Concession contract renegotiations
Subtitle: some efficiency versus equity dilemmas
By: Antonio Estache, Lucia Quesada.
Contributors: Quesada, Lucia.; World Bank Institute. Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 2705; Policy research working papers (Online) ;; 2705.
Publisher: World Bank, World Bank Institute, Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Concessions -- Developing countries -- Econometric models.; Contracts -- Developing contries -- Econometric models.; Negotiation in business -- Developing countries -- Econometric models.
Genres: Econometric models.
Description: If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of renegotiation.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-30).
Title from title screen as viewed on Aug. 24, 2002.
"November 2001."
Also available in print.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.