Social Choice Mechanisms
By: by Vladimir I. Danilov, Alexander I. Sotskov
Contributors: Sotskov, A. I. (Aleksandr Ivanovich)
Series: Studies in Economic Design; Studies in economic design
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published: 2002
Place of publication: Berlin, Heidelberg
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Number of pages: 191
ISBN-13: 9783642077159; 9783540248057
Subjects: Mathematical Economics; Mathematics; Economics
Description: Theory of social choice mechanisms is a comparatively new theory. The first results were obtained as early as the beginning of the seventies. The book contains the most important results of the theory. In two main topics the book describes what mechanisms allow equilibrium solutions at any agents` preference profiles, and what outcomes can be implemented. The answer depends on the equilibrium concept. Furthermore the four equilibrium concepts Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium, equilibrium in dominant strategies, and the core were described in detail.
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Table of contents: title: Introduction; title: Basic Concepts; title: Nash-consistent Mechanisms; title: Strategy-proof Mechanisms; title: Cores and Stable Blockings; title: Strongly Consistent Mechanisms.