Charity auctions
Subtitle: a field experimental investigation
By: by Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Jessica Holmes, Peter Hans Matthews.
Contributors: Holmes, Jessica.; Matthews, Peter Hans.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1330; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1330
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Benefit auctions.
Description: "Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. The small theoretical literature suggests that the all-pay auction should garner more money than winner-pay auctions. We conduct field experiments to test which sealed bid format, first price, second price or all-pay raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all-pay and second price formats are dominated by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the difference between existing theory and the field. To conclude, we show that a model of charity auctions augmented by an endogenous participation decision predicts the revenue ordering that we see in the field"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/19/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.