Aging and the welfare state
Subtitle: the role of young and old voting pivots
By: Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka.
Contributors: Sadka, Efraim.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10967; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10967.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Transfer payments.; Intergenerational relations.
Description: "An income tax is generally levied on both capital and labor income.  The working young bears mostly the burden of the tax on labor income, whereas the retired old, who already acummulated her savings, bears the brunt of the capital income tax.  Therefore, there arise two types of conflict in the determination of the income tax: the standard intragenerational conflict between the poor and the rich, and an ntergenerational conflict between the young and the old.  The paper studies how aging affects the resolution of these conflicts, and the politico-economic forces that are at play: the changes in the voting pivots and the fiscal leakage from tax payers to transfer recipients"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.