Krisis hutang kerajaan Yunani

**Krisis hutang pemerintah Yunani** ialah salah satu daripada beberapa krisis hutang Eropah semasa.

Bermula pada akhir 2009, kebimbangan mengenai krisis hutang negara muncul di kalangan pelabur mengenai keupayaan Yunani untuk memenuhi kewajipan hutang disebabkan oleh peningkatan tinggi dalam tahap hutang pemerintah. Ini membawa kepada krisis keyakinan, ditandakan dengan pelebaran rebakan hasil bon dan kos insurans risiko pertukaran mungkir kredit berbanding negara lain, terutamanya Jerman. Penurunan hutang pemerintah Yunani ke status bon kualiti rendah pada April 2010 menimbulkan kecemasan dalam pasaran kewangan. Pada 2 Mei 2010, negara zon euro dan IMF mempersetujui pinjaman €110  untuk Yunani, tertakluk kepada pelaksanaan langkah-langkah penjimatan keras. Pada bulan Oktober 2011, pemimpin zon Euro bersetuju menawarkan pinjaman kedua, €130 bilion bagi keperluan kewangan Yunani bagi tahun fiskal 2012 dan 2013. Selain langkah penjimatan, pinjaman ini mensyaratkan semua pemiutang bersetuju langkah penstrukturan semula hutang Yunani. Tempoh pembayaran semula dilanjutkan kepada 15 tahun, kadar faedah diturnkan kepada 3.5%, dan pemegang bon menerima penghapusan nilai nominal 50% hutang mereka. Yunani perlu menerima syarat ini selewat-lewatnya Mac 2012, atau "mungkir negara" akan diisytiharkan.

Di sidang kemuncak EU pada 2011, para pemimpin mengambil dua langkah bagi mengurangkan risiko menularnya krisis ini, sekiranya Yunani mungkir. Langkah tersebut ialah meningkatkan EFSF kepada €1 trilion dan mewajibkan bank-bank Eropah untuk mencapai permodalan 9% bagi agar cukup kukuh dan dapat menyerap kerugian.

## Sebab

Ekonomi Yunani adalah salah satu ekonomi yang paling pesat berkembang dalam zon euro dalam tempoh 2000-2007 dengan peningkatan pada kadar tahunan sebanyak 4.2% hasil kemasukan modal asing ke dalam negara ini.  Ekonomi yang kukuh dan kejatuhan kadar hasil bon membenarkan pemerintah Yunani untuk menjalankan besar defisit struktur.

Menurut kepada editorial yang disiarkan oleh akhbar sayap kanan Yunani , defisit awam yang besar adalah salah satu ciri-ciri yang telah ditanda model sosial dalam bahasa Yunani sejak pemulihan demokrasi pada tahun 1974. Selepas penyingkiran junta tentera sayap kanan, pemerintah mahu membawa gerakan penentang yang kuat bahagian berhaluan kiri penduduk dalam arus perdana ekonomi.  Untuk berbuat demikian, pemerintah Yunani berturut-turut, antara lain, kebiasaan berjalan defisit yang besar untuk membiayai pekerjaan di sektor awam, pencen, dan lain-lain faedah sosial. Sejak tahun 1994, nisbah hutang kepada KDNK kekal melebihi 94%. Dalam kegawatan Krisis Kewangan Global ia berkembang pesat di atas paras maksimum yang tidak lestari untuk Yunani (ditakrifkan oleh majoriti ahli ekonomi untuk menjadi 120%). Menurut* "Program Pelarasan Ekonomi untuk Yunani" "yang diterbitkan oleh Suruhanjaya EU pada bulan Oktober 2011, paras hutang dijangka untuk mencapai tahap yang tidak lestari 181% pada tahun 2012.*

Pada mulanya, mata wang penurunan nilai membantu membiayai pinjaman. Selepas pengenalan euro pada bulan Januari 2001, Yunani pada mulanya dapat meneruskan tahap pinjaman, kerana faedah yang lebih rendah kadar bon pemerintah boleh memberi perintah, dalam kombinasi dengan siri yang panjang kadar pertumbuhan yang kukuh KDNK di Yunani. Masalah bagaimanapun mula meningkat, apabila Krisis Kewangan Global memuncak dengan kesan negatif yang memukul semua ekonomi negara pada September 2008. Krisis Kewangan Global mempunyai impak khususnya besar negatif ke atas kadar pertumbuhan Keluaran Dalam Negara Kasar (KDNK) di Yunani. Dua industri terbesar di negara ini ialah pelancongan dan perkapalan, dan kedua-dua terjejas teruk oleh kemelesetan, dengan pendapatan yang jatuh 15% pada tahun 2009. Satu lagi masalah yang konsisten Yunani telah mengalami dalam beberapa dekad kebelakangan ini, cukai pendapatan pemerintah. Setiap tahun ia beberapa kali di bawah paras yang dijangka. Pada tahun 2010, pengelakan cukai bagi anggaran kos pemerintah Yunani berjumlah lebih $20  setahun.

Untuk memastikan dalam tempoh garis panduan kesatuan kewangan, pemerintah Yunani mempunyai juga selama bertahun-tahun misreported statistik rasmi ekonomi negara. At the beginning 2010, it was discovered that Yunani had paid Goldman Sachs dan other banks hundreds millions dollars in fees since 2001, for arranging transactions that hid the actual level borrowing. Tujuan tawaran yang dibuat oleh beberapa pemerintah Yunani berturut-turut, adalah untuk membolehkan mereka untuk terus berbelanja, manakala menyembunyikan defisit sebenar dari EU. Seperti yang dilaporkan dalam jadual di bawah, statistik yang disemak semula menunjukkan bahawa Yunani pada setiap tahun dari tahun 2000-2010 telah melebihi kriteria kestabilan Euro, dengan defisit tahunan yang melebihi had maksimum yang disyorkan pada 3.0% daripada KDNK, dan juga paras hutang dengan jelas melebihihad yang disyorkan pada 60% daripada KDNK.

Pada Februari 2010, pemerintah baru George Papandreou (dipilih pada bulan Oktober 2009), menyemak semula defisit 2009 daripada% sebelum ini dianggarkan 5% yang membimbangkan 12.7 daripada KDNK.  Pada Mei 2010, pemerintah Yunani deficit was dianggarkan to be 13.6% which is one the highest in the world relative to GDP. pemerintah Yunani hutang was dianggarkan at €216  in January 2010. Hutang pemerintah terkumpul telah diramalkan, mengikut sesetengah anggaran, mencecah 120% daripada KDNK pada tahun 2010.  Pasaran bon pemerintah Yunani bergantung kepada pelabur asing, dengan beberapa anggaran mencadangkan bahawa sehingga kepada 70% daripada bon pemerintah Yunani diadakan luaran.

Walaupun dalam krisis, lelongan bon pemerintah Yunani pada Januari 2010, mempunyai jumlah yang ditawarkan €8bn 5 tahun bon lebih dilanggan oleh empat kali. Pada lelongan seterusnya Mac, Financial Times lagi katanya: *"dijual Athens € 5bn dalam bPada 10 tahun dan menerima pesanan untuk tiga kali ganda amaun"*. Lelongan terus berjaya dan penjualan bon, Walau bagaimanapun, hanya boleh dilakukan pada kos peningkatan hasil, yang pulangan menyebabkan semakin teruk lagi defisit awam Yunani. Hasilnya, agensi penarafan akhirnya menurunkan ekonomi Yunani status ringan pada akhir April 2010. Dari segi praktikal ini menyebabkan pasaran modal swasta untuk membekukan, supaya semua keperluan kewangan Yunani kini sebaliknya terpaksa dilindungi oleh pinjaman menyelamatkan antarabangsa, untuk mengelakkan [lalai berdaulat]]. 

1 Tahun kemasukan ke dalam Zon Eropah. 2 Anggaran dan Unjuran yang diterbitkan pada bulan Okt-Dis.2011.

Anggaran flash rasmi pertama bagi pertumbuhan KDNK pada tahun 2011, berdasarkan akaun awam untuk semua 4 suku dan dikira bagi tahun secara purata, menunjukkan bahawa KDNK pada harga malar merosot -6,8%. Ini adalah lebih teruk berbanding unjuran sebelumnya pada -5.5%, dan berpotensi memanggil keperluan untuk meningkatkan lagi yang € terkini 130bn bailout bungkusan, sedang dirundingkan pada bulan Februari 2012.

## Penurunan taraf hutang
Pada 27 April 2010, penarafan hutang Yunani telah menurun kepada tahap atas "kualiti rendah" status by Standard & Poor's amidst hints default by pemerintah Yunani. Yields pada pemerintah Yunani two-year bonds rose hingga 15.3% following the downgrading.  Some analysts continue to question Yunani's ability to refinance its hutang. Standard & Poor's estimates that in the event default investors would fail to get 30–50% their money back. Stock markets worldwide declined in response to this announcement.

Following downgradings by Fitch dan Moody's, as well as Standard & Poor's, Yunani bond yields rose pada tahun 2010, both in absolute terms dan relative to German bon pemerintah. Yields have risen, particularly in the wake successive ratings downgrading. According to *[[The Wall Street Journal]]*, "dengan only a handful bonds changing hands, the meaning the bond move isn't so clear."

On 3 May 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) suspended its minimum threshold for Yunani hutang "until further notice", meaning the bonds will remain eligible as collateral even dengan junk status. The decision will guarantee Yunani banks' access to cheap central bank funding, dan analysts said it should juga help increase Yunani bonds' attractiveness to investors.  Following the introduction these langkah-langkah the yield pada bPada 10 tahun Yunani menurun kepada 8.5%, 550 basis points above German yields, down from 800 basis points earlier. As 22 September 2011, bPada 10 tahun Yunani diperdagangkan pada hasil efektif bernilai 23.6%, more than double the amount the year before.

## Langkah pembendungan
### Oleh pemerintah Yunani
Yunani adopted a numberPakej penjimatans since 2010. According to research published pada 5 May 2010 by Citibank, the fiscal tightening is "unexpectedly tough". It will amount to a total €30&nbsp;bilion (i.e. 12.5% 2009 Yunani GDP) dan consist 5% GDP tightening pada tahun 2010 dan a further 4% tightening pada tahun 2011.

#### Pakej penjimatan pertama – Februari 2010
The first round came dengan the signing the memorandums dengan the IMF dan the ECB concerning a loan €80&nbsp;bilion. The package was implemented pada 9 Februari 2010 dan termasuk a freeze in the salaries all government employees, a 10% potongan in bonuses, as well as potongan kepada overtime workers, public employees dan work-related travels.

#### Pakej penjimatan kedua– March/April 2010
On 5 Mac 2010, amid new fears bankruptcy, Parlimen Yunani meluluskan the "Economy Protection Bill", which was expected to save another €4.8&nbsp;bilion. The langkah-langkah termasuk (in addition to the above): 30% potongan kepada Christmas, Easter dan leave absence bonuses, a further 12% potongan in public bonuses, a 7% potongan in the salaries public dan private employees, a rise VAT from 4.5% to 5%, from 9% hingga 10% dan daripada 19% to 21%, a rise tax pada petrol hingga 15%, a rise in the (already existing) cukai pada imported cars up hingga 10%–30%, among others.

On 23 April 2010, after realizing the pakej penjimatan kedua gagal to improve the country's economic position, pemerintah Yunani requested that the EU/International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout package be activated. Yunani needed money before 19 May, or it would face a hutang roll over $11.3bn. The IMF had said it was "prepared to move expeditiously pada this request". 

Shortly after the European Commission, the IMF dan ECB set up a tripartite committee (the Troika) to prepare an appropriate rancangan economic policies underlying a massive loan. The Troika was led by Servaas Deroose, from the European Commission, dan termasuk juga Poul Thomsen (IMF) dan Klaus Masuch (ECB) as junior partners. In return pemerintah Yunani agreed to implement further langkah-langkah.

#### Pakej penjimatan ketiga – Mei 2010
Pada 1 Mei 2010, Perdana Menteri George Papandreou mengumumkan satu lagi pusingan langkah penjimatan yang disebut "tidak pernah dijangka". Cadangan perubahan, yang bertujuan untuk menjimatkan €38  sepanjang 2012, mewakili baik pulih pemerintah yang terbesar dalam satu generasi. The bill was submitted to Parlimen pada 4 May dan approved pada separate votes pada 29 dan 30 Jun. It was met dengan a nationwide general strike dan massive protests the following day, dengan tiga people being killed, dozens injured, dan 107 arrested.

The langkah-langkah termasuk:

*Potongan elaun sektor awam sebanyak 8% (tambahan kepada dua pakej penjimatan sebelum ini) dan pemotongan gaji sebanyak 3% untuk para pekerja DEKO (kemudahan sektor awam).
*Public sector limit €1,000 diperkenalkan kepada bi-annual bonus, abolished entirely for those earning lebih €3,000 a month.
*Limit €500 sebulan hingga 13th dan 14th month salaries public employees; abolished for employees receiving lebih €3,000 a month.
*Limit €800 sebulan hingga 13th dan 14th month pension installments; abolished for pensioners receiving lebih €2,500 a month.
*Return a special tax pada high pensions.
*Extraordinary cukai imposed pada company profits.
*Kenaikan nilai hartanah (dan menjadikan cukai lebih tinggi).
*Kenaikan tambahan sebanyak 10% ke atas semua kereta impot.
*Changes were planned to the laws governing lay-offs dan overtime pay.
*Increases in value added tax to 23% (daripada 19%), 11% (daripada 9%) dan 5.5% (daripada 4%).
*10% rise in luxury cukai dan sin cukai pada alcohol, cigarettes, dan fuel.
*Equalization men's dan women's pension age limits.
*General pension age has not changed, but a mechanism has been memperkenalkan to scale them to life expectancy changes.
*A financial stability fund has been created.
*Average retirement age for public sector workers akan increased from 61 to 65.
*The number public-owned companies shall be reduced from 6,000 to 2,000.
*The number municipalities shall shrink daripada 1,000 to 400.

Pada Mei 2010, satu perjanjian pinjaman telah dimeterai di antara Yunani, negara-negara Zon Eropah lain dan Tabung Kewangan Antarabangsa. Perjanjian merangkumi pinjaman segera €45 yang akan diberikan pada 2010 dengan lebih banyak dana disediakan kemudian. Pembayaran pertama meliputi €8.5 bilion bon Yunani yang akan matang untuk pembayaran.

Secara keseluruhan, sejumlah €110 bilion telah dipersetujui. Kadar faedah pinjaman kawasan euro ialah sebanyak 5%, considered to be a rather high level for any bailout loan. Pinjaman  EMU akan *[[pari passu]]* dan not senior like those the IMF. Bahkan, the seniority the IMF Pinjaman themselves has no legal basis but is respected nonetheless. The Pinjaman should cover Yunani's funding needs for the next tiga tahun (dianggarkan at €30&nbsp;bilion for the rest 2010 dan €40&nbsp;bilion each for 2011 dan 2012). According to EU officials, France dan Germany demanded that their military dealings dengan Yunani be a condition their participation in the financial rescue.

, the deficit was down 40% dari tahun sebelumnya.

#### Pakej penjimatan ke-4 – Jun 2011 (rancangan pertengahan penggal)
Penjimatan lanjut diperkenalkan pada 2011. In the midst public discontent, massive protests dan a 24-hour-strike throughout Yunani, the Parlimen debated pada whether or not to meluluskan a new penjimatan bill, known in Yunani as the "mesoprothesmo" (*the pertengahan penggal [plan]*). pemerintah intent to meluluskan further langkah-langkah penjimatan was met dengan discontent from denganin pemerintah dan Parlimen as well, but was eventually meluluskan dengan 155 votes in favor (a marginal 5-seat majority). Horst Reichenbach headed up the task force overseeing Yunani implementation penjimatan dan structural adjustment.

The new langkah-langkah termasuk: raising €50&nbsp;bilion from privatizations dan sales government property; increasing cukai for those dengan a yearly income lebih €8,000, cukai tambahan for those dengan a yearly income lebih €12,000, increasing VAT in the housing industry, an cukai tambahan 2% for combating unemployment, lower pension payments ranging from 6% hingga 14% from the previous 4% hingga 10%, the creation a special agency responsible dengan exploiting government property, dan others.

Pada 11 Ogos 2011 pemerintah memperkenalkan cukai yang menyasarkan pemilik tanah tidak boleh dipindahkan. The new tax, which is to be paid through the owner's electricity bill, will affect 7.5&nbsp;million Public Power Corporation accounts dan ranges from 3 to 20 euro per square meter. Cukai ini akan apply for 2011–2012 dan is expected to raise €4&nbsp;bilion in revenue.

Pada 19 Ogos 2011, Menteri Kewangan Yunani , Evangelos Venizelos, said that new langkah-langkah penjimatan "should not be necessary". pada 20 Ogos 2011 it was revealed that pemerintah economic langkah-langkah were still out track; government revenue went down by €1.9&nbsp;bilion while perbelanjaan went up by €2.7&nbsp;bilion.

On a meeting dengan representatives the country's economic sectors pada 30 Ogos 2011, the Prime Minister dan the Menteri Kewangan acknowledged that some the langkah-langkah penjimatan were irrational, such as the high VAT, dan that they were forced to take them dengan a gun to the head.

In Oktober, Perdana Menteri Yunani George Papandreou got Parlimenary backing for further langkah-langkah penjimatan. These new langkah-langkah would allow Yunani to get an extra instalment international Pinjaman that would prevent a sovereign default dan they would make possible the partial write-off Yunani hutang, the so called Private Sector Involvment (PSI). As a result this backing, Yunani was granted by the EU a *quid pro quo* further penjimatan for a €100bn loan dan a 50% hutang reduction through PSI. denganin a week, Papandreou, backed unanimously by his cabinet, announced a referendum pada the deal, sending shockwaves through the financial markets. This resulted in Germany's chancellor Angela Merkel dan France's prime minister Nicolas Sarkozy issuing an ultimatum declaring that, unless the referendum resulted in the approval the new langkah-langkah, they would denganhold an overdue €6bn loan payment to Athens, money that Yunani needed by mid-December. Papandreou cancelled the referendum the next day after the New Democracy Party, leaders the oposition, agreed to back the agreement.

Pada 10 November Papandreou resigned as prime minister following an agreement dengan the New Democracy party dan the Popular Orthodox Rally to appoint a new prime minister common acceptance promulgate laws associated dengan implementing the new langkah-langkah that were agreed dengan the EU.The person chosen for this task was non-MP technocrat Lucas Papademos, former Governor the Bank Yunani dan former Vice President the European Central Bank; his appointment was criticised by left-wing parties dan branded "unconstitutional". By contrast, tiga separate polls taken apabila Papademos assumed office revealed that around 75% warga Yunani thought that temporary, emergency technocratic rule was "positive". The EU insisted that whichever government was elected after Papademos pada tahun 2012, it must be bound to honour the agreed upon EU-IMF penjimatan strategy. It thus demanded that Yunani party-political leaders sign legally-binding letters to this effect, as well as to any additional langkah-langkah that might be required in future as part the second rescue-package. Papademos argued in favour signing, even in the face opposition from major pro-penjimatan factions in his government. Such letters would bind pemerintah warga Yunani to penjimatan dan structural adjustment through to 2020. At the end December, it was mengumumkan bahawa the general election to replace Papademos' technocratic administration was to be delayed until April 2012, as more time was needed to finalise plans for penjimatan dan structural adjustment, as well as to complete negotiations over the Yunani hutang reduction.

Finalising the deal pada the 50% PSI hutang write-off, required by the troika as a condition for extending more aid, proved difficult in early 2012, dengan hedge funds being the most difficult to persuade. In an interview dengan *The New York Times*, Papademos said that if his country did not receive unanimous agreement from its bondholders to voluntarily write down €100bn Yunani's €340bn hutang, he would consider legislating to force bondholder losses, dan that if things went well, warga Yunani could expect "an end to penjimatan" pada tahun 2013. Others believed that even the proposed 50% would not be enough to prevent a sovereign default.

#### Fight against rasuah dan pengecualian cukai
The rapid increase in government revenue is difficult, since 

The size the Yunani black economy is dianggarkan sekitar  €65bn, resulting in €20bn cukai yang tidak dibayar. Yunani has aimed at increasing the effectiveness its tax authorities to get a hold shady business practices dan to push back Fakelaki, the practice cash donations through the envelope. A rapid increase in government revenue is unlikely, memandangkan restructuring the tax authorities dan legislative changes at most show a long-term success.

The Inspector General Public Administration has started an online census civil servants. In connection dengan this census he has uncovered a number criminal offenses, including an entire non-existent health authority.

pada tahun 2010 pemerintah has implemented a tax reform. The year 2012 saw the introduction a duty non-cash payments for amounts over 1,500 euro.

The Yunani police have established a special unit, which deals exclusively dengan tax offenses. The new police force is supported by experts from the German financial management dan tax investigation office, who provide technical assistance.

In November 2011, the new Yunani finance minister Evangelos Venizelos called upon all persons who owe the state more than €150,000 to pay their outstanding cukai until November 24 or find their names pada a black list published pada the Internet. pemerintah later revealed the list, which juga termasuk a number prominent warga Yunani, including pop stars dan sportsmen.

#### Pakej penjimatan ke-5 – Februari 2012
In Februari 2012, facing sovereign default, Yunani was in need more funds from the IMF dan EU by 20 Mac2012, dan was negotiating over the next lending package, bernilai €130 bilion. pada 10 Februari 2012, the Yunani cabinet approved a draft bill dengan rancangan penjimatan baru, which has been calculated to improve the 2012 budget deficit dengan €3.3bn (dan a further €10bn improvement scheduled for 2013 dan 2014). Rancangan penjimatan ini termasuk:
* 22% potongan in minimum wage from the current €750 sebulan
* Holiday wage bonuses (2 extra months full wage being paid each year) are permanently cancelled
* 150,000 jobs potongan from state sector by 2015, which 15,000 shall be potongan by the end 2012
* Pension potongan bernilai €300 million pada tahun 2012
* Changes to laws to make it easier to lay off workers
* Health dan defense perbelanjaan potongan
* Industry sectors diberikan hak merunding gaji lebih rendah bergantung kepada pembangunan ekonomi.
* Opening up closed professions to allow for more competition, particularly in the health, tourism, dan real estate sectors
* Privatizations bernilai €15bn by 2015, including Yunani gas companies DEPA dan DESFA. In the medium term, the goal remains at €50bn.

Besides the newPakej penjimatan, there are other hurdles for Yunani to get the Pinjaman:
* Demands from kawasan euro finance ministers:

:* €325 million out the total €3.3bn package, still need to be specified, in the form "structural expenditure reductions"
:* Written commitments from the main party leaders to support the program before dan after elections
* Negotiations dengan private creditors over the proportion hutang write-off dan over the bond swap
* A hutang sustainability report by the troika

Showing position disagreement, the transport minister dan member the Popular Orthodox Rally Makis Voridis along dengan five deputy ministers from various ministries resigned. pada 11 Februari, caretaker prime minister Lucas Papademos warned "social explosion dan chaos" if the Parlimen would not approve the deal the next day. After a night debating, the Parlimen meluluskan the plan dengan 199 votes for dan 74 against pada the early hours 13 Februari, while massive protests were witnessed in Athens that left stores looted dan burned dan more than 120 people injured. The riot was one the worst since 2010.

Despite being one the ruling parties, the Popular Orthodox Rally voted against the plan dan dengandrew itself from pemerintah. Forty-tiga MPs from the other two ruling parties (socialist PASOK dan conservative New Democracy) juga voted against the plan dan were immediately expelled from their parties. This reduced the combined power these two parties from 236 hingga 193 seats, which is still majority for the 300-seat Parlimen Yunani. The vote was a major precondition for the EU dan IMF to jointly release the funds, which are supposed to cover all financial needs pada tahun 2012 dan 2013. The troika hopes that Yunani akan able menerima all its economic funding from private capital markets pada tahun 2014.

The determination the leaders Yunani ruling parties to implement the newPakej penjimatan was doubted, dan their written assurance was demanded by the kawasan euro finance ministers. For example, despite voting for thePakej penjimatan, Antonis Samaras, leader New Democracy, talked about renegotiating the deal.

Of the 110 bilion promised by the IMF took €30bn, the kawasan euro 80 bilion (as bilateral loan commitments). Instrumental in determining the rates the individual euro area countries in the €80bn the kawasan euro was the respective equity interest in the capital the ECB, which in turn is determined every five tahun after the prorated share a country in the total population dan economic output in the EU. The German share the €80bn was 28%, or about €22.4bn in tiga tahun.

Pada Mei 2010 Yunani menerima the first tranche the bailout money totaling €20bn. Sebanyak 5.5 bilion daripadanya datang dari IMF manakala 14.5 bilion dari negara-negara kawasan Euro.

Pada 13 September the second Tranche €6.5bn was disbursed. The ke-3 tranche the same amount was paid pada 19 January 2011. pada 16 Macthe 4th tranche in the amount €10.9 bilion euro was paid out, followed by the 5th installment pada 2 July. The ke-6 tranche €8bn was paid out after months delay in early December. this amount, the IMF took lebih €2.2bn euro.

#### Pakej menyelamat kedua daripada EU dan IMF - Julai 2011
Since the first rescue package proved insufficient, the 17 leaders Euro countries approved a second rescue package at an EU summit pada 21 July 2011. Pakej ini berisi sebanyak 109 bilion euro dibekalkan European Financial Stability Facility. The repayment period was extended from seven hingga 15 tahun dan the kadar faedah was lowered to 3.5%.

For the first time, this juga termasuk a private sector involvement, meaning that the private financial sector took a voluntary hair potongan. It was agreed that the net contribution banks dan insurance companies to support Yunani would termasuk an additional 37 bilion euro pada tahun 2014. The planned purchase Yunani bonds from private creditors by the euro rescue fund at their face value will burden the private sector dengan at least another €12.6 bilion.

It was juga announced at the EU summit, a reconstruction plan for Yunani in order to promote economic growth.  The European Commission established a "Task Force for Yunani" * Declaration the EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso at a special summit*]

#### EU summit pada 26 Oktober 2011
On the night 26 to 27 Oktober the Euro countries agreed pada a plan memotong hutang Yunani from todays 160% hingga 120% GDP by 2020. As part that plan, it was proposed that all pemilik bon pemerintah Yunani menerima "secara relanya" potongan 50% (resulting in a hutang reduction bernilai €100bn), dan more over accept pengurangan kadar faedah kepada hanya 3.5%. Ketika sidang kemuncak ini berlangsung, this was at first formaly accepted by pemerintah banks in Europe. The task merunding a final deal juga including the private creditors, was handed over kepada para ahli politik Yunani politicians.

Lenders were planned to convert their bon mereka kepada bon "terpotong" pada January 2012. As negotiations dengan the private creditors proofed more difficult than expected, this time line however has been a bit delayed. According to the latest news, the "hairpotongan deal" is expected to be finalized dan submitted to the EU comission at Februari 20, dan if approved the bond exchange will happen in March. In the euro-area, Member States have pledged to contribute uptil €30bn for private sector participation.

Another decision by the summit was to leverage the EFSF funds from €500bn to €1000bn. The leverage had previously been criticized from many sides, because it is something taxpayers ultimately risk to pay for, due to the significantly increased risiko yang diambil EFSF.

In view the uncertainty the domestic political development in Yunani, the first disbursement was suspended after Prime Minister George Papandreou announced pada 1 November 2011 that he wanted to hold a referendum pada the decisions the Euro summit. After two days intense pressure, particularly from Germany dan France, he finally gave up pada the idea. pada 11 November 2011 he was succeeded as prime minister by Loukas Papadimos, who leads a new transitional government. The most important task this interim government, was to finalize the "hairpotongan deal" untuk bon pemerintah Yunani dan meluluskan a newPakej penjimatan, to comply dengan the Troika requirements for receiving the second bailout loan bernilai €130bn (enhanced from the previously offered amount at €109bn).

## Objections to proposed policies

;Economic dan social effects langkah-langkah penjimatan

In exchange for European funding Yunani was forced to impose strict fiscal penjimatan. As early as 2010 some economists have expressed fears that the negative impact tighter fiscal policy could offset the positive impact lower borrowing costs dan social disruption could have a significantly negative impact pada investment dan growth in the longer term. US economist Joseph Stiglitz has juga criticised the EU for being too slow to help Yunani, insufficiently supportive the new government, lacking the will power to set up sufficient "solidarity dan stabilisation framework" to support countries experiencing economic difficulty, dan too deferential to bond rating agencies.

According to an IMF official langkah-langkah penjimatan have helped Yunani bring down its primary deficit from €24.7bn (15.8% GDP) pada tahun 2009 to just lebih €5bn (9.3%) pada tahun 2011 namun ia turut mengheret negara ini ke dalam kemerosotan selama five tahun berturut-turut. Industrial output is more than 28% lower than pada tahun 2005 The number Yunani companies that went bankrupt pada tahun 2011 was 27% higher than the year before. Kadar pengangguran are hitting a record high mencapai hampir 20 peratus by 2011. Pengangguran dalam kalangan warga muda mencecah 48%, suatu peningkatan daripada kadar 22.4% back pada tahun 2008 apabila krisis kewangan ini bermula.

The social effects the langkah-langkah penjimatan pada the Yunani population have been severe, as well as pada poor dan needy foreign immigrants, dengan some Yunani citizens turning to NGOs for healthcare treatment. By 2011 more than a third the nation had fallen into poverty. pada 17 Oktober 2011 Menteri Kewangan Evangelos Venizelos mengumumkan bahawa pemerintah would establish a new fund, aimed at helping those who were hit the hardest from langkah-langkah penjimatan pemerintah. The money for this agency will come from the proceeds made by tackling pengecualian cukai.

Februari 2012 saw Poul Thomsen, a Danish IMF official overseeing the Yunani rancangan penjimatan, warn that ordinary warga Yunani were at the "limit" their toleration penjimatan as he called for recognition "the fact that Yunani has done a lot, at a great cost to the population". Another IMF official admitted that potongan perbelanjaan memudaratkan kewangan Yunani. Seorang pegawai PBB memberi amaran bahawa langkah-langkah penjimatan ini boleh melanggar hak asasi manusia.

;Public opinion
On a poll  by Public Issue dan SKAI Channel, PASOK who has won the National Elections 2009 dengan 43.92% has seen its approval ratings being decimated to a mere 8%, being placed at 5th place, after right-wing Parti Demokrasi Baru (31%), left-wing Kiri Demokrasi (18%), left-wing Parti Komunis Yunani (KKE) (12.5%) dan left-wing SYRIZA (12%). At the same poll, G.A. Papanderou, is the least approved political leader dengan 9% approval, while 71% warga Yunani do not trust Papademou as a PM.

On a poll published pada 18 May 2011, 62% the people questioned felt that the IMF memorandum that Yunani signed pada tahun 2010 was a bad decision that hurt the country, while 80% had no faith in the Menteri Kewangan, Giorgos Papakonstantinou, to handle the crisis. Evangelos Venizelos replaced Mr. Papakonstantinou pada 17 Jun. 75% those polled gave a negative image the IMF, dan 65% feel it is hurting Yunani's economy. 64% felt that the possibility bankruptcy is likely, dan apabila asked about their fears for the near future, polls showed a fear of: unemployment (97%), poverty (93%) dan the closure businesses (92%).

;Call for hutang audit commission

In the documentary hutangocracy made by a group Yunani journalists, it is argued that Yunani should create an audit commission, dan force bondholders to suffer from losses, like Ecuador did.

## Lihat juga
*European sovereign hutang crisis
*The role the Institute International Finance in the Yunani hutang crisis

## Nota

## Rujukan
*Ronald Janssen, 'Yunani dan the IMF:Who Exactly is Being Saved?' (July 2010) CEPR