FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF NEDERLANDSE OMROEP STICHTING AND OTHERS v. THE NETHERLANDS
(Application no. 20066/18)
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 10 • Freedom to receive and impart information • Partial refusal of journalists’ request to disclose State-held information pertaining to the political and administrative handling of the downing of flight MH17 in July 2014 • Information requested for journalistic activities on a matter of public interest and was ready and available • Compatibility ratione materiae • Considerable portion of the requested information ultimately disclosed during the domestic proceedings • Effective review of the compliance of the impugned refusal with domestic law and the Convention by the domestic courts in adversarial proceedings • Relevant and sufficient reasons • Domestic authorities acted within their margin of appreciation when striking a fair balance between competing interests with due regard to the principles and criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law • Interference “necessary in a democratic society” in pursuance of several legitimate aims
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
21 April 2026
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Nederlandse Omroep Stichting and Others v. the Netherlands,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Lado Chanturia, President,
 Jolien Schukking,
 Faris Vehabović,
 Ana Maria Guerra Martins,
 Anne Louise Bormann,
 Sebastian Răduleţu,
 András Jakab, judges,
and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 20066/18) against the Kingdom of the Netherlands lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Dutch broadcasting organisations and a national newspaper (“the applicants”), indicated in the appended table, on 18 April 2018;
the decision to give notice to the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning Article 10 of the Convention;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 24 March 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns the alleged unjustified interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention on account of the authorities’ partial refusal to disclose information relating to the Government’s handling of the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in July 2014. The applicants had requested this information in their capacity as journalists. THE FACTS
2. The applicants are two Dutch broadcasting organisations and a national newspaper. They were represented by Mr J.H.A. Van der Grinten, a lawyer practising in Amsterdam. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms B. Koopman, and their Deputy Agent at the time, Mr. V. de Graaf, both of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. I. REQUESTS UNDER THE TRANSPARENCY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ACT
5. On 17 July 2014 Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was downed in eastern Ukraine. All 298 civilians on board were killed, 196 of whom were nationals of the Netherlands. Subsequently, working closely with Ukraine and other affected States, the Netherlands coordinated the recovery and repatriation efforts and established, in August 2014, together with Australia, Belgium and Ukraine, a joint investigation team (“JIT”) to carry out a criminal investigation into the crash of flight MH17, with the participation of Malaysia and Eurojust (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, §§ 54 and 126, 9 July 2025). 6. Immediately after the downing of flight MH17, the Netherlands’ national crisis structure was mobilised, on the basis of which a number of governmental bodies were activated, including the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (Ministeriële Commissie Crisisbeheersing – “the MCCb”), comprising ministers from the relevant ministries, and the civil service Interministerial Crisis Management Committee (Interdepartementale Commissie Crisisbeheersing – “the ICCb”), comprising senior officials from various ministries (see further details in paragraphs 58-63 below). Together, the MCCb and the ICCb formed the linchpin of the national crisis management organisation in response to the downing of MH17. 7. On various dates in October and November 2014 the applicants asked the then Minister of Security and Justice (“the Minister”) to disclose all MCCb and ICCb documents relating to the political and administrative handling of the MH17 disaster, including the minutes of their meetings. The applicants relied on Article 10 of the Convention and the Transparency of Public Administration Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur – “the Wob”; see paragraphs 47-53 below), which has since been repealed and replaced (see paragraph 56 below). 8. On 10 February 2015 the Minister issued decisions on the applicants’ requests. A total of 255 documents were identified. The Minister refused to disclose 79 of these documents, while the remaining documents were disclosed either in full or in part with redactions. In making those decisions, the Minister relied on four different grounds for refusal taken from sections 10(2) and 11(1) of the Wob, finding each time that the interests protected by the relevant individual grounds outweighed the public interest that was served by disclosure of the corresponding information. The applicants also received a list which contained, inter alia, the titles and dates of all 255 documents and the grounds (if any) for non-disclosure. 9. The Minister refused to disclose the minutes of the MCCb and the ICCb (74 documents in total) on the grounds of “disproportionate disadvantage” (section 10(2)(g) of the Wob), considering that disclosure would likely hinder uninhibited deliberation between members of the MCCb and the ICCb and obstruct their decision-making process. A free and unrestricted exchange of arguments at meetings of the MCCb and the ICCb was deemed essential for those committees to perform their duties properly. 10. The Minister also refused to disclose the minutes of the MCCb and the ICCb, as well as certain passages in other documents, because they included “personal opinions on policy contained in documents drawn up for the purpose of internal consultation” (section 11(1) of the Wob). In this connection, the Minister referred to the relevant legislative history (see paragraph 55 below) and noted the following:
“This restriction on the obligation to provide information is included in the Wob because it is necessary to ensure that civil servants ... involved in formulating and preparing policy do not feel constricted when doing so. They must be able to communicate in all candour (in alle openhartigheid) with each other and with the ministers responsible. The minutes of the meetings of the ICCb and the MCCb are drafted for the purpose of internal consultation and contain personal opinions on policy. Moreover, I will not make use of section 11(2) of the Wob and disclose these opinions, because proper and democratic governance depends on ensuring that consultations within these various bodies can be conducted in confidence, in the knowledge that anything said is and will remain confidential. In so far as the documents also contain factual information, this is so closely interwoven with the personal opinions on policy that it cannot be viewed separately from them. I have therefore decided to refuse disclosure of these documents in their entirety.”
11. The Minister refused to disclose certain information contained in a number of documents – including the minutes of the MCCb and the ICCb – on the grounds that disclosure could harm “relations between the Netherlands and other States or international organisations” (section 10(2)(a) of the Wob). The MH17 incident had very far-reaching ramifications and required an investigation to be conducted jointly with multiple affected countries. In the Minister’s opinion, the investigation could be conducted properly only if the various parties were free to exchange information in full, and the countries and organisations involved needed to be assured that any information shared in confidence would remain confidential. 12. The Minister also noted that the requested documents – including the minutes of the MCCb and the ICCb – contained personal data, such as the names and contact details of members of the public and civil servants who did not regularly operate in public view as part of their position. The Minister removed the personal data of those individuals from the documents, relying on the grounds of “respect for personal privacy” (section 10(2)(e) of the Wob). The names of civil servants who did hold public positions were left unredacted. 13. Lastly, some documents contained information relating to the security of Dutch personnel in the disaster zone. Because this information could reveal actual or potential security measures, there was a heightened risk to individuals receiving personal protection, individuals providing such protection, and the family, friends and associates of any persons directly involved. The Minister refused to disclose this information, again relying on the grounds of “disproportionate disadvantage” (section 10(2)(g) of the Wob). II. OBJECTIONS, APPEAL AND ADDITIONAL DECISION ON OBJECTIONS
A. The Minister’s decisions on objections
14. On various dates in March 2015, the applicants lodged objections against the Minister’s decisions of 10 February 2015 (see paragraphs 8-13 above). 15. On 11 August 2015, following a hearing, the Minister maintained his decisions, providing more detailed reasoning. 16. In response to the applicants’ claim that the interests of disclosure should be accorded more weight due to the impact of the MH17 disaster, the Minister stated, inter alia, the following:
“Although I agree that the MH17 disaster has had a major impact on Dutch society and acknowledge that there has been an extensive public and political debate on the matter, this does not alter the fact that I have, with good reason, attached greater weight to the interests on which the relevant grounds for refusal are based than to the interest served by disclosure. The Wob presupposes that the interest served by disclosure for proper and democratic governance is an independent interest (op zichzelf staand belang), and according to well-established case-law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, the weight of this interest is independent of the subject matter of the documents (see, for example, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division’s judgment of 17 February 2010, ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:BL4132). The sole fact that your Wob application relates to information about the handling of the MH17 disaster therefore does not lead to the conclusion that more weight should be attached to the interest of disclosure ... or that greater weight should not be attached to the interests underlying the grounds for refusal.”
17. In response to the applicants’ claim that “respect for personal privacy” (section 10(2)(e) of the Wob) could not be relied on as a reason for refusal where the requested information concerned the exercise of official duties (beroepshalve functioneren), the Minister considered the following:
“It is ... apparent from your notice of objection and what you stated at the hearing that you are less concerned with the personal data of the officials in question than with who said what at the meetings of the ICCb or the MCCb. In view of that, I assume that you are not interested in the disclosure of the personal data as such. In so far as you would like to have the relevant documents indicate in some other way the various people who spoke, I take the view that, given the nature and content of the minutes and the fact that both the MCCb and the ICCb have a small number of members, it is not possible to redact the personal data in the minutes – for example by replacing names with initials to indicate who is speaking – without the information in question being traceable to particular individuals. Nor am I required to do so under the Wob, given that ... I have attached greater weight to the personal privacy of the officials in question than to the interest of disclosure.”
B. The Regional Court’s interlocutory judgments
18. On 21 September 2015 the applicants lodged separate appeals with the Central Netherlands (Midden-Nederland) Regional Court against the Minister’s decisions of 11 August 2015 (see paragraphs 15-17 above). 19. On 10 December 2015 the Minister submitted a statement of defence. 20. On 3 June 2016, following a hearing, the Regional Court issued interlocutory judgments (ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2016:3018 and ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2016:3019). With the applicants’ permission, and in accordance with section 8:29 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) (see paragraph 57 below), the court had considered the unredacted content of all documents to which the requests pertained. 21. The Regional Court held that, although the applicants could derive a right to receive information from Article 10 of the Convention, the statutory restrictions set out in sections 10 and 11 of the Wob complied with Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. It further held that the applicants’ position as social watchdogs and the societal impact of the MH17 disaster could play no role in the assessment of their request under the Wob, because the Wob presupposed the public interest in disclosure as a self-standing interest (referring, inter alia, to the judgment of 17 February 2010 of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State). Lastly, it held that the refusal to disclose the MCCb and ICCb minutes and three other documents could not be based on section 10(2)(g) and section 11(1) of the Wob, and it identified several defects in the Minister’s decisions to disclose certain documents in part only. 22. In view of the above, the Regional Court ordered the Minister to make a new decision on the MCCb and ICCb minutes and certain other documents, and to determine on a section-by-section basis whether grounds for refusal would preclude disclosure. C. The Minister’s additional decisions on objections
23. On 26 August 2016, following the Regional Court’s interlocutory judgments, the Minister made additional decisions regarding the applicants’ objections. As a result, 38 of the 255 documents (including all 33 sets of MCCb minutes) were not disclosed. All remaining documents were either disclosed in full (70 documents), or partially disclosed with redactions (147 documents). The applicants also received an updated list with the titles and dates of all 255 documents and the grounds (if any) for non-disclosure (see paragraph 8 above). 24. As regards the MCCb minutes, the Minister decided, after extensive deliberation (na uitvoerige beraadslaging), to maintain his refusal to disclose them. In addition to the Wob-grounds relied on by the Minister in relation to certain parts of the minutes of the ICCb (see paragraphs 26-29 below), the Minister maintained that the disclosure of these documents would result in a “disproportionate disadvantage” (section 10(2)(g) of the Wob). In his decision, the Minister noted, inter alia, the following:
“First of all, I believe that disclosure of the MCCb minutes would lead to a disproportionate disadvantage, because it would jeopardise the effective functioning of the MCCb and the proper performance of the MCCb’s work as part of the system of Cabinet sub-committees and ministerial consultative bodies. Unlike the ICCb, the MCCb is a (temporary) Cabinet sub-committee, and its minutes form part of the Cabinet’s decision-making process. The Prime Minister is chair of this MCCb, and the other ministers concerned ([the Ministers of] Security and Justice, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Infrastructure and the Environment) are part [of the sub-committee] as members. In order for the Cabinet to function, anything discussed there must remain confidential, in the interest of maintaining the coherence of government policy and ensuring that members of the government can exchange thoughts in complete freedom. In the light of the above, disclosure of the minutes would also jeopardise the Cabinet’s constitutional task under Article 45 of the Constitution to promote the coherence of policy [see paragraph 46 below] and the duty of confidentiality enshrined in section 26(1) of the Rules of Procedure for the Cabinet [see paragraph 61 below]. Where the minutes of the MCCb are concerned, a free and unrestricted exchange of arguments, views or opinions is essential to the effective functioning of the MCCb and the performance of its work. Disclosure of these passages could also frustrate the decision-making process and consultations in the future. Moreover, this interest is still relevant today, because the MCCb still meets regularly and the decision-making process, after-effects and criminal investigation concerning the MH17 air disaster are still ongoing. For those reasons, I have decided not to disclose any part of the MCCb minutes, as the interest in ensuring the effective functioning of the MCCb and the Cabinet and in preventing a disproportionate disadvantage to the organisations involved in the matter outweighs the public interest served by disclosure.”
25. As regards the ICCb minutes and the other documents in respect of which the Regional Court had ordered him to take a new decision (see paragraph 22 above), the Minister decided to disclose much of the information, as there were no grounds (or no longer any grounds) to refuse disclosure, particularly given the passage of time and the fact that certain information had meanwhile been released in a number of reports (see paragraphs 44-45 below). Concerning the non-disclosure of several passages of these documents, the Minister relied on five Wob-grounds, considering each time that the interests protected by those grounds outweighed the public interest that was served by disclosure of the corresponding information. 26. The first of those grounds was “respect for personal privacy” (section 10(2)(e) of the Wob). In this connection, the Minister referred to the reasoning as set out in his decisions of 11 August 2015 (see paragraph 17 above) and pointed out that the Regional Court had upheld those decisions in its interlocutory judgments of 3 June 2016 (see paragraphs 20-22 above) in so far as they had concerned the grounds of privacy. 27. The second ground for refusal concerned “relations between the Netherlands and other States or international organisations” (section 10(2)(a) of the Wob). According to the Minister, the disclosure of certain passages in the ICCb minutes could hinder relations between the countries and international organisations involved in dealing with the aftermath of the disaster. In particular, the Minister stated the following:
“Given the scope and sensitivity of the incident and the fact that it occurred only recently, as a result of which our dealings with the relevant countries and organisations regarding the incident, its cause, the prosecution of the perpetrators and the aftermath are still ongoing, the information in question could have repercussions for our collaboration with other countries and organisations in conducting the investigation into and dealing with the aftermath of the MH17 disaster. Considering the nature and content of the redacted information, I am of the opinion that the interest in maintaining good relations with other countries and organisations outweighs the public interest served by disclosure.”
28. The third ground for refusal, on the basis of “the security of the State” (section 10(1)(b) of the Wob), was applied in relation to a very limited (zeer beperkt) number of passages in the ICCb minutes, in respect of which the Minister noted the following:
“The information in question gives insight into the methods used by the relevant security services and the knowledge they possess, or into security methods used and measures taken by those involved on the scene. Such information could be used by malicious parties to carry out attacks or other acts that pose a danger to the security of the State. For that reason, I believe that it remains necessary to prevent malicious parties from gaining insight into the level of knowledge of the security services involved, the security methods used, and the security measures taken by Dutch personnel in these kinds of circumstances ... These security measures can also be applied in future cases and thus provide general insight into the security methods to be applied.”
29. The fourth ground for refusal was the protection of “personal opinions on policy contained in documents drawn up for the purpose of internal consultation” (section 11(1) of the Wob), and was explained as follows:
“The rationale behind [section 11(1) of the Wob] is to protect freedom of opinion and to ensure that brainstorming is possible in confidence without fear of loss of face, and that those involved in the primary formulation of policy can express their ideas and views in complete freedom. Restricting freedom of opinion through the disclosure of documents intended for internal consultation could come at the expense of contributions from the officials in question to the decision-making process and to the formulation of policy. The need for confidentiality and uninhibited deliberation is all the more important in the case of a sensitive matter like the MH17 disaster and within bodies such as the ICCb. As I have explained before, the ICCb is a gateway (voorportaal) to the MCCb [and includes] senior staff from the organisations concerned, some of whom are also part of the MCCb, and the minutes of the ICCb are drawn up in preparation for the MCCb. Within these bodies, it must be possible to confer in confidence, in the knowledge that anything said is and will remain confidential. Therefore, I refuse to disclose the personal opinions on policy in the ICCb minutes, on the basis of section 11(1) of the Wob. In the light of what I noted before, I see no reason to make use of section 11(2) of the Wob and disclose these passages. I will, however, disclose the other information in these minutes, in so far as no other grounds for refusal apply.”
30. Lastly, the Minister refused to disclose several passages in three sets of ICCb minutes because disclosure would result in a “disproportionate disadvantage” (section 10(2)(g) of the Wob) to the ministries and organisations that were part of the ICCb:
“Disclosing these passages would hinder open and uninhibited deliberation between the members of the ICCb. Where these passages in the ICCb minutes are concerned, a free and unrestricted exchange of arguments, views or opinions is essential to the effective functioning of the ICCb and the performance of its work. Disclosure of these passages could also frustrate the decision-making process and consultations in the future. Moreover, this interest is still relevant today, as there is still contact at ICCb level concerning the aftermath of the MH17 air disaster. Therefore, with regard to the limited number of passages from the ICCb minutes that I am still refusing to disclose, I am of the opinion that the interest in ensuring the effective functioning of these bodies and preventing a disproportionate disadvantage to the organisations concerned outweighs the public interest served by disclosure.”
D. The Regional Court’s judgments
31. On 22 September 2016 the applicants submitted written comments to the Regional Court, claiming that that the Minister’s additional decisions had not been prepared with due care, and that the reasoning contained therein was flawed. 32. On 24 February 2017 the Regional Court delivered its judgment in the applicants’ cases (ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2017:901 and ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2017:902). It held, inter alia, as follows:
“7. With regard to the minutes of the MCCb, the [Minister] did not take the opportunity he was offered to rectify the defect ... The Regional Court upholds ... the verdict it gave in the interlocutory judgment [of 3 June 2016; see paragraphs 20-22 above] that the decision was not adequately substantiated owing to the lack of a section‑by-section assessment of every document in order to determine whether disclosure could hinder open and uninhibited deliberation between the members of the committee and, if so, whether the interest in preventing that should outweigh the interest in disclosure.”
33. The court also held that the Minister had failed to rectify a number of defects with respect to his refusal to disclose certain passages in six ICCb documents. 34. In view of the above, the Regional Court declared the applicants’ appeal well founded, and annulled the Minister’s decisions of 11 August 2015 (see paragraph 15-17 above) and 26 August 2016 (see paragraphs 23-30 above), insofar as they concerned the refusal to disclose the minutes of the MCCb and certain passages in six ICCb documents. The court decided that the Minister had to disclose those documents and passages. It upheld all other aspects of the Minister’s decisions. III. FURTHER APPEAL
35. In April 2017 the applicants and the Minister lodged further appeals against the Regional Court’s judgments of 3 June 2016 and 24 February 2017. 36. At a hearing on 11 July 2017 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (“the Administrative Jurisdiction Division”) was informed that the passages from the six ICCb documents (see paragraphs 33‑34 above) had, in the meantime, been released. 37. On 25 October 2017 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division gave judgment (ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2883). With the applicants’ permission, and in accordance with section 8:29 of the General Administrative Law Act (see paragraph 57 below), it had considered the unredacted content of all documents to which the requests pertained. 38. With regard to the MCCb minutes, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division held that the effective functioning of the MCCb would be jeopardised by mandatory disclosure. “17.1.  ... [T]he State has a significant interest in ensuring that ministers and other attendees at MCCb meetings ... are able to speak freely with each other about the progress of investigations and the handling of crises. To this end, it is essential that the matters discussed during the meetings remain confidential. The [Administrative Jurisdiction] Division therefore concurs with the Minister’s position that the obligation to disclose these reports would compromise the proper functioning of the MCCb. It is likely that disclosure of the minutes would cause ministers and other participants to be more reserved about what they say at future meetings. It is in the interest of the State that the members of both the Cabinet itself and this ministerial committee can speak freely and in confidence, and can freely decide on what matters they raise. Disclosure of these minutes would subject this interest to a disproportionate disadvantage. Given the applicable regime of confidentiality [laid down in section 26(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure for the Cabinet; see paragraph 61 below], the mandate to promote the unity of government policy [laid down in Article 45 § 3 of the Constitution; see paragraph 46 below], and the sensitive nature of the topics discussed within the MCCb, the Minister was entitled to prioritise the interest in preventing a disproportionate disadvantage over the interest involved in disclosure. In so far as the [applicants] have argued that the refusal to provide the requested information under section 10(2)(g) of the Wob violates Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, this argument fails in the light of the [above], viewed also in conjunction with paragraph 12.3. [see paragraph 41 below]. Accordingly, the Regional Court incorrectly held that the Minister had to disclose all minutes of the MCCb ... The [Minister’s] appeal succeeds.”
39. With regard to the Minister’s refusal to provide the personal data contained in the minutes of the MCCb and the ICCb which related to the members of those committees, the applicants had stated that they were interested in only the job titles of those present. They had contended that this information could be made public because it was unlikely that it could be traced back to specific individuals. In this connection, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division held as follows:
“10.1.  ... [T]he Administrative Jurisdiction Division notes that the documents do not mention any job titles. Furthermore, the Minister was not required to replace the names of people referred to in the minutes with job titles, as such designations could be traceable to specific individuals ... The [applicants’] submission fails [in this regard].”
40. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division assessed the applicants’ grounds for appeal alleging that the refusal violated the right to receive government information under Article 10 of the Convention. In doing so, it based its reasoning on the principle that any refusal to provide information which relied on the grounds for refusal provided for in the Wob complied with Article 10 of the Convention, unless an applicant could satisfactorily establish “very special circumstances” warranting disclosure. In this connection, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division held as follows:
“12.2. The parties do not dispute ... that [the applicants], [as members of] the press, derive a right to information from the Government under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention – a right which is, by the way, subject to restrictions that may be imposed under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The parties do disagree, however, on the consequences that should be attached to this ... The Division considers the following in this regard. Article 10 of the Convention does not require all information to be provided or made public, and it gives High Contracting Parties the ability to make legal provision for restrictions on providing or making public information and documents. The provisions of the Wob regarding grounds for refusal make legal provision for interference with the right to receive information enshrined in Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division notes at the outset that it can generally be assumed that in formulating the grounds for refusal in sections 10 and 11 of the Wob, the legislature created restrictions that are necessary in a democratic society in order to serve the interests referred to in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The grounds for refusal laid down in the Wob aim to protect one or more of these interests. However, this principle does not prevent an applicant from arguing that (and why) this general principle should not be upheld in his [or her] specific situation. It is therefore up to the applicant to adduce and demonstrate very special circumstances (zeer bijzondere omstandigheden) which mean that despite the application of the Wob, the applicant is being restricted in his [or her] exercise of the specific right to receive information under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention, without justification on the basis of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. If such special circumstances can be established, and a refusal to provide information cannot be justified on the basis of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, such a refusal will be contrary to Article 10 of the Convention ... Aspects that are, in principle, irrelevant to the assessment of a Wob request, such as the capacity (hoedanigheid) of the applicant and the subject matter of the request, do become relevant when considering the applicability of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention and whether there is justification as referred to in the second paragraph of this Article.”
41. Turning again to the facts of the case, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division held that the interest in public disclosure was outweighed by the interests protected by refusal. It held that the applicants had not demonstrated the existence of any “very special circumstances” on the basis of which an unjustified interference with Article 10 of the Convention had occurred. In this regard, it held:
“12.3.  ... [T]he Administrative Jurisdiction Division agrees with the Regional Court that the Minister was entitled to take the position, with reference to sections 10 and 11 of the Wob, that the interest in public disclosure was outweighed by the interests that would be protected by refusal, namely: ... the Netherlands’ relations with other States and international organisations, respect for personal privacy, the prevention of a disproportionate disadvantage and the protection of personal opinions on policy. It has not been established that there are any very special circumstances which mean that an unjustified interference as referred to above has occurred. The mere assertion by the [applicants] that they are journalists is insufficient in this regard. Furthermore, the fact that the public interest served by disclosure is great has already been addressed sufficiently in sections 10 and 11 of the Wob and the assessment of interests that took place [as a result of] the application of those provisions. With regard to the above, it is significant that the Minister has provided a great deal of the requested information via the documents that were disclosed to the [applicants], and that a considerable amount of information about the MH17 disaster has been made public through other channels, including various briefings to the House of Representatives [see paragraph 43 below], press conferences and the evaluation report ... by the University of Twente ... [see paragraph 45 below]. The foregoing means that, in the light of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, there was no unlawful interference with the [applicants’] right under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention to receive information from the government.”
42. In view of the above, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division declared the Minister’s appeal well founded and the applicants’ appeal unfounded, and it quashed the Regional Court’s judgments in so far as they concerned the MCCb minutes. It upheld all other aspects of the Regional Court’s judgments. No appeal lay against that judgment. IV. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Disclosure of information to Parliament and to the public
43. The House of Representatives and the public have received regular updates about the MH17 air disaster, including via briefings, progress reports and answers to parliamentary questions. In accordance with a motion adopted by the House of Representatives in 2016 (Parliamentary Documents, Lower House of Parliament (Kamerstukken II) 2015/16, 33 997, no. 73), documents associated with MH17 are being retained for transfer to the National Archives, partly for the purposes of the future accountability of the government for its handling of this matter. B. Confidential disclosure to researchers for evaluation purposes
44. In October 2015 the Dutch Safety Board published two reports into the downing of flight MH17. The first report dealt with the technical investigation into the cause of the crash and the issue of flying over conflict zones (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, cited above, § 128). The second report dealt with the way in which the passenger list had been drawn up and the next of kin of the Dutch victims had been informed. 45. In 2015, the national crisis management organisation that arose in response to the MH17 disaster was evaluated by a team of researchers at the University of Twente, at the behest of the Research and Documentation Centre (Wetenschappelijke Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum) of the Ministry of Justice and Security. As part of that study, the researchers from the University of Twente were granted confidential access to all relevant information regarding the MH17 disaster (see the working agreement reproduced in Annex D to the evaluation report). The evaluation report was published on 9 December 2015 (Parliamentary Documents, Lower House of Parliament 2015/16, 33 997, no. 55, annex). RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
I. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
46. The relevant provisions of the Constitution (Grondwet) read as follows:
Article 45
“1. The Ministers shall together constitute the Cabinet. 2. The Prime Minister shall chair the Cabinet. 3. The Cabinet shall consider and decide upon overall government policy and shall promote the coherence thereof.”
Article 110
“In the exercise of their duties, government bodies shall observe (betracht) transparency (openbaarheid) in accordance with rules to be prescribed by Act of Parliament.”
II. THE TRANSPARENCY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ACT
47. The Transparency of Public Administration Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur – “the Wob”) entered into force in 1992. It was applicable at the time of the events complained of. 48. The purpose of the Wob, as stated in the preamble, was to regulate the disclosure of information in such a way that would ensure proper and democratic governance (goede en democratische bestuursvoering). 49. Section 1 of the Wob provided the following definitions:
“...
c. internal consultation: consultation concerning an administrative matter within an administrative authority or within a group of administrative authorities in the framework of their joint responsibility for an administrative matter;
...
f. personal opinion on policy: an opinion, proposal, recommendation or conclusion of one or more persons concerning an administrative matter and the arguments they advance in support thereof ...”
50. Section 2 of the Wob described the underlying principle as follows:
“1. Without prejudice to provisions laid down in other Acts of Parliament, an administrative authority shall, in the exercise of its functions, disclose information in accordance with the present Act on the basis that it is in the public interest to do so (algemeen belang van openbaarheid van informatie) ...”
51. Section 3 of the Wob described the scope of the right to request information as follows:
“1. Anyone may submit a request for information contained in documents relating to an administrative matter to an administrative authority ... 2. The applicant shall state in his [or her] request the administrative matter or the document relating thereto about which he [or she] wishes to receive information. 3. The applicant does not need to state an interest (belang) in his [or her] request. 4. If a request is formulated too broadly, the administrative authority will ask the applicant to clarify his [or her] request as soon as possible, and it will assist him [or her] in doing so. 5. A request for information shall be granted having regard to sections 10 and 11.”
52. Under the Wob, any information disclosed upon request was, in principle, available to anyone. It was not possible to provide information to only a limited group. Nor did the Wob provide for a separate disclosure regime for journalists, newspapers or broadcasters. The weight attached to an applicant’s interest did not depend on the subject to which the documents related or the position of the applicant. In this connection, the Explanatory Memorandum (Kamerstukken II, 1986/87, 19 859, no. 3) to the bill which became the Wob notes the following (at p. 17 and pp. 37-38 respectively):
“The Wob assumes that, in principle, the applicant’s interest in the information does not play a role in the assessment of a request for information. The applicant’s interest may not work to his disadvantage, but knowledge of the interest may be necessary for the government body in the context of assessing the relative grounds for refusal [in section 10(2) of the Wob]. The applicant’s interest may well then be in favour of disclosure of the requested information.
...
[With regard to the question] of whether persons who have a special relationship with the government by virtue of the law or certain interests should have access to more rather than less information than members of the public in general ..., [we] support the standpoint ... that all members of the public can derive equal rights from the [Wob]. This means that it is prohibited to provide more or less information to certain groups of people, and no additional rules on access to information may be applied to such groups.”
53. In the case of a request for information, it followed from section 2 of the Wob that government information was public unless a special interest precluded its disclosure. That special interest could follow from the grounds for refusal listed in sections 10 and 11 of the Wob, of which the relevant provisions read as follows:
Section 10
“1. Disclosure of information pursuant to this Act shall not take place in so far as:
 ...
 b. this might damage the security of the State;
... 2. Nor shall disclosure of information take place in so far as its importance does not outweigh one of the following interests:
 a. relations between the Netherlands and other States or international organisations;
 ...
 e. respect for personal privacy;
 ...
 g. the prevention of a disproportionate advantage or disadvantage to the natural or legal person concerned, or [to] third parties. 3. Paragraph 2(e) does not apply in so far as the person concerned consents to disclosure.”
Section 11
“1. When a request concerns information contained in documents drawn up for the purpose of internal consultation (intern beraad), no information is to be provided concerning personal opinions on policy (persoonlijke beleidsopvattingen) contained therein. 2. Information on personal opinions on policy may be disclosed, in the interests of proper and democratic governance, in a form that cannot be traced back to any individual. If those who expressed the opinions in question or who supported them consent, information may be provided in a form that can be traced back to the individual.
...”
54. The Explanatory Memorandum (see paragraph 52 above, at pp. 34‑37) provides the following in respect of section 10 of the Wob:
“a. The relations between the Netherlands and other States or international organisations [section 10(2)(a) of the Wob]
This exception is intended to prevent the legal obligation to provide information from damaging Dutch international relations ... For the application of this provision, it is not necessary to foresee a deterioration in good relations as such with other countries or with international organisations. It is sufficient that, as a result of providing information under the law, it is foreseeable that international contact will become more difficult (stroever) in certain areas, with the result that, for example, maintaining diplomatic relations or conducting bilateral consultations ... would become more difficult than before, or that those countries or international organisations would be less inclined to provide certain information than before.
...
e. Respect for personal privacy [section 10(2)(e) of the Wob]
... No information shall be disclosed concerning personal data provided by citizens to the government in the confidence that it would be used by the government only for the purpose for which it was provided, if the public interest in disclosure does not outweigh the interest in the confidentiality of the information ... The protection of privacy is not limited to private individuals. Administrators (bestuurders) and civil servants (ambtenaren) are also entitled to it. The present exception therefore also applies to data [relating to individual officials] recorded in documents held by government bodies ...
g. The prevention of a disproportionate advantage or disadvantage to the natural or legal person concerned, or [to] third parties [section 10(2)(g) of the Wob]
These grounds for exemption ... are the most general and are applied if the provision of information would unduly harm interests other than those mentioned above ... The exception clause provides for the need to be able to apply the Wob in very different, unpredictable situations ... This provision should ... not lead to government bodies withholding information because its publication might cast their policies in an unfavourable light or reduce the chances of their proposed policies being accepted. The interests at stake here do not outweigh the public interest in providing information as intended by the Wob. This does not alter the fact that ministers, other administrators and civil servants may also be persons involved in the matters [in question], particularly if information is requested about matters concerning themselves. This ... refers to cases in which the proper functioning of the public body to which they belong is at stake. An example of this is the provision, upon request, of information about the identity of the [people with whom] ministers and civil servants [are speaking] in confidential consultations on matters of legislation or administration. This could undermine the smooth functioning of the public-law body to which the persons concerned belong ...”
55. The Explanatory Memorandum (ibid., pp. 38-39) provides for the following in respect of section 11 of the Wob:
“... The restriction of public access is intended to ensure that those involved [in internal deliberations] can freely express their thoughts and opinions during the initial formulation of the policy ... [T]he restriction on public access does not apply to factual data contained in internal documents [or] the forecasts and policy alternatives derived from those data. Such data must be provided upon request and on the authority’s own initiative. This also applies in cases where such data could presumably create an unfavourable impression of the policy pursued or jeopardise the acceptance of the policy to be pursued ... [I]n the event of a request for information [being submitted], the data must be provided in an objective [non-identifying] form. This means that the data is provided in a form that cannot be traced back to individuals.”
56. On 1 May 2022 the Wob was repealed and replaced by the Open Government Act (Wet open overheid). III. THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ACT
57. Section 8:29 of the General Administrative Law Act provides for the full or partial confidentiality of documents in proceedings before the administrative courts (in judicial review proceedings and on appeal). At the relevant time, it read as follows:
“1. Parties who are obliged to provide information or submit documents may, if there are substantial reasons (gewichtige redenen) to do so, refuse to provide such information or submit such documents, or may inform the administrative tribunal that it alone shall be allowed to inspect the information or the documents. 2. In the case of an administrative body, no such substantial reasons can exist in so far as there is an obligation, pursuant to the Transparency of Public Administration Act, to accede to any request for information contained in the documents to be submitted. 3. The administrative tribunal shall decide whether the refusal or restriction of the inspection referred to in the first paragraph is justified. 4. If the administrative tribunal decides that the refusal is justified, the obligation [to provide information] shall no longer exist. 5. If the administrative tribunal decides that the restriction of an inspection is justified, it may give judgment on the basis of that information or those documents only with the permission of the other parties. If such permission is refused, the case shall be remitted to another chamber.”
IV. NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
58. In a situation in which national security is or may be at risk, or in another situation which has or may have serious consequences for society, the national crisis management structure is activated. The core of the national structure for decision-making in crisis situations is formed by the MCCb and the ICCb. 59. The organisation and working methods of the MCCb which responded to the MH17 disaster, were laid down in the Order establishing the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee. The Order was adopted on 12 April 2013 (Official Gazette (Staatscourant) 2013, no. 11207) and entered into force on 25 April 2013. It was included in its entirety and expanded upon in the 2013 version of the National Handbook for Decision-Making in Crisis Situations (reproduced in Parliamentary Documents, Lower House of Parliament 2012/13, 29 668, no. 37, annex). The task of the MCCb was to coordinate intersectoral crisis management and decision-making (section 2 of the Order establishing the MCCb). 60. The MCCb was a ministerial committee as referred to in section 25(1) of the Rules of Procedure for the Cabinet, in accordance with which the Cabinet “may form other committees of a permanent or temporary nature from among its members in order to prepare for or decide on certain matters”. 61. There is a duty of confidentiality pertaining to anything that is discussed or happens at the meetings of the Cabinet or its committees (section 26(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure for the Cabinet). 62. Decisions by the MCCb must be approved by the Cabinet unless – as was deemed to be the case with the MH17 disaster – decisions need to be implemented without delay (section 4(2) of the Order establishing the MCCb). 63. If necessary, senior officials (at Director-General level) may convene an ICCb, which is chaired by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (2013 National Handbook for Decision-Making in Crisis Situations, at p. 8). The ICCb advises the MCCb and, if necessary and possible, takes its own decisions. THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
64. The applicants complained that the partial non-disclosure of State‑held information pertaining to the political and administrative handling of the MH17 crisis had violated their rights under Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority ... 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions [or] restrictions ... as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security ... or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others [or] for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence ... ”
A. Admissibility
65.

Outcome for Article 10: no_violation