Free will as an open scientific problem
By: Mark Balaguer.
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 202
ISBN-13: 9780262013543
Subjects: Free will and determinism
Notes: "A Bradford book."

Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Introduction; title: Formulating the problem of free will; title: The old formulation of the problem of free will; title: Compatibilism and the rejection of an intermediate formulation of the problem of free will; title: The final (or a new-and-improved) formulation of the problem of free will; title: Some remarks on libertarianism; title: Synopsis of the book; title: Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant; title: What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct; title: Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will; title: Question, assuming the OL view is correct; title: Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will; title: Question, even if the OL view isn't correct; title: The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question; title: The coherence question; title: The moral responsibility question (and the issue of what's worth wanting); title: Generalizing the argument; title: Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question; title: Where we stand and where we're going next; title: An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question; title: The what-is-free-will question and the compatibilism question; title: The moral responsibility question; title: Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy; title: Preliminaries; title: Torn decisions; title: Indeterminacy; title: Appropriate non-randomness; title: The argument; title: If our torn decisions are undetermined, then we author and control them; title: The argument from token-token identity; title: The argument from phenomenology; title: Objections; title: Why TDW-indeterminism increases or procures authorship and control; title: Why this sort of L-freedom is worth wanting; title: If our torn decisions are undetermined, then they are sufficiently rational to be L-free; title: Plural authorship, control, and rationality non-torn decisions; title: Where we stand; title: Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism)?; title: An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism); title: An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-ndeterminism); title: Empirical arguments; title: Arguments for universal determinism; title: Arguments for macro-level determinism or virtual macro-level determinism; title: Arguments for neural determinism or virtual neural determinism; title: Arguments for torn-decision determinism, or for virtual torn-decision; title: Determinism or against TDW-indeterminism; title: The argument from Tegmark's work; title: The argument from Libet's work; title: Arguments from psychology; title: Where we stand.