Factions and political competition
By: Nicola Persico, José Carlos Rodríguez-Pueblita, Dan Silverman.
Contributors: Rodríguez-Pueblita, José Carlos.; Silverman, Dan; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13008.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13008.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 44
Subjects: Pressure groups; Politics, Practical -- Econometric models; Politics, Practical -- Case studies; Water resources development -- Political aspects -- Mexico
Genres: Case studies.
Description: This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. Voters view the public goods as a credible signal that their local candidate is in the right (i.e., powerful) faction. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.
Notes: "April 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 41-44).

Also available in PDF from NBER World Wide Web site (www.nber.org).