Ascending auctions for markets with externalities and applications to routing in wireless networks.
Published: 2006
Language: eng
Number of pages: 103
ISBN-13: 9780494210659
Description: We encode a model of a wireless network with the general allocation model and develop an auction with a compact bidding space. Optimality results are supported by empirical results showing the mechanism finds good allocations and, relative to a VCG auction, generates higher auction revenues.This thesis addresses the problem of finding socially optimal routing allocations in wireless networks with selfish users. We model the problem as a resource allocation problem in a market with externalities. Finding an optimal solution to the underlying resource allocation problem requires solving a mathematical program with non-convex constraints which is difficult to approach using traditional distributed price-mediated allocation mechanisms.We consider centralized ascending auction mechanisms as robust allocation techniques. A general allocation model is developed which can be used to encode a wide variety of markets including markets with externalities. We show that an ascending auction over this model is approximately optimal given myopic bidding.
Notes: Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-03, page: 1537.

Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of Toronto, 2006.

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