Conventional prompt global strike
Subtitle: strategic asset or unusable liability?
By: by M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo
Contributors: Manzo, Vincent A.; National Defense University. Center for Strategic Research
Series: Strategic forum -- SF no. 263; Strategic forum -- no. 263.
Publisher: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Washington, D.C.]
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Number of pages: 24
Subjects: Weapons systems; Conventional Warfare; Military policy; Strategy
Description: A Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability would be a valuable strategic asset for some fleeting, denied, and difficult-to-reach targets. It would fill a gap in U.S. conventional strike capability in some plausible high-risk scenarios, contribute to a more versatile and credible U.S. strategic posture, and potentially enhance deterrence across a diverse spectrum of threats. A small number of CPGS systems would not significantly affect the size of the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal or substitute for the ability of nuclear weapons to hold large sets of hard, deeply buried, or mobile targets at risk. A key concern is the risk that either Russia or China might launch its nuclear forces due to uncertainty about the target of an ambiguous U.S. CPGS strike. Assuming functioning early warning systems, the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) mitigates this risk better than the conventional strike missile because Russian and Chinese officials would be better able to assess quickly whether a CTM would land on their territory.
Notes: Title from PDF title screen (viewed June 23, 2011).

"February 2011."

"Center for Strategic Research."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 21-23).

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.