Farsighted stability for roommate markets
By: Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, and Markus Walzl
Contributors: Klijn, Flip; Walzl, Markus; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 09-135; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 09-135.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2009
Place of publication: [Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 17
Description: Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate markets with no and with a non-singleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Examples 1 and 2).
Notes: "May 2009"--Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references.