Of candidates and character
By: B. Douglas Bernheim, Navin Kartik
Contributors: Kartik, Navin; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16530; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16530.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "We study the characteristics of self-selected candidates in corrupt political systems.  Potential candidates differ along two dimensions of unobservable character: public spirit (altruism toward others) and honesty (the disutility suffered when selling out to special interests after securing office).  Both aspects combine to determine an individual's quality as governor.  We characterize properties of equilibrium candidate pools for arbitrary costs of running for office.  As the cost of running vanishes, there is an essentially unique candidate pool, which is typically highly asymmetric: it consists of only the most dishonest individuals but a mixture of the most selfish and the most public-spirited ones.  We explore how two policy instruments - the governor's compensation and anti-corruption enforcement - affect the expected quality of governance through candidate self-selection.  We also examine the effects of incumbency and term limits on self-selection in a dynamic version of the model"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/24/2011.

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