Vote-buying and reciprocity
By: Frederico Finan, Laura A. Schechter
Contributors: Schechter, Laura A.; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 17411; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 17411.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target.  We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity.  Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation.  Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals.  Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/1/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

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