FIRST SECTION
CASE OF SŁAWIŃSKI v. POLAND
(Application no. 61039/16)
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
STRASBOURG
15 April 2021
 
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Sławiński v. Poland,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
 Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President,
 Erik Wennerström,
 Ioannis Ktistakis, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 61039/16) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Mariusz Grzegorz Sławiński (“the applicant”), on 11 October 2016;
the decision to give notice to the Polish Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings and right to an effective remedy;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 16 March 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant and lack of an effective remedy to complain thereof. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Gniewkowo. 3. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska and subsequently by Mr J. Sobczak, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Criminal proceedings
5. In 2001 the Toruń District Prosecutor started an investigation into allegedly fraudulent activity of the applicant’s company dealing with vindication of debts. The applicant and his business partner allegedly failed to transmit to a bank several hundreds of monthly instalment payments which they had received from individuals who had contracted consumption loans. On 26 February 2002 the applicant was charged with fraud and the prosecutor decided to place him under police supervision. 6. On 24 June 2002 the applicant and one co-accused were indicted before the Toruń District Court. 7. The trial court held the first hearing on 4 December 2003. Afterwards, the court held hearings at regular intervals; in total about 100 hearings took place. By 7 March 2006 the Toruń District Court had heard over 300 witnesses listed in the bill of indictment. 8. On 30 October 2013 the Toruń District Court gave judgment. The applicant was found guilty of having defrauded payments he had received from over 300 persons. He was sentenced to one year and eight months’ imprisonment, suspended on probation, and a fine. The applicant was served with the written reasons for the judgment on 23 April 2013; on 7 May 2013 he lodged an appeal. 9. On 23 October 2014 the Toruń Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case. 10. Between 9 April and 16 June 2015 the trial court held four hearings. On 22 June 2015 the Toruń District Court gave judgment in which it acquitted the applicant of some charges and convicted him of fraud in a more limited scope. The applicant was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, suspended on probation, and a fine. The applicant appealed. 11. On 17 March 2016 the Toruń Regional Court gave judgment. It quashed the Toruń District Court’s judgment in the part concerning the applicant’s conviction, and discontinued the proceedings as the offences for which he had been convicted had become time-barred. The court gave the judgment at a hearing and the applicant and his lawyer were present. According to the minutes of the hearing the court informed the parties that the written reasons for the judgment would be prepared within fourteen days. The presiding judge set out the main grounds for the ruling orally. The parties were informed that the judgment was final and about the conditions for lodging a cassation appeal. 12. On 12 April 2016 the applicant was served with the written grounds for the judgment of the Toruń Regional Court, containing a detailed summary of the facts of the case as established by the court and the court’s reasoning as to the law. Proceedings under the 2004 Act
13. On 6 July 2015 the applicant lodged a complaint under the Law of 17 June 2004 about the breach of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor and in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki - “the 2004 Act”). 14. On 20 August 2015 the Toruń Regional Court partly allowed his complaint and considered that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. It awarded the applicant 2,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation (approximately 475 euros (EUR) at the material time). The court noted that the first hearing had been scheduled almost eighteen months after the bill of indictment had been lodged with the trial court. Afterwards, the court held many hearings but all meaningful evidence had been gathered by 7 March 2006. Thus during the following seven and a half years the court had only heard four witnesses and had requested some evidence from a bank. That had amounted to a flagrant lack of procedural efficiency. The trial court should also have been more active in securing the attendance of the applicant and his lawyer at the hearings as they had contributed to some delays. Moreover, it had taken the trial court an excessively long period of time to prepare the written reasons for the judgment of 30 October 2013. The Toruń Regional Court examined further stages of the proceedings after the case had been remitted for reconsideration and considered that there had been no more delays attributable to the courts. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
15. A detailed description of the relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for excessive length of judicial proceedings – in particular the applicable provisions of the 2004 Act – are presented in the Court’s decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland ((dec.), no. 15212/03, §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V), and Ratajczyk v. Poland ((dec.), no. 11215/02, ECHR 2005-VIII), and in its judgments in the cases of Krasuski v. Poland (no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V) and, most recently, Rutkowski and Others v. Poland (nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, §§ 75-107, 7 July 2015). 16. Article 457 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings provides that, when the second-instance court quashes the judgment and discontinues the case, the written reasons for the judgment shall be prepared automatically. The party shall nevertheless apply to be served with the reasoned judgment. THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
17. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
18. The Government contested that argument. 19. The period to be taken into consideration began on 26 February 2002 and ended on 17 March 2016 (see paragraphs 5 and 11 above). It thus lasted fourteen years and one month at two levels of jurisdiction. Admissibility
20. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to submit his case to the Court within the six-month time-limit provided for by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant and his lawyer had been present at the hearing of 17 March 2016 at which the court had delivered the final judgment. The applicant was not entitled to be served with the written grounds for the judgment automatically; he had to make a request to that effect. 21. The applicant in general stated that his case was admissible and that there had been a violation of the Convention. 22. The purpose of the six-month rule is to promote legal certainty and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable period of time. Furthermore, it is also meant to protect the authorities and other parties concerned from being left in a state of uncertainty for a prolonged period of time (see Sabri Güne v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, § 39, 29 June 2012). 23. The Court has held in the past that where an applicant is entitled to be served automatically with the written final domestic decision the object and purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention are best served by counting the six-month period as running from the date of service of the written judgment (see Worm v. Austria, judgment of 29 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑V, p. 1547, § 33, and Sernawit and Others v. Poland, no. 61967/00, § 39, 6 November 2007). Where the domestic law does not provide for service, the Court considered it appropriate to take the date on which the decision was finalised as the starting-point, that being when the parties were definitely able to find out its content (see Papachelas v. Greece [GC], no. 31423/96, § 30, ECHR 1999-II, and Jakelaitis v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 17414/05, 16 December 2008). 24. In the present case the court gave its final ruling on 17 March 2016 and informed the parties that it would prepare written reasons for the judgment within fourteen days (see paragraphs 11 and 16 above). Even accepting the Government’s submission that the applicant was not entitled to be served the written judgment automatically, he must have promptly requested the service. The applicant was served the final judgment with written reasons on 12 April 2016 (see paragraph 12 above). 25. The Court notes that the written grounds for the judgment contained a detailed summary of the facts of the case as established by the court and the court’s reasoning as to the law (see paragraph 12 above). Consequently, the applicant was able to find out the full content of the judgment given in his case only after having received its reasoning in writing (see Piętka v. Poland, no. 34216/07, § 45, 16 October 2012). In view of the above and in the particular circumstances of the case the Court considers that the six‑month period started to run on the date when the applicant was served with the written grounds of the judgment (see Pastuszenia v. Poland, no. 46074/07, § 34, 21 September 2010). 26. The applicant submitted his application to the Court on 11 October 2016, less than six months after the final decision in the case had been served on him. 27. It follows that the application cannot be declared inadmissible for failure to comply with the six-month term within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and the Government’s objection should be dismissed. 28. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 13
Outcome: violation