The myth of democratic failure
Subtitle: why political institutions are efficient
By: Donald A. Wittman.
Series: American politics and political economy
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Published: 1995
Place of publication: Chicago
Language: eng
Number of pages: 229
Subjects: Democracy.; Free enterprise.
Description: In this provocative manifesto, Donald A. Wittman refutes one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government. Applying economic analysis to virtually every aspect of politics, Wittman confronts the stock examples of democratic market failure, from self-aggrandizing or incompetent bureaucracies and inefficient regulations to powerful pressure groups and uninformed voters.

He argues that democratic governments and democratic markets are no more inefficient than the economic markets to which they are so often unfavorably compared.

Wittman concludes that political institutions are organized to promote wealth-maximizing outcomes, are highly competitive, and are able to reward political and bureaucratic entrepreneurs for efficient behavior. He demonstrates that nearly all of the arguments claiming that economic markets are efficient apply equally well to democratic political markets; and, conversely, that economic models of political failure are not more valid than the analogous arguments for economic market failure.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p.195-215) and indexes.