Strategic judicial decision making
By: Pablo T. Spiller, Rafael Gely.
Contributors: Gely, Rafael, 1961-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13321.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13321.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 21
Subjects: Judicial process -- Econometric models
Description: This survey paper starts from the basic, and intuitive, assumption that judges are human and as such, can be modeled in the same fashion we model politicians, activists, managers: driven by well-defined preferences, behaving in a purposive and forward-looking fashion. We explore, then, the role politics play in judicial decision-making. We provide a brief overview of what is called the "strategic approach," compare it to alternative approaches to understand judicial behavior, and offer some concluding thoughts about the future of positive analyses of judicial decision-making.
Notes: "August 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 16-20).

Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).