Pricing and welfare in health plan choice
By: M. Kate Bundorf, Jonathan D. Levin, Neale Mahoney.
Contributors: Levin, Jonathan D. 1972-; Mahoney, Neale.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 14153; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 14153.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees.  This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans.  We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new data on small employers.  In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs.  Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices.  Despite the inefficiency, we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/23/2008.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.