Building blocks in the economics of mandates
By: by John T. Addison, C. R. Barrett, W. Stanley Siebert.
Contributors: Barrett, C. R.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1866; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1866
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Unfunded mandates.
Description: "The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more "deserving" workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts -- separating the various worker types -- the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be reduced by restricting mandates to larger firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision has the advantage over mandates of preserving separations"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/5/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.