Local electoral incentives and decentralized program performance
By: Alain de Janvry, Frederico Finan, Elisabeth Sadoulet
Contributors: Finan, Frederico; Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1945-; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16635; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16635.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil.  We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors.  First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected.  These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/7/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

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