Executive compensation at Fannie Mae
Subtitle: a case study of perverse incentives, nonperformance pay, and camouflage
By: Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried
Contributors: Fried, Jesse M.; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 505; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business) -- no. 505
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Subjects: Officials and employees; Salaries; Pensions; Golden parachutes (Executive compensation); Misleading financial statements; Executives; Fannie Mae; Federal National Mortgage Association
Other titles: Case study of perverse incentives, nonperformance pay, and camouflage
Notes: "02/2005."

Includes bibliographical references.

Discussion papers published since September 1997 are available for downloading free of charge from the Olin Center web site.