Mediocracy
By: Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo.
Contributors: Merlo, Antonio.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 12920; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 12920.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector.  We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector.  We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians.  We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/5/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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