Infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries
By: Emmanuelle Auriol, Pierre M. Picard, Research working paper Collection Title:Policy
Contributors: Picard, Pierre M.; World Bank
Series: Policy research working paper -- 3950; Policy research working papers (Online) -- 3950.
Publisher: World Bank
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Subjects: Infrastructure (Economics); Public utilities; Privatization
Description: "The paper analyzes governments' tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus in privatization reforms of noncompetitive industries in developing countries.  Under privatization, the control rights are transferred to private interests so that public subsidies decline.  This benefit for tax-payers comes at the cost of price increases for consumers.  In developing countries, tight budget constraints imply that privatization may be optimal for low profitability segments.  For highly profitable public utilities, the combination of allocative inefficiency and critical budgetary conditions may favor public ownership.  Finally, once a market segment gives room for more than one firm, governments prefer to regulate the industry.  In the absence of a credible regulatory agency, regulation is achieved through public ownership. "--World Bank web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/28/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.