Conscious will and responsibility
Subtitle: a tribute to Benjamin Libet
By: edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel.
Contributors: Libet, Benjamin, 1916-; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 1955-; Nadel, Lynn.
Edition: 1st ed.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2010
Place of publication: New York, NY
Language: eng
Number of pages: 261
ISBN-13: 9780195381641
Subjects: Will; Responsibility; Consciousness
Description: "We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not befor but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action." "Libet's striking results are often claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and moral responsibility and also to have practical implications for criminal justice. His work has also stimulated a flurry of further fascinating scientific research--including findings in psychology by Dan Wegner and in neuroscience by John-Dylan Haynes--that raise novel questions about whether conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics respond that both commonsense views of action and traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel have brought together prominent experts in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and law to discuss whether our conscious choices really cause our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for how we view ourselves and how we should treat each other."--BOOK JACKET.
Table of contents: title: Benjamin Libet, Do we have free will?; title: Adina L. Roskies, Why Libet's studies don't pose a threat to free will?; title: Alfred r. mele, libet on free will : readiness potentials, decisions, and awareness?; title: Susan Pockett and Suzanne Purdy, Are voluntary movements initiated preconsciously? : the relationships between readiness potentials, urges, and decisions?; title: William P. Banks and Eve A. Isham, Do we really know what we are doing? : implications of reported time of decision for theories of volition?; title: Elisabeth Pacherie and Patrick Haggard, What are intentions?; title: Mark Hallett, Volition : how physiology speaks to the issue of responsibility?; title: John-Dylan Haynes, Beyond Libet : long-term prediction of free choices from neuroimaging signals?; title: F. Carota, M. Desmurget, and A. Sirigu, Forward modeling mediates motor awareness?; title: Tashina Graves, Brian Maniscalco, and Hakwan Lau, Volition and the function of consciousness?; title: Deborah Talmi and Chris D. Frith, Neuroscience, free will, and responsibility?; title: Jeffrey P. Ebert and Daniel M. Wegner, Bending time to one's will?; title: Thalia Wheatley and Christine Looser, Prospective codes fulfilled : a potential neural mechanism of the will?; title: Terry Horgan, The phenomenology of agency and the libet results?; title: Thomas Nadelhoffer, The threat of shrinking agency and free will disillusionism?; title: Gideon Yaffe, Libet and the criminal law's voluntary act requirement?; title: Larry Alexander, Criminal and moral responsibility and the libet experiments?; title: Michael S. Moore, Libet's challenge(s) to responsible agency?; title: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Lessons from Libet?.