Information and externalities in sequential litigation
By: Xinyu Hua, Kathryn E. Spier.
Contributors: Spier, Kathryn E.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10943; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10943.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "The information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value.  Suppose a long-lived plaintiff is suing a defendant for damages sustained in an accident.  The plaintiff may suffer similar damages in future accidents involving different defendants.  Potential injurers update their beliefs after observing the first case and subsequently fine-tune their precautions to avoid accidents.  The joint incentive of the plaintiff and the first defendant to create public information through litigation is too small.  The optimal liability rule trades off providing future injurers with incentives to take precautions and providing the plaintiff with incentives to create information"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/12/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.