A rational model of the closed-end fund discount
By: Jonathan Berk, Richard Stanton.
Contributors: Stanton, Richard.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10412; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10412.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Closed-end funds -- Econometric models.; Discount -- Econometric models.
Description: "The discount on closed-end funds is widely accepted as proof of investor irrationality.  We show,however, that a parsimonious rational model can generate a discount that exhibits many of the characteristics observed in practice.  The only required features of the model are that managers have (imperfectly observable) ability to generate excess returns; they sign long-term contracts guaranteeing them a fee each year equal to a fixed fraction of assets under management; and they can leave to earn more money elsewhere if they turn out to be good.  With these assumptions, time-varying discounts are not an anomaly in a rational world with competitive investors -- they are required"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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