When the weak challenge the strong
Subtitle: the North Korean nuclear crisis
By:  Jaeho Cheon
Publisher: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service
Published: 1996
Place of publication: Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va
Language: eng
Number of pages: 148
Description: This thesis examines the political behavior of weak states in crises through a detailed case study of the recent North Korean nuclear crisis.  In the early 1990s, North Korea initiated a politcal challenge that threatened both U.S. nonproliferaiton and South Korean defense interests.  North Korea manipulated the shared risks of the ensuing crisis to achieve political objectives rather than military victory, which was unobtainable due to U.S. and South korean defense efforts.  It is puzzling how a small state, such as North Korea, could nevertheless successfully challenge more powerful states and not be punished.  Indeed, North Korea was rewarded for its challenge.  Aymmetric conflict theory states that a weaker state, even after assessing its disadvantages viv-a-vis an opponent, can successfullychallenge stronger adversaries to political and strategic advantage.  In the North Korean nuclear crisis.its limited aims/fait accompli strategy--namely, developing nuclear weapons and gaining economic benefits from the West--and challenging domestic politics were the driving force behind its challenge.  The findings of this study provide some theoretical insights as well as policy implications for the United States and South KKorea in their policy toward North Korean nuclear behavior.
Notes: Thesis advisor(s): John Arquilla,  Peter Lavoy.

"June 1996."

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval   Postgraduate School, June 1996.

Bibliography: p.  135-145.

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Republic of Korea Army author.

dk/dk cc:9996 (11/9/96)