Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction
Subtitle: evidence from a firm-level panel
By: Margaret S. McMillan, Andrew R. Waxman.
Contributors: Waxman, Andrew R.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13332.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13332.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 21
Subjects: Natural resources -- International cooperation -- Mathematical models
Description: The "fairness" of negotiations between countries and resource extracting firms is subject to many accusations and counter-accusations and may be argued, in many instances, to impact the subsequent economic benefit to a host country from extraction. This paper examines the role of host country governance on the share of government take from extraction revenue. We attempt to disentangle a number of competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between governance and government take using panel data for US resource extracting multinational corporations (MNCs) operating abroad from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce over 1982-1999. Using fixed effects regression, we find a statistically significant positive impact of institutional quality on government take. The nature of this relationship -- whether this represents the result of a "corruption premium" paid by US MNCs or the exploitation of poor governance in negotiating government take -- is not completely clear. The evidence presented does, however, indicate that potential forms of bargaining power other than institutional quality (e.g., outside options to the deal) do increase government take, indicating that bargaining power may nonetheless be an important factor.
Notes: "August 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 20-21).

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