Looking beyond the incumbent
Subtitle: the effects of exposing corruption on electoral outcomes
By: Alberto Chong ... [et al.].
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 17679; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 17679.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability.  However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation.  We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identification with the party of the corrupt incumbent.  Our results suggest that while flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond to information by withdrawing from the political process.  We conclude with a discussion of the institutional contexts that could allow increased access to information to promote government accountability"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/21/2012.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.