School admissions reform in Chicago and England
Subtitle: comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation
By: Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez
Contributors: Sönmez, Tayfun; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16783; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16783.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "In Fall 2009, officials from Chicago Public Schools changed their assignment mechanism for coveted spots at selective college preparatory high schools midstream.  After asking about 14,000 applicants to submit their preferences for schools under one mechanism, the district asked them re-submit their preferences under a new mechanism.  Officials were concerned that "high-scoring kids were being rejected simply because of the order in which they listed their college prep preferences" under the abandoned mechanism.  What is somewhat puzzling is that the new mechanism is also manipulable.  This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms based on their vulnerability to manipulation.  Under our notion, the old mechanism is more manipulable than the new Chicago mechanism.  Indeed, the old Chicago mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism.  A number of similar transitions between mechanisms took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007.  Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes involving matching mechanisms"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/10/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

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