Cash transfers, conditions, school enrollment, and child work
Subtitle: evidence from a randomized experiment in Ecuador
By: Norbert Schady, Maria Caridad Araujo, Research working paper Collection Title:Policy
Contributors: Araujo, Maria Caridad; World Bank
Series: Policy research working paper -- 3930; Policy research working papers (Online) -- 3930.
Publisher: World Bank
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Subjects: School attendance; Student aid; Child labor
Description: "The impact of cash transfer programs on the accumulation of human capital is a topic of great policy importance.  An attendant question is whether program effects are larger when transfers are "conditioned" on certain behaviors, such as a requirement that households enroll their children in school.  This paper uses a randomized study design to analyze the impact of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), a cash transfer program, on enrollment and child work among poor children in Ecuador.  There are two main results.  First, the BDH program had a large, positive impact on school enrollment, about 10 percentage points, and a large, negative impact on child work, about 17 percentage points.  Second, the fact that some households believed that there was a school enrollment requirement attached to the transfers, even though such a requirement was never enforced or monitored in Ecuador, helps explain the magnitude of program effects. "--World Bank web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/30/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

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