Organizational economics and physician practices
By: James B. Rebitzer, Mark E. Votruba
Contributors: Votruba, Mark Edward, 1970-; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 17535; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 17535.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this.  You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email.  Economists seeking to improve the efficiency of health care delivery frequently emphasize two issues: the fragmented structure of physician practices and poorly designed physician incentives.  This paper analyzes these issues from the perspective of organizational economics.  We begin with a brief overview of the structure of physician practices and observe that the long anticipated triumph of integrated care delivery has largely gone unrealized.  We then analyze the special problems that fragmentation poses for the design of physician incentives.  Organizational economics suggests some promising incentive strategies for this setting, but implementing these strategies is complicated by norms of autonomy in the medical profession and by other factors that inhibit effective integration between hospitals and physicians.  Compounding these problems are patterns of medical specialization that complicate coordination among physicians.  We conclude by considering the policy implications of our analysis - paying particular attention to proposed Accountable Care Organizations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/5/2012.

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