The measurement of central bank autonomy
Subtitle: survey of models, indicators, and empirical evidence
By: prepared by Marco Arnone, Bernard J. Laurens, and Jean-François Segalotto.
Contributors: Laurens, Bernard.; Segalotto, Jean-François.; International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.
Series: IMF working paper -- WP/06/227
Publisher: International Monetary Fund.
Published: 2006
Place of publication: [Washington D.C.]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 85
Subjects: Monetary policy -- Econometric models; Banks and banking, Central -- Management -- Econometric models
Genres: Econometric models
Description: "This paper presents a survey of the literature on the measurement of central bank autonomy. We distinguish inputs that constitute the building blocks in the literature, and the literature that builds them. Issues including sensitivity analysis, robustness, and endogeneity are discussed.  The review show that empirical evidence regarding the beneficial effect of central bank autonomy is substantial, although some technical issues still remain for further research. In particular, central bank autonomy raises the issue of subjecting the monetary authorities to democratic control; this calls for additional research on the linkages between central bank autonomy and accountability and transparency. Additional empirical analysis on the relationship between the financial strength of the central bank and its de facto autonomy, and between its autonomy and financial stability, would also be desirable."
Notes: Caption title.

"October 2006."

Includes bibliographical references (p.79-85).

Also available on the World Wide Web.