Design and Analysis of Decoy Systems for Computer Security
By: Brian M. Bowen
Publisher: [publisher not identified]
Published: 2011
Place of publication: [New York, N.Y.?]
Language: eng
Description: This dissertation is aimed at defending against a range of internal threats, including eaves-dropping on network taps, placement of malware to capture sensitive information, and general insider threats to exfiltrate sensitive information. Although the threats and adversaries may vary, in each context where a system is threatened, decoys can be used to deny critical information to adversaries making it harder for them to achieve their target goal. The approach leverages deception and the use of decoy technologies to deceive adversaries and trap nefarious acts. This dissertation proposes a novel set of properties for decoys to serve as design goals in the development of decoy-based infrastructures. To demonstrate their applicability, we designed and prototyped network and host-based decoy systems. These systems are used to evaluate the hypothesis that network and host decoys can be used to detect inside attackers and malware. We introduce a novel, large-scale automated creation and management system for deploying decoys.

Decoys may be created in various forms including bogus documents with embedded beacons, credentials for various web and email accounts, and bogus financial in- formation that is monitored for misuse. The decoy management system supplies decoys for the network and host-based decoy systems. We conjecture that the utility of the decoys depends on the believability of the bogus information; we demonstrate the believability through experimentation with human judges. For the network decoys, we developed a novel trap-based architecture for enterprise networks that detects "silent" attackers who are eavesdropping network traffic. The primary contributions of this system is the ease of injecting, automatically, large amounts of believable bait, and the integration of various detection mechanisms in the back-end. We demonstrate our methodology in a prototype platform that uses our decoy injection API to dynamically create and dispense network traps on a subset of our campus wireless network. We present results of a user study that demonstrates the believability of our automatically generated decoy traffic.

We present results from a statistical and information theoretic analysis to show the believability of the traffic when automated tools are used. For host-based decoys, we introduce BotSwindler, a novel host-based bait injection sys- tem designed to delude and detect crimeware by forcing it to reveal itself during the ex- ploitation of monitored information. Our implementation of BotSwindler relies upon an out-of-host software agent to drive user-like interactions in a virtual machine, seeking to convince malware residing within the guest OS that it has captured legitimate credentials. To aid in the accuracy and realism of the simulations, we introduce a novel, low overhead approach, called virtual machine verification, for verifying whether the guest OS is in one of a predefined set of states. We provide empirical evidence to show that BotSwindler can be used to induce malware into performing observable actions and demonstrate how this approach is superior to that used in other tools. We present results from a user to study to illustrate the believability of the simulations and show that financial bait infor- mation can be used to effectively detect compromises through experimentation with real credential-collecting malware.

We present results from a statistical and information theo- retic analysis to show the believability of simulated keystrokes when automated tools are used to distinguish them. Finally, we introduce and demonstrate an expanded role for decoys in educating users and measuring organizational security through experiments with approximately 4000 university students and staff.
Notes: Department: Computer Science.

Thesis advisor: Salvatore Stolfo.

Thesis advisor: Angelos D. Keromytis.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2011.