Toward an understanding of the relative strengths of positive and negative reciprocity
By: Omar Al-Ubaydli ... [et al.].
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16547; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16547.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "A stylized fact is that agents respond more acutely to negative than positive stimuli.  Such findings have generated insights on mechanism-design, have been featured prominently in policymaking, and more generally have led to discussions of whether preferences are defined over consumption levels or changes in consumption.  This study reconsiders this stylized fact.  In doing so, it provides insights into an important domain wherein positive stimuli induce a greater response than negative stimuli: a principal-agent game with reputational considerations and with the agent on the market's short end.  This common setting represents an important feature of labor markets with involuntary unemployment.Published: Judgment and Decision Making, Vol.  5, No.  7, December 2010, pp.  5240-539"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/24/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.