Walrasian bargaining
By: Muhamet Yildiz
Contributors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 02-02; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 02-02.
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 20
Description: Given any two-person economy, we consider a simple alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the agents offer prices. We provide conditions under which the outcomes of all stationary subgame-perfect equilibria converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (the price and the allocation) as the agents become infinitely patient. Therefore, price-taking behavior can be achieved with only two agents. Keywords: Bargaining, Competitive equilibrium, Coase Conjecture. JEL Classification: C73, C78, D41.
Notes: "October 2001."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 19-20).

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