A simple model of optimal hate crime legislation
By: Li Gan, Roberton C. Williams, III, Thomas Wiseman.
Contributors: Williams, Roberton C., 1972-; Wiseman, Thomas E., 1974-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10463; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10463.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Hate crimes.
Description: "We present a simple model of the effects of hate crime legislation.  It shows that even if the direct harm to victims of hate crime is the same as for other crimes, because of other differences in the effects it may still be optimal to exert more law-enforcement effort to deter or prevent hate crime.  These differences also have previously unrecognized effects on the optimal level of effort by potential hate crime victims to avoid being victimized, thus affecting the efficiency of government policies that encourage or discourage such effort.  We discuss the implications of these results for optimal hate-crime policy, as well as for policy toward other similar crimes, such as terrorism"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.