Unilateral tariff liberalisation
By: Richard Baldwin
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16600; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16600.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Unilateral tariff liberalisation by developing nations is pervasive but our understanding of it is shallow.  This paper strives to partly redress this lacuna on the theory side by introducing three novel political economy mechanisms with particular emphasis is on the role of production unbundling.  One mechanism studies how lowering frictional barriers to imported parts can destroy the correlation of interests between parts producers and their downstream customers.  A second mechanism studies how Kojima's pro-trade FDI raises the political economy cost of maintaining high upstream barriers.  The third works via a general equilibrium channel whereby developing country's participation in the supply chains of advanced-nation industries undermines their own competitiveness in final goods, thus making final good protection more politically costly.  In essence, developing nations' pursuit of the export-processing industrialisation undermines their infant-industry industrialisation strategies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/31/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.