Tacit collusion in a dynamic duopoly with indivisible production and cumulative capacity constraints
By: Glenn Lowry
Contributors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper / Dept. of Economics -- no. 556 [i.e. 557]; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 557.
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Published: 1990
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 43
Notes: "May 1990." -- "June 1990."--3rd prelim. page.

Series numbering changed by hand on t.p. by the Dept. of Economics.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 43).

Research support from the Bradley Foundation, the Olin Foundation and the Center for Energy Policy Research, MIT.