Stealth compensation via retirement benefits
By: Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried.
Contributors: Fried, Jesse M.; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 487; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 487.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper analyzes an important form of &ldquo;stealth compensation&rdquo; provided to managers of public companies.  We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments.  Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements.  Our study also highlights the importance of having information about compensation arrangements not only publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders.  We propose requiring public companies to place a monetary value on all retirement benefits to which their executives become entitled.  In particular, firms should disclose to investors the annual buildup in the monetary value of executives' retirement benefits, including the value of tax savings reaped by executives at the company's expense"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/28/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.