Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition
Subtitle: theory and evidence
By: Allan Drazen, Marcela Eslava.
Contributors: Eslava, Marcela, 1975-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11085; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11085.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Elections -- Economic aspects -- United States -- Econometric models.; Government spending policy -- United States -- Econometric models.
Description: "We present a model of the Political Budget Cycle in which voters and politicians have preferences for different types of government spending.  Incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues.  Rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it can also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor.  Classifying expenditures into those which are targeted to voters and those that are not, we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all Colombian municipalities.  Our findings indicate both a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure, and a voter response to targeting"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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