When target CEOs contract with acquirers
Subtitle: evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions
By: Elijah Brewer III, William E. Jackson III, and Larry D. Wall.
Contributors: Jackson, William E.; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Series: Working paper series / Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta -- 2006-28; Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta : Online) -- 2006-28.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Published: 2006
Place of publication: [Atlanta, Ga.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper investigates the impact of the target chief executive officer's (CEO) postmerger position on the purchase premium and target shareholders' abnormal returns around the announcement of the deal in a sample of bank mergers during the period 1990-2004.  We find evidence that the target shareholders' returns are negatively related to the postmerger position of their CEO.  However, these lower returns are not matched by higher returns to the acquirer's shareholders, suggesting little or no wealth transfers.  Additionally, our evidence suggests that the target CEO becoming a senior officer of the combined firm does not boost the overall value of the merger transaction"--Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/2/2007.

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