Essays on matching
Subtitle: N-lateral matching with K decisions and matching with coordination frictions.
Published: 2005
Language: eng
Number of pages: 157
Description: In section 3.2 of Chapter 3, I consider a bilateral K-decision matching model in which agents are endowed with one-dimensional types and, in contrast to Chapter 2, the surplus generated in a match may be non-linear. I provide sufficient conditions under which equilibrium matching is positive assortative. In section 3.4 of Chapter 3, I propose a bilateral stochastic  K-decision model in which the utility of each matched individual is a sum of a deterministic component, a match transfer, and an idiosyncratic component. I provide general sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the model. The proof of equilibrium existence is constructive.The thesis consists of three essays on matching. In Chapter 2, I introduce an N-lateral K-decision matching model in which a matched group of N (one from each class) must simultaneously choose one of K decisions. For any decision, the surplus generated by a group of matched individuals is linear in the individuals' types. In each of the N classes, I assume that (i) there is a continuum of agents, (ii) the agents are endowed with multi-dimensional types, and (iii) the distribution of the types has a continuous density function. In this case, I show that the equilibrium of the model exists and that it can be constructed by solving an associated convex minimization problem. I provide easily verifiable conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium.In chapter 4, I consider a matching model that describes a matching process with coordination frictions in the labor market. In the literature, a standard way to introduce coordination frictions is to describe the market equilibrium as a symmetric equilibrium of a Bayesian game in which workers apply simultaneously to firms and payoffs of the workers at each firm are determined by the Vickrey mechanism. I extend the analysis of the model to the case in which the workers are endowed with multi-dimensional types and there are multiple job positions at each firm. I provide conditions under which the construction of a symmetric equilibrium of the Bayesian game is equivalent to the construction of a solution of a planner's convex constrained optimization problem.
Notes: Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-10, Section: A, page: 3756.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto, 2005.

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