Trust and bribery
Subtitle: The role of the quid pro quo and the link with crime
By: Jennifer Hunt.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10510; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10510.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Political corruption -- Case studies.; Bribery -- Case studies.; Trust -- Case studies.
Genres: Case studies.
Description: "I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks.  A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption.  Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age.  I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys.  I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less.  These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility.  I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/11/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.