Corruption under moral hazard
By: Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele.
Contributors: Thiele, Henrik.; World Bank. Development Research Group. Public Economics.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 2204; Policy research working papers ;; 2204.
Publisher: World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
Published: 1999
Place of publication: Washington, DC
Language: eng
Number of pages: 39
Subjects: Political corruption -- Econometric models.; Civil service -- Salaries, etc. -- Econometric models.
Description: Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties.  Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints.  Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39).
"October 1999"--Cover.
Also available on the World Wide Web.