Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate control
By: Lucian Arye Bebchuk.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper no. 4788; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 4788.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 1994
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 37
Subjects: Tender offers (Securities) -- Econometric models.; Stock transfer -- Econometric models.; Stockholders' pre-emptive rights.; Minority stockholders -- Legal status, laws, etc. -- Econometric models.; Corporation law.
Notes: "July 1994."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 36-37).

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Electronic version available via the Internet at the NBER World Wide Web site.

Financial support provided by the National Science Foundation.