Balancing risks
Subtitle: great power intervention in the periphery
By: Jeffrey W. Taliaferro.
Series: Cornell studies in security affairs
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Ithaca, N.Y
Language: eng
Number of pages: 304
Subjects: World politics -- 20th century.; Imperialism -- History -- 20th century.; Great Britain -- Foreign relations -- 1901-1910.; Japan -- Foreign relations -- 1912-1945.; United States -- Foreign relations -- 1945-1953.
Description: "Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive, and self-defeating conflicts?" "Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to accept losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational concerns about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be at odds with the master explanation of political realism." "He constructs a "balance-of-risk" theory of foreign policy that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and prospect theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States' involvement in the Korean War in 1950-52, and Japan's entanglement in the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937-40 and its decisions for war with the United States in 1940-41"--Jacket.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Power politics and the balance of risk; title: Explaining great power involvement in the periphery; title: Germany and the 1905 Morocco crisis; title: Japan and the 1940-41 war decisions; title: The United States and the Korean War (1950-51); title: The limits of great power intervention in the periphery.