THIRD SECTION
CASE OF VEGOTEX INTERNATIONAL S.A. v. BELGIUM
(Application no. 49812/09)
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Fair trial • Tax debt time-barred by retrospective effect of case-law but subsequently reinstated by retrospective but foreseeable legislation, while dispute still pending and with aim of ensuring legal certainty • Compelling grounds of general interest
Art 6 § 1 • Adversarial proceedings • Dismissal of appeal on new grounds, substituted of court’s own motion • Sufficient opportunity to challenge the substitution of grounds
Art 6 § 1 • Reasonable time • Excessive length of tax proceedings

 
STRASBOURG
10 November 2020
 
THIS CASE WAS REFERRED TO THE GRAND CHAMBER WHICH DELIVERED JUDGMENT IN THE CASE ON 03/11/2022
 
This judgment may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Georgios A. Serghides, President,
 Paul Lemmens,
 Helen Keller,
 Georges Ravarani,
 María Elósegui,
 Darian Pavli,
 Peeter Roosma, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 49812/09) against the Kingdom of Belgium lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Belgian public limited company, Vegotex International S.A. (“the applicant company”), on 10 September 2009;
the parties’ observations;
Noting that on 14 May 2018 the Government were given notice of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court;
Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2020,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The application concerns proceedings for the recovery of taxes and of a surcharge which the applicant company had been ordered to pay. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant company complained of the decisive intervention by the legislature during the proceedings, in breach of the principle of legal certainty. It alleged a breach of its right of access to a court and a breach of the adversarial principle on account of the fact that the Court of Cassation had substituted its own grounds for those of the contested judgment. It also complained of a failure to comply with the reasonable-time requirement. THE FACTS
2. The applicant is a Belgian public limited company with its registered office in Antwerp. It was represented by Mr P. Wouters and Mr D. Van Belle, lawyers practising in Leuven and Antwerp respectively. 3. The Belgian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms I. Niedlispacher, of the Federal Justice Department. THE administrative PHASE
4. On 5 October 1995 the tax authorities informed the applicant company that they intended to rectify its tax return for the 1993 fiscal year, on the grounds that the deduction of certain expenses relating to a stock‑exchange transaction by the applicant company had not been allowed because the expenditure in question did not satisfy the criteria laid down in the Income Tax Code. The deduction of investment costs could not be allowed either. The applicant company was informed that it would be required to pay a surcharge of 50% as it had attempted to evade payment of the tax. 5. On 2 November 1995 the applicant company expressed its disagreement. 6. On 11 December 1995 the tax office assessed the corporation tax payable by the applicant company at 12,054,089 Belgian francs (BEF) (approximately 298,813 euros (EUR)), to which a 50% surcharge of BEF 6,027,045 (approximately EUR 149,405) was added. A notice of assessment was issued to the applicant company on 15 December 1995. 7. On 22 February 1996 the applicant company lodged an objection with the Antwerp regional director of direct taxation against the tax assessment and the surcharge, giving reasons. 8. On 19 September 2000 the objection was rejected by the regional director. 9. On 24 October 2000 the tax authorities served the applicant company with a payment order interrupting the limitation period (commandement de payer interruptif de prescription/verjaringsstuitend bevel tot betaling; see paragraph 30 below). The document stated specifically that it was not aimed at enforcing payment of the tax debt, as the latter had been disputed by the applicant company. THE JUDICIAL PHASE
10. On 14 December 2000 the applicant company brought proceedings in the Antwerp Court of First Instance seeking, in particular, the setting‑aside of the tax surcharge imposed on it for the 1993 fiscal year. 11. On 8 March 2004 the Court of First Instance declared the application admissible and, to a very limited extent, well-founded. The surcharge was reduced to 10% in so far as it related to the deduction of investment costs. The remainder of the application was dismissed. 12. On 15 April 2004 the applicant company appealed. It sought, in particular, a finding that the State’s entitlement to recover the tax for the 1993 fiscal year was time-barred. In that connection it argued that the debt had become time-barred five years after the date on which it became due. In the applicant company’s view, the five-year period had started to run on 15 February 1996, two months after the notice of assessment of 15 December 1995 had been sent. As the period had not been interrupted the debt had become time-barred on 15 February 2001. The applicant company referred to the case-law of the Court of Cassation, according to which service of a payment order in respect of a disputed tax debt did not interrupt the limitation period (see paragraph 31 below). 13. The Miscellaneous Provisions Act (loi-programme) of 9 July 2004 entered into force on 25 July 2004 (see paragraph 36 below). 14. On 6 February 2007 the Antwerp Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment. It held that the payment order interrupting the limitation period issued on 24 October 2000 had not stopped the running of that period, as it did not constitute an “order” (commandement/bevel tot betaling) within the meaning of Article 2244 of the Civil Code. Its service had not been based on any authority to execute, since the notice of assessment issued on 11 December 1995 had been contested by the applicant. As the payment order was not an “order” (commandement/dwangbevel) within the meaning of section 49 of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 9 July 2004, that provision was not relevant in the present case. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal considered that the limitation period had been suspended under Article 2251 of the Civil Code pending a final decision on the disputed tax debt, and that recovery of the debt was therefore not time-barred. Ruling on the merits, it dismissed all the complaints in respect of the impugned judgment. 15. On 22 August 2007 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law. It relied on a single ground of appeal, relating to the Court of Appeal’s finding that the limitation period had been suspended under Article 2251 of the Civil Code. 16. On 19 November 2007 the State likewise appealed on points of law, relying on a single ground of appeal concerning the Court of Appeal’s finding that the limitation period had not been interrupted under section 49 of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 9 July 2004. 17. On 17 October 2008 the advocate-general at the Court of Cassation made written submissions. He concluded that the ground of appeal relied on by the applicant company was inadmissible for lack of interest, since the impugned decision would at all events continue to be justified in law if the Court of Cassation substituted for the grounds of the impugned judgment a new ground to the effect that the limitation period, in accordance with section 49 of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 9 July 2004, had been interrupted by the service of the payment order of 24 October 2000. The advocate-general referred to the case-law of the Court of Cassation (judgments of 17 January 2008) and the Constitutional Court (judgments of 7 December 2005 and 1 February 2006) (see paragraphs 38 and 39 below). 18. The applicant company stated that it had received the advocate‑general’s submissions on 5 March 2009; that assertion was not disputed by the Government. 19. On 9 March 2009 the applicant company submitted a memorandum under Article 1107 of the Judicial Code (see paragraph 41 below). It argued that if the Court of Cassation substituted its own grounds for those of the contested judgment, as proposed by the advocate-general, it would be in breach of Article 6 of the Convention unless the applicant company had an opportunity to challenge the proposed new grounds. It also alleged that the criteria for the substitution of grounds were not met. It concluded by stating that a number of objections remained which had not been addressed by the lower courts, in particular the fact that the application of section 49 of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 9 July 2004 would amount to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. That matter should have been debated before the lower courts. 20. In a judgment of 13 March 2009 (F.07.0085.N-F.07.105.N) which echoed the advocate-general’s submissions, the Court of Cassation held that, according to section 49 of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 9 July 2004, a payment order interrupted the limitation period in a valid manner even where there was no amount that was “indisputably due”. It went on to find as follows:
 “Section 49 of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act is ... not an interpretative legal provision. Nevertheless, this new provision must be applied retrospectively by the courts, in accordance with the legislature’s wishes. It is clear from the parliamentary drafting history of this provision that the legislature’s aim in enacting a retrospective measure was to protect the rights of the Treasury in the context of pending proceedings in which tax debts disputed on the basis of the position taken in the case-law were about to become, or had already become, time-barred.”
The Court of Cassation concluded that the payment order served on 24 October 2000 had interrupted the limitation period and that the debt was therefore not time-barred. The decision contested by the applicant company was justified in law on the basis of the new grounds set out by the Court of Cassation. Accordingly, the court declared the ground of appeal inadmissible for lack of interest and dismissed the applicant company’s appeal. The Court of Cassation declared the appeal lodged by the State inadmissible for lack of interest, as it related to a decision in the State’s favour. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
21. The domestic legislation and case-law concerning the assessment of tax, the legal remedies and limitation periods in respect of taxation are described in detail in Optim and Industerre v. Belgium ((dec.), no. 23819/06, §§ 11-16, 11 September 2012). In the interests of clarity, that information is reiterated and elaborated on below. ASSESSMENT OF TAX AND LEGAL REMEDIES
22. Corporation tax is assessed on the basis of an entry in the tax roll. In order to collect the tax, the authorities must have a claim against the taxpayer, which they establish unilaterally by means of an entry in the tax roll, an officially recorded document. The assessment is entered in the roll in the name of the taxpayer, who is then informed by means of a notice of assessment, once the roll has become enforceable. 23. The taxpayer concerned may “lodge an objection in writing with the director of taxation against the tax assessment, including any additional amounts, increases and penalties” (Article 366 of the Income Tax Code). 24. The taxpayer subsequently has the possibility of challenging the decision on the administrative objection in the court of first instance (Article 375 of the same Code). Since the enactment of a Law which entered into force on 6 April 1999, court proceedings may also be brought if the director of taxation fails to take a decision within six months of the administrative objection being lodged (Article 1385 undecies of the Judicial Code). 25. Neither the objection nor the application to the courts affects the enforceability of the entry in the tax roll. The full amount of the disputed tax assessment may therefore be subject to an attachment order, enforcement procedures or any other measures aimed at ensuring recovery of the sums due (Article 409 of the Income Tax Code). 26. However, Article 410 of the Income Tax Code stipulates that in the event of an objection or an application to the courts, the amount due (the principal, together with any additions and increases and the corresponding interest) is deemed to constitute a debt that is “certain and of a fixed amount” and that can “be recovered by means of enforcement procedures” only “in so far as it corresponds to the amount of income declared” or, when it has been assessed of the authorities’ own motion (in the absence of a tax return), “in so far as it does not exceed the most recent finally assessed amount payable by the taxpayer concerned in respect of a previous fiscal year”. 27. Only amounts that are “indisputably due”, according to the usual terminology, may be the subject of enforcement procedures pending a decision on the objection. This means, among other things, that where an objection has been lodged against an assessment and the amount indisputably due is zero, enforcement of the debt is not possible until such time as the dispute has been determined. LIMITATION PERIODS IN TAXATION MATTERS
28. In accordance with Article 145 of the Royal Decree of 27 August 1993 implementing the Income Tax Code, tax debts become time-barred five years after the date on which the taxes became due. The running of the limitation period may be interrupted in the manner provided for in Articles 2244 et seq. of the Civil Code or by a waiver of the part of the period that has already elapsed. Where the limitation period is interrupted, a fresh period starts to run which can be interrupted in the same way and which expires five years after the last action stopping the running of the preceding period, if no legal proceedings are brought. 29. According to Article 2244 of the Civil Code, the limitation period is interrupted when the person concerned is served with a court summons, a payment order or a seizure order. 30. Prior to the entry into force of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 22 December 2003 (see paragraph 33 below), the lodging of an objection did not interrupt the limitation period for recovery of the tax debt. In order to interrupt the limitation period, the administrative authorities had adopted a practice of issuing the taxpayers concerned with a payment order (as was done in the present case, see paragraph 9 above). 31. In judgment C.01.0157.F of 10 October 2002 (confirmed by judgments C.01.0287.N of 21 February 2003, C.02.0024.F of 27 February 2004 and C.02.0596.F of 12 March 2004), the Court of Cassation ruled against this practice. It found that a payment order was “a step in the judicial proceedings which require[d] an authority to execute and [was] the prelude to attachment”, with the result that, when served by the State in the absence of an amount of tax that was “indisputably due”, it could not “have the effect of stopping time running”. This ruling meant that a payment order could not interrupt the limitation period where the tax assessment was disputed. 32. This line of case-law prompted a response from the legislature. It took the view that action was essential “in order to prevent a situation in which, owing to the administrative authorities’ inability to validly interrupt the limitation period for the recovery of disputed taxes that [were] not certain and of a fixed amount, and immediately payable, many of them would be declared time-barred”. The legislature considered that the need for action was “particularly compelling in the light of the data concerning income tax arrears, which show[ed] that disputed tax assessments account[ed] for more than forty per cent of those arrears” (explanatory memorandum concerning the draft version of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 22 December 2003, Parliamentary papers (Documents parlementaires), Chamber, 2003-2004, DOC 51-0473/001 and 51-0474/001, p. 148). 33. The legislature therefore decided that the State should be equipped with a mechanism for interrupting the limitation period. Accordingly, when enacting the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 22 December 2003, it inserted new provisions in the Income Tax Code to the effect that any administrative or judicial appeal against the assessment or collection of taxes and withholding tax suspended the running of the limitation period (new Articles 443 bis and 443 ter of the Income Tax Code). 34. The Minister of Finance stated on that occasion that these provisions “[were] not applicable with retrospective effect because this [was] a major issue with regard to limitation periods with public-policy implications, a fact which could have very significant repercussions for taxpayers” (Parliamentary papers, Chamber, 2003-2004, DOC 51-0473/027, p. 20). 35. In its opinion on draft Article 443 ter of the Income Tax Code, the Conseil d’État expressed doubts as to the applicability of this provision to tax debts which had already become time-barred before the entry into force of the legislation, in accordance with the above-mentioned case-law of the Court of Cassation. The Conseil d’État emphasised in that connection that “if the authors of the preliminary draft [wished] to prevent the risk of taxpayers invoking the statute of limitations in such cases, an explicit transitional provision [would be] required” (opinions of 7 and 12 November 2003, Parliamentary papers, Chamber, 2003-2004, DOC 51-0473/001 and 51-0474/001, p. 464). 36. On the basis of this observation among other considerations, the legislature subsequently inserted in the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 9 July 2004 an “interpretative legal provision applicable to the cases referred to in the Court of Cassation judgments of 10 October 2002 and 21 February 2003 (reasons for government amendment no. 7, Parliamentary papers, Chamber, 2003-2004, DOC 51-1138/015, p. 2). The provision in question was section 49 of the Act, according to which “the payment order must also be interpreted as an act interrupting the limitation period within the meaning of Article 2244 of the Civil Code even where the disputed tax debt is not certain and of a fixed amount”. 37. A number of taxpayers, including the applicants in the case of Optim and Industerre (cited above), lodged applications with the Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court (Cour d’Arbitrage) (now the Constitutional Court) seeking the repeal of section 49 of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 9 July 2004. 38. In a judgment of 7 December 2005 (no. 177/2005; see also judgment no. 20/2006 of 1 February 2006), the Constitutional Court rejected the applications, finding as follows:
 “B.19.1. ... the justification given for the provision in issue was the fact that the limitation period in respect of disputed taxes had always been interrupted by the serving of a payment order, and the validity of such orders had always been recognised, until the Court of Cassation judgments of 10 October 2002 and 21 February 2003 ... While there was some disagreement as to the nature of the payment order within the meaning of Article 2244 of the Civil Code, there were no grounds, prior to [these] judgments, for rejecting the argument advanced by the administrative authorities regarding the dual effect of such orders, according to which a payment order, although invalid as an enforcement measure, could nevertheless retain its effects as an act interrupting the limitation period. When the Civil Code was enacted in 1804 a payment order was not regarded as an enforcement measure, but rather as a preparatory step expressing the creditor’s wish to obtain payment of the sums due. Following the entry into force of the Judicial Code, and more specifically Articles 1494 et seq. thereof, disagreement arose as to the nature of payment orders, with some taking the view that a payment order was no longer a preparatory step but an enforcement measure. While the payment order referred to in Articles 148 and 149 of [the Royal Decree of 27 August 1993 implementing the Income Tax Code] constitutes an enforcement measure the validity of which depends on the debt being certain and of a fixed amount, the effects of the payment order within the meaning of Article 2244 of the Civil Code are not subject to any statutory validity criteria. However, neither the above-mentioned provisions of the Judicial Code nor any judgment of the Court of Cassation ruled out the validity of a payment order as an act interrupting the limitation period where the debt was not certain and of a fixed amount. On the contrary, some decisions of the lower courts have found payment orders to interrupt the limitation period irrespective of their validity as enforcement measures. B.19.2. This approach guided administrative practice regarding income tax and prompted numerous taxpayers to sign a document waiving the part of the limitation period that had elapsed. B.19.3. Furthermore, in a judgment of 28 October 1993 the Court of Cassation quashed a judgment of the Liège Court of Appeal on the ground that the latter had not replied to the arguments of the Belgian State to the effect that payment orders were ‘aimed in particular at interrupting the limitation period, in accordance with Article 194 of the Royal Decree on the Income Tax Code ...’. The Brussels Court of Appeal, to which the case was remitted, held in a judgment of 24 June 1997 that ‘such orders are to be considered as acts interrupting the limitation period for the purposes of Article 2244 of the Civil Code and are not affected by the invalidity of the subsequent attachment, as the payment order stops time running irrespective of the effects of the enforcement measure as such’ (Brussels, 24 June 1997, J.T., 1998, pp. 458-459). B.19.4. Having served a payment order, the State could therefore legitimately expect that it had interrupted the limitation period in a valid manner, even where the tax debt was disputed. B.19.5. Moreover, the Minister of Finance observed as follows with regard to the impugned provision: ‘[It] prevents arbitrary discrimination between those taxpayers who have signed a document waiving the part of the limitation period that has elapsed and those who refused to sign such a waiver and awaited the service of a payment order. If the taxpayer does not sign a document waiving the part of the limitation period that has elapsed, serving a payment order is the sole means for the tax collector to stop the limitation period running. The recent case-law of the Court of Cassation would mean that this possibility too would be lost, with the result that the debts would inevitably become time-barred. Given that the taxpayers themselves disputed the taxes, they could not have a legal expectation that the tax debt would become time‑barred on that account. It would not appear reasonable for a taxpayer to expect to be released from his or her debts by lodging an appeal, while the State is unable to recover the tax due’ (Parliamentary papers, Chamber, 2003-2004, DOC 51-1138/015, pp. 2-3). B.19.6. Although from a legal viewpoint the res judicata effects of the Court of Cassation judgments of 10 October 2002 and 21 February 2003 are only relative, the fact that these judgments determined the legal issue relating to the nature and effects of payment orders confers on them a de facto authority to which all the courts are subject, since any ruling departing from the approach taken by the Court of Cassation would be liable to be quashed as being in breach of the law as interpreted by the Court of Cassation. Moreover, it is clear from the case-law relied on by the applicants that the lower courts agreed with the approach taken in the two Court of Cassation judgments cited above. B.19.7. Hence, the judgments of 10 October 2002 and 21 February 2003 deprived of effect, retrospectively, the means of interrupting the limitation period that had been commonly used in relation to income tax ... As a result, one category of taxpayers was released from debts which they had disputed but which could not be assumed not to be payable. The legislature’s aim in enacting a retrospective provision in its turn was to counteract the retrospective effect of the case-law established by the above‑mentioned judgments. B.19.8. The use of a retrospective provision is also explained in the present case by the absence of any provision allowing an application to be made to the Court of Cassation to set a time-limit on the effects of the positions of principle adopted in its judgments, whereas the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Article 231, second paragraph, of the EC Treaty), the Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court (section 8(2) of the Special Law of 6 January 1989 on the Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court) and the Conseil d’État (section 14 ter of the consolidated Laws on the Conseil d’État of 12 January 1973) can maintain the effects of decisions they have declared void. B.19.9. The initial response of the legislature to the above-mentioned Court of Cassation judgments, in the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 22 December 2003, entailed the insertion in the Income Tax Code of Articles 443 bis and 443 ter in a new Chapter IX bis entitled ‘Time-barring of Treasury rights’. The legislature elaborated on its response in the impugned provision of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 9 July 2004. Given that these provisions were enacted within a short time of each other they should be deemed to constitute together the legislature’s response to the above‑mentioned judgments. B.19.10. It was also noted during the preparatory work that ‘disputed tax assessments account[ed] for more than forty per cent’ of income tax arrears and that some cases that stood to benefit from the position taken by the Court of Cassation ‘concerned large‑scale tax fraud’ ... The measure was deemed to meet the requirements of the general interest in so far as it protected the Treasury’s rights with regard to the disputed assessments without adversely affecting taxpayers’ rights. B.19.11. Lastly, the retrospective effect of the impugned provision does not restrict to a disproportionate extent the rights of those taxpayers who considered, prior to the Court of Cassation judgments, that the payment order served on them had stopped the running of the limitation period in a valid manner. The fact that they hoped to benefit, contrary to expectations, from the above-mentioned case-law of the Court of Cassation does not render the legislature’s intervention unjustified. B.20. The measure is therefore justified by specific, exceptional circumstances and is based on compelling grounds of general interest.”
39. In two judgments of 17 January 2008 (F.06.0082.N and F.07.0057.N), the Court of Cassation confirmed that it was clear from section 49 of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 9 July 2004 that a payment order served in respect of a disputed tax debt constituted a valid act interrupting the limitation period even where no part of the debt was indisputably due. In the second of these judgments it also held that section 49 did not constitute an interpretative provision but that it should nevertheless be applied retrospectively, in accordance with the legislature’s intentions. 40. In a judgment handed down on 21 November 2013 (F.11.0175.N), that is, after the judgment in the applicant company’s case, the Court of Cassation held that section 49, “which [was] designed to prevent some taxpayers from securing an advantage not intended by the legislature, and which [was] in accordance with the general interest and necessary in order to ensure the payment of taxes – the rules on the assessment of which [had] not been amended by the legislature – [was] compatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”
PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF cassation
41. Under Article 1107, second paragraph, of the Judicial Code, where State Counsel makes written submissions, the parties may, at the latest during the hearing and solely in reply to those submissions, submit a memorandum in which they may not raise any new grounds of appeal. According to the next paragraph of that Article, each party may request an adjournment at the hearing in order to reply orally or by means of a memorandum to State Counsel’s written or oral submissions. The Court of Cassation then sets the time-limit for submission of the memorandum. THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
42. The applicant company complained of the State’s intervention during the proceedings before the domestic courts, which it considered to be in breach of the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty and the right to a fair hearing. It also alleged that the fact that the Court of Cassation had substituted its own grounds for those of the contested judgment had deprived the applicant company of its right of access to a court. Lastly, it complained of a breach of the reasonable-time requirement. It relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in its relevant parts provides:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
AdmissibilityApplicability of Article 6 § 1

(a)   The parties’ submissions
43. The Government did not dispute the applicability of the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention, in view of the tax surcharge imposed on the applicant company. However, they argued that Article 6 was not applicable under its civil head. In their view, the time-barring of the State’s entitlement to recover taxes was in itself neither a civil nor a criminal matter and was covered only indirectly by the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 in so far as the tax surcharge itself was covered. The Government submitted that there was no support in the Court’s case-law for the distinction which the applicant company sought to make between the assessment of the tax and its collection. The judgment in National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom (23 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VII), on which the applicant company relied, was not applicable in the present case because in that case the applicants had sought the repayment of taxes that had been unduly paid, and more specifically the sums it had paid under tax legislation that had been struck down as ultra vires. It was indisputable in the present case that the debt which the Belgian State had sought to recover was a tax debt based on fiscal legislation that had been properly enacted. 44. The applicant company maintained that the case concerned not only a criminal charge but also a dispute over civil rights and obligations, since the subject matter of the proceedings had been the time-barring of a claim for recovery of a disputed tax amount, and not the State’s right to impose tax on a citizen. Since the dispute in the present case concerned the recovery of a debt rather than the assessment of taxes, there were no grounds to exclude the case from the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil head. (b)   The Court’s assessment
45. The present case concerns proceedings in relation to the tax authorities’ decision to issue a supplementary tax assessment in respect of the applicant company, together with a tax surcharge amounting to 10% of the taxes for which it was considered liable, on account of errors in the company’s tax return for the 1993 fiscal year. 46. As regards the civil limb of Article 6, the Court has held on numerous occasions that it is not applicable to the assessment of tax and the imposition of surcharges (see, among other authorities, Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC], no. 44759/98, § 29, ECHR 2001‑VII; Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, § 29, ECHR 2006‑XIV; and, more recently, Formela v. Poland (dec.), no. 31651/08, § 127, 5 February 2019). 47. The Court reached the same conclusion in the case of Optim and Industerre v. Belgium ((dec.), no. 23819/06, §§ 24-26, 11 September 2012) which, like the present case, concerned proceedings instituted by the applicants in the ordinary courts to challenge a supplementary tax assessment. The Court sees no reason to depart from that conclusion in the present case, since the proceedings brought by the applicant company in the domestic courts were aimed at contesting the assessment of the tax. The fact that, in practice, the issue of the time-barring of the debt was central to the proceedings does not alter that conclusion. 48. The case of National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society (cited above), to which the applicant company referred, concerned a situation different from that in the present case in so far as the domestic proceedings were aimed at obtaining repayment of tax that had been wrongly paid by the applicant companies under tax legislation that was subsequently struck down. 49. The applicability of the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, however, is not disputed by the Government. Regard being had to the fact that the tax surcharge imposed on the applicant company pursued an aim that was both preventive and punitive (see Jussila, cited above, §§ 29-39), and to the severity of the penalty which the company was liable to incur, namely a surcharge amounting to 10% of the tax (see A.P., M.P. and T.P. v. Switzerland, 29 August 1997, § 40, Reports 1997‑V, and Janosevic v. Sweden, no. 34619/97, § 69, ECHR 2002‑VII), the Court concludes that the provision relied on is applicable under its criminal limb. 50. The Court emphasises that the proceedings in question concerned both the supplementary tax assessment, which in itself did not come within the scope of application of Article 6 § 1, and the tax surcharge, which was covered by that provision. The Court must examine the proceedings in so far as they related to a “criminal charge” against the applicant company. Even assuming that it were possible to separate those parts of the proceedings which determined a “criminal charge” from those parts which did not, examining the proceedings in relation to the tax surcharge will inevitably involve taking into consideration the aspects of the proceedings concerning the supplementary tax assessment (see Jussila, cited above, § 45; see also Georgiou v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 40042/98, 16 May 2000; Sträg Datatjänster AB v. Sweden (dec.), no. 50664/99, 21 June 2005; and Chambaz v. Switzerland, no. 11663/04, § 42, 5 April 2012). Conclusion as to admissibility
51. The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 41
Outcome: violation