Truly understood
By: Christopher Peacocke.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Oxford; New York
Language: eng
Number of pages: 341
ISBN-13: 9780199239443
Subjects: Comprehension (Theory of knowledge); Truth; Reference (Philosophy)
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. [321]-330) and index.
Table of contents: title: A theory of understanding; title: Truth's role in understanding; title: Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts; title: Do pragmatist views avoid this critique?; title: A realistic account; title: How evidence and truth are related; title: Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding; title: Anchoring; title: Next steps; title: Reference and reasons; title: The main thesis and its location; title: Exposition and four argument-types; title: Significance and consequences of the main thesis; title: The first person as a case study; title: Fully self-conscious thought; title: Immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person; title: Can a use of the first-person concept fail to refer?; title: Some conceptual roles are distinctive but not fundamental; title: Implicit conceptions; title: Implicit conceptions : motivation and examples; title: Deflationary readings rejected; title: The phenomenon of new principles; title: Explanation by implicit conceptions; title: Rationalist aspects; title: Consequences : rationality, justification, understanding; title: Transitional; title: Applications to mental concepts; title: Conceiving of conscious states; title: Understanding and identity in other cases; title: Constraints on legitimate explanations in terms of identity; title: Why is the subjective case different?; title: Attractions of the interlocking account; title: Tacit knowledge, and externalism about the internal; title: Is this the myth of the given?; title: Knowledge of others' conscious states; title: Communicability : between Frege and Wittgenstein; title: Conclusions and significance; title: 'Another I' : representing perception and action; title: The core rule; title: Modal status and its significance; title: Comparisons; title: The possession-condition and some empirical phenomena; title: The model generalized; title: Wider issues; title: Mental action; title: The distinctive features of action-awareness; title: The nature and range of mental actions; title: The principal hypothesis and its grounds; title: The principal hypothesis : distinctions and consequences; title: How do we know about our own mental actions?; title: Concepts of mental actions and their epistemological significance; title: Is this account open to the same objections as perceptual models of introspection?; title: Characterizing and unifying schizophrenic experience; title: The first person in the self-ascription of action; title: Rational agency and action-awareness; title: Representing thoughts; title: The puzzle; title: A proposal; title: How the solution treats the constraints that generate the puzzle; title: Relation to single-level treatments; title: An application : reconciling externalism with distinctive self-knowledge.