Political pressure deflection
By: James E. Anderson, Maurizio Zanardi.
Contributors: Zanardi, Maurizio.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Dumping (International trade); Economic policy -- Political aspects.; United States -- Commercial policy.
Description: "Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes - political pressure deflection.  Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to sell is valuable to politicians.  The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence.  U.S.  trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.