Correspondence principles for concave orthogonal games
By: Michael J. Stutzer.
Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report -- 90; Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) -- 90.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 1984
Place of publication: [Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Silberberg [6] and Pauwels [2] have produced and clarified seminal results in the comparative statics of single-agent classical optimization problems.  This paper extends Pauwels' method to derive analogous results for stable Nath equilibria in a subclass of the widely used class of concave orthogonal games defined by Rosen [3].  Application of these results to cost curve shifts in the asymmetric Cournot oligopoly immediately uncovers apparently new comparative statics results"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/9/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.