Wintel
Subtitle: cooperation or confict
By: Roamon Casadesus-Masanell, David B. Yoffie
Contributors: Yoffie, David B.; Harvard Business School. Division of Research
Series: Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School -- 05-083; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 05-083
Publisher: Division of Research, Harvard Business School
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 41
Subjects: Management; Computer software industry; Microprocessors; Competition; Microsoft Corporation; Intel Corporation
Description: We study the incentives of complementors (producers of complementary products) to cooperate vs. compete and how these interact. In a system of complements, like the PC, the value of the final product depends on how well the different components work together. This, in turn, depends on the firms' investment in complementary R&D. We ask whether profit maximizing complementors will fully cooperate to make the final product as valuable as possible. Contrary to the popular view that two tight complements will generally have well aligned incentives, we demonstrate that natural conflicts emerge over pricing, the timing of investments, and who captures the greatest value at different phases of product generations.
Notes: "April 13, 2005"--Added t.p.

Includes bibliographical references.