Delay as agenda setting
By: James J. Anton, Dennis A. Yao
Contributors: Yao, Dennis Alden, 1953-; Harvard Business School
Edition: Revised edition
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 11-082; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 11-082
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2012
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 46
Description: We examine a multi-issue dynamic decision-making process that involves endogenous commitment. Our primary focus is on actions that impact delay, an extreme form of lack of commitment. Delay is strategically interesting when decision makers with asymmetric preferences face multiple issues and have limited resources for influencing outcomes. A delayed decision becomes part of the subsequent agenda, thereby altering the allocation of resources. The opportunity to delay decisions leads the players to act against their short-run interests by changing the expected decision delay. We characterize delay equilibria and explore how delay affects agenda preferences and, when possible, bargaining.
Notes: "Revised September 2012"--Publisher's Web site.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 32-33).