The philosophical system of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati
By: translated, with a sketch ofthe author's life, bibliography, introduction, and notes by Thomas Davidson.
Contributors: Davidson, Thomas, 1840-1900.
Publisher: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.
Published: 1882
Place of publication: London
Language: eng
Number of pages: 396
Subjects: Rosmini, Antonio, -- 1797-1855.; Philosophers -- Italy.; Philosophy.
Notes: Bibliography: p.[li]-lxxxviii.
Table of contents: title: CONTENTS.; title: The Contents of the Notes are preceded by a( — ).; title: Sketch of Rosmini's Life xxv; title: Bibliography of Rosmini's Works li; title: Bibliography of Works bearing on Rosmini's Life and; title: Philosophy lxxii; title: Introduction lxxxix; title: PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM.; title: Introductory.; title: § 1. What is Philosophy? — Various definitions 1; title: § 2. Ultimate grounds. — Formal, real, and moral grounds 4; title: § 3. Philosophy general and special. — Philosophy and Science 8; title: § 4. Point of departure — Experience 9; title: § 5. Different forms of mental quiet. — Nature of assent 11; title: § 6. Popular and philosophical knowing 15; title: § 7. Philosophy the restorer of repose of intellect  16; title: § 8. Difference between demonstration and persuasion. — Direct, popular, and philosophical science  16; title: § 9. The first questions put by philosophy and their consequences. — Philosophy, regressive and progressive. Four starting-points distinguished 19; title: Sciences of Intuition.; title: I. Ideology.; title: § 10. Ideology and Logic. — Rosmini's chief merit in philosophy 22; title: f 11. Internal observation the method of Ideology. — Philosophy does not begin with an hypothesis, as Hegel thought 27; title: § 12. Objection to the validity of observation answered 30; title: § 13. Human cognitions, though innumerable, have a common element. — Abstraction 31; title: § 14. Cognition of real entities is an internal affirmation or judgment. — Synthesis must precede analysis. Kant and his synthetic judgments a priori 32; title: § 15. The notion of being in general is a necessary condition of the cognition of particular real beings. — Real and ideal being. Ideal being innate. St. Thomas quoted 36; title: § 16. Being in general is known by intuition. Two great classes of human cognitions. — Intuition and perception 40; title: § 17. Order of the two classes. — Universality ; its nature 41; title: § 18. Being in general and particular being. By intuition we know the essence of being.— Being has two modes. Aristotle and the German school criticized for confounding the two. Kant. Hegelian Logic 44; title: § 19. When I affirm a particular real being, what do I know more than before? The cause of affirmation is a feeling. The formula for affirmative cognitions.— Real being. Intellective perception sees passivity on its obverse side as activity 59; title: § 20. What this formula presupposes. It is feeling that constitutes the reality of being. — Subject and object. The ancient meaning differs from the modern; title: § 21. In what sense the essence of being is universal — Principle and term 64; title: § 22. Examination of the objections to the identification of reality with feeling.— Matter. Pure reality 66; title: § 23. Identity between the essence of being and the activity manifested in feeling. — Ideal and real being 69; title: § 24. This identity imperfect. — Universality 70; title: § 25. The essence of being is realized in the difference, as well as in the identity of real being 73; title: § 26. Corollaries derived from the identity of the essence of being and the multiplicity of its realizations  73; title: § 27. "Quantity belongs to the realization, not to the essence, of being. — Parmenides. The One and the Many 75; title: § 28. Ideas which make known the negation of being. All ideas of particular beings consist of positive and negative. There is but one idea, the essence of being, and all the rest are relations of it. — Negative and particular ideas 79; title: § 29. In respect to quantity, the essence of being and beings perceived by us are different, not identical — Contingency 81; title: § 30. The identity between the essence of being and real beings exists between them only in so far as they are known 82; title: § 31. It is only as known that real being identifies itself with ideal being. Perception not less true on that account — Universality not derived from things 83; title: § 32. Why we think we do not know the ground of things. — The intellect knows things in an absolute mode. Passion and action. Intellective perception 84; title: § 33. Why being, as a means of cognition, is called ideaL — Rosmini's system not idealism. Means sub quo 87; title: § 34. The essence of being is self-intelligible and forms the intelligibility of all other things. The idea of being is the light of reason, is inborn, and is the form of intelligence. — The idea of being not derived from external sensation, feeling of our own existence, reflection or the act of perception. It is, therefore, innate. Mean- ing of innate 88; title: § 35. Meaning of the word form. Two senses of the word form. In which of the two senses is the idea of being- used? Object and Subject and their relation. Kant's forms not objective, but subjective. — Form of cognition. Criticism of Kant's Table of Categories. The modal categories — necessary, actual, possible 92; title: § 36. All intelligence is reducible to thinking being as realized in a certain manner, with certain limits. — Though the soul is finite, its means of cognizing is infinite 106; title: § 37. In what sense ideal being is said to be possible. — Ideal being, being in itself, and being as object 108; title: § 38. How possible and ideal beings are said to be many. — Concept is one ; the things conceived are many 109; title: § 39. Ideality a mode of being incapable of being confounded with reality 110; title: § 40. Differences between ideas and the things known by means of them 111; title: § 41. Essence known through idea ; subsistence, through affirmation on occasion of a feeling. — Contingent things have two inconfusible modes of being 112; title: § 42. How in perception we unite ideal being with feeling. — Rosmini's Theory of Cognition 114; title: § 43. Objection to calling intellective perception a judgment. Answer. The objection does not touch the fact, but only the propriety of the term. — Difference between Rosmini and Kant. Reid 119; title: § 44. Is this affirmation a judgment? No judgment is possible without the union of its terms. — The elements of a judgment are combined by nature 124; title: § 45. In intellective perception, it is not intelligence, but nature, that unites the terms of the judgment. This judgment produces its own subject — Kant's errors 1 26; title: § 46. The term judgment does not express the nature of affirmation, but a subsequent reflection analyzes it. — The terms of a judgment are perceived as one 128; title: § 47. Reflection, in analyzing a judgment, distinguishes, but does not separate, Us elements. Subject and predicate do not exist prior to the judgment, fcut are formed in the act of judgment. — Direct and reflexive cognition 129; title: § 48. Difference between primitive affirmations and other judgments. The nature of the primitive judgment further illustrated. — The predicate is contained in the concept of the subject 132; title: § 49. The primitive judgment may also be called the primitive synthesis. — Perception spontaneous, abstraction voluntary 136; title: § 50. Convertibility of the terms of the primitive judgment. — Ancient mode of expressing judgments 137; title: § 51. Solution of the problem of the origin of ideas. — The Light of Reason 138; title: § 52. New Essay and Restoration of Philosophy. — Logic the link between Ideology and Metaphysics 139; title: 2. Logic.; title: § 53. Logic. — Aristotelian and Hegelian Logic 140; title: § 54. Aim of reasoning and nature of conviction. — Certainty and its conditions 158; title: § 55. Twofold office of Logic 159; title: § 56. What is truth? Truth is the form of our intelligence. — Truth and being synonymous terms. Criticism 159; title: § 57. Confirmation of the same doctrine. — Meaning of truth 162; title: § 58. Transcendental scepticism objects to the doctrine that the mind by its nature possesses the first truth. Reply. In the case of universal being, illusion is impossible. Two kinds of being. Proof of the impossibility of the first illusion. — No concept illusory 163; title: § 59. The impossibility of the second illusion proved 165; title: § 60. Transition from observation to the proof that observation is a valid source of knowledge. Meaning of abstract 166; title: § 61. Error impossible in ideas generic and specific. Ideas the exemplary truths of things 167; title: § 62. There can be no error without a judgment. — Aristotle cited 168; title: § 63. There are judgments absolutely free from error. — Nouns and verbs 169; title: § 64. Such are the judgments expressing what is contained in an idea. What are principles? Meaning of absurd. — Principle of contradiction. Aristotle cited 172; title: § 65. Primitive judgments affirming that what is felt exists are free from error. The child affirms being only, not its modes. — No doubt respecting feeling as such. Individuum vagum 174; title: § 66. In perception we add the essence of being to the felt activity, but we never confound the two. — Perception distinguished from sensation. Theories of Reid and Hamilton 176; title: § 67. Judgments respecting the mode of perceived beings. Condition of their validity. Three possibilities with regard to this condition. We may be deceived in determining the modes of perceived being ; but we are not necessarily so. — Origin of error 180; title: § 68. We have a faculty for affirming exactly what we feel, and this faculty is only another function of the faculty whereby we affirm being apart from its modes. Deception arises, not from this faculty, but from the faculty of error which I allow to disturb it. — St. Thomas on faith 182; title: § 69. The error possible in the perception of real being. Perception is followed by reflection, which tries to determine the exact mode of the perceived being. Error begins with reflection and keeps pace with the complication and extent of it. — Nature of reflection 184; title: § 70. Perception infallible. Reflection may be rendered so by Logic — Province of Logic 186; title: § 71. Error is always voluntary. Reflection does not, save accidentally, produce error. The faculty of persuasion does not always de- pend, as it ought, on that of reasoning. Hence error. Various causes that produce persuasion, in spite of reasoning. Error, though always voluntary, is not always culpable. — Occasional causes of error 187; title: § 72. Three kinds of remedies against error, corresponding to its three sources 189; title: § 73. Sophistic. — Various kinds of Sophisms 189; title: § 74. More on perception. Analysis of corporeal sensations. Law of intellectual attention. The necessary nexus of objects does not enter into perception. — Sensation, sensitive perception and intellective perception distinguished. Perception limited to its object. Object and term 190; title: § 75. Source of Fichte's error, confusion between feeling and perception. Perception separates, reflection distinguishes, its object from others. — Refutation of Fichte's system. Distinction between knowledge an4 consciousness. Nature of the Ego 194; title: § 76. Schelling's error in asserting that the finite cannot be perceived without the infinite. Origin of this error, confusion between intellective perception and reasoning 202; title: § 77. How reason finds the limits, contingency, etc., of perceived beings. Schelling saw dimly, but could not express the fact that the mind, prior to all reasonings, must have something complete and universal. — Refutation of Pantheism. Albertus Magnus on the active intellect 204; title: § 78. Defence of the laws of perception and reasoning against the objections of sceptics. In external sensation we feel within us a force which is not ourselves. This enables us to affirm that a being exists without confounding it with ourselves.— Objects of perception. Intellective imagination. Subject and extra-subject 207; title: § 79. Perception is the bridge between us and the external world, and the difficulties of idealism arise from considering the world apart from perception. — Meaning of external world 209; title: § 80. Perception yields the important ontological truth that beings, in so far as agents, may exist in each other without intermingling. — Definitions of body, force. Perception of our own bodies and of external bodies 211; title: § 81. Our perception of ourselves is posterior to our perception of the external world. — Intellective perception of the Ego 214; title: § 82. Reflection would be unable to compare perceived beings together, if it had not universal being, by means of which it knows the mode and quantity of its realization in those beings, and, hence, if they belong or not to the same species. Principle of the discernibility of individuals. — Individual and idea of individual 217; title: § 83. Origin of the ideas of numbers 218; title: § 84. Difference of the mode of realization constitutes difference of species ; difference in quantity or actuality constitutes accidental differences. — Origin of Species. Reality ; two kinds of it. Various kinds of real form 219; title: § 85. When may we say that the Ego and the non-Ego mutually limit each other? — Affirmation does not include negation 221; title: § 86. The mind rises to the infinite neither in the primal perception, nor in the reflection which compares the Ego and the non-Ego, but in that which considers the limitation, contingency, and relativity of either. — Max Miiller on the manner in which the infinite is perceived 223; title: § 87. The supreme principle of all our reasoning 224; title: § 88. The principle of substance one of the conditions of real being falling under perception. — Modes of our idea of substance. Herbert Spencer on the substance of mind 224; title: § 89. We cannot perceive sensations pure, but only as modifications of ourselves  230; title: § 90. Does perception take place directly or through reasoning? — Cognition and recognition ..232; title: § 91. Process by which reflection translates the perception of ourselves. — The Ego a substance and a feeling 233; title: § 92. Perception does not take place blindly. — How sensation acts upon intelligence 234; title: § 93. Perception is governed by the principle of substance. — Difference between substance and cause 235; title: § 94. Substance and accident 236; title: § 95. Why the child, which has not perceived itself, is compelled by the principle of substance to attribute its own sensations to bodies 236; title: § 96. It does not follow that the principle of substance is fallacious. The errors we commit in referring accidents to the wrong sub- stance may be corrected. — Subject as distinguished from extra- subject 237; title: § 97. The principle of substance is the intuition of the essence of being, the first and universal truth. — Rosmini's idea of substance not pinozistic 238; title: § 98. One of the conditions of reflection is the principle of cause. — Principle of cause dependent on principle of contradiction, and this on the principle of cognition 239; title: § 99. Various orders of reflection. Reflection of the first order discovers the different limitations and mutual dependence of real beings. — Dependence the result of reflection 240; title: § 100. Notions of cause and effect. — Refutation of scepticism with reference to the universality and necessity of cause 242; title: § 101. The principle of cause is merely an application of the idea of being a perceived being, so as to see whether the latter has or has not in itself subsistence. — Hypotheses. All causes either physical or metaphysical 244; title: § 102. What is contingent being? — Concept of necessity 245; title: § 103. The principle of integration is a development of the principle of cause, and contains the reason why all peoples believe that God exists. — The argument for the existence of God derived from the impossibility of thinking an infinite number is entirely allacious 246; title: § 104. All other principles of reflection are reducible in the same way to the first universal truth, the essence of being naturally intuited by us 247; title: § 105. Purposes of the art of reasoning 247; title: § 106. How errors in reasoning are avoided. — Descartes' four rules of method. Rosmini's six norms 247; title: § 107. Three aims of reasoning. Hence three methods — apodeictic, heuristic, and didactic 248; title: § 108. Artifice of the syllogism, to which the various forms of argument are reducible.— Defence of the syllogism against Hegel 250; title: § 109. Universal rule of the syllogism 250; title: § 110. From the necessity of more than one middle term arises the Sorites 250; title: § 111. The conclusion has the same logical value as the premises. — Nature of probability 251; title: § 112. The sources from which a knowledge of truth is derived 253; title: § 113. The didactic method is either general or particular 253; title: § 114. Supreme principles of the three methods 253; title: Sciences of Perception.; title: § 115. Why Ideology and Logic were called Sciences of Intuition. — Means of knowing essences 254; title: § 116. What we can perceive is ourselves and the external world. Hence the two sciences, Psychology and Cosmology. — Relation of Psychology to Cosmology 255; title: § 117. Supernatural Anthropology goes beyond the limits of mere philosophy; title: I. Psychology.; title: § 118. What is Psychology? 256; title: § 119. Parts of Psychology 256; title: § 120. All reasoning on the essence of the soul sets out from the feeling of the soul. — Being and feeling indefinable 256; title: § 121. Difference between the feeling of our bodies and the feeling of our souls. — The Ego different from sensations 257; title: § 122. The human soul is a principle at once sensitive and intellective. — Difference between sense and intelligence 260; title: § 123. In what sense the Ego expresses the soul, and in what sense it is called the principle and subject of Psychology. — The Ego is a self-affirmed subject and belongs to the Science of Logic 261; title: § 124. Complete definition of the human soul. — Definitions given by Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Porphyry; title: § 125. Hence are deduced the other properties of the human soul. Simplicity. Immortality. — Various kinds of simplicity. The two terms of the soul. Its immortality is due to the intuited term 264; title: § 126. In what sense the opinion of Plato, that the body is an obstacle to the soul, is false. — Human knowledge is a seVies of determinations of being 268; title: § 127. The extended term of feeling is double, space and body, and these have opposite characters.— Nature of space and extension. The external world. Atoms 269; title: § 128. Connection of soul and body. The incomprehensibility of this connection does not give us the right to doubt the fact — Opinion of Plotinus. Of Professor Bain. The soul not a mathematical point. Porphyry on the incorporeal 278; title: § 129. The sentient principle feels its own body with a passivity mingled with much activity. The sentient principle feels a foreign body if in the body subject to its power there comes a change independent of, and opposed to it 278; title: § 130. There would be no difficulty in understanding how the soul should feel external bodies, if we could understand how, being a simple principle, it can have an extended term. — The substance of the soul is simple. Herbert Spencer's view 280; title: § 131. A close consideration of this question shows that the continuous does not lie in the single parts, but in a principle embracing them all at once, and hence the continuous cannot exist, except as the term of the act of a simple principle. — The principle of continuity is sensation. The ultimate elements of matter are animate and sentient 281; title: § 132. The first term of the sensitive soul is unmeasured space. Its second term is the body which it informs. The fundamental feeling. External sensations. How measured space is presented to feeling. — Feeling and consciousness ©f feeling. Herbert Spencer on the fundamental feeling. We form the idea of space or extension in two ways 287; title: § 133. The soul exercises no action on its first term ; but toward its second it is both active and passive 290; title: § 134. Sensitivity and instinct 291; title: § 135. Instinct, sensual and vital. Origin of Medicine. — The various instincts. Table of divisions of the vital instinct 291; title: § 136. Principle and term in the animal form a single being 295; title: § 137. Three kinds of feeling in the animal corresponding to the three conditions of the sensible term. — Feeling of Continuity. Feeling of Excitation. Feeling of Organization 295; title: § 138. Difference between animate and animal. — Elementary and organic souls. The unit of natural existence is sentience 301; title: § 139. Laws of essential changes which the animate undergoes in respect of its individuality. — Meaning of generation 302; title: § 140. The human soul, in so far as it is intellective, is united to its own body by an original, inborn perception of it. — Extra-subjective real body and anatomical body 304; title: § 141. There is a physical influence between soul and body. — Characteristics of the fundamental animal feeling 305; title: § 142. How the intellective and sensitive principles are one 306; title: § 143. What is death? — Separation of the body from its sensible term 307; title: § 144. Second office of Psychology to deduce and classify the faculties of the soul. — Powers of the intellect 309; title: § 145. Questions that present themselves when we try to deduce the powers of the soul from its essence 311; title: § 146. Three classes of laws to which the soul is subject in its operations — psychological, ontological, cosmological 312; title: § 147. The supreme ontological law is the principle of cognition 312; title: § 148. Cosmological laws are either laws of motion or laws of harmony 312; title: § 149. Two classes of psychological laws, corresponding to the ontological and cosmological. — Composition of Ego, non-Ego. Infinite 313; title: § 150. The third and last aim of Psychology is to discover the destiny of the human soul. The soul naturally tends to its own perfection, which consists in the full vision of the truth, full exercise of virtue, and full attainment of happiness. These three goods are but aspects of one and the same good.— Happiness versus pleasure 313; title: § 151. Religious tradition alone can free man from the doubts which arise from the sad spectacle of the present life, and man's higher destinies must be treated in a supernatural Psychology and Anthropology. — The supernatural light 315; title: 2. Cosmology.; title: § 152. What is Cosmology? — The science of the extra-subjective 317; title: § 153. How Cosmology considers the world.— Parts of Cosmology 318; title: § 154. First part of Cosmology 319; title: § 155. First proof of the creation of the world. — Nature of creation 319; title: § 156. Second proof. — Creation is from non-being, not from nothing 320; title: § 157. Third proof 321; title: § 158. The knowledge of the essential limitations of contingent being completes our knowledge of its nature. — Doctrine of limits 321; title: § 159. Sublime questions to which the theme of creation gives occasion — Possible limitations not infinite 322; title: § 160. Second part of Cosmology 323; title: § 161. Third part of Cosmology 323; title: § 162. Cosmology connected with Ontology and Theology 324; title: Sciences of Reasoning.; title: § 163. Sources of the principles and material of reasoning. Nature of reasoning. — Materiated sciences 325; title: § 164. Two classes of sciences of reasoning 326; title: I. Ontological Sciences.; title: § 165. Ontological Sciences 326; title: A. Ontology.; title: § 166. Ontology. The three forms of being : the ideal, the real, and the moral 326; title: § 167. The essence identical, the forms utterly distinct. — Unitarians from Plotinus to Hegel 326; title: § 168. Ideal form. Real form 327; title: § 169. Moral form. — Moral good infinite 328; title: § 170. Properties of the three forms. — Two views of ideality 329; title: § 171. The three forms are the foundation of the categories 330; title: § 172. The categories differ from genera and species 331; title: § 173. Law of the synthesism of being. — The world as absolute and as relative 331; title: § 174. Ontology examines the recesses of being to find the reason for the distribution of being into genera and species 332; title: § 175. It seeks the essential properties of being in the light of cognition. — Idea of God includes subsistence 333; title: B. Natural Theology.; title: § 176. Natural Theology 333; title: § 177. The idea we have of God is not positive but negative 334; title: § 178. First proof of the existence of God 335; title: § 179. Second proof 335; title: § 180. Third proof 336; title: § 181. Fourth proof. — Rosmini's view of Categorical Imperative 336; title: § 182. Considering the manner in which we know God, we call our knowledge of him negative-ideal. — Negative cognition 337; title: § 183. Two ways in which our minds rise to the Absolute Being 347; title: § 184. Theology must supplement what was said in the Cosmology of the divine operations ad extra , 348; title: § 185. Of the divine essence 348; title: § 186. Can the human intelligence, fortified by revelation, know that the divine essence must exist in three persons? Views of Ermenegildo Pini and the Abbe" Mastrofini 348; title: § 187. On the creative act 349; title: § 188. The exposition of the divine attributes leads to Theodicy, which deals with the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as displayed in the world. — Contents of Rosmini's Theodicy 349; title: 2. Deonlologkal Sciences.; title: § 189 Deontological Sciences 350; title: § 190. Deontology general and special 351; title: A. General Deontology.; title: § 191. General Deontology. Three classes of relations of perfection 351; title: § 192. These relations are immutable and complete in the Supreme Being. In contingent being they are more or less realized 351; title: § 193. Perfection, real, intellectual, and moral 352; title: § 194. The relations of perfection have a double exigence 352; title: § 195. Objective exigence 353; title: § 196. Subjective exigence 353; title: § 197. Meaning of "exigence" 353; title: § 198. The exigences, or necessities, in virtue of which the relations peculiar to the various classes of beings claim realization 353; title: § 199. Physical, intellectual, and moral necessities have each two forms, an ontological and a deontological 354; title: § 200. Perfection, being a form, may be either objective or subjective 354; title: § 201. The form which perfects real being is subjective, and is either a constituent element of that being or a distinct reality 355; title: § 202. The form which perfects intelligent beings is objective 355; title: § 203. The form which perfects moral beings is subjective-objective 355; title: § 204. What is moral obligation? 355; title: § 205. First difference between moral perfection and that of real and intellectual beings 357; title: § 206. Second difference ### 3^7; title: § 207. Third difference 357; title: § 208. Three parts of the doctrine of the perception of being 358; title: § 209. Nature of the object of each of these parts 358; title: B. Special Deontology,; title: § 210. Vastness of Special Deontology. — Callology 359; title: § 211. Human Deontology 361; title: § 212. The doctrine of moral perfection implicitly contains the whole doctrine of human perfection 362; title: § 213. Doctrine of human perfection embraces three parts — archetypes, actions, means. (a) Teletics. (b) Ethics. (c) Ascetics. (d) Education, (e) Economy, (f) Politics. (g) Cosmopolitics. 362; title: § 214. (a) Teletics. The Archetype of man, both in the natural and supernatural orders, is Jesus Christ 363; title: § 215. (b) Ethics 363; title: § 216. Ethics includes three parts, corresponding to its three offices. (a) General Ethics, (b) Special Ethics, (c) Eudaemonology 364; title: § 217. (a) General Ethics treats of the esserice of virtue. First element of moral good is the will. Second element of moral good is law. — There is no special moral faculty or Practical Reason, in Kant's sense 365; title: § 218. What part of human action is moral in itself and what by participation 367; title: § 219. A man is not completely virtuous until he refers every action to God as his ultimate aim. 367; title: § 220. God's will is the source of divine positive law 368; title: § 221. Why there are duties toward human nature, which is contingent and limited 368; title: § 222. Special logic of Ethics.— Jesuits on the Lex dubia 369; title: § 223. Third element of moral good is the relation between will and law 369; title: § 224. (b) Special Ethics treats of the special forms of moral good and evil 370; title: § 225. (c) Eudaemonology shows the beauty of moral good and the turpitude of moral evil, in themselves and in their effects 370; title: § 226. Rational Right 371; title: § 227. Sphere of the Science of Right 372; title: § 228. Fundamental division of a man's rights in relation to other men 372; title: § 229. What is freedom? — Aristotle's view 372; title: § 230. What is property? 373; title: § 231. Two parts of the Science of Right 374; title: § 232. Subject of Individual Right 374; title: § 233. Social Right based on Individual Right 375; title: § 234. Social Right, universal and particular 375; title: § 235. Universal Social Right is either internal or external 375; title: § 236. Internal Right is divided into Signorial, Political, and Communal Right 376; title: § 237. Particular Social Right arises from the application to particular societies of the principles of universal Social Right. Three societies necessary to the human race 376; title: § 238. Theocratic Right either initial or perfect 377; title: § 239. Domestic Right twofold, conjugal and parental 377; title: § 240. There may be a general, as well as a special, theory of civil society 377; title: § 241. The supreme problem of the Science of Right 378; title: § 242. Wherein consists External Right 379; title: § 243. (a) Ascetics 379; title: § 244. (b) Education 379; title: § 245. Three parts of Education 380; title: § 246. Physical and intellectual must be made subordinate to moral education 3S1; title: § 247. (c) Economy 381; title: § 248. Conditions necessary for the prosperity of the family 381; title: § 249. The government of the family tends to bring the members of a family nearer the aim of existence 382; title: § 250. Nature and limits of family government 382; title: § 251. Vices belonging to domestic society 382; title: § 252. Politics. — Rosmini's works on this subject 383; title: § 253. Political rules 384; title: § 254. Four sources of political rules 384; title: § 255. First source, the end of Civil Society 384; title: § 256. Second source 385; title: § 257. Third source 386; title: § 258. Fourth source 386; title: § 259. The Catholic religion is the most powerful political means, the one which tempers and harmonizes all the rest 387; title: § 260. (a) Cosmopolitics 387; title: § 261. End and fruit of philosophy 388; title: § 262. The true philosopher's self-surrender to God 388; title: § 263. Philosophy a school of humanity 388; title: List of Authors quoted or referred to 391; title: Index to Definitions and Principal Subjects 393