Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
By: Hanna Halaburda
Contributors: Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 09-068; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 09-068
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 39
Description: This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism that the literature focuses on), unravelling is more likely to occur when participants have more similar preferences. It also shows that any Pareto-optimal mechanism must prevent unravelling, and that the ex-post stable mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and only if it prevents unravelling.
Notes: "November 2008"--Publisher's web site.

Includes bibliographical references.