SECOND SECTION
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE OF DRAKŠAS v. LITHUANIA
 
(Application no. 36662/04)
 
JUDGMENT
 
 
 
 
STRASBOURG
 
31 July 2012
 
 
 
 
 
FINAL
 
31/10/2012
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Drakšas v. Lithuania,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Françoise Tulkens, President,
 Danutė Jočienė,
 Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
 András Sajó,
 Işıl Karakaş,
 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
 Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 3 July 2012,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 36662/04) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Mr Algirdas Drakšas (“the applicant”), on 1 October 2004. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr J. Gaudutis, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Baltutytė. 3. The applicant complained that his telephone conversations had been intercepted and they had been disclosed to the public, and alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. He also submitted that he did not have an effective domestic remedy in respect of the above complaint, in breach of Article 13. 4. On 24 November 2006 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1). THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Vilnius. 6. At the relevant time, the applicant was a founding member of the Liberal Democrats political party, led by Mr Rolandas Paksas. The applicant was also a member of the Vilnius City Municipal Council. 7. On 16 March 2003 the State Security Department (“the SSD”) intercepted a telephone conversation between the applicant and Jurij Borisov (“J.B.”) (see Borisov v. Lithuania, no. 9958/04, § 15, 
14 June 2011), a major contributor to the electoral campaign of the State President, Rolandas Paksas. The tapping of J.B.’s telephone had been authorised by a court. The conversation was as follows:
“Jurij Borisov (J.B.): So. He [the State President R. Paksas] said on television that Borisov isn’t on the list of his advisers and won’t be included. Algirdas Drakšas (A.D.): Won’t be on the list of his advisers? But I don’t understand. After all, you always said that [he would]. J.B.: A week ago he and I agreed that from Monday I would be on the list [of advisers to the President]. A.D.: I don’t know anything about this. J.B.: I am telling you – that was his promise. So he has been stressed for two days, because he has already betrayed me. You understand? He has already sold me. And he is stressed, he is afraid to meet. So I have told him, if by Monday he doesn’t fulfil any of his promises - not a single one for what I have done for him - I will begin to recover my money. I will have to go public, do you understand?... A.D.: I don’t know. I don’t know. I haven’t heard that, I don’t know. J.B.: Algis, I have recorded everything on tape, the tape will be ready tomorrow. A.D.: Damn, I don’t know that. I don’t know that. I know that you declared that you would act differently, that you wouldn’t go to the President’s Office because the salary is low there, that you wouldn’t manage to earn a living there. I know only that. J.B.: That was in the press. At his [the State President’s] request: “Jura, tell that in the meantime you won’t go [to work at the President’s Office]. And on Monday you will be [working] there”....That’s why he has already been suffering for two days, because he has lied on television. And I don’t know how he is going to walk away from this... Death to him as to the President. Tomorrow this lie will surface... That’s why he is restless... A.D.: I don’t know these facts, how can I give you an answer. J.B.: Algis, I am not asking you for an answer, I am just emotional, because I don’t know ... how I should go and talk to him. Because I have to go public and say everything now. Rolandas is such-and-such... We have agreed with him... And now: he went to Dalia [D.K.G. - adviser to the President], and [the President] has said that Borisov won’t harass you. I don’t know what she has told him. So the President, you understand, is a corpse already. A.D.: If it is easier for you, but you’re behaving improperly. J.B.: Algis, I haven’t done anything yet, so far I’ve done nothing. But he has sold me publicly already. A.D.: Calm down. He hasn’t sold you publicly; he is not that kind of person ... I don’t know that you are not going to be an adviser. That wasn’t discussed openly, there was no such idea, I haven’t heard about that. He hasn’t sold you publicly; I can’t imagine he would do that. He is not like that. J.B.: You see. Such is the fact... A.D.: Such fact can’t [be]... J.B.: Maybe you want to see the agreement with his signature? I’ll show it [to you] tomorrow. A.D.: I can only repeat what I’ve said. J.B.: Okay, Algis, have you called him? A.D.: What? I have called him, but he isn’t picking up his telephone.”
8. On 17 September 2003 the SSD applied to the Attorney General’s Office with a request for the applicant’s telephone to be tapped. The request was based on operational information that the applicant maintained contact with J.B. and A.Z., both of whom had contributed to the electoral campaign of Mr Rolandas Paksas. A.Z. worked for a Russian public relations company. Subsequently, J.B. was convicted of having threatened the State President so that the latter would appoint him as an adviser, grant him Lithuanian citizenship and grant other favours, failing which J.B. threatened to disclose certain information which could damage the President’s reputation (see Borisov, cited above, § 30). The monitoring of the applicant’s telecommunications also had the goal of establishing the nature of his relationship with a Russian citizen, V.F., who, according to the SSD, had been expelled from Spain in 1982 for spying for the former USSR. 9. Later that day the Attorney General requested the Vilnius Regional Court to authorise the tapping of the applicant’s telephone. The court order was classified as secret, and was not disclosed to the applicant. The Attorney General based his request on the applicant’s “possible participation in smuggling strategic goods and other crimes”. The court granted the request, authorising the measure for a period of three months. The court order reads:
“on the basis of the material in the case file of the operation it is reasonable to [tap the applicant’s telephone] in order to verify his involvement in the criminal activities described in the request: the information in the case file (the operative information and other data) confirms that [the applicant] could be linked to criminal acts which qualify as serious crimes; in order to establish all the relevant circumstances other operative measures had already been [exhausted], therefore a supplementary investigative measure [tapping of the applicant’s telephone] is to be authorised, pursuant to the rules of the Law on Operational Activities”. 10. As came to light later on, the request by the SSD was also based on the applicant’s allegedly unlawful involvement in attempts to take over the shares of the road-building company “Žemaitijos keliai”. 11. On 1 November 2003 the SSD declassified the recording of the telephone conversation of 16 March 2003 between the applicant and J.B. It sent the recording to the Attorney General’s Office. The following day, the latter began a pre-trial investigation into threats to the State President. 12. On 2 November 2003 the recording of the telephone conversation of 16 March 2003 between the applicant and J.B. was aired by the State-run and private national television channels LTV and LNK. The SSD denied any involvement in leaking the conversation to the media. 13. Having intercepted the applicant’s telephone conversations between 18 September and 11 November, the SSD obtained recordings of his communications with the State President, the President’s advisers and the applicant’s business partners. It can be seen from the transcripts of those recordings that the SSD intercepted five conversations between the applicant and the head of State. At least one of these telephone calls was from the State President to the applicant. The transcripts also reveal that the conversations between the applicant and his interlocutors contained some swearing. 14. On 11 November 2003 the Attorney General wrote to the director of the SSD. The Attorney General noted that on 10 and 11 November the media had made known the fact that the SSD had obtained recordings of telephone conversations between the applicant and the State President. Such recordings, if they existed, were unlawful, given that Article 6 § 3 of the Law on Operational Activities prohibited any operational activities in respect of the head of State (see “Relevant domestic law” below). The SSD was ordered to make sure that the recordings were not made public and were destroyed the same day. The letter of the Attorney General does not specify whether by that time the content of the applicant’s conversations with the State President had already been disclosed to the public. 15. The letter also read that “noting the illegal practice, which began on 30 October 2003, of transfer and making public operational information, the SSD is ordered to adhere strictly to the requirements of the Law on Operational Activities and the Law on State Secrets, as well as those concerning Criminal Procedure”. On this point the Attorney General emphasised that classified information obtained during operational activities, as well as data concerning a person’s private life and/or demeaning to his or her honour or dignity should not be disclosed. Furthermore, once the operational investigation had been terminated and where the information concerning the target of the surveillance activities had not proved to be true, such information had to be destroyed. Lastly, the information collected during a pre-trial investigation was to remain confidential, unless a prosecutor decided otherwise. 16. On 12 November 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Attorney General, alleging that the tapping of his telephone had been unlawful. He also complained that his telephone call with the State President had been intercepted. The applicant alleged a breach of privacy. 17. On 20 November 2003 the Attorney General requested information from the SSD regarding the leak. 18. On 11 December 2003 the SSD informed the Attorney General that neither recordings nor transcripts of the applicant’s conversation with J.B. of 16 March 2003 had been given to the media. It noted that on 
1 November 2003 the transcripts of that recording had been declassified and submitted to the Attorney General’s Office for the purpose of a pre-trial investigation. 19. By a letter of 15 December 2003, the Attorney General requested the SSD to conduct an inquiry into the leak, as a result of which the applicant’s and J.B.’s telephone conversation of 16 March 2003 had been aired on television (paragraph 12 above). 20. On 15 December 2003 the Attorney General’s Office informed the applicant that his telephone conversations had been monitored in accordance with the law. The applicant’s conversations with the State President had been recorded while the SSD had been tapping the applicant’s telephone, and not that of the President. The operational investigation in respect of the applicant had been terminated on 11 November 2003. The applicant was advised to address the SSD in order to obtain the information held on him. To the extent that the applicant complained about the damage he had allegedly sustained by the disclosure of his telephone conversation [of 16 March 2003] to the media, he was advised to bring an action before the civil courts. 21. On 16 December 2003 the SSD wrote to the Attorney General’s Office that the information gathered pointed to the conclusion that the applicant and other persons were attempting to unlawfully acquire the shares of the “Žemaitijos keliai” company. The behaviour of the applicant and his interlocutors could be characterised as extortion of property. 22. In February 2004 the applicant attempted to challenge the lawfulness of the court order authorising the tapping of his telephone. On 18 February 2004 the Vilnius Regional Court informed the applicant by letter that the law did not provide for an appeal against court orders of that type. 23. The applicant also wrote to the SSD, requesting it to disclose the results of its inquiry into the leak. He explained that such information was necessary in order to enable him to prepare a civil action for damages. The applicant also requested access to the information on him held by the SSD. 24. On 9 March 2004 the SSD replied that the information recorded by the SSD had been declassified and transferred to the prosecutors as evidence in two sets of criminal proceedings unrelated to the applicant (namely, the proceedings against J.B. for blackmailing the State President and the proceedings relating to the influence of civil servants in the management decisions of the “Žemaitijos keliai” company). The applicant was advised that he could obtain access to that evidence with a prosecutor’s authorisation. 25. On 10 March 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Court of Appeal, again challenging the court order of 17 September 2003. He argued that there had been no lawful grounds for the tapping, and that his rights under Article 8 of the Convention had been breached. The applicant was also critical of the fact that the SSD had intercepted and made public his telephone conversations with the State President and J.B. He further complained about the absence of a domestic remedy against the court order authorising telephone tapping, alleging a violation of Article 13. By a letter of 6 April 2004, the President of the Court of Appeal returned to the applicant his complaint without examination. The President stressed that to grant a person the right of access to court orders authorising operational measures and to allow him to challenge such court orders would deprive the secret investigative actions of their meaning. He also noted that Article 8 of the Convention did not prohibit secret investigative measures as such, provided that the interference involved was necessary in the interests of national security or for the prevention of crime. Well-reasoned court orders were to guarantee that the investigating authorities acted within the law. 26. On 15 March 2004 the SSD informed the Attorney General that in September and October 2003 the applicant and a Russian citizen, V.F., had organised visits by Lithuanian civil servants to the Russian Federation and visits by Russian officials to Lithuania. The applicant had acted in cooperation with the advisers to the Lithuanian President. The applicant also had business dealings with V.F. According to the SSD, the applicant had ceased to organise such visits once the Lithuanian media had made public the SSD report “On negative tendencies posing a threat to national security”. The SSD also reiterated that the above facts could be linked to [unlawful] attempts to take over the shares of the “Žemaitijos keliai” company. The SSD asked the Attorney General to verify the information by way of criminal proceedings. 27. On 15 March 2004 the recordings and transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with Russian businessman V.F., J.B. and the State President were deposited with the registry of the Constitutional Court, which was about to hear the State President’s impeachment case. The prosecutors did not impose any restrictions on the disclosure of those recordings. 28. At the hearing of the Constitutional Court on 19 March 2004, some of the recordings were played. Given that the hearing was public and directly broadcast by national television, the conversations were aired. 29. On 22 March 2004 the applicant requested the opening of a criminal investigation in relation to the disclosure of the contents of his conversations at the Constitutional Court’s hearing. He argued that after the disclosure “none of his foreign partners would want to do business with [him] or [his] company”. 30. On 25 March 2004 the prosecutors refused to open criminal proceedings. They noted that the information had been disclosed during a public hearing at the Constitutional Court and in accordance with domestic law. A further complaint by the applicant was dismissed by the Attorney General, who observed that disclosure of the applicant’s conversations during the proceedings in the Constitutional Court was a normal part of the judicial process. Furthermore, the disclosed materials contained no information about the applicant’s private life. By a final decision of 
7 May 2004 the Vilnius City Second District Court upheld the prosecutors’ decisions. 31. On 31 March 2004 the Constitutional Court found that the State President had committed gross violations of the Constitution and a breach of his constitutional oath on account of, inter alia, exploiting his official status to influence decisions by the “Žemaitijos keliai” company concerning the transfer of shares with a view to defending the property interests of certain private individuals close to him. He was also found guilty of having knowingly hinted to J.B. that the law-enforcement institutions were investigating him and tapping his telephone conversations (see Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 34932/04, § 27, 6 January 2011). 32. The applicant lodged an administrative complaint against the refusal by the SSD to grant him access to the recordings of his telephone conversations. 33. On 21 May 2004 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action as unsubstantiated. The court accepted that pursuant to the domestic legislation a person had a right to obtain information of a private nature held on him by the State institutions (see paragraphs 39 and 40 below). Nonetheless, the information the applicant sought access to had much wider implications; therefore it could not be regarded as concerning his private life. Furthermore, that information had in the meantime been given to the prosecutors as evidence in criminal proceedings (paragraph 24 above). Disclosure of such information was explicitly prohibited by Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court also noted that citizens’ rights, as established in [Article 25 § 5 of] the Lithuanian Constitution, could be restricted only when this was provided for by law, necessary in a democratic society and with the aim of protecting rights and freedoms of others. In the applicant’s case, such a restriction had been established by law. There was no proof that by refusing the applicant access to the transcripts of his telephone conversations the SSD had acted arbitrarily. It followed that the applicant’s right to receive information had not been infringed. 34. On 12 October 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, upholding the reasoning of the lower court. 35. In reply to an inquiry by the applicant’s lawyer, on 25 May 2005 the Deputy Attorney General wrote that to that day the SSD had not informed the prosecutors about the results of an internal investigation into the circumstances how the media had got hold of the applicant’s telephone conversation with J.B. (paragraphs 12 and 19 above). 36. By a letter of 15 July 2005, the SSD informed the applicant that, given that there was no ground for an internal investigation into the lawfulness and reasonableness of the tapping of his phone, as sanctioned by the court on 17 September 2003, no inquiry had ever taken place at the level of the SSD. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
37. The Law on Operational Activities (Operatyvinės veiklos įstatymas), adopted by the Lithuanian Parliament and published in the State Gazette (Valstybės žinios) on 28 June 2002, in force at the relevant time, provided:
Article 3. Basic Definitions of the Law
 “1. Operational activities are overt and covert intelligence activities by operational entities conducted in accordance with the procedure established by this Law. 2. Targets of operational activities are crimes being planned, being perpetrated, or already committed, persons engaged in planning or committing crimes or persons who have committed a crime, vigorous actions of these individuals in neutralising operational activities or by infiltrating law enforcement, national defence, or other government and administrative institutions, and activities of foreign intelligence services and other persons and events linked with State security matters.”
Article 5. Tasks of Operational Activities
“The tasks of operational activities shall be as follows:
1)  crime prevention;
2)  solving crimes and establishing the identity of the individuals who are planning, are engaged in or have already committed criminal acts;
3)  protection of individuals from criminal influence;
(...)
5)  actions posing a threat to the constitutional order, its independence, economic safety of the State, or other important interests of national security (...);
(...)
7)  protection of State secrets;
8)  investigation of the activities of the intelligence services of  other States;
9)  ensuring the safety of the entities of operational activities.”
Article 6. Safeguarding Persons’ Rights when Implementing Operational Activities
1. The individual and citizens’ rights and freedoms may not be violated in the course of operational activities. Individual restrictions on these rights and freedoms shall be temporary and may be applied only in accordance with the procedure established by laws, striving to defend another person’s rights and freedoms, property and the security of the State and society (...). 3. It shall be prohibited to apply operational activities to the President of the Republic. (...)
6. In case the rights and freedoms of an individual and citizens have been violated, the entities of operational activities must restore the rights which have been violated and compensate the damage according to the procedure established by legal acts. 7. The classified information obtained in the course of operational activities, as well as that about a person’s personal and family life and information demeaning his or her honour or dignity may not be disclosed, with the exception of ... situations stipulated in Article 17 of this Law. 8. Within three months of the completion of the operational investigation and provided that the operational information about the target of the operational activities did not prove to be true, information about a person’s private life must be destroyed (...). 9. A person who considers that the activities of the entities of operational activities have violated his rights and freedoms may appeal against those actions to the chief of the entity of operational activities, a prosecutor or a court.”
Article 9. Principles of Operational Investigation
“An operational investigation shall be conducted, when:
1)  information is held with respect to a serious crime being planned (...);
2)  information is available regarding the activities of the special services of other States;
(...)
6)  protection of State secrets is being implemented;
7)  information is available concerning actions which are endangering the constitutional system of the State, its independence, economic security ... or other important interests of national security.”
Article 10. Covert Monitoring of (...) Telecommunications (...)
“1. The covert monitoring of ... telegraph and other communications and the use of technical equipment in accordance with special procedure shall be authorised by the chairman of a regional court or the chairman of the criminal cases division of that court, on the basis of a reasoned recommendation by the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General, or ... a recommendation by the chief prosecutor of the regional prosecutor’s office or ... assistant regional chief prosecutor, that recommendation being based on the information submitted by the chiefs of the entities of operational activities or  their authorised deputy chiefs. (...)
3. The implementation of actions recommended for aims of conspiracy concerning the actions indicated in paragraph one of this Article, may be authorised by any district court. 4. The request for covert monitoring shall indicate:
1)  the name, surname and position of the officer who submitted the request;
2)  a description of the target or the name and surname of the person in respect of whom operations shall be conducted;
3)  facts (grounds) warranting a request to employ the operational activities;
 (...)
6)  an estimate how long the operational measures will be applied;
7)  the aim of the investigation. 5. The covert monitoring ... and the use of technical equipment according to special procedure shall be authorised for no longer than three months. This period may be extended (...).”
Article 17. Use of Classified Operational Information and Other Classified Information in Non-operational Activities and Disclosure of Such Information
“1. Classified operational information may be declassified according to the procedure established by laws and used as evidence in a criminal case (...). 2. Classified operational information may be used for other purposes in cases determined by the laws (...).”
38. The Code of Criminal Procedure reads:
Article 177
“1. Information about a pre-trial investigation shall not be made public. It may be made public only subject to a prosecutor’s authorisation and only to such an extent as is determined as permissible (...).”
39. Article 25 § 5 of the Lithuanian Constitution stipulates that citizens have the right to receive, according to the procedure established by law, any information concerning them which is held by the State institutions. 40. The Law on the Right to Obtain Information from State and Local Authorities (Teisės gauti informaciją iš valstybės ir savivaldybių įstaigų įstatymas), in force as of 1 June 2000, provided that a person had a right to obtain information of a private nature held on him by the authorities (Article 7 § 1). Nonetheless, the authorities could refuse to reveal information, the disclosure of which could damage the interests of State security, defence, foreign policy, or hinder a criminal investigation. A refusal to disclose information had to be necessary in a democratic society and based on reasons more weighty than a person’s right to obtain information. The authorities’ refusal to reveal information held on a person could be appealed against to the administrative courts (Article 13). THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
41. The applicant complained that the interception and disclosure of his telephone conversations violated Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The applicant
42. The applicant claimed that there had been a breach of his right to respect for his correspondence and private life. Firstly, the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the interception of his telephone conversation of 16 March 2003 with J.B. The applicant maintained that he had not been a participant in any planned, or already executed criminal activity. He was merely a person to whom J.B. had spoken of his threatening thoughts towards the State President. The applicant contended that the other two persons mentioned by the SSD to the Vilnius Regional Court, A.Z. and V.F., were not Russian spies but ordinary citizens. He also noted that the SSD had intercepted his conversations not only with J.B., but also with other persons, including the State President, which had been in clear breach of Article 6 § 3 of the Law on Operational Activities. 43. The applicant further observed that Article 6 § 7 of that Law prohibited the disclosure of secretly gathered information that demeaned honour and dignity. During the conversations at issue, the applicant, the State President and J.B. had used words which were obscene and generally “used only in a very familiar environment”. Those words themselves did not have any independent meaning apart from strengthening the connotation of the non-obscene words. Therefore, the disclosure of those words had merely had the goal of destroying the reputation and good name of the applicant and of the head of State. 44. For the applicant, the biggest violation of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention was the leak of his telephone conversation with J.B. to the media and the disclosure thereof on 2 November 2003, as well as the subsequent disclosure of his other conversations at the Constitutional Court’s hearing on 19 March 2004. Until those events, the applicant had had no information as to the scope and content of the recordings and could not have challenged the lawfulness of the monitoring of his communications. 2. The Government
45. The Government maintained, firstly, that the complaint was inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Whilst acknowledging that the applicant could not appeal against the court order to tap his telephone, they argued that Article 6 § 9 of the Law on Operational activities allowed the applicant to challenge the operational “actions” of the SSD. Nonetheless, the applicant had not challenged those actions, that is to say, the tapping of his telephone. 46. The Government acknowledged that the monitoring of the applicant’s telephone conversations by the SSD could be considered an interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the interference in question was legitimate and fully satisfied the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 of that provision. 47. Interception of the applicant’s telephone communications was regulated by the Law on Operational Activities, which set out exhaustive and detailed guidelines for operational investigations, as well as time limits for surveillance and the terms for storage of the recordings. The procedure established for the authorisation of telephone tapping provided adequate protection against arbitrariness. 48. The Government noted that the necessity of the measure had been assessed twice, with a possibility of rejection – first by the Attorney General and subsequently by the Vilnius Regional Court. The contested operational measure had been necessary and had been applied in the interests of national security, public safety and the prevention of crime. The authorities had had operational information about the applicant’s possible involvement in criminal activities. The applicant had close connections with J.B. and persons from J.B.’s milieu. Most importantly, in the course of the operational investigation in respect of J.B., the authorities had learned about his threats to the State President. That information had later been confirmed when intercepting the applicant’s telephone conversation with J.B., in which the latter used psychological pressure and demanded that his requirements be reported to the head of State. Subsequently, J.B. had been convicted of having threatened the State President. The Government also observed that both J.B. and the applicant had had close relations with the State President and had played a significant role in the political activities of the President’s political party and his electoral campaign; at the time of surveillance the applicant had been a member of the Vilnius City Municipal Council. In this connection the Government also referred to the Court’s judgment in Craxi v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 25337/94, § 64, 17 July 2003), submitting that politicians inevitably and knowingly laid themselves open to close scrutiny by both journalists and the public at large. Therefore, even acknowledging that no investigation had been carried out by the SSD in order to reveal the circumstances in which the journalists had obtained the recording of the intercepted conversation, the question of fulfilment of the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention could not arise. 49. In the view of the Government, the measures of surveillance at issue did not go beyond what was strictly necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime and safeguarding public safety and national security. The legislation regulating telephone tapping precisely defined and thus limited the goals for which the restrictive measures could be applied. Furthermore, the applicant had been the target of operational actions for only two months and the operational investigation had been terminated in advance of the time-limit allowed for by the court. Only the conversations related to the aims sought subsequently comprised material from the preliminary investigation by serving as evidence in the criminal proceedings against J.B., where the applicant had been questioned as a witness, and in the impeachment proceedings in respect of the State President. Moreover, in contrast to Odièvre v. France ([GC], no. 42326/98, § 29, ECHR 2003-III), those conversations had not disclosed any information of a private nature; therefore, the applicant did not have a right to have access to such information either under the domestic law or the Convention. B. The Court’s assessment
1. Admissibility
50. The Court first turns to the Government’s suggestion that the applicant could have challenged the SSD’s “actions”, performed in the context of surveillance measures applied to him. It has difficulty accepting the Government’s argument. For the Court, it is hard to conceive how the applicant could have known initially that his telephone conversations were being intercepted and thus contested the “action” if he had not been informed of the court order authorising the monitoring. Furthermore, the Court also notes that all the applicant’s subsequent efforts to lodge complaints with the prosecutors, the SSD or domestic courts on the matter of disclosure of his telephone communications were unsuccessful (paragraphs 20, 22, 23, 25, and 32-36 above). Accordingly, the Government’s objection must be dismissed. 51. The Court also finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 2. Merits
52. The Court reiterates its settled case-law, according to which telephone conversations, although they are not expressly mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Convention, are covered by the notions of “private life” and “correspondence” referred to by this provision (see Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, § 41, Series A no. 28, and Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 44, ECHR 2000-II). 53. The Government in essence admitted that the monitoring of the applicant’s telephone communications amounted to an interference within the meaning of Article 8. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. 54. The cardinal issue arising in the present case is whether the interference so found is justified in terms of paragraph 2 of Article 8. This paragraph, since it provides for an exception to a right guaranteed by the Convention, is to be narrowly interpreted. Powers of secret surveillance of citizens, characterising as they do the police state, are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions (see Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 47, ECHR 2000-V). 55. In order for the “interference” established above not to infringe Article 8, it must first of all have been “in accordance with the law”. The Court finds that this condition is met in the present case, given that the “interference” had a basis in the Law on Operational Activities. The Court also observes that, as the Government have pointed out, any individual measure of surveillance had to comply with the stringent conditions and procedures laid down in the legislation itself (see, in particular, Articles 6, 10 and 17 of the Law). In particular, it is satisfied that the measure was required to be authorised by a judge. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the authorisation to start monitoring the applicant’s telephone conversations had a legal basis in Lithuanian law. 56. Turning to the particular circumstances of the instant case, the Court notes that on 17 September 2003 the Vilnius Regional Court, acting on a request by the Attorney General, and “on the basis of the materials in the operation case file” authorised the tapping of the applicant’s telephone on the basis of information about the applicant’s possible participation in smuggling strategic materials and other crimes. Although the court order did not elaborate much further on the substance of the crimes the applicant was suspected of, having regard to the facts of the case (paragraphs 8, 21, 24, 26 and 31 above), the Court is ready to accept that the Regional Court had sufficient reasons to sanction the telephone tapping. On this point the Court also takes note of the fact that earlier that day the SSD had submitted information to the Attorney General about the applicant’s suspicious links with foreign citizens. It is reasonable to assume that the factual information was presented to the court (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). Accordingly, the Court is not ready to find that the authorisation was without grounds or that the surveillance was “general” or “exploratory” (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 51). Above all, on this last point the Court also reiterates that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. In principle, therefore, it is not for the Court to express an opinion contrary to that of the Vilnius Regional Court in its order of 17 September 2003 on the compatibility of the judicially ordered tapping of the applicant’s telephone with Articles 5 and 9 of the Law on Operational Activities (see Kopp v. Switzerland, 25 March 1998, § 59, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑II). 57. The Court next turns to the applicant’s argument about the unlawfulness, with regard to Article 6 § 3 of the Law on Operational Activities, of the interception of his telephone calls with the head of State (paragraph 13 above). Whilst observing that Lithuanian legislation indeed prohibits interception of the State President’s communications, the Court attaches particular weight to the fact that the operative measures had been ordered not in respect of the head of State, but in respect of the applicant. It also considers that it is not for the Court to speculate whether the SSD’s officers should have hung up the telephone once they heard the voice of Mr Rolandas Paksas at the other end. In other words, the Court is not ready to conclude that incidental involvement of the State President in a telephone conversation automatically meant that the interception became unlawful also in respect of his interlocutor. This appears to have been confirmed by the Attorney General’s Office (paragraph 20 above), notwithstanding its initial position. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that a violation of Article 8 of the Convention arises from the unlawfulness, under the Lithuanian law, of the interception and recording of the telephone calls received by him from the head of State must be dismissed. 58. In the light of the conclusions the Court has reached in paragraph 56 above, it also accepts the assertion by the Government that the monitoring of the applicant’s telephone conversations was aimed at safeguarding national security and the prevention of crime and necessary, in pursuance of Article 8 paragraph 2 of the Convention. 59. Turning to the matter of the disclosure of the applicant’s telephone conversations, the Court notes that the applicant complained about two separate sets of facts, namely the disclosure of his telephone conversation of 16 March 2003 with a Russian businessman, J.B., and the disclosure of his conversations with his business partners and the State President while the impeachment proceedings were pending before the Constitutional Court. The Court will analyse each of these issues separately. 60. The Court notes that on 2 November 2003 the recorded conversation between the applicant and J.B. was aired on two Lithuanian television channels. Even though the recording had been declassified a day earlier by the SSD, it is the Court’s view that the recording still ought to have been kept confidential from the general public. As appears from the SSD’s letter, at that time the Attorney General’s Office was examining the recording in the framework of criminal proceedings, and, pursuant to Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, information about the pre-trial investigation had to remain confidential. Nonetheless, the conversation became known to the public. The fact that the SSD had exploited the information was also confirmed by the prosecutor on 11 November 2003 (paragraphs 14 and 15 above). The Court thus concludes that despite the legal provisions designed to ensure that the surveillance is carried out in strict accordance with the law in order to protect a person’s privacy against abuse, the actual practice followed in this case was different. Whilst acknowledging the Government’s argument that the public had a right to information about one of its civil servants, the Court nevertheless considers that the SSD was responsible for keeping the information confidential. Lastly, the Court cannot fail to observe that to this day the Lithuanian authorities have not discovered who leaked the conversation to the media (paragraphs 35 and 36 above). In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the lack of protection exercised in respect of the applicant’s telephone conversation with J.B. was not in accordance with the law. This gives rise to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 61. The Court lastly turns to the disclosure of the applicant’s conversations of October and November 2003 with his business partners and the State President. Given the bad language used by the applicant during those telephone calls, the Court attaches a certain weight to his sentiment that the disclosure thereof might to a certain extent have discredited his name in business circles and with public in general. That being so, the Court cannot overlook the fact that those conversations were disclosed in the framework of Constitutional Court proceedings strictly adhering to the requirements of the domestic law and having obtained authorisation from a prosecutor (paragraphs 27 and 30 above). Moreover, the reasons to play the conversations, on the basis of which the State President was later impeached, at the Constitutional Court’s hearing appear to be weighty. On this point the Court also reiterates that reporting, including comment, on court proceedings contributes to their publicity and is thus perfectly consonant with the requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that hearings be public. Not only do the media have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive them. This is all the more so where public figures are involved, such as, in the present case, the applicant, who was a founding member of the State President’s political party and a member of the Vilnius City Municipality Council, and the head of State. Such persons inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny by both journalists and the public at large (see Craxi, cited above, § 64). Furthermore, as it appears from the materials presented by the parties, the disclosed telephone conversations did not contain any details about the applicant’s private life. The Court therefore concludes that the disclosure of the applicant’s telephone conversations during the Constitutional Court proceedings was in accordance with the law and can be regarded as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of others. In view of the above, the Court finds no violation of Article 8 of the Convention as regards this part of the complaint. 62. In the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that by disclosing the applicant’s conversation of 16 March 2003 with J.B. to the media, the Lithuanian authorities failed to ensure the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence, as enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation thereof in that regard. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION
63. Invoking Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant further complained about the absence of a remedy against the interception of his telephone communications. The Court considers that the complaint falls to be examined under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
”Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
64. The Court finds that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
65. The applicant argued that he had not been informed about the fact that the Lithuanian authorities were intercepting his telephone calls, and that he could not appeal against the court’s authorisation. He further complained about the SSD’s refusal to disclose him the information, which it had gathered about the applicant when intercepting his telephone communications. 66. The Government contended that there had been no violation of Article 13 in the present case. 2. The Court’s assessment
67. The Court first turns to the applicant’s complaint that he had no remedy against the Vilnius Regional Court’s order of 17 September 2003 to authorise the tapping of his telephone. On this point the Court shares the position of the Court of Appeal to the effect that the very nature and logic of secret surveillance dictate that not only the surveillance itself but also its authorisation may be effected without the individual’s knowledge (paragraph 25 above). It also observes that the requirements of the Convention, notably with regard to foreseeability, cannot be exactly the same in the special context of interception of communications for the purposes of criminal investigations as they are where the object of the relevant law is to place restrictions on the conduct of individuals. In particular, the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly (see Malone v. the United Kingdom, 2 August 1984, § 67, Series A no. 82). The Court reiterates its opinion that such notification might serve to reveal the working methods and fields of operation of the intelligence services and even possibly to identify their agents (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 58). The Court also considers that the absence of prior notification was compensated for in the Law on Operational Activities by the fact that the Law, at least in theory, laid down strict conditions with regard to the implementation of the surveillance measures and the processing of the information thus obtained. In pursuance of Article 6 §§ 7 and 8 of the Law, information obtained in the course of operational activities, as well as that about a person’s private life, could not be disclosed, and information about private life which was irrelevant to the operational investigation had to be destroyed. It follows that the applicant’s argument must be dismissed and that no violation of Article 13 of the Convention arises in this respect. 68. That being so, the Court cannot overlook the fact that, as regards the surveillance in the applicant’s case, the Law on Operational Activities did not allow for an examination of its legality and did not provide for sufficient protection against arbitrariness. The Court reiterates its conclusion that all the efforts by the applicant to lodge complaints with the domestic courts and the SSD in order to challenge lawfulness of the Vilnius Regional Court’s order of 17 September 2003 to start monitoring his telephone conversations were unsuccessful (see paragraphs 22, 25 and 36 above). Moreover, although Article 6 § 9 of the law in theory provided for a possibility to appeal against the “actions” of the operational activities’ entities, the applicant’s attempts to bring complaints with the prosecutors, the SSD and the courts about the disclosure of his telephone conversation with J.B. by the media were futile (see paragraphs 20, 23, 25 and 35 above). The Court accordingly finds that, in the specific circumstances of the applicant’s case, there was no institution which could effectively scrutinise any errors which could have occurred and did occur in the implementation of the operational measure (see paragraph 60 above and, by contrast, Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, no. 26839/05, §§ 166 and 168, 18 May 2010). 69. Insofar as the applicant complains that the SSD refused to reveal him the information gathered about his person when listening to his telephone communications, the Court recalls that the SSD indeed denied such a request by the applicant, its decision being upheld by the administrative courts at two instances (see paragraphs 24 and 32-34 above). Even so, sight should not be lost of the special reasons justifying the Lithuanian courts’ departure from the general rule, established in Article 7 § 1 of the Law on the Right to Obtain Information from State and Local Authorities, that a person was entitled to receive information of a private nature held about him by the State authorities. In particular, the principal reason for the refusal in this particular case was to ensure the effectiveness of pre-trial investigations in two sets of criminal proceedings, since only part of the telephone communications had already been disclosed and the public prosecutor had a legitimate interest in maintaining the other part secret, according to Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Given the seriousness of the charges in those two criminal investigations, the Court is ready to find that the applicant’s rights under Article 13 of the Convention had not been breached.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 8
Outcome: violation