FIRST SECTION
CASE OF MORAWIEC v. POLAND
(Application no. 46238/20)
 
JUDGMENT
Art 6 § 1 (civil and criminal) • Tribunal established by law • Lifting of judge’s immunity from prosecution and suspension from judicial duties by Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Chamber • Art 34 • In specific case-circumstances, favourable second-instance resolution of the Disciplinary Chamber did not deprive the applicant of her victim status • Case distinguished from Tuleya v. Poland in that respect • Art 6 § 1 applicable under its civil limb to the applicant’s suspension and under its criminal limb to the lifting of her immunity • Findings in Reczkowicz v. Poland, Juszczyszyn v. Poland and Tuleya v. Poland applied • Independence and impartiality of Disciplinary Chamber compromised
Art 8 • Private life applicable • Art 34 • Victim status • Disciplinary Chamber’s decision lifting applicant’s immunity and suspending her from duties affected her private life to a very significant degree • Impugned decision given by a body not considered a “court” • Lack of proper safeguards against arbitrariness • Interference not “in accordance with the law”
Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Art 34 • Victim status • Actions aimed at lifting the applicant’s judicial immunity prompted by her views and criticisms, publicly expressed in her professional capacity, of the legislative reforms affecting the judiciary • Lack of proper safeguards against arbitrariness • Interference not “in accordance with the law” and not pursuing any legitimate aim
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
5 February 2026
 
FINAL
 
05/05/2026
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Morawiec v. Poland,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Ivana Jelić, President,
 Erik Wennerström,
 Raffaele Sabato,
 Frédéric Krenc,
 Davor Derenčinović,
 Alain Chablais,
 Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 46238/20) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Ms Beata Morawiec (“the applicant”), on 20 October 2020;
the decision to give notice to the Polish Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 6 § 1, Article 8 and Article 10 of the Convention;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 13 January 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns a decision of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court to lift the applicant’s immunity from prosecution and suspend her from judicial duties. The applicant submitted that the Disciplinary Chamber had not satisfied the requirements of an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. She further submitted that the Disciplinary Chamber’s decision had amounted to a breach of her right to respect for her private life and her right to freedom of expression. The case raises issues under Article 6 § 1, Article 8, and Article 10 of the Convention. LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE CASE
2. The instant application belongs to a series of cases concerning the overhaul of the judiciary which was initiated in 2017 and has been implemented by successive amending laws (for an overview of the Court’s case-law on the matter see Wałęsa v. Poland, no. 50849/21, §§ 2‑4, 23 November 2023). 3. The Court has previously given judgments dealing with measures applied to judges that were similar to the measures encountered by the applicant in the present case (see Juszczyszyn v. Poland, no. 35599/20, 6 October 2022, and Tuleya v. Poland, nos. 21181/19 and 51751/20, 6 July 2023). THE FACTS
4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Libertów. The applicant was represented by Ms S. Gregorczyk-Abram and Mr. M. Wawrykiewicz, lawyers practising in Warsaw. 5. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Sobczak, subsequently replaced by Ms A. Kozińska-Makowska, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. The applicant’s profile and public activity
7. The applicant is a judge with over thirty years of professional experience. Since 2002 she has been adjudicating in criminal matters at the Cracow Regional Court. She is a former member of the National Council of the Judiciary (between 2002 and 2010), a former President of the Cracow Regional Court (between 2015 and 2017) and a former deputy director of the National School of Judiciary and Prosecution. She is also a member, since 2011, of the Judges’ Association Themis, and has been its President since January 2018. 8. The Judges’ Association Themis, under the applicant’s presidency, was actively involved in public debate concerning the reorganisation of the judiciary. In a resolution of its General Assembly adopted on 14 January 2018, the association called upon all judges to refrain from participating in appointment procedures conducted by the recomposed National Council of the Judiciary (“the NCJ”), deeming it a “body established contrary to the Polish Constitution”. On 26 July 2018 the association issued a joint statement with the Polish Judges’ Association Iustitia in which they stated that the procedure for the competition then underway to fill vacancies at the Supreme Court’s Civil Chamber had been invalid (see Manowska and Others v. Poland (dec.), nos. 51455/21 and five others, § 23, 1 April 2025). 9. The association was also publicly critical of the Minister of Justice, Mr Zbigniew Ziobro (who held that office between 2015 and 2023). In March 2018 the association issued a public protest “against the use by the Minister of Justice of one particular judgment to discredit the Supreme Court and to justify the destruction of judicial independence for political purposes”. Referring to the Minister’s statements concerning a disciplinary case before the Supreme Court and the announced changes regarding the removal of judges from office, the association stated that “these actions aim[ed], under the pretext of safeguarding the image of the judiciary, to restrict the protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms”. In August 2019, following reports in Polish media about the so-called “hate campaign scandal” (afera hejterska), the association called upon the Minister of Justice to resign and requested that a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry be formed to examine the allegations. B. The applicant’s dismissal from the post of President of the Cracow Regional Court and the subsequent dispute
10. On 24 November 2017 the Minister of Justice dismissed the applicant from her post as President of the Cracow Regional Court. That decision was taken on the basis of the Act of 12 July 2017 amending the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, which conferred on the Minister competence to dismiss and appoint at his discretion presidents of ordinary courts during a period of six months following the Law’s entry into force (see Broda and Bojara v. Poland, nos. 26691/18 and 27367/18, § 33, 29 June 2021). A press release published on the website of the Ministry of Justice on 27 November 2017 stated that the applicant had failed to properly supervise the administrative activities of the Regional Court. It also asserted that the court had not been working efficiently. 11. In January 2018 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the State Treasury, represented by the Minister of Justice, demanding an apology for the contents of the press release as it had, she contended, damaged her reputation. In January 2019 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed the applicant’s claim. The respondent lodged an appeal against that judgment which the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed on 20 January 2021. The Minister was ordered to publish an apology to the applicant and pay a certain sum to a charity. II. PROCEEDINGS TO LIFT THE APPLICANT’S JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
12. On 14 September 2020 a prosecutor of the Internal Affairs Department of the State Prosecutor’s Office applied to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (hereinafter referred to as “the DCSC”) seeking the lifting of the applicant’s immunity with a view to charging her with several criminal offences: intentional abuse of power by a public official (Article 231 § 2 of the Criminal Code), misappropriation of funds (Article 284 § 2 of the Criminal Code) and bribery (Article 228 § 3 of the Criminal Code). The prosecutor alleged that the applicant had accepted a mobile phone from a defendant in a criminal case in exchange for delivering a judgment in his favour and that she had accepted public funds to write a report which she had never actually written. 13. On 12 October 2020 the DCSC, sitting in a single-judge formation, lifted the applicant’s immunity and suspended her from judicial duties. It noted that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences as alleged by the prosecutor. The DCSC further decided, pursuant to the applicable law, that the applicant’s salary be reduced by 50% (the maximum permitted amount). In doing so, the DCSC stated that it had been “guided by the high degree of social harm caused by the conduct [the applicant] engaged in, which was detrimental to the administration of justice and to the State Treasury in respect of public funds allocated to the judiciary. [The DCSC] also took into account the degree of social harm attributed to her actions by the requesting prosecutor.” The written reasons for the resolution were published on the Supreme Court’s website. 14. Both the applicant’s representatives and the Deputy Disciplinary Officer at the Cracow Court of Appeal lodged appeals in the applicant’s favour against the DCSC’s resolution of 12 October 2020. The appeals lodged on the applicant’s behalf raised complaints, inter alia, that the DCSC had not been a “tribunal established by law”. 15. On 7 June 2021 the DCSC, sitting in a three-judge formation, quashed the first-instance resolution and refused to lift the applicant’s immunity. At the outset, the DCSC dismissed the complaints that it was not a “tribunal established by law”, relying, inter alia, on its own case-law (resolution of 25 May 2020, case no. I DO 21/20), and that of the Constitutional Court (judgment of 20 June 2017, case no. K 5/17; for details thereof, see Grzęda v. Poland [GC], no. 43572/18, §§ 38-44 and § 102, 15 March 2022). On the merits of the applicant’s case, the DCSC then held that the evidence adduced by the prosecutor had been insufficient to substantiate the charges against the applicant. In particular, it noted that the main witness for the prosecution had often changed his testimony, which diminished his credibility. The DCSC additionally held that the prosecutor’s evidentiary initiative had been insufficient and that the request to lift the applicant’s immunity had therefore been premature. It further observed that some elements of the applicant’s conduct could potentially raise issues within disciplinary, rather than criminal, proceedings, although the possibility to launch disciplinary proceedings had become time barred owing to the passage of time. 16. Shortly thereafter, the applicant resumed her judicial duties and the withheld part of her salary was paid out to her. Her suspension had lasted for 238 days. III. PUBLIC REACTION AND MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE APPLICANT’S CASE
A. Reactions to the announcement of the application to lift the applicant’s immunity
17. Following the announcement by the State Prosecutor’s Office of the application to lift her immunity, the applicant stated in an interview with the press published on 16 September 2020:
“I have no wrongdoing to reproach myself with and consider these attacks to be part of a political game ... [A] considerable effort must have been made to fabricate an allegation so evidently baseless. ... The objective is to silence the judicial community as we approach the next phase of reforms to the justice system announced by the Ministry.”
18. On 16 September 2020, an article containing an interview with M. Safjan – then a judge of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the CJEU”), and a former President of the Polish Constitutional Court – was published. In the article, Judge Safjan made, inter alia, the following statements:
“Judge Beata Morawiec has my full support, and I wish to express my complete solidarity with her stance. ... Through their active defence of judicial independence and their open protest against violations of judicial autonomy, [certain judges] expose themselves to the kind of risks we have seen materialise in the case of Judge Morawiec – the risk of severe repression. ... Turning back to the case of Judge Morawiec, it is difficult not to perceive a connection between her first-instance victory in the dispute with the Minister of Justice and the accusations now being made against her. ... There is no doubt that both attempts to bring criminal charges against judges and to subject them to disciplinary proceedings are intended to – and already do – have a chilling effect that is aimed at paralysing the work of independent judges. All those who are independent, observing what is currently happening, have every reason to fear reprisals. All the more admirable, therefore, is the fact that they continue to act, continue their work, and continue defending the independence of the judiciary.”
19. On 10 October 2020 (that is two days before the session scheduled by the DCSC at first instance to examine the prosecutor’s application – see paragraph 13 above), the State-owned television channel TVP broadcasted a news programme (“Wiadomości”) in which a few minutes of material was devoted to the applicant’s case – “‘Wiadomości’ Reveals Evidence of Pathology”. Relying on excerpts from the prosecutor’s files, the material suggested that the applicant had used her position and connections in Polish courts to “conduct criminal activity”. Quoted in the material, the Deputy Minister of Justice Sebastian Kaleta stated that the applicant’s “torpedoing of the reform of the judiciary” might not necessarily be selfless because she could be defending her own interests. Meanwhile, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Gazeta Polska said that Judge Morawiec’s case was akin to “an arrangement typical of Chicago in the 1930s, when the mafia was defending its judges and the judges were defending their mafia.”
B. Reactions to the first-instance resolution of the DCSC lifting the applicant’s immunity
20. Following the DCSC’s resolution of 12 October 2020 lifting the applicant’s immunity, several international associations of judges published statements in reaction to it. On 12 October 2020 the European Association of Judges (Regional Group of the International Association of Judges) stated:
“In a decision of April 8th[,] 2020 (Case C-791/19 Commission v Poland), the [CJEU] ruled that Poland must immediately suspend the application of the national provisions on the powers of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. The [CJEU], on the basis of a question referred by the Sąd Najwyższy – Izba Pracy i Ubezpieczeń Społecznych (Supreme Court – Labour and Social Insurance Chamber), found, inter alia, that [European Union (EU)] law precluded cases concerning the application of EU law from falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court which is not an independent and impartial tribunal. According to the [CJEU], that is the case where the objective circumstances in which the court concerned was formed, its characteristics and the means by which its members have been appointed are capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of that court to external factors, in particular, as to the direct or indirect influence of the legislature and the executive and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it and, thus, may lead to that court not being seen to be independent or impartial with the consequence of prejudicing the trust which justice in a democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law. The Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court is not a court and cannot continue to act as one. However, in a blatant disobedience to this decision of the European Court of Justice, this bogus body today waived the immunity of Beata Morawiec, judge of the District Court in Kraków, along with evident disciplinary sanctions that included a 50% salary cut. Although the case against Judge Morawiec allegedly does not constitute a disciplinary proceeding, but a criminal one, it is clear that this supposed decision for such illegitimate body is not acceptable. Therefore:
The European Association of Judges publicly expresses its unbreakable solidarity to Judge Beata Morawiec and to all independent Polish judges;
The European Association of Judges urges, once more, the European Commission to take all necessary measures to urgently reestablish the EU legal order in Poland.”
On 13 October 2020 MEDEL (Magistrats européens pour la démocratie et les libertés) issued the following statement:
“The CJEU-disabled Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme court decided on lifting judicial immunity of judge Beata Morawiec and imposing disciplinary charges in the form of suspension and reduction of salary by 50%. This is a direct and blatant violation of [CJEU] order of 08.04.2020, suspending the so-called Disciplinary Chamber in the disciplinary proceedings against judges. Consequently, MEDEL does not recognize todays’ decision, considers Beata Morawiec an active judge and expresses [to] her its full support and solidarity. This illegal activity must result in immediate action from the European institutions, mainly the European Commission, within its role of guardian of the Treaties, on the basis of art. 260 (2) TFEU. The time for mere expressions of concern is long gone – all red lines have been crossed. We can no longer watch passively the destruction of the European legal system.”
Also on 13 October 2020, the Association of European Administrative Judges issued the following statement:
“On 8 April 2020 the Court of Justice of the European Union has ordered to suspend the [relevant] national legal provisions on the powers of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court of Poland. Beyond any doubt this order is clear concerning its scope and meaning, it is executable and in any case it is binding. Court decisions must be followed. Furthermore, this order of a court concerns fundamental issues of a national justice system, i.e. the question of the independence of a judiciary and thus the rule of law in one of the member States of the EU. Even more the organs of this EU member State should be aware of the consequences when ignoring such an order. The Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court of Poland is not independent and it must not continue its activities for the time being. Despite these facts this Disciplinary Chamber has decided to lift the immunity of Judge Beata Morawiec in ... yesterday’s decision in order to enable criminal proceedings against this judge. Furthermore it has decided to suspend judge Morawiec with reduction of salary of 50%. It is crystal clear that these activities of the Disciplinary Chamber fall under the scope of the order of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Thus[,] organs of the Polish State have ignored the binding decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
- AEAJ fully agrees with and supports the statements of the other European judicial associations of 12 October 2020 and of 13 October 2020
- AEAJ expresses its solidarity with colleague Beata Morawiec and all our Polish colleagues
- AEAJ refers to the open letter of AEAJ, EAJ, Judges for Judges and MEDEL sent to the President of the European Commission Ms Von der Leyen, the Commissioner Ms Jourova and the Commissioner Mr Reynders on 30 September 2020 and repeats the therein stated calls on members of the European Commission as guardians of the European Treaties
- AEAJ urges the European Commission to respond to this devastation of rule of law as well as of the European legal system.”
C. Reactions to the second-instance resolution of the DCSC refusing to lift the applicant’s immunity
21. Following the second-instance resolution of the DCSC, Government officials made public comments regarding the applicant’s case. On 8 June 2021, M. Wójcik, a Minister without portfolio, called the ruling a “disgrace” and deemed it to have “harmed” the applicant, stating that:
“In the case of such serious allegations, she should be interested in clearing herself of these allegations during a public hearing.”
On 9 June 2021 the Minister of Justice, Z. Ziobro, held a press conference at which he made the following statements:
“The decision of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court has clearly demonstrated that the judiciary is not capable of self-purification. ... This decision is all the more concerning because it does not determine the guilt or innocence of Judge Morawiec. The Disciplinary Chamber does not decide this; it is for the competent court to adjudicate the case. ... Monday’s decision by the Disciplinary Chamber denies even the possibility of such a ruling. It turns out that there is a professional group to whom the rules of law that apply to ordinary citizens do not apply.”
Those statements were cited in an official press release by the State Prosecutor’s Office published on the same day, which further added that the Minister considered the DCSC’s resolution “shocking”. IV. OTHER RELEVANT MATERIAL
22. In 2024 judges from the Polish Judges’ Association Iustitia published an updated version of their report entitled “Justice Under Pressure”[1] (Wymiar sprawiedliwości pod presją). The report stated, in so far as relevant:
“Judge Beata Morawiec serves as the President of the National Board of the Association of Judges Themis. She has repeatedly participated in public debate concerning the state of the rule of law in Poland, consistently and courageously defending the independence of the judiciary, judicial impartiality, and the principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law. Her public statements have included open criticism of unconstitutional reforms introduced by the ruling political majority in the area of justice administration, as well as actions undertaken by the Minister of Justice, Mr Zbigniew Ziobro. In her capacity as President of the Association of Judges Themis, Judge Morawiec has frequently presented to the public the Association’s positions and resolutions, which were critical of the so-called judicial reforms implemented by the ruling authorities in Poland between 2015 and 2018. In November 2017, prior to the expiration of her term of office, Judge Morawiec was dismissed from her position as President of the Regional Court in Cracow without being provided with reasons, without the right to appeal, and in the context of a systemic purge of court leadership carried out by the Minister of Justice pursuant to the legislative amendment of 12 July 2017. This amendment granted the Minister the authority to dismiss presidents and vice-presidents of ordinary courts. This power was temporally limited to a six-month period following the entry into force of the relevant provisions. Exercising this authority, Minister Ziobro dismissed approximately 160 court presidents and vice-presidents during their lawful terms of office, without providing justification, without consulting the judicial boards, and without affording the right to appeal. Judge Morawiec was among those affected. Judge Morawiec was also the first judge against whom criminal proceedings were initiated by the political authorities with the apparent aim of removing her from judicial duties. In 2020, the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against her, alleging that she had accepted a mobile phone in exchange for issuing a favourable judgment and had received public funds for a legal analysis. These allegations were widely regarded as unfounded and fictitious, and the proceedings were perceived as a textbook example of the instrumental use of criminal law to discredit a judge who had publicly and fearlessly defended core democratic values, including judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy. In September 2020, at 6.30 a.m., agents of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and a prosecutor entered Judge Morawiec’s home and presented a search warrant. Judge Morawiec voluntarily handed over her laptop and USB drives, asserting she had nothing to hide. On 12 October 2020 the Disciplinary Chamber operating within the Supreme Court building – an entity which is not and has never been a court, and whose activities had been suspended by the CJEU’s interim order of 8 April 2020 (C-791/19) – decided to lift Judge Morawiec’s judicial immunity, suspend her from her official duties, and reduce her salary by 50%. She remained unlawfully suspended for 238 days. Following a decision of the Disciplinary Chamber’s second-instance panel on 7 June 2021, which refused to lift her immunity, Judge Morawiec was reinstated to judicial duties. However, by decision of the President of the Regional Court in Cracow, Ms Dagmara Pawełczyk-Woicka, Judge Morawiec was transferred – without her consent – from the Fourth Criminal Appellate Division, where she had served for 20 years, to the First-Instance Third Criminal Division. This transfer was widely regarded within the judiciary as a de facto demotion. The decision followed Judge Morawiec’s declaration that she would adjudicate in accordance with European law and would refuse to sit alongside ‘neo-judges’. The criminal proceedings against Judge Morawiec were ultimately discontinued in January 2022. However, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her were not formally discontinued by the disciplinary officer until one year and seven months later. Judge Morawiec was also subjected to online harassment. On Twitter, the group KASTA, via the account KastaWatch, disseminated false information about her. She was further targeted by state-controlled media, including defamatory content broadcast on the ‘Wiadomości’ programme of TVP 1.”
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE ALREADY SUMMARISED
23. The relevant legal framework and practice is set out in detail in the Court’s judgments in the cases of Reczkowicz v. Poland (no. 43447/19, §§ 59‑176, 22 July 2021); Grzęda v. Poland [GC] (no. 43572/18, §§ 64-169, 15 March 2022); Żurek v. Poland (no. 39650/18, §§ 94-112, 16 June 2022); Juszczyszyn (cited above, §§ 84-112); Tuleya (cited above, §§ 143-241), Wałęsa (cited above, §§ 58-64 and 79-129), and Wróbel v. Poland (dec.) (no. 6904/22, § 30, 25 March 2025). II. DOMESTIC LAW
Criminal code
24. The Criminal Code, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:
Article 228
“3. Whoever, in connection with the performance of a public function, accepts a material or personal benefit, or a promise thereof, in exchange for conduct constituting a violation of the law, shall be subject to a penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of between one and ten years.”
Article 231
“1. A public official who, exceeding his authority, or not fulfilling his duty, acts to the detriment of a public or individual interest shall be subject to a penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to three years. 2. If the perpetrator commits the act specified in paragraph 1 hereof for the purpose of obtaining a material or personal benefit, he or she shall be subject to a penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of between one and ten years.”
Article 284
“2. Whoever appropriates a movable item entrusted to him or her shall be subject to a penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of between three months and five years.”
THE LAW
PRELIMINARY objections regarding the application as a whole
A. Lack of significant disadvantage on the part of the applicant
1. The parties’ submissions
25. The Government argued that the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage. They argued that the consequences of the DCSC’s resolution of 12 October 2020, by which the applicant had been suspended from her judicial duties and her salary had been reduced by 50%, had not attained a minimum level of severity. The Government added that the second-instance resolution of 7 June 2021 had quashed the first-instance ruling, restored the applicant’s immunity, reinstated her to her judicial duties and resulted in the withheld part of her salary being paid out to her. They further argued that the applicant’s suspension had been of relatively short duration. 26. The applicant maintained that her application should be declared admissible. 2. The Court’s assessment
27. The Court refers to the general principles concerning the application of the admissibility criterion under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention as set out for instance in Šeks v. Croatia (no. 39325/20, § 47, 3 February 2022). It reiterates that in assessing the severity of a violation, both the applicant’s subjective perceptions and what is objectively at stake in a particular case should be taken into account (ibid., see also Gagliano Giorgi v. Italy, no. 23563/07, § 55, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). The Court takes into account the fact that the present case concerns a matter of principle that was of the utmost importance for the applicant – in particular, her right to have her case reviewed by an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law” in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in so far as she had faced serious allegations, as well as her right to respect for her private life, under Article 8, and her right to freedom of expression, under Article 10. Given the circumstances, the applicant suffered a disadvantage that cannot be considered insignificant for the purposes of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention. The same considerations amount in any event to grounds for finding that respect for human rights (as defined in the Convention) requires an examination of the complaint on the merits (see Friedrich and Others v. Poland, nos. 25344/20 and 17 others, § 125, 20 June 2024, and the case-law cited therein). 28. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection. B. Remaining objections to the application as a whole
29. The Government raised several other preliminary objections to the admissibility of the application as a whole, that is without expressly specifying the Convention provisions to which those arguments applied. Notably, they argued that the application should be rejected: (i) as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention; (ii) on account of its premature character and non-exhaustion of domestic remedies; and (iii) for a lack of victim status on part of the applicant. However, seeing as those specific objections cannot be reviewed without having regard to the specific alleged violations, the Court will examine those objections when dealing with the applicant’s respective complaints, to which they essentially pertain. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
30. The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the proceedings concerning the lifting of her immunity and her suspension from judicial duties had been conducted by the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (“the DCSC”), a body that did not satisfy the requirements of “an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
A. Admissibility
1. Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the context of the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 March 2022 in case no. K 7/21
(a)   The parties’ submissions
31. The Government argued that the application should be considered incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention on account of the alleged effect of the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 March 2022 in case no. K 7/21 which found Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to be incompatible with various provisions of the Constitution (for details of that judgment see Wałęsa v. Poland, no. 50849/21, §§ 107-08, 23 November 2023). 32. Relying on arguments identical to those raised in Wałęsa, the Government contended that the judgment in question should be regarded as an emanation of the “constitutionally justified objection” against the Court’s authority of a judicial and interpretative nature, thus making Article 6 of the Convention inapplicable to the present case (see Wałęsa, cited above, §§ 134‑38). 33. In reply, referring to the Court’s findings in Juszczyszyn v. Poland (no. 35599/20, §§ 207-09, 6 October 2022) the applicant submitted that the Constitutional Court was not authorised to issue rulings regulating the jurisdiction of the Court and that the judgment relied upon by the Government should be considered legally ineffective. (b)   The Court’s assessment
34. The Court notes that in the case of Wałęsa (cited above, §§ 140-45) it dealt in detail with the Government’s arguments as to the alleged effects of the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 March 2022. 35. Seeing no reason to depart from the findings made in that case, the Court reiterates that (i) the Court alone is competent to decide on its jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Convention and the Protocols thereto (see Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378/02, § 293, ECHR 2005-III), and (ii) the Constitutional Court’s judgment cannot be considered anything other than an attempt to restrict the Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 19 and 32 of the Convention, undermining the rule-of-law standards. The Court further observes that, although this point is not central to the Government’s objection relying on a particular judgment of the Constitutional Court, the CJEU has recently delivered a judgment that appears to support the Court’s conclusion (judgment of 18 December 2025 in Commission v Poland (Ultra vires review of the case-law of the Court – Primacy of EU law), C-448/23, EU:C:2025:975). In that case, the CJEU held that Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union on account of the fact that the Constitutional Court “does not meet the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, on account of irregularities in the procedures for the appointment of three of its members in December 2015 and of its President in December 2016”. 36. Consequently, the Government’s objection as to the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention in the present case based on the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 March 2022 in case no. K 7/21 must be dismissed. 2. Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to the proceedings before the DCSC
(a)   The parties’ submissions
37. The Government raised a preliminary objection as to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to the proceedings under review, in respect of its distinct aspects. The Government argued that Article 6 was not applicable: (i) under its civil limb, in so far as the applicant’s suspension was concerned, and (ii) under its criminal limb, as regards the lifting of the applicant’s immunity. Concerning the civil limb, the Government asserted that the applicant participated in the exercise of public power or there existed a “special bond of trust and loyalty” between her, as a judge, and the State, as employer. Therefore, the dispute in the applicant’s case was not an example of an “ordinary labour dispute” relating to “salaries, allowances or similar entitlements” to which Article 6 should in principle apply. Polish law did not grant judges the right to exercise their authority and remain in office irrespective of their conduct; nor did it grant them the right to be released from criminal responsibility. As for the criminal limb, the Government submitted that proceedings in which a court decided whether to permit a judge to be held criminally liable were neither criminal nor even disciplinary. They were of an ancillary nature and were conducted separately from the criminal proceedings at their in rem stage. The subject of those proceedings was solely the question whether the immunity of a judge should be lifted, and their aim was limited to allowing a prosecutor in charge to conduct criminal proceedings in order to establish whether the offence in question had been committed. A person whose immunity had been lifted did not automatically become a suspect. 38. The applicant maintained that Article 6 § 1 was applicable to her case under both heads. Relying on the Court’s case-law, particularly as outlined in the case of Juszczyszyn (cited above), she argued that the civil limb of Article 6 applied to her case as regards her suspension. Regarding the criminal head of that provision, it was applicable to her case because proceedings on the lifting of immunity of a judge were by their nature related to repression. In those proceedings a competent court could decide not only to lift an obstacle to pursuing a criminal case, but also to apply directly repressive measures, such as suspension from judicial duties paired with a salary reduction (both of which had been applied in her case) and detention. (b)   The Court’s assessment
(i)      Applicability of Article 6 § 1 under its civil limb in so far as the suspension of the applicant from her judicial duties is concerned
39. The general principles regarding the applicability of Article 6 § 1 in its “civil” limb were recently summarised in Grzęda v. Poland ([GC], no. 43572/18, §§ 257‑64, 15 March 2022). 40. The Court observes that the applicant in the present case, who is a judge, faced the lifting of her judicial immunity and that in the course of the proceedings brought to that end she was suspended from the exercise of her judicial duties by the DCSC. 41. The Court reiterates that the employment relationship of judges with the State must be understood in the light of the specific guarantees essential for judicial independence. Thus, when referring to the “special trust and loyalty” that they must observe, it is loyalty to the rule of law and democracy and not to holders of State power that is at issue (see Grzęda, cited above, § 264 and the cases cited therein). 42. Applying the criteria established in Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland ([GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007-II) in an earlier case, which concerned a similar situation of suspension of a judge (albeit within the context of disciplinary proceedings), the Court held that the guarantees of Article 6 were applicable to the suspension in issue (see Paluda v. Slovakia, no. 33392/12, §§ 33-34, 23 May 2017; see also Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, no. 36889/18, § 70, 20 October 2020; and, in the Polish context, Juszczyszyn, cited above, § 137). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case and finds, therefore, that Article 6 § 1 in its civil limb is applicable. The Government’s objection must accordingly be dismissed. (ii)    Applicability of Article 6 § 1 under its criminal limb in so far as the lifting of the applicant’s judicial immunity is concerned
43. In Tuleya v. Poland (nos. 21181/19 and 51751/20, §§ 277-79, 6 July 2023) the Court summarised principles concerning the applicability of the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 in general and applied them in the specific context of Polish proceedings for the lifting of a judge’s immunity (ibid., §§ 280-300). The Court reiterates in this respect that there are two separate sets of proceedings enabling the prosecution of a judge and the establishing of his or her criminal liability. The initial proceedings, which relate to the authorisation for the lifting of immunity of a judge, are a condition sine qua non for the subsequent prosecution of a judge; those proceedings are of a judicial nature and the lifting of immunity is decided by a court at two levels of jurisdiction. Criminal proceedings against a judge would begin only if the authorisation has been given by a court in the immunity proceedings and it would be for the competent criminal court subsequently to decide on the commission of an offence and the question of guilt. 44. In both Tuleya and in the case under review the above-mentioned initial proceedings were relevant for the Court’s analysis. Consequently, the Court considers that, owing to the substantial similarities between the circumstances of the present case and those examined in Tuleya, the reasoning adopted in that judgment can be applied mutatis mutandis and may guide its assessment in the instant case. 45. The assessment of the applicability of Article 6 under its criminal limb is based on three criteria, commonly known as the “Engel criteria” (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 82, Series A no. 22, and Gestur Jónsson and Ragnar Halldór Hall v. Iceland [GC], nos. 68273/14 and 68271/14, § 75, 22 December 2020). 46. In the present case, the prosecutor sought permission to have the applicant’s criminal liability established for intentional abuse of power by a public official (Article 231 § 2 of the Criminal Code), misappropriation of funds (Article 284 § 2 of the Criminal Code) and bribery (Article 228 § 3 of the Criminal Code) – see paragraph 24 above. 47. As regards the first criterion – the legal classification of the offence under national law, the Court notes that the offences in respect of which the prosecutor sought to have the applicant’s liability established are clearly criminal offences under domestic law. 48. In the Tuleya case (cited above, §§ 286-90), the Court analysed and attached significant weight to the findings of the highest domestic courts concerning the nature of the immunity proceedings, and in particular to their view that (i) the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applied to immunity proceedings, and that (ii) in immunity proceedings, despite their interlocutory nature, adequate procedural safeguards had to be afforded to the person concerned. The same considerations apply to the present case. 49. As to the second criterion – the very nature of the offence – the Court observes that Articles 231 § 2 and 228 § 3 of the Criminal Code deal with offences which can only be committed by public officials, although, it should be stressed, not exclusively judges. That being said, Article 284 § 2 of the Criminal Code establishes an offence that can be committed by the public in general, and not only by a specific category of persons. Thus, at least in respect of that provision (without there being need for the Court to pronounce itself on the remaining provisions), the charge against the applicant was criminal in nature (compare with Tuleya, cited above, §§ 283 and 294). 50. With regard to the third criterion, the Court notes that the offence set out in Article 284 § 2 of the Criminal Code is punishable by a fine, restriction of liberty or imprisonment for up to five years, which confirms the seriousness of the penalties at stake (compare with Tuleya, cited above, § 295, where the maximum penalty was imprisonment for up to two years). 51. Consequently, even though the applicant was not formally charged in the criminal proceedings opened in connection with the allegations against her, the Court finds that following the first-instance resolution the applicant’s situation was substantially affected – within the meaning of the Court’s case-law – by actions taken by the authorities as a result of a suspicion against her (see, mutatis mutandis, Tuleya, cited above § 299; see also Deweer v. Belgium, 27 February 1980, §§ 42‑46, Series A no. 35, and Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 21980/04, §§ 110-11, 12 May 2017). In this regard, the Court also refers to the judgment of 5 June 2023 in Commission v. Poland (Independence and private life of judges) (C-204/21, EU:C:2023:442) where the CJEU held that the mere prospect of judges running the risk that authorisation to prosecute them may be sought and obtained from a body whose independence was not guaranteed was likely to affect their independence (see Tuleya, cited above, § 241). 52. In view of the foregoing and having regard to the specific features of the immunity proceedings under review, the Court finds that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its criminal limb is applicable to those proceedings. It follows that the Government’s objection in this regard must be dismissed. 3. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
(a)   The parties’ submissions
53. The Government argued that the case was premature for three reasons. Firstly, they noted that, at the time when the application was lodged with the Court, the proceedings for the lifting of the applicant’s judicial immunity had still been pending, in so far as the applicant had not lodged her appeal against the first-instance resolution of the DCSC. Secondly, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies as regards the issue of the composition of the DCSC, given that she had not lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court; had she obtained a favourable judgment of the Constitutional Court, the applicant would have been able to lodge a compensation claim in respect of damage incurred as a result of a final decision given on the basis of provisions which were found to be incompatible with the Constitution, under Article 4171 § 1 of the Civil Code (see Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, § 38, 24 October 2023). Thirdly, the Government submitted that, following the abolition of the DCSC and the establishment of the Chamber of Professional Liability (“the CPL”) of the Supreme Court in its place (for details see Tuleya, cited above, §§ 181-87), a new remedy was made available to judges affected by the rulings of the DCSC. In particular, the Government referred to the provision under which a judge in respect of whom the DCSC had adopted a final resolution permitting him or her to be held criminally liable was entitled to request the reopening of the proceedings within six months from the date of entry into force of the legislative amendment; such requests for reopening were to be examined by the CPL (ibid., § 187). Against that background, the Government acknowledged that the applicant had been in a different situation than the one covered by the legislative amendment, in so far as the DCSC had refused, at second-instance, to lift her immunity. Nevertheless, the Government maintained that the applicant should have requested the newly created CPL to reopen the proceedings using that remedy. 54. The applicant disagreed and maintained that no effective remedy – be it civil, criminal, or constitutional – was available to her. As to the Government’s first argument, the applicant argued that her rights had been breached by the initiation and the involvement of the DCSC in the immunity proceedings, which by definition could not have been remedied at second instance by the DCSC. Concerning the constitutional complaint, the applicant contended that it could not automatically annul an individual decision issued in application of a successfully challenged provision. Moreover, she asserted that, in the context of the Court’s judgment in Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland (no. 4907/18, 7 May 2021), the constitutional complaint could no longer be considered an effective remedy. (b)   The Court’s assessment
55. Concerning the allegedly premature character of the complaint on account of the fact that the applicant had lodged her application with this Court before appealing against the first-instance resolution of the DCSC, the Court considers that, irrespective of whether this remedy could be regarded as an effective one for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the objection as to non-exhaustion has lost its relevance, because in any event it accepts that the last stage of domestic remedies may be reached after the application has been lodged but before its admissibility has been determined (see Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], no. 20452/14, § 90, 19 December 2018, Karoussiotis v. Portugal, no. 23205/08, § 57, 1 February 2011, and Panayotopoulos and Others v. Greece, no. 44758/20, § 90, 21 January 2025). 56. Concerning the constitutional complaint, the Court reiterates its position on preliminary objections as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies involving a constitutional complaint which have been raised in similar terms in other Polish cases concerning the independence of the judiciary (see Wałęsa, cited above, §§ 152-53, and the case-law referenced therein), notably that the recent trend of the Constitutional Court’s case-law indicated that that body was essentially determined to preserve the new judicial appointment procedure involving the recomposed NCJ. The Court further refers, in this respect, to the CJEU judgment of 18 December 2025 in Commission v Poland and the conclusion made therein (see paragraph 35 above). 57. In so far as the Government raised the possibility of the applicant bringing an action for damages under Article 4171 of the Civil Code, the Court observes, considering its findings above regarding a possible constitutional complaint, that the Government’s assertions concerning the civil action, the exercise of which would depend on the prior success of the constitutional complaint in question, remain speculative. 58. Concerning the third argument raised by the Government, that is the possibility for the applicant to request reopening of her case by the CPL, the Court notes that the new provisions expressly limited that possibility to cases where the DCSC had given a final decision lifting a judge’s immunity. The Court further notes that the Government essentially conceded that this mechanism was not available to the applicant in the circumstances of her case (see paragraph 53 above). Based on that, the Court concludes that the Government have failed to demonstrate that the remedy had ever been available to the applicant, given that in the final decision by the DCSC it had refused to lift the applicant’s immunity. 59. In the light of the foregoing, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection regarding the applicant’s alleged failure to make use of domestic remedies. 4. Victim status
(a)   The parties’ submissions
60. The Government contended that the DCSC’s resolution of 7 June 2021 had been unequivocally favourable to the applicant in so far as it precluded her from being criminally prosecuted. In view of that resolution they argued that the applicant had lost her victim status and the application should be considered incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention. 61. The applicant disagreed with the Government and maintained that she had kept her victim status despite the favourable second-instance decision of the DCSC. She argued that the infringement of her rights by the DCSC at the first-instance could not have been remedied by another panel of the same body, tainted as it was with the same doubts as to the validity of the appointments of its members. (b)   The Court’s assessment
(i)      General principles
62. The Court reiterates a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive him of his status as “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 179-80, ECHR 2006 V; Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 259, ECHR 2012 (extracts); and Cristea v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 35098/12, § 25, 12 February 2019). Only where both these conditions have been satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention preclude examination of the application (see Rooman v. Belgium [GC], no. 18052/11, § 129, 31 January 2019, and Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, § 218, 22 December 2020). 63. The alleged loss of the applicant’s victim status involves an examination of the nature of the right in issue, the reasons advanced by the national authorities in their decision and the persistence of adverse consequences for the applicant after the decision (see Sakhnovskiy v. Russia [GC], no. 21272/03, § 67 in fine, 2 November 2010, and Freimanis and Līdums v. Latvia, nos. 73443/01 and 74860/01, § 68, 9 February 2006). 64. With the above being said, the Court reiterates that, as per its well-established case-law, a full acquittal or the discontinuation of the proceedings against an applicant may constitute appropriate redress in respect of the criminal-limb guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention, with the appropriateness and sufficiency of redress depending on the nature of the violation complained of by the applicant (see Sakhnovskiy, cited above, §§ 70-71). The case-law on this matter varies depending on the exact nature of the complaint raised by the applicant under Article 6 of the Convention, as it will be discussed below. 65. Concerning fairness of proceedings and impartiality and independence of a domestic court, an acquitted defendant or a person against whom criminal proceedings were discontinued cannot claim to be a victim of violations of the Convention which, according to him, took place in the course of the proceedings against him (see, among other authorities, Komyakov v. Russia (dec.), no. 7100/02, 8 January 2009; Yaşar Kaplan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 56566/00, 24 September 2004; Osmanov and Husseinov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 54178/00, 4 September 2003; and Oleksy v. Poland (dec.), no. 1379/06, 16 June 2009). 66. However, not all complaints under the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention can be considered automatically remedied by a favourable outcome of criminal proceedings. For example, the Court has found that, as regards complaints on the excessive length of criminal proceedings against an accused applicant, his or her acquittal or a reduction of sentence on account of such excessive length does not, in principle, deprive him or her of victim status within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention (see Freimanis and Līdums, cited above, § 68). This general rule may, in particular, be subject to an exception where the national authorities have acknowledged, in a sufficiently explicit manner, the failure to comply with the reasonable‑time requirement and have afforded redress by expressly and measurably reducing the sentence (see Beck v. Norway, no. 26390/95, § 27, 26 June 2001; Wejrup v. Denmark (dec.), no. 49126/99, ECHR 2002‑IV; and Morby v. Luxembourg (dec.), no.  27156/02, ECHR 2003‑XI). 67. Similarly, the Court has found that an accused applicant complaining of a failure to have his case heard by a “tribunal established by law” may lose victim status where the domestic decision given by the impugned body is quashed and the case remitted to a differently composed bench, as long as the quashing decision carries an explicit acknowledgment and affords adequate redress for that violation (see Freimanis and Līdums, cited above, §§ 71-72, where the applicants raised no complaints as to the subsequent proceedings before a different bench). (ii)    Application of the general principles to the present case
68. The Court reiterates that the applicant’s complaint pertains to the characteristics of the judicial body which examined the case concerning the lifting of her judicial immunity and her suspension from judicial duties, namely the DCSC – a body whose compliance with the requirements of a “tribunal established by law”, was previously assessed, in the negative, in the case of Reczkowicz (cited above, § 281). 69. The Court notes, in this respect, that the entire proceedings concerning the applicant’s immunity and suspension were conducted before the DCSC, and the second-instance resolution – however favourable to the applicant – was also given by the same body. 70. Against that background, the Court finds it important to compare and contrast the applicant’s situation with that of Judge Tuleya (see Tuleya, cited above, §§ 255-64), in the light of its findings in the case Freimanis and Līdums (cited above). In Tuleya, the original resolution lifting that applicant’s immunity and suspending him from his judicial duties had similarly been given by DCSC (ibid., §§ 43-44 and 256). However, the subsequent resolution lifting the applicant’s suspension was given by a panel of the CPL, the composition of which was found to raise no concerns under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the light of the Reczkowicz judgment. The Court took into account, on the one hand, the composition of the body which gave the final decision (ibid., § 258), and on the other, the fact that the CPL panel in question had recognised that the suspension had been ordered by the DCSC – a body that did not meet the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal established by law within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court therefore found that the CPL had acknowledged – in substance – that there was a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the proceedings before the DCSC (ibid., § 260; thus, the Court followed the approach adopted in the above-cited case of Freimanis and Līdums, § 72). On this basis, the Court accepted that at last instance Judge Tuleya received a hearing before an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, notably due to lack of doubts as to the validity of the appointments of the members of the CPL panel concerned (ibid., § 261). Consequently, having found that the CPL resolution could be regarded as having afforded the applicant appropriate and sufficient redress in so far as his suspension was concerned, the Court concluded that the applicant had lost his victim status (ibid., § 262). 71. Turning to the case under review, the Court notes that the second-instance decision of the DCSC refused to lift the applicant’s immunity, terminated her suspension and resulted in her remuneration being paid out to her. Consequently, following the criteria reiterated in Sakhnovskiy (cited above, § 67 in fine; see paragraph 63 above), the Court finds that the adverse consequences for the applicant (as resulting from the first-instance resolution) appear to no longer persist after the final domestic decision. However, with that being said, the Court observes the following circumstances relevant for the remaining criteria, that is, on the one hand, the nature of the right in issue and, on the other, the reasons advanced by the national authorities. Firstly, the complaint raised by the applicant and examined herein does not concern material fairness of the proceedings before the DCSC but the alleged lack of compliance of that body with the requirements of a “tribunal established by law” on account of the appointment procedure to the DCSC. In this context, the Court reiterates that the process of appointing judges has fundamental implications for the proper functioning and the legitimacy of the judiciary in a democratic State governed by the rule of law (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 227, 1 December 2020). As such, the right in issue would, by design, require, that the body examining a complaint in this respect be free from similar doubts as to its very establishment (as was the case in both cases cited above, that is Tuleya, and Freimanis and Līdums, where the ensuing proceedings were conducted before different compositions). Secondly, the second-instance DCSC panel was composed of judges appointed in the same procedure as the judge who examined the case at first instance. Thirdly, the second-instance panel expressly dismissed the complaints raised by the applicant that the DCSC was not a “tribunal established by law” (see paragraph 15 above). Therefore, the reasons on the basis of which the first-instance resolution had been amended had no connection with the applicant’s allegations concerning the composition of the DCSC. Thus, unlike in the Tuleya case, in the reasons of its resolution the second-instance panel did not recognise that the first-instance panel failed to meet the requirements of a “tribunal established by law”, as per the findings in Reczkowicz. It also did not acknowledge, neither expressly, nor in substance, a violation of the applicant’s right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on that account. 72. Against that background, and considering that the conditions of acknowledgment and redress for the breach of the Convention are cumulative (see Rooman, cited above, § 129), the Court finds that, in the specific circumstances of the present case, the resolution of 7 June 2021 could not have deprived the applicant of her status as a victim in relation to the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the DCSC had not been a “tribunal established by law”. 73. In view of the foregoing, the Government’s preliminary objection as to the applicant’s victim status in respect of the proceedings before the DCSC must be dismissed. 5. Conclusions as to admissibility
74. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits
1. The applicant’s submissions
75. The applicant argued that the DCSC, which had dealt with her case, did not meet the requirements of an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. She argued that the DCSC had been established in flagrant breach of the domestic law since the judges of that Chamber had been appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the recomposed NCJ, which, in turn, had been established contrary to the Constitution. In that latter respect, citing the Court’s judgment in Reczkowicz (cited above), the applicant referred to the fact that judicial members of the NCJ had been elected by the Sejm and not by their peers, and that the term of office of the previous judicial members had been unlawfully terminated. 2. The Government’s submissions
76. The Government argued that there had been no manifest breach of domestic law with regard to the process of appointing the judges of the DCSC who had heard the applicant’s case. Referring to Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson (cited above), they noted that the Convention did not establish any universally binding model with regard to the procedure for appointing candidates to judicial office, nor did it prohibit the cooperation of the authorities in that procedure. Accordingly, the applicant’s assertion that the judges adjudicating in her case had been improperly appointed as a result of being subject to unspecified political influence by the NCJ seemed to be devoid of any substantive basis and could not constitute a violation of Article 6 § 1. The Polish legislature could not be accused of violating any standards applicable to the appointment of judges on account of the participation of the Sejm in the election of the judicial members of the NCJ. Although representatives of the legislature and members of the executive, including the Minister of Justice, were members of the NCJ, the independent constitutional authority of the State, they acted only as its members without having a decisive role in making any decisions. In addition, it had to be noted that the majority of the members of the NCJ were judges. 77. Furthermore, as regards the right to an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”, the Government restated the same arguments as those that they had already submitted in the case of Juszczyszyn (cited above, §§ 171‑78). 3. The Court’s assessment
(a)   General principles
78. The general principles regarding the scope of, and meaning to be given to, the concept of a “tribunal established by law” were set out in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson (cited above, §§ 211-34). In the same judgment, the Court developed a threshold test made up of three criteria, taken cumulatively, in order to assess whether the irregularities in a given judicial appointment procedure were of such gravity as to entail a violation of the right to a tribunal established by law, and whether the balance between the competing principles had been struck by the State authorities (ibid.,§§ 243-52). (b)   Application of the general principles to the present case
79. In the present case, the alleged violation of the right to a “tribunal established by law” concerns the DCSC, which decided – at both instances – on the issues of the applicant’s immunity and suspension. The applicant submitted that the judges of that Chamber had been appointed by the President of the Republic upon the recommendation of the recomposed NCJ in manifest breach of the domestic law within the meaning adopted in the Court’s case-law. 80. In Reczkowicz (cited above) the Court previously examined whether the fact that an applicant’s case had been heard by the DCSC had given rise to a violation of her right to a “tribunal established by law”, in the light of the three-step test as set out in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson (cited above, § 243), and found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that regard (ibid., §§ 281-82). 81. In the present case, the Government contested the findings made in the Reczkowicz judgment. The Court previously examined the Government’s arguments, which were phrased in similar terms, in the Juszczyszyn case and dismissed them (see Juszczyszyn, cited above, §§ 200‑09). The grounds on which the Court reached its conclusions still stand. It is therefore unnecessary to reiterate them in detail in the present case. 82. In sum and for the same reasons as in the cases of Reczkowicz, Juszczyszyn and Tuleya (all cited above), the Court concludes that the DCSC, which examined the applicant’s case, was not a “tribunal established by law”. 83. Having made that finding, it further holds that the question whether those irregularities have also compromised the independence and impartiality of the same court has already been answered in the affirmative and does not require further examination (see Reczkowicz, § 284; Juszczyszyn, § 215, and Tuleya, § 344, all cited above; see also Advance Pharma sp. z o.o. v. Poland, § 353, no. 1469/20, § 353, 3 February 2022).
84.

Outcome for Article 10: violation