A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation
By: Andrew Atkeson, Harold L. Cole.
Contributors: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11083; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11083.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Corporations -- Finance -- Mathematical models.; Executives -- Salaries, etc. -- Mathematical models.
Description: "We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs.  We model this tradeoff dynamically.  We assume that early on in the production process, outside investors face an informational friction with respect to withdrawing funds from the firm which dissipates over time.  We assume that they also face an agency friction which increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm.  The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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