Rules and reason
Subtitle: perspectives on constitutional political economy
By: edited by Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, Giuseppe Sobbrio.
Contributors: Mudambi, Ram, 1954-; Navarra, Pietro.; Sobbrio, Giuseppe.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Cambridge; New York
Language: eng
Number of pages: 320
Subjects: Economics -- Political aspects -- Congresses; Constitutional law -- Congresses; Elections -- Congresses
Genres: Congresses.
Other titles: Rules & reason
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Foreword / James M. Buchanan; title: Constitutional issues in modern democracies / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio; title: On writing a constitution / Dennis C. Mueller; title: Constitutional order and economic evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic Society / Viktor Vanberg; title: The efficacy of arbitrary rules / James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon; title: Constitutional political economy and civil society / Charles K. Rowley; title: The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution / Nicolaus Tideman; title: Ideological competition and institutions: why "cultural" explanations of development patterns are not nonsense / Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger; title: Electoral systems and the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings / Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds; title: Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements / Pierre Salmon; title: The cost imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of italian national elections / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio; title: A model of two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections with evidence /  Chris W. Paul II and Allen W. Wilhite; title: Ensuring a stable federal state: economics or political institutional design / Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga V. Shvetsova; title: A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOJC / Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger; title: The Maastricht "excessive deficit" rules and creative accounting / Francesco Forte; title: Subsidiarity, federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a federal European constitution: some ideas using constitutional economics / Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.