Family altruism and incentives
By: Roberta Gatti.
Contributors: World Bank. Development Research Group. Macroeconomic and Growth.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 2505; Policy research working papers (Online) ;; 2505.
Publisher: World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth
Published: 2000
Place of publication: Washington, DC
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Altruism -- Econometric models.; Inheritance and succession -- Econometric models.
Genres: Econometric models.
Description: In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38).
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002.
"December 2000"--Cover.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.