Delegation in the regulatory state
Subtitle: independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe
By: by Fabrizio Gilardi.
Publisher: Edward Elgar
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 186
ISBN-13: 9781847204479
Subjects: Delegation of powers -- Europe, Western; Administrative agencies -- Europe, Western -- Decision making; Public administration -- Europe, Western -- Decision making
Description: Working from data of transnational depth and breadth, the author concludes that policy makers delegate in order to tighten the credibility of policy commitments and to tie the hands of future ministers who may have different preferences.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-180) and index.
Table of contents: title: Introduction; title: The institutional foundations of the regulatory state; title: Delegation to independent regulatory agencies : credibility, political uncertainty, and veto players; title: The formal independence of regulators : empirical analysis; title: Interdependent delegation : the diffusion of independent regulatory agencies; title: The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies : empirical analysis; title: Conclusion; title: Appendices.