Essays on experimental economics and behavioral contract theory
By: by Stephen Leider
Published: 2009
Language: eng
Number of pages: 187
Description: This dissertation consists of three essays using experiments and theory to apply behavioral insights to questions of contract theory and organizational economics. The first essay (co-authored with Judd Kessler) argues that an important aspect of incomplete contracts is their role in establishing a norm for the transaction or relationship, which increases the efficiency of agents' actions. We demonstrate experimentally that unenforceable handshake agreements within a contract can substantially increase the efficiency of subjects' actions, particularly in games with strategic complements. When there is a handshake agreement, adding an additional enforceable clause to the contract often does not further increase efficiency in our experiment. The second essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) analyzes a principal-agent setting where the agent has reciprocity preferences (the intrinsic desire to repay generosity). We identify the optimal contract, which typically includes both monetary performance-pay incentives as well as excess rents to induce gift exchange incentives. We then identify several organizational characteristics that can enhance or diminish the efficacy of reciprocity-based incentives. In the third essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) we test experimentally a key prediction of our general theory: the value to the principal of the agent's output (relative to the effort cost) should influence the agent's willingness to reciprocate generous wage contracts. Our results confirm this prediction, as well as providing additional evidence that agent's effort decisions are motivated by reciprocity.
Notes: "May 2009."

Thesis (Ph.D., Committee of Business Economics)--Harvard University, 2009.

Includes bibliographical references.