Market share thresholds
Subtitle: on the conflation of empirical assessments and legal policy judgments
By: Louis Kaplow
Contributors: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 692; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 692.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Subjects: Unfair Competition; Market share
Description: "Abstract: In competition law, market power requirements are often articulated in terms of market shares.  The use of market share thresholds, however, conflates two distinct questions: (1) How much market power exists in a given situation? (2) How much market power should the law require? As a consequence, neither question is answered, or even directly illuminated.  Furthermore, because market shares are not themselves measures of market power but instead merely a factor that bears on its magnitude in a given setting, they are inapt answers to both inquiries.  Their use involves a category mistake.  The identified problems are illustrated by unpacking Learned Hand's famous pronouncement in Alcoa of the market shares required for the offense of monopolization, but the core defects characterize all market share declarations"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/19/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

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