Private takings
By: by Ed Nosal .
Contributors: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Series: Working paper -- WP07-13; Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland : Online) -- WP07-13.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cleveland, Ohio]
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "This paper considers the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court ruling that can be interpreted as supporting the use of eminent domain in transferring the property rights of one private agent--a landowner--to another private agent--a developer. Compared to voluntary exchange, when property rights are transferred via eminent domain, landowners' investments in their properties become more inefficient and, as a result, any any benefit associated with mitigating the holdout problem between landowners and the developer is reduced. Social welfare can only increase if the holdout problem is significant; otherwise, social welfare will fall when property rights are transferred via eminent domain."--Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/25/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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