Interest groups & the electoral control of politicians
By: James M. Snyder, Jr., Michael M. Ting
Contributors: Ting, Michael M.; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 05-3; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 05-03.
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 37
Other titles: Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians
Description: We study an under-utilized source of data on legislative effectiveness, and exploit its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We find that effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms even after controlling for legislators institutional positions, party affiliation, and other factors. Effectiveness never declines with tenure, even out to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and selective retirement, but appears to be due to learning-by-doing. We also find evidence that a significant amount of "positive sorting" occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators moving more quickly into positions of responsibility and power. Finally, effectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success, and on the probability of moving to higher office. These findings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency advantage, and seniority rule. Keywords: elections, interest groups, voting, rent-seeking. JEL Classifications: D7, D72
Notes: "February 3, 2005."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 35-37).

Abstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.