The Industrial organization of the japanese bar
Subtitle: levels and determinants of attorney incomes
By: Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen.
Contributors: Ramseyer, Mark J.; Rasmusen, Eric B.; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 559; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 559.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Using micro-level data (from tax records) on attorney incomes in 2004, we reconstruct the industrial organization of the Japanese legal services industry.  These data suggest a bifurcated bar.  The most talented would-be lawyers (those with the highest opportunity costs) pass the bar-exam equivalent on one of their first tries or abandon the effort.  If they pass, they then opt for careers in Tokyo that involve complex litigation and business transactions.  The work places a premium on their talent, and from it they earn appropriately high incomes.  The less talented face lower opportunity costs, and willingly spend many years studying for the exam.  If they eventually pass, they tend to forego the many amenities available to professional families in Tokyo and disproportionately opt for careers in the under-lawyered provinces.  There, they earn monopoly rents not available in the far more competitive Tokyo market"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/16/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.