How do staggered boards affect shareholder value ?
Subtitle: evidence from a natural experiment
By: Alma Cohen, Charles C.Y. Wang
Contributors: Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 13-068; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 13-068
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2013
Place of publication: Boston ]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 43
Description: This paper examines whether staggered boards reduce firm value or are merely associated with it due to the tendency of low-value firms to maintain staggered boards. To analyze this causal question, we take advantage of a natural experiment involving two offsetting court rulings, separated by several weeks, that affected the antitakeover force of staggered boards for a subset of Delaware firms. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the market viewed the antitakeover force of staggered boards as value-reducing. Our findings have implications for the long-standing policy debate on the desirability of staggered boards.
Notes: "February 2013" -- Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 30-32).