How much is a seat on the security council worth?
Subtitle: foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations
By: Ilyana Kuziemko, Eric Werker
Contributors: Werker, Eric; Harvard Business School. Division of Research
Series: Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School -- 06-029; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 06-029
Publisher: Division of Research, Harvard Business School
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 32
Description: Ten of the fifteen seats on the U.N. Security Council are held by rotating members serving two-year terms. Using country-level panel data, we find that a country's foreign aid receipts rise substantially when it is elected to the Security Council: on average, U.S. aid increases by 54 percent and U.N. development aid rises by 7 percent. We find that the positive effect of Security Council membership on aid is much greater during years in which key diplomatic events take place, when members' votes are likely to be especially valuable. Further, the increase on aid is shown to begin the year a country is elected to the council and to disappear after its membership ends. We find evidence that the effect of council membership on U.S. aid is especially large for dictatorships and U.S. allies, suggesting that the United States seeks to form alliances with the council members who are cheapest to bribe. Finally, the connection between U.N. aid and council membership seems to be driven by UNICEF, an aid organization over which the United States has historically exerted much control.
Notes: "October 2005"--Added t.p.

Includes bibliographical references.