God and phenomenal consciousness
Subtitle: a novel approach to knowledge arguments
By: Yujin Nagasawa.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Cambridge; New York
Language: eng
Number of pages: 162
ISBN-13: 9780521879668
Subjects: Jackson, Frank, -- 1943-; Consciousness; Knowledge, Theory of
Description: "In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. First, he introduces some of the most powerful arguments against the existence of God and provides new objections to them. He then presents a hitherto unrecognised parallel structure between these arguments and influential arguments offered by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness. By appealing to this structure, Nagasawa constructs novel objections to Jackson's and Nagel's arguments. Finally, he derives, from the failure of these arguments, a unique metaphysical thesis, which he calls 'non-theoretical physicalism'. Through this thesis, he shows that although this world is entirely physical, there are physical facts that cannot be captured even by complete theories of the physical sciences"--Publisher description.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-158) and index.
Table of contents: title: The structure of knowledge arguments; title: The structure of knowledge arguments; title: Jackson's Mary argument; title: Nagel's bat argument; title: Defining a knowledge argument; title: The argument from concept possession; title: Grim's argument from knowledge de se; title: Why they are knowledge arguments; title: Nontheoretical physicalism; title: Knowledge arguments in the philosophy of religion; title: Grim's argument from knowledge de se; title: Castañeda's and Abbruzzese's objections to the argument from knowledge de se; title: First principle : divine omniscience and epistemic powers; title: Second principle : divine omnipotence and necessary impossibilities; title: Applying the principles; title: Possible objections; title: Aplication of my strategy; title: The argument from concept possession (1); title: Historical background; title: The structure of the argument from concept possession; title: Objections to (1); title: Objections to (2); title: Objections to (3); title: Objections to (4); title: The argument from concept possession (2); title: A new objection to (4); title: Amending (4); title: Objections to the new argument; title: Knowledge arguments in the philosophy of mind; title: Nagel's bat argument; title: Argument 1; title: Objections to argument 1; title: Argument 2; title: The thomistic principle; title: The revised thomistic principle; title: Thomas vs. Thomas : applying the revised thomistic principle; title: Possible objections; title: Jackson's Mary argument (1); title: The Mary argument against physicalism; title: The parity of reasons objection; title: The Mary argument against dualism; title: Replies from dualists; title: Reductive dualism and non-reductive dualism; title: Application of the parity of reasons objection : Chalmers' panprotopsychism; title: Jackson's Mary argument (2); title: The Mary argument again; title: The argument from concept possession again; title: The structural similarity between the mary argument and the argument from; title: Concept possession; title: The crucial dissimilarity between the mary argument and the argument from; title: Concept possession; title: Mary's ignorance; title: Knowing the fundamental features of physical entities and properties; title: Knowledge arguments and nontheoretical physicalism; title: Knowledge arguments and nontheoretical physicalism; title: Plausibility of (i); title: Pausibility of (ii); title: Pausibility of (iii); title: Nontheoretical physicalism and the mystery of phenomenal consciousness; title: Nontheoretical physicalism and the existence of God; title: Knowledge arguments and measuring the size of omniscience.