Corporate governance and bank performance
Subtitle: a joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership
By: Allen N. Berger ...[et al.].
Contributors: Berger, Allen N.; World Bank.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 3632; Policy research working papers (Online) ;; 3632.
Publisher: World Bank
Published: 2005
Place of publication: [Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Corporate governance -- Argentina.; Banks and banking -- Argentina.; Privatization -- Argentina.
Description: "The authors jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance.  They argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model.  "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument.  Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, their strongest and most robust results concern state ownership.  State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect.  However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks."--World Bank web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2005.
Also available in print.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.