On the political economy of social security and public education
By: by Panu Poutvaara.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1408; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1408
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper analyzes simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education with three overlapping generations and productivity differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. The presence of productivity differences introduces a time-consistency problem with repeated voting. This can be solved by trigger strategies which do not punish upward deviations in the wage tax rate. If there are multiple equilibria, then higher tax rates are associated with more education. Surprisingly, the median voter may be a young citizen even when cohorts are of the same size"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/13/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.