On the theory of ethnic conflict
By: Francesco Caselli and Wilbur John Coleman II
Contributors: Coleman, Wilbur John; London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance
Series: CEP discussion paper -- no. 732
Publisher: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
Published: 2006
Place of publication: London
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy's resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.
Notes: Title from PDF file (viewed on Sept. 26, 2006).

"July 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

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