How adverse selection affects the health insurance market
By: Paolo Belli.
Contributors: World Bank. Development Research Group. Public Economics.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 2574; Policy research working papers (Online) ;; 2574
Publisher: World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Adverse selection (Insurance) -- Mathematical models; Insurance, Health -- Mathematical models; Managed care plans (Medical care) -- Mathematical models
Description: There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31).
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 13, 2002.
"March 2001"--Cover.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.