FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF CAVCA v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
(Application no. 21766/22)
 
 
JUDGMENT
Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Fair hearing • Disciplinary proceedings against public official resulting in his dismissal after being allegedly incited by undercover State agent to accept bribe as part of professional integrity test • Art 6 not applicable under its criminal limb but under its civil limb • Fair-trial guarantees developed in the Court’s case-law in respect of entrapment in context of criminal proceedings relevant to impugned civil proceedings • Subjecting a person to professional integrity test not in itself entrapment or incompatible with Art 6 § 1 requirements • Need for strong procedural guarantees for planning, execution and evaluation of such test • Flagrant procedural deficiencies • Domestic courts’ failure to examine applicant’s arguable claim of entrapment effectively and to observe principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
9 January 2025
FINAL
 
09/04/2025
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Mattias Guyomar, President,
 María Elósegui,
 Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,
 Gilberto Felici,
 Andreas Zünd,
 Diana Sârcu,
 Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 21766/22) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Moldovan national, Mr Ivan Cavca (“the applicant”), on 18 April 2022;
the decision to give notice to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the alleged incitement to commit acts of misconduct and the failure to observe the principle of adversarial proceedings, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 3 December 2024,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns the applicant’s alleged incitement to commit a disciplinary offence and insufficient procedural guarantees in that regard (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention). THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Cozești. He was represented by Mr I. Cobîşenco, a lawyer practising in Chișinău. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr D. Obadă. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was head of a territorial subdivision of the Environmental Protection Inspectorate (“the EPI”). Before the relevant events, he had never been sanctioned for any disciplinary offence. On 29 February 2019 the National Anti-Corruption Centre (“the NAC”) initiated a procedure to test the professional integrity of EPI employees, in accordance with Law no. 325 on the assessment of institutional integrity (see paragraph 18 below). It identified corruption risks within the EPI on the basis of the information available, such as previous reports, a decision by the Court of Auditors, reports by non-governmental organisations, statistics and specific confirmed cases of corruption among EPI employees. It also described a plan to randomly test public officials employed by the EPI, and to evaluate the results and formulate proposals to reduce such risks following the testing. As part of the procedure in the present case, a judge from the Chișinău Court (Centru Office) reviewed whether it was necessary to carry out such testing and the manner in which it would be carried out, and then authorised it by a decision of 5 March 2019. 6. On 22 May 2019 someone called the applicant’s office, complaining about the illegal felling of trees. At the location indicated by the caller, the applicant discovered that S. had cut down a tree with a chainsaw. In fact, S. was acting undercover to test the applicant’s professional integrity. He suggested to the applicant that the issue could be resolved without there being an official procedure, and offered the applicant various items as a bribe. The applicant rejected that suggestion and drew up a record of the administrative offence committed by S., imposing a fine on him. S. then returned to the applicant’s office to show proof that he had paid the fine. The applicant informed S. that he also had to confiscate the chainsaw used to commit the administrative offence. S. replied that this was not a problem since he had another tool like it. According to the Government, the applicant gestured to S. not to speak so that they would not be overheard, then they went outside and the applicant told him that he had had to draw up the record because there had been a complaint and a local forester had been present. He promised to help S. in the future if S. warned him ahead of time. S. asked whether the applicant needed the chainsaw (apparently offering it as a bribe), and the applicant replied that he did and showed S. a car where he could leave it. S. secretly recorded the above-mentioned events. 7. In a decision dated 28 January 2020, the judge who had authorised the testing examined all the material relating to a number of public officials who had been tested during the relevant period, including audiovisual recordings. He confirmed the facts mentioned above in respect of the applicant. The judge established that several public officials, including the applicant, had failed the professional integrity test. He also stated that “... the NAC ha[d] proved the existence of indications that the acts described above [the breaches of rules of professional conduct] would have been committed by the public officials even in the absence of any involvement by the State authorities”. He did not give any details. The applicant and the other officials tested had not been summoned to that hearing and were not given the opportunity to make any submissions in those proceedings. Only the institution concerned by the professional integrity testing (in this case, the EPI) could appeal against the decision. 8. In the light of the decision of 28 January 2020, the NAC asked the EPI to examine the material in the case and inform it of any measures taken. On 8 May 2020, having heard the applicant, the EPI disciplinary commission proposed that he be dismissed for failing the integrity test. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant had breached “legislative instruments for internal use”, namely several provisions of the Law on public functions and the status of public officials. On 19 May 2020 the EPI decided to dismiss the applicant on that basis. The dismissal decision also noted that the applicant had taken steps “to satisfy requests outside the legal framework – actions which affect[ed] the prestige of the public authority for which he work[ed] – [and that there had been a] breach of the rules of conduct of a public official [and a] breach of provisions concerning the rights and duties established by law ...”. 9. On 18 June 2020 the applicant challenged that decision in court. He argued, inter alia, that he had been incited to commit the disciplinary offence and that the sanction imposed had been disproportionate. 10. On 3 November 2020 the Chișinău Court (Râșcani Office) dismissed the court action as ill-founded. It found that the applicant’s propensity to commit such offences was evident from the video-recordings of the events of 22 May 2019 which had been examined at the hearing, and from the fact that he had voluntarily reimbursed the State for the cost of the chainsaw in the meantime. Moreover, the results of the professional integrity testing had been confirmed by a court in its decision of 28 January 2020. The court noted, inter alia, a statement made by the NCA’s representative. According to that statement, the applicant had said several times that he had had to draw up the record of the administrative offence because a complaint had already been made and he had not been alone; he had also stated several times that the chainsaw had to be confiscated, and S. had responded by saying that this was not a problem since he had another tool like it; and “on the basis of this previous discussion [about the chainsaw], when they [had gone] outside, [S. had] asked once more if the applicant needed such a tool and [had] not even [been] able to finish his sentence because the applicant [had] told him that he needed it”. The court did not comment on the applicant’s argument about entrapment. 11. The applicant appealed and stated, inter alia, that the video-recording of the relevant events showed S. offering him brandy, fish, money, and finally the chainsaw. This had not been passive recording of an ongoing offence, but active incitement to accept a bribe. Moreover, under section 28 of the Law on the assessment of institutional integrity (see paragraph 18 below), the EPI had had an obligation to inform him that his professional integrity might be tested, and he had had to countersign such a notification. This had not happened in his case. He added that under domestic law, the employer had to pay him the salary he had not received for the entire period after his wrongful dismissal and compensate him for the non-pecuniary damage caused, which he assessed as equating to two average monthly salaries. 12. On 12 May 2021 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision, essentially for the same reasons. It did not comment on the applicant’s argument about entrapment or the failure to inform him that his professional integrity might be tested. 13. The applicant appealed, repeating his arguments, including those about entrapment and the failure to inform him that his professional integrity could be tested, as required by law. In relation to this latter argument, he relied on the case of F., which had previously been decided by the Supreme Court of Justice (see paragraph 21 below). 14. On 27 October 2021 the Supreme Court of Justice declared the appeal inadmissible. It did not comment on the applicant’s argument about entrapment or the failure to inform him that his professional integrity might be tested. 15. On 15 February 2022 the applicant asked for the proceedings in his case to be reopened, referring to a decision by the Constitutional Court to strike down parts of section 17 of Law no. 325 (see paragraph 20 below). However, by decisions of 30 May and 5 October 2022, the Chișinău Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice rejected that request. RELEVANT material
relevant domestic law and practice
16. Under Article 3438 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as in force at the material time, the decision confirming the result of the professional integrity testing could be appealed against by the agency concerned by the evaluation. 17. Under section 22 of the Law on public functions and the status of public officials (no. 158-XVI of 23 December 2008), a public official must, inter alia, observe rules of professional conduct established by law and comply with the provisions of section 7(2) of the Law on the assessment of institutional integrity (no. 325 of 23 December 2013). Under section 58 of the Law on public functions and the status of public officials, the list of applicable disciplinary sanctions is limited to warnings, reprimands, severe reprimands, temporary suspension of the right to be promoted, demotion and dismissal. 18. Under section 4 of the Law on the assessment of institutional integrity (no. 325 of 23 December 2013 – “Law no. 325”), a test of a person’s professional integrity is the creation and application by the tester of virtual, simulated situations similar to those in the work environment, carried out in the context of covert operations and influenced by the behaviour of the public official being tested, with a view to passively monitoring and recording the official’s reactions and conduct, thus determining the degree to which the climate of professional integrity is affected and the risk of corruption within the public entity where professional integrity is being evaluated. Under section 7 of the same Law, public officials have the right, inter alia, to be informed of the specific requirements of professional integrity within their public entity, as well as the applicable disciplinary sanctions for breaching those requirements. They also have a duty not to allow corrupt behaviour and to immediately report such behaviour and any attempt to involve them in such activity, to know and observe the duties resulting from sectorial and national anti-corruption policies, and to comply with the specific requirements of professional integrity of public officials in the relevant public agency of which they have been informed. Under section 8 of the same Law, when hiring new public officials or within ten days of the entry into force of the Law for existing public officials, public authorities and local administrations have an obligation to inform those officials that their professional integrity could be tested. Under section 11 of the same Law, if a person fails a professional integrity test, only disciplinary sanctions can be applied and the evidence obtained during such a test cannot be used in a criminal trial. The use of such evidence in civil proceedings is allowed if it is relevant, admissible and truthful, and if the public interest is preserved and human rights and freedoms are protected. Under section 13 of the same Law, the process of testing professional integrity starts with the identification of a risk of corruption within specific public authorities, on the basis of information already made available by various persons, the media and analytical documents. The testing itself may follow (subject to authorisation by a judge under section 14 of the same Law), as may an analysis of the risk and any proposals to eliminate that risk. Under section 17 of the same Law, as in force before the Constitutional Court’s decision of 7 December 2021 (see paragraph 20 below), a judge who had previously authorised professional integrity testing would examine the result of the test and decide whether the person in question had passed or failed the test, or whether the result was inconclusive. In doing so, the judge would verify whether the testing had been authorised and review any evidence in the file relating to the test, including audiovisual recordings. At the request of the public agency concerned by the evaluation, the judge could issue a decision dealing with any outstanding issue. Under section 21 of the same Law, disciplinary sanctions which are applicable as a result of a person failing a professional integrity test, including dismissal, are to be applied in accordance with the legislation regulating the activity of the relevant public agency. The NAC and the Security and Information Service (“the SIS”) are both required to maintain professional integrity records of public officials. Employers may access those records up to five years after the events in question, in line with the conditions established in the relevant Government Regulation (see paragraph 19 below). Under section 28 of Law no. 325, within ten days of its publication, the public authorities concerned by that Law had to inform the public officials they employed that their professional integrity might be tested, and the officials had to countersign that notification. 19. Under the Government Regulation concerning the maintaining and use of the professional integrity records of public officials (no. 767 of 19 September 2014), the aim of a record is to prevent public officials who have not shown professional integrity during a previous test from being hired to perform public functions. Future employers in the public sphere can request a certificate concerning the content of a candidate’s personal professional integrity record. Information about a person failing a previous professional integrity test is stored in the record for five years if the person was found to be in breach of anti-corruption rules, and one year if he or she failed to report corruption and related activities. 20. On 7 December 2021 the Constitutional Court issued decision no. 37, whereby it declared parts of section 17 of Law no. 325 (see paragraph 18 above) unconstitutional since it effectively prevented a public official from participating in the court proceedings to determine whether he or she had failed a professional integrity test and had thus committed a disciplinary offence, and from appealing against such a decision. It found that in any subsequent proceedings brought by a public official seeking the annulment of a sanction which had been applied, the courts would be bound by the previous determination made by another court concerning the results of the relevant professional integrity test, which had the power of res judicata. This irremediably affected the right to a fair trial. The court added that its decision affected only future cases; however, in order to make an immediate impact on the case which was the subject of the complaint before it, it decided that the complainant could appeal against the court decision confirming the results of his professional testing. 21. On 16 March 2016, in the case of F. (3ra-964/16), the Supreme Court of Justice quashed judgments by lower courts. It found that F., who had failed a professional integrity test, had not been informed that such tests could be carried out, as required by law. Accordingly, his dismissal had been unlawful; he was reinstated in his job.
relevant international material
22. The relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2004), which the Republic of Moldova ratified on 1 October 2007, provide as follows:
Article 1. Statement of purpose
“The purposes of this Convention are:
(a)  To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively;
(b)  To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery;
(c)  To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property.”
Article 8. Codes of conduct for public officials
“... 4. Each State Party shall also consider, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, establishing measures and systems to facilitate the reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities, when such acts come to their notice in the performance of their functions.
... 6. Each State Party shall consider taking, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, disciplinary or other measures against public officials who violate the codes or standards established in accordance with this article.”
The Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), in dealing with Article 50 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, provides for the possibility of having recourse to undercover and sting operations, while warning about lawfulness issues in some countries, particularly in relation to concerns about entrapment. 23. Article 23 of the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (opened for signature on 27 January 1999, ETS 173), which the Republic of Moldova ratified on 14 January 2004, provides as follows:
Measures to facilitate the gathering of evidence and the confiscation of proceeds
“1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary, including those permitting the use of special investigative techniques, in accordance with national law, to enable it to facilitate the gathering of evidence related to criminal offences established in accordance with Article 2 to 14 of this Convention and to identify, trace, freeze and seize instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption, or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds, liable to measures set out in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 19 of this Convention.
...”
The Explanatory Report to the above-mentioned Convention provides, in respect of Article 23, as follows:
“114. This provision acknowledges the difficulties that exist to obtain evidence that may lead to the prosecution and punishment of persons having committed those corruption offences defined in accordance with the present Convention. Behind almost every corruption offence lies a pact of silence between the person who pays the bribe and the person who receives it. In normal circumstances none of them will have any interest in disclosing the existence or the modalities of the corrupt agreement concluded between them. In conformity with paragraph 1, States Parties are therefore required to adopt measures, which will facilitate the gathering of evidence in cases related to the commission of one of the offences defined in Articles 2-14. In view of the already mentioned difficulties to obtain evidence, this provision includes an obligation for the Parties to permit the use of ‘special investigative techniques’. No list of these techniques is included but the drafters of the Convention were referring in particular to the use of under-cover agents, wire-tapping, bugging, interception of telecommunications, access to computer systems and so on. Reference to these special investigative techniques can also be found in previous instruments such as the United Nations Convention of 1988, the Council of Europe Convention on the Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141, Article 4) or the Forty Recommendations adopted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Most of these techniques are highly intrusive and may give rise to constitutional difficulties as regards their compatibility with fundamental rights and freedoms. Therefore, the Parties are free to decide that some of these techniques will not be admitted in their domestic legal system. Also the reference made by paragraph 1 to ‘national law’ should enable Parties to surround the use of these special investigative techniques with as many safeguards and guarantees as may be required by the imperative of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
24. The Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption (opened for signature on 4 November 1999, ETS 174), which the Republic of Moldova ratified on 17 March 2004, requires Contracting Parties to provide in their domestic law 
“for effective remedies for persons who have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend their rights and interests, including the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage”. Its implementation will be monitored by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). It provides in Article 11 (Acquisition of evidence) that:
“Each Party shall provide in its internal law for effective procedures for the acquisition of evidence in civil proceedings arising from an act of corruption.”
25. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) manual on “Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Sector” states that “the Integrity Test can be a powerful specialised corruption detection tool”. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s “Best practices in combating corruption” notes that “[i]ntegrity testing has now emerged as a particularly useful tool for cleaning up corrupt police forces – and for keeping them clean”. Furthermore, the World Bank’s guidelines on “Preventing Corruption in Prosecution Offices: Understanding and Managing for Integrity” refer to integrity testing as “a powerful corruption detection tool”. 26. In its amicus curiae brief for the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova on certain provisions of the law on professional integrity testing (opinion no. 789/2014, CDL-AD(2014)039 of 15 December 2014), the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) noted, inter alia (footnotes omitted):
“10. As corruption undermines the rule of law and good governance, poses significant risks to the protection of human rights, hinders economic development, endangers the stability of democratic institutions and the moral foundation of society, any efforts made by Moldova to fight this is to be encouraged and welcomed. However, it is also important that these efforts do not jeopardise the stability of democratic institutions nor weaken the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.
...
83.  [The guiding principles which can be derived from the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law] seem to be violated by the professional integrity procedure set out in Law no. 325: Articles 4 and 10.2 are not sufficient for a reasonable grounds test or a comparable concept concerning the initiation of an individual integrity testing procedure. It is also highly questionable whether the (confidential) ‘professional integrity testing plan’ established by the NAC (or ISS) under Article 11.3 of Law no. 325 satisfies the minimum requirements for the formal authorisation of an undercover agent’s activity. 84. Finally, Law no. 325’s circular argumentation for a ‘justified risk’ (Article 4) leading towards the legal fiction of the professional integrity tester not committing a criminal offence (Article 9.5), cannot negate that – factually – the tester with a fake identity who approaches a judge for the first time with an apparent corruptive offer – and be it with a mental reservation as to the seriousness of the offer – commits a criminal offence and thus has to be qualified as an agent provocateur.”
27. The relevant parts of the United Nations Handbook on Practical Anti-Corruption Measures for Prosecutors and Investigators (Vienna, 2004) read as follows:
CHAPTER 11. INTEGRITY TESTING
“... So it is that integrity testing is now considered to be an effective instrument that embraces both the prevention and the prosecution of corruption. The objectives of integrity testing are to:
a)  Determine whether or not a particular public civil servant or branch of government is likely to engage in corrupt practices.
b)  Increase the actual and perceived risk to corrupt officials that they may be detected, thereby deterring corrupt behaviour and encouraging officials to report instances when they are offered bribes (many genuine offers of bribes will be taken for being integrity tests and be reported to protect the official’s job); and to
c)  Identify officials, such as police officers, who are working in areas exposed to corruption as being honest and trustworthy, and therefore likely to be suitable for promotion. (For this reason it is essential that any regime of integrity testing include random elements and not rest solely on suspicion; passing an integrity test should be recorded as a credit to an official’s record, and not imply that there has been an allegation of corruption against the official that an integrity test has failed to confirm). Integrity testing has been used effectively to ‘test’ whether public officials of all description resist offers of bribes and refrain from soliciting them. As such they are proving to be an extremely effective and cost-efficient deterrent to corruption.
... C. FAIRNESS
In democratic societies, it is generally considered to be unacceptable for a government to engage in activities that encourage individuals to perpetrate crimes they might not otherwise commit. It is, however, usually quite acceptable for a government to observe whether or not someone is willing to commit a crime under ordinary, everyday circumstances. For that reason, integrity testing must be carried out with the strictest discipline. Integrity testing, like other forms of intrusive technique, is an ‘aggressive’ exercise of state power. To avoid the criticism of abuse of power, audio or video recordings of the actual event should be made to verify that the accused person was not acting other than of his or her own free will, and that government agents have not behaved unfairly or coercively. Such recordings also help to ensure that a government has sufficient evidence to pursue a successful prosecution.
... E. INTEGRITY TESTING AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Although integrity tests can be extremely effective as an investigative tool as well as being an excellent deterrent, not all courts readily accept them as a valid method of collecting evidence. Notwithstanding, there are substantial reasons for its use. It is one of the most effective tools for identifying and eradicating corrupt practices in government services within a short period of time. Where corruption is rampant and levels of public trust are low, it is one of the few tools that can promise immediate results and help restore trust in public administration. It cannot be stressed enough that legal systems that provide for ‘agent provocateur’ scenarios should try to ensure that they are never designed to instigate conduct that makes criminals out of those who might otherwise have reacted honestly. It is therefore important to ensure that the degree of temptation is not extreme and unreasonable. ...”
28. The Venice Commission issued an interim opinion on the draft law on integrity checking of Ukraine (CDL-AD(2015)031), where it made an overview of available international texts dealing with the issue of integrity tests. It warned, inter alia, about the possibility that such testing could in certain circumstances amount to entrapment. THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION (alleged entrapment and adversarial proceedings)
29. The applicant complained that he had been entrapped by agents acting on behalf of the State, which had resulted in an unfair trial. Moreover, he had not had the opportunity to address the court which had confirmed the results of his professional integrity testing in its decision of 28 January 2020. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
Admissibility
30. The Court must first determine whether Article 6 of the Convention is applicable to the present case under its criminal or civil limb. Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its criminal limb
31. The Court reiterates that the assessment of the applicability of Article 6 under its criminal limb is based on three criteria, commonly known as the Engel criteria (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 82, Series A no. 22). The first criterion is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the very nature of the offence, and the third is the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring (see, for example, Gestur Jónsson and Ragnar Halldór Hall v. Iceland [GC], nos. 68273/14 and 68271/14, § 75, 22 December 2020). In respect of the third criterion, the Court has also considered the nature of the penalty (see, for example, Öztürk v. Germany, 21 February 1984, § 50, Series A no. 73). 32. It was not disputed by the parties that the applicant was not convicted of any offence characterised under domestic law as “criminal”; rather, he was sanctioned for behaviour that belongs to the sphere of disciplinary law. However, the indications furnished by the domestic law of the respondent State have only a relative value (see, for instance, Ziliberberg v. Moldova, no. 61821/00, § 30, 1 February 2005). 33. It is therefore necessary to examine the behaviour that gave rise to the sanction in the light of the second and third criteria mentioned above. In this connection, the Court reiterates that these criteria are alternative and not cumulative: for Article 6 to apply, it suffices that the offence in question should by its nature be criminal from the point of view of the Convention, or should have made the person concerned liable to a sanction which, by its nature and degree of severity, belongs in general to the criminal sphere (ibid., § 31). 34. As regards the nature of the behaviour for which the applicant was sanctioned, the Court notes that he was accused of having breached several provisions of the Law on public functions and the status of public officials (“Law no. 158” – see paragraph 17 above), which the EPI disciplinary commission referred to as legislative instruments for internal use (see paragraph 8 above). The Court notes that the relevant disciplinary regime was aimed at ensuring that public officials complied with the specific rules governing their professional conduct. Moreover, the above-mentioned instruments were to be applied in accordance with the legislation regulating the activity of each specific public agency (see paragraph 18 above), thus limiting the reach of those rules even further and making it doubtful that they could be seen as rules of general application. While some aspects of the wrongdoing for which the applicant was disciplinarily sanctioned would probably have resembled constituent elements of the criminal offence of corruption if established outside the field of application of Law no. 325, it remains the fact that under the relevant legal regime, what was sanctioned was the attitude shown by the person concerned during a test situation and not the commission of a specific act prohibited by law. Having regard to all these elements, the Court finds that the breach of the relevant rules in Law no. 158 was not criminal but disciplinary in nature (see Müller-Hartburg v. Austria, no. 47195/06, §§ 44-45, 19 February 2013). 35. Turning to the nature and degree of severity of the sanction which the applicant risked incurring, the Court reiterates that this criterion is to be determined by reference to the maximum potential penalty for which the relevant law provides. The actual penalty imposed is relevant to the determination, but cannot diminish the importance of what was initially at stake (see Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98, § 120, ECHR 2003-X, with further references). The Court notes that under the domestic law (see paragraph 17 above), the sanctions applicable for a disciplinary offence ranged from warnings and reprimands to suspension of the right to be promoted and dismissal. These are typical disciplinary sanctions (see Müller-Hartburg, cited above, § 47). In particular, the applicant did not risk detention or a large fine, but was instead dismissed, which meant that for five years he had no right to be re-employed as a public official (see paragraph 19 above). 36. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the elements above cannot lead to a conclusion that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant concerned the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention (see Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey, nos. 30226/10 and 4 others, § 154, 28 January 2020, and Xhoxhaj v. Albania, no. 15227/19, §§ 240-46, 9 February 2021). Therefore, that provision is not applicable to the present case under its criminal limb. Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil limb
37. The Court notes that the proceedings in the present case concerned a dispute in respect of the decision imposing a disciplinary sanction on the applicant. Regarding the existence of a “right”, it observes that the proceedings in question were decisive for the applicant’s rights in so far as they could have led to the setting-aside of the disciplinary sanction imposed had his appeal been allowed. As to the “civil” nature of such a right, the Court notes that domestic law allows a public official against whom a disciplinary sanction has been applied to challenge it in court, and that the applicant availed himself of that right. Accordingly, Article 6 is applicable under its civil limb (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 112 and 117-20, 6 November 2018). Conclusion on admissibility
38. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. MeritsThe parties’ submissions

39. The applicant argued that he had been entrapped by State agents, which had rendered the subsequent court proceedings unfair. 40. The Government argued that the applicant had failed a professional integrity test by accepting a bribe in exchange for imposing a milder sanction on S. The legal requirements concerning the planning and carrying out of such tests had been observed. When viewing the material in the case in order to decide whether the applicant had passed the professional integrity test, the relevant court had also examined the actions of the undercover agent in question. In doing so, it had established that there were sufficient reasons to consider that the applicant would have committed the relevant disciplinary offence even without the tester’s involvement. The Government added that the applicant had not opposed the bribery attempt, but had stalled the events by having long telephone conversations and stating that he would have been open to accepting the proposals by S., but had not been able to owing to the presence of a forester and the existence of a formal complaint. Moreover, he had initially announced that a larger fine would be imposed, but had then found a way to reduce it, thus coming to an illegal arrangement with the tester. When accepting the bribe in the form of the chainsaw, he had told S. that he could help him in the future if he was warned in advance. Moreover, by reimbursing the State for the cost of the chainsaw after the testing had been revealed, he had acknowledged having taken the bribe. The relevant court had examined his complaint of entrapment and had concluded that there had been no incitement. The court had not found that argument decisive, as it had considered all the material in the case, including the video-recordings in the file. Moreover, the applicant had not raised the issue of entrapment before the EPI disciplinary commission.

Outcome for Article 6: violation