Pork barrel cycles
By: Allan Drazen, Marcela Eslava
Contributors: Eslava, Marcela; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 12190; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 12190.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "We present a model of political budget cycles in which incumbents influence voters by targeting government spending to specific groups of voters at the expense of other voters or other expenditures.  Each voter faces a signal extraction problem: being targeted with expenditure before the election may reflect opportunistic manipulation, but may also reflect a sincere preference of the incumbent for the types of spending that voter prefers.  We show the existence of a political equilibrium in which rational voters support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though they know it may be electorally motivated.  In equilibrium voters in the more "swing" regions are targeted at the expense of types of spending not favored by these voters.  This will be true even if they know they live in swing regions.  However, the responsiveness of these voters to electoral manipulation depends on whether they face some degree of uncertainty about the electoral importance of the group they are in.  Use of targeted spending also implies voters can be influenced without election-year deficits, consistent with recent findings for established democracies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/8/2006.

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