The dark side of the vote
Subtitle: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
By: Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan, Jean-Robert Tyran
Contributors: Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 13-017; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 13-017.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2012
Place of publication: [Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 52
Description: We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a "dark side", i.e. result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. We develop a model to predict how two types of social information shape efficiency in the presence of biased voters and we test these predictions using a novel experimental design. In line with predictions, we find that information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. In the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective. While voters with higher cognitive abilities are more likely to be de-biased by such information, most voters do not seem to interpret such information rationally.
Notes: "August 2012" -- Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references.