Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems
Subtitle: theory and experimental evidence
By: by Oliver Gürtler, Christine Harbring
Contributors: Harbring, Christine
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 3111; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 3111
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Subjects: Sports tournaments; Feedback (Psychology); Commitment (Psychology)
Description: "In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate information regarding the agents' previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credibly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/12/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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