Farsighted house allocation
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus, Flip Klijn, and Markus Walzl
Contributors: Klijn, Flip; Walzl, Markus; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 09-129; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 09-129
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 11
Description: In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else.
Notes: "May 2009"--Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references.