Why not a political Coase theorem?
Subtitle: social conflict, commitment and politics
By: Daron Acemoglu.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 9377; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 9377.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2002
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 45
Subjects: Political corruption -- Mathematical models.; Social policy -- Mathematical models.
Notes: "December 2002."

JEL no. H2, N10, N40, O1.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 40-45).

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Electronic version available via the Internet at the NBER World Wide Web site.