FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF VYACHESLAVOVA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE(Applications nos. 39553/16 and 6 others – see appended list) JUDGMENT Art 19 • Ensure observance of engagements • Mass disorder in Odesa in May 2014 and a fire in the Trade Union Building resulting in loss of life and injuries • Court’s role limited to the examination of the Respondent State’s international responsibility albeit some wrongdoings being attributable to its former local officials who fled Ukraine to the Russian Federation • Consideration given to general context, in particular, the Russian Federation’s established involvement in the events in Crimea and the east of UkraineArt 2 (substantive) • Positive obligations • Life • Death of some of the applicants’ relatives from firearm injuries during street clashes or the fire and injuries of some of the applicants from that fire • Respondent State’s failure to do everything that could be reasonably expected of it to prevent, and then stop, the violence • Real and immediate risk to life • Negligence attributable to State officials and authorities went beyond an error of judgment or carelessness of individuals involved • Police’s passivity rendered them partly responsible for violence resulting in the loss of lives • Failure to ensure timely rescue measures for persons trapped in the fireArt 2 (procedural) • Positive obligations • Domestic authorities’ failure to institute and carry out an effective investigation into the events • Investigation neither promptly opened nor pursued with reasonable expedition • Prohibitive delays, significant periods of unexplained inactivity and stagnation • Resulting expiry of the applicable limitation period stripped continuing investigations of any possible usefulness and thus of any potential effectiveness • Lack of independence • Failure to ensure sufficient involvement of the victims and public scrutiny • Allegation of lack of impartiality not substantiatedArt 8 • Private and family life • Inability of one of the applicants to recover her father’s body for burial for at least four months • Retention of the body by the authorities devoid of any legitimate aim Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG13 March 2025 FINAL 13/06/2025  This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. INTRODUCTIONTHE FACTSI. BackgroundA. General contextB. Background events in OdesaII. Events on 2 May 2014A. Introductory remarksB. Events prior to the clashesC. Clashes in the city centreD. Fire in the Trade Union BuildingIII. Events on 4 May 2014IV. Domestic investigationsA. Evidence securing and handling1. As regards the deaths of the applicants’ relatives from firearm injuries(a) Material evidence(b) Forensic evidence(c) Photographic and video evidence2. As regards the deaths of the applicants’ relatives and the injuries of other applicants as a result of the fire in the Trade Union Building                            (a) Material evidence(b) Forensic evidence(c) Photographic and video evidenceB. Investigations in respect of private individuals1. Authorities in charge2. Case no. 37003. Cases nos. 0451 and 04944. Case no. 04505. Case no. 04566. Case no. 03807. Case no. 06138. Other casesC. Investigations in respect of the police1. Authorities in charge2. Case no. 01863. Cases nos. 1126, 1219 and 05004. Case no. 28215. Case no. 11656. Case no. 03637. Case no. 07138. Case no. 0441D. Investigations in respect of the SES officials1. Internal inquiry2. Criminal investigations(a) Authorities in charge(b) Case no. 0154(c) Case no. 0119(d) Case no. 1428V. Facts relating to the identification of the body of Ms Vyacheslavova’s father and its retention by the investigating authorities (application no. 39553/16)VI. Subsequent eventsRELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICEI. Relevant domestic law (as worded at the material time)A. Criminal Code of 2001B. Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012C. Police Act of 1990 (in force until 2 July 2015)D. Order no. 1345 of the Ministry of the Interior of 11 November 2003 on quelling mass riotsII. Other relevant domestic materialA. Findings by the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (“the Ombudsperson”)B. Report of the Parliament Temporary Investigation Commission on its inquiry into the deaths in Odesa (approved on 2 September 2014)C. Findings by the “2 May Group” NGO concerning the fire in the Trade Union BuildingIII. Material from Council of Europe bodiesA. Resolution 1988 (2014) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) on recent developments in Ukraine: threats to the functioning of democratic institutions, adopted on 9 April 2014B. Information note published by the PACE Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe on 25 August 2014, following their fact-finding visit to Kyiv and Odesa (7 to 11 July 2014)C. Report by the International Advisory Panel (IAP)IV. Material from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)V. European Parliament resolutionsTHE LAWI. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONSII. Role of the CourtIII. Alleged violations of Article 2 of the ConventionA. Admissibility1. The parties’ submissions2. The Court’s assessment(a) Preliminary remark(b) General case-law principles(c) Application of the above principles to the present cases(i) Failure to apply for procedural status of victim in all sets of proceedings(ii) Failure to lodge a civil claim in criminal proceedings(iii) Ongoing criminal proceedingsB. Merits1. Substantive limb of Article 2 of the Convention(a) The parties’ submissions(i) The applicants(ii) The Government(b) The Court’s assessment(i) General case-law principles(ii) Application of the above principles to the present cases(α) Introductory remarks(β) Failure to prevent violence(γ) Failure to stop violence(δ) Failure to ensure timely rescue measures(ε) Conclusion2. Procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention(a) The parties’ submissions(i) The applicants(ii) The Government(b) The Court’s assessment(i) General case-law principles(ii) Application of the above principles to the circumstances of the present cases(α) Adequacy of the investigation(β) Promptness and reasonable expedition(γ) Involvement of the victims or their next of kin and public scrutiny(δ) Independence(ε) Impartiality(στ) Conclusion IV. Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of Ms Vyacheslavova (application no. 39553/16)A. AdmissibilityB. MeritsV. Other alleged violations of the ConventionA. Complaint under Article 3 of the ConventionB. Complaint under Article 6 of the ConventionVI. Application of Article 41 of the ConventionA. DamageB. Costs and expensesAPPENDIX IAPPENDIX II   In the case of Vyacheslavova and Others v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Mattias Guyomar, President, María Elósegui, Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, Gilberto Felici, Andreas Zünd, Kateřina Šimáčková, Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,Having regard to:the seven applications against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by twenty-eight individuals (“the applicants”), whose personal information and other details are set out in Appendix I to this judgment;the decision to give notice of the applications to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) and the decision to request further observations from the parties, pursuant to Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court, in application no. 59339/17;the parties’ observations;Having deliberated in private on 11 February 2025,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:INTRODUCTION1. The applications concern the mass disorder and fire in Odesa[1] on 2 May 2014, which involved heavy casualties. The applicants are the next of kin of some of those who lost their lives, as well as three survivors of the fire (see the table in Appendix I to this judgment). They complained under Article 2 of the Convention that the State had failed to protect their lives or those of their relatives and that there had been no effective domestic investigation into the matter. Ms Vyacheslavova (application no. 39553/16) also complained, under Article 8 of the Convention, about the delay in handing over her father’s body for burial.THE FACTS2. Ms Vyacheslavova (application no. 39553/16), who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr M. Tarakhkalo, Ms O. Chilutyan and Ms Y. Lisova, lawyers from the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union based in Kyiv. Ms Berezovska (application no. 52632/16) and Ms Olena Brygar (application no. 53467/16) were represented by Mr A. Popov, a lawyer practising in Kyiv. The remaining applicants (applications nos. 59339/17, 59531/17, 76896/17 and 47092/18) were represented by Mr E. Wesselink of the Stichting Justice Initiative, a non-governmental organisation based in Utrecht, the Netherlands.3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko.4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.I. BackgroundA. General context5. In late November 2013 a wave of mass protests began, first in Kyiv and then throughout the country, in response to the then Ukrainian government’s decision to suspend preparations for signing an Association Agreement with the European Union and instead strengthen economic ties with Russia. The protests, which became commonly referred to as “Maidan”[2], were marked by violent clashes between protesters and the police, with the involvement of hundreds of so-called “titushky” (тітушки), private individuals reported to have carried out numerous assaults, kidnappings and murders of protesters with the authorisation, support or acquiescence of State officials (see Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 15367/14 and 13 others, §§ 10-11 and 14-15, 21 January 2021).6. The Maidan protests culminated on 22 February 2014, when President Yanukovych left for the Russian Federation and was removed from office by the Ukrainian Parliament for failing to perform his constitutional duties (ibid., § 9).7. A series of changes in Ukraine’s political system then took place, including the formation of a new interim government, followed by the replacement of the leadership of, in particular, the Security Service of Ukraine (“the SSU”[3]) and the Prosecutor General’s Office (“the PGO”), as well as the heads of regional State administrations.8. In late February 2014 the Russian Federation, which by that time had considerably increased its military presence in Crimea, started to exercise effective control over the peninsula through the active involvement of its military personnel in the following events. Unidentified armed men in green military uniforms without insignia took over strategic infrastructure and the building of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. At gunpoint, the Supreme Council dismissed the government of Crimea, appointed a new “Prime Minister” and decided to hold a “referendum” on the future status of Crimea. That “referendum” took place on 16 March 2014 and, according to the published results, there was overwhelming support for Crimea’s integration into the Russian Federation. On 18 March 2014 Crimea purported to join Russia on that basis. On 27 March 2014 the United Nations General Assembly underscored the invalidity of the above-mentioned “referendum”[4]. On 9 April 2014 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe held that the “outcome of this referendum and the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation [had] no legal effect and [were] not recognised by the Council of Europe”[5] (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§ 211 and 214 and 315-35, 16 December 2020, and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 2 others, § 46, 30 November 2022).9. In early March 2014 pro-Russian protests began across eastern regions of Ukraine. In early April 2014 they deteriorated into widespread violence. Some of the protesters formed armed groups, which started to forcibly take control of administrative buildings across the Donetsk and Lugansk Regions. They announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Lugansk People’s Republic”. The separatist entities in question enjoyed military, economic and political support from the Russian Federation (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, cited above, §§ 611-21, 628-39, 649-54, 670-75 and 684-97).B. Background events in Odesa10. Like in Kyiv, starting from late November 2013, the Maidan protests also took place in Odesa. They were dispersed by the police, reportedly with the involvement of “titushky” (see paragraph 5 above).11. On 19 February 2014 a group of Maidan supporters gathered near the Odesa Regional State Administration building. According to numerous media reports, they, along with journalists present at the event were attacked by at least a hundred people dressed in similar civilian clothes, wearing helmets and masks, and armed with baseball bats. The law-enforcement authorities did not intervene.12. Tensions in the city considerably increased thereafter.13. As observed, in particular, by the non-governmental organisation (NGO) 2 May Group[6], on 21 February 2014 Maidan activists announced the creation of the “self-defence of the Odesa Euromaidan” to ensure the safety of pro-Maidan and Euro-integration supporters’ public events.14. On 23 February 2014 anti-Maidan activists made a similar announcement. They called for volunteers willing to undergo special training and subsequently patrol the city.15. On 1 March 2014 a pro-Russian rally with some seven thousand participants took place in Odesa. Subsequently, pro-Russian activists set up a tent camp at Kulykove Pole Square accommodating about two hundred people. It appears that the regional police, notably, its then Deputy Head (заступник начальника ГУ МВС України в Одеській області) Mr Fuchedzhy[7] manifested various support to the Kulykove Pole movement[8].16. As seen in publicly available video footage of the tent camp at Kulykove Pole and various events organised by its activists, supporters of the movement often displayed Russian and former Soviet Union flags and chanted or displayed slogans denouncing the new government as a “fascist junta” and calling for a referendum and federalisation of Ukraine into semi‑autonomous regions. Some people were seen holding placards expressing hope for a repeat of the Crimean scenario in Odesa and calling for the Russian Federation to embrace their city. Popular songs about the “Great Patriotic War” (the term used for the Second World War in the Soviet Union) containing calls to fight fascism were broadcast over loudspeakers. A large screen was installed at Kulykove Pole, showing programmes from Russian State-run news channels.17. While an idea of creation of the so-called “Odesa People’s Republic” and “Novorossia” started circulating at some point on the internet, the Kulykove Pole activists apparently publicly denied their involvement.18. On 2 March 2014 a pro-unity rally took place in Odesa, with seven to ten thousand participants, according to media reports. The participants called for preserving a united Ukraine. They mainly protested against the Russian military presence in Crimea (see paragraph 8 above) and emphasised that they would not tolerate a similar scenario in Odesa.19. On 3 March 2014, while the Odesa Regional Council was holding an extraordinary session devoted to the situation in the region and Ukraine as a whole, pro-Russian protesters stormed the building and tried, without success, to force the Council to adopt decisions in favour of federalisation and a local referendum. They also took down the Ukrainian flag from the flagpole and raised a Russian flag in its place. Serious clashes with pro‑unity activists, who had also arrived at the scene, were avoided owing to a police cordon between the two sides.20. As reported in the mass media, on 17 March 2014 the law‑enforcement authorities arrested one of the leaders of the pro-Russian protesters in connection with the incident of 3 March 2014.21. Subsequently, during March and April 2014, both Maidan and anti-Maidan rallies took place in Odesa on a weekly basis without any major incidents.22. In early April 2014 an operational headquarters was established within the Odesa Regional Police Department to ensure coordination of operational measures at the regional level in response to national security challenges and threats. A special working group was established to carry out regular monitoring of social media[9].23. Furthermore, on 17 April 2014 the Head of the Odesa Regional Police Department (начальник ГУ МВС України в Одеській області), Mr Lutsyuk, issued an order entitled “On organisational and practical measures to prevent the aggravation of the socio-political and criminal situation in the region”. The case file before the Court does not contain a copy of that order. According to its summary in the bill of indictment of 4 June 2021 in case no. 0363 (see paragraph 174 below), the heads of all police structural units were to immediately organise various “organisational and preventive measures aimed at: detecting any armed formations and criminal groups and organisations, including extremist, separatist and other radical ones; identifying their leaders and participants; documenting and putting an end to their illegal activities; dismantling their financial infrastructure; searching for and seizing any illegally circulating weapons and means of restraint; [and] preventing any provocations and breaches of order during public events in the region”.24. At some point in late April 2014 fans of the Odesa Chornomorets and Kharkiv Metalist football clubs announced their intention to hold a joint rally in the form of a march “For a United Ukraine”, together with Maidan activists and anybody wishing to join them, on 2 May 2014 in Odesa. The rally was to start at 3 p.m. at Soborna Square, after which its participants were to walk by Derybasivska Street to the football stadium (about 2.5 km east of the departure point)[10], before the beginning of the football match scheduled for 5 p.m. that day. It appears that the Odesa Regional State Administration was notified of the plan[11].25. The announcement triggered negative reactions from some organisations and individuals with anti-Maidan views. Posts appeared on social media describing the planned rally as a Nazi march and calling for people to gather to prevent it from taking place[12].26. On 28 April 2014 the SSU local office obtained intelligence indicating a risk of possible incitement to violence, clashes and disorder during the football fans’ rally scheduled for 2 May 2014[13]. On the same day an inter‑agency meeting was held between the heads of the local offices of the SSU and the Ministry of the Interior (“the MoI”), the PGO and the head of the Odesa Regional State Administration, during which the intelligence was shared. On 30 April 2014 the Odesa regional office of the SSU sent a letter to Mr Lutsyuk, the Head of the Odesa Regional Police Department (see paragraph 23 above), informing him of the above.27. According to the case-file materials in the Court’s possession[14], on 29 April 2014 the then Deputy Head of the Odesa Regional Police Department Mr Fuchedzhy (see paragraph 15 above), approved a “Plan of organisational and practical measures by [the regional police] to ensure public order” in relation to the football match scheduled for 2 May 2014. The document in question was a standard contingency plan for such a sporting event and provided for the deployment of a total of 594 policemen.28. The case file before the Court also contains a “Plan to ensure public order and traffic safety during the football match [in question]”, approved by Mr Lutsyuk on 30 April 2014[15]. That document, too, appeared to be a standard contingency plan for a football match. It provided for involvement of about 800 policemen in total, to be deployed mainly in the stadium and the surrounding areas, and did not mention anything about the planned pro‑unity rally.29. On 30 April 2014 the Public Relations Unit of the MoI Main Department informed the operational headquarters of that Department that it had become aware of some plans by “sabotage groups” to destabilise the situation in the Odesa Region during the upcoming May holidays. At around the same time, the Cybercrime Unit of the MoI Main Department alerted the chief of the Police Headquarters, the Organised Crime Department, the Criminal Investigation Department and the Public Security Unit about social media publications that had appeared at some anti-Maidan activists’ pages suggesting the possibility of mass riots in Odesa on 2 May 2014[16]. It is not known whether there was any follow-up to that information.II. Events on 2 May 2014A. Introductory remarks30. A detailed chronology of the events in Odesa on 2 May 2014 was established by the domestic investigation authorities[17] and by the “2 MayGroup” NGO[18]. Furthermore, those events were summarised in the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“the OHCHR”) on the human rights situation in Ukraine of 15 June 2014, with the reference to the first-hand information from the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (“the UN Monitoring Mission”), whose staff members had witnessed the situation with their own eyes (see paragraphs 271-279 below). Also, a detailed summary was provided, on the basis of a variety of sources, by the IAP in its report of 4 November 2015 (see paragraphs 255-270 below).31. The Government and Ms Vyacheslavova (application no. 39553/16) provided the Court with a summary of the 2 May 2014 events, relying on the information available to them, which was consistent with that in the aforementioned sources. The remaining applicants, including the survivors who had directly participated in the events (Mr Didenko, Mr Dmitriyev and Mr Gerasymov – application no. 59339/17), neither provided their factual summaries nor contested the accuracy of the reports in question. Ms Berezovska (application no. 52632/16) submitted, in particular, that, as a layperson with no access to official documents or power to conduct an independent investigation into the events in question, she was not in a position to confirm or refute the Government’s version of the facts. She therefore invited the Court to take into consideration all the information available from the various public sources.32. The Court will base its summary of the facts below on the parties’ submissions, the documents of relevance in the case file before it, all the sources cited above, the pertinent information from the publicly accessible Unified State register of judicial decisions (Єдиний державний реєстр судових рішень) and the extensive publicly available photographic and video footage.33. The Court also considers it important to note the following. Among the relatives of the applicants in the present cases, who lost their lives on that day, there were Maidan supporters and opponents, and, possibly, simple passers-by. The applicants often preferred not to mention their relatives’ political views. The Court respects their choice and will only indicate the political views of the individuals concerned where that is essential for establishing and understanding the events or where, in any event, the applicants themselves made that information public. The same applies to the three applicants who were personally involved in the events under examination, namely Mr Didenko, Mr Dmitriyev and Mr Gerasymov (application no. 59339/17).B. Events prior to the clashes34. In the morning a patrol service regiment of 133 officers, organised into five companies, was deployed to several different locations in the city centre[19].35. At 12 noon the then Deputy Prosecutor General held a meeting with local prosecutors, law enforcement and military officers at the Odesa Regional Prosecutor’s Office to discuss public order challenges in the region. According to the information published on the MoI’s website, the meeting lasted until 4 p.m. with the participants’ telephones being switched off. However, according to the findings by the Parliamentary Temporary Investigation Commission (see paragraphs 249-250 below), the meeting had ended by 2.50 p.m. and certain officers had been contacted from outside during the meeting.36. From 1 p.m. twenty policemen were deployed to Soborna Square, the place of gathering of pro-unity protesters (see paragraph 24 above). In addition, a ten-strong Public Security Unit of the City Police Department, headed by Mr Tashmatov (начальник відділу громадської безпеки ОМУ ГУ МВС України в Одеській області), was deployed to the city centre area nearby.37. At around 1.30 p.m., anti-Maidan protesters started to gather on Oleksandrviskyy Avenue, about 450 metres from the meeting point of the pro-unity activists. Many of them had their faces covered with balaclavas or scarves and were wearing helmets or masks. They carried shields, axes, or wooden or metal sticks. Some had firearms[20]. When Mr Tashmatov asked the anti-Maidan protesters why they were gathering, they replied that they were there to prevent pro-unity activists and football fans from trying to destroy the tent camp at Kulykove Pole[21]. He subsequently informed thereabout Mr Netrebskyy, the Head of the Odesa City Police Department (начальник ОМУ ГУ МВС України в Одеській області).38. At 2 p.m. Mr Vdovychenko, the Deputy Head of the Odesa City Police Department (заступник начальника ОМУ ГУМС України в Одеській області), who was at the football stadium, held a briefing for his subordinates. It appears from the available case-file materials[22] that 225 to 250 policemen were involved in ensuring order in and around the stadium.39. At one point, Mr Netrebskyy instructed his deputy to deploy as many policemen as possible from the stadium to the city centre. As a result, Mr Vdovychenko sent 120 policemen. However, they had no protective equipment. Some of them also had no means of restraint[23].40. At around 3 p.m. about thirty pro-Russian activists tried to break into the headquarters of a local pro-unity NGO in the city centre. Some pro-unity activists blocked their access at the entrance. The pro-Russian supporters damaged a car parked nearby while reportedly searching for weapons, but did not find any.41. Following a telephone call to the police about the events described above, one of the companies of the patrol service regiment (see paragraph 34 above), consisting of thirty officers, was deployed to the scene[24]. They set up a cordon near the entrance to the building without taking any further action.42. At around the same time, Mr Fuchedzhy (see paragraphs 15 and 27 above), together with Mr Knyshov, the commander of the patrol service regiment (командир полку патрульної служби ОМУ ГУ МВС України в Одеській області) (see paragraph 34 above), arrived in the city centre, at the place where the pro-Russian activists were gathering. By that time, their number had grown to about 300 people.43. At around 3.15 p.m. the anti-Maidan activists started moving in the direction of the pro-unity march. They were accompanied by thirty officers of the patrol service regiment company (see paragraph 41 above) and ten policemen of the city police (see paragraph 36 above). Furthermore, Mr Fuchedzhy and Mr Knyshov walked at the head of the column, alongside the activists’ leaders.44. The number of pro-unity protesters at Soborna Square had grown, according to various data, to about 1,000[25] to 2,000[26] persons by then. Some of them, notably, members of the Maidan self-defence units (see paragraph 13 above), were wearing helmets, shields and masks and carrying axes or wooden or metal sticks. Some were seen carrying firearms.C. Clashes in the city centre45. At around 3.30 p.m. the clashes started. According to all the sources available to the Court (see paragraphs 30-32 above), anti-Maidan activists approached and attacked the pro-unity supporters after those had just started their march along the planned route (that is, eastwards, in the direction of the stadium and without manifesting any attempt to move towards the south, in the direction of Kulykove Pole (see paragraph 24 above)). The 2 May Group observed some pro-Russian activists open fire in the direction of pro-unity protesters using short-barrelled weapons. Both sides used pyrotechnic devices and airguns, and threw stones, stun grenades and Molotov cocktails.46. The only applicant directly involved in the clashes was Mr Didenko (application no. 59339/17). As the Court has already noted (see paragraph 31 above), he did not provide any first-hand information as to what he had seen and experienced. Nor did he comment on or challenge the version of events before the Court (ibid.). That said, the Court takes note of the following document submitted by Mr Didenko.47. The case file contains a “witness statement” by Mr Didenko dated 10 July 2015, which he gave to a Russian advocate in an unknown context. Mr Didenko, who described himself as an anti-Maidan activist, stated that he had actively participated in the clashes in the Odesa city centre. According to him, anti-Maidan activists had feared that pro-unity protesters would destroy the tent camp at Kulykove Pole and had therefore approached the pro-unity march. He submitted, without providing further details, that the law‑enforcement officers present in the city centre at the time had appeared to favour the pro-unity supporters. Mr Didenko noted that the first shots had been fired in the direction of the pro-unity march, in his view – by some law‑enforcement officials, which had provoked the clashes.48. By 3.50 p.m. law-enforcement officers had formed a cordon separating the two sides, with their backs turned on the pro-Russian activists. The latter tried to build barricades using rubbish bins. As pointed out by the 2 May Group, with reference to publicly available photographic and video footage, some police officers and certain anti-Maidan protesters were wearing similar red adhesive tape on their arms.49. At 4.10 p.m. the first victim, Mr Ivanov, a pro-unity activist, sustained a firearm injury to the abdomen (application no. 59531/17). He was taken to hospital by an ambulance but died during surgery[27].50. As can be seen from publicly available video footage, at around the same time a pro-Russian activist wearing a balaclava, who was standing behind and, at times, next to the police, was seen firing numerous shots in the direction of pro-unity supporters. The police did not respond.51. According to an assessment by the 2 May Group’s ballistics expert[28], the pro-Russian activist in question, identified by that NGO as Mr Budko[29], fired live ammunition from a Kalashnikov-type assault rifle (AKS-74U). The expert considered that Mr Ivanov’s fatal injuries had been inflicted by the same type of weapon. The expert also referred to video footage circulating on the internet, according to which cartridge cases of this type had been found at the scene of the clashes.52. The Government also stated in their summary of the facts that “Mr B.” had fired several shots in the direction of Maidan supporters from what appeared to be an AKS-74U assault rifle (see paragraphs 139 and 177 below).53. Another publicly available video showed that, at one point[30], Mr Fuchedzhy, who had sustained a minor injury to his arm, had boarded an ambulance in which Mr Budko, apparently uninjured, was sitting. A few seconds later, a seriously injured police officer, assisted by two other officers, was apparently refused access to the ambulance, which then drove off.54. According to the chronology of events provided by the 2 May Group, between 4.21 p.m. and 4.24 p.m. anti-Maidan activists broke the police cordon and drove back their opponents by using firearms and throwing Molotov cocktails. It was at that point that Mr Biryukov (application no. 59531/17) was fatally injured.55. At around 4.30 p.m. a fire engine, which had been sent in response to an emergency call (which eventually proved to be without basis[31]) was hijacked by some pro-unity supporters who then used it to batter down barricades. It was released a few hours later following negotiations between the protesters and the management of the State Emergency Service (“the SES”)[32].56. The clashes continued. At around 5.45 p.m. numerous shots were fired in the direction of anti-Maidan activists and the police cordon in front of them, apparently from a hunting gun, by someone standing on a nearby balcony. A video filmed by a person standing behind the shooter was later posted on the internet. Some people claimed to identify the shooter as Mr Khodiyak, a pro-unity activist (see also paragraphs 110-120 below).57. It was around that time that Mr Zhulkov, Mr Yavorskyy and Mr Petrov (application no. 76896/17) sustained fatal firearm injuries.58. At a certain point, the pro-unity protesters gained the upper hand in the clashes.59. At around 6.30 p.m. some pro-Russian activists took refuge in a shopping centre, which had been closed for the day. They were subsequently[33] removed by the special police forces, who had arrived at the scene. Forty-seven people were placed in detention.60. At around 6.50 p.m. an angry crowd of Maidan activists and sympathisers ran to the pro-Russian protesters’ tent camp at Kulykove Pole shouting loud their resolve to destroy it.61. The clashes in the city centre claimed six lives, including five relatives of nine of the applicants (see Appendix I for details).D. Fire in the Trade Union Building62. The anti-Maidan protesters at Kulykove Pole, aware of the situation evolving in the city centre, decided to take refuge in the Trade Union Building, a five-storey building facing the square. At around 6.50 p.m. they broke down the door and took inside various materials, including boxes containing Molotov cocktails and the products needed to make them. The pro-Russian protesters also took inside a fuel-powered electric generator that they had been using at the tent camp. With wooden pallets which had been used to support tents in the square, as well as various pieces of wooden and plastic furniture that they had been able to find inside the building, they blocked the entrances from the inside and erected barricades.63. At around 7.20 p.m. Maidan activists reached Kulykove Pole and started setting fire to the tents and destroying the belongings inside. As can be seen from various publicly available video footage, a group of pro-Russian protesters on the roof of the Trade Union Building threw Molotov cocktails at the crowd beneath. Pro-unity activists also started throwing Molotov cocktails in the direction of the building. Gunshots were reportedly heard from both sides. According to the 2 May Group, the anti-Maidan protesters barricaded inside the Trade Union Building could be seen shooting in the direction of the crowd from the roof and from several windows on the first and second floors. The 2 May Group also referred to publicly available video footage showing a pro-unity activist, later identified as Mr Volkov (see paragraphs 121-124 below), firing a pistol in the direction of a window of the Trade Union Building from which an explosive device had been thrown.64. At 7.31 p.m. the first telephone call was made to the SES dispatch centre for the fire brigade, which was 650 metres away. Numerous similar telephone calls followed, including one from the staff of the UN Monitoring Mission, at 7.43 p.m., but no fire engines were sent. An audio recording, purportedly of the calls to the dispatch centre was later posted on the internet. In the recording, the dispatcher can be heard telling the callers that there was no risk in burning tents in an open space, and then hanging up. At one point, she asked her superior whether she should continue responding this way and was instructed to do so.65. At 7.32 p.m. the Head of the SES Main Department in the Odesa Region (начальник ГУ ДСНС України в Одеській області), Mr Bodelan, who had arrived at Kulykove Pole a minute earlier in his official capacity[34], instructed the SES staff by telephone not to send any fire engines there without his explicit order[35]. Mr Bodelan eventually explained in the course of the internal inquiry (see paragraph 182 below) that he had taken that decision “having regard to the hijacking of a fire engine a few hours earlier and to prevent any similar hijacking, as well as to prevent risks to firefighters’ lives”.66. At 7.45 p.m. a fire broke out in the Trade Union Building. The people trapped inside reached for the fire equipment, but the fire extinguishers were apparently out of service. The SES dispatch centre immediately started receiving telephone calls about the fire from eyewitnesses. Furthermore, according to the chronology of events provided by the 2 May Group, at around the same time, an official of the city police unit on duty informed the SES of the need to immediately deploy firefighters to Kulykove Pole, but that message was disregarded.67. By 7.54 p.m. the fire had reached its peak and some of the people in the building desperately tried to escape by jumping out of the windows on the upper floors. Mr Dmitriyev (application no. 59339/17) was among them. Once he was on the ground, a pro-unity supporter was allegedly about to hit him when another pro-unity activist rescued him and took him to an ambulance[36]. A number of people fell to their deaths, including the son of Ms Radzykhovska (application no. 59339/17) and the son of Ms Nikitenko (application no. 47092/18). Video footage posted on the internet shows pro-unity protesters making makeshift ladders and platforms from the stage erected for speakers in the square and using them to rescue the people trapped in the building, who were then evacuated to safe zones. There is also video footage showing other pro-unity protesters assaulting those who had jumped or fallen from the windows.68. At 7.55 p.m. Mr Bodelan, reportedly under pressure from the public, finally ordered his subordinates to send fire engines to Kulykove Pole[37].69. At 8.09 p.m. the fire engines started arriving. According to statements made by the firefighter leading the unit in the course of the internal inquiry (see paragraph 182 below), their work was complicated by obstruction and threats from aggressive activists. According to the 2 May Group’s submissions to the IAP, its own inquiry found no evidence of obstruction to the fire crews’ access.70. Turntable ladders were used to evacuate people from the windows.71. At around 8.30 p.m., firefighters entered the building. At 8.50 p.m. they reported that the fire had been extinguished.72. The police arrested sixty-three anti-Maidan activists who were still inside the building or on the roof (see also paragraph 85 below).73. The fire in the Trade Union Building claimed forty-two lives. Fourteen of the deceased were the next of kin of sixteen of the applicants (see Appendix I for details).74. Many people, including Mr Didenko, Mr Dmitriyev and Mr Gerasymov (application no. 59339/17), sustained burns and other injuries. Mr Didenko had third-degree burns to both upper limbs and a closed fracture of his left elbow[38]. He underwent inpatient hospital treatment until 15 May 2014. Mr Dmitriyev was hospitalised from 2 May to 12 May 2014 on account of a closed head injury, cerebral concussion and burns of the upper respiratory tract. He also suffered second-degree burns and cuts and bruises on both wrists. As for Mr Gerasymov, he remained in hospital until 22 August 2014, where he was treated for second-degree burns of the upper respiratory tract, third- to fourth-degree burns on the left thigh and both knees, as well as a closed head injury, cerebral concussion and contused lacerations to the head. In September 2014 he was classified as having the third category of disability (the mildest) on account of the knee burns.III. Events on 4 May 201475. On 4 May 2014 a group of several hundred anti-Maidan protesters stormed the local police station where those who had been arrested at the Trade Union Building (see paragraph 72 above) were being held. Following a verbal order by Mr Fuchedzhy, the sixty-three detainees were released without any formal decision being taken.IV. Domestic investigations76. The domestic investigations, which comprised numerous interrelated sets of criminal proceedings evolving over time, can be divided into the following three groups:1) investigations in respect of private individuals[39] (see paragraphs 100‑143 below);2) investigations in respect of the police (see paragraphs 144-181 below); and3) investigations in respect of the SES officials (see paragraphs 182-208 below).A. Evidence securing and handling77. In view of the multitude of interrelated domestic proceedings and the lack of sufficient information to enable the Court to link each individual investigative measure to a specific set of proceedings, this part of the summary of the facts does not refer to specific case file numbers as registered in the Unified State register of pre-trial investigations (Єдиний реєстр досудових розслідувань).1. As regards the deaths of the applicants’ relatives from firearm injuries[40](a)   Material evidence78. It appears from the case-file materials[41] that on the evening of 2 May 2014 an investigator drew up a report about having found, in the city centre, an object appearing to be a bullet. No further information is available in that regard, apart from the fact that the report was not admitted into evidence in case no. 0380 (see paragraph 134 below) on the grounds that the investigator in question was not a member of the investigation team dealing with the case.79. Also on the evening of 2 May 2014 the police inspected the shopping centre where the pro-Russian supporters had taken refuge (see paragraph 59 above). A dozen wooden and metal sticks, as well as some plastic bottles containing combustible substances, were seized.80. As observed by the 2 May Group, the area of the city centre where the clashes had taken place was neither secured by a police perimeter nor inspected by the police. Instead, during the night of 2 to 3 May 2014 local cleaning and maintenance services were sent there. By the morning of 3 May 2014, the area had been thoroughly cleaned.81. On 15 May 2014 the police carried out their first on-site inspection in the areas of the city centre where the clashes had taken place. No items of relevance to the investigation were found, apart from some damaged pavements.82. According to the information provided by the Government, without further details, the investigating authorities carried out nine additional on-site inspections in the areas in question between 2016 and 2021.(b)   Forensic evidence83. By early June 2014 the forensic medical examinations of the bodies of the applicants’ relatives killed during the clashes in the city centre (see Appendix I) had been completed. Although forensic ballistics examinations had apparently been carried out on the airgun bullet extracted from the body of Mr Biryukov and on the shrapnel extracted from the bodies of Mr Zhulkov, Mr Petrov and Mr Yavorskyy, the experts found it impossible to establish with precision from which weapons the fatal shots had been fired[42]. In the case of Mr Ivanov, it is not known whether the bullet was ever examined by a forensic ballistics expert. As stated in the report of 4 June 2014 on the forensic medical examination of the body, the bullet had been extracted during surgery, before Mr Ivanov’s death, but had not been provided to the expert for examination.(c)   Photographic and video evidence84. The Government informed the Court, without providing details, that between 2016 and 2021 “more than fifty people [had been] identified from photographs” and that “more than 300 [reports on] the inspection of photographic and video material, including that posted on the internet, [had been] compiled”.2. As regards the deaths of the applicants’ relatives[43] and the injuries of other applicants[44] as a result of the fire in the Trade Union Building(a)   Material evidence85. During the night of 2 to 3 May 2014 experts of the Odesa Regional Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations carried out an on-site examination of the bodies of those who had died as a result of jumping from the building. Early the next morning, they started examining the bodies inside the building. The examination was apparently interrupted several times, as some anti‑Maidan protesters were still inside the Trade Union Building. They were evacuated by the police by 10 a.m.86. Throughout the entire day on 3 May 2014 the investigation team and forensic medical experts continued to inspect the scene and examine the bodies in the Trade Union Building.87. From 4 to 20 May 2014 the building was freely accessible to the public.(b)   Forensic evidence88. At a press conference held on 19 May 2014, the Deputy Minister of the Interior stated that a complex forensic examination of the combustible materials and flammable objects in the Trade Union Building had revealed the presence of chloroform, and that the Ukrainian authorities were seeking the assistance of international experts to draw more precise conclusions.89. By mid-June 2014 the forensic medical examinations of the bodies of those who had died as a result of the fire had been completed. The experts concluded that the relatives of Mr Negaturov, Mr Petrov and Ms Yakhlakova (application no. 59339/17) had died of burns and high temperatures, while the relatives of Ms Babushkina, Ms Lukas and Ms Pidorich (also application no. 59339/17) had died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning[45]. As also stated in the expert reports, the deaths of the relatives of the following applicants were caused by intoxication by unidentified gases, fumes and vapours: Ms Berezovska (application no. 52632/16); Ms Olena Brygar and Ms Lyudmyla Brygar (applications nos. 53467/16 and 59339/17); Ms Kovriga and Ms Mishyna (application no. 59339/17); and Ms Marikoda and Mr Milev (application no. 47092/18).90. The case file before the Court does not contain copies of any forensic examination reports other than those mentioned in the previous paragraph.91. It appears that on 7 July 2014 a report on the forensic examination in respect of the fire in the Trade Union Building was issued by the Scientific Research and Forensics Centre of the MoI Department in the Mykolayiv Region. According to its findings, as summarised in the IAP report on the basis of the authorities’ related submissions, the building could have caught fire as a result of one or more individuals bringing combustible materials and a source of ignition into the building. The report identified five separate fire origin points: the lobby of the building; the left and right stairwells between the ground and first floors; a room on the first floor; and the landing between the second and third floors. The fire origin points, other than the one in the lobby, could only have resulted from actions taken by individuals inside the building.92. As also observed in the IAP report, in April 2015 the PGO issued a press release summarising the findings of a forensic examination. It established that the fire in the Trade Union Building had started in the lobby. People died as a result of the rapid spread of the fire and the sharp rise in temperature, due to the chimney effect of the central stairwell, exacerbated by the blocking of interior doors with barricades. Almost all those who died inside the building were on or near the staircase. It was established in the course of the investigations that incendiary mixtures (Molotov cocktails) had been used by both parties to the conflict, including in the building itself. There was no evidence of pre-planned arson or of the use of potent toxic agents, including chloroform. The IAP stated in its report that the above findings appeared to be corroborated by the findings of the 2 May Group (see paragraph 252 below).93. On 11 March 2016 an additional forensic medical examination was ordered in respect of thirty-four people who had died in the fire[46]. One of the questions put to the experts was whether the deceased’s bodies contained any indication suggesting the use of poisonous gases or substances.94. In early 2017 experts of the Kyiv City Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations informed the investigator that the exhumation of the bodies of at least five people was required (the late husband of Ms Mishyna (application no. 59339/17) was among those mentioned)[47]. According to the prosecution authorities[48], no exhumations were carried out because the relatives objected.95. Although the prosecution authorities considered the possibility of involving international experts, they eventually abandoned that idea, referring to certain legal loopholes and various technical difficulties[49].96. As indicated in a letter from the State Bureau of Investigations to the Government Agent dated 13 May 2022, a forensic engineering examination of the Trade Union Building to determine the material damage caused by the fire was still underway.97. On 31 May 2022 the Kyiv City Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations carried out the forensic medical examination ordered on 11 March 2016 (see paragraph 93 above) “on the basis of the available case material”[50]. It found no evidence of the use of poisonous gases or substances. No copy of that report was provided to the Court.(c)   Photographic and video evidence98. The general statistical information provided by the Government concerning the investigative measures taken in relation to the identification of specific individuals on photographic and video material (see paragraph 84 above) is also relevant to this section.99. Further relevant information concerning the handling of photographic and video evidence is provided below (see, in particular, paragraphs 127 and 129).B. Investigations in respect of private individuals1. Authorities in charge100. Initially entrusted to the investigation unit of the Odesa Regional Police Department, on 5 May 2014 the investigation in respect of private individuals became the responsibility of the MoI Main Investigation Department.101. On 15 January 2016 the pre-trial investigation was, however, transferred back to the investigation unit of the Odesa Regional Police Department. The respective ruling of the PGO, a copy of which was published by the 2 May Group on its website, provided the following grounds for that decision:“The pre-trial investigation in the case has been carried out by the MoI Main Investigation Department.As it appears from the case file, the criminal offences under investigation were committed on the territory of the city of Odesa.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 2
Outcome: violation