Pairwise-core monetary trade in the lagos-wright model
By: Tai-wei Hu, John Kennan, Neil Wallace
Contributors: Kennan, John; Wallace, Neil; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13310; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13310.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "The Lagos-Wright model has been analyzed using particular trading protocols.  Here, weakly and strongly implementable allocations are studied, where weak and strong are used in the sense of (weak) Nash (immune to individual defection) and strong Nash (immune to individual and cooperative pairwise defection).  It is shown that the first-best allocation is strongly implementable without intervention for all sufficiently high discount factors.  And, if people are free to skip the centralized meeting, then Friedman-rule intervention that uses lump-sum taxation in the centralized meeting to raise the return on money does not enlarge even the set of weakly implementable allocations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/22/2007.

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