Central bank boards around the world
Subtitle: why does membership size differ?
By: prepared by Helge Berger, Volker Nitsch, and Tonny Lybek.
Contributors: Nitsch, Volker.; Lybek, Tonny.; International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.
Series: IMF working paper -- WP/06/281
Publisher: International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.
Published: 2006
Place of publication: [Washington, D.C.]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 46
Subjects: Banks and banking, Central.; Monetary policy.
Description: This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.
Notes: Caption title.

"December 2006."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 43-46)

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