Building the family nest
Subtitle: pre-marital investments, marriage markets and spousal allocations
By: by Murat Iyigun, Randall P. Walsh.
Contributors: Walsh, Randall P., 1963-
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1752; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1752
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Marriage -- Economic aspects.; Households -- Economic aspects.
Description: "We develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by pre-marital investments, the marriage market is characterized by assortative matching, and endogenously-determined sharing rules form the basis of intra-household allocations. By incorporating pre-marital investments and spousal matching into the collective household model, we are able to identify the fundamental determinants of endogenously determined and maritally sustainable intra-marital sharing rules. In particular, we find that all sharing rules along the assortative order support unconditionally efficient outcomes where both pre-marital investments and intra-household allocations are efficient. The efficiency of both pre-marital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of pre-marital endowments and the sex ratios in the market"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/28/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.