Mathematics and democracy
Subtitle: designing better voting and fair-division procedures
By: Steven J. Brams.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Princeton, N.J
Language: eng
ISBN-13: 9780691133201; 9780691133218
Subjects: Voting -- Mathematical models; Elections -- Mathematical models; Finance, Public -- Mathematical models
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice; title: Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory; title: Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference; title: Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting; title: Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure; title: Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation; title: Selecting winners in multiple elections; title: Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament; title: Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament; title: Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst off or avoid envy?; title: Allocating a single divisible good : divide-the-dollar; title: Allocating multiple divisible goods : adjusted winner; title: Allocating a single heterogeneous good; title: Allocating divisible and indivisible goods; title: Summary and conclusions.