Contemporary debates in epistemology
By: edited by Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa.
Contributors: Steup, Matthias.; Sosa, Ernest.
Series: Contemporary debates in philosophy -- 3
Publisher: Blackwell Pub.; Wiley-Blackwell
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Malden, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 348
Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of
Description: "Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. This distinctive format offers readers a unique opportunity to observe philosophers engaging in head-to-head debate. The essays are centered on three core areas of epistemology: skepticism, the foundations of knowledge, and justification."--BOOK JACKET
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: I: Knowledge and skepticism / Matthias Steup; title: 1. Is knowledge closed under known entailment?; title: The case against closure / Fred Dretske; title: The case for closure / John Hawthorne; title: Reply to Hawthorne; title: 2. Is knowledge contextual?; title: Contextualism contested / Earl Conee; title: Contextualism defended / Stewart Cohen; title: Contextualism contested some more; title: Contextualism defended some more; title: 3. Can skepticism be refuted?; title: The refutation of skepticism / Jonathan Vogel; title: The challenge of refuting skepticism / Richard Fumerton; title: 4. Is there a Priori knowledge?; title: In defense of the a Priori / Laurence BonJour; title: There is no a Priori / Michael Devitt; title: Reply to Devitt; title: Reply to BonJour; title: Last rejoinder; title: II: Foundational knowledge / Matthias Steup; title: 5. Is infinitism the solution to the regress problem?; title: Infinitism is the solution to the regress problem / Peter Klein; title: Infinitism is not the solution to the regress problem / Carl Ginet; title: Reply to Ginet; title: Reply to Klein; title: 6. Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone?; title: Non-foundationalist epistemology: holism, coherence, and tenability / Catherine Z. Elgin; title: Why coherence is not enough: a defense of moderate foundationalism / James van Cleve; title: 7. Is there immediate justification?; title: There is no immediate justification / James Pryor; title: Doing without immediate justification / Michael Williams; title: 8. Does perceptual experience have conceptual content?; title: Perceptual experience has conceptual content / Bill Brewer; title: Perception and conceptual content / Alex Byrne; title: III: Justification / Matthias Steup; title: 9. Is justification internal?; title: Justification is not internal / John Greco; title: Justification is internal / Richard Feldman; title: 10. Is truth the primary epistemic goal?; title: Truth is not the primary epistemic goal / Johnathan Kvanvig; title: Truth as the primary epistemic goal: a working hypothesis / Marian David; title: 11. Is Justified belief responsible belief?; title: Justified belief as responsible belief / Richard Foley; title: Obligation, entitlement, and rationality / Nicholas Wolterstorff; title: Response to Wolterstorff; title: Response to Foley.