Open-secret voting
By: Adrian Vermeule
Contributors: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 674; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 674.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Abstract: Stock debates about transparency and secrecy usually assume that open voting and secret voting are mutually exclusive.  But these positions present a false alternative; open and secret voting can be employed as complements in a larger decision-procedure.  In what follows I will propose a hybrid or dual procedure of open-secret voting, and attempt to specify the conditions under which that procedure works well.  I suggest that open-secret voting can best be justified as an institutional means of obtaining a second opinion from the voting group.  A second opinion of this sort might produce informational benefits either for the members of the voting group itself, for outsideparties, or for both.  (This is a companion paper to Adrian Vermeule, "Second Opinions" available on SSRN)---John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/20/2010.

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