FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF RUBLEV v. UKRAINE(Application no. 17368/10)      JUDGMENT STRASBOURG11 December 2025  This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of Rublev v. Ukraine,The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Andreas Zünd, President, Diana Sârcu, Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,Having deliberated in private on 20 November 2025,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:PROCEDURE1. The case originated in an application against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 25 March 2010.2. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the application.THE FACTS3. The applicant’s details and information relevant to the application are set out in the appended table.4. The applicant complained of the excessive length of his pre-trial detention. He also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention.THE LAWTHE LOCUS STANDI OF MR YEVGENIY VLADIMIROVICH RUBLEV5. The Court notes that the applicant died on 10 November 2016, while the case was pending before the Court. The applicant’s father, Mr Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Rublev, has requested to pursue the application on his late son’s behalf. The Court points out that in various cases, where applicants have died in the course of the proceedings, it has taken into account the wishes of their heirs or close members of their families to pursue the proceedings before the Court (see, for example, Jama v. Slovenia, no. 48163/08, § 28, 19 July 2012 and Ghavalyan v. Armenia, no. 50423/08, §§ 59-60, 22 October 2020). It sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case and, therefore, accepts that the applicant’s father, Mr Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Rublev, can pursue the application initially brought by his son. However, reference will still be made to the applicant throughout the present judgment.ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION6. The applicant complained principally that his pre-trial detention had been unreasonably long. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.7. The Court observes that the general principles regarding the right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, as guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, have been stated in a number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110, ECHR 2000‑XI, and McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006‑X, with further references).8. In the leading cases of Kharchenko v. Ukraine (no. 40107/02, 10 February 2011) and Ignatov v. Ukraine (no. 40583/15, 15 December 2016), the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case.9. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of these complaints. Having regard to its case-law on the subject (see, for instance, mutatis mutandis, Kobernik v. Ukraine, no. 45947/06, § 50-52, 25 July 2013), the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention was excessive even after deducting the period during which the applicant was serving a custodial sentence imposed by the first-instance court, which was subsequently quashed (see, for instance, Svershov v. Ukraine, no. 35231/02, § 60 27 November 2008).10. The applicant submitted other complaints which also raised issues under the Convention, given the relevant well-established case-law of the Court (see appended table). These complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other ground.

Article of the Convention at issue: Article 6
Outcome: violation