Title: On the virtues of a philosophically pragmatic reorientation in environmental ethics
Description: With global environmental systems under increasing anthropogenic influence, conservationists and environmental managers are under immense pressure to protect and recover the world's imperiled species and ecosystems. This effort is often motivated by a sense of moral responsibility, either to nature itself, or to the end of promoting human wellbeing over the long run. In other words, it is the purview of environmental ethics, a branch of applied philosophy that emerged in the 1970s and that for decades has been devoted to understanding and defending an attitude of respect for nature, usually for its own sake. Yet from the very start, environmental ethics has promoted itself as contributing to the resolution of real-world management and policy problems. By most accounts, however, the field has historically failed to deliver on this original promise, and environmental ethicists continue to miss opportunities to make intellectual inroads with key environmental decisionmakers. Inspired by classical and contemporary American philosophers such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty, I defend in this dissertation the virtues of a more explicitly pragmatic approach to environmental ethics. Specifically, I argue that environmental pragmatism is not only commensurate with pro-environmental attitudes but that it is more likely to lead to viable and sustainable outcomes, particularly in the context of eco-social resilience-building activities (e.g., local experimentation, adaptation, cooperation). In doing so, I call for a recasting of environmental ethics, a project that entails: 1) a conceptual reorientation involving the application of pragmatism applied to environmental problems; 2) a methodological approach linking a pragmatist environmentalism to the tradition and process of adaptive co-management; and 3) an empirical study of stakeholder values and perspectives in conservation collaboratives in Arizona. I conclude that a more pragmatic environmental ethics has the potential to bring a powerful set of ethical and methodological tools to bear in real-world management contexts and, where appropriate, can ground and justify coordinated conservation efforts. Finally, this research responds to critics who suggest that, because it strays too far from the ideological purity of traditional environmental ethics, the pragmatic decision-making process will, in the long run, weaken rather than bolster our commitment to conservation and environmental protection.
Subjects: Environmentalism, Ethics, Philosophy