The vote is cast
Subtitle: the effect of corporate governance on shareholder value
By: Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine, Maria Guadalupe
Contributors: Gine, Mireia; Guadalupe, Maria; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16574; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16574.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S&P1500 firms.  We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings.  A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to a random outcome, allowing us to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules.  Passing a corporate governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of the vote with an implied market value per provision of 2.8%.  We also find evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance improvements"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/29/2011.

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