How elections matter
Subtitle: theory and evidence from environmental policy
By: John A. List, Daniel M. Sturm.
Contributors: Sturm, Daniel M.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10609; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10609.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Elections -- Mathematical models.; Environmental policy -- Mathematical models.
Description: "In this paper we explore to what extent secondary policy issues are influenced by electoral incentives.  We develop a political agency model in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue, such as the level of public spending, and a secondary policy issue, such as environmental policy.  The model shows under which conditions the incumbent finds it worthwhile to manipulate the secondary policy to attract additional votes to his platform.  We test the predictions of the model using state-level panel data on Gubernatorial environmental policy choices over the years 1960-2000.  In contrast to the popular view that choices on secondary policy instruments are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives on environmental policy"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.