Decentralization and environmental quality
Subtitle: an international analysis of water pollution
By: Hilary Sigman.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13098.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13098.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 26
Subjects: Decentralization in government; Water -- Pollution -- Econometric models; Water quality -- Econometric models; Public goods -- Econometric models; Environmental policy
Description: Many arguments about decentralization in public goods provision have testable implications for the relationship between decentralization and the level and spatial variability of public goods. This paper explores the empirical relationship between decentralization and environmental public good, water quality in rivers at monitoring stations around the world. It examines pollution levels and spatial variability of pollution within a country for both a local and a regional pollutant. The results suggest higher pollution levels with greater decentralization when fixed effects are included; the evidence is strongest for the regional pollutant, where it might result from interjurisdictional free riding. Federalism is associated with greater spatial variability in pollution within a country, consistent with the traditional view that decentralization allows policies more tailored to local conditions.
Notes: "May 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 24-26).

Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).