Title: The determinants and consequences of managerial earnings guidance prior to regulation fair disclosure
Description: Abstract: Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure some management spent considerable time and effort guiding analyst earnings estimates; other management did not. In this paper I examine the determinants and consequences of management's decision to work with analysts in the development of their earnings estimates using proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute. Findings suggest that when earnings are important to valuation but hard to forecast because businesses and financial transactions are complex, management is more likely to provide assistance to analysts presumably to avoid inaccurate analyst forecasts and negative earnings surprises. A comparison of guided and unguided analyst forecasts indicates that guided quarterly earnings forecasts are more accurate but also more frequently pessimistic, consistent with analysts rationally trading offbias for accuracy to retain access to management's earnings guidance. Cross-sample comparisons of analysts' stock recommendations and long-term growth forecasts provide additional support for the hypothesis that analyst objectivity and independence is affected by management's decision to provide earnings guidance. Finally, evidence from stock price reactions to deviations from the consensus forecast (the traditional measure of earnings surprises) indicates that investors distinguish between guided and unguided analyst forecasts when forming their earnings expectations. This study furthers our understanding of what factors affect management's disclosure choices and how managers' disclosure choices influence the objectivity and independence of sell-side analysts.