The law and economics of public health
By: Frank A. Sloan, Lindsey M. Chepke
Contributors: Chepke, Lindsey M.
Series: Foundations and trends in microeconomics -- v. 3, issue 5-6; Foundations and trends in microeconomics -- v. 3, no. 5-6.
Publisher: Now
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Number of pages: 162
ISBN-13: 9781601980755
Subjects: Torts; Public health; LAW; Economic aspects; Public Health
Description: The fundamental question addressed by this paper is whether or not and the extent to which imposing tort liability on potential injurers improves the public's health. Conceptually, imposing the threat of litigation on potential injurers gives them an incentive to exercise more care than they would absent the threat. While the conclusion might seem to be obvious at first glance, in reality, the conclusion is far from obvious. For one, insurance coverage may blunt incentives to take care. Also, the tort system may operate far less perfectly than the theory would have it. In the end, the question must be answered on the basis of empirical evidence.
Notes: Title from PDF title page (viewed Jan. 23, 2008).

Offprint. Foundations and trends in microeconomics (Online). Vol. 3, no. 5-6 (2007).

Includes bibliographical references.
Table of contents: title: Abstract; title: Introduction; title: Government intervention in markets: alternative approaches; title: Tort law in an economic framework; title: Alternative liability rules; title: Contracts versus torts; title: Unilateral versus bilateral precautions to avoid accidents; title: When will applying the negligence rule lead private parties to select a socially optimal precaution level?; title: Four markets; title: Tort liability under attack; title: Motor vehicle accidents, insurance, and tort liability; title: Context; title: Four markets; title: Empirical evidence; title: Dram shop and social host liability; title: Rationale; title: Four markets; title: Empirical evidence; title: Medical malpractice; title: Background and context; title: Four markets; title: Empirical evidence; title: International medical no-fault programs; title: Tobacco litigation; title: Rationale for regulation of tobacco products; title: Latency of tobacco-related injuries; title: Four markets; title: Empirical evidence; title: Litigation involving pharmaceutical, medical device, and vaccine manufacturers; title: Rationale; title: Background: regulation of pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and vaccines in the United States; title: Four markets; title: Empirical evidence: case studies; title: Medical no-fault for vaccines; title: International experience; title: Empirical evidence: consumer risk perceptions, static and dynamic efficiency; title: Workers' compensation; title: Rationale; title: Four markets; title: Empirical evidence on effects of workers' compensation on injury-illness duration; title: Experience rating of workers compensation premiums and rates of occupational injuries and illnesses; title: The experiences compared; title: Does tort liability improve the public's health?; title: If not tort, what are the alternatives?; title: Public policy implications; title: Future research; title: Bottom line; title: Acknowledgements; title: References; title: Updates.