FIRST SECTION
CASE OF CAUCHI v. MALTA
(Application no. 14013/19)
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 1 P1 • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Disproportionate burden on applicant due to inadequate rent imposed by law • Insufficient domestic redress
Art 13 (+ Art 1 P1) • Effective remedy • Aggregate remedies ineffective in the present case

 
STRASBOURG
25 March 2021
 
FINAL
 
25/06/2021
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Cauchi v. Malta,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Ksenija Turković, President,
 Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
 Alena Poláčková,
 Péter Paczolay,
 Raffaele Sabato,
 Lorraine Schembri Orland, judges,
 and Renata Degener, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 14013/19) against the Republic of Malta lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Maltese national, Ms Catherine Cauchi (“the applicant”), on 11 March 2019;
the decision to give notice to the Maltese Government (“the Government”) of the application;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 16 February 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The present application concerns compensation and redress for a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the disproportionate amount of rent received by the applicant, and therefore the effectiveness in 2018 of the available remedies in this regard, in particular following amendments to the law by Act No. XXVII of 2018. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Valletta. She was represented by Dr M. Camilleri and Dr E. Debono, lawyers practising in Valletta. 3. The Government were represented by their then Agent, Dr V. Buttigieg and later by their Agents Dr C. Soler, State Advocate, and Dr J. Vella, Advocate at the Office of the State Advocate. 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Background to the case
5. The applicant owns a property at 19 Dar il-Bebbux Street in Ħal Għaxaq. 6. On 24 February 1967 she rented the property (under title of temporary emphyteusis) to a third party for seventeen years, at 25 Maltese liras (MTL – approximately 58 euros (EUR)) per year. The third party rented the property under title of sub‑emphyteusis to another third party, who did the same. The sub‑empyhteutae on the date of termination of the emphyteusis, 26 February 1984, were a certain couple A., who used it as their sole ordinary residence and for this purpose undertook substantial works to make the place habitable. The latter had been a condition placed on them to obtain the lease in question, to which they had agreed. Further works continued to be undertaken throughout the years by the tenants, with the applicant’s permission. 7. On an unspecified date couple A. relied on Act XXIII of 1979 amending Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta, the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance, (hereinafter “the Ordinance”) to retain the property under title of lease, at the above-mentioned rent increased in line with inflation but not exceeding double the previous rent, until 26 February 1999. As of 27 February 1999, in accordance with the law, the rent was to increase to MTL 100 (approximately EUR 116) per year. However, couple A. continued to pay MTL 50 per year, as the applicant did not seek to increase the rent. 8. With the introduction of Act X of 2009 couple A. started paying EUR 185 per year, as of 1 January 2010. In accordance with the law, on 1 January 2013 they started paying EUR 197.31 per year until 31 December 2016, and as of 1 January 2017 the rent was increased to EUR 200 per year. 9. During the tenancy the couple did not own any other property. Mr A. was on a low wage and was, for some time, unemployed. He is today retired and receives a pension of EUR 515 a month. Constitutional redress proceedings
10. In 2017 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings claiming that the provisions of the Ordinance as amended by Act XXIII of 1979 – which granted tenants the right to retain possession of the premises under a lease – imposed on her as owner a unilateral lease relationship for an indefinite period without enabling her to obtain a fair and adequate rent, in breach of, inter alia, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. She asked the court to award her compensation for the damage suffered since 1984 and order the eviction of the tenants. She argued that prior to 1979 she had had no other option than to rent the property under title of temporary emphyteusis, in order to avoid it being requisitioned, as had been common at the time. 11. According to the Government’s expert, at the time the relevant report was drawn up (2017), the property in its refurbished state (the water, electricity and drainage having been updated by the tenants) was valued at EUR 174,000. Bearing in mind that unfurnished property, which was extensively refurbished by tenants, bore a rental value of no more than 2.75% of its sale value, he estimated its rental value at EUR 398.75 per month (EUR 4,785 per annum). 12. According to the court-appointed expert, who considered the property refurbished, including the additional rooms added by the tenants, the sale value in 2017 was EUR 165,000. Considering a rental value at a rate of 3.5% of its sale value, he estimated the annual rental value as being EUR 701 in 1984, EUR 965 in 1989, EUR 1,328 in 1994, EUR 1,828 in 1999, EUR 2,516 in 2004, EUR 3,463 in 2009, EUR 4,767 in 2014 and EUR 5,775 in 2017. 13. By a judgment of 31 October 2018 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, found a violation of the applicant’s property rights, awarded her EUR 20,000 in compensation and declared that the tenants (or their descendants) could no longer rely on the law in question to retain title to the property. 14. In particular, the court was satisfied that the applicant had proved her title to the property and that Article 12 of the Ordinance applied in her case. It also considered that the fact that she had not raised the rent during a certain period did not prejudice her right to bring her claims before the court. 15. On the merits, the court disagreed with the applicant’s argument that it would be impossible to ever recover her property. However, it considered that the tenants had been occupying the property for thirty-four years; that the lease had not been entered into voluntarily, but had been imposed by Article 12 of the Ordinance, and that the difference between the market rental value and the rent received by the applicant, despite the various increases, remained “enormous if not shocking”. It was clear that the rent applicable by law was not compatible with the reality of current Maltese society or the applicable rents on the free open market. It followed that the applicant was not receiving fair and adequate compensation in exchange for the burden imposed by law. While the legislator had a right to address social issues and protect a category of citizens such as tenants, it could not disproportionally prejudice another group of citizens (owners). It was thus for the State to assume responsibility for the imbalance created between the two interests at stake. Moreover, the law at issue did not provide any procedural safeguards. 16. The court refused to order the eviction of the tenant, considering that it was not the appropriate court to take such action. In particular, it considered that, given that the interference had been lawful and that there had been a legitimate aim, to order eviction without taking into consideration other factors would shift the balance in favour of the applicant. It therefore sufficed to order that the tenants be prevented from relying on the relevant law, namely Article 12 (2)(b)(i) of the Ordinance, in any future eviction proceedings. 17. For the purposes of compensation, the court considered the huge discrepancy between the rent received and the market value, despite the fact that market value might not be payable in view of the legitimate aim at issue, namely social housing; the uncertainty as to when the applicant would recover her property; on the one hand, the thirty-four years during which such disproportionality persisted and, on the other hand, the fact that she had only instituted proceedings in 2017; and the inertia of the State in amending its legislation – in an effective manner – in order to avoid such a disproportionate burden on owners. It therefore awarded the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. One third of the costs were to be paid by her, given that not all her claims had been upheld. Other information
18. The applicant did not appeal explaining that – as had been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights – the appeal procedure before the Constitutional Court was not an effective remedy since that court systematically reduced the awards given by the first‑instance courts of constitutional competence. 19. Despite the order of the first-instance court that the tenants could no longer rely on the relevant law, the applicant was unable to institute eviction proceedings due to the enactment of Act No. XXVII of 2018, which provided that even with a judgment in his or her favour, it would not be lawful for the owner to proceed to request the eviction of the occupier without first availing him or herself of the new procedure provided by that law (see paragraph 22 below). 20. In 2019 the applicant filed a case with the Rent Regulation Board (hereinafter “the RRB”) in accordance with Article 12B of the Ordinance (as amended in 2018), requesting that the RRB increase the rent in accordance with that law. The proceedings were still pending in May 2020 and the Court has not been informed that they have been concluded. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
21. The relevant domestic law is set out in Amato Gauci v. Malta (no. 47045/06, § 19-22, 15 September 2009). 22. Article 12B of the Ordinance, which was introduced by Act No. XXVII of 2018 published on 10 July 2018 and entered into force on 1 August 2018, reads as follows:
“(1) Where a person is in occupation of a dwelling house under title of lease created by virtue of a previous title of emphyteusis or sub-emphyteusis which commenced before the 1st June 1995 through the application of article[s] 5, 12, or 12A the following conditions shall, insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the said articles of this Ordinance apply in respect of such lease as from, the 10th April 2018 notwithstanding the provisions of the said articles of the Ordinance or of any other law. (2) The owner shall be entitled to file an application before the Rent Regulation Board demanding that the rent be revised to an amount not exceeding two percent per annum of the open market freehold value of the dwelling house on the 1st January of the year during which the application is filed and that new conditions be established in respect of the lease. (3) The procedure applicable to the hearing of applications before the Rent Regulation Board shall apply to the hearing of an application made under sub-article (1):
Provided that:
(i) the Housing Authority shall be notified with the application and shall have a right to fully participate as amicus curiae in the proceedings; and
(ii) the tenant and the landlord shall always be entitled to the benefit of legal aid in proceedings filed in terms of this article if they are not in full-time gainful employment; and
(iii) at the initial stage of the proceedings the Board shall conduct a means test of the tenant which shall be based on the means test provided for in the Continuation of Tenancies (Means Testing Criteria) Regulations issued under articles 1531F and 1622A of the Civil Code or any regulations from time to time replacing them. The means test shall be based on the income of the tenant between the 1st January and the 31st December of the year preceding the year when the proceedings are commenced and the capital of the tenant on the 31st December of the said year. The means test shall be conducted with particular reference, inter alia, to regulations 4 to 8 of the said regulations which shall apply mutatis mutandis. (4) Where the tenant does not meet the income and capital criteria of the means test the Board shall, after hearing any evidence and submissions produced by the parties, give judgement allowing the tenant a period of five years to vacate the premises. The compensation for occupation of the premises payable to the owner during the said period shall amount to double the rent which would have been payable in terms of articles 5, 12 or 12A. (5) Where the tenant meets the income and capital criteria of the means test the Board shall proceed according to the following sub-articles. (6) In establishing the amount of rent payable in accordance with sub-article (1) the Board shall give due account to the means and age of the tenant and to any disproportionate burden particular to the landlord and it may determine that any increase in rent shall be gradual. The Board, after briefly hearing the parties and examining any evidence which it considers relevant, may also order that an increased amount of rent be paid whilst the hearing of an application filed in terms of sub‑article (1) is pending. (7) Where an amount of rent is established in terms of sub-article (1) that rent shall apply in respect of the lease of the dwelling house, unless the lease is previously terminated, for a period of six years, after which it shall be subject to being revised in accordance with sub-article (1) unless an agreement is reached between the parties. (8) (a) Upon the happening of a material change in circumstances during the continuance of a lease established in accordance with article 5, 12 or 12A the owner shall be entitled to file an application before the Board demanding that the conditions of the lease be revised on account of their causing a disproportionate burden upon him. (b) The owner may also demand the dissolution of the lease if he can prove through unequivocal evidence that the tenant is not a person in need of the social protection provided by articles 5, 12 or 12A and by this article:
Provided that:
(i) the provisions of paragraph (a) of this sub-article shall not apply where the hearing of an application under sub-article (1) is pending or has been determined for less than three years;
(ii) the tenant shall always be deemed to be a person not in need of the social protection provided by articles 5, 12, 12A and by this article if the Housing Authority or the landlord offer alternative accommodation suitable to the tenant and guarantees the availability of such accommodation to the tenant for at least ten years for a rent which is not in excess of that which would have been payable by the tenant had the tenant continued the lease under articles 5, 12 or 12A. (9) (a) Any person who has a right to be recognised as a tenant in terms of the proviso to the definition "tenant" in article 2 shall, unless the said is a person referred to in paragraph (a) of the said definition, only acquire a right to occupy the dwelling house for a period of five years upon the expiration of which he shall vacate the said dwelling house. The compensation for occupation of the dwelling house payable to the owner during the said period shall, unless the occupier meets the income and capital criteria of the means test referred to in paragraph (iii) of sub-article (3), amount to double the rent which would have been payable in terms of articles 5, 12 or 12A. (b) Any dispute as to whether the occupier meets the criteria of the means test may be referred by either party to the Board by application and the provisions of sub‑article (3) shall apply. (10) The provisions of article 1555A of the Civil Code shall apply in respect of any lease which came into effect by virtue of articles 5, 12, 12A or this article. (11) The provisions of this article shall also apply in all cases where any emphyteusis, sub-emphyteusis or tenancy in respect of a dwelling house regulated under articles 5, 12, or 12A has lapsed due to a court judgment based on the lack of proportionality between the value of the property and the amount receivable by the landlord and the person who was the emphyteuta or the sub-emphyteuta or the tenant still occupies the house as his ordinary residence on the 10th April 2018. In such cases it shall not be lawful for the owner to proceed to request the eviction of the occupier without first availing himself of the provisions of this article.”
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 of Protocol no. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
23. The applicant complained that she was still a victim of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 acknowledged by the domestic court, given the low amount of compensation awarded and the fact that there had been no order to evict the tenants. That provision reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
AdmissibilityVictim Status

(a)   The parties’ submissions
24. The Government submitted that the applicant had lost her victim status as the domestic court had expressly acknowledged the violation and awarded appropriate redress, namely compensation of EUR 20,000. According to the Government, this sum had been sufficient given that the tenants had added a number of rooms to the property and undertaken structural alterations at their own expense. All this had gone to the applicant’s benefit. 25. The applicant submitted that the remedy given to her had not remedied the breach of her rights, which remained ongoing. In particular, the court had not ordered the eviction of the tenants. Whilst it had declared that they were prevented from relying on the relevant law in any future eviction proceedings to be instituted, that order had been meaningless due to the introduction of Act No. XXVII of 2018. The latter provided that even after obtaining a favourable judgment, it would not be lawful for an owner to proceed to request the eviction of an occupier without first availing him or herself of the new procedure provided by that law. Furthermore, the compensation awarded had been too low in relation to the amount of rental income lost by her. She referred to the estimates of the court-appointed expert (see paragraph 12 above). (b)   The Court’s assessment
26. The Court reiterates its general principles concerning victim status as set out in Apap Bologna v. Malta (no. 46931/12, §§ 41 and 43, 30 August 2016). 27. In the present case, the Court notes that there has been an acknowledgment of a violation by the domestic courts. As to whether appropriate and sufficient redress was granted, the Court considers that even though the market value is not applicable and the rent valuations may be decreased due to the legitimate aim at issue, a global award of EUR 20,000 covering pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, for a property with a rental value of between EUR 2,000 and 6,000 per year, in the last twenty years, appears a priori insufficient for a violation persisting for over thirty years. 28. While it is true that the property was substantially refurbished by the tenants, the Court observes firstly that this was a condition of the lease which they accepted at the time they took over the sublease (see paragraph 6, in fine, above). Secondly, the applicant did not ask for the increase in rent allowed by law in 1999 (see paragraph 7 above). Thus, for a decade the tenants paid half the rent due by law. While this “deduction” remained a humble amount, it offset some of the expenses incurred by the tenants. Furthermore, the Court notes that, unlike the estimate of the court-appointed architect, the estimate of the Government’s architect did take account of the fact that the renovation works had been undertaken by the tenants and not the owner. Despite their different considerations, the estimates are not very dissimilar – EUR 5,775 and 4,785 annually in 2017. Thus, even on the basis of the estimates of the Government’s own architect, the sum awarded remains insufficient. 29. That would be enough to find that the redress provided by the domestic court in the present case did not offer sufficient relief to the applicant, who thus retains victim status for the purposes of this complaint (see, mutatis mutandis, Portanier v. Malta, no. 55747/16, § 24, 27 August 2019). 30. However, the Court also notes that the domestic court failed to bring the violation to an end. In particular, it failed to order the eviction of the tenants or alternatively award a higher future rent. While it ordered that the tenant could no longer rely on Article 12 (2)(b)(i) of the Ordinance (see paragraph 16 above), the Court cannot ignore that at the time of judgment, namely October 2018, the amendments to the Ordinance had already been promulgated and entered into force. 31. The latter, in particular the new Article 12B (11) of the Ordinance, provided that it would not be lawful for the owner to proceed to request the eviction of the occupier without first availing him or herself of the provisions of that Article. As a result, the applicant is obliged to undertake a new procedure before proceeding to evict the tenant. In this connection, the Court has previously expressed its reservations about the fact that the constitutional jurisdictions, whose role is to bring a violation to an end and redress the violation found, abdicate the responsibility assigned to them by the Constitution of Malta and refer applicants to yet another remedy despite having the power and authority to grant such redress (ibid., § 50). Moreover, the Court observes that the new Article 12B (4) provides that even where the tenant does not meet the means test he or she would have five years to vacate the premises, during which time the rent would amount to only double the – often miserly – rent which would have been payable under the Ordinance (see paragraph 16 above). Thus, such a procedure allows for the violation of an individual’s property rights to continue for another five years despite the absence of any legitimate aim behind the interference, the tenant not having fulfilled the criteria making him or her eligible to benefit from such social housing measures. It follows that the declaration of the domestic court in the present case cannot be considered to have had any effect in bringing the violation to an end, so much so that more than two years after the domestic court’s judgment, the applicant continues to suffer the same violation of her property rights. 32. In consequence, the applicant still retains victim status for the purposes of this complaint and the Government’s objection is dismissed. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
(a)   The parties’ submissions
(i)      The Government
33. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as she had failed to appeal to the Constitutional Court, which in their view was an effective remedy. In this connection, they considered that when reducing compensation awarded by the first-instance courts, the Constitutional Court did so on the basis of its considerations, and not systematically. They noted that, in the absence of an appeal by the State, the Constitutional Court could not decrease compensation, so in the present case, if the applicant had appealed, it could not have decreased the compensation unless the State had filed a cross-appeal. 34. Moreover, the Government relied on three examples where the Constitutional Court had increased such compensation, namely Angela sive Gina Balzan vs the Honourable Prime Minister of 31 January 2018 (from EUR 15,000 to 20,000), Azzopardi Josephine proprio et nominee vs the Honourable Prime Minister (93/2014) of 31 January 2019 (from EUR 5,000 to 20,000) and Azzopardi Josephine proprio et nominee vs the Honourable Prime Minister (6/2015) of 29 November 2019 (from EUR 20,000 to 38,000). 35. They also submitted that the Constitutional Court had abandoned its practice of reducing compensation on the basis that applicants had delayed initiating proceedings. Indeed, it had started to follow the Court’s findings in relation to that issue, as set out in Montanaro Gauci and Others v. Malta (no. 31454/12, § 45, 30 August 2016), as it had done, for example, in Ian Peter Ellis pro et noe vs Major Alfred Cassar Reynaud et of 27 January 2017. It therefore could not be said with certainty that there had been no prospects of success, and by failing to appeal the applicant had denied the domestic courts the opportunity of developing their case-law. The Government considered that if the Court rejected their objection, it would be usurping the Constitutional Court’s role of protecting human rights, turning itself into a first-instance court. 36. Lastly, the Government questioned whether the applicant had deliberately decided not to appeal, or whether she had failed to appeal in time and was thus attempting a remedy before the Court. Nevertheless, in their submission on the merits of the complaint under Article 13, they considered that she had deliberately not appealed. (ii)    The applicant
37. The applicant submitted that she had known that an appeal to the Constitutional Court to increase the compensation would fail and that she had thus resorted to the Court to right a wrong which the Constitutional Court had systematically denied most applicants in the context of a challenge to rent laws such as Article 12 of the Ordinance. She submitted that, even after the case of Amato Gauci v. Malta (no. 47045/06, 15 September 2009) the Constitutional Court had continued to reject such claims, for one reason or another. She cited, for example, a series of Constitutional Court judgments overturned by the Court (see Emanuel Said Ltd vs Carmel Zammit and Doris Attard Cassar et of 5 July 2011 (25/2008/1); Franco Buttigieg et vs the Attorney General of 6 February 2015 (70/2012 JA)); and Anthony Aquilina vs the Attorney General et al of 13 April 2018). 38. Alternatively, when such claims had been upheld, the compensation awarded by the first-instance constitutional jurisdiction had been systematically reduced by the Constitutional Court. The applicant relied on the case of Dr Cedric Mifsud and Dr Michael Camilleri (as special mandatories) vs the Attorney General and Andrè Azzopardi of 25 October 2013, where the Constitutional Court had reduced the compensation from EUR 30,000 to 15,000 on appeal on the basis that the applicants had taken too long to initiate proceedings; and Maria Ludgarda Borg et vs Rosario Mifsud et of 29 April 2016, with similar circumstances. In this connection, the applicant submitted that before the case of Amato Gauci (cited above), the Constitutional Court would not find a breach of human rights in such situations. Therefore, any action in the Maltese courts before 2010 would have failed. Owners thus could not have been blamed for initiating proceedings at that time. 39. The applicant further relied on the above-mentioned case of Ian Peter Ellis pro et noe, where the Constitutional Court had reduced the award to EUR 15,000 from 50,000; Alessandra Radmilli vs Joseph Ellul et of 14 December 2018, where it had reduced the compensation from EUR 31,000 to 25,000; and Maria Stella sive Estelle and John Azzopardi Vella vs the Attorney General, decided on 30 September 2016, where it had reduced the compensation from EUR 20,000 to 5,000. 40. The applicant also considered that while the Constitutional Court could evict tenants, it had refused to do so, thus failing to rectify the breach. She relied on Portanier (cited above) and gave, as an example, the case of Maria Pia sive Maria Galea vs the Attorney General et of 14 December 2018, where the Constitutional Court had confirmed the amount of compensation of EUR 10,000 but overturned the order for the eviction of the tenants. 41. Furthermore, while the Constitutional Court had recently taken the approach of ordering that tenants could no longer rely on Article 12 of the Ordinance to retain title to property (see Portanier, cited above, § 49), the applicant noted that that approach had become inconsistent following the amendments to the Ordinance in 2018 (by Act XXVII of 2018), it having been applied to some cases but not to others. In Chemimart Ltd vs the Attorney General, also of 14 December 2018, the Constitutional Court had confirmed the amount of compensation of EUR 5,000 and the order that the tenants could not rely on the provisions of the Ordinance to continue to reside in the property, knowing that in the meantime amendments had been introduced giving rise to a contradiction. 42. Worse still, in the case of Brian Psaila vs Attorney General et al, decided by the Constitutional Court on 27 March 2020, the latter had upheld the part of the judgment of the first-instance court stating that the tenants could not rely on Article 12 of the Ordinance to continue residing in the property, considering however that they could have title under the new Article 12B of the Ordinance. In the applicant’s view, this was contradictory because title under Article 12B was dependent on title acquired under the principal Article 12 of the Ordinance. Be that as it may, the situation as it stood was one where the Constitutional Court would find that the law in question did not apply between the parties, but would not order eviction. It opted instead to open the door for applicants to initiate eviction proceedings – at least on paper – knowing, however, that in practice and in law such an eviction could not be successful because the RRB would reject the claim in line with the newly enacted Article 12B (11) of the Ordinance, which did not allow for such action. 43. As to the cases relied on the by the Government (see paragraph 34 above), the applicant noted that in the Balzan case the Constitutional Court had increased the compensation because it had wanted to keep the amount of compensation awarded in line with other cases. As to the two other cases – only two of fifteen cases lodged by the same person and concerning the same legal provision – the Constitutional Court had increased the damages in one case because the first-instance court had only awarded compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage (known in domestic law as moral damage), and in the second case because of the value of the property. However, in another of the cases lodged by the same person, namely Azzopardi Josephine proprio et nominee vs the Honourable Prime Minister (72/2015), the Constitutional Court had decreased the award from EUR 98,000 to 20,000, which had been the standard sum it had been awarding in the cases lodged by Mr. Azzopardi. 44. Lastly, the applicant noted that claimants rarely appealed to the Constitutional Court, and that it was generally the State which appealed. This had brought about a situation in which applicants before the Court were considered to have exhausted domestic remedies if the State had appealed, but other applicants, like the applicant in the present case, risked their application being dismissed if the State had not appealed. The applicant submitted that exhaustion of domestic remedies should not be dependent on the actions of the State. (b)   The Court’s assessment
(i)      General principles
45. The Court reiterates that the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring their case against the State before the Court to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system. Consequently, States are dispensed from answering for their acts before an international body until they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. The rule is based on the assumption – reflected in Article 13 of the Convention, with which it has close affinity – that there is an effective remedy available to deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and grant appropriate relief (see, for example, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 152, ECHR 2000-XI). 46. It should be emphasised that the Court is not a court of first instance; it does not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function as an international court, to adjudicate on large numbers of cases which require the finding of basic facts or the calculation of monetary compensation ‑ both of which should, as a matter of principle and effective practice, be the domain of domestic jurisdictions (see Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04 and 21819/04, § 69, ECHR 2010). 47. The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑IV). 48. To be effective, a remedy must be capable of remedying directly the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Balogh v. Hungary, no. 47940/99, § 30, 20 July 2004, and Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 46, ECHR 2006‑II). However, the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust that avenue of redress (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 71; Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 70, 17 September 2009; and Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, § 53, 25 March 2014). 49. According to the “generally recognised rules of international law”, there may be special circumstances which absolve the applicant from the obligation to exhaust the domestic remedies at his or her disposal. The rule is also inapplicable where an administrative practice consisting of a repetition of acts incompatible with the Convention and official tolerance by the State authorities has been shown to exist, and is of such a nature as to make proceedings futile or ineffective (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 67). 50. As regards the burden of proof, it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time. Once this burden has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted, or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 68; Demopoulos and Others, cited above, § 69; and McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 107, 10 September 2010). (ii)    Application of the above principles to the present case
51. The Court observes that the applicant did not come to the Court to ask it to be a first-instance court, and that she lodged her application following a first-instance decision of the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. The latter examined the merits of her complaint and acknowledged a violation of her property rights. Dissatisfied with the redress awarded to her, she considered that an appeal to the Constitutional Court in this regard had no prospects of success. 52. The Court has no reason to doubt that she intentionally did not appeal. It further notes that it has repeatedly found that constitutional redress proceedings, which are an effective remedy in theory, are not so in practice in cases concerning rent laws presenting similar problems. The first time the Court found a violation of Article 13 in relation to this problem was in Apap Bologna (cited above, § 91) in connection with requisition orders. The same findings have continued to be reiterated in similar cases, in the absence of anything being brought to the Court’s attention which could alter those conclusions (see, more recently, Marshall and Others v. Malta, no. 79177/16, § 79, 11 February 2020, in connection with rent laws under Chapter 69 of the Laws of Malta). 53. The reason behind the violations are twofold. In particular, the Court has taken issue with the approach of the Constitutional Court, which has regularly failed to prevent the continuation of the violation (for example, by evicting tenants or awarding a higher future rent to applicants remaining in the same situation as a result of the laws in place), and secondly, it has repeatedly found that the sums awarded in compensation by the Constitutional Court do not constitute adequate redress. It has specifically found that when eviction has been ordered or a future rent established by the first‑instance court, it would be revoked by the Constitutional Court on appeal (see Portanier, cited above, §§ 47-48). Similarly, an analysis of the cases brought before the Court has also shown that the Constitutional Court has persistently reduced the compensation awarded by the first‑instance courts for no valid reason. This has led to a number of Chamber judgments and a series of repetitive well-established case-law judgments finding a violation of Article 13 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 since applicants remained victims of the violation found (see, recently, Ellis and Scilio v. Malta, no. 165/17, and Testaferrata Bonici and Others v. Malta, no. 41862/18, both Committee judgments of 30 June 2020). 54. The only exception to this long list of cases, and only in part, is a specific group of cases lodged by the same family, where the properties affected by the law in question (in that case Article 12A of the Ordinance) had been vacated by the time of the domestic judgment and the compensation awarded until then was deemed adequate by the Court (see Bartolo Parnis and Others v. Malta, (dec.), nos. 49378/18 and 3 others, §§ 50 and 54, 24 March 2020). However, in relation to the properties still occupied and subject to the same law, notice of the complaints was given to the Government (ibid., §§ 52 and 55). 55. The Court considers that this last case, together with the mere three cases cited by the Government (two of which date from 2019) – despite the hundreds of similar cases being decided domestically and the number of violations already found by the Court in this regard – do not suffice to dispel its concerns about the prospects of success of such an appeal at the relevant time. Bearing in mind the above and the Court’s case-law on the matter, it considers that at the end of 2018, following the first-instance judgment in the applicant’s case, an appeal to the Constitutional Court could not be considered an effective remedy, and that it was therefore not unreasonable for her to come directly to the Court. 56. It follows that the Government’s objection is dismissed. Conclusion
57. The Court notes that the complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 1
Outcome: violation