Title: Toppling Foreign Governments
Description: Melissa Willard-Foster explores the question of why stronger nations overthrow governments when they could attain their aims at the bargaining table.  She identifies a central cause--the targeted leader's domestic political vulnerabilty--that not only gives the leader motive to resist a strong nation's demands, making a bargain more difficult to attain, but also gives the stronger naiton reason to believe that regime change will be comparatively cheap.  As long as the targeted leader's domestic opposition is willing to collaborate with the foreign power, the latter is likely to conclude that ousting the leader is more cost effective than negotiation.  Willard-Foster analyzes 133 instances of regime change, ranging from covert operations to major military invasion, spanning over two hundred years.  She also conducts three in-depth case studies that support her contention that domestically and militarily weak leaders appear more costly to coerce than overthrow and that, as long as they remain ubiquitous, foreign-imposed regime change is likely to endure. -- Provided by publisher.
Subjects: Intervention (international law), International relations, research, Regime change, Case studies, Government policy, International relations, Research, Mathematical models