A noncooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
By: Itai Ashlagi, Emin Karagözoglu, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
Contributors: Karagözoglu, Emin; Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 09-069; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 09-069
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 15
Description: We consider estate division problems, a generalization of bankruptcy problems. We show that in a direct revelation claim game, if the underlying division rule satisfies efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and weak order preservation, then all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider division rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. For claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored.
Notes: "November 2008"--Publisher's web site.

Includes bibliographical references.