Population and regulation
By: Casey B. Mulligan, Andrei Shleifer.
Contributors: Shleifer, Andrei.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10234; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10234.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Trade regulation.; Population.
Description: "We present a model of efficient regulation along the lines of Demsetz (1967).  In this model, setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, and therefore jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have them.  Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U.S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history.  We also find that specific types of regulation, including the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations.  Overall, the data show that population is an empirically important determinant of regulation"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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