Investor protection and interest group politics
By: Lucian A. Bebchuk and Zvika Neeman
Contributors: Neeman, Zvika; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 603; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 603.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection.  In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the politicians setting the level of investor protection.  We identify conditions under which this lobbying game has an inefficiently low equilibrium level of investor protection.  Factors that operate to reduce investor protection below its efficient level include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence politicians, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value that efficient investor protection would produce for outside investors.  The interest that entrepreneurs (and existing public firms) have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions arising from insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital public firms already have.  Our analysis generates testable predictions, and can explain existing empirical evidence, regarding the way in which investor protection varies over time and around the world"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/20/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.