Monotonicity of equilibrium payoff sets with respect to observability in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
By: by Michihiro Kandori.
Series: Technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University -- no. 532; Economics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University; Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 532.; Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)
Publisher: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University
Published: 1988
Place of publication: Stanford, Calif
Language: eng
Number of pages: 15
Notes: "Prepared under National Science Foundation Grant #IST 85-21838".

"October, 1987, Revised, May, 1988".

Includes bibliographical references (p. 15).

Binghamton University Libraries' copy bound with: Coalitions and sustainable social norms in repeated games / Peter M. DeMarzo.