Microfinance games
By: Xavier Gine ...[et al.].
Contributors: World Bank
Series: Policy research working paper -- 3959; Policy research working papers (Online) -- 3959.
Publisher: World Bank
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Subjects: Microfinance; Game theory
Description: "Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets.  But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements.  In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection.  The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way.  They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal.  The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.