The political economy of job protection and income redistribution
By: by Bruno Amable, Donatella Gatti.
Contributors: Gatti, Donatella.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1404; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1404
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper presents a model allowing to analyze voting, welfare institutions and economic performance. We consider a political economy framework with three classes of agents: entrepreneurs, employed workers and unemployed workers. Agents vote on alternative institutional options: the degree of labour market flexibility and the intensity of redistribution. We show that the welfare state configuration depends on the nature of the political system - majoritarian, coalition, two-party. Because internationalization reduces the possibility for national government to effectively tax profits, the existing political coalition is fragilized by the process of globalization. The model generates results concerning the macroeconomic equilibrium employment level. Hence we can assess the effects of internationalization on macroeconomic performance. The impact of internalization depends on the nature of the political system (majoritarian versus coalition government) and on the institutional configuration (positive flexibility versus positive redistribution)"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/14/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.