Rational cooperation in the finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma
By: by David M. Kreps ... [et al.].
Contributors: Kreps, David M.; Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences; Stanford University. Center for Research on Organizational Efficiency
Series: Technical report / Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences -- no. 375; Economics series / Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences; Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 375.; Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)
Publisher: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University
Published: 1982
Place of publication: Stanford, Calif
Language: eng
Number of pages: 13
Subjects: Games of strategy (Mathematics); Cooperation -- Mathematical models.; Rational choice theory.
Notes: "A report of the Center for Research on Organizational Efficiency, Stanford University."

"Contract ONR-N00014-79-C-0685, United States Office of Naval Research, NSF grants SES 80-06407 and SES 81-08226 to Standford University, and NSF grants SOC 70-07542 and SES 80-0L932 to Northwestern University."

"March 1982."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 13).

Photocopy. [Alexandria, Va.] : DTIC, 1982. 28 cm.