Strategy, national interests, and means to an end
By: Stephen D. Sklenka
Contributors: Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Series: Carlisle papers in security strategy
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Carlisle, PA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 26
ISBN-13: 9781584873099
Subjects: Evaluation; Operation Allied Force, 1999; National interest; Iraq War, 2003-2011; Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993; Military policy; History
Description: The U.S. inability -- or unwillingness --to connect strategic ends and appropriate means to accomplish those ends has occurred so often over the past 15 years that one could make a credible argument that it has become a disturbing and pervasive characteristic of the modern American way of war. Beginning with a theoretical discussion of the relationship among ends, means, and strategy, this paper continues by examining specific cases of U.S. intervention from the previous decade and Operation Iraqi Freedom to demonstrate that when the U.S. commits its military forces, success can only be achieved if clear ends are identified, appropriate means are leveraged against those stated ends, and a coherent strategy is developed to coordinate the ends and means.
Notes: "October 2007."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 21-24).

Electronic version also available on the SSI website.
Table of contents: title: Introduction; title: Ends, means, and the design of strategy; title: Somalia on the periphery; title: Strategic pitfalls of a Balkanizing policy; title: Haiti and the American backyard; title: Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ends-means disconnect; title: Conclusion.