Agency problems and goal conflicts
By: Robert A. Eisenbeis.
Contributors: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Series: Working paper series / Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ;; 2004-24; Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta : Online) ;; 2004-24.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Published: 2004
Place of publication: [Atlanta, Ga.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Financial institutions -- European Union countries.; Banks and banking -- European Union countries.; Bank failures -- European Union countries.
Description: "Agency theory is used to evaluate how the European Union (EU) may deal with the resolution of goal and agency conflicts in dealing with failing financial institutions.  Experience in the United States suggests that the financial and regulatory structure being put in place, which relies upon country-sponsored deposit insurance funds and home country responsibility for supervision and lender-of-last-resort functions, is not likely to be robust to the failure of a large EU institution that threatens the solvency of the deposit insurance fund or that poses systemic risk.  The author concludes that the EU needs a centralized and common approach to dealing with troubled institutions"--Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/30/2004.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.