Overturning Mundell
Subtitle: fiscal policy in a monetary union
By: Russell Cooper and Hubert Kempf.
Contributors: Kempf, Hubert, agrégé de science économique.
Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report ;; 311; Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) ;; 311.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 2002
Place of publication: [Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Monetary unions.; Fiscal policy.
Description: "Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell [1961]: a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective.  If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/17/2004.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.