Title: Open-secret voting
Description: "Abstract: Stock debates about transparency and secrecy usually assume that open voting and secret voting are mutually exclusive.  But these positions present a false alternative; open and secret voting can be employed as complements in a larger decision-procedure.  In what follows I will propose a hybrid or dual procedure of open-secret voting, and attempt to specify the conditions under which that procedure works well.  I suggest that open-secret voting can best be justified as an institutional means of obtaining a second opinion from the voting group.  A second opinion of this sort might produce informational benefits either for the members of the voting group itself, for outsideparties, or for both.  (This is a companion paper to Adrian Vermeule, "Second Opinions" available on SSRN)---John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Subjects: Voting, Economic aspects, Decision making