Title: Who is the 'sovereign' in sovereign debt?
Description: In this dissertation, I argue that the contemporary norm of sovereign debt continuity--the general rule that sovereign states should repay debt even after a major regime change and the related expectation that they will otherwise suffer reputational consequences--is not as theoretically or historically stable as it first appears. An expectation of uniform repayment depends upon and reinforces what I call a 'statist' approach to sovereignty in the debt regime, which is only one of several competing concepts with deep roots in political theory, international practice, and international law. I trace historical challenges to this approach in the post-World War I era, identify reasons that debt continuity became dominant through most of the mid-late twentieth century, and consider its potential weakening at the turn of the twenty-first century. In so doing, I analytically reframe questions of sovereign debt and reputation, present an original hypothesis on long-term norm development, and contribute to interdisciplinary work in political science and law. I contend that the dominance or weakness of a statist norm of debt continuity depends primarily on two elements: broader notions of sovereignty in the international arena, and the dynamics of creditor interaction, particularly the degree to which creditors are consolidated or disaggregated in their approach to borrowers.

Drawing from post-World War I diplomatic documents, legal case material, the correspondence of major U.S. financial houses, and an analysis of trans-Atlantic financial competition, I reinterpret the 1918 Soviet debt repudiation and the foundational 1923 Tinoco Arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica as offering an open historical moment in the norm of debt continuity. Continuing the analysis through the mid-twentieth century, I highlight the rising importance of non-competitive public creditors such as the IBRD and the U.S. government, the entrenchment of a statist concept of sovereignty under the influence of the Cold War and decolonization, and the relative unity of private capital upon its re- engagement with sovereign lending in the 1970s and 1980s. These trends strengthened the norm of sovereign debt continuity and limited the space available for alternative approaches in the decades following World War II. By way of conclusion, I suggest that the post-Cold War era and the turn of the twenty-first century may be witnessing a new opening in the concept of sovereignty underlying the debt regime.