Legal restrictions on buyout fees
Subtitle: theory and evidence from German soccer
By: by Eberhard Feess, Bernd Frick, Gerd Muehlheusser.
Contributors: Frick, Bernd.; Muehlheusser, Gerd, 1972-.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1180; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1180
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "We perform a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of transfer fee regulations on professional soccer in Europe. Based on a model on the interaction of moral hazard and heterogeneity, we show (i) how the regulations effect contract durations and wages, (ii) that contracting parties have an incentive to agree upon inefficiently long contracts, (iii) how these incentives vary with the legal system, and (iv) how the relationship between contract duration and performance also depends on the legal system. With one exception, all theoretical results are empirically confirmed using a comprehensive data set from the top German Soccer League ("Bundesliga")"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/16/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.