Free banking and bank entry in nineteenth-century new york
By: Howard Bodenhorn.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10654; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10654.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Previous studies of entry under New York's free banking law of 1838 have generated conflicting results.  This article shows that different measures of entry lead to different conclusions about the competitive effects of free banking.  Measured by the entry of new banks, New York's free banking law led to increased rates of entry relative to both other states and New York before 1838.  New York's free banking law, however, did not generate significant increases in per capita bank capital relative to other states or to New York prior to 1838.  This discrepancy results from the practical effect of New York's law, which led to the entry of many small banks.  Thus bond collateral requirements created effective barriers to entry comparable to the costs associated with obtaining a legislative charter"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/11/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.