Governance and intermediation problems in capital markets
Subtitle: evidence from the fall of Enron
By: Paul M. Healy, Krishna G. Palepu
Contributors: Harvard Business School. Division of Research; Palepu, Krishna G., 1954-
Series: Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School -- 03-027; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 03-027
Publisher: Division of Research, Harvard Business School
Published: 2002
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 51
Subjects: Corporate governance; Capital market; Enron Corp
Description: The financial reporting and disclosure problems at Enron, as well as the high market valuations for its stock raise troubling questions about the functioning of capital market intermediaries, regulators and governance experts who are supposed to ensure the effective functioning of the stock market. This paper examines the functions of key capital market intermediaries and analyzes how their own governance and incentive problems may have contributed to Enron's rise and fall. We conclude by proposing system modifications to resolve the observed problems.
Notes: "This paper is an early draft of a manuscript commissioned by the Journal of Economic Perspectives for a special issue on the Enron collapse."

"August 15, 2002."

Includes bibliographical references.