Health reform, health insurance, and selection
Subtitle: estimating selection into health insurance using the massachusetts health reform
By: Martin B. Hackmann, Jonathan T. Kolstad, Amanda E. Kowalski
Contributors: Kolstad, Jonathan T.; Kowalski, Amanda E.; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 17748; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 17748.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2012
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this.  You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email.  We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts.  Our test examines changes in the cost of the newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform.  We find that counties with larger increases in insurance coverage over the reform period face the smallest increase in average hospital costs for the insured population, consistent with adverse selection into insurance before the reform.  Additional results, incorporating cross-state variation and data on health measures, provide further evidence for adverse selection"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/6/2012.

Includes bibliographical references.

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