THIRD SECTION
 
 
CASE OF ČONKA v. BELGIUM
(Application no. 51564/99)
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
 
STRASBOURG
 
 
5 February 2002
 
 
 
FINAL
 
 
05/05/2002
 
 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. In the case of Čonka v. Belgium,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Mr J.-P. Costa, President,
 Mr W. Fuhrmann,
 Mr P. Kūris,
 Mr K. Jungwiert,
 Sir Nicolas Bratza,
 Mr K. Traja, judges,
 Mr Velaers, ad hoc judge,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 15 May 2001 and 15 January 2002,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 51564/99) against the Kingdom of Belgium lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Slovakian nationals, Mr Ján Čonka, Mrs Mária Čonková, Miss Nad'a Čonková and Miss Nikola Čonková (“the applicants”), on 4 October 1999. 2. The applicants alleged, in particular, that the circumstances of their arrest and deportation to Slovakia amounted to an infringement of Articles 5 and 13 of the Convention and of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. 3. The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. Mrs F. Tulkens, the judge elected in respect of Belgium, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28). The Belgian Government (“the Government”) accordingly appointed Mr J. Velaers to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1). 4. By a decision of 13 March 2001 the Chamber declared the application partly admissible [Note by the Registry. The Court's decision is obtainable from the Registry]. 5. The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). 6. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 15 May 2001 (Rule 59 § 2). There appeared before the Court:
(a)  for the Government
Mr C. Debrulle, Director-General, Ministry of Justice, Agent,
Mr R. Ergec, Lawyer, Counsel,
Mr F. Bernard, 
Mr F. Roosemont, 
Mr T. Michaux,
Mr P. Smets, 
Mr J. Gilliaux, 
Mrs I. Verheven,  Advisers;
(b)  for the applicants
Mr G.-H. Beauthier, 
Mr N. van Overloop, 
Mr O. de Schutter,  Counsel. The Court heard addresses by Mr Beauthier, Mr de Schutter, Mr Ergec, Mr van Overloop and Mr Gilliaux and their answers to its questions. THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
7. Mr Ján Čonka, Mrs Mária Čonková, Miss Nad'a Čonková and Miss Nikola Čonková are Slovakian nationals of Roma origin who were born in 1960, 1961, 1985 and 1991 respectively. The first two applicants are the parents of the third and fourth applicants. 8. The applicants say that on several occasions between March and November 1998 they were violently assaulted by skinheads in the Slovak Republic. Indeed, in November 1998 Mr Čonka had been so seriously injured in an assault that he had had to be hospitalised. The police had been called but had refused to intervene. Several days later Mr and Mrs Čonka had been subjected to renewed insults and threats by skinheads, but the police had again refused to intervene. As a result of those constant threats, the applicants had decided to flee Slovakia and travel to Belgium, where they had arrived at the beginning of November 1998: Mr Čonka and the two minor children on 6 November and Mrs Čonka two days later. A. The applicants' request for asylum
9. On 12 November 1998 the applicants requested political asylum in Belgium. 10. On 3 March 1999 their applications for asylum were declared inadmissible by the Minister of the Interior through the Directorate-General of the Aliens Office on the ground that they had not produced sufficient evidence to show that their lives were at risk in Slovakia for the purposes of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The decisions refusing permission to remain in Belgium were accompanied by a decision refusing permission to enter the territory itself, endorsed with an order to leave the territory within five days. 11. On 5 March 1999 the applicants lodged an appeal under the urgent-applications procedure with the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (“the Commissioner-General”) against the decisions refusing them permission to remain in Belgium. 12. On 14 April 1999 Mr Čonka was invited to attend the Commissioner-General's Office to set out his grounds for seeking asylum. He failed to keep the appointment. 13. On 23 April 1999 Mrs Čonková, assisted by an interpreter, was heard by representatives of the Commissioner-General's Office at Ghent Prison, where she was in custody pending trial. On 17 May 1999 she was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment for theft by the Ghent Criminal Court. 14. On 18 June 1999 the Commissioner-General's Office upheld the decision of the Aliens Office refusing the applicants permission to remain. Its decision in Mr Čonka's case was based on his failure to attend his appointment without showing due cause. As regards Mrs Čonková, in some two pages of reasons the Commissioner-General pointed out major discrepancies in her deposition and expressed serious doubts about her credibility. For example, Mrs Čonková had declared among other things that on 4 November 1998 her husband, Mr Čonka, had been assaulted by skinheads so violently that he had had to be taken to hospital. The police had been called but had not come out. That incident had been the direct cause of their decision to flee Slovakia. However, the Commissioner-General considered that statement to be refuted by the fact that the travel tickets had been issued before the above incident of 4 November: Mrs Čonková's plane ticket on 2 October and her husband's and their children's bus tickets for the journey to Belgium on 2 November 1998. Furthermore, Mrs Čonková's account of the incident did not match her stepdaughter's, in particular on the important issue of whether the police had attended the scene. The Commissioner-General stipulated in his decisions that the applicants could be deported to the country from which they had fled (Slovakia), and that for the purposes of calculating the five-day period for leaving the territory, which had been suspended by the application under the urgent procedure, time began to run again from the date of service of the decisions on the applicants. 15. On 24 June 1999 Mrs Čonková was released and a new order was served on her to leave the territory within five days, that is to say by midnight on 29 June. 16. On 3 August 1999 the applicants lodged applications with the Conseil d'Etat for judicial review of the decision of 18 June 1999 and for a stay of execution under the ordinary procedure. They also applied for legal aid. 17. On 23 September 1999 the Conseil d'Etat dismissed the applications for legal aid on the grounds that they had not been accompanied by the means certificate required by Article 676-3 of the Judicial Code, a photocopy, rather than the original, of the certificate having been enclosed with Mrs Čonková's application. Consequently, the applicants were invited by the orders refusing legal aid to pay the court fees within fifteen days after service. As they failed to respond to that invitation, their applications for judicial review and for a stay of execution were struck out of the list on 28 October 1999. B. The applicants' arrest and deportation
18. At the end of September 1999 the Ghent police sent a notice to a number of Slovakian Roma families, including the applicants, requiring them to attend the police station on 1 October 1999. The notice was drafted in Dutch and Slovak and stated that their attendance was required to enable the files concerning their applications for asylum to be completed. 19. At the police station, where a Slovak-speaking interpreter was also present, the applicants were served with a fresh order to leave the territory dated 29 September 1999, accompanied by a decision for their removal to Slovakia and their detention for that purpose. The documents served, which were all in identical terms, informed the recipients that they could apply to the Conseil d'Etat for judicial review of the deportation order and for a stay of execution – provided that they did so within sixty days of service of the decision – and to the committals division (chambre du conseil) of the criminal court against the order for their detention. According to the Government, some of the aliens concerned were nevertheless allowed to leave the police station of their own free will on humanitarian grounds or for administrative reasons. 20. A few hours later the applicants and other Roma families, accompanied by an interpreter, were taken to a closed transit centre, known as “Transit Centre 127 bis”, at Steenokkerzeel near Brussels Airport. It appears that the interpreter only remained at the centre briefly. According to the Government, he could have been recalled to the centre at the applicants' request. The applicants say that they were told that they had no further remedy against the deportation order. 21. While at the centre, the Slovakian families received visits from a delegation of Belgian members of Parliament, the Slovakian Consul, delegates of various non-governmental organisations and doctors. At 10.30 p.m. on Friday 1 October 1999 the applicants' counsel, Mr van Overloop, was informed by the President of the Roma Rights League that his clients were in custody. Taking the view that he was still instructed by them, Mr van Overloop sent a fax on 4 October 1999 to the Aliens Office informing it that the applicants were in Transit Centre 127 bis awaiting repatriation to Slovakia. He requested that no action be taken to deport them, as they had to take care of a member of their family who was in hospital. However, Mr van Overloop did not appeal against the deportation or detention orders made on 29 September 1999. 22. On 5 October 1999 the families concerned were taken to Melsbroek Military Airport, where the seat numbers allocated to them in the aircraft were marked on their hands with a ballpoint pen. The aircraft left Belgium for Slovakia at 5.45 p.m. 23. Shortly afterwards the Minister of the Interior declared in reply to a parliamentary question put on 23 December 1999:
“Owing to the large concentration of asylum-seekers of Slovakian nationality in Ghent, arrangements have been made for their collective repatriation to Slovakia. ... Reports I have received from the mayor of Ghent and the Director-General of the Aliens Office indicate that the operation was properly prepared, even if the unfortunate wording of the letter sent by the Ghent police to some of the Slovaks may have been misleading. Both the Aliens Office and the Ghent Police Department were surprised by the large number of Slovaks who responded to the notice sent to them. That factual circumstance resulted in their being detained in Transit Centre 127 bis for deportation a few days later. ...”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The Aliens Act 
24. The procedure relating to the recognition of refugee status is governed under Belgian law by the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and expulsion of aliens (“the Aliens Act”) and by the Royal Decree of 8 October 1981 on the entry, residence, settlement and expulsion of aliens. The procedure for according refugee status is in two stages. The first concerns admissibility for refugee status, while the second concerns eligibility for such status. The authorities with jurisdiction to take part in the examination of the issue of admissibility are the Aliens' Office and, on appeal, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, as administrative authorities, and the Conseil d'Etat, which hears applications for judicial review. The relevant authorities at the eligibility stage are the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, as the administrative authority, the Permanent Tribunal for Refugees' Appeals, as an administrative tribunal, and the Conseil d'Etat, which hears administrative appeals on points of law. Lastly, the committals division (chambre du conseil) of the criminal court has jurisdiction to hear appeals against orders depriving aliens of their liberty during or at the end of the proceedings (see below). 25. The provisions of the Aliens Act applicable in the instant case read as follows:
Section 6
“Except where permitted by international treaty, statute or royal decree, aliens may not stay more than three months in the Kingdom, unless a different period is stipulated in the visa or the authorisation in lieu stamped in their passport or on the travel document issued in lieu thereof.
...”
Section 7
“Without prejudice to any more favourable provision in any international treaty, the Minister or his or her delegate may order an alien who is not authorised or has not been given permission to remain for more than three months or to settle in the Kingdom to leave the territory before a set date:
... (2)  if the alien has stayed in the Kingdom beyond the period fixed in accordance with section 6, or is unable to establish that the period has not expired;
... In the same sets of circumstances, if the Minister or his or her delegate considers it necessary, they may have the alien deported. The alien may be detained for that purpose for the time strictly necessary for the execution of the measure provided that the period of detention shall not exceed two months.”
Section 8
“Any order to leave the territory or deportation order shall state which provision of section 7 is being applied.”
Section 57/2
“The Commissioner-General's Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons is hereby established. It shall be attached to the Ministry and shall comprise a Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons and two deputies. The Commissioner-General and his or her deputies shall be wholly independent in taking their decisions and expressing their opinions.”
Section 57/3
“The Commissioner-General shall be in charge of the Commissioner-General's Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons. The Commissioner-General shall be appointed by the King by a decree approved by the Cabinet on a proposal by the Minister. The Commissioner-General shall be appointed for a period of five years. His or her term in office may be renewed.
...”
Section 63/2(1)
“An appeal under the urgent-applications procedure shall lie to the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons against decisions of the Minister or his or her delegate pursuant to section 52 refusing aliens claiming refugee status permission to enter, remain or settle in the Kingdom.”
Section 71
“Aliens against whom a measure has been taken depriving them of their liberty pursuant to sections 7, 25, 27, 29, second paragraph, 51/5(3), fourth paragraph, 52 bis, fourth paragraph, 54, 63/5, third paragraph, 67 and 74/6 may appeal against that measure by lodging a notice of appeal with the committals division of the criminal court with jurisdiction for the place where they reside in the Kingdom or the place where they are found.
... They may renew the appeal referred to in the preceding paragraphs at monthly intervals.
...”
Section 72 
“The committals division shall deliver its decision within five working days from the date an appeal is lodged after hearing the submissions of the alien or his or her counsel and the opinion of State Counsel's Office.
... If the committals division fails to deliver its decision within the period fixed, the alien shall be released. The committals division shall review the legality of the detention and deportation orders but shall have no power to review their reasonableness. An appeal shall lie against orders of the committals division by the alien, State Counsel's Office and, in the circumstances set out in section 74, the Minister or his or her delegate. The procedure shall be the same as that applicable under the statutory provisions on pre-trial detention, with the exception of the provisions relating to arrest warrants, investigating judges, prohibitions on communications, release on licence or on bail, and the right to inspect the administrative file. Counsel for the alien may consult the case file at the registry of the relevant court during the two working days preceding the hearing. The registrar shall notify counsel of the decision by registered letter.”
Section 73
“If the committals division decides that the alien shall not remain in custody, he or she shall be released as soon as the decision has become final. The Minister may order the alien to reside in a designated place either until the deportation order has been executed or until his or her appeal has been decided.”
26. In a judgment of 14 March 2001 the Court of Cassation reversed a decision of the Indictment Division of the Liege Court of Appeal ordering an alien's release. The Indictment Division had held that, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, the authorities had deprived the alien of an effective remedy in law by interpreting the fact that appeals to the Conseil d'Etat had no suspensive effect as meaning that it was lawful for illegal immigrants to be forcibly expelled. The Court of Cassation held that, on the contrary, the issue whether an alien who had applied for refugee status had an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 had to be examined in the light of the procedure as a whole. After observing that appeals to the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons under the urgent procedure were of suspensive effect and that aliens were entitled, when lodging applications with the Conseil d'Etat for judicial review, to apply at the same time for a stay of execution under the ordinary or extremely urgent procedure, it concluded that those remedies taken as a whole satisfied the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention. B. The urgent procedure in the Conseil d'Etat
27. The relevant provisions of the Royal Decree of 5 December 1991 laying down the urgent procedure in the Conseil d'Etat read as follows:
Article 16
“In cases certified to be extremely urgent, Article 7 and 11 to 14 shall not be applicable. In such cases, the president may issue a summons ordering the applicants, the respondent, any intervening party and any persons with an interest in the outcome of the case to attend a hearing (which may be held at the president's home) at the time indicated, including on bank holidays and on a few days' or a few hours' notice. The order shall be served on Crown Counsel or on a designated member of Crown Counsel's Office. The notice shall, if applicable, indicate whether the administrative file has been lodged. If the opposing party has not communicated the administrative file beforehand, it shall produce it to the president at the hearing and the president may suspend the hearing to allow the representative of Crown Counsel's Office, the applicants and any intervening party to inspect it. The president may order immediate execution of the judgment.”
Article 25
“Applications for provisional measures shall be made separately from applications for a stay of execution or for judicial review. The application shall be signed by a party, a person with an interest in the outcome of the case or a lawyer satisfying the conditions laid down by section 19, second paragraph, of the consolidated Acts.”
Article 33
“If an applicant for a stay of execution also seeks extremely urgent provisional measures, Article 25 shall apply to his or her application. Articles 29 to 31 shall not be applicable. In cases certified to be extremely urgent, the president may issue a summons ordering the parties and any persons with an interest in the outcome of the case to attend a hearing (which may be held at the president's home) at the time indicated, including on bank holidays and on a few days' or a few hours' notice. The order shall be served on Crown Counsel or on a designated member of Crown Counsel's Office. The notice shall, if applicable, indicate whether the administrative file has been lodged. The president may order immediate execution of the judgment.”
28. The Conseil d'Etat's practice direction on the “procedure to be followed by duty staff at weekends” includes the following passage concerning “the receipt of applications for stays under the extremely urgent procedure”:
“The caretaker shall contact the duty judge, the representative of Crown Counsel's Office and the registrar so that the degree of urgency can be determined and a hearing date agreed. In cases concerning 'aliens', the registrar shall, at the judge's request, contact the Aliens Office to ascertain the scheduled repatriation date and shall seek confirmation by fax. It is advisable in all cases concerning 'aliens' for the Minister of the Interior and the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons to be recorded as the opposing parties. It is also prudent in cases involving imminent repatriation to order the applicant's appearance in person.”
29. There are a number of examples in the case-law of the Conseil d'Etat of cases in which it ordered a stay of execution of a deportation order on the same day as the application for a stay under the extremely urgent procedure or on the following day, or, in any event, before the time-limit for leaving the territory expired. These are to be found in the following judgments: nos. 40.383 of 20 September 1992, 51.302 of 25 January 1995, 57.807 of 24 January 1996, 75.646 of 2 September 1998, 81.912 of 26 July 1999, 84.741 of 18 January 2000 and 85.025 of 1 February 2000. The Conseil d'Etat has also ruled that it may entertain applications for judicial review of deportation orders (see, for instance, the following judgments: nos. 56.599 of 4 December 1995, 57.646 of 19 January 1996, 80.505 of 28 May 1999 and 85.828 of 3 March 2000). C. Other sources
30. In August 1999 there was a sharp increase in the number of asylum-seekers from Slovakia. While the average for the first seven months of 1999 had been 22 applications monthly, including 51 applications in July alone, no less than 359 applications were made between 1 and 24 August 1999. On that latter date, the Director-General of the Aliens Office wrote to the Minister of the Interior and the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons to inform them of his intention to deal with asylum applications from Slovakian nationals rapidly in order to send a clear signal to discourage other potential applicants. 31. A “Note providing general guidance on overall policy in immigration matters” approved by the Cabinet on 1 October 1999, contained, inter alia, the following passage:
“A plan for collective repatriation is currently under review, both to send a signal to the Slovakian authorities and to deport this large number of illegal immigrants whose presence can no longer be tolerated.”
32. The report on Slovakia of 15 June 1998 of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance contains the following passage: 
“In Slovakia as in several other countries of central and eastern Europe, Roma/Gypsies belong to the most disadvantaged sections of society. Apart from a few isolated cases, they live outside the public arena, cut off from decision-making centres and the main currents of political opinion. They are often the victims of skinheads' violence and are regularly subjected to ill-treatment and discrimination by the authorities.”
33. A further report produced by the applicants and drawn up after a joint mission to Slovakia in February 1999 of the Aliens Office and the Commissioner-General's Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons appears to confirm the existence of serious discrimination against Roma, who are treated as a lower class. THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
34. The applicants alleged that their arrest at Ghent police station on 1 October 1999 entailed a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
... (f)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”
35. The Court observes that, in its decision on the admissibility of the application, it joined to the merits the Government's preliminary objection that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as they had not appealed to the committals division of the criminal court under section 71 of the Aliens Act. 36. As regards the merits, the applicants denied that their arrest had been necessary to secure their departure from Belgium. They complained above all of the manner of their arrest, saying that they had been lured into a trap as they had been induced into believing that their attendance at the police station was necessary to complete their asylum applications when, from the outset, the sole intention of the authorities had been to deprive them of their liberty. They had therefore been deceived about the purpose of their attendance at the police station and, accordingly, there had been an abuse of power that amounted to a violation of Article 5 § 1. Consequently, no blame could attach to the applicants for their refusal to place any further trust in the authorities and their decision not to lodge an appeal with the Belgian courts. In the event, any such appeal would have been futile in the circumstances. The applicants had been trapped by the authorities, assembled as part of a collective-repatriation operation and placed in closed centres where they were told that no appeal was available to them; accordingly, they would not have been able to contact their lawyer, Mr van Overloop, directly. Mr van Overloop had not learnt of his clients' detention until Friday 1 October 1999, when he was informed by the President of the Roma Rights League. At no stage between the applicants' arrest and the execution of the deportation order had any direct contact between them and their lawyer been possible, in particular as they were not permitted to receive any telephone communications from outside. Admittedly, they could have telephoned out, but they were convinced that it was impossible to appeal against their detention. Consequently, Mr van Overloop would not have been able to lodge an application with the committals division in Ghent until Monday 4 October. Since the division sat on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays only, the case could not have been heard until Wednesday 6 October and the aircraft carrying the applicants left Belgium on Tuesday 5 October. 37. The Government pointed out that the applicants had been served on 3 March and 18 June 1999 with orders to leave the territory, which expressly stated that they were liable to detention with a view to deportation if they failed to comply. The applicants would therefore have been well aware that they were overstaying. Furthermore, Mrs Čonková had been convicted of theft by the Ghent Criminal Court. In those circumstances, it was absurd to suggest that the applicants had been acting in good faith. On the contrary, the “clean hands” doctrine or the nemo auditur adage had to be applied in their case. In addition, the fact that the tenor of the notice was potentially ambiguous could not suffice to give rise to an inference that there had been an abuse of power. That was a serious accusation that could only be made out if the authority had acted solely for unlawful reasons, which was manifestly not the case. Besides, the Minister of the Interior had publicly expressed regret for the “unfortunate wording” of the notice. However, the fact that other aliens who had attended the police station after receiving the notice were released after their cases had been considered demonstrated that the notices had not been sent with the sole aim of carrying out arrests. Even if they had been, the method used was nonetheless preferable to going to aliens' homes or to their children's schools to arrest them. Therefore, any ruse there had been had been a “little ruse”. The Government saw no grounds on which the applicants could have been exempted from the requirement to lodge an appeal with the committals division of the criminal court. In their view, if the applicants were capable of applying to the European Court of Human Rights, they must have been equally capable in the same circumstances of appealing to the committals division. 38. The Court notes that it is common ground that the applicants were arrested so that they could be deported from Belgium. Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention is thus applicable in the instant case. Admittedly, the applicants contest the necessity of their arrest for that purpose; however, Article 5 § 1 (f) does not require that the detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing. In this respect, Article 5 § 1 (f) provides a different level of protection from Article 5 § 1 (c): all that is required under sub-paragraph (f) is that “action is being taken with a view to deportation” (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, p. 1862, § 112). 39. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law, but it requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see, among other authorities, Bozano v. France, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 111, p. 23, § 54, and Chahal, cited above, p. 1864, § 118). 40. In the present case, the applicants received a written notice at the end of September 1999 inviting them to attend Ghent police station on 1 October to “enable the file concerning their application for asylum to be completed”. On their arrival at the police station they were served with an order to leave the territory dated 29 September 1999 and a decision for their removal to Slovakia and for their arrest for that purpose. A few hours later they were taken to a closed transit centre at Steenokkerzeel. 41. The Court notes that, according to the Government, while the wording of the notice was admittedly unfortunate, as had indeed been publicly recognised by the Minister of the Interior (see paragraph 23 above), that did not suffice to vitiate the entire arrest procedure, or to warrant its being qualified as an abuse of power. While the Court has reservations about the compatibility of such practices with Belgian law, particularly as the practice in the instant case was not reviewed by a competent national court, the Convention requires that any measure depriving an individual of his liberty must be compatible with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see paragraph 39 above). Although the Court by no means excludes its being legitimate for the police to use stratagems in order, for instance, to counter criminal activities more effectively, acts whereby the authorities seek to gain the trust of asylum-seekers with a view to arresting and subsequently deporting them may be found to contravene the general principles stated or implicit in the Convention. In that regard, there is every reason to consider that while the wording of the notice was “unfortunate”, it was not the result of inadvertence; on the contrary, it was chosen deliberately in order to secure the compliance of the largest possible number of recipients. At the hearing, counsel for the Government referred in that connection to a “little ruse”, which the authorities had knowingly used to ensure that the “collective repatriation” (see paragraph 23 above) they had decided to arrange was successful. 42. The Court reiterates that the list of exceptions to the right to liberty secured in Article 5 § 1 is an exhaustive one and only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision (see, mutatis mutandis, K.-F. v. Germany, judgment of 27 November 1997, Reports 1997-VII, p. 2975, § 70). In the Court's view, that requirement must also be reflected in the reliability of communications such as those sent to the applicants, irrespective of whether the recipients are lawfully present in the country or not. It follows that, even as regards overstayers, a conscious decision by the authorities to facilitate or improve the effectiveness of a planned operation for the expulsion of aliens by misleading them about the purpose of a notice so as to make it easier to deprive them of their liberty is not compatible with Article 5. 43. That factor has a bearing on the issue to which the Court must now turn, namely the Government's preliminary objection, which it has decided to join to the merits. In that connection, the Court reiterates that by virtue of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1210, § 66). 44. In the instant case, the Court identifies a number of factors which undoubtedly affected the accessibility of the remedy which the Government claim was not exercised. These include the fact that the information on the available remedies handed to the applicants on their arrival at the police station was printed in tiny characters and in a language they did not understand; only one interpreter was available to assist the large number of Roma families who attended the police station in understanding the verbal and written communications addressed to them and, although he was present at the police station, he did not stay with them at the closed centre. In those circumstances, the applicants undoubtedly had little prospect of being able to contact a lawyer from the police station with the help of the interpreter and, although they could have contacted a lawyer by telephone from the closed transit centre, they would no longer have been able to call upon the interpreter's services; despite those difficulties, the authorities did not offer any form of legal assistance at either the police station or the centre. 45. Whatever the position – and this factor is decisive in the eyes of the Court – as the applicants' lawyer explained at the hearing without the Government contesting the point, he was only informed of the events in issue and of his clients' situation at 10.30 p.m. on Friday 1 October 1999, such that any appeal to the committals division would have been pointless because, had he lodged an appeal with the division on 4 October, the case could not have been heard until 6 October, a day after the applicants' expulsion on 5 October. Thus, although he still regarded himself as acting for the applicants (see paragraph 21 above), he was unable to lodge an appeal with the committals division. 46. The Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective (see, mutatis mutandis, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-I). As regards the accessibility of a remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, this implies, inter alia, that the circumstances voluntarily created by the authorities must be such as to afford applicants a realistic possibility of using the remedy. That did not happen in the present case and the preliminary objection must therefore be dismissed.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 5
Outcome: no_violation