Entry and asymmetric lobbying
Subtitle: why governments pick losers
By: Richard E. Baldwin, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud.
Contributors: Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 8756; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 8756.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2002
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 23
Subjects: Lobbying.; Economic policy.
Notes: "February 2002."

JEL no. F1, L5.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 19-21).

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Electronic version available via the Internet at the NBER World Wide Web site.