Preference signaling in matching markets
By: Peter Coles, Alexey Kushnir, Muriel Niederle
Contributors: Kushnir, Alexey; Niederle, Muriel; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16185; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16185.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information.  In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets.  We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous.  A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2010.

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