Choosing electoral rules
Subtitle: theory and evidence from us cities
By: Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, Francesco Trebbi.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11236; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11236.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Apportionment (Election law) -- United States; Minorities -- United States -- Political activity
Description: "This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation.  Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules.  With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small.  In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts.  However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts.  Single-member district rules serve this purpose.  We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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