Assessing the Chrysler bankruptcy
By: Mark J. Roe and David Skeel.
Contributors: Skeel, David A., 1961-; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 645; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 645.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Chrysler Corporation; Bankruptcy -- United States
Description: "Abstract: Chrysler entered and exited bankruptcy in 42 days, making it one of the fastest major industrial bankruptcies in memory.  It entered as a company widely thought to be ripe for liquidation if left on its own, obtained massive funding from the United States Treasury, and exited via a pseudo sale of its main assets to a new government-funded entity.  The unevenness of the compensation to prior creditors raised concerns in capital markets, which we evaluate here.  We conclude that the Chrysler bankruptcy cannot be understood as complying with good bankruptcy practice, that it resurrected discredited practices long thought interred in the 19th and early 20th century equity receiverships, and that its potential, if followed, for disrupting financial markets surrounding troubled companies in difficult economic times is more than small"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/15/2009.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.