The economic structure of fiduciary law
By: Robert Sitkoff
Contributors: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 689; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 689.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Trusts and trustees; Economic aspects
Description: "Abstract: This essay revisits the economic theory of fiduciary law.  Nearly two decades have passed since the publication of the seminal economic analyses of fiduciary law by Cooter and Freedman (1991), and by Easterbrook and Fischel (1993), which together have come to underpin the prevailing economic, contractarian model of fiduciary law.  The economic theory of agency that motivates those papers has come to permeate the literature on law and legal institutions generally.  The law-and-economics movement has matured further, developing new tools and refining its understanding of previously applied concepts.  The purpose of this essay is to restatethe economic theory of fiduciary law in an updated and accessible synthesis"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/12/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

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