British official reaction to the Rhineland crisis, November, 1935-May, 1936
By: by Lawrence Werner Hill
Publisher: University Microfilms International
Published: 1978
Place of publication: Ann Arbor, Mich
Language: eng
Number of pages: 228
Subjects: Foreign relations
Other titles: British official reaction to the Rhineland crisis ...
Description: "The German reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, was, as some realized even then, a 'turning point' in world history, for Hitler's fait accompli allowed him to refortify the demilitarized zone and proceed with his expansionist plans in eastern and southeastern Europe ... While much blame has subsequently been placed on the French for failing to act decisively against the Germans, contemporary international opinion regarded Great Britain as the 'key' to the situation. British responsibility in the crisis stemmed from Britain's role as a guarantor power of the Treaty of Locarno, which provided that the Rhineland demilitarized zone as established by the Treaty of Versailles would remain neutralized. Moreover, many recalled Stanley Baldwin's pronouncement in 1934 that with the development of modern aircraft the Rhine would henceforth have to be regarded as Britain's frontier.

Since Germany's action of March 7 was clearly a breach of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, why then did the British apparently fail to carry out their obligations and thus contribute to an inevitable war? This dissertation is an attempt to answer that question. It is primarily concerned with an analysis of the official British reaction to the Rhineland crisis which occurred between November, 1935, and May, 1936. Of necessity, such a study must emphasize diplomatic, political, and economic factors which circumscribed British efforts to deal with the problem. It is also concerned with the effects which timing and personal qualities of leadership exerted on world events ... the historian ... is forced to the conclusion that during the Rhineland crisis the British followed a policy of drift which was, as Sir Austen Chamberlain noted, no policy at all ...

[and] may still wonder why men, certain of Hitler's expansionist plans, appeared to be weak of will, but he cannot fail to have a trace of sympathy for British leaders who were restrained by public opinion that wanted no coercive measures taken against Germany"--Preface.
Notes: "72-27950."

Vita.

Thesis--Texas Christian University, 1972.

Bibliography: leaves 218-228.
Table of contents: title: The evolution of a crisis; title: The period of speculation; title: In search of a policy; title: To implement a plan; title: The immediate crisis; title: An interlude of confusion and uncertainty; title: The Locarno Agreement at London; title: The Locarno proposals : reaction and aftermath.