Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)
By: Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O'Connell.
Contributors: O'Connell, Edward.
Series: Rand counterinsurgency study ; volume 2
Publisher: Rand
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Santa Monica, CA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 106
ISBN-13: 9780833042972
Subjects: Postwar reconstruction -- Iraq; Counterinsurgency -- Iraq
Description: Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.

This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on COIN; analyzes COIN operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about COIN, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future COIN operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct COIN in the future. For example, U.S. COIN experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate. The need to continually reassess COIN strategy and tactics implies that military and civilian leaders must have not only the will, but also a formal mechanism, to fearlessly and thoroughly call to the attention of senior decisionmakers any shortfalls in policies and practices, e.g., in Iraq, failure to protect the civilian population, as well as overreliance on technological approaches to COIN. The Iraq experience is particularly germane to drawing lessons about COIN. In essence, the conflict there is a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihadists and criminal opportunists--a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Table of contents: title: Summary; title: Iraq and the goal of counterinsurgency; title: Recommendations; title: Acknowledgements; title: Abbreviations; title: Overview of the conflict in Iraq; title: Ba'athist regime; title: Invasion of Iraq; title: Post-invasion Iraq; title: Steps towards constitutional government; title: Spring; title: Iraqi elections; title: Islamic extremists and sectarian violence; title: U.S. strategy; title: Armed groups in Iraq; title: Overview; title: Kurdish separatists; title: Sunni Arab insurgents; title: Violent extremists; title: Shi'ite Arab militias; title: Criminal gangs; title: Insurgent use of terrorism; title: Counterinsurgency in Iraq; title: Organization of the U.S. effort; title: U.S. military operations; title: Fallujah; title: Tal Afar; title: Baghdad; title: Air support; title: Combatting improvised explosive devices; title: Detainee operations; title: U.S. support to Iraqi forces; title: Iraqi police; title: Iraqi armed forces; title: Assessing progress in counterinsurgency; title: Iraqi casualties and displacement; title: Iraqi economy; title: Iraqi opinion; title: Accounting for success and failure; title: Understanding Iraqi society; title: Planning for the post-invasion period; title: International support for the war; title: Dismantling the Ba'athist regime; title: Building a new Iraqi state; title: A new system of justice; title: Reconstruction of Iraq; title: Security; title: Military missions; title: Intelligence; title: Detainee operations; title: Capabilities for counterinsurgency; title: Use of military force; title: Safety and security of the population; title: Enabling indigenous forces; title: Intelligence on the enemy; title: Essential services and reconstruction; title: Information operations; title: Detainee operations; title: Recommendations; title: Development of strategy; title: Coalition-building planning process; title: Unity of effort; title: Interagency process; title: Host nation governance; title: Funding mechanisms; title: Counterinsurgency as a mission; title: Personnel policy; title: U.S. army special forces; title: Partnership with indigenous forces; title: Policing functions; title: Brigade organization; title: Gunship-like capability; title: Intelligence collection and sharing.