Venezuela as an exporter of 4th generation warfare instability
By: Max G. Manwaring
Contributors: Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Series: Strategic Studies Institute monograph; SSI monograph
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Published: 2012
Place of publication: Carlisle, PA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 46
ISBN-13: 9781584875567
Subjects: Political and social views; Asymmetric warfare; Propaganda; Paramilitary forces; Political stability; Politics and government; Foreign relations; Military policy
Other titles: Venezuela as an exporter of fourth generation warfare instability
Description: Almost no one seems to understand the Marxist-Leninist foundations of Hugo Chavez's political thought. It becomes evident, however, in the general vision of his "Bolivarian Revolution." The abbreviated concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S. dominated) political and economic systems in the Americas, to take power, and to create a socialist, nationalistic, and "popular" (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout the Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that the notion of the use of force (compulsion) is never completely separated from the Leninist concept of destroying any bourgeois opposition, Chavez's revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a conventional military war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to Lenin and Chavez, a "new society" will only be created by a gradual, systematic, compulsory application of agitation and propaganda (i.e., agit-prop). That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and generating public opinion in favor of a "revolution" and against the bourgeois system. Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that the North American (U.S.) "Empire" and its bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not doing what is right for the people, and that the socialist Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will. This may not be a traditional national security problem for the United States and other targeted countries, and it may not be perceived to be as lethal as conventional conflict, but that does not diminish the cruel reality of compulsion.
Notes: "December 2012."

Format not distributed to depository libraries.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-46).

Also available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
Table of contents: title: Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian vision and how to achieve it; title: Key components of the Chavez strategic-level asymmetric warfare; title: The paramilitary operational model; title: Implications and recommendations.