FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF TSAAVA AND OTHERS v. GEORGIA
(Applications nos. 13186/20 and 4 others)
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 3 (procedural) • Ineffective criminal investigation, still ongoing for more than four and half years, into injuries sustained by demonstrators and journalists from rubber bullets fired by the police and from alleged ill‑treatment during the dispersal of a demonstration in front of the Parliament building 
Art 3 (substantive) • Art 10 • Art 11 • Court refrained from taking a decision in view of scope of ongoing investigation and need for further elucidation of factual elements at domestic level • Importance of principles of subsidiarity and shared responsibility
Art 46 • Execution of judgment • Individual measures indicated by the Court
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
7 May 2024
 
Referral to the Grand Chamber
 
23/09/2024
 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Tsaava and Others v. Georgia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Georges Ravarani, President,
 Lado Chanturia,
 Carlo Ranzoni,
 María Elósegui,
 Mattias Guyomar,
 Kateřina Šimáčková,
 Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
five applications against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by twenty-six Georgian nationals (“the applicants”, whose personal information and other details are set out in the appended table);
the decision to give notice to the Georgian Government (“the Government”) of the respective complaints under Articles 3, 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 20 February and19 March 2024,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The present case concerns the allegedly excessive use of force by the police during the dispersal of a demonstration on 20-21 June 2019, and the allegation that no effective criminal investigation was carried out in this regard. All applicants relied, explicitly or in substance, on Article 3 and Article 13 of the Convention. Applicants in applications nos. 20175/21 and 39382/21 additionally complained of a violation of Article 11 of the Convention, while applicants in applications nos. 13186/20, 16757/20, 20129/21 and 39382/21 raised complaints under Article 10 of the Convention. THE FACTS
2. The details of the applicants and their representatives are set out in the appended table. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili, of the Ministry of Justice. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. DEMONSTRATION OF 20-21 JUNE 2019Background

5. On 20 June 2019 a session of the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO – an interparliamentary institution based in Athens, set up to foster relations between Christian Orthodox lawmakers) was held in the Parliament building. S.G. – a member of the Russian State Duma and, at the time of events, President of the General Assembly of the IAO – sat in the chair reserved for the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament and delivered a speech in the Russian language. This turn of events sparked widespread civic and political protest and was criticised as unacceptable (see Melia v. Georgia, no. 13668/21, §§ 6-8, 7 September 2023). Initial phase of the demonstration
6. A number of civic activists started to gather at the entrance of the Parliament building immediately following the above developments. Some were allowed to enter the building with visitors’ passes issued by opposition members of parliament. A demonstration to protest about the events of the day (see paragraph 5 above) was apparently announced in the afternoon. Individuals started gathering in front of the Parliament building soon afterwards. By 7 p.m. the demonstration had started and its participants – politicians, civic activists and ordinary citizens – occupied the entire space in front of the Parliament building and the avenue alongside it. According to media accounts, the demonstration was initially peaceful, with approximately 12,000 people gathered at the site. 7. Police formed a cordon above the stairs leading to the Parliament building, blocking access to the main entrance of the building. A number of ordinary policemen, riot police officers and other officers of the Special Assignments Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) were additionally stationed inside the yard of the Parliament building, behind the gate of the main entrance. 8. At about 8.53 p.m. a politician addressed the protesters and presented the main demand directed at the ruling party: the resignations of the Speaker of the Parliament, the Minister of the Interior and the Head of the State Security Service. Another demand voiced during the demonstration was for snap parliamentary elections and a transition to a system of proportional representation. The ruling party was given until the end of the day to comply with those demands. At 9 p.m. another politician addressed the protesters and stated that “civil disobedience” would be inevitable in the event of the authorities’ failure to heed the protesters’ demands. In a video-recording of a discussion among the opposition politicians, the phrase “A revolution is about to begin” is heard. It is unclear who uttered it. 9. At 9.09 p.m. one of the leaders of the opposition stated that if the demands of the demonstrators were not met within an hour, they would enter the Parliament building peacefully and stay there until the relevant officials resigned. Apparently, at 9.17 p.m. the same politician addressed the protesters again. He asked why it was that S.G. had had the right to sit in the seat of the Parliament’s Speaker yet Georgian people could not even stand in the yard of that building. He stated that in the event the authorities failed to respond within ten minutes, “[they would] enter the yard of the Parliament building peacefully and very constructively, with raised hands”. The speech was followed by cheers from the protesters located in the immediate vicinity. First episode involving tensions
10. The events were filmed by different journalists, including those who provided uninterrupted live coverage of the demonstration and its subsequent dispersal. The facts relating to tensions at the demonstration are disputed by the parties. The summary below is primarily based on the media coverage of the events. 11. By 9.49 p.m. several hundred individuals who had gathered immediately below the stairs leading to the main entrance of the Parliament building started pushing their way towards the gate. They attempted to break the police cordon located just above the stairs. The footage of the events shows that several participants cried out that there was a risk of people in the crowd being crushed, and police officers shielded some journalists standing there, warning them against the risk of crushing. 12. Several protesters threw plastic bottles at the officers. Others started dismantling metal constructions which had been placed at the building’s entrances to keep the protesters out. Multiple demonstrators managed to seize the police officers’ protective shields and rubber batons and passed them back along the line of protestors. Several police officers were split off from the cordon by the demonstrators and led away, apparently in a calm manner. The video material relating to the incident shows the police telling the demonstrators to retreat and not push forward. 13. The police cordon was briefly broken, but it was reinforced by the riot police officers stationed inside the Parliament courtyard. They used batons and shields to contain the demonstrators. 14. Around 10 p.m. the Minister of Internal Affairs gave a brief interview to journalists as he was entering the Parliament building. According to him, the events unfolding there constituted an attempted storming of State institutions and the demonstrators had to obey the demands of the police or face consequences. At 10.07 p.m. the MIA circulated the following official statement via media outlets and its website: “The [MIA] calls on the demonstrators gathered in front of the Parliament building to stop [their] unlawful and violent actions, not yield to provocation, [and] comply with the lawful request[s] of the police and leave the premises. Otherwise, the police will take necessary measures provided for by the law.”
15. Eventually, at approximately 10.30 p.m. the tension was somewhat defused and the riot police managed to push the demonstrators back to the bottom of the stairs. 16. During this incident involving tensions, the majority of the journalists gathered near the building were located behind the police cordon, and they appear to have left the area with the help of the police officers. 17. As is apparent from the material available in the case file, including reports by non-governmental organisations relating to the event in question, a large number of the demonstrators gathered in the area in front of the Parliament building, away from the stairs, may have been unaware of the developments at the Parliament’s main entrance. Interim period
18. At 10.30 p.m. the mayor of Tbilisi issued a televised warning against escalating the circumstances on the ground. Around the same time, the Minister of Internal Affairs gave a brief interview to journalists located inside the Parliament building. He stated that even where there were justified grounds for protest, an assault on State institutions, including policemen and Parliament, was an unacceptable act and would entail strict consequences under the law. He called on citizens to respect the orders of the police officers who had been trying to uphold public order. Other leaders of the ruling party, including the Prime Minister, also condemned the demonstrators’ actions (via the media) and called on them to respect the law and avoid lawful sanctions. 19. Between approximately 10.30 and 11.22 p.m. the situation on the ground was somewhat tense but calmer, with some politicians making statements to condemn the earlier events of the day (see paragraph 5 above), criticising the ruling party. On several occasions during this period some individual participants in the demonstration attempted to push through the police cordon, asking to be let inside the Parliament building and/or courtyard. They were pushed back by officers who used shields and batons. Second episode involving tensions and the dispersal of the demonstration
20. The situation at the demonstration escalated again from 11.22 p.m. onwards. 21. At 11.22 p.m. multiple individuals in the front rows of the demonstration restarted joint attempts at forcibly breaking through the police cordon. 22. Various accounts estimated that between 300 and 1000 individuals had attempted to forcibly break through the police cordon and had behaved in an aggressive manner. 23. The scuffle between the demonstrators gathered in the front rows and the officers forming the cordon on the stairs of the Parliament building continued until 11.55 p.m. and included incidents where police gear was taken away, various items (water bottles, but apparently stones as well) were thrown at the officers, and individual officers were split off from the cordon and led away. Some of these officers appear to have been physically assaulted. According to some journalists’ reports, politicians gathered on the ground told the demonstrators not to use force against the police. Some protesters managed to overcome the police cordon and the metal constructions located in front of the Parliament building. People gathered in the middle and back rows of the demonstration appear to have been standing in a relatively calm manner. 24. At 11.55 p.m. the sounds of shooting were heard during the live broadcast of the events. Smoke started to rise on Rustaveli Avenue, with the journalists reporting that it had been tear gas or pepper spray. A large number of the demonstrators and journalists moved away towards the nearby Freedom Square, but individuals located in front of the police cordon stayed there. The shooting was not preceded by a warning. 25. At 12 midnight some demonstrators started returning to the area in front of the Parliament building. Tensions and scuffles around the police cordon continued. Water bottles and other items were thrown at the officers. Minutes later, additional tear gas projectiles were fired. Individuals in the middle and back rows started leaving the area. Paramedics helped those who felt unwell. While demonstrators located in front of the police cordon stayed there and continued with their attempts to break through it, the area in front of the Parliament building was largely cleared, with a few demonstrators attempting to return. 26. At 12.11 a.m. a journalist reporting on the events commented that rubber bullets were being shot. A moment later another journalist showed small rubber bullets he had apparently picked up from the ground. Around the same time several officers holding guns (apparently loaded with rubber bullets and/or tear gas projectiles) were seen being stationed on the top landing of the stairs leading to Parliament, behind the police cordon, overlooking the cordon and the demonstrators. 27. By 12.21 a.m. many demonstrators who had left for Freedom Square had returned to the area in front of the Parliament. Individuals in the front rows kept demanding to be let into the Parliament building. People gathered in the back rows appeared to stand calmly. By then, various demonstrators and police officers appear to have been injured. Soon thereafter more tear gas was fired and many demonstrators left again for Freedom Square. During this period tear gas and rubber bullets were shot simultaneously or in close sequence. The live broadcast of the events showed injured individuals being helped by paramedics. The demonstrators kept returning to the protest site in front of the Parliament building. The sounds of shooting were heard, and there were signs of tear gas being fired every time this happened. All this time a small group of individuals remained in front of the police cordon and kept attempting to break through it, using the shields and batons previously seized from the police. 28. By 12.43 a.m. the area in front of the police cordon had been cleared of all demonstrators, and the officers moved several steps down the stairs. 29. At 12.45 a.m. the officers located above the stairs, behind the police cordon, fired certain projectiles towards the demonstrators who had been located further away from the area in question. 30. The demonstrators’ attempts to return to the protest area continued. At 1.02 a.m. the majority returned, with some minutes of calm until another attempt to break through the police cordon was made and the police used tear gas. At 1.27 a.m., while the police attempted to disperse the demonstrators again, at least one officer was shown by journalists as he was loading his rifle and aiming at the crowd. His face was clearly identifiable. Some demonstrators were seen with blood stains. Around that same time the efforts to break through the police cordon became particularly intense in the front rows of the demonstration, and the sounds of shooting also intensified. 31. By 1.42 a.m. loud sirens could be heard and riot police, with a water cannon behind them, started moving from the Freedom Square area towards Rustaveli Avenue. They started clearing the area with the use of tear gas and the water cannon. At 1.47 a.m., while the water cannon and tear gas were being used, the reporters commented that rubber bullets were also being fired. 32. Once the protesters had receded, water cannons were used to lead them away from the Parliament building. Several protesters continued throwing different items at the riot police. Others attempted to return to the Rustaveli Avenue area with protective gear seized from the police officers. 33. A warning to disperse was sounded at 2.59 a.m., while tear gas and the water cannon were being used. The message transmitted via sound amplifying equipment was “please disperse, otherwise measures provided for by the law will be used in order to restore public order and peace. Please take children, women and the elderly away from the areas of unrest.” The message was repeated several times, as the riot police proceeded to clear Rustaveli Avenue and the remaining demonstrators kept retreating while throwing various items at the police. Journalists kept filming and reporting on the events as they unfolded, mostly from the pavements of Rustaveli Avenue. 34. While retreating, some individuals engaged in acts of vandalism. The dispersal and the clashes continued until approximately 6.45 a.m. on 21 June 2019. In total, 342 individuals were arrested. 35. Over 200 individuals were injured during the events of 20-21 June 2019, including approximately eighty police officers and forty journalists. In early March 2020 approximately fifteen individuals admitted to having committed violent acts against the police. They were convicted by means of plea-bargain agreements. Other individuals also appear to have been convicted in respect of the violent behaviour against the police. APPLICANTS’ INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
36. The applicants in applications nos. 13186/20, 16757/20 and 20129/21 were reporting on the demonstration in their capacity as journalists, camera operators and/or photographers. 37. At the material time, the eleventh applicant in application no. 20129/21 was wearing a badge showing that he was a journalist accredited by Parliament. 38. The applicants in applications nos. 20175/21 (except for the eighth applicant) and 39382/21 were participants in the demonstration. Medical and non-medical expenses (such as transportation and accommodation costs) related to the treatment (including outside Georgia) of injuries sustained during the demonstration were covered by the State. Application no. 13186/20Video material depicting the applicants’ circumstances

39. On 10 and 11 March 2021 the investigation unit of the General Prosecutor’s Office (“the GPO”) assessed video material which it had obtained on different dates in July 2019. The resulting report described the applicants’ behaviour and the moment when they had received their injuries in the following terms:
“It has been established, on the basis of the analysis of the video file, that Merab Tsaava [the first applicant] was standing in front of the administrative building of the Georgian Parliament, on the pavement ... [He was] standing calmly and [was] not dangerous to the individuals located there. [He had] his hands directed towards the Parliament [building] and [was] presumably making a photo/video recording, at which moment ... his right hand [was] presumably hit with the so-called ‘rubber bullet’, following which he [went up] to the individuals located next to the fountain and within seconds it appeared that he [was] looking for something, [and then] he disappear[ed] from view. ... It has been established, on the basis of the analysis of the video file, that Beslan Kmuzov [the second applicant] was moving from the pavement towards the stairs of the administrative building of the Georgian Parliament ... [He was] holding [what was] presumably a tablet in his right hand, [w]ith his left hand held out, presumably in the direction of the law-enforcement officers stationed at the entrance of the ... Parliament building, addressing them[.] Beslan Kmuzov [was] moving calmly and [was not] dangerous to the individuals located [in that area]. [He was] standing facing the ... Parliament building when ... he [was] presumably hit in the head with the so-called ‘rubber bullet’, following which he join[ed] the mass of people [and] disappear[ed] from view. ...”
40. The reports did not specify the exact point in time during the events when the applicants were hit by rubber bullets. Medical documents regarding the injuries received by the applicants
41. According to medical material obtained by the authorities in June and July 2019, the first applicant received an open wound to a finger and to his chest. The medical note also mentioned the “toxic effect of an unspecified substance”. On 10 March 2021 the National Forensic Bureau (NFB) classified the wound on the finger as a minor bodily injury entailing a short‑term deterioration in his health. The other injury was classified as a minor bodily injury entailing no deterioration in his health. 42. According to the medical material obtained by the authorities in June and July 2019, the second applicant sustained an open wound to the upper right side of the head, necessitating stitches. On 11 March 2021 the NFB found that this had constituted a minor bodily injury entailing a short-term deterioration in his health. Application no. 16757/20Video material depicting the applicant’s circumstances

43. On 9 March 2021 the GPO assessed video material which it had obtained in June and July 2019. The applicant’s behaviour and the moment when he had received an injury were described as follows:
“It has been established, on the basis of the analysis of the video file, that Zaza Svanadze [was standing] in front of the administrative building of the Georgian Parliament ..., he [was] moving calmly and [did] not pose any danger, as is apparent from the video, he raised his hands in the air (and on the basis of his gesticulation, [it appears that] he attempted to call on the law-enforcement officials and the demonstrators to remain calm), at which moment he was hit in the area of the left thigh, presumably with the so-called ‘rubber bullet’. He put his hand on his left leg and disappeared from view.”
Medical documents regarding the injuries received by the applicant
44. According to the medical material obtained by the authorities in June and July 2019, the applicant sustained four open wounds to the inner left thigh and two open wounds to the inner right thigh. On 23 July 2020 the NFB found that this had constituted a minor bodily injury entailing no deterioration in his health. Application no. 20129/21Video and photo material depicting the applicants’ circumstances

45. The first applicant: according to the GPO’s report of 15 December 2022 concerning the examination of the video material available in respect of the first applicant, she was injured while standing on the right-hand side of the stairs leading to the Parliament’s entrance. It was noted that at that time some demonstrators had been clashing with the police. According to the report in question, the applicant did not pose any threat to the law-enforcement officers or other individuals when she was injured. 46. The second applicant: the video material available in the domestic criminal case file showed her filming the events. The related report by the GPO of 2 September 2021 described a moment when the applicant had moved her left leg in an unusual manner and grabbed it suddenly. During the official examination of that video-recording, the applicant explained that her movements had been caused by a rubber bullet which had ricocheted hitting her shin. 47. The third applicant: while the applicant appeared in some videos from the demonstration, they do not appear to have depicted the moment she was injured. 48. The fourth and fifth applicants: the two applicants were reporting on the events of the demonstration together. The video material available in relation to them showed that the fourth applicant had filmed the moment when a rubber bullet had hit the fifth applicant and the latter had picked it up and shown it to the camera. The fifth applicant was then heard saying that the bullet had also hit the fourth applicant. The fourth applicant took photographs of herself with round bruises on her body. 49. The sixth applicant: An examination report produced by a prosecutor on 25 June 2019 in respect of some media coverage of the events noted that according to the material in question, the applicant had been injured by rubber bullets. The applicant also presented the authorities with photos of his back showing open wounds. He also submitted video material filmed by him from the area where other journalists had also been located, showing the tensions at the stairs of the Parliament building and what appears to be the shooting of rubber bullets. The video ends with the applicant screaming, apparently owing to pain. The material assessed by the GPO in 2019 and later on 28 February 2023 showed that the applicant had been standing near the stairs leading to the entrance of the Parliament building, taking photos and making video-recordings of the events, while wearing a press badge. He did not pose any threat to the law-enforcement officers or other demonstrators when he was injured, “presumably with a rubber bullet”. He was located within several metres of the police cordon. 50. The seventh applicant: the video material available in respect of the seventh applicant showed him filming the events, including the shooting of rubber bullets during the demonstration. At the end he was heard saying “something hit me.”
51. The eighth applicant: a photo featuring the eighth applicant showed him with a round haematoma on the stomach. He also submitted video material showing one masked officer standing at the entrance of the Parliament building, while a scuffle was going on just below the entrance, aiming a rifle in the applicant’s direction (it does not appear from the case file material that the officer shot at the applicant). The applicant was standing in an area where people were either standing calmly or walking away from the Parliament building. 52. The ninth applicant: in a video file uploaded by the ninth applicant online, he was heard saying “presumably they fired rubber bullets, because two have hit me personally”. After the sound of shooting, he was also heard to say:
“We are journalists, what are you doing? ... Despite the fact that I am showing you the T-shirt I am wearing [with the word Press printed on it], ... I was hit in the chest, just several minutes ago, [and] it can be said that I was shot on purpose. This was not a random shooting, because I will now show you that nobody was standing there [the ninth applicant turned the camera around to show that no people were standing at the memorial known as the 9 April Memorial], and I was standing there with a journalist from Netgazeti when they shot in my direction.”
53. A report by the GPO dated 17 March 2021 regarding the video material available in respect of the tenth applicant noted the following:
“It has been established, on the basis of the analysis of the video file, that ... presumably Ekaterine Abashidze [the tenth applicant] was standing at the stairs in front of the administrative building of the Georgian Parliament, [and] presumably [she] did not pose a danger to the individuals gathered there. She was presumably ... making a video-recording and/or taking photographs when her left hand was hit, presumably by the so-called ‘rubber bullet.”
Another recording was said to contain a statement by the tenth applicant, recorded after she had been injured:
“I have also been hit by a bullet, I can show you ..., it is a stray bullet, but still.”
54. The eleventh applicant: a video taken by the applicant and submitted to the GPO in 2019 shows that he was livestreaming the events via his mobile phone from the inner yard of the Parliament building, where riot police had been positioned. The sounds of shooting, possibly from guns containing rubber bullets and/or tear gas, could be heard coming from outside the area. The applicant was heard coughing. The video contains images of policemen moving around in the yard and the applicant’s running commentary stating that journalists had been stationed outside the entrance when tear gas had been used by the police, and that he had been helped by a policeman and led into that yard. At that moment he was addressed by a male who cannot be seen on the video, who demanded to know his identity and asked what he was doing there. The applicant responded that he was a journalist, instructing the said individual to look at his badge, at which moment it appears that a scuffle broke out, with the applicant yelling “What are you doing? I was live ...”, with the phone being lowered and movements suggesting that he was being pushed out of the inner yard. “Why are you breaking the equipment?” the applicant was heard shouting, and the same male voice was heard saying “What am I breaking? I will break it over you (დაგალეწავ)”. He was then heard shouting “Kick him out” and “Take him out” and telling the applicant to leave. The applicant was heard repeating that he was a journalist and that it had been a police officer who had let him inside. The scuffle lasted slightly over a minute. Medical documents regarding the applicants
55. No medical documents were made available in respect of the ninth applicant. He refused to undergo a forensic examination by the NFB. 56. As regards the remaining applicants, the content of the available medical documents relating to them can be summarised as follows. 57. The first applicant: a medical certificate dated 21 June confirms that she was taken to hospital by paramedics. It describes the injuries she sustained as “a wound to the [top] part of the left shoulder” and “an open fracture of the left shoulder bone”. A discharge certificate indicates that the injuries necessitated a surgical intervention, and the first applicant was discharged from hospital two days later. An NFB report dated 27 January 2023 noted that the injuries in question were to be classified as grave and life‑threatening. According to the NFB report, it could not be excluded that they might have been inflicted by some sort of projectile, but determining the type of weapon used to inflict the injury went beyond the NFB’s remit. On the basis of the documents presented for examination, the expert was unable to determine from what distance the shot in question had been fired. 58. The second applicant: according to the medical material from June 2019, and subsequently an NFB report dated 4 August 2021, the applicant received a bruise on her left shin inflicted by some blunt object, and it could have been received on the date indicated by the GPO (20-21 June 2019). 59. The third applicant: according to the medical material from June 2019, and subsequently an NFB report of 26 October 2021, the third applicant “suffered from the toxic effect of an unspecified substance”. It was also noted that she had had bruises on her right shin which must have been inflicted by some blunt object. The injuries were classified as minor, entailing no deterioration in her health. 60. The fourth applicant: according to a medical certificate issued on 21 June 2019, the fourth applicant suffered from the toxic effect of an unidentified substance and sustained bruises on her lower back and thigh. The NFB report obtained at some point in 2022 confirmed those findings. 61. The fifth applicant: on 6 July 2019 the NFB expert examined the applicant and did not find any signs of injuries. No other medical documents are available in relation to him. 62. The sixth applicant: the medical certificate dated 21 June 2019 diagnosed the applicant with eleven open wounds on his back and “one open wound on the left shoulder, inflicted by a rubber bullet”. The NFB report of 21 December 2022 concluded that each injury, taken in isolation, belonged to the category of minor injuries entailing no deterioration in his health. On the basis of the documents presented for examination, the expert was unable to determine from what distance the shot in question had been fired. 63. The seventh applicant: a medical note produced by paramedics on 21 June 2019 describes open wounds received by the applicant on his cheek and temple. An NFB report of 26 July 2021 found that these injuries could have been inflicted by some blunt object, potentially on the date indicated by the applicant, and that they were to be classified as minor injuries. 64. The eighth applicant: an NFB report of 19 August 2021 stated that on the basis of photographs taken by the applicant on 22 June 2019, he did not have a “mechanical injury”, but he had a pinkish area on his stomach. 65. The tenth applicant: medical documents of 21 June 2019 and an NFB report of 26 October 2021 described the applicant’s injury as “a superficial wound with burnt borders to the middle section of the upper left shoulder, measuring 1 centimetre in diameter, and a superficial wound measuring 1 centimetre in diameter to the middle (upper) section of the ... front part of the shoulder”. The NFB classified the injuries as minor, entailing “some or no” deterioration in her health. It was noted that it had been impossible to determine the possible cause of the injuries and when they had been sustained, because their description in the medical certificates was incomplete. 66. The eleventh applicant: on 21 June 2019 the applicant applied to the NFB to have his injuries recorded. It was established that he had sustained bruises on his right and left forearms, right shoulder, and between the shoulder blades. On 4 August 2021 the NFB found that the injuries recorded in respect of the eleventh applicant could have been inflicted by some blunt object, potentially on the date indicated by him, and that they were to be classified as minor injuries entailing no deterioration in his health. Application no. 20175/21
67. All but the eighth applicant were demonstrators. The eighth applicant went to the site of the events to search for his brother-in-law, and he was injured soon thereafter. 68. All the applicants sustained injuries. The third, fifth and seventh applicants alleged that they had been physically ill-treated. The remaining applicants alleged that their injuries had been inflicted by rubber bullets. 69. The third, fifth and seventh applicants were arrested and charged with administrative offences of disorderly conduct and disobedience to lawful orders of the police. The third and seventh applicants were acquitted of the charges for lack of evidence. The fifth applicant was convicted as charged. It was established that he had been arrested at 5 a.m. on 21 June 2019 for swearing and disobeying a police order to leave the area. He was sentenced to three days’ administrative detention. Video and other material depicting the applicants’ circumstances
70. The first applicant: an examination report produced by a prosecutor on 24 June 2019 in respect of some media coverage of the events noted that the first applicant appeared to have been injured by a rubber bullet. A report on an examination of the video material carried out with the applicant’s participation noted the location where the applicant had been injured and the fact that at that moment he had posed no threat to anyone. 71. The second applicant: a photo of the applicant’s injuries was made available at domestic level. 72. The third applicant: an examination report produced by a prosecutor on 14 November 2019 in respect of a video-recording noted that the applicant’s wife had confirmed that the recording in question depicted the moment of the third applicant’s arrest and ill-treatment. The report did not give any details of the ill-treatment described by the third applicant’s wife. 73. The fourth applicant: one video-recording was identified at domestic level in 2019. It apparently showed the applicant after he had been injured. 74. The fifth applicant: a report produced by a prosecutor on 18 November 2022 noted that video and photo material depicting the applicant’s arrest existed. It apparently showed the applicant lying handcuffed on the ground face down, and later being escorted to a police car. 75. The sixth applicant: a report produced by a prosecutor on 24 June 2019 in respect of some media coverage of the events noted that the sixth applicant had lost an eye during the events of 20-21 June 2019. A report produced on 6 November 2019 noted that the sixth applicant had been led away from near the left side of the stairs leading to the Parliament building, with a bleeding injury to her left eye which she had been covering with her hand. 76. The seventh applicant: an examination report produced by a prosecutor on 28 June 2019 in respect of a video-recording of the applicant’s arrest noted that the applicant had explained that he had been ill-treated, apparently when the camera had been directed elsewhere. 77. The eighth applicant: video material featuring the eighth applicant appears to have been made available at domestic level. It is unclear what that material showed. 78. The ninth applicant: an examination report produced by a prosecutor on 24 June 2019 in respect of some media coverage of the events noted that the ninth applicant had lost an eye during those events, without elaborating on the matter. 79. The tenth applicant: an official report produced on 28 December 2021 in respect of video and photo material noted that the applicant had actually been injured at 12.16 a.m., rather than at 1 a.m. as he had indicated. At one point, prior to being injured, he could be observed standing in front of the police cordon holding a shield which had apparently been seized from a police officer. It was noted that in one of the incidents caught on camera, the tenth applicant had been “actively resisting, with his hand movements” the police officers located on the stairs leading to the Parliament building. He had then turned around and gone down the stairs, “presumably owing to the effect of tear gas”. In another video it appeared that the applicant had kicked a police officer’s shield with his leg and waved his own shield in the direction of the officer. Photo material obtained from a witness showed that the applicant had been kneeling down either when he had apparently been injured or immediately thereafter. 80. The eleventh applicant: an official report produced on 25 June 2019 in respect of video material, with the eleventh applicant’s participation, noted that the applicant had indicated to an investigator the segments in the video material in which he could be identified, and that they had confirmed the circumstances described in his witness statements produced at domestic level. An examination report of 17 November 2022 noted that the eleventh applicant had been standing in front of law-enforcement officers, near individuals who had been violent, but he had not posed any danger to the officers or other individuals. He had been hit in the back by a rubber bullet when he had leaned down to help an injured individual to his feet. He had been standing on the stairs leading to the Parliament’s entrance. There had been approximately three metres between him and the first row of the police cordon. In another incident, the eleventh applicant could be seen suddenly putting his hand to the area of his right eye, and then being helped by two demonstrators and led away. Medical documents regarding the applicants
81. The first applicant: a medical certificate of 27 June 2019 indicated that the applicant had been taken to hospital by paramedics at 4.42 a.m. on 21 July 2019, with an open wound in the area of his left eye, concussion and other traumatic injuries of the facial bones. The applicant had explained that he had been injured by a rubber bullet. The document indicated that the first applicant had undergone two operations and received inpatient care, and he had been discharged on the date when the certificate had been issued. It also noted that the injuries in question had meant that the applicant had been unable to work for a month. Numerous subsequent medical documents issued on various dates in 2019 and 2020 indicated that the applicant had undergone multiple surgical interventions and other treatment in respect of injuries sustained on 21 June 2019, and that he had virtually lost his sight in the injured eye. An NFB report of 29 April 2021 classified the applicant’s injuries as serious and life-threatening, on the basis of an assessment of the medical documents. 82. The second applicant: a medical certificate of 22 June 2019 indicated that the second applicant had been taken to hospital at 12.45 a.m. on 21 June 2019. He had been diagnosed with a broken jaw. The applicant had explained that he had been injured by a rubber bullet. The document indicated that the second applicant had undergone an operation and received inpatient care, and that he had been discharged on the date when the certificate had been issued. 83. The third applicant: a medical certificate of 21 June 2019 indicated that the third applicant had sustained superficial trauma to the chest wall. The applicant had explained that he had been injured as a result of physical ill‑treatment by a police officer. He had been discharged on the same day. 84. The fourth applicant: a medical certificate of 21 June 2019 indicated that the fourth applicant had sustained an open wound in the area of his stomach, necessitating a surgical intervention. He had been discharged on the same day. An NFB report of 21 September 2021 noted that the injury could be categorised as a minor bodily injury entailing a short-term deterioration in his health. 85. The fifth applicant: a medical certificate of 23 June 2019 indicated that the fifth applicant had been admitted to hospital on that date. He had had pain in the right eye, redness and swelling. He had explained that the injury had been sustained at a demonstration (“presumably [inflicted] by a truncheon”). On 24 June 2019 the applicant returned to hospital, complaining of pain in the face and head area. Medical imaging revealed traumatic injury to the facial bones. A surgical intervention was recommended, but the applicant refused this. 86. The sixth applicant: medical certificates issued upon the sixth applicant’s admission to hospital inpatient care at 1.53 a.m. on 21 June 2019, and in relation to her subsequent care, indicated that she had sustained injuries to her left eye and around the eye, resulting in open wounds, the rupture of the eyeball and fragmented fractures of the eye socket and nose. The applicant had explained that she had been injured by a rubber bullet at the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019. The sixth applicant underwent operations. Her left eyeball was eventually removed and an artificial one inserted. An NFB report of 8 November 2019 classified the applicant’s injuries as grave, entailing the permanent loss of more than one-third of her ability to work. 87. The seventh applicant: a medical certificate of 21 June 2019 indicated that the seventh applicant had been diagnosed with closed trauma to the chest, superficial trauma to the scalp, and contusion on an eyelid and in the eye area. He had explained that the injury had been sustained as a result of being beaten at a demonstration. A medical certificate of 12 August 2019 indicated that the applicant had a linear fracture of the left eighth and ninth ribs. 88. The eighth applicant: a medical certificate of 21 June 2019 indicated that the eighth applicant had been diagnosed with an open wound to the cheek necessitating stitches. He had explained that he had received the wound after a foreign object had been shot at him at the demonstration. 89. The ninth applicant: medical certificates issued upon the ninth applicant’s admission to hospital inpatient care at 1.12 a.m. on 21 June 2019, and in relation to his subsequent care, indicated that he had sustained injuries to his left eye and around the eye resulting in open wounds, rupture of the eyeball and fractures of the facial bones. He had explained that he had been injured by a foreign object at the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019. The ninth applicant underwent operations. His left eyeball was eventually removed and an artificial one inserted. An NFB report of 19 November 2019 concluded that the injuries had been grave, resulting in the permanent loss of 35% of the applicant’s working capacity. 90. The tenth applicant: a medical certificate of 28 June 2019 indicated that the applicant had been admitted to hospital at 1.11 a.m. on 21 June 2019. He had been diagnosed with an open wound of the posterior chest wall. Three black round objects identified as “rubber bullets or rubber bullet fragments” had been retrieved from the wound. An NFB report of 26 October 2021 established that the applicant’s injury should be categorised as a minor bodily injury entailing a short-term deterioration in his health, and that it might have been caused by impact from some type of projectile. 91. The eleventh applicant: a medical certificate of 21 June 2019 indicated that the eleventh applicant had been admitted to hospital at 4 a.m. on that date. He had been diagnosed with trauma to his right eyeball, superficial trauma to the face and, later on, a detached retina. Several surgical interventions and other procedures were carried out subsequently. The eleventh applicant’s eyesight in the injured eye remained diminished. An NFB report of 9 June 2022 concluded that his injuries had been caused by trauma and could be classified as less severe but resulting in the permanent loss of 15-25% of his capacity to work. Application no. 39382/21Video and photo material depicting the applicant’s circumstances

92. An examination report produced by a prosecutor on 24 June 2019 in respect of some media coverage of the events noted that according to the material in question, the applicant had sustained an arm injury caused by a rubber bullet. The video material submitted by the applicant at domestic level and before the Court revealed that he had been shot while filming the events on his mobile phone, in the right corner near the stairs leading to the Parliament building. At that moment some demonstrators located in the central area in front of the police cordon had been throwing items at the officers stationed there, while several officers had been standing above the stairs, behind the police cordon, and shooting tear gas projectiles and/or rubber bullets. Medical documents regarding the applicant
93. Medical documents dated 21 June and 1 July 2019 indicated that the applicant had been treated at 1.56 a.m. on 21 June 2019. He had had an open wound to the left lower shoulder, and a rubber bullet had been retrieved from there. An NFB report of 25 October 2021 noted that the injury sustained by the applicant had constituted a minor bodily injury entailing a short-term deterioration in his health. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONOpening of the criminal investigation and granting of victim status

94. On 22 June 2019 the GPO opened an ex officio criminal investigation into the events of 20-21 June 2019. The decision to open the investigation referred to Article 333 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 133 below) in the context of “the alleged exceeding, by means of violence or weapons, of the official authority of individual officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, during the dispersal of the participants in the assembly and demonstration held on Rustaveli Avenue” on 20-21 June 2019. The investigation covered all incidents which had taken place during the events in question. 95. On an unspecified date the investigation was extended to cover alleged unlawful interference with journalists’ professional activities, an offence under Article 154 of the Criminal Code (ibid.). 96. All the applicants were questioned as part of the investigation in question in June and July 2019 (see paragraph 108 below). 97. On various dates in 2019 and 2020 the fifth, ninth and eleventh applicants in application no. 20129/21 and the third, fourth, seventh, eighth and tenth applicants in application no. 20175/21 lodged applications requesting that they be granted the procedural status of a victim as part of the ongoing criminal investigation. Their applications were rejected first by the prosecutor and subsequently by the domestic courts on the grounds that the investigation had not yet determined whether a criminal offence might have been committed against the relevant applicants. They were however informed that the investigation into the matter was ongoing. According to the case-file material, these applicants have not been granted victim status to date. 98. The remaining applicants were granted victim status on different dates in 2020-2023. Involvement of the Public Defender’s Office in the monitoring of the investigation
99. On 2 July 2019 the GPO authorised the Public Defender’s Office (PDO) to monitor the ongoing criminal investigation and have full access to the material in the criminal case file. 100. On various dates in July 2019 the PDO made several recommendations for the GPO to follow. Among other things, the PDO stressed the importance of investigating the actions and omissions of mid- to high-level officials of the MIA in relation to the contested events, including as regards the supervision of the use of rubber bullets during the dispersal. Noting the statements of individual officers saying that they had been unaware of whether any individual had been hurt as a result of their use of rubber bullets, the PDO noted the importance of investigating whether any MIA officials had produced a report concerning the use of rubber bullets and their impact on various individuals. These and other recommendations were subsequently reiterated in public reports by the PDO (see also paragraph 170 below), and included exploring possible omissions of senior MIA personnel and a systemic legal analysis of the events (ibid.). 101. On 29 July 2021, in its correspondence with the Ministry of Justice, and apparently in respect of the recommendations made by the PDO (see the previous paragraph), the GPO noted the following:
“On the basis of the material in the case file, the decision to use non-lethal projectiles was taken by individual police officers, [acting] independently. Additionally, the material does not confirm that the police officers used non-lethal projectiles in excess of their authority in absolutely all circumstances. There [were] individual, independent incidents when non-lethal projectiles were used. Accordingly, the link between [any possible omission of the former Director of the Special Assignments Department of the MIA] and the outcome [of such use of projectiles] must be determined in respect of [each] individual incident, taking into account the specific situation and factual circumstances. In addressing the question of criminal liability, the investigation must determine a specific incident where the immediate and direct link between the omission of the director and the exceeding of authority/outcome of a police officer’s action is incontrovertibly proven. Failure to observe this will create a risk of an individual being held criminally liable for a specific action which he could not have foreseen and repressed, also taking into account the scope of the present police operation. However, it is to be noted that the investigation regarding the case is ongoing, [and] the obtaining/assessment of evidence and the above-noted position [are] not final. The position is based on the information available thus far, and depends on the final outcome of the investigation.”
Retrieval of information from different non-governmental organisations
102. On 29 June and 1 July 2019 the GPO asked various non-governmental organisations to provide any information, documents or reports regarding the possible violation of human rights by law-enforcement officers during the dispersal of the demonstration. It appears that the information was obtained soon thereafter. Requests made to the Ministry of Internal Affairs
103. On different dates in June and July 2019 the GPO asked the MIA – the authority in charge of securing public order during demonstrations – for information regarding: (a) the strategy and methods used to terminate the demonstration and the legal basis for such decisions; (b) the use of special means by the police officers involved in the process, and the type of weapons involved; and (c) the professional preparation and training of the officers. The GPO also applied to different State agencies for information regarding their employees’ alleged participation in the events of 20-21 June 2019. The information requested was received at some point in 2019. 104. On 23 August 2019 the GPO asked the MIA whether any of the officers involved in the dispersal of the demonstration had informed their superiors of injuries inflicted on individuals. The MIA replied on the same day that the purpose of the obligation to inform superiors of any injuries inflicted on individuals as a result of the use of force had been to ensure that such acts were followed up by a proper investigation to determine if the officers had complied with the law. In this regard, the dispersal had been widely covered by the media, which had shown that both the law-enforcement personnel and the individuals present at the demonstration had suffered injuries. The superiors of officers who had used non-lethal force during the dispersal had become aware of such use of force on the ground. Additionally, senior officials of the MIA and the GPO had also become aware of such developments, leading to the GPO’s opening of a criminal investigation. Accordingly, the purpose of the notification obligation provided for in Ministerial Order no. 1002 (see paragraph 149 below) had been complied with. 105. The investigating authorities also obtained various pieces of classified material, such as recordings from the portable radio equipment of middle and high-ranking MIA officials which had been made during the demonstration and its dispersal. Examination of weapons and shells used to disperse the demonstration
106. On various dates in June 2019 the GPO commissioned ballistic and chemical forensic examinations regarding the weapons and ammunition used during the dispersal of the 20-21 June demonstration. The results of the examinations, obtained on different dates in September 2019, determined that the shells belonged to either “non-lethal” rubber bullets in the “category of non-combat material, aimed to be trauma-inducing with limited injurious effect”, or “non-lethal” tear gas shells in the “category of non-combat material, with limited injurious effect”. With respect to orange-coloured rubber bullets, it was noted that precision as regards hitting a target was diminished beyond a radius of five metres. As for the remaining types of rubber bullets, it was noted that they would spread out depending on the range of the shooting. It was stated that the shells presented to the experts had an overall range of fifty metres at most. 107. The GPO also obtained information from the manufacturers of the relevant projectiles. According to the documents provided, the projectiles were non-lethal. Questioning of victims and witnesses
108. All the applicants were questioned in June and July 2019. They provided their account of the events and submitted video and photo material which they had obtained. Among other things, the first applicant in application no. 13186/20 noted that two police officers had aided him in his attempts to find his mobile phone, which he had dropped on the ground because of his injuries. The second applicant in application no. 20129/21 stated that she had been hit by a rubber bullet which had ricocheted, and that the protesters standing on the stairs had been the actual target. Several applicants stated that, in their opinion, the injuries which they had sustained could only have been inflicted by their having been directly targeted. Some applicants stated that they had seen police officers targeting individual demonstrators and/or journalists. None could identify any of the officers. 109. In total, 625 individuals were questioned in 2019. 110. Among other witnesses, the Minister of Internal Affairs gave statements, in July and November 2019, regarding the planning, management and supervision of the dispersal of the demonstration. He noted that the demonstration had initially been peaceful, but the situation on the ground had deteriorated following the statements made by some politicians and attempts by one aggressive group of individuals to storm the Parliament building. He noted that he had explained the unlawful nature of the developments in his statements, and the MIA had circulated warnings about the possible use of special means to disperse the demonstration in the event that violent actions were committed. In view of those warnings, and due to the tense nature of the circumstances on the ground, it had not been possible to issue a warning to the demonstrators gathered there prior to starting to use the special means such as tear gas. Such a warning had, however, been issued prior to the use of the water cannon. As for the use of rubber bullets, no order to use them had been issued by any of the senior officials and the police must have acted in circumstances of force majeure, aiming to avert an immediate risk to the lives and health of police officers and/or other individuals, and all officers had been properly trained to use such equipment (the content of such training was not specified). He stated that no special authorisation to use rubber bullets was required in such situations, and in the circumstances of the massive breach of public order which had taken place, it had not been necessary to give a prior warning to the demonstrators and give them a reasonable period of time to leave the area. The Minister also stated that the police measures had been proportionate, slowly increasing in severity, and that the various means used to disperse the demonstration had been used only after the police had been deprived of most of their protective gear after hours of resisting the violence employed by a group of demonstrators. Therefore, around midnight he had decided to authorise the termination of the violent demonstration with the use of tear gas. He stated that the special means had not been used simultaneously in respect of the same group of people. In reply to a question from the prosecutor as to whether it had been possible to separate the group of individuals who had been inclined to aggression from the peaceful demonstrators, the Minister stated that this had not been feasible, given that the individuals concerned had occupied the space immediately adjacent to the police cordon located on the stairs of the Parliament building, and had been surrounded by other individuals. In the Minister’s submission, the individuals gathered in front of the Parliament building had had every opportunity to leave the area once the dispersal had commenced, as no street had been blocked by the authorities. The Minister also noted that there had been efforts to negotiate with the leaders of the political parties who had been at the forefront of the demonstration, but they had failed to make any specific moves to de-escalate the situation. As the degree of violence had intensified, any negotiation attempts had become futile. 111. Other senior officials were also questioned about their role in the events and whether they had ordered or authorised the use of rubber bullets. Their account was similar to that given by the Minister (see the previous paragraph). 112. Individual officers involved in the dispersal of the demonstration stated that they had withstood several hours of repeated attempts by one part of the protesters to break the police cordon and storm the Parliament building. They stated that individuals in the front rows of the demonstration had acted aggressively, violently pushing the officers, throwing stones, bottles and other items at them, grabbing their helmets and pieces of defensive equipment, and assaulting some of them. Some officers noted that the violent individuals had attempted to take away their non-lethal ammunition which, in case of the said individuals’ success, would have been used against the officers. Others also noted that it had become impossible to use the batons to control the crowd as any such movement by them would have led to the breaking of the cordon. The dispersal had started only after the violent group of demonstrators had breached the three-metre perimeter around the entrance of the Parliament building and the police cordon had been unable to contain them any further. It was noted that at first only tear gas was used, as a measure of last resort and when it became clear to the officers that their life and health had become seriously endangered. The relevant officers noted that they had duly observed the rules on using tear gas projectiles in densely populated demonstrations by shooting them in the direction further away from the crowd. The immediate effect with the crowd receding only lasted a couple of minutes and, according to the officers, the aggressive part of the demonstrators started assaulting the officers stationed in the police cordon with even greater hostility. 113. As the use of tear gas yielded no lasting results and the violent behaviour of a number of individuals became particularly intense, the officers became compelled, in their submission, to use rubber bullets. In this respect, they noted that the decision to use rubber bullets had been taken individually, without there being an order for this, on the basis of the specific circumstances on the ground, namely when a real and imminent danger to the lives and health of officers and other individuals existed. Some officers specified that they had acted in accordance with the law as in such cases it had been unnecessary to obtain an order or an instruction on the use of rubber bullets. The relevant officers noted that they had received “general permission” before their deployment to be ready for any situation which could necessitate the use of special means, including rubber bullets. According to the officers, only those who had undergone specific training on the use of non-lethal ammunition had been given such equipment. Some also stated that their commanders had been present when non-lethal shells had been used and that there had been no order to stop shooting rubber bullets. The officers had not been aware of whether specific individuals had been injured by their use of tear gas projectiles or rubber bullets. 114. The officers who used special equipment during the dispersal of the demonstration also indicated that the allocation and use of non-lethal guns and projectiles had been subject to strict control. Namely, such equipment was recorded and kept at a special storage facility. Each time any of these means was allocated to an officer, and subsequently returned to the storage unit, an appropriate record was to be made with the relevant officer’s signature. This procedure was also followed on 20-21 June 2019, both at the allocation and the return stages. Thus, alongside the non-lethal rifles, all non‑lethal projectiles which had not been used during the dispersal were counted and returned to the designated storage facility. 115. The officers in question also noted that they had not had a body camera with them and that their protective uniforms did not have insignia which could identify them personally. They also stated that many officers had worn protective helmets and it had been difficult to recognise each other. 116. A number of witnesses noted that the demonstration had not had any designated organisers, but some protesters located in the front rows of the demonstration had appeared to resort to violent behaviour after hearing speeches made there in the evening. A number of items, including pieces of metal, sticks and bottles, had been thrown at the officers standing in the police cordon, and protestors located in the front rows had become particularly violent just before the dispersal had started. Some individuals, including at least one applicant, mentioned that the use of rubber bullets had appeared to aggravate the demonstrators. A photographer (not an applicant in the present case) located in the front rows of the demonstration stated that individual officers in the police cordon had been shouting phrases like “What are you doing? Step back” as some of the protesters had been attempting to break through the cordon. 117. Several witnesses noted that it had been impossible to identify the shooters, as they had worn masks. Some indicated that tensions had started in response to the repeated attempts by a group of individuals to enter the Parliament building, while others noted that they had not been aware of this, as they had been standing away from the stairs leading to the building. Some individuals confessed to having attempted to break through the cordon even as the tear gas had been used. Others stated that they had not been violent, but had been injured nonetheless. Injuries were reported by individuals who had been standing relatively close to the stairs leading to Parliament and those who had been located further away from the area. Some witnesses and victims alleged that rubber bullets had been deliberately aimed at them, while others noted that such bullets had been shot indiscriminately at the crowd, without regard for whether the individuals shot at had been violent or not. 118. On 29 July 2021, in its correspondence with the Ministry of Justice, the GPO stated that “certain impediments existed in the process of identifying officers allegedly involved in criminal offences”, apparently because of the constant rotation of the officers on the ground, the poor quality of the videos available and/or the shifting angles of the video-recordings. It was noted that efforts to address the issue were ongoing but were taking time, given the sheer amount of material to be analysed. Obtaining video and other material
119. On 20 June 2019, forty minutes after the incident involving the eleventh applicant in application no. 20129/21 (see paragraph 54 above), the applicant in question made a complaint to the General Inspectorate of the MIA and requested that the video material be obtained from the cameras positioned inside the yard of the Parliament building. It appears that no reply was received. No such material was obtained. 120. On various dates in June, July and November 2019 the GPO obtained different pieces of video and photo material from media organisations, the applicants and various agencies of the MIA depicting the events of 20-21 June 2019 (recordings from police body cameras, video cameras installed in police vehicles, cameras installed in the buildings where detainees had been taken, and cameras installed in the premises of the MIA). This material was examined, and relevant reports describing its content were produced on different dates in 2019 and 2021. 121. In June and July 2019 the GPO also inspected the scene of the incident, obtained information regarding the persons arrested during the demonstration, and identified the ambulances and emergency crews which had been on duty or called to Rustaveli Avenue on 20-21 June 2019. Retrieval of medical documentation
122. On various dates in June and July 2019 the prosecution obtained a judicial warrant to retrieve, from various medical establishments, documents and other material (such as rubber bullets and bloodstained clothing) relating to 318 individuals, including the applicants, in relation to the events of 20‑21 June 2019. The warrant was executed and the requested material was obtained within that same period. Ordering of forensic medical examinations
123. On 2 July 2019 the GPO forwarded the medical documents obtained in respect of 337 individuals to the NFB, with a view to carrying out forensic medical examinations. The NFB was asked to determine the existence of any injuries, when and how they had been inflicted, and their gravity. 124. The resulting reports involving the majority of the applicants were received on different dates in 2019-2022. The NFB report regarding the first applicant in application no. 20129/21 was received on 27 January 2023. 125. The NFB reports involving the applicants and other individuals noted that determining the type of weapons used to inflict the injuries in question had been beyond the competence of the NFB. The reports also noted that the information available in the documents presented to the NFB had not been sufficient to determine from what distance shots had been fired or in what direction. Officers charged as part of the criminal investigation
126. On 16-17 July and 27 August 2019 three officers of the Special Assignments Department of the MIA who had been engaged in restoring public order during the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019 were charged with the offence of exceeding official authority. L.I. was charged for allegedly using excessive force and physical violence against a demonstrator who had been arrested; G.E. for allegedly firing rubber bullets at two protesters at close range, unnecessarily; and M.A. for allegedly using physical violence against a demonstrator who had been arrested. 127. On an unspecified date in 2021 the criminal proceedings against the three individuals were terminated, as they accepted the application of an amnesty to their cases under the Amnesty Act of 7 September 2021 (see paragraph 154 below). Disciplinary inquiry by the MIA
128. On 24 June 2019 the MIA suspended ten officers pending the outcome of the criminal investigation into the possible exceeding of authority during the dispersal of the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019. At some point in July 2019 the head of the Special Assignments Department was also suspended. 129. As appears from the material in the case file, at some point in 2019 the General Inspectorate of the MIA carried out an inquiry and disciplinary measures were taken against eleven employees. One was severely reprimanded, eight were reprimanded, and a formal notice was issued against two officers. The case file does not contain the relevant report. The identity of the relevant officers is unclear, as is the substance of the findings in respect of them. It is unclear whether these were the same officers as those who had been suspended on 24 June 2019 (see the preceding paragraph). Current status of the investigation
130. The criminal investigation into the events of 20-21 June 2019 is ongoing. CIVIL-LAW PROCEEDINGS
131. On different dates in 2020 several applicants instituted civil-law proceedings against the MIA, claiming damages for the injuries they had sustained during the dispersal of the 20-21 June 2019 demonstration. Some sets of proceedings are still pending at first-instance level, while others have reached appellate stage with some of the applicants having obtained damages in relation to their injuries. OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
132. On 12 March 2020 the Government adopted special measures to counter the global outbreak of COVID-19. These measures included public institutions switching to a special remote working regime. The measures were lifted on 22 March 2022. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
THE CRIMINAL CODE
133. The Criminal Code, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:
Article 154 (unlawful interference with a journalist’s professional activities)
“1. Unlawful interference with a journalist’s professional activities, that is, coercing a journalist into disseminating or not disseminating information, shall be punished by a fine or 120 to 140 hours of community service, or up to two years of corrective labour, or six months to two years of house arrest. 2. The same act committed using the threat of violence or an official position shall be punished by a fine or up to two years’ imprisonment, with or without [the perpetrator] being deprived of the right to hold office or carry out activities for up to three years.”
Article 333 (misuse of authority)
“1. Misuse of authority by a public official ... which substantially [and] adversely affects the rights of a natural person or legal entity, or the legal interests of society or of the State ..., shall be punishable by a fine or six months to two years of house arrest, or by up to three years’ imprisonment, with up to three years’ disqualification from holding public office ...
... 3. The offence specified in paragraphs 1 [and] 2 of this Article, when committed
(a) repeatedly;
(b) with the use of violence or a weapon; [and/or]
(c) by offending the personal dignity of the victim,
shall be punishable by five to eight years’ imprisonment, with up to three years’ disqualification from holding public office ...”
TERMINATION OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCEThe Assemblies and Demonstrations Act

134. In accordance with section 11(1) of the Act, “when organising and holding an assembly or demonstration, it shall be prohibited to call for the overthrow of or a violent change in the constitutional order of Georgia, or for encroachment on the independence or territorial integrity of the country, or to make any calls propagandising armed conflict or violence or inciting national, regional, religious or social hostility [which] create a clear, direct and real risk [of such actions being carried out]”. Section 11(2)(b) provides, among other things, that participants in a demonstration are prohibited from carrying any items which endanger or can be used to endanger the life or health of the participants in the demonstration or other individuals. 135. Section 13(1) of the Act provides that “[i]f the requirements of section 11(1) and (2)(a-c) of this Act are massively violated, the assembly or demonstration shall be terminated immediately at the request of an authorised representative. If the assembly or demonstration is not terminated, law‑enforcement bodies shall take measures under international law and the legislation of Georgia to terminate the assembly or demonstration and disperse the participants”. The Police Act
136. Under section 17(2)(i) of the Police Act, the police shall “ensure, in circumstances provided for under the laws of Georgia, the termination of an assembly or demonstration and the dispersal of the participants in [such events]”. 137. The use of force during such events is regulated as follows:
Article 30 - Coercive measures
“Coercive measures shall include the use, by the police, of physical force, special means and firearms in order to perform police functions.”
Article 31 - Right to use coercive measures
“1. To perform police functions, a police officer may use appropriate and proportionate coercive measures only where this is necessary, and to an extent which shall ensure the achievement of legitimate objectives. 2. A police officer shall be authorised to use firearms and special means only if he or she has undergone special training. 3. Before using physical force [and/or] special means and firearms, a police officer shall warn a person and give [him or her] a reasonable period of time to comply with the lawful order, except in situations where [such a] delay may pose a risk to the life and health of a person and/or a police officer, or other severe consequences, or if such a warning is unjustifiable or impossible in a given situation. 4. The type and intensity of a coercive measure shall be defined on the basis of a given situation, the nature of an offence and the individual particularities of an offender. Additionally, a police officer shall try to cause minimal and proportionate damage when resorting to a coercive measure. 5. A police officer shall be obliged to provide first aid to a person injured by coercive measures. 6. A police officer shall not use means that can cause a person severe injury, may pose an unjustifiable risk, or are prohibited by the laws of Georgia.”
Article 33 - Use of special means
1. A police officer shall use passive and active special means to ensure public security and legal order. 2. Passive special means shall ensure the protection of the life and health of a police officer and/or a person being protected by a police officer. Passive special means are: bulletproof vests, helmets, riot shields, gas masks and other special protective equipment for the body. 3. Active special means disable, for a short period of time, an individual’s resistance to a police officer and/or assist a police officer in performing police functions. Such special means are: handcuffs and other means of restraint, rubber batons, tear gas, pepper spray, sonic weapons, non-lethal weapons (including non-lethal projectiles), stun grenades, devices to stop vehicles by force, barrier demolition equipment, water cannons, armoured cars and other special transport vehicles, special paints, police dogs and horses, electroshock devices and nets. The above-mentioned special means shall be used in the following cases:
... (c) Tear gas, pepper spray, sonic weapons and non-lethal weapons (including non-lethal projectiles) are used to repel an attack on a person, a police officer and/or a protected facility; to suppress a massive breach of legal order by a group; when detaining a person who has committed a crime or an act posing a threat to the public, or when forcing such a person to leave an occupied territory, vehicle or building that the person is using as a shelter; ... (g) water cannons, armoured cars and other special transport [vehicles] are used to suppress mass violations of legal order; to repel a group attack on the State and/or public facilities; to stop a vehicle by force if the driver does not obey a police officer’s demand to stop; to detain an armed offender; ... 4. A police officer shall inform [his or her] immediate superior and the [relevant] prosecutor about causing a person damage or wounding [him or her] as a result of using special means, apart from when it is impossible to inform the immediate superior and the prosecutor, [when this involves] exceptional difficulties, or [when this] impedes the performance of police functions. 5. If special equipment is used against an unspecified number of people, a senior leader [of the operation] shall inform his or her immediate superior and the prosecutor. 6. Rules concerning the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police ... are defined by [legal instruments adopted by] the Minister [of Internal Affairs].”
Ministerial Order no. 1002 approving instructions for the conduct of MIA personnel during assemblies and demonstrations
138. Section 3 of Order no. 1002, in so far as relevant, provides the following definitions of terms:
“(h) A warning – a verbal warning [given] by technical means regarding the use of special measures, [and] given by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies to the participants in an assembly/demonstration;
(i) Special measures – the totality of measures provided for by the laws of Georgia [to be] used by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies to disperse an assembly/demonstration;
... (k) Use of special means – the use of special means as defined by the Police Act ... and the laws of Georgia by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies towards the participants in an assembly/demonstration.”
139. Under section 4(1), “assemblies/demonstrations may be terminated and dispersed by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies when the participants violate the rules set out in the law regarding the holding [of such events] and there are lawful grounds for dispersing [those events] as provided for in the law”. 140. Under section 4(2), the representatives of law-enforcement agencies shall ensure
“(a) negotiation with the organisers of or participants [in an assembly or demonstration], in order to avoid, as much as possible, a forceful intervention and regulate the situation in a peaceful manner;
(b) that peaceful protesters are distinguished or separated from potential lawbreakers, in respect of whom measures provided for in the law can be applied;
(c) that individuals who [have] allegedly breached public order are separated [from the rest of the group] and removed from the area, so that their actions do not lead to the termination or dispersal of a peaceful assembly or demonstration;
... (f) during the termination or dispersal of an assembly or demonstration, the peaceful exit of the participants on the basis of a pre-defined plan (as regards exits, corridors), in order to avoid unrest;
... ”
141. Under section 4(4), “the use of physical force and/or special means by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies must be in conformity with the principle of proportionality [and must be employed] only in cases of absolute necessity, and to the minimum extent necessary in specific circumstances (the principle on the proportionate use of force)”. 142. Section 4(6) provides as follows:
“The representatives of law-enforcement agencies are obliged to not impede the professional activities of journalists who are covering an assembly or demonstration [and] have insignia identifying them as such.”
143. Section 5 provides for the authorities having an obligation to adopt a security action plan in respect of an assembly or demonstration. 144. Section 7 of Order no. 1002 provides that an authorised person shall give a warning to the participants in a demonstration before resorting to force and the use of special means, and “give them a reasonable period of time (at least thirty minutes) to comply with the lawful instructions”. This obligation does not apply in circumstances where a delay may pose a danger to the life and/or health of an individual and/or a law-enforcement officer, or may result in other grave consequences, or if such a warning is unjustified or impossible in a given situation. 145. Section 8(1)(a) provides that a decision to use tear gas can be taken by an individual law-enforcement officer. Section 8(1)(d) provides that “an order to use non-lethal weapons, including non-lethal projectiles, shall be issued by the leader of the unit participating in the [dispersal] measure, with the consent of the supervisor”. In cases where a delay “can pose a real danger to the life and/or health of an individual, [such an order can be issued] by the leader of the unit [alone]”. 146. Section 9(1)(c) of Order no. 1002 prohibits “the use of non-lethal weapons and projectiles in respect of an individual [who is] less than twenty metres away, and in respect of the areas of the body [where an injury would] pose a threat to health and life (the head, neck, stomach, genitals), except in cases where a delay may result in the health and life of an individual or a group of individuals being damaged, or some other grave outcome”. 147. Under section 9(1)(p) of Order no. 1002, “it is prohibited [for a representative of a law-enforcement agency] to use water cannons, rubber bullets and tear gas in respect of the participants in an assembly or demonstration simultaneously, or in parallel to one another (ერთდროულად ან პარალელურ რეჟიმში)”. 148. Under section 9(2), “the use of force and special means [by those] without professional or special training shall be prohibited”. 149. Under section 10(1)(d), a law-enforcement officer participating in the dispersal of a demonstration should inform his or her immediate supervisor and a prosecutor of any injuries caused by the use of force or special means, unless this is impossible. Once the circumstance precluding such notification no longer persists, the officer should notify the relevant persons immediately. Ministerial Order no. 1006 on the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police
150. Order no. 1006, in section 2(2)(c) and (g), provides that the police can use the following special means: tear gas, pepper spray, sonic weapons, non-lethal weapons (including non-lethal projectiles), water cannons, armoured cars and other special transport vehicles. 151. Section 4 of Order no. 1006 regulates the use of special means by the police. It provides that any use of such means should be guided by the principle of necessity, if other means are considered to be ineffective to attain the relevant objectives. Under section 4(2), an officer should firstly issue a warning about the potential use of special means and afford sufficient time for compliance with the lawful order, “except in circumstances where a delay may result in damage to the life and health of a citizen and/or [an officer], some other grave result, or if, in a given situation, it is impossible to issue a warning”. 152. Section 4(4) of Order no. 1006 provides as follows:
“Taking into account the principle of proportionality, the type of special means [used and] the intensity of the physical force [employed] are determined in a specific situation, depending on the nature of the breach of the law and its individual particularities.”
153. Section 5 concerns the “results of the use of special means” and provides as follows:
1. After using special means, an individual authorised [to use force] is obliged to
(a) ensure that individuals who have suffered harm as a result of the use of special means are provided with first aid;
(b) immediately notify his or her supervisor and a prosecutor about the injury or damage caused to an individual as a result of the use of special means, and inform a family member of that individual (if this is feasible), except where [such notification] is impossible, poses particular difficulties or will impede the performance of police functions;
(c) if special means are used in respect of an indeterminate group of individuals, the leader [of the operation] should inform [his or her] immediate supervisor and a prosecutor. 2. When topical and widely publicised issues in society are linked to the use of special means by authorised personnel, the MIA is obliged to disseminate information regarding the appropriateness and lawfulness of such use of special means, by means of the mass media.”
THE AMNESTY ACT
154. The Amnesty Act of 7 September 2021 (see Melia, cited above, §§ 62 and 67) provides as follows:
Section 1
1. All individuals who have committed a criminal offence relating to the events of 20-21 June 2019 ... and who do not refuse the application, by means of the procedure provided for in this Act, of the amnesty provided for in this section, shall be released from criminal liability and [any] sentence, [including] a suspended sentence. 2. The amnesty provided for in this section also applies to individuals who have ... attempted [to carry out such a] criminal offence or [who have been involved in] the preparation of [such an offence]. 3. An individual to whom the amnesty ... is applied shall not have a criminal record. ...”
Section 2
“The amnesty provided for in section 1 of this Act shall not apply to criminal offences under Articles 117 [intentional infliction of serious harm to health] and 1441-1443 [torture, threat of torture, humiliating or inhuman treatment] of the Criminal Code.”
Section 3
“... 3. If criminal proceedings have ended, the first-instance court which delivered the judgment may, after assessing the circumstances provided for in sections 1 and 2 of this Act, take a decision regarding the application of the amnesty ... by means of an oral hearing or written proceedings.
...”
Section 4
“1. Criminal proceedings shall continue in respect of an individual to whom the amnesty provided for in this Act is not applied. This individual shall exercise his or her right to a fair trial. ... 2. An individual who has been convicted at first instance shall have a right to withdraw, at any time and in writing, his or her [prior] written refusal to have the amnesty provided for by this Act applied to him or her. 3. If an individual withdraws, in writing, his or her refusal to have the amnesty provided for in this Act applied to him or her
... (d) after the termination of the criminal proceedings against [him or her], the decision to release [him or her] from the [obligation to serve his or her] sentence ... shall be taken by the regional (city) court which delivered the initial judgment, by means of oral or written proceedings.
...”
OTHER MATERIAL
PLAN for MEASURES AIMED AT SAFEGUARDING AND RESTORING PUBLIC ORDER IN TBILISI
155. The Government provided the Court with a redacted copy of a classified document entitled “the Plan for measures aimed at safeguarding and restoring public order in Tbilisi” (“the Plan”). The document was approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs on 20 June 2019, at some point before the start of the demonstration at 7 p.m. on that day. Its content is summarised below. 156. The Plan indicated that its legal basis included the Constitution of Georgia, the Police Act, the Assemblies and Demonstrations Act, Ministerial Order no. 1002 on instructions for the conduct of MIA personnel during assemblies and demonstrations, and Ministerial Order no. 1006 on the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police. 157. The Plan noted citizens’ “high degree of dissatisfaction” with the events preceding the demonstration (see paragraph 5 above), and referred to a “risk of escalation” on account of the number of individuals expected at the demonstration and the fact that opposition political parties were also planning to participate in it. The Plan noted that it was thus being adopted with a view to “determining the measures to be taken by the MIA in order to safeguard and, if necessary, restore public order”. It provided that special means were to be used in the event of mass violations of public order by the demonstrators, with a view to putting an end to violent and aggressive unlawful acts, and restoring order and protecting, as much as possible, the lives and health of citizens. A section in the document entitled “additional instructions” specified that personnel present at the event were to be given “instructions”, that in order to avoid incidents, any risks or dangers were to be “identified and reported or dealt with in a timely manner”, and that groups with aggressive intentions were to be neutralised. 158. The identity of the leader of the police operation was redacted in the Plan. The number of officers to be mobilised was set at 5,110. In total, nineteen different agencies of the MIA were mobilised, including the Special Assignments Department (tasked with maintaining and, if necessary, restoring public order and security). According to the Plan, the Special Assignments Department was entitled “to use special means, if necessary, to ensure the implementation of measures aimed at restoring public order”. The Security Police Department was tasked with preventing the invasion of the Parliament building, by using special means. The Facilities Protection Department was asked to “clear Rustaveli Avenue from the [area of] Freedom Square metro station towards First Republic Square, by using special means”. The remaining agencies were also asked to ensure that their personnel were stationed where the events were taking place, according to needs and following any indications by the leaders of the police operation, with a view to “maintaining public order”. 159. The Plan contained a list of special equipment commissioned for the police operation and provided that the personnel involved in the police operation were to be equipped with special means and weapons as provided for in section 33 of the Police Act and Ministerial Order no. 1006 on the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police (see paragraphs 137 and 150 above). 160. Three pages of the section entitled “Assignments for the subordinate units in the event of a need to restore public order” were blank, apparently redacted. Pages four to six contained the following assignments:
“Carrying out [officially designated] tasks during the restoration of public order[;]
If necessary, supporting the movement of the main group [of officers] on Rustaveli Avenue by using special means ..., with the aim of preventing demonstrators from returning to Rustaveli Avenue and invading the Parliament building[;]
Deploying [personnel] in the waiting area and, if necessary, [becoming] involved in measures aimed at restoring public order by using special means ...”
161. Sections regarding how the various agencies were to communicate with each other were redacted. REPORTS REGARDING THE DEMONSTRATION OF 20-21 JUNE 2019Special report by the Public Defender’s Office (PDO)

162. On 31 March 2020 the PDO published the “Interim report on the investigation into the events of 20-21 June”. It contained a summary of the investigation material, including in relation to the classified documents, and recommendations made by the PDO to ensure the effectiveness of the investigation. 163. According to the report, the investigating officials of the GPO had started to question officers of the Special Assignments Department of the MIA in mid-July 2019. The individuals who had been questioned had revealed that at the material time the Special Assignments Department had been comprised of (a) military conscripts whose function had been to secure the perimeter of the Parliament building via passive special means; (b) officers designated as shooters who had used tear gas and/or rubber bullets (the exact number of such individuals was not specified, but on one occasion it was referred to as “more than 100 officers”); and (c) other officers (also referred to as riot police) who had been stationed in the police cordon once tensions had arisen at the demonstration. 164. The report contained, among other things, a summary of statements given by the officers of the Special Assignments Department (see paragraphs 112-114 above). According to the report, the statements had contained “virtually identical information”, and only when questioned a second time (following the proposal by the PDO), the officers had explained that their use of special means had been regulated by the Police Act and the relevant Ministerial order concerning the use of such means. 165. As regards whether an official order regarding the use of rubber bullets had been issued, the report concluded as follows:
“according to the case material, the high-level officials of the Ministry (the Minister and his deputies) did not order the use of rubber bullets. It is clear from the recordings from the handheld radios of the Minister and his deputies ... that they categorically ruled out the use of rubber bullets. Nevertheless, officers from the Special [Assignments] Department, who were led by the director of the department ... fired about 800 rubber bullets, and the director of the department did not resort to any means to prevent those actions. At the same time, he was obliged to carry out the orders of his immediate superiors – the Minister and the Deputy Minister in charge of the operation. It is noteworthy that the Minister and his deputies point out in their statements that they soon learned about the use of rubber bullets, although they do not specify [when]. Nevertheless, no action was taken to ensure that the order issued by them was fulfilled, especially given that the use of rubber bullets was not [a] one-off [occurrence lasting] a short time ...”
166. As regards the weapons used during the dispersal, the report noted that three types of non-lethal weapons had been used during the dispersal: 12 mm-calibre guns designed only for rubber bullets; 38 mm-calibre guns designed for rubber and tear gas projectiles; and 40 mm-calibre guns that could only fire tear gas projectiles. According to the summary of the investigation material contained in the report, “[t]he effective distance for accurately hitting a target [was] about 5 metres for orange rubber bullets. The chances of hitting the target decrease[d] as the distance increase[d]. In the case of pellets, the [range] of their scattering increase[d] with distance”. 167. The PDO’s report noted that on 9 January 2020 it had recommended that “a criminal prosecution be launched against G.K., former Director of the Special [Assignments] Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia”. In particular, according to the report:
“The examination of the case material made it clear that the Director of the Special [Assignments] Department had a legal obligation to prevent illegal actions by his subordinates (the disproportionate use of special equipment) and had the capacity to do so. His unjustified failure to perform his obligation resulted in dozens of citizens [suffering] severe physical injuries. In particular, G.K. was instructed by high-level officials not to use rubber bullets. He was personally involved in the operation and, according to him, he was informed about the use of rubber bullets. However, according to the case material, he did not take any measure to prevent [such use], and on the other hand, the case material does not prove that he provided information to the Minister or his deputies. Moreover, he provided incorrect information to [those leading the operation]. The recordings from handheld radios make it clear that he provided false information to [them] about guns not being used ... Despite receiving repeated warning[s] through [his] handheld radio to not use bullets (at 12.36 a.m.), the shooting continued. Later, the Director of the Special [Assignments] Department asked for permission to use bullets, and despite the refusal of [his] immediate supervisor (at 2.34 a.m.), the frequent use of rubber bullets continued.”
168. The PDO’s report of 31 March 2020 concluded, among other things, that the criminal investigation had been focused “only on identifying the criminal actions of individual law-enforcement officers and assessing their individual roles”, and that it had “not aimed to make [a] complete systemic legal analysis of the events of the night of [20-21 June 2019], and consequently to determine the scope of responsibility of high-level officials”. It was stated that the ongoing investigation was not attempting to “identify or rule out alleged offences resulting from the inaction of officials who had been in charge during the dispersal of the demonstration”, and that it “was not critical when questioning high-level officials”. General report by the PDO
169. A report of 2 April 2020 by the PDO entitled “The Situation Regarding the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia in 2019” made several references to the events of 20-21 June 2019 and the related criminal investigation. The relevant parts of the section entitled “Cases involving the use of force against demonstration participants” provided as follows:
“[A] protest gathering which started peacefully in front of the Parliament [building] on 20 June 2019 ended with the use of force and rather serious consequences. Within several hours of the demonstration beginning, the actions of some of the demonstrators went beyond the scope of a peaceful assembly and turned into an acute confrontation with officers ... In the end the police terminated the assembly by force, following which more than two hundred individuals were injured. The law-enforcement officers used, among other things, tear gas, rubber bullets and a water cannon against the participants in the demonstration. In the Public Defender’s assessment, the force used during the termination of the 20-21 June assembly, especially the use of non-lethal projectiles, cannot be assessed as a proportionate ... measure, considering the absence of an order provided for in law, the number of shells [used] (several hundred) and [the number] of shooters [present] (several dozen), the area [in which the shooting took place] (immediately in front of the Parliament building and in other sections of Rustaveli Avenue), the duration [of the operation] (a period of several hours), the number of injured demonstrators and the extent of the injuries. ... As regards the warnings given by the [MIA] in respect of the participants in the assembly by means of the emergency statement disseminated publicly, and the calls [on the participants] made by the Minister ... and the mayor ... [which] were disseminated by the media, such measures do not ensure that the participants in a demonstration are fully informed and do not comply with the ... standard[s relating to] warning[s]. ...”
170. The relevant parts of the section entitled “Investigation into the events of 20-21 June” provided as follows:
“Representatives of the [PDO] personally observed the events unfolding at the demonstration ... They met and talked to doctors, the administrative [teams] from clinics, and citizens injured during the dispersal of the demonstration. ... The PDO suggested [to the GPO] that the former Director of the Special Assignments Department of the MIA should be charged because it had been his legal obligation to prevent unlawful actions by [his] subordinates (the disproportionate use of special means) and, as revealed by the case material, he had been able to do so. Additionally, as the material obtained so far reveals, on several occasions he received direct orders not to use rubber bullets. ... On the basis of the video material available in the case file, at the time when the police resorted to the use of [non-lethal] weapons, no massive attack by the participants in the demonstration on the representatives of the police or on other individuals was imminent, and there had been [no such attack] to give the police officers grounds to decide to use non-lethal shells without an order from the leader [of the police operation] and in order to protect their own lives and health (self-defence). By contrast, in accordance with the existing legislative framework, an order regarding the use of non-lethal weapons (including non-lethal projectiles) must be made by the leader of the unit participating in the [police operation] with the consent of a person responsible for the conduct of such an operation, taking into account the principles of lawfulness and proportionality and the [relevant] risks. When a delay may pose a real risk to a person’s life and/or health, an order made by the leader of the unit shall suffice. ... At the time the present report was published, the [GPO] had not managed to carry out a full systemic legal analysis of the events of the night of 20-21 June. ...”
Report by Human Rights Watch
171. In 2020 Human Rights Watch published its World Report for the year 2019. The relevant excerpt from that report reads as follows:
“On the night of June 20, riot police fired rubber bullets and used tear gas against thousands of protesters outside the parliament building in Tbilisi. The protest was sparked by the presence of a delegation from the Russian Duma in the parliament’s plenary chamber, as part of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of Orthodoxy. Some protesters repeatedly tried to break through the police cordon, grabbing and damaging some riot gear. Otherwise the crowd was largely nonviolent. While riot police showed restraint initially, around midnight, without prior warning, they opened fire on the crowd with tear gas and rubber bullets, chasing and arresting people who tried to gather. Some 240 people, including 80 police officers and 32 journalists, sustained injuries and sought medical attention. Many civilians sustained rubber bullet injuries to the head, legs, and back; two people each lost an eye.”
THE LAW
PRELIMINARY REMARK
172. In so far as applications nos. 20129/21 and 20175/21 are concerned, the parties referred to the applicants in a different order. The Court will use the sequence contained in the original applications, which is reflected in the appended table. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
173. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONSThe parties’ submissionsThe Government

174. The Government stated that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies. Namely, some of the applicants had not instituted civil‑law proceedings to obtain damages from the MIA, and others had failed to duly pursue such proceedings. This had been, according to the Government, particularly necessary in respect of the complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. Nor had the applicants applied to the General Inspectorate of the MIA, which could have conducted a disciplinary inquiry. 175. Additionally, the Government submitted that the applicants had failed to demonstrate why the criminal investigation had been ineffective at the time they had submitted their applications, rather than with respect to the subsequent developments. In the Government’s submission, the criminal investigation in question – which had been tasked with assessing all aspects relevant to the termination of the demonstration – had been effective in respect of all the complaints raised as part of the present applications, which rendered the applications premature, on account of the ongoing nature of the investigation. The applicants
176. The applicants stated that only a thorough and effective criminal investigation could serve as an effective remedy in respect of allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of State officials – conduct contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Such an investigation having been duly opened, in the applicants’ submission, they had not been required to institute civil-law or disciplinary proceedings against the MIA as well. As for the complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, the criminal investigation had also covered issues relating to those provisions, absolving the applicants of the need to institute another set of proceedings. 177. As regards the allegedly premature nature of the applications, the applicants, relying on arguments raised in respect of the merits of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, submitted that the ongoing criminal investigation had been ineffective.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 3
Outcome: violation