FIFTH SECTION
 
 
 
 
 
CASE OF TANDA-MUZINGA v. FRANCE
 
(Application no. 2260/10)
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
(Extracts)
 
 
STRASBOURG
 
10 July 2014
 
 
FINAL
 
10/10/2014
 
 
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Tanda-Muzinga v. France,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Mark Villiger, President,
 Angelika Nußberger,
 Boštjan M. Zupančič,
 Ann Power-Forde,
 Vincent A. de Gaetano,
 André Potocki,
 Helena Jäderblom, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 June 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 2260/10) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Congolese national, Mr Deo Tanda-Muzinga (“the applicant”), on 29 December 2009. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr C. Meyer, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Belliard, Head of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3. The applicant alleges, in particular, that the obstacles encountered in obtaining visas for his wife and children in the context of the so-called “family reunification” procedure for refugees amounted to a violation of his right to respect for his family life, guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 4. On 21 September 2010 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Venissieux. A. Facts at the time the application was lodged
6. In the course of 2000 the applicant, a Congolese national, was granted refugee status under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Cameroon (hereafter UNHCR/Cameroon). According to his certificate of refugee status, he was accompanied by his wife, who also held such a certificate, and his children (Vanessa Ntabugi, born in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1994, and Michelle Tanda-Ngubiri, born in 2001 in Cameroon). The couple had a third child (Benjamin Tanda) who was born in Yaoundé (Cameroon) in 2004, but the applicant was absent when his son was born, having left Cameroon to claim asylum in France. 7. On 19 July 2004 the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (hereafter, the OFPRA) rejected his claim. On 6 August 2004 the applicant appealed against that decision. By a decision of 8 February 2007, the Refugee Appeals Board (the Commission des recours des réfugiés, formerly the National Asylum Tribunal, the Commission nationale du droit d’asile, CNDA) granted the applicant refugee status. He obtained a ten-year residence permit and in April 2007 the OFPRA issued him with a marriage certificate and a family record book (livret de famille), serving as civil-status documents. 8. By a letter of 26 June 2007, for the purpose of family reunion and on the basis of the “family reunification” procedure for certified refugees (see paragraph 36 below), the applicant applied for long-stay visas for his wife and three children. By a letter of 28 June 2007, the Movement of Aliens Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the applicant that it would contact the OFPRA to verify, on the basis of the statements which had enabled him to be granted refugee status, whether those persons were indeed members of the family group, before contacting the French consular services in Yaoundé with a view to compiling an application file for long-stay visas. 9. By a letter of 13 February 2008, the Visa Section at the Ministry of Immigration informed the applicant that the consular services in Yaoundé would be summoning his family for an interview. 10. The applicant’s wife was requested to attend an interview at the consulate on 21 February 2008. After she had submitted the necessary documents for compiling the application, the consular authorities asked her to contact the UNHCR/Cameroon delegation to obtain travel papers for herself and her children, in accordance with the Convention of 28 July 1951. She was assured that once she had brought those documents to the consulate she would be issued with an acknowledgement of receipt of the visa application. On 18 March 2008 the applicant’s wife submitted to the consulate a travel document, issued in her name after a favourable opinion had been obtained from the Cameroonian Ministry of External Affairs. This document, which could substitute a national passport, indicated that she was accompanied by her three children. She did not receive an acknowledgment of receipt of her visa application. Having received no news on examination of his request, the applicant applied to various authorities, including the consulate in Yaoundé, for information as to why the visas had not been issued, and included a copy of all of the documents in his possession, including his residence permit, the reconstituted documents issued by the OFPRA, his wife’s certificate of refugee status, the document serving as his elder daughter’s birth certificate, and the birth certificates of the two other children. 11. On 30 May 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Appeals Board against Decisions to refuse Entry Visas to France (the CRRV, hereafter the “Appeals Board”), against the consular authorities’ implicit refusal. 12. By a letter of 3 June 2008, the OFPRA replied to a letter from the applicant dated 24 January 2008 in the following terms:
“I have the honour to inform you that on 23 July 2007 the Office certified your family’s situation to the visa section. You are registered with the Office as the husband of Mrs Julie Ngubiri Zirirane and father of three children (Vanessa Ntabugi, born on 28 December 1994; Michelle Tanda, born on 4 June 2001; and Benjamin Tanda, born on 3 September 2004). I further observe that your family has been or will shortly be invited to lodge an application for a visa with the consular authorities in Yaoundé”. 13. On 11 June 2008 the applicant lodged an urgent application before the Conseil d’État, requesting a stay of execution of the consular authorities’ implicit decision to refuse the visas. 14. On 12 June 2008 the Conseil d’État acknowledged receipt of the appeal for abuse of authority lodged by the applicant calling for judicial review of this implicit decision. 15. By an order of 23 June 2008, the urgent-applications judge at the Conseil d’État dismissed the urgent application for a stay of execution, on the grounds that the Appeals Board had not yet ruled on the matter. 16. On 30 July 2008, after two months without any reply from the Appeals Board, which amounted to implicit rejection, the applicant lodged a new urgent application for a stay of execution, as well as an urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom (requête en référé-liberté), dated 3 August 2008. 17. By an order of 13 August 2008, the urgent-applications judge at the Conseil d’État rejected the urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom. 18. By a letter of 13 August 2008, the applicant was summoned to a hearing on the urgent application for a stay of execution, scheduled for 10 September 2008. The applicant, who attended the hearing on that date, learnt of pleadings by the Minister of Immigration, which he received only on 12 September, contesting the birth certificates of his children Michelle and Benjamin. Following this hearing, the applicant submitted a memorandum for the deliberations. 19. According to the Government’s observations, the transcripts of the certificates obtained on 13 and 23 April 2008 from the relevant local authorities had revealed that birth certificate no. 1271 held by the civil-status authorities of the 4th arrondissement of Yaoundé concerned the birth of a boy and not that of Michelle Tanda, and that birth certificate no. 78/2004, held by the civil-status authorities of the 2nd arrondissement of Yaoundé, concerned the birth of a girl and not that of Benjamin Tanda. 20. On 16 September 2008, the urgent-applications judge informed the applicant that he had decided to reopen the investigation in the case and that he had communicated the memorandum for the deliberations to the relevant Minister for Immigration. 21. By an order of 26 September 2008, the Conseil d’État dismissed the urgent application for a stay of execution:
“[the applicant] alleges that ... the criterion of urgency has been met, in that he has been living separately from his wife and children for almost four years; [that the impugned decision] is tainted by error of law, in that by refusing to issue visas on the grounds that certain civil-status documents were absent, it breached Article 11 of Directive (EC) no.200/86 of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification; ... that the submitted documents cannot be considered of doubtful authenticity; that he [had] provided evidence establishing his family ties with his wife and his children; that his children’s birth certificates had been registered by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees;
... the Minister alleges ... that the criterion of urgency has not been met, in that responsibility for the separation lies with the applicant; that the latter has not established that he has maintained regular written or telephone contact with his family or has contributed to their upkeep since his departure; that the argument alleging a breach of the Directive of 22 September 2003 is ineffective, in so far as it has been correctly transposed into domestic law and cannot therefore have direct effect; that this text does not require the national authorities to issue a visa to an applicant who has not established his or her filiation with the refugee; that the submission of fraudulent documents is a public policy reason justifying the rejection of visa applications submitted in a family context; ... It appears from the facts of the case ... that visa applications submitted by [the applicant], who has refugee status in France, in respect of his wife Julie B. and his three children, Vanessa C., Michelle D. and Benjamin D., were refused on the grounds that filiation had not been established for the latter two children on account of the doubtful authenticity of the submitted birth certificates; the argument that such a ground could not be a legal basis for the decision to refuse [the visas] is not such, as the evidence stands, to give rise to serious doubts as to the lawfulness of this decision, in view of the outcome of the civil-status verifications carried out by the French Consulate General in Yaoundé and the fact that the fraudulent nature of the request was such as to entail refusal not only of visas applied for in respect of these two children, but also in respect of his wife and his third child...”
22. On 6 October 2008, in the context of an appeal for judicial review, the relevant Minister filed a memorial concluding that the birth certificates of Michelle and Benjamin Tanda were fraudulent. With regard to the alleged violations of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, he responded that it had already been shown that the applicant had abandoned his wife and putative children, that the parent-child relationship had not been established and that the applicant had not shown that he had maintained ties with them. The applicant responded by arguing that an anomaly in the referencing of the birth certificates was not sufficient to establish the doubtful authenticity or fraudulent nature of the documents submitted by his wife. He noted firstly, with regard to Benjamin’s birth certificate, “that it was not certain that the certificate sought by the authorities was related to the document in question, given that the first component of its reference number seemed to be made up of three figures, rather than two (“?78/2004”) (see paragraph 19 above), which would be more coherent, given the date it had been drawn up, in September 2004”. He argued that the Minister did not explain how UNHCR/Cameroon had issued a Family Composition Certificate (dated 26 September 2008, referring to his wife and his three children) and official travel documents permitting his family to travel internationally. He pointed out that he had submitted to the court correspondence from the Cameroonian Ministry for External Relations, dated 11 March and 13 August 2008, drawn up in the context of the checks conducted with a view to issuing those travel documents (travel document for the child Michelle, issued on 26 August 2008 following the favourable opinion of 13 August 2008). He added that the authenticity of the other documents submitted to the court had not been called into question, namely the declaration of Michelle’s birth, issued by the Cité Verte District Hospital in Yaoundé, and the declaration of Benjamin’s birth, issued by the Yaoundé Police Medical Centre, nor that of the travel documents for his first two children, drawn up on 26 August 2008. Lastly, he indicated that other evidence submitted to the court, photographs and bank transfer statements, invalidated the Immigration Ministry’s arguments as to the reality of his ties with his wife and children. 23. On 7 October 2008 UNHCR/Cameroon drew up a “certifiate of parenthood”, stating that the applicant and his wife were the legitimate parents of the children known as Michelle Tanda-Ngubiri and Benjamin Tanda. 24. By a letter of 22 May 2009, the applicant’s lawyer informed him that a hearing had taken place before the Conseil d’État on 20 May 2009; the public rapporteur had proposed that his appeal be dismissed and had suggested that judicial rectification of the civil-status documents of the children concerned be carried out in Cameroon. 25. By a judgment of 8 July 2009, served on 5 August, the Conseil d’État rejected the appeal. It pointed out that the transcripts of the certificates, obtained by the French authorities in the Cameroonian civil-status offices for the purpose of verifying the civil-status documents of the two children born in that country, had shown that two totally different birth certificates had been issued under the same reference numbers, and concerned third parties. It considered that even if the fraudulent nature of one of the two certificates had not been demonstrated, this did not create any doubt as to evidence of the inauthenticity of the second certificate, and concluded that “in those circumstances, neither the submission of declarations of birth from the Yaoundé Maternity Hospital and the Yaoundé Police Medical Centre, not the allegation that this discrepancy originated in dysfunctions within the Cameroonian civil-status authorities, allow for the fraudulent nature of at least one of the documents thus produced to be set aside”. Lastly, it specified that the fraudulent nature of at least one of the submitted documents was such as to entail refusal of all of the requested visas. 26. On 16 July 2009 a psychologist from the Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (CIMADE) certified that the applicant’s psychological health had deteriorated, and described a worsening state of depression. She submitted that “in addition to the traumatic events experienced in his country, [the applicant] is currently developing reactional depression as a result of the separation from his family, which has lasted for several years... Although he was simultaneously actively engaged in preparing a professional insertion plan, the applicant is finding it increasingly difficult to take the necessary steps and is sliding into a form of apathy”. 27. In a letter of 17 July 2009, the applicant’s lawyer confirmed that the appeal had been dismissed and informed him that the public rapporteur’s closing arguments were not available in writing. 28. Following that decision, the applicant contacted the UNHRC/Paris Office and the Director of the OFPRA. By a letter of 18 August 2009, the former replied that, according to the information communicated by the Cameroonian delegation, the French Consulate in Yaoundé was willing to issue a visa to his wife and to two of his children, Vanessa and Benjamin. With regard to the birth certificate for his daughter Michelle, he was advised to submit a request to the Yaoundé tribunal de grande instance for a supplementary judgment relating to a birth certificate. By a letter of 21 August 2009, the Director of the OFPRA wrote to the CIMADE, which had also received the applicant’s file; he was considering transferring his refugee status to another country. In that letter, the Director pointed out that his department, by a memorandum of 23 July 2007, had certified his family situation to the sub-directorate for visas in Nantes, the only administrative body with competence for the family reunification of foreigners. 29. The applicant’s wife brought proceedings before the Yaoundé Court of First Instance, seeking to obtain a supplementary judgment concerning Michelle’s civil status. By a judgment of 27 October 2009, that court declared that it did not have jurisdiction. On 24 February 2010 she brought proceedings before the Yaoundé tribunal de grande instance for the same purpose. 30. By a decision of 30 April 2010, following a further request by the applicant’s family, the consular authorities refused to issue long-stay visas. 31. According to the Government, new checks carried out in 2010 established that it had been possible to authenticate Benjamin’s birth certificate but the doubtful authenticity of the birth certificate produced for Michelle, which had been double-checked, had prompted the consular authorities to maintain their refusal to issue visas to the whole family. 32. On 18 June 2010 the applicant brought proceedings before the Appeals Board against the decision of 30 April 2010. His request was implicitly refused. B. Facts which occurred after communication of the application
33. On 20 September 2010 the applicant applied to the urgent-applications judge at the Nantes Administrative Court seeking an order for a stay of execution of the Appeal Board’s implicit decision to refuse his request. By an order of 28 October 2010, the urgent-applications judge ordered a stay of execution of that decision on the ground that the reasons for the rejection had not been communicated. He added:
“... further, as the evidence stands, although there is uncertainty as to the parent-child relationship in respect of one of the three children, Michelle, [the applicant] refers, without however submitting it, to a supplementary judgment which purportedly substantiates his allegations; having regard to the length of time that the applicant has been separated from his family, the criterion of urgency is met; ... it is appropriate to direct the Minister to re-examine the visa application within one month of notification of the present order”. 34. According to the applicant, on 19 November 2010 UNHCR/Cameroon’s lawyer forwarded to him, and to the French authorities, the original copy of a judgment delivered by the Yaoundé tribunal de grande instance on 3 June 2010, reconstituting the birth certificate for the child Michelle. That judgment indicates that, on the day following Michelle’s birth, a declaration of birth had been duly drawn up by the doctor at the Yaoundé Cité Verte Hospital and handed to her mother, for the purpose of having the child’s birth certificate issued by the Yaoundé IV district office. However, as the applicant’s wife had been unaware of the rules in force in Cameroon for this administrative procedure, she had entrusted this declaration of birth to a third party, who had demanded and obtained from her the sum of 20,000 Central African francs (CFA) in order to obtain the birth certificate; this third party had given her a document presented as birth certificate no. 1271/2001, allegedly drawn up and signed by the mayor of Yaoundé IV. The tribunal de grande instance specified that since this document was a forgery Michelle’s birth certificate had never been issued, and it ordered that this step be taken. 35. By a letter of 17 January 2011, the Government informed the Court that on 8 December 2010 the French consular authorities had issued the long-stay visas requested by the applicant’s wife and children. They alleged that, during the period in which the visa applications were re-examined, the applicant had communicated to the consular authorities the judgment of 3 June 2010 to which he had referred but had not produced in the course of the proceedings.
 
... THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
50. The applicant alleged that the consular authorities’ prolonged refusal to issue the visas to this wife and his children had infringed his right to respect for his private life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Admissibility
51. The Government requested that the case be “struck out”, as the applicants could no longer claim to be “victims” of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, given that they had obtained the visas. They explained that the French authorities had agreed in principle to family reunification (see paragraph 9 above) and that it was only the discovery of the irregularities in the civil-status documents submitted in support of the visa applications which had delayed the issue of these visas. They had been issued as soon as the Yaoundé tribunal de grande instance’s judgment of 3 June 2010 had been brought to the authorities’ attention. Examination of a possible violation of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention had thus ended at the stage of evidence of the documents’ authenticity; verification of the genuine nature of the applicant’s filiation had been essential standard practice, was in accordance with the legislation and could not be contrary to the stipulations of Article 8. 52. The applicant contested the Government’s submissions, arguing that they had neither recognised nor afforded redress for the alleged violation of the Convention. In this connection, he argued that the order in his favour issued by the urgent-applications judge on 28 October 2010 (see paragraph 33 above) had not been taken on the basis of a violation of fundamental rights, but on the grounds of a failure to communicate the reasons for the Appeal Boards’ refusal. The applicant considered that the Government had grasped the pretext provided by UNHCR/Cameroon’s communication of the judgment of 3 June 2010 to find a solution to the dispute, in breach of Article 11 of the European Directive 2003/86/EC ... He emphasised that there had been no need for an interminable administrative procedure that went against the evidence in the documents provided by UNHCR/Cameroon. The applicant added that his daughter Vanessa had been raped in Cameroon during this lengthy period; following an unwanted pregnancy, she had given birth, aged fifteen, in December 2010, two weeks after arriving in France. The reason for her being granted refugee status had been precisely because she was at risk of being raped or assassinated; in the applicant’s opinion, it was the incompetence of the French authorities which had led to this tragedy. 53. The Court considers it appropriate to examine the Government’s request as a plea of inadmissibility, based on the applicant’s loss of “victim” status within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. 54. It is the settled case-law of the Court that the word “victim” in the context of Article 34 of the Convention denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission in issue. The existence of a violation of the Convention is conceivable even in the absence of prejudice; prejudice is relevant only in the context of Article 41. Consequently, a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08, § 128, ECHR 2012). 55. In the instant case, the Court notes that the applicant’s family had been able to join him once the visas had been issued. However, this measure was taken in December 2010 – in other words, three and a half years after his request for family reunification, and well after the applicant had sought a ruling from the domestic courts on the alleged violation of the Convention. The French authorities had not explicitly recognised, either in the domestic proceedings or before the Court, that there had been a violation of the applicant’s Convention rights during that period. Moreover, the decision to issue the visas was not followed by redress for the purposes of the Court’s case-law, cited above. Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicant can still claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. 56. Nonetheless, the Court notes that the Government have requested it to strike out the application.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 8
Outcome: violation