Social security and the timing of divorce
By: Gopi Shah Goda, John B. Shoven, Sita Nataraj Slavov.
Contributors: Shoven, John B.; Slavov, Sita N.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13382.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13382.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 20
Subjects: Social security beneficiaries -- United States; Divorce -- Economic aspects -- United States; Divorce -- Law and legislation
Description: "Social Security provides spousal benefits in retirement to secondary workers in married couples based on the primary worker's earnings record.  In addition, Social Security pays spousal benefits to divorced secondary workers whose marriages lasted at least ten years.  However, if a marriage failed in less than ten years, no spousal benefits are paid.  The spousal benefit is particularly valuable to secondary workers in couples where there is a large disparity in earnings between the primary worker and the secondary worker.  We examine whether these couples, who have more to gain from extending their marriage to ten years, are more likely to delay marriage to the tenth year relative to a control group.  We find that vulnerable couples are slightly more likely to delay divorce from year nine to year ten; however, the effect is statistically insignificant and small in magnitude.  While the "cliff"-vesting of retirement benefits for divorced spouses raises equity concerns, it does not appear to distort incentives for divorce"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: "September 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 20).

Also available in PDF from the NBER World Wide Web site (www.nber.org).