When do firms hire lobbyists?
Subtitle: The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
By: John M. de Figueiredo, James J. Kim.
Contributors: Kim, James J.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10553; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10553.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: United States. Federal Communications Committee.; Lobbyists -- United States.; Lobbying -- United States.
Description: "This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms.  We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls.  When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC.  However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.