Plato on mental representation.
Published: 2005
Language: eng
Number of pages: 313
Description: In this thesis I argue that Plato has a well-developed theory of mental representation, as contemporary philosophers understand such theories. I argue that this theory is consistent through the dialogues Republic, Theaetetus, Cratylus, Sophist and Timaeus. The core concept in Plato's theory of mental representation is   mi&d12;mh siv  or imitation: specifically, a sub-type of   mi&d12;mh siv  occurring by means of images (  3 ,  i&d12;d wla ). While this idea is most evident in the Cratylus and the Sophist, I argue that essentially the same theory is central to the epistemological passages of the Republic. This leads me to conclude that Plato's representational theory does not undergo radical development between the middle and late dialogues.I show that the most important consequence of Plato's theory of representation is that Knowledge (  3 ,tt isth&d12; mh ,   noh&d12;s iv ), cannot be a representational state. This is because Plato conceives of knowledge as infallible (  a , nama&d12; rthton, a , y3ud 3v&d12; ) cognition of reality (  to&d13; , o&d12; n ) and no representational state can be cognition of   to&d13; , o&d12; n  by or infallible in the manner appropriate for Knowledge. In contrast, I hold that Plato believes that lesser cognitive states, which he groups under the term belief (  do&d12;x a ), are representational states and that the representational nature of these states is the key to explaining why they are different from knowledge.
Notes: Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-10, Section: A, page: 3671.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto, 2005.

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