Title: Essays on signaling and behavior
Description: This dissertation consists of three essays on economic theories of signaling and behavior. The first essay presents a model of indirect speech as a costly signal of quality. The model explains the tendency of people to use language that is more confusing that necessary by showing that indirect speech is rational when outside options are invisible and related to quality in a matching environment. The second essay explores the relationship between conspicuous consumption and population density. The returns to conspicuous consumption are higher in denser areas for several reasons, and the returns to high-quality agents of signaling visibly can support the existence of dense cities by themselves. The third essay develops a model of "semi-conspicuous" consumption. Wealthy agents who are also socially well-connected signal discreetly, credibly signaling both quality and connectedness. Wealthy agents who are not well-connected signal more conspicuously, and poor agents do not signal.