Welfare effects of tax policy in open economies
Subtitle: stabilization and cooperation
By: Jinill Kim and Sunghyun Henry Kim.
Contributors: Kim, Sunghyun H.
Series: Finance and economics discussion series ;; 2003-51; Finance and economics discussion series (Online) ;; 2003-51.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Board
Published: 2003
Place of publication: Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper studies an international tax policy design problem by employing a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets.  We investigate the possibility of welfare improving active tax policies, in particular capital and labor income tax, under the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and the cooperative equilibrium.  Unlike the conventional wisdom regarding stabilization policies, optimal tax policies in our economy are procyclical.  Relative to the non-cooperative setting, international tax policy cooperation requires more active tax policies (about two times) and generates large extra welfare gains (by about a third)"--Federal Reserve Board web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/21/2004.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.