Judicial lobbying
Subtitle: the politics of labor law constitutional interpretation
By: Matias Iaryczower, Pablo Spiller, Mariano Tommasi.
Contributors: Spiller, Pablo T. 1951-; Tommasi, Mariano, 1964-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11317; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11317.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Judicial process -- Political aspects.; Labor laws and legislation.; Law and politics.; Lobbying.; Pressure groups.; Labor laws and legislation -- Argentina.; Law and politics -- Argentina.; Lobbying -- Argentina.; Pressure groups -- Argentina.
Description: "This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary.  The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems.  We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues.  We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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