Real options in a dynamic agency model, with applications to financial development, ipos, and business risk
By: Thomas Philippon, Yuliy Sannikov
Contributors: Sannikov,Yuliy; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13584; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13584.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "We study investment options in a dynamic agency model.  Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment.  The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms' dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the decrease in the age of IPOs"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/20/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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