The Origin Of Ideas
Subtitle: Volume 1
Publisher: Kegan, Paul, Trench & Co.
Published: 1883
Place of publication: London
Language: eng
Description: Volume 1 of 3.
Table of contents: title: CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME.; title: PREFACE vii; title: SECTION I.; title: PRINCIPLES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THESE INQUIRIES.; title: CHAPTER I.; title: On the Two Principles of Philosophic Method i; title: CHAPTER II.; title: Two Philosophies: the one Vulgar, and the other Scientific ; their two Defects 3; title: CHAPTER III.; title: On the Defect of the Philosophy of Locke 7; title: SECTION II.; title: ON THE NATURE OF THE DIFFICULTY TO BE OVERCOME IN EXPLAINING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS: — THE DIFFICULTY STATED.; title: SECTION III.; title: THEORIES WHICH ERR BY DEFECT — THAT IS, BY NOT ASSIGNING TO IDEAS AN ADEQUATE CAUSE.; title: CHAPTER I.; title: LOCKE.; title: I. The System of Locke 18; title: II. Locke, when coming to account for the Origin of the Idea of Substance, stumbles upon the Difficulty, but does not perceive it 18; title: III. Without the Idea of Substance the Development of our Intellectual Life would be impossible 20; title: IV. Why the Idea of Substance cannot come from Sensations alone 21; title: V. The Difficulty found in explaining the Origin of the Idea of Substance is the same as that which I have stated in another form 24; title: VI. Conclusion on the Imperfection of the System of Locke 32; title: CHAPTER II.; title: CONDILLAC; title: I. Objections raised by D’Alembert against the System of Locke 35; title: II. Locke censured by Condillac 38; title: III. The System of Condillac 39; title: IV. Defectiveness of Condillac’s Analysis 41; title: V. Intellectual Attention is not the same thing as Sensitivity 41; title: VI. Memory is not Sensitivity 44; title: VII. Attention is different from Memory 46; title: VIII. Judgment must not be confounded with simple Attention 47; title: IX. Condillac stumbles upon the Difficulty without perceiving it : that is, he accounts for the Formation of Ideas by unconsciously Begging the Question 49; title: X. In every representative Apprehension we contemplate a; title: Universal : hence the Difficulty is seen still more; title: clearly in the Theory of Condillac, and remains in it unsolved 53; title: XI. Continuation 60; title: XII. Conclusion on the Intrinsic Defect of the System of Condillac 63; title: CHAPTER III.; title: REID.; title: I. Origin of the Scottish School 65; title: II. System of Reid on the Distinction of the Human Faculties 68; title: III. The Difficulty as seen by Dr. Reid 73; title: IV. The Difficulty found by Dr. Reid in the System of Locke had in some way been perceived by Locke himself 75; title: V. Objection urged by Reid against Locke 77; title: VI. Reid places Judgment before Ideas 78; title: VII. Dr. Reid maintains, against Locke, that the First Operation of the Human Mind is, not Analytic, but Synthetic 79; title: VIII. The System proposed by Dr. Reid cannot be considered satisfactory 79; title: IX. Defect common to Reid and his Adversaries 83; title: X. The part in which the System of Reid holds good as against that of his Adversaries 91; title: XI. Conclusion 94; title: CHAPTER IV.; title: DUGALD STEWART; title: I. Various Aspects of the Difficulty 96; title: II. Dugald Stewart grounds his Theory on a Passage of Adam Smith 98; title: III. Defects in the above Passage. — First Defect : It does not distinguish the several Species of Names indicating Multitudes of Individuals 100; title: IV. Second Defect : Smith does not distinguish the Names indicating Multitudes of Individuals from those which indicate Abstract Qualities 102; title: V. Third Defect : Smith confounds with Common Nouns the Names indicating Multitudes of Individuals and those indicating Abstract Qualities 103; title: VI. Fourth Defect : Smith does not understand the true Distinction between Common and Proper Nouns 105; title: VII. Fifth Defect : Smith does not understand the Reason why Common Nouns and Proper Nouns are severally so called 106; title: VIII. Sixth Defect: Smith does not see that the first Names given to things were Common Nouns 108; title: IX. Seventh Defect : Smith does not see that to know in things that which is ‘common' is easier than to know that which is ‘proper' 114; title: X. Eighth Defect : Smith does not know in what way Common Nouns pass into being used as Proper 115; title: XI. Ninth Defect : Smith, while professing to explain Abstract Ideas, gives no such Explanation at all 121; title: XII. Tenth Defect : The language of Smith throws a veil over the true Point of the Difficulty to be overcome in explaining the Origin of Abstract Ideas 123; title: XIII. What Form the Ideological Problem takes in the Reasonings of Smith and Dugald Stewart 130; title: XIV. The System of the Nominalists does not solve the Ideological Problem 130; title: XV. How Dugald Stewart’s Error originated 131; title: XVI. The Theory of Dugald Stewart sins by a petitio principii 132; title: XVII. Another Error of Dugald Stewart 136; title: XVIII. Other Errors of Dugald Stewart : the Inadequacy of his Theory to solve the Ideological Problem is further demonstrated 138; title: XIX. The Nominalism of Dugald Stewart flows from the Principles of Reid 148; title: XX. In explaining how our Mind conceives the Similarity of Objects, the same Difficulty is met with under another aspect 151; title: XXI. In explaining how Individuals can be Classified, the same Difficulty presents itself again 151; title: XXII. Uncertainty observable in the Expressions used by Dugald Stewart 158; title: XXIII. Dugald Stewart confounds together two Questions which are totally distinct 159; title: XXIV. Dugald Stewart does not understand the Doctrines of the ancient Philosophers whom he censures, concerning the Formation of Genera and Species 160; title: XXV. Dugald Stewart does not understand the Question debated between the Realists, the Conceptualists, and the Nominalists 162; title: XXVI. Dugald Stewart confounds the Question of the Necessity of Language with that of the Existence of Universal 164; title: XXVII. Another petitio principii : Dugald Stewart, while professing to explain how the Mind forms the Ideas of Genera and Species, begins by presupposing these ideas as already formed 166; title: XXVIII. Another petitio principii : Dugald Stewart assumes that General Ideas are something, in the very discussion in which he attempts to prove that they are mere Names 167; title: XXIX. The Use of Signs does not suffice to account for our Knowledge of Universals 169; title: XXX. Another Fallacy in the Mode of Reasoning adopted by Dugald Stewart 172; title: XXXI. Conclusion : The Scottish School, conscious of its inability to overcome the difficulty in question, has tried in vain to eliminate it from Philosophy 176; title: CHAPTER V.; title: What Steps has Philosophy made by means of the Systems we have examined thus far? 177; title: SECTION IV.; title: THEORIES WHICH ERR BY EXCESS — THAT IS, BY ASSIGNING TO IDEAS A GREATER CAUSE THAN IS NECESSARY.; title: CHAPTER I.; title: PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.; title: I. The Difficulty of the Problem of the Origin of Ideas as proposed by Plato 188; title: II. Plato’s Solution of the Difficulty 190; title: III. The Difficulty seen by Plato is in substance the same as that which has been proposed in these pages 192; title: IV. The System of Plato solves the Difficulty, but is at the same time Vitiated by Excess 196; title: V. Aristotle points out the Inaccuracy of Plato’s Reasoning 201; title: VI. Its Defect notwithstanding, the Reasoning of Plato contains an Element of solid Truth 203; title: VII. Aristotle does not seem to give an adequate Explanation of Universals 204; title: VIII. From some passages in the Works of Aristotle it would seem that he did not sufficiently mark the Distinction between Sense and Understanding 207; title: IX. According to Themistius’s Paraphrase, Aristotle did not properly understand the Nature of the Universal 213; title: X. To Judge is more than to Apprehend the Universal 215; title: XI. Absurdity of the Doctrine expounded by Themistius 216; title: XII. Contradiction between two Opinions of Aristotle 220; title: XIII. The Difficulty pointed out in this Discussion was perceived by the Schoolmen, as is proved from a Distinction which they invented in order to meet it. That Distinction is examined 222; title: XIV. The intellects agens of Aristotle does not account for the Origin of Universals 226; title: XV. According to Aristotle, the Understanding communicates its own Form to the things perceived by it. This, taken in conjunction with the Denial of all Innate Ideas, is the Foundation of Modern Scepticism 230; title: XVI. An Aristotelian self-contradiction 232; title: XVII. According to the System just expounded, the Understanding would operate blindly : Absurdity of this 233; title: XVIII. Aristotle catches a glimpse of the True Doctrine 234; title: XIX. The Hint of the True Doctrine given by Aristotle is explained 236; title: XX. Aristotle acknowledges that the Human Understanding carries with it by Nature a Light, as attested by Mankind generally 237; title: XXI. The Arabians, by denying the Existence of a Light Innate in Man, fell into the erroneous Doctrine that the intellectus agens was outside of the Human Soul 240; title: XXII. St. Thomas refutes the Error of the Arabians 242; title: XXIII. Credit due to Aristotle for having seen the Necessity of an Innate Primitive Act in the Human Understanding 243; title: XXIV. According to the Interpretation of Egidius, the Indeterminate Habits hinted at by Aristotle are Innate in the Human Soul 248; title: XXV. Conclusion on Aristotle 248; title: XXVI. Two Kinds of Doctrine in Plato 249; title: CHAPTER II.; title: LEIBNITZ; title: I. The Difficulty to be overcome in accounting for the Origin of Ideas was seen by Leibnitz 259; title: II. Leibnitz was led to perceive the Difficulty by the Analysis, not of the Intellectual Faculty in Particular, but of Powers in General 262; title: III. Leibnitz saw the Difficulty imperfectly because he deduced it from Principles which were too General 263; title: IV. Leibnitzian Solution of the Difficulty 266; title: V. How Innate Ideas as understood by Leibnitz are made successively to pass from a Confused to a Luminous State 269; title: VI. Merit of Leibnitz in this Question 270; title: VII. Leibnitz admits less of the Innate than Plato 277; title: VIII. To explain the Existence of Human Ideas, Leibnitz assumes more of the Innate than is necessary 278; title: IX. Other errors of the Leibnitzian Theory 279; title: X. Conclusion as to the Theory of Leibnitz 284; title: CHAPTER III.; title: KANT; title: I. Kant, without any Examination, takes for granted the Principle of Locke, that 'all Human Knowledge comes from Experience' 286; title: II. In his Opposition to Locke, Kant imitated Leibnitz 288; title: III. Two Species of Knowledge, the one a priori and the other a posteriori, admitted by all Philosophical Schools 289; title: IV. The Characteristics of a priori and of a posteriori Knowledge 292; title: V. Hume, by discarding a portion of a priori Knowledge, induces Scepticism 297; title: VI. No Portion of a priori Knowledge can be explained by Means of the Senses 301; title: VII. How it was Attempted to Confute the Scepticism of Hume 305; title: VIII. A more effectual Way of Confuting the Scepticism of Hume 307; title: IX. Reid rejects the Principle of Locke, and acknowledges the Existence of a priori Cognitions 309; title: X. The Theory of Reid does not run clear of Scepticism 311; title: XI. Kant deduces his Scepticism from the Fundamental Principle of Reid, even as Hume had deduced his from die fundamental Principle of Locke 314; title: XII. The Doctrine of Kant stated : he distinguishes Two Parts in our Cognitions — i.e. form and matter 315; title: XIII. How Kant seeks to prevent the chaise of Idealism 318; title: XIV. How Kant seeks to prevent the charge of Scepticism 319; title: XV. The Fundamental Error of the Philosophy of Kant 321; title: XVI. Another Error of the Philosophy of Kant 326; title: XVII. An Objection answered 329; title: XVIII. Philosophical Merit of Kant : he was fully sensible of; title: the fact that to Think is nothing but to Judge 333; title: XIX. Kant saw very distinctly the nature of the difficulty to be overcome in accounting for the Origin of Human Cognitions 333; title: XX. Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments 335; title: XXI. The General Problem of Philosophy as stated by Kant 336; title: XXII. Is it true that we make Synthetical a priori Judgments? 339; title: XXIII. Is the Proposition, ‘Everything that Happens must have a Cause,’ a Synthetical a priori Judgment in the Kantian sense? 342; title: XXIV. The Ideological Problem was not properly stated by Kant 347; title: XXV. The Nature of the Ideological Problem is still more clearly set forth 348; title: XXVI. Are the First Judgments, through which we form the Concepts of Things, Synthetical in the Kantian sense? 350; title: XXVII. The Kantian Solution of the Ideological Problem 358; title: XXVIII. Kant did not understand the Nature of Intellectual Perception 361; title: XXIX. In what he admits as Innate in the Human Spirit, Kant errs at once by Defect and by Excess 362; title: XXX. Conclusion 364; title: CHAPTER IV.; title: HOW PHILOSOPHY MAY BE SAID TO HAVE PROGRESSED BY MEANS OF PLATO, LEIBNITZ, AND KANT; AND WHAT IT STILL REQUIRES IN ORDER TO BE PERFECT.; title: I. Recapitulation of the Three Systems 366; title: II. How the Kantian Forms are Vitiated by Excess, and how they are all Reducible to one only Form 370