Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Subtitle: removing Saddam Hussein by force
By: Steven Metz ; John R. Martin, executive editor
Contributors: Martin, John R. (John Robert), 1952-; Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Series: Operation Iraqi Freedom key decisions monograph series -- v. 1; Operation Iraqi Freedom key decisions monograph series -- v. 1.
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Carlisle, PA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 67
ISBN-13: 9781584874263
Description: One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made.--
Notes: "February 2010."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 54-67).

Also available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
Table of contents: title: Introduction; title: Decisionmakers; title: Defining the issue; title: Decision shapers; title: Political and strategic context; title: An iterative decision; title: Facts; title: Assumptions; title: Options; title: The decisionmaking process; title: Analysis and conclusions.