Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies
By: Alexander Muermann, Howard Kunreuther.
Contributors: Muermann, Alexander.; Kunreuther, Howard.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 12827; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 12827.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others.  If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium, individuals underinvest in self-protection.  Limiting insurance coverage through deductibles can partially internalize this externality and thereby improve individual and social welfare"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/22/2007.

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