Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem
By: Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard T. Holden.
Contributors: Fudenberg, Drew.; Holden, Richard T., 1974-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 15167; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15167.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988).  We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information.  We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero.  Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/18/2009.

Includes bibliographical references.

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