What do unions do to CEO compensation?
By: Rafael Gomez and Konstantinos Tzioumis
Contributors: Tzioumis, Konstantinos; London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance
Series: CEP discussion paper -- no. 720; Discussion paper (London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance : Online) -- no. 720.
Publisher: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
Published: 2006
Place of publication: London
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: In this paper we estimate the relation between union presence and CEO compensation, using a unique panel of publicly listed US firms for the period 1992-2001. We find that, on average, union presence: 1) is significantly associated with lower levels of total CEO compensation; 2) affects the mix of CEO compensation by providing higher levels of pay but much lower stock option values; 3) lowers dispersion of CEO compensation across firms; and 4) does not significantly reduce the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation as compared to non-union firms.
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"May 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

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