Universal service obligations in developing countries
By: Jean-Jacques Laffont, Antonio Estache, and Xinzhu Zhang.
Contributors: Estache, Antonio.; Zhang, Xinzhu.; World Bank.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 3421; Policy research working papers (Online) ;; 3421.
Publisher: World Bank
Published: 2004
Place of publication: [Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Infrastructure (Economics) -- Developing countries.
Description: "Estache, Laffont, and Zhang develop a model to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries.  Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments pricing and network investment.  Under discriminatory pricing, asymmetric information leads to a higher price and smaller network in the rural area than under full information.  Under uniform pricing, the price is lower but the network is even smaller.  In addition, under both pricing regimes, not only the firm but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator.  This paper a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network is part of a larger effort in the network to promote analytical work on emerging policy issues in infrastructure service delivery"--World Bank web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/1/2004.
Also available in print.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.