Verifying a fissile material cut-off treaty
Subtitle: technical and organizational considerations
By: Shannon N. Kile and Robert E. Kelley
Contributors: Kelley, Robert E., 1947-; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Series: SIPRI policy paper -- 33; SIPRI policy paper -- no. 33.
Publisher: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Published: 2012
Place of publication: Solna, Sweden
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Number of pages: 42
ISBN-13: 9789185114726
Subjects: Nuclear nonproliferation; International cooperation; Nuclear arms control; Verification; Nuclear facilities; Inspection; International Atomic Energy Agency
Description: The renewed momentum behind international efforts to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) has focused attention on how the proposed ban on the production of fissile material will be verified: what type of organization should be given this responsibility and what technical expertise will it require? The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is often identified as the obvious choice for this role, given its long experience in implementing nuclear safeguards agreements. Many of the tools and procedures developed by the IAEA for safeguards purposes could be directly applied to verifying a future FMCT. However, without changes to its existing safeguards mandate and practices, the IAEA would be hindered in verifying treaty compliance in the nuclear weapon-possessing states. This Policy Paper proposes an alternative arrangement that, while taking advantage of the IAEA's experience and expertise, creates a verification body tailored specifically for an FMCT with the requisite legal mandate and technical capabilities.
Notes: August 2012.

Title from PDF cover screen (viewed on Aug. 30, 2012).

Includes bibliographical references.

Mode of access:  World Wide Web.

System requirements:  Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Table of contents: title: Preface; title: Summary; title: Abbreviations; title: Introduction; title: FMCT verification choices; title: FMCT verification tasks and tools; title: The design of an FMCT inspection system; title: The role of the IAEA in verifying an FMCT; title: A proposal for the structure and operation of an FMCT verification body; title: Conclusion; title: Appendix: Categories of IAEA safeguards agreement.