存在與時間

**存在與時間**（），1927年，係德國哲學家海德格最重要之作。雖然寫得好趕，而且完成唔到佢喺導言勾勒出嘅計劃，呢部書深刻影響二十世紀哲學，尤其係存在主義、詮釋學同埋解構主義。

## 導言同埋概括
### 存在 / Sein / Being
《存在同埋時間》第一頁，海德格咁樣描述項計劃： 「切實整理 ()「存在」嘅意義 () 嘅問題係以下論文嘅目標。」 海德格聲稱，傳統本體論有偏見咁忽略咗呢條問題，以其太廣泛、定義唔到、或明顯而拒絶渠。

反而，海德格提議 別於任何特定存在嘅嘢 咁去理解存在 「『存在』唔係件好似一件存在嘅嘢。」 海德格聲稱：「存在，係樣決定存在嘅嘢之所為存在嘅嘢嘅嘢，而透過渠，存在嘅嘢已被理解。」  海德格想揾出啲條件，透過渠任何特定嘅嘢之所以可以然。  

若我地捉到存在，我哋就會理清存在嘅意思同意義，其中「意義」(德文：Sinn，英文：sense）海德格指「藉住渠一樣嘢變成 可以理解做一樣嘢。」   據海德格話，由於呢種存在意義先過 任何存在嘅嘢(beings)所以存在(exist)嘅概念 ，渠係先概念、先命題，所以係先科學嘅。 係乜。 同時，除咗啲存在嘢 (beings) 本身，再無任何去到存在嘅辦法 (access to being) —— 要寫低存在之問 (the question of being) 即係要問「一個」存在 關於渠自己嘅存在。 因為呢種解釋係先過邏輯嘅，而且因為要明白存在只有 通過討論某啲特定嘅存在嘅嘢 一種途徑，研究存在嘅方法必然，海德格話，涉及某種詮釋圈，即係話，涉及解釋。 「現象學描述 嘅方法學意義 係 『解釋』(*interpretation*) 。」

### ''Dasein''
所以，海德格響《存在同埋時間》導言中問嘅問題係：乜嘢係嗰樣存在，可以畀（我地）接觸到 關於存在嘅意思嘅問題？海德格嘅答案係：渠只可能係嗰樣嘢，存在嘅問題對渠係重要嘅，對渠來講存在係有份量嘅。 呢個答案顯示，認為being 係問題嘅嗰樣being 唔係個「乜」，而係個「邊個」。 海德格叫呢樣 being 做「Dasein」（一個普通嘅德文字，意思大概係「（人嘅）存在」或者直譯做「係－嗰度」(英文 *being-there*)），而 *Being and Time* 入面用嘅方法就係試探 *Dasein* 嘅特徵， 嚟探索  being 本身。*Dasein* 唔係 「人」（"man"），但又唔係「人」以外嘅任何嘢 — 就係因呢種分野 (*distinction*)，海德格可以話《存在同埋時間》唔係部「哲學人類學」 (*philosophical anthropology*)。

海德格嘅 *Dasein* 嘅解釋，經過解剖 *Angst*嘅經驗同埋mortality，跟住過  "care"  as such 結構嘅分析。 由嗰度佢提出  "authenticity" 嘅問題，即係話mortal *Dasein*有無可能 (potentiality or otherwise) 存在「夠」(fully enough) 到佢可能真係明 being。海德格喺全書都好明：冇嘢保證 *Dasein*「係」有呢種理解能力嘅。

### 時
最後，一 *Dasein* 嘅「真實性」(*authenticity*) 問題離唔開*Dasein*嘅「歷史性」(*historicallity*)。 一方面，*Dasein* 係會死嘅 (mortal)，由生「拉」"stretched along" 到死，被氹落呢個世界，即係話，氹入佢嘅咁多「可能性」(*possibilities*)，呢啲可能性 *Dasein* 要負責做 (?*assuming*)。 另一方面， *Dasein's* access to this world and these possibilities is always via a history and a tradition—this is the question of "world historicality," and among its consequences is Heidegger's argument that *Dasein's* potential for authenticity lies in the possibility of choosing a "hero."

咁，再廣泛啲講， the outcome of the progression of Heidegger's argument is the thought that the being of *Dasein* is time. Nevertheless, Heidegger concludes his work with a set of enigmatic questions foreshadowing the necessity of a destruction (that is, a transformation) of the history of philosophy in relation to temporality—these were the questions to be taken up in the never completed continuation of his project:

The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial *time* to the meaning of *being*? Does *time* itself reveal itself as the horizon of *being*?

## 海德格同胡塞爾嘅現象學
雖然海德格話自己喺《存在同埋時間》係用現象學嘅方法， 不過佢同胡塞爾現象學嘅關係就好複雜。The fact that Heidegger believes that ontology includes an irreducible hermeneutic (interpretative) aspect, for example, might be thought to run counter to Husserl's claim that phenomenological description is capable of a form of scientific positivity. On the other hand, however, several aspects of the approach and method of *Being and Time* can be seen more directly in relation to Husserl's work.

The central Husserlian concept of the directedness of all thought—intentionality—for example, while scarcely mentioned in *Being and Time*, has been identified by some with Heidegger's central notion of "*Sorge*" (Cura, care or concern). But for Heidegger, *theoretical* knowledge represents only one kind of intentional behaviour, and he asserts that it is grounded in more fundamental modes of behaviour and forms of practical engagement with the surrounding world. Whereas a theoretical understanding of things grasps them according to "presence," for example, this may conceal that our first experience of a being may be in terms of its being "ready-to-hand." Thus, for instance, when someone reaches for a tool such as a hammer, their understanding of what a hammer is is not determined by a theoretical understanding of its presence, but by the fact that it is something we need at the moment we wish to do hammering. Only a *later* understanding might come to contemplate a hammer *as* an object. There is thus a sense in which this kind of argument, although very different from Husserlian phenomenology, nevertheless resembles it, to the extent that what is involved is a kind of *suspension* of the everyday understanding of what it means to experience beings in the world.

## 拒笛卡兒
This also necessitated a rejection of the Cartesian, disembodied Cogito: that is, an 'I' as a purely thinking object. 代之，海德格堅持，任何人類行為嘅分析都應由「我哋係喺世界入面」呢一事實開始 (not viewing it in an 'abstract' fashion): therefore the fundamental fact about human existence is our 'being-in-the-world'. Human beings, or Dasein (German" *da*—there/here; *sein*—being or its; *dasein*—existence), Heidegger insisted, are embodied beings who act in the world.  He therefore rejected the 'subject-object' distinction assumed by most philosophers since Descartes and so rejected terms like Consciousness, ego, human being, Man, which are so laden with Cartesian dualism that, for his purposes, they are practically useless.  Instead he uses the German portmanteau, Dasein.

Things are meaningful to us in terms of their use in certain contexts, which are defined by social, that is mainly practical, norms. However, all of these norms are radically contingent.  Their contingency is revealed in the fundamental phenomenon of Angst, in which all norms fall away and beings show up as nothing in particular, in their essential meaninglessness.  (Contrary to some existentialist interpretations of Heidegger, this does not mean that all existence is absurd; rather, it means that existence always has the *potential* for absurdity.)  The experience of Angst reveals the essential finitude of Dasein.

## '''真'''作為 '''Aletheia'''
The fact that beings can show up, either as meaningful in a context or as meaningless in the experience of Angst, depends on a prior phenomenon: that beings can show up at all.  Heidegger calls the showing up of beings, truth, which he defines as unconcealment rather than correctness or correspondence.  This "truth of beings", their self-revelation, involves a more fundamental kind of truth, the "disclosure of being in which the being of beings is unconcealed.", in Greek, aletheia.  

It is this unconcealment of being that defines Dasein for Heidegger: Dasein is that being for whom being is an issue, that is, for whom being shows up as such. This is why Heidegger begins his inquiry into the meaning of being with an inquiry into the essence of Dasein; The unconcealment of being is an essentially temporal and historical phenomenon (hence the "time" in *Being and Time*); what we call past, present, and future correspond originarily to aspects of this unconcealment and not to three mutually exclusive regions of the homogeneous time that clocks measure (although clock-time is derivative from the originary time of unconcealment, as Heidegger attempts to show in the book's difficult final chapters).

## 詮釋學
The total understanding of being results from an explication of the implicit knowledge of being that inheres in Dasein.  Philosophy thus becomes a form of interpretation; this is why Heidegger's technique in *Being and Time* is often referred to as hermeneutical phenomenology.  *Being and Time*, being incomplete, contains Heidegger's statement of this project and his interpretation of Dasein and its temporal horizon, but does not contain the working out of the meaning of being as such on the basis of this interpretation.  This ambitious task is taken up in a different way in his later works (see below) and had a profound influence on his student Hans-Georg Gadamer.

## 哲學嘅衰嘢
對海德格，哲學嘅衰嘢唔係 重未有外在於我地嘅世界（存在）嘅證明，而係從未有人去揾呢個證明。 At the same time his own project is hugely ambitious, in that he is interested not in the being of certain things, such as are studied in various (ontical) categories such as, biology, physics, psychology, and history, but in the question of being in general (the ontological question), of why or how there is something rather than nothing.  Being in general is the most difficult because, like a smell that was always in our nose, it is almost always there, it is closest and for the most part there.  Only in a state of anxiety (and not fear, which is fear of something in particular), where the whole world itself is pushed away, can we see something of this and get some authentic sight of it, before we again take up some activity and get lost in it.

At the same time that he tackles these soaring questions, he does so in a most practical way, by looking at how we encounter the world in a concrete and non-theoretical manner, how history and tradition affect us and are created by us, in effect how we live together and how our language and meaning is shaped through history by us.  Though such a project might remind one of Hegel's pragmatism, Heidegger attempts to do this without resorting to any ideas of positing some overall goal of historical progress toward some Absolute, nor does he talk of the sublation (*[[Aufhebung]]*) of contradictions in some higher unity.

## Presence嘅哲學
His view inverts the traditional priority of theory over practice.  For him the theoretical view is artificial and comes from just looking at something without any involvement, such an experience is 'levelled off'.   For Heidegger this attitude is given the moniker, "present-at-hand" and it is parasitic upon our more fundamental mode of interaction, called "ready-to-hand".  Parasitic in the sense that in our history we must first have an attitude or mood toward the world before we can adopt a scientific or neutral attitude toward it.  Such a re-evaluation of science allows him to say, for example, that the friend caught sight of across the road is in fact closer than the street upon which one walks, that the voice on a phone is closer than the handpiece, that the glasses pushed back on your head, can be, when not found, considered as remote and far away.

## Being-with
In addition to present-at-hand and ready-to-hand there is a third mode for Dasein, being-with, that is essential to Dasein.  For example, a field that we may carefully walk around so as not to damage the crops or compact the soil, is ready-to-hand but shows itself also as belonging to someone and cared for by someone. We do not just add this person, "in thought," to the field we see because the farmer(s) already show themselves with the field through its improvements as the object of their care.  Likewise, we may hear a scream, not as a noise or a sense-datum, but as someone in distress. 

There is a dark side, however, to "being-with": referring to the "They", as in "they say it was carried out by terrorists."  Heidegger notes that there is a tendency with assertions in general to simply pass it along without any context, as is the case with news or gossip. Essentially, the idea of the "They" (Das Man) explores the existential notions of what is authentic or inauthentic.

## Time, Temporality
用新嘅途徑去考察時間。 海德格話自從亞里士多德，大家都用差唔多同一種途徑去解譯時。 However, time in a primordial, that is a practical, sense, is always the time of something or time for something. We are involved in the world, in projects, and these swallow up time; for example, we open doors without explicitly giving time to it. The present emerges not out of itself but as the time we must act or not act, as a finite being we are always being-towards-death, being itself is an issue for us. Similarly, the past, through tradition, is transmitted to us or rejected by us, but we are thrown into a certain time; one cannot choose to be a genuine Samurai warrior in the twenty first century. The variety of ways time can be thought out, e.g., in Aristotle's simplistic past-present-future, and these others ways of thinking it out are referred to as temporality.

## 形上學嘅解構
As part of his ontological project, Heidegger undertakes a reinterpretation of previous Western philosophy. He wants to explain why and how theoretical knowledge came to seem like the most fundamental relation to being. This explanation takes the form of a destructuring (*[[Destruktion]]*) of the philosophical tradition, an interpretive strategy that reveals the fundamental experience of being at the base of previous philosophies that had become entrenched and hidden within the theoretical attitude prevalent in the history of philosophy in its metaphysics of presence. Such "destruktion", is to be read not only in its negative sense but also in the positive sense of recovery. In *Being and Time* he briefly destructures the philosophy of Descartes though the second half of the book which was intended to be a *Destruktion* was never written; in later works he uses this approach to interpret the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Plato, among others. This technique exerted a profound influence on Derrida's deconstructive approach, although there are very important differences between the two methods.

時間

最後，Dasein 嘅「真實性」問題，離唔開佢嘅「歷史性」。
一方面，Dasein 會死。由生到死，好似一路被拉長。佢被拋入世界，同時被拋入各種「可能性」。呢啲可能性要由佢自己承擔。

另一方面，Dasein 接觸世界同可能性，必然經由歷史同傳統。呢個就係「世界歷史性」問題。海德格認為，Dasein 要達到真實性，可以選擇一位「英雄」作為典範。

更廣泛咁講，海德格論證嘅結果係：Dasein 嘅存在本身就係時間。不過佢喺書尾提出幾個難題，指出要對哲學史作一次「解構」或轉化，特別係關於時間性。呢啲問題原本留待未完成嘅續篇處理：

Dasein 整體嘅存在結構建基於時間性。因此，一種原初嘅時間化方式，令存在嘅投射成為可能。呢種時間化應該點理解？可唔可以由原初「時間」通向「存在」嘅意義？時間本身會唔會就係存在嘅視域？

海德格同胡塞爾嘅現象學

海德格話《存在同時間》用現象學方法，但佢同胡塞爾嘅關係好複雜。

海德格認為，本體論包含不可還原嘅詮釋面向。呢點似乎同胡塞爾講嘅「科學式描述」有衝突。不過，《存在同時間》亦明顯承繼咗胡塞爾嘅方法。

胡塞爾嘅核心概念係「意向性」。海德格少提呢個詞，但有人認為佢嘅「Sorge」（關懷）同意向性有關。不過海德格指出，理論知識只係其中一種行為方式，而且建基於更基本嘅實踐活動。

例如理論上理解事物為「在場」，可能遮蔽我哋最初嘅經驗。當一個人攞起鎚仔時，佢唔係先理論分析鎚仔，而係直接用佢。鎚仔首先係「隨手可用」，唔係抽象對象。之後先可能當佢係一件物件去思考。呢種做法同胡塞爾唔同，但同樣暫停日常理解。

拒笛卡兒

海德格拒絕笛卡兒式「純思考我」。佢強調，人本身就「在世存在」。我哋唔係抽象主體，而係活喺世界入面嘅存在。佢亦反對主客二分，唔再用「意識」「自我」「人」等帶有二元論色彩嘅詞，而用「Dasein」。

事物嘅意義來自實踐脈絡，同社會規範有關。但呢啲規範都係偶然。喺「焦慮」入面，一切規範會崩解，事物顯得冇特定意義。呢唔代表存在荒謬，而係存在有荒謬嘅可能。焦慮顯示 Dasein 嘅有限性。

「真」作為 Aletheia

事物可以顯現為有意義或冇意義，前提係佢哋能夠顯現。海德格稱呢種顯現為「真」。真唔係正確對應，而係「去蔽」。希臘文叫 aletheia。

Dasein 就係能夠讓存在顯現嘅存在者。所以海德格由 Dasein 入手討論存在意義。存在嘅顯現本質上係時間同歷史性嘅。過去、現在、未來並非鐘錶時間嘅三段，而係顯現嘅不同面向。

詮釋學

對存在嘅理解，來自闡明 Dasein 本有嘅隱含知識。哲學因此成為詮釋。《存在同時間》提出計劃，但未完成。後期著作用其他方式繼續。佢影響咗學生伽達默爾。

哲學嘅衰嘢

對海德格而言，問題唔係冇證明外在世界存在，而係冇人追問點解要證明。
佢關心嘅唔係某類存在者，而係「存在本身」點解會有。存在太貼近我哋，所以反而難察覺。只有喺焦慮中，世界退開，我哋先稍為見到存在。

同時，佢由具體生活出發，討論歷史、傳統、語言點樣形塑我哋。呢點或令人想起黑格爾，但海德格唔講歷史必然進步或絕對精神。

Presence 嘅哲學

海德格顛倒理論優先於實踐嘅傳統。理論態度其實建基於更原初嘅實踐模式。
「在手」同「隨手可用」係兩種模式。理論態度寄生於實踐。

例如馬路對面嘅朋友，可能比腳下條街更「接近」。電話入面把聲，比聽筒更近。

Being-with

除咗在手同隨手可用，仲有「與人共在」。

例如一塊田地顯示出有人耕作。農夫唔係之後加上去，而係已經喺田地之中顯現。
聽到尖叫，我哋聽到嘅唔只係聲音，而係有人受苦。

但「與人共在」亦有陰暗面，即「人哋都係咁講」嘅「他們」（Das Man）。好多說法只係無脈絡咁流傳。呢個概念涉及真實同不真實嘅區分。

Time, Temporality

海德格用新方法討論時間。自亞里士多德以來，多數人用相近方式理解時間。但原初時間總係「為某事而有」。我哋投入計劃，時間因此展開。

現在係行動嘅時機。人作為向死而在嘅存在，存在本身成為問題。
過去經由傳統傳承，我哋被拋入某個時代，無法任意選擇。

時間嘅多種理解方式稱為「時間性」。

形上學嘅解構

作為本體論計劃一部分，海德格重新詮釋西方哲學傳統。佢指出理論知識點樣成為主導。呢種做法叫「解構」（Destruktion）。目的唔只是否定，而係回復原初經驗。

《存在同時間》簡略處理笛卡兒。原本計劃嘅下半部未寫成。後期著作再解讀亞里士多德、康德、黑格爾、柏拉圖等。呢種方法深刻影響德里達，不過兩者仍有重要差異。

## 第啲嘢做
*Being and Time* 係海德格早期最重要嘅成就，但佢喺呢時期重有第啲嘢做咗出來，包括一啲出版嘅演講有： *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*（《現象學嘅基本問題》，1927年）、*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* （《康德同形而上學嘅問題》，1929年）、 *Was ist Metaphysik?*（《形而上學係乜？》，1929年）。

## 註


## 參攷
* Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, in Heidegger's ''Gesamtausgabe'', volume 2, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p.
* Martin Heidegger, ''Being and Time'', trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (London: SCM Press, 1962).
* Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).
* Robert Bernasconi, "'The Double Concept of Philosophy' and the Place of Ethics in *Being and Time*," *Heidegger in Question: The Art of Existing* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993).
* Jacques Derrida, "*Ousia* and *Gramme*: Note on a Note from *Being and Time*," *Margins of Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
* Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's* Being and Time, *Division I* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, & London: MIT Press, 1990).
* Christopher Fynsk, *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1993, expanded edn.), ch. 1.
* Magda King, *A Guide to Heidegger’s* Being and Time, edited by John Llewelyn (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).
* Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).
* William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), ch. 3-4.
* Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Decision of Existence," *The Birth to Presence* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).