SECOND SECTION
CASE OF LÁRUS WELDING v. ICELAND
(Application no. 24999/21)
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Independent tribunal • Appointment and participation of an expert lay judge in the applicant’s trial did not disclose deficiencies of such a nature or degree as to be capable of undermining the tribunal’s independence or its appearance of independence
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
5 May 2026
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Lárus Welding v. Iceland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,
 Jovan Ilievski,
 Péter Paczolay,
 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
 Gediminas Sagatys,
 Stéphane Pisani,
 Juha Lavapuro, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 24999/21) against the Republic of Iceland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Icelandic national, Mr Lárus Welding (“the applicant”), on 10 May 2021;
the decision to give notice to the Icelandic Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning the judicial independence and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 20 January and 18 March 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The application concerns the alleged violation of the applicant’s right to an independent tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention, arising from the participation of an expert lay judge in the applicant’s trial and the statutory framework that governed her selection and appointment. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Reykjavík. He was represented by Óttar Pálsson, a lawyer practising in Reykjavík. 3. The Government were represented by Fanney Rós Þorsteinsdóttir, Agent. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5. On 10 February 2014 the applicant, together with two co-defendants, was committed for trial before the Reykjavík District Court on charges of fraud by abuse of position. The case was heard by a panel of three judges composed of professional judges S.S. and S.H., and one expert lay judge. Judge S.S., as presiding judge, summoned H.S.B., chair of the undergraduate business studies department at Reykjavík University, to sit on the bench as the expert lay judge. 6. By judgment of 21 December 2015, the Reykjavík District Court convicted the defendants on all charges. However, on 1 June 2017 the Supreme Court quashed the conviction and remitted the case for reconsideration, on the basis that there were circumstances capable of casting doubt on the impartiality of District Court Judge S.H., warranting her withdrawal from the case. 7. For the re-trial, District Court Judge S.S. again summoned H.S.B. to sit as an expert lay judge on the panel of three judges. The applicant requested that H.S.B. be recused and argued that the legal framework and practical implementation of the selection, appointment and status of expert lay judges created legitimate doubts as to the independence of the bench in violation of his right to an independent tribunal. 8. By a ruling of 20 October 2017, the District Court rejected the request, holding that the system for selecting expert lay judges contained sufficient safeguards. Since expert lay judges participated in the conduct of proceedings and the drafting of judgments, enjoyed the same rights and bore the same obligations as the professional judges, and were bound by the constitutional duty to adjudicate solely on the basis of law, their independence was sufficiently protected. 9. On 22 October 2017 the applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, reiterating his arguments and adding that the ad hoc appointment of expert lay judges could be professionally and financially appealing to those seeking an appointment, creating strong incentives to please the presiding judge who summons them to serve. Expert lay judges were also dependent on the presiding judge for the determination of their remuneration. He further noted that H.S.B. had previously sat with Judge S.S. in the initial trial and in another trial against him, in which he had been convicted. He submitted that it appeared as if the expert lay judge had been selected for the re-trial because she had previously participated in two sets of proceedings resulting in his conviction. 10. On 2 November 2017 the Supreme Court upheld the decision, primarily relying on the reasoning set out in the District Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court also reiterated that expert lay judges have the same authority as professional judges in adjudicating cases, and that their impartiality could be challenged before a higher court. 11. By judgment of 21 December 2017, the Reykjavík District Court again found the defendants guilty on all charges. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction on 26 June 2020. The applicant’s request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected on 26 November 2020. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK      DOMESTIC lAW   Constitution of the Republic of Iceland

12. Article 61 provides that, in the performance of their official duties, judges shall be guided solely by the law. 13. Article 70 provides that everyone has the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, within a reasonable time, for the determination of their rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against them. Criminal Procedure Act no. 88/2008 (“the CPA”)     As applicable at the time of the applicant’s trial

14. At the material time, the CPA contained provisions on the participation of expert lay judges in criminal proceedings. It allowed two such judges to be summoned to sit with one professional judge where specialist knowledge was considered necessary to resolve disputed facts. In cases of broad scope or of general importance, the president of the court could decide that the bench be composed either of three professional judges or of two judges together with one expert lay judge (Article 3(3) and (5)). 15. Eligibility criteria required sufficient maturity, mental and physical health, Icelandic citizenship, a minimum age of twenty-five as well as financial competence and legal capacity. Persons convicted of offences considered disgraceful, or otherwise displaying conduct undermining public trust in the judiciary, were excluded (Article 4(1)). 16. Expert lay judges were to take their seats no later than at the start of the main hearing, with the parties being informed in advance so they could raise objections to the proposed appointment (Article 5(1)). When serving for the first time they were required to sign a sworn declaration to perform their duties conscientiously, impartially and in full compliance with the law (Article 5(2)). They participated in the hearing and the compilation of the judgment with the same rights and obligations as the presiding judge, while the presiding judge directed the proceedings and acted alone in ruling on procedural matters other than the dismissal of the case (Article 5(3)). Their fees were determined by the presiding judge (Article 5(4)). 17. The CPA provided the same rules of recusal for judges and expert lay judges, including where circumstances exist that can justifiably raise doubts about their impartiality (Article 6(1)(g)). 18. Judges were required to assess their own competence ex officio, and the parties were entitled to request their recusal. The presiding judge was to assess the competence of expert lay judges. Recusal requests concerning a judge or an expert lay judge were to be decided by the judge concerned, or by the presiding judge in a panel. In cases heard by three District Court judges, the ruling should be delivered jointly by all three (Articles 7(1) and (2)). 19. District Court rulings on recusal requests were subject to appeal to the Supreme Court (Article 192(1)(a)). Subsequent amendments
20. The new Act on the Judiciary, no. 50/2016, entrusts the Court Administration with designating expert lay judges for a fixed term of five years and maintaining a roster of qualified experts in specified fields. Designations are to be made following a public advertisement or on the basis of judges’ recommendations, subject to verification of the expert lay judges’ professional competence. Eligibility criteria and the requirement of a sworn declaration largely mirror the previous requirements under the CPA (Article 39). When an expert lay judge is required in a particular case, the competent judge is to summon one or more experts from the roster, provided that they possess the specialist knowledge needed for the determination of the case. Should the judge consider that none have the requisite knowledge, he or she is to refer the matter to the Court Administration, which is to identify a suitable expert (Article 40). The Act also requires the Court Administration to issue binding rules on the assessment of their competence, remuneration and reimbursement of expenses. It further provides that the Court Administration shall take steps to ensure that expert lay judges have minimum knowledge of legal procedure (Article 41). The Explanatory Report to the Act noted that the new provisions were intended to accommodate the findings of the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (“GRECO”) on the appointment of expert lay judges in Iceland (see paragraph 23 below). 21. In 2016, Articles 3 to 5 of the CPA were also amended. In the amended version, Article 3 largely mirrored the previous provisions on the appointment of expert lay judges (see paragraph 14 above), except for specifying that one expert lay judge could be summoned to sit with two professional judges unless expert knowledge in more than one field was considered necessary. The amended Article 4 mirrored the eligibility criteria provided in the new Act on the Judiciary (see paragraph 20 above) and added a cross-reference providing that other aspects of the selection of expert lay judges were to be governed by that Act. Article 5 likewise retained the rule that fees were determined by the presiding judge (see paragraph 16 above) but specified that this was to be done in accordance with rules set by the Court Administration. 22. The above amendments entered into force on 1 January 2018 and therefore did not apply during the applicant’s trial. COUNCIL OF EUROPE
23. In its Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Iceland, adopted at its 59th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 18-22 March 2013), GRECO examined corruption prevention in respect of judges. It noted that in Iceland, district courts could summon experts to sit on the bench in both civil and criminal cases if specialist knowledge was required. Such experts enjoyed the same rights and obligations as professional judges and could theoretically determine the outcome against the vote of the professional judge. However, unlike professional judges, they were not subject to administrative scrutiny, and the appointing judge retained wide discretion in choosing the individuals who would serve. GRECO expressed concern that this procedure did not provide sufficient guarantees for judicial independence and recommended reform of the appointment process to ensure independence, impartiality and transparency (§§ 84-85). 24. In its Second Compliance Report, adopted at its 78th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 4-8 December 2017), GRECO noted the legislative amendments introduced by the new Act on the Judiciary (see paragraphs 20-22 above). GRECO welcomed these reforms as significantly strengthening the transparency, independence and impartiality of the process (§§ 24-25). THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
25. The applicant complained that his right to an independent tribunal had been violated due to the participation of expert lay judge H.S.B. in the tribunal at first instance. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in its relevant part reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...”
   Admissibility
26. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits     The parties’ submissions   The applicant

27. The applicant submitted that the District Court lacked the requisite independence owing to the participation of the expert lay judge, H.S.B. 28. He argued that the rudimentary legal framework and non-transparent procedure for the selection of such judges created structural deficiencies and did not provide safeguards against undue influence. In his submission, expert lay judges were appointed on an ad hoc basis at the sole discretion of the presiding judge without clear legal rules, rendering them structurally dependent on the appointing authority. This dependency, combined with the fact that their remuneration was determined by the presiding judge in a discretionary manner and that appointment and re-appointment carried professional and financial appeal, undermined the appearance of independence of the tribunal. 29. The applicant further pointed to the fact that H.S.B. had previously sat with the presiding judge in other proceedings against him, giving rise to objectively justified concerns that she had been selected due to their previously established working relationship and her personal views, as reflected in the previous judgments. The applicant also emphasised that expert financial knowledge was central to his defence. Therefore, it had been essential that any expert member of the bench be both fully independent and professionally competent. 30. The applicant relied on GRECO’s criticism of Iceland’s appointment system for expert lay judges (see paragraph 23 above), noting that subsequent legal reforms addressed these deficiencies only after his case had concluded at first instance (see paragraphs 20-22 above). The Government
31. The Government submitted that the participation of the expert lay judge H.S.B. was not in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They maintained that the Criminal Procedure Act provided sufficient safeguards to ensure independence, noting that expert lay judges were required to sign a sworn declaration to perform their duties conscientiously, impartially and in full compliance with the law. Furthermore, expert lay judges enjoyed the same rights and obligations as professional judges, thereby ensuring compliance with the guarantees enshrined in Article 61 of the Constitution (see paragraph 12 above). 32. The Government further submitted that presiding judges did not hold a position of superiority over expert lay judges, who were not subject to their instructions. They emphasised that the careers of expert lay judges were independent of their service within the justice system and that their appointment to serve had minimal impact on their professional prospects. The pool of District Court judges was also broad enough to dispel suggestions that the views of one District Court judge could preclude future service as expert lay judge. 33. Regarding remuneration, the Government stated that the presiding judge did not have discretion to determine payment; instead, his role was to estimate and review the number of hours to be paid, rather than to determine a reasonable hourly rate. They further submitted that the role of an expert lay judge was supplementary and infrequent in nature, with minimal bearing on financial or professional prospects. The Court’s assessment   General principles

34. The legislation of the Council of Europe’s member States affords many examples of tribunals in which professional judges sit alongside specialists in a particular sphere whose knowledge is desirable and even essential in settling disputes (see, for example, Ettl and Others v. Austria, 23 April 1987, § 40, Series A no. 117; and Pabla Ky v. Finland, no. 47221/99, § 32, ECHR 2004-V). 35. The principles established in the Court’s case-law concerning independence and impartiality are to be applied to lay judges in the same way as to professional judges (see Cooper v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48843/99, § 123, ECHR 2003-XII; Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, § 98, 23 January 2025, and the authorities cited therein). The decisive issue is whether their appointment follows a rigorous and transparent process based on objective criteria of merit, it being understood that different selection criteria may apply to non-professional judges (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 222, 1 December 2020). 36. The concepts of “independence” and “impartiality” are closely linked, and depending on the circumstances, may require joint examination (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 150, 6 November 2018). “Independence” refers to the necessary personal and institutional independence that is required for impartial decision-making and is thus a prerequisite for impartiality. It characterises both a state of mind which denotes a judge’s imperviousness to external pressure as a matter of moral integrity, and a set of institutional and operational arrangements – involving both a procedure by which judges can be appointed in a manner that ensures their independence and selection criteria based on merit – which must provide safeguards against undue influence and/or unfettered discretion of other State powers, both at the initial stage of the appointment of a judge and during the performance of his or her duties (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson, cited above, § 234). 37. In determining whether a body can be considered as “independent” regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence (see Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, § 78, Series A no. 80; Findlay v. the United Kingdom, 25 February 1997, § 73, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑I; and Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, § 49, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). 38. Judicial independence must be protected not only from undue influences outside the judiciary, but also from within. This internal judicial independence requires that individual judges must be free from directives or pressures from the fellow judges or those holding administrative authority within the court such as the president of the court (see Daktaras v. Lithuania, no. 42095/98, § 36, ECHR 2000-X; and Parlov-Tkalčić v. Croatia, no. 24810/06, § 86, 22 December 2009). 39. It is the role of the domestic courts to manage their proceedings with a view to ensuring the proper administration of justice. The assignment of a case to a particular judge falls within the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the domestic authorities in such matters. There is a wide range of factors, such as, for instance, resources available, qualification of judges, conflict of interests, accessibility of the place of hearings for the parties etc., which the authorities must take into account when assigning a case. Although it is not the role of the Court to assess whether there were valid grounds for the domestic authorities to (re)assign a case to a particular judge or court, the Court must be satisfied that such (re)assignment was compatible with Article 6 § 1, and in particular, with its requirements of objective independence and impartiality (see Moiseyev v. Russia, no. 62936/00, § 176, 9 October 2008). Application of the above principles to the present case
40.

Outcome for Article 6: no_violation