Principals and agents
Subtitle: the structure of business
By: edited by John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser ; contributors, Kenneth J. Arrow ... [et al.].
Contributors: Pratt, John W., 1931-; Zeckhauser, Richard.
Series: Research colloquium / Harvard Business School
Publisher: Harvard Business School Press
Published: 1985
Place of publication: Boston, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 241
Subjects: Management -- Congresses.; Agency (Law) -- Economic aspects -- Congresses.; Agency (Law) -- Congresses.
Description: Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business" by John W. Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser is a seminal work in economics that explores the concept of agency relationships, where one party (the "principal") delegates decision-making power to another party (the "agent") who may have different interests, leading to potential conflicts and the need for mechanisms to align incentives.
Key points about the book:
Central Theme:
The core idea is that in business, there are inherent conflicts of interest when one person (the agent) is tasked with acting on behalf of another (the principal), especially when the agent has more information or control over actions than the principal.
Information Asymmetry:
A key aspect of agency theory is "information asymmetry," where the agent often has more knowledge about the situation than the principal, creating opportunities for the agent to act in their own self-interest, potentially to the detriment of the principal.
Agency Costs:
The book discusses the "agency costs," which are the expenses incurred by the principal to monitor and incentivize the agent to act in line with their interests, including costs of contracting, monitoring, and bonding.
Mitigating Agency Problems:
The book explores various mechanisms that principals can use to mitigate agency problems, including:
Performance-based compensation: Tying the agent's pay to their performance metrics to incentivize desired outcomes.
Monitoring and oversight: Implementing systems to track the agent's actions and decisions.
Legal contracts: Establishing clear contractual agreements that specify expected behaviors and consequences of non-compliance.
Corporate governance structures: Designing organizational structures that provide checks and balances on management power.
Applications of Agency Theory:
Executive Compensation:
Understanding how to structure CEO pay to align their interests with shareholder value.
Employee Incentives:
Designing employee compensation schemes that incentivize desired performance levels.
Investment Management:
Assessing the potential conflicts of interest between fund managers and their clients.
Contract Design:
Developing contracts that effectively address agency problems in various business relationships.
Overall, "Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business" is a foundational text in the field of agency theory, providing a framework for understanding and addressing the challenges arising when one party delegates decision-making power to another with potentially conflicting interests.
Notes: Includes bibliographies and index.
Proceedings from one of a series of conferences held at the Harvard Business School in 1984.
Table of contents: title: Principals and agents / John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser; title: The economics of agency / Kenneth J. Arrow; title: Agency costs versus fiduciary duties / Robert C. Clark; title: Insider trading as an agency problem / Frank H. Easterbrook; title: Empirical evidence of incentive problems and their mitigation in oil and gas tax shelter programs / Mark A. Wolfson; title: Agency costs, employment contracts, and labor unions / Richard A. Epstein; title: Transfer pricing as a problem of agency / Robert G. Eccles; title: Agency as control / Harrison C. White.