Do local elections in non-democracies increase accountability?
Subtitle: evidence from rural China
By: Monica Martinez-Bravo ... [et al.].
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16948; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16948.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "We use unique survey data to study whether the introduction of local elections in China made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents.  We develop a simple model to predict the effects on different policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into account that there is an autocratic upper government.  We exploit variation in the timing of the top-down introduction of elections across villages to estimate the causal effects of elections and find that elections affected policy outcomes in a way that is consistent with the predicted effects of increased local leader accountability"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/23/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

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