THIRD SECTION
CASE OF TSATANI v. GREECE
(Application no. 42514/16)
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Independent and impartial tribunal • Disciplinary proceedings against a prosecutor, leading to a sanction, brought by the Court of Cassation (CC) President, after she conducted the preliminary disciplinary investigation and examined the applicant’s recusal request against her • CC disciplinary councils satisfied Art 6 § 1 “tribunal” requirements • Disciplinary council’s failure to address the impact on the fairness of the proceedings of the CC President’s official press release issued during the confidential preliminary investigation referring to the applicant and analysing the merits of the recusal request • CC President’s statements ipso facto incompatible with the notion of an “independent and impartial” tribunal • CC President being the highest authority within the civil and criminal courts and being well known as a former interim prime minister, should have exercised caution not to create the impression of influencing the proceedings, particularly as she was conducting a disciplinary investigation against a member of the judiciary • Emphasis on the singular context of the case • Lack of objective impartiality
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
14 October 2025
 
FINAL
 
14/01/2026
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Tsatani v. Greece,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Peeter Roosma, President,
 Ioannis Ktistakis,
 Darian Pavli,
 Diana Kovatcheva,
 Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,
 Canòlic Mingorance Cairat,
 Vasilka Sancin, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 42514/16) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Greek national, Ms Georgia Tsatani (“the applicant”), on 20 July 2016;
the decision to give notice to the Greek Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
the decision to treat as confidential the documents deposited with the Registry as annexes to the Government’s observations (Rule 33 of the Rules of Court);
Having deliberated in private on 8 July and 16 September 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, a prosecutor. The applicant complained that she had not been heard by an impartial tribunal, in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as the President of the Court of Cassation (hereinafter also “the CC”), who had been conducting the preliminary disciplinary investigation, had herself examined the recusal request submitted by the applicant against her and had subsequently brought disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Athens. She was represented by Mr T. Sofos, a lawyer practising in Athens. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms N. Marioli, and their Agent’s delegate, Ms O. Patsopoulou, Legal Advisor at the State Legal Council. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGSPreliminary disciplinary investigation

5. On 23 March 2016, V.T., the President of the CC at the relevant time, informed the applicant, a prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeal at the relevant time, that she had opened a preliminary disciplinary investigation against her. V.T. had taken that action on the basis of letters by the Cypriot Minister of Justice and the Attorney-General, both dated 24 February 2016, in which those officials had expressed concern as regards the applicant’s decision to close criminal investigations into a criminal fraud case, which had been covered by the media, involving Greek and Cypriot individuals. V.T. sent to the applicant the evidence that she had collected in the context of the investigation (witness testimonies and documents) and reports by the Cypriot officials, and called upon the applicant to present her written defence within ten days. 6. On 30 March 2016, the applicant submitted a report to the Prosecutor at the CC. Noting that she was under preliminary investigation by V.T., she argued that the Prosecutor of the CC had exclusive competence in the matter and requested the latter to launch a preliminary investigation. The applicant also complained that D.P., deputy Minister of Justice, had referred to the pending disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in a speech before Parliament on 29 March 2016, even though the proceedings were confidential. The applicant invited the Prosecutor of the CC to investigate. 7. On 1 April 2016, the applicant replied to V.T. She complained that she had not been called upon to present an oral defence and that V.T. had failed to clearly specify the acts allegedly committed by the applicant which constituted the disciplinary offence in question. 8. On 4 April 2016, V.T. replied to the applicant that, in order to avoid tension and to expedite the proceedings, she was enclosing a detailed statement specifying the acts in question, and invited the applicant to present her written and oral defence within a fresh ten-day time-limit. Applicant’s recusal request
9. On 4 April 2016, the applicant submitted her written defence to V.T. She also submitted a recusal request against V.T., arguing that the latter had previously been involved in the case and, therefore, could not be impartial. In particular, on account of the fact that V.T. had had a previous function as interim prime minister in September 2015, she had special relations (in her capacity as a hierarchical superior) with D.P., deputy Minister of Justice at the time, which had been ongoing. The applicant noted that D.P., in his speech before Parliament on 29 March 2016, had apparently been aware of the pending disciplinary proceedings against her (see paragraph 34 below). She alleged that V.T. had provided this information to D.P., even though the proceedings were confidential. 10. The applicant submitted that V.T. had also developed special relations (in her capacity as interim prime minister) with the Cypriot officials who had written to V.T. about the applicant’s actions (see paragraph 5 above). 11. Lastly, the applicant alleged that V.T. had failed to remain impartial because she had addressed questions to the applicant and to the witnesses in a prejudicial manner and had given an incomplete copy of the file to the applicant. Further steps in the preliminary disciplinary investigation
12. On 12 April 2016, V.T. referred the case to a Vice-President of the CC so that the latter could pursue the preliminary investigation. 13. In the referral document, V.T. stated that the applicant’s recusal request constituted an abuse of process, that the reasons relied on had been unfounded and that the applicant’s objective had been to delay the proceedings. In particular, V.T. stated that her relations with the Cypriot officials in question had been strictly confined to her official functions as interim prime minister. She had not initiated the preliminary investigation in question under pressure by the Cypriot authorities. V.T. had decided to conduct the investigation herself under Article 99 § 9 of Law no. 1756/1988 owing to the high socioeconomic interest in the cases handled by the applicant. She reiterated that, under the same provision, she had the power to assign the investigation to another judge. Furthermore, under the case-law of the CC, the manner in which a judge formulated questions to witnesses could not constitute valid grounds for recusal. V.T. added that the applicant’s allegation that she had given to the applicant an incomplete copy of the case file had constituted an abuse of process, as the document that had allegedly been missing was one which had already been known to the applicant. 14. V.T. concluded that, even though the applicant’s request was unfounded, it was necessary to refer the case to the Vice-President of the CC “... in order to safeguard the authority and credibility of both my institutional position and of the judiciary in general ...”. 15. On 21 April 2016, the applicant complained to the Vice-President of the CC that V.T. had issued a press release regarding the recusal request that the applicant had lodged, and she submitted as a supporting document a press publication wherein V.T. had been quoted as declaring that the applicant’s recusal request had been ill-founded and had constituted an abuse of process (see paragraph 32 below). The applicant requested that the Vice-President of the CC take no further action in the preliminary investigation until the recusal request against V.T. had been decided by the competent judicial body. 16. On 5 May 2016, the Vice-President of the CC concluded the preliminary investigation and proposed, on the basis of the evidence collected by V.T. and the written defence submitted by the applicant to V.T., that V.T. bring a disciplinary action against the applicant. The Vice-President of the CC noted that the applicant had reiterated before her the recusal request she had submitted against V.T. and, noting that V.T. had dismissed it as an abuse of process on 12 April 2016 (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above), declared it inadmissible for lack of standing. Disciplinary action brought by V.T. against the applicant
17. On 24 June 2016, V.T. brought a disciplinary action against the applicant and referred her to the seven-member disciplinary council of the Court of Cassation (“the seven-member disciplinary council”). 18. As regards the applicant’s recusal request, V.T. stated that it was inadmissible, as it had not been lodged with the Prosecutor of the CC under Article 17 § 2 and Articles 19 and 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, it could only be considered an invitation for V.T. to withdraw, which had not created an obligation for her. V.T. further found that, in the referral document dated 12 April 2016, she had not dismissed any “recusal request”, but had rather exercised her right under Article 99 § 9 of Law no. 1756/1988 to assign the preliminary disciplinary investigation to another judge and had provided reasons to that effect. In any event, V.T. noted that the applicant could raise before the seven-member disciplinary council her concerns as regards V.T.’s alleged bias. Proceedings before the seven-member disciplinary council
19. On 6 July 2016, the President of the seven-member disciplinary council invited the applicant to present her written defence. 20. On 19 July 2016, the applicant presented her written defence. 21. On 16 September 2016, the council heard the applicant in person; she presented her oral defence, assisted by an attorney. 22. The council, by decision no. 22/2016 of 10 October 2016, found that the applicant had committed acts entailing serious negligence, which had damaged the prestige of the judiciary. It found that the applicant had terminated criminal investigations which had been under the exclusive competence of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor and had breached an agreement between Greek and Cypriot authorities, concluded in the context of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (EUROJUST), according to which some aspects of the case had to be investigated by the Cypriot authorities. It sentenced the applicant to sixty days of salary deprivation. 23. As regards the applicant’s recusal request in respect of V.T., the council noted that it was inadmissible, as the applicant had failed to submit it before the Prosecutor of the CC. The applicant’s report to the Prosecutor of the CC (see paragraph 6 above) did not amount to a recusal request because, inter alia, the applicant had not included therein a concrete grievance vis‑à‑vis V.T.’s impartiality, nor had she alleged that V.T. had leaked information pertaining to the disciplinary investigation. Furthermore, the council held that, as the applicant’s recusal request was inadmissible, V.T. was not bound by it in any way. V.T. had not dismissed the “recusal request”, but had exercised her right under Article 99 § 9 of Law no. 1756/1988 to delegate the preliminary investigation to another judge. Accordingly, the council held that V.T.’s assignment of the investigation to the Vice-President of the CC had been lawful and dismissed the applicant’s written and oral objections asserting that it had warranted a procedural annulment owing to the invalidity of the disciplinary action. 24. The applicant lodged an appeal. Proceedings before the nine-member disciplinary council
25. On 9 and 10 January 2017, the applicant’s case was heard by the nine‑member disciplinary council of the Court of Cassation (“the nine‑member disciplinary council”). During the hearing, the applicant complained that she had been unjustly subjected to negative publicity. 26. On 16 March 2017, it dismissed the applicant’s appeal by decision no. 7/2017. 27. As regards the applicant’s recusal request, the council noted that the applicant had been aware that such requests were to be submitted to the Prosecutor of the CC under the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which applied mutatis mutandis, but she had chosen, for her own reasons, not to submit it to the competent body. The applicant’s request before the Prosecutor of the CC did not amount to a recusal request because, inter‑alia, the lawyer signing it had not submitted a power of attorney which mentioned the specific grounds of recusal relied on, in accordance with Article 17 §§ 1-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Further, the Prosecutor of the CC did not take any action on the basis of that request. 28. The council found that V.T. had not dismissed the applicant’s recusal request. V.T. had merely referred the case to the Vice-President of the CC and had provided reasons, notably explaining why the applicant’s recusal request had been inadmissible and non-binding on her, and that her own actions had been aimed at preserving the prestige of the judiciary. Furthermore, V.T. had explained that, even if the applicant’s recusal request were to be considered an invitation to withdraw, there had been no valid ground for her to do so. 29. The council also found that, in any event, the applicant’s recusal request was unfounded. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant’s allegations regarding V.T.’s previous functions as interim prime minister did not amount to a valid ground for recusal: as regards V.T.’s relations with D.P., they had been formal and, in any event, V.T. had not been in a position of dependence in respect of D.P., but had rather been his hierarchical superior. As regards V.T.’s relations with the Cypriot officials in question, they had also been strictly official. Moreover, V.T.’s accidental omission to include one document from the case file with the applicant’s copy of the file did not raise doubts as to V.T.’s impartiality, as, inter alia, the applicant could obtain a copy of the document upon request. Lastly, the applicant’s allegation that V.T. had leaked information regarding the proceedings was unsubstantiated. 30. Accordingly, the council found that the applicant’s objection regarding grounds for annulment in the proceedings before V.T. was unfounded and had been rightly dismissed by the seven-member disciplinary council. 31. On 22 March 2021, the nine-member disciplinary council, by decision no. 5/2021, rejected a request by the applicant to reopen the proceedings. OTHER DEVELOPMENTSPress release by V.T. regarding the disciplinary investigation

32. On 18 April 2016, V.T. issued a press release in her capacity as President of the CC. V.T. explained that she was issuing the press release because some persons had tried to misinform the public by undermining public confidence in her and in the institution of President of the CC because they were upset by the fact that V.T. was “fighting big, interconnected interests”. As regards the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, in the press release V.T. mentioned the following:
“A. Regarding the competence [to exercise] disciplinary control (regarding which there is a criticism that a law has been adopted that grants the President of the Court of Cassation the power to exercise disciplinary control by herself):
(1) The competence to exercise disciplinary proceedings (pursuant to Article 99 § 1 of the Code of Courts – Law no. 1756/1988) is vested in the Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and the Chief Inspector in respect of all members of the judiciary (judges and prosecutors), in the Presidents of the Courts of Appeals managing a Court of Appeal in respect of the judges of their region, and in the Prosecutors of the Courts of Appeal in charge of a Prosecutor’s Office in respect of the prosecutors in their region. Under Article 46 § 3 of Law no. 4356/2015, the competence of the President of the Court of Cassation was added. Therefore, the question of who is bothered and why reasonably arises, in view of the fact that the President of the Court of Cassation has also acquired this competence in addition to the Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and the Chief Inspector. It is also clear from the text of the law that all the bodies with the power to exercise disciplinary proceedings are single-member bodies and it is completely inaccurate that until now only multi-member bodies have had the right to exercise disciplinary control, as some people claim in an attempt to misinform. (2) It is also completely inaccurate that the President who brings disciplinary proceedings judges the person under review by participating in the disciplinary council, given that ‘those persons who have brought a disciplinary action or have conducted the investigation in the same disciplinary case may not participate in a disciplinary council or tribunal for the purpose of hearing a particular disciplinary case’ (Article 97 § 5 of the above-mentioned Law).
Β. Regarding my exercise of disciplinary control against the Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal, Georgia Tsatani, (in respect of the ... case against V.):
(1) The person vested with the power to bring disciplinary proceedings has the right (under Article 99 § 1 (a) of the above-mentioned Law) to launch a preliminary investigation which is carried out by his order, or by another member of the judiciary who outranks the person under investigation, or in person, as I have done in the present case, because of the wide publicity the case has received and the high socioeconomic interest in the cases handled by the person under investigation. (2) Consequently, the grounds for recusal which were relied on, involving suspicions regarding my impartiality, namely that I myself undertook the disciplinary investigation allegedly ‘upon the advice of’ the Cypriot officials or that I allegedly have a relationship of acquaintance with them because of my status as a former interim prime minister, or that I allegedly maintain a relationship of official cooperation with the Deputy Minister of Justice, Mr. D.P., do not even require a reply, because, if formal official relations or mere acquaintance are to be assessed as grounds for recusal, then every member of the judiciary would need to be recused. The other grounds for recusal have been held to be ill-founded in case-law (decision no. 1080/2010 of the Court of Cassation), besides being completely unfounded in substance and inaccurate, as was the reason that I allegedly admitted that the summons for a written defence served on her were vague. (3) However, in spite of the unfoundedness of the recusal request in question, of the fact that it constituted an abuse of process, and of the fact that I never had any animosity or antipathy towards the person under investigation, with whom, on the contrary, I always maintained very good official relations, and the fact that I have no particular relationship whatsoever with the Cypriot officials who submitted the reports, I have, nonetheless, entrusted a Vice-President of the Supreme Court with the further conduct of the disciplinary investigation and the drafting of the relevant report in order to safeguard the authority and credibility of both my institutional position and of the judiciary in general ...”
33. On 18 and 19 April 2016, the above‑cited press release by V.T. was mentioned in articles in the press. Such an article was published on 19 April 2016 by the newspaper Efymerida ton Sintakton, entitled “[V.]T.: I fight big, interconnected interests”, which mentioned that V.T. had issued an unprecedented press release. V.T. was quoted as referring to the pending disciplinary proceedings and mentioning the applicant by name, stating that she had no particular relationship with the Cypriot officials who had written to her about the case and reiterating that the applicant’s recusal request was “unfounded” and an “abuse of process”. Statements of the deputy Minister of Justice to Parliament
34. On 29 March 2016, Parliament held a discussion as regards developments in the judiciary. In that context, D.P., deputy Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, intervened, alleging that there was a plot which was aimed at framing him for alleged interventions in the judiciary. In that context, D.P. noted that the applicant had also made allegations that he had tried to influence her handling of cases. He added that a disciplinary investigation was pending against the applicant and that the origin of that investigation had been the letter by the Cypriot Minister of Justice to the President of the CC. He noted that he had mentioned this information “to protect the plotters from making other mistakes in their effort to once more distort reality” and that it was preferable “to await the finalisation of the disciplinary investigation and whatever else will be revealed afterwards”. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK and practice
RELEVANT LEGISLATIONThe Constitution

35. The Constitution provides, in so far as relevant:
Article 37
Appointment of the Prime Minister and the government
“...
3. ... if it is confirmed that it is impossible to form a government which has the confidence of Parliament, [the President of the Republic] shall seek the formation of a government from all the parties in Parliament for the purpose of holding elections and, in the event of failure, shall instruct the President of the Supreme Administrative Court or the Court of Cassation or the Court of Auditors to form a government, [which is] as broadly acceptable as possible, in order to hold elections, and shall dissolve Parliament.”
Article 87
Judicial independence
“1. Justice is delivered by courts composed of permanent judges who enjoy personal and functional independence ...
...”
Article 88
Guarantees of independence of members of the judiciary, remuneration and secondments
“1. Members of the judiciary are appointed by Presidential Decree, in accordance with a law which provides for the qualifications and the selection procedure, and are permanent. 2. Remuneration of members of the judiciary is analogous to their function. Everything relevant to their hierarchical and compensatory development and their situation in general are provided for in a special law ... 4. Members of the judiciary may be dismissed, only following a court decision, on account of a criminal conviction or for serious disciplinary misconduct, illness, disability or incapacity to serve, to be ascertained as provided for by law and after the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 93 have been complied with. 5. Members of the judiciary, up to the rank of appeal judge or deputy appeal prosecutor and equivalent to those ranks, shall be compulsorily retired from service on reaching the age of sixty-five years, and those with ranks higher than that or equivalent to those ranks shall be compulsorily retired from service on reaching the age of sixty‑seven years.” ... Article 90
Supreme Judicial Council
“1. Promotions, assignments, transfers, detachments and secondments of members of the judiciary shall be effected by Presidential Decree, issued by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council. [The Council] shall be composed of the president of the supreme court concerned and of members of the same court appointed by lot from among those who have at least two years’ service in that court, as prescribed by law. ...
... 5. Promotions to the posts of President ... of the Court of Cassation ... shall be effected by Presidential Decree, issued on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, by selection from among the members of the relevant Superior Court, as prescribed by law ...
...”
Article 91
Supreme Disciplinary Council
“...
3. ... Disciplinary authority over other members of the judiciary shall be exercised at the first and second levels of jurisdiction by councils constituted by drawing lots from ordinary judges, as specified by law. The disciplinary action can also be brought by the Minister of Justice. 4. Disciplinary decisions under the provisions of this Article shall not be subject to appeal before the Supreme Administrative Court.”
The Code of Courts (Law No. 1756/1988)
36. The provisions of Law no. 1756/1988 containing the Code of Courts, as in force at the material time, read, in so far as relevant:
Article 53
Immovability
 “1. The members of the judiciary shall be permanent. Before being appointed as professional judges, they shall undergo a period of education and testing ...”
Article 97
Establishment and functioning of the other disciplinary councils
“1. The seven-member and nine-member disciplinary councils of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Court of Cassation and the Court of Auditors shall be composed of a corresponding number of ordinary judges, appointed each year by lot ... 5. The following persons may not participate in a disciplinary council to hear a particular disciplinary case: ... (c) those who have brought disciplinary proceedings or have conducted the investigation in the same disciplinary case ... (f) those who are connected by a special friendship or are in a ... dispute with the person under investigation or have a special connection with the case, so as to cast doubt on their impartiality.
Α member of the judiciary who is prevented from acting on account of the [circumstances] above shall have the obligations set out in Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which shall apply mutatis mutandis ...”
Article 98
Procedural provisions
“... 2. The pre-trial phase before disciplinary ... councils shall be secret. ... The main proceedings in the other disciplinary councils shall be secret ...”
Article 99
The bringing of disciplinary proceedings
“1. The persons that have the power to bring disciplinary proceedings are:
(a) the Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights for all members of the judiciary ... (d) the President of the Court of Cassation, the Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and the Chief Inspector of the Inspectorate for all members of the judiciary of the civil and criminal courts, except for members of the Court of Cassation ... 9. The person vested with the power to bring disciplinary proceedings has the right to immediately conduct a preliminary investigation. The preliminary investigation shall be informal and shall be conducted either by the person vested with the power to bring disciplinary proceedings or, upon his instructions, by another member of the judiciary who outranks the person alleged to have committed a disciplinary offence. 10. The person conducting a preliminary investigation must request oral or written explanations from the person alleged to have committed the disciplinary offence. He shall have the right to request information or the transmission of relevant information from any other authority, shall arrange for the gathering of evidence and shall examine witnesses if necessary. The person called upon to present his defence shall have the right to be acquainted beforehand with all the evidence relating to him. A report shall be drawn up on the preliminary examination, the conclusions of which shall be reasoned ...”
Article 100
Initiation and termination of disciplinary proceedings
“1. Disciplinary proceedings shall be initiated with the bringing of a disciplinary action and shall be terminated with the delivery of a definite (οριστικής) and final (τελεσίδικης) decision within a short period of time. 2. The disciplinary action shall contain:
(a) the name and official data of the person subject to the proceedings; [and]
(b) a determination of the facts which constitute the disciplinary offence alleged, the circumstances in which it was committed and the relevant provisions. 3. The disciplinary action shall be brought before the competent council ...”
Article 101
Pre-trial procedure
“... 2. The rapporteur shall invite the person concerned to present his defence. The summons shall state a reasonable time-limit, which shall not be shorter than five days and may be extended, on the request of the person concerned, to up to three times the time-limit ... 3. The person concerned may consult the disciplinary file and request copies of the documents, in which case a special report shall be drawn up. The defence shall be [submitted] in writing to the rapporteur, who shall issue a written acknowledgment of receipt ... The defence shall be accompanied by all the information at the disposal of the person subject to the proceedings, who may ask the rapporteur for a reasonable time-limit for submitting additional information. In the defence, the examination of a maximum of five witnesses may be proposed and it may be indicated that the disciplinary report must be complemented by certain crucial documents or other evidence with any authority ...”
Article 103
Setting of a hearing – summoning of the person subject to the proceedings
“1. After the end of the investigation and the preparation of the relevant report, the president of the council, after receiving the case file, shall set a date for the hearing of the case before the disciplinary board ... This act shall also be communicated to the person subject to the proceedings with a summons to appear and to examine the file, if he so wishes, and to attend the hearing. The summons shall be served at least ten days before the date of the hearing. Failure of the person subject to the proceedings to attend shall not hinder the progress of the proceedings. 2. The president of the council may, of his own motion or at the request of the person being prosecuted, summon witnesses to appear before the council.”
Article 104
Main proceedings before disciplinary councils
“... 2. The person subject to the proceedings may request in writing before the beginning of the hearing the recusal of a maximum of two members of the disciplinary council, stating the grounds for recusal. The council shall take a decision on the request, without the participation of the member whose recusal has been requested, by means of a reasoned decision to be entered in the minutes. The members whose recusal has been decided by the council shall be replaced by alternates. 3. During the hearing, the rapporteur shall transmit (διαβιβάζει) the disciplinary action and the findings of the investigation, if one has taken place. The witnesses shall then be called for examination and the person subject to the proceedings shall be given the opportunity to present his defence orally and answer the questions of the members of the council. The person subject to the proceedings shall have the right to submit a memorandum within a reasonable time limit set by the president ... 4. The council shall assess the evidence freely. If it considers it insufficient, it may decide to order the taking of further evidence ... The decision shall contain the composition of the council, the name and rank of the accused, an indication of any appearance or legal summons, a summary of the accusation and of the defence with the essential allegations of the accused, the reasons for the finding or not of guilt and for the calculation of the sentence, and an operative part ...”
Article 105
Appeals
“1. The definite (οριστικές) decisions of the councils referred to in Article 95 §§ 5, 7, 9 and 11 are subject to appeal when they have been delivered at first instance ... 4. As regards the appeal procedure before the disciplinary councils, the rights of the person subject to the proceedings, the issuance and service of the decision and the above-mentioned provisions regarding first-instance disciplinary councils shall apply mutatis mutandis ... 6. The decisions of the disciplinary councils shall not be open to any other appeal before any other court or to an appeal before any other authority besides the remedies referred to in the preceding paragraphs.”
Legislative amendments as regards the President of the Court of Cassation’s power to bring disciplinary proceedings against judges and prosecutors
37. Article 99 of Law no. 1756/1988, amended by Article 46 § 3 of Law nο. 4356/2015 (which entered into force 24 December 2015), effectively added, for the first time since the current Constitution came into force in 1975, the President of the CC to the list of persons vested with the authority to bring disciplinary proceedings against civil and criminal judges and prosecutors (with the exception of members of the Court of Cassation). According to the explanatory report, this was necessary, “as the presidents of supreme courts had the general supervision and control of all judges of their respective jurisdiction and considering the specificities of civil and criminal jurisdiction”. 38. Article 99 of Law no. 1756/1988 was further amended by Article 23 of Law no. 4786/2021 (which entered into force 23 March 2021), with the effect of removing the President of the CC from the list of persons vested with such authority. The new Code of Courts (Law no. 4938/2022), which entered into force on 6 June 2022 and remains in force to date, did not reinstate the President of the CC’s power to bring disciplinary proceedings against civil and criminal judges and prosecutors. The status of prosecutors in the Greek judicial system
39. The Greek judicial system makes no fundamental distinction between the status of judges and that of prosecutors, both being considered members of the judiciary. In accordance with the Constitution, all members of the judiciary enjoy the same guarantees of independence (Article 88). Further, the same bodies are competent with respect to transfers, promotions, supervision and disciplinary control (Articles 90 and 91) for all members of the judiciary (see also paragraph 35 above). The status of all members of the judiciary, including prosecutors, was, at the relevant time, regulated in a uniform way by Law No. 1756/1988 (see also paragraph 36 above) regarding appointment (Articles 34-39), rights (Articles 43-47), transfers and secondments (Articles 49-52), seniority and precedence (Articles 54-55), suspension (Articles 56‑57) and termination of career (Articles 58-60), all members of the judiciary being permanent (Article 53) and their supervision (Articles 80-88) and disciplinary control (Articles 90-107) being regulated in a uniform manner. Lastly, in accordance with Article 24 of Law No. 1756/1988, the Prosecutor’s office shall be a judicial authority independent from the courts and the executive, and prosecutors shall be hierarchically subordinate to the Prosecutor of the CC. Code of Criminal Procedure
40. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force at the material time, read, in so far as relevant:
Article 17
Content and submission of the request for recusal
“1. The recusal request shall clearly specify the grounds for the recusal of the judicial person, specifically mention the facts on which those grounds are based and mention the supporting evidence. Otherwise, the request shall be rejected as inadmissible at the same hearing by the same composition of the court or council to which it was submitted. 2. The recusal request must be signed by the claimant himself or by a representative who has a special power of attorney for this purpose. Subsequent production of the power of attorney shall not be permitted for any reason. The power of attorney must state specific and concrete grounds for which the recusal is requested. If the above formalities are not complied with, the request shall be rejected as inadmissible at the same hearing by the same composition of the court or council to which it was submitted. 3. The recusal request shall be submitted to the public prosecutor of the court where the person whose recusal was requested is serving...”
Article 18
When the application is inadmissible
“1. If the recusal request has been submitted ... irregularly or if it has deficiencies of content, the court, having competence under Article 20 ..., shall reject it as inadmissible within a maximum of two days after its submission. The person concerned by the recusal shall not take part in the composition and the applicant is summoned along with, if possible, the other parties...”
Article 20
Competent court
“1. ... [T]he prosecutor shall submit the recusal request to the court in which he or she is serving, or to the indictments division if the request concerns an investigating judge or a member of the indictments division. The court or indictments division ... shall decide on the recusal request. The person whose recusal is requested may not take part in the composition. He or she shall be replaced in accordance with the law ...”
CASE-LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
41. In Inspektorat kam Visshia sadeben savet (30 April 2025, C‑313/23, C‑316/23, C-332/23, EU:C:2025:303), the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter the CJEU) held, inter alia, that Article 19 of the Treaty on the EU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence precludes a practice under which the members of a judicial body who are competent notably to investigate the activity of judges and prosecutors and to propose the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, continue to perform their functions beyond the legal duration of their terms of office, where the extension does not have an express legal basis in national law. In conducting the abovementioned analysis, the CJEU held the following:
“86 As regards specifically the rules governing the disciplinary regime in respect of judges, the requirement of independence of courts and tribunals following from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU requires that that regime must provide the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of its being used as a system of political control of the content of judicial decisions.
...
87 Since the prospect of opening a disciplinary investigation is, as such, liable to exert pressure on those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute, it is essential that a body competent to conduct investigations and bring disciplinary proceedings should act objectively and impartially in the performance of its duties and, to that end, be free from any external influence (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 May 2021, Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19, EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 199, and of 11 May 2023, Inspecţia Judiciară, C‑817/21, EU:C:2023:391, paragraph 49). That applies in particular to a judicial body which, like the Inspectorate, has broad powers to scrutinise the activity of judges, public prosecutors and investigating magistrates in the performance of their functions, to carry out checks in respect of their integrity and the absence of conflicts of interest on their part, as well as to propose to another judicial body, following such checks, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings with a view to the imposition of disciplinary penalties on those persons.”
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE OF 6 § 1 of THE CONVENTION
42. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that her case had not been heard by an independent and impartial tribunal, as the President of the CC, who had been conducting the preliminary disciplinary investigation, had herself examined the recusal request submitted by the applicant against her and had subsequently brought disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
AdmissibilityThe parties’ submissions

43. The Government argued that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was not applicable, either under its civil or its criminal limb. 44. As regards the civil limb, the Government noted that, in the context of disciplinary proceedings against judges and prosecutors, Article 91 § 4 of the Constitution expressly excluded access to a court for those judges or prosecutors who had had disciplinary sanctions imposed on them by the seven-member or nine-member disciplinary councils. This was justified by the fact that power of the judiciary was one of the essential manifestations of State sovereignty and public power, which, for the constitutional legislator, rendered it essential that disciplinary power be conferred to special courts whose decisions would be excluded from judicial review. 45. As regards the criminal limb, the Government argued that the sanction imposed on the applicant had not concerned criminal law, but had rather related exclusively to the disciplinary field and the applicant’s professional conduct. As such, no criminal charge had been brought against the applicant. 46. The applicant contested that assertion. She argued that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applied under both its civil and criminal limbs.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 6
Outcome: violation