Pay without perfomance
Subtitle: overview of the issues
By: Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried.
Contributors: Fried, Jesse M.; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 528; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 528.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "In a recent book, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of executive Compensation, we critique existing executive pay arrangements and the corporate governance processes producing them, and put forward proposals for improving both executive pay and corporate governance.  This paper provides an overview of the main elements of our critique and proposals.  We show that, under current legal arrangements, boards cannot be expected to contract at arm's length with the executives whose pay they set.  We discuss how managers' influence can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that researchers subscribing to the arm's length contracting view have long viewed as puzzling.  We also explain how managerial influence can lead to inefficient arrangements that generate weak or even perverse incentives, as well as to arrangements that make the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay less transparent.  Finally, we outline our proposals for improving the transparency of executive pay, the connection between pay and performance, andthe accountability of corporate boards"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/19/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.