Regulatory barriers and entry in developing economies
By: by John Bennett, Saul Estrin
Contributors: Estrin, Saul
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 2150; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 2150
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Subjects: Investments; Non-tariff trade barriers; Protection
Description: "We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result in both greater entry by first movers and a higher steady-state number of firms. Delay also leads to speculation, with entrepreneurs taking out licences to obtain the option of immediate entry if they later observe the industry to be profitable enough"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/5/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

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