Social choice mechanisms
By: Vladimir I. Danilov, Alexander I. Sotskov.
Contributors: Sotskov, A. I.
Series: Studies in economic design
Publisher: Springer
Published: 2002
Place of publication: Berlin; New York
Language: eng
Number of pages: 191
Subjects: Social choice -- Mathematical models
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. [183]-188) and index.
Table of contents: title: Machine generated contents note: 1. Basic Concepts9; title: 1.1 Preferences9; title: 1.2 Social Choice Correspondences13; title: 1.3 Monotone Social Choice Correspondences19; title: 1.4 Social Choice Mechanisms25; title: 1.5 Effectivity Functions and Blockings30; title: 1.A1 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem35; title: 1.A2 Non-manipulable SCFs37; title: 1.A3 Minimal Monotone SCCs40; title: Bibliographic Comments43; title: 2. Nash-consistent Mechanisms45; title: 2.1 Definitions and Examples45; title: 2.2 Blockings Generated by Consistent Mechanisms50; title: 2.3 Strongly Monotone Social Choice Correspondences54; title: 2.4 Nash-implementable Correspondences58; title: 2.5 Implementation: the Case of Two Participants62; title: 2.6 Acceptable Mechanisms65; title: 2. A Simple Mechanism for the Implementation of Walrasian; title: Equilibria68; title: Bibliographic Comments70; title: 3. Strategy-proof Mechanisms73; title: 3.1 Dominant Strategies. The Revelation Principle73; title: 3.2 Single-Peaked Environment78; title: 3.3 Linear Environment85; title: 3.4 The Transferable Environment. Groves Mechanisms 92; title: 3.5 Further Properties of Groves Mechanisms97; title: 3.A1 The Simple Transferable Environment Case105; title: 3.A2 Acceptable Mechanisms in Transferable Environment106; title: Bibliographic Comments108; title: 4. Cores and Stable Blockings111; title: 4.1 Stable Outcomes if; title: 4.2 Additive Blockings 116; title: 4.3 Convex Blockings122; title: 4.4 Almost Additive Blockings 125; title: 4.5 Necessary Stability Conditions 128; title: 4.6 Veto as a Decision-making Procedure 132; title: 4.A1 Balanced Blockings138; title: 4.A2 Blockings with Infinite Number of Alternatives140; title: 4.A3 The Harems Lemma 141; title: Bibliographic Comments 142; title: 5. Strongly Consistent Mechanisms145; title: 5.1 Definitions and Examples 145; title: 5.2 A Tokens Mechanism (or Veto-mechanism) 149; title: 5.3 Blockings Generated by SC-mechanisms 153; title: 5.4 Direct Core Mechanisms158; title: 5.5 Laminable Blockings 163; title: 5.6 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Laminability 168; title: 5.7 Neutral Laminable Blockings 172; title: 5.A Implementation via Strong Equilibria 175; title: Bibliographic Comments180; title: References183; title: Index189.