Public action for public goods
By: Abhijit Banerjee, Lakshmi Iyer [and] Rohini Somanathan
Contributors: Lakshmi Iyer; Somanathan, Rohini; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 07-05; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 07-05.
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 38
Subjects: Mathematical models; Self-interest; Collective behavior; Public goods
Description: This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model of collective action which is intended to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We argue that several of these intuitive theoretical arguments rely on special additional assumptions that are often not made clear. We then review the empirical work based on the predictions of these models of collective action. While the available evidence is generally consistent with these theories, there is a dearth of quality evidence. Moreover, a large part of the variation in access to public goods seems to have nothing to do with the "bottom-up" forces highlighted in these models and instead reflect more "top-down" interventions. We conclude with a discussion of some of the historical evidence on top-down interventions. Keywords: Public goods, collective action. JEL Classifications: H41, 012.
Notes: "September 30, 2006."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 33-38).

Abstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.