Media bias and reputation
By: Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse Shapiro.
Contributors: Shapiro, Jesse.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11664; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11664.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Mass media -- Objectivity.; Corporate image.; Corporations -- Public relations.
Description: "A Bayesian consumer who is uncertain about the quality of an information source will infer that the source is of higher quality when its reports conform to the consumer's prior expectations.  We use this fact to build a model of media bias in which firms slant their reports toward the prior beliefs of their customers in order to build a reputation for quality.  Bias emerges in our model even though it can make all market participants worse off.  The model predicts that bias will be less severe when consumers receive independent evidence on the true state of the world, and that competition between independently owned news outlets can reduce bias.  We present a variety of empirical evidence consistent with these predictions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/14/2005.
Also available in print.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.