Social reciprocity
By: by Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Peter Hans Matthews.
Contributors: Matthews, Peter Hans.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1347; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1347
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Social norms.
Description: "We define social reciprocity as the act of demonstrating one's disapproval, at some personal cost, for the violation of widely-held norms (e.g., don't free ride). Social reciprocity differs from standard notions of reciprocity because social reciprocators intervene whenever a norm is violated and do not condition intervention on potential future payoffs, revenge, or altruism. Instead, we posit that social reciprocity is a triggered normative response. Our experiment confirms the existence of social reciprocity and demonstrates that more socially efficient outcomes arise when reciprocity can be expressed socially. To provide theoretical foundations for social reciprocity, we show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of the two stable equilibria of an evolutionary game with selection drift"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/18/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.