One-sided contracts in competitive consumer markets
By: Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner.
Contributors: Posner, Richard A.; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 534; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 534.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Number of pages: 13
Description: "This paper shows that &quot;one-sided&quot; terms in standard contracts, which deny consumers a contractual benefit that seems efficient on average, may arise in competitive markets without informational problems (other than those of courts).  A onesided term might be an efficient response to situations in which courts cannot perfectly observe all the contingencies needed for an accurate implementation of a &quot;balanced&quot; contractual term when firms are more concerned about their reputation, and thus less inclined to behave opportunistically, than consumers are.  We develop this explanation, discuss its positive and normative implications, and compare them to those of informationbasedexplanations for one-sided terms"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/19/2007.

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