Evolutionary games and population dynamics
By: Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund.
Contributors: Sigmund, Karl, 1945-
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 1998
Place of publication: Cambridge; New York, NY
Language: eng
Number of pages: 323
Subjects: Evolution (Biology) -- Mathematical models.; Population biology -- Mathematical models.; Game theory.; Volterra equations.
Other titles: Evolutionary games and replicator dynamics
Description: Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, id est to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 301-320) and index.