FOURTH SECTION
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE OF VELLA v. MALTA
 
(Application no. 73182/12)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
 
STRASBOURG
 
27 February 2018
 
 
 
 
 
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Vella v. Malta,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
 Faris Vehabović, President,
 Carlo Ranzoni,
 Péter Paczolay, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 February 2018,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 73182/12) against the Republic of Malta lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Maltese national, Ms Josephine Mary Vella (“the applicant”), on 13 November 2012. 2. The applicant was represented by Dr I. Refalo and Dr S. Grech, lawyers practising in Valletta. The Maltese Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Dr P. Grech, Attorney General. 3. On 22 January 2015 the application was communicated to the Government. 4. The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee. After having considered the Government’s objection, the Court rejects it. THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Siġġiewi. A. Background to the case
6. The applicant is the owner of 14 Kirkop Square, Kirkop, a two‑storey tenement with a surface area of around 175 sq.m. (hereinafter “the property”). In 1975, 1979, and 1987, following the death of their father, mother and uncle respectively, the applicant and her three brothers inherited an estate which included the property. By a deed of partition of 11 November 1998 the property was assigned to the applicant and she became its sole owner. 7. The property was requisitioned in 1955 by means of a requisition order. The premises were then allocated to the San Leonard Band Club in Kirkop (hereinafter “the band club”). The owners of the property never recognised the tenant or accepted any rent from the club. According to a judgment of 1 February 1958 of the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction, the owners were entitled to do so because the tenement had not been leased as a dwelling, and thus greater risks were involved. 8. In the years that followed rent was paid to the owners by the competent authority (then the Director of Social Housing, today the Housing Authority). The annual rent payable amounted to 30 Maltese Lira (MTL – approximately 70 euros (EUR)), less than EUR 6 per month. According to an architect’s valuation from 2007 submitted by the applicant, the rental value of the tenement at the time was MTL 750 (approximately EUR 1,747) per month. The Government challenged this estimate, as the valuation had contained no explanation as to the basis for the calculations, or whether the property was considered residential or commercial, or vacant or occupied. They relied on a valuation in an architect’s report concerning a property (3 Kirkop Square) requisitioned in 1955 for the purposes of the band club – which stated that the rental value in 2015 was EUR 12,250 per year, which meant EUR 1,021 per month. The Government did not refer to the different address, arguing as though the valuation referred to the property at issue in the present case. 9. Over the years the band club carried out extensive structural alterations, without obtaining the consent of the owners or the relevant permits from the competent authorities. According to an architect’s report, there had been a total change and the alteration effected had effaced what had once been the traditional layout of important buildings in old Maltese towns. According to the applicant, this deprived her of the valuable quality and historical and architectural importance of the property, thus devaluing it. The Government argued that the applicant had not availed herself of any ordinary remedy in this regard and had thus failed to substantiate the loss in value. Moreover, in their view the property was in a good state of repair and the alterations had increased its value. 10. According to the applicant, the band club also repeatedly breached the tenancy agreement which it had signed, by manufacturing fireworks on the premises and conducting commercial activities (such as running a bar and letting the premises out as a wedding venue despite not having the requisite authorisation). The Government submitted that these were unsubstantiated allegations, which had not been proved before the domestic courts. 11. As from 2008, in the light of constitutional proceedings (see below), the band club started depositing the annual rent in court. B. Proceedings concerning the adjacent property
12. The applicant and her brothers also owned a property (18 St. John’s Alley, Kirkop) adjacent to the tenement above, which was requisitioned in 1986 and also assigned to the band club. 13. In 1987 the owners of the tenement instituted civil proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction against the Housing Secretary and the band club. They requested that the requisition order of 30 December 1986 be declared null and void as being contrary to the 1949 Housing Act, and sought to regain possession of the tenement. They also requested compensation for the damage allegedly sustained. 14. In a judgment of 9 October 1991 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction rejected the plaintiffs’ claim. The owners appealed against that decision. 15. In a judgment of 30 December 1993 the Court of Appeal declared the requisition order null and void and ordered that the appellants be given possession of the premises within six months. It held that the requisition for the purposes of assigning the property to the band club could not be considered to be in the public interest. It sent the case back to the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction for it to award the appellants compensation. 16. In a judgment of 31 May 2005 the Court of Appeal rejected a request for a new trial submitted by the band club. 17. In a judgment of 16 October 2006 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction found the Housing Secretary and the band club liable for the damage suffered by the owners in connection with the structural alterations to the property. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 27 February 2009. 18. By a judgment of 6 May 2009 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction awarded the owners EUR 72,000 in damages, covering EUR 16,000 for missing objects, EUR 40,000 to rectify the structural changes made and EUR 16,000 for the loss of use of the property for twenty years. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 2 October 2012. C. Constitutional redress proceedings
19. In 2007 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings in relation to the property requisitioned in 1955, asking the court to declare that, as a result of the requisition order and the continued occupation of the premises, she had suffered a breach of her rights under Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. She asked the court to award her compensation for the taking of possession of the property and for the violations suffered, and to order any other measure capable of preventing the continuation of the violation, including the release of the property. 20. The defendants, the Director of Social Accommodation, the Attorney General and the band club, argued that no such violations had occurred. 21. By a judgment of 11 October 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction upheld the applicant’s claims. It considered that the requisition order had been issued for the property to be enjoyed by a private entity and therefore the measure had not been in the public interest. In this connection, it referred to a judgment of 30 December 1993 by the Court of Appeal concerning what it considered to be the same property (see above). Moreover, the measure had not been proportionate. The rent had been derisory, causing the applicant to suffer a disproportionate and excessive burden. She had therefore suffered a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. According to the court, the applicant had also suffered a violation of Article 14, as only her property had been requisitioned for the use of the band club. In determining the amount of compensation, the court did not take into account the fact that the applicant or her ancestors had received rent, given that the amount was derisory. Bearing in mind the values established by the applicant’s expert as to the rental value and sale value of the property, which was MTL 180,000 (approximately EUR 420,000) (pg.12 of the judgment), as well as the length of time the requisition was and remained in place, the court awarded the applicant EUR 60,000 in compensation (kumpens) for the requisition of the premises and the violations found, noting it was not awarding civil damages (danni ċivili) in this context. Three quarters of the amount was to be paid by the Director of Social Housing and one quarter by the band club. It further ordered the band club to vacate the premises within three months of the date of judgment and to return the premises to the applicant. 22. The band club appealed, arguing that it could not be held responsible for breaches of human rights and that, in any event, the measure had been in the public interest. It further contested the order to vacate the property. The Attorney General and the Director of Social Accommodation also appealed, in particular in relation to the findings of a lack of public interest, a violation of Article 14 and the redress awarded. The applicant cross‑appealed, arguing that the compensation awarded was too low and did not reflect the losses she had incurred over the years. 23. By a judgment of 25 May 2012 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance judgment in part. It reiterated the finding of a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the requisition had been disproportionate. It found, however, that it had been in the public interest – the court considered that jurisprudence had shifted since the time of the judgment of 30 December 1993 of the Court of Appeal on which the first-instance court had based its assessment. In the present case the requisition had served a social and cultural purpose for the generality of citizens and could not be said to have served solely private interests. 24. It further found that there had been no violation of Article 14. 25. As to the redress, the Constitutional Court revoked the order for the club to vacate the premises. Considering that the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was a consequence of the lack of a fair balance between the interests of the landlord and those of the tenant, and given that the validity of the lease was not at issue in the present case, it did not seem appropriate for it to evict the tenant; it sufficed that that unfair balance be redressed. 26. The Constitutional Court confirmed the amount of compensation awarded by the first-instance court, including the way in which it had to be shared. It considered that the band club had benefited from the situation and had never attempted to fix it, despite the fact that it had not been recognised as a tenant. In relation to the amount of compensation, it considered that the disproportionality of the measure had not persisted since the start of the requisition in 1955, but had started to be so only after the 1980s. Furthermore, the applicant had received the rent paid by the department and had only instituted constitutional proceedings in 2007 (while never contesting the validity of the requisition), thus it was legitimate and in line with local case-law to reduce her compensation. It also held that the property had been taken in the public interest and therefore the compensation needed not reflect market values. It followed that the compensation had to be reduced, however, given that the property was not to be vacated, it was appropriate to retain the amount awarded by the first‑instance court. Lastly, the court held that the claim for damages for the depreciation of the property as a result of structural works did not fall within the ambit of a constitutional complaint, and it was thus not its place to award such damages. 27. The Constitutional Court ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the cross-appeal and half the judicial costs of the proceedings before the two levels of jurisdiction. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Requisition orders
28. The relevant domestic law and practice concerning requisition orders is to be found in, inter alia, Ghigo v. Malta (no. 31122/05, §§ 18‑24, 26 September 2006). 29. Furthermore, Subsidiary Legislation 16.13, entitled Conditions Regulating the Leases of Club Regulations provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“2. (1) The rent of a club as referred to in Article 1531J of the Civil Code which is paid on the basis of a lease entered into before the 1st June 1995 shall, unless otherwise agreed upon in writing after the 1st January 2014, or agreed upon in writing prior to the 1st June 1995 with regard to a lease which was still in its original period di fermo or di rispetto on the 1st January 2014, as from the date of the first payment of rent due after the 1st January 2014, be increased by a fixed rate of ten per cent over the rent payable in respect of the previous year and shall continue to be increased as from the date of the first payment of rent due after the 1st January of each year until and including the year 2016 by ten per cent over the previous rent. (2) The rent as from the first payment of rent due after the 1st January 2017 shall be increased by a fixed rate of five per cent over the rent payable in 2016. Such rent shall continue to be increased by five per cent per annum until the 31 December 2023 and the rent shall thereafter increase every year according to the index of inflation for the previous year. 3. (1) Where club premises or part thereof to which these regulations apply are used for the generation of income through an economic activity carried out in the said premises, then as from the 1st January 2015 the tenant of the said premises shall also pay the person entitled to receive the rent a sum equivalent to five per cent of the annual income derived by the club from the said economic activity, other than income derived from fund raising or philanthropic activities organised and managed by the club itself:
Provided that for the purposes of this regulation, income generated from economic activity means any income which is directly or indirectly derived from the bar and, or restaurant and from any lease, sub-lease, lease of a going - concern or a management agreement of the said premises that is leased out as a club or part thereof. (2) The amount referred to in sub-regulation (1) shall be calculated on an annual basis and shall be payable by the 30th September of the following year with the first payment being due in respect of the year 2015 by the 30th September 2016. (3) The annual income referred to in sub-regulation (1) shall be calculated on the basis of financial statements signed by a certified public accountant in the case of clubs having an income of less than €200,000 per annum and by audited financial statements in the case of clubs having an income of €200,000 or more per annum.”
B. The Civil Code
30. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code, following the 2009 and 2010 amendments, read as follows:
Article 1523(3)
“"commercial tenement" means an urban tenement which is not a residence and which is leased to house an activity primarily intended to generate profit and includes, but is not limited to, an office, a clinic, a tenement leased out for the sale of merchandise by wholesale or retail, a market stall, a warehouse, a storage used for commercial purposes as well as any tenement licensed to sell things, wines, spirits or foodstuff or drinks, theatre, or tenement mainly used for any art, trade or profession:
Provided that a tenement leased to a society or leased to a musical, philanthropic, social, sporting or political entity, that is used as a club, shall not be considered as a commercial tenement even if part of it is used for the purpose of generating profit;
"club" means any club which is registered as such with the Commissioner of Police in accordance with the provisions of the law.”
Article 1531C
“(1) The rent of a residence which has been in force before the 1st June, 1995 shall be subject to the law as in force prior to the 1st June, 1995 so however that unless otherwise agreed upon in writing after the 1st January, 2010, the rate of the rent as from the first payment of rent due after the 1st January, 2010, shall, when this was less than one hundred and eighty-five euro (€185) per year, increase to such amount:
Provided that where the rate of the lease was more than one hundred [and] eighty‑five euro (€185) per year, this shall remain at such higher rate as established. (2) In any case the rate of the rent as stated in subarticle (1) shall increase every three years by a proportion equal to the increase in the index of inflation according to article 13 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance; the first increase shall be made on the date of the first payment of rent due after the 1st January, 2013:
Provided that where the lease on the 1st January, 2010 will be more than one hundred [and] eighty-five euro (€185) per year, and by a contract in writing prior to 1st June, 1995 the parties would have agreed upon a method of increase in rent, after 1st January, 2010 the increases in rent shall continue to be regulated in terms of that agreement until such agreement remains in force.”
Article 1531J
“In the case of a tenement leased to an entity and used as a club before the 1st June, 1995 including but not limited to a musical, philanthropic, social, sport or political entity, when its lease is for a specific period and on the 1st January, 2010 the original period "di fermo" or "di rispetto" is still running and the lease has not yet been automatically extended by law, then in that case the period of lease established in the contract shall apply. In all other instances where the contract of lease was made prior to the 1st June, 1995 the law and all definitions as in force on the 1st June, 1995 shall continue to apply:
Provided that notwithstanding the provisions of the law as in force before the 1st June, 1995, the Minister responsible for accommodation may from time to time make regulations to regulate the conditions of lease of clubs so that a fair balance may be reached between the rights of the lessor, of the tenant and the public interest.”
Article 1531M
“With regard to leases made before the 1st June, 1995 of tenements which are not residences or commercial tenements, subject to the provisions of article 1531J relating to clubs, and subject to the provisions of article 1531H with regard to garages and summer residences, the law and all definitions as were in force before the 1st June, 1995 shall continue to apply:
Provided that the Minister responsible for accommodation may from time to time make regulations to regulate such leases so that a fair balance may be reached between the rights of the lessor, of the tenant and the public interest.”
31. Under Article 946 of the Civil Code, after partition, a co-heir is deemed to be the sole and direct successor to property comprised in his share. The provision reads as follows:
“Each co-heir is deemed to have succeeded alone and directly to all the property comprised in his share, or come to him by licitation, and never to have had the ownership of the other hereditary property.”
C. Remedies
32. Article 46 of the Constitution of Malta, in so far as relevant, reads:
“(1) ... any person who alleges that any of the provisions of articles 33 to 45 (inclusive) of this Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, or such other person as the Civil Court, First Hall, in Malta may appoint at the instance of any person who so alleges, may, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, apply to the Civil Court, First Hall, for redress. (2) The Civil Court, First Hall, shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of sub-article (1) of this article, and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions of the said articles 33 to 45 (inclusive) to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled:
Provided that the Court may, if it considers it desirable so to do, decline to exercise its powers under this sub-article in any case where it is satisfied that adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged are or have been available to the person concerned under any other law. (4) Any party to proceedings brought in the Civil Court, First Hall, in pursuance of this article shall have a right of appeal to the Constitutional Court.”
33. Similarly, Article 4 of the European Convention Act, Chapter 319 of the Laws of Malta, provides:
“(1) Any person who alleges that any of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, or such other person as the Civil Court, First Hall, in Malta may appoint at the instance of any person who so alleges, may, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, apply to the Civil Court, First Hall, for redress. (2) The Civil Court, First Hall, shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of subarticle (1), and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement, of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to the enjoyment of which the person concerned is entitled:
Provided that the court may, if it considers it desirable so to do, decline to exercise its powers under this subarticle in any case where it is satisfied that adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged are or have been available to the person concerned under any other ordinary law. (4) Any party to proceedings brought in the Civil Court, First Hall, in pursuance of this article shall have a right of appeal to the Constitutional Court.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
34. The applicant complained that the requisition order affecting her property had caused her an excessive individual burden, incompatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
1. Compatibility ratione temporis
35. The Government submitted that because the Convention had only entered into force with respect to Malta in 1967, claims in connection with the period before this should not be entertained by the Court. 36. The applicant made no submissions in this regard. 37. The Court reiterates that its jurisdiction ratione temporis covers only the period after the ratification of the Convention or its Protocols by the respondent State. From that date onwards, all of the State’s alleged acts and omissions must conform to the Convention or its Protocols and subsequent facts fall within the Court’s jurisdiction even where they are merely extensions of an already existing situation (see, for example, Bezzina Wettinger and Others v. Malta, no. 15091/06, § 52, 8 April 2008). 38. The Court further reiterates that in the case of X v. France (no. 9587/81, Commission decision of 13 December 1982, Decisions and Reports (DR) 29, p. 238), it was held that in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the declaration made by a State in accordance with former Article 25 of the Convention, the Commission was competent to examine facts which had occurred between the date of ratification and the date on which the State’s declaration under former Article 25 became effective. 39. The Court observes that in the absence of an express limitation, the Maltese declaration of 30 April 1987 is retrospective and the Court is therefore competent to examine facts which occurred between 1967 and 1987 (see Bezzina Wettinger and Others, cited above, § 54, and the case-law cited therein). 40. It follows from the above that the Government’s objection must be upheld. The Court finds therefore that the complaint concerning the period before 1967 is incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention and must thus be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 2. The Government’s objection of lack of victim status
(a)  The parties’ submissions
41. The Government submitted that the applicant had lost her victim status as the national courts had expressly acknowledged the violation and awarded appropriate redress, namely compensation of EUR 60,000. The Government relied on the case of Staykov v. Bulgaria (no. 49438/99, § 90, 12 October 2006), where the Court accepted that the domestic courts which had awarded compensation had acknowledged the relevant violations even though their reasoning could have been more precise. 42. In the present case the Constitutional Court had highlighted that the applicant had started to suffer a disproportionate burden only in the 1980s and it had only been in 2003 that rental prices had increased significantly. Initially, therefore, the amount of rent had not been low, considering the fact that the property was located in a small village. It had also taken into account the fact that the applicant had been receiving rent and that the requisition had been lawful and in the public interest. Thus, the domestic court had given attention to various factors and had finally been satisfied that the situation had called for less than compensation at market value. In the Government’s view, in the present case there was no call for restitution in integrum. They noted that it appeared from the documents submitted that as from mid-2008 the applicant started to receive a higher rent per annum (EUR 185, which would increase every three years), in line with the amendments made to the law, in particular Article 1531C of the Civil Code (see Relevant domestic law above), which applies to the present case given that the tenement originally consisted of a residence. Furthermore, provisions for a yearly increase in the rent of clubs and for the owner’s right to a share in the annual income received from a commercial activity carried out in clubs, were also put in place in 2015 by means of the Conditions Regulating the Leases of Club Regulations (see Relevant domestic law above). 43. They considered that the redress awarded by the Constitutional Court (which amounted to around EUR 1,153.85 per year for fifty two years, that is to say, since 1955 even though the Convention only entered into force with respect to Malta in 1967) was sufficient since the requisition had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim. It was also comparable to awards made by the Court in similar circumstances which, when including non-pecuniary damage, amounted to, for example, EUR 1,168 and 1,400 annually respectively, in Edwards v. Malta ((just satisfaction), no. 17647/04, § 22, 24, and 37, 17 July 2008), and Ghigo v. Malta ((just satisfaction), no. 31122/05, §§ 19, 21 and 32, 17 July 2008). According to the Government the yearly rent awarded (EUR 1,153.85) in conjunction with the EUR 70 rent paid each month, amounted to a much higher rent than would have been applicable in the first decades of the requisition. Lastly, the Government submitted that the cases relied on by the applicant concerned the failure to award compensation in respect of expropriations not requisitions. 44. The applicant submitted that she could still claim to be a victim of the violation upheld by the domestic court, as the final judgment had only provided partial redress. She argued that the sum awarded was not appropriate given what the property would have fetched had it not been requisitioned or subject to rent restrictions. In her view, the sum of EUR 60,000 for the rent of a huge property over so many years was clearly not appropriate. Moreover, part of that sum had been absorbed by the payments of costs she had been ordered to pay despite being successful in her claim. 45. The applicant further submitted that her situation had not changed following the judgment of the Constitutional Court and therefore she remained a victim of the same requisition order and rent restrictions existing in law. Thus, she was still receiving EUR 70 annually in rent, despite the property’s annual rental market value (in 2007) being EUR 20,964 according to an ex parte architect. In this connection, she referred to the case of Chinnici v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 22432/03, § 40 et sequi, 14 April 2015). The applicant emphasised that the amendments mentioned by the Government had not improved her situation, since they were not applicable to her property. Indeed, her property was being used as a band club not as a residential property, thus the rent remained unaltered in the light of Article 1531J and M of the Civil Code (see Relevant domestic law above). 46. Moreover, while she remained subject to the laws which were found to breach her property rights, she had no prospect of having the property returned to her. Thus, despite the wide powers of the constitutional jurisdictions in relation to redressing Convention violations, in practice no remedy had been given to put an end to a continuing violation which had persisted through time. This practice had become systematic, as evidenced by the various Court judgments, which continued to find that applicants in similar cases are still victims of the Convention, despite the domestic findings in their favour. In this connection, the applicant relied on Azzopardi v. Malta (no. 28177/12, 6 November 2014), Schembri and Others v. Malta (no. 42583/06, 10 November 2009) and Frendo Randon and Others v. Malta (no. 2226/10, 22 November 2011). (b)  The Court’s assessment
47. The Court reiterates that the adoption of a measure favourable to the applicant by the domestic authorities will deprive the applicant of victim status only if the violation is acknowledged expressly, or at least in substance, and is subsequently redressed (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178 et seq. and § 193, ECHR 2006‑V, and Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 50, ECHR 1999‑VII). Whether the redress given is effective will depend, among other things, on the nature of the right alleged to have been breached, the reasons given for the decision and the persistence of the unfavourable consequences for the person concerned after that decision (see, for example, Freimanis and Līdums v. Latvia, nos. 73443/01 and 74860/01, § 68, 9 February 2006). The redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. Whether an individual has victim status may also depend on the amount of compensation awarded by the domestic courts and the effectiveness (including the promptness) of the remedy affording the award (see, for example, Gera de Petri Testaferrata Bonici Ghaxaq v. Malta, no. 26771/07, § 53, 5 April 2011, and Frendo Randon and Others, cited above, §§ 36-38, concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1; Scordino, cited above, § 202, in respect of Article 6; see also Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, §§ 118 and 119, ECHR 2010 concerning Article 3). 48. In the present case the Court notes that the first criterion, namely acknowledgment of a violation, has been met. 49. As to the second criterion, the Court notes that appropriate redress in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cases requires an award in respect of both pecuniary damage (see Frendo Randon and Others, cited above, §§ 37 and 39, and Azzopardi, cited above, §§ 33-34) as well as non-pecuniary damage, which would generally be required when an individual was deprived of, or suffered an interference with, his or her possessions contrary to the Convention (see Gera de Petri Testaferrata Bonici Ghaxaq, cited above, § 53). 50. The Court notes, firstly, that in the present case, it is unclear which heads of damage are covered by the award granted by the Constitutional Court. From the Constitutional Court’s statements and considerations (see paragraph 26 above), it would appear that it was intended to cover at least pecuniary damage – no mention is, however, made of non‑pecuniary damage. The Government’s calculations (see paragraph 43 above) also assume that the entire amount awarded was in respect of pecuniary damage. It follows that, if that award solely covered pecuniary damage, the applicant is still a victim of the said violation which has not been redressed, given the absence of any redress in the form of an award for non‑pecuniary damage. 51. Secondly, even assuming that the award covered both heads of damage, the Court considers that in the present case, even if it had to be accepted that the market value is not applicable and that the rent valuations may to some extent be decreased due to any legitimate aim, an award of EUR 60,000 – from which around EUR 4,000 (being the sum the applicant had to pay in costs as shown by relevant documents – see paragraph 92 below) must be deducted, and a further sum deducted for the purposes of non-pecuniary damage – can hardly be considered sufficient pecuniary damages given the size of the property and the relevant period, despite any other factors. This is so even in the light of the Government’s own valuations which are in themselves much lower than those submitted by the applicant. Indeed, according to the Government’s submitted valuations (although it is unclear whether the report they relied on is indeed in respect of the property at issue), in 2015 the property had an annual rent of approximately EUR 12,500. Thus, all considerations relevant to the present case having been made, the sum awarded cannot be said to cover pecuniary damage suffered over several years, let alone also non-pecuniary damage. 52. Of further concern to the Court is the persistence of the unfavourable consequences for the applicant. Indeed, following the Constitutional Court judgment, the applicant has remained subject to more or less the same laws which have breached her rights, as the Constitutional Court did not take any action in that respect (see Montanaro Gauci and Others v. Malta, no. 31454/12, § 46, 30 August 2016).

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 1
Outcome: violation