The welfare effects of public drug insurance
By: Darius Lakdawalla, Neeraj Sood
Contributors: Sood, Neeraj; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13501; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13501.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "Rewarding inventors with inefficient monopoly power has long been regarded as the price of encouraging innovation.  Public prescription drug insurance escapes that trade-off and achieves an elusive goal: lowering static deadweight loss, while simultaneously encouraging dynamic investments in innovation.  As a result of this feature, the public provision of drug insurance can be welfare-improving, even for risk-neutral and purely self-interested consumers.  In spite of its relatively low benefit levels, the Medicare Part D benefit generate $3.5 billion of annual static deadweight loss reduction, and at least $2.8 billion of annual value from extra innovation.  These two components alone cover 87% of the social cost of publicly financing the benefit.  The analysis of static and dynamic efficiency also has implications for policies complementary to a drug benefit: in the context of public monopsony power, some degree of price-negotiation by the government is always strictly welfare-improving, but this should often be coupled with extensions in patent length"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/1/2007.

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