Title: How can conceptual content be social and normative, and, at the same time, be objective?
Description: "In this book, Andrea Clausen intends to reconcile Kripke's point according to which conceptual content has to be considered as being constituted by social, normative practice by a process of mutual assessments with the view that the content of empirical assertions has to be conceived as objective. She criticizes approaches that explicate content-constitutive practice in non-normative terms, namely in terms of sanctioning behavior (Haugeland, Pettit, Esfeld). She also rejects a pragmatist reading of Heidegger that proceeds from thoroughly normative but pre-conceptual practice. She develops and defends a particular reading of an approach that conceives normative, conceptually articulated practice giving and asking for reasons as primitive (Brandom, McDowell)."--Jacket.
Subjects: OUR Brockhaus selection, Philosophy, Conceptualism, Philosophy of mind, Cognitive science