on efficiency of the English auction
By: [by] Oleksii Birulin [and] Sergei Izmalkov
Contributors: Izmalkov, Sergei; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 03-38; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 03-38.
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Published: 2003
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 26
Description: We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders. This paper extends both Maskin's result and the single-crossing condition to the case of N bidders. We introduce the generalized single crossing - a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise singlecrossing - and show that it is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in the N-bidder English auction. Keywords: English auction, efficient auction, ex post equilibrium, single-crossing, interdependent values. JEL Classifications: D44, C72, C73.
Notes: "November 2, 2003."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 26).

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