Political dynasties
By: Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, Jason Snyder.
Contributors: Dal Bó, Pedro, 1971-; Snyder, Jason.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13122.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13122.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 40
Subjects: United States. -- Congress -- History -- 18th century -- Mathematical models; United States -- Politics and government -- Mathematical models
Description: We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power.
Notes: "May 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 36-40).

Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).