FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF NAYDYONOV AND VEDUTENKO v. UKRAINE(Application no. 56181/15)      JUDGMENT STRASBOURG23 October 2025 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Naydyonov and Vedutenko v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Gilberto Felici, President, Diana Sârcu, Sébastien Biancheri, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the application (no. 56181/15) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 3 November 2015 by two Ukrainian nationals, Mr Oleksiy Valeriyovych Naydyonov and Ms Olga Igorivna Vedutenko (“the applicants”), who were born in 1980 and 1977 respectively and live in Kyiv, and were represented by Mr M. Tarakhkalo and Ms A. Kozmenko, lawyers practising in Kyiv;the decision to give notice of the application to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Marharyta Sokorenko;the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 2 October 2025,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE1. The case concerns the applicants’ complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the allegedly inadequate response of the domestic authorities to a criminal infringement of their property rights by private individuals and the prolonged seizure of the applicants’ property as physical evidence within the related criminal proceedings.2. In late 2013 and early 2014 the applicants, a married couple who owned a vehicle leasing company, leased two vans and a truck to Ms O. and her common-law husband Mr T.3. On 3 May 2014 the applicants complained to the police that they had discovered that the three vehicles had been sold to third parties on the basis of forged powers of attorney, which had been certified by a private notary, Mr K. A criminal investigation was launched the same day without any suspects being named.4. Shortly thereafter the applicants located the two vans by their own efforts (using the integrated GPS trackers) and notified the police. On 6 May 2014 the investigator seized the vehicles as physical evidence.5. On 26 May 2014 the investigator questioned Ms O. as a witness. She claimed that she had not been aware of the sale. Ms O. admitted that the truck was still in her possession but refused to give any details, referring to her right not to self-incriminate.6. On 30 May 2014 the investigator transferred the two vans to the first applicant for safekeeping.7. In July 2014 the prosecutor wrote to the applicants that the investigation had been entrusted to a different unit, as the previous one had not carried out any investigative measures since the beginning of the investigation.8. On 28 October 2014 a forensic handwriting examination report confirmed that the first applicant’s signatures on the powers of attorney had been forged.9. At some point the applicants found that there were other persons whose vehicles had also been fraudulently appropriated with the involvement of the same notary. In May 2015 the investigator questioned two of those victims as witnesses. However, no charges were brought against Mr K., nor did the investigator question Mr K. at any time.10. In July 2015 the prosecutor wrote a letter to the investigative unit, criticising it for disregarding his directions and for the failure to carry out any investigative measures for more than half a year.11. On 23 February 2016 the investigator issued a notice of suspicion in respect of Ms O. and Mr T.12. On 26 May 2016 Ms O. was placed under house arrest. As regards Mr T., it appears that he was detained in unrelated parallel criminal proceedings.13. On 3 June 2016 the applicants lodged a civil claim against Ms O. and Mr T. Shortly thereafter the investigating judge seized some non-residential premises belonging to Ms O. in order to secure the civil claim.14. On 18 July 2016 the criminal investigation was split into two cases: one in respect of Ms O. and the other in respect of Mr T. It appears that the bill of indictment in respect of Mr T. was then sent to the Pecherskyi Court.15. In September 2016 the bill of indictment in respect of Ms O. was also sent to the same trial court.16. In November 2016 the prosecutor wrote to the applicants that an internal inquiry had been ordered in respect of various omissions and shortcomings in the criminal investigation concerning their property.17. Since the two cases remained pending before the Pecherskyi Court without even a preparatory hearing being held for more than two and a half years, in July 2019 they were transferred to the Shevchenkivskyi Court at the applicants’ request. In December 2019 the cases were merged again into one after the prosecutor had admitted that their separation had been unjustified.18. The applicants applied several times to the Shevchenkivskyi Court for permission to sell the two vans. On 19 February 2021 the judge informed the first applicant that he was free to sell them if he wished.19. The criminal proceedings remain pending before the first-instance court. The truck belonging to the applicants is still on the list of vehicles sought by the police. The applicants submitted that no action has been taken to locate it.20. The applicants also brought civil proceedings against the notary, Mr K., but their claim was rejected on the grounds that the notary had not been a party to the contested deed. They brought further administrative proceedings against the Ministry of the Interior in respect of the investigating authorities’ failure to respond to their numerous applications and enquiries. The courts found that there had indeed been unlawful omissions but rejected the applicants’ claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage.THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT21. The applicants complained that the State had failed to discharge its positive obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, since the investigation into the fraudulent appropriation of their three vehicles by private individuals had been lengthy and flagrantly deficient. They also complained, under the same provision, that the prolonged seizure of two of their vehicles as physical evidence in the related criminal proceedings had been unjustified and had amounted to a disproportionate interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. Although the applicants additionally relied on Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention, the Court considers that the application falls to be examined only under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (compare Credit Europe Leasing Ifn S.A. v. Romania, no. 38072/11, §§ 46-47, 21 July 2020).22. The Government submitted that the applicants had not complied with the six-month time-limit in so far as their complaint concerned the restrictions relating to the seizure of the vehicles as physical evidence. In the Government’s view, that period had started to run on 6 May 2014. The applicants submitted, in reply, that their complaint concerned the prolonged duration of the restriction on their right to freely dispose of the two vans in question, which had ceased to exist only on 19 February 2021. The Government also argued that there had been no violation of the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.23. The Court accepts the applicants’ argument and rejects the above-mentioned objection by the Government. It further notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.24. The relevant principles of the Court’s case-law have been set out, in particular, in Blumberga v. Latvia (no. 70930/01, §§ 67-68, 14 October 2008) as regards the positive obligations of the State in cases of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions by a private individual and in Akshin Garayev v. Azerbaijan (no. 30352/11, § 56, 2 February 2023) as regards the proportionality of measures designed to control the use of an individual’s property, in particular its retention as material evidence in criminal proceedings.25. The Court notes that, as soon as the applicants learned about the fraudulent appropriation of their three vehicles, they complained about it to the police (see paragraph 3 above). As acknowledged by the domestic authorities, the investigation was undermined by serious delays and omissions. It was established, in particular, that no investigative measures had been carried out during the initial crucial period of the first two months after the beginning of the investigation (see paragraph 7 above; see also paragraphs 10, 16 and 20 above for other examples of delays and deficiencies). While two of the vehicles were located and withheld by the police thanks to the applicants’ efforts, no action was apparently taken to locate the third vehicle. The Court finds the passivity of the police particularly striking, regard being had to the fact that Ms O. admitted as early as in May 2014 that that vehicle had still been in her possession but refused to give any details (see paragraph 5 above). It was only two years after the events that a notice of suspicion was issued to Ms O. and her common-law husband (see paragraph 11 above). As regards the private notary directly implicated in the misappropriation of the applicants’ property, the investigator did not find it necessary even to question him, let alone bring any charges, even after having been informed of other similar episodes (see paragraph 9 above). Furthermore, the investigation was unjustifiably split into two cases in July 2016 only to be merged back into one three years later (see paragraphs 14 and 17 above). The Court also takes note of the unexplained delay of more than two and a half years before the beginning of the trial after the bills of indictment were sent to the court (see paragraph 17 above). In sum, the Court considers that the circumstances of the case disclose exceptionally serious and flagrant deficiencies in the conduct of the criminal proceedings, indicative of the State’s failure to comply with its positive obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.26. The Court further notes that the applicants were under the obligation to ensure safekeeping of the two vehicles, which had the status of physical evidence in the proceedings, from 30 May 2014 to 19 February 2021. In other words, they did not have the right to dispose of the vehicles, which were obviously depreciating and losing market value, for almost seven years. While the lawfulness of that restriction is not in dispute, the Court notes that its necessity was not explained. That being so and having regard to the fact, which the Court considers sufficiently established, that the major reason for the lengthy duration of the proceedings mainly stemmed from the authorities’ omissions, the Court finds that the contested measure was disproportionate.27.

Outcome for Article P1-1: violation