GRAND CHAMBER
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE OF MOREIRA FERREIRA v. PORTUGAL (No. 2)
 
(Application no. 19867/12)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
 
STRASBOURG
 
11 July 2017
 
 
 
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2),
The European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:
 Guido Raimondi, president,
 Işıl Karakaş,
 Angelika Nußberger,
 Luis López Guerra,
 András Sajó,
 Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
 Nona Tsotsoria,
 Vincent A. De Gaetano,
 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
 Helen Keller,
 Paul Mahoney,
 Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
 Faris Vehabović,
 Egidijus Kūris,
 Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,
 Síofra O’Leary,
 Marko Bošnjak, judges,
 and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 1 June 2016 and 5 April 2017,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 19867/12) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Portuguese national, Ms Francelina Moreira Ferreira (“the applicant”), on 30 March 2012. 2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr J.J. F. Alves, a lawyer practising in Matosinhos. The Portuguese Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Maria de Fátima da Graça Carvalho. 3. Relying in particular on Articles 6 and 46 of the Convention, the applicant complained of the dismissal of her application for a review of a criminal judgment delivered against her. 4. The application was assigned to the First Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 1 April 2014 the Section President decided, pursuant to Rule 54 § 2 (b), to give notice of the aforementioned complaints to the respondent Government. The remainder of the application was declared inadmissible in accordance with Rule 54 § 3. 5. Following a change in the composition of the Sections of the Court (Rule 25 § 1), the case was assigned to the Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1). 6. On 12 January 2016 a Chamber of that Section, composed of András Sajó, President, Vincent A. De Gaetano, Boštjan M. Zupančič, Nona Tsotsoria, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Egidijus Kūris, judges, and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 7. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. 8. The applicant and the Government each filed written observations on the admissibility and the merits of the case. 9. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 1 June 2016 (Rule 59 § 3). There appeared before the Court:
(a)  for the Government
Ms M. de Fátima da Graça Carvalho, Agent,
Mr J. Conde Correia,
Ms A. Garcia Marques, Advisers;
(b)  for the applicant
Mr J.J.F. Alves, Counsel. The Court heard addresses by Ms da Graça Carvalho and Mr Alves, and also their replies to questions put by the judges. THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
10. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Matosinhos. A. Factual background
11. Following an altercation with other persons, the applicant was prosecuted by the public prosecutor at the Matosinhos District Court for threatening conduct. An expert report was produced during the investigation, stating that the applicant had limited intellectual and cognitive capacities but that she should be held criminally responsible for her acts. 12. In a judgment of 23 March 2007 the Matosinhos District Court dismissed the applicant’s defence of diminished criminal responsibility and sentenced her to 320 day-fines, amounting to a total of 640 euros (EUR), for threatening and insulting conduct, as well as ordering her to pay damages to the victims. 13. On 13 April 2007 the applicant appealed to the Oporto Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) against the judgment. She repeated that she had been unaware of the unlawfulness of her acts and sought an acknowledgment of her lack of criminal responsibility owing to the psychiatric disorders from which she claimed to suffer. Consequently, she asked for a fresh assessment of the facts and the opportunity to state her case at a hearing. 14. On 12 December 2007 the Court of Appeal held a hearing attended by the public prosecutor and counsel for the applicant. However, no examination of the applicant herself took place. 15. In a final judgment of 19 December 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction for threatening and insulting conduct, but reduced the sentence to 265 day-fines, amounting to a total of EUR 530. It held that there was no need for a fresh assessment of the facts because the applicant had not succeeded in challenging the validity of the assessment conducted by the court of first instance. 16. The applicant paid the fine in several instalments. 17. During the hearing before the Court it was pointed out that in January 2016, five years after the fine had been paid in full, the entry concerning the applicant’s conviction had been deleted from her criminal record. B. Application no. 19808/08 and the judgment delivered by the Court on 5 July 2011
18. On 15 April 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Court complaining that she had not been heard in person by the Court of Appeal, and that this violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 19. In a judgment of 5 July 2011 the Court declared admissible the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and found a violation of that provision, holding as follows:
“... 33. The Court notes that in the present case the Court of Appeal was invited to determine several questions relating to the facts of the case and to the person of the applicant. As before the court of first instance, the applicant raised, in particular, the question whether her criminal responsibility should have been deemed diminished, which might have had a major impact on the determination of the sentence. 34. The Court takes the view that that question could not have been settled by the Court of Appeal without a direct assessment of the applicant’s personal testimony, particularly since the judgment of the Matosinhos District Court had departed slightly from the conclusions of the psychiatric report without setting out the reasons for such a departure, as required under domestic law ... The Court of Appeal’s re-examination of that question should therefore have comprised a full rehearing of the applicant ... 35. Those factors are sufficient for the Court to conclude that in the instant case a public hearing should have been held before the appellate court. As regards the claims in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention, the Court stated the following:
“41. The Court firstly considers that when, as in the instant case, an individual has been convicted after proceedings that have entailed breaches of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, a retrial or the reopening of the case, if requested, represents in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation. In that regard, it notes that Article 449 of the Portuguese Code of Criminal Procedure permits the reopening of proceedings at domestic level where the Court has found a violation of a person’s fundamental rights and freedoms. However, the specific remedial measures, if any, required of a respondent State in order to discharge its obligations under the Convention must depend on the particular circumstances of the individual case and be determined in the light of the terms of the Court’s judgment in that case (see Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 210, ECHR 2005-IV, and Panasenko v. Portugal, no. 10418/03, § 78, 22 July 2008). In the present case, the only point at issue is the fact that the applicant was not given a hearing by the Court of Appeal. 42. Secondly, the Court notes that in the present case the only applicable basis for an award of just satisfaction lies in the fact that the applicant was not afforded the safeguards of Article 6. In that regard, it does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, and rejects this claim. The Court cannot speculate as to what the outcome of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal would have been if it had examined the applicant at a public hearing (see Igual Coll v. Spain, no. 37496/04, § 51, 10 March 2009). On the other hand, it considers it appropriate to award the applicant EUR 2,400 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.”
C. Procedure before the Committee of Ministers for the execution of the judgment of 5 July 2011
21. On 5 July 2012 the Portuguese Government submitted an action plan to the Committee of Ministers concerning the execution of the Court’s judgment of 5 July 2011. They confirmed that the amount awarded to the applicant had been paid to her on 14 December 2011. As regards the general measures, the Government pointed out that the Prime Minister’s Office had proposed amending the Code of Criminal Procedure to allow hearings to be held in any court of appeal determining the issue of guilt or the sentence in respect of an accused person. 22. At the hearing before the Court it was pointed out that the aforementioned proposal had not been approved and had therefore not in fact been included in the final version of the revised Code of Criminal Procedure. 23. At the time of adoption of the present judgment no plans to reform the Code of Criminal Procedure were on the domestic authorities’ agenda. The procedure for supervising the execution of the judgment of 5 July 2011 was still pending before the Committee of Ministers. D. The applicant’s application for review
24. Concurrently, on 18 October 2011, relying on Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant lodged an application for review with the Supreme Court. She submitted that the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 19 December 2007 was incompatible with the Court’s judgment of 5 July 2011. 25. The prosecution submitted that the application should be allowed on the grounds that serious doubts could legitimately be raised about the conviction, particularly as regards the sentencing. 26. In a judgment of 21 March 2012 the Supreme Court refused to grant a review. It held that there was no cause for a review because the judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal was not incompatible with the Court’s judgment. It considered that the lack of a hearing for the applicant in the Court of Appeal had constituted a procedural irregularity that was not amenable to review, and held as follows:
“... under domestic law, an application for review can be submitted solely in respect of judgments (in particular, convictions), and not in respect of orders concerning the conduct of proceedings, it being understood that ... ‘judgment’ denotes any judicial decision on a case or on a procedural application (see Article 156 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure). In the light of domestic law, however, a review of the judgment in the present case cannot be allowed on the basis invoked by the applicant, because the conviction is not incompatible with the European Court’s judgment (Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). On the other hand, the procedure followed by the Court of Appeal in holding the hearing at the close of which the appeal was determined was incompatible with what the European Court has deemed vital in order to guarantee the rights of the defence. Under domestic law, where the accused is legally required to appear in court, his or her absence entails an irremediable nullity (Article 119 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). However, even where a nullity is irremediable, it cannot give rise to an extraordinary application for review of the judgment ... Furthermore, as noted by the European Court, it is impossible to speculate about the decision which the Court of Appeal might have taken if the convicted person had been examined at the hearing which led to the decision on her appeal, and, in particular, about whether or not the sentence would have been the same. The European Court thus precluded from the outset any possibility that its decision might raise serious doubts about the conviction, regardless of the sentence actually imposed. In short, the conviction is not incompatible with the European Court’s binding decision, and no serious doubts arise as to its validity. For that reason, being aware that it is not always possible to secure a retrial or the reopening of proceedings under the applicable domestic law, as in the present case, the European Court decided to require the Portuguese State to compensate the applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and thus to afford redress not for the unfairness of the conviction, which has not been established, but for a serious defect in the conduct of the proceedings which infringed the applicant’s defence rights ... For the above reasons, the applicant’s argument in support of her application to be granted a review is not substantiated. Consequently, the judges of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court decide not to grant a review.”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Application for review
27. Article 449 § 1 (g) of Law no. 48/2007 of 29 August 2007 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure established a new ground for an application for review of a final judgment. The Article in question is worded as follows:
Article 449 (grounds for an application for review)
“1. A judgment which has become final may be reviewed on the following grounds:
(a)  a final judgment has established that the evidence on which the conviction was based was invalid;
(b)  one of the judges or jurors who took part in the proceedings that led to the final judgment has been convicted with final effect of an offence linked to the performance of his or her duties;
(c)  the facts giving rise to the conviction are incompatible with the facts established in another judgment, where such discrepancy casts serious doubt on the validity of the conviction;
(d)  after delivery of the final judgment, fresh evidence has been discovered casting serious doubt on the validity of the conviction;
(e)  the conviction was based on unlawfully obtained evidence;
(f)  the Constitutional Court has declared unconstitutional one of the provisions on which the conviction was based;
(g)  the conviction is irreconcilable with a judgment binding on the Portuguese State that has been delivered by an international authority, or such a judgment casts serious doubt on the validity of the conviction in question. 2. For the purposes of the previous paragraph, any decision discontinuing criminal proceedings shall be treated as a judgment. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1 (d), an application for review shall be inadmissible where its sole aim is to secure a different sentence. 4. An application for review may be admissible even where proceedings have been discontinued, the sentence has been fully served or the time-limit for its enforcement has expired.”
28. In a judgment of 27 May 2009 (domestic proceedings no. 55/01.OTBEPS-A.S1), the Supreme Court held that the new ground, as set out in Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for review of a final judgment had to be interpreted restrictively. In the light of Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of the Committee of Ministers, it held that the reopening of proceedings was necessary “where a decision of the European Court of Human Rights had concluded that a domestic judgment was contrary to the Convention or where there had been procedural errors or shortcomings of such gravity as to cast serious doubt on the decision (fortes dúvidas sobre a decisão) adopted at the close of the proceedings, and, simultaneously, where the injured party continued to suffer very serious adverse effects as a result of the national decision, those effects could not be remedied by the just satisfaction awarded by the Court and restitutio in integrum could only be achieved by means of a retrial or the reopening of the proceedings”. In a separate opinion, one of the three judges on the bench that had examined the application for review, while concurring with the decision, expressed the view that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 449 § 1 (g) had been overly restrictive. The judge stated the following:
“In my view, the new sub-paragraph (g) of Article 449 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has introduced a mechanism for the execution of judgments delivered by international courts and recognised by the Portuguese State as binding; where it is called upon to consider an application for review, the Supreme Court must confine itself to ascertaining whether the formal condition referred to [in Article 449 § 1 (g)] is satisfied, namely the existence of a judgment delivered by an international authority and binding on the Portuguese State that is irreconcilable with the conviction or casts serious doubt on its validity. At this stage of the proceedings, the Supreme Court’s sole task – I repeat – is to determine whether this formal condition for granting a review is present. It will be for the body conducting the review to deliver a new judgment (Articles 460 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure) entailing the execution of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights.”
29. In the judgment in question, the Supreme Court allowed an application for the reopening of criminal proceedings in which a journalist had been convicted of a breach of judicial confidentiality (segredo de justiça), having regard to the European Court’s finding in Campos Dâmaso v. Portugal (no. 17107/05, 24 April 2008) that the conviction had infringed the applicant’s right under Article 10 of the Convention. 30. The Supreme Court has allowed three applications for review under Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning convictions for defamation which the European Court had deemed incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention:
(a)  in its judgment of 23 April 2009 (domestic proceedings no. 104/02.5TACTB-A.S1) concerning the criminal conviction of the author of a book for defamation, the Supreme Court found that the conviction was incompatible with the European Court’s judgment in Azevedo v. Portugal (no. 20620/04, 27 March 2008);
(b)  in its judgment of 15 November 2012 (domestic proceedings no. 23/04.0GDSCD-B.S1) concerning a conviction for defamation, the Supreme Court found that the conviction was incompatible with the European Court’s judgment in Alves da Silva v. Portugal (no. 41665/07, 20 October 2009); and
(c)  in its judgment of 26 March 2014 (domestic proceedings no. 5918/06.4TDPRT.P1) concerning the reopening of criminal proceedings in which the author of a book had been convicted of defamation and fined, the Supreme Court found that the conviction was incompatible with the European Court’s judgment in Sampaio e Paiva de Melo v. Portugal (no. 33287/10, 23 July 2013). It held, in particular, that the reopening procedure was not intended to re-examine a judgment that had already been delivered but rather to secure a fresh decision following a retrial on the basis of new evidence. B. Other relevant provisions
31. The other relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the material time read as follows:
Article 119 (irremediable nullity)
“The following shall constitute grounds of irremediable nullity (nulidades insanáveis), which must be raised proprio motu at any stage of the proceedings, in addition to those provided for in other statutory provisions:
(a)  a breach of the statutory provisions governing the composition of the court;
(b)  a breach of the statutory provisions governing the role of the public prosecutor’s office during the prosecution stage;
(c)  the absence of the defendant or counsel for the defence in circumstances where they are required by law to appear;
(d)  the absence of compulsory steps in the conduct of the proceedings;
(e)  a breach of the rules concerning the court’s jurisdiction ...;
(f)  the conduct of proceedings in accordance with inappropriate procedures.”
Article 122 (effects of nullity)
“1. The act found to constitute a nullity, together with all other acts resulting from it, shall be deemed invalid. 2. The court that establishes the existence of a nullity shall determine which act is to be deemed invalid and shall order, wherever necessary and possible, that the act be repeated. Any associated costs shall be borne by the party responsible for the act that has been deemed invalid. 3. The court that deems an act invalid shall confirm, where possible, that the other steps in the proceedings remain valid.”
Article 450 (locus standi)
“A review of a judgment may be requested by:
(a)  the Attorney General;
... (c)  the convicted person.”
Article 457 (granting of a review)
“1. Where a review is granted, the Supreme Court shall refer the case to the nearest possible court in the same category and with the same composition as the court that gave the decision being reviewed. 2. If the convicted person is serving a term of imprisonment or is subject to a security measure, the Supreme Court shall decide, having regard to the seriousness of the doubts concerning the conviction, whether the execution of the sentence or measure should be suspended. 3. If such suspension is ordered or the convicted person has not yet started serving the sentence, the Supreme Court may order a preventive measure.”
Article 458 (quashing of incompatible judgments)
“1. If a review is granted under Article 449 § 1 (c) on account of the existence of incompatible judgments resulting in the conviction of different individuals for the same acts, the Supreme Court shall quash the judgments, order a retrial of all the individuals concerned and remit the case to the competent court. 2. Where a retrial is held, the cases shall be joined. 3. The quashing of the judgment shall bring its execution to an end. The Supreme Court may, however, order preventive measures in respect of the individuals being retried.”
Article 460 (retrial)
“1. Once the case has been prepared for trial, a date shall be set for the hearing and the ordinary rules of procedure shall be followed. 2. If the review has been granted on the basis of Article 449 § 1 (a) or (b), individuals who have been convicted or prosecuted for acts which were decisive for the outcome of the proceedings being reopened shall not be permitted to take part in the retrial.”
III. RECOMMENDATION No. R (2000) 2 OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
32. In its Recommendation No. R (2000) 2, adopted on 19 January 2000 at the 694th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, the Committee of Ministers stated that its practice in supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments showed that in exceptional circumstances the re-examination of a case or the reopening of proceedings had proved the most efficient, if not the only, means of achieving restitutio in integrum. It therefore invited States to introduce mechanisms for re-examining cases in which the Court had found a violation of the Convention, especially where:
“(i)  the injured party continues to suffer very serious negative consequences because of the outcome of the domestic decision at issue, which are not adequately remedied by the just satisfaction and cannot be rectified except by re-examination or reopening, and
(ii)  the judgment of the Court leads to the conclusion that
(a)  the impugned domestic decision is on the merits contrary to the Convention, or
(b)  the violation found is based on procedural errors or shortcomings of such gravity that a serious doubt is cast on the outcome of the domestic proceedings complained of.”
33. The explanatory memorandum sets out more general comments on issues not explicitly addressed in the Recommendation. As regards cases corresponding to the above-mentioned criteria, it notes the following:
“12. Sub-paragraph (ii) is intended to indicate ... the kind of violations in which re-examination of the case or reopening of the proceedings will be of particular importance. Examples of situations aimed at under item (a) are criminal convictions violating Article 10 because the statements characterised as criminal by the national authorities constitute legitimate exercise of the injured party’s freedom of expression or violating Article 9 because the behaviour characterised as criminal is a legitimate exercise of freedom of religion. Examples of situations aimed at under item (b) are where the injured party did not have the time and facilities to prepare his or her defence in criminal proceedings, where the conviction was based on statements extracted under torture or on material which the injured party had no possibility of verifying, or where in civil proceedings the parties were not treated with due respect for the principle of equality of arms. Any such shortcomings must, as appears from the text of the recommendation itself, be of such gravity that serious doubt is cast on the outcome of the domestic proceedings.”
IV. LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
34. A comparative study of legislation and practice in forty-three member States of the Council of Europe shows that many of those States have introduced domestic machinery for requesting, on the basis of a finding by the Court of a violation of the Convention, the re-examination or reopening of a criminal case which has been the subject of a final judicial decision. 35. In particular, in a substantial number of those States the domestic Code of Criminal Procedure expressly authorises any individual in respect of whom the Court has delivered a judgment finding a violation of the Convention in a criminal case to request the re-examination or reopening of the case on the basis of that finding. Among the member States in question are: Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. 36. In most of those States, the application for re-examination or reopening must be lodged with a court, but the level of jurisdiction varies from one State to another. In some States the individuals concerned must apply to the highest court, that is to say the Supreme Court (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Monaco, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain and Switzerland) or the Constitutional Court (the Czech Republic). In others, the application for re-examination or reopening of the case must be lodged with the court which gave the decision complained of (Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine). 37. In some member States the application for re-examination or reopening of the case must be submitted to non-judicial bodies such as independent administrative or quasi-judicial commissions (Iceland, Norway and the United Kingdom), the Minister of Justice (Luxembourg), the Prime Minister, who has discretion to refer the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal (Malta), or the public prosecutor (Latvia). 38. The re-examination or reopening of a case is not normally granted automatically, and the application must satisfy admissibility criteria such as compliance with deadlines and procedural formalities. In some States, national legislation lays down further conditions: for instance, applicants must provide a legal ground in support of their application (Germany, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey), rely on a new circumstance (Armenia) or present sufficient facts and evidence to substantiate the application (Italy and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). 39. Lastly, in other member States the re-examination or reopening of criminal cases on the basis of the Court’s finding of a violation of the Convention is currently not expressly provided for in domestic law (this is the case, for example, in Albania, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Malta, Sweden and the United Kingdom). In some of these States, however, this option is possible by means of an extensive interpretation of the general provisions on the reopening of proceedings (for example, in Albania, Denmark, Italy and Sweden). In only one member State, Liechtenstein, there is no possibility of re-examining or reopening a criminal case on the basis of a judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights. THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
40. The applicant complained that the Supreme Court had dismissed her application for a review of the criminal judgment delivered against her. She submitted that the Supreme Court’s judgment amounted to a “denial of justice”, because that court had incorrectly interpreted and applied the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the conclusions of the Court’s 2011 judgment, thus depriving her of the right to have her conviction reviewed. She alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
1. The parties’ submissions
41. The Government objected that the Court lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae to rule on the merits of the complaint raised by the applicant under Article 6 of the Convention. 42. They contended, firstly, that the new application did not include any new facts as compared with the previous one. It was solely concerned with the execution of the Court’s 2011 judgment, and therefore Article 46 prevented the Court from examining it. 43. The Government submitted, secondly, that Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to the proceedings before the Supreme Court for granting a review of the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 19 December 2007 and that the present case involved no factual or legal issues liable to trigger a fresh examination by the Court under Article 6 of the Convention. In the Government’s view, the applicant could not assert any right to have a final criminal conviction reviewed. The extraordinary application for review laid down in Article 449 of the Code of Criminal Procedure differed in its nature, scope and specific features from the other ordinary remedies available in Portuguese law (appeals, in which the whole case was referred to the appellate court for adjudication, and revista appeals, which concerned points of law and, in exceptional cases, serious factual irregularities). According to the Portuguese rules on criminal procedure, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was limited to granting or refusing the reopening of proceedings, and any decision to allow such an application resulted in the case being remitted to the court of first instance. 44. In the present case, the Supreme Court had confined itself to determining, in the light of domestic law and the European Court’s conclusions, whether the conditions for reopening of proceedings were satisfied. To that end, it had compared the judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal on 19 December 2007 with that delivered by the Court on 5 July 2011 for the sole purpose of establishing whether they were compatible and whether the Court’s judgment had given rise to any serious doubts as to the validity of the applicant’s conviction. 45. The applicant, on the other hand, contended that the Supreme Court’s judgment of 21 March 2012 constituted new information and that Article 6 of the Convention had been applicable to the proceedings concerning her application for a review. 2. The Court’s assessment
46. In examining the admissibility of the present application, the Court must first of all ascertain whether it has jurisdiction to consider the applicant’s complaint without encroaching on the prerogatives of the respondent State and the Committee of Ministers under Article 46 of the Convention, and if so, whether the safeguards of Article 6 of the Convention were applicable to the proceedings in question. (a)  Whether Article 46 of the Convention precludes the examination by the Court of the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention
(i)  General principles
47. The Court observes that in its judgments in Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) ([GC], no. 22251/08, ECHR 2015) and Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) ([GC], no. 32772/02, ECHR 2009) and its decision in Egmez v. Cyprus ((dec.), no. 12214/07, §§ 48-56, 18 September 2012) it considered the issue of its jurisdiction in relation to the prerogatives of the respondent State and of the Committee of Ministers under Article 46 of the Convention. The principles set out by the Court in those judgments and that decision may be summarised as follows:
(a)  Findings of a violation in its judgments are essentially declaratory and, by Article 46 of the Convention, the High Contracting Parties undertook to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case to which they were parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers (see Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) (no. 2), cited above, § 61). (b)  The Committee of Ministers’ role in this sphere does not mean, however, that measures taken by a respondent State to remedy a violation found by the Court cannot raise a new issue undecided by the judgment and, as such, form the subject of a new application that may be dealt with by the Court. In other words, the Court may entertain a complaint that a retrial at domestic level by way of implementation of one of its judgments gave rise to a new breach of the Convention (ibid, § 62; see also Bochan (no. 2), cited above, § 33, and Egmez, cited above, § 51). (c)  On that basis, the Court has found that it had the competence to entertain complaints in a number of follow-up cases, for example where the domestic authorities had carried out a fresh examination of the case by way of implementation of one of the Court’s judgments, whether by reopening the proceedings or by initiating an entirely new set of proceedings (see Egmez, cited above, § 52, and the references therein). (d)  It transpires from the Court’s case-law that the determination of the existence of a “new issue” very much depends on the specific circumstances of a given case and that distinctions between cases are not always clear-cut (see Bochan (no. 2), cited above, § 34, and, for an examination of that case-law, Egmez, cited above, § 54). The powers assigned to the Committee of Ministers by Article 46 to supervise the execution of the Court’s judgments and assess the implementation of measures adopted by States under that Article are not encroached on where the Court has to deal with relevant new information in the context of a fresh application (see Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) (no. 2), cited above, § 67). 48. The Court reiterates that it does not have jurisdiction to order, in particular, the reopening of proceedings (ibid., § 89). Nevertheless, as stated in Recommendation No. R (2000)2 of the Committee of Ministers, the practice of the Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments shows that in exceptional circumstances the re-examination of a case or the reopening of proceedings has proved the most efficient, if not the only, means of achieving restitutio in integrum, that is to say ensuring that the injured party is restored, as far as possible, to the situation which he or she enjoyed prior to the violation of the Convention. Among the cases in which the Court finds a violation, re-examination or reopening will be of particular importance in the field of criminal law, according to the explanatory memorandum to the Recommendation (see paragraphs 32 and 33 above). 49. It is therefore clear, as regards the reopening of proceedings, that the Court does not have jurisdiction to order such a measure. However, where an individual has been convicted following proceedings that have entailed breaches of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, the Court may indicate that a retrial or the reopening of the case, if requested, represents in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation (see Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) (no. 2), cited above, § 89). For example, in the specific context of cases concerning the independence and impartiality of the Turkish national security courts, the Court has held that, in principle, the most appropriate form of redress would be for the applicant to be given a retrial by an independent and impartial tribunal (see Gençel v. Turkey, no. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003). 50. That approach was confirmed in Öcalan v. Turkey ([GC], no. 46221/99, § 210, ECHR 2005‑IV) and Sejdovic v. Italy ([GC], no. 56581/00, ECHR 2006‑II). In the latter judgment the Court set out general principles (§§ 126 and 127) which may be summarised as follows:
(a)  Where an individual has been convicted following proceedings that have entailed breaches of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, a retrial or the reopening of the case, if requested, represents in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation. However, the specific remedial measures, if any, required of a respondent State in order for it to discharge its obligations under the Convention must depend on the particular circumstances of the individual case and be determined in the light of the Court’s judgment in that case, and with due regard to the Court’s case-law. (b)  In particular, it is not for the Court to indicate how any new trial is to proceed and what form it is to take. The respondent State remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its obligation to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he would have been in had the requirements of the Convention not been disregarded, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment and with the rights of the defence. 51. In exceptional cases, the very nature of the violation found may be such as to leave no real choice as to the measures required to remedy it, and this will prompt the Court to indicate only one such measure (see, for example, Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, §§ 202 and 203, ECHR 2004‑II, and Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750/09, §§ 138 and 139, ECHR 2013). On the other hand, in some of its judgments the Court has itself explicitly ruled out the reopening, following a finding of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, of proceedings concluded by final judicial decisions (see, for example, Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v. Poland, no. 23614/08, § 66, 30 November 2010). (ii)  Application of the above principles in the present case
52. The aforementioned general principles indicate that a finding by the Court of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention does not automatically require the reopening of the domestic criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, this is, in principle, an appropriate, and often the most appropriate, way of putting an end to the violation and affording redress for its effects. 53. This position is supported by the wide range of remedies in Europe enabling individuals to apply, following a finding by the Court of a violation of the Convention, for the reopening of a criminal case which has been concluded by a final judgment. In that connection, the Court notes that there is no uniform approach among the Contracting States as regards the right to apply for the reopening of proceedings that have been closed. It also observes that in most of those States the reopening of proceedings is not automatic and is subject to admissibility criteria, whose observance is supervised by the domestic courts, which have a broader margin of appreciation in that sphere (see paragraphs 34 et seq. above). 54. In the instant case, the Court notes that although the proceedings adjudicated by the Supreme Court incontrovertibly concerned the execution of the Court’s 2011 judgment, they were new in relation to the domestic proceedings forming the subject of that judgment, and were subsequent to them. As for the applicant’s complaint, the Court notes that it relates to the reasons given by the Supreme Court for dismissing the application for review. That being so, the question whether the procedure for considering the application for review was compatible with the fair-trial standards deriving from Article 6 of the Convention can be examined separately from the aspects relating to the execution of the judgment delivered by the Court in 2011 (see, mutatis mutandis, Bochan (no. 2), cited above, § 37). 55. The Court thus notes that in examining the application for review, the Supreme Court dealt with a new issue, that is to say the validity of the applicant’s conviction in the light of the finding of a violation of the right to a fair trial. In rejecting the applicant’s argument that her conviction was incompatible with the Court’s 2011 judgment, the Supreme Court carried out its own interpretation of the Court’s judgment, finding that the Court’s conclusions were in fact compatible with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It accordingly ruled that the argument put forward in support of the application for review, based on Article 449 § 1 (g) – an Article which the Court had expressly mentioned as permitting the reopening of the proceedings – was unsubstantiated. 56. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the alleged lack of fairness of the procedure followed in examining the application for review, and more specifically the errors which the applicant claimed had vitiated the reasoning of the Supreme Court, constitute new information in relation to the Court’s previous judgment. 57. The Court further notes that a supervision procedure in respect of the execution of the judgment is still pending before the Committee of Ministers (see paragraph 23 above), although that does not prevent the Court from considering a new application in so far as it includes new aspects which were not determined in the initial judgment. 58. The Court therefore finds that Article 46 of the Convention does not preclude its examination of the new complaint under Article 6 of the Convention. 59. Having concluded that it has jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s complaint, the Court will now consider whether Article 6 of the Convention applies to the proceedings in question. (b)  Whether the applicant’s new complaint is compatible ratione materiae with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
(i)  General principles
60. The Court reiterates that in Bochan (no. 2) (cited above) it considered the issue of the applicability of Article 6 to remedies concerning the reopening of civil proceedings which had been concluded by final judicial decisions. The principles set out by the Court in that case may be summarised as follows:
(a)  According to long-standing and established case-law, the Convention does not guarantee a right to have a terminated case reopened. Extraordinary remedies by which the reopening of terminated judicial proceedings may be sought do not normally involve the determination of “civil rights and obligations” or of “any criminal charge” and therefore Article 6 is deemed inapplicable to them. This approach has also been followed in cases where the reopening of terminated domestic judicial proceedings has been sought on the ground of a finding by the Court of a violation of the Convention (ibid., §§ 44‑45, with the references therein). (b)  However, should an extraordinary remedy lead automatically or in the specific circumstances to a full reconsideration of the case, Article 6 applies in the usual way to the “reconsideration” proceedings. Moreover, Article 6 has also been found to be applicable in certain instances where the proceedings, although characterised as “extraordinary” or “exceptional” in domestic law, were deemed to be similar in nature and scope to ordinary appeal proceedings, the national characterisation of the proceedings not being regarded as decisive for the issue of applicability (ibid., §§ 46-47). (c)  In sum, while Article 6 § 1 is not normally applicable to extraordinary remedies by which the reopening of terminated judicial proceedings may be sought, the nature, scope and specific features of the relevant procedure in the legal system concerned may be such as to bring the procedure within the ambit of Article 6 § 1 and of the safeguards of a fair trial which that provision affords to litigants (ibid., § 50). 61. As regards criminal proceedings, the Court has found that Article 6 is not applicable to applications for their reopening, given that a person who, having been convicted with final effect, submits such an application is not “charged with a criminal offence” within the meaning of that Article. Likewise, Article 6 is not applicable to a plea of nullity for the preservation of the law, brought with the aim of quashing a final conviction following a finding by the Court of a violation, as the person concerned is likewise not “charged with a criminal offence” in such proceedings (see, for example, Fischer v. Austria (dec.), no. 27569/02, ECHR 2003-VI, and Öcalan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 5980/07, 6 July 2010). 62. Still in the criminal-law sphere, the Court has held that the requirements of legal certainty are not absolute. Considerations such as the emergence of new facts, the discovery of a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings that could affect the outcome of the case, or the need to afford redress, particularly in the context of the execution of the Court’s judgments, all militate in favour of the reopening of proceedings. Accordingly, the Court has held that the mere possibility of reopening a criminal case is prima facie compatible with the Convention (see Nikitin v. Russia, no. 50178/99, §§ 55-57, ECHR 2004‑VIII). However, it has emphasised that higher courts’ power of review should only be exercised to correct judicial errors and miscarriages of justice, and not to carry out a fresh examination. The review should not be treated as an appeal in disguise, and the mere possibility of there being two views on the subject is not a ground for re-examination. A departure from that principle is justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see Bujniţa v. Moldova, no. 36492/02, § 20, 16 January 2007, and Bota v. Romania, no. 16382/03, §§ 33 and 34, 4 November 2008). 63. The Court has thus held that a conviction ignoring key evidence constitutes a miscarriage of criminal justice, and that leaving such errors uncorrected may seriously affect the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings (see Lenskaya v. Russia, no. 28730/03, §§ 39 and 40, 29 January 2009, and Giuran v. Romania, no. 24360/04, § 39, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). Similarly, the Court has found that the upholding, after review proceedings, of a conviction which breached the right to a fair trial amounted to an error of assessment which perpetuated that breach (see Yaremenko v. Ukraine (no. 2), no. 66338/09, §§ 52-56 and 64-67, 30 April 2015). On the other hand, the arbitrary reopening of criminal proceedings, in particular to the detriment of a convicted person, infringes the right to a fair trial (see Savinskiy v. Ukraine, no. 6965/02, § 25, 28 February 2006; Radchikov v. Russia, no. 65582/01, § 48, 24 May 2007; and Ştefan v. Romania, no. 28319/03, § 18, 6 April 2010). 64. The Court has also considered other stages in criminal proceedings where the applicants were no longer “persons charged with a criminal offence” but persons “convicted” as a result of judicial decisions deemed final under domestic law. Given that “criminal charge” is an autonomous notion and having regard to the impact which the procedure for examining an appeal on points of law may have upon the determination of a criminal charge, including the possibility of correcting errors of law, the Court has found that such a procedure is covered by the safeguards of Article 6 (see Meftah and Others v. France [GC], nos. 32911/96, 35237/97 and 34595/97, § 40, ECHR 2002‑VII), even where it is treated as an extraordinary remedy in domestic law and concerns a judgment against which no ordinary appeal lies. By the same token, the Court has held that the safeguards of Article 6 are applicable to criminal proceedings in which the competent court began by examining the admissibility of an application for leave to appeal with a view to having a conviction quashed (see Monnell and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, § 54, Series A no. 115). 65. It transpires from the general principles expounded above that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable, in its criminal aspect, to criminal proceedings concerning remedies classified as extraordinary in domestic law where the domestic court is called upon to determine the charge. The Court therefore examines the issue of the applicability of Article 6 to extraordinary remedies by seeking to establish whether, during the consideration of the remedy in question, the domestic court was required to determine the criminal charge. 66. The Court emphasises that its assessment of the Bochan (no. 2) case (cited above) focused on issues relating to the civil aspect of Article 6 of the Convention. However, there are significant differences between civil and criminal proceedings. 67. The Court considers that the rights of persons accused of or charged with a criminal offence require greater protection than the rights of parties to civil proceedings. The principles and standards applicable to criminal proceedings must therefore be laid down with particular clarity and precision. Lastly, whereas in civil proceedings the rights of one party may conflict with the rights of the other party, no such considerations stand in the way of measures taken in favour of persons who have been accused, charged or convicted, notwithstanding the rights which the victims of offences might seek to uphold before the domestic courts. (ii)  Application of the above principles in the present case
68. In applying the above principles in the present case, the Court would emphasise that it takes into consideration the domestic law as interpreted by the courts in the respondent State. In the present case, it notes that domestic law, in particular Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, provided the applicant with a remedy entailing the possibility of a review, in adversarial proceedings, of the compatibility of her conviction by the Court of Appeal with the Court’s findings in its 2011 judgment (compare Bochan (no. 2), cited above, § 54). 69. The Court observes that the Supreme Court has no discretion in determining the grounds for a review, as those grounds are exhaustively listed in Article 449 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 27 above). They relate either to the emergence of new material or to breaches of substantive or procedural rules. In the latter eventuality, the Supreme Court must adjudicate on the conformity with substantive law of the decision delivered or on the lawfulness of the procedure followed, and decide whether or not the defects noted justify reopening the proceedings. In particular, in the context of the examination provided for in Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court’s task is to consider the conduct and the outcome of the terminated domestic proceedings in relation to the findings of the Court or of another international authority and, where appropriate, order the re-examination of the case with a view to securing a fresh determination of the criminal charge against the injured party. Furthermore, under Article 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court may, if it decides to grant a review, suspend the execution of the sentence or security measure should it deem this necessary. The Court therefore notes that the legislative framework requires the Supreme Court to compare the conviction in question with the grounds on which the Court based its finding of a violation of the Convention. The examination on the basis of Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is therefore likely to be decisive for the determination of a criminal charge, and in that respect has some features in common with an appeal on points of law (compare Maresti v. Croatia, no. 55759/07, §§ 25 and 28, 25 June 2009). 70. As regards the scrutiny performed by the Supreme Court in the present case, the Court notes that although that court’s task was to adjudicate on the application for the granting of a review, it nonetheless carried out a re-examination on the merits of a number of aspects of the disputed issue of the applicant’s absence from the hearing on her appeal and the consequences of her absence for the validity of her conviction and sentence. 71. The Supreme Court thus found that the judgment of the Court of Appeal had not been incompatible with the European Court’s judgment. It supported that finding with its own interpretation of the Court’s judgment, holding that the Court had “precluded from the outset any possibility that its decision might raise serious doubts about the conviction”. Even though it accepted that the applicant’s absence from the hearing on her appeal had infringed her defence rights, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court had fully and sufficiently remedied that defect by awarding the applicant a sum of money in respect of just satisfaction. Having concluded that the validity of the conviction was not subject to any serious doubts, it was bound to uphold the conviction and sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal. 72. Given the scope of the Supreme Court’s scrutiny, the Court considers that that scrutiny should be regarded as an extension of the proceedings concluded by the judgment of 19 December 2007. The Supreme Court once again focused on the determination, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, of the criminal charge against the applicant. Consequently, the safeguards of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention were applicable to the proceedings before the Supreme Court. (c)  Conclusion
73. The Government’s objection that the Court lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae to examine the merits of the complaint raised by the applicant under Article 6 of the Convention must be dismissed. 74. Furthermore, the Court finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It therefore declares the complaint admissible. 75. The Court will now seek to establish whether the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention were complied with in the instant case. B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
(a)  The applicant
76. The applicant contended that the Court’s findings in its judgment of 5 July 2011 had raised serious doubts about the outcome of the domestic proceedings which had led to her conviction. 77. She submitted that by dismissing her application for review, the Supreme Court had committed a serious error in the interpretation and application of Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She maintained that her application for review should have been allowed, particularly since the prosecution had submitted that a review should be granted on the grounds that serious doubts could legitimately have been raised about her conviction, particularly as regards the sentence. (b)  The Government
78. The Government submitted that the Supreme Court had merely compared the judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal on 19 December 2007 with the Court’s judgment in order to establish whether they were compatible and whether the latter judgment had prompted any serious doubts regarding the applicant’s conviction. 79. With reference to the Supreme Court’s case-law concerning applications for review, they observed that under Portuguese law the right to the reopening of terminated criminal proceedings was neither absolute nor automatic. 80. The Government submitted that unlike in cases concerning a violation of the right to freedom of expression in which the incompatibility of the conviction had been manifest, the Supreme Court had held that a procedural defect could not give rise, without undermining the res judicata principle, to a review of a criminal conviction unless the defect was one of exceptional gravity. A mere doubt as to the validity of a conviction, or a simple procedural irregularity, was therefore an insufficient ground for granting a review, and only defects which had tainted the decision to such an extent as to make it intolerable to society in general could justify reopening the proceedings. 81. That had not been the situation in the present case. The only points at issue had been the extent of the applicant’s criminal responsibility and the possible consequences in terms of sentencing. Since the fine imposed as the penalty had been paid, it had been unnecessary in substantive and procedural terms to reopen the proceedings. 82. In conclusion, the Government stated that the procedure followed by the Supreme Court and the conclusion which it had reached had fully complied with the requirements of a fair trial. In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, the Supreme Court had had a broad margin of appreciation in interpreting and applying domestic law, and this margin had to be respected. 2. The Court’s assessment
(a)  General principles
83. The Court reiterates that in its Bochan (no. 2) judgment (cited above) it considered, under the civil head of Article 6 of the Convention, the issue of unfairness resulting from the reasoning adopted by the domestic courts. The principles set forth by the Court in that case may be summarised as follows. (a)  It is not for the Court to deal with alleged errors of law or fact committed by the national courts unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention, for instance where, in exceptional cases, such errors may be said to constitute “unfairness” incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention (ibid., § 61). (b)  Article 6 § 1 of the Convention does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way in which evidence should be assessed, these being primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts. Normally, issues such as the weight attached by the national courts to particular items of evidence or to findings or assessments submitted to them for consideration are not for the Court to review. The Court should not act as a fourth-instance body and will therefore not question under Article 6 § 1 the national courts’ assessment, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (ibid., § 61; see also the cases cited therein: Dulaurans v. France, no. 34553/97, §§ 33-34 and 38, 21 March 2000; Khamidov v. Russia, no. 72118/01, § 170, 15 November 2007; and Anđelković v. Serbia, no. 1401/08, § 24, 9 April 2013; as well as the application of this case-law in more recent judgments: Pavlović and Others v. Croatia, no. 13274/11, § 49, 2 April 2015; Yaremenko (no. 2), cited above, §§ 64‑67; and Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria, no. 43800/12, § 91, 15 September 2015). 84. The Court also reiterates that according to its established case-law reflecting a principle linked to the proper administration of justice, judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based. The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 26, ECHR 1999‑I). Without requiring a detailed answer to every argument advanced by the complainant, this obligation presupposes that parties to judicial proceedings can expect to receive a specific and explicit reply to the arguments which are decisive for the outcome of those proceedings (see, among other authorities, Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 9 December 1994, §§ 29-30, Series A no. 303‑A, and Higgins and Others v. France, 19 February 1998, §§ 42-43, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I). Moreover, in cases relating to interference with rights secured under the Convention, the Court seeks to establish whether the reasons provided for decisions given by the domestic courts are automatic or stereotypical (see, mutatis mutandis, Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], no. 25358/12, § 210, ECHR 2017). Furthermore, the Convention does not require jurors to give reasons for their decision and Article 6 does not preclude a defendant from being tried by a lay jury even where reasons are not given for the verdict. Nevertheless, for the requirements of a fair trial to be satisfied, the public, and above all the accused, must be able to understand the verdict that has been given (see Lhermitte v. Belgium [GC], no. 34238/09, §§ 66 and 67, ECHR 2016). (b)  Application of the aforementioned principles in the present case
85. It transpires from the above-mentioned case-law that a domestic judicial decision cannot be qualified as arbitrary to the point of prejudicing the fairness of proceedings unless no reasons are provided for it or if the reasons given are based on a manifest factual or legal error committed by the domestic court, resulting in a “denial of justice”. 86. The question in the instant case is whether the reasons provided for the judicial decision given by the Supreme Court complied with the standards of the Convention. 87. The Court notes that neither Article 6 nor any other Article of the Convention lays down a general obligation to give reasons for all decisions declaring extraordinary remedies inadmissible. Domestic law may exempt such decisions from providing any reasons. Nevertheless, where, in its examination of an extraordinary remedy, a domestic court determines a criminal charge and gives reasons for its decision, those reasons must satisfy the requirements of Article 6 regarding the provision of reasons for judicial decisions. 88. In the present case, the Court notes that in its judgment of 21 March 2012 the Supreme Court held that in the light of Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a review of the Court of Appeal’s judgment could not be granted on the ground relied upon by the applicant. The Supreme Court considered that although the procedural irregularity noted by the European Court could have had an impact on the applicant’s sentence, it had not been serious enough for the conviction to be considered incompatible with the Court’s judgment. 89. The Court observes that the reasons given for the judicial decision in question addressed the main arguments put forward by the applicant. According to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 449 § 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, procedural irregularities of the type found in the instant case do not give rise to any automatic right to the reopening of proceedings. 90. The Court considers that this interpretation of the applicable Portuguese law, which has the effect of limiting the situations that may give rise to the reopening of criminal proceedings that have been terminated with final effect, or at least making them subject to criteria to be assessed by the domestic courts, does not appear to be arbitrary. 91. The Court notes that that interpretation is supported by its settled case-law to the effect that the Convention does not guarantee the right to the reopening of proceedings or to any other types of remedy by which final judicial decisions may be quashed or reviewed, and by the lack of a uniform approach among the member States as to the operational procedures of any existing reopening mechanisms. Moreover, the Court reiterates that a finding of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention does not generally create an continuing situation and does not impose on the respondent State a continuing procedural obligation (contrast Jeronovičs v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898/10, § 118, ECHR 2016). 92. As regards the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the judgment delivered by the Court in 2011, the Grand Chamber emphasises that in that judgment the Chamber held that a retrial or reopening of the proceedings, if requested, represented “in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation”. A retrial or the reopening of the proceedings was thus described as an appropriate solution, but not a necessary or exclusive one. Furthermore, the use of the expression “in principle” narrows the scope of the recommendation, suggesting that in some situations a retrial or the reopening of proceedings might not be an appropriate solution (see paragraph 20 above). 93. A reading of this part of the judgment, and particularly the words “in principle” and “however” (see paragraph 20 above), indicates that the Court refrained from giving binding indications on how to execute its judgment, and instead opted to afford the State an extensive margin of manoeuvre in that sphere. Moreover, the Court reiterates that it cannot prejudge the outcome of the domestic courts’ assessment of whether it would be appropriate, in view of the specific circumstances of the case, to grant a retrial or the reopening of proceedings (see Davydov v. Russia, no. 18967/07, § 29, 30 October 2014). 94. Accordingly, the reopening of proceedings did not appear to be the only way to execute the Court’s judgment of 5 July 2011; at best, it represented the most desirable option, the advisability of which was a matter for assessment by the domestic courts, having regard to Portuguese law and to the particular circumstances of the case. 95. The Supreme Court, in its reasoning in the judgment of 21 March 2012, analysed the content of the Court’s judgment of 5 July 2011. It inferred from its reading of the latter judgment that the Court had “precluded from the outset any possibility that its decision might raise serious doubts about the conviction” (see paragraph 26 above) on account of the applicant’s absence from the hearing on her appeal. That was the Supreme Court’s own interpretation of the Court’s judgment. In view of the margin of appreciation available to the domestic authorities in the interpretation of the Court’s judgments, and in the light of the principles governing the execution of judgments (see, mutatis mutandis, Emre v. Switzerland (no. 2), no. 5056/10, § 71, 11 October 2011), the Court considers it unnecessary to express a position on the validity of that interpretation. 96. Indeed, it is sufficient for the Court to satisfy itself that the judgment of 21 March 2012 was not arbitrary, that is to say that the judges of the Supreme Court did not distort or misrepresent the judgment delivered by the Court (compare with Bochan (no. 2), cited above, §§ 63-65, and Emre (no. 2), cited above, §§ 71-75). 97. The Court cannot conclude that the Supreme Court’s reading of the Court’s 2011 judgment was, viewed as a whole, the result of a manifest factual or legal error leading to a “denial of justice”. 98. Having regard to the principle of subsidiarity and to the wording of the Court’s 2011 judgment, the Court considers that the Supreme Court’s refusal to reopen the proceedings as requested by the applicant was not arbitrary. The Supreme Court’s judgment of 21 March 2012 provides a sufficient indication of the grounds on which it was based. Those grounds fall within the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation and did not distort the findings of the Court’s judgment. 99. The Court emphasises that the above considerations are not intended to detract from the importance of ensuring that domestic procedures are in place whereby a case may be re-examined in the light of a finding that Article 6 of the Convention has been violated. On the contrary, such procedures may be regarded as an important aspect of the execution of its judgments and their availability demonstrates a Contracting State’s commitment to the Convention and to the Court’s case-law (see Lyons and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 15227/03, ECHR 2003-IX).
100.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 6
Outcome: no_violation