Public trust and government betrayal
By: Christopher Phelan.
Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report ;; 283; Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) ;; 283.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 2001
Place of publication: [Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Public opinion -- Developing countries.; Political corruption -- Developing countries.; Trust -- Developing countries.; Developing countries -- Politics and government.
Description: "This paper presents a simple model of government reputation which captures two characteristics of policy outcomes in less developed countries: governments which betray public trust do so erratically, and, after a betrayal, public trust is regained only gradually"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/15/2005.
Also available in print.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.