Corruption, public finances, and the unofficial economy
By: Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón.
Contributors: Kaufmann, Daniel, 1951-; Zoido-Lobatón, Pablo.; World Bank Institute. Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 2169; Policy research working papers ;; 2169.
Publisher: World Bank, World Bank Institute, Governance, Regulation, and Finance
Published: 1999
Place of publication: Washington, DC
Language: eng
Number of pages: 50
Subjects: Political corruption.; Bribery.; Finance, Public.; Tax administration and procedure.; Taxation -- Law and legislation.; Informal sector (Economics)
Description: In this sample of 49 Latin America, OECD, and transition economies, it is the ineffective and discretionary administration of tax and regulatory regimes--not higher tax rates alone--as well as corruption, that increases the size of the unofficial economy.  And countries with a large unofficial economy tend to grow more slowly.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-31).
"August 1999"--Cover.
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