Title: Essays on platform competition and two-sided markets
Description: This dissertation comprises three essays on the industrial organization of platform and two-sided markets. In these networked industries, agents on one side of the market adopt, join, or visit a platform intermediary in order to access goods or services provided by agents on another side of the market. All three essays focus on environments where one side of the market consists of a small number of strategic firms, and analyze competition among platforms to get members of this oligopolistic side "on-board." The first essay provides a model of platform competition for symmetric firms that allows for general externalities across both contracting and non-contracting partners, and addresses the question of when a market will sustain a single or multiple platforms. When firms and consumers can join only one platform, the essay provide conditions under which market-tipping and market-splitting equilibria may exist, and illustrates how either outcome may still be inefficient despite the presence of contingent contracts.

The second essay studies competition between two platforms for a single firm or contracting partner, and determines when the firm will be exclusive to one platform or join both. Through a model of bargaining and price competition, the essay shows that the resulting industry structure depends crucially on whether or not the contracting partner maintains control over the pricing of its own good. The third essay develops empirical techniques to analyze the adoption decisions of consumers and firms for competing platform intermediaries, and applies them to measure the impact of vertical integration and exclusive contracting in the sixth-generation of the U.S. videogame industry (2000-2005). The essay introduces a framework to estimate consumer demand in platform-intermediated markets, specifies a dynamic network formation game to model the hardware adoption decisions of software providers, and uses estimates to determine the new equilibrium industry structure if exclusive vertical arrangements were prohibited. Counterfactual experiments indicate that exclusivity benefited the smaller entrant platforms and not the dominant incumbent, which stands contrary to the interpretation of exclusivity as primarily a means of foreclosure and entry deterrence.