When should sellers use auctions?
By: James W. Roberts, Andrew Sweeting
Contributors: Sweeting, Andrew; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 17624; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 17624.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially.  In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions.  The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate.  A simple sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneous bid auction.  The findings are illustrated with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS timber auctions where our estimates predict that the sequential mechanism would increase revenue and efficiency"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/9/2012.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.