Matching firms, managers and incentives
By: Oriana Bandiera, [et al.].
Contributors: Guiso, Luigi; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 10-073; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 10-073.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2010
Place of publication: [Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 45
Description: We provide evidence on the match between firms, managers, and incentives using a new survey that contains information on managers' risk preferences and human capital, on their compensation schemes, and on the firms they work for. The data is consistent with the equilibrium correlations predicted by a model where firms with different ownership structure and managers with different risk aversion and talent match endogenously through incentive contracts. The model predicts and the data support that, compared to widely-held firms, family firms use contracts that are less sensitive to performance; these contracts attract less talented and more risk averse managers; these managers work less hard, earn less, and display lower job satisfaction.
Notes: "March 2010"--Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references.