How much is a seat on the Security Council worth?
Subtitle: foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations
By: by Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker
Contributors: Werker, Eric; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper -- 06-029; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 06-029.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2006
Place of publication: [Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 28
Subjects: American Economic assistance; Bribery; United Nations. Security Council; United Nations
Description: Ten of the fifteen seats on the UN Security Council are held by rotating members serving two-year terms. We find that a country's U.S. aid increases by 59 percent and its UN aid by 8 percent when it rotates onto the council. This effect increases during years in which key diplomatic events take place (when members' votes should be especially valuable) and the timing of the effect closely tracks a country's election to, and exit from, the council. Finally, the UN results appear to be driven by UNICEF, an organization over which the United States has historically exerted great control.

Ten of the fifteen seats on the U.N. Security Council are held by rotating members serving two-year terms. Using country-level panel data, we find that a country's foreign aid receipts rise substantially when it is elected to the Security Council: on average, U.S. aid increases by 54 percent and U.N. development aid rises by 7 percent. We find that the positive effect of Security Council membership on aid is much greater during years in which key diplomatic events take place, when members' votes are likely to be especially valuable. Further, the increase on aid is shown to begin the year a country is elected to the council and to disappear after its membership ends. We find evidence that the effect of council membership on U.S. aid is especially large for dictatorships and U.S. allies, suggesting that the United States seeks to form alliances with the council members who are cheapest to bribe. Finally, the connection between U.N. aid and council membership seems to be driven by UNICEF, an aid organization over which the United States has historically exerted much control.
Notes: "June 2006."

Working paper.

"Forthcoming: Journal of Political Economy."

Title from title screen (viewed August 22, 2006).

Includes bibliographical references and appendices.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.