Efficiency advantages of grandfathering in rights-based fisheries management
By: Terry L. Anderson, Ragnar Arnason, Gary D. Libecap
Contributors: Ragnar Arnason, 1949-; Libecap, Gary D.; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16519; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16519.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights.  It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents.  We counter that rents are not fixed in situ, but rather depend additionally upon the innovation, investment, and collective actions of fishers, who discover and enhance stocks and convert them into valuable goods and services.  Our analysis shows how grandfathering increases rents by raising expected rates of return for investment, lowering the cost of capital, and providing incentives for collective action"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/22/2011.

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