Conscription as regulation
By: Casey Mulligan, Andrei Shleifer.
Contributors: Shleifer, Andrei.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10558; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10558.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Draft -- Costs -- Case studies.
Genres: Case studies.
Description: "We examine the practice of military conscription around the world from the perspective of two standard theories, and a new one, which emphasizes the fixed cost of introducing and administering the draft as a deterrent to its use.  We find that, holding the relative size of the military constant, higher population countries are more likely to use the draft.  We also find that French legal origin countries, which we see as facing lower fixed and variable administrative costs, are more likely to draft than are common law countries.  Conscription does not seem to be influenced by democracy, and is influenced by the deadweight costs of taxation only in countries with very large militaries.  The results suggest that fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations may be an important determinant of their use"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.