structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata
By: by Dilip Abreau and Ariel Rubinstein.
Contributors: Rubinstein, Ariel.
Series: Technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University -- no. 505; Economics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University; Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 505.; Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)
Publisher: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University
Published: 1987
Place of publication: Stanford, Calif
Language: eng
Number of pages: 39
Subjects: Equilibrium (Economics); Game theory.
Notes: "Prepared under National Science Foundation Grants IST-85-21838, MCT-8120790, SES-8420114, and SES-8590774".

"February 1987".

Includes bibliographical references (p. 39).

Binghamton University Libraries' copy bound with: Paths of optimal accumulation in two-sector models / Michele Boldrin.