Elected versus appointed policymakers
Subtitle: evidence from city treasurers
By: Alexander Whalley.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 15643; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15643.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper investigates whether methods of public official selection affect policymaking in cities.  I draw on the unique characteristics of California's city referendum process to identify the causal effect of city treasurers' method of selection on their cities' debt management policies.  I utilize a regression discontinuity strategy based on the effect of narrowly-passing appointive city treasurer referendums on city borrowing costs.  The results indicate that appointive treasurers reduce a city's cost of borrowing by 13% to 23%.  The results imply that if all cities in California with elected treasurers were to appoint them, total borrowing expenditures would be reduced by more than $20 million per year.  Appointive city treasurers appear to reduce borrowing costs primarily through the refinancing of expensive debt at lower interest rates"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/16/2010.

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