Corruption, inequality and fairness
By: Alberto Alesina, George-Marios Angeletos.
Contributors: Angeletos, Marios.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11399; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11399.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Political corruption -- Mathematical models.; Equality -- Mathematical models.; Decentralization in government -- Mathematical models.; Distributive justice -- Mathematical models.
Description: "Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption.  We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model.  A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population.  This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality.  Multiple steady states exist in some cases"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.