The rules of standard setting organizations
Subtitle: an empirical analysis
By: Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole.
Contributors: Lerner, Joshua.; Tirole, Jean.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11156; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11156.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Technology -- Standards -- Economic aspects -- Mathematical models.; Information technology -- Standards -- Economic aspects -- Mathematical models.; Standardization -- Economic aspects -- Mathematical models.
Description: "This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations.  Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard.  We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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