Factions and political competition
By: Nicola Persico, Jos ̌Carlos Rodrg̕uez-Pueblita, Dan Silverman.
Contributors: Rodríguez-Pueblita, José Carlos.; Silverman, Dan.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13008; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13008.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions.  Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies.  Voters view the public goods as a credible signal that their local candidate is in the right (i.e., powerful) faction.  The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources.  Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/1/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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