FIFTH SECTION
 
 
 
 
CASE OF SCHÄDLER-EBERLE v. LIECHTENSTEIN
 
(Application no. 56422/09)
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
 
 
STRASBOURG
 
18 July 2013
 
 
FINAL
 
09/12/2013
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Schädler-Eberle v. Liechtenstein,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Angelika Nußberger, President,
 Mark Villiger,
 Boštjan M. Zupančič,
 Ann Power-Forde,
 André Potocki,
 Paul Lemmens,
 Helena Jäderblom, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 18 June 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 56422/09) against the Principality of Liechtenstein lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Liechtenstein national, Ms Karolina Schädler‑Eberle (“the applicant”), on 14 October 2009. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr W.L. Weh, a lawyer practising in Bregenz, Austria. The Liechtenstein Government (“the Government”) were represented by Ms A. Frick, Minister of Justice, and by their Agent, Mr D. Ospelt, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the Council of Europe. 3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that the Administrative Court’s refusal to take evidence in an adversarial manner in a public, oral hearing had violated her rights under Article 6 of the Convention. 4. On 24 January 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1). THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Triesenberg. A. Background to the case
6. On 25 and 27 February 2000 a land development plan (Zonenplan) was adopted by referendum in the Municipality of Triesenberg. According to that plan, two plots of land owned by the applicant fell within a zone in which the construction of buildings was not authorised. B. The municipality’s decision
7. By submissions of 28 March 2000 the applicant, who was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, lodged an objection with the Municipality of Triesenberg. She contested the lawfulness of the land development plan, which she considered in breach of her right to equality and to protection of her property and requested that the plots of land in question be designated as building land. 8. On 15 November 2000 the Municipality of Triesenberg dismissed the applicant’s objection. It found, in particular, that the applicant’s plots of land were not fully developed for lack of complete water installations. Her real property had not been classified as building land in the municipality’s land development plan at issue, which was the first land development plan ever adopted for the area in question, for reasons of protection of the environment and of the landscape as the plots of land were situated outside the area inhabited throughout the year. It had been justified to treat the area in which the applicant’s plots of land were situated in a different manner than three areas which were fully developed and on large parts of which buildings had already been erected. 9. The decision was issued and sent to the applicant on 22 January 2001. C. The Government’s decision
10. On 27 and 28 April 2004 the Liechtenstein Government dismissed the complaint made by the applicant on 7 February 2001 about the municipality’s decision. They considered the land development plan to be lawful. Endorsing the reasons given by the municipality, they argued, in particular, that even if the applicant’s plots of land may have been building land under the provisional building rules of 1983, the applicant did not have a claim that her plots of land, which were not fully developed, should be designated as building land in the municipality’s first land development plan. That plan defined the use of the real property covered by it for the first time in accordance with the law. The citizens of Triesenberg had been aware that there would be a land development plan, as prescribed by law, in the future and the authorities had not undertaken to designate the applicant’s plots of land as building land. The Government considered that it had not been necessary to hear the parties in person or to inspect the property in question as the relevant facts were clear from the applicant’s submissions and the documents relating to the land development plan. D. The proceedings before the Administrative Court
11. On 14 May 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint against the Government’s decision with the Liechtenstein Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). She requested the Administrative Court to obtain certain documents concerning the land development plan from the municipality, to hold a public oral hearing, to designate her plots of land as building land or to grant her compensation for her factual expropriation and to declare the referendum adopting the land development plan void. The applicant further asked the court to question several witnesses whose submissions would show that the referendum had been manipulated. 12. On 2 June 2004 the Municipality of Triesenberg submitted observations to which the applicant replied on 12 June 2004. 13. On 14 June 2004 the Municipality of Triesenberg submitted further documents and photographs on the court’s request. The court informed the applicant thereof and further obtained the Government’s file and extracts from the land register on the plots of land in question. 14. On 30 June 2004 the Administrative Court, without having held a public oral hearing, dismissed the applicant’s complaint. 15. The Administrative Court found that there was nothing to indicate that Triesenberg’s land development plan as submitted to the citizens and as adopted by referendum had breached the applicant’s legitimate expectations that her real property be designated as building land. Even assuming that, as alleged by the applicant, prior to the referendum on the land development plan, officials of the municipality had raised her hopes that the applicant’s plots of land could be designated as building land at some point in the future, it was clear that in the land development plan to be adopted by referendum, those plots of land were not designated as building land. Therefore, it was not necessary to take the evidence offered by the applicant or to hold a public oral hearing. 16. Having regard to the documents submitted by the applicant, there was also no proof that the referendum of 25 and 27 February 2000 had been unlawfully manipulated. E. The proceedings before the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court
1. The parties’ submissions before the Constitutional Court
17. On 26 August 2004 the applicant, who was from then on represented by counsel, lodged a constitutional complaint with the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court against the decision taken by the Administrative Court. 18. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that despite her express request and despite the fact that none of the authorities previously involved in the proceedings had held an oral hearing, the Administrative Court had refused to take evidence in an adversarial manner in an oral public hearing, contrary to its practice in comparable cases. In particular, it had not examined the witnesses she had named. Instead, that court had taken a lot of evidence and had obtained observations and replies only in a written procedure. 19. Referring to her complaints made before the Administrative Court, she further complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the procedure of adoption of the land development plan in Triesenberg. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the Convention, she also argued that the unlawful land development plan had disproportionately interfered with her property rights. 20. The applicant requested the Constitutional Court to hold an oral hearing. 21. In its reply to the applicant’s observations, the Administrative Court confirmed that, contrary to previous proceedings before it in which Triesenberg’s land development plan had been at issue, it had indeed not held a public oral hearing in the applicant’s case. It argued that the situation of the plots of land concerned was commonly known and clearly shown on the photographs in the file and that the applicant had been given the opportunity to comment on the few documents obtained by it in writing. Moreover, in proceedings concerning land development, it did not, as a rule, hold public oral hearings. 22. On 15 May 2006 the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court held a public hearing. The composition of the court subsequently changed, without a new hearing being held despite the applicant’s request. 2. The Constitutional Court’s judgment
23. On 4 November 2008 the Constitutional Court, in its deliberations in private, decided to dismiss as inadmissible the applicant’s request to declare void the referendum of 25 and 27 February 2000 on the land development plan in the Municipality of Triesenberg as the applicant had failed to lodge a separate complaint in respect of that referendum with the Government. It further rejected the remainder of the applicant’s complaints as ill-founded. It found, however, ex officio that the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time under the Liechtenstein Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been violated in the proceedings before it as the proceedings had been too long. It ordered that therefore, Liechtenstein was to bear the applicant’s costs of the proceedings, amounting to statutory lawyer’s fees of some 2,960 Swiss francs (CHF), and the court costs, amounting to CHF 1,700 (file no. StGH 2004/58). 24. The Constitutional Court’s judgment, served on the applicant’s counsel on 14 April 2009, gave the following reasons. (a)  Lack of a public oral hearing before the Administrative Court
25. As regards the applicant’s complaint that the Administrative Court had failed to hold a public oral hearing, the Constitutional Court found that under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which the applicant could rely on in the proceedings before it, as a rule, an oral hearing had to be held. 26. However, when ratifying the Convention, Liechtenstein had made extensive reservations concerning, inter alia, the publicity of hearings as prescribed by Article 6 § 1. That reservation was to be considered as complying with Article 57 of the Convention. Even though some of the statutes to which the reservation applied had been changed in the meantime, such as the Constitutional Court Act, the reservation concerning the publicity of the proceedings has not been withdrawn. 27. In determining whether the proceedings before the Administrative Court complied with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court found that the National Administrative Justice Act (Gesetz über die allgemeine Landesverwaltungspflege) of 21 April 1922 (see paragraph 36 below) was applicable to the proceedings before the Administrative Court. It considered the reservation made by Liechtenstein in relation to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as far as, inter alia, that Act was concerned, to be valid. Therefore, the requirement of a public hearing, and thus the requirement of an oral hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings before the Administrative Court. 28. The Constitutional Court noted, however, that under its recent case‑law, the principle of a public hearing had to be considered as a vital aspect of the right to a fair trial and was thus part of the foundations of a democratic State governed by the rule of law. The applicant could be understood to have also complained about the lack of a fair trial as she had complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the Administrative Court had refused to take evidence in an adversarial manner in the course of a public oral hearing. The right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 was not covered by any reservation made by Liechtenstein when ratifying the Convention and was also protected by the Liechtenstein Constitution. The European Court of Human Right’s case-law on the scope of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 therefore had to be taken into account in the proceedings at issue. 29. The Constitutional Court noted that under Article 100 § 4 of the National Administrative Justice Act (see paragraph 36 below), the Administrative Court had discretion in deciding whether or not to hold an oral hearing, but it had to exercise that discretion in accordance with fundamental procedural rights. The Administrative Court had argued that an oral hearing had not been necessary because the applicant’s submissions, even if correct, did not warrant the conclusion that the land development plan was unlawful. In the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court had further argued that the situation of the plots of land concerned had been commonly known and clearly shown on the photographs in the file. 30. The Constitutional Court agreed that the Administrative Court had been in a position to determine all factual and legal questions by having regard to the parties’ written observations and the documents contained in the file. Moreover, the legal question whether in the course of the referendum on the land development plan the principles of good faith and of the protection of legal interests had been respected and whether the referendum had been manipulated had not been complex. 31. Therefore, having regard to the principles developed in the Strasbourg Court’s case-law concerning a public oral hearing (the court referred, in particular, to Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263; Speil v. Austria (dec.), no. 42057/98, 5 September 2002; and Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, ECHR 2007‑IV), the applicant’s right to a fair trial had not been violated by the Administrative Court’s refusal to hold a public oral hearing. The Administrative Court had thus exercised its discretion under Article 100 § 4 of the National Administrative Justice Act in accordance with fundamental procedural rights. (b)  The remainder of the applicant’s complaints
32. The Constitutional Court considered that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to her further complaints under Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 of the Convention because she had not submitted these complaints to the lower authorities and the Administrative Court. 33. The Constitutional Court further argued that, in any event, the land development plan had not breached the applicant’s right to property. The failure to designate the applicant’s plots of land as building land in the municipality’s first land development plan did not deprive her of a possession, but merely regulated the use of her real property. There were also no exceptional circumstances indicating that the applicant’s real property had to be designated as building land and she could not, therefore, claim compensation. 34. Moreover, the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 about the procedure of adoption of the land development plan in Triesenberg was ill-founded, in particular because the applicant had had access to the Administrative Court, an independent and impartial tribunal with full jurisdiction on both facts and law under Article 100 § 2 of the National Administrative Justice Act (see paragraph 36 below). II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The National Administrative Justice Act
35. Section 100 of the National Administrative Justice Act (Landesverwaltungspflegegesetz) of 21 April 1922 (LGBl. (Official Gazette) 1922, no. 24) was amended by the Act of 27 November 2003 on the Amendment of the National Administrative Justice Act, which entered into force on 20 January 2004 (see LGBl. (Official Gazette) 2004, no. 33). The term “(Administrative) Complaints Instance” ((Verwaltungs-) Beschwerdeinstanz) was replaced in that provision by “Administrative Court” (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). 36. Section 100 of the National Administrative Justice Act of 21 April 1922, on the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction, as amended and in the version in force at the time of the present proceedings, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:
“(2) The Administrative Court shall have the powers and obligations of a court of full jurisdiction (unlimited review) with regard to any matter brought to it by way of a complaint in so far as no rights or legally recognised interests of parties individually are at issue. (3) Accordingly, the Administrative Court may of its own motion order a hearing involving the appearance of the parties to present oral argument, take evidence, and in general conduct the whole proceedings anew. (4) However, the Administrative Court may also, if it considers an oral hearing of the parties to be unnecessary, or if the parties have not expressly requested such a hearing, review the contested decision on the basis of the files ...”
37. According to court practice, hearings before the Administrative Court are not open to the public. B. Council of Europe documents relating to reservations to the Convention
38. In its Recommendation 1671 (2004), entitled “Ratification of protocols and withdrawal of reservations and derogations made in respect of the European Convention on Human Rights”, adopted on 7 September 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe found:
“... 6. Some member states, when ratifying the Convention, entered one or more reservations under its Article 57 and some of these reservations, entered several years ago, have not been withdrawn. 7. Such reservations are permitted to the extent that legislation in force at the time in the territory of the contracting party is not in conformity with a particular provision of the Convention. They should not therefore be of a permanent nature and should be confined to the period required to bring the legislation in question into conformity with the Convention. ... 9. It must nevertheless be acknowledged that numerous states have in fact withdrawn reservations, declarations or derogations, as is the intended practice. The Assembly welcomes such conduct and congratulates the states in question for their commitment to the protection of human rights and their respect for the principles of international law. 10. The Assembly consequently recommends that the Committee of Ministers invite the States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights to: ...
10.2. withdraw any reservations which they made upon ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights after, where appropriate, amending the legislation which justified the reservation in order to bring it into conformity with the Convention, within three years of the adoption of the present recommendation; ...”
39. In the reply adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 8 June 2005, at the 929th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, to Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1671 (2004), the Committee of Ministers agreed with the desirability of withdrawal of reservations made to the Convention or its protocols (see document CM/AS(2005)Rec1671 final, § 2). It did not consider it appropriate to fix, as the Assembly suggested, a general three‑year deadline for the withdrawal of reservations (see ibid., § 8). III. LIECHTENSTEIN’S RESERVATION IN RESPECT OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
40. The reservation contained in Liechtenstein’s instrument of ratification, deposited on 8 September 1982 and modified with a declaration contained in a letter from the Permanent Representative on 23 May 1991, registered at the Secretariat General on 24 May 1991, in relation to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:
“In accordance with Article 64 of the Convention [Article 57 since the entry into force of the Protocol No 11], the Principality of Liechtenstein makes the reservation that the principle that hearings must be held and judgments pronounced in public, as laid down in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention, shall apply only within the limits deriving from the principles at present embodied in the following Liechtenstein laws:
- Act of 10 December 1912 on civil procedure, LGBl. 1912 No. 9/1
- Act of 10 December 1912 on the exercise of jurisdiction and the competence of the courts in civil cases, LGBl. 1912 No. 9/2
- Code of Criminal Procedure of 18 October 1988, LGBl. 1988 No. 62
- Act of 21 April 1922 on non-contentious procedure, LGBl. 1922 No. 19
- Act of 21 April 1922 on national administrative justice, LGBl. 1922 No. 24
- Act of 5 November 1925 on the Supreme Court (``Haute Cour’’), LGBl. 1925 No. 8
- Act of 30 January 1961 on national and municipal taxes, LGBl. 1961 No. 7
- Act of 13 November 1974 on the acquisition of immovable property, LGBl. 1975 No. 5. The statutory provisions of criminal procedure relating to juvenile delinquency, as contained in the Act on Criminal Procedure in Matters of Juvenile Delinquency of 20 May 1987, LGBl. 1988 No. 39.”
41. The relevant part of the French version of that reservation provides:
« Conformément à l’article 64 de la Convention [article 57 de la Convention depuis l’entrée en vigueur du Protocole No 11], la Principauté de Liechtenstein émet la réserve que le principe de la publicité des audiences et du prononcé des jugements, contenu dans l’article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, ne s’appliquera que dans les limites dérivées des principes qui trouvent actuellement leur expression dans les lois liechtensteinoises suivantes :
...
- Loi du 21 avril 1922 sur la justice administrative nationale, LGBl. 1922 No 24
... »
42. The modifications to the original reservation contained in Liechtenstein’s instrument of ratification, made with a declaration dated 23 May 1991, concerned only the references to the Code of Criminal Procedure (a new version of 1988 having replaced the previous version of 1913) and to the statutory provisions of criminal procedure relating to juvenile delinquency. THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LACK OF A PUBLIC ORAL HEARING
43. The applicant complained that the Administrative Court’s failure to hold a public oral hearing, in which evidence should have been taken in an adversarial manner, had breached her rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”
44. The Government contested that argument. A. Admissibility
45. The Government asserted that the Court could not deal with the applicant’s complaint that there had not been a public hearing before the Administrative Court in the proceedings concerning the classification of the applicant’s property in a land development plan since those proceedings were covered by Liechtenstein’s reservation in respect of Article 6 of the Convention. 46. The applicant contested that view. 47. The Court considers that the Government’s objection is closely related to the merits of the applicant’s complaint. It will therefore examine it together with the merits of this complaint. 48. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits
1. Liechtenstein’s reservation in respect of Article 6
(a)  Compliance of the reservation with Article 57
49. The Court therefore has to determine, at the outset, whether Liechtenstein’s reservation at issue is in conformity with Article 57 of the Convention, which provides:
“1. Any state may, when signing [the] Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this article. 2. Any reservation made under this article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.”
(i)  The parties’ submissions
(α)  The Government
50. In the Government’s submission, the reservations made by Liechtenstein on ratification of the Convention complied with Article 57 of the Convention and were thus valid. The validity of the reservations had been repeatedly thoroughly examined and confirmed by the Constitutional Court. This was true, in particular, for the reservation made with regard to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the principle that hearings must be held and judgments be pronounced in public. 51. The Government argued, in particular, that the reservation at issue could not be considered as a prohibited reservation of a general nature. The wording of the reservation referred to a specific Convention Article, Article 6 § 1, and, more specifically, to the requirement that “... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...” and that “[j]udgment shall be pronounced publicly”. 52. The reservation further contained an exhaustive list of Liechtenstein laws to which it applied, including the Act of 21 April 1922 on national administrative justice here at issue. Moreover, a statement of the contents of the national laws concerned had been made in the reservation in that the latter referred to “the limits deriving from the principles at present embodied in the following Liechtenstein laws ...”. Thereby, it had been clarified that these laws contained different rules, diverging from those laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, on the public nature of proceedings at the time of Liechtenstein’s ratification of the Convention. 53. The Government further submitted that the current version of Article 100 § 4 of the National Administrative Justice Act, at issue in the present application, was still covered by the reservation. Since the time Liechtenstein has made its reservation, the said provision had only been changed in that the term “Administrative Complaints Instance” had been replaced by “Administrative Court”, without its content having been modified. (β)  The applicant
54. The applicant considered that the reservation made by Liechtenstein on its ratification of the Convention was incompatible with Article 57 of the Convention and thus invalid. She argued that as the purpose of reservations was to allow the respondent State during an interim period to adapt its national legislation so that it met the standards of the Convention, the reservation was by now already obsolete for lapse of time. It was further doubtful whether the modification, by Liechtenstein, of its reservation in 1991, following ratification of the Convention, was valid. 55. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that the reservation was invalid, in any event, for being incompatible with the public order of the Council of Europe. Under the present-day standards of the Convention, it had to be considered as contrary to European public order to allow national courts an unfettered discretion as to whether or not to hold a hearing. It also rendered the case-law of the Liechtenstein courts inaccessible to the public. 56. Moreover, in the applicant’s submission, the reservation in question did not meet the specific requirements laid down in Article 57 of the Convention. She argued that the reservation, by attempting to exempt from the applicability of Article 6 all procedures before a court in Liechtenstein, covered the entirety of Liechtenstein’s legal order. It therefore amounted to a prohibited reservation of a general character. She referred, inter alia, to the Court’s judgment in the case of Belilos v. Switzerland (29 April 1988) in support of her argument. 57. The applicant further claimed that the reservation failed to comply with paragraph 2 of Article 57 as it did not contain a brief statement of the law concerned. Such a statement would have been impossible as it would have had to comprise Liechtenstein’s whole legal order. The applicant relied, inter alia, on the Court’s judgments in the cases of Weber v. Switzerland (22 May 1990) and Gradinger v. Austria (23 October 1995) to support her view. 58. In addition, the new version of the National Administrative Justice Act, at issue in the present application and applying to the Administrative Court, was no longer covered by the reservation. Changing “Administrative Complaints Instance” into “Administrative Court” in the relevant law was not simply a change of terms, but a substantive change, given that the new tribunal was to conform to the minimum standards of a court. The reservation was therefore not applicable to the Administrative Court. The applicant relied on the Court’s judgment in the case of Stallinger and Kuso v. Austria (23 April 1997) in that context. (ii)  The Court’s assessment
(α)  Recapitulation of the relevant principles
59. In order for a reservation to be applicable to the case at issue, the measures or proceedings complained of must have been governed by the law(s) covered by the reservation (compare, for instance, Gradinger v. Austria, 23 October 1995, § 39, Series A no. 328‑C; Koslova and Smirnova v. Latvia (dec.), no. 57381/00, 23 October 2001; and Dacosta Silva v. Spain, no. 69966/01, §§ 34, 37, ECHR 2006‑XIII). 60. The Court reiterates that, in order to be valid, a reservation to the Convention must satisfy the following conditions: (i) it must be made at the moment the Convention is signed or ratified (Article 57 § 1, first sentence); (ii) it must relate to a particular provision of the Convention (Article 57 § 1, first sentence); (iii) it must relate to specific laws in force at the moment of ratification (Article 57 § 1, first sentence); (iv) it must not be a reservation of a general character (Article 57 § 1, second sentence); and (v) it must contain a brief statement of the law concerned (Article 57 § 2; see also Shestjorkin v. Estonia (dec.), no. 49450/99, 15 June 2000; and Liepājnieks v. Latvia (dec.), no. 37586/06, § 45, 2 November 2010 with many further references). 61. As to the requirement that the reservation must relate to specific laws in force at the moment of ratification, the Court considered that that condition was not complied with where a new legislative provision was not essentially identical to the provision in force at the time of ratification, but extended the measures covered by the reservation, such as the domestic courts’ power to refuse to hold a public hearing (see Fischer v. Austria, 26 April 1995, § 41, Series A no. 312; compare also Stallinger and Kuso v. Austria, 23 April 1997, § 48, Reports 1997‑II; Eisenstecken v. Austria, no. 29477/95, § 25, ECHR 2000‑X; and Dacosta Silva, cited above, § 37). 62. The Court reiterates that Article 57 § 1 (former Article 64 § 1) of the Convention requires precision and clarity. The term “reservation of a general character” denotes in particular a reservation which does not refer to a specific provision of the Convention or is couched in terms that are too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact meaning and scope (see Belilos v. Switzerland, 29 April 1988, § 55, Series A no. 132; Shestjorkin, cited above; Koslova and Smirnova, cited above; and Steck‑Risch v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 63151/00, ECHR 2004‑II). 63. As regards the “brief statement of the law concerned” required by Article 57 § 2, the Court reiterates that this requirement both constitutes an evidential factor and contributes to legal certainty. The purpose of Article 57 § 2 is to provide a guarantee – in particular for the other Contracting Parties and the Convention institutions – that a reservation does not go beyond the provisions expressly excluded by the State concerned. This is not a purely formal requirement, but a condition of substance (see Belilos, cited above, § 59; Weber v. Switzerland, 22 May 1990, § 38, Series A no. 177; Steck-Risch, cited above; and Dacosta Silva, cited above, § 37). 64. That requirement does not mean, however, that it is necessary to provide a description, even a concise one, of the substance of the texts in question. A reference to the Official Gazette – preceded by an indication of the subject-matter of the relevant provisions – makes it possible for everyone to identify the precise laws concerned and to obtain any information regarding them and provides a safeguard against any interpretation which would unduly extend the field of application of the reservation (see Chorherr v. Austria, 25 August 1993, § 20, Series A no. 266‑B; and Steck-Risch, cited above; compare also Shestjorkin, cited above; and Koslova and Smirnova, cited above, where an annex to the reservation contained, in addition, a brief outline of the main aim and scope of each law). 65. Finally, in the Court’s case-law, reservations, which restrict the fundamental rights protection guaranteed by the Convention, have been interpreted narrowly (compare, inter alia, Eisenstecken, cited above, §§ 24‑30; Schmautzer v. Austria, 23 October 1995, § 31, Series A no. 328‑A; Umlauft v. Austria, 23 October 1995, § 34, Series A no. 328‑B). (β)  Application of these principles to the present case
66.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 6
Outcome: no_violation