Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring
By: by Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti.
Contributors: Pearce, David.; Stacchetti, Ennio.
Series: Economics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University; Technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University -- no. 487; Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 487.; Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)
Publisher: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University
Published: 1986
Place of publication: Stanford, Calif
Language: eng
Number of pages: 35
Subjects: Game theory.
Notes: Bibliography: p. 34-35.

Binghamton University Libraries' copy bound with: Stable standards of behavior, a unifying approach to solution concepts / Joseph Greenberg.