Does trade foster contract enforcement?
By: James E. Anderson.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 14045; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 14045.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes.  A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement.  In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high.  Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low.  Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic).  The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/10/2008.

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