Parametric properties of tax effort revenue sharing
By: Michael J. Stutzer
Series: Staff report -- #66; Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department : Online) -- 66.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 1981
Place of publication: Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Subjects: Revenue sharing; Mathematical models
Description: "Some Revenue Sharing programs, including the Federal government's General Revenue Sharing program, reward higher tax effort with larger aid payments.  A natural, game-theoretic generalization of the standard consumer demand based theory of grants-in-aid is used to examine the impacts such tax effort provisions have on the recipient government's tax effort, spending levels, and welfare.  Nonlinear simulation is used to provide rough quantitative estimates of the impacts General Revenue Sharing had in 1972"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/16/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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