FIRST SECTION
CASE OF JELINIĆ-STARĆEVIĆ v. CROATIA
(Application no. 3942/24)
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
STRASBOURG
27 November 2025
 
 
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Jelinić-Starćević v. Croatia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
 Frédéric Krenc, President,
 Davor Derenčinović,
 Alain Chablais, judges,
and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 November 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application against Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 29 January 2024. 2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the application. THE FACTS
3. The applicant’s details and information relevant to the application are set out in the appended table. 4. The applicant complained of the excessive length of criminal proceedings against her, which concerned two charges of defamation and the determination of the related costs. One of those criminal charges was dismissed as time-barred while the applicant was acquitted of the other. THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
5. The applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings in question had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As regards the determination of the criminal charge of which the applicant was acquitted
6. To the extent that the proceedings complained of concern the determination of the criminal charge of which the applicant was acquitted, the Court notes that they lasted some seven years and nine months before two levels of jurisdiction. 7. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999‑II, and Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000‑VII). 8. In the leading cases of McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, §§ 140-56, 10 September 2010, and Camasso v. Croatia, no. 15733/02, §§ 28-36, 13 January 2005, the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case. 9. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of justifying the length of the proceedings in the part concerning the determination of the criminal charge of which the applicant was acquitted. 10. In particular, unlike the dismissal of the charge which had become time-barred, the applicant’s acquittal was in no way connected to the excessive duration of the criminal proceedings in question. It thus cannot be argued, as the Government did, that the applicant had lost her victim status (see Irodotou v. Cyprus, no. 16783/20, § 63, 23 May 2023, with further references, and Osmanov and Huseinov v. Bulgaria (dec.), nos. 54178/00 and 59901/00, 4 September 2003). Likewise, having regard to its case-law (see Irodotou, cited above, § 62), the Court rejects the Government’s objection that the applicant has not suffered any significant disadvantage. 11. Remainder of the application
12. On the other hand, in so far as the application concerns the length of those criminal proceedings in relation to the determination of the charge that was dismissed as time-barred, the Court, having regard to its case-law (see Gagliano Giorgi v. Italy, no. 23563/07, § 57, ECHR 2012 (extracts); and, mutatis mutandis, Galović v. Croatia, no. 54388/09, §§ 70-74, 5 March 2013), considers that the applicant has suffered no significant disadvantage from the alleged breach of her right to a hearing within a reasonable time and that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto does not require an examination on the merits within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b). 13. Lastly, to the extent that the application concerns the part of the criminal proceedings regarding determination of costs, to which Article 6 of the Convention applies under its civil head, the Court notes that they lasted two years and almost six months at two levels of jurisdiction, which cannot be considered excessive. Moreover, by a decision of 29 May 2024 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time in respect of that part of the proceedings and awarded her 510 euros in compensation. Therefore, the applicant has already obtained an acknowledgment of the violation complained of and appropriate redress at domestic level and therefore can no longer claim to be the victim of that violation, as required by Article 34 of the Convention. 14. It follows that this, remaining, part of the application is inadmissible under Article 34 and Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

Outcome for Article 6: violation