Feasibility of monetary incentives within the United States Army Recruiting Command
By: by Joseph A. Anderson and Marvin S. Whitaker
Contributors: Whitaker, Marvin S.
Publisher: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service
Published: 1994
Place of publication: Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va
Language: eng
Number of pages: 73
Description: The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) has come under the scrutiny of the United States Congress due to the size of USARECs operating budget and the decreasing productivity of its recruiting forces. Many of the existing incentive problems are caused by the quota based recruiting system. This thesis examines the potential issues of a monetary based incentive program within USAREC as a means to increase individual recruiter productivity, which would allow USAREC to allocate resources more efficiently. Experiments indicate that simulated monetary bonuses motivate actual recruiters to increase their estimated recruit production. The authors believe that the Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model (BIRM) mechanism provides the best opportunity for efficient resource allocation within USAREC. Therefore, the authors strongly recommend USAREC to experiment with the BIRM mechanism as it is designed to allow various incentive tools to be incorporated within its framework.
Notes: Thesis advisor(s): Katsuaki Terasawa, Keebom Kang.

"December 1994."

Thesis (M.S. in Management) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994.

Includes bibliographical references.

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Also available online.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

US Army (USA) authors.