Optimal emission pricing in the presence of international spillovers
Subtitle: decomposing leakage and terms-of-trade motives
By: Christoph Böhringer, Andreas Lange, Thomas F. Rutherford
Contributors: Lange, Andreas; Rutherford, Thomas F.; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 15899; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15899.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Carbon control policies in OECD countries commonly differentiate emission prices in favor of energy-intensive industries.  While leakage provides a efficiency argument for differential emission pricing, the latter may be a disguised beggar-thy-neighbor policy to exploit terms of trade.  Using an optimal tax framework, we propose a method to decompose the leakage motive and the terms-of-trade motive for emission price differentiation.  We illustrate our method with a quantitative impact assessment of unilateral climate policies for the U.S.  and EU economies.  We conclude in these instances that complex optimal emission price differentiation does not substantially reduce the overall economic costs of carbon abatement compared with a simple rule of uniform emission pricing"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/13/2010.

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