Nobility and nihilism: Nietzsche's science of souls.
Published: 2006
Language: eng
Number of pages: 246
ISBN-13: 9780494220252
Description: Nietzsche is denounced or lauded as the philosopher who established the idea there is no such thing as the good. Through an examination of  On the Genealogy of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil, I argue Nietzsche argues there is a supreme good. It is not located in a moral doctrine. Instead, it lies beneath these moral doctrines in the super-abundant vitality that generates positive moral values.This good is content-free. It is a formal good. It is shaped by the act of valuation, which imparts content. The content-rich account of the good, which is offered by every positive or noble morality, does not persist nor do all human beings recognize it as authoritative. By contrast, the formal good is persistent and is universally recognized at some level by all human beings.What Nietzsche finds is that the structure of the soul, which he claims is revealed by moral values, is fundamentally the same in all human beings. Thus, though he claims there are two human types with two opposing moralities, he also argues these differences are secondary to a primary similarity. All human beings are characterized by will to power, which expresses itself in human beings through moral values. The difference between noble and slave values is quantitative, not qualitative.Nietzsche discovers the human consensus about the formal good by means of the science of souls as practiced by Socrates. Nietzsche, like Socrates, examines human opinions about the good as a way of trying to see whether there is an underlying similarity between human opinions.Regardless of the secondary differences that exist between noble and slave morality, fundamentally, all human beings think more vitality is better. He argues the careful employment of psychology reveals slave morality actually endorses the super-abundant vitality it seems to condemn.
Notes: Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-01, Section: A, page: 0335.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto, 2006.

Electronic version licensed for access by U. of T. users.