Belief about the self
Subtitle: a defense of the property theory of content
By: Neil Feit.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Oxford; New York
Language: eng
Number of pages: 195
ISBN-13: 9780195341362
Subjects: Self (Philosophy)
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 187-191) and index.
Table of contents: title: Mental content and the problem of De Se belief; title: Cognitive attitudes and content; title: The doctrine of propositions; title: The problem of De Se belief; title: The property theory of content; title: In favor of the property theory; title: Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation; title: Lewis's case of the two Gods; title: Arguments from internalism and physicalism; title: An inference to the best explanation; title: Alternatives to the property theory; title: The triadic view of belief; title: How the property theory and the triadic view are rivals; title: Dyadic propositionalism reconsidered; title: Arguments against the property theory; title: Self-ascription and self-awareness; title: Nonexistence and impossible contents; title: Stalnaker's argument; title: Propositionalist arguments from inference; title: The property theory and De Re belief; title: Lewis's account of De Re belief; title: McKay's objection to Lewis; title: Mistaken identity and the case of the shy secret admirer; title: Some other worries and concluding remarks; title: The property theory, rationality, and Kripke's puzzle about belief; title: Kripke's puzzle about belief; title: The puzzle argument; title: A solution to the puzzle; title: Puzzles with empty names and kind terms; title: The property theory, twin earth, and belief about kinds; title: Twin earth and two kinds of internalism; title: The twin earth argument; title: An internalist response (stage one); title: An internalist response (stage two); title: Self-ascription and belief about kinds.