Trust and discretion in agency contracts
By: Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Ramon Casadesus-Masanell
Contributors: Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon; Harvard Business School. Division of Research
Series: Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School -- 02-015; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 02-015
Publisher: Division of Research, Harvard Business School
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 42
Description: We extend the standard agency framework to allow for complex information, trust worthiness of the principal, and incomplete contracts and show that contractual incompleteness arises endogenously when there is enough complexity and trust. Several predictions of the standard model break down in our more general construction: trust plays a crucial role in the design of optimal contracts; not all the relevant, valuable information on the agent's choice of action is incorporated in the equilibrium contract; and even when inference is perfect, the principal may only be able to implement the low cost effort. We conclude that one main function of agency contracts is to protect the agent from possible opportunistic behavior of the principal.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.