Using deferred compensation to strengthen the ethics of financial regulation
By: Edward J. Kane.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 8399; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 8399.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 27
Subjects: Financial services industry -- State supervision -- Corrupt practices.; Financial institutions -- State supervision -- Corrupt practices.; Incentives in industry.; Government executives -- Salaries, etc.; Corporate governance.; Deposit insurance -- Corrupt practices.; Administrative agencies -- Management.; Civil service ethics.; Deferred compensation.
Notes: "July 2001."

JEL no. G2, G3, H4, K2.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 25-27).

Electronic access limited to Binghamton University faculty, staff and students for instructional and research purposes only.

Electronic version available via the Internet at the NBER World Wide Web site.