The Origins of Elected Strongmen
Subtitle: How Personalist Parties Destroy Democracy from Within
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2024
Place of publication: New York City, USA
Language: eng
Format: Hardback
Number of pages: 224
ISBN-13: 9780198888079
Table of contents: title: List of Illustrations; title: List of Tables; label: 1
title: Introduction; label: 1.1
title: Introduction; label: 1.2
title: The Rise of Personalist Politics; label: 1.3
title: Previewing the Argument; label: 1.4
title: What Do We Mean by Democracy?; label: 1.5
title: Contemporary Patterns of Democratic Collapse; label: 1.6
title: Existing Explanations of Democratic Backsliding; label: 1.7
title: Contributions of the Book; label: 1.8 P
title: lan of the Book; label: 2
title: What Are Personalist Parties?; label: 2.1
title: Conceptualizing Personalist Political Parties; label: 2.2
title: Measuring Personalism in Ruling Political Parties; label: 2.2.1
title: Addressing Endogeneity; label: 2.2.2
title: Underlying Indicators; label: 2.2.3 What Our Measure Can and Cannot Capture; label: 2.3
title: Related Concepts and Measures; label: 2.3.1
title: Party Personalism and Populism; label: 2.3.2
title: Other Related Concepts and Measures; label: 2.4
title: Basic Facts and Features of Ruling Personalist Parties; label: 2.4.1
title: Trends in Ruling Party Personalism over Time; label: 2.4.2
title: Geographical Distribution of Personalist Parties; label: 2.4.3
title: Personalist Parties and Ideology; label: 2.4.4
title: Personalist Parties and Populism; label: 2.4.5
title: Institutional Arrangements and Personalist Parties; label: 2.5
title: Why Do Personalist Parties Win Elections?; label: 2.6
title: Conclusion; label: 2.7
title: Appendix A: Measurement Model of Ruling Party Personalism; label: 2.7.1
title: Internal Consistency and Reliability; label: 2.7.2
title: Face Validity; label: 2.7.3
title: External Validity; label: 2.8
title: Appendix B: Regression Results; label: 2.9
title: Appendix C: Selection into Ruling Party Personalism; label: 3
title: The Argument; label: 3.1
title: The Argument; label: 3.1.1
title: Underlying Assumptions; label: 3.2
title: Executive Restraint in Incumbent Support Parties; label: 3.2.1
title: Incentive; label: 3.2.2
title: Capacity; label: 3.3
title: Empirical Patterns; label: 3.3.1
title: The Political Experience of Elites; label: 3.3.2
title: Party Nominations; label: 3.3.3
title: Local Party Strength and Party Funding; label: 3.3.4
title: The Duration of Cabinet Appointee Tenures; label: 3.4
title: Conclusion; label: 3.5
title: Appendix A: Regression Results; label: 4
title: The Evidence; label: 4.1
title: Case Studies; label: 4.1.1
title: El Salvador under Nayib Bukele; label: 4.1.2
title: Hungary under Viktor Orban; label: 4.2
title: Ruling Party Personalism and Democratic Backsliding; label: 4.2.1
title: Repression of Political Civil Liberties; label: 4.2.2
title: Democratic Backsliding Broadly; label: 4.2.3
title: How Do Democracies Collapse?; label: 4.2.4
title: Personalism Matters Most When Ruling Parties Dominate; label: 4.3
title: Conclusion; label: 4.4
title: Appendix A: Regression Results; label: 5
title: Institutional Pathways; label: 5.1
title: Executive Constraints in Democracies; label: 5.1.1
title: Legislatures; label: 5.1.2
title: Judiciaries and Bureaucracies; label: 5.1.3
title: How Do We Know When Institutional Actors Constrain?; label: 5.2
title: Empirical Tests; label: 5.2.1
title: Legislative Constraints on the Executive; label: 5.2.2
title: Judicial Constraints on the Executive; label: 5.2.3
title: Bureaucratic Constraints on the Executive; label: 5.2.4
title: Term Limit Extension Attempts; label: 5.3
title: Conclusion; label: 5.4
title: Appendix A: Regression Results; label: 6
title: Societal Pathways; label: 6.1
title: Are Citizens to Blame for Decreasing Vertical Constraints?; label: 6.2
title: Polarization; label: 6.3
title: Shifting Democratic Norms; label: 6.4
title: Case Studies