Pay, reference points, and police performance
By: Alexandre Mas
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 12202; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 12202.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance.  Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one.  In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline and crime reports rise relative to when they win.  These declines are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union's demand.  The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/24/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

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