Coerced confessions
Subtitle: self-policing in the shadow of the regulator
By: Jodi L. Short, Michael W. Toffel
Contributors: Toffel, Michael W.; Harvard Business School. Division of Research
Series: Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School -- 07-020; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 07-020
Publisher: Division of Research, Harvard Business School
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 30
Description: As part of a recent trend toward more cooperative relations between regulators and industry, novel government programs are encouraging firms to monitor their own regulatory compliance and voluntarily report their own violations. In this study, we examine how regulatory enforcement activities influence organizations' decisions to self-police. We created a comprehensive dataset for the "Audit Policy," a United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) program that encourages companies to self-disclose violations of environmental laws and regulations in exchange for reduced sanctions. We find that facilities are more likely to selfdisclose if they were recently subjected to one of several different enforcement measures and if they were provided with immunity from prosecution for selfdisclosed violations.
Notes: "July 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.