Democratization and clientelism
Subtitle: why are young democracies badly governed?
By: Philip Keefer.
Contributors: World Bank.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 3594; Policy research working papers (Online) ;; 3594.
Publisher: World Bank
Published: 2005
Place of publication: [Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Democratization.; Patron and client.; Political corruption.
Description: "This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers.  Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens.  This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies.  A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives.  The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies. "--World Bank web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.