THIRD SECTION
CASE OF JÓHANNES BALDURSSON AND BIRKIR KRISTINSSON v. ICELAND
(Applications nos. 14175/16 and 3 others – see appended list)
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Impartial tribunal • Conviction of an executive and an employee of a bank, for financial crimes related to transactions between that bank and a company • Losses suffered (in relation to shares and equity funds in the above bank and shares in other banks), by three of the five judges on the Supreme Court’s panel that upheld the applicants’ convictions, not of such a nature and/or degree to give rise to an objectively justified fear that they lacked impartiality in the applicants’ case
Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Fairness of criminal proceedings against first applicant not prejudiced by the lack of re-hearing oral evidence before the Supreme Court
Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Fair hearing • Supreme Court’s failure to address first applicant’s arguments concerning the credibility of a key witness’s testimony • First applicant’s submissions raised a specific, pertinent and important point in the proceedings against him that called for explicit reply
Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Fair hearing • Change of second applicant’s status from suspect to witness and back to suspect again at pre-trial stage, which he challenged in the court proceedings, did not per se seriously prejudice the principle of legal certainty nor prejudiced his right to a fair trial under Art 6 § 1 • Evidence obtained during his second interrogation when he had witness status disregarded by the Supreme Court
Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Reasonable time • Duration of criminal proceedings not excessive
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
21 January 2025
 
FINAL
 
21/04/2025
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Jóhannes Baldursson and Birkir Kristinsson v. Iceland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Ioannis Ktistakis, President,
 Peeter Roosma,
 Lətif Hüseynov,
 Darian Pavli,
 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
 Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,
 Mateja Đurović, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 14175/16, 22729/17, 32167/16 and 22720/17) against the Republic of Iceland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Icelandic nationals, Mr Jóhannes Baldursson and Mr Birkir Kristinsson (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table;
the decision to give notice to the Icelandic Government (“the Government”) of the applications;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 10 December 2024,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The applications concern the applicants’ indictment and conviction for financial crimes, following the financial crisis of 2008. THE FACTS
2. Mr Jóhannes Baldursson (hereinafter “the first applicant”) was represented by Mr Reimar Pétursson, a lawyer practising in Reykjavik. Mr Birkir Kristinsson (hereinafter “the second applicant”) was represented by Mr Ólafur Eiríksson, a lawyer practising in Reykjavik. Further details of the applicants are set out in the appendix. 3. The Government were initially represented by their Agent, Mr Einar Karl Hallvarðsson, State Attorney General, and subsequently by Ms Fanney Ros Thorsteinsdottir, his successor in that office. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. The background of the case
5. The first applicant was an executive at Glitnir bank hf. (“Glitnir”). The second applicant was an employee of Glitnir’s Private Banking department and the owner of the company BK-44 ehf. (“BK-44”). 6. Following the financial crisis in the autumn of 2008 and the subsequent collapse of the three major Icelandic banks, including Glitnir (which collapsed in early October 2008), the newly founded Office of the Special Prosecutor (“the Special Prosecutor”) initiated a number of investigations into alleged criminal activity in the financial sector leading up to the crisis (see, for further background information, Sigríður Elín Sigfúsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 41382/17, § 6, 25 February 2020). Among these was an investigation into a loan granted in 2007 by Glitnir to BK-44 for the purchase by the latter of 150,000,000 shares in Glitnir (“the BK-44 case”). At the time of the sale, the shares were owned by Glitnir itself. The Financial Supervisory Authority (Fjármálaeftirlitið) referred the case to the Special Prosecutor on 10 November 2011. The investigation
7. The Special Prosecutor’s office began its questioning of suspects and witnesses in November 2011. 8. On 1 December 2011 the second applicant was interviewed for the first time as a suspect in the BK-44 case. He was informed of his right to remain silent and was accompanied by legal counsel. 9. On 21 December 2011 the second applicant was interviewed for the second time, this time as a witness in the BK-44 case. He was informed of his obligation, under threat of penal consequences, to testify truthfully, and that he had the right to refuse to answer if there was reason to believe that his answer could constitute an admission, or an indication, that he had committed a punishable offence. He was not accompanied by legal counsel. In a report of the interview, it was further stated that the second applicant had been informed that his status could be changed again if called for by the appearance of new evidence or information. According to the second applicant, no such exchange could be heard on a recording of the interview. The Government does not contest the applicant’s submission in this respect but maintains that he was nevertheless so informed. 10. On 18 June 2012 the second applicant was interviewed for the third time, this time again as a suspect in the BK-44 case. He was informed of his right to remain silent and was accompanied by legal counsel. 11. During all three interviews the second applicant discussed the loan to BK-44 and the events surrounding its granting and settlement. The first two interviews broadly concerned the same issues. During the third interview, the second applicant was additionally interrogated about several recorded phone calls. These included a conversation on 11 December 2007, which the Special Prosecutor received on 29 December 2011, where the second applicant and suspect E.S. discussed that efforts were being made to place “percentages in the bank” with buyers and that such “favours” would have to be remunerated. After stating that the second applicant had nothing to worry about, E.S. explained that the turn of the year was very important in this respect, as this would be when “the picture is taken of the balance-sheet”. He asked the second applicant whether “the contract” could be extended into the next year and the second applicant agreed to that. It emerges from the case file that the loan to BK-44 was due to be paid on 12 December 2007 and that the due-date was subsequently extended on numerous occasions. The criminal proceedings against the applicants
12. On 28 June 2013 both applicants, along with E.S. and M.A.A., who are not applicants in the present case, were indicted on charges relating to the transactions between Glitnir and BK-44. The first applicant, E.S. and M.A.A. were charged with fraud by abuse of position for having acted beyond their powers and endangered the interests of Glitnir by arranging for the grant of a loan from the bank to BK-44 in the amount of 3,791,340,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK, approximately 44,200,000 euros (EUR) at the material time), without the consent of the bank’s loan or risk committee and without sufficient security for repayment. Additionally, the first applicant and E.S. were charged with fraud by abuse of position for having acted beyond their powers and endangered the interests of Glitnir by verbally agreeing with the second applicant that BK-44 be granted a put option on the Glitnir shares which guaranteed that the entirety of the market risk of the shares’ price rested with Glitnir, to which they made Glitnir adhere in July 2008. Both applicants and co-accused E.S. were, further, charged with market manipulation for having, by means of the above transactions, which concerned shares owned by Glitnir itself, incorrectly indicated the demand for and price of shares in Glitnir. The second applicant was also charged with aiding and abetting in the fraud by abuse of position or, alternatively, for concealment and money laundering, as well as with violations of the Act on Annual Accounts for failing to reflect the above transaction in BK-44’s annual account. The facts referred to in the indictment happened during the period from 7 November 2007 to 22 July 2008 (when the loan was finally settled) and on 16 September 2008 (the date of BK-44’s annual account for the year of 2007). 13. On 4 September 2013, the second applicant petitioned for the charges against him to be dismissed, arguing that there had been no lawful basis to consider him a suspect after his status had been changed to a witness in the case. He submitted that the Special Prosecutor had not received any new evidence, except for two recorded phone calls with co-accused E.S., which had taken place on 12 November and 11 December 2007. He claimed that they had not concerned the subject matter of the case. Their content could in any event only relate to the charge of market manipulation and could, thus, not be regarded as new evidence in relation to other charges. The Special Prosecutor submitted that the second applicant’s mens rea had been revealed during the phone calls received after his second questioning as witness, and that they had therefore constituted important new evidence. The petition was rejected by a ruling of 31 October 2013, wherein the Reykjavik District Court held that the phone calls constituted new evidence that justified the reopening of the criminal investigation under section 57(3) of the Criminal Procedures Act (see paragraph 47 below). 14. During the District Court proceedings, over twenty witnesses (including Glitnir’s compliance officer) and the four accused were heard by the court in the applicants’ and their lawyers’ presence. 15. By a judgment of 23 June 2014, the Reykjavik District Court rejected again the second applicant’s renewed petition, on the same grounds as before, for the dismissal of the case. The court convicted all four accused, including the two applicants, on all charges. The applicants were sentenced to five years’ imprisonment each. 16. As regards the charge against the first applicant of fraud by abuse of position for arranging for the grant of the loan to BK-44, the District Court found that since BK-44 had been registered in risk category no. 6, the loan required approval by a loan or risk committee of the bank. No documents in the case file indicated that any such approval had been granted. The first applicant and co-accused E.S. had both testified that on the morning of 7 November 2007 a meeting had taken place where they and a stockbroker had decided to grant the loan in question to BK-44. In an e-mail later that day to E.S. and the bank’s employee responsible for registering credit limits, of which the first applicant received a copy, co-accused M.A.A. had stated that he had received approval for granting a loan of the relevant kind and magnitude to BK-44. In a reply to this e-mail, copied to the first applicant, a staff member had confirmed that this loan had been granted. The District Court held that the first applicant and co-accused E.S. had taken a joint decision on granting the loan to BK-44, and that co-accused M.A.A. had had the necessary credit limit registered. They had all worked at Glitnir for a long time, the first applicant and M.A.A. having held executive positions. They had known the internal rules of the bank and could not have been unaware that a loan of this magnitude had to be approved by Glitnir’s risk committee. No security for repayment had been provided, endangering the financial interests of the bank, which had in fact subsequently suffered a loss. The three accused had thus committed an aggravated offence of fraud by abuse of position, punishable under section 249 of the General Penal Code. The second applicant had, further, aided and abetted in the commission of the offence. 17. With respect to the charge against the first applicant of fraud for verbally agreeing that BK-44 be granted a put option which guaranteed that the entirety of the market risk of the shares’ price rested with Glitnir, the District Court found that the first applicant, his co-accused E.S. and the second applicant had testified that upon BK-44’s purchase of the Glitnir shares on 7 November 2007, the put option had also been negotiated. By mistake, the put option had not been registered in Glitnir’s systems and this had come to light when the shares had been sold back to Glitnir in July 2008. E.S. had testified that in light of the mistake, it had been decided that Glitnir would bear all of the loss on the difference in price of the shares from their purchase to their sale. Glitnir’s internal rules stated that agreements on options should be registered, priced and protected by certain securities. Glitnir’s compliance officer had, further, testified that co-accused E.S. had called him in for a meeting in July 2008 when it had been discovered that the put option had not been registered. According to the compliance officer, in the end, the first applicant had decided how the put option would be settled. The District Court held that Glitnir had in place various protective mechanisms to safeguard the bank against a risk of losses linked to put options. Upon the settlement with BK-44, these rules had been disregarded and no effort had been made to prevent Glitnir’s loss. Glitnir had borne the whole loss resulting from the transaction. The first applicant and co-accused E.S. had taken that decision and E.S. had handled the settlement. They had thus committed an aggravated offence of fraud by abuse of position, punishable under section 249 of the General Penal Code. The second applicant had, further, aided and abetted in the commission of the offence. 18. Finally, with respect to the charges against both applicants for market manipulation, the District Court noted its previous findings of fact and found that the final buy-back of shares by Glitnir had been effectuated at a price far above their market price and that this had not been reported to the Icelandic Stock Exchange. While BK-44’s purchase of the shares on 7 November 2007 had been at the market rate, this could not have correctly indicated the price of those financial instruments as the buyer had secured complete indemnity on the transaction and was, thus, in a situation completely different from that of other owners of shares in Glitnir. The District Court held that by not reporting the financing and the complete indemnity of the buyer, deception had been employed in the transaction. The accused had all played a part in effectuating the illegal transaction, and were accordingly guilty of market manipulation under Articles 117(1)(1a) and (2) and 117(2), in conjunction with Article 146 of the Act on Securities Transactions (no. 108/2007). 19. The applicants appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Court seeking acquittal or, alternatively, in the case of the second applicant, the dismissal of the case from the District Court on the basis that he could not lawfully be considered a suspect after his status had been changed to a witness (see paragraph 13 above). During the Supreme Court proceedings, both applicants submitted written observations. 20. Before the Supreme Court the first applicant argued, inter alia, that the District Court’s premise that he and E.S. had confessed to having decided to grant the loan in question to BK-44 was incorrect. Neither of them had confessed to this and the first applicant had expressly denied having taken that decision. He had, further, not participated in the meeting of 7 November 2007 where the conditions of BK-44’s transactions with the bank had been decided, but in a different meeting earlier that morning, with the second applicant and the co-accused E.S., where they discussed transactions of the same kind in general terms and with reference to customers of the bank generally. The District Court’s description of testimonies as regards the meeting was, thus, inaccurate. 21. The first applicant, further, submitted that he had not participated in the decision-making on how Glitnir’s and BK-44’s dealings should be settled in July 2008. His and his co-accused E.S.’s testimony had supported this, unlike the testimony of Glitnir’s compliance officer. The first applicant called into question the credibility of the compliance officer’s testimony before the District Court. First, the compliance officer had admitted in his police testimony to not having been fully mentally stable at the time of the settlement. Secondly, two contemporaneous e-mails and the compliance officer’s police testimony showed that the compliance officer had attributed the settlement decision to two other staff members, that is to say to co-accused E.S. and a witness in the case, rather than to the first applicant. In his police testimony, the compliance officer had, further, described the first applicant’s role differently. Thirdly, the compliance officer’s consent had been needed to do business with BK-44. Therefore, Glitnir’s staff, including the first applicant, could hardly protest against the advice the compliance officer gave on the settlement of the put option. 22. The first applicant also maintained that as the District Court had based its conviction for market manipulation on its findings concerning fraud by abuse of position, that conviction suffered from the same flaws. 23. In his submissions to the Supreme Court, the first applicant did not request that he, his co-accused or any witnesses be heard. 24. Before the Supreme Court, the prosecutor accepted that the finding of the District Court, that the first applicant and co-accused E.S. had both testified that the decision to grant the loan in question to BK-44 had been made during their meeting on the morning of 7 November 2007, was an overstatement. 25. The second applicant argued, inter alia, that the decision to interview him again as a suspect during his third interview with the Special Prosecutor (see paragraphs 7-10 above) had constituted the reopening of finalised criminal proceedings against him. No important new evidence capable of justifying the reopening had emerged after his second questioning as a witness. This had seriously affected his interests and curtailed his rights in violation of section 57(3) of the Criminal Procedures Act as well as the ne bis in idem guarantee provided in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. 26. The Supreme Court held a hearing during which the parties’ representatives presented oral arguments. In the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the applicants and the witnesses were not heard again but the case file included transcripts of all statements before the District Court. 27. By a judgment of 3 December 2015, the Supreme Court rejected the second applicant’s claim that the case against him be dismissed from the District Court. It noted that section 57(3) of the Criminal Procedures Act stipulated that if an investigation is terminated because the case materials are not considered sufficient as basis for indictment, its reopening is excluded unless new case materials come to light or are likely to come to light. It found that it could not be assumed that the change of the second applicant’s status from accused to witness was based on the prosecutor’s conclusion that the case materials were insufficient for indictment. The second applicant had, further, not been notified in accordance with section 57(3) of the Criminal Procedures Act that the investigation against him had been terminated. In addition, he had been informed of his privilege against self-incrimination before the second interview. The Supreme Court therefore held that the investigation against the second applicant had not been terminated when his status was changed from accused to witness and that section 57(3) of the Criminal Procedures Act had not been engaged. However, the Supreme Court decided to disregard from evidence his second interview. One judge dissented and held that the investigation against the second applicant had been terminated and that the conditions of section 57(3) of the Criminal Procedures Act for reopening had not been met. 28. The Supreme Court upheld the District Court’s conviction of both applicants, but as regards the charge of market manipulation, it held that the first applicant should be convicted only under Article 117(1)(1a) in conjunction with Article 146 of the Act on Securities Transactions. The first applicant’s sentence was reduced to three years’ imprisonment and the second applicant’s sentence to four years’ imprisonment. 29. In its judgment, the Supreme Court gave a more detailed description of the documentary evidence mentioned in the District Court judgment. It also described additional documentary evidence, including contemporaneous e-mails and transcripts of telephone conversations, which had been recorded by Glitnir at the time of the transactions in question. The Supreme Court, further, provided a more detailed summary of the testimonies of the four accused and eight witnesses, including Glitnir’s compliance officer, while noting that the testimony of the accused and witnesses were otherwise summarised in the District Court’s judgment. 30. As regards the first charge of fraud by abuse of position, the Supreme Court held that it was clear from Glitnir’s internal rules that the accused had not been authorised to grant the loan in question. It found that the first and second applicants and co-accused E.S. had all testified that they had attended a meeting together on the morning of 7 November 2007 where BK-44’s purchase of the shares in Glitnir had been discussed. Their testimonies had, however, differed as to whether one or two meetings had taken place, whether the first applicant had attended them both and on the level of detail of discussions. Specifically, as regards the first applicant’s role in events, the Supreme Court referred to how the first applicant had stated before the District Court that he had attended at least a part of a meeting on the purchase of the shares on 7 November 2007. While E.S.’s testimony had not been clear on the first applicant’s participation in the decision-making during this November morning, he had stated clearly that the first applicant had encouraged the second applicant to make the purchase, which the first and second applicants could not have arranged on their own. The second applicant had also testified that the first applicant and E.S. had told him that they would take care of the business as a whole. The Supreme Court, further, found that it was clear from the documentary evidence in the case that the first applicant had had a larger role in the transaction than attending a part of a meeting on 7 November 2007. He had later that day sent an e-mail to have BK-44 registered as a recipient of a loan of the kind granted and had received, on that same day, an e-mail confirming that the necessary credit limit had been registered. On 11 November 2007 he had, further, sent Glitnir’s Chief Executive Officer an e-mail confirming the sale of the shares. The following day, he had also received an e-mail confirming the details of and the granting of the loan. 31. As relates to the second charge of fraud by abuse of position in relation to BK-44’s put option, the Supreme Court held that the granting and settlement of the put option had been in violation of Glitnir’s internal rules. As regards the first applicant’s role in events, the Supreme Court noted that the testimonies of the four accused and witnesses varied with regard to his and co-accused E.S.’s role. The first applicant and E.S. had both testified that a put option had verbally been agreed upon already in the beginning, on 7 November 2007. The first applicant had testified that he had only had a minor role at that time and that he had not been involved in the settlement of the put option in July 2008. Co-accused E.S. had testified that he had discussed the settlement with the first applicant and another staff member and that the first applicant had not disagreed with the manner of settlement, which had possibly already taken place at that time. The compliance officer had, however, testified that it had in the end been the first applicant who had decided how the put option would be settled. The Supreme Court concluded that the settlement had been executed with the knowledge and consent of the first applicant. It did not, however, explicitly address the first applicant’s challenge to the credibility of the compliance officer. 32. As regards the charge of market manipulation and the charge against the second applicant for aiding and abetting in fraud by abuse of position, the Supreme Court referred to the findings of the District Court. 33. The Supreme Court panel which decided the case was composed of Justices M.S., G.B., H.I.J., Ó.B.Þ. and Þ.Ö. Appearance of new information and subsequent events
34. As is described in Sigríður Elín Sigfúsdóttir (cited above, §§ 13-14) on 5 December 2016 confidential financial information first came to light in the media regarding the Justices of the Supreme Court. The coverage included the disclosure inter alia of Justice M.S.’s e-mails on withdrawals from equity funds. 35. On 6 December 2016, Justice M.S. sent the media a statement where he explained that he had received an inheritance in February 2002, which had included shares in three companies, including Glitnir. That same month he had, in accordance with Rules no. 463/2000, sought and received the authorisation of the Committee on Judicial Functions for participating in the division of the estate which owned these shares, and for his related ownership of them. He had, further, notified the Committee when he had sold the shares in 2003 and 2007. Justice M.S. also revealed that he had, following the sale of the shares, entrusted Glitnir with the management of a large part of the funds. They had, inter alia, been placed in equity funds, which he did not consider subject to any reporting obligation. 36. On 2 and 9 January 2016, the applicants requested information from the Committee on Judicial Functions on the reported financial interests of those Supreme Court Justices who had sat as judges in their case. 37. The Committee replied to the applicants by letters dated 23 and 25 January 2017. It explained that between 2004 and 2016, Justices G.B. and Ó.B.Þ. had not reported any shareholdings or requested authorisation for such holdings and that Justice M.S. had, by letter dated 28 February 2007, notified the Committee that he had sold his shares in Glitnir and that he no longer held shares in any company. Moreover, the Committee informed the applicants that it had decided at its meeting on 15 December 2016 that assets in equity funds and similar funds were not subject to the reporting obligation under Rules no. 463/2000 (see paragraph 50 below). 38. On 15 February 2017 the Committee on Judicial Functions sent the applicants a letter detailing shareholdings reported retroactively by Justices G.B., Ó.B.Þ. and M.S. in January and February 2017. 39. In parallel, in December 2016, a press release from the Supreme Court stated that as of 2017, the court would publish information about the financial interests of Justices on its website. All parties to cases that had been adjudicated before that time were invited to request such information directly from the court. 40. By letters to the Supreme Court, dated 2 January and 6 February 2017, the applicants requested certain information about the financial interests of the Justices that had adjudicated their case. By letters dated 31 January and 15 February 2017, the Supreme Court responded to the applicants’ requests by providing information for the period between 2004 and 2008. In its reply to the second applicant, the Supreme Court noted that Rules no. 463/2000 did not cover assets in equity funds and similar funds. While shares conferred decision-making power in the affairs of the relevant company on their owners, stakeholders in such funds had no say in how the funds invested, which could moreover change on a daily basis. The two types of financial interests were fundamentally different, the latter being more akin to depositing money in a savings account. The Supreme Court would, therefore, not provide any information on Justices’ assets in such funds. In its replies to both applicants, the Supreme Court otherwise referred to the signed declarations of individual Justices, which were enclosed with its letters, and which contained the following information. 41. Justice G.B informed that she had owned shares in the other two major Icelandic banks, Kaupþing Bank (hereinafter “Kaupþing”) and Landsbanki Íslands (hereinafter “Landsbanki”), which had lost all of their value in October 2008. She had not held shares in Glitnir. 42. Justice Ó.B.Þ. explained that he had acquired shares in Glitnir in July 2007 by inheritance when their market value had been ISK 14,679,947. Their original purchase value had been ISK 2,313,617. He had sold these shares on 7 December 2007 for ISK 11,532,528. 43. Justice M.S. disclosed that he had acquired shares in Glitnir in 2003, which he had sold in January and February 2007. In March 2007 he had acquired shares in Glitnir again, apparently as dividend payment on the shares previously sold. These shares had been worth ISK 343,034 and had become worthless in October 2008. While noting that he did not consider himself bound to do so, Justice M.S. also disclosed that since January 2007, he had had a contract for asset management with Glitnir. Specifically, in January and February 2008, he had placed ISK 61,450,000 in asset management. The funds appeared to have been placed in equity funds and partly in savings accounts, all without his direct involvement. He had withdrawn some of his funds in 2007 and 2008, but at the end of the latter year ISK 51,485,000 should have remained. At that time, however, ISK 43,878,000 had remained, resulting in a loss of ISK 7,607,000 or 14.78% of his capital after the withdrawals. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Constitution
44. Article 70 of the Constitution of the Republic of Iceland provides that everyone shall, for the determination of his rights and obligations or in the event of a criminal charge against him, be entitled, following a fair trial and within a reasonable time, to the resolution of an independent and impartial court of law. Criminal Procedures Act (no. 88/2008)
45. Section 6(1)(g) of the Criminal Procedures Act (lög um meðferð sakamála) reads as follows:
“(1) A judge, including a lay judge, shall be disqualified from sitting as judge in a case where:
...
g. there are other circumstances or conditions that may justifiably raise questions about his or her impartiality.
...”
46. Section 7(1) of the Act provides:
“A judge shall be responsible for ensuring his own eligibility to hear a case. Parties may, however, require a judge to recuse himself. In the same manner, the presiding judge shall ensure the eligibility of expert lay judges.”
 
47. Section 57(1) and (3) provides:
“1. When the police consider that the investigation is complete, and that evidence has been revealed that could lead to a prosecution, they shall send the investigation materials to a prosecutor, unless an action may be brought by the chief of police under the first and fourth subsections of section 24. Together with the investigation materials, the police shall send a report covering the investigation in accordance with the first subsection of section 56.
... 3. If an investigation against a suspect has been terminated because the case materials were not considered sufficient as the basis for an indictment, the investigation against the suspect shall not be reopened unless new case materials have come to light or are likely to come to light. If an investigation against a suspect has been terminated, the police shall inform the person, who shall be entitled to have this confirmed in writing.”
48. Sections 196, 205 and 208 at the material time provided the following as regards appeals to the Supreme Court against District Court’s judgments:
 
Section 196
“With the limits arising from other provisions of this Act, appeal against a District Court judgment lies to the Supreme Court in order to obtain:
 a. a re-examination of the determination of penalties;
 b. a re-examination of conclusions based on the interpretation or application of rules of law;
 c. a re-examination of conclusions based on the evaluation of the evidentiary value of documentation other than oral statements before the District Court;
 d. quashing of the judgment and remittal of the case;
 e. dismissal of the case from the District Court. When a judgment is appealed against, a re-examination may also be sought of rulings and decisions made during the court proceedings before the District Court.
...”
Section 205
“... The Supreme Court can decide to hear oral evidence to the extent it considers needed, when the court considers in light of events that such taking of evidence may influence the outcome of the case.”
 
Section 208
“... The Supreme Court cannot re-evaluate a District Court’s conclusion on the evidentiary value of oral testimony, unless the witness in question or the defendant have given oral statements before the Supreme Court. Should the Supreme Court consider that the conclusion of a District Court concerning the evidentiary value of oral testimony in court may be incorrect so as to materially affect the outcome of the case, and the witnesses or defendant in question have not given oral testimony before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court may quash the judgment of the District Court as well as its procedure to the extent necessary for oral testimony to be given before the District Court, and for the case to be resolved anew. Should a District Court judgment be quashed in such a manner, three judges shall deal with the case in a new trial before the District Court and they may not be the same judges as previously dealt with the case.”
The Judiciary Act (no. 15/1998)
49. Section 26 of the Judiciary Act (lög um dómstóla), as in force at the time, provided the following:
“A judge may not accept an occupation or become the owner of a share in a company or enterprise if this is not compatible with his office or carries a risk that he will not be able to discharge his official duties properly.
... The Committee on Judicial Functions shall issue general rules concerning the extent to which ownership of a share in a company or enterprise is compatible with the office of a judge. A judge shall report any share acquired by him in a company or enterprise to the Committee. If the general rules issued by the Committee do not provide for his right to own such a share, the judge shall seek its permission in advance. The Committee on Judicial Functions can, by a reasoned decision, prevent a judge from discharging an additional function or owning a share in a company or enterprise. A judge shall be obliged to heed such prohibition, but is entitled to seek a judicial resolution on its legality.”
Rules no. 463/2000
50. Section 7 of Rules no. 463/2000, on Additional Functions of District Court and Supreme Court Justices and their Ownership in Companies and Enterprises of 20 June 2000 (Reglur um aukastörf héraðs- og hæstaréttardómara og eignarhlut þeirra í félögum og atvinnufyrirtækjum), adopted by the Committee on Judicial Functions in June 2000, as in force at the relevant time, provided that:
“A judge may own shares in companies or undertakings other than those to which special statutory restrictions apply in terms of ownership. A judge is obligated to notify the Committee on Judicial Functions about his shareholdings, in a company that has a listed exchange rate, up to the value of ISK 3,000,000. The same applies to other companies in which a judge holds up to 5% shares. The Committee’s authorisation shall be sought for a judge’s holding in a company exceeding the limits stipulated above.”
51. Section 9 of the same Rules provided that a party to a court case had the right to receive information from the Committee on Judicial Functions regarding a judge’s specified extra work or ownership of shares in a company if this might, in the opinion of the Committee, be significant in respect of the matter of disagreement under resolution or as judged. Rules no. 1165/2017
52. Rules no. 463/2000 were repealed by Rules no. 1165/2017, on Additional Functions of District Court, Appeals Court and Supreme Court Justices and their Ownership in Companies and Undertakings, which entered into force on 1 January 2018 (Reglur um aukastörf héraðsdómara, landsréttardómara og hæstaréttardómara og eignarhlut þeirra í félögum og atvinnufyrirtækjum og skráningu þeirra). They set the value of shares triggering the reporting obligation at ISK 5,000,000. In addition, section 7(5) of the rules also provided that:
“A judge investing money in an investment fund, a mutual fund or a comparable fund which grants the judge a share of a fund on joint investment, cf. Act no. 128/2011 on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), Investment Funds and Professional Investment funds, is not obligated to notify the Committee on Judicial Functions of such disposition of funds.”
THE LAW
JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
53. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE APPLICANTS’ RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
54. The applicants complained of a violation of their right to be heard by an impartial tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in its relevant part, reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
Admissibility
55. The Government, with reference to the Court’s finding in the case of
Sigríður Elín Sigfúsdóttir (cited above, §§ 34-38), agreed that the applications had been submitted within the six-month time-limit and that domestic remedies had been exhausted. 56. However, the Government submitted that the complaint should be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. Both applicants contested the Government’s submission. 57. The Court finds that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 6
Outcome: violation