Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficient defences
By: David Spector
Contributors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 01-18; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 01-18.
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 18
Description: It is shown that if firms compete in quantities and marginal costs are nondecreasing, any profitable merger failing to generate technological synergies must harm consumers through higher prices, irrespective of entry conditions in the industry. However this result does not hold if products are differentiated and firms compete in prices. The implications for merger policy are discussed. Keywords: Horizontal mergers, competition policy, oligopoly theory. JEL Classifications: D43, K21, L13, L41.
Notes: Title from cover.

"May 2001."; "May 2001 (first draft: April 2001)"--Abstract.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 14-15).

Abstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.