SECOND SECTION
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE OF HAGYÓ v. HUNGARY
 
(Application no. 52624/10)
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
 
 
 
STRASBOURG
 
23 April 2013
 
 
FINAL
 
23/07/2013
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Hagyó v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Guido Raimondi, President,
 Peer Lorenzen,
 Dragoljub Popović,
 András Sajó,
 Nebojša Vučinić,
 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
 Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 2 April 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 52624/10) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr Miklós Hagyó (“the applicant”), on 6 September 2010. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr A. Kádár, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. 3. The applicant complained, relying on Article 5 of the Convention, that his detention had been unduly protracted and that the principle of “equality of arms” had not been respected when it was prolonged. He also complained that his serious health conditions had not been duly considered, in breach of Article 3. Lastly, relying on Article 8, read alone and in conjunction with Article 13, he complained of a restriction on maintaining contact with his family members. 4. On 13 April 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1). THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Budapest. 6. On 14 May 2010 the applicant, former Vice-Mayor of Budapest and former Member of Parliament, was arrested on charges of aggravated fraudulent breach of trust committed by misusing funds at the Budapest Transport Company. The police apprehended him shortly after he had lost his right to parliamentary immunity, when the new MPs elected in the 2010 general elections had been sworn in. Previously, in January and March 2010, criminal proceedings had been initiated against some of the Transport Company’s senior officials and a close colleague of the applicant, in the same context. 7. In the prosecution’s ensuing motion to have the applicant detained on remand, the dangers of absconding and collusion were referred to. 8. The defence argued that the applicant, although he had known for months about his highly probable indictment after losing his right to immunity, had not left the country. It outlined that the alleged corruption cases at the Budapest Transport Company had attracted intense publicity and that the applicant’s indictment was more than foreshadowed given the admissions made by the other suspects in the ongoing investigation. The applicant had denied several times the press rumours about his leaving the country, and on 11 May 2010 he had also indicated to the authorities his willingness to cooperate. 9. The defence moreover submitted that, against this background, the applicant’s pre-trial detention was not justified and should be substituted with a less coercive measure if any was needed at all. 10. On 17 May 2010 the Buda Central District Court ordered the applicant’s detention on remand, despite the defence’s request that house arrest be considered in its stead. Reiterating in essence the reasons in the prosecution’s motion, the court held that there was a danger that the applicant would abscond in the face of the serious charges, which was even more plausible given that he had sold a number of properties in his name. The court noted that an ‘element’ had occurred in the investigation pointing to the risk that the applicant might abscond by leaving the country; however, this circumstance was not specified. The court also held that because the applicant’s immunity had been removed only a short time before, several further steps of investigation were still outstanding and that therefore the risk of collusion or interference was real. On 18 May 2010 the applicant’s lawyer appealed, again proposing the application of less stringent measures. 11. On 26 May 2010 the Budapest Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. 12. The defence’s repeated requests to consult the case file with regard to the above-mentioned evidence were disregarded by the courts. The applicant’s further request lodged with the Central Investigation Prosecutor’s Office to consult the evidence was also rejected, and his complaint to the Chief Public Prosecutor against this remained unanswered. The applicant was not allowed to get acquainted with the relevant material of the investigation, and the evidence of his alleged intention to abscond has never been disclosed. 13. The applicant’s pre-trial detention was repeatedly prolonged at the statutory intervals. In these proceedings, the arguments of the defence remained largely the same, supplemented by the fact that the applicant’s health condition had deteriorated. However, it does not appear that the courts assessed, in an individualised manner, the applicant’s personal circumstances. The defence’s fresh arguments to demonstrate the unlikelihood of the applicant’s intention to abscond, in particular the fact that the applicant had paid off a debt of 16 million Hungarian forints some months before his accusation, did not impress the courts, either. Nor did the courts assess the arguments raised by the defence to the effect that the applicant, an influential former politician, had not even attempted to conceal evidence or connive with witnesses, so that any fears of collusion were unfounded. 14. The applicant’s further requests, of 9 June and 30 July 2010, for release or for a less coercive measure were to no avail. The defence repeatedly stressed the absence of concrete elements underlying the detention and the disregard for the applicant’s personal circumstances, most importantly his serious health problems. The courts rejected these arguments in rather stereotyped decisions, mainly arguing that a severe sentence was impending. 15. Detained at Budapest Penitentiary, the applicant spent over 4 months in cells with 3.52 m2 and another 4 months in cells of 4.7 m2 ground surface per person, including fixtures. From 21 November 2010, upon the recommendations of the Central Prison Hospital and a medical expert (issued on 17 and 27 September 2010, respectively), he was permanently placed in a cell of 4.7 m2 ground surface per person. He was allowed to spend outside these cells only one hour per day, which corresponded to the statutory daily outdoor stays. 16. Upon his admission on 18 May 2010 to the penitentiary institution, when a medical check-up was carried out, the applicant indicated his bad health condition (including asthma, chronic sinusitis, gluten and dairy allergies, and a chronic inflammation of the left ear). He was allowed to continue to take the medications brought with him, to obtain products strengthening the immune system, and a gluten and dairy free diet was prescribed for him. Moreover, due to his being overweight (on admission, the applicant weighed 130 kilograms), he was permitted to take daily baths; and, since he had indicated on 10 June 2010 that he would like to lose weight, he was also permitted to use a battery-powered stimulation belt. 17. From 1 to 3 June 2010 the applicant underwent medical examinations by specialists at the Central Prison Hospital where treatment and medications were prescribed for him. Due to the persistence of his health complaints (including excessive weight loss by that time, which finally amounted to 37 kilograms), on 13 September 2010 he underwent further examinations, and more medications were prescribed. From 17 September to 6 October 2010 he was treated at the Central Prison Hospital, where initially it was found that his pulmonological condition had deteriorated but then further tests showed that a new therapy had improved his condition to some extent. 18. However, complaining of constantly deteriorating health problems, the applicant repeatedly requested an improvement in the conditions of his detention. In particular he requested larger cell space, a less humid environment, more fresh air and better nutrition. He persistently requested a hearing by the penitentiary supervisory public prosecutor in this context, which was eventually granted on 25 October 2010. 19. Moreover, the applicant requested to be examined by a medical expert in May 2010 and repeated this request twice. An expert was appointed in September 2010. The expert confirmed the applicant’s serious health problems; however, it was stated that they could be treated within the penal institution. 20. In November 2010 the applicant’s request for the prolongation of the daily one hour outdoor stay by an additional hour was dismissed on the ground that his health condition had improved. However, in December 2010 the prolongation was permitted, based on the above medical expert opinion according to which more fresh air would improve the applicant’s health. 21. Meanwhile, on 23 August 2010 the applicant complained about an asthma attack, therefore the following day he was referred to the Central Prison Hospital to undergo further tests. However, he refused to be taken to the hospital because of a coinciding family visit. 22. The applicant was provided with medication in all the three daily medication distribution rounds (morning, noon and evening) during the whole period of his pre-trial detention. According to the rules, medication must be taken in the presence of the health personnel, not later. The applicant refused to take some medication distributed to him in the morning rounds of 27 and 31 August, 16 September and 28 December 2010. 23. In addition to the regular visits, in August 2010 extra visits were authorised to the applicant from his common-law wife on the ground that she had become his representative in civil-law matters. However, from 9 November 2010 all meetings and phone calls between them were prohibited due to the perceived risk of collusion during the visits, with the reasoning that they had intended to circumvent their controlled family contact. The prison authorities relied on section 118 (2) of Law-Decree No. 11 of 1979. The defence complained about this measure to the Chief Prosecutor, arguing that any potential lack of control could only be a consequence of the absence of prison personnel at some visits, and not the applicant’s or his visitor’s fault. This complaint remained unanswered. In this context, additional criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant on the charge of giving his common-law wife a retainer with false contents with the purpose of circumventing the provisions pertaining to family visits. In the course of these proceedings, the wardens of the penitentiary institutions stated that all the visits had taken place under supervision. The applicant was acquitted of the charge. 24. During the detention, the applicant did not receive visits from his eleven-year old daughter at all. Although this was not prohibited, the daughter’s own health condition did not allow for such visits. The applicant’s requests for a less coercive measure or a general unlimited phone contact with his daughter based on this fact were to no avail. However, on September 2010 and 7 January 2011 he was granted extra phone time with her, in addition to his regular entitlement of ten minutes three times a week. 25. The applicant’s pre-trial detention continued until 23 February 2011 when the Regional Court replaced it with house arrest. In view of the applicant’s serious health problems, the Regional Court held that the danger of absconding had lessened to an extent that house arrest was then sufficient. 26. This measure was in place until 10 June 2011. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
27. Act no. XIX of 1998 on the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
Section 43(3)
“A detainee shall be entitled to ...
b) have contact with his relative or ... any other person [by telephone] or in person under supervision, or in writing under control. Contact with a relative may be restricted or banned exclusively in the interest of the success of the criminal proceedings.”
Section 129
“(2) Pre-trial detention of a defendant may take place in a procedure related to a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment, and only under the following conditions: ...
b) if, owing to the risk of escaping or absconding, or for other reasons, there is reasonable cause to believe that the presence of the defendant in procedural actions cannot be otherwise ensured,
c) if there is reasonable cause to believe that if left at liberty, the defendant would frustrate, obstruct or jeopardise the taking of evidence, especially by means of influencing or intimidating witnesses, or by the destruction, falsification or secretion of physical evidence or documents, ...”
Section 131
“(1) Pre-trial detention ordered prior to filing the indictment may continue up to the decision of the court of first instance during the preparations for the trial, but may never be longer than one month. The pre-trial detention may be extended by the investigating judge by three months at the most on each occasion, but the overall period may still not exceed one year after the order of pre-trial detention. Thereafter, pre-trial detention may be extended by the county court acting as a single judge by two months at the most on each occasion, in compliance with the procedural rules pertaining to investigating judges.”
Section 211
“(3) At the [court] session, the [prosecution] having submitted the motion [on ordering or prolonging pre-trial detention] shall present the evidence substantiating the motion in writing or orally. Those present shall be granted the opportunity to examine – within the limits set forth in section 186 – the evidence ... . If a notified party does not attend the session but submitted observations in writing, this document shall be presented by the investigating judge.”
Section 186
“(1) Any person having the right to be present at an investigatory action may forthwith inspect the minutes taken. (2) The suspect, counsel for the defence and the victim may inspect the expert opinion during the investigation as well, but may only inspect other documents if this does not injure the interests of the investigation. (3) The suspect and counsel for the defence shall be entitled to receive a copy of the documents they may inspect. (4) The copy of the documents produced, obtained, filed or attached in the course of the investigation and containing the testimony or personal data of the victim or the witness shall not indicate the personal data of either the victim or the witness. No copy may be issued of the draft decisions of the prosecutor or the investigating authority. No copy may be issued of the documents created in the course of communications between the prosecutor and the investigating authority pursuant to sections 165 and 165/A, except for the documents that contain the legal standpoint of the prosecutor and the investigating authority in relation to the case – including particularly the document containing the prosecutor’s instruction concerning the conduct of the investigation, provided that the specific investigation was conducted – provided that this does not interfere with the interests of the investigation.”
28. Law-Decree No. 11 of 1979 on the Execution of Punishments and Measures provides as follows:
Section 118
“(1) A pre-trial detainee ...
d) may have correspondence with his relatives and – with the approval of the public prosecutor, or after the filing of the bill of indictment, with the approval of the court – with other persons; he may receive one visitor and one parcel at least once a month. (2) The pre-trial detainee’s right of correspondence and right to receive visitors and parcels may – except for contact with his defence counsel – be limited in the interests of the successful completion of the criminal proceedings.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
29. The applicant complained that the improper conditions of detention, resulting in severe deterioration of his health, amounted to inhuman treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
30. The Government contested that argument. A. Admissibility
31. The Government submitted that the applicant should have filed a civil action in compensation against the authorities allegedly responsible for the deterioration of his health. Having failed to do so, he had not exhausted domestic remedies. 32. The applicant maintained that an action in compensation could not be deemed to rectify a breach of Article 3, as it could not have provided a speedy and direct remedy to his acute health problems. He was of the view that by repeatedly indicating his problems to the prison personnel, lodging complaints against related decisions and requesting a hearing by the prosecutor he exhausted all potentially efficient remedies. 33. The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. However, Article 35 § 1 does not require that recourse should be had to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, §§ 51-52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI). 34. The Court considers that a civil action in compensation cannot be regarded as an effective remedy redressing a violation of Article 3 of the Convention allegedly suffered on account of the deterioration of an applicant’s health originating in the conditions of detention, as it is aimed at awarding damages rather than resolving the actual situation complained of. In the particular case, remedies capable of improving the applicant’s situation were the only ones to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1. 35. The Court observes that the applicant expressed his related complaints at a hearing by the penitentiary supervisory public prosecutor (see paragraph 18 above). It has not been argued by the Government that the prosecutor was not in a position to instruct the penitentiary institution to address the situation complained of. The Court is therefore of the opinion that the applicant should be regarded as having brought the substance of his complaint to the notice of the national authorities and as having sought adequate redress. 36. It follows that this complaint cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Moreover, the Court considers the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits
37. The applicant admitted that his illness might have recurring episodes of deterioration by its nature. He stressed, however, that the wet, mouldy environment of the cramped cells where he had to spend 23 hours a day, the delay in permitting him to have extra open air stays and the inadequacy of his nutrition significantly contributed to the exacerbation of his condition and his extreme weight loss (37 kilograms). Indeed, his condition had only improved in the prison hospital, in a different environment, and once he had been returned to the penitentiary institution his ailment had started to deteriorate rapidly. His extreme loss of weight had not been as intended and had certainly not been the result of the use of the stimulation belt. His counsel had repeatedly warned the prison authorities about the potential danger of such a drastic weight loss, but his detention conditions, including his nutrition, had not improved. Moreover, although he had already requested a medical expert opinion upon his admission, this had only been provided four months later. 38. The Government stressed that the deterioration of the applicant’s health condition had not been constant, and had not originated in the detention conditions; it had rather been caused by his chronic diseases. The applicant had received proper medical treatment throughout his detention and his health condition had been taken into account in his placement. Upon the doctor’s recommendation he had been permanently placed in a larger cell, and a prolongation of his open-air stays had been permitted when the medical expert had stated that it would improve his condition. The rejection of his earlier request for prolonged open-air time had been justified by some improvement in his health at that time. Lastly, it was the applicant who had intended to lose weight; therefore, this could in no way be imputed to the authorities. 39. As the Court has held on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV). 40. The Court further recalls that, according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 162, Series A no. 25). 41. The Court has consistently stressed that a breach of Article 3 of the Convention would generally involve suffering and humiliation beyond that which is inevitably connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of his or her liberty may often involve such elements. Thus, under this provision, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject the individual to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, the prisoner’s health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI). 42. Moreover, Article 3 imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty. If the authorities decide to place and maintain a seriously ill person in detention, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions of detention that correspond to his special needs resulting from his diseases (see Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672/02, § 56, 2 December 2004). 43. Turning to the facts of the present case, it was not in dispute between the parties that both before and during his detention the applicant had suffered from chronic diseases which necessitated treatment. The Court further observes that during his detention the applicant regularly sought, and obtained, medical attention. However, in spite of his medical treatment he lost an undesired amount of weight and on the whole his state of health deteriorated in the penitentiary institution. 44. The Court cannot determine from the circumstances of the present case the extent to which the conditions of the applicant’s detention actually contributed to the exacerbation of some of his symptoms. It observes moreover that the loss of weight in question was to some extent due to the applicant’s express desire, to which end he made personal efforts, including the application of a stimulation belt, the use of which was – quite remarkably – authorised by the prison authorities. Even assuming that the alleged inadequacy of the applicant’s diet played some role in this loss of weight, the Court finds that this element of the applicant’s complaints does not reach the requisite threshold for Article 3 to come into play. 45. However, the Court would draw attention to the fact that the applicant was accommodated for over four months in cells of 3.52 m2 ground surface per person, including fixtures (see paragraph 15 above), whereas the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) considers 4 m2 living space per inmate an acceptable minimum standard in multi-occupancy cells (see, for example, in respect of other Hungarian prisons, paragraphs 65 and 80 of the Report to the Hungarian Government on the visit to Hungary carried out by the CPT from 24 March to 2 April 2009). 46. It is moreover to be noted that the applicant was authorised to leave these cells for only one hour a day, which corresponded to his statutory entitlement to open air stays, and that the authorities increased his time allotment outside the cell only after a period of six months. The Court considers that the prolonged stay in such cramped conditions, coupled with the fact that the applicant was overweight and suffered from respiratory ailments such as asthma and chronic sinusitis evidently aggravated by the permanent lack of fresh air, amounts to a treatment capable of causing suffering that goes beyond the inevitable suffering connected with legitimate detention. 47. Therefore, taking into account the cumulative effect of the above factors on the applicant’s physical well-being, the Court concludes that the conditions of the applicant’s detention amounted to inhuman treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
48. The applicant further complained that his detention and its prolongations were unjustified since the courts had failed to produce any concrete elements underlying the necessity of this measure. He relied on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which provides as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
49. The Government contested this view. A. Admissibility
50. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits
51. The applicant complained that the decisions prolonging his detention had not been individualised or taken into account his deteriorated health condition, nor had they substantiated the risk of his absconding, collusion or re-offending. Moreover, they had not involved an assessment of the possibility of applying less stringent measures. The arguments of the defence (see paragraphs 8, 13 and 14 above) had largely remained unanswered. 52. The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention had been based on specific facts related to his specific case. The existence of reasonable suspicion against the applicant had always been examined and supported by evidence. Likewise, the possibility of applying less stringent measures had not been overlooked, and as soon as they had been found sufficient, their application had been ordered. The applicant’s health condition had not excluded his detention, since it could be properly treated in the penitentiary institution. 53. The Court recalls that under its case-law, the issue of whether a period of detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto. Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in each case according to its special features. Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty (see, among other authorities, W. v. Switzerland, 26 January 1993, § 30, Series A no. 254-A). 54. It falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty and set them out in their decisions dismissing the applications for release.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 13
Outcome: violation