Giving in dictator games
Subtitle: regard for others or regard by others?
By: by Alexander K. Koch, Hans-Theo Normann.
Contributors: Normann, Hans-Theo.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1703; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1703
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Negotiation -- Research.
Description: "Recent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete information on subjects' behavior. This has rekindled the question whether "fair" behavior is inspired by regard for others or is explained by external forces. To test for the importance of external pressure we compare a standard double blind dictator game to a treatment which provides no information about the source of dictator offers, and where recipients do not even know that they participate in an experiment. We find no differences between treatments. This suggests that those dictators who give are purely internally motivated, as asserted by models of other-regarding preferences"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/11/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.