A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control
By: Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper no. 7203; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7203.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 1999
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 37
Subjects: Corporate governance -- Econometric models.; Stock ownership -- Econometric models.; Stockholders' voting -- Econometric models.; Corporate governance -- United States -- Econometric models.; Stock ownership -- United States -- Econometric models.; Stockholders' voting -- United States -- Econometric models.
Other titles: Corporate ownership and control
Notes: "July 1999."

JEL no. G3, K22.

Includes bibliographical references (p. R1-R4)

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Electronic version available via the Internet at the NBER World Wide Web site.