Lebanese security and the Hezbollah
Subtitle: Anthony H. Cordesman
Contributors: Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.)
Published: 1996
Language: eng
Subjects: Arab-Israeli conflict; Politics and government; Foreign relations; Hizballah (Lebanon)
Description: Hezbollah has opened a dangerous second front in the Israeli-Palestinian war of attrition that began in September 2000. The attached analysis not only describes the nature of Hezbollah and its military capabilities, but the severe limits to the Lebanese Army and other divisions and problems within Lebanon. It is important to note that the dangers involved do not simply extend to Hezbollah actions. Hezbollah probably saw this as an opportunity to try to demonstrate that it still is a key fighter in the Arab cause. It had l worked out agreements with Lebanon's Christians who recognized that it was the one militia that could keep its arms, and that the Lebanese Army would remain largely passive in south Lebanon. Ideology, politics, opportunism, and anger may all have been factors, although with the fact that Israel had made massive prisoner releases the last time Hezbollah took hostages and once again had appeared to be "defeated." Syria and Iran, however, may have had their own agenda. Provoking Israel creates a natural division between the US, as Israel's ally, and Europe. It distracts from Syria's crimes in Lebanon and Iran's nuclear programs. Every Israeli action against Arabs feeds Arab anger against the US, and undermines its influence in the Gulf and in gaining Arab support to force a full UN investigation into Syria. Pushing or encouraging Hezbollah action offers advantages with few risks. Lebanon's losses are a victory for Iran and Syria, another form of asymmetric war. Added Hezbollah dependence makes it a better potential proxy. Finding a new way to feed Palestinian radicalism makes Hamas and the PIJ more dependent, and young Palestinians more open to outside influence. Regardless of any ceasefires or short-term outcomes, Hezbollah, Iran, Syrian, Islamist extremists like Al Qaida, and Iraqi hard-liners like Sadr can play a spoiler role at any time, and broaden the conflict at minimal risk, attacking both the US and Israel indirectly with considerable safety.
Notes: Viewed on (July 18, 2006).

"Working Draft, Revised: July 14, 2006."

Working draft will be revised regularly.