The United States - Russian Military cooperation in implementation force operations in Bosnia
By: Roumen I. Kondev
Publisher: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service
Published: 1997
Place of publication: Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va
Language: eng
Number of pages: 64
Description: Yugoslavia's rapid disintegration amid violence and war in 1991 came as a shock to the outside world. The war was a result of an organized program of domestic conflict waged along ethno-cultural lines by a threaten powerful elite. The response of the international community has been marked by considerable confusion and inconsistency. With most of the major obstacles that characterized the Cold War now removed, there seemed to be a more favorable environment for effective U.S.-Russian cooperation in matters of mutual interests in international security. This notwithstanding, the U.S.-led initiative to cooperate with Russia to find a lasting solution to the Bosnian crisis ran into impediments from the very onset. This thesis will argue that the causes of these impediments were rooted in Russia's domestic political and economic constraints, coupled with a nostalgia to exercise the leverage of a super-power over the Bosnian peace process. The Balkans is only of secondary national interest to Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, the Balkans constitute an area of extensive interaction between the two countries. The Bosnian conflict offers a good case study for examining the causes of the impediments to U.S.-Russian cooperation.
Notes: "December 1997."

Thesis advisor(s): Daniel Moran, Mikhail Tsypkin.

Thesis (M.A. in Civil-Military Relations and International Security)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 1997.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-62).

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Also available online.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat reader.