How have borrowers fared in banking mega-mergers?
By: Kenneth A. Carow, Edward J. Kane, Rajesh Narayanan.
Contributors: Kane, Edward J. 1935-; Narayanan, Rajesh, 1968-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10623; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10623.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2003
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Bank mergers.
Description: "Previous studies of event returns surrounding bank mergers show that banks gain value in megamergers and additional value when they absorb in-market competitors.  A portion of these gains has been traced to the increased bargaining power of banks vis-ʹaʹa-vis regulators and other competitors.  We demonstrate that increased bargaining power of megabanks adversely affects loan customers of the acquired institution.  Wealth losses are greater when loan customers are credit-constrained and the acquisition is unfriendly or an in-market deal.  These findings reinforce complaints that the ongoing consolidation in banking has unfavorably affected the availability of credit for capital-constrained firms"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.