Lobbying, corruption and political influence
By: by Nauro F. Campos, Francesco Giovannoni
Contributors: Giovannoni, Francesco
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 2313; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 2313
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Subjects: Lobbying; Case studies; Political corruption
Description: "Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/25/2006.

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