Bribery in health care in peru and uganda
By: Jennifer Hunt
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13034; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13034.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "In this paper, I examine the role of household income in determining who bribes and how much they bribe in health care in Peru and Uganda.  I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in public health care: doubling household consumption increases the bribery probability by 0.2-0.4 percentage points in Peru, compared to a bribery rate of 0.8%; doubling household expenditure in Uganda increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points compared to a bribery rate of 17%.  The income elasticity of the bribe amount cannot be precisely estimated in Peru, but is about 0.37 in Uganda.  Bribes in the Ugandan public sector appear to be fees-for-service extorted from the richer patients amongst those exempted by government policy from paying the official fees.  Bribes in the private sector appear to be flat-rate fees paid by patients who do not pay official fees.  I do not find evidence that the public health care sector in either Peru or Uganda is able to price-discriminate less effectively than public institutions with less competition from the private sector"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/3/2007.

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