What have we learned from market design?
By: Alvin E. Roth
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13530; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13530.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures.  To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e.  they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior.  I'll draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/15/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.