Title: Essays on governance, population and political stability
Description: This dissertation inquires into the determinants of governance as policy outcomes in imperfect democratic contexts from three different angles. The first two essays study the role of population size, and population concentration around the capital, and the third deals with incentives for corruption in the form of political instability. The first essay models the existence of a size effect in the political economy of redistribution, particularly in the presence of different channels of popular request for redistribution, e.g. "institutional" channels and "revolutions". Suggesting that staging a viable revolution attempt depends on the number of people taking part in it, the theory predicts that there is a negative relationship between population size and density and post-tax inequality in non-democracies. These predictions are brought under extensive empirical scrutiny in a cross-country context, and the data robustly confirm these patterns of inequality, population, and the interaction with democracy.

In extension, the second essay proposes that population concentration around the policy making center serves as an insurgency threat to a dictatorship, inducing it to yield to more redistribution and better governance. This centered concept of population concentration is brought to the data through the lenses of four natural axioms, from which the existence and uniqueness of its measure are proved, and its empirical superiority to existing measures shown. Again, cross-country evidence supports our predictions: only in the sample of non-democracies, population concentration around the capital city is positively associated with better governance and more redistribution (proxied by post-tax inequality), in OLS and IV regressions. The third essay investigates a the link between corruption and political stability by building a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects: A horizon effect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more during his short window of opportunity; and a demand effect, by which the private sector is more willing to bribe stable incumbents. The horizon effect dominates at low levels of stability, whereas the demand effect gains salience in more stable regimes. Together, these two effects generate a U-shaped relationship between total corruption and stability. The data confirm this robust U-shaped pattern between country indices of corruption perception and various measures of incumbent stability, including historically-observed average tenures of chief executives and governing parties.