The Case for managed judges
Subtitle: learning from japan after the political upheaval of 1993
By: J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen.
Contributors: Rasmusen, Eric B.; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 538; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 538.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Although the executive branch appoints Japanese Supreme Court justices as it does in the United States, a personnel office under the control of the Supreme Court rotates lower court Japanese judges through a variety of posts.  This creates the possibility that politicians might indirectly use the postings to reward or punish judges.  For forty years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) controlled the legislature and appointed the Supreme Court justices who in turn controlled the careers of these lower-court judges.  In 1993, it temporarily lost control.  We use regression analysis to examine whether the end of the LDP's electoral lock changed the court's promotion system, and find surprisingly little change.  Whether before or after 1993, the Supreme Court used the personnel office to &quot;manage&quot; the careers of lower court judges.  The result: uniform and predictable judgments that economize on litigation costs by facilitating out-of-court settlements"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/19/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.