Selection of public servants into politics
Subtitle: an economic analysis of its causes and consequences
By: Thomas Brändle
Series: Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie -- v. 12; Neue Studien zur politischen Ökonomie
Publisher: Nomos
Published: 2013
Place of publication: Baden-Baden
Language: eng
Number of pages: 166
ISBN-13: 9783845246437; 9783848703074
Subjects: Representative government and representation; Legislative bodies; Discipline; History
Description: Reihe Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie - Band 12.
Table of contents: title: I Introduction; II Economics of Political Selection; 1 Two complementary views: sanctioning and selection; 1.1 Political sanctioning; 1.2 Political selection; 2 Which institutions impact political selection?; 2.1 Pay for politicians; 2.2 Electoral rules and parties; 3 Direct professional interest representation in politics; 3.1 Businessmen in politics; 3.2 Lawyers in politics; 4 Discussion; III Selection of Public Servants into Politics: A First Pass; 1 Introduction; 2 The rationale and some history behind (in)compatibility regimes; 2.1 A short recapitulation of (in)compatibility regimes.; title: 2.2 Selection effects of incompatibility rules3 Empirical analysis for the political selection of public servants; 3.1 Data; 3.2 Results; 4 Consequences for political outcomes; 4.1 The trade-off between conflicts of interest and competence; 4.2 Empirical analysis; 5 Concluding remarks; IV Theory and Evidence on the Determinants in Germany; 1 Introduction; 2 Theoretical considerations; 2.1 Ineligibility and incompatibility of public service with a parliamentary mandate; 2.2 The cost-benefit calculus of running for political office; 2.3 Public servants as voters; 3 Empirical analysis; 3.1 Data.; title: 3.2 Results4 Concluding remarks; V Consequences for Legislative Oversight; 1 Introduction; 2 Theoretical considerations; 2.1 Relevance of parliamentary oversight; 2.2 Incentives for parliamentary oversight; 2.3 Public servants as legislators; 2.4 Additional determinants of parliamentary oversight; 2.5 Hypotheses on parliamentary oversight; 3 Institutional background; 4 Empirical analysis; 4.1 Data; 4.2 Results; 5 Concluding remarks; VI Consequences for Employment in the Ministerial Bureaucracy; 1 Introduction; 2 Theoretical considerations; 2.1 Political partisanship; 2.2 Political patronage.; title: 2.3 Political selection of public servants3 Empirical analysis; 3.1 Data; 3.2 Estimation strategy and empirical results; 4 Concluding remarks; VII Conclusions; 1 Summary; 2 Implications for constitutional choice; 3 Implications for economic research; References; Appendix.