Variable rate subsidies
Subtitle: the inefficiency of in-kind transfers revisited
By: Michael J. Stutzer.
Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report -- 76; Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) -- 76.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 1983
Place of publication: [Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Subsidies -- Mathematical models.
Description: "The inefficiency of fixed rate consumer price subsidies, relative to cash transfers, is one of the best-known propositions in welfare economics. It has also been used to show that matching grants are a more inefficient intergovernmental aid than are lump sum grants.  Furthermore, the cost of fixed rate subsidies cannot be controlled without providing a "cap" beyond which amount no subsidy is received. This paper reports, both qualitatively and quantitatively, that a broad class of variable rate price subsidies also dominates fixed rate subsidies on both counts. The relative inefficiency of matching grants compared to the variable rate Federal General Revenue Sharing program is estimated"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/19/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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