Strategic incentive in manipulation in rivalrous agency
By: by Chaim Fershtman, and Kenneth Judd.
Contributors: Judd, Kenneth L.
Series: Technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University -- no. 496; Economics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University; Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 496.; Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)
Publisher: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University
Published: 1986
Place of publication: Stanford, Calif
Language: eng
Number of pages: 34
Subjects: Social sciences -- Mathematical models.
Notes: "Prepared under National Science Foundation Grants IST-85-21838 and SES-83-06581".

"November 1986".

Includes bibliographical references (p. 34).

Binghamton University Libraries' copy bound with: Reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly / Lawrence Ausubel and Raymond Deneckere.