Persistence of civil wars
By: Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni.
Contributors: Ticchi, Davide.; Vindigni, Andrea.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 15378; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15378.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future."--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/29/2009.

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