Understanding general deterrence
Subtitle: theory and application
By: Stephen L. Quackenbush
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Published: 2011
Place of publication: New York, NY
Language: eng
Number of pages: 208
ISBN-13: 9780230115040
Subjects: International relations; POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General; Mathematical models; Conflict management; POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / International Security; Deterrence (Strategy); POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory; Game theory
Description: "This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence. "--
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Table of contents: title: Machine generated contents note:; title: Purpose and Method * General Deterrence Case Selection * Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory * Three-Party Extended Deterrence * Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict * Appendix 1: FORTRAN Program Used to Determine Active Dyads * Appendix 2: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game * Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game.