The nature and value of knowledge
Subtitle: three investigations
By: Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock
Contributors: Millar, Alan, Ph. D.; Haddock, Adrian
Publisher: Oxford University Press; Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Oxford; New York
Language: eng
Number of pages: 274
ISBN-13: 9780199586264
Notes: Includes bibliographical references  and index.
Table of contents: title: The value problem; title: Unpacking the value problem; title: The swamping problem; title: fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods; title: The relevance of epistemic value monism; title: Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response; title: Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response; title: Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response; title: Robust virtue epistemology; title: Knowledge and achievement; title: Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge?; title: Achievement without achievement; title: Back to the value problem; title: Contra virtue epistemology; title: Two master intuitions about knowledge; title: Anti-luck virtue epistemology; title: Interlude : is anti-luck virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge?; title: Diagnosing the structure of knowledge; title: Back to the value problem; title: The final value of achievements; title: Understanding; title: Understanding and epistemic luck; title: Understanding and cognitive achievement; title: Back to the value problem; title: Two potential implications of the distinctive value of understanding thesis; title: The traditional analytical project and the central tension; title: Knowledge, evidence, and reasons; title: Concepts versus phenomena; title: The way ahead; title: Perceptual-recognitional abilities; title: Broad and narrow competence; title: Avoiding reduction; title: Perpetual-recognitional abilities; title: Broad and narrow competence; title: Avoiding reduction; title: Perceptual knowledge and justified belief; title: Closure and doxastic responsibility; title: Knowledge from indicators; title: Recognitional abilities again; title: Detached standing knowledge; title: Back to knowledge from indicators; title: Taking stock; title: Why knowledge matters; title: Approaching the epistemology of testimony; title: Telling and informing; title: Acquiring true beliefs and acquiring knowledge through being told; title: Access to facts about knowledge; title: The modest route; title: Fool's knowledge; title: The distinctive value of knowledge; title: Fool's justification; title: Arguing from illusion; title: The regress of justifications; title: Transparency and knowledge; title: Transparency and entitlement; title: On trying to do without transparency; title: Transparency and luminosity; title: Non-sensible knowledge; title: Self-knowledge; title: Non-sensible knowledge of action; title: The two dimensions; title: The distinctive value of knowledge of action; title: Non-observational knowledge; title: Practical knowledge and intention; title: Practical knowledge and direction of fit.