On Fed watching and central bank transparency in an overlapping generations model
By: Joseph H. Haslag.
Contributors: Haslag, Joseph H.
Series: Research Department working paper ;; 0002; Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Research Dept. : Online) ;; 0002.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Published: 2000
Place of publication: [Dallas, Tx.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.); Monetary policy.; Banks and banking, Central.
Description: "I develop a simple general equilibrium model that integrates Fed watching with central bank opaqueness. With the intergenerational conflict, opaqueness can solve a Ramsey problem. With monetary uncertainty as the only source of randomness, transparency is the welfare maximizing policy. With other sources of variation, transparency is costly in the sense that it limits the central bank's response to intrinsic shocks. In short, opaqueness is the veil that permits the central bank freedom to choose money growth in a way to raise welfare"--Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/27/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.