The creation of the rule of law and the legitimacy of property rights
Subtitle: the political and economic consequences of a corrupt privatization
By: Karla Hoff, Joseph E. Stiglitz.
Contributors: Stiglitz, Joseph E.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11772; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11772.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Privatization -- Developing countries.; Right of property -- Developing countries.; Post-communism -- Developing countries.; Rule of law -- Developing countries.
Description: "How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime towards rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large.  We show that a demand for broadly beneficial legal reform may not emerge because the expectation of weak legal institutions increases the expected relative return to stripping assets, and strippers may gain from a weak and corrupt state.  The outcome can be inefficient even from the narrow perspective of the asset-strippers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/7/2005.
Also available in print.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.