unilaterally terminating his rental contract in respect of the office, until such time as the privatisation procedure, subject to the final judgments of 17 February 2005 and 8 January 2010 (see paragraph 5 above), was completed. The second applicant had previously, in July 2017, unsuccessfully pursued separate proceedings seeking a judicial order to the same effect. 17. It would appear that the second applicant continued to use the office as the premises for his legal practice, even though, according to him, the municipal authorities had at some point cut the electricity and water supply to the house. The first applicant, who had shared the office with the second applicant until about 2007, has moved out. 18. In addition, both applicants successfully pursued proceedings under the State and Municipality Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 (“the SMRDA”), concerning non-pecuniary damage in relation to the council’s unlawful decisions of November and December 2013 (see paragraph 8 above). The courts examining the claims for compensation found that, as those decisions had been declared unlawful in court (see paragraph 9 above), and the applicants had experienced negative emotions and frustration in connection with those decisions, they had sustained related non-pecuniary damage as a result. In particular, in a final judgment of 10 October 2017 the SAC awarded the first applicant 500 euros (EUR) in relation to damage he had sustained as a result of the council’s decision of 25 November 2013. In a final judgment of 31 May 2018 the SAC awarded the second applicant EUR 2,500 in relation to damage he had sustained as a result of the council’s decision of 19 December 2013. The damages concerned the period between 2013 and 2016. In determining the amount of the award, the courts deciding on the claim of the second applicant found that the demonstrative unwillingness by the council to act in accordance with the final domestic judgment (see paragraph 5 above) had resulted in increased intensity of the applicant’s suffering and granted his claim in full. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORk
19. The relevant domestic legal provisions have been set out in Stoyanov and Tabakov (cited above, §§ 45-64). 20. In addition, under section 21 of the Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act (“the Local Self-Government Act”), the municipal council has competence to dispose of municipal property and define the scope of the mayor’s related powers. Under section 23(4) of the Local Self-Government Act, the council could be convened to vote by its chairperson on his or her initiative, or following a request to that effect by one third of the municipal councils, one fifth of the municipal electorate, or by the regional governor. THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION and of article 1 of protocol no. 1 to the COnvention
21. The applicants complained about the continued lack of enforcement of the final judgments of 17 February 2005 and 8 January 2010 (see paragraph 5 above), according to which the municipal authorities had been obliged to open a privatisation procedure and to offer to sell an office to the applicants under preferential conditions. They also argued that this was in breach of the Court’s 2013 judgment (see paragraphs 5-7 above). They relied on Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
AdmissibilityArguments by the parties

22. The Government advanced the argument that the complaint was inadmissible on a number of counts. 23. Firstly, Article 6 was not applicable and the applicants were not victims of a Convention violation, given that there had been no refusal to implement the final judgments in the applicants’ favour, nor a new interference with their rights. 24. Secondly, the application had been submitted outside the six-month time-limit following the final domestic decision. 25. Finally, the complaint was inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In particular, the applicants had not attempted to convene the municipal council in accordance with the Local Self‑Government Act. Furthermore, they had not turned to the Ombudsperson or the Mediator of Pazardzhik Municipality for assistance. Nor had they brought proceedings for damages under the SMRDA, in relation to the delayed enforcement, at the end of which they could have been awarded compensation for potential new violations of their rights. 26. The applicants disagreed.

Outcome for Article P1-1: violation