FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF MUKHTARLI v. AZERBAIJAN AND GEORGIA
(Application no. 39503/17)
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 3 and Art 5 (procedural and substantive) • Failure by Georgia to carry out an effective investigation into Azerbaijani national’s plausible allegations of abduction, ill-treatment and unlawful transfer from Georgia to Azerbaijan and that they were related to his journalistic activities • In view of investigation shortcomings, impossible to establish with sufficient certainty events leading to applicant’s disappearance from Georgia and reappearance in Azerbaijan • Court unable to conclude “beyond reasonable doubt” that alleged acts occurred with the involvement (active or passive) or acquiescence of the Georgia authorities
Art 5 § 1 • Deprivation of liberty • Court unable to establish unlawfulness of applicant’s arrest and initial detention prior to being brought before by a judge in Azerbaijan • Art 5 § 3 • Reasonableness of pre-trial detention • Azerbaijani courts’ failure to give “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons to justify need for applicant’s pre-trial detention
Art 8 • Private life • Correspondence • Search of contents of applicant’s mobile phone by Azerbaijani investigating authorities without judicial authorisation and no judicial review not in “accordance with the law”
 
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
5 September 2024
FINAL
 
05/12/2024
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Mukhtarli v. Azerbaijan and Georgia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Mattias Guyomar, President,
 Lado Chanturia,
 Carlo Ranzoni,
 Lətif Hüseynov,
 María Elósegui,
 Kateřina Šimáčková,
 Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 39503/17) against Azerbaijan and Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Azerbaijani national, Mr Afgan Sabir oglu Mukhtarli (Əfqan Sabir oğlu Muxtarlı - “the applicant”), on 3 June 2017;
the decision to give notice to the Azerbaijani and the Georgian Governments (“the Governments”) of the complaints under Articles 3, 5 §§ 1 (c) and 4, 8, 10, 13 and 18 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the observations submitted by the respondent Governments and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant;
the comments submitted by three non-governmental organisations: Freedom Now; the International Partnership for Human Rights; and the Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center, who were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section;
Having deliberated in private on 4 June and 2 July 2024,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The application concerns, as regards Georgia, the applicant’s alleged abduction, ill-treatment and forcible transfer to Azerbaijan, and the relevant authorities’ failure to conduct an effective investigation in that regard. As regards Azerbaijan, the applicant alleged that his arrest and detention there had been unlawful and unjustified. He also asserted that his abduction from Georgia and subsequent arrest in Azerbaijan had been intended to silence him and to punish him for his journalistic activities. The applicant relied on Articles 3, 5 §§ 1 (c), 3 and 4, 8, 10, 13 and 18 of the Convention, Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1974 and currently lives in Germany. He was represented by Mr N. Legashvili and Mr A. Chopikashvili, lawyers practising in Georgia, and by Mr E. Sadigov and Ms Z. Sadigova, lawyers practising in Azerbaijan. 3. The Georgian Government were represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia. The Azerbaijani Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Ç. Əsgərov. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. BACKGROUNG INFORMATION
5. The applicant is an investigative freelance journalist who worked in Azerbaijan for several media outlets, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and was known for his critical journalistic coverage of the Azerbaijani Government. In 2009 he was allegedly beaten by police during the dispersal of a demonstration in Baku (see Haji and Others v. Azerbaijan [Committee], no. 3503/10, §§ 26-31 and 172, 177-180, 1 October 2020). In 2011 he was convicted for participation in another demonstration in the city (see Mukhtarli and Aslanli v. Azerbaijan [Committee], nos. 13509/12 and 64801/12, §§ 2-5 and 15-26, 2 March 2023). 6. In January 2015, because of alleged harassment and persecution from the Azerbaijani authorities, the applicant moved with his family to Georgia and applied for asylum. During his stay in Georgia, he continued working for various media outlets, reporting on high-level corruption in the Azerbaijani Government. THE APPLICANT’S ALLEGED ABDUCTION IN GEORGIA AND FORCIBLE TRANSFER TO AZERBAIJANThe applicant’s account

7. On 29 May 2017, at about 7.30 p.m., while the applicant was on his way home, walking towards his apartment at Niaghvari Street in Tbilisi, he was stopped by four unknown men who spoke the Georgian language and drove a silver Opel car; three of them wore uniforms allegedly belonging to the Georgian criminal police. The men forced the applicant into the car, handcuffed him and started beating him. According to the applicant, he was driven in the direction of Tbilisi International Airport; the car passed the airport and continued in the direction of Sagarejo (Kakheti Region in Eastern Georgia). Once the car had passed Tbilisi International Airport, the applicant was blindfolded. They had twice changed a vehicle. The radio in the last car was playing an Azerbaijani song and the applicant realised that he had been handed over to the Azerbaijanis across the State border. These men reported every five-seven minutes by telephone to a person to whom they referred as “Mr General”. 8. At about 10.40 p.m. on the same day, they arrived at an unknown destination and the applicant was taken to a room, where his blindfold was removed. He saw the insignia of the Azerbaijani State Border Service (“the SBS”) on the walls and realised that he was detained in the military unit of the Service in the Balakan District. The servicemen told the applicant that he had illegally crossed the border and that they had found 10,000 euros (EUR) in cash in his pocket. He asserted that the money did not belong to him. They also searched him and seized his mobile telephone, Georgian bank and transport cards and a few Georgian coins. The applicant did not have his international passport on him. The Georgian Government’s account
9. Without providing any version of the alleged events, the Georgian Government submitted that the applicant’s allegations were unsubstantiated and unsupported by evidence. The Azerbaijani Government’s account
10. According to the Azerbaijani Government, on 29 May 2017 at around 10.40 p.m. officers from the sixth border-guard post of military unit no. 2007 of the SBS, which was stationed in the Balakan District, while patrolling the relevant border section adjacent to the border checkpoint, spotted the applicant moving from the territory of Georgia in the direction of the territory of Azerbaijan. The officers waited for the applicant to get closer and then ordered him to stop. The applicant tried to run away, but one of the officers pursued him. When the officer reached the applicant, the latter punched the officer in the chest and, as a result, the officer fell and hit his head against a blunt object and lost consciousness. The applicant was then apprehended by another officer and brought to the border‑guard post, where he was subjected to administrative arrest on suspicion of having committed an administrative offence of breaching the regulations of the border regime. 11. On the same day the applicant was transferred to Baku, where criminal proceedings were instituted against him on various charges (see paragraphs 81-95 below). Georgian authorities’ reaction to the applicant’s allegations
12. The applicant’s allegations, which were first voiced by his lawyer already on 31 May 2017 (see paragraph 22 below) prompted public reactions from several high officials in Georgia. 13. On the same day the President of Georgia said in a brief comment regarding the applicant’s alleged abduction that the allegations needed to be analysed thoroughly, “since the disappearance of a person from the territory of Georgia – be it through the sea, air, or land routes, the Georgian capital or its border – is a serious challenge to our statehood and our sovereignty.” On the same day, the head of the State Security Service said that “we should not hurry to make any conclusions” and that the Azerbaijani official version of the applicant being arrested while crossing the “green border” needed to be verified. 14. On 1 June 2017, the Prime Minister of Georgia called on the law‑enforcement agencies “to do everything to investigate the case within the shortest time possible.” He further noted that “speculations” regarding the applicant’s alleged transfer by the Georgian security agencies to the Azerbaijani authorities were absolutely unacceptable and that he ruled out the involvement of Georgian State institutions in any such activity. The Minister of the Interior noted that “the probability of a person crossing [the State border] at any sector, bypassing border guards is low, although it still exists.” He further stated that “I declare with full responsibility that the Georgian law‑enforcement agencies have and can have nothing to do with [the applicant’s] version of the case.”
Azerbaijani authorities’ reaction to the applicant’s allegations
15. On an unspecified date in June 2017, a member of the Azerbaijani Parliament, E.N., stated in an interview given to a media outlet that the arrest and transfer of the applicant had been the result of cooperation between the Georgian and Azerbaijani intelligence services. 16. On 13 June 2017 the Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan made a statement indicating that the allegation made by E.N. to the media about the alleged cooperation between the Azerbaijani and Georgian intelligence services in connection with the arrest of the applicant in Tbilisi and his subsequent transfer to Azerbaijan was false. The statement further noted that the Azerbaijani law-enforcement authorities had not cooperated with the Georgian law-enforcement authorities or intelligence services in connection with the applicant’s arrest and had not made such a request to the Georgian part. It further stated that at 10.40 p.m. on 29 May 2017 the applicant had been arrested by the agents of the SBS while the former had been unlawfully crossing the State border between Georgia and Azerbaijan. INVESTIGATION BY THE GEORGIAN AUTHORITIES INTO THE APPLICANT’S ALLEGED ABDUCTION, ill-treatment AND forcible TRANSFER TO AZERBAIJANCriminal complaint concerning the alleged disappearance of the applicant

17. On 30 May 2017 the applicant’s wife, L.M., informed the police by letter of her husband’s disappearance. In her letter she explained that he had spent the evening before with his Azerbaijani friend, D.A., in one of the cafés on Baratashvili Street in Tbilisi. At around 7 p.m. he had called her, using D.A.’s mobile telephone, to tell her that he was coming home. Since then, he had been missing. 18. On the same date a lawyer acting on behalf of L.M. wrote a letter to the police requesting that they establish the whereabouts of the applicant. He noted that the last time the applicant had talked to his wife had been on 29 May 2017 at about 7 p.m. He had called using his friend’s mobile telephone, as his own had been running out of battery. The lawyer also provided the number of the applicant’s mobile telephone, noting that the last time it had been on (according to WhatsApp) had been at 1.32 a.m. on 30 May 2017. In the same letter the lawyer alleged that in the period preceding his disappearance the applicant had been followed by unknown people and that he had even made a public post in this respect on his private Facebook account. Initiation of the investigation by the Tbilisi police department
19. On 30 May 2017 criminal proceedings were initiated in respect of the circumstances of the applicant’s disappearance under Article 143 § 1 of the Criminal Code (the criminal offence of unlawful deprivation of liberty) by the Old Tbilisi district police department. The applicant’s wife was immediately interviewed in the presence of her lawyer and an interpreter. She confirmed that the last time she had heard from her husband had been at around 7.00 p.m. on 29 May 2017. According to her statement, he had called her using his friend’s, D.A.’s mobile telephone and had told her that he was coming home. After some fifteen minutes she had tried to reach him on his own mobile telephone, but it had been switched off. The next morning, when she had realised that her husband was not at home, she had called D.A. to enquire about the applicant’s whereabouts. In reply, she had been told that he had not seen the applicant since their meeting at the café the previous day. 20. During her interview L.M. also told the investigator that her husband had recently told her that he was being watched by some unknown people. 21. On the same date the investigator interviewed D.A. and R.Sh., two friends of the applicant, with whom he had spent the evening of 29 May 2017, before his disappearance. They both said that they had met the applicant at around 4 p.m. in a café, Local Taste, on Baratashvili Street in Tbilisi. Having talked for a while, R.Sh. had left, while D.A. and the applicant had stayed until around 7 p.m. Then they had also left the café, walking away in different directions. The applicant, according to D.A.’s statement, had been planning to go home. 22. The following day L.M.’s lawyer additionally told the police that the applicant had apparently been abducted and forcibly transferred to Azerbaijan. 23. By a letter of 1 June 2017, the lawyer provided the police with further details concerning the alleged abduction of the applicant – information which, he said, he had received from Azerbaijan. As described in detail in the letter, on 29 May 2017 the applicant – having left the Local Taste café on Baratashvili Street – had taken a minibus in the direction of his home on Niaghvari Street in Tbilisi. He had got off the minibus in the area close to the Hotel Astoria and a branch of the Bank of Georgia. Having walked for a while he had turned right onto Niaghvari Street, where he had immediately been approached by two men speaking Georgian. They had forced him into an Opel-type car, tied his arms behind his back and put a bag over his head. He had been driven like this for some time, before being moved to another vehicle and eventually taken into Azerbaijan. According to the information that L.M. had received, the applicant had been beaten and subjected to other kinds of inhumane treatment during his abduction; as a result, his ribs were most likely broken. 24. In this letter the lawyer requested the relevant authorities to (i) grant him access to the investigation file, (ii) seize closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage from the cameras installed outside the Hotel Astoria and the above‑mentioned branch of the Bank of Georgia, and (iii) interview the applicant’s wife. 25. The main investigative actions that were subsequently undertaken by the Old Tbilisi district police department can be grouped in the following manner:
Questioning of witnesses
26. On 31 May 2017 the lead investigator interviewed the owner of the Local Taste café, which the applicant had visited on 29 May 2017. According to the statement, the owner of the café knew the applicant, as the latter visited his establishment quite often. On the day in question, he had come to the café with two other persons at around 2 p.m. One of them, who had been in his late twenties, had been a stranger to the owner as on that occasion he had seen him for the first time. He had left the café after about an hour. As for the second person, who had been several years older than the applicant, the owner of the café had known him, as he had visited the café on previous occasions with the applicant. According to the owner, they had both left the café between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. In reply to a specific question, the owner explained that there were no CCTV cameras installed either inside or outside the café. On the same date the investigator conducted an inspection of the café and its surroundings and took various photographs. 27. On 2 June 2017 the owner of the café was interviewed again. While confirming his initial statement, he added that the last time he had seen the applicant (in the company of the above-mentioned two other persons), on 29 May 2017, he had not noticed anything suspicious. All three of them had been quietly talking and drinking tea. No other person had entered the café during the period of time in question. The owner also stated that the applicant had left the place at around 7 p.m. but that he had not seen in which direction he had gone. The investigator also interviewed two employees of the café, who had confirmed that they had seen the applicant with two other persons on 29 May 2017. They noted that they had not noticed anything suspicious or unusual on that day, that the youngest of the three men had left the place earlier than the other two, and that the applicant had left at around 7 p.m. 28. On the same date twenty-eight persons – including three taxi drivers, five employees of a nearby carpark, several shopkeepers and outdoor booksellers, and several employees of grocery stores and restaurants in the neighbourhood where the applicant had last been seen – were interviewed. They all stated that they had not seen or heard anything suspicious or unusual on 29 May 2017. 29. The questioning of people from the area in question continued on 3, 6, and 7 June 2017. Twenty-five more witnesses were questioned in connection with the alleged abduction of the applicant. All of them stated that they had not witnessed any type of confrontation or anything suspicious or unusual happening on that day in the area. 30. On 3 June 2017, the investigator interviewed the applicant’s wife. While referring to her telephone conversation with O.K., the applicant’s defence lawyer in Azerbaijan, she reiterated her initial version of the events, furnishing the police with further details concerning the applicant’s alleged abduction. Notably, according to that statement, having left the café on 29 May 2017 the applicant had taken minibus no. 4 in the direction of Chonkadze Street. He had got off the minibus on that street, at the corner of a local park, and had continued in the same direction before turning right into Niaghvari Street. There he had been stopped by four men, three of whom had been wearing the uniform of the Georgian criminal police. All four had been speaking Georgian. He had tried to resist them and had as a result been physically assaulted. He had been forced into an Opel car, the colour and number plate of which he could not recall. He had been taken via Baratashvili Bridge, passing by 300 Aragveli metro station, and via the so-called “airport road”, outside Tbilisi, in the direction of the Kakheti Region (in eastern Georgia). According to the statement, after leaving Tbilisi, the applicant had had a bag put over his head. During the drive he had been able to hear the men making mobile telephone calls and apparently reporting to someone in the Georgian language. 31. On various dates in June 2017 the investigators questioned twenty‑two drivers who worked on the no. 4 minibus route. They all noted, with the exception of one driver who had not been working on 29 May 2017, that they did not remember the applicant getting on their minibus and that they had not noticed anything unusual or suspicious happening that day. 32. In the same period the investigation interviewed eighty-seven witnesses from the neighbourhood in which the applicant had been living with his family since 2015. With the exception of a few who had not been at home on the evening of 29 May 2017, all of them testified that they had not seen or heard anything unusual or suspicious happening in the neighbourhood on that day. 33. On 12 June 2017 the investigator interviewed eight employees of the branch of Bank of Georgia located on Chitadze Street. They noted that their standard working hours were from 10 a.m. until 5.30 p.m. and that all of them had been working on 29 May 2017, with at least four of them staying in the office as late as 7 p.m. None of them could remember seeing or hearing anything strange or suspicious happening on that day. 34. Between 11 and 18 July 2017 the investigator interviewed drivers of seven Opel cars that had been captured on various CCTV footage in the area where the applicant had been allegedly abducted in the evening hours of 29 May 2017. Four of them turned to be taxi drivers – one of them a heating engineer, and the last two a lawyer and a police officer. While some of them could not remember the exact reason they had been driving in the relevant area in the evening hours of 29 May 2017, all of them said that they did not know the applicant or have any link to his possible abduction. The police officer stated in his interview that on the evening in question he had been driving to pick his son up from kindergarten. His statement was subsequently confirmed by his wife and the director of the kindergarten in question, who were interviewed on 13 and 20 July 2017, respectively. 35. In parallel with the interviewing of potential witnesses in Tbilisi, information was requested from the head of the Border Police of Georgia (an agency under the Ministry of the Interior) regarding the border sections adjoining the Balakan District of Azerbaijan (the area where the applicant was arrested, according to the Azerbaijani authorities, see paragraph 10 above) and the border guards who had been on duty on the night of 29-30 May 2017 patrolling the relevant sections of the State border. Having received the information requested, in June-July 2017 seventy-three border guards from four different border sections, who had been patrolling the so-called “green border” (about 100 km long) between Georgia and Azerbaijan on the night concerned, were interviewed. According to their description, the stretch of green border under their responsibility had included a 5-km-wide border zone and a 500-metre-wide border line. The term “green” border indicated that there were no border crossing points at that section of the border and that, hence, it was impossible for people to legally exit Georgia and enter Azerbaijan via that stretch of territory. The border line was accessible only to local residents who had special authorisation issued for that purpose by the Border Police. A river marked a long section of the border at that section, which meant that it was possible to cross the State border on foot by wading through the water. There was no vehicle crossing point on the “green” border zone; thus, it was not possible to cross the “green” border in a vehicle. A wire was stretched along the land part of the border. 36. All the border guards who were interviewed in connection with the applicant’s alleged abduction stated that no incident had occurred on that date in the sections that they had been patrolling. They noted that no unknown vehicle other than locals’ vehicles had entered the border zone while they had been on duty and that no attempt to cross the border had been detected. Seizure and examination of CCTV footage
37. On 1 and 2 June 2017 the investigator in charge of the applicant’s case interviewed representatives of six businesses/properties that were located on Baratashvili Street (where the café was located) and several adjacent streets and were equipped with external CCTV cameras – among them, Georgian State Electro Systems (“GSES”), a computer shop (Alta), a pharmacy, the V. Chabukiani Ballet School, and two small shops. They all agreed to provide the investigation with a copy of their footage covering the period of time in question. On 6 June 2017 the investigator, having obtained a court’s authorisation, took possession of footage from three businesses. It appeared impossible to obtain CCTV footage from the two small shops and V. Chabukiani Ballet School, as for technical reasons unknown to their respective heads of security, the footage covering the relevant period of time had not been saved on their respective digital video systems. 38. Having analysed the footage obtained from GSES, on 8 June 2017 the investigator noted in the relevant examination report that he had identified a man in a white shirt, who at 7.24 p.m. had taken a yellow minibus no. 4 heading in the direction of Freedom Square. On 14 June 2017 he tried to watch the footage again in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer, but, as subsequently noted in a report, they could not open the relevant DVD file for technical reasons. On 16 June 2017, the applicant’s lawyer – having finally watched the very same footage – confirmed that most probably the man in the video was the applicant. On this footage the lawyer also noted a person in black suit who was allegedly watching the applicant boarding the minibus; the lawyer requested the investigator to establish his identity. On 12 July 2017 there was an attempt to examine the above-noted footage again with the participation of L.M. and the applicant’s lawyer; however, the DVD file did not open. According to the relevant examination report “it proved impossible to open the file saved on the DVD for a technical reason; namely, in the absence of required software, the file could not be examined.”
39. Meanwhile, the investigator had also examined the footage obtained from the Alta computer shop and the pharmacy (see paragraph 37 above). The CCTV footage from the pharmacy did not reveal any information of interest for the investigation. As for the computer shop, in the relevant examination report of the footage, the investigator noted a man in a white shirt taking a yellow minibus at 7.22 p.m. On 12 July 2017 L.M. having watched the above footage, confirmed that most probably the man in the white shirt was her husband. 40. Subsequently CCTV footage was obtained from five more businesses located in the area where the applicant had last been seen. An examination of that footage, according to the relevant reports in the case file, did not provide any new information. 41. The investigator also sought to obtain footage from three road-traffic cameras situated on Orbeliani Square, in the immediate vicinity of Baratashvili Street (where the applicant had last been seen). On 2 June 2017 the investigator was told by the employee in charge of such matters at the Tbilisi car-patrol police that the relevant cameras had not been working on 29 May 2017. According to the interview report, in reply to a specific question the police officer simply stated that to his knowledge the cameras on Orbeliani Square had been out of order for technical reasons since 21 May 2017. On 24 June 2017 another police officer was interviewed in connection with other road-traffic cameras located along the road supposedly taken by the applicant and his abductors in Tbilisi. According to that officer’s statement, around forty road-traffic cameras installed along that road either had been turned off or had not been recording during the period in question, among them four cameras on Baratashvili Bridge, three cameras on Baratashvili Slope, and eight cameras in the area adjacent to Avlabari metro station. Other traffic cameras had, according to the police officer’s statement, been streaming live, but had not been recording. 42. On 14 June 2017 the investigator wrote to the director of the Joint Operations Centre at the Ministry of the Interior, requesting a copy of the footage from the surveillance cameras on the outside perimeter of the Tsodna border crossing point (the closest to Balakan District of Azerbaijan, where the applicant was allegedly arrested and the only one in the Lagodekhi Region of Georgia) for the period between 6 p.m. on 29 May 2017 and 6 a.m. on 30 May 2017. On 16 June 2017 the director of the responsible department replied that the footage could not be retrieved owing to the fact that the “recording system of the video surveillance system” was not functioning. On 20 June 2017 an identical request was sent this time to the State Security Service. The latter produced the requested footage on 2 July 2017. Subsequently, the investigative authorities interviewed the employee of the Joint Operations Centre at the Ministry of the Interior who had unsuccessfully tried to retrieve the requested footage in June 2017 (interview dated 3 October 2017). In his statement he explained that by noting that “the recording system of the video surveillance system was not functioning”, he had not implied that the recordings as such had not existed, but simply that he had failed to retrieve those recordings. He further noted that the State Security Service had a direct access to the video surveillance system of all border crossing points and that they had better equipment, which had allowed them to retrieve the recordings concerned. 43. In June and July 2017, the investigator obtained and examined footage from various CCTV cameras situated in the area surrounding the applicant’s home, from where the applicant had allegedly been abducted. Accordingly, footage from the period in question had been seized, with the authorisation of a court, from the Hotel Astoria, the branch of the Bank of Georgia (mentioned in the lawyer’s letter of 1 June 2017 – see paragraph 23 above), the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. The examination of the footage from the Hotel Astoria did not reveal any information of interest to the investigation, except for the fact that on some of the recordings Opel cars could be seen. In the relevant examination report, however, the investigator noted that it was impossible to identify the registration numbers of those vehicles. The CCTV footage obtained from the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, located at 3a Chitadze Street, did not yield any relevant information either. As for the voluminous footage obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, located at 4 Chitadze Street, only on one of the recordings did the investigator identify eight Opel-type vehicles, together with their respective registration numbers. The investigator also sought to obtain CCTV footage from the branch of the Bank of Georgia (see ibid.). By a letter of 13 June 2017, the director of the security department at the Bank of Georgia informed the investigation that, for technical reasons, that footage could not be provided. 44. In June-July 2017 the investigators additionally approached owners of around fifty private properties or businesses located in the area where the applicant had last been seen, in the area from where he had been allegedly abducted, and along the road via which he had been allegedly transported after his abduction, requesting access to their CCTV footage. According to the relevant interview reports, it appeared that during the relevant period of time some of the cameras had been switched off, some had been broken, while the footage from most of the rest of the cameras had already been deleted. Interaction with the applicant’s lawyer throughout the investigation and various complaints lodged on behalf of the applicant
45. On 5 June 2017 the applicant’s lawyer requested the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia to relieve the Old Tbilisi district police department of the case owing to the alleged involvement of police officers in the applicant’s abduction and to entrust the investigation to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia. In his request the lawyer provided further details concerning the applicant’s alleged abduction, including an allegation that he had been transferred to the territory of Azerbaijan via border crossing point in Lagodekhi. In the absence of a reply, on 9 June 2017 the lawyer reiterated his request to the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia for the case to be investigated by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. In support of his request he submitted a clip from a radio interview with one of the members of the Parliament of Azerbaijan, in which the latter had stated that the arrest of the applicant had been the result of joint efforts and steps undertaken by the Georgian and the Azerbaijani intelligence services (see in this connection paragraphs 15-16 above). The applicant’s lawyer also requested the district prosecutor supervising the police investigation to grant the applicant and his wife victim status in the proceedings and to allow them access to the investigation file. The requests went unanswered. 46. On 9 June 2017 the lawyer complained to the Tbilisi prosecutor of the district prosecutor’s failure to respond to his requests. He reiterated his requests for access to the case file and the granting of the victim status to the applicant and his wife. His letter was forwarded on 14 June 2014 to the district prosecutor’s office, but no reply followed. 47. On 13 June 2017 the applicant’s lawyer was given access to the investigation file. The file contained the testimony of about 200 witnesses and several CCTV recordings. Having gone through the case file, the lawyer complained to the investigator of the inadequacy of the investigation. He asserted that instead of interviewing hundreds of witnesses who had not seen or heard anything, it would have been more efficient to analyse the seized CCTV footage with a view to identifying the vehicle involved in the applicant’s abduction and establishing the identity of its passengers. On the same date the applicant’s lawyer lodged an application with the Tbilisi City Court. He requested that the court recognise as unlawful the tacit refusal of the district prosecutor’s office to grant the applicant and his wife victim status within the scope of the ongoing investigation. The Tbilisi City Court rejected the above-noted application on 28 June 2017. The court concluded that the request was unfounded, and that in any event it had no jurisdiction to entertain it, as victim status-related issues within the scope of ongoing criminal proceedings fell within the discretion of the prosecutor. There was no possibility to appeal against the above-noted court decision. 48. On 16 June 2017 the applicant’s lawyer requested a copy of the entire investigation file. He maintained that the amount of material was voluminous and that without a proper copy it was impossible to study the file within just a few hours or even a day. In addition, the lawyer alleged that he had not been afforded the possibility to watch some of the CCTV footage. 49. On the same date the lawyer was allowed to watch one item of CCTV footage on which the applicant had been identified. The latter was seen boarding a yellow no. 4 minibus on Baratashvili Street no. 2. The time shown on the video recording at the relevant period of time was 7.24 p.m. On this footage the lawyer noted a person in black suit who was allegedly watching the applicant boarding the minibus; the lawyer requested the investigator to establish his identity. He further requested that the following investigative measures be taken:
-            seizure of CCTV footage from a number of addresses along the route of the no. 4 minibus;
-            seizure of CCTV footage from the area around Niaghvari Street;
-            seizure of CCTV footage along the route via which the applicant was allegedly driven by his abductors, including around the 300 Aragveli metro station and along the so-called “airport route”; and
-            seizure of CCTV footage from the Georgia-Azerbaijan border crossing point for the relevant period of time. 50. On 3 July 2017 the applicant’s lawyer reiterated his request for access to a copy of the investigation file. On 20 July 2017 a district prosecutor of the Old Tbilisi district prosecutor’s office refused the request. He ruled that given the fact that the lawyer lacked any status in the ongoing investigation, he was procedurally not entitled to have a copy of the file. In the meantime, however, on 12 July 2017, the applicant’s wife and the lawyer were allowed access to the case material for several hours. 51. Throughout June-July 2017 the investigator also attempted on a number of occasions to make contact with the applicant’s two Azerbaijani lawyers, however, unsuccessfully, as they were not answering their mobile telephones. Eventually, on 17 July 2017 the investigator got in touch with both of them. The first of them refused to appear before the Georgian police to undergo an interview. The second lawyer stated that he would inform them of his position after consulting the applicant. As can be seen from the case file, neither of the Azerbaijani lawyers were ever interviewed by a Georgian investigator. Other steps taken in the course of the police investigation
52. On 3 June 2017 the Tbilisi City Court, acting at the request of a prosecutor, authorised the seizure of (i) records from the MagtiCom mobile telephone company of all the incoming and outgoing calls made from the mobile telephone of the applicant in the period between 10 a.m. on 25 May 2017 and midday on 1 June 2017, (ii) records of the message texts either sent or received by the applicant during that period, and (iii) the relevant international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) codes, with a list of the antennae that had transmitted the signals from the applicant’s telephone. According to the information provided by MagtiCom, the last time the applicant had used his mobile telephone had been on 29 May 2017 at 4.49 p.m. in Tbilisi. Cooperation with the Azerbaijani authorities
53. On 31 May 2017 the head of the Old Tbilisi police department wrote a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (“the MFA”) asking it to obtain information regarding the circumstances of the arrest of the applicant in Azerbaijan and the initiation of criminal proceedings against him. In reply to the MFA’s request for information, the Azerbaijani authorities informed the Georgian authorities that the applicant had been arrested on 29 May 2017 in the Balakan Region when trying to illegally cross the Georgian-Azerbaijani State border. 54. On 8 June 2017 the Old Tbilisi district prosecutor’s office – via the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia – lodged a request for assistance with the relevant Azerbaijani authorities under the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959). They submitted a detailed list of questions and asked for the applicant to be interviewed. That request was left unanswered; so was the request, reiterated on 13 June 2017. Investigation by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia
55. On 20 July 2017 the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia decided to transfer the investigation of the case from the Old Tbilisi district police department to the investigations department of the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia. Several investigators from the investigations department dealing with the most serious crimes were assigned to the case. 56. L.M., the applicant’s wife, was interviewed by one of the newly assigned investigators on 25 July 2017. She reiterated the applicant’s version of his alleged abduction, ill-treatment and forcible transfer to Azerbaijan. She provided detailed information about their life and work in Georgia, and she said that they had never been subjected to violence or pressure from the Georgian authorities. She confirmed that her husband had been followed and watched by unknown people, although he had never told that to the police, as he had not expected to see any results. With regard to the alleged abduction, L.M. noted that on the day in question the applicant had been carrying neither his national ID card nor his international passport. As she had learned from one of his Azerbaijani lawyers, during the drive following his abduction the applicant and his abductors had changed car twice – the first time somewhere close to Sagarejo. There the bag had been taken off his head and replaced with adhesive tape wrapped around his eyes. The second time that they had changed vehicles before entering the border crossing point, most probably in Lagodekhi region, the applicant had been moved to a sort of minibus. The Georgian-speaking abductors had been replaced at that point by men speaking Azerbaijani. The applicant had crossed the border in the minibus, and when the adhesive tape had been taken off his eyes, he had found himself in a building belonging to the SBS. According to L.M.’s statement, when in Azerbaijan, the applicant’s abductors had called someone, telling him: “Please tell the general that we are bringing mullah – you can come to the funeral.” Then the applicant had had EUR 10,000 put into his pocket, which had been subsequently found during a so-called “personal search”. Early in the morning of 30 May the applicant had been taken to the bank of the River Mazimchay (on the border between Georgia and Azerbaijan), where the photographs of his purported arrest had been taken. L.M. asserted that the photographs had been taken for the purpose of staging the applicant’s purported attempt to illegally cross the Georgian-Azerbaijani green border. However, she noted in her interview that the clothes and shoes of the applicant had been strangely dry. In connection with the applicant’s mobile telephone, L.M. reiterated that according to WhatsApp messenger, her husband’s telephone had been on at around 1.00 a.m. on 30 June 2017. 57. Between 22 July and 2 August 2017, several investigators reviewed all the footage obtained from the CCTV cameras from the Tsodna border crossing point. Their reports said, without giving further details, that they had not seen anything of interest in respect of the case in those recordings. 58. Between 3 and 10 August 2017, the investigators reviewed footage obtained from the area surrounding the applicant’s home – namely, from the Hotel Astoria, the Italian Embassy, the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. In the relevant reports the investigators noted that they had not seen anything of interest in respect of the case. On 20 September 2017 the investigator ordered a forensic examination of the above-mentioned footage. As noted in the relevant investigator’s order, the purpose of the examination was the identification of the registration numbers of the vehicles seen on the above‑mentioned footage. It is not clear from the case file what (if any) was the outcome of the forensic examination. 59. In August the investigators also reviewed the footage obtained from the neighbourhood where the applicant had last been seen on 29 May 2017. The footage obtained from GSES, located at 2 Baratashvili Street, could not be opened (see paragraph 38 above), while the analysis of the footage from the Alta computer shop showed the applicant on Baratashvili Street boarding a yellow minibus at 7.23 p.m. (see paragraph 39 above). According to the investigator who reviewed the footage, no other person was visible in the vicinity of the applicant in the video. 60. Subsequently, after a number of unsuccessful attempts to access the files obtained from the GSES, on 13 July 2018 the investigator ordered a forensic computer examination for the purpose of establishing whether the GSES footage had been damaged (and if so, how) or whether the DVD disk itself had been damaged (and if so, how). The investigator also asked for the available files to be retrieved, if possible, in a format that would allow them to be read without the involvement of a specialist. A computer forensic examination was conducted on 30 July 2018. The expert involved concluded that the DVD was not damaged; however, he could not read the files themselves because they were damaged or because of their incompatibility with the software on his computer. 61. Between 7 August and 19 September 2017, the investigators interviewed eleven border-patrol police officers who had been on duty at the Tsodna border crossing point on the night of 29-30 May 2017. According to their statements, the Tsodna border crossing point was the closest to Balakan District of Azerbaijan and the only one in the Lagodekhi Region of Georgia; no one could cross the border without passing through passport control and having their vehicle registered. There were three so-called “gates” at the border crossing point: the first gate was designated for the checking of pedestrians, the second gate to the checking of vehicles, and the third gate to the checking of lorries. While the Tsodna border crossing point was under the responsibility of the patrol police, the lorries passing through the third gate were checked by customs officers. The latter were also responsible for checking the passports of lorry drivers. The so-called green border around the border crossing point was controlled by the border police. All of the eleven border-patrol police officers interviewed stated that no incident had taken place on the night of 29-30 May 2017 at the Tsodna border crossing point and that they had not noticed anything suspicious. In reply to a specific question, they dismissed as unrealistic the likelihood of allowing someone to cross the border without having his or her passport checked. They all confirmed that they had never received such an order. 62. At the same time the investigators interviewed eleven customs officers, who, with the exception of one, had been on duty at the Tsodna border crossing point on the night of 29-30 May 2017. As well as providing a general overview of the way the border crossing point functioned, they all confirmed that not a single person could cross the border into Azerbaijan without undergoing passport control. None of them could recall any incident happening at the border crossing point on that night. 63. The investigators also obtained information about the drivers who had crossed the border to Azerbaijan via the Tsodna border crossing point on the night of 29-30 May 2017. On 28 September 2017 one of the investigators interviewed M.U., the driver of the only minibus to have crossed the border to Azerbaijan on that night. According to his statement, he was a national of Azerbaijan, the owner of the minibus in question, and he worked as a private taxi driver, taking people from Georgia to Dagestan, in the Russian Federation. He made this trip normally twice a week. M.U. stated that it was impossible either for him or for his passengers to cross the border in either direction without having their passport checked. Late that night he had been returning to his home village in Azerbaijan via the Tsodna border crossing point. When shown the applicant’s photograph, he said that he did not know the man and had never seen him before. He also stated that he had never been asked by anyone to transfer the applicant to Azerbaijan. On the same date as his interview, his minibus was searched and biological samples and microparticles were removed from its interior. On 13 October 2017 a request for legal assistance was sent to the Azerbaijani authorities with a view to organising a forensic examination capable of showing whether the applicant had been transported in the minibus concerned. In particular, the Georgian investigative authorities asked the Azerbaijani authorities to compare the seized biological samples with the applicant’s DNA, and the microparticles with the fibres removed from the applicant’s clothes. According to the case file, the request of the Georgian authorities had been left unanswered. 64. On 17 October 2017 one of the investigators also interviewed M.M. (one of M.U.’s passengers) on the night of 29 May 2017. M.M. confirmed that she had taken his taxi with other passengers travelling from Dagestan to her home village in Azerbaijan. She noted that there had been no incident on the border that night and that she had crossed the border without hindrance, after having her passport checked. M.M. said that she had never heard of the applicant and had not seen him crossing the border. 65. Subsequently, having obtained judicial authorisation, the investigator also requested data concerning M.U.’s mobile telephone – namely, information about the calls he had made and received on the night of 29‑30 May 2017 indicating the relevant IMEI codes together with a list of the antennae that had transmitted the signals from M.U.’s telephone. By a letter of 12 March 2018, the relevant mobile telephone company informed the investigator that for technical reasons it was impossible to retrieve the data requested. 66. Between 2 October 2017 and 16 February 2018, the investigators interviewed an additional ten people who had crossed the Georgian‑Azerbaijani State border via the Tsodna border crossing point on the night of 29-30 May 2017. While providing detailed statements concerning the circumstances and the motives of their crossing the border on that night, they all stated that they had not seen the applicant; neither had they heard anything suspicious or unusual happening on the Tsodna border crossing point that night. 67. In the meantime, on 31 July and 12 December 2017 the Georgian authorities reiterated their request for legal assistance from the Azerbaijani authorities (see paragraph 54 above); however, no reply followed. On 29 January 2018 yet another request for legal assistance was sent to the Azerbaijani authorities. This time, the investigator in charge of the applicant’s case asked for a copy of the first-instance court decision convicting the applicant of illegal crossing the border, resisting an official representative, and smuggling (see, in this connection, paragraph 122 below). In reply, on 31 January 2018 the requested decision was provided. 68. On 2 April 2018, in response to an allegation voiced by the applicant’s lawyer that certain footage in the case file had been manipulated, the investigator ordered a forensic examination of the footage obtained from the Tsodna border crossing point. He asked the experts to establish whether the footage recorded on a DVD-R disk had been tampered with. The investigator also requested the identification of the registration numbers of all the vehicles seen on the footage. The case material available to the Court does not contain the results of that forensic examination. 69. On 26 June 2018 the investigator examined again the information concerning the use of mobile telephones by the applicant and his wife on 29 May 2017. According to the report that he subsequently drew up, the applicant’s wife had received two calls from the mobile telephone of D.A. – at 7 p.m. and at 7.01 p.m. At the moment of both calls, L.M. had been in the area of Chitadze Street (in the vicinity of their home), while D.A. had been in the area of Grigol Orbeliani Park (in the area where the applicant was last seen). 70. On 3 July 2018 the applicant’s lawyer provided the investigator in charge of the applicant’s case with a copy of the applicant’s handwritten statement in Azerbaijani and a translation thereof into Georgian. The lawyer noted that the statement had been written by the applicant and handed over to his Azerbaijani lawyer on 14 June 2018. In his statement the applicant reiterated his version of the events, stating that three persons wearing criminal police uniforms had attacked him from behind and had started beating him. He had been forced into a vehicle, which had driven several hundred metres down the road and had then stopped close to a local kindergarten. There, he had been beaten again and his arms had been tied behind his back. The applicant provided a detailed description of the journey that he and his abductors had then made. Notably, he mentioned passing by the Parliament of Georgia on Rustaveli Avenue, then – via Freedom Square – turning in the direction of Baratashvili Bridge; they had then crossed the bridge, passing by the Avlabari and 300 Aragveli metro stations, and had taken the so-called “airport route”. He stated that a bag had been put over his head after the vehicle had left Tbilisi, however, he had still been able to see the road, as the bag had been damaged. The first stop had been made after about one and a‑half hour of driving, close to Sagarejo. There, the abductors had taken the bag off the applicant’s head and had pulled his shirt over his head instead. After about another forty minutes he had been forced into another car. The same men had continued to escort him. After two hours’ drive, he had been moved to yet another car. From there on he had been accompanied by men speaking Azerbaijani. In a short while, their vehicle had stopped again, and someone had said: “Ali – come and see.” Then, after about fifteen minutes the applicant had been taken into a building, where his shirt had been pulled off his head and he had been able to see that he was at an Azerbaijani border crossing point. In his statement the applicant named two persons who had allegedly brought him to the Azerbaijani side: A.Sh. an assistant to the head of the SBS, and J.G. He also alleged that prior to his abduction he had already been expecting to be detained and abducted to the Azerbaijani side of the border, as he had been followed and watched intensively. He concluded by saying that the Government of Georgia, the Georgian criminal police, and the head of the Lagodekhi customs and border crossing point were responsible for his abduction and that he had been taken via the Lagodekhi border crossing point into neutral territory, where he had been handed over to the Azerbaijani authorities. 71. On 27 July 2018 the investigator checked in the relevant border crossing database of the Ministry of the Interior whether the two persons identified by the applicant as A.Sh. and J.G. had crossed the border into Georgia in 2017. He found in the system three persons bearing the name of A.Sh.; however, none of them had crossed the border with Georgia in 2017. As for J.G., the investigator identified one person of the same name who had left Georgia via another border crossing point on the border between Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Vakhtangisi, on 28 May 2017 and had returned to Georgia on 7 June 2017 using the same border crossing point. 72. On the same date the investigator also checked whether anyone with the name “Ali”, as mentioned in the applicant’s statement, had crossed the border via the Tsodna border crossing point on 29 May 2017. He found in the relevant database that one Azerbaijani national, a certain A.I., had indeed crossed the border on that day at 10.41 p.m. According to the case file, he has not been interviewed to date. Allegations of being under surveillance in Georgia, and the related investigation
73. On 7 August 2017 L.M. requested the prosecutor in charge of the investigation to also investigate the allegations that she and the applicant were being watched and followed by unknown people. She stated that the surveillance of them had started several days before the applicant’s alleged abduction. In support of her request L.M. submitted several photographs depicting four different men who had allegedly been following her on 4 August 2017 on Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi. 74. On 14 August 2017 L.M. provided three more photographs of the men who had been allegedly watching them. In connection with one of the photographs, she stated that it had been taken by the applicant several days before his abduction. 75. On 24 August 2017 the applicant’s wife was interviewed in connection with the allegations of unlawful surveillance. She provided detailed information about the four photographs she had taken on 4 August 2017 of the men on Rustaveli Avenue when they had been allegedly following her. She also recalled noticing on 3 August 2017 around seven men who she said had been watching her and her daughter in one of the central parks in Tbilisi. L.M. also noted another incident on 26 June 2017 when, while sitting in one of the cafes in Tbilisi with D.A., a handbag had been placed on her seat. She alleged that there had been recording equipment inside that handbag. 76. On 31 August 2017, the Tbilisi City Court allowed an application lodged by the prosecutor to have CCTV footage seized from Rustaveli Avenue, where L.M. had been allegedly followed by unknown man on 4 August 2017. Footage was obtained from four private properties. 77. On 19 September 2017 L.M. held a press conference during which she showed several additional photographs of the men who had allegedly been watching her, the applicant and their Azerbaijani friends (including D.A.) in Tbilisi. 78. Having undertaken a number of investigative steps, the identity of the four men from the photographs were established. All four had Azerbaijani nationality. The first one, Sh.M., was interviewed by one of the investigators on 28 September 2017. He stated that after making a number of short business trips to Georgia, he had moved to Tbilisi on 24 April 2017 and had started a business there. He noted that he did not know either the applicant or his wife, and that he had never heard of them. He dismissed as untrue the allegations that he had been following and watching L.M. As regards his photograph, he said that it had been taken on 31 May 2017 by two Azerbaijani men and that he had even complained about this to the police. A copy of his complaint dated 31 May 2017 was subsequently added to the case file. 79. G.H., another of the persons identified in the photographs, stated that his photograph had been taken in April 2016 in one of the hotels in Tbilisi and that another person on the photograph was B.M., an uncle of his former wife. His version of the events was subsequently corroborated by both B.M. and the owner of the hotel in question, both of whom were interviewed by the investigator in September 2017 and April 2018, respectively. They dismissed having any kind of relationship with the applicant and his wife. THE APPLICANT’S ARREST IN AZERBAIJAN AND THE INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIMThe applicant’s arrest

80. The Government of Azerbaijan were requested to provide all the documents related to the applicant’s arrest and other material concerning the criminal proceedings instituted against him. The most relevant documents provided by the Government are set out below. 81. Upon the applicant’s apprehension, on 30 May 2017, Mr A.O., the investigator of military unit no. 2007 prepared the following document:
“    RECORD
   of administrative arrest  
30 May 2017
12.30 a.m. Mazimgara village, Balakan District              
In accordance with Articles 27 and 28 of the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the State Border and Articles 88.1.2 and 90 of the Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan of Administrative Offences, [Mr A.O., official position and rank] carried out an administrative arrest of [the applicant] for having committed an administrative offence under Article 570 of the Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan of Administrative Offences.
- Ground for administrative arrest: Breach of the regulations of the border regime.
... The arrested person should be subjected to administrative arrest for a period of twenty-four hours and kept in military unit.”
82. The above-noted record was followed by a document attesting that the applicant had been informed of his rights as an arrested person within administrative proceedings. 83. Following his arrest, the applicant was searched, and the following items were seized: a mobile telephone, EUR 10,000, Georgian bank and transport cards and some coins. A record of the search was drawn up at 12.40 a.m. on 30 May 2017. 84. On the same date Mr A.O. prepared the following document:
“   Record of administrative offence
30 May 2017
12.50 a.m. Mazimgara village, Balakan District              
In accordance with Article 100 of the Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan of Administrative Offences, [Mr A.O.] prepared the present record because the actions [of the applicant] indicate the commission of the following administrative offence. On 29 May 2017 at 10.40 p.m. [the applicant] breached the State border of the Republic of Azerbaijan [crossing from Georgia] in the 45th section of the left flank of outpost no. 6 of military unit no. 2007, stationed in the village of Mazimgara, Balakan District.
... Having regard to the fact that the above-noted administrative offence is listed by Article 570 of the Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan of Administrative Offences, [the applicant] is held administratively liable. 85. On 30 May 2017 an investigator from the SBS, issued the following decision:
“    DECISION
 On the opening of a criminal case and the assembly of investigation team
30 May 2017         Baku
 
[Mr A.I., official position and rank], having considered the material received from military unit no. 2007 of the State Border Service,
 
    HAVING ESTABLISHED THAT:
It follows from the material received from military unit no. 2007 of the State Border Service that at 10.40 p.m. on 29 May 2017 [the applicant] illegally crossed the secured State border of the Republic of Azerbaijan outside the checkpoint ... Specifically, [he] illegally passed from Georgia into the Republic of Azerbaijan through the border located in the 45th section of outpost no. 6 of military unit no. 2007, stationed in the Balakan District, and smuggled ... cash on a large scale – [namely,] 10,000 euros [equivalent to 19,062 [Azerbaijani manats (AZN)] ... Thereafter, he was apprehended by servicemen of the State Border Service. During the search [of the applicant’s person], a large amount of cash – [namely] 10,000 euros equivalent to [AZN] 19,062 – was found and seized. Having regard to the fact that the actions of [the applicant] contain elements of crimes listed by Articles 318.1 and 206.1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, it is necessary to open a criminal case under those Articles and to create an investigation team ... in order to investigate the criminal case in a full and impartial manner. Having regard to the above... HAS DECIDED:
1. To open criminal case against [the applicant] under Articles 318.1 and 206.1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 2. To register the case under no. 172960049 ...”
86. On 30 May 2017 the investigator in charge of the case examined the crime scene. The relevant record read:
RECORD
(upon inspection of the crime scene)
30 May 2017    Outpost no. 6 of military unit no. 2007,
     Mazimgara village, Balakan District
... Inspection started: 6.30 a.m. Inspection ended: 7 a.m. The inspection was carried out in daylight conditions. During the inspection the following was established: the crime scene is located at the end of the border fence, 50 metres from the forty-fifth section of the left flank of outpost no. 6 of military unit no. 2007, stationed in the village of Mazimgara, Balakan District. At a distance of 2 metres from the end of the border fence there is a gulley leading to the bed of the River Mazimchay, where dry tree branches have been placed. The depth of the riverbed is 2.5 metres. The part of the terrain leading from the riverbed towards the Republic of Azerbaijan is flat. During the inspection of the crime scene, [the officers G.M. and D.Kh.] indicated that while [they had been] on [guard]duty from 10.15 p.m. on 29 May 2017 until 1 a.m. on 30 May 2017 in the 45th section of the left flank of the border outpost, at 10.40 p.m. on 29 May 2017 [the applicant] had crossed the State border from Georgia into the Republic of Azerbaijan near a fence post marked with the number “46-45” at the end of the border fence in the 45th section. During the inspection of the crime scene, footprints were found in the indicated area – namely on the bank of the River Mazimchay, which leads toward the Republic of Azerbaijan. During the inspection photographs were taken ...”
87. On an unspecified date, an officer from the SBS, Sh.Z., was questioned by the investigator. The relevant parts of his interview read:
“From 10.15 p.m. on 29 May 2017 until 1.00 a.m. on 30 May 2017, I – together with [officers A.Sh., J.G., G.M. and D.Kh.] – were on [border-patrol] duty. During our period of duty, at 10.40 p.m., we noticed one person in civilian clothes crossing the State border of the Republic of Georgia towards the Republic of Azerbaijan. That person was warned to stop. However, that person, ignoring the warning, tried to run away from the area. As a result of the measures taken subsequently, we apprehended the person who had tried to breach the State border. During the apprehension, the said person offered resistance to a member of the border patrol by throwing punches, and punched in the chest [G.M.], who fell to the ground. When [G.M.] fell to the ground he hit the back of his head on a stone and lost consciousness for a while. Because I was standing next to [G.M.], I saw exactly what happened. Afterwards, the said person was restrained ... [and] taken to the outpost in order to establish his identity. During the initial inquiry the person arrested was identified as [the applicant]. 88. G.M., who was questioned by the investigator, gave the following testimony:
“... I began my military service in the State Border Service on 28 January 2015, and am continuing my service in the military unit ... stationed in the Zagatala District ... On 29 May 2017, owing to service needs, I was posted for duty to outpost no. 6, stationed in Mazimgara village, Balakan District. During my attachment, I – together with [officers A.Sh., J.G., Sh.Z., and D.Kh.] – were on [border-patrol] duty from 10:15 p.m. on 29 May 2017 until 1 a.m. on 30 May 2017. During [our patrol], at 10:40 p.m., we noticed one person in civilian clothes crossing the State border from the Republic of Georgia towards the Republic of Azerbaijan. That person was warned to stop. However, that person, ignoring the warning, tried to run away from the area. As a result of the measures taken afterwards, we apprehended the person who had tried to breach the State border. During the apprehension, the said person offered resistance to the members of the border patrol by throwing punches; he punched me in the chest, and I fell on the ground. When I fell on the ground, I hit the back of my head on a stone. At that moment my eyes blacked out and I became unconscious. Afterwards, the said person was restrained ... [and] taken to the outpost in order to establish his identity. During the initial inquiry the person arrested was identified as [the applicant]. 89. The investigator also questioned D.Kh., who gave testimony similar to that of Sh.Z. and G.M. 90. On 30 May 2017 the applicant was declared a suspect in the criminal proceedings and was informed of his right to access a lawyer and not to incriminate himself. The applicant retained a lawyer of his own choosing, Mr Elchin Sadigov. On the same date at 7.40 p.m. the investigator drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest as a suspect. 91. On the same date the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the presence of his lawyer. The relevant parts of his testimony read:
“Question: You are invited to give testimony as regards the suspicion against you of committing a criminal offence. What could you state in this regard? Response: I would like to state that in 2015 I travelled together with my family to Tbilisi, Georgia through the Shihli border checkpoint in order to reside [there] temporarily. I live there with my family in a rented apartment ... I started my career in journalism around 2000. During this period, I worked for the Yeni Müsavat, Azadlig, Muhalifat, Bizim Yol, and Khural newspapers, and I currently cooperate with the Internet television station Meydan TV. At the same time – from 2000 until 2010 – I was a member of the Müsavat Party (a political party) and was involved in political activity. I am no longer a member of this party, and at present I continue my journalistic activities in Tbilisi as an independent journalist. At around 6 p.m. on 29 May 2017 I bought some bread in a shop located in Niaghvari Street, next to my temporary residence, and on my way back an Opel car [drove up and] blocked my way and three persons grabbed me from behind and forced me into the car ... I had the feeling that these persons were State agents. They drove the car [away] and pulled over in a nearby park ... They then tied my arms behind my back with a cable and drove in the direction of the airport. While in the car, the said persons injured me by punching me in the face and in the chest. At present I have bruise marks on my wrists left by the cable binding, injuries to my left temple, forehead, the upper part of my nose [and] my right eye, and I also have pain below the left side of my chest. After driving past the airport, the said persons put a bag on my head and changed direction towards the Sagarejo District. After a while, my heart started to cause [me] pain. ... I informed them of that, and they stopped the car and removed the bag ... At that moment I saw that the car had not stopped on the road but in a field. Because I did not feel well, they covered [only] my eyes, [binding them with] tape, and took me out of the car. After waiting for five-six minutes, another car arrived, and they put me in that car. They switched cars, but the persons who had apprehended me remained – I realised that from their voices. After two hours on the road, they took me out of the car and put me in a large crossover-type car. In this car there sat other persons and they were speaking Azerbaijani. After driving for a while, the said persons brought me to a building and opened my eyes. Afterwards, I realised that I had been brought to the border outpost. In the outpost they started to question me and told me that I had [illegally crossed] the State border. During a search of my person, they found and seized one mobile telephone, one [payment] card, one public transport card, one [Georgian] lari, two five-tetri coins and EUR 10,000. I declare that the EUR 10,000 found and seized do not belong to me. ... While my eyes and arms were tied, [this money] was put in my pocket by the persons next to me ...”
92. At 8.50 p.m. on 30 May 2017 the applicant was admitted to the temporary detention facility of the Khatai District Police Office, where he was examined by a doctor. According to extracts from the medical logs kept by the temporary detention facility, no sign of injury was found on the applicant’s body, and he did not make any complaint in that regard. 93. On 30 May 2017 the investigator ordered a medical forensic examination of G.M. According to the forensic report dated 31 May 2017, G.M. sustained swelling to the back of his head, which resulted in concussion. He also had bruises on his chest and forearm. The expert concluded that the injuries caused to G.M. resulted in short-term damage to his health. 94. On 31 May 2017 the investigator conducted a face-to-face confrontation between the applicant and G.M., who maintained their initial submissions. 95. On 31 May 2017 the applicant was additionally charged under Article 315.2 of the Criminal Code (Resistance to or violence against a public official that poses a danger to his life and health), and G.M. joined the proceedings as the victim. 96. It appears from a letter dated 1 June 2017 from the head of the Baku pre-trial detention facility that at 12.10 p.m. on 1 June 2017 the applicant was transferred from the temporary detention facility of the Khatai District Police Office to the Baku pre-trial detention facility and that no sign of injury was observed on his body during the medical examination carried out upon his admission to the Baku pre-trial detention facility. The applicant’s detention on remand
97. On 31 May 2017 the prosecutor in charge of the case lodged an application with the Sabail District Court asking that the applicant be remanded in custody. 98. On the same date the Sabail District Court ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of three months. The court justified the applicant’s detention by referring to the gravity of the charges brought against him, and the likelihood that, if released, he would abscond and interfere with the investigation. 99. On 2 June 2017 the applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that his detention was unlawful and unjustified. He complained, in particular, that there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed any criminal offence because he had not unlawfully crossed the State border between Georgia and Azerbaijan but had rather been abducted by Georgian State agents and forcibly transferred to Azerbaijan. He also alleged that the cash found on him had been planted and that the medical evidence related to G.M.’s injuries had been fabricated. Furthermore, he asked the appellate court to request and examine the video recordings of the security cameras situated at the border crossing point in Balakan District of Azerbaijan. 100. On 6 June 2017 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and confirmed his pre-trial detention. Referring to the applicant’s arrest record of 30 May 2017, the court held that his detention was based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence. As regards the applicant’s complaint in respect of the alleged fabrication of the criminal case against him, it noted that the conduct of the preliminary criminal investigation and the collection of evidence fell under the responsibility of investigating authorities and that the applicant should have addressed his complaints to those authorities. 101. On 13 June 2017 the applicant lodged an application with the court asking to be released on bail or placed under house arrest. He maintained his submissions concerning his alleged abduction and covert transfer from Georgia to Azerbaijan and stated that there was no reason for his continued pre-trial detention. 102. On 20 June 2017 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the applicant’s application, mainly citing the characteristics and gravity of the charges brought against him. 103. On 22 June 2017 the applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous arguments. 104. On 29 June 2017 Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 20 June 2017. 105. On 17 August 2017 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 29 October 2017. The court justified its decision by stating that additional time was needed in order to carry out further investigative actions and that the grounds for the applicant’s pre-trial detention had not changed. It does not appear from the case file that the applicant appealed against the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 17 August 2017. 106. On 13 October 2017 the Nasimi District Court, referring to the same grounds, extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 20 December 2017. It does not appear from the case file that the applicant appealed against the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 13 October 2017. 107. In the meantime, on 27 August, 4 October and 7 November 2017 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the applicant’s requests asking to be released on bail or to be placed under house arrest rather than in pre-trial detention. 108. No further decisions extending the applicant’s detention are contained in the case file. Proceedings concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention from 29 to 31 May 2017
109. On 31 May 2017 the applicant lodged a complaint, as amended on 16 June 2017, with the Sabail District Court, asking the court to declare unlawful his deprivation of liberty from the moment of his actual apprehension at 10.40 p.m. on 29 May 2017 until the moment at which his detention on remand had been ordered by the Sabail District Court at 5 p.m. on 31 May 2017. In support of his claim, he mainly argued that although he had been apprehended at 10.40 p.m. on 29 May 2017, the record of his arrest as a suspect had been compiled only on 30 May 2017 – almost twenty hours after his arrest. 110. On 16 June 2017 the Sabail District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the applicant’s detention during the period in question had been lawful. In particular, the court held that an administrative arrest record concerning the applicant’s arrest for breaching the border regime had been compiled at 12.30 a.m. on 30 May 2017, following the applicant’s apprehension at the State border between Azerbaijan and Georgia at 10.40 p.m. on 29 May 2017. 111. On 19 June 2017 the applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 112. On 23 June 2017 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. Search of the contents of the applicant’s mobile telephone
113. On 31 May 2017 the investigator, referring to Article 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”), drew up a record of the inspection of the applicant’s mobile telephone (mobil telefona baxış keçirilməsi haqqında protokol). According to the record, the inspection of the mobile telephone carried during the applicant’s arrest had begun at 10.00 a.m. and ended at 11.00 a.m. The record indicated that there had been a number of exchanges of messages between the applicant and various persons via a communication platform, but that no information relevant to the criminal investigation had been found in those messages. The record also indicated that there were 604 photographs and videos in the mobile telephone’s gallery and that the mobile telephone contained various social media applications. 114. On 14 June 2017 the investigator in charge of the case ordered a forensic technical and linguistic examination of the applicant’s mobile telephone. In particular, the investigator asked the expert to extract all the information stored in the device, to provide the investigation with all the SMS messages available in the device (and, if possible, the information available on the social media accounts of the applicant) and to establish whether the audio, video, photograph and textual documents contained any call for the unlawful usurpation of power and a change of the constitutional order by force or calls for action against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, or any call for incitement to ethnic, racial, social or religious hatred and hostility or the restriction of citizens’ rights on the above‑mentioned grounds. 115. On the same date the applicant lodged a request with the investigator asking for the above-mentioned decision to be quashed on the grounds that his mobile telephone contained information constituting private family information. 116. On 19 June 2017 the investigator refused the request, finding that the expert was under an obligation not to disclose any information relating to the applicant’s private life and that the forensic examination had been ordered in the light of the fact that the mobile telephone might contain information relevant to the investigation. 117. It appears from the case file that on an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Nasimi District Court under Article 449 (Procedure for the review of the lawfulness of procedural actions or decisions by the prosecuting authorities) of the CCrP, complaining that the search of the contents of his mobile telephone had been unlawful. The parties failed to provide the Court with a copy of that complaint. 118. On 6 July 2017 the Nasimi District Court refused to admit the applicant’s complaint for examination, holding that the measures complained of were not covered by Article 449 § 3 of the CCrP, which provided a list of specific measures that could be challenged before the domestic courts. 119. On 10 July 2017 the applicant appealed against that decision, mainly arguing that the search of the contents of his mobile telephone had been unlawful since it had been conducted in the absence of a court decision. 120. On 14 July 2017 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 6 July 2017. 121. On 14 July 2017 the expert issued forensic report no. 15634 concerning the examination of the contents of the applicant’s mobile telephone in accordance with the instructions of the investigator in his decision of 14 June 2017. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASEThe applicant’s criminal conviction in Azerbaijan, subsequent release and asylum in Germany

122. On 12 January 2018 the applicant was convicted of illegal border crossing, smuggling, and violently resisting a law-enforcement official, and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. On 17 March 2020 his sentence of imprisonment was commuted to a fine and he was released from prison. On the same date he left for Germany, where he was granted asylum. The progress of the investigation in Georgia
123. On 23 March 2020 the applicant’s lawyer requested the prosecutor’s office to arrange for the applicant to be interviewed remotely. In the absence of a reply, the applicant reiterated his request on 23 July 2020. 124. On 24 July 2020 the applicant was interviewed in Germany, with the participation of a German investigator. He reiterated his allegations that he had been abducted from Georgia and identified by name five Azerbaijani individuals who had allegedly participated in his abduction and forceable transfer to Azerbaijan. He further stated that one of those individuals had told him that the Azerbaijani side had paid 3 million US dollars to the Georgian side for organising his abduction. 125. On 14 January 2021 the Georgian authorities lodged a request for legal assistance with the Azerbaijani authorities on the basis of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959). They requested the questioning of the five Azerbaijani nationals named by the applicant in his statement of 24 July 2020 and the provision of information concerning their official status and whereabouts on 29 May 2017. In the same request the Georgian authorities queried whether surveillance cameras had been installed on the Azerbaijani side of the Tsodna border crossing point and if so, whether the relevant recordings could be obtained and saved. The case file contains no further information about the progress, if any, of the above‑mentioned request. 126. On 20 April 2021 the offence was re-categorised from the offence of unlawful deprivation of liberty (Article 143 § 1 of the Criminal Code) to that of the offence of unlawful deprivation of liberty by a group in a premeditated manner (Article 143 § 3 (a)). The applicant was granted the procedural status of victim. The relevant prosecutorial decisions stated that there was sufficient evidence in the case file to allege that the applicant had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty and had suffered non-pecuniary damage on that account. 127. According to the case file, several additional investigative actions were conducted in 2021, such as a DNA examination of the applicant’s genetic code in order to compare it with DNA samples obtained from the minivan, interviewing several Georgian police officers, and an investigative re-enactment of the applicant’s abduction (with the participation of the applicant). 128. On 26 July 2022 former deputy head of the State Security Service of Georgia, I.G. – who was in pre-trial detention on various charges at the material time – published a letter alleging, inter alia, that the abduction and transfer of the applicant from Georgia to Azerbaijan had been carried out by Georgian security service officials and that the video footage confirming the allegations had been deleted. On 27 September 2022, in reply to several reiterated requests, the prosecutor in charge informed the applicant that the interviewing of I.G. had not been finalised and that, accordingly, the information provided by him could not yet be shared with him. 129. In the meantime, I.G. issued another public statement in which he identified by name two individuals who had allegedly, at the request of the former Prime Minister of Georgia, B.I., organised and executed the abduction and transfer of the applicant from Georgia to Azerbaijan: V.G., the Minister of the Interior of Georgia, who at the relevant time had been the head of the State Security Service; and O.K., former head of the counter-intelligence department at the State Security Service. On 28 September 2022 the applicant requested that the three above-mentioned individuals be questioned. 130. In commenting on further information provided by the applicant, on 13 September 2023 the Government of Georgia informed the Court that the criminal investigation into the alleged abduction of the applicant was still ongoing and that the interviewing of I.G. had been completed. They further noted that four officers of the counter-intelligence department and four State Security Service officers (who had been named by I.G. in his evidence) had been interviewed and that they had all had dismissed the assertion that they had been involved in the applicant’s abduction or in the tampering with the evidence as untrue. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE IN GEORGIA
131. Article 143 § 1 of the Criminal Code (1999) provides for the offence of unlawful deprivation of liberty, which is punishable by two to four years’ imprisonment. Paragraph 3 (a) of the same provision provides for seven to ten years’ imprisonment for the same offence committed by a group in a premeditated manner. 132. Under the Ministerial Order No. 34 issued by the Minister of Justice on 7 July 2013, as in force at the material time, although criminal investigations were usually carried out by the Ministry of the Interior, an investigation into an offence implicating, inter alia, police or other law‑enforcement officers, was to be entrusted to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE IN AZERBAIJAN
133. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”) concerning pre-trial detention are described in detail in the Court’s judgments in Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan (no. 37138/06, §§ 83-102, 9 November 2010) and Muradverdiyev v. Azerbaijan (no. 16966/06, §§ 35‑49, 9 December 2010). 134. The relevant decisions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court concerning pre-trial detention are described in detail in the Court’s judgment in Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan (no. 69981/14, §§ 79-80, 17 March 2016). 135. The relevant provisions of the CCrP concerning inspection, search and seizure are described in detail in the Court’s judgments in Avaz Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (nos. 37816/12 and 25260/14, § 51, 22 April 2021) and Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 3409/10, § 37 and §§ 43-50, 22 July 2021). RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTSThe European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959)

136. The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959 (“the Mutual Assistance Convention”) was ratified by Georgia on 13 October 1999 and entered into force in respect of Georgia on 11 January 2000. The Mutual Assistance Convention was ratified by Azerbaijan on 4 July 2003 and came into force with respect to Azerbaijan on 2 October 2003. The relevant provisions of this Convention read:
Article 1
“1. The Contracting Parties undertake to afford each other, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, the widest measure of mutual assistance in proceedings in respect of offences the punishment of which, at the time of the request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities of the requesting Party.
...”
Article 2
“Assistance may be refused:
(a) if the request concerns an offence which the requested Party considers a political offence, an offence connected with a political offence, or a fiscal offence;
(b) if the requested Party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of its country.”
Article 3
“1. The requested Party shall execute in the manner provided for by its law any letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by the judicial authorities of the requesting Party for the purpose of procuring evidence or transmitting articles to be produced in evidence, records or documents. 2. If the requesting Party desires witnesses or experts to give evidence on oath, it shall expressly so request, and the requested Party shall comply with the request if the law of its country does not prohibit it. 3. The requested Party may transmit certified copies or certified photostat copies of records or documents requested, unless the requesting Party expressly requests the transmission of originals, in which case the requested Party shall make every effort to comply with the request.”
Article 6
“1. The requested Party may delay the handing over of any property, records or documents requested, if it requires the said property, records or documents in connection with pending criminal proceedings.
...”
Article 15
“1. Letters rogatory referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5 as well as the applications referred to in Article 11 shall be addressed by the Ministry of Justice of the requesting Party to the Ministry of Justice of the requested Party and shall be returned through the same channels. 2. In case of urgency, letters rogatory may be addressed directly by the judicial authorities of the requesting Party to the judicial authorities of the requested Party. They shall be returned together with the relevant documents through the channels stipulated in paragraph 1 of this article.
... 7. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to those of bilateral agreements or arrangements in force between Contracting Parties which provide for the direct transmission of requests for assistance between their respective authorities.”
Article 19
“Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual assistance.”
The 1993 Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (“the 1993 Minsk Convention”)
137. The 1993 Minsk Convention, to which both Azerbaijan and Georgia are parties, was signed on 22 January 1993 in Minsk. It entered into force in respect of both countries on 11 July 1996. Section II of the Minsk Convention regulates issues concerning cooperation in criminal matters. The Treaty on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters between Azerbaijan and Georgia
138. The Treaty on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters was signed on 8 March 1996 in Tbilisi between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the instruments of ratification were exchanged between the parties on 20 January 1997. The relevant provisions of this Treaty read:
Article 5 – scope of legal assistance
“1. The parties to the treaty shall afford one another mutual legal assistance in carrying out procedural and other measures [..] notably, in the form of preparing and sending a document, conducting a search, seizure, sending items of evidence, conducting expert examinations, taking statements from parties, accused persons, convicts, witnesses, experts ...”
Article 17 – refusal to afford legal assistance
“No legal assistance shall be afforded if the requested State party consider that [execution of the request] is prejudicial to its sovereignty and security or is in breach of the essential principles of its legislation.”
Other relevant documents
139. The relevant extracts of Resolution 2184 (2017) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “The functioning of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan”, adopted on 11 October 2017, read as follows:
“... 6. The Assembly is concerned about the reported problem of arbitrary application of criminal legislation to limit freedom of expression, as highlighted by the Committee of Ministers in the framework of its supervision of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Since 2013, several journalists and bloggers have been arrested on criminal charges (drug trafficking or hooliganism). There are groups of so-called “prisoners of Facebook”, young people who go to prison for criticising the policy of the authorities on Facebook ... 8. The Assembly is concerned about repressive actions against independent media and advocates of freedom of expression in Azerbaijan. These actions are detrimental to effective media freedom and freedom of expression, undermine the safety of journalists and create a climate of violence against those who express divergent views ... 16. Taking all these concerns and developments into account, the Assembly calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to:
16.1. put an end to systemic repression of human rights defenders, the media and those critical of the government, including politically motivated prosecutions ...
16.3. review the cases of the so-called “political prisoners”/“prisoners of conscience” detained on criminal charges following trials whose conformity with human rights standards has been called into question by the European Court of Human Rights, civil society and the international community, and use all possible means to release those prisoners whose detention gives rise to justified doubts and legitimate concerns, in particular but not exclusively, ... Afgan Mukhtarli ...”
140. The European Parliament in its Resolution (2017/2722(RSP)) of 15 June 2017 on the case of Azerbaijani journalist Afgan Mukhtarli, stated the following:
“...1. Strongly condemns the abduction of Afgan Mukhtarli in Tbilisi and his subsequent arbitrary detention in Baku; considers this a serious violation of human rights and condemns this grave act of breach of law;
2. Urges the Georgian authorities to ensure a prompt, thorough, transparent and effective investigation into Afgan Mukhtarli’s forced disappearance in Georgia and illegal transfer to Azerbaijan and to bring the perpetrators to justice;
3. Considers it of utmost importance that the Georgian authorities make every effort possible to clarify beyond any doubt all suspicion regarding the involvement of Georgian state agents in the forced disappearance;
4. Recalls that it is the responsibility of the Georgian authorities to provide protection to all those third-country nationals living in Georgia or requesting political asylum, who face possible severe judicial consequences in their country of origin for human rights or political activities; in this regard, recalls Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Georgia is a party;
5. Strongly condemns the prosecution of Afgan Mukhtarli following bogus charges and reiterates that he is trailed for his work as an independent journalist ...”
THE LAW
COMPLAINTS AGAINST GEORGIAAlleged violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention

141. The applicant complained that he had been abducted in Tbilisi on 29 May 2017, ill-treated and forcibly transferred to Azerbaijan with the involvement or tacit acquiescence of the Georgian authorities and that the investigation into these events has been ineffective. He alleged violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, which in as far as relevant read:
Article 3
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Article 5
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a)  the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...”
Admissibility
(a)   The parties’ submissions
142. The Georgian Government submitted that the applicant’s complaints against Georgia were manifestly ill-founded, or alternatively inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. According to them, there was no evidence in the case file suggesting that the Georgian authorities had either actively or passively participated in the applicant’s alleged abduction and forcible transfer to Azerbaijan, or that there had been any failure on the part of the Georgian Government in discharging their positive obligation to protect the applicant. In fact, having conducted a full-scale investigation, the Government stated that it could not be established that the applicant had in actual fact been abducted from the centre of Tbilisi and forcibly transferred to Azerbaijan. In the alternative, they submitted that the criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged abduction had not yet been completed; thus, the application was premature. 143. In reply, the applicant contended that the investigation into his alleged abduction was simply aimed at creating the illusion of an investigation. In view of the passage of time and a number of important deficiencies and flaws, he submitted that it was pointless for him to wait for the completion of those proceedings. (b)   The Court’s assessment
144. The Court notes that the Georgian Government’s principal plea of inadmissibility relies on the premise that the allegation that the applicant was abducted from Tbilisi and forcibly transferred to Azerbaijan with the involvement or tacit acquiescence of the Georgian authorities cannot be regarded as proven. It considers that by its very nature this argument falls to be examined under the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 145. As for the Government’s objection of non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies and the premature nature of the application on account of the ongoing criminal investigation, the Court accepts that at the time the application was lodged it may have been too early to draw conclusions as to the State’s substantive and procedural obligations under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention and notably the effectiveness of the criminal investigation. However, the Court has consistently held that when examining a complaint, it can take into account facts which have occurred after the lodging of the application but are directly related to those covered by it (see, Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 15367/14 and 13 others, § 302, 21 January 2021). In the present case, the parties made detailed submissions referring to developments since the lodging of the application, and the Government relied on documents and information relating to the ongoing investigation, which started more than seven years ago. The Court is not therefore prevented from examining the complaints with reference to events which occurred after the lodging of the application (see Tsaava and Others v. Georgia, nos. 13186/20 and 4 others, § 184, 7 May 2024 [not final yet]). In view of the particular circumstances, noting also the length of the ongoing criminal proceedings at the domestic level and the nature of the applicant’s grievances regarding these very proceedings, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection. 146. The Court, accordingly, finds that the complaints under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention raised against Georgia are neither manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. They are, therefore, to be declared admissible.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 5
Outcome: no_violation