Compulsory licensing - evidence from the trading with the enemy act
By: Petra Moser, Alessandra Voena.
Contributors: Voena, Alessandra.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 15598; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15598.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners.  This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention.  Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/29/2009.

Includes bibliographical references.

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