FIRST SECTION
CASE OF P.H. v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no. 37574/19)
 
 
JUDGMENT
 
Art 2 (procedural and substantive) • Life • Positive obligations • Ineffective investigation into incident involving applicant falling out of second-floor window at a police station, where she was being questioned after arrest • Respondent State responsible for applicant’s injuries, in the light of officer’s failure to continuously watch her under domestic rules for escorting persons
 
STRASBOURG
8 September 2022
 
 
FINAL
 
08/12/2022
 
 
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of P.H. v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
 Marko Bošnjak, President,
 Péter Paczolay,
 Alena Poláčková,
 Erik Wennerström,
 Raffaele Sabato,
 Lorraine Schembri Orland,
 Davor Derenčinović, judges,
and Renata Degener, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 37574/19) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, P.H., on 4 July 2019;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”);
the decision not to disclose the applicant’s name;
the observations submitted by the Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant;
the comments submitted by (i) Harvard Law School Project on Disability and Centre For Disability Law and Policy (“the HPOD” and “the CDLP”, respectively), (ii) the European Roma Rights Centre (“the ERRC”), and (iii) Validity (Mental Disability Advocacy Centre), which were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section, and the parties’ observations in reply;
Having deliberated in private on 3 May and 5 July 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. This case concerns the incident of the applicant falling out of a second‑floor window of a police station, where she was being questioned following her arrest on suspicion of theft. It focuses on the question whether the State discharged its duties to ensure the applicant’s well-being and to carry out an effective investigation into the incident. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was represented by Ms V. Durbáková, a lawyer practising in Košice. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Bálintová. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. ARREST AND TRANSPORT TO POLICE STATION
5. On 17 January 2017, when the applicant was sixteen years and four months old, a police patrol consisting of Officers A. and B. was called to a shopping mall where she had been caught red-handed while committing petty theft. Her brother was also present. 6. The patrol checked the applicant’s identity, she confessed to the theft, and it was established from the police database that some eight months earlier she had been found guilty of a similar minor offence. 7. At around 3 p.m. the patrol took charge of the applicant and put her in a police car with a view to transporting her to the local county police station for further procedural steps to be taken in relation to the incident. No coercive measures were applied. The applicant’s brother was also taken to the police station by another unit and in another car. 8. In the car, the applicant was seated in the back while Officers A. and B. sat in the front. The parties’ accounts concerning the transport diverge as follows. 9. The applicant stated that the officers had told her that she would be put in a cage, used insulting language having to do with her Romani origin, and each of them had slapped her once. The Government on the other hand argued that no physical or verbal abuse had taken place. In support of that position, they relied on an entry in the county police logbook concerning the shift of the patrol on the given day and on a note on the record dated 17 January 2017 and drawn up by Officer A. These documents indicate that no coercive measures had been applied during the transport since the applicant was a minor who had not resisted and had cooperated, and there had been no grounds for concern that she might try to abscond. EVENTS AT THE POLICE STATION
10. According to the documents mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the events at the police station unfolded as follows. 11. On arrival, (i) the applicant confessed to having committed three other similar acts of theft earlier that day, (ii) at 3.24 p.m. the case was brought to the attention of the supervising prosecutor, who instructed that the applicant should not be detained but be released after the necessary paperwork had been filled in, and (iii) Officer A. immediately informed the applicant of the prosecutor’s instructions. 12. The applicant was then searched by a female officer. Afterwards, Officer A. began to fill in various records concerning the case, in the process of which he was alone with the applicant and continued communicating with her. As she repeatedly asked to be allowed to use the toilet, Officer A. accompanied her to the bathroom. As she was cooperative and had been informed that she would be released, there was no concern that she might attempt to flee, and no other officer was requested to go with them. 13. As would later be noted in the minutes of an in situ inspection, carried out between 7 and 8.30 p.m. of the same day, the bathroom was situated on the second floor of the police station, at the end of a corridor ending in a wall with a window. The size of the window was 116 by 140 cm and its sill was 90 cm above the ground. It opened by tilting along the horizontal axis in its middle, providing a maximum opening of 60 by 102 cm. The door to the area with the ladies’ bathroom was situated immediately next to the window, in the right wall of the corridor leading to the window. Behind the door, there was a small room with a washbasin and another door, situated opposite the first door, leading to another small room, on the right side of which there was a glass door to a room with the toilet in. 14. According to the above-mentioned documents, in the corridor at the door to the area with the ladies’ bathroom, Officer A. showed the applicant where the toilet was and, since he was less than a metre away from her and had seen her entering that area, he turned his back to the door, intending to wait until the applicant was ready. As he was turning, he noted in his peripheral vision a shadow in front of the door to the bathroom area. He turned towards it and saw the applicant falling out of the open window to the ground in front of the police station. As noted in the minutes of the in situ inspection, the bottom edge of the window was 770 cm above the ground, which was grass covered with snow that had been walked on. In front of the window, there was a pine tree the trunk of which was 143 cm away from the building and one branch of this tree, 260 centimetres above the ground, was not covered by snow. 15. The above-mentioned documentation concludes that Officer A. then alerted his colleagues and an emergency ambulance was called to attend to the applicant who was lying on the ground in front of the police station making an indistinct sound. 16. The applicant for her part submitted that she had no recollection of the events preceding and surrounding her fall from the window, but that it was likely that the type of treatment to which she had been exposed during her transport to the police station had continued there. 17. In the course of the proceedings before the Court, the applicant submitted a written statement made on 23 March 2021 by her brother, to the effect that when the police car with the applicant had arrived at the police station on 17 January 2017, he had already been there and had witnessed the police car arriving and seen her crying intensely. At the police station, the applicant had been taken to different premises from those where her brother was but he had heard her shouting to be released because she had not done anything and he had also heard a female voice shouting threats, insults and racial slurs at the applicant. He had then seen police officers running down the stairs and shouting that his sister had jumped out of the window. APPLICANT’S PHYSICAL INJURIES AND TREATMENT
18. On 17 January 2017 at 4.47 p.m. a doctor attending to the applicant at the emergency reception of a hospital ordered a full-body examination by computed tomography scan. In two reports issued on that day at 5.26 p.m. and 5.44 p.m. by that and another doctor, they noted that after her fall the applicant had been found unconscious and established that, at the time they saw her, she was analgo-sedated and there was no sign of any injury to her skull, spine, organs of the abdominal cavity or pelvis. Nevertheless, she was diagnosed with an unspecified endocranial injury, four rib fractures, four other skeletal fractures and a pneumothorax on one side. 19. A hospital-admission report of 17 January 2017 confirmed the above injuries and noted that the applicant was analgo-sedated, in a coma, and suffering from polytrauma, and that she had contusions to both of her lungs. 20. In the applicant’s own submission, she was in a coma for more than a month. 21. According to a report on her discharge from hospital on 24 February 2017, the applicant was discharged in good health with no restrictions on her ability to move. The report also indicated that no surgical intervention had been required, conservative treatment being sufficient. Nevertheless, it was observed that the applicant was suffering from a “quantitative disruption of consciousness”. 22. Another doctor saw the applicant on 3 March 2017 and recorded, in a report of that day, that she was feeling fine and could walk alone but that she became out of breath if walking for a long period. It was also noted that she was due for a check-up by a traumatologist and that outpatient rehabilitation was required. INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT AT THE POLICE STATION
23. On 18 January 2017 an investigator of the Inspection Service of the Ministry of the Interior (“the Inspection Service”) opened criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s fall but the decision was quashed by the Public Prosecution Service (“the PPS”) on the grounds that the elements of the suspected crime had not been properly defined. 24. Meanwhile, on 23 January and 15 February 2017, the investigator had enquired as to the possibility of interviewing the applicant. On the former occasion, it was established that she was still in a medically induced sleep. On the latter occasion, while she was still hospitalised, her doctor recommended that she not be questioned. 25. On 10 March 2017 the investigator again opened criminal proceedings against one or more officers unknown attached to the local county police department, on suspicion that, by failing to discharge their duties in relation to guarding the applicant, as defined in Decree no. 83/2011 of the Minister of the Interior on escorting persons (“the 2011 Decree”), they had failed to prevent her attempt to escape and had thereby committed the offence of frustrating the fulfilment of an official duty within the meaning of Article 327 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The 2011 Decree is an internal regulation not accessible to the public. 26. On 10 April 2017 the investigator again attempted to interview the applicant. However, a few minutes before the scheduled interview, he was informed that the applicant would not be coming as she had fallen ill. 27. The applicant was then interviewed on 20 April 2017, in the presence of her mother, an expert in psychology and a social worker. The applicant’s lawyer was also present and assisted her at all times from then on. 28. In the interview of 20 April 2017, the applicant submitted that she remembered nothing of the events at the police station but did remember having been insulted by the two officers who had arrested her and having been slapped by each of them once as described in paragraph 9 above. 29. Later the same day, the investigator also interviewed Officers A. and B. The former described the events at the police station in the same way as in his initial deposition, except that he stated that he had been standing a metre to a metre and a half away from the door to the ladies’ bathroom area, that the applicant had entered the room with the toilet in, that he had been alerted by a scraping sound, in response to which he had noted that the window was open, that he had initially gone to check the bathroom area, and that it had been only after that that he had noticed the applicant’s body lying on the ground underneath the window. In response to questions, he stated that it might have been some twenty seconds that the applicant had been in the bathroom area, and that he thought that the window had initially been closed, but that he was unable to say whether it had been locked. Officer B. knew nothing that could elucidate the above events as he had not been present. 30. On 26 April 2017 the PPS informed the investigator that, having reviewed the material in the case file, they had established no grounds for a criminal prosecution of any officer. There had nevertheless been a negligent failure to discharge one’s duties in relation to guarding the applicant, which could be dealt with as a disciplinary offence. However, the applicant’s allegation in her interview on 20 April 2017 that the arresting officers had physically and verbally mistreated her had to be investigated into as a separate matter under a separate file number. No copy of the letter of 26 April 2017 has been served on the applicant. 31. On the same day, that is 26 April 2017, the applicant’s lawyer requested that the investigation examine the applicant’s allegation of physical and verbal abuse, in particular with a view to establishing whether any such possible mistreatment might have been the reason for the applicant jumping out of the window. These circumstances could be clarified by interviewing the applicant’s brother and mother. 32. In a letter of 12 May 2017, the investigator rejected the applicant’s lawyer’s request on the grounds that the applicant had witness status and that, unlike victims, witnesses had no right to ask for additional investigative measures. At the same time, he informed her that the alleged mistreatment was going to be examined in a separate set of proceedings. 33. On the same day, that is 12 May 2017, the investigator referred the matter to the head of the local district police department to be handled as a disciplinary offence. In doing so he had regard to the depositions of the applicant and Officers A. and B. as well as the documentation referred to above. The investigator noted that as the applicant had been processed at the police station by Officer A. as the arresting officer, his responsibility in relation to her there was still governed by the regime applicable to escorting persons under the 2011 Decree. In particular, he had been under a duty to guard the applicant by continuously watching her behaviour and to be prepared to intervene so as to prevent an escape or disobedience (section 34 (a) and (b) of the 2011 Decree). Officer A. had failed to discharge these duties diligently, in particular when he had turned his back to the entrance door to the toilet area thus losing sight of it, without having taken precautions such as, for example, verifying whether the given window had been locked or ensuring the guarding of the applicant in the toilet area by another person of the same sex. The applicant had made use of this failure by attempting to escape. Nevertheless, the level of the responsibility of Officer A. was reduced by the following factors: the applicant had not been a dangerous offender; she had only been suspected of a relatively minor offence; it had been envisaged that following her interview she would be released; until the incident, her behaviour had been calm; and the offence of which she had been suspected had eventually been elucidated so that it had ultimately been possible to bring charges of theft against her on 14 March 2017. Thus, in combination with the service track record of Officer A., disciplinary action was deemed to be sufficient. The applicant was not informed of this decision. 34. In a letter of 7 July 2017, the head of the district police informed the Inspection Service that, as a follow-up to the decision of 12 May 2017, a disciplinary sanction of a one-off 5% reduction of monthly salary had been imposed on Officer A. The applicant was not informed of this decision and no copy of it has been made available to the Court. INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT IN THE POLICE CAR
35. Following the instruction by the PPS that the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment in the police car be examined in a separate set of proceedings (see paragraph 30 above), the Inspection Service treated the incident as a suspicion of abuse of official authority within the meaning of Article 326 § 1 (a) of the Criminal Code. As such, it obtained and examined the contents of the investigation file concerning the police-station incident and an expert report concerning the applicant’s mental condition (see paragraph 46 below), and re‑interviewed her and Officers A. and B. 36. On 12 July 2017 the Inspection Service decided to terminate the proceedings, having concluded that there was no suspicion of any wrongdoing. Above all, the applicant’s allegations were found to be improbable as all the available evidence showed that there had been no reason to apply any coercion to her because she had not resisted and had cooperated. Officer A. had previously served as a specialist for Roma-related issues. It appeared implausible that he and Officer B., who had been sitting in the front of the police car, would slap the applicant, who had been sitting in the back of it, and that this could have occurred on the outskirts of a pedestrian zone in plain sight of random passers-by. It was further noted that the applicant had been diagnosed as suffering, inter alia, from retrograde amnesia concerning the events preceding her injuries on 17 January 2017. If this was true, then it was excluded that she would remember practically nothing of the day, but remember the alleged physical and verbal abuse in the police car explicitly. In sum, there was no indication of the offence under investigation having been committed. 37. The decision of 12 July 2017 was served on the applicant on 19 July 2017. It is uncontested that she could have but did not challenge it by way of an interlocutory appeal to the PPS. 38. Nevertheless, she repeatedly asked for it to be reviewed at all levels of the PPS, arguing that the Inspection Service had failed to establish the facts properly, contesting its factual and legal conclusions, and asserting that the reasoning behind the decision was insufficient and thus not susceptible to review. She objected that the investigators had simply endorsed the version of events as submitted by the officers under suspicion, without (i) interviewing her brother and mother, (ii) enquiring through an expert whether it was possible for her to remember some of the relevant events but not others and to regain her memory of them, and (iii) examining possible racial motives of the officers under suspicion. In her view, it was necessary to establish the cause of her fall out of the window, in particular whether it had been due to the treatment she had been exposed to in the police car or at the police station immediately before the incident. Although she had already asked for that and the authorities were under a positive duty to investigate this matter, no investigation into it had been carried out at all. 39. The applicant’s repeated requests were all dismissed, for the final time in a communication from the Prosecutor General’s Office on 21 September 2018. The PPS had examined the contents of the case file and had fully endorsed the investigator’s decision and reasoning. Other than that, it was only noted that the subject matter of the investigation in issue was limited to the alleged ill-treatment in the police car and that the circumstances of the applicant’s fall out of the window at the police station were beyond its scope. CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEEDINGS AND REVIEW BY OMBUDSPERSON
40. On 20 November 2018 the applicant lodged an individual complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court. In the body of the complaint, she alleged a violation of her rights, inter alia, under Articles 2, 3, 13 and 14 of the Convention. As to the facts, she complained that the authorities had failed to take appropriate steps to safeguard her life during her deprivation of liberty at the police station and to ensure an effective investigation into the events leading up to her fall out of the window, including into her allegation of abuse in the police car. The investigation undertaken had been deficient in that it had not been prompt, independent and adequate in that it had failed to examine the possible racial motive behind the alleged violations. Regarding the independence of the investigation, the applicant pointed out that the Inspection Service was subordinate to the Minister of the Interior as was ultimately the police, including the officers under suspicion. Moreover, the investigation had been limited to the alleged physical and verbal abuse in the police car, but had failed to examine the possible connection between her falling out of the window at the police station and the events that had immediately preceded it, all of which had in her opinion racial connotations. Furthermore, the applicant objected that the investigation had simply and arbitrarily accepted the version of events submitted by the officers suspected of having mistreated her and being responsible for her injuries. 41. In the summary of her complaint, as formulated in a standardised and prescribed form (petit), the applicant linked it to the results of the investigation concerning the alleged incident in the police car (see paragraphs 35 et seq. above). 42. In a decision of 13 December 2018, the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 43. It noted that the applicant’s complaint essentially concerned an allegation that the authorities had failed to ensure an effective investigation into the alleged offences committed against her by members of the police. However, there was no standalone right guaranteed to ensure the criminal prosecution of a third party. It was true that Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention imposed a positive obligation in that respect. However, it was extremely rare for any such obligation to stem from Article 8 of the Convention. 44. Without providing any details, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant’s complaints had been duly examined by the authorities. The fact that she disagreed with their conclusions was not capable of engaging a constitutional review since the Constitutional Court was neither a court of fact nor of appeal in matters governed by criminal law. 45. In a letter of 15 February 2019 concerning the investigation into the alleged police-car incident, the Ombudsperson of Slovakia informed the Inspection Service that, in response to the applicant’s complaint in relation to the actions taken against her by officers of the SNV county police department, she had established no violation of the applicant’s human rights and fundamental freedoms. THE APPLICANT’S MENTAL CONDITION AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HER
46. In the context of the criminal proceeding against the applicant on the charges brought on 14 March 2017 (see paragraph 33 above), on 23 June 2017 a sworn expert in psychiatry drew up a report on the applicant’s condition. 47. In her examination, the expert relied, inter alia, on the contents of the case file concerning the suspicion of theft against the applicant. This material included depositions by her brother. 48. The expert established that, at the time of the suspected offence, the applicant had been between sub-average intellectual ability and a mild mental retardation. However, this had not prevented her from understanding the unlawfulness of her actions and from controlling them. At the time of the examination, the applicant was suffering from an organic mental disorder, which presented as a mild cognitive impairment and retrograde amnesia, due to craniocerebral trauma. Her intellectual level was mild, or at worst moderate, mental retardation, the precise level being impossible to establish in view of the applicant’s attitude towards the examination. Nevertheless, in conclusion, the applicant was found to be unable to comprehend the reason for the criminal proceedings against her. 49. It appears that the criminal proceedings against the applicant have been terminated, but no details have been submitted to the Court in that respect. THE LAW
        PRELIMINARY REMARKS
50. The present case concerns facts that partly took place in the police car and partly at the police station. The former allegedly concerned ill-treatment. The latter essentially involved a situation in which the applicant’s life was allegedly put at risk. The domestic authorities treated these two sets of facts in two separate sets of proceedings. 51. The Court is of the opinion that, to the extent the alleged incident in the police car and the incident at the police station are interrelated, a holistic assessment of the applicant’s complaints in respect of each of them requires that they be examined together as follows. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION
52. Relying on Articles 2, 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that (i) she had been verbally and physically mistreated during her transport to the police station and while being detained there, (ii) the State had failed to provide a plausible explanation of the incident at the police station and to take adequate steps to protect her health and life during her detention there, (iii) the State had failed to conduct an effective investigation into these matters, (iv) the Constitutional Court had misconceived and arbitrarily rejected her complaint, and (v) she had been denied an effective remedy in that connection. 53. The Court finds that, on the facts of the case, these allegations fall to be examined under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, which read as follows:
Article 2
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
Article 3
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
AdmissibilityThe parties’ submissions

(a)   The Government
54. As to the applicability of Article 2, the Government pointed out that the present case did not involve loss of life and that the applicant’s injuries had not required surgery but merely a conservative treatment. 55. The Government also alleged non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on a multitude of grounds as follows. 56. The applicant had failed to challenge the decisions concluding the investigation (see paragraphs 33 and 36 above) by way of an interlocutory appeal. It was true that she had sought a review of the decision concerning the alleged incident in the police car by the PPS, but this was not considered to be an effective remedy for the purposes of being allowed to have her grievances examined by the Constitutional Court. 57. In addition, the applicant’s constitutional complaint had concerned the investigation regarding the alleged incident in the police car, mentioning the incident at the police station only very generally. As to any grievances in relation to the latter incident, she should have lodged a separate constitutional complaint or have specifically mentioned the incident at the police station as a part of the object of her constitutional complaint of 20 November 2018 in order to enable the Constitutional Court to examine both matters in context. 58. Furthermore, the applicant could and should have asserted her rights in the civil courts by means of an action for the protection of personal integrity and claims for damages under the Police Corps Act and under the general law of tort. Such claims would have found support in the investigator’s finding that Officer A. had failed to discharge his duties when guarding the applicant. 59. The Government also argued that, despite investigative efforts compatible with any applicable requirements, it had not been shown that the applicant had been exposed to any ill-treatment. (b)   The applicant
60. The applicant responded by contending that her injuries had been life‑threatening and acknowledging that she had not challenged the decisions concluding the investigation by an interlocutory appeal. As for the incident at the police station, since she had had witness as opposed to victim status, she had never been informed of the outcome of the proceedings and had accordingly been unable to challenge it other than before the Constitutional Court, which she had done. As to the alleged incident in the police car, the PPS review had been in substance equivalent to one carried out on an interlocutory appeal and neither the Constitutional Court nor any of the other authorities involved had ever questioned this. 61. As to the other remedies referred to by the Government, the applicant pointed out their civil-law nature and argued that, as such, they fell short of the requirement that there be a criminal-law remedy, which in her submission applied on the facts of her case. Even if there were a choice of remedies, having chosen one that was apparently effective and sufficient, she had not been required to make use of another that was available but not more likely to be successful. Furthermore, as she had been denied the procedural standing of a victim in the proceedings concerning the incident at the police station, and having only learned of their outcome from the Government’s observations before the Court, she had been unable to bring any tort claim on the basis of the investigation’s finding of negligence on the part of Officer A. At the same time, as she had not had victim status in those proceedings, she had had no access to the relevant case file and had accordingly been unable to rely on any material therein concerning the incident at the police station. This was of particular relevance for her, as she had no recollection of her own as to what had happened at the police station. 62. Nevertheless, referring to the submissions of her brother, the applicant argued that it was likely that her ill-treatment in the police car had continued at the police station. 63. In addition, she contended that there was no indication that, at the time of the restriction of her liberty, she had been informed about her situation in a manner adapted to her specific needs and in the presence of a support person. Any treatment she had been exposed to at the police station had been marked by the lack of procedural accommodations called for by the special needs inherent in her particular situation. As demonstrated by the course of her subsequent questioning in the ensuing investigation, those needs were clearly discernible and identifying and responding to them had not required of the arresting officers to diagnose her mental capacity. (c)   The third-party interveners
64. The third-party interveners the HPOD and the CDLP argued that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities amplified the obligations enshrined in the Convention, in particular as regards the Contracting Parties’ positive obligations to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, to investigate effectively all complaints of ill-treatment of such persons, to involve them effectively in such investigations by providing them with appropriate procedural accommodations, and not to discriminate on the basis of disability. 65. In its third-party comments, Validity asserted that intellectual disability was associated with a number of systemic disadvantages, which was further exacerbated in the case of women and children. It argued that the refusal of appropriate accommodations to such persons might amount to ill‑treatment and that, for such persons to have access to justice, it was of particular importance (i) to have access to information and communication adapted to their specific needs, (ii) to be afforded legal aid and a support person in the proceedings, and (iii) to be heard and allowed to participate in the proceedings.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 2
Outcome: violation